U.S grounds ALL 737 Max

[CONSO]

per announcement from White House

link may follow

NYT partly screwed up

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/business/canada-737-max.htmlTrump Announces Ban of Boeing 737 Max Flights

VideoCanada Bans Boeing 737 Max (https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/canada/100000006408475/canada-bans-737-max.html?action=click&gtype=vhs&version=vhs-heading&module=vhs&region=title-area)

By Cctv, Via Associated Press







0:59Canada Bans Boeing 737 Max






By Ian Austen (https://www.nytimes.com/by/ian-austen) and Selam Gebrekidan (https://www.nytimes.com/by/selam-gebrekidan)





March 13, 2019















President Trump announced that the United States was grounding Boeing’s 737 Max aircraft, reversing an earlier decision by American regulators to keep the jets flying in the wake of a second deadly crash involving one of the jets in Ethiopia.The Federal Aviation Administration had for days resisted calls to ground the plane even as safety regulators in some 42 countries hadbanned flights by the jets. As recently as Tuesday, the agency said it had seen “no systemic performance issues” that would prompt it to halt flights of the jet.The order came hours after Canada’s transport minister said that newly available satellite-tracking data suggested similarities between the crash in Ethiopia and another accident last October.

[canyonblue737]

Trump says FAA & Boeing in agreement.

[kghjfg]

What’s that Boeing marketing slogan again?

they were interviewing passengers at an airport the other day, and they were actually using it.

”If it says Boeing, I ain’t going”

[mickjoebill]

Is it unusual for such announcements to originate from the White House?

mjb

[Gilmorrie]

The issue, in my mind, is the silence of Boeing and the FAA, in the face of serious public concerns. I'm not a huge Trump supporter, but something needed to be said and done.

[SirLoosli]

That's good to hear, glad to see erring on the side of caution

[Dee Vee]

per announcement from White HouseTrump Announces Ban of Boeing 737 Max Flights


Still a few in the air ATM over US/Canada mostly...
BOE123
WJA8978
ACA7056
ACA7054


https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1026x584/8ccei0p_b86035c7874d021d7965ae09d732d540c22601ab.jpg

[kenish]

All crew-only recovery flights. BOE= Boeing test/undelivered flights. 8900-series flights are maintenance/special flights per ICAO. ACA used 7xxx numbers as ferry flights to maintenance bases. At KPSP, the ACA aircraft arrived as normal from CYVR; the turnaround was a ferry to CYYC instead of CYVR and departed only a few minutes later than the originally scheduled revenue flight.

[Seat4A]

Still a few in the air ATM over US/Canada mostly...
.......
ACA7056
ACA7054

........

.....ACA used previously scheduled flight numbers but flew to maintenance bases.


These ACA flights and others that were in the air with 4 digits such as above, were all ferry flights. Seen here. These are not regular flight numbers.

https://twitter.com/TomPodolec/status/1105952692822831104

[futurama]

Is it unusual for such announcements to originate from the White House?

mjb
Very unusual. From press reports:

Until Tuesday night, the FAA did not want to ground the 737 Max
On Wednesday morning, new ADS-B data from Aireon was received. This contradicts earlier reports saying that the FAA received Aireon data on Monday or Tuesday.
Reportedly there were also additional, undisclosed clues from recovered wreckage pointing to "similarities" with the Lion Air accident
The FAA still elected not to ground the Max fleet
1pm Wednesday, FAA's acting chief briefed Trump and Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao on latest information
Trump made the decision to ground the Max fleet
Trump calls Boeing CEO, who concurs with the decision
Trump announces the decision, pre-empting the FAA
FAA scrambles as Trump's announcement came "as a shock" to FAA managers
FAA acting chief suggested in a post-conference that there are still doubts within FAA about the grounding

[ProPax]

Why would FAA (which btw is led by a former military pilot, is it not?) resisted the groundings? In the past they were always on the side of caution. Two planes down in 5 months, the public is very concerned, yet they don't act. I don't want to speculate about the obvious suspicion of corruption but what could any other reasons be?

[Preemo]

Very good article on Leehams about this and what Boeing needs to do.

https://leehamnews.com/2019/03/13/commentary-boeings-tylenol-moment-and-the-need-for-radical-transparency/

[safetypee]

Preemo , #11 :ok:
A very telling article from Lehman.
The non-standard presidential intervention also adds to the FAA’s problems, reputation, trust, worldly image.
Additionally, some un substantiated reports state that the grounding lasts until Boeing has a modification, i.e not just a temporary grounding for safety until more information is available.
If so this implies that irrespective of the outcome of the Ethiopian accident, there is now sufficient concern about Lion to warrant grounding.
Trump has built his wall - around Boeing and FAA, and it is very much higher than normal.

P.S. Also https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/the-world-pulls-the-andon-cord-on-the-737-max/

[krismiler]

Any FAA official who grounded the B737 Max would have no chance of retiring from government service and joining Boeing. In the US, it's not unusual to have people moving from senior positions in the public sector into the private sector and vice versa within the same industry.

[Rated De]

Any FAA official who grounded the B737 Max would have no chance of retiring from government service and joining Boeing. In the US, it's not unusual to have people moving from senior positions in the public sector into the private sector and vice versa within the same industry.

His name was Ali Bahrani, FAA Safety director (787 program) then after signing off on the battery fix (which didn't fix anything) went onto to lobby for more self regulation on behalf of the industry.

Now back with the revolving door at the FAA.
Regulatory capture is very real and soft corruption pays big dividend.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UqIzcuNpXP0

[Good memories]

Hello, retired many years ago .Flew 737 200/300/400 and really liked the plane. This MCAS system looks similar to the ALSAS on the MD 11. Can anybody explain me why the stick pusher uses the stabiliser iso the elevator ?

[fdr]

Hello, retired many years ago .Flew 737 200/300/400 and really liked the plane. This MCAS system looks similar to the ALSAS on the MD 11. Can anybody explain me why the stick pusher uses the stabiliser iso the elevator ?

LSAS is a stab augmentation system that made up for a relaxed stability arising from a reduced relative tail volume.MegaDeath2 pitch stability is enhanced in both directions.... The Max system is specifically related to a particular part of the envelope, where static stability reduces, where a pitch up tendency is developing. Both are related to static stability, but are for different causation, and act in different manners.

[Loose rivets]

Recent posts on the main thread, that happen to be from Seattle, give a very clear understanding of the design logic. But first read the Jakarta thread in full before starting again with last Sunday's crash thread. Put aside several hours for the task.

[keesje]

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/927x885/lionair_fdr_6e08bd26e45e7b0362c16d7cb8262b2ab17de8f8.png

Trim / Auto Trim read outs : chilling.

[safetypee]

keesje, is there any FDR printout indicating slat position during that flight.
The interest is that slat triggering also depends on AoA and is in the same computational box as MCAS.
Furthermore, the mechanism of slat signalling was specifically changed in the Max (electronic?)

[keesje]

Safetypee, no doubt I don't have it. Graphical quality is low.

Online for hours on a.net now, don't know where it comes from, how long it will remain online.

https://i.imgur.com/nlisopA.jpg

https://i.imgur.com/HrNWlSQ.jpg

https://i.imgur.com/PrN5CPO.jpg

[DaveReidUK]

There are some decent, high-resolution copies of those FDR readouts in the Lion Air thread.

[gums]

Salute Safety !
Can't find the complete data traces from the Indonesian safety folks that released a few of the data plots, including the preveious flight.
Remember that the MCAS alternates AoA data probes with each cycle, so the alt/leading edge flap and other things may bot have been using the AoA probe that was 20 degrees higher than the other one.
However, that plot show classic MCAS operation with a bogus high AoA. It also shows the stick shaker going off briefly when the initil MCAS nose down trim kicks in and the plane loses a few hundred feet in a few seconds, back stick forces high and flaps put down again - bet they had enough of a reduced AoA /andor the flap position was a factor for the shaker then, but soon the shaker came back and remained until the end.
This should have the data plots and in pdf so you can zoom in.
KNKT Beberkan Data FDR Lion Air PK-LQP di DPR (https://news.detik.com/berita/4312425/knkt-beberkan-data-fdr-lion-air-pk-lqp-di-dpr)

Gums sends...

[keesje]

Stuff is coming out.

In an appearance on CNBC in December, Muilenburg was asked whether the company was doing enough to ensure pilots were properly trained after the October crash.

Muilenburg said that the company's bulletin on the software helped in "directing pilots and airlines to these existing procedures" and that Boeing was "taking a look at that to make sure all the appropriate training is in place and that the communications with our customers are there."

"It's very, very important to us, but I will say bottom line here, very important, is that the Max 737 is safe," he said.
Muilenburg's comments came about a week after the meetings in Texas and Reno, when pilots said they heard similar promises.

Sitting around pullout tables in leather-backed chairs, Tajer said, some of the company's top engineers were apologetic.
"We said 'shame on you.' They said, 'I know.' "


https://www.nola.com/business/2019/03/at-tense-meeting-with-boeing-pilots-angry-about-company-not-disclosing-737s-software.html

[WindSheer]

So 24 hours after the US grounding, why are there still AA max's still flying around? There are 4 at the moment.
I don't get it.

[DaveReidUK]

So 24 hours after the US grounding, why are there still AA max's still flying around? There are 4 at the moment.
I don't get it.

Read the terms of the restriction, posted earlier.

[Plane Watcher]

If they've been grounded why are they still flying? These can't all be ferry flights can they?

[BehindBlueEyes]

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/540x1600/9e0a7d2a_49f1_4981_bb8a_20b9bf860357_654ae97a3d968e1926ca5e6 45b1056bd2bbcd0f2.jpeg
This has been doing the rounds too.

[kenish]

If they've been grounded why are they still flying? These can't all be ferry flights can they?

They are all ferry flights. The orders from FAA and Transport Canada allowed revenue flights to continue to their destination. This left planes stranded at outstations across the continental US, Canada, Hawaii, and the Caribbean. The order allows ferry flights back to maintenance base(s). In Europe and Asia, the pattern was more haphazard as some countries completely closed their airspace, others allowed continuation to destination, and this was rolled out over a few days semi-randomly. Some flights completed or diverted (requiring a recovery ferry flight) while others returned to their departure airport.

[DaveReidUK]

They are all ferry flights.

Indeed so.

The mods have, quite understandably, started deleting the posts that have been appearing today querying 737 Max aircraft spotted on the flight trackers.

Does anyone seriously believe that airlines would defy the restrictions and carry on flying passengers ? Time to nail this one on the head.

[CONSO]

FOUND JACKSCREW . . . :uhoh:

FROM SEATTLE TIMES
Investigators find new clue in wreckage of Ethiopian Airlines flight as Boeing continues production of its 737 MAX and works on software patch to get planes back in the air.ByDominic Gates (https://www.seattletimes.com/author/dominic-gates/)
,Mike Baker (https://www.seattletimes.com/author/mike-baker/)
,Paul Roberts (https://www.seattletimes.com/author/cap-paul-roberts/)
andMike Rosenberg (https://www.seattletimes.com/author/cap-mike-rosenberg/)

Investigators on the ground near the crash site of the Ethiopian Airlines 737 MAX found the plane’s jackscrew, a part that moves the horizontal tail of the aircraft, and it indicates that the tail was in an unusual position, according to an aviation safety consultant briefed on the findings.The consultant, John Cox, chief executive of Safety Operating Systems and formerly the top safety official for the Air Line Pilots Association, said that Boeing’s new flight control system on the MAX — implicated in the preliminary investigation into the earlier crash of a Lion Air jet in Indonesia — is one of several possible systems that could explain the unusual deflection in the horizontal tail, a control surface that swivels to pitch the plane’s nose up or down. . . .


Goes on but under paywall so posting link may not work

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/investigators-find-new-clues-to-potential-cause-of-737-max-crashes-as-faa-details-boeings-fix/

but here is print of plots released

[Eric Janson]

Here's the problem at Boeing in their own words! (2 videos)

Boeing: Diversity and Inclusion at Boeing (http://www.boeing.com/principles/diversity.page#/video/what-our-leaders-are-doing-to-make-boeing-more-inclusive-for-all)

Instead of hiring the best people for the job they're going for "Diversity" and 'Equality" (of outcome).

First thing they should do is put a stop to this PC nonsense - then fire those responsible for these Policies imho.

[CONSO]

Here's the problem at Boeing in their own words! (2 videos)

Boeing: Diversity and Inclusion at Boeing (http://www.boeing.com/principles/diversity.page#/video/what-our-leaders-are-doing-to-make-boeing-more-inclusive-for-all)

Instead of hiring the best people for the job they're going for "Diversity" and 'Equality" (of outcome).

First thing they should do is put a stop to this PC nonsense - then fire those responsible for these Policies imho.

but but the elite schools also push diversity over meritocracy at a cost . ....:ooh:

[fdr]

JT610 DFDR

Wow.

Expected to see activity, but the poor driver is getting RSI on the trim system there. The last minute is just desperately sad to see, however it sure looks like the pilot was cognitively saturated in the event, he was constantly on the trim fighting against the stab augment system, MCAS, but didn't get to the point of isolating the system with the stab cutout on the throttle quadrant.

1. Hidden (not so much...) in the chart there is AND motion automatically occurring with the flaps extended, from 23:22:59 through to 23:24:44, with the AP off the whole time. WTF

2. The AOA probe values show a constant DC offset between L & R, that is not consistent with a AOA failure. The chart may have the indices for the Left and right offset for clarity, but they don't indicate a signal error between the two, there is more or less a constant DC difference between the two values. There is no other way as far as I can recall from my own B735 AMM, that you can get a constant variation between the output, from an faulty vane, it will be jammed, or otherwise inoperative but it doesn't have a constant offset between the two systems. If there is no offset of the indices, then the zero is wrong on one of the vanes. If they are offset, then the issue is not from the AOA vane.

What work was done on the aircraft prior to despatch on the AOA system?

For current NG Max drivers, is STS still a mode in manual flight on these aircraft? I am current on classics, not the later variants.

[CONSO]

2. The AOA probe values show a constant DC offset between L & R, that is not consistent with a AOA failure, that looks horribly like an installation error. There is no other way as far as I can recall from my own B735 AMM, that you can get a constant variation between the output, from an faulty vane, it will be jammed, or otherwise inoperative but it doesn't have a constant offset between the two systems.

What work was done on the aircraft prior to despatch on the AOA system?


very early in the lionair thread in pprune , the issue of installation error was discussed- thrashed and a few diagrams of hole arrangements a to avoid improper install were dug up/published here . supposedly arranged to avoid such a problem of ' clocking'- since the same unit is used left and right.

[fdr]

It appears that the Max8 still has the STS system incorporated, which is the short period automatic trim at the latter stage of flap retraction. The report states the previous flight was undertaken immediately after a change of the AOA sensor. The indices of the charting do appear to be the same for L and R AOA, so there was an offset at all times when the vane was responding to flow. That looks like an installation issue, the zero is wrong on the L AOA, otherwise the function appears normal.

The prior flight responded correctly to the use of the cutout switches, and the crew at least did use the trim wheel for the rest of the flight, even if there was a continuous stall warning going on in the background. Not a good way to fly.

The MCAS is still a questionable system architecture but the human factor in the handling of this event looks unfortunate. The DFDR for ET302 will be interesting to look at ASAP, as the Max8 may be only part of the problem.

[Busbert]

The bottom line is that Boeing were allowed to certificate an aircraft with unacceptable longitudinal stability with a band-aid to get around loss of pitch authority to counteract the crazy positioning of the engines. No-one but an accountant would design an aircraft that looks like a 737max. The stubby landing gear and low cargo door sills on 737 would not be possible if the engines were positioned such that they didn’t contribute to divergent stall behavior.

[dhavillandpilot]

They say those that don't learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

we should all re visit the Dhavilland Comet saga. The parallels are truly there between the DH106 and Boeing 737 Max

[El Bunto]

They say those that don't learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

we should all re visit the Dhavilland Comet saga. The parallels are truly there between the DH106 and Boeing 737 Max

Oh I disagree totally. The Comet was a trailblazer which pushed the envelope and revealed issues that changed how aircraft were designed. It later matured into a safe, popular airliner.

The Max is completely the opposite, it has traded 50 years of 737 maturity and reliability** for a slapdash money-making opportunity. Nothing that the Max investigations have uncovered is unknown or novel for aerodynamic or structural design; it's purely the result of hackish design due to beancounting. It's the McDonnell Philosophy in action; get something out the door to beat the rival.

The episode I think it resembles more closely is the DC-10, rushed under pressure to get into the air before the more rationally-designed TriStar. And look what that did to Douglas' reputation.

** Classic rudder actuator issues noted

[DaveReidUK]

And finally, don't believe Flight Radar, they are not infallible, they get 737-800NG and 737-8Max mixed up, as do a lot of spotters.

And, to be fair, the FAA:

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/616x296/max_grounding_advisory_bd772e96da75281355dabcc6e0b5d4a5c18c8 ba3_03ef5d82ee073159b5fcbc94352ea5a3df76ac43.jpg

(later corrected)

[CW247]

On ch-aviation (paid for article), suggesting the FAA warns that the grounding may last most of 2019!!!! :sad:

[El Bunto]

And finally, don't believe Flight Radar, they are not infallible, they get 737-800NG and 737-8Max mixed up, as do a lot of spotters.)

Erm, FR24 and other trackers don't squint up at the overflying aircraft and try to guess the variant; they look the ADS-B or Mode-S emitted ICAOhex up against a database of aircraft. It's not possible to mix a 737-8 and a 737-800 up unless the FAA, CAA etc has already done so in their national registry.

As for spotters, well it's easy to tell a Max from the others; it has crinkly nacelles. Even a 12yo by the fence at Gatters will tell you that.

[DaveReidUK]

Erm, FR24 and other trackers don't squint up at the overflying aircraft and try to guess the variant; they look the ADS-B or Mode-S emitted ICAOhex up against a database of aircraft. It's not possible to mix a 737-8 and a 737-800 up unless the FAA, CAA etc has already done so in their national registry.

I haven't noticed any such instances on FR24, but other flight trackers (RadarBox24, for example) have certainly been known to get confused between a Max and an NG.

[CaptainMongo]

Some on this thread point to a Boeing conspiracy to willfully put into operation an unsafe aircraft

I find it hard to believe every individual involved in the Max program, from designer to operator, would engage in a conspiracy of silence allowing and condoning Boeing to put out an unsafe aircraft.

Every Boeing design engineer, programmer, supervisor, and test pilot coupled with every FAA official conspired to purposefully put to market an unsafe aircraft? Every major airline which accepted the aircraft purposefully and ignorantly accepted the aircraft and training plan as designed by Boeing?

I am not referring to airlines which don’t have the financial wherewithal and deep historical training expertise in operating the 737, I am referring to the SWA, AA, UAL’s (apology’s to international operators which have commensurate expertise) which accepted on blind faith Boeing’s plan.

And then let’s not leave out the pilots unions. ALPA, the most powerful pilots union in the history of commercial aviation (of which I am a proud member) APA, SWAPA all have robust safety and training committees. Did they fail due diligence, were they also complicit in the Max coming to operation purposefully overlooking obvious aircraft and training flaws? Did the Standards Captains, the Line Check Airmen, and pilot instructors at those airlines also engage in a willful conspiracy of ignorance and silence?

I am not by any stretch excusing or absolving Boeing, the FAA, the airlines, the unions or the supervisory pilots (who should know better) I am merely stating to believe a few executives at Boeing could alone get away with producing and deploying an unsafe aircraft requires a willing belief in a improbable widespread conspiracy - from producer to regulator to airline to hands on (pilot) operator.

[CONSO]

Some on this thread point to a Boeing conspiracy to willfully put into operation an unsafe aircraft


Never ascribe a conspiracy to insipid acts of bureaucrats at the top of the food chain. Simply ask why/how Both BA and FAA did not realize the problem- but instead played word games

[CurtainTwitcher]

Some on this thread point to a Boeing conspiracy to willfully put into operation an unsafe aircraft

I find it hard to believe every individual involved in the Max program, from designer to operator, would engage in a conspiracy of silence allowing and condoning Boeing to put out an unsafe aircraft.

Every Boeing design engineer, programmer, supervisor, and test pilot coupled with every FAA official conspired to purposefully put to market an unsafe aircraft? Every major airline which accepted the aircraft purposefully and ignorantly accepted the aircraft and training plan as designed by Boeing?

I am not referring to airlines which don’t have the financial wherewithal and deep historical training expertise in operating the 737, I am referring to the SWA, AA, UAL’s (apology’s to international operators which have commensurate expertise) which accepted on blind faith Boeing’s plan.

And then let’s not leave out the pilots unions. ALPA, the most powerful pilots union in the history of commercial aviation (of which I am a proud member) APA, SWAPA all have robust safety and training committees. Did they fail due diligence, were they also complicit in the Max coming to operation purposefully overlooking obvious aircraft and training flaws? Did the Standards Captains, the Line Check Airmen, and pilot instructors at those airlines also engage in a willful conspiracy of ignorance and silence?

I am not by any stretch excusing or absolving Boeing, the FAA, the airlines, the unions or the supervisory pilots (who should know better) I am merely stating to believe a few executives at Boeing could alone get away with producing and deploying an unsafe aircraft requires a willing belief in a improbable widespread conspiracy - from producer to regulator to airline to hands on (pilot) operator.

Mongo, that's the entire point. The argument against large conspiracies is that a large number can't keep their mouth shut and it will become known. How about if a the MCAS was known to a very small number? I find it hard to believe that any engineer would not see the potential failure mode with any single channel input system driving a flight control surface potentially to the full limit of travel. This raises questions of the internal processes at Boeing to get the MCAS implemented and reviewed. That is the truely astounding bit of the story, just how did this piece of software end up installed without almost anybody apparently knowing about it, and how it worked.

As far as we can tell, no pilots were aware that the MCAS existed. No airlines, trainers, nobody. The only public reference to the MCAS prior to Lion Air was the Brazilian CAA, see this article: Flight control feature of Boeing 737 MAX under scrutiny after Lion Air accident (https://news.aviation-safety.net/2018/11/13/flight-control-feature-of-boeing-737-max-under-scrutiny-after-lion-air-accident/). There is a comparison between the response from Canada and Brazil to the MCAS implementation.

It give the appearance that the FAA accepted Boeings word for it, this FAA certification was then accepted without question by every airworthiness authority except Brazil. No conspiracy necessary, more likely a global failure of due diligence. It is similar to the global issue of flammable cladding on high rise buildings. A single regulatory sign-off then gives carte blanche to accept a product without further investigation or due diligence locally. Regulators have simply given up.

[ProPax]

I find it hard to believe every individual involved in the Max program, from designer to operator, would engage in a conspiracy of silence allowing and condoning Boeing to put out an unsafe aircraft.
Every Boeing design engineer, programmer, supervisor, and test pilot coupled with every FAA official conspired to purposefully put to market an unsafe aircraft? Every major airline which accepted the aircraft purposefully and ignorantly accepted the aircraft and training plan as designed by Boeing?If anything, I find it hard to believe anything otherwise. Replace "MAX MCAS" with "DC-10 cargo door" or "MD-11 landing characteristics". Has it never surprised you how the news started referring to the Boeing Company from Seattle as "the Chicago-based plane maker"? Boeing moved into the headquarters of that same company. It is now run by the same people and governed by the same principles.

[Speedywheels]

I don’t know how true this is but I heard Boeing are compensating the operators to the tune of $50k per aircraft per day. If true, that’s a cool $18 million for every day. I also heard Boeing expect the aircraft to be grounded until the end of May at the earliest. That’s knocking on the door of $1.5 billion :eek:

[Bonzo777]

I don’t know how true this is but I heard Boeing are compensating the operators to the tune of $50k per aircraft per day. If true, that’s a cool $18 million for every day. I also heard Boeing expect the aircraft to be grounded until the end of May at the earliest. That’s knocking on the door of $1.5 billion :eek:
Didn't Boeing say 10 days and fix is ready to install? Should that be the case hardly pax will fly the 737 max in the coming years.

[DaveReidUK]

How about if a the MCAS was known to a very small number?

I don't believe that in this day and age you can run a commercial aircraft programme while simultaneously incorporating "secret stuff" than only a handful of people in the company know about. Many, many people inside (and outside) Boeing will have been involved in the design, implementation and flight testing of MCAS.

It may well be true, however, that only a few knew (even before Lion Air, if the rumours of internal Boeing memos turn out to be true) that MCAS could, under certain circumstances, come back and bite you. If there's a smoking gun to be found, that's where it is.

[groundbum]

It may well be true, however, that only a few knew (even before Lion Air, if the rumours of internal Boeing memos turn out to be true) that MCAS could, under certain circumstances, come back and bite you. If there's a smoking gun to be found, that's where it is.

I can guarantee in Boeing and their contractors there are engineers, IT and otherwise, that at the time felt very SQUASHED by management to just get the thing (MCAS) in and stuff all the questions and analysis said engineers wanted to get done. Just as in Erin Brocovich. What would be disappointing is if the subsequent inquiries in Congress or anywhere else do not hear from the coal face engineers on this project, and how it got into production despite being unsafe on so many counts. That's the real failure of leadership and safety first imho. I definitely understand the commercial pressure to see off the A321neo and to keep the 737 commonality cash cow to keep on producing.But hundreds dead is not an acceptable price to pay for this terrible engineering shortcut. What happened to integrity? Personally I would hope to see Boeing exec's in Jail, but suspect the system will keep Trump's favourite exporters away from any meaningful scrutiny, which will be another regulatory failure, this time of corporate governance and product safety.

G

[esscee]

Let me put this question to all readers. Would you or your family be happy to fly in a B737 MAX as soon as Boeing say that they have given the MAX a software upgrade and all is well?

[b1lanc]

Boeing may be saying 10 days for an update to be ready to install but the installation is likely to stretch the timeframe out. Note also that the FAA has stated that " The grounding will remain in effect pending further investigation, including examination of information from the aircraft’s flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders." This from the FAA website and referencing ET302 boxes. Given the position this puts the FAA and French led discovery process in, a sofware update and installation may not be sufficient for certification authorities to rescind the grounding order. This presents an interesting dynamic since those boxes are now in BEA's hands which leads me to wonder,
1) At what point will BEA be comfortable with its findings since the FAA is stating the grounding will remain in effect pending 'further investigation' to which there is no current timeframe or specified endpoint from the FAA's wording;
2) Is any 'fix' sufficient to allay airline concern about the fundamental airworthiness of the Max? If airlines can't fill the seats on the type because of the enormous press coverage of two horrific accidents, what then? The press coverage and viral responses are not comparable to any other sequence of accidents for any other type;
3) Is any fix to MCAS sufficient for crews that fly the aircraft to be comfortable in the safety of the type or will there still be some crew who have a little voice in the back of their heads saying 'oh s**t, a Max on this leg (and I do not refer to capability of crew, but workload of maybe a tired crew on their last leg of the day with just another pay attention to jolt)?

[lomapaseo]

Let me put this question to all readers. Would you or your family be happy to fly in a B737 MAX as soon as Boeing say that they have given the MAX a software upgrade and all is well?


Yes!

I put my trust in the pilot who knows a lot more than I do and is prepared to act on it

the day I refuse to fly is when the pilot community refuses to fly

[CONSO]

I can guarantee in Boeing and their contractors there are engineers, IT and otherwise, that at the time felt very SQUASHED by management to just get the thing (MCAS) in and stuff all the questions and analysis said engineers wanted to get done. Just as in Erin Brocovich. What would be disappointing is if the subsequent inquiries in Congress or anywhere else do not hear from the coal face engineers on this project, and how it got into production despite being unsafe on so many counts. That's the real failure of leadership and safety first imho. I definitely understand the commercial pressure to see off the A321neo and to keep the 737 commonality cash cow to keep on producing.But hundreds dead is not an acceptable price to pay for this terrible engineering shortcut. What happened to integrity? Personally I would hope to see Boeing exec's in Jail, but suspect the system will keep Trump's favourite exporters away from any meaningful scrutiny, which will be another regulatory failure, this time of corporate governance and product safety.

G

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/


may be behind paywall but

starts
Federal Aviation Administration managers pushed its engineers to delegate wide responsibility for assessing the safety of the 737 MAX to Boeing itself. But safety engineers familiar with the documents shared details that show the analysis included crucial flaws.https://static.seattletimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/DominicGates_web-100x100.jpg (https://www.seattletimes.com/author/dominic-gates)ByDominic Gates (https://www.seattletimes.com/author/dominic-gates/)Seattle Times aerospace reporter

As Boeing hustled in 2015 to catch up to Airbus and certify its new 737 MAX, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) managers pushed the agency’s safety engineers to delegate safety assessments to Boeing itself, and to speedily approve the resulting analysis.But the original safety analysis that Boeing delivered to the FAA for a new flight control system on the MAX — a report used to certify the plane as safe to fly — had several crucial flaws.


The people who spoke to The Seattle Times and shared details of the safety analysis all spoke on condition of anonymity to protect their jobs at the FAA and other aviation organizations.Both Boeing and the FAA were informed of the specifics of this story and were asked for responses 11 days ago, before the second crash of a 737 MAX last Sunday (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/a-sense-of-urgency-as-investigation-into-second-recent-crash-of-a-boeing-737-max-begins/).
Late Friday, the FAA said it followed its standard certification process on the MAX. Citing a busy week, a spokesman said the agency was “unable to delve into any detailed inquiries.”

[Big Pistons Forever]

I find conspiracy theories about the MAX pretty hard to believe. What is easy to believe is a Boeing management engineering culture that prioritized the absolute minimum changes to the 737 so that Boeing could advertise upgrading to the Max would not incur any training cost to airlines. This combined with the fact that the inevitably individual engineers work on one small part of the aircraft perhaps without a full realization of how "their" system could effect others results in the fact that the AOA sensor has now become a single point of failure which can result in so much uncommanded down trim being applied aircraft control is lost.

The big picture question is IMO what and how should regulatory oversight work in a world where aircraft feature increasingly sophisticated materials and complex integrated electronic architectures. Is this accident the canary in the coal mine for all regulators ?

[CONSO]

However, pilots and aviation experts say that what happened on the Lion Air flight doesn’t look like a standard stabilizer runaway (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-evaluates-a-potential-design-flaw-on-boeings-737-max-after-lion-air-crash/), because that is defined as continuous uncommanded movement of the tail.On the accident flight, the tail movement wasn’t continuous; the pilots were able to counter the nose-down movement multiple times.In addition, the MCAS altered the control column response to the stabilizer movement. Pulling back on the column normally interrupts any stabilizer nose-down movement, but with MCAS operating that control column function was disabled. These differences certainly could have confused the Lion Air pilots as to what was going on.Since MCAS was supposed to activate only in extreme circumstances far outside the normal flight envelope, Boeing decided that 737 pilots needed no extra training on the system — and indeed that they didn’t even need to know about it. It was not mentioned in their flight manuals.

from the SEATTLE TIMES ARTICLE

responsible miss- managemet should be fired- passports removed and/or given a window seat in a blank room and not allowed to touch anything related- or talk to anyone involved

[pilotmike]

I don't believe that in this day and age you can run a commercial aircraft programme while simultaneously incorporating "secret stuff" than only a handful of people in the company know about. ....

If there's a smoking gun to be found, that's where it is.
I DO believe that in this day and age you can run a car programme while simultaneously incorporating "secret stuff" that only a handful of people in the company allegedly know about....

If there's a smoking gun exhaust to be found, Wolfsburg (VW) is where it is.

[atpcliff]

Why would FAA (which btw is led by a former military pilot, is it not?) resisted the groundings? In the past they were always on the side of caution. Two planes down in 5 months, the public is very concerned, yet they don't act. I don't want to speculate about the obvious suspicion of corruption but what could any other reasons be?

The same reason that the FAA did NOT follow the NTSB's recommendation to put wingtip cameras on all wide body aircraft to help prevent ground collisions.

The same reason that the FAA did NOT require all US aircraft to auto-report to satellites after the AF447 crash.

The same reason that the FAA did not do LOTS of safety related changes.

The shareholders didn't want their profits reduced.

[calypso]

Let me put this question to all readers. Would you or your family be happy to fly in a B737 MAX as soon as Boeing say that they have given the MAX a software upgrade and all is well?

Absolutely. Even with the current safety record, before any mods, a 737 MAX is 100 times safer than the taxi that takes you to the airport which in turn is way safer than cycling or walking which in turn are way way safer than motorcycles. What I would not do is fly Lion Air.

[cappt]

I see a second AoA sensor and AoA disagree WAS an option for the 737 MAX, the two accident aircraft did not have that option.
My solution
> Install second AoA/Mis-compare option.
>MCAS dis-connect on control wheel.
> SIM training for all pilots before return to service.
Here's a good synopisis of whats going on.
https://twitter.com/trevorsumner/status/1106934362531155974

[SMT Member]

I don't believe that in this day and age you can run a commercial aircraft programme while simultaneously incorporating "secret stuff" than only a handful of people in the company know about. Many, many people inside (and outside) Boeing will have been involved in the design, implementation and flight testing of MCAS.

The pollution cheat device scandals would seem to suggest otherwise. Auto industry is also highly regulated, and employs a far larger number of people than aircraft manufacturing. Yet they got away with it for a very long time, and the eventual discovery came from outside the companys involved.

Boeing have seen more than their fair share of production, design and supplier scandals - most of which have successfully been kept out of the mainstream media. The same can be said for a large number of other companies in a wide range of industries.

On balance, I'll hazard the proposition that, in general, large corporations are pretty apt at keeping their dirty laundry away from public view.

[lomapaseo]

Summarizing from the latest surviving posts today

my comments are;
Lack of faith in the industry will ultimately doom it.

What is needed is understanding followed by trust that flows to all users.

I can assure you from the safety aspects and lessons learned that we search out every new lesson world wide and act on it. There is no industry hidden rooms of secrets when it comes to safety. The engineers that rub elbows on crash sites will not allow it. They will act together as one voice when needed regardless of who pays their salary.. As an example I can assure you that Airbus is just as concerned as the posters here.

[airman1900]

> SIM training for all pilots before return to service.

According to the New York Times, article titled, After 2 Crashes of New Boeing Jet, Pilot Training Now a Focus, March 16, 2019, there is currently ONE 737 Max simulator in the United States and apparently American and United Airlines pilots currently do not have access to it.

From the article:

When United was set to take delivery of the 737 Max in 2017, a group of pilots put together training materials without ever flying the aircraft or a full simulator. James LaRosa, a 737 captain and union official who helped lead the training group, said he flew to a Boeing training center in Seattle to learn about the new plane on a mock cockpit that didn’t move like typical simulators.

In addition to a two-hour iPad training course from Boeing, he and colleagues used their experience in the cockpit to create a 13-page handbook on the differences between the Max and its predecessor, including changes to displays and the engines. The training materials did not mention the new software that later became a focus of the Lion Air crash investigation.
...

But Boeing isn’t planning to overhaul its training procedures. And neither the F.A.A., nor the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (https://www.easa.europa.eu/), are proposing additional simulator training for pilots, according to a person familiar with the deliberations. Instead, the regulators and Boeing agree that the best way to inform pilots about the new software is through additional computer-based training, which can be done on their personal computers.

...

And airlines are getting flight simulators, even if they aren’t required by regulators. One flight simulator maker has received 40 orders.

It will be months before pilots in the United States can use them.

Hours after the Ethiopian Airlines crash, Mr. Tajer, the American Airlines union spokesman, spoke with the carrier and asked for an update on the simulator request. The reply: One had been ordered, and pilots would be able to train on it by the end of this year.

United Airlines, the world’s third-largest carrier, was told that it has to wait until 2020 for one. Today, there is only one simulator specifically designed for the Max in the United States.


https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/16/business/boeing-max-flight-simulator-ethiopia-lion-air.html?emc=edit_nn_20190317&nl=morning-briefing&nlid=4764506920190317&te=1 (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/16/business/boeing-max-flight-simulator-ethiopia-lion-air.html?emc=edit_nn_20190317&nl=morning-briefing&nlid=4764506920190317&te=1)

A version of this article appears in print on March 17, 2019, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Left Little Time for Pilot Training.

[MartinAOA]

Agreed! Didn't Airbus do the same thing with the Phugoid damping? Even Sully didn't know about it.

I don't believe that in this day and age you can run a commercial aircraft programme while simultaneously incorporating "secret stuff" than only a handful of people in the company know about. Many, many people inside (and outside) Boeing will have been involved in the design, implementation and flight testing of MCAS.

It may well be true, however, that only a few knew (even before Lion Air, if the rumours of internal Boeing memos turn out to be true) that MCAS could, under certain circumstances, come back and bite you. If there's a smoking gun to be found, that's where it is.

[Ranger One]

Someone check my sanity here. From the Seattle Times article:

According to a detailed FAA briefing to legislators, Boeing will change the MCAS software to give the system input from both angle-of-attack sensors.

Good, good.

It will also limit how much MCAS can move the horizontal tail in response to an erroneous signal. And when activated, the system will kick in only for one cycle, rather than multiple times.​​​​​​​

First, that sentence doesn't make sense; if a signal is known to be "erroneous", surely MCAS shouldn't act at all?! More significantly, my understanding is that MCAS was given the greater control authority because, when the system with the original intended control authority was tested, it was found to be inadequate and still produced handling characteristics that were not certifiable; Boeing had to significantly increase MCAS authority (without properly informing the FAA of the design change!) in order to get the high AoA handling certifiable. So how can they now reduce MCAS authority and retain certification?

I'm starting to wonder if Boeing are going to have to change the airframe, not the software, to produce an acceptable solution.

[SteinarN]

Someone check my sanity here. From the Seattle Times article:



Good, good.



First, that sentence doesn't make sense; if a signal is known to be "erroneous", surely MCAS shouldn't act at all?! More significantly, my understanding is that MCAS was given the greater control authority because, when the system with the original intended control authority was tested, it was found to be inadequate and still produced handling characteristics that were not certifiable; Boeing had to significantly increase MCAS authority (without properly informing the FAA of the design change!) in order to get the high AoA handling certifiable. So how can they now reduce MCAS authority and retain certification?

I'm starting to wonder if Boeing are going to have to change the airframe, not the software, to produce an acceptable solution.

Might this mean that the airframe is too unsafe in high AoA situations without MCAS, so MCAS cant be allowed to disable itself if input goes unreliable? If the interpretetion is correct that MCAS only decrease its authority and not disable itself in case of erroneous AoA signals?

[DaveReidUK]

First, that sentence doesn't make sense; if a signal is known to be "erroneous", surely MCAS shouldn't act at all?!

The thinking behind that is presumably that it is safer to assume that the higher of two differing AoA signals is the correct one and initiate a single-shot application of MCAS if the criteria are satisfied.

More significantly, my understanding is that MCAS was given the greater control authority because, when the system with the original intended control authority was tested, it was found to be inadequate and still produced handling characteristics that were not certifiable; Boeing had to significantly increase MCAS authority (without properly informing the FAA of the design change!) in order to get the high AoA handling certifiable. So how can they now reduce MCAS authority and retain certification?

It was the initial 0.6° nose-down trim application that wasn't certifiable. There's no indication in the Seattle Times article that Boeing are planning to revert to that.

[FCeng84]

The thinking behind that is presumably that it is safer to assume that the higher of two differing AoA signals is the correct one and initiate a single-shot application of MCAS if the criteria are satisfied.


It was the initial 0.6° nose-down trim application that wasn't certifiable. There's no indication in the Seattle Times article that Boeing are planning to revert to that.

On the first point about AOA signal selection, picking the higher of two would get you into the same situation that was seen with Lion Air. A comparison monitor that disables MCAS would be much more robust and seems to be what rumors are suggesting. It may be that Boeing is also considering how the system would response to two sensors that track, but are both erroneously high. That may be where the suggestion of limiting the response to a single MCAS increment comes in.

On the second point, MCAS was originally thought to be needed only at high Mach number where 0.6 degrees is sufficient. The need for MCAS at lower Mach numbers was discovered later. The 2.5 degree MCAS authority is only at low Mach numbers with a schedule that ramps MCAS authority down to about the original design value of 0.6 degrees at high Mach numbers. From what we have heard I about the need for MCAS I doubt it will be sufficient to limit it to 0.6 degrees at all Mach numbers.

[DaveReidUK]

On the first point about AOA signal selection, picking the higher of two would get you into the same situation that was seen with Lion Air.

Not if, as implied in the article, MCAS deployment is limited to a single application.

"According to a detailed FAA briefing to legislators, Boeing will change the MCAS software to give the system input from both angle-of-attack sensors.

It will also limit how much MCAS can move the horizontal tail in response to an erroneous signal. And when activated, the system will kick in only for one cycle, rather than multiple times."

[derjodel]

Absolutely. Even with the current safety record, before any mods, a 737 MAX is 100 times safer than the taxi that takes you to the airport which in turn is way safer than cycling or walking which in turn are way way safer than motorcycles. What I would not do is fly Lion Air.

Do you have any stats to back this up?

Uber has 5.5 million rides per day. How many are deadly?

Flying is not all that safe when you compare it in # of journeys taken.

[infrequentflyer789]

The thinking behind that is presumably that it is safer to assume that the higher of two differing AoA signals is the correct one

Not entirely sure they aren't doing that already - on a quick check back through the published info I can't find anything that says it only uses one side AOA, only that one bad AOA can trigger it.

Reason I was checking - I compared the MMELs. On NG you can MEL "1 aoa sensor", on MAX you cannot, and no mention of MCAS either.

Availability requirement for MCAS seems to be higher than STS (which can be MELed), and possibly higher than a single AOA would give?

It was the initial 0.6° nose-down trim application that wasn't certifiable. There's no indication in the Seattle Times article that Boeing are planning to revert to that.

It's been stated that FAA thought 0.6 was the total authority - maybe as well as that being increased to 2.5 the reset/repeat was added at that point too, possibly because it couldn't pass one of the cert tests without it. Or maybe the reset wasn't documented to, or understood by, the FAA.

[Mark in CA]

Interesting tweets from a pilot. Also interesting, as he claims Boeing does offer dual AoA sensors as an option on the MAX, but neither of these crashed planes had it.

https://twitter.com/trevorsumner/status/1106934369158078470

Boeing sells an option package that includes an extra AoA vane, and an AoA disagree light, which lets pilots know that this problem was happening. Both 737MAXes that crashed were delivered without this option. No 737MAX with this option has ever crashed.

[DaveReidUK]

Not entirely sure they aren't doing that already - on a quick check back through the published info I can't find anything that says it only uses one side AOA, only that one bad AOA can trigger it.

My understanding is that MCAS uses Captain's and F/O's AoA sources on alternate flights.

[FCeng84]

https://twitter.com/trevorsumner/status/1106934369158078470

All current Boeing commercial models have 2 AOA vanes. None are offered with 3.

[Gove N.T.]

One reads/hears the mantra “Safety is our no. 1 concern”. from airlines and aircraft manufacturers so it is with some head scratching as to why why the AoA disagree light is just an option.
I treat this mantra with a touch of disbelief.

[FCeng84]

One reads/hears the mantra “Safety is our no. 1 concern”. from airlines and aircraft manufacturers so it is with some head scratching as to why why the AoA disagree light is just an option.
I treat this mantra with a touch of disbelief.

This gets into the whole topic of presenting the crew with data they need to do their job but no more that might be distracting. I’m in the camp that AOA is a key to flight and should be displayed. There are other opinions.

[.Scott]

I don’t know how true this is but I heard Boeing are compensating the operators to the tune of $50k per aircraft per day. If true, that’s a cool $18 million for every day. I also heard Boeing expect the aircraft to be grounded until the end of May at the earliest. That’s knocking on the door of $1.5 billion :eek:
I don't know where you heard that - but the "at the earliest" part sounds very reasonable. That still a very aggressive time frame.

[.Scott]

More significantly, my understanding is that MCAS was given the greater control authority because, when the system with the original intended control authority was tested, it was found to be inadequate and still produced handling characteristics that were not certifiable; Boeing had to significantly increase MCAS authority (without properly informing the FAA of the design change!) in order to get the high AoA handling certifiable. So how can they now reduce MCAS authority and retain certification?

I'm starting to wonder if Boeing are going to have to change the airframe, not the software, to produce an acceptable solution.
From what I have read, the amount of control authority was determined by what it would take to make the MAX operate as previous models did - to reduce cross-over pilot training (boy, did that not ever fail).

[infrequentflyer789]

My understanding is that MCAS uses Captain's and F/O's AoA sources on alternate flights.

That is my understanding too, I am just starting to think that I have reached that understanding by just assuming MCAS works the way the rest of the 737 FCC stuff does and not from actual released information.

MCAS clearly used same AOA source on consecutive LionAir flights, the reason for that has not yet been confirmed.

[SteinarN]

That is my understanding too, I am just starting to think that I have reached that understanding by just assuming MCAS works the way the rest of the 737 FCC stuff does and not from actual released information.

MCAS clearly used same AOA source on consecutive LionAir flights, the reason for that has not yet been confirmed.

If one segment used AoA1/FCC1, the arcraft landed, power to the FCC was cycled, then upon power up the AoA1/FCC1 would be active, as this FCC is always the active one after a power cycling regarding computing MCAS.
So one sees that there is a 50 percent chance that two consecutive flights will use the same FCC/AoA if the power to the FCC was cycled when on the ground.

[FCeng84]

If one segment used AoA1/FCC1, the arcraft landed, power to the FCC was cycled, then upon power up the AoA1/FCC1 would be active, as this FCC is always the active one after a power cycling regarding computing MCAS.
So one sees that there is a 50 percent chance that two consecutive flights will use the same FCC/AoA if the power to the FCC was cycled when on the ground.

I fully concur. A further observation is that if power is cycled after every flight, then AoA1/FCC1 would be selected for MCAS and STS every flight.

[w1pf]

If one segment used AoA1/FCC1, the arcraft landed, power to the FCC was cycled, then upon power up the AoA1/FCC1 would be active, as this FCC is always the active one after a power cycling regarding computing MCAS.
So one sees that there is a 50 percent chance that two consecutive flights will use the same FCC/AoA if the power to the FCC was cycled when on the ground.

SLF.
Two questions:
1: How often is FCC power cycled?
2: If it is important to alternate AoA/FCC, why is this alternation interrupted by power cycling?

It seems to me, if power cycling can interrupt the alternation of sources/computers, then the alternation is not important at all.

[cooperplace]

would a certain European plane maker be lobbying for the 737 Max to be re-certified in Europe?

[Lake1952]

Does the convening of a grand jury in D.C. and the broad supoena issued by a federal criminal prosecutor to obtain Boeing corporate communications potentially slow down the safety process of finding out what happened and the best way to fix the issues? It cannot be helpful, IMO.

While Boeing and the FAA may eventually be found to have been negligent, the threat of criminal negligence cannot be helpful in the accident investigation process.

[Euclideanplane]

For as long as the 737 MAX are grounded, and assuming other models are not affected by the same issue, the slowing down of the safety process actually seems more helpful than not, especially if the planes would otherwise be sent up soon with another quick software hack.

[JonHutch]

would a certain European plane maker be lobbying for the 737 Max to be re-certified in Europe?With the current trade issues being perused across the globe, it could be more than Europe that requires recertification. With Huawei in the crosshairs, I would expect China to be playing a hard line on recertification

[GlobalNav]

For as long as the 737 MAX are grounded, and assuming other models are not affected by the same issue, the slowing down of the safety process actually seems more helpful than not, especially if the planes would otherwise be sent up soon with another quick software hack.

Normally, I think, the grounding reduces immediate risk, but the pressure to approve a fix and get the airplanes flying is stronger than ever. Not sure, but I feel encouraged that the third party scrutiny by DOJ and DoT investigations might make things a bit more transparent. We’ll see.

Considering how blame tends to be assigned, I wouldn’t want to be an FAA or Boeing certification engineer right now. When the delegation and oversight processes are scrutinized, management (current and retired) will skillfully deflect responsibility.

[Lake1952]

Normally, I think, the grounding reduces immediate risk, but the pressure to approve a fix and get the airplanes flying is stronger than ever. Not sure, but I feel encouraged that the third party scrutiny by DOJ and DoT investigations might make things a bit more transparent. We’ll see.

Considering how blame tends to be assigned, I wouldn’t want to be an FAA or Boeing certification engineer right now. When the delegation and oversight processes are scrutinized, management (current and retired) will skillfully deflect responsibility.
The aviation world might be better served in terms of transparency if the involved players were not under threat of criminal prosecution which will cause them to lawyer up more than they already have, allow them to clam up for fear of self-incrimination, and overall delay discovery that would enable a safer future. There may well have been profound negligence on the part of BA and the FAA, but short of a smoking gun email, I would doubt criminal intent.

Three hundred counts of manslaughter, conspiracy to commit murder, ....do we really want to go there?

[Maninthebar]

The aviation world might be better served in terms of transparency if the involved players were not under threat of criminal prosecution which will cause them to lawyer up more than they already have, allow them to clam up for fear of self-incrimination, and overall delay discovery that would enable a safer future. There may well have been profound negligence on the part of BA and the FAA, but short of a smoking gun email, I would doubt criminal intent.

Three hundred counts of manslaughter, conspiracy to commit murder, ....do we really want to go there?

I think it would be VERY strange if this option were taken away in a circumstance which, superficially at the very least, bears the traits of corporate manslaughter.

[FrequentSLF]

would a certain European plane maker be lobbying for the 737 Max to be re-certified in Europe?

https://www.forbes.com/sites/marisagarcia/2019/03/19/boeing-works-up-stream-as-regulatory-rift-threatens-delays-of-737-max-relaunch/#a6a5fcd74f4d

Interesting article about the topic

[Gove N.T.]

One reads/hears the mantra “Safety is our no. 1 concern”. from airlines and aircraft manufacturers so it is with some head scratching as to why why the AoA disagree light is just an option.
I treat this mantra with a touch of disbelief.





This gets into the whole topic of presenting the crew with data they need to do their job but no more that might be distracting. I’m in the camp that AOA is a key to flight and should be displayed. There are other opinions.

I read that Boeing say they will now provide these items free of charge. Shameful they weren’t included as a basic safety feature Boeing say is their number 1 concern. I think my cynicism on that mantra used by anyone is justified.

[FCeng84]

One reads/hears the mantra “Safety is our no. 1 concern”. from airlines and aircraft manufacturers so it is with some head scratching as to why why the AoA disagree light is just an option.
I treat this mantra with a touch of disbelief.





I read that Boeing say they will now provide these items free of charge. Shameful they weren’t included as a basic safety feature Boeing say is their number 1 concern. I think my cynicism on that mantra used by anyone is justified.

It would be interesting to know the history of these options. I would imagine that this story looks something like one of the two following flavors;

1. Did Boeing originally offered these options with some customers choosing them and others declining?

2. Or did Boeing design the 737MAX flight deck without them only to have some customers request them to which Boeing agreed provided those to customers who were willing to pay enough to cover the development costs?

In all the talk about airlines having to pay extra for these AOA displays and AOA disagree message I have not heard how much they cost. Without understanding the full history (which I don't) it seems unfair after seeing these displays only on some 737MAXs to jump to the conclusion that Boeing was using them as a way to get more out of customers willing to pay for them.

[SteinarN]

It would be interesting to know the history of these options. I would imagine that this story looks something like one of the two following flavors;

1. Did Boeing originally offered these options with some customers choosing them and others declining?

2. Or did Boeing design the 737MAX flight deck without them only to have some customers request them to which Boeing agreed provided those to customers who were willing to pay enough to cover the development costs?

In all the talk about airlines having to pay extra for these AOA displays and AOA disagree message I have not heard how much they cost. Without understanding the full history (which I don't) it seems unfair after seeing these displays only on some 737MAXs to jump to the conclusion that Boeing was using them as a way to get more out of customers willing to pay for them.

I did read somewhere, dont remeber where, that the price asked by Boeing was 60,000 US$ for the AoA indicator/display. I dont know if that could be correct, if it is, then it is not cheap at all.

[FCeng84]

I did read somewhere, dont remeber where, that the price asked by Boeing was 60,000 US$ for the AoA indicator/display. I dont know if that could be correct, if it is, then it is not cheap at all.

How many orders do you have to spread the development costs across? $60K doesn’t seem that high if the non-recurring costa are spread over 30 to 50 planes

[SteinarN]

How many orders do you have to spread the development costs across? $60K doesn’t seem that high if the non-recurring costa are spread over 30 to 50 planes


That is true.
But first you have to decide how many aircraft you can sell with this option. Say you think you only can sell one aircraft. Then you must charge say 1 million for that option. Ofc you wont get any sales at that asking price.
Let say you think you can sell 50 airplanes, than the 1 million non-recurring is down to $20K per aircraft. How many will you now sell, might be hard to tell, you think you will get some sales.
What if you think you can sell 6,000 aircraft with that option? Then the non-recurring cost would be only $166 for each aircraft. I think everyone would take that option for such a low cost and you would sell it on the full production run of the aircraft family. You could just as well make it standard.
I suppose the actual recurring cost for this option would be close to zero, isnt that correct?

[porch monkey]

While the cost you use and the logic you use may be correct, (or not), I would hazard a guess and say you aren't an airline beancounter............ "Cost of everything, value of nothing", as the saying goes.

[PEI_3721]

FCeng #95
Reading between the lines and industry articles, the demand appears to originate from misguided ‘solutions’ for LoC recovery (little consideration of how the situation should have been avoided in the first instance).
Also, perhaps more influential, proposals from eminent safety gurus, Unions, and individual Airlines.
Unfortunately this appears to be the current state of industry knowledge, or the perception of aspects which might previously be taken as known; less so today.

https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/618252-boeing-737-max-software-fixes-due-lion-air-crash-delayed-15.html#post10424987
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/southwest-airlines-is-adding-new-angle-of-attack-indicators-to-its-737-max-fleet/
https://thepointsguy.com/news/southwest-changes-boeing-737-max-sensor-that-played-role-in-lion-air-crash/

Related, and relevant:-
A US author, for US audience, about US education; however, if the aspects of IT / web and their effect on thinking - social change, then the world-wide aviation industry might face a greater threat than one errant system design.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-02-13/how-america-lost-faith-expertise

[ProPax]

I find conspiracy theories about the MAX pretty hard to believe. What is easy to believe is a Boeing management engineering culture that prioritized the absolute minimum changes to the 737 so that Boeing could advertise upgrading to the Max would not incur any training cost to airlines.

That's a crowbar separation. If you mean that Boeing did NOT have a meeting on a basement floor where Muilenberg said, "Let's put passengers in grieve danger to line our pockets with gold", no, that probably never happened... I hope. So the differential you pose is strictly linguistic. It wasn't a "conspiracy" but I seriously doubt nobody questioned the new system and its implementation. One of the whistleblowers is suing Boeing and Boeing's defence of "he was a bad enginner because he expenced alcoholic beverages on business dinners" is not indicative of a strong "discussion culture" in the company.