Flight Director distraction during recovery from an unusual attitude

[Judd]

In a 737 simulator recently. The exercise being recovery in IMC from unusual attitudes. The exercise started from level flight, flight directors on and autothrottles engaged. During the initial identification of the UA, the flight director indications were invalid with needles all over the PFD. This is to be expected. But what should you do about it? You could leave the FD's on while trying to ignore the invalid indications as a momentary distraction. Or you could switch off the FD's and remove the distraction.

The interesting part in this case, was the PF instinctively attempted to chase FD "commands" to force the aircraft right side up (for want of a better description). The PF later said the FD indications were so compelling he found himself trying to satisfy their commands instead of "looking behind" at the ADI 'little aeroplane' to gauge the correct attitude. He put this down to company SOP that FD's must be switched on for all phases of flight and commands followed.

Some operators require the FD's to be switched off during a TCAS RA to avoid distraction from unwanted commands. Perhaps the same principle should apply as the first action in identification of an unusual attitude identification. After all, it takes only a second or two to switch them off leaving a "clean screen" to focus on the ADI symbol? Comments invited.

[Vessbot]

I'm on the fence about this issue. It came up on this forum fairly recently, too, and I didn't make a comment even though I usually have very strong opinions about unusual attitudes. The reason to get rid of the FD is strong and obvious. But on the other hand, every second in a UA counts, especially a nose-low and/or inverted one. You can ask the other guy to get rid of it for you, but having the mental bandwidth to make that request verbally, or for him to understand and fulfill it, also may not be there.

And "just fly through it" is naive, for the very reason you posted.

Policies requiring the FD to be always switched on are idiotic, and can only be sensible under the premise that any remaining manned aircraft control is only a temporary stopgap until complete automation arrives and the yoke/stick is replaced by a mouse.

[stilton]

If the FD is not providing useful information just turn it off


Otherwise it’s just a distraction

[Check Airman]

If the FD is not providing useful information just turn it off


Otherwise it’s just a distraction
Agreed 100%.

[compressor stall]

Some operators require the FD's to be switched off during a TCAS RA to avoid distraction from unwanted commands.

Not so much for distraction - in the Airbus the FDs must be turned off in a TCAS RA to avoid the reaching high speed protection activation quicker if you get a TCAS descent in OP CLB.

[Escape Path]

Not so much for distraction - in the Airbus the FDs must be turned off in a TCAS RA to avoid the reaching high speed protection activation quicker if you get a TCAS descent in OP CLB.

Or reaching the low speed protection with THR IDLE/OP DES modes active. In short wording, you turn off the FDs in the FBW Airbus to get the autothrust in speed mode, whether coming from THR CLB/OP CLB or THR IDLE/OP DES modes.

I have my concerns too, regarding mental bandwidth for ordering/understanding FDs off command. However, one could try to diagnose the situation, start corrective actions and then ordering FDs off during the manoeuvre? That way you’re not wasting time to correct flight path and then taking off the nuisance of the FDs. But it is a handful...

[Uplinker]

I remember asking during the groundschool for my second commercial aircraft type: “excuse me, what is a flight director?”. I had spent a year flying my first commercial aircraft type which had no flight director, so we thought they were talking about the person who sat in Flight Ops !!

I suppose that if you have flown commercially without a F/D, it is second nature to ignore it when necessary and concentrate on the pitch and roll. However, if you have only ever had a F/D on all the time, it must be difficult to ignore it.

Maybe we now have ‘children of the flight director’? (and I don’t mean that in an unkind way.)

PS, it is not hard to ask PM for “flight directors off” in an Airbus as you are disconnecting the autopilot, ready for a TCAS RA. As well as removing incorrect directions, this also forces the A/THR to SPEED, as has been noted, which protects your flight path.

[212man]

in the Airbus the FDs must be turned off in a TCAS RA to avoid the reaching high speed protection activation quicker if you get a TCAS descent in OP CLB
Presumably not in those types that have automated RA following!

[safetypee]

Re #3, #4, might be obvious, but not so by the pilot flying in the situation (good in theory, but not in practice); particularly if the FD is used for 99.99% of operations. The rarity or surprise of the event could reduce the ability to think about the situation or turn the FD off. More so because of the routine of using the FD is a ‘comfort blanket’, its hard to discard.

Extreme situations should be covered by aircraft certification; instruments must not display hazardous or misleading information, e.g. stick shake / push will (should) remove the display - according to aircraft type, …
The in-between area; upset as defined vs ADI de-clutter might have been judged as safe because the information is not misleading - it shows the required flight path, but of course this might not show the approved means of recovery.

There may not be a simple answer, particularly if current industry views on training / operation conflict with previous (outdated) certification assumptions.
But don’t expect pilots to act rationally in surprising situations, nor to plug gaps in certification / operation.

“Most capacities needed to cope with the unexpected are eroded in the continuous attempt to prepare for the expected.
Decreasing staff autonomy (higher compliance to predefined responses) increases the odds that a normal situation stays normal, but decreases the odds for recovery in case of unexpected events.
Surprises are more Surprising.” Jean Paries

[Denti]

Presumably not in those types that have automated RA following!
Quite, which is all airbus FBW aircraft if one chooses to buy the option.

That said, in unusual attitudes the airbus will remove the flight directors automatically. Specifically if the pitch is greater than 25° nose up or lower than 13° nose down, or bank is greater than 45°.

[Vessbot]

I suppose that if you have flown commercially without a F/D, it is second nature to ignore it when necessary and concentrate on the pitch and roll. However, if you have only ever had a F/D on all the time, it must be difficult to ignore it.

I flew commercially without a FD for a while, and for me it's difficult to ignore it. I just feel the mental pull and it's very distracting trying to cast it aside. And if I go for a while without turning it off and I go raw data in IMC, I get this unsteady "lost" feeling for the first few minutes until I get back to a comfortable rhythm with my scan.

Maybe we now have ‘children of the flight director’? (and I don’t mean that in an unkind way.)
"Children of the magenta," I think, was always meant to include that.

[gums]

Salute!

Excuse me, but what is it about this "FD (flight director)" that is so important to the end result of an "upset" or just a basic takeoff/landing or approach?

Make so mistake, i have flown a very sophisticated lite that had the steering bars and such for ILS/TACAN approaches. The jet also had a great HUD, but that thing did not provide steering "commands", only where the glideslope and centerline was with respect to my posotion in space. Piece of cake, and my LEF video ( over on the profile link) shows the ILS presentation.

Seems to me that first thing if you wind up in an "unusual" attitude is determine up versus down and roll using basic attitude refence gauge or the flatscreen so the dark half is between your feet and the light grey or blue is at the top.. Then while doing that, move the power lever(s) depending on whether speed is increasing or decreasing. Huh?

Does the FD tell you to reduce power? I don't think so. And vice versa.

If you look at the few HUD tapes of the shuttle approaches that are on line, you can see the difference between what Hal thot was perfect and what the pilo tdid. I personally know several of those folks (and flew with one of them way back) and they have the same opinion about the "FD". Good for basic clues, but not to blindly follow.

Gums opines...

[Goldenrivett]

Hi Gums,
Excuse me, but what is it about this "FD (flight director)" that is so important to the end result of an "upset" or just a basic takeoff/landing or approach?
My first 10 years of commercial aviation was on AC types which only had the flight director turned on for ILS approaches. For the first 30 years we never had the FD on for any take offs. (minimum Alt for engagement was AA - often it was much later) In those days "pilot error" was high in the accident records.

Nowadays, the FD is on continuously from takeoff to landing. The big advantage is that each pilot knows the intention of the other by monitoring the FD modes. The big disadvantage is the erosion of basic flying skills. However we seem to need those basic flying skills far less frequently than we need good crew co-operation and monitoring of each other.

During an upset recovery, the FD can uselessly give incorrect "orders" (e.g. the climbing VS order for AF447 during the stall). Some pilots become fixated on the FD.
Good for basic clues, but not to blindly follow.
I couldn't agree more.

[gums]

Thanks, Golden

My prolly tiny problem is "what is the FD directing you to do?" Somebody has to tell the thing what it is you should be dong, right?

My SLUF had a FD for instrument approaches, basic nav and terrain following. The ADI had needles and the HUD had a little symbol ( tadpole) that you were supposed to center within the flight path marker. In those old days when the earth was still cooling, but solid state avionics were emerging from eggs, the ILS and TACAN "directions" on the ADI were not heavily dampened and you would wind up doing "s" turns that got smaller and smaller. The HUD "tadpole" was not as bad. In all modes we had the raw vertical deviation for ILS and left-right for INS NAV, TACAN and ILS. To wit, from the Manual ( FCOM for the commercial heavy pilots):
https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/383x228/fd_warning_8e159f4bf3ac39bb46c4fee7535bb3c8eefb4364.jpg


Anyways, thanks for the education from you and many others here. I was blessed to fly a variety of sophisticated systems and in between I had a few years in the Dragonfly with minimal avionics, no computers and basic "Cessna" flight controls.

Gums sends...

[PEI_3721]

Several posts relate the FD issue to ‘Children of the magenta’ … which concludes ‘Click, Click’, requiring disconnecting / switching automation off.

The assumption is that the crew will be able to identify the need for change (switch off) and have confidence in deviating from the norm; yet in the same instance they were unable to avoid or mitigate the approach to an ‘upset’ situation.

There is a similar assumption in the belief that ‘back to basics’ will provide preventative or recovery measures. Some pilots may be able to manage, but they are probably not the ones being ‘upset’.
The industry increasingly relies on automation, aircraft are built with that aim, many operations and thus training depend on it. Changing back to basics - training, has a high cost, thus few if any operators are willing to change - it’s not required by regulation.

We have to accept what already exists and work around that. Modern designs are adapted for automation - FD bars are automatically removed. The residual problem is with those aircraft types where the systems were designed in a different era, with different assumptions about pilot capability and training effectiveness. The reality is that this ‘old world’ is the minority, and those operators and aircraft types have to accommodate regulations based on modern assumptions - catch 22.
There are no simple answers; teach ‘click-click’, but don’t depend on it. Teach look-through, but pilots will be distracted.
A generalised approach might require avoidance of the situation, but how is that taught. Or require pilots to manage startle and surprise, how; easy to require, impossible to be sure of success.

Oh well, let’s just jump through the hoop; …
/ close cynical thoughts / open optimistic mode / - view the human as an asset, capable of much more than we might credit.

[gums]

Salute PEI !

You are touching upon some philosophy and $$$ for the commercial airline business.
How many $$$ are saved by one JT610 accident?
Unfortunately, after my brief experience as a basic line jock, I had three assignments in a row to the initial units of three jets. The muckety mucks decided I should be an instructor pilot, so my last 15 years was as an IP with only a few months as a pilot in a combat unit. One of those tours did not have two seat "family" models, so good ground school and good in-flight "advice" for the newbies was essential.

I do not feel that the new kids on the block cannot learn the lessons that served so many well since Orville and Wilbur. In the A-7D, circa 1970, we first saw the "systems management" aspect of our trade. Granted, my "one heart" tribe ( single seat, single engine) saw this way ahead of the commercial airline folks and our fellow military transport folks that had "crews". We had to be everything and handle all the aspects of the mission. Automation was drastically increased from the 50's and 60's legasy fighters and recce planes. But you still had to know all the systems and the overall aircraft avionics architecture. And did I mention the hydraulics, engine and electrical system stuff with no "flight engineer"?

We found that most pilots and the newbies could learn the systems and to exploit the new automation without a GIB as the F-4 folks had. The autopilot helped, but the nav systems and pilot-vehicle-interface ergonomics progress was the biggie. In the Viper, we began to see the "Atari" generation. Those youngsters had zero problems with our avionics and lack of a co-pilot or GIB. Some of the dinosaurs had to adapt, but I soloed folks older than me ( and that was really old! heh heh).

I would love to see more basics during checkouts and upgrades to new types. Get a "feel" for the plane and worry about the FMS and such after a few flights. So PEi's comment about dealing with "upsets" rings very strongly with me:

There is a similar assumption in the belief that ‘back to basics’ will provide preventative or recovery measures. Some pilots may be able to manage, but they are probably not the ones being ‘upset’.

I agree about the "natural" sticks being able to handle really harsh events, but I also feel from personal experience checking out folks that well-executed training courses can make a difference down the road when that "upset" occurs.

Gums steps off soap box...

[Alpine Flyer]

Embraers with HUD switch to a special "upset recovery" mode on the HUD outside certain pitch/roll parameters. I do think tat removes the FD as well but am not completely sure. Helpful for recovery and necessary, as the simple green horizon line would be either stuck to the top or bottom and without a color difference between "up" and "down" wouldn't give a clear indication where "up" is when banked steeply.

Pilots should be able to look "through" the FD and use brown/blue, sky pointer and the red chevrons as a cue where to roll/pitch to recover.

[Uplinker]

Presumably not in those types that have automated RA following!

Fair point. I have not flown one so equipped yet.

Problem with Children of the FD is that some are not even looking at basic pitch and roll at all* - those scales may as well be absent for all the attention they are given by some........which is presumably how upsets occur in the first place?


* I am not blaming anybody, the training needs to change.

[compressor stall]

The trouble with a procedure for an "if you get an UA, turn the FD off" procedure is that the aircraft may well be in the stall/UA and have relatively "normal" attitudes - e.g. AF447.

The FD was commanding fly up commands, and the crew faced a stall warning at similar time, with a 3° pitch (although subsequently it was mostly awry with higher pitch attitudes).

Airbuses and Embraers are smart in some areas (like dropping the FDs in extreme attitudes) but you still need to see through the FD in relatively normal attitudes at times. You may be in an upset and not have an extreme attitude.

[Centaurus]

Teach look-through, but pilots will be distracted.
How do you teach pilots how to "look through" the FD to the aircraft symbol behind? That is like poking a finger in your eye and teaching you not to blink.

[PEI_3721]

Yo gums, et al.
Beware of what is assumed. Would training every pilot for JT type of event assure success. Was JT actually a failure to recover; not directly. Similar to many high profile accidents where the initiators are in the certification process - design and regulation.
Why should operators allocate more time and money on training to add experience, reduce startle, aid awareness, and act appropriately in very rare technical system related situations. The regulators rushed to implement recovery training, which actually manages a weakness in their certification process (AF447, Westair CRJ, JT 737, Asiana 777).

The safety focus has changed; now to avoid situations, on common aspects of LoC - speed, thrust, attitude.
Simulators can be used to practice recovery, less so for avoidance - if successful, avoidance is a non event, often cited as a waste of simulator time. AF447 required reading a checklist and doing nothing, JT required a checklist, the CRJ information / software revision, Asiana information - knowledge.

So back to #1, why are simulator upset exercises being flown, … because the regulations mandate them?
How much time is spent on avoidance or mitigating the initial onset conditions?
What is the form of this training; ‘how to’, and to what effect?
Which deficient systems have been rectified, not 777, CRJ, (JT).

We train for the unknown, yet are killed by that already known - distraction and switching workload required to compensate for a system ‘feature’.

[compressor stall]

How do you teach pilots how to "look through" the FD to the aircraft symbol behind?

By having them fly for hundreds or thousands of hours without one. And unfortunately that is impractical.

People with extensive GA experience without FD's sometimes have to be reminded to follow the FD in normal ops during early training transitioning on big jet types, they are used to other cues..

[gums]

Thanks, Stall

A long time ago, with another philosophy in effect, I managed ( earned) to get my fighter assignment from the basic drill. I went to Air Defense Command as a pilot and was from the only training unit that still flew T-33 jets ( Craig AFB)

ADC had such a low opinion of the early "children of the magenta line" that they required 20 or so hours of "instrument" training in the T-33 for all the newbies from the T-38 places Reason was basic instrument flying skills and the T-38 folks had the flight director stuff for TACAN and ILS nav. They also had neat attitude indicators and such, while we had the basic J-8 thingie. So I flew two or three rides and they checked me off. I then flew "target missions" for rest of my "spare" time while going thru F-102 checkout. Loved it, and would fly a Deuce mission and then a target mission later in the day. Along the way I learned a lot about instrument approaches
using the basics that were invented by Doolittle 40 years before.

"Looking thru" to the real world background is easier for some than others, as Stall has implied. I see the biggest problem in that the FD symbology has more precedence on the displys than the actual attitude and airspeed/AoA. In the A-7D, many pilots flew the raw data due to the poor mechanization of the FD box ( loose dampening and no connect with the basic INS/Doppler nav system).

Thanks for helping me understand the concern with following the FD.

Gums sends...

[westhawk]

Interesting discussion. I'd like to add another perspective if I may.

Attitude. Not just the attitude of the airplane, but of the pilot. I started off with basic flight instruments like most pilots of my civilian general aviation background. Later when I started flying jets, we had the Collins FD109. It worked well enough most of the time, but didn't always keep up when capturing VOR radials, altitudes, ILS localizers or glideslopes. So one had to anticipate a bit and try to stay "slightly ahead" of the FD command bars. That meant scanning the raw data and "predicting" when the command bars should react. If the bars moved when they should, follow them. If not, fly "through" them.

The first line Captain I flew with regularly called it the "flight advisor". He cautioned against allowing it to act as an "electronic flight instructor". Though he was joking, there was a serious side to his characterizations. For various reasons, depending upon the flight guidance computer to provide timely and correct pitch and roll commands could sometimes lead to some pretty rough or oscillatory intercepts. The A/P didn't make very smooth intercepts either because it relied upon the same guidance. So if you wanted fly smooth and accurate course or altitude captures, you hand flew it just slightly ahead of the FD command. You could help the automation to work better by making very shallow intercepts, but this is not always practical in the approach environment.

Of course, most of the analogue electromechanical FD issues are all but gone in later generation digital avionics, but the analogue mindset will still serve a pilot well when surprises occur.

Returning to the subject of pilot attitude, I think Captain E. had it right. The flight director is best considered to be an advisor, not an instructor! And if a pilot maintains that mental "attitude" in all subsequent flying, the reaction to an uncommanded change of attitude is more likely to be automatic for that pilot. Click-Click, crosscheck, flight controls and thrust as appropriate. Get it back to where it's supposed to be, (course altitude, speed) THEN communicate, analyze, troubleshoot, checklists etc...

Someone brought up the subject of training earlier. Initial training on two of my types included both unusual attitude recovery and a couple of opportunities to put that training to work in the form of unannounced surprise upsets. Sim instructors the world over have a sadistic streak that can be put to good advantage! During a complex RNAV DP while on A/P, a distraction or two can be introduced along with an uncommanded attitude deviation. Pitch trim runaway is a favorite of course, but wake vortex and several other problems are equally demonstrative and provide a good opportunity to put briefing room theory into practice. I once saw a guy throw up his hands and scream when the airplane rolled over. (the instructor had secretly asked him to) I was supposed to take over like a good FO should. Cardiac stress test passed!

My point regarding pilot attitude is that the pilot must believe in their own ability to fly the airplane on raw attitude and performance data. This belief can only be earned by doing it. In normal line operations these days, various levels of automation will be engaged most of the time. So the basic attitude instrument skills must be revisited often, and re-enforced by realistic simulator training scenarios requiring their use.

Of course, all of the above is just my own take on what I see as a problem of some pilots attitude towards their role as a pilot. They didn't acquire this attitude problem all on their own either. Manufacturers, operators and regulatory authorities had their roles in promoting an "automation first" mindset across the industry. That's what needs to change. Automation is fantastic in so many ways. Until it isn't.

[Centaurus]

So the basic attitude instrument skills must be revisited often, and re-enforced by realistic simulator training scenarios requiring their use.
This is easily achieved by raw data circuits and landings and go-arounds in the simulator. Scan rate of the basic instrument panel increases as long as the pilot is permitted to fly raw data with autothrottles switched off.

That said, it is common to see (as the simulator instructor) children of the magenta line pilots going heads down before engine start into the PFM box dialing in the runway, and even way points around the circuit and even the destination. None of this info is needed to fly a simple circuit pattern. It is only a simulator, right? Yet we see pilots sneaking in a pitch bar on the FD to help maintain correct circuit height.

When told to switch off the pitch bar and simply fly the aeroplane, flying becomes inaccurate and plus or minus 200 feet from circuit height becomes the norm.
We see some pilots getting quite irritated with themselves with their inability to fly a circuit, and can't wait to plug in the FD and AT and hdg mode. Other types enjoy the opportunity to increase their pure flying skills and cannot wait for a friendly instructor to say "feel like a few touch and go circuits?" Horses for courses as the saying goes.

[westhawk]

Besides, it's the most fun you'll probably have all day in a sim. If someone was willing to pay me to do it, I'd be happy to do nothing but circuits and bumps! (and maybe some raw data ILSs)

[Denti]

Besides, it's the most fun you'll probably have all day in a sim. If someone was willing to pay me to do it, I'd be happy to do nothing but circuits and bumps! (and maybe some raw data ILSs)

Really? I rather do the raw data stuff on the line. Reality is always better than the simulator.

[Gauges and Dials]

Because this is a professional pilots' forum, it is sensible that the attention ought to be first on things that pilots can directly control (piloting technique) and secondly on things that pilots can influence (airline SOP). But to my eye there's a huge point that's being missed here; one that ought to get the attention of engineers and system designers:

The automation is supposed to help, i.e. by reducing pilot workload. Automation that misleads, for example by a FD giving bad advice, is not only not helpful, it is potentially fatally dangerous.

So, beyond deciding whether or not to shut off the FD during unusual attitude recovery, pilots ought to be looking at the engineers and shouting, "what the actual hell?" and demanding automation that does its job. In principle there is no technical reason why the aircraft automation cannot detect unusual attitudes and give correct FD indications, or , at a bare minimum automatically suppress the FD display when the FD display is going to be misleading.

[Goldenrivett]

pilots ought to be looking at the engineers and shouting, "what the actual hell?" and demanding automation that does its job.

That is the recommendation of the BEA. See page 188 of
https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf

"However, analysis of previous events shows that the AP and the A/THR always disconnected automatically(25). The flight directors always disappeared (at least temporarily) when the A/THR disconnected, but reappeared automatically when the operating conditions were regained, whereas the re-engagement of the AP or of the A/THR required action by the crew. This difference in behaviour between the AP and the A/THR on the one hand, and the FDs on the other, probably played a role in the accident as a result of the conjunction of several effects: ˆ The credibility of the cross bars is strengthened by their disappearance followed by their re-appearance: if they appear, it implies that the indications that they display are valid; ˆ Since they attract the crew’s attention (green colour and presentation in the centre of the PFD), the presence of the cross bars could have influenced the actions of the PF, notably in respect to his reaction to the stall warning; ˆ It is only possible to be aware of the changes in active modes (when the cross bars reappear) by reading the FMA, which is probably difficult to do in a high workload situation induced by piloting or failure management tasks. One may therefore question the suitability of the automatic reappearance of the flight directors once they have disappeared."

& Page 211. "Consequently, the BEA recommends that: € EASA require a review of the re-display and reconnection logic of the flight directors after their disappearance, in particular to review the conditions in which an action by the crew would be necessary to re-engage them; [Recommendation FRAN-2012-047]"

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

For the FAA, AC 23.131-1C para 17.4 and AC25-11b (more tangentially in a couple of places) both discuss "decluttering" displays when in unusual attitudes (I think there's another AC which parallels AC23.1311 for part 25, but I can't find it right now). Suffice it to say, for those calling upon the "engineers and designers" to address this, there's already a bunch of guidance out there which does influence current designs. Indeed, one item for debate is what needs to be decluttered and what needs to be kept; something that is distracting clutter in one case might be the vital piece that completes the mental picture for the crew in another....

[Centaurus]

In principle there is no technical reason why the aircraft automation cannot detect unusual attitudes and give correct FD indications,

The general rule for recovery on instruments from (say) a spiral dive, is first level the wings. There may be other things including simultaneously selecting idle thrust to prevent speed build up and selecting speed brakes out. Once the wings are level, then apply elevator to raise the nose. The important thing is not to pull back on the stick while the aircraft is still in a spiral. All this is ab-initio stuff.
A FD recovery (if it is invented) would not prioritize wings level first. It would presumably only display direction of turn required and direction of pitch up (aircraft in a spiral dive for example). The pilot could be sucked into simultaneously rolling and pulling top satisfy FD commands. Not a wise move.

[compressor stall]

And conversely, an extreme nose high / high roll scenario - broadly speaking - you want the opposite, nose down then roll level. Another variable in the program!

[westhawk]

Really? I rather do the raw data stuff on the line. Reality is always better than the simulator.

Me too!

I did specify that I was referring to the sim. :cool:

Besides, it's the most fun you'll probably have all day in a sim.

Of course it's more fun in a real airplane!

[Escape Path]

Someone asked how do you teach a pilot through the FDs. Well, for starters, teach them to be in command, not a proactive passenger. You simply cannot fully, 100%, blindly trust everything the machine is telling you. It makes mistakes too, it fails, no matter how modern and techy it is.

I fly an A320 for a regular job and I like to get a kick out of it by manually flying it a bit more than most pilots I’ve seen. How to look through the FD? Well, since I’m flying it, I make my scan and my inputs are based off it. Take a look at the FD, does it match my own “mental commands”? Yes? Follow them. No? Diagnose why it doesn’t (diagnose includes my own commands, I can of course be wrong and the machine right).

I liked the concept mentioned earlier: Flight Advisory. Most of the time it will be right, but then one time it may not... what will be your course of action?

[Gauges and Dials]

The general rule for recovery on instruments from (say) a spiral dive, is first level the wings. There may be other things including simultaneously selecting idle thrust to prevent speed build up and selecting speed brakes out. Once the wings are level, then apply elevator to raise the nose. The important thing is not to pull back on the stick while the aircraft is still in a spiral. All this is ab-initio stuff.

A FD recovery (if it is invented) would not prioritize wings level first.
Why not? It should, if that's the correct thing to do in that particular recovery situation

It would presumably only display direction of turn required and direction of pitch up (aircraft in a spiral dive for example). The pilot could be sucked into simultaneously rolling and pulling top satisfy FD commands. Not a wise move.
In which case the FD would be in error, which would suggest that the FD was improperly designed, engineered, or programmed.

My argument is that if you, or I, or Wolfgang Langewiesche, or your average CFI is capable of writing down in words what to do in a given recovery situation, then a FD can be programmed to recommend exactly that.

[Denti]

The general rule for recovery on instruments from (say) a spiral dive, is first level the wings. There may be other things including simultaneously selecting idle thrust to prevent speed build up and selecting speed brakes out. Once the wings are level, then apply elevator to raise the nose. The important thing is not to pull back on the stick while the aircraft is still in a spiral. All this is ab-initio stuff.
A FD recovery (if it is invented) would not prioritize wings level first. It would presumably only display direction of turn required and direction of pitch up (aircraft in a spiral dive for example). The pilot could be sucked into simultaneously rolling and pulling top satisfy FD commands. Not a wise move.

Automatic leveling functions can already do that. Those are available for a few bucks in RC planes, and considerably more expensive in GA planes, for example with the Garmin autopilot "Level" function. Programming wise that is pretty easy to implement. To get it certified is of course a different thing altogether. See a demonstration of the Garmin retrofit AP. "Level" function.

[misd-agin]

How do you ignore, ‘look through’, the FD’s? By using basic, raw data, ‘attitude then performance’ instrument flying skills.

We get paid to realize when the FD’s aren’t providing the correct information. Revert to a lower level of automation, as low as raw data (ignoring the FD), and turn the FD’s off or reestablish the FD’s to give proper guidance.

[safetypee]

misd - you appear to assume in stating ’ignore’, that the process is conscious, rational, easy, can be taught, etc. This might apply in less stressful circumstances, but with shock, surprise, we tend to ‘tunnel’, focus on one cue as a solution; using the FD right or wrong.
In this state we are unable to ‘realize’, the need to change the course of action; thus we don’t ‘see’ some instruments or consider alternative actions.

Many discussions overlook how the upset was encountered, we forget about previous knowledge and events which contribute to the current state - why we all have different views of the same situation. Many problems in upset conditions stem from not knowing how you got there; if you did, perhaps there would be a simple mental undo button.

The focus should be awareness, before and during the event; these are often bypassed in simulator training. The exercise might be announced - no surprise, or canned recovery actions briefed, whereas what is required is to understand the situation before acting.
Understanding requires thought, opposed to moving the controls, thus often considered a waste of simulator time. We need a simulator for the mind.