Flight deck access

[Snakecharma]

from Casa....

Air operators should take an operational approach to maintaining the so-called ‘two in the cockpit’ practice. This is the advice from CASA following a review of the practice and consultation with the aviation industry. The operational approach to ‘two in the cockpit’ is in line with the position taken by the European Aviation Safety Agency. The ‘two in the cockpit’ practice was adopted as a precautionary approach in aircraft with a seating capacity of more than 50 passengers following the German Wings aircraft crash in early 2015.

The review of the practice in Australia found there were unintended consequential risks, including the second person in the cockpit potentially distracting the pilot, making inadvertent contact with cockpit switches and taking cabin crew away from their safety role in the cabin. It was also found the practice complicated flight crew access to the cockpit and introduced an additional risk of flight deck incursion.

The recommendation is for air operators to evaluate their own safety requirements and make an operational decision on whether to maintain ‘two in the cockpit’ in their standard operating procedures. CASA’s aviation medicine branch will continue to monitor pilot mental health and maintain a high level of awareness among pilots of mental health priorities and sources of assistance.

Hopefully common sense will prevail and we will ditch the dopey two in the flight deck rule

[4Greens]

It should be two pilots in the cockpit at all times.

[cessnapete]

It should be two pilots in the cockpit at all times.

What about toilet visits?.
So do you issue nappies. or fit pee tubes into your two crew aircraft??

[Lapon]

I'll avoid taking a position on the merit of the 'two on the flight deck' argument, but the unintended consequences would have been obvious to anyone at the time the rule was implemented.... unless of course the rule was merely implemented as an overnight knee jerk reaction to an reasonably isolated incident.

Regardless if whether there is merit for the two on deck policy or not, it strikes me as very weak of CASA to handball the problem to individual operators rather than take a stance themselves as the regulator.

[Lookleft]

How are CASA monitoring mental health now? If they were serious they would get on and implement the FRMS rules

[Capt Fathom]

What about ops with one FA
Is that why the rule applies to aircraft above 50 passengers? 2 FA's.

[Rated De]

How are CASA monitoring mental health now? If they were serious they would get on and implement the FRMS rules

With an industry consultation period of three years that expired two years ago...It would seem rather uninterested . Your point is extremely relevant.

From the point of the airline response, two well remunerated, rested and respected pilots is the best safety device on any aircraft. Placing a flight attendant on the flight deck did little given that mental health problems can be just as well disguised under layers of make up as it could allegedly be behind an armoured door.

[ACMS]

Why so complicated, we’ve been having cabin crew come into the cockpit on toilet breaks for over 10 years now with absolutely no problems at all. “Distracting or bumping switches” what clap trap. So how would the crew get food and drink delivered then? I suppose the Pizza is slipped under the ballistic door is it.....oh and forget the cabin crew ever coming in to discuss any issues they need assistance with.......they might bump a switch or distract the poor Pilots.

rubbish.

[Snakecharma]

I am baffled that some pilots are making the case to continue with this knee jerk nonsense.

We have become an industry which is amazingly safe, and we did so with considered, well thought out rules that manage risk in an appropriate way. Just look at the number of “adverse outcomes” in medicine and compare that figure with aviation and it is very clear that we, as an industry, are exceptionally good at managing risk and safety.

This rule, however, is utter nonsense and does little to nothing to improve safety.

It probably isn’t a big issue with hitting switches etc in the bigger aeroplanes, but the 50 seat and above turboprops and smaller jets there is a real risk of people getting in the way of each other and the controls when entering and leaving the flight deck, plus add the fact that in many cases if it not possible to get one in the flight deck standing, another manoeuvring themselves out of a control seat without the flight deck door being open and it seems to me that this policy created as many risks as it supposedly mitigated.

I would love to see some studies done on the impact on the rule on the health of pilots. Rubbish I hear you say, but if we are honest, how many of us manage our fluid intakes because the ability to jump out and take a leak is significantly more difficult now than it was before? Things like kidney stones, headaches etc are all a function of dehydration and kidney stones have a direct impact on our medicals.

I agree that we need to be cognisant of the mental health of both ourselves and our colleagues, however bunging a cabin crew member in the flight deck is not the way to manage that.

[73qanda]

If they were serious they would get on and implement the FRMS rules
100% correct. Current rostering software is by far a greater risk to pilot mental health than anything else. I’d go so far as to say it’s the biggest risk factor the industry faces at the moment. FRMS by itself will not make for better rostering practices. If there are not hard legal limits that no FRMS can cross, it may well be worse.

[Mach E Avelli]

Arm all crew with guns. Teach them to shoot to kill. Paint yellow line on floor aft of cockpit. Remove dangerous lockable door.
During welcome aboard PA advise that anyone who crosses the yellow line will be shot. During induction advise crew ditto if they act irrationally....or serve cold coffee.....or do a bad landing.
Israelis may be willing to share how they stopped all this hijack crap, but I bet they don’t agonise over switches being bumped or 60kg Flight Attendants going berserk. FFS.
That armoured lockable door is the real threat, as we have seen on several suicide flights and at least one where pilots were incapacitated.

[Icarus2001]

The aviation medicine branch will continue to monitor pilot mental health and maintain a high level of awareness among pilots of mental health priorities and sources of assistance. They are kidding themselves. How are they monitoring the mental health of pilots? Once a year medical that does not even broach the subject. What about the rest of the year? That does not equal "monitoring".

High level of awareness? Again, they are in dreamland. Where is the guidance and education material?

[hoss]

Interesting discussions. Vote 1 Snakecharma for President, Mach E Avilli for Minister of Defence. ;)

Lets hope they lighten up on the jump seat as well.

[morno]

They are kidding themselves. How are they monitoring the mental health of pilots? Once a year medical that does not even broach the subject.

Don’t know what your doctor asks you Icarus, but mine reading the questions out that CASA gives them it does broach the topic.

However, how many pilots are going to really say “yeah I’m depressed and want to kill myself”? Probably not many if any.

[VH DSJ]

This is a practice that's commonly done by airlines in the USA and by FAA regulations, the remaining pilot on the flightdeack must wear their oxygen mask when above FL250. It also begs the question whether the flight attendant who enters the cockpit to accompany the remaining pilot can legally sit in the control seat of the pilot who has left on a lav break? Standing on the flightdeck is not a problem when the air is smooth but if you encounter some light or moderate chop, especially in the smaller cockpits like in the 737 or CRJ/ERJ, surely you'd want the FA to be seated?

[C441]

How are they monitoring the mental health of pilots?

Whilst not wishing to sound like a 'conspiracy theorist'…….. The current animated discussion over the 'My Health Record' system may take another turn if a future government/regulator insists that every person involved in a public safety related position must have their My Health Record available to the regulator. Personally, all of my medical events have been discussed with my DAME (who's not my family GP), but I'm sure there's some out there who may just overlook some conditions not seen as relevant to maintaining a licence.

[laterron]

Bring back the Flight Engineer

[havick]

This is a practice that's commonly done by airlines in the USA and by FAA regulations, the remaining pilot on the flightdeack must wear their oxygen mask when above FL250. It also begs the question whether the flight attendant who enters the cockpit to accompany the remaining pilot can legally sit in the control seat of the pilot who has left on a lav break? Standing on the flightdeck is not a problem when the air is smooth but if you encounter some light or moderate chop, especially in the smaller cockpits like in the 737 or CRJ/ERJ, surely you'd want the FA to be seated?

DSJ as you know the FAA tend not to over complicate things. Can you point to anything in the FAR’s that specifically precludes a flight attendant from sitting in the pilot seat while another pilot goes to use the lav?

[What The]

In Australia try CAR 226.

CAR 226 Dual controls
(1) During flight, a person may occupy a control seat of an aircraft equipped with fully or partially functioning dual controls only if:
(a) the person holds an appropriate pilot licence for the type of aircraft and the class of operations in which the aircraft is flown; or
(b) the person is a student pilot assigned for instruction in the aircraft; or
(c) the person is authorised by CASA.
(2) In authorising a person to occupy a control seat in pursuance of subregulation (1), CASA may grant the authority subject to such conditions as CASA considers necessary in the interests of safety.

Had a cabin crew member sitting in a control seat once on return from the bathroom. Politely informed them that they were breaking the law and not to do it again as the next person may not be so forgiving. Cabin crew are not authorised to occupy a control seat.

As an exercise, ask the cabin crew what they think the purpose of them being on the flight deck whilst the other pilot uses the bathroom is. You may be surprised to find a variety of answers.

[JekiJock]

How is every GA operator in the country managing to get around with pax in the front seat without everyone dying I wonder?

[Capn Bloggs]

This is a practice that's commonly done by airlines in the USA and by FAA regulations, the remaining pilot on the flightdeack must wear their oxygen mask when above FL250.
As Australia tends to not overcomplicate things, we don't have a single-pilot mask requirement until above FL450. :ok:

[witwiw]

That armoured lockable door is the real threat, as we have seen on several suicide flights and at least one where pilots were incapacitated.

Spot on, Mach, and that, amongst other reasons is why the extra person is there.

Where I once worked, if wasn't necessarily a flightie but often paxxing tech crew who came in when an operating pilot needed a loo stop. It was the practice to make sure a flightie knew the reason they were there and they were also told to sit on the jump seat and, if necessary, strap in.That overcame the concerns DSJ has raised.

As an exercise, ask the cabin crew what they think the purpose of them being on the flight deck whilst the other pilot uses the bathroom is. You may be surprised to find a variety of answers.
See previous paragraph, if the tech crew aren't doing that (making them aware) then they are remiss.

[neville_nobody]

As Australia tends to not overcomplicate things, we don't have a single-pilot mask requirement until above FL450

Only because they made the oxy mask a maintenance item whereas 30+ years ago it wasn't an issue if anyone used the mask. Which is probably how the FAA view it.

The major issue with having Cabin Crew in the cockpit with 1 pilot is that it creates more security issues than it actually solves.

[Icarus2001]

As Australia tends to not overcomplicate things,You are sounding a little hypoxic Capn.
​​​​​​​Part 61 licence as example one.

[What The]

How is every GA operator in the country managing to get around with pax in the front seat without everyone dying I wonder?Civil Aviation Order 20.16.3 - Air service operations - Carriage of persons (02/12/2004)

[73qanda]

The major issue with having Cabin Crew in the cockpit with 1 pilot is that it creates more security issues than it actually solves.
Agreed. Prior to the new rule there was approximately 290,000 people who regularly sat in a flight deck with only one other person. Each one of those people represented a tiny risk with regard to mental state or nefarious intentions.
After the new rule there are approximately 870,000 people who regularly sit in a flight deck with only one other person, each one representing a tiny risk with regard mental state or nefarious intention.
How does that solve our problem? Oh that’s right, it doesn’t , it makes it worse but the public think that the risk has been mitigated.

[Lookleft]

The public also don't like it when you shoo them away from the forward toilet because the bladder ballet has started and entrance to and from the flight deck has to be coordinated 6 times.

[ACMS]

I’ll say it again, my company introduced FA’s coming into the cockpit during toilet breaks after Ballistic doors and key pad locks were introduced 15 years ago. It made sure access was available at all times for incapacitation issues without having to wait the 30 seconds time delay......

Since then we’ve NEVER had any problems at all with security or FA’s bumping switches......it just hasn’t happened.

You might as well ban anyone coming into the cockpit during flight but you’ll need a small galley, toilet and crew rest facilities installed in the cockpit. That ain’t gunna happen is it. So until then those pesky fumbling possibly mentally unstable FA’s will have to come in many times during flight, so live with it.....

[Mach E Avelli]

As for CAR 226 (1) (c) sorry CASA. On MY flight deck if it is convenient for the F/A to sit in a control seat while the F/O, or I, go back for a leak, then I will authorise it as Captain. I will invoke (2) of the same CAR as justification. The F/A is far safer strapped into a seat should the unexpected happen during the absence of one of the pilots
Because most jumpseats on narrow body aircraft merely get in the way it is easier to drop into a control seat and strap in. Think depressurisation, turbulence etc.

A rule that can not be enforced invites contempt. That saying “rules are for the guidance of wise men and the blind obedience of fools” comes to mind.
Change the wording from ‘CASA authorises ‘ to ‘Pilot in Command authorises’ and the whole silly argument goes away

[zanthrus]

Love your work Mach!

[What The]

As for CAR 226 (1) (c) sorry CASA. On MY flight deck if it is convenient for the F/A to sit in a control seat while the F/O, or I, go back for a leak, then I will authorise it as Captain. I will invoke (2) of the same CAR as justification. The F/A is far safer strapped into a seat should the unexpected happen during the absence of one of the pilots
Because most jumpseats on narrow body aircraft merely get in the way it is easier to drop into a control seat and strap in. Think depressurisation, turbulence etc.

A rule that can not be enforced invites contempt. That saying “rules are for the guidance of wise men and the blind obedience of fools” comes to mind.
Change the wording from ‘CASA authorises ‘ to ‘Pilot in Command authorises’ and the whole silly argument goes away

I suggest you read the Criminal Code then for the meaning of Strict Liability.

[73qanda]

Yeah cabin crew shouldn’t be in control seats of narrow body jets while airborne. I’ve seen pilots muck up the entry and exit of 737 control seats and they are used to it. The flight is safer with the cabin crew in the jump seat than it is with them getting into and out of a control seat.

[Mach E Avelli]

Ah yes, the Aussie fear of strict liability is what has us all doing exactly the speed limit and not 3 kph over.
As for not strapping a F/A in to a control seat in the cruise, I would never have snared my wife but for that ploy. Better than a pub pick up any day...

[What The]

Giddy up Cowboy

[underfire]

I have seen many versions of this, especially with carriers in the US. Sometimes the lead will stand in the doorway holding the door open, and not entering. Many times you can tell they are on the flight deck, but just standing there, or sitting on the jump seat, rather than get in and out.

Dont forget the ANZ incident when they argued and locked out the other driver!

(MH370 perhaps?)

[VH DSJ]

DSJ as you know the FAA tend not to over complicate things. Can you point to anything in the FAR’s that specifically precludes a flight attendant from sitting in the pilot seat while another pilot goes to use the lav?

Yes, you are correct Havick, there's nothing in the part 121 FAR's about that. My head was still stuck in the CARs when I wrote that. To say CASA makes things over complicated is an understatement.

[JPJP]

Yes, you are correct Havick, there's nothing in the part 121 FAR's about that. My head was still stuck in the CARs when I wrote that. To say CASA makes things over complicated is an understatement.

It’s been in every FOM that I’ve seen. It’s also the standard practice at every airline that i’m familiar with. Only the operating crew may occupy a control seat (as listed on the dispatch release). Caveat - I’m neither all seeing nor all knowing, so there may be hundreds of airlines that allow it :)

Without a FA or Jumpseater on the flight deck, how does one confirm the returning crewmember ? Does the lone pilot get out of his seat to check that the returning pilot isn’t under duress etc. etc ? Obviously camera systems negate this requirement.

[havick]

It’s been in every FOM that I’ve seen. It’s also the standard practice at every airline that i’m familiar with. Only the operating crew may occupy a control seat (as listed on the dispatch release). Caveat - I’m neither all seeing nor all knowing, so there may be hundreds of airlines that allow it :)

Without a FA or Jumpseater on the flight deck, how does one confirm the returning crewmember ? Does the lone pilot get out of his seat to check that the returning pilot isn’t under duress etc. etc ? Obviously camera systems negate this requirement.

I know this is an Aussie thread, but I was referring to ops in the USA of which just about every FM1 or FCOM has such restrictions.

[JPJP]

I know this is an Aussie thread, but I was referring to ops in the USA of which just about every FM1 or FCOM has such restrictions.


I think we’re having a human factors failure here :) You seemed to indicate below that not allowing a FA in a Plots seat was uncommon

Can you point to anything in the FAR’s that specifically precludes a flight attendant from sitting in the pilot seat while another pilot goes to use the lav?

I was disagreeing, and I was referring to the U.S as well. “FCOM” is a Boeing specific manual and FM1 sounds like something American probably made up. :E

[havick]

I think we’re having a human factors failure here :) You seemed to indicate below that not allowing a FA in a Plots seat was uncommon



I was disagreeing, and I was referring to the U.S as well. “FCOM” is a Boeing specific manual and FM1 sounds like something American probably made up. :E

sorry typo on my phone. I meant NO such restrictions in my earlier post.

FM1 is just another name for a company ops manual in the US, they’ve also got a myriad of other names/abbreviations.

[JPJP]

sorry typo on my phone. I meant NO such restrictions in my earlier post.

FM1 is just another name for a company ops manual in the US, they’ve also got a myriad of other names/abbreviations.



Ahh. Gotcha. That makes sense.

Yup. I’m very familiar :E

[NGsim]

Without a FA or Jumpseater on the flight deck, how does one confirm the returning crewmember ? Does the lone pilot get out of his seat to check that the returning pilot isn’t under duress etc. etc ? Obviously camera systems negate this requirement.

How do 2 pilots currently check the FA isn’t under duress when he/she asks for flight deck access on the interphone as neither pilot gets out of their seat to check presently so I’m confused why you think the situation is any different when there is only 1 person remaining in the flight deck??

[JPJP]

How do 2 pilots currently check the FA isn’t under duress when he/she asks for flight deck access on the interphone as neither pilot gets out of their seat to check presently so I’m confused why you think the situation is any different when there is only 1 person remaining in the flight deck??




There’s an incorrect assumption in your quote. I’m talking about the way they do it in the U.S. - the origin of the this procedure after 9/11. The EU seemed to start thinking about it after the Eurowings incident (mass murder). I’m not commenting on the efficacy of any system in place.

[Icarus2001]

Probably best not to continue with this line of discussion...

[Mach E Avelli]

Icarus, fret not. The baddies have all the airline training manuals and SOPs anyway. Having cost the aviation industry billions in security measures, they much prefer now to mount their attacks externally, as recent history shows.

[Iron Bar]

I'd be more worried about the reaction of your head of security to posting sensitive and confidential procedures on a public forum.

[Bend alot]

I'd be more worried about the reaction of your head of security to posting sensitive and confidential procedures on a public forum.
One or two flights and it will be pretty clear what the company procedure on toilet breaks is - just select an aisle seat in row 2 or 3 and be observant.

[parabellum]

Personal view but I believe that to suggest that a FA on the flight deck during a toilet break is compromising her duties in the cabin is utter bo**ocks. The FA's duties on the FD are to ensure that legitimate access to the flight deck is not denied and that the safety of all passengers, crew and aircraft are not compromised, what, in the cruise, could be more important than that?

[Rated De]

Personal view but I believe that to suggest that a FA on the flight deck during a toilet break is compromising her duties in the cabin is utter bo**ocks. The FA's duties on the FD are to ensure that legitimate access to the flight deck is not denied and that the safety of all passengers, crew and aircraft are not compromised, what, in the cruise, could be more important than that?

Given that the actions of a pilot with nefarious intent resulted in this 'policy' How precisely does the industry ensure that a similar 'murderous intent' is not present in the (FA) person just let on the flight deck?

[F.Nose]

Personal view but I believe that to suggest that a FA on the flight deck during a toilet break is compromising her duties in the cabin is utter bo**ocks. The FA's duties on the FD are to ensure that legitimate access to the flight deck is not denied and that the safety of all passengers, crew and aircraft are not compromised, what, in the cruise, could be more important than that?

So how does the flight deck FA do that exactly when the remaining Pilot could easily destroy the aircraft in far less time than it takes for the other Pilot to zip up and return? And how does the FA do that exactly when one Pilot could easily destroy the aircraft even with the other Pilot sitting in their designated Pilot seat?

The truth is the only duty the FA is performing in the flight deck is that of appeasing the ignorant travelling public!

[parabellum]

The truth is the only duty the FA is performing in the flight deck is that of appeasing the ignorant travelling public!

Even more utter bollocks.

[F.Nose]

The truth is the only duty the FA is performing in the flight deck is that of appeasing the ignorant travelling public!

And fools like parabellum!

[ACMS]

FNose.....
mate, can you read?

I’ve previously posted why my company have done exactly this since locked doors came in post 9-11.....

No issues and a genuine reason why.

Open your Eyes and mind, you’ll find it’s a big World out there and others may just already successfully use these proceedures........

[Xeptu]

The company I worked for was one of the first to implement the two on the flight deck policy soon after the armoured doors were fitted. The policy at the time had nothing to do with the mental health of the lone crew member on the flight deck. It was implemented purely for the reason that if anything happened to this crew member whilst alone there was no possible way to access the flight deck. The door could only be opened from the flight deck side if closed and locked by one of two methods.

[parabellum]

The trouble with F.Nose and those like him who ridicule the idea of the FA standing in is that they keep quoting the million to one chance against a FA on the FD policy and choose to ignore the rest of the time when the system works just fine. During their flying career these individuals may just discover that their life depends on a lot less than a million to one chance at times. Once out of the safe environment of European/Antipodean ATC the game is on.

[F.Nose]

ACMS...In the extremely unlikely event that the remaining Pilot becomes incapacitated during the time the other is taking a comfort break the door can still be opened via key pad in good time.

Parabellum...Are you referring to the possibility of a rogue FA taking advantage of the remaining Pilot and sabotaging the aircraft? If so I have never claimed such a risk to be a threat....read my post again carefully!

My point is that a FA on the flight deck is unnecessary and does not effectively improve safety in any way.

[havick]

ACMS...In the extremely unlikely event that the remaining Pilot becomes incapacitated during the time the other is taking a comfort break the door can still be opened via key pad in good time.

Parabellum...Are you referring to the possibility of a rogue FA taking advantage of the remaining Pilot and sabotaging the aircraft? If so I have never claimed such a risk to be a threat....read my post again carefully!

My point is that a FA on the flight deck is unnecessary and does not effectively improve safety in any way.

not all aircraft have keypads

[Bend alot]

not all aircraft have keypads
And - F Knows y not!

[F.Nose]

not all aircraft have keypads

Good grief.

The cold hard facts are; The 2 on the flight deck at all times rule was mandated by the regulator in Australia as a direct result of a disturbed 'German Wings' FO deliberately flying an aircraft into terrain. However....the 2 on the flight deck rule does not prevent either Pilot destroying the aircraft and its occupants at any time.....if they so desire! So the rule does not achieve its objective other than it may have an influence on where and how the job is done.

Nobody would object if the few operators of aircraft 'without keypads' develop procedures, such as the 2 on the flight deck, to mitigate the risk of Pilot incapacitation at an inappropriate time......but that does not mean there needs to be a blanket rule for all operators on all aircraft with more than 50 seats, when in the majority of cases the risk is alleviated by other means......such as a key pad.

[Derfred]

The 2 on the flight deck at all times rule was mandated by the regulator in Australia as a direct result of a disturbed 'German Wings' FO deliberately flying an aircraft into terrain.

Fortunately, it was never mandated by the regulator in Australia.

I believe the practice was introduced by mutual agreement between the Airlines and the Australian Government to calm the noise at the time - can't find a reference right now, but that's how I remember it.

Which means it probably wouldn't be too hard for the Airlines to discontinue the practice, if they desired to.

All they would need to do is to contain any outcry by using all the appropriate PC nonsense such as "following an extensive review, risk analysis, studies of world's best practice etc etc.."

But the important thing is that those in the position to make change, have to want to make change. Where would that desire come from? It doesn't inconvenience them. Unless of course increased disruptions to cabin service start causing the Frequent Flyers to complain.

[havick]

Good grief.

The cold hard facts are; The 2 on the flight deck at all times rule was mandated by the regulator in Australia as a direct result of a disturbed 'German Wings' FO deliberately flying an aircraft into terrain. However....the 2 on the flight deck rule does not prevent either Pilot destroying the aircraft and its occupants at any time.....if they so desire! So the rule does not achieve its objective other than it may have an influence on where and how the job is done.

Nobody would object if the few operators of aircraft 'without keypads' develop procedures, such as the 2 on the flight deck, to mitigate the risk of Pilot incapacitation at an inappropriate time......but that does not mean there needs to be a blanket rule for all operators on all aircraft with more than 50 seats, when in the majority of cases the risk is alleviated by other means......such as a key pad.

I could care less. Simply pointing out that not all aircraft have keypads as someone else earlier suggested.

[Icarus2001]

The cold hard facts are; The 2 on the flight deck at all times rule was mandated by the regulator in Australia as a direct result...

Can you provide a link to the rule as I cannot find it? Thanks.

[mrdeux]

However....the 2 on the flight deck rule does not prevent either Pilot destroying the aircraft and its occupants at any time.....if they so desire! So the rule does not achieve its objective other than it may have an influence on where and how the job is done.

Sad but true. Just after this rule was introduced, we tried a little experiment in the sim...and the outcome was an uncontrollable aircraft. Distraction and misdirection are doubly dangerous if you want them to be.

[Derfred]

Steve Creedy

Australian airlines will be able to decide for themselves whether they want to have two people in the cockpit at all times.

The Australian government followed the lead of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and adopted the two-in-the cockpit rule for aircraft with a seating capacity of more than 50 passengers after the crash of Germanwings Flight 9252 crash in March, 2015.

Co-pilot Andreas Lubitz, who had been diagnosed with suicidal tendencies, deliberately flew the aircraft into the side of a French mountain, killing 144 passengers and six crew.

The idea was to have another crew member enter the cockpit if one of the pilots left for any reason but the practice has raised a number of safety and security issues.

EASA eased the two-person rule in August, 2017, and German airlines revealed they would abandon it April this year, arguing it increased security risks rather lowered them.

Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority said a review of the practice in Australia found there were “unintended consequential risks, including the second person in the cockpit potentially distracting the pilot, making inadvertent contact with cockpit switches and taking cabin crew away from their safety role in the cabin”.

“It was also found the practice complicated flight crew access to the cockpit and introduced an additional risk of flight deck incursion,’’ CASA said in a recent briefing note.

“The recommendation is for air operators to evaluate their own safety requirements and make an operational decision on whether to maintain ‘two in the cockpit’ in their standard operating procedures.

“CASA’s aviation medicine branch will continue to monitor pilot mental health and maintain a high level of awareness among pilots of mental health priorities and sources of assistance.”

Australian pilot unions have welcomed the decision to ease the rules.

It comes as the EU recently published strengthened mental health guidelines for pilots.

The new rules mean all European airlines will need to perform a psychological assessment of pilots before they start employment, something many airlines already do.

They also include a support program for all pilots working for European airlines to help them “recognize, cope with and overcome “problems which might negatively affect their ability to safely exercise the privileges of their license”

Mandatory alcohol testing will be extended to pilots and cabin crew of all European and foreign airlines that fly into the EU.

[fullnoise]

Good, the sooner this procedure is gone, the better. FD door open for far longer in total, the FA removed from their security role in the cabin, and not one FA given a single minute's training on what their actual responsibilities and required actions are when they're up there with one pilot.

[VHFRT]

My concern with this has always been managing the flight attendant during a non-normal. At my airline, the cabin crew aren't exactly the brightest sparks, however they do have a very high opinion of themselves and have an long established attitude of being the true "managers" of the aircraft. I believe the CC union once sent a memo stating that the lead flight attendant was "second in charge of the aircraft, behind the captain".

If I have a major failure (ie: depres) and need to start a rapid descent, I have no faith that the 19 year old sitting in the jump seat (who is already on "heightened alert" as they've been told I am sitting there plotting to kill them) won't grab the crash axe and take my head off. About the last amount of added stress one needs during such an event.

[morno]

I believe the CC union once sent a memo stating that the lead flight attendant was "second in charge of the aircraft, behind the captain".

Good f**king luck. If I had any CM put that to me as Captain I’d very quickly put them in their place.

[AerocatS2A]

We had the rule before all of this happened (because of how the door lock works) so I assume we will still have it.

[Capn Bloggs]

I believe the CC union once sent a memo stating that the lead flight attendant was "second in charge of the aircraft, behind the captain".
Reg Ansett's "boilers" of the 70s/80s?

[Lookleft]

I remember something about a senior manager being a bit too close to an FAAA rep and having the Policy manual changed to show the CM being number two on the chain of command. It didn't last long, the manager's position in the airline and the policy change. Through the mists of time the only thing I do know for certain is that it wasn't the 70's or 80's and it wasn't the boilers but one of the new breed of managers and FAAA ladder climbers.