Operation Mikado

[tartare]

I was 15 at the time - reading about this now and trying to understand why a greater effort was not mounted to destroy A-4 and Etendard bases on the mainland as a prelude, particularly using air-power.
There were 38 SHARS and GR3s deployed (if I have numbers right).
I assume:
*More sensible to keep large capital assets like Harrier capable ships at the limit of Argentine air-forces' loiter range, and let the FAA bring the fight out to the islands, than take the fight to them.
*Harrier combat radius would dictate a coming to within at least 600 miles of the coast to launch
*Mobile air search radar on the mainland would have given ample warning of attacks - end result - no surprise - mass Argentine scramble by upwards of 100 fast jets, and a turkey shoot.
*Perceptions of attacks on Argentine mainland (even if just military targets) might have escalated the conflict further drawing in Peru and Venezuela.
Hence the Entebbe-style plan...
It is sobering to look back and see how the numbers were tilted against Operation Corporate.
No criticism intended or implied - just curious.

[Wensleydale]

An attack against invading forces is one thing - an attack directly on that country raises the political stakes somewhat. The threat of air strikes against the Argentinian mainland was enough for Argentina to keep its air defence forces firmly defending the home-land - especially after the Vulcan "Black Buck" raids earlier in the War. This kept the environment over the Falklands a little easier for the Harriers to operate.

[Pontius Navigator]

Remember there had been plans for a Special Forces assault but while the benefits of success would have been worthwhile the probability of success was assessed as low, the risk of annihilation of the SF and the loss of its delivery aircraft near certain.

Wensleydale will also confirm that there was a 'serious' question asked of 8 Sqn on whether it could reach the FIEZ and how long it could remain on task. Once off task the plan was to ditch near the TF. While this might have given a useful, albeit very short, time on task the best that could be achieved was 4 or 5 shots before writing off the sqn.

With hindsight, for we were told nothing else, the question might have been in relation to either the initial Black Buck raid or of the initial landings on East Falklands rather than guessing when to launch. Under that assumption the question was not as daft as it seemed. Certainly there was pressure within light blue on trying to get a piece of the action.

[Danny42C]

I believe that, when Galtieri surrendered, the Gurkhas were rather upset - they were looking forward to the prospect of going across to the Argentine and getting to work there !

[sandiego89]

Interesting subject, your first two assumptions of keeping the carriers well to the east seems to be the major driver of ruling out a Harrier/Sea Harrier strike on the mainland. Plans with Sea Harrier navigation systems being suited for the task of leading a mixed air group were drawn up but never executed. I would add to the list that these aircraft were precious for air defense of the task force, so losses had to be kept to a minimum. Not so sure it would have been a turkey shoot against the (Sea) Harriers. They could have come in at ultra low level. I believe the airbase at Rio Gallegos had hardened aircraft shelters, and Rio Grande had revetments likely minimizing damage.


Invincible did one dash to the west and launched a Sea Harrier (Sharkey) that approached the mainland. I seem to recall from his book he reported seeing the glow of lights or factory IR on a pop-up.

[PEI_3721]

PN,"...and the loss of its delivery aircraft near certain."
Helicopter write off (burnt) close to Arg/Chilean boarder?

[Arclite01]

If you read 'Soldier I' there was similar plans done for an attack at Port Stanley with a C130 loaded with SF and equipment to crash onto the runway and wreak havoc. It was canned fairly early on I seem to recall as a virtual suicide mission.

Similar missions against Argentine airfield targets would probably have had devasting results on the parked aircraft and facilities (like Pebble Island) but the suicidal nature of the assault would have meant heavy casualties and also as previously mentioned the ratcheting up of the political stakes............ our position would have had to have been incredibly precarious for this type of mission to be actually launched.

Planning them is one thing - Execution quite another...........

Arc

[BossEyed]

PEI 4721: That was Operation PLUM DUFF (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mikado#Preliminary_reconnaissance), a recce for MIKADO.

[ExRAFRadar]

What was the point of the single Sea Harrier launch against the Mainland and putting the Invincible in harm's way?

Show we could do it?

I would have thought the Argie Air Planners could see we could do it.

[Pontius Navigator]

PN,"...and the loss of its delivery aircraft near certain."
Helicopter write off (burnt) close to Arg/Chilean boarder?
An entirely different situation. The C130 OP mentioned by Arclite was the type that I mentioned.

[Wander00]

Single SHAR, Sharky............maybe the RN were trying to tell him something......

[Marcantilan]

I strongly recommend to read "Exocet Falklands" by Ewen Southby Tailyour, about SF ops to destroy the SuE / Exocet.

There was three DA missions ordered:
Plum Duff, a DA / Recce mission against Rio Grande. It was aborted early.
Mikado, a DA mission against Rio Grande. Plum Duff was prerequisite of Mikado, so Mikado never started.
Kettledrum, a DA mission against Puerto Deseado.

Also, a recce mission, called Shutter was executed. The idea is boots on the ground to report departures from Comodoro Rivadavia, Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande.

I´ve never heard about a strike from the carriers to the mainland. It was a risky mission, putting in jeopardy the entire operation (lost a carrier and Corporate was off). However, recently desclassified files shows Vulcan missions against the mainland were analyzed and prepared.

Regards!

[dragartist]

I was half expecting you to pop up Mario. Hope you are keeping well. Complements of the season to you.
Drag

[Wensleydale]

Wensleydale will also confirm that there was a 'serious' question asked of 8 Sqn on whether it could reach the FIEZ and how long it could remain on task. Once off task the plan was to ditch near the TF. While this might have given a useful, albeit very short, time on task the best that could be achieved was 4 or 5 shots before writing off the sqn.
To be honest - I had not heard this one, although I believe (crewroom gossip) that the Squadron was asked whether we could get a Shackleton or two down to the Falklands Islands once they had been recaptured. Breaking down the aircraft and rebuilding it on the island after transportation by sea was considered but thought to be too difficult. A direct transit was also considered - without any diversions (which is where the ditching next to the ships may have come from) but due to the very slow speed of the Shackleton at range speed, we would have had to refuel in Buenos Aires, but again, this was considered to be a bit complicated diplomatically.

[Shackman]

Another rumour (!) was that there was also a feasability study done on fitting AAR kit to the Shacks. It was going quite well until it was pointed out there were no Avgas tankers!!

[Pontius Navigator]

W, not heard about the post-conflict deployment. I know we looked briefly at a west coast deployment but, as you say, range was the problem.

Shackman, concur.

[sycamore]

Shack, shouldn`t have been a problem with 28k fuel in the tankers fuselage tanks...just need to not transfer to wing tanks....

[tartare]

Marcantilan - any links to those Vulcan papers? I'll read your recommended books.
I visited Buenos Aires in 2000 - fascinating city.
These replies are very interesting guys - have got a copy of the infamous Sharkey's Sea Harrier over the Falklands, but had forgotten he was sent within range of the mainland.
Keen to hear any other insights or information that can now surface with the passing of time.
Very relevant today given it is the largest air-sea battle since WW2.

[Wensleydale]

Another problem with tanking a Shackleton was to find a tanker that was slow enough to give the fuel, even if capable of AVGAS!! If I remember, range speed was about 160 kts? (Friday afternoon cruise was 180 kts with endurance at 140 kts). Flying into a headwind, we were regularly overtaken by trains on the East Coast line.

[Shackman]

Shack Vne was normally 300kts, which was achievable with take off power and straight and level. During an (internal) noise trial at Boscombe Down I achieved 330kts with water meth as well, and the noise meters proved it was very noisy (and quite uncomfortable) and used a LOT of fuel. It also surprised the Harvard which tried to catch us!

[ORAC]

There was also Op Fingent - the deployment of 1ACC's T259 radar to Balmaceda Airport - Al C******y as one of the controllers IIRC?

http://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/586841-op-fingent-chile-1982-a.html

[sycamore]

Wen and Shack,Albert was fitted with a low-speed basket,and used `tobogganing` if we were not able to maintain speed with another tanker or receiver.A selection of `wigs` could also be attached to the basket ,as an `incentive` to a prodder finding it difficult to `get it in`...!
Herc tankers are used regularly to refuel helos,probably around 130-150 kts...It was early days,but I`m sure it could have been sorted.....just neede a bit of `lateral `thinking...

[Heathrow Harry]

Wensleydale is correct - big difference between trying to regain your own territory and attacking another country

We never went to war with Argentina in a legal sense - it was more a "police action"

Plus our American allies would have been really p***** off and it wouldn't have done much with the other S American nations who were either on our side (Chile) or neutral-ish (Brazil)

Special Forces attacks over long distances can work (Entebbe, perhaps the best example) but they can also go wrong (US hostage rescue in Iran). They decided it wasn't worth the risk - especially once we were onshore

[Davef68]

I strongly recommend to read "Exocet Falklands" by Ewen Southby Tailyour, about SF ops to destroy the SuE / Exocet.

There was three DA missions ordered:
Plum Duff, a DA / Recce mission against Rio Grande. It was aborted early.
Mikado, a DA mission against Rio Grande. Plum Duff was prerequisite of Mikado, so Mikado never started.
Kettledrum, a DA mission against Puerto Deseado.

Also, a recce mission, called Shutter was executed. The idea is boots on the ground to report departures from Comodoro Rivadavia, Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande.

I´ve never heard about a strike from the carriers to the mainland. It was a risky mission, putting in jeopardy the entire operation (lost a carrier and Corporate was off). However, recently desclassified files shows Vulcan missions against the mainland were analyzed and prepared.

Regards!


One of the interesting things Ewen ST touches on, but doesn't expand, is the other operations going on in Chile at the time (UKSF, - both SAS and SBS were mentioned, C-130 - the Nimrod R1 ops from San Felix are menioned). Presumably the C130 was related to Operation Fingent.

[Marcantilan]

I was half expecting you to pop up Mario. Hope you are keeping well. Complements of the season to you.
Drag

Hello Drag. Thanks and season´s greetins too!

Presumably the C130 was related to Operation Fingent.

The Marconi S259 radar (and supporting equipment) was airlifted via a Flying Tigers 747 flight to Santiago (with Stopover San Juan PR), and then moved to position with a UK C130 with "Fuerza Area de Chile" (note "Area" not "Aérea") markings.

Regards!

[ORAC]

Data Library - Interview with Fernando Matthei (http://www.falklandswar.org.uk/matthei_interview.htm) The whole interview is there in Spanish, but only portions are translated into English. The English portions are copied below. Someone else can translate the Spanish if they wish, some covers the Nimrods and the C-130s, which also transmitted via Easter Island.

During October 2007, I was sent this transcript of an interview given by Chilean Air Force General, Mr. Fernando Matthei on July 1999 who was C-in-C of the Chilean Air Force (FACH) and member of the Military Junta that ruled Chile between September 1973 until March 1990. It was originally published in a Chilean local newspaper 'La Tercera'. I have included the original Spainish text and English translation (in italics) for most of the interview.

What is the origin of this help and what was your role?

In first place I have to say that this war was a surprise to everybody. I learned myself reading "El Mercurio" (Chilean Newspaper). We knew there was a chance this war might materialize but I never thought the Argentineans were that crazy. Years after the war, I spoke with a friend, former C in C of the Argentianian Air Force, Mr Omar Grafina Rubens, and he didn't know about it as well. He just retired and his successor was Mr. Arturo Basilio Lami Dozo. Even in a meeting where he did participate they kept him aside. I have to admit that was a very well kept secret. Nobody knew about it. They took the British by surprise and to us Chileans as well.

What was yours and the goverment's reaction?

Take notice of it and remain alert. Two days later my chief of intelligence, General Vicente Rodriguez, told me an English officer sent by the RAF would like to meet me. I told him I was ok. It was Wing Commander Sidney Edwards, a character that didn't look Englishman at all and spoke perfect Spanish.

Can you describe this gentleman?

He was a young man, around 35-40 years old. Very active and nervous, he was full of adrenaline. He came with a letter from Sir David Great, C in C of the RAF asking if we could help them. He was fully empowered to coordinate anything that we could do together. This sounded very interesting to me. Their main interest was to gather intelligence information. The British never worried about Argentina; they knew everything about the Soviet Union but they knew nothing about Argentina. Edwards asked me if we could help them. I told him I couldn't act on my own and I would discuss with General Pinochet (member of the military junta and de facto head of state).

Did you talk with Pinochet about this "offer"?

I spoke with him in very general terms, telling him we had a great opportunity here. We didn't care if the Argentineans were at war with British because then, as Galtieri said, we would be the next ones. We were just digesting the speech given at Plaza de Mayo where in front of the people he mentioned Malvinas will be just the start. He looked like Mussolini.

Were you worried about this speech?

We worried that after the islands they would attack us. After all, they believed some of our territories belonged to them. In principle, Pinochet agreed I worked with them but nobody should know. We wouldn't even mention this to our foreign office.

Did the Navy or Army got a similar request?

No

Why do you think the British choose the Air Force?

Good question. They knew me because I was Air Force attaché in UK between December 1971 and January 1974.

They took advantage of the personal relationship then?

I visited their industries of war material and I had contact with British senior officers. While I was there, I signed contracts to buy six Hawker Hunter and six Vampires. They knew me, we had a fluid relationship. Been at London, I went to the Soviet Union, I gave the British a copy of the visit's report I gave to the FACH. They knew I was their friend, although Chile, ruled at that time by a socialist government, was considered by them a member of the "East block".

What did you do after meeting Pinochet?

We agreed to keep it secret and then I met Sidney Edwards again telling him I was fully empowered on this subject and we would operate under my criteria. Edwards told me that British Embassy nor the navy attaché should know about his existence. Edwards went to England then to discuss what they could do with us. Upon his return, he asked for intelligence.

What would Chile get in return?

They will sell us, at one pound, Hawker Hunters. These would arrive by plane immediately. Also a long range radar, air-air misiles, and aerial recon Canberra aircraft. This material was very important, especially the Canberras because we didn't have any before. They fly very high, like the Americans U-2 and they have huge cameras. Also, they would send us a 'Moondrop', specialized in intelligence, communications and electronic espionage. It was very much like a passenger 707 but modified.

And the Argentinean spies?

There were no Argentinean spies and we didn't have spies in Argentina either. With this plane we did high altitude flights over Chilean Territory, getting signals from the other side. Ours, because of the Andes and type of plane, couldn't fly that high in order to gather signals.

Who piloted the plane?

The British, although we had our observers on board. They gave us the necessary information about the Argentineans but nothing we didn't know before. This flight didn't help us, but was done, so for the story, is good to know. The British were impressed for what they saw thru our systems in the south and the long range radar we had in Punta Arenas.

You spied with that radar to the other side?

This one was bought to France and had a range of 200 miles. We installed it in a little hill. On the ground we had numerous listening posts to check all radio communications in Argentina. We also had, from before, an underground command post close to Punta Arenas. All the information arrived there in a very graphic format, like a cinema. It is there where Sydney Edwards remained.

How did Edwards send the information to his senior officers?

He had satellite communications directly with the Royal Navy central command in Northwood, close to London. What happened here the British knew immediately.

The British couldn't get a better ally?

Impossible. We told them, for example, that four planes left a specific base, in which direction and that because of their speed, they were Mirage apparently. One hour before they arrived, the British knew already.

How long did it last?

The whole war. At the end, we kept the plane, radars, misiles and planes. They [the British] got on-time information and everybody was satisfied.

'Thank you and goodbye'?

Of course. And Sidney Albert Edwards was fired the next day for personal reasons. Later I learned he was involved in arms contraband with Croatia.

British Commandos in Punta Arenas

The only tangible proof that Chile had to do something with England during the conflict, was the chapter of a Helicopter that had an emergency landing close to Punta Arenas and its crew was rescued by Chilean Police.

One day Sidney Edwards came to confess that a British chopper landed in Chilean territory. I asked him what happened, in lieu of our agreement that they will not make any military operation to Argentina from Chilean territory and that no plane operated against Argentina would land in Chile. That was the fundamental agreement we had.

What happened?

They organize an operation, not from commandos but "ultra" commandos, to destroy the Super Etendard planes of the Argentinean Navy who where capable to operate Exocet. The British knew Argentinean had six Exocet and they already corroborated their capabilities: with just one of them they sunk the Sheffield one day after they sunk the Belgrano. But the commandos got lost and they didn't find anything better that land in Chile. They did it west of Punta Arenas, close to a road in an opening in the woods. As soon as they touched ground they burned the chopper and although nobody saw them land, the smoke alerted the police.

What happened to the commandos?

After burning the aircraft they alerted Sidney Edwards on the radio in order to see what to do. I answered that they had to go to our air base where a Chilean intelligence officer would meet them. They would be given plainclothes and they would be flown to Santiago in a commercial flight. That was exactly what happened. They should've been interned in Chile because that is the law but I did offer them another alternative. This is why Ms. Thatcher also mentioned about saving human life.

Did the Argentineans learn about the incident?

Yes and we had to give them lengthy explanations, swearing that we didn't know anything about it. I don't know if they did believe us or not but honestly I got angered about this issue and I had to face Pinochet telling him "look what these stupid did". The General had to alert the our Foreign Office and give explanations.

General Matthei also gave a TV interview to Chile's National Channel along similar lines in September 2005 - see Chilean General Did Everything to Help the British Win in 1982 (http://www.sartma.com/art.php?artid=1858&skip=1) (external link)

[Pontius Navigator]

Shackman, there was also a high speed drogue gun assisted parachute trial for the V-Force around 1972 over the Akrotiri Salt Lake with the Shack at 300 it's.

AAR wise I seem to recall another problem besides AVGAS and that was the unpressurized fuel system, gravity refueling?

And another probably would have been lack of Avgas at ASI.

[Davef68]

Interesting stuff, thanks. I remember the wrongly spelt C130 being mentioned in the aviation 'spotting' magazines at the time (I was but a schoolboy in 1982) but I don't think anyone had a photograph of it.

[Marcantilan]

http://www.histarmar.com.ar/Malvinas/Sciaroni/ataqueTaskForce/01.jpg

I think I´ve posted this one in another thread, but the image shows the early warning assests of the fleet, covering Rio Grande Naval Air Base (home of SuE / Exocet and others Argentine Navy and AAF units) and Rio Gallegos Naval Air Base on late May 1982.

So you have:

A Chilean Thomson CSF radar near Punta Arenas.
HMS Valiant and HMS Spartan on EW picket duty
At least a couple of "boots on the ground" patrol covering the airports (Op Shutter)


The fleet has 40 minutes of early warning. Yep, better having a Gannet of Shackleton on task, but worst is nothing...

The Op Fingent radar was much further nort.

Regards!

[sandiego89]

ExRAFRadar: What was the point of the single Sea Harrier launch against the Mainland and putting the Invincible in harm's way?

Show we could do it?

I would have thought the Argie Air Planners could see we could do it


Ex RAF, in Chapter 28 of Sharkey's book, he indicates that the plan for 5 June was for Invincible to proceed in darkness to the south of the Southern tip of West Falkland and launch a Sea Harrier CAP as close to 80 miles of the coast of Argentina to "virtually challenge the enemy fighters to come out and play". The plan was for 3 harriers to launch in intervals to maintain a single ship CAP. There had also been intelligence that Argentine C-130's were still doing supply runs under the cover of darkness. Sharkey complained abut SAR coverage and reduced the station to 120 miles from the ship. Sharkey was the first to launch and said he could clearly see the coastline on his radar, and exhaust plumes from plants on the shore. The third aircraft was recalled early as fog set in. After the final recovery the 3 ships sprinted back east.


Reference: Ward, Sea Harrier over the Falklands, pages 249-252

[Marcantilan]

Ex RAF, in Chapter 28 of Sharkey's book, he indicates that the plan for 5 June was for Invincible to proceed in darkness to the south of the Southern tip of West Falkland and launch a Sea Harrier CAP as close to 80 miles of the coast of Argentina to "virtually challenge the enemy fighters to come out and play". The plan was for 3 harriers to launch in intervals to maintain a single ship CAP. There had also been intelligence that Argentine C-130's were still doing supply runs under the cover of darkness. Sharkey complained abut SAR coverage and reduced the station to 120 miles from the ship. Sharkey was the first to launch and said he could clearly see the coastline on his radar, and exhaust plumes from plants on the shore. The third aircraft was recalled early as fog set in. After the final recovery the 3 ships sprinted back east. Reference: Ward, Sea Harrier over the Falklands, pages 249-252

Well, it looks like around 350 nm from the nearest Argentine mainland airbase...

http://i65.tinypic.com/mwe0w3.jpg
(From Invincible´s War Diary - and to avoid any comment, yes, I´ve stole it from Adm. Woodward´s safe)

[Trim Stab]

I strongly recommend to read "Exocet Falklands" by Ewen Southby Tailyour, about SF ops to destroy the SuE / Exocet.

There was three DA missions ordered:
Plum Duff, a DA / Recce mission against Rio Grande. It was aborted early.
Mikado, a DA mission against Rio Grande. Plum Duff was prerequisite of Mikado, so Mikado never started.
Kettledrum, a DA mission against Puerto Deseado.

Also, a recce mission, called Shutter was executed. The idea is boots on the ground to report departures from Comodoro Rivadavia, Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande.

I´ve never heard about a strike from the carriers to the mainland. It was a risky mission, putting in jeopardy the entire operation (lost a carrier and Corporate was off). However, recently desclassified files shows Vulcan missions against the mainland were analyzed and prepared.

Regards!

You might be interested to read "Kisses from Nimbus" by Peter Red Riley, who was Hereford 8 Flight commander at the time. He describes an operation parallel to Plum Duff to probe the air defences of Rio Grande. A four man team flew down to a nearby Chilean base in a King Air 350 provided by the Chilean Intelligence Service, then used a borrowed Chilean Huey to fly a test run to Rio Grande from the west.

[Union Jack]

Currently running in a new thread on Arrse at https://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/kisses-from-nimbus-peter-riley.267294/

Jack

[Marcantilan]

Hello,

But they actually fly near Rio Grande?

Regards and thanks for the heads up.

[Trim Stab]

Yes, according to the book they take a Chilean Secret Service BE350 down to somewhere south, then borrow a Chilean Huey to recce Rio Grande from the air and take some photos.

I can't personally vouch for that particular episode but some of the later events overlapped with my experience, and they check out.

[PPRuNeUser0139]

He came with a letter from Sir David Great, C in C of the RAF asking if we could help them.
Think this would have been ACM Sir David Craig.. who was CinC Strike at the time.

[GlosMikeP]

Wensleydale will also confirm that there was a 'serious' question asked of 8 Sqn on whether it could reach the FIEZ and how long it could remain on task. Once off task the plan was to ditch near the TF. While this might have given a useful, albeit very short, time on task the best that could be achieved was 4 or 5 shots before writing off the sqn.

With hindsight, for we were told nothing else, the question might have been in relation to either the initial Black Buck raid or of the initial landings on East Falklands rather than guessing when to launch. Under that assumption the question was not as daft as it seemed. Certainly there was pressure within light blue on trying to get a piece of the action.

How right you are Pontious. It was me who phoned Octagon and OC8 and asked!

The question asked of me at HQSTC, while I was the desk officer for AEW at the time was, 'How long can a Shackleton stay on task 2000nm from Ascension". The conversation went like this:

GMP: Oh, about 15 minutes, which allowing for plan of a 20kt headwind would be as long as it would take to splash down out of fuel.

Astonished WgCdr AD: But the bl**dy things fly for hours!

GMP: Yes we do, but at 180kts range speed we don't actually go very far.

Even more astonished Wg Cdr AD: Pause of silence, obviously thinking something like 'How do I tell the RN that!' then departed down the corridor at high speed.

To help, I then wrote a paper proposing cutting the radars out of the Shack to put them in ISO containers to get them installed as ground stations on FI. For all manner of practical considerations it didn't come off...I suspect much to the disappointment of a large proportion of 8 Sqn.

[parabellum]

Did the RN have any submarines with a capability to deliver some kind of missile into the Argentine military airfields? Less risky than aircraft?

[Pontius Navigator]

Did the RN have any submarines with a capability to deliver some kind of missile into the Argentine military airfields? Less risky than aircraft?



Poseidon? But I think you meant cruise missiles. Harpoon was only just being fielded in 1981 in the USN.

[SNator]

I remember a plan for the Buccaneers around Cape Horn. It would have been interesting to say the least. But think what we could have done with conventional carriers (cat & trap) Buccs and F4s!

[ancientaviator62]

If you look on the 'Global Aviation Hercules' site # 30 shows a Chilean AF Hercules alongside XV292 at Easter Island . Pic taken by me on 24/4/82 as we departed by VC10.

[Heathrow Harry]

Anyone read Sidney Edwards book?

[chopper2004]

Poseidon? But I think you meant cruise missiles. Harpoon was only just being fielded in 1981 in the USN.

We only had Polaris and never upgraded to Poseidon and went straight to Trident over a decade later...

cheers

[ICM]

Concerning Mikado, I've seen no mention of another alternative SAS delivery method that appears to have been seriously considered. This emerges in Jeremy Brown's A South American War. (The author was Air Attache in Brazil in 1982.) It seems that, whilst at Ascension, and with no prior training or preparation, a VC 10 crew was briefed by a SAS officer to prepare to carry a SAS unit to Belize, where a civilian aircraft would take them on down to Argentina. However, should that aircraft not materialise, the VC 10 would be required to do the job. Things got as far as loading all the SAS kit before a call came to stand down.

[NutLoose]

Another rumour (!) was that there was also a feasability study done on fitting AAR kit to the Shacks. It was going quite well until it was pointed out there were no Avgas tankers!!

Another problem with tanking a Shackleton was to find a tanker that was slow enough to give the fuel, even if capable of AVGAS!! If I remember, range speed was about 160 kts? (Friday afternoon cruise was 180 kts with endurance at 140 kts). Flying into a headwind, we were regularly overtaken by trains on the East Coast line.

Surely we already had one, another Shack, if you were going to the trouble of fitting a AAR capability, you might as well throw a pod on it.

[ian16th]

I remember a plan for the Buccaneers around Cape Horn. It would have been interesting to say the least. But think what we could have done with conventional carriers (cat & trap) Buccs and F4s!
....and an AEW Gannet or three!

[Heathrow Harry]

or a long enough runway to be able to fly troops in by 747..................

[Marcantilan]

Op Mikado never materialized and Op Plum Duff´s infiltration by Sea King helo was in the public domain (first, because ZA290 wreck was discovered in Chilean territory and because, later, Hutchings and Ewen ST wrote extensively about that).

Op Kettledrum involved HMS Onyx and SBS troops, but Onyx never went near Puerto Deseado Airbase, the designated target.

Op Shutter remains a mistery.

How the troopers were infiltrated near the airbases? According to James Adams´"Secret Armies", the infiltration was made by submarine. In that respect, the Dagger in HMS Conqueror Jolly Roger could be a "leak" (the "official" explanation - if a Jolly Roger has an official explanation - is because Conx disembarked some SBS near South Georgia)

An helo was involved? A radar echo was detected near Comodoro Rivadavia on the night of May 22nd. A Pucara (first) and a Mirage III (later) was launched to investigate, and informed three helos were in close formation. The Mirage driver locked a Matra 530 IR on a helo but hesitated to launch. The helos, flying with no lights vanished shortly after. There were reports of troops informing the helos were here or there, disembarking troops. Hours later, a sentry in Comodoro Rivadavia base informed about intruders, and a firefight erupted.

Because Op Shutter files are closed, we could only argue about it...

Regards!

[Treble one]

I remember a plan for the Buccaneers around Cape Horn. It would have been interesting to say the least. But think what we could have done with conventional carriers (cat & trap) Buccs and F4s!


I did hear that the Bucc couldn't be considered for the Black Buck missions (from Ascension) because they would run out of engine oil on the trip!


There was also rumour that the RN popped into IWM Duxford to take a look at their Gannet AEW when this was all kicking off.


I'm pretty sure that Duxford's Vulcan is without its AAR probe too???

[Heathrow Harry]

"Information held within the MOD archives is indexed by file title and file reference. A search of these has identified 3 files relating to Operation Shutter.

One of these (DEFE 58/274 Examination of Argentine Air Efforts during the Falklands Campaign) is retained under a retention instrument until 2025. The other two are currently being reviewed; if approved, it is likely that these will be retained under a retention instrument until 2026. Once these retention periods have expired the information will be reviewed again to determine whether the sensitivity of the information still applies".

[TEEEJ]

I'm pretty sure that Duxford's Vulcan is without its AAR probe too???

Air Marshal John Bago Curtiss. Air Commander, Northwood.

Forgotten Voices of the Falklands: The Real Story of the Falklands War
By Hugh McManners

Their in-flight refuelling systems had to be upgraded, and in fact we had to borrow one probe from a bomber in the Imperial War Museum's collection at Duxford, which I understand was returned after the war.

XJ824 photographed at Duxford, September 1982 with the probe removed. It was re-fitted after the conflict.

https://www.flickr.com/photos/24101413@N03/7719991608

[gopher01]

AA62,

I was waving to you as you left Easter Island and XV 292 disappeared off the face of the earth re-appearing in Tahiti some three weeks later and returning to the UK with refuelling probes removed from Vulcans that were in American museums by parties of Techies from the Det at Offut.
As Max Boyce said " I know because I was there ".
A mention was made in an article in Air International some years ago entitled " Labours of Hercules " on how an un-named South American country had a sudden increase in the number of Hercs it was operating!

[TEEEJ]

There was also rumour that the RN popped into IWM Duxford to take a look at their Gannet AEW when this was all kicking off.

The IWM Duxford Gannet is a ECM.6

http://www.iwm.org.uk/sites/default/files/public-document/List%20of%20Exhibits%20at%20IWM%20Duxford.pdf

See following PPRuNE thread.

http://www.pprune.org/aviation-history-nostalgia/411781-falklands-war-fairey-gannet.html

[ancientaviator62]

Gopher,
I was waving to you lot too ! I knew what the Chilean Herc was doing there before we left . We took XV 292 to Easter Island from March AFB. It seemed a very long way at night !

[Treble one]

Thanks TEEEJ-I see the Gannet most weekends-I should read the accompanying board next time.

[Marcantilan]

One of these (DEFE 58/274 Examination of Argentine Air Efforts during the Falklands Campaign) is retained under a retention instrument until 2025.

mmm, I have a copy of this file just in front of me right now.

[Heathrow Harry]

worth us waiting 9 years for? I'll put in an advance order with Amazon if it is.......................

[Jackonicko]

[URL="http://www.falklandswar.org.uk/matthei_interview.htm"]
I visited their industries of war material and I had contact with British senior officers. While I was there, I signed contracts to buy six Hawker Hunter and six Vampires. They knew me, we had a fluid relationship. Been at London, I went to the Soviet Union, I gave the British a copy of the visit's report I gave to the FACH. They knew I was their friend, although Chile, ruled at that time by a socialist government, was considered by them a member of the "East block".


They will sell us, at one pound, Hawker Hunters. These would arrive by plane immediately. Also a long range radar, air-air misiles, and aerial recon Canberra aircraft. This material was very important, especially the Canberras because we didn't have any before. They fly very high, like the Americans U-2 and they have huge cameras. Also, they would send us a 'Moondrop', specialized in intelligence, communications and electronic espionage. It was very much like a passenger 707 but modified.

And the Argentinean spies?

There were no Argentinean spies and we didn't have spies in Argentina either. With this plane we did high altitude flights over Chilean Territory, getting signals from the other side. Ours, because of the Andes and type of plane, couldn't fly that high in order to gather signals.

Who piloted the plane?

The British, although we had our observers on board. They gave us the necessary information about the Argentineans but nothing we didn't know before. This flight didn't help us, but was done, so for the story, is good to know. The British were impressed for what they saw thru our systems in the south and the long range radar we had in Punta Arenas.


Vampires?

What the heck is a Moondrop?

[Jackonicko]

Anyone read Sidney Edwards book?

Yes, I have. Very interesting, but the chronology of events doesn't quite fit with the official record (e.g. 51 Squadron's ORB).

[Marcantilan]

Yes, I have. Very interesting, but the chronology of events doesn't quite fit with the official record (e.g. 51 Squadron's ORB).

Does it matter? 39 Sqn (Canberra) records of the time mentions a lot about the Dinner Dance and the disbandment parade, but not one word about the Chilean deployment.

Regards,

[TEEEJ]

Treble one wrote

Thanks TEEEJ

You are very welcome, Treble one.

Jackonicko wrote

Vampires?

The General would be referring to the Vampires that Chile bought in the early 1970s as lead in trainers for the Hunters.

What the heck is a Moondrop?

Looks like the General was referring to Nimrod. Something lost in translation or maybe he actually thought that the name of the aircraft was "Moondrop"?

[Marcantilan]

Falklands war captain says he blames himself for mission failure | Daily Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5481611/Falklands-war-captain-says-blames-mission-failure.html)

mmm...

[ZH875]

Falklands war captain says he blames himself for mission failure | Daily Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5481611/Falklands-war-captain-says-blames-mission-failure.html)

mmm...
Good headline from one of the pictures:

"Captain Ann Legg,pictured at his desk in Northern Ireland in 1977, led the SAS's disastrous secret invasion of Argentina"

[Heathrow Harry]

"maps dated 1930......."

I do remember a story that when the invasion happened the MoD turned up with a large van at Stanford's in Long Acre, the London Map Centre in Victoria and Capt Birdseye's nautical shop in Chelsea and cleaned them out of anything they had on the S Atlantic - it was rumoured they only had one map of the place in house...............

[GlosMikeP]

"maps dated 1930......."
S Atlantic - it was rumoured they only had one map of the place in house...............

Not quite. I walked into the HQSTC glass house the morning we supposedly 'lost comms' to see stack after stack of thousands of FI OS maps. They left for better locations pretty quickly.

[Tankertrashnav]

£40k is an eye watering estimate for Captain Legg's South Atlantic Medal and Northern Ireland GSM. Before PPRuNers who have these two medals start getting excited, I should warn them that £1,000 would be a more usual estimate for a similar pair to an officer - maybe a little more on a good day. Whether they make the estimate we shall see, but if they do it will be the magic letters "SAS", plus the story behind the medals which will get them there.

[Heathrow Harry]

Not quite. I walked into the HQSTC glass house the morning we supposedly 'lost comms' to see stack after stack of thousands of FI OS maps. They left for better locations pretty quickly.

I think that may have been a rush job in the week or so that things started to warm up.................................

[Mogwi]

The first 1:50,000 maps we were sent had no grid overlay. Bit tricky plotting targets using Lat/long from the edge of the map!

[GlosMikeP]

Not an advance print, as I understand it, but run through the night. I dare say there was a contingency plan in place as events escalated.

[dragartist]

Yes, I have. Very interesting, but the chronology of events doesn't quite fit with the official record (e.g. 51 Squadron's ORB).

Does anyone know or prepared to say if the 51 Sqn ORB would be restricted to Nimrod R operations at the time. I wondered if it would mention if members of C Flt had been operating on other platforms or attached to other units.

[Archimedes]

Does anyone know or prepared to say if the 51 Sqn ORB would be restricted to Nimrod R operations at the time. I wondered if it would mention if members of C Flt had been operating on other platforms or attached to other units.

It can be found at Kew. And is a masterpiece in providing a fairly detailed account of activities in a way which means that anybody who wasn't there at the time, or who doesn't know in detail what the squadron did/does won't have the first clue as to what went on.

If you have that knowledge, the ORB will make perfect sense; if you have a bit of knowledge and some other open source info, it'll make a little bit of sense. Otherwise, it's possibly the most boring ORB to be found... (which is meant as a compliment to whoever wrote it).

[Marcantilan]

It can be found at Kew. And is a masterpiece in providing a fairly detailed account of activities in a way which means that anybody who wasn't there at the time, or who doesn't know in detail what the squadron did/does won't have the first clue as to what went on.

If you have that knowledge, the ORB will make perfect sense; if you have a bit of knowledge and some other open source info, it'll make a little bit of sense. Otherwise, it's possibly the most boring ORB to be found... (which is meant as a compliment to whoever wrote it).

Yes, you are right.

Op ACME details are still secret.

http://i64.tinypic.com/2n0oj82.jpg

[dragartist]

It can be found at Kew. And is a masterpiece in providing a fairly detailed account of activities in a way which means that anybody who wasn't there at the time, or who doesn't know in detail what the squadron did/does won't have the first clue as to what went on.

If you have that knowledge, the ORB will make perfect sense; if you have a bit of knowledge and some other open source info, it'll make a little bit of sense. Otherwise, it's possibly the most boring ORB to be found... (which is meant as a compliment to whoever wrote it).

Ah..our old unit moto “Lead and Mislead” !
Only one TRIM in 82. We did 35 ten years later

[mrmrsmith2]

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/falklandislands/9158097/The-secret-Falklands-suicide-mission.html

[tartare]

Have searched Google but no answer - what does the acronym ORB stand for in this context?
EDIT: Hmmm - answer above - that'd be Operations Record Book.

[ORAC]

More detailed story of Mikado/Plum Duff by Andy Legg in today”s Times.

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/i-led-the-falklands-sas-mission-that-no-one-wants-to-talk-about-cvfh0jrplI led the Falklands SAS mission that no one wants to talk aboutIn April 1982, a few days after the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, I was ordered to report to the SAS camp in Hereford. I was 28, a captain in B Squadron, and had spent five years in the army, two of them in the SAS in Northern Ireland and Oman. At 8am the next day we were told there would be an undercover SAS operation by B Squadron to remove the threat of enemy jets stationed at Rio Grande on Tierra del Fuego, off the southern tip of Argentina, 400 miles from the Falklands. The Argentine Super Étendard jets carried Exocet missiles and posed a serious threat to the Royal Navy task force and the 5,000 troops heading for the islands. Our job was to destroy them.

The SAS operation I took part in was ambitious, audacious and, ultimately, completely ineffective, proof that the SAS’s reputation for infallibility can run aground on reality.

Operation Mikado was simple, echoing the wartime origins of the regiment when the fledgling Special Air Service destroyed hundreds of enemy planes during hit-and-run raids on north African airfields. Two C-130 Hercules planes with 60 men on board would make a low-level approach at night over the sea and land stealthily at Rio Grande. Land Rovers armed with heavy machineguns would burst on to the airfield, fan out, destroy the planes and kill the pilots in their accommodation blocks. The squadron would then split into small groups and make their way to the border. There was no discussion of the plan — we were on a war footing — but SAS men are not stupid, and serious questions were raised. Argentina had sophisticated radars: how were we going to land two fully laden RAF planes without being spotted?

Still, the plan was sanctioned by Margaret Thatcher and the war cabinet, and we began training for the assault in earnest, night and day: long-distance forced marches in Wales, hours on the rifles ranges, night-navigation exercises, night-ambush drills and parachute drops. At Wick airport in the north of Scotland, with six inches of snow on the ground, we practised low-level approaches and landings by night to test the feasibility of flying low in off the sea without being picked up on radar. D and G Squadrons were sent off to the South Atlantic; B Squadron was held back.

On May 14, 1982, a week before British troops were due to land on the Falklands, we met the director of the SAS (DSAS), Brigadier Peter de la Billière, for our final briefing in the operations centre at Hereford HQ. De la Billière was a truly iconic figure in the regiment, the most-decorated soldier in the British Army at the time.Andy Legg in his military daysHe walked in, informed me I had passed the junior staff college exams, then told us that the mission had changed completely. Instead of a full-scale attack on Rio Grande, I would be leading a nine-man patrol on a search-and-destroy mission to Rio Grande codenamed Operation Plum Duff.

Someone asked: “Any other intelligence on the enemy forces, sir?” None. When we asked about the method of insertion into Argentina the DSAS said: “We think you will be using a submarine, but we could be using a fast frigate and a patrol boat, or we could use a helicopter. Tomorrow you will be taken to Ascension Island and then flown down to the South Atlantic, where you will parachute into the sea.” I asked: “If we are going into Argentina on a helicopter one way, what happens when they find that helicopter? You cannot just get rid of it. It is pretty large.” He basically said: “It is not your concern.” I don’t know what action, if any, was taken to address our concerns.

By the time we reached Ascension Island, just south of the Equator, I felt we were on a one-way trip. We had little intelligence, few maps, no aerial photographs of Rio Grande and little idea of any enemy forces. It was going to be a wing-and-a-prayer job. After another ten hours flying down over the South Atlantic, we rendezvoused with the RFA Fort Austin, off the Falklands, and parachuted fully loaded into the sea with all our kit, hoping to be quickly fished out by a small boat. It was 20 minutes before they found us and later took us to HMS Invincible.

The next day we heard we were going into Argentina aboard a stripped-down Sea King helicopter, which would then be abandoned and blown up by the crew. We had food for only three days because, as well as taking our normal kit, weapons and ammunition, we had lots of explosives. We’d been issued with one-man tents, but because of all the extra stuff we didn’t have room for the tent poles.

We took off from HMS Invincible in total darkness. I could see the lights of an oil rig. Near the Argentine coast the navigator said we had been detected on their radar, so we started to fly at low level, through the fog. The Royal Marines pilot and the navigator were using night-vision goggles. After 15 minutes we reached the drop-off point northeast of Rio Grande airbase on the island of Tierra del Fuego, which shares a border with the southern tip of Chile near Cape Horn. One of the patrol had actually got down off the aircraft and was standing alone in Argentina when suddenly we saw lights and a flare going off. We were clearly compromised, so we hauled him and his kit back on board and headed for the secondary drop-off point, flying at low level.

As we headed towards the border with Chile, the visibility was awful and we had to gain altitude to 2,000ft. But at that height we could be picked up on radar, so we made a decision to go on into Chile and land as close to the border as possible. We would then cross back into Argentina and continue the mission.We landed and headed back towards Argentina, across fairly rough terrain. Meanwhile, the helicopter crew flew on, abandoned their aircraft in the sea close to Punta Arenas in Chile, blew it up with demolition charges and went into hiding.

We established a lying-up position, tried to work out where we were and made contact with our SAS base at Hereford with a state-of-the-art satellite phone borrowed from US special forces. Hereford asked for my wife’s name as proof we were not being held at gunpoint because at that point they thought we might actually have been captured. I gave her name and they said: “Right, carry on — get some eyes on the ground.” It was bloody awful and much colder than I imagined it would be. One of my men was quite ill. He’d been freezing cold when he was fished out of the sea only 24 hours before. We medicated him and let him rest for a bit. We worked our way eastwards towards the Argentine frontier, but was the border just a line on a map, or was there a barbed-wire fence?

By the third day we were running out of rations and it became obvious we would need to regroup. We talked to Hereford again. The instructions were to move west to a position from where we could give them our precise location so they could arrange to pick us up. They tried to find us, but by now we were four days into the operation and still in Chile. The batteries went and the satellite phone had packed up. Getting back into Argentina was not going to happen without a resupply of food. We could probably manage for six days on three days’ rations, but could not hold out for ever. Operation Plum Duff was running out of time. I decided to leave the rest of the guys and go with another man to locate some support. After several hours’ walking a Toyota pick-up truck came along carrying logs. He dropped us off at Porvenir, which looked like a western shanty town.

We stood out in our military uniforms. We carried 9mm pistols. Using some dollars and Argentine currency we checked into a guest house and I telephoned the British Consulate in Punte Arenas, saying we were British soldiers, that we had run out of food and needed support. He didn’t want to know, saying: “Well, you’re going to have to give yourselves up.” When it was dark we wandered about Porvenir; then something unbelievable happened. I had noticed a four-wheel-drive vehicle and looked through a restaurant window and saw three other SAS guys. I had absolutely no idea they were going to be there because no one had told us to go to Porvenir. Using their pick-up truck, we got the rest of the lads and all our kit, and holed up in a safe house close to the airstrip near Porvenir, while Hereford decided what to do with us.

We still hoped to get into Argentina and finish the operation, but flew on a small Chilean air force plane to Santiago, where we stayed in a safe house, a big bungalow, for a week, waiting to see whether Hereford were going to fly us back south again. We had our uniforms and kit in packs and our weaponry with us, and we were all dressed in civilian clothes. The days were spent talking and waiting to see what happened next. There was reading material and I played chess with another of the men. We cleaned our weapons and rested because we were pretty knackered. Our expectation was that we were going to be sent back south.

Then one morning they said: “You are going back to Hereford.” We went on a civilian flight, dressed in civilian clothes. Our kit was moved separately. A passport was dished out to me just before we got on the plane. We were deliberately dotted around the plane so we didn’t talk to each other, and we wore assorted borrowed clothes. I had a cashmere jumper lent by the staff at the British embassy. We flew to Sao Paulo, then Lisbon and on to London. We did not go through passport control.

The next day, at HQ, I discovered that my squadron boss had been dismissed after saying that Operation Mikado was not simply foolhardy, but downright unachievable. It was a view that many members of B Squadron held. Like the other blokes, I would like to have returned home with a better war story to tell. They probably felt, like me, cheated. An Intelligence Corps officer attached to the SAS came and said: “Just calm down and deal with it. Keep your mouth shut because the stakes are so high on this.” He later told me that they subsequently discovered that the Argentine air force was not actually keeping the planes on the Rio Grande airfield at all. They were stationed on the runways on the huge estancias because they had their own airfields.

De la Billière later blamed the squadron. “I was dismayed to find that the attitude of this unit remained lukewarm,” he wrote in his autobiography. Speaking of Operation Mikado, the brigadier said: “I had to do what I thought was right for all the people whose lives were going to be at stake.”

Even though the board of inquiry exonerated me, I felt I was being blamed for something. But there is no way anyone forced me out of the SAS. I forced myself out. Mike Rose, my commanding officer, who was not involved in the operation, said in a letter: “He decided to resign for his own reasons.” Every May, when the anniversary came around, I always used to feel a bit down.Today I have moved on, but I’ve still got my demons. You don’t really forget about it. We didn’t blow anything up, the jets were not even on the target airfield, and only one of my team set foot, for a few minutes, in Argentina. You would have to imagine your men could walk on water to have had any chance of succeeding, at least based on the intelligence we were privy to.

Who dares wins, but proper planning, reliable information and back-up always help.

As told to Michael Bilton

[Bergerie1]

I have recently been reading "Kisses from Nimbus" by Pete 'Red' Riley.

Does anyone on this thread know him, and can anyone vouch for the veracity of his accounts of various operations and escapades?

[West Coast]

You might be interested to read "Kisses from Nimbus" by Peter Red Riley, who was Hereford 8 Flight commander at the time. He describes an operation parallel to Plum Duff to probe the air defences of Rio Grande. A four man team flew down to a nearby Chilean base in a King Air 350 provided by the Chilean Intelligence Service, then used a borrowed Chilean Huey to fly a test run to Rio Grande from the west.


Likely just a faulty memory, but I believe the King Aire 350 didn’t fly until after the war.

[Pontius Navigator]

Likely just a faulty memory, but I believe the King Aire 350 didn’t fly until after the war.
According to Wiki, 1990. A case of trying to match a remembered aircraft type to a specific model?

[Davef68]

I have recently been reading "Kisses from Nimbus" by Pete 'Red' Riley.

Does anyone on this thread know him, and can anyone vouch for the veracity of his accounts of various operations and escapades?

Read it as well, some strange jumps in chronoloogy in that book, and a strong hint regarding outside involvement in Princess of Wales car crash.

[West Coast]

PN

Not sure, believe the validity of the story, author just erred in aircraft type imo.