Germanwings crash: Have cockpit doors changed?

[fmgc]

How is Sean Maffett qualified to comment on something that he is totally uneducated about:

"The concept of always having more than one person on the flight deck is an improvement, argues aviation analyst Sean Maffett, although this is an added expense for cash-strapped smaller airlines who need to train staff."

Germanwings crash: Have cockpit doors changed? - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-35802645)

It is absolutely not an improvement.

[Sir George Cayley]

Don't know the guy so can't comment. However, can you suggest a solution better than the current state of the art?

[fmgc]

Yes, forget the whole two people in the cockpit at all times policy.

[AerocatS2A]

Our company have required two in the cockpit since the advent of locked cockpit doors. It's never been a problem for us. What don't you like about it?

[Rossian]

......is a very experienced ex RAF transport chap. He is also a very well respected commentator and broadcaster on aviation matters and posts in these hallowed halls from time to time under the name "Airsound".

You may want to moderate the censorious tone of your OP.

The Ancient Mariner

[ZeBedie]

You may want to moderate the censorious tone of your OP.

Or perhaps you may not.

[Aluminium shuffler]

Rossian, RAF Transport Command experience does not qualify one for commenting on airline ops. Being a commentator, broadcaster or journalist is often a disqualification; look at the usual pundits on BBC and Channel 4 and you'll agree. Only if he has airline experience does have some qualification to comment. I don't know him, so I am making no judgement.

As to whether the policy is beneficial, for most companies it is a hindrance, having to wait until a cabin crew member (who is not psycologically screened) reports to the cockpit, which often takes considerable time, and sometimes is too late, arriving after the aircraft is descending and the workload too high to safely leave the cockpit. However, some airlines played dispicably cheap with the regulations and only installed the armoured door, not the cameras for the pilots to see who is outside the door, needing someone to physically check through the spy hole (disgracefully, many are too lazy to do so), which obviously can't be done if one pilot is alone in the cockpit, so the cabin crew can do that check and open the door for the returning second pilot.

So, the policy's benefit depends on the company.

[wiggy]

Presumably Sean Maffat was aware of the actual wording of the actual EASA recommendation (EASA SIB 2015-04, datd 27th March 2015) when writing his piece- here's the important bit:

operators are recommended to
implement procedures requiring at least two persons
authorised in accordance with CAT.GEN.MPA.135 to be in
the flight crew compartment at all times, or other equivalent
mitigating measures to address risks identified by the
operator’s revised assessment.


It's short paragraph worth a careful read.....

[SlowAndSilly]

Does any airline have provisions for ferry flights? That is do you carry an extra crew member so that the cockpit crew are able to comply with the EASA recommendation in case they should need to go to the lavs?

Mine doesn't, and I'm yet to receive a decent answer why ferry flights should be operated in accordance with EASA safety recommendations.

[Basil]

OP BBC article:
The pilot had no way to get into the cabin because of one event - 9/11.
Exactly! One event; no repeats.

also:
The Israeli airline El Al effectively has a toilet within the secure part of the cockpit.
The way we have to go.

[Denti]

Does any airline have provisions for ferry flights? That is do you carry an extra crew member so that the cockpit crew are able to comply with the EASA recommendation in case they should need to go to the lavs?

Just checked my OMA, which does not include the 2 person on the flightdeck rule. However the Interim Procedure Leaflet to that effect is still in force and does not have an excemption for ferry flights. So yes, we should better not take off without an extra crew member or take an empty bottle for "physiolical needs" into the flight deck...

[MATELO]

Exactly! One event; no repeats.

Probably because of the security measures put in place.

[Superpilot]

The two person rule is more practical for some aircraft types/cabin set ups than others. If it works for you then you are clearly not facing the issues some of us are.

Ignoring the security element of it for one minute (i.e. you now introduce MORE predictability as to when a door is going to open. I.e. If a CC member has gone into the FD, rest assured a pilot is going to come out within 30 seconds and vice versa), it's damn awful not to be able to have a pee when I choose. Instead someone else decides. We fly fully laden 220 passenger A321s with average sector length at 4 hours, with only one toilet forward of row 19.

http://s17.postimg.org/6tlcdeyy7/a321.jpg

Everybody from that row onwards and a good portion of those behind row 19 want to use toilet number 1 (lack of education on this also pisses me off). As such, timing is of paramount importance. We used to be able to look at the camera screen, see the area is clear and jump out for a pee. Not now, by the time you've got the attention of a CC, they have come in and you get up, there could be 2 or 3 people standing in the forward galley. If it's a granny or a little kid, you think twice about asking if you can go in first. It's not a healthy setup, especially if like me you pee as often as a water fountain at altitude (I'm fine on the ground). Whatever timing you had in mind when you were sitting and and thinking of a pee, is now gone through the window. Now you're standing and holding it. Yes, we are not children - we should be able to hold it! But holding it 3 or 4 times a day for longer than I would if I were on the ground, AND for the rest of my flying career? That's got to be doing some long lasting damage!

Yes, my airline doesn't curtain off the forward galley or station a cart in between. It considers it too impractical.

[wiggy]

The two person rule is more practical for some aircraft types/cabin set ups than others.

I suspect that's one of several reasons why EASA very carefully used the word "recommend", rather than for example "must" in the SIB (you can bet your bottom euro that the document was approved by the lawyers). Of course how your company chooses to phrase things in your OM is another matter.

[WhatsaLizad?]

Superpilot,


Who exactly is in command of the aircraft when you fly?

[JW411]

In the interests of accuracy, Sean Maffett was a Transport Command navigator on Andover and Belfast aircraft.

[Basil]

Quote:
Exactly! One event; no repeats.
Probably because of the security measures put in place.
My point precisely. Sorry if I didn't make that clear.

[Piltdown Man]

The two people in the flight deck rule is complete and utter bollocks. It suggests that just before one person leaves, another comes in (or one leaves and the other comes in). And in that time, the aircraft had to be flown and communications have to be monitored. At the same time, nothing must be touched that would compromise the aircraft. Then we are invariably left with cabin crew monitoring us. And prey tell me, what could they do? Would they know you have just done something that will jeopordise the aircraft? (There are no prizes for the correct answer). So if Mr Moffat is unable to see the problem with this shyte dictat, then he was little more than talking ballast.

Do I stick to the rule? Yes. Of course I do and compromise flight safety in the process because it does creates unnecessary hassle. But as ever, the practitioners of onastic practices in EASA have fudged and fumbled to try and weasle their way out the problem. The problem is that there are are (too many) people flying public transport aircraft who shouldn't be.



ps. Are there any pilots in EASA? I get the impression it is made up of wannabes and ner'do'wells.

[Superpilot]

WhatsaLizard, don't get the question. I'm a lowly FO.

[wiggy]

Piltdown Man

The two people in the flight deck rule is complete and utter bollocks.

Agreed, but if it's a rule, as in a "must", it didn't come from EASA.

...Are there any pilots in EASA?

Might be, but the problem might be closer to home..

If the EASA recommendation is causing so much grief where you work then is it worth trying to get your management in your own company to read again what EASA actually wrote, perform their own risk assessment and then implement " other equivalent mitigating measures"....or would that cost them too much?

[Ian W]

Wiggy
If the EASA recommendation is causing so much grief where you work then is it worth trying to get your management in your own company to read again what EASA actually wrote, perform their own risk assessment and then implement " other equivalent mitigating measures"....or would that cost them too much?

It wouldn't cost too much when the decision is made. However, should there be another incident where a second person in the cockpit might have prevented it and the decision was not to always have a second person in the cockpit. Imagine the legal arguments being made against the airline. Imagine the bad PR. Imagine the costs of fighting all that --- so why should the person in the airline making the decision go for the one that the aircrew seem to support and take the risk for her/his career? Easier and less of a career risk to follow EASA recommendations.

EASA of course made it a recommendation only so that any airlines that complain of the costs and problems are told with a smile "but it is only a recommendation...". Knowing that safety recommendations are never turned down by the risk averse company men in the aircraft operating companies.

[Denti]

If the EASA recommendation is causing so much grief where you work then is it worth trying to get your management in your own company to read again what EASA actually wrote, perform their own risk assessment and then implement " other equivalent mitigating measures"....or would that cost them too much?

We get told that one Big Airline never introduced that measure, no idea if its true. But over here in germany it was impossible not to implement it, damn the risk assessment which turned out to be not in favor of that measure at all. Simply a bow to public pressure and be done with it.

Due to the very public nature of how that recommendation came to be, it was discussed at length in every newspaper, it is now very easy to get into a flight deck. Especially in a company like mine where several hundred, if not a thousand or more, temporary workers are "bought" from an agency every summer, fast track trained in four weeks and then legally enter the flight deck with just a very superficial "background" check and no psychological evaluation at all.

No need to train a sleeper through flight school, pass rigorous assessment tests and then, after years of training finally be on the flightdeck, every terrorist who wants can be there in just four weeks.

[DX Wombat]

Doors locked or no doors locked, 2 staff or only one, throne room accessible from cockpit only? Why not opt for the really cheap option - nappies (of a suitable size and construction) and special disposal bags? I say this partly in jest but it could be a cheap solution.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

An entirely knee-jerk reaction to a freak one off event. What next, am I not allowed to drive my car alone in case I fall asleep at the wheel?

[RexBanner]

I've said it before and I'll say it again. At 500 feet on approach, the PF out of nowhere dumps the flaps, flicks the master switches off and plants the stick full forward, all before you've had any time whatsoever to react. How are you going to recover that, exactly? There's two people in the cockpit and that didn't stop anything. Bring back a flight engineer sitting behind if you like, it would inevitably happen too fast for him to react either. Just how many bodies are we going to suggest cramming into the flightdeck before we realise that it is all pointless window dressing and that, if we have humans anywhere in the chain whatsoever, there is the small chance one will be a nut job with nefarious intentions, with the capacity for great harm.

[sandos]

flicks the master switches off

Not a pilot, but what are these master switches? I have been working with a Gripen simulator a couple of years ago, and I was surprised at the degree which controls were "locked out" in flight. Master power switch is latched, so you can never disable power in flight for example. Is this not the case on transports?

[Denti]

I guess he refers to the engine master switches, and those are not locked out at all. Have to be able to switch them off if the donks are burning.

[neila83]

An entirely knee-jerk reaction to a freak one off event. What next, am I not allowed to drive my car alone in case I fall asleep at the wheel?

Complete straw man analogy, as I would hope you know. Air travel is subject to rather stricter regulation that car travel, amongst other reasons because if planes crashed as often as cars, no-one would ever get on a plane, and then you wouldn't have a job. You also don't have direct responsibilty for up to 600 people's lives in your car.

This has really upset some pilot's egos hasn't it? Most crashes are 'freak one off events', do you suggest we should just carry on then, no investigations, no ADs, no attempts to improve safety? In any case, it is not a freak one off event, in recent years pilot suicide crashes are probably a statistically significant proportion of crashes. And the preference has been to do so when alone in the cockpit. There are perfectly good reasons - psychological and practical - that a person is less likely to follow through on their intentions if they are not alone. Therefore an extra person in the cockpit serves two useful purposes - reducing the likelihood the individual will act, and providing someone to open the door.

Finally, would you care to tell me how many crashes have been caused by deliberate action by cabin crew, and how many by pilots. As far as I'm aware the pilots are inifitely more responsible. I've never felt comfortable with just having one person on the cockpit, for many other perfectly innocent reasons, or with inpenetrable doors. On the balance of probability, this is likely to reduce risk, and that is all the regulators are concnerned about.

[Denti]

This has really upset some pilot's egos hasn't it?
Nah, i believe that is not the real issue. It is just that pilots (and surprisingly cabin crew as well) believe that this "solution" doesn't solve the problem at all. In fact it does actually introduce new risks and much easier attack vectors. After all now everybody knows that you just need to apply to a temporary worker agency and four weeks later you are guaranteed a seat on the flight deck with just a very superficial background check. Easy enough for anyone, just train on MS Flightsim how to program an FMCG and it won't surprise me when some aircraft on approach to frankfurt just pitches down and slightly to the right and boom, the ECB is gone (not that that would be any loss).

Not to mention that pilots refuse to drink because cabin crew often do not have time when it is needed, effectively dehydrating themselves which leads to severely reduced performance. And of course, if toilet breaks are finally done, the door will be open much longer, more often and the airplane monitoring between the dance to the loo and at least one ass on a pilot seat (more isn't needed, after all george takes care of business, right?) isn't really all that great either.

There was no need for that beforehand, after all we do not need cabin crew to identify anyone who wants into the flightdeck, the video picture is right there on the displays. Yes, the new system might prevent another germanwings, or it might not, everyone knows that there will be someone, and how to disable them if needed. Either electrocute them (we do need powersupplies for our EFBs after all), use the crashaxe or any number of other means available.

Basically, it (slightly) plugs one hole, and opens up quite a number of other ones.

[Emoclew]

As a long time pilot of the emerald green aircraft, who has operated the 2 person in cockpit rule since shortly after 9-11, I am amazed at the negative tone of this discussion.
I filled out the recent EASA survey and am very much in favour of having a second person in the cockpit at all times,if only to make sure I can get back into the cockpit at all times. This policy has never caused any safety issues, and I personally cannot see what the issue is.

[FlightDetent]

Likewise, although a different operator.

I started airline 2003 and so had the policy been eversince.

The reasons given then
- visual check for cockpit entry request (mandatory all the time)
- operate the door that were not reachable from cockpit seat

Both suprising and educative to see otherwise very reasonable and knowledgeable memebers here post vigorously against the policy.

[wiggy]

otherwise very reasonable

I haven't seen anyone being unreasonable, it's just that some disagree that 2 on the flight deck at all times with all operators is a panacea.

Depending on where you work and what you are operating it's quite conceivable and reasonable that you might see the blind enforcement of a rule requiring 2 on the flight deck at all times as possibly introducing extra risks, unless extra checks, procedures and specific training are introduced.

I think you'll find the BEA report on the Germanwing's accident said much the same - the BEA spokesperson at the press conference on the day of release of the report certainly said so.

[neila83]

It is the nature of the issue that there is no perfect solution; either someone is left alone and can act without intervention, or a 3rd party has to be allowed into the cockpit. Procedure has to be decided on balance of probability, and statistically a pilot alone is higher risk.

It is reasonable that some point out the new risks introduced, but this is not sufficient to render the policy ineffective, if the risks it mitigates are greater. Cabin crew already come into the cockpit in any case, so if they are a threat then that is present regardless. Reasonable concern is fair enough, the problem is I have read some pilots who are merely indignant at the idea their mighty self should possibly be supervised by lowly cabin crew, and do not see the bigger picture. That is not constructive. You are not being judged, in how many industries would someone in charge of such a potenially destructive missile be allowed to lock themselves away? I venture none.

[wiggy]

neila.

Reasonable concern is fair enough, the problem is I have read some pilots who are merely indignant at the idea their mighty self should possibly be supervised by lowly cabin crew,

I don't see many or any saying the cabin crew are "lowly". The problem some have (me included) is the old issue of "who watches the watcher," especially in a very large organisation, possibly with a high level of churn...


You are not being judged, in how many industries would someone in charge of such a potenially destructive missile be allowed to lock themselves away? I venture none.

Industries - possibly none, but FWIW other organisations world wide do allow that to happen on a regular basis - but not controlled by someone employed 5 minutes ago or even 5 weeks ago.

[BigGeordie]

I think your attitude to this depends on where you come from and where you are flying. If you are working for an established European carrier whose cabin crew predominantly all come from the same country and which has a low staff turnover you probably wouldn't see the problem. You are on the same cultural wavelength as the people on the other side of the (locked) door and they can all be (and probably are) properly security checked. I used to work for an airline like that and if I was still there I would probably be wondering what all the fuss was about.

However, there are airlines implementing this policy who hire hundreds of temporary cabin crew every year who get minimal training and minimal security vetting. There are other airlines that have such a high turnover of crew that they hire thousands of 21 year olds every year from all over the world including countries with known links to terrorism. It is not physically possible to security clear that number of people from that many countries properly. In the past, of course, these people still had access to the flight deck but it was fairly rare for them to be there with only one pilot. Now is is a certainty. That is why we need to ask, who watches the watcher?

Also, it used to be policy in my company that the flight deck door was opened as seldom as possible. With the new two person rule it needs to be opened twice as often as it was before and it wouldn't take a genius sitting in the first fewrows to spot the pattern. This becomes a bigger problem if, as on many types, there is a passenger toilet right next to the flight deck.

This is a badly thought out policy introduced as a "must be seen to be doing something" reaction to an extremely rare occurrence which leaves us all exposed to much greater risks much more often.

[wiggy]

^^^^

+1 to what BigGeordie said

:ok:

[DirtyProp]

Why not opt for the really cheap option - nappies (of a suitable size and construction) and special disposal bags? I say this partly in jest but it could be a cheap solution.
And oxygen masks on 100% as soon as the gear is up...:}

[DuctOvht]

JW411,

In the interests of accuracy, Sean Maffett was a Transport Command navigator on Andover and Belfast aircraft.

From the above quote it's difficult to ascertain your position but with respect to Mr Maffett and everything he may have achieved in the RAF, he has no place commenting on commercial airline issues in the media. Unfortunately, the media in general are so thick they can't grasp the difference and think one flying discipline is the same as another. In this arena he simply hasn't the experience or knowledge to make him anything more than an 'interested observer' but in commentating the way he does, he influences the debate in the wrong way.

BigGeordie & Piltdown Man are far more on the money imho.

[DaveReidUK]

Unfortunately, the media in general are so thick they can't grasp the difference and think one flying discipline is the same as another.

Hence their widespread use of the meaningless term "aviation expert". :ugh:

[FlightDetent]

... flight deck door was opened as seldom as possible. With the new two person rule it needs to be opened twice as often as it was before ... Does not compute, sorry. I wish you guys well who feel upset about and endagered by this (for you) new rule. I wish you did not need to do it, but the presented arguments are not tangible.

Apart from that, anybody beating a dead horse yet?

2 quick check questions:
- post 9-11, with intrusion proof door and before cameras installed, what means were used to comply with visual check requirement with a pilot returning from loo?
- in UK airspace, are you allowed jumpseaters on flightdeck?

[Denti]

- post 9-11, with intrusion proof door and before cameras installed, what means were used to comply with visual check requirement with a pilot returning from loo?

Never happened. Reinforced doors alway were installed with a CCTV system. At least at the airlines i worked for. However, if i remember correctly, the rule about the locked door didn't came into force until 2002 or so due to limited supply. There was no point in locking doors which could be opened from the outside even if locked...

And yes, we can take jumpseaters, but only company flying staff with a valid ticket (until a couple months ago any pilot from any airline, until the unmentionable airline became unhappy about it) except on flights to and from the UK, US and Israel. Since we do not fly to the UK, it is only about the other two countries for us.

Anyway, the EASA recommendation is just that, it is a recommendation which is currently under review. Not a rule (yet). Quite some airlines in europe didn't follow that recommendation and those that did, had mixed experiences with it. Hiring hundreds or even thousands of muslim and eastern europeans as cabin crew each year can make security assessment results rather different than with other carriers.

[FlightDetent]

Cool reply. To a point. Hiring hundreds or even thousands of muslim and eastern europeans as cabin crew each year can make security assessment results rather different than with other carriers. I wonder if these shady characters are forbidden from making coffee for flight deck, as per the different outcome of security assesments.

I do not to wish end confrontational. Thanks for pointg out the recommednation part. Horse alive then.

Quick question 3:
- what is the resolution for single-cockpit memeber incap. behind locked door whilst the other pilot is out?

[wiggy]

I wish you guys well who feel upset about and endagered by this (for you) new rule. I wish you did not need to do it, but the presented arguments are not tangible.

Not tangible to you but I really think both sides of this debate perhaps need to accept this is a classic case of: "To understand another man's point of view, you need to walk a mile in his shoes" (or in this case work for the airline he/she works for...).


Quick question 3:
- what is the resolution for single-cockpit memeber incap. behind locked door whilst the other pilot is out?

The possibility of simple straightforward incapacitation is catered for in the design of the systems I'm aware of and/or have used - I'm not going to spell it out here - I'm sure it's all on the internet - but I must admit I'd have thought anyone engaging in a debate on the pros and cons of the various flight deck doors and access systems must be aware of the fundamentals of how they work?

[DuctOvht]

what is the resolution for single-cockpit memeber incap. behind locked door whilst the other pilot is out?

Wouldn't you like to know! Rest assured there is one.

[FlightDetent]

Obviously I lost my sanity before writing that! :uhoh: I salute your alertness a shall now retire to vertical, with my best regards.

[FullWings]

Why is the locked door there in the first place? To stop unauthorised access from the cabin. That’s it.

For those without CCTV and remote unlocking (is anyone still in that position?), I can see the need for another person. Otherwise, it adds risk.

What is the function of this extra person on the flight deck? EASA is silent on this one. As an alternative view, if you wanted to decrease risk, no non-pilot should be allowed on the flight deck unless there are at least two pilots present...

[Piltdown Man]

What is the function of this extra person on the flight deck?

To be the target of an axe? To wonder why the aircraft is now silent engine wise but very noisy bell wise? To see what the world looks like upside down?

I'd ask EASA, but I bet these muppets find it hard remembering where they work and what they are meant to do when they actually do get into their ivory tower.

[Pontius]

Never happened. Reinforced doors alway were installed with a CCTV system.

It most certainly did happen and, no, they weren't.

When this was the case, one of the pilots had to get up and check the peephole before admitting the member of cabin crew. Pilot would disappear for a 'physiological break' and, on return, the peephole would be checked by the aforementioned member of cabin crew before being the pilot being let back onto the flight deck.

The appearance of the TVs made it a lot easier (as did doing away with the deadbolt requirement) but when the locked doors first came into being there was a fair amount of hokey kokey going on, with stand up, sit down nonsense.

[NSEU]

It most certainly did happen and, no, they weren't.

+1

On some fleets, the addition of electronic door control (post-911) and cameras was progressive. Were cameras even initially mandated? (or as an afterthought)

[Denti]

It most certainly did happen and, no, they weren't.

You did forget the next sentence in your quote though. Never had a reinforced door without a CCTV system in any airline i worked for. I believe it was due to a demand from the local CAA to that effect. The non-reinforced doors could be locked, but from the outside with a key that could open all cockpit doors in the fleet, the door had no peephole and even if locked could be kicked open, so anybody who wanted to enter could crawl in. There was even a big fat safety note to that effect on the outside of the door. It was, as usual in security, pure window dressing.

So no, we never had to work with a two person rule on the flightdeck as normal procedure before, not even when the non-reinforced doors had to be locked. It wouldn't have served any purpose.

I'm very well aware though that it might have been different elsewhere.

[hoss183]

To the OP. Do you think if they had changed, if there was a way to override, or a pass-code known only to pilots, that anyone would make that public on a forum?

[FullWings]

To reiterate: the door is there ONLY to stop people coming in. To do that properly there must be no “secret” way round it. This was proven effective in the GermanWings accident.

If a pilot wishes to crash the aircraft, there is nothing anyone can do about it and that includes the guy sitting next to them (or behind them). The answer is to not have mentally ill people coming to work.

[yst_01]

How does it work for Cargo Pilots? Usually there are two pilots without cabin crew. Sometimes one pilot has to leave the cockpit to go to the lavatory, making food or checking the freight etc..

[AerocatS2A]

There's no cockpit door in our freighters so you can't get locked out.

[Longtimer]

Re freighters , so far no glory in taking down a cargo aircraft so no worries unless///////

[stator vane]

When one needs to go to the toilet, then both pilots come out and leave the flight deck empty so no one can do anything bad? Then when both finished, enter the open code both go back in together.

Problem solved!

[susier]

I wonder if this apparently similar incident in Botswana/Namibia which took place in November 2013 might be relevant to the discussion at all. Final Report just out.


Crash: LAM E190 over Botswana/Namibia on Nov 29th 2013, captain intentionally crashed aircraft (http://avherald.com/h?article=46c3abde/0015&opt=0)

[noske]

I wonder if this apparently similar incident in Botswana/Namibia which took place in November 2013 might be relevant to the discussion at all. Final Report just out.
BEA certainly found it relevant, it is mentioned in section 1.18.1 of their report, "Previous Events".

The sad thing is: I suspect that even if the following recommendations had been made earlier (in a perfect world, the final report could have been completed by November 2014), it wouldn't have prevented the Germanwings disaster.

DAAI recommends that Mozambique Civil Aviation Authority should come up with a mechanism to ensure that the procedure of two people in the flight deck is adhered to at all times as laid out in LAM’s Manual of Flight Operation Chapter 10.1.4, Page 5 of 36, Edition 3 Revision 8, (Absence from Flight Deck).

DAAI recommends that ICAO should establish a working group that should look into the operation and the threat management emanating from both side of the cockpit door.

DAAI recommends that ICAO should establish standards that implement recommendations of the working group, formed under safety recommendations number 002/2015 LAM to suitably avert the locking out of the cockpit of authorized crew members.

[itsnotthatbloodyhard]

In the months after the introduction of the 2-person rule, my outfit had:

F/As attempting to occupy the LHS as the captain departed on toilet breaks;

A F/A asking the F/O "Are you sure you should be touching that?" as the F/O made an adjustment to the MCP/FCU to avoid wx or comply with ATC; and

A large male F/A telling an S/O (and not joking) "Don't touch anything!" (Or else what? :ooh:)

While this points to either inadequate education or an unusual level of stupidity in the individuals concerned, it hasn't made me feel any safer.

[fmgc]

While this points to either inadequate education or an unusual level of stupidity

A bit of both I would have thought but maybe your FAs should have been told that their responsibility was to let the other pilot back in to the FD and not to supervise the pilot on the FD.

It does highlight the complete farce that this policy is.

[AerocatS2A]

In the months after the introduction of the 2-person rule, my outfit had:

F/As attempting to occupy the LHS as the captain departed on toilet breaks;

A F/A asking the F/O "Are you sure you should be touching that?" as the F/O made an adjustment to the MCP/FCU to avoid wx or comply with ATC; and

A large male F/A telling an S/O (and not joking) "Don't touch anything!" (Or else what? :ooh:)

While this points to either inadequate education or an unusual level of stupidity in the individuals concerned, it hasn't made me feel any safer.
Never had FAs do or say anything like that. They come in, stand there and chat if I want, then when I let the other guy in they go back out. Me thinks your FAs haven't been told what they're there for.

[itsnotthatbloodyhard]

My personal experience is the same as yours. Hopefully it was just a few people getting overexcited post-Germanwings.

[airsound]

Blimey! What an honour! A whole four-page thread starting with a quote from moi. Thanks fmgc. Bit of a shame I was being thoroughly ****bagged in the process, but you can’t have everything, I suppose.

Sorry to have been so late in coming to the party, btw - have been away, and only espied the thread today.

Anyway, a bit of background, if I may. I’m a broadcast journo, and I rarely do written stuff. I was asked to do this by the BBC online magazine - and ended up being quoted out of context. If you can be arsed, here are the exact words I sent to the reporter Harry Low.

There are always unintended consequences. The secure flight deck door policy was brought in after the events of 9-11.

The concept of always having more than one person on the flight deck is probably an improvement. The best solution would be to have two pilots. But most short haul flights only have two pilots in total, so that would mean no toilet breaks on a flight lasting several hours - clearly impractical. So the other person has to be cabin crew - a flight attendant. So, do all flight attendants have to be trained to understand the myriad switches on the flight deck? And are we happy expecting unqualified crew to be able to understand when a pilot is doing something dangerous, as opposed to something which may actually be in response to an emergency?

On balance, an extra crew member on the flight deck is probably beneficial - if for no other reason than to operate the switches that unlock the door if it is clear that someone with appropriate authority needs to get into the flight deck. But that does all need training - more expense for cash-strapped smaller airlines. So, as Flightglobal said, "It is a problem that is irreconcilable at its most fundamental level."

There is another consideration. It is suggested that a pilot intent on suicide (and hence mass-murder) will be less likely to carry out his or her plans if there is someone else on the flight deck with them. That may be true, but I don’t think it can be proven.

I hope that clarifies things a bit, fmgc. And also - thanks to the peeps who’ve come to my support, and to the ones who don’t think the way fmgc does.

But I’d like also to answer fmgc’s questionHow is Sean Maffett qualified to comment on something that he is totally uneducated about:I believe, perhaps immodestly, that I’m quite well qualified - even educated - in the subject. Although I can’t boast those magic letters ATPL, I have spent all 50-plus years of my adult life in aviation. I like to claim that aviation fuel runs in my veins. I wrote in my LinkedIn summary that I try to “bring an understanding of aeroplanes and flying to people who have not had the experience that I have been lucky enough to have had in the world of aviation.”


Since spending twenty years and several thousand hours in the RAF - nearly all on transport flying (incidentally, ‘Transport Command’ disappeared in 1967, just after I left my my first squadron) - I’ve been a freelance journo.

Over the years, I’ve become, in the public shorthand, an aviation expert or analyst. I’ve written and narrated more than a hundred aviation dvds and videos. I’ve commentated at more air shows than I care to think about, including Dubai and Farnborough - on lots of aircraft types, civil and military.

And, on average these days, I do about sixty broadcasts a year on tv and radio. They’re about aviation, civil or military, and they’re all by request from a broadcaster. They’re mostly for the BBC, but also for ITV and Sky, as well as Al Jazeera and other international broadcasters - even sometimes for the Russians.

And, although I may not be ‘current’ on anything, I try my hardest to do the appropriate research. It’s even been known for the odd PPRuNer to say something kind about my efforts - although clearly not invariably….

In short - I know that, if I poke my head over the parapet, I must expect to get shot at by people with more appropriate aviation experience than I. But I’d just like the shooters to know that I do have a background in their world. The point is, I’m actually one of the people trying to make available to the Beeb, and the rest, an authentic aviation viewpoint, rather than the view of an aviation-ignorant reporter. And I remain happy to continue poking my head over the parapet.

fmgc, if you’re so unhappy with what I was quoted as saying, why don’t you offer your view to the BBC, rather than hiding behind an impenetrable PPRuNe name? All you have to do is phone the BBC, and ask for the reporter by name. Or, if you don’t want to do that, you could contact me through a PPRuNe PM. As a reputable journalist , I would, of course, guarantee to protect your anonymity should you choose to tell me your name.

That’s it - sorry to have taken up so much space.

[fmgc]

Air sound, thanks for taking the time to reply. I do appreciate that but I still question either your qualification to comment on this or your research (or even both).

I am an airline pilot of 20 years and am in management. I have participated in creating the safety case and have had comms with airline management of most of the bigger UK airlines. I can categorically say that most if not all of them do not show that "On balance, an extra crew member on the flight deck is probably beneficial".

PR with this issue is the problem and what the public perceive to be "safer" policies but which actually aren't. So your comments do not help safety they just add credibility to incorrect public perception that makes it harder to move back to the better policy of NOT having a 2 person flight deck policy.

I am not at liberty to reveal my company's safety case nor am I at liberty to speak to the press, either anonymously or not, as what is said to the press is a corporate decision made above my pay level.

I would suggest that you try to use your contacts to have a look at these safety cases, if you are unable to gain access then your research is incomplete and so your comments are based on incorrect assumptions.

[DaveReidUK]

Over the years, I’ve become, in the public shorthand, an aviation expert or analyst.

With respect, I think that illustrates the problem perfectly.

You are to be commended for your understanding, if I interpret you correctly, that "aviation expert" is a virtually meaningless term (given how wide-ranging the discipline is) and is used solely by the public, who don't know any better, and the media, who don't care and are solely concerned with filling column-inches or airtime with the nearest available talking head.

What we really need are more "experts" who acknowledge there are areas in the aviation universe that are outside their competency/comfort zone.

Somehow, I don't see that happening.

[wiggy]

I'm in line with fmgc and DaveReidUK on this.

Items such as the original BBC piece (and other pieces in the media) have fed an incorrect public perception which in turn has led to some interesting and sometimes some not particularly helpful comments and even e-mails and letters from some of our more observant passengers.

Unfortunately many of us (even the non-experts such as myself) have to remain tight lipped on the subject.

[airsound]

fmgc, I’m impressed with your 20 years, and management stuff - which of course I didn’t know before.I am an airline pilot of 20 years and am in management.However (there’s always one of those, isn’t there….) - however, I don’t think people need to be ‘qualified’ to comment. I wonder, what actually is a comment qualification, and how does one get it?

What usually happens to me is that I get invited by programmes to appear because I have a track-record as a professional broadcaster with an area of specialist expertise - an area, incidentally, in which many broadcasting organisations have little or no expertise.

I would be fascinated to see your safety case findings. But I suggest you’re being a tad disingenuous if you think I’d be likely to see such any such thing - unless, of course, there was a whistleblower. Not much likelihood of that, perhaps. Or perhaps you could advise the highly-paid helps ‘above your pay level’ that it might be important to tell the travelling masses why you don’t think something is safe?

I also note that, on this thread alone, there seem to be at least as many posters in favour of the two person flight deck as against it. Do you suppose they have safety cases of their own?

As a journo, I have to take a view on the balance of probability. But if you read what I actually wrote for the Beeb, you’ll surely agree that I did not come out firmly on the side of the two person flight deck, merely ”on balance …. probably”. Not exactly a ringing endorsement. Also, I’m not entirely convinced that a longish article in the magazine section of BBC Online has the kind of readership that would affect anybody’s considerations much - especially since the article includes, with traditional BBC 'balance', people on both sides of the argument.

Finally, on the question of whether to have journalistic experts (however defined) or not, I’m fully aware of antipathy from many PPRuNers. But I have to ask whether you actually approve of journalism, as an essential part of democracy, at all. I assume, indeed I hope, you do. If so, would you rather have somebody commenting who does at least know something about aviation, or would you prefer to hear from a general reporter who knows nothing about the subject? Btw, the answer ‘none of the above’ is not open to you…..

airsound

[airsound]

DaveReidUKWhat we really need are more "experts" who acknowledge there are areas in the aviation universe that are outside their competency/comfort zone.

Somehow, I don't see that happening.Well, Dave, I guess you wouldn’t see it, because it’s by definition invisible!

As it happens, I’ve turned down several invitations to be interviewed in the past few months, mostly because I thought the subject wasn’t appropriate for me.

After this current, mildly bruising, PPRuNe encounter, I may well turn down future invites to contribute comment in writing, since the risk of being taken out of context is much greater than in live broadcast interviews.

So…. (small) result, for you, fmgc?!

airsound

[fmgc]

Mr Airsound,


If you comment on things or write articles in the mainstream media then you can only expect to receive differing views and for your qualification to express those views to be questioned, surely it comes with the job.


I have not taken you out of context, you said what you said. "On balance, an extra crew member on the flight deck is probably beneficial" and the rest of your comments just qualify your statement.


I bet that anything you write about with regards to Vulcans, airshows and the ilk are very good and interesting.


My feelings on the press and a debate about that here is not appropriate, but let us just remember that when it comes to "taking things out of context" the press are hardly innocent!


If you had the confidence in what you were writing then I doubt that you would be so ready to throw in the towel. Maybe you would admit that it is reasoned argument and expressed views that has made you reconsider your future invites rather than just getting a mild bruising.

[fmgc]

However (there’s always one of those, isn’t there….) - however, I don’t think people need to be ‘qualified’ to comment. I wonder, what actually is a comment qualification, and how does one get it?


So by not being qualified then incorrect and misleading information is being passed to the public as qualified comment.


I think that in this instance somebody with airline experience, who understands safety cases and who has operated with this policy (ie subject matter experts) would be qualified to comment.

[airsound]

fmgc - I’ve tried to answer your sallies politely and with patience. But you just keep pushing.

I have no problem with anybody questioning what I say or write in public. That comes with the territory. But if you want to push me, then at least pay attention to my responses. As well as being disingenuous (you didn’t answer that one), you’re now being condescending.I bet that anything you write about with regards to Vulcans, airshows and the ilk are very good and interesting.You also choose not to enter the debate about what you call ‘the press’ - but surely that’s absolutely central to what we’re discussing here? You opened this whole thread by questioning my right to comment. I’m telling you why I have every right.

You suggest that only SMEs should be allowed to enter this arena. Well, in an ideal world, maybe. But tell me, please - how does the broadcaster:
a. find these SMEs
b. get the SMEs to speak in public, when they - and their bosses - are institutionally opposed to any such public airing of views.
c. make sure that an SME actually comes over as audience-friendly?

incorrect and misleading information is being passed to the public as qualified commentYou judge that information incorrect - but, as I’ve said, others don’t. And, as I’ve also said, I’d hardly describe my equivocal ‘support’ for the two-person-flight-deck as argument-settling or fact-changing.
If you had the confidence in what you were writing then I doubt that you would be so ready to throw in the towel.Where did I say I was throwing in any towel? All I’ve said is that I may not contribute in writing in the way that I did. As a matter of interest, contributing that way was a first for me - and it didn’t work. But I shall continue with my broadcast work, as long as broadcasters want me to - as they did today in reference to the immensely sad Bergen Super Puma event.

So, fmgc - may I suggest that we agree to differ? Neither of us is going to change the way we do things much, if at all. And I expect PPRuNe is probably fed up with this dialogue anyway…….

airsound

[fmgc]

I fundamentally disagree with most everything you say in your post so let's, as you suggest, agree to differ.

[Aluminium shuffler]

In my perception, the problem lies with lazy news corporations. They don't have specialist journalists or researchers any more, and throw together extremely badly researched stories. To gain any sense of credibility, they then wheel out a paid name who often compounds the rubbish. David Learmount and John Nichol are two good examples (the latter excelling himself on the first night of the second Gulf War, and Learmont's initial BBC interviews on the recent hijacking were pretty epic). The good commentators are rarely noticed, if used, as they don't give the punchy comments that the preferred "experts" give. Unfortunately, this means that the whole group's reputation is tarnished. Of course, the same is true of pundits in most fields of specialisation.

[IcePack]

Let's face it "the press" don't have a clue about aviation. In over 40 years of flying I have seen that the press not only don't know the difference between a Boeing or an Airbus but between 4 engined & 2 engined. Also some supposedly knowledgeable writer believing pilots only do 10 hours work a week, when in fact it is more like 50. As for 2 in the cockpit how many times have press articles made out their is only 1 pilot operating the airliner.
Streuth

[anengineer]

Slightly related to the recent discussion (journos / pilots), whilst it's obvious that most journos will have no flying skills, the standard of written English by many pilots here leaves a great deal to be desired ! That said, I'd rather be flown by a pilot who can't string a sentence together than a journo who can't fly !

[airsound]

I'd rather be flown by a pilot who can't string a sentence together than a journo who can't fly !Indeed, anengineer.

Like most broadcasters, I've been involved in my share of cockups, live, on air. In the inevitable washup afterwards, there are always the questions 'How did that happen?', and 'How can we stop it happening again?' But there's also usually someone who says "It's only broadcasting - nobody died."

airsound

[aguadalte]

Most national agencies have implemented the “minimum two crew members in the cockpit rule" as a response to EASA SIB No.: 2015-04.

From that day on, every time, one of the pilots needs to leave the cockpit for physiological reasons, a cabin crew member, has to be called to "watch" the other pilot's movements, in order not to allow him/her to lock the door and plunge the aircraft into the sea or into a mountain hill...

Not only this recommendation was immediately implemented by most agencies, without proper investigation and consideration for unforeseen risks, just to appease the public opinion, but was turned into a rule in many countries.

There is nothing an element seated in the first observers seat can do to prevent a suicidal pilot to crash an aircraft! (Every pilot knows that). From take-off to landing phases, there are a miriade of ways to intentionally crash an airliner and so, the ultimate goal should be, to reassure that we have psychologically fit pilots at the controls at any time. Not to have watch dogs at their back.

On the other hand, the permission granted to third persons to enter the cockpit — while there is only one pilot at the controls — even if that person is authorized in accordance with CAT.GEN.MPA.135, leaves that pilot alone, facing forward, completely vulnerable (offering his/her's back), to another person, he/she knows nothing about, and that could well be a potencial suicidal person…

It is a question of statistics, therefore, a question of time: the more people are granted access to the flight deck, the greater is the risk of one of them being a suicidal potential person.

So, the million dollar question is: why grant more people access (while the other pilot is alone in the cockpit), if he/she is unable to prevent a malicious pilot to crash an airliner?

There are no final solutions for the prevention of suicidal pilot's misbehavior. But a good start would be to facilitate a closer relationship between management (Fleet Chief Pilots, GeneralOps Management, HR, psychologists, TRI'/TRE's, SMS, etc) and their working force mates.

A more human and closer relationship done through the promotion of workshops and leisure events and specially through the integration within the workforces of companies while dignifying careers and wages.

A system where a pilot would feel at ease to talk freely about his/her personal life, without being afraid of being judged, penalized (personally and economically), nor prejudiced by being honest.

In my humble opinion, this recommendation is unsafe and doesn’t motivate operators to accept the responsibility to do their homework on the establishment of preventive mesures for a healthy work environment.

[FlightDetent]

There is nothing an element seated in the first observers seat can do to prevent a suicidal pilot to crash an aircraft! Yes there is.

To open the door for the raid party.

[Denti]

How with a crashe axe in their brain?

[WhatsaLizad?]

Yes there is.

To open the door for the raid party.


Do the skilled combat members of your "raid party" have any recent cockpit assault training in zero G? :E

[Uplinker]

Suicidal folk are not generally the type to take violent action against other people. They will usually quietly, privately take their own life.

With another person on the flight deck, the latent suicide also knows that their actions are likely to be thwarted - either by the other pilot, or by the F/A opening the door to allow the other pilot back in, so there is not much point in the suicide even trying anything - they are unlikely to be successful.

The problem is that a suicidal person left alone in a locked secure flight deck could convince themselves that they are now 'alone' and that their actions will only affect themselves.

The solution is quite simple: Move the secure cockpit door rearwards so that the forward toilet cubicle becomes part of the cockpit. Then no pilot needs to leave the flight deck during flight, even for a comfort break. If passengers complain about there being no forward toilet or higher ticket prices, say sorry, but remind them it is for greater security. I don't remember them complaining when the locked cockpit doors were first fitted.

This will cost money, but until 9/11, most aircraft did not have secure locking cockpit doors, and as soon as the security flaw was recognised, action was taken. The threat of the latent suicide by a non terrorist was possibly unrecognised until this crash, but a solution exists and action can be taken again.

[framer]

It was well recognised.

[Icarus2001]

The threat of the latent suicide by a non terrorist was possibly unrecognised until this crash,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SilkAir_Flight_185

I don't remember them complaining when the locked cockpit doors were first fitted.

Why would they, there was no impact on passengers?

[AfricanSkies]

Move the armoured door backwards - just fore of row 1. The passengers are the threat. Lock them in, not the crew.

Then there would be a crew toilet, a crew galley, more space, better relations with cabin crew, happier work environment.

[evansb]

Would the above mentioned configuration be practical in a 19-seat turbo-prop?
Of course not..

[Parker13]

The passengers are the threat. Lock them in, not the crew.

Surely you didn't make that statement in a thread about the Germanwings incident.