B-738 Crash in Russia Rostov-on-Don

[Vc10Tail]

The ILS glide slope for this runway is very flat at 2.67 degrees. The Jepp chart also has warnings about turbulence and windshear on final.
Cat 1 minima is 480(200)- 700m RVR
Can someone post the ILS App plate and Airport chart with minima?

With thanks

[Snowcat]

What about if the wing never stalled. After watching the video showing the GA I am interested in the stabilizer , what happened to it in the GA, it was loaded with ice or clean ? It was the stab that stalled ? May be there is something that we dont know about this plane, even after millons of hours.
By the way I fly NG everyday

[win_faa]

Another cctv of FZ981. From the video, it seems that it took only about a minute after the go-around when the crash occurs.

https://youtu.be/8BZbQzFuj9M

[ManaAdaSystem]

I know one thing that would make a light 737 go up like a rocket, and make it hard to control; A WS escape manouver with throttles to the walls.
That is how we train it in the simulator. We also normally set the MCP altitude up (just spin the wheel) to avoid altitude capture and confusing FD commands.
IF you get altitude capture and try to follow the FD commands, now commanding nose down with engines producing (27K ?) max thrust, things could go pear shaped really fast.
6 hours into this flight, at night, bad weather, tired, a number of holes are lined up.

For those European pilots who claim their rosters are just as bad. Do you routinely fly night turn arounds? Four hour flights into the night, then back again? 8 days off in a month? Switch between day and night duty?

[porkflyer]

Try Turkish Airlines 100/110 hours roster with multiple consecutive night duties ending early morning followed by 0100/0300 AM starts for 4/5 hours night turns to Iran Iraq followed by early morning with no whatsoever consideration for circadian rhythm..8 days off often followed by 0015 starts absolutely crazy.. This profession as become a business for masochist with no self respect trading their health and longevity for a little of cash.

[STEXUP]

A possible scenario: fatigue induced error, engine anti ice left off... engine failure...loss of control...or again..un commanded rudder. I have seen all post critical of 737 being removed... Boeing is watching..

[framer]

Its great to know you would not bust FTLs (you legend). There is nothing saying this FO did either. Unless you have facts stop trying to degrade him.
Genuine miscommunication here donpiz.
I can see how my post could be read that I was degrading the First Officer but my intention was not that. The opposite is true but the way I phrased it was not clear.
I was trying to make a comment on FTL's , not on the First Officer.
Framer

[EGPFlyer]

The off duty time on the 10th was 1140AM, not PM.

[Avenger]

AFS Operation in Windshear General
Automatic Flight Chapter : 12-4 System Description Section : 20
The autopilot and flight director provide positive corrective action to counteract most windshears. The autothrottle system also aids in windshear recovery by providing quick response to any increase or decrease in speed. The commanded levels of power may be beyond what the average pilot considers necessary but, in fact, are required by the situation.
Takeoff or Go–Around
If windshear is encountered during F/D takeoff or go–around, the F/D pitch command bar provides commands to maintain the target speed until vertical speed decreases to approximately +600 fpm. At this point, the F/D pitch bar commands a 15 degree nose–up pitch attitude. If vertical speed continues to decrease, the F/D continues to command a 15 degree pitch attitude until a speed of approximately stick shaker is reached. It then commands pitch attitudes which result in intermittent activation of the stick shaker. As the airplane transits the windshear condition, the F/D programming reverses. As climb rate increases above approximately +600 fpm, the F/D commands pitch attitudes which result in
acceleration back to the target speed. The A/P and F/D both operate in a similar manner during A/P or F/D go–around.
Approach and Landing
If windshear is encountered during an ILS approach, both the F/D and A/P attempt to hold the airplane on altitude, or on glideslope after glideslope capture, without regard to angle of attack or stick shaker limitations. Airspeed could decrease below stick shaker and into a stall if the pilot does not intervene by pushing the TO/GA switch or disconnecting the A/P and flying manually.
WARNING!
Although the F/D, A/P and A/T may be performing as previously described, severe windshear may exceed the performance capability of the system and/or the airplane. In this situation, the flight crew must, if necessary to avoid ground contact, be prepared to disconnect the autothrottle, advance thrust levers to the forward stop, disconnect the autopilot and manually fly the airplane.

There is no need to "spin up " MCP altitudes, just follow the FD commands if "within the aircraft capability"..of course, the aircraft capability and Pilot capability are different matters...

It looks possible this aircraft may have entered CB clouds in the GA..control problems and stalled..

[ManaAdaSystem]

If you have 3000 ft in the MCP window and fly a WS escape the flight directors will capture that altitude. The system will not disregard the altitude.
TS has been discussed before. Not likely according to the weather experts.

Against the WS scenario is the radio handover that was pretty normal.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Try Turkish Airlines 100/110 hours roster with multiple consecutive night duties ending early morning followed by 0100/0300 AM starts for 4/5 hours night turns to Iran Iraq followed by early morning with no whatsoever consideration for circadian rhythm..8 days off often followed by 0015 starts absolutely crazy.. This profession as become a business for masochist with no self respect trading their health and longevity for a little of cash.

Sorry, I forgot about Turkish, but their accident statistics speaks for itself.
They are a sort of European airline.

When it comes to comparing rosters, I am sure if I post a roster with 5 nights, one day off, five nights, some pilot would immediately claim their roster is worse.

[de facto]

Operative weather radar?strange pilot is asking how the weather is outside the tower's window..
Regardless of whether there were actual large CB or TS, all the clues were there...
High pitch following a go around is not unheard of,,,cobra maneuver as i was told..40 deg+ pitch...unless one in front is switched on,it can obvioulsy go bad very quick.
Some mentioned the facilities of airport or lack of, could have been a factor.
When a landing is not possible at destination an alternate airport is normally chosen based on a few factors..weather,fuel,performance restrictions,airport familiarity,then maintenance facilty if required and pax comfort,cost related.

[de facto]

Manada,

If you have 3000 ft in the MCP window and fly a WS escape the flight directors will capture that altitude. The system will not disregard the altitude.

For crying out loud...if you are a pilot,maybe its time you review your basic maneuvers:ugh:

That is how we train it in the simulator. We also normally set the MCP altitude up (just spin the wheel) to avoid altitude capture and confusing FD commands.

Sad really,and you work for an airline?

[ManaAdaSystem]

I can only speak for myself, but I have on a number of occasions done exactly what he did. Asked the tower guys how it looks from their station. They have a very good view all around, and first class knowledge of the local conditions.
I have also called the tower a number of times before deparure to get a fresh update of conditions. Obviously I don't call LHR tower to ask them, but the smaller airports are just happy to help.

Airmanship and CRM in practice. Use all available means.

[PBY]

Quote:
Judging by the various comments in this thread, it makes me wonder if airlines permit their crews to fly an ILS manually, anymore? Is it that dangerous to do so? Or is that for CAVOK approaches only?
Yes,thanks god.
I do it each day i fly to base,about 15/20 mins of manual,no FD...done a go around raw data at 50 feet due to a blocked runway,yeah an extra 10-15 of manual.
We not only do it but enjoy it but yes some who dont do it may find it stressful rather than enjoyable.


De Facto does manual flying with no FDs. He is one of the few these days, who can do it. Only few airline captains today are confident enough to fly without FDs or are able to "see through the FDs. There is a real jungle out there.
As the Airbus training " airbus philosophy" used to say: Captain does not need to be a good pilot, he needs to be a good manager. Thankfully they stopped saying that after AF447. Most captains cannot fly basic ILS without FDs even when they are fresh. Now imagine adding fatigue to it. It is a very sad state of the industry. But if any demanding flying need to be done close to the ground, for example a go around with an early turn, the outcome will be shaky even with the well rested majority of captains. Many of you guys who read this post, you know your limits and your low level of flying skills. Yes you are very afraid of simulator checks. But I am not blaming you. I am blaming the management. Because I know that if you were exposed to the right kind of training, you would improve very quickly. But the ambitious guys in the training management are most of the time not real instructors. Yes, legally they are instructors. But airline instructor gets only few days of CRM teaching techniques, but was never trained on how to teach flying. And the airlines are full of non-instructors. Flying by hand is considered dangerous. And rightly so. Because if the pilots lost their basic skill, it is dangerous. But if you know how to fly, it is easy. Anytime lack of flying skill is discussed in airlines, most people are quiet. These days it is so normal, not having a basic flying skills, if you are an airline captain. And airlines do not teach it. They prefer to mindlessly punish people for infractions on FDRs. Simulators are used for teacing complicated procedures, which could be discussed in a classroom and valuable sim time, which could give guys flying skill confidence backback is waisted in a freeze mode. There must be a fresh air on this. FAA is saying, lack of flying skills is an endemic. but the guys, who can really teach it are not welcome in training departments. They could make the other guys look bad. I know, most pilots who are non-pilots will not believe this post. I have never believed that airlines could be in such a state. Having said that, there are few exceptions, where the training is good. But most of the captains, who are regularly flying passengers these days do not have the private pilot basic flying skills! That could be easily fixed in the sim and on the line. Guys could have confidence back quick. But IT IS NOT BEING DONE! It is a blind, leading the blind. good trainers are few or are prevented from training others.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Enlighten me, de facto.

In the simulator we do the worse case CB WS. You will crash if you don't use throttle to the walls and aggressively follow the FD (or momentary stick shaker if FD is not available).
I am not saying I will follow the FD commands in a level off, but the system will capture the altitude.

Are you saying this is not correct?

I have had reactive WS three time in real life. Non of them required max thrust.

[de facto]

MANADA,

NOT CORRECT.
Enlighten me, de facto.
Certainly,
During a WS,you need to press a TOGA switch,in manual or automated thrust...for a reason..
Please review your basic WS escape maneuver,,,,in your aircraft QRH,gladly provided by boeing to review such if flying near or close possible windshear area.

PBY,

Nothing to do with raw data flying.
Pressing TOGA as laid down in boeing WS escape maneuver,will provide FD guidance to initial 15 deg,no guidance to MCP altitude at all.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Yes, you press TOGA to get WS guidance, but it will not override the altitude set in the FMC.
At least it does not in our simulator. I have seen this a number of times.

I fail to see what this has to do with my basic manouvering skills?

I would be very happy if you could show me where it says that altitude capture is overridden by TOGA in a WS.

BUT, however nice it is to discuss the finer points of automation and flying skills here, these two guys got something thrown at them after six hours of flying, tired and in darkness, that confused them to so much that they lost control of the aircraft and crashed.

What? I can't wait to find out. I fly the NG, so I need to know.

[cessnapete]

Virgin UK also apparently high level of sickness due fatigue.

[Notwhatihadplanned]

That's as maybe, ho can argue.
You certainly don't mean FMC in that sentence though do you?
Perhaps you are tired habibi.
Cheers

[Skyjob]

Pressing TOGA as laid down in boeing WS escape maneuver,will provide FD guidance to initial 15 deg,no guidance to MCP altitude at all.

You are correct in this statement de facto.
However you are most importantly WRONG in the logic behind the FD's.

Pressing TO/GA will command a thrust increase, for either case GA or WS Escape.
It does NOT differentiate between them when reaching an altitude preset in the MCP, it WILL acquire the altitude.

Hence there is a threat when a (low level) altitude for a missed approach is selected, as WS Escape will terminate...

Anticipate!

[victorc10]

What is all this nonsense about people not being able to hand fly either with or without FD, or fly ILS. What utter crap. If you don't practice now and again, sure your your handling might be a bit rough (i.e. not so smooth) but your not going to turn into a jellyfish...like some people on here seem to think. And if your company lets you turn the FD off then turn it off if you want, if they don't leave it on.

In any case the FD doesn't always have the same objective as the pilot flying with regards to rates etc etc....so begs the question, when the company says FD on..but do not specify.....FD on and follow the FD, do they actually want you to follow them? because if you haven't programmed them properly they may not give you the guidance you want...also if you begin a manoeuvre before updating the AP or FMC the FD is very slow to update and "join you" in the manoeuvre, I can only speak for one of the Boeing types I have operated where we were not restricted by SOP's.

[Hotel Tango]

I'm not surprised that these poor guys possibly got something wrong. You only need to read the disagreements between qualified pilots on this thread. Quite frightening for SLF to read when you think about it!

[Leftfoot]

Just looking at the one CCTV video, that wind looked hectic....gusting! No wonder the pilot pulled out.

[B737SFP]

http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2014_q3/pdf/AERO_2014q3.pdf

Not long ago Boeing released this issue of their AERO Magazine...

"Performing Safe Go-Around Maneuvers"

Is one of the topics !

They describe few cases where things went south pretty fast during a Go Around, and I quote the following:

Extreme nose-down attitude. Since 2000,
several incidents have involved extreme
nose-down attitudes during the go-around
maneuver on different types of airplanes
from different manufacturers. These inci-
dents often result from a breakdown in
correct cockpit instrument scanning. Here
are some examples:

■ After the PF initiated a manual go-around
at night over the sea, at 1,000 feet
(305 meters), the PF kept a prolonged
pitch-down input resulting in a 15-degree
nose-down attitude and a dive that was
not recovered before the impact with the
sea. The amplitude and duration of the
initial reaction by the PF to the “pull-up”
warning from the ground proximity warn-
ing system (GPWS) was insufficient
(i.e., a full back stick input was required).

■ After the PF initiated a manual go-around
in instrument conditions, and approach-
ing 2,500 feet (762 meters), the flight
director altitude capture mode was
activated earlier than expected by the
crew because of a high rate of climb.
The PF manually initiated a level-off
but kept a prolonged pitch-down input
that resulted in a dive that reached
an extreme negative attitude (minus
40 degrees). The PF recovered from
the dive at about 400 feet (122 meters)
above the ground with a vertical accel-
eration of 3.6 g-force (g).

■ After the PF initiated a manual go-around
at night over the sea, the altitude acqui-
sition mode activated while approaching
the selected altitude and the PF pitched
down to level off. The indicated airspeed
increased toward the maximum for the
configuration. Instead of leveling off, the
PF kept a prolonged pitch-down input.
The attitude quickly decreased and
reached a negative 9-degree pitch with
a vertical speed of 4,000 feet (1,219
meters) per minute. When the GPWS
activated, the PF reacted by pitching the
airplane up. The minimum altitude was
600 feet (183 meters) over the sea. The
total duration of the event was about
15 seconds. Neither pilot could explain
the reason for the upset.

In all of these examples, pilots reacted
very late to extreme negative attitudes
displayed on both attitude director indicator
(ADI) instruments. All of these events
happened at night over a dark area or in
instrument meteorological conditions. At
the time of the upset, in the absence of
visual reference, the only attitude infor-
mation was provided by the ADIs. When
flying manually or when monitoring the auto-
pilot, the ADIs are at the center of a control
process in which pilots must detect and
then quickly and accurately correct devia-
tions from targeted values.

So... What do you guys think? The scenario here looks very close to the examples above, doesn't it?

[despegue]

I have never worked for, nor am I prepared to work for any "Airline" that forbids its flightcrew to fly manually or raw-data.

Any such company should have its AOC revoked immediately untill raw data manual flying is encouraged.

And I can not believe that any Capt. Of a modern airline is unable to fly an all engine raw-data ILS.

Don't all airlines practice complete assymetrical thrust raw-data ILS anymore in the sim? It is a pass/fail item where I came from!

[tarik123]

How about the new FAR117 that is used in the US and Saudi Arabia, where pilots could fly 6 sectors per day, max rest time is 10 hours regardless of what time of the day you get your rest. 30 minutes after chocks on is considered part of the rest time. And the best is that pilots must sign a paper before each flight that they are fit to fly??? and if for any reason the pilot could not continue the full 4 or more sectors, then he is at fault because he already declared that he is fit. And the best part if you call fatigue for any reason, then you have to answer to the computer who would tell you that what you feel is not right because according to its calculation you are legal to fly.

[de facto]

Hotel tango,When the automatics dont do what we want,we disconnect them,no worries here,thatis if pilots arent released to the line as captains unless they can fly an altitude,heading and speed without stress.
Skyjob,please refer an info you may have other than the sim did it.
The FD logic is different when TOGA is pressed in a windshear or not in a windshear.

[aterpster]

despegue:

I have never worked for, nor am I prepared to work for any "Airline" that forbids its flightcrew to fly manually or raw-data.

Any such company should have its AOC revoked immediately untill raw data manual flying is encouraged.

And I can not believe that any Capt. Of a modern airline is unable to fly an all engine raw-data ILS.

Don't all airlines practice complete assymetrical thrust raw-data ILS anymore in the sim? It is a pass/fail item where I came from!

I saw the beginning the "disease" in the 1980s. Prior to my transition to the early 767 everything was as you say on the 707, DC-9-10, 880, and 727. But, along comes the 767 and with it came a new embracing by the company of the automatics. IMHO, this was the way Boeing sold and promoted this then-new automatic "wonder." And, the airlines bought the philosophies the OEM sold. After my stint on the 767 I went to the L-1011. In my view the 1011 had better automatics than the 767 but my airline's training command wasn't hard over on the 1011 automatics like it was with the 767.

[Vortex Thing]

Perhaps PKP this is because the METARS frequently lie like NAAFI watch.

Trust me when I arrived in Dubai incidentally from THY where the rosters were loads easie to manage and much better in B737 fleet! I also found it odd, I was an FO then and the skippers would often ask for the actual weather.

After operating to all of the 18 Russian destinations from braking action poor, to -37 degC, to 35 kts across the Rwy in fog. I also sarted to ask the same question.

You call it mistrust if you want to. We call it experience! If you're experience of Russia is a Cat 2 into UUDD or UUEE then it is a very different world east of the Urals!

[PBY]

Quoted VictorC10
What is all this nonsense about people not being able to hand fly either with or without FD, or fly ILS. What utter crap. If you don't practice now and again, sure your your handling might be a bit rough (i.e. not so smooth) but your not going to turn into a jellyfish...like some people on here seem to think. And if your company lets you turn the FD off then turn it off if you want, if they don't leave it on.

VictorC10, from your quote I am guessing you have no experience as a trainer.
Because there is a HUGE difference in the required skill in flying with or without FDs ( Flight Directors). I can teach a 8 years old boy in a simulator to fly reasonably following a flight director. Because he just follows it blindly like a computer game and he does not scan or questions the FDs commands. But I need 45 minutes of hard training to make most captains to be able to fly a raw data ILS within limits. And most airlines don't seem to understand it, the same way you don't understand it.
From your remarks about, if my company allows me to switch off flight directors I deduced, that you are not allowed to switch off flight directors. If you did it, you would have a nasty surprise, how badly your skill deteriorated. I fly often without FDs to keep my skill. May be I am less talented, but I need it to do it once a week to keep my skill sharp. For those who are not pilots, Flight Directors make out of flying, unlike raw data no FDs flying, a simplified computer game, where the pilot just keeps a dot in a cross or similar design. And many pilots loose the ability to scan instruments. It is amazing, how fast the brain becomes a jelly, if you allow it to. I think that those who do not practise, play a russian rulette with he passengers. Because this skill does not come back under fatigue and stress. And your airline is playing russian rulette with passengers by not allowing yiu flying without FDs. Because that is the only way to get your scan back. At least do it in a nice sunny afternoon, with light winds.

[Vortex Thing]

Luckily the comments re hand flying are not relevant here. Hand flying is encouraged and done often at FDB those who dont do it are because they chose not to.

It is so encouraged that all LVPs are hand flown to the ground. So lets not get into if the crew were proficient in hand flying.

Knackered, perhaps even likely but proficiency is likely as bad as other airlines when it comes to hand flying. Sister airline North of the RWY has handling sims because hand flying is not encouraged.

Lets stick to the facts.

Speaking of not sticking to the facts....

FlyDubai Crash In Russia Now Labeled “Criminal Act” After US Missile Fragments Found (http://www.whatdoesitmean.com/index2016.htm)

[de facto]

From my notes,
Please see the difference between a FD in normal toga mode and one in enhanced WS recovery mode.
They may be displayed the same way,unlike for example an RA guidance but the system behind is different.
The sim may not display the difference or simply the system was out of the WS,FD go back to standard mode and alt acq mcp altitude.

The Flight Director was chosen as the guidance system because it is simple, displayed on the ADI, and pilots use it on a routine basis. The windshear recovery enhancement flight director will provide proper flight, path guidance only when operating in the TOGA pitch mode (i.e., with TOGA annunciated). The control inputs for the guidance come from vertical speed, airspeed and angle of attack. When using the windshear recovery enhanced flight guidance system, the command guidance control laws are:
• V/S Greater than 1200 fpm - The F/D will maintain a minimum of cursor speed.
• V/S Less than 1200 fpm and Down to 600 fpm - As the V/S decreases, the F/D command will slowly adjust from speed control to pitch control so that at 600 FPM the F/D will command 15 degrees pitch and disregard airspeed.V/S 600 fpm Down to 0 fpm - The F/D will slowly adjust from 15° pitch toward optimum pitch (the angle of attack for stick shaker minus 2 degrees).
• V/S Less than 0 fpm - The F/D will maintain the angle of attack for stick shaker minus 2 degrees.
• When the aircraft departs the windshear environment, the flight director will smoothly transition back to the normal takeoff or go-around mode.

[ExDubai]

Vortex With that link you've opend Pandoras box ;)

[de facto]

I would doubt they'd go out in such atrocious weather.:}

[porkflyer]

Trust me when I arrived in Dubai incidentally from THY where the rosters were loads easie to manage and much better in B737 fleet! I also found it odd, I was an FO then and the skippers would often ask for the actual weather.

Vortex ..I'm talking of Cpt rosters in THY..not FO that had it a quite bit easier. I flew 999,5 hours in 11 months... kind of enough for me bye bye. Ryanair is a dream airline if compared.

[PBY]

Vortex Thing,
you are saying that LVP approaches in FDB are manually flown to the ground.
That is the extremely easy hand flying, as you are strictly following FDs.
So based on your reply, I think the crew do not practice efficient scanning, which can happen only in hand flying without FDs. Are we really professional people here, if we cannot distinguish there is a huge difference in the work load and skill if flying with or without FDs? I can teach 8 years old in 10 minutes in the sim to hand fly LVP all the way to the ground. But again, it takes 45 min of hard training to make a captain learn how to intercept an ILS and fly it to minimums.
As this skill is forgotten quickly, if not practised. From your quote is apparent that FDB is yet another airline where people do not practise scan.
And if I understand de facto correctly, in a go around on the Boeing is very easy to overcontrol and make the FDs crazy and consequently not being able to get it under control, unless you have the ability to see through them and choose a pitch and power. On Airbus the FDs dissapear, if you pitch more than 20 degrees, so you are instantly without a guidance of FDs. I am not sure if Boeing lets you in the dark too in this way. And yes. Having a good scanning ability is important. Can any experienced guy confirm, what I am talking about?

[de facto]

B737 are not easy to overcontrol,fds dont go crazy,however basic knowledge pitch and thrust for all phases of flight is paramount to a safe flight.
FD can be off during flight,not required,even by the automatics.(basically there for take off/GA and manual flight if required).
Boeing clearly says that pilots must know basics of flying,unfortunately because airlines dont ask for a certain level of manual flying,we end up with new checklists,,such as airspeed unreliable,designed to keep the aircraft from stalling or overspeeding while they reach for the basics of pitch and thrust.
Boeing also states in their manuals that the pilot should decrease automatics if needed...that is of course pilots can handle it.
You see they still believe pilots may have more problems with automatics than with manual flying....until you see some in the sim... a real mcp piano in progress..scary yes....
But sorry im drifting again,,,back to terrorists.....

[silverstrata]

Not long ago Boeing released this issue of their AERO Magazine...

They describe few cases where things went south pretty fast during a Go Around, and I quote the following:

So... What do you guys think? The scenario here looks very close to the examples above, doesn't it?

Thanks for those examples.

The first sounds like acceleration diorientation, which killed a number of fast jet pilots in the early years. The sim does not duplicate this well. I think it has been mentioned on this thread before.

The second two sound like stall confusion. In light training I have seen several pilots confuse zero-g with a stall, and so they push more and more to 'unstall' the aircraft. And if you are not careful, you end up pointing vertically down.

Another problem identified from this thread, is the poor understanding of systems and procedures by some pilots (presuming they fly) - not even understanding capture modes, for instance. This is due to the week of ground-training each year, being replaced by a stupid questionaire, that has no relevence to the operation whatsoever. Some office clerk goes through a manual and pulls out stupid facts that nobody needs - like "at what angle of bank will CWS level the wings 3, 4, or 5 degrees". Nobody ever uses CWS (never seen it used in 20 years) and nobody gives a stuff which exact degree is limiting (which you cannot measure anyway).

The result is a new generation of pilots who never discuss the primary flight and engineering issues of the aircraft, as a group in the classroom. And they never have overnights, so they have never sat in the bar listening to the grizzled old captain recounting all the gotchas on the aircraft, and so they know nothing. Each pilot in the fleet is reinventing his or her own wheel, and some coming up with penagons and hexagons. Its sad, because the entire history of aviation is being lost to a new generation who know next to nothing.

ST

[ManaAdaSystem]

You have a major flaw in your notes, de facto.
You are not required to press TOGA to get into WS mode. Only if you are on an ILS. This is from the FCOM. In reality it matters very little as we press TOGA as part of the manouver.
And your notes does not say a thing about altitude capture being inhibited during WS. In my experience, it is not. Nowhere is that stated in the FCOM.

B737SFPs quote from the Boeing article is very close to what I believe happened here. Read it and weep.

From the 737 NG FCOM:

Takeoff or Go–Around
If windshear is encountered during F/D takeoff or go–around, the F/D pitch command bar provides commands to maintain the target speed until vertical speed decreases to approximately +600 fpm. At this point, the F/D pitch bar commands a 15 degree nose–up pitch attitude. If vertical speed continues to decrease, the F/D continues to command a 15 degree pitch attitude until a speed of approximately stick shaker is reached. It then commands pitch attitudes which result in intermittent activation of the stick shaker. As the airplane transits the windshear condition, the F/D programming reverses. As climb rate increases above approximately +600 fpm, the F/D commands pitch attitudes which result in acceleration back to the target speed. The A/P and F/D both operate in a similar manner during A/P or F/D go–around.

Approach and Landing
If windshear is encountered during an ILS approach, both the F/D and A/P attempt to hold the airplane on altitude, or on glideslope after glideslope capture, without regard to angle of attack or stick shaker limitations. Airspeed could decrease below stick shaker and into a stall if the pilot does not intervene by pushing the TO/GA switch or disconnecting the A/P and flying manually.

[tarik123]

Apparently they had a serious weather phenomena between 7000 ft and the ground. I would love to hear from the pilots of Aeroflot that tried the approach 3 times, and could not make a landing. what did they face during the approach.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Silverstrata,

Another problem identified from this thread, is the poor understanding of systems and procedures by some pilots (presuming they fly) - not even understanding capture modes, for instance.

It is not poor understanding of the systems, it is poorly written manuals. When I can't find any information about how the altitude capture logic works when in WS, then I have to rely on my experience from the simulator. de facto says, since it is not written that the FD/AP will capture the altitude, it will not.

Why the AP have to disconnect when you do a single channel approach is a question I have yet to get an answer to. It's a stone age technology, and the reason for several near accidents. You can blame pilots handling skills, but I know what I would prefer when I am dead tired in crappy weather.

[de facto]

My notes are from a major US airline and explain that there is a system difference between the FD guidance during a normal TOGA and during a TOGA in WS condition.

Your statement from the Fcom is typical of poorly written manuals...it states"on approach/landing on an ils ,the AP and FD will try to hold the pitch and speed" .,basic automatic work and thats on a level segment then,not really on an ils now,are we?
From my notes:
Approaches are generally made with the flight directors ON. When the flight director is ON, the command guidance is to maintain either vertical path or level flight. In either case, there is no windshear guidance. Even in windshear conditions, the F/D will command a return to vertical path up to the point of 25° pitch and reaching full stall conditions. To achieve windshear recovery enhancement flight guidance, the aircraft must be flown in the TOGA pitch mode.
So please next time you fly a NPA and enter a WS,i hope youll press Toga anyways...

[Avenger]

You are not required to press TOGA to get into WS mode. Only if you are on an ILS. This is from the FCOM. In reality it matters very little as we press TOGA as part of the manouver.


Non-normal procedures ( Boeing Standard)

Windshear Escape Maneuver
Pilot Flying
Pilot Monitoring
MANUAL FLIGHT
• Disconnect autopilot.
• Press either TO/GA switch.
• Aggressively apply maximum*
thrust.
• Disconnect autothrottle.
• Simultaneously roll wings level and rotate toward an initial pitch attitude of 15 °.
• Retract speedbrakes.
• Follow flight director TO/GA guidance (if available).
• Verify maximum* thrust.
• Verify all required actions have been completed and call out any omissions.
AUTOMATIC FLIGHT
• Press either TO/GA switch**.
• Verify TO/GA mode annunciation. • Verify GA thrust.
• Retract speedbrakes.
• Monitor system performance***.
• Verify GA* thrust.
• Verify all required actions have been completed and call out any omissions.
MANUAL OR AUTOMATIC FLIGHT
• Do not change flap or gear configuration until windshear is no longer a factor.
• Monitor vertical speed and altitude.
• Do not attempt to regain lost
airspeed until windshear is no longer a factor.
• Monitor vertical speed and altitude.
• Call out any trend toward terrain contact, descending flight path, or significant airspeed changes.




[Notwhatihadplanned]

If windshear is encountered during F/D takeoff or go–around,
In this case surely toga toga are the active modes!

the F/D pitch command bar provides commands to maintain the target speed until vertical speed decreases to approximately +600 fpm. At this point, the F/D pitch bar commands a 15 degree nose–up pitch attitude. If vertical speed continues to decrease, the F/D continues to command a 15 degree pitch attitude until a speed of approximately stick shaker is reached. It then commands pitch attitudes which result in intermittent activation of the stick shaker.

If fpm is the controlling input then capturing an altitude would reduce the v/s to zero. This would be below 600fpm so 15 degrees nose up would be commanded (if ws was still detected)

As the airplane transits the windshear condition

Ie the airplane is no longer in wind shear, all bets are now off and fd mode reverts to normal. If you were above commanded mcp altitude you would continue in toga toga until you made another selection. Below mcp alt then yes it would capture (if ws condition is left)

In any other mode below the reactive wind shear threshold, you need to activate toga by pushing the toga button. Otherwise the airplane tries to maintain the commands and uses thrust to the appropriate limit to recapture airspeed. If those modes were arm lvl change speed then..... Well that's a bad day below the reactive wind shear threshold.

Autopilot on a single approach disconnects because you have two ils receivers and one fmc I believe. Therefore the fd system is going from one system monitoring the master ils signal to one system monitoring one system, there is a break in the signal. On a dual channel approach below the self test, you have two systems monitoring two signals, there doesn't have to be a break to go to one system monitoring one fmc signal as something else takes the strain while it thinks.

It's all there it's just not written good
Cheers

[ManaAdaSystem]

Yes, de facto, it is SOP. It's a theoretical discussion, we both know what to do, and I suspect none of us are likely to push the nose down 15 degrees in a go around, FD or no FD.

This thread is being read by thousands, including Boeing reps, instructors and line pilots.
Regarding the issue of altitude capture logic in WS, there must be somebody out there that can put an end to this discussion. With facts dug up from the vaults of Boeing.

[de facto]

the airplane is no longer in wind shear, all bets are now off and fd mode reverts to normal. If you were above commanded mcp altitude you would continue in toga toga until you made another selection. Below mcp alt then yes it would capture (if ws condition is left)

I think some may need to have a reference for that..without the y"all bets are now off" innit:E but yeah i feel ya.

Manada,
If the enhanced guidance in a windshear would guide you to alt acquire then there would be a major flaw in their guidance system not my notes....

[ManaAdaSystem]

Manada,
If the enhanced guidance in a windshear would guide you to alt acquire then there would be a major flaw in their guidance system not my notes....

I agree, but this is the heart of the matter if we are looking at a WS scenario in this accident.
A failure to set the correct MCP altitude, an overshoot and nose down in a regular go around could also explain this accident.

[Notwhatihadplanned]

Quite right old chap.

Here's an accurate one
"As the airplane transits the windshear condition, the F/D programming reverses. As climb rate increases above approximately +600 fpm, the F/D commands pitch attitudes which result in acceleration back to the target speed."

I think that means go on your way, you are free to select another mode and good luck, since a second reactive wind shear alert would be unlikely unless you exited it and levelled off quickly. But I can't be sure because I don't have a reference. :)

The big question then would be, if you encounter wind shear in level flight what would happen? Surely you can't climb away from the mcp altitude?!?!?

I suppose it does raise the point that I've been trying so hard to resist, I wouldn't even begin to relate it to this tragedy..... But in general in airlines these days, where is the airmanship? We all have the same words in the same books (or at least similar) but where we sit as individuals between what the book says and what the book means is diverse. I agree that the tech quiz puts undue emphasis in what the book says and in general, the understanding of the systems is left behind.... This may be because the cost of the instructor is too great to justify a classroom, but I suspect the disease has been set for so long that the general standard of instruction has become so poor that it is pretty much PowerPoint reading these days.

Anyway who am I to cast aspersions in any direction, I too am guilty of an occasional lapse!

Cheers
Nwihp

[Twiglet1]

With respect to comments from FZ Pilots we as outsiders cannot comment on the F/O's roster and if it is fatiguing as the roster pre view is so small. Any sleep scientist commenting here wont mention the F word they will mention the S word = sleepiness = the need to sleep. I hope the Investigators talk to his wife and find out what he did pre flight. Knowing many Spanish Pilots they have a culture of being able to take afternoon naps so he may have been in a good position when reporting.
On hopes that FZ would have risk assessed the possibility of holding for 2 hours going round in circles trying to land at an airport in the middle of no-where at night. One can only suspect neither Pilot would have been able to nap.........
Lastly I hope Fly Dubai now look after the Cockpit and cabin crew families, keep paying their wages, keep them housed etc. If they try blame the crew without recognising their own errors and or the F or S word it will be a cover up for sure.
May they Rest in Peace

[Twiglet1]

There is already a fairly public "paper trail" of fatigue reports on the RT link. Of course, with FlyDubai being Govt owned that will probably just "evaporate". Nonetheless, a decent solicitor could make a very big case against them if someone engaged him/her. I won't speculate on the cause ( I have flown 737 long enough to know "her" foibles & to understand my own human weaknesses when dealing with them) but, a decent legal honcho should assuredly destroy the little scrotes who run the flt ops Dept with no regard for the health/state of alertness of their employees having ignored multiple fatigue reports over the years

Captain - one of the RT fatigue reports mentioned I was on night standby, i couldn't sleep despite trying so I rang in fatigued.
This is how FRM works so in this respect was a positive report

[alainthailande]

Sorry if this is old news but I just saw a tweet from the FR24 guys saying: Flightradar24 data for #FZ981, including a decoded single-receiver extended data set.
Link is: https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/flightradar24-data-for-flydubai-flight-981/
Not sure whether this is more complete data than what has already been discussed here or not.

[bar none]

As a SLF and non aviator I find all the previous posts quite alarming.

There seems to be a discussion about what to do in a given set of circumstances. I would expect everybody to agree as to what the correct course of action should be. The fact that there are many differing opinions i find quite disconcerting.

[furbpilot]

This profession has been diminished to a point that any idiot with 5 neurons a bit of guts and no real understanding of life or self respect can seat in command to the joy of greedy managers that can't wait to find more frustrated morons. Let's regulate again.

[pianopilot]

@bar none: I don't quite share your disconcertment. Airplanes are very complicated working environments and often there is more than one way that will lead to a safe outcome of a potentially dangerous situation.
Also procedures are being amended and systems improved all the time based on occurences or accidents. A discussion of the same is always part of that process.


I don't understand, why, while levelling off, excessive down force was applied, causing the accidents mentioned earlier. When you retard the thrust levers, the pitch up moment decreases right away, so that little down force needs to be applied.

[Chronus]

Bears many similarities to Tatarstan 363, Kazan crash of November 2013.
Even the video footage looks uncannily similar, see link below.
LiveLeak.com - Boeing crash in Kazan city, Russia caught on camera.
Final report was published in December last year. It is in Russian. Does any one have an English version.

[Didacts and Narpets]

Sadly, this accident could have been avoided and should have been. It will now take the deaths of a number of people (And RTs report) to finally draw attention to a serious issue that has gone largely ignored for some time.

[threemiles]

Data show excessive climb rate of 6000 ft/min within 33 seconds after go around from 1125 ft MSL, thereafter accelerating with rates between 2000 and 4000 ft/min for another 20 seconds, before suddenly dropping to ground from 3600 ft within 11 seconds.

First go around started at 1350 ft MSL, was smooth with max. climb rate of 2500 ft/min and acceleration segment.

[Notwhatihadplanned]

Is there a significant pitch change or speed tendency on the ng as the slats retract?
Cheers
Nwihp

Edit: spelling

[Old Boeing Driver]

This video link was posted earlier.

Is it just me, or does the aircraft seem level/normal coming out of the overcast, then take a sharp break to the ground?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ifJ9osyLRqQ

[TypeIV]

I think it's an illusion with the refraction of the clouds getting more sparse around the ceiling. It looks like there was no attempt to pull up before impact which is rather puzzling I must say.

[swish266]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=slL2KMoM3p8

https://www.rt.com/news/336903-flydubai-pilot-fatigue-report/

This is what emi------tion and white slavery is all about.

EK, AY, QR next to come!

:mad:

[Rananim]

What is all this nonsense about people not being able to hand fly either with or without FD, or fly ILS. What utter crap.

Its endemic.Where have you been?
Pilots(old school) like Centaurus/411A(RIP) and myself have been saying this for years on this forum.It needs to be repeated again and again.And the problem is in the training dept,the board and the SOP clutter in the manuals.Ive flown all over in expat land and I have seen it all.Its terrifying.
Yes,fatigue is an issue but at the end of the day,you can refuse a flight if you're too tired.In most airlines anyway.I dont know zip about Flydubai.I have tended to avoid the ME like the plague.I never saw the appeal.
I dont know what happened in Rostov but I do know that we need to call a worldwide conference right now.It should be chaired by PILOTS and they should at the very minimum include reps of SOUTHWEST,QANTAS,and LUFTHANSA..Top of the agenda should be a refocus on airmanship and stick and rudder.Pilots must be on the board and they must be the right pilots,not yes men.Fatigue and rostering also to be addressed.

The travelling public deserve no less.Our profession likewise.

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

What is all this nonsense about people not being able to hand fly either with or without FD, or fly ILS. What utter crap.

AF447. Buffalo. And a few others.

[de facto]

Rananim,

In todays hiring needs,im afraid manual skills arent put in the forefront,possibly maybe only in china.
Considering the rostering,the legal late shift ending at 2am followed by 2 pm start is a killer in itself.
Computer is puking out a legal schedule,a continuous circadian rhythm buster,is unfortunately another accident to happen and not only in flydubai.

[ExSp33db1rd]

What is all this nonsense about people not being able to hand fly either with or without FD, or fly ILS. What utter crap.

....... have been saying this for years on this forum.It needs to be repeated again and again........

Rananim - well said.

[Done with the ME]

[QUOTE]Yes,fatigue is an issue but at the end of the day,you can refuse a flight if you're too tired.... [Unless you work in the ME]

I dont know what happened in Rostov but I do know that we need to call a worldwide conference right now. It should be chaired by PILOTS and they should at the very minimum include reps of SOUTHWEST, QANTAS, and LUFTHANSA..Top of the agenda should be a refocus on airmanship and stick and rudder. Pilots must be on the board and they must be the right pilots, not yes men. Fatigue and rostering also to be addressed./QUOTE]

Perhaps we are our own worst enemies. Whilst i agree whole heartedly with everything you say, there are other pilots waiting in the wings to fill the vacancies as a result of resignations in airlines all over the world... And the ME airlines know this and use it to their recruitment advantage. But still, good people resign.

We don't know what happened here...yet. Knowing the region of origin of this operator, one suspects they will do everything to deflect the responsibility from themselves. They probably have several statements prepared based on the findings to absolve themselves of any responsibility. Probably the actions right now will be about damage limitation.

I guess one remedy is for every ME airline is to just divert to Tel Aviv when the **** hits the fan, because normal methods of communication are lost on this lot!!!

[Hotel Tango]

EK, AY, QR next to come!

AY? Do you really mean Finnair?????

[cooperplace]

Hi Rananim, why have you specifically mentioned Southwest, Qantas and Lufthansa?

[ManaAdaSystem]

As a SLF and non aviator I find all the previous posts quite alarming.

There seems to be a discussion about what to do in a given set of circumstances. I would expect everybody to agree as to what the correct course of action should be. The fact that there are many differing opinions i find quite disconcerting.

We are discussing details about a system which may or may not do certain things in certain situations. Above that we have a procedure so we don't normally have to think about this when we fly.
Above it all we have a Boeing 737 which is a fairly basic aircraft. Provided we are properly trained and rested we can fly it without any of the systems we are discussing here. It will go where we point it.

As a SLF, is you first thought how rested the pilots for your flight will be, or how much the ticket will cost?
You should worry a lot more about how pilots are being used and abused, particulary in areas of the world where unions are not allowed.
Start in the ME forum and read what the FZ and EK pilots have been saying now for a very long time, and why you should not be surprised this sad accident happened.
You don't find anything about the other big UAE carrier, they took PPRuNe to court and stopped their pilots from posting anything here.
Just that should tell you a thing or two.

Enjoy your flight.

[Hotel Tango]

they took PPRuNe to court and stopped their pilots from posting anything here.

Well, not just their pilots actually. All PPRuNers are banned from mentioning them. But it doesn't matter because we all know who "they" are!

[PBY]

Somebody can try to look at Aegean schedule. It is unbelievable, such a slavery in Europe.

[Sciolistes]

I have looked at the low resolution flight radar data that is available. The only scenario that fits the information we currently have is flight control failure/malfunction, specifically the trim/horizontal stab. The go around profile and speeds are consistent with a normal go around - initial climb, then shallower climb to accelerate - the ground speed data is absolutely consistent on this. Then all of a sudden, at around a derived IAS of 220+ kts, a nose over and then an avg of 18500 fpm. Two pilots in a low authority gradient environment and neither one takes control? I can't see it. In my mind they were attempting to recover.

I see the comments regarding the parallels with the Kazan accident, but they already performed a safe go-around and they were already expecting to go around again. The disorientation is of course possible, but in my judgement so very unlikely.

As for fatigue. It may or may not be an issue in general terms. But this crew, from the limited info we have, they seemed to make sensible and logical decisions. They held because they had the endurance, weather was above minima with the worst condition forecast as a tempo, they clearly requested levels to keep them out of icing and they already made a successful go-around.

From what I can see, there is no evidence yet of a lack of SA or of poor judgement. No evidence of a stall and disorientation is so unlikely.

[Walnut]

I am sure its been mentioned before, but in the 20000 hrs I did before retirement I would have diverted before the tragic end. These guys had plenty of fuel so after an initial approach and a consideration of the forecast they should have left.

[donpizmeov]

Just because you are saying it Walnut, does not make it right. He had the fuel to hold, and by doing so keep al his options open. Holding like this happens every day.

[sAx_R54]

Above it all we have a Boeing 737 which is a fairly basic aircraft. Provided we are properly trained and rested we can fly it without any of the systems we are discussing here. It will go where we point it.

@ManaAda After 10 pages of Oh yes it would....Oh no it wouldn't TO/GA flying, doesn't quite sound like there is a general industry concensus on how to point it where you want it to go in WS/TS!

[donpizmeov]

The problem SaX, is that we now have a generation of pilots that have never had a person, be it pilot or FLT Eng teach them about their aircraft. There is now only CBT. The quicker you click the quicker you finish. Pass the tech quiz with no idea of what just happened.

From flight school to airliner. The poor buggas never get a chance to learn how to be a pilot.

[sAx_R54]

From flight school to airliner. The poor buggas never get a chance to learn how to be a pilot.

@donpizmeov Perhaps its time to cram Captains and First Officers into fleets of the most common types piloted by the most experienced in the line with the flight deck screened as 'in flight entertainment', where they are taken through WS/TS and can visually see what buttons are pressed or more importantly not pressed! Perchance there would be some form of concensus on how tight buttocks were clenched or relaxed!

[Lord Farringdon]

The most sensible comment I have seen so far Sciolistes. The only thing I would add is the possibility of uncommanded thrust reverser deployment. Although I have no idea of NG inflight protections in this regard. I also agree that they were most likely fighting for control all the way to impact although at that altitude and decent angle, recovery was most likely impossible. Nevertheless, I would have expected to see the wings roll level (or at least start to). Something was stopping those guys from having any influence on the aircraft at all. TR deployment in flight is very rare these days so is probably unlikely but it doesn't sound like fatigue or bad airline management no matter how much it is discussed.

[de facto]

Uncommanded reversers in flight is remote...would happen only due to multiple systems failure.

[FullWings]

The only scenario that fits the information we currently have is flight control failure/malfunction, specifically the trim/horizontal stab. The go around profile and speeds are consistent with a normal go around - initial climb, then shallower climb to accelerate - the ground speed data is absolutely consistent on this. Then all of a sudden, at around a derived IAS of 220+ kts, a nose over and then an avg of 18500 fpm. Two pilots in a low authority gradient environment and neither one takes control? I can't see it. In my mind they were attempting to recover.
Given the data we have at the moment, I would have to agree.

It’s all normal until suddenly it isn’t. In terms of acceleration, +2,500fpm to -18,500fpm in seconds is substantial. That’s a change in velocity of >100m/s in the vertical plane in a very short time which would imply considerable negative ‘g’, most likely outside the aircraft limitations and possibly enough to cause structural failure...

[bradyx10]

New article on BBC. Covering the fatigue reports from Fly Dubz crew.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35855678

I was just speaking to a member of EK's cabin crew yesterday.....utterly exhausted crew on a recent turn around.

[Kolossi]

That’s a change in velocity of >100m/s in the vertical plane in a very short time which would imply considerable negative ‘g’, most likely outside the aircraft limitations and possibly enough to cause structural failure...

... and possible GLOC (redout) explaining lack of obvious corrective action? it looks pretty abrupt, would it be enough to cause this, or injury to one or both pilots?

[Admiral346]

It’s all normal until suddenly it isn’t. In terms of acceleration, +2,500fpm to -18,500fpm in seconds is substantial. That’s a change in velocity of >100m/s in the vertical plane in a very short time which would imply considerable negative ‘g’, most likely outside the aircraft limitations and possibly enough to cause structural failure...

The egg or the chicken?

What caused what?

Did a hard negative G manouver cause the elevator (Hor. Trim,...) to fail, or did it fail by unknown reasons and cause the plane to dive?

Today it has been 1 year exactly since the Germanwings accident.

Is something like that thinkable? I doubt it.

The most probable scenario to me is some kind of failure on the tail, that caused the nose over, and the inability to roll it back to wings level.
Maybe ice, or the combination of ice and an A/P disconnecting. I always hand fly in heavy ice...

Nic

[beamender99]

FlyDubai crash pilot 'was due to leave job over fatigue'

FlyDubai crash pilot 'was due to leave job over fatigue' - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35855678)

[clearedtocross]

Two facts:
The pros agree on bashing airline management.
The pros disagree on how to perform the most basic evasive maneuvre in one of the most common aircraft of this world.

If I'd be airline manager, I would see to it that all the crews flying a given type agree on how to perform a GA with or without WS before they start ranting about rosters.
Of course, fatigue can impair performance. But this is true for many professions, not only flying. A pro should be able to find remedies or avoids.
The poor crew had enough time to brief their options and after a more than bumpy approach into a howling gale probably enough adrenalin to stay awake until either stopped or safely aloft.

[MrSnuggles]

I think it is kind of funny that Russia Today is the outlet for the whistleblower over fatigue concerns. It is awesome that they highlight this, as it needs to be highlighted. At the same time.... it is Russia Today we are dealing with. Do they have a hidden agenda with this?

Then again. I think it is extremely important that they make fatigue the centre of attention and for that I applaud them.

(Just hoping MAK still will make a thorough investigation.)

[framer]

Clearedtocross; Your first post in 2007 starts withI am no professional pilot.
and then today you tell us
If I'd be airline manager
So.....if you're not a pilot and you're not a manager......... why do you think you understand the issues we are discussing here as well as, or better than those of us who do it day in day out?

[silvertate]

Bar none.

As a SLF and non aviator I find all the previous posts quite alarming.

There seems to be a discussion about what to do in a given set of circumstances. I would expect everybody to agree as to what the correct course of action should be. The fact that there are many differing opinions i find quite disconcerting.


You have reason to be slightly alarmed. And I will try to explain why this has come about.

The B737 was not designed. It was a B707, a B 727, a B737 Classic, and then a B737 NG, with hundreds of modern sticking-plasters patching up the system-gaps. And so the systems do not talk to each other, and nor is there any rhyme or reason to the systems and the cockpit ergonomics. It is a design by several committees, over three human generations of designers and engineers, all doing something different.

To compound the issue many airlines (Fly Dubai?) lease aircraft that have come from many different previous operators, and so each aircraft will have a different system and do something different. Our fleet has a subsection in the flight manual for each aircraft and for each system, detailing the many differences between all the aircraft in the fleet. So you have no idea what each aircraft will do next.

The manuals are written by administrators, not engineers, and they do not always know what they are talking about. And they also simplify things for the pilots, which sometimes distorts the truth. An example is the Classic fuel schematic, which shows the center fuel pumps in the center tank, because that seems more logical. But they were not, they were in the wing tank, and that made a big difference. (The NG now has the pumps in the center tank, which is why it has all those fuel pump problems and fake solutions to the problem.)

And to nail my views to the door of the cathedral (as it were), nowhere does it say in my manual that WS system disables the altitude capture. And why should it? You are supposed to dial in the MA altitude, which should take MSA into account. And you don't want to fly up into an upper airway that might be very busy, so why bust that preset altitude? I have done this several times, and I am sure on each occasion altitude was captured.

[threemiles]

A plane stalls from high AoA, not from IAS.
Derived IAS from GS is not really relevant.
The very high initial ROC of 6000 fpm points to a high AoA imho.
Cleaning the config may contribute.

[Lost in Saigon]

The egg or the chicken?

What caused what?

Did a hard negative G manouver cause the elevator (Hor. Trim,...) to fail, or did it fail by unknown reasons and cause the plane to dive?

Today it has been 1 year exactly since the Germanwings accident.

Is something like that thinkable? I doubt it.

The most probable scenario to me is some kind of failure on the tail, that caused the nose over, and the inability to roll it back to wings level.
Maybe ice, or the combination of ice and an A/P disconnecting. I always hand fly in heavy ice...

Nic
Yes, Tail Plane Stall due to icing also fits this scenario. There is no anti-icing or de-icing on a 737 tail.

[MrSnuggles]

sunbird123

Yeah.... was thinking something like this although you made a more direct connection of everything. Thanks.

Still: Fatigue is important.

[fireflybob]

Yes, Tail Plane Stall due to icing also fits this scenario. There is no anti-icing or de-icing on a 737 tail.

Has this happened before on the B737?

[Old Boeing Driver]

I think you are going in the right direction.

The 737 when it is light will really accelerate quickly.

Maybe flaps/slats were not retracted and failed?

Maybe they were retracted as the thrust levers were idled and they didn't catch it as they slowed?

The FDR and the CVR will tell us soon.

[RAT 5]

It is most disturbing to hear that even the glamorous gulf airlines are tarred with the fatigue brush. Their external image is for well paid and looked after crews and heavily pampered pax -business class the more so. Is the veil coming off, finally. However, the profits are achieved from the pax, and their perception is still of the flashy upmarket airline. That's what they are paying good for, a good value ticket with all its parameters. It will be difficult, without 'dispatches/panorama' type undercover investigation to reveal the truth. Whinging crews are always whinging crews in the publics' eyes. To them everyone in the working world has a gripe; why not pilots. If you shove safety in their faces, with related facts, you might get them to support you: the XAA's? Ah, they sit on a different fence and might be influenced by deep pockets.

[Lonewolf_50]

There is no anti-icing or de-icing on a 737 tail.That's chilling. How does one address tail icing in the 737? Is there a particular procedure or set of airspeed limits, pitch limits, etc? (Is there an ice detection circuit that alerts the pilot to tail ice being detected?)
To compound the issue many airlines (Fly Dubai?) lease aircraft that have come from many different previous operators, and so each aircraft will have a different system and do something different. Our fleet has a subsection in the flight manual for each aircraft and for each system, detailing the many differences between all the aircraft in the fleet. So you have no idea what each aircraft will do next.

===============

And to nail my views to the door of the cathedral (as it were), nowhere does it say in my manual that WS system disables the altitude capture. And why should it?
You are supposed to dial in the MA altitude, which should take MSA into account. And you don't want to fly up into an upper airway that might be very busy, so why bust that preset altitude? I have done this several times, and I am sure on each occasion altitude was captured.
Configuration differences; do they require separate sim checks/quals? Seems a place for a few holes to appear in the cheese.

[Lost in Saigon]

That's chilling. How does one address tail icing in the 737? Is there a particular procedure or set of airspeed limits, pitch limits, etc? (Is there an ice detection circuit that alerts the pilot to tail ice being detected?)

Configuration differences; do they require separate sim checks/quals? Seems a place for a few holes to appear in the cheese.
None of the Boeing aircraft have tail anti-icing. Boeing designs the tail to be large enough to be immune from icing. It's never been a problem, but then how many times has an aircraft actually held for 2 hours in icing conditions?

http://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/367/why-do-only-some-aircraft-require-tail-anti-icing

"Some airplanes don't need the horizontal stabilizer to have anti-ice because it was shown during flight testing that there were no adverse effects from having ice on the tail.

This is mainly because the horizontal stabilizer/elevator has been designed so that even with a degradation of lift due to the ice, it still produces a sufficient tail down force to maintain control, even when approaching the stall speed.

The airplanes that do have anti-ice usually either have smaller horizontal stabilizers or (on some older designs) couldn't get the FAA to sign off on a design without it. Some designs are also more prone to collecting ice (based mainly on the radius of the leading edge) so must demonstrate sufficient handling qualities with even more ice, which may not be possible."

[TopBunk]

There is no anti-icing or de-icing on a 737 tail.

Not unique to B737 ... nor in a B747, A320 etc etc etc.

[Sciolistes]

A plane stalls from high AoA, not from IAS.
Derived IAS from GS is not really relevant.
The very high initial ROC of 6000 fpm points to a high AoA imho.
Cleaning the config may contribute.
The afore mentioned data shows a steady shallow climb and acceleration consistent with the phase of flight and the previous go around. There is no evidence of anything other than an adequately conducted manoeuvre. If they were in a relatively steady state flight path, which the data shows, and increasing airspeed, which the data shows, and maintaining the track, which the data shows, then they cannot have stalled. The sample rate of the FR24 data would be sufficient to show evidence of a stall, if it were to exist.

It's never been a problem, but then how many times has an aircraft actually held for 2 hours in icing conditions?
Actually they were vectored for an hour and held for an hour. They requested FL80 after a missed approach. The obvious inference is at FL80 they would be in VMC and hence not in icing conditions. Vectoring was at FL80 and holding at FL150. So it would seem they were not in icing conditions for anything other than the approach and missed approach phases. I think the chances of icing being a factor as extremely unlikely.

But the video shows they were almost diving vertically at that point
With a bit of trig, the descent angle was approximately 45 degrees and the avg speed in the descent around about 320kts. That would be consistent with the videos.

So I would say there is no evidence of uncommanded reverser, stall, uncommanded roll, mishandling upto the descent, significant icing nor bad judgement. The current FR24 data indicates only a very sudden pitch down with no other changes in parameters or their trend. What is most likely to be an uncommanded pitch down.

[de facto]

And to nail my views to the door of the cathedral (as it were), nowhere does it say in my manual that WS system disables the altitude capture. And why should it? You are supposed to dial in the MA altitude, which should take MSA into account. And you don't want to fly up into an upper airway that might be very busy, so why bust that preset altitude? I have done this several times, and I am sure on each occasion altitude was captured.
Silverstate,
Quite a good post,however,the view that acquiring an altitude for ATC while in an active windshear is more important due to traffic than climbing away from the windshear is worrying to say the least.
The same philosophy when pilots brief they will follow the sid instead od eosid due to dense traffic.
In both cases,one option is vital,safely climbing out of windshear and the other staying within a demonstrated track clear of obstacles.
You advise ATC in both cases,,part of basic CRM and airmanship.
Now,having flown more than 10000 as PIC in the 737NG,i have yet to fly myself into an actual windshear...not a predictive one,,,an actual
one,(TS induced).GPWS warning,not PWS alert.
You have flown into 3 already?maybe one should better use of its radar...
Going around, out of light windshear (gusty,terrain induced) isnt the same as in a downdraft/updraft...one you go out nearly instantaniously out if it...the other in which i hope you have never been to,is a whole different story....
I have contacted boeing about the subject,as their FCOM/Tech docs do not specify the fd in that exact scenario.
I believe that such fd guidance during a GPWS windshear warning would be a major flaw and should be addressed.
Again,traffic in a situation like is would be the last of my worries....aircraft around do have Tcas for traffic issue as yours would be inhibited by the system anyways,clever no?
I will ,even if told otherwise,post for all to know the answer provided by Boeing,in the meanwhile however,using sim reaction to make a system truth is light to say the least.
I believe PPRuners have discussed in lengh simulators fidelity issues in the past,they are as accurate as the software used...

[Lost in Saigon]

The afore mentioned data shows a steady shallow climb and acceleration consistent with the phase of flight and the previous go around. There is no evidence of anything other than an adequately conducted manoeuvre. If they were in a relatively steady state flight path, which the data shows, and increasing airspeed, which the data shows, and maintaining the track, which the data shows, then they cannot have stalled. The sample rate of the FR24 data would be sufficient to show evidence of a stall, if it were to exist.


Actually they were vectored for an hour and held for an hour. They requested FL80 after a missed approach. The obvious inference is at FL80 they would be in VMC and hence not in icing conditions. Vectoring was at FL80 and holding at FL150. So it would seem they were not in icing conditions for anything other than the approach and missed approach phases. I think the chances of icing being a factor as extremely unlikely.


With a bit of trig, the descent angle was approximately 45 degrees and the avg speed in the descent around about 320kts. That would be consistent with the videos.

So I would say there is no evidence of uncommanded reverser, stall, uncommanded roll, mishandling upto the descent, significant icing nor bad judgement. The current FR24 data indicates only a very sudden pitch down with no other changes in parameters or their trend. What is most likely to be an uncommanded pitch down.
They may have requested FL80 just because it was a smooth altitude.

Do you have any evidence to show there was no icing at FL80 or FL150?

[FullWings]

It’s been a while since I operated the 737 but I remember it coping pretty well with icing conditions - most jets with bleed air wing and engine anti/de-ice do. Only once after extended holding did we add a bit to Vref and it was obvious from the buildup on the wipers, etc. that there was significant icing.

Anyway, if the flight under discussion was seriously iced up, enough to badly affect the aerodynamics, I would have expected the problems to occur as they slowed down on the approach or loaded the wings as they pitched up at the start of the GA. Neither of these happened but there does appear to have been a sudden LoC after accelerating to a speed with a much greater stall margin.

There may have been ice involved with this accident but it seems unlikely to be a direct result of contamination affecting the flying characteristics.

[A0283]

In the 048 seconds Liveleak video post above - at the 004 seconds time point - there appears to be a very clear and bright flash to the right hand side of what appears to be the fuselage ... with the plane going nose down.

It is not possible to see if we are looking at the top or bottom of the plane. So hard to say if its the right or left engine.

Could that be a fire from either an engine separation or from a damaged wing? Or both in tandem?

You do not see that flash or light in the first seconds of the video.

Would be interesting to have that video enhanced.

[Sciolistes]

Do you have any evidence to show there was no icing at FL80 or FL150?
Your suggestion that the level was smooth is a good one. The METAR showed BKN CB at 3300 and overcast at 10,000. Smooth air would be above the cumulus layer and FL80 would be below the overcast. FL150 would most likely be above a stratified overcast. So I think that it is a reasonable assumption that they were not in icing.

However, the 737 should be able hold in light to moderate icing for two hours without any issues whatsoever.

[Nemrytter]

Do you have any evidence to show there was no icing at FL80 or FL150?Judging from the closest met sounding to the accident time there almost certainly would've been icing at FL80 and probably also at FL150

[_Phoenix_]

Sciolistes,
I agree with your suppositions, that makes perfect sense based on data available publicly. Early GA suggests that the second landing attempt was "let's give another try". The main plan was to divert. Once GA maneuver looked stabilized, I guess both were programming the FMS for new destination, possibly unaware of A/P not engaged and the g factor shadowed by strong turbulence in clouds. Maybe they never noticed the runway lights coming up very fast.

[Sciolistes]

Judging from the closest met sounding to the accident time there almost certainly would've been icing at FL80 and probably also at FL150
Good info. Do you have a link to that please?

I guess both were programming the FMS for new destination, possibly unaware of A/P not engaged
I agree, their intention must have been to divert after that fateful approach. Good point about the A/P. I can't speak for this crew, but I would have got the A/P in pronto, but the air was very rough (which it can be at ROV) then it is quite likely that A/P engagement would have been later than sooner. I personally have made the cardinal error of pressing the CMD button but failing to check the FMA. The aircraft flew itself, in level flight, with slight turn for 30 seconds before I noticed! It is quite an insidious error to make.

The problem is with this suggestion is the pitch down was far too sudden. The aircraft would have had to have been massively out of trim and the effort require to make the steady climb shown in the data considerable if out of trim to such a degree. Likewise, even with moderate thrust and the aircraft trimmed, the amount of effort required to achieve such a sudden pitch change would, in my opinion, be beyond beyond reason.

If it banked enough to cause such a pitch change then surely it would have deviated a considerable distance from the runway centreline, which it didn't.

[Hotel Tango]

In the 048 seconds Liveleak video post above - at the 004 seconds time point - there appears to be a very clear and bright flash to the right hand side of what appears to be the fuselage ... with the plane going nose down.

It is not possible to see if we are looking at the top or bottom of the plane. So hard to say if its the right or left engine.

Could that be a fire from either an engine separation or from a damaged wing? Or both in tandem?

Not a fire. Not an explosion, but a strobe light as mentioned before.

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

Where has the idea come from that the aircraft was banked? The 'disappearing into and re-appearing from cloud' video shows a straight-ahead GA, and over half a minute later a dive on a similar or same heading out of the cloudbase to impact.

[portmanteau]

depends on which video you are referring to. the clearest one shows 4 lights forming a square with what appear to be the landing lights at top right and bottom left and the anti-collision lights at the other corners. my interpretation is that the aircraft was banked around 45 deg to the right.

[_Phoenix_]

The problem is with this suggestion is the pitch down was far too sudden.
Yes, the change in pitch was massive as the pitch up moment given by light landing configuration + THR at max. Once this big moment is removed by reducing power and changing to clean configuration, the aircraft will pitch down.

[threemiles]

http://i65.tinypic.com/2hns1dv.jpg

http://i68.tinypic.com/309hjy1.jpg

[silvertate]

Interesting graphs, Threemiles.

The rate of climb on the second go-around is pretty steady, and consistent with the first. And if one presumes that the throttles were not being retarded for no good reason, it does not exactly look like a stall. More like loss of control for all the other possible reasons - iceing, engine failure, disorientation, flaps - there are many to choose from at present.

[Jwscud]

Now,having flown more than 10000 as PIC in the 737NG,i have yet to fly myself into an actual windshear...not a predictive one,,,an actual
one,(TS induced).
You have flown into 3 already?maybe one should better use of its radar...


It depends where you fly. I only have 2500h on the NG but have experienced 3 windshear goarounds. It depends where you fly - 2 were DUB RWY16 in winter where it is a known issue. In all cases the shear was associated with terrain and wind rather than the classic down draft windshear profile.

[poke53281]

In the 048 seconds Liveleak video post above - at the 004 seconds time point - there appears to be a very clear and bright flash to the right hand side of what appears to be the fuselage ... with the plane going nose down.

It is not possible to see if we are looking at the top or bottom of the plane. So hard to say if its the right or left engine.

Could that be a fire from either an engine separation or from a damaged wing? Or both in tandem?

If you mean the LL video in post #585 its a Strobe and is not the Crash in Rostov-on-Don, its from 2013.

[de facto]

i flew in europe,africa,asia all the way to Korea via china.
I understand the type of windshear you are talking about,obviously i have done a few myself,weather radar picked up WS (PWS),but never had a Windshear windshear windshear gpws call out.
Again,if people cared to read,when you go around from such "light" windshear as in the UK windy conditions,you will be out of it fairly quickly and FD will revert to normal toga mode,ie alt acq.
I am discussing the alt acq during a reactive windshear escape maneuver procedure,not for PWS,short windshear alert.

[Chronus]

It is most disturbing to hear that even the glamorous gulf airlines are tarred with the fatigue brush. Their external image is for well paid and looked after crews and heavily pampered pax -business class the more so. Is the veil coming off, finally. However, the profits are achieved from the pax, and their perception is still of the flashy upmarket airline. That's what they are paying good for, a good value ticket with all its parameters. It will be difficult, without 'dispatches/panorama' type undercover investigation to reveal the truth. Whinging crews are always whinging crews in the publics' eyes. To them everyone in the working world has a gripe; why not pilots. If you shove safety in their faces, with related facts, you might get them to support you: the XAA's? Ah, they sit on a different fence and might be influenced by deep pockets.
Did the Romans give a toss about those pulling the oars on their galleons.

[silvertate]

Did the Romans give a toss about those pulling the oars on their galleons.

How true. Not sure you will get away with saying that, but how true.
The term you are looking for is dhimmi.

And P.S. to de facto - the WS I experienced were mainly in the sim. Only had two outside, and they were both quite noticeable without the warning. And one was at higher level, about 2,500 ft.

[Old Boeing Driver]

On the very good graph posted by threemiles, it looks like something catastrophic happened about 45 seconds after they started the GA

I'm using the starting point of 2470 seconds to 2515 where the break starts.

After the 2515 mark, it only takes them about 10 seconds to go from 3,500 feet to the ground.

Is there an airspeed plot for the 2515 mark?

Regards,

OBD

[DaveReidUK]

Is there an airspeed plot for the 2515 mark?

Airspeed isn't one of the parameters captured by FR24 in this instance.

As a proxy, the groundspeed at impact-10s (the point at which the aircraft stops climbing) is around 185kts.

[737er]

3500 feet per minute at 1000 AGL on both. The plane is already flying. It's not an emergency. Why fly like that? I don't care what the flight director says. Yet time and time again you see guys doing this on a miss. Guaranteed setup for a low energy state.

[weatherdude]

Icing & the Rostov upper air ascent.

I find the upper air sounding for Rostov for 00Z 19 March 2016 shows the following:

1: Air temperature 0C at 2000-3000ft falling to -10C by 12000ft and -27C at 17000ft.
2: Saturated air, without a break, between about 2000-3000 ft and 17000ft.
3: Air mass stable wrt to saturated air between about 3000 ft and 17000 ft - hence no Cb, but suggestive of thick multilayer cloud, common in frontal zones.


Area of doubt.
As was the case over 50 years ago when I first plotted tephigrams, it seems that even today, the humidity sensors used by different nations behave differently.

Rarely in the UK did we see ascents showing saturated air, without a break, up to great altitudes.
This Rostov ascent shows temperatures and dew points very close together, even above the tropopause! I cannot 100% say that the dew point readings are wrong, but they do appear most anomalous. Sometimes it appears that once the humidity sensor gets a soaking in the lower levels, it may not dry out properly to give accurate readings higher up.
Maybe more up to date meteorologists may like to comment.
Absolutely, it's not a realistic sounding for dew point/humidity. Obviously the humidity sensor remained frozen/iced over during the entire ascent. There was quite some water in the air, but again: Nothing that wouldn't be seen a dozen of times in Scotland, Iceland or else during a winter.

[737er]

And flight directors don't care about wonky high unsustainable pitch attitudes when flying into strong increasing headwinds. I believe this will be a factor.

[PT6Driver]

737er And flight directors don't care about wonky high unsustainable pitch attitudes when flying into strong increasing headwinds. I believe this will be a factor.

Wow FD will command a 15 degrees pitch up during a GA. I never knew that was wonky, high and unsustainable. Thanks for sharing your valuable insight.

[de facto]

Boeing source just confirmed the FD in a wind shear warning will guide you through the mcp altitude.

[Vc10Tail]

Not really true. Even with total hydraulic failure it's possible to control the aircraft with a stab trim out by more than 23 turns. Ask me how I know.


How? Manual trim wheel?

[Vc10Tail]

Does FZ have a FOQA program?
Any rumours om ACARS transmits?

[Old Boeing Driver]

Just for info. Check this video of a deep stall in the 737.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kkYXhLwlHrg

[ExSp33db1rd]

Holding like this happens every day.

Nothing new, mid 1960's, a Friday night Nassau - New York, starting holding over Baltimore and eventually landed over 2 hours later, a common occurrence in those days, not a weather issue but the volume of 'traffic' approaching New York. 'course we had been warned and carried the fuel.

[737er]

You are welcome PT6Driver. Except you are only a little bit right.





Pitch Modes
•TO/GA – Takeoff Engaged for takeoff by turning both F/D switches ON and pushing either TO/GA switch. Both F/Ds must be ON to engage TO/GA prior to starting takeoff.
The AFDS commands pitch attitude in the following order:
•10 degrees nose down until 60 knots IAS
•15 degrees nose up after 60 knots IAS
•15 degrees nose up after lift–off until a sufficient climb rate is acquired.
Then, pitch is commanded to maintain MCP speed plus 20 knots.TO/GA can also be engaged for takeoff with F/D switches OFF if a TO/GA switch is pushed after 80 knots IAS below 2000 feet AGL and prior to 150 seconds after lift–off.


What happens in weather conditions like this where the wind is a violently strong and gusty rapidly increasing headwind is the FD directs pitch for MCP speed plus 20 and at go around thrust this will command a pitch attitude that is unsustainable once the increasing headwind goes away...and it will.

15 degrees is good and you don't need that much. Where pilots bone this up is following a FD up to oblivion. The FD simply can't keep up with the dynamics involved. The answer is 15 degrees as long as you have a good climb going and if max flap speed become a problem pull the damn power back.

Everyone is gonna have to face it. We have to know how to fly. Automation isn't always good to us. It's a great tool used appropriately.

[Old Boeing Driver]

Where did the information in your graphs come from?

If I am reading the second GA graph correctly, they went from a positive 4,000 FPM climb to a negative 15,000 FPM in about 6 seconds.

That is a huge change.

[Rananim]

If not a catastrophic flight control failure(HS/rudder),then maybe engine failure below Vmca has to be considered.The scenario is nicely set for a Vmca encounter;low weight,aft cg,high thrust,windshear,pilots trained to follow FD like pavlov dog.
This also explains the 18500fpm dive.

[threemiles]

Where did the information in your graphs come from?

If I am reading the second GA graph correctly, they went from a positive 4,000 FPM climb to a negative 15,000 FPM in about 6 seconds.

That is a huge change.

FR24 on their blog site.
I haven't depicted GS because I think it is misleading.
Low energy state seems to me to be the right description at least. But that's certainly not enough to let it drop like this. It needs more cheese holes.

[threemiles]

Airspeed isn't one of the parameters captured by FR24 in this instance.

As a proxy, the groundspeed at impact-10s (the point at which the aircraft stops climbing) is around 185kts.

The last plot is not the impact, but at 700 ft AGL. This may be due to ADS-B reception limitation or aircraft disintegration.

The Go Around starts at 800 ft AGL/1100 ft MSL. The Missed Approach Altitude is 2240 ft MSL. From RT it seems their intention was to climb to FL80, though they never got a clearance for that.

[jfkjohan]

I thought they did get a clearance to FL080?

[737er]

Just to add to my heavy handed rant from my perch....I'm in no way implying these gents weren't good sticks and in fact my preach could very well be preaching to the choir with regards to these guys.

If their rumored rosters are correct then I think fatigue will also be a serious factor on this one especially considering how their day way going. Lots of stuff going on when you are holding for bad weather and getting close to bingo fuel. Like someone else posted, math you can normally do in your head all of a sudden requires a calculator and tests show it has as a serious effect as being drunk. Reflexes slow. Instrument scan slows markedly. Stuff you do almost reflexively when well rested requires pause and much extra thought. Fighting off tunnel vision becomes a personal war.

These guys might have been top notch dudes in every way. They might have done exactly what they were trained to do in this circumstance, even if that training wasn't optimum. I'm going to assume they were great pilots until something proves it to me otherwise and for me fatigue and training will most definitely be factored in that mix. I hope it is for the investigation as well.

[737er]

I thought they did get a clearance to FL080?



They did. And they informed ATC that's what they intended to do if they missed, ahead of time while still on approach.

[CodyBlade]

"And to nail my views to the door of the cathedral (as it were), nowhere does it say in my manual that WS system disables the altitude capture. And why should it? You are supposed to dial in the MA altitude, which should take MSA into account. And you don't want to fly up into an upper airway that might be very busy, so why bust that preset altitude? I have done this several times, and I am sure on each occasion altitude was captured."

or

"Boeing source just confirmed the FD in a wind shear warning will guide you through the mcp altitude."

Well at least thats settled then...

[wiggy]

737er

15 degrees is good and you don't need that much. Where pilots bone this up is following a FD up to oblivion.

.. :ooh: You've done it now, you've mentioned an attitude and even worse mentioned ignoring the FD.

Go and wash your mouth out with soapy water, wipe your keyboard clean and don't come back until you've learnt that it is far more important these days to discuss and nitpick modes ad -infinitum........

ATB :ok:

[DaveReidUK]

The last plot is not the impact, but at 700 ft AGL.

Well yes, given that the ROD at that point was approaching 20,000 fpm, impact would have occurred around 2 seconds later, so make that 185kts at t-12 seconds rather than t-10.

[Sciolistes]

185kts is the ground speed. During the last moments the aircraft would have been doing around 320-330kts at impact.

[Rachman]

One consideration I have not yet seen anything about is the weight and balance issue ie how the payload was distributed.
A 30% load factor, if not distributed through the cabin appropriately can lead to extreme trim conditions on any aircraft type. And I mean where passengers were actually sat as opposed to how the load sheet shows them to be. Baggage, in common with most LoCo operators was probably light and misloading of these alone would probably not make much difference but in combination with wrongly sat passengers it could make a difference. A poor physical trim of the aircraft could well contribute to any subsequent handling difficulties, as being discussed predominantly on this thread.

[despegue]

Rachman,

That is not correct.

On several types, including for example B744, seating of passengers has no effect on mass & balance calculations.

B737 is also not that critical by the way.

The aircraft seemed to be accelerating to flaps-up speed when the upset occured. This might have nothing to do with a botched g/a, but with flight controls and icing.
What will be the effect of a wing when the Leading edge devices retract on schedule but the leading edge itself is seriously contaminated?...

[guided]

they went from a positive 4,000 FPM climb to a negative 15,000 FPM in about 6 seconds.

Is that true? That would mean almost 20ms^-2 AVERAGE accelaration i.e. -2g

EDIT: 737 seems to have a limit of -1g with the flaps down. And acceleration of 2 engines at full thrust on empty plane is only 0.58g

[DaveReidUK]

185kts is the ground speed. During the last moments the aircraft would have been doing around 320-330kts at impact.

A bit less than that, based on the FR24 data - about 275 kts - but we won't argue. Certainly enough to spoil everyone's day.

[Daylight Robbery]

6 deg on the ground, I think from the metar. Probably not icing on app and go around

[MrSnuggles]

I never thought I'd say this (and I know there are reasons for RT) but RT is doing an excellent job at reporting on the fatigue problem in UAE airlines.

[Daylight Robbery]

Yes, yes PKP, but they had only climbed to 3500' . Air at that point only just getting to 0 deg (CB not withstanding) Thanks for the mountaineering advice....

[despegue]

My concern is not so much icing during the approach or G/A itself, but accrued icing during the approach preparation in the hold and vectors towards the ILS.

Time over time again, I have seen crews putting faith on the " wiper/bolt" ice indication to estimate wing icing. This is completely wrong and extremely dangerous. Still, some people even teach this during line-training:ugh:

To me, the upset occured at the moment that the Leading Edge Flaps/Slats became UP. This rings an alarm bell to me.

[Craggenmore]

Any similarity between the BA Boeing crash at LHR and this event in terms of fuel ice crystals, waxy fuel, fuel pump failure and thrust failure?

Fuel line/pump/system commonalities across the fleets?

The only time I've seen a 737 fly like this was a SE go-around that was not caught in time and over she went.

Perhaps an engine failure in the GA due the above?

[de facto]

Time over time again, I have seen crews putting faith on the " wiper/bolt" ice indication to estimate wing icing. This is completely wrong and extremely dangerous. Still, some people even teach this during line-training

It seems the instructors are putting too much faith into the FCOM info that states:
Wing Anti-ice Operation - In Flight
Ice accumulation on the flight deck window frames, windshield center post, or on the windshield wiper arm may be used as an indication of structural icing conditions and the need to turn on wing anti-ice.

It seems pilots seem to use to wing light more to put it in your face than using it for its original purpose.
That said,newer models do have an icing caution light to alert crew while icing is being accumulated.
I believe the 737 was certified up to 3 inches of ice without controllability issues.

[de facto]

Perhaps an engine failure in the GA due the above?

Such failures are the most trained in sims...doubt they would be caught on it.
However stall recoveries do not seem to be...last line if
defense to manual flying issues.

[Dormant Dog]

Remember the airframe is super cold after a long flight and holding. 6 degrees on the ground in those conditions would provide perfect conditions for ice accrual in flight IMHO.

[_Phoenix_]

Is that true? That would mean almost 20ms^-2 AVERAGE accelaration i.e. -2g

Newton is turning in his grave...
That's simple physics a = dv/dt.
(hope moderators agree to kill this myth of large negative gees)

http://www.mediafire.com/convkey/c987/dzc1d6xbqsa49uuzg.jpg
The graph of vertical speed is almost a straight line, therefore the acceleration "a" was almost constant for that segment. What that means? The PF didn't move the column control or the aircraft control system didn't respond.
I would put my money on possibility that PF passed out. The PM had very little time (10-12 sec) to notice and react, possible he was watching the middle console running checklist or programing FMS.

[de facto]

Remember the airframe is super cold after a long flight and holding. 6 degrees on the ground in those conditions would provide perfect conditions for ice accrual in flight IMHO.

Nope,irrelevant.
The only ice accretion due to long flight would be fuel frost on the top surface of the wing,very little if any performance issue.
The only reason of a stall would be,failure to engage AP while believing it was and not monitoring or reengaging the AP but not the AT, speed decaying after having manually reduced it to avoid flaps overspeed,or retracting flaps without a speed increase..possibly only using speed trend rather than actual speed.
In any case ,a stall warning gives enough time to react and perform the necessary maneuver unless of course both crews are tired,slow to respond and worse react in the opposite manner than necessary.

Very easy to fix the schedule issues,,,make it a legal requirement to limit change of circadian rythm each month...but hey that costs money ...

[bsieker]

Just for info. Check this video of a deep stall in the 737.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kkYXhLwlHrg

That is in a simulator that is so far out of its certified flight envelope that it has nothing to do with what the real airplane would do.

It extrapolates somewhat and the behaviour may or may not be reasonable, but you can't use it "for info" on 737 stall behaviour.

I'd be surprised if anyone has flown a real 737 to 90º pitch angle just to see what happens and create data for a simulator.


Bernd

[Old Boeing Driver]

I realize it was in a simulator, and I agree unrealistic in real flying.

However, something happened very quickly when they went from a positive rate, to level, to a high rate of descent.

Early in my 737 career, we did approaches to stalls in the airplane, and flew them well into the stick shaker. No one ever went so far as to complete the stall to a break, but it was always interesting.

Regards.

[fireflybob]

Closer analysis of the Rostov upper air ascent for 00Z 19 March 2016 (for what it is worth!) reveals to me the following air temperature readings at the bottom:

Surface +5.2C
2063ft +0.6C
916mb (c2333ft) -0.3C
4275ft -2.3C

FZ level c2200ft

At 180 knots the ram rise would be about 4 deg C so "practical"height of 0 deg c isotherm would be higher than this.

[weatherdude]

A typical temperature lapse rate is 0.6C per 100 metres.
You do not have to be very high to get below freezing with a surface temp of 6C.
Just ask the mountaineers in your country if you do not believe airmen.
Yes, 0 degrees at about 1000 m above AD.

[aox]

If their rumored rosters are correct then I think fatigue will also be a serious factor on this one especially considering how their day way going. Lots of stuff going on when you are holding for bad weather and getting close to bingo fuel. Like someone else posted, math you can normally do in your head all of a sudden requires a calculator and tests show it has as a serious effect as being drunk. Reflexes slow. Instrument scan slows markedly. Stuff you do almost reflexively when well rested requires pause and much extra thought. Fighting off tunnel vision becomes a personal war.

Indeed. To some extent someone can realise their performance is dropping off, though not necessarily quite how much. And then what can they do about it?

A couple of pages ago someone said it was simply not professional to fail to find ways to avoid this.

I thought that was a bit unsympathetic. I replied, a bit long-windedly, to the effect that whilst a car driver can stop at the next rest area, that can hardly be suggested as an option for pilots.

My post has been removed, but I still wonder what that person was thinking of. There was something about possible adrenaline rush keeping people alert for a while, but without corresponding mention of detrimental effects as it wears off.

[threemiles]

This is a zoom of the critical event.

At time 2512 V/S starts reducing from peak value of 4,000 fpm.

In the 12 secs before it had increased very significantly from 2,000 fpm to 4,000 fpm, aircraft climbed from 2,900 to 3,600.

In the same period GS had increased from 166 to 180 KT.

The event happens suddenly after a significant increase in ROC and GS.

http://i63.tinypic.com/rr6qgg.jpg

[AtomKraft]

In the Colgan accident, they might have got away with it had they not retracted flap.
This accident could be explained by an early flap retraction, followed by a stall.

Clearly, they would normally accelerate first, but perhaps things happened in the wrong order due to a combination of tiredness, bad weather and business as they started to get on with the inevitable diversion.

I wonder if their decision to go straight back to FL80 contributed?

[threemiles]

http://i67.tinypic.com/2j0jwr8.jpg

Imho flap retraction does not fit into this graph.

I know, GS <> IAS and Stall happens from AoA, but 30 secs before the event, they were climbing at 6,000 ft/min with 20 KTS less GS, and did not drop.

[Sciolistes]

The climb rate would increase once the speed reaches the bugged speed. Up to the point of the sudden descent, this looks normal.

[sgs233a]

If, as others have said, the profile looks normal until flap retraction... What about some kind of asymmetry on LE or TE devices? How much of a split can develop before some sort of asymmetry protection stops movement?

[de facto]

Flaps assymetry is automatically stopped by the fseu.
Some assymetry is not an issue and can be easily be controlled.

[Anvaldra]

Just announced on Russia tv channel to deliver last minute CVR data

[Anvaldra]

Just delivered:
- don't worry, don't worry
- don't do it
- pull up, pull up

[Sciolistes]

Flap assymetry isn't going to result in a sudden dive more or less holding the runway QFU.

[737er]

Not sure where those graphs are coming from but the last tracker blip I found showed a GS of 90 knots at 700 MSL.

[Old Boeing Driver]

I think the low ground speed is because they were going down steeply and not much movement across the ground.

[FullWings]

...and if you think about it, as soon as they have pitched down significantly, the differential between GS and IAS is going to widen. This makes things like stalls unlikely, especially as the wings have been unloaded.

[Organfreak]

Just delivered:
- don't worry, don't worry
- don't do it
- pull up, pull up

I wonder what somebody didn't want done?

[flash8]

https://www.rt.com/news/337128-emirates-pilots-fatigue-scandal/

Looks like the can of worms is finally opening for all to see.

[spitfire_sl]

Russian state TV claims to have obtained leaked transcript of the voice recorder which has the last words of the crew.

Video of the their analysis.
?????.Ru: ?? ????????, ????: ? ??? ?????? ?????? "??????" ?? ??????? ?? ???????? (http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2735707#)

I will translate it and post it soon.

[threemiles]

Not sure where those graphs are coming from but the last tracker blip I found showed a GS of 90 knots at 700 MSL.

csv file on FR24 blog site
90 kts not on there

[thehighlander959]

https://www.rt.com/news/337128-emirates-pilots-fatigue-scandal/

Looks like the can of worms is finally opening for all to see.
Definitely looks like someone is scraping away the Emirates veneer with a blowtorch.

[Leightman 957]

Very rough Google translation of spitfire's link, request fluent speaker:

Became known to the crew last word "Boeing", crashed in Rostov-on-Don. They do not reveal the whole story of what happened, but allow us to make some conclusions.

Today revision "Vesti" program has at its disposal information that leads us back to the recent disaster, "Boeing" in Rostov-on-Don. This interpretation of the last words of the crew, a minute before the collision with the ground. The document is not official, from sources in the commission of inquiry, which shifted voice recorder information to the paper. Without claiming to be the truth - it is only the investigation findings - Now we try to simulate the situation that prevailed before the disaster aboard.

Thus, Boeing-737-800 company FlyDubai in harsh weather conditions was not able to land in Rostov and the aircraft commander - 37-year-old Aristos Socratous decides to go to the second round. At this time, the autopilot operates. Time 1 hour 40 minutes 00 seconds GMT.

"We collect 50" - is care echelon of 1500 meters. Boeing raised to an angle of 15 degrees, it is normal mode. In these shots we see how the plane goes up, going beyond the view of the camera surveillance. Climb machine continues 40 seconds. Not reaching echelon commander disengages the autopilot. The reason is not yet clear. Maybe the plane hit - slang for pilots - in atmospheric scissors, it could greatly revive. But with this second, after disconnecting the autopilot, "Boeing" dives down. And these are the words of transcripts translated us into the Russian language, which sounded in the cockpit for clarity: "Do not worry, pull!". Time 1 hour 40 minutes and 40 seconds GMT.

That is, the pilots could not do anything with the aircraft, which flew nose to the ground. Version professionals such. Disabling automatic pilot tried to bring "Boeing" in horizontal flight, but at this moment in the dive mode is activated stabilizer, it is in the keel. In this mode, the elevator is no longer effective and practical does not respond to the helm of the aircraft and the pilots apparently did not realize that a sharp peak at fault stabilizer.

Why are joined at the peak of the stabilizer mode - question. He is driven by a button that pilots call "knyupel". That is, during turbulence commander going into manual mode, can accidentally catch the knyupel, and did not notice, as complained before on chronic fatigue. Otherwise - it is any more unprecedented automation surprise.

The last six seconds in the cockpit, according to our source, is heard a....scream. We did not play it. Plane crashes with an acceleration in the land of 1 hour 41 minutes and 00 seconds GMT. Killing all 62 people. Once again, the official conclusions about the causes of the disaster can only be made on the results of the investigation.

[spitfire_sl]

just translating now, standby.

[oicur12.again]

Accidental un recognized autopilot disconnect with high nose att??????

[Lost in Saigon]

"Do not worry, pull!" as the aircraft nosed over into a dive.

The dive looks to me like Ice Contaminated Tailplane Stall and now the voice transcripts sound to me like Ice Contaminated Tailplane Stall.

Two men puling can override a runaway trim or stab, but all the pulling in the world won't recover from a stalled tail.

[spitfire_sl]

Slightly better translation than google:

?????.Ru: ?? ????????, ????: ? ??? ?????? ?????? "??????" ?? ??????? ?? ???????? (http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2735707#)



Today revision "Vesti" program has at its disposal information that leads us back to the recent disaster, "Boeing" in Rostov-on-Don. This interpretation of the last words from the CVR, a minute before the collision with the ground. The document is not official, from sources in the commission of inquiry, which shifted voice recorder information on paper. Without claiming to be the truth - it is only the investigation findings - Now we try to simulate the situation that prevailed before the disaster aboard.
Thus, Boeing-737-800 company FlyDubai in harsh weather conditions was not able to land in Rostov and the aircraft commander - 37-year-old Aristos Socratous decides to try to land a 2nd time. At this time, the autopilot is engaged. Time 1 hour 40 minutes 00 seconds GMT.

CVR transcript:
-‘Going around’
-‘Climbing to 50’
-‘Climbing to 50’

"Climbing to 50" – means climbing to height of 1500 meters. Boeing climbed at an angle of 15 degrees, it is normal mode. In these shots we see how the plane goes up, going beyond the view of the camera. Climbing continues on autopilot for 40 seconds. Before reaching this height, the commander disengages the autopilot. The reason is not yet clear.
Maybe the plane ran into atmospheric scissors (pilot slang), which could violently shake it. But exactly after this second, after the autopilot disconnect the Boeing dives to the ground.
And these are the words of transcripts translated us into the Russian language for clarity
01:40:40GMT“Do not worry, do not worry, do not worry!”
01:40:45GMT “Don’t do this, don’t do this, don’t do this!”
01:40:50GMT ‘Pull! Pull! Pull!
01:40:54GMT ‘Aaaaaa’

That is, the pilots could not do anything with the aircraft, which flew nose to the ground, such is the version of the experts.

By disabling the autopilot, pilot tried to bring "Boeing" in horizontal flight, but at this moment the stabiliser which is located at the keel went into ‘dive mode’. In this mode, the elevator is no longer effective and practical does not respond to control inputs. The pilots apparently did not realize that the sharp dive is responsible by the stabilizer.
The question is- why has the stabiliser switched to ‘dive mode’? This mode is activated by a button the pilots call ‘Knyupel’ That is, during turbulence by going into manual mode, the pilot could have accidentally activated the ‘knyupel’, and he did not notice, as he complained before about chronic fatigue. Otherwise - it is an unprecedented surprise from the automatic system.
During the last six seconds of the recording, according to our source, the screams heard were inhumane. We chose not to play them.
Plane crashes with acceleration at 1 hour 41 minutes and 00 seconds GMT killing all 62 people. Once again, the official conclusions about the causes of the disaster can only be made after the results of the investigation.

[threemiles]

The animation shows that the horizontal stabilizer is in the full down position when the autopilot becomes disconnected and cannot be countered by pulling the yoke.

[core_dump]

"catch the knyupel" I would assume means "bump the yoke". But that didn't really make sense to me in context because they were just previously talking about stab trim. And nothing related to stab trim in my mind could be translated as "joystick". Who knows.

[737er]

Autopilot stab trim motor malfunction?

"bump the yoke" could mean Control Wheel Steering reversion with AP engaged.

[aox]

For some reason, it seems that automatic translations render the word кнюпел only as a transliteration. It probably means button or lever.

[spitfire_sl]

In the context of the video simulation, they refer to the knyupel as the button on the yoke on the left side.
From a the Russian language translation, it doest make sense to me and I don't know what they are referring to with regards to the knyupeli. I cannot guess what they are talking about. We have to take into account poor interpretation from the TV channel and representation of this data to the masses.

[aox]

For some reason, it seems that automatic translations render the word кнюпел only as a transliteration. It probably means button or lever.

Solved: it was a misprint - put кнюппель instead in Google or translate

Seems to be joystick

[737er]

Button on yoke is probably referring to AP disconnect. Still doesn't make sense.

[threemiles]

Knypel: The video shows that the commander triggers stab trim on the yoke.

[737er]

Is he trimming nose up or down?

[core_dump]

A captain once told me (jokingly, I thought) that one way to deal with runaway stab trim is to grab the _other_ guy's hand and forcibly jam it in the trim wheel. I'm not sure what kind of conversation would result in that event, but it sure might sound a lot like "Don't worry, don't worry." "Don't do this!"

[spitfire_sl]

Just listening to the news report again:

quote: 'The 'dive mode' is activated by a button called 'knyupeli'

What the news report is implying is that the pilot could have accidentaly touched this 'knyupel' and not have noticed. Or this is a unprecedented act from the automatic system.

Im no 737 pilot, but i think the news report refers to the stabiliser trim button as the knyupeli, and that the pilot accidentally used it incorrectly because of fatigue, not realising the dive is cause by the trim button. Is such a thing possible?

Once again, im just translating. It doesnt make sense to me, and we have to account to news media dumbing down the raw data and not presenting it correctly.

[737er]

One possibility: Autopilot on as thrust comes up on miss. 737 tends to try to pitch up strongly. If AP is on the AP must roll in lots of nose down trim to stay engaged. If it over trimmed nose down on the go around and they turned off the AP as they were pulling power off it could have been trimmed very nose down for new condition. I've seen this but not this extreme. The airplane pitches over abruptly and its quite startling.

[aox]

Is he trimming nose up or down?

I haven't watched the video, but to retranslate the automatic translations given above, it sounds like they are suggesting the trim was accidentally moved fully or very forward without the pilots realising for a few moments.

edit: cross-posted with two posts above

[737er]

Thought of that too spitfire. I wonder if the stab trim brake system prevented them from manually trimming up with the yoke that far back.




° The stabilizer is held in position by a dual brake system. Either stabilizer brake can maintain the position set by the trim system. In the event of a dual brake failure, and without pilot response, airloads can drive the stabilizer to its mechanical stops. Main electric trim can resist this motion, but control column opposition will make the condition worse.





A Control Column actuated Stabilizer Trim Cutout Switch stops operation of the main electric and
autopilot trim when the control column movement opposes trim direction.

[threemiles]

FDR data will show if stab trim was triggered from the flight deck or was a runaway.
Looks like full TOGA on a light aircraft, high GA platform altitude, excessive climb rate, still significant acceleration, lot's of energy involved.

[Lost in Saigon]

I doubt it was runaway stab trim. It would be impossible to not see the trim wheels running to full nose down trim. If it starts to runaway, the cutout switched should stop it instantly.

https://vimeo.com/34501723

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ULCrAZyNk34

[_Phoenix_]

Here is the video link on youtube (it doesn't come with dozens of advertisings)

https://youtu.be/kEjEGHYGh4A?t=125

It would be interesting to have the translation about stabilizer pitch down (at 2:06), it was commanded?

[737er]

Autopilot trim motor runs very slow and not very noticeable. Could be insidious. Manuel electric trim runs quick with flaps out.

[Rananim]

It might be implying that he mistook the VHF transmit for the trim switch.Instead of transmitting he trims down.The transmit and trim down are directly opposite each other on the stick.

[737er]

Or left side for captain.


Confusion on the yoke switch can happen in the heat of battle: http://youtu.be/F9LruOa-hzA

[Chesty Morgan]

Thought of that too spitfire. I wonder if the stab trim brake system prevented them from manually trimming up with the yoke that far back.
Only if the control column us moved in opposition to the trim as per your quotes.

[Old Boeing Driver]

As a guess, the 5,000 hour minimum for captain may mean for a direct hire. Since he was there as an F/O, he was probably upgraded sooner based on seniority and/or performance.

Regards.

[ExDubai]

According to Wikipedia the Captain has 5,965 hours and became captain 18 months ago. The minimum hours to be a Captain at FlyDubai is 5,000 hours. Assuming Wikipedia is correct (they quote several sources including NY Times) and the Captain was promoted as soon as he hit 5,000 hours, he averaged 13hrs flying a week over the 18 months. I guess there must be work hours spent around those flying hours, but even 26 hours a week does not strike me (self loading cargo) as being particularly demanding. What am I missing ?
you're missing that the 5.000 hours are the min. for a DEC (direct entry captain). The Captain was with FZ already as an F/O so his promotion was based on seniority/performance and not on the min. hours.

[737er]

Quote:
Originally Posted by 737er View Post
Thought of that too spitfire. I wonder if the stab trim brake system prevented them from manually trimming up with the yoke that far back.
Only if the control column us moved in opposition to the trim as per your quotes.



You are correct sir.

[KKN_]

Whatever stab problems one can think of (technical, inputs), this alone seems not to explain the notable bank angle inferred from CCTV recordings.

Could someone be conceivably as confident, at ~3'500 AGL, as to try to break out of whatever perceived nose-high attitude threat, by positively lowering a wing?

(Indeed a silly attempt to conjecture a subject to the alleged "don't worry" <> "don't do this", in absence of transcript authenticity confirmation, FDR, and ECAM/EICAS picture)

[DaveReidUK]

Whatever stab problems one can think of (technical, inputs), this alone seems not to explain the notable bank angle inferred from CCTV recordings.

The FR24 data does not support the hypothesis that the GA involved any significant bank angle.

[PuraVidaTransport]

I'm of the mind when he said "don't do this" he may have been talking to the aircraft itself not to the other pilot.

[enola-gay]

The FR24 data does not support the hypothesis that the GA involved any significant bank angle.

=============

But the video footage does. The video at post #298 shows 2 landing lights in view of the ground camera situated at right angle to the descent path. It looks like a high bank angle as the a/c impacted

[Leightman 957]

"scissors" = "shear", no?

Help from our Russian friends would be useful.

[Iceheart]

"scissors" = "shear", no?

Help from our Russian friends would be useful.


The original article says "atmospheric scissors" literally and doesn't make much sense in my mother tongue just as well - well, other than the journalist didn't have any idea of what she or he was talking about and just made up a lot of things.

[Alice025]

Media tries to look technical or their source of "leak" is not easy for them to understand :o. "Atmosphernye nozhnitsy" - literally - "atmospheric scissors" means media heard of the notion IN ENGLISH. They were told "wind shear". Translated by google or with a help of an English-Russian dictionary. Obtained a literal translation : "Atmospheric scissors" - made Russian audience learn of a new thing, previously un-heard of :o.
Some scissors. In the air. ??? To me, a Russian, it signals that the media heard it in English.
Dictionary says English shear has two meanings (as minimum) - "large scissors" and "shift". Journalists opted for "large scissors".


No 2 is "knuppel". General public in Russia never heard about any knuppels and is same impressed with them so scary unknown things as you. might be.

Googling in Russian shows knuppels are German, German term, invented to operate some rocket back in 1943. Then it tells that Russian engineers back in the 20th century used to use this German term to name those. rolling balls' things. Target tracking balls. Like in a computer mouse. Russian engineers preferred the German word knuppel to own term "sharovy manipuliator". In English the German knuppel looks like a thing inside a computer mouse.
It better corresponds to the joystick in airplanes than to a "button" in the airplanes.


There will certainly be further confusion as one media re-tells the news to another media, like in a game "broken telephone" as the word "knuppel" suspiciously sounds like Russian word "knopka"/button. When I heard knuppel first, I thought it' s a diminitive suffix added to the word "button".
But it's not. It's a computer mouse round ball whatever it corresponds to in a modern airplane.

[172driver]

In an aviation context the German word 'Knüppel' short for 'Steuerknüppel' means control stick or in a wider sense yoke.

[Alice025]

Pictures of different "knuppels" in Russian technicians' understanding are here.


IT ???? thinkit.ru ??????? ???????????? ???? (http://thinkit.ru/blog/viewblog/194/)

[KKN_]

Fair enough then, no consensus regarding bank angle yet.

Reported AP disengage and "do not worry" expression must fall closely together.

From the translated article (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/576325-b-738-crash-russia-rostov-don-37.html#post9322985) and the FR24 vertical data plot (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/576325-b-738-crash-russia-rostov-don-33.html#post9321623), an approximate combined* timeline could look like

01:40:00, at ca. 1200ft, GA commences
01:40:40, at ca. 3300ft, Vs +3500 ft/min, : "Do not worry", and AP disengage (is cavalry discharge warbler recorded?)
01:40:42, at ca. 3500ft, Vs +4000 ft/min, onset of vertical deceleration
01:40:45, at ca. 3600ft, Vs 0 ft/min, : "Don't do this", highest altitude after GA
01:40:50, at ca. 3000ft, Vs -10'000 ft/min, : "Pull, pull, pull"
01:40:54, at ca. 1300ft, Vs -21'000 ft/min, [screaming]
01:41:00 ground impact

(*times adjusted to transcript/vesti, ending at 01:41:00, while the FR24 data plotted by threemiles (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/576325-b-738-crash-russia-rostov-don-33.html#post9321623) will have the corresponding point at ca. 01:42:10 )(the CCTV from #589: (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/576325-b-738-crash-russia-rostov-don-30.html#post9320561) 01:45:09)

[thf]

Googling кнюппел (https://www.google.ru/#newwindow=1&q=кнюппель) (knjuppel) shows a lot of images of control or "joy" sticks. So I follow rather 172driver.

[Alice025]

The media message, in essence, is:
"We do not know nothing and feel obliged to warn you about it. However, we managed to obtain a textual representation of the voices' record, what was heard - we were let to know about the last seconds of the record. There were 3 phrases there followed by a shout. The phrases were this, and that, translated into Russian, the shout we won't let you know of for ethic considerations.
Based on that, we deduced that "large atmospheric scissors" happened to the plane, together with mis-play of the "button of the joystick / button on the joystick / button of the button/ no buttons, joystick. - anyway, what the aviators call "knuppel" - either in the result of the accidental touch of it by the pilots or it was the "automation" itself. At 01:40:40, by Greenwich, sharp."

[SergeyKa]

Russian TV at it's best :-/

CVR translated to Russian with some noise added so it sounds like the real recording, with blame speculations to follow...

Anyway, the word "Knuppel" sounds in a sentence "Stabiliser is activated by a button that pilots call Knuppel"
The word "button" goes at the moment when CGI'ed pilot's left thumb flicks the switch on the CGI'ed yoke.

[mommaklee]

In what way does the FR24 data contraindicate a significant L or R roll? Honest question as all I see is vert. velocity and ground speed. It will help me better understand the data as it is.

[Sciolistes]

01:40:50GMT ‘Pull! Pull! Pull!
01:40:54GMT ‘Aaaaaa’
What is this? The crash happened at 00:42Z (03:42L). (Edited: this can only mean 01:40 mins into the CVR recording).

Also, the notion that the pilot accidentally held the trim button down to such an extreme degree is something i find very very hard to believe. It is actually quite ridiculous. It is much more likely that, in a dark noisy 737 cockpit, the continuous and uncommanded motion of the trim wheel could have easily not be noticed,especially in rough air and considering that many crew wear ANC headsets to protect their hearing which do attenuate all cockpit noises to varying degrees.

[olasek]

I agree about this accidental pressing on the switch but I also find this uncommanded motion of trim very hard to swallow. We better have a theory why their vertical speed varied widely from +6000 fpm down to +2000 fpm and then up again to +4000 fpm (all within about 75 sec) to finally plummet to negative values. I don't see how uncommanded trim motion in the same direction would help explaining that.

[mommaklee]

Also really quick: I am wondering what happened about 30 sec prior to the last data point, and about 32 sec prior to impact :(

I plotted the comparison between first and second attempts relative to when each attempt both descended through 1500' GPS altitude. (Point in question is near 65 sec past in second attempt.)

Images via Flickr:

GPS altitude and estimated pitch: https://flic.kr/p/FEWW2p
Est Vert Accel and est pitch: https://flic.kr/p/EKvmjG

If any are interested in the calcs I did (hopefully correctly), I'm happy to share the Excel file.
http://www.pprune.org/Also really quick: I am wondering what happened about 30 sec prior to the last data point, and about 32 sec prior to impact :(I plotted the comparison between first and second attempts relative to when each attempt both descended through 1500' GPS altitude. (Point in question is near 65 sec past in second attempt.)Images via Flickr:GPS altitude and estimated pitch: <a href=https://flic.kr/p/FEWW2p target=_blank>https://flic.kr/p/FEWW2p</a> Est Vert Accel and est pitch: <a href=https://flic.kr/p/EKvmjG target=_blank>https://flic.kr/p/EKvmjG</a>If any are interested in the calcs I did (hopefully correctly), I'm happy to share the Excel file.

[lovelove]

Whatever stab problems one can think of (technical, inputs), this alone seems not to explain the notable bank angle inferred from CCTV recordings.The FR24 data does not support the hypothesis that the GA involved any significant bank angle.

But the video footage does. The video at post #298 shows 2 landing lights in view of the ground camera situated at right angle to the descent path. It looks like a high bank angle as the a/c impacted


This question is equally puzzling to me:

How could the plane have gone from 0° bank angle to 45°-90° bank angle
WITHOUT lateral course deviation ?


FZ981 was well lined up with the runway on second/final approach, hence ~0° bank angle:

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CeH2VjwUsAEzeky.jpg


Even AFTER "start of dive" FZ981 continues on its straight ground track without almost
any lateral deviation. Here better seen from above:

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CeJ7YUMUUAA-I_I.jpg


But during the fatal dive, FZ981 had a bank angle somewhere between 45°-90° (probably
closer to 90°), as can be seen in the various videos posted here:



http://youtu.be/9aBq8saXy2M

Pause this video in a precise moment between 0:06 and 0:07 so that aircraft in fall (or rather its lights) can be seen shortly becore impact. Observe the position of landing lights. Conclude the bank angle being close to 90 degrees left, with a steeply negative pitch attitude.


http://i.imgur.com/O8RfFqB.jpg



Nevertheless during [final approach + GA + fatal dive] FZ981 doesn't sensibly deviate
from its straight ground track, which can not only be seen in image #2 above but is also
corroborated by the plane crashing onto the runway (hence no lateral deviation):

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CeV6U9lUEAAVEgq.jpg


avherald (http://avherald.com/h?article=495997e2) says: "Radar data suggest the aircraft on final approach was to the left of the localizer and just to the
left of the left runway edge and corrected to the right while over the runway bringing the aircraft just within the
runway edges moments before ground contact."

http://i.imgur.com/nnl3k4E.jpg


So how does the plane go from 0° to 45°-90° bank angle without lateral deviation ?
Forward motion provided, a passenger jet makes a turn when it banks, isn't it ?


the plane banked (see image #3 above)
the plane was in forward motion: 200 kts when starting to bank and it still kept some forward motion during the final dive (see images below)
yet the plane didn't make a turn (image #2) but crashed onto the runway (image #5)

how come ?


images showing forward motion (and banking) throughout the final dive:

http://i.imgur.com/T05boQN.png



http://i.imgur.com/W6aAX39.png


(Google Earth Images produced by IG member Victor Ianello)

[Sciolistes]

A trim runaway of jammed elevator does seem unusual. But as they are QRH procedures then one assumes they are conceivable. It would also explain the disengagement of the A/P - again probably uncommanded. If the rate of climb was undesirable, the initial reaction by the crew would have probably been to select Vertical Speed mode and not disconnect (unless it was extreme - which it does not appear to be).

Regarding the vertical speed values and ground speed values. I don't see too much wrong with this. We know they were in rough air, rough enough for them to not want to continue the approach. Perhaps we can expect bumps and spikes in speeds and altitudes over that time. The general trends look consistent with an initial climb, acceleration to commanded speed and then once that speed was reached another steeper climb.

Does anybody know how the Mode S system derives or calculates these values? Obviously vertical speed is a function of altitude change over time and ground speed of position change over time. If the Mode S system calculates these values rather than extracting directly from the Air Data Computer then perhaps we can expect the data to be somewhat erratic depending on the sampling rate (frequency) of altitude and position data by the Mode S system. It would seem sensible for these values to be calculated from a systems integration unit interoperability point of view. If I was the designer of the Mode S system, I think I would calculate as much as possible within the module.

[Otto Throttle]

From my limited understanding of the transcript, it reads as though the aircraft encountered wind shear during the go around, whether annunciated or crew detected. It appears that the autopilot was then disconnected, presumably manually, to fly through the shear. This is probably an automatic response to training, as I suspect many operators do not routinely teach the autopilot coupled escape manoeuvre.

If the aircraft is for some reason grossly out of trim, this will have been masked by the autopilot, and the out of trim condition only apparent on disconnection. Assuming that the trim is for nose down, it would explain the pitch over. This will almost certainly have come as a surprise to the crew, but the "Don't worry, don't worry" sounds like it could be the captain, and indicates to me he has recognised a problem and at this moment feels it is something he can control. The subsequent CVR transcript of "Don't do this" I'm pretty sure is directed at the aircraft and would suggest that the aircraft is not responding as expected.

Why they couldn't recover, only further investigation will tell.

[Sunamer]

Just found this on "vesti" website.
http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2735707


Почему включился в режим пике стабилизатор — вопрос. Он приводится в действие кнопкой, которую пилоты называют "кнюпель".

The phrase itself, if translated to English, would suggest that the knyupel thing is responsible for re-posistioning of a horiz.stab ...

Direct translation is:
It is a question why the stabilizer was activated(started trimming, I presume) nose-down (пике literally means - negative pitch situation).
It (stab) is activated by a button that pilots call knyupel.

And I have to warn that this is a news organization and normally, when they post something about aviation or any other technical field, their wording in those articles usually sounds extremely weird and cumbersome.

[ipilot86]

Correct me if I am wrong, but is it only a dual channel ILS approach (autoland) that allows for autopilot go-around? Otherwise pushing TOGA disconnects the A/P.

[Otto Throttle]

Ipilot, correct.

The news link re the CVR transcript appears to suggest that the autopilot had been re-engaged during the go around itself.

[megan]

It is a question why the stabilizer was activated(started trimming, I presume) nose-down (пике literally means - negative pitch situation)They could possibly mean the stab itself was trimming nose down, meaning an aircraft pitch up reaction.

[FlyingTinCans]

Hypothetically, if during the GA at light weights with full thrust and flaps down, the PF trimmed almost full nose down at high trim speed (the 737 trim is faster when flaps are down) to keep the nose up attitude under control.

Then when levelling off the speed increases rapidly, so PF makes a large thrust reduction while PM is retracting flaps correctly according to the speed schedule.

The aircraft will then have a large pitch down motion due to reduction of thrust, coupled with the nose down trim position and then with the flaps now up, a slower trim wheel or maybe no trim adjustment at all due to a failure or pilot error/fatigue, would the PF have enough elevator authority to correct the aircraft attitude?

The CVR transcripts says the autopilot disconnected, the PF could try and engage the autopilot but if grossly out of trim, would immediately disengage and the autopilot disconnect horn would sound in the flight deck.

[porterhouse]

It appears that the autopilot was then disconnected,
I don't think autopilot was ever engaged during this go-around, it was regular CAT I approach, perhaps even localizer only approach (this is not clear) and execution of go-around disconnects autopilot.

[ipilot86]

I believe re-engaging AP during a flight director go-around is a standard procedure? It can get messy with the AP modes (LVL CHG), full thrust, flap retraction, trimming.

[porterhouse]

I believe re-engaging AP during a flight director go-around is a standard procedure?
Yes, at some point however looking at their weird vertical speed gyrations it doesn't look like autopilot would be commanding something like that.

[threemiles]

A trim runaway of jammed elevator does seem unusual. But as they are QRH procedures then one assumes they are conceivable. It would also explain the disengagement of the A/P - again probably uncommanded. If the rate of climb was undesirable, the initial reaction by the crew would have probably been to select Vertical Speed mode and not disconnect (unless it was extreme - which it does not appear to be).

Regarding the vertical speed values and ground speed values. I don't see too much wrong with this. We know they were in rough air, rough enough for them to not want to continue the approach. Perhaps we can expect bumps and spikes in speeds and altitudes over that time. The general trends look consistent with an initial climb, acceleration to commanded speed and then once that speed was reached another steeper climb.

Does anybody know how the Mode S system derives or calculates these values? Obviously vertical speed is a function of altitude change over time and ground speed of position change over time. If the Mode S system calculates these values rather than extracting directly from the Air Data Computer then perhaps we can expect the data to be somewhat erratic depending on the sampling rate (frequency) of altitude and position data by the Mode S system. It would seem sensible for these values to be calculated from a systems integration unit interoperability point of view. If I was the designer of the Mode S system, I think I would calculate as much as possible within the module.

Data are from Air Data Computer. No data are calculated outside the airframe. Most likely recorded FDR data will appear 100% the same, albeit at a higher sampling rate.
MSL altitiude is from GPS (height over ellipsoid) and transmitted as an offset to QNE baro altitude.
Open remains the source of VS. There are two options: GPS or Baro. Depends on the supplier of the avionics.

[Otto Throttle]

The weird vertical speed gyrations aren't unheard of when the autopilot is controlling the aircraft in low level turbulence. It flies like a piece of cr@p. It wouldn't be unusual for a pilot to disconnect and fly an average pitch attitude through it and accept a small amount of speed deviation.

[Old King Coal]

On the B737, during a 'dual channel' approach (i.e. an approach being made with both autopilots engaged), a press of a TOGA button will cause the aircraft to go-around and the autopilot / auto-throttle will remain engaged (i.e. the autopilot / auto-throttle will fly the go-around, all the pilots then have to do is raise the landing gear, and move the flap lever in order to accelerate the aircraft).

During a single channel approach (i.e. an approach made with just one autopilot engaged), a press of the TOGA button will cause the selected autopilot to disengage (along with an associated aural warning of such), it's then up to the pilots to action the go-around manoeuvre and all subsequent associated actions.

In flydubai 'dual-channel' approaches are not approved, wherein Cat II / Cat III (low visibility approaches & landings) are entirely hand-flown via use of the HGS / HUD... and accordingly it would be true to say that ALL landings in flydubai are hand-flown (i.e. use of 'auto-land' is not permitted) and therein at some point during an approach (regardless of it being either Cat I/II/III) the autopilot must be disconnected, and following which the remainder of the approach & landing (or go-around) is flown manually.

During a go-around, the normal procedure is to hand-fly the aircraft until the flaps are fully up and then to engage the autopilot... that said, some might (for workload reasons) engage an autopilot & auto-throttle once the aircraft is above the autopilot's 'minimum use height'.

[Sunamer]

"They could possibly mean the stab itself was trimming nose down, meaning an aircraft pitch up reaction."

No, because then a different word would have been used to indicate nose-up situation.
Пике (pee'ke(a)) - is a nose DOWN attitude.

[framer]

I am a little bit surprised that nobody has mentioned the speed trim system in this conversation.
If indeed the horizon-stab ended up positioned to fly the nose of the aircraft down, then the STS is one of several ways that it can get there.
The horizon-stab could get there through some sort of failure.
It could get there by being manually motored there by the PF.
It could get there by being motored there by the STS.
What conditions would result in the STS motoring the stabiliser 'aircraft nose down' ?
1/ The A/P must not be engaged
2/ High thrust settings and light weights
3/ Airspeed decaying below target speed
So when we see 6000fpm climb, I wonder if an increasing headwind has resulted in higher attitudes being flown and when the head wind stabilises that attitude is too high, speed decays, STS try's to compensate by trimming forward.
If this did occur then another hole has lined up as well because elevator should be able to control the attitude even if this has happened.
Where you would be in trouble though is if you let the nose get too low in conjunction with the ' nose down stabiliser' and then tried to recover solely with elevator.
My understanding is that elevator can override the stab position but if you have an aircraft pointing downhill and are trying to bring it out with the (relatively) small elevators, you'd want either lots of height or not too much nose down attitude.
That's just my thoughts, I'm not suggesting it applies to this flight ( or even that my assessment of elevator capability is accurate) but I am surprised that the STS hasn't been discussed yet.
Thoughts?

[wongsuzie]

Whatever the stab position/angle how come pulling ("pull,pull,pull") back on the CC doesn't raise the nose even one inch?

[737er]

The weird vertical speed gyrations aren't unheard of when the autopilot is controlling the aircraft in low level turbulence. It flies like a piece of cr@p. It wouldn't be unusual for a pilot to disconnect and fly an average pitch attitude through it and accept a small amount of speed deviation.



True. Especially if you manage to get the AP to engage in a dynamic siituation.

[framer]

Whatever the stab position/angle how come pulling ("pull,pull,pull") back on the CC doesn't raise the nose even one inch?

What I was getting at above is that there may be limits to the 'power' of the elevators relative to the 'power' of the hori-stab. The elevators are small compared to the stabiliser, so if ( due to a reason I won't speculate on) the nose of the aircraft was allowed to get to very low attitudes (-20? -30? ) then do the elevators have enough power to correct the situation from that altitude?
I'm not at all convinced that this is what happened, I was just surprised that with all the technical discussion around the pitch control of the aircraft nobody had mentioned the STS.

[silvertate]

No 2 is "knuppel". It's a computer mouse round ball whatever it corresponds to in a modern airplane.

Since the trim switch is a rocker switch, rather than a true switch, is is possible this refers to the trimmer.

[PBY]

What if the aircraft climbs rapidly on the autopilot with a lot of power. Than the AP captures altitude quite abruptly. It has to pitch quite hard nose down. The stab is trimmed hard nose down and at the same time power comes agressively off to keep level. Than AP disconnects. Stab is trimmed down. Power goes back. It is a huge nose dow moment.
You try to pull the yoke, but the small elevator is aerodynamically hidden behind the huge stabilazor. You try tu pull, but nothing happens. At the moment you have too options. Either add a lot of power to get the nose up or trim fast like hell. I am not a Boeing pilot. Does that make sense? May be trimmimg would not be fast enough to get yourself out of it. You would probably need to add a lot of power.

[PBY]

The Go around altitude is 3240. So if the power was kept on, the AP had no other alternative than to pitch down very hard. Because of the nose down parameter being exceeded, the AP disconnected. The airspeed increased a lot.
So when the AP disconnects the pilot powers back to get the speed under control. What a set up trap!

[PBY]

The GA altitude seem to support my theory. As the problem started around that altitude.

[de facto]

if your nose is stuck way down(stab down)last thing is to add thrust which will just add the downward energy,speed increase and even harder to pull out.
Adding thrust for pitch up works wonders when in trim condition not in that scenario.
You need to get back to the speed at which it was in trim,reduce thrust which will allow the elevators more control over the jammed stab.(less manual force required).

[PBY]

I slightly disagree. The engines are mounted below the centre of gravity. So immediate hard power starts pulling nose up, even though the increase in speed is counterproductive. But I still think that full power is quicker and faster way to get the nones momentarily up that could buy the pilot some time whlie trimmimg hard up. If that's not possible, than it is a fatal trap!

[PBY]

As I say, I don't fly the boeing. But there was a fatal accident like this on a Airbus. They forgot low altitude selected, something like 1500 feet. But it spdoes not matter what altitude, if you sleep through it. Does anybody know, when that accident happened? It was fatal too.

[Util BUS]

In reference to some of the points mentioned above.

On the ATC recording at time 5:58 the crew advise in case of a go-around they will climb to FL80.

The B737-800 FCOM 2 Section 4.20.2 states that the auto pilot will disconnect automatically in case of:

Pushing TO/GA on a single channel approach:

- Below 2000 ft RA
- with flaps not up or
- G/S engaged

Also if they had a STAB Trim runaway it would have been obvious to the crew from the sound of the trim wheel and would be quickly discovered by the investigators given the associated sounds on the CVR.

I would be much more inclined to believe it was due to tailplane icing such as in the
October 1994 American Eagle ATR72 crash which was further investigated in NASA's Tailplane Icing program of March 2000.