B-738 Crash in Russia Rostov-on-Don

[Dan_Brown]

I think we are seeing lack of manual flying skills coming to the fore yet again, if my gut feeling is correct. Not the crews fault, as they aren't allowed to practice on the line.

As mentioned previously, once in 6 months is defiantly not enough to practice what normally, should be a routine procedure.

We have been for sometime now and will be paying a very high price, for allowing "operators of automatics", who are almost totally reliant on such, to excel in the airline environment, rather than pilots who are able to fly the aircraft, first and foremost.

To make sure the aircraft is flown, if not by the automatics then manually, must take presidence over all else IMHO.

Years ago I was told by a "Chief Pilot" of a major, "flying skills are not a priority in our airline". :ugh:

[GlenQuagmire]

microscalewx thats a really useful and well constructed post - rare on here. I will be really interested to hear the results of the enhanced grid. Are you a colleague of Nils Widi? he used to explain all this stuff to me and make me feel really thick..

[JoeMcGrath]

Live ATC comms with the flight

http://youtu.be/-4m0FcsLnEg

[HDP]

Listening to the ATC tape, I can't understand why one of the pilots asked the controller to look out the window, to tell if the weather looked better or not. The first landing attempt was 1:41AM local time and the second attempt 3:43AM local time, so the sky would have been pitch black. How can a controller look at a dark sky and say "oh yes, the conditions look better now". To me, the fact that the plane made this call suggests the pilots were already fatigued, perhaps disorientated, and desperate to get the plane on the ground.

[CodyBlade]

FZ staff page says Capt. first flgt to URRR.

[airman1900]

From the U.S. Federal Meteorological Handbook Number 1 - Surface Weather Observations and Reports:

FMH-1 (http://www.ofcm.gov/fmh-1/fmh1.htm)

cumulonimbus. An exceptionally dense and vertically developed cloud, occurring either isolated or as a line or wall of clouds with separated upper portions. These clouds appear as mountains or huge towers, at least a part of the upper portions of which are usually smooth, fibrous, or striated, and almost flattened.

[mothminor]

Once in 6 months training, will make people legal, but not competent.


Or in the case of some airlines (including the one which I recently retired from), once every 12 months,


More training but less often, just happens to be a cost saving too;)

[RoyHudd]

Reluctant to even suggest this, but could the rapid descent have been caused by a deliberate input of one of the pilots? Most unlikely, I think.

The FDR should reveal all, assuming the recording is intact. But never take anything for granted in this business, until a proper analysis and report are undertaken.

[Sciolistes]

No. Just no.

[AtomKraft]

Just thinking about their flight duty.
This was a BIG day, even as rostered. Two long 4 hour sectors and a report, one turnaround and a check out.

Now this crew held for two hours, so they were now looking at 10 hours at the controls, plus their ground duties before they get to go home in DXB.

I don't know their start time, but wouldn't they have been out of hours to fly the return leg anyway, after that 2 hour hold? And if so, why not divert? Why persist with trying to get in at Rostov, only to be stuck there anyway?

Also, who the heck waits for two hours in the air for weather (that's not clearly transient- like a Cb over the field) to improve?

I expect it will all be clear soon enough....

[B777Heavy]

For those wondering, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7orMIfJx-uw
a FZ low vis approach into BTS, from cockpit. As can be seen here, it's Single CH all the way until the AP disconnect. Also what's interesting is the VSD on both sides, Pm and Pf.

Also, as I read somewhere, Rostov is captain's airport only, so capt was PF i'd guess.

Whats wrong with VSD on both sides?

[Kulverstukas]

http://icdn.lenta.ru/images/2016/03/20/16/20160320162818603/pic_a6404affd0b6df28475927aadd17f87c.jpg

[GooneyCaptain]

Reluctant to even suggest this, but could the rapid descent have been caused by a deliberate input of one of the pilots? Most unlikely, I think.

The FDR should reveal all, assuming the recording is intact. But never take anything for granted in this business, until a proper analysis and report are undertaken.
RoyHudd is offline Report Post


Both of the cockpit crew's wives were pregnant. FO's wife with twins. It was supposed to be one of the captain's last flights with FZ, he had resigned, intended to move back to his home in Cyprus to raise his children, and start flying wit Ryan Air on Monday...

Sad day...

[weatherdude]

Just decided to sign up to inject some extra weather information into an already compelling discussion, and to back up some of weatherdude's input.

I am an amateur, not a professional, and do not hold any kind of pilot/aviation credentials.

The METAR report is a good source for surface conditions and observations from there, and I'd like to add that the CB report is quite likely correct. Any cumulus cloud (Cu) that rains is by definition a cumulonimbus (Cb), the discriminator for a thunderstorm is in METAR code as TS, with +/- for each to indicate rain rate. The reason for this is that any Cu is technically convective and thus can cause upset, with TCu also used to warn of non-raining but potentially strong updrafts. The METAR reports around the accident time correctly state showers and broken low clouds, hence CB's, with stratiform cloud cover at 10k ft. Given the immediately pre-frontal nature of that night's weather at Rostov this is a likely cloud pattern.

A better source for weather conditions, if you can find one nearby to an accident time/location, is a sounding; it just so happens a balloon was launched from Rostov-on-don at 00z (likely just prior, so perhaps 1hr before accident). The lowest levels up to 700mb are available here: 34731 URRR Rostov-Na-Donu Sounding (http://weather.uwyo.edu/cgi-bin/sounding?region=europe&TYPE=GIF%3ASTUVE700&YEAR=2016&MONTH=03&FROM=1900&TO=1900&STNM=urrr) in which on either side of the diagram you can see the height of a recorded measurement and wind information (bearing, strength) from this you can infer a wind shear difference of 40kts within ~600m of the surface. Additionally, there is slight vertical directional shear (difference in wind bearing with height), both of which would suggest shear-induced wave action, ie: turbulence. This amount of low level shear is quite extreme, and on an airfield already known for turbulence.

The synoptic scenario on the night was a strong frontal zone advancing from the NW that had just reached the Black Sea area at 00z, and was at it's strongest point for that location. Here is the 850mb wind chart for that part of Asia taken from the initial chart of the GFS model (note: this would be mostly assimilated actual data, just gridded, before the model started to compute anything): http://www.tropicaltidbits.com/analysis/models/gfs/2016031900/gfs_mslp_uv850_asia_1.png A quick look on Google maps at the local terrain shows that the wind fetch was coming straight off the Black Sea up into a valley where Rostov is with an elevation change of 78m. Adding to the vertical turbulence effects would have been the possibility of further horizontal eddying from orographic wind effects of the valley coupled with the approaching front maxima. All in all a very bad weather situation to head into.

As for icing, the complete diagram for the 00z Rostov sounding shows saturation between 0C and -20C: 34731 URRR Rostov-Na-Donu Sounding (http://weather.uwyo.edu/cgi-bin/sounding?region=europe&TYPE=GIF%3ASKEWT&YEAR=2016&MONTH=03&FROM=1900&TO=1900&STNM=34731) (note for non-weather folk, that diagram is a skew-T which means temperature on the x-axis relates to the blue lines that are the most skewed to the right from immediately above their labels, the black lines are the instrument measurements so to read off the temp see where they intersect at your chosen height) which means riming was possible. It also shows that at above 5.5km there was less saturation (separation between the lines of temp and dewpoint measurements), so quite possible there was minimal icing risk in the hold (esp being off to the SW of this reading) but perhaps some icing in the descent to the 2nd attempt.

brb an associate is running a GFS-WRF simulation at 2km grid scale
No. Most parts of the text are not correct. especially the assumption, that a raining CU is automatically a CB - in most cases the other layers are the rain producers (as/ns) and the Russian assumption, that the sky is overcast with CB doesn't match the truth anyway. In most rainy weather situations the lower atmosphere is saturated, again: This weather pattern is being handled worldwide hundreds of times and it is beyond me why we would create non existing weather drama out of the situation at Rostov. If this created someting automatically, we'd see planes crashing every day.

[langleybaston]

My professional opinion is that weather probably had little to do with this tragedy. For example the idea that 40 kts shear [with little directional shear] in the bottom 600m of the atmosphere is at all unusual is risible.

My opinion is based on a long career as a weather forecaster with the British service, and retiring as a PSO, Chief Met Officer British Forces Germany

[weatherdude]

From the U.S. Federal Meteorological Handbook Number 1 - Surface Weather Observations and Reports:

FMH-1 (http://www.ofcm.gov/fmh-1/fmh1.htm)
Again: They do that in Russia with any shower cloud. In the night, nobody sees if it was a CB cloud. The cloud top temperature of -26 degrees at the time of the event means that the cloud never reached heights where you would expect to see a well developed CB. It just doesn't make sense and I can't follow the agenda to create a weather drama out of a situation which is mastered by pilots many times every day.

[Future Rodney King]

Thinking about the somotographic illusion question posed by some posters. Lets not discount the fact that flying around in circles for hours on end, no doubt fatigued and anxious by this point is going to degrade performance significantly. Anyone who has experienced this phenomena in a high performance jet at night will understand that you must rely on your excellent instrument flying skills in order to stop yourself screwing up. I remember feeling disorientated for a number of seconds, tired and during the throes of a windshear escape manoeuvre in a 737 at night. Body telling me one thing, eyes the other, fatigue a factor, its always on the last sector and at night when these things happen. Were these guys aviating navigating and communicating? Or was this a loss of control due to the loss of situational awareness by a fatigued crew? Never mind the supposed calm manner of the pilot over the RT, that really tells us nothing. You have to question the commanders reasoning for the 2 hour hold over the field. If he was under commercial pressure do you think he would have been worried? By all accounts this chap had resigned and was leaving for Ryanair in the morning. Somehow I don't think tea and biscuits in Dubai the following day factored in his decision making somehow. Murphy was out that night, time will tell.

[etudiant]

Both of the cockpit crew's wives were pregnant. FO's wife with twins. It was supposed to be one of the captain's last flights with FZ, he had resigned, intended to move back to his home in Cyprus to raise his children, and start flying wit Ryan Air on Monday...

Sad day...



Very pertinent input relevant to the discussion of there being a corporate policy which inhibited diversion. If this was the captain's last flight with the carrier, would he not feel free to ignore a counterproductive policy?

[furbpilot]

"Some of the victims were from rebel-held areas in eastern Ukraine where fighting between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian government troops has killed more than 9,100 people since April 2014. The war has turned the region’s main airport of Donetsk into a wasteland, and many locals have been using the airport in Rostov across the border".

[*Lancer*]

JJ, bag's from the first flight wouldn't be on the return.

[golfyankeesierra]

Listening to the ATC tape, I can't understand why one of the pilots asked the controller to look out the window, to tell if the weather looked better or not. The first landing attempt was 1:41AM local time and the second attempt 3:43AM local time, so the sky would have been pitch black. How can a controller look at a dark sky and say "oh yes, the conditions look better now". To me, the fact that the plane made this call suggests the pilots were already fatigued, perhaps disorientated, and desperate to get the plane on the ground.
Absolutely to the contrary! The fact that they ask the controller to look outside illustrates to me that they were able to think out of the box, which would be the first to go when fatigued (or under stress).
To have the best situational awareness you use all the information you can get.
I think asking for an observation was a very professional thing to do (albeit it yielded little).

And having flown into and over their airspace often for 25+ years I hardly read a Russian tag, meter or runway state msg anymore, they are notoriously unreliable and just generic for the time of the season. Do what you like but for me discussing them would be a waste of time..

[Machinbird]

Somatogravic Illusions are often used as the catch-all excuse for crashes like these because it's hard to believe there are airline pilots out there simply cannot fly on instruments when most of their career has been watching an autopilot do its work.
I might have thought that too until one of the military stovepipe drivers on our base (NTU) pulled up into the overcast after a normal takeoff and then came right back down and did a lawn dart, still in afterburner. And that was with a crew of two-two sets of eyes, but one set of controls!

I've been looking at possible causes for piloting failures under stressful conditions, and there is one common thread that I keep seeing:


A startling event.
A perceived need for quick action.
Action taken on the basis of incomplete information, perhaps using improvised methods.
Action continued beyond an appropriate duration.

I am not a professional psychologist, but I do have a lifetime of my own experiences to reflect upon, and what I see is a form of what is called attention tunneling.
I am posting the above observations so that others can perhaps distill their own experiences in that light, and perhaps learn from them.

[Herod]

This was a BIG day, even as rostered. Two long 4 hour sectors and a report, one turnaround and a check out.

I don't know where you work, AtomKraft, but it must be a cosy operation. I'm not going to get into fatigue issues, because I have no idea of their previous work/rest schedules, but two four-hour sectors is hardly a big day.

[gtaflyer]

I have experienced performing go-around on an A320 and A330 both engines aircraft during the day in good visibility and can say that it is most uncomfortable feeling I ever want to experience. I had a very strong urge to push forward on the joystick but thankfully did not. Imagine the same situation but at night in rain and with pitch up of at least 17 degrees you have no visual que, in strong turbulence the illusion is even more pronounced, you have to trust the instruments.

I have practiced the manoeuvre in a sim and it does not even come close to replicating the real thing in the aircraft in weather conditions described. Hopefully the data recorders will reveal the truth. I wonder what the results would show if research was done to evaluate the pilot reactions to similar situation as that in the Kazan and fly Dubai.

My feeling is that the pilot in flydubai had even more unstable approach extreme weather and visual ques such that on this second Go/Around his own perception was very different from that of the aircraft with the resultant mismanaged control.

We need to replicate this most dangerous manoeuvre in aviation in the sim and train pilots to fly it safely 100% of time every time. How hard can it be to train pilots in basic power/attitude flying to get out of trouble ?

[Airbubba]

Here's a brief update today from Russia's Interstate Aviation Committee:

20 march 2016

On 20th of March 2016 the flight recorders from Boeing 737-800 A6-FDN ("FlyDubai" Airlines – United Arab Emirates) after an accident at Rostov aerodrome on 19th of March 2016 were delivered to the Interstate Aviation Committee.

The flightrecorders are significantly damaged.

The Interstate Aviation Committee specialists jointly with the specialists from the United Arab Emiratesand France have started inspection, opening and extraction of the memory modules from the protecting casing in order to continue work on recovery of the interface cables and preparation for the data downloading. The preparation works are planned to be completed by the end of today.


From the somatogravic/disorientation discussion:

I might have thought that too until one of the military stovepipe drivers on our base pulled up into the overcast after a normal takeoff and then came right back down and did a lawn dart, still in afterburner. And that was with a crew of two-two sets of eyes, but one set of controls!


Are you perhaps referring to the short tragic airshow on a weekend cross country at BNA twenty years ago? Sadly, in addition to the crew, three people in a house were killed as well.

Interestingly, 'Scary' Mary Schiavo says the FR24 ground plot supports the pilot disorientation theory:

Pilot disorientation?

CNN aviation expert Mary Schiavo said radar suggested the plane had flown three large, looping circles around the airport before it crashed.

"The poor visibility is probably the biggest clue," Schiavo said. "But this runway was lighted, it had good lighting at one end and passable lighting at the other and it did have an instrument landing system."

"With the clue of bad weather and making at least three different circles trying to reorient to this runway, it does look like pilot disorientation."


Flydubai plane crashes in Russia; 62 dead - CNN.com (http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/18/europe/russia-plane-crash/)

[Starfox64]

Just thinking about their flight duty.
This was a BIG day, even as rostered. Two long 4 hour sectors and a report, one turnaround and a check out.


Pretty much every single short/medium hall UK based pilot has done this sort of duty multiple times in a week at some point. 5 canary return flights in a row from the UK is around a 4:30-5:00 block each time round. Wake up 4am, land at 5pm straight into rush hour traffic on the way home, freshened up and ready for dinner by 6:30. Bed straight after that and attempt to get some decent sleep before the alarm goes again around 8 hours later at 4am. Thats if your neighbours or young kids play ball. Repeat this 4 times over. Done on multiple occasions myself and whilst all within limits absolutely draining.

If it is found that fatigue did play a part then remember these guys were on their first sector! Consider the crew that is up at 4am, 5 hours down to Tenerife and picks up a 2 hours slot and goes into discretion. 5 hours after that approaching home base where the weather is gusting 50 knots, you're both tired and theres a distinct possibility of diversion. This happens and it happens all the time.

[SMT Member]

This was a BIG day, even as rostered. Two long 4 hour sectors and a report, one turnaround and a check out.

The hour was unsociable, but a 4-hour return is more or less a 'Home to Southern Spain/Greece and back' from where I'm based. That's not big, that's actually a rather relaxed day out and done by the thousands every single day.

[alainthailande]

Don't think this has been posted yet: the Russian rt.com site has published a panoramic video of the crash site:
https://youtu.be/FWct9sbguTA

[Wrist Watch]

9aBq8saXy2M

Pause this video in a precise moment between 0:06 and 0:07 so that aircraft in fall (or rather its lights) can be seen shortly becore impact.

Observe the position of landing lights.

Conclude the bank angle being close to 90 degrees left, with a steeply negative pitch attitude.

Certainly no discussion of any "wing strike", the video clearly shows the severity of the situation.

For those who cannot watch videos, here's an annotated frame (screenshot):

http://i.imgur.com/O8RfFqB.jpg

Very tragic for everyone involved, may the deceased rest in peace. I've got a pal in that company (low hour F/O), could've been him.

[Old Boeing Driver]

In looking at the graphics from posts 37 and 107, it appears they made a slightly steep go around and quickly made a very steep descent to the ground.

I think your 90 degree comment is correct.

Very sad for all involved, and I hope the FDR and CVR will be readable.

[EternalNY1]

Everything here points to a stall on the last go-around.

I have no idea why the media is still talking about a "wing strike" or a "tail strike". The videos clearly show this aircraft was stalled and impacted in a steep vertical dive. Totally disintegrated.

I am leaning towards the Somatogravic Illusion issue here, especially with what was probably an exhausted crew and rough weather. I'm not sure exactly what the 737-800 does in this go-around scenario in terms of automation but it does look like they stalled it from altitude.

Tragic.

[Kulverstukas]

Media reported that FDR was read today. It was operative up to impact. Latest information is that a/c staled and dived over left wing, falling from 900m at 400 kmh speed. Bad weather and wind shear was not confirmed.

[FullWings]

The videos clearly show this aircraft was stalled...
How do they show that? All I see is an aircraft in an unusual attitude impacting the ground violently. This could have come about for many reasons: disorientation, flight control failure (rudder hardover, etc.), improper inputs plus anything else you can think of...

[EternalNY1]

How do they show that? All I see is an aircraft in an unusual attitude impacting the ground violently. This could have come about for many reasons: disorientation, flight control failure (rudder hardover, etc.), improper inputs plus anything else you can think of...

If you look at the 3D plot of the flight path (assuming that data is reliable, which I believe it is) the go-around seemed to be going smoothly until it suddenly didn't.

Latest information is that a/c staled and dived over left wing, falling from 900m at 400 kmh speed.

[Old Boeing Driver]

I lean toward the stall scenario. The news media rarely have their information correct.

The Somatogravic Illusion may be a factor, but that has been around for years in various terms.

I flew the 737(200 through the BBJ) and the automation in the later models, I thought, was very good.

However, a few missed switch pushes, or settings could ruin your day.

Sadly, there seems to be less emphasis on simply flying the airplane instead of using the automation most of the time.

Peace to the families and those involved.

[His dudeness]

falling from 900m at 400 kmh speed.

Forward or vertical speed ? 400km/h translate to 215 knots. Flaps/Slats retracted at light weight, would the 738 stall at 215 knots (or a little below that) ?

[aeromech3]

Echo of the GF A320 go-around and subsequent crash off Muharraq Bahrain!

[Phil80]

As this is my first post in this forum, let me please begin with stating that I am not a pilot but coming from the medical sector, and having some skills in TRM/CRM course systems as a coach for clinical teams.

Having said that, the question I'd like to ask you as the experts: Could the earlier GA have indeed have had a negative impact on the outcome of this tragic event?
I am thinking in a way that the behaviour of the Aircraft might not have fitted the pilots "mental model " here.
I guess that after being in the holding for 2+ hrs, it must have been significantly lighter than before. Could it therefore play a role that the pilots expexted a similar response to control inputs like in the first GA, but the now lighter aircraft reacted differently?
Humans tend to interprete situations under stress following their previous experiences, and this might have prevented the crew from judging the current situation approbately?

[Chesty Morgan]

Forward or vertical speed ? 400km/h translate to 215 knots. Flaps/Slats retracted at light weight, would the 738 stall at 215 knots (or a little below that) ?
Whilst not specifically commenting on this incident one could stall a 738 at any speed.

[Weathergirly]

Very Sad day. For such a major event I am shocked at how little news coverage in the UK. I fear this is another handling issue. Automation dependency is the biggest threat we face in the modern world and what we are witnessing is more and more loss of control of large Aircraft. Let's follow the FAA - world leading and respected throughout the world, let's get back to how Europe was 20 years ago. No Airline would touch Pilots unless they had bags of experience - Thousands of hand flying hours in most cases. We need to get back to basics.

[Dune]

Latest from the TASS news agency.

TASS: World - Causes of plane crash in Rostov-on-Don yet unclear - sources (http://tass.ru/en/world/863828)

MOSCOW, March 20. /TASS/. Experts and specialists from the Interstate Aviation Committee so far have no clear understanding of what might have caused the crash of a passenger plane in Russia’s southern city of Rostov-on-Don, sources close to Russia’ air transport authorities and the Interstate Aviation Committee told TASS on Sunday.


More news on
Boeing crash in southern Russia


© IAC Press Service


Flight recorder from crashed FlyDubai jet opened, records quality good - IAC


Chief Investigator took the Boeing crash investigation under his personal control


Rostov-on-Don airport may be opened morning March 21


Earth Hour in Moscow devoted to Rostov-on-Don crash victims


"So far, they have only theories neither of which is definitely proved," the sources said, adding that specialists have only reconstructed a preliminary picture of the crash.

"According to preliminary data, the Boeing carried out go-around after it failed to land on the first try. The pilots cut short the second go-round to execute a third one. At an altitude of about 900 meters and a speed of more than 400 kilometers per hour, the plane banked left and hit the ground in the left edge of the runway almost vertically, at an angle of 60 degrees," the sources said.

Weather conditions in Rostov-on-Don were unfavorable at the moment but there was no sidewind. "Wind gusts reached 11-17 meters per second but there was no sidewind," the sources said.

Having hit the ground, the plane exploded and caught fire. Its fragments were scattered on both sides of the runway.

According to the sources, the pilots reported no technical malfunctions during the flight and the landing. "The flight was carried out in a routine mode," the sources said.

They found it difficult to say how long the investigation might take. "It may take a lot of time, so far it is difficult to be more exact. It will depend on the results of deciphering of the flight recorders," the sources said. "So far, it is not absolutely clear how many go-rounds the plane carried out trying to land. As for the radar information, it is only taken into consideration."

A FlyDubai’s Boeing 737-800 crashed at Rostov-on-Don’s airport in the small hours on March 19 during a second attempt to land in complicated weather conditions of strong side wind and rain. The plane served regular Flight FZ 981 from Dubai. The passenger jet capable of carrying 189 passengers had 62 people aboard, including the crew. None has survived.

The investigation looks into several leads: a pilot error, a technical malfunction, bad weather conditions, and others.


More:
TASS: World - Causes of plane crash in Rostov-on-Don yet unclear - sources (http://tass.ru/en/world/863828)

[jack11111]

Flight instruction still builds hours and life-saving reflexes when students do the most unexpected things. I want my captains to have lots of those hours.

[Paracab]

Pretty much every single short/medium hall UK based pilot has done this sort of duty multiple times in a week at some point. 5 canary return flights in a row from the UK is around a 4:30-5:00 block each time round. Wake up 4am, land at 5pm straight into rush hour traffic on the way home, freshened up and ready for dinner by 6:30. Bed straight after that and attempt to get some decent sleep before the alarm goes again around 8 hours later at 4am. Thats if your neighbours or young kids play ball. Repeat this 4 times over. Done on multiple occasions myself and whilst all within limits absolutely draining.

If it is found that fatigue did play a part then remember these guys were on their first sector! Consider the crew that is up at 4am, 5 hours down to Tenerife and picks up a 2 hours slot and goes into discretion. 5 hours after that approaching home base where the weather is gusting 50 knots, you're both tired and theres a distinct possibility of diversion. This happens and it happens all the time.


Concurs with a chat I had on the ground in Dalaman last year with a pleasant Captain who shared a few minutes of his very limited turn around time with me and my lad (who is hoping to join the RAF as an officer A level results pending) who'd never seen a flight deck up until then. This chap said he couldn't wait to retire, was fed up with automation and most of all was absolutely knackered all the time, that crew were all up at 0400 that particular day. Interestingly he'd made his money elsewhere, had a flying lesson and the rest is history but still desperately wanted out.

Sad and terrifying at the same time.

[aterpster]

jack1111:

Flight instruction still builds hours and life-saving reflexes when students do the most unexpected things. I want my captains to have lots of those hours.

I had lots of light airplane time when I went with my airline. That included a lot of actual instrument flying, including approaches to minimums. And, none of those airplanes had auto-pilots. Almost all was single pilot. And, I was an instrument instructor. In my case it wasn't being instructor that prepared me nearly as much as all the hand-flown en route and approaches to minimums.

[DH_call]

aeromech3:
Echo of the GF A320 go-around and subsequent crash off Muharraq Bahrain!

Obviously had nothing to do with this tragedy but a good read nonetheless. Thanks. http://flightsafety.org/ap/ap_dec02.pdf

[AtomKraft]

Flap retraction before acceleration????

[Hotel Tango]

I do hope this is not going to reveal another B737 rudder hard-over...

You are living way way behind the times. Take another chill pill....or 10.

[Util BUS]

Answers and Questions?

I think I might have some answers to some of the questions being raised, but then also some questions that need answering.

Everyone is asking why they held for 2 hours. From past experience flying similar routes, fuel if much more expensive in Russia and the Ex-Soviet Republics. Therefore we used to always tanker round trip fuel when we had such light passenger loads. Combine this with a fairly restrictive max duty period based on CAP-371 given the start of duty and the impact of a 3rd sector diversion would have had on the max duty time, might have meant night stopping. Therefore if the fuel was available it seemed rather sensible to just wait out the weather.

There is quite a lot of information online with detailed timelines on Avsafety net and even atc recordings on Avherald. Looking at that those bits of information, everything seemed to be flowing smoothly. This included the first go around. Why then would someone mess up a go around when you have just successfully completed it a short time previously.

My question would be why did they go-around? Windshear again? If so they would have followed a windshear escape maneuver instead of a standard go-around.

With only 55 passengers on board, where were they seated? Did the plane have an empty business class with most people and bags towards the rear of the aircraft?

Was there a flyaway kit onboard? If so was it in the forward cargo hold and properly lashed down?

Also what changed between the first approach and the second? Were they holding in icing conditions? If so what would have been the effect of heavy ice accumulation on the stabilizer?

[framer]

The hour was unsociable, but a 4-hour return is more or less a 'Home to Southern Spain/Greece and back' from where I'm based. That's not big, that's actually a rather relaxed day out and done by the thousands every single day.
These duties that have people doing in excess of 8 hrs airborne with two sectors are asking for trouble if they are rostered several in a row month in month out, year on year.
If you are 28, no kids, a girlfriend lives down the road, have the option of getting into bed and dozing off when you finish work without all the hustle and bustle of a normal family household, then it is tiring but safely achievable. If on the other hand you are 42, have two kids under five, a wife that has to work around your alarm clock settings and random absence during public holidays and weekends etc etc, then it is a case of family v's health v's work and something has to give. There is no free lunch with this type of rostering.

[AtomKraft]

Framer.
I quite agree.
I've also worked some utterly exhausting rotas, and the exhaustion certainly built up as the days went by- but it was manageable most of the time. Add in filthy weather, first time to a new (Captains only landing) destination and in my own case anyway, an attempt to also have a life outside work....and it can get a little much.

In the case of this crew, they must have known as they shot this approach that they were looking at use of discretion to complete the trip, and that they would be flying for around ten hours. Not to mention their other duty time.

We all know that flight crew are an expensive resource, and that maxing out their FDPs makes good business sense......but knackered crews make mistakes.

And those are expensive too....:(

[pezetaroi]

Rubbish. It is part of every low-vis check. agree 100% GA procedures with all and one engine out, are always part of recurrent checks!

[Dan_Brown]

".but knackered crews make mistakes."

Not only knackered crews...

[cyflyer]

I'm not from either country (Greece/Spain) and I think for anyone not from either country it would be difficult to distinguish between the accents especially from a low quality recording.
Also capt landing does not mean capt has to be PF for approach, could be monitored app.
All speculation and not really relevant.

I've spent years abroad and met lots of Spanish, Greek and many other (mainly European) people - speaking English. Agreed, with some parts I also found the accent of the pilot speaking to ATC hard to judge. But his accent is crystal clear in other parts of the comms, which leaves me with absolutely no doubt. Like when he says "Eh-sta-blissed-eh on se loca-li-sa...". The guy talking is 100% Spanish - and definitely not Greek.

As there seems to have been quite a bit discussion on who's voices are heard on the atc recording, I listened to it and can say with almost certainty, the first part until about 2.20" is Aristos, the captain, and from that point onwards its a spanish accented person, ie the F/O. I am Cypriot and I know a cypriot voice 100%, and I met Aristos years ago, may he rest in peace. Also, I heard this was one of his last flights with Flydubai as he was joining Ryanair, and based in Cyprus with his wife who was 7 months expecting. Another point, I thought the Russian woman atc officers' English was atrocious.

[Airbubba]

A little more detail on the status of the two flight recorders from another TASS article:

MOSCOW, March 20. /TASS/. A flight recorder from the FlyDubai passenger jet that crashed on March 19 in Russia’s southern city of Rostov-on-Don killing 62 has been opened, with records found to be of good quality, Sergei Zaiko, the chief of the Interstate Aviation Committee, said on Sunday.

"The flight data recorder has been opened. The damaged cable has been mended, the memory module has been studies. The data have been copied. The quality of records is good. The flight recorder was on until the plane hit the ground," he told the FM radio station.

"So, we have the records of this flight. As for the voice recorder, it was also seriously damaged, its cable was destroyed, so, efforts are now being taken to restore it. The works will be resumed tomorrow morning," he said.


TASS: World - Flight recorder from crashed FlyDubai jet opened, records quality good - IAC (http://tass.ru/en/world/863847)

I flew the 737(200 through the BBJ) and the automation in the later models, I thought, was very good.

However, a few missed switch pushes, or settings could ruin your day.


Most folks seem to say that this CAT I coupled approach would likely be flown with a single autopilot which would disconnect on the go around.

If they had a lower altitude set in the window, e.g. the published miss of 2260 feet, as they climbed to FL80, would the autothrottles come alive and pull the power back to idle as they zoomed upward in manual flight past the window altitude? This is what happens in some of the so called EFIS Boeings.

[aterpster]

framer:

These duties that have people doing in excess of 8 hrs airborne with two sectors are asking for trouble if they are rostered several in a row month in month out, year on year.
If you are 28, no kids, a girlfriend lives down the road, have the option of getting into bed and dozing off when you finish work without all the hustle and bustle of a normal family household, then it is tiring but safely achievable. If on the other hand you are 42, have two kids under five, a wife that has to work around your alarm clock settings and random absence during public holidays and weekends etc etc, then it is a case of family v's health v's work and something has to give. There is no free lunch with this type of rostering.

So well stated!

[Antoine2]

Just read an interesting comment on a Canadian site. The poster said: "It appears that the first missed approach was because he didn't get full lock confirmation on one of the landing gear, NOT weather. The circling was trying to get a confirmed gear down lock".
I know that is not official, but wonder if it is accurate.

[captplaystation]

Just completed a similar scenario in the Sim as part of my last PC. It takes maybe 20min (& I did it on a Classic, where we had to elicit the response of the Sim Instructor acting as Cabin Crew to check the viewers , not applicable on the NG) to do. Certainly not the 2+hr in the holding quoted.

Seems weather was well above minima, bit windy, but didn't sound anything too special. . . I am at a loss to understand this 2+hr holding . . . & what they were waiting for ? ? certainly not RVR/cloudbase . . . so what ?

As to the actual accident, well, if what we know is from Flightradar24 is moderately accurate , if they really climbed in the go around to 2500+ ? flight controls ? /trim? /icing (less so but not impossible) /instruments or disorientation ? . . . . . strange one.


Oh, and the 800 has 6 greens, and a procedure to determine how many you need to be good to go, so, even stranger.

[Old Boeing Driver]

It's been awhile...I think your scenario would be correct.

If they had 2260 set, and turned the "automation" back on, the throttles would go to idle. The nose should drop, but it may have been too late.

Roll Tide.

[jfkjohan]

I subscribe to the belief that, making the approach, they realized they couldnt be stabilized at company criteria stabilization minimums, then went missed. Probably due severe turbulence etc

Held for 2hrs with hopes the SVR TURB would pass. They had the fuel. It was their first sector. They probably haven't even reached their MDF (min div fuel) so was holding until MDF. For all we know, this could have been their last try before going to their alternate to land and step down pending FTL/FDPs etc.

Something may have happened during that G/A that stopped their plans short. Only time and the investigators will tell what that was.

Nothing weird about "holding for so long" etc. In my humble opinion of course-- granted that they had a plan.

[Craggenmore]

The ILS approach for runway 22 is 2.67 degrees.

The threshold and first segment of runway 22 slopes away from landing aircraft at 1.3%. The next segment is 0.3%, then 0.5% and continues to slope away to the threshold of 04.

The LIDO charts for both 22 and 04 come with boxed warnings to expect turbulence and windshere on short finals.

[Alice025]

Local media (incl. BBC Russia) tells of varied behaviour of other planes that night at Rostov airport. One, from Moscow, attempted landings three times, stubbornly, and went away, as didn't succeed. That took place within these 2 hours while the plane cruised around the airport - plus 1 hour. Within 3 hours, in total.
Another one, from St. Petersburg, just, like, gave up at once, and landed in Krasnodar, instead.
The third one, from Yekaterinburg - landed from the first attempt (to annoy metropolitan ones :o, no doubt) moreover, took passengers and took off again, all within an hour, on schedule. So, weather was a factor and of concern to other pilots - simultaneoulsy there - above Rostov airport. Locals on the ground (in plain words) described it as ? say"drizzle" (annoying but not heavy rain) plus ? "intermitting gusts of wind" . (one guy said he re-parked his car away , from under a high tree, afraid the tree would fall). So, quite some wind gusts. Additionally, there seems to be something else. which only black boxes will tell about. ;o( as other planes managed somehow.

[alainthailande]

aeromech3:


Obviously had nothing to do with this tragedy but a good read nonetheless. Thanks. http://flightsafety.org/ap/ap_dec02.pdf
Would you kindly explain what makes you so sure that the two cases are absolutely unrelated? I've read the full document and I can figure out a lot of similarities in the onset of the situation, if not in the final outcome (especially the plane's attitude during the last moments is obviously very different in this case)

[A_Van]

Fully agree with those pointing to "man-machine" interaction problems and too much relying on automation.
Since they were at about 1500 ft (450 m) altitude, why not to manually transit to horizontal flight (no problem to lose some 50 m more) and then slowly change to the desired (or prescribed) altitude. Again, slowly and without reaching high (and stressing) pitch angles. It was not, say, Heathrow, neither Schiphol with heavy traffic, hardly a couple of other planes in the airport airspace. Also, no mountains around to climb as fast as possible.

[framer]

Better to stick to a standard manoeuvre that has been taught to you and trained in the sim and your first officer expects and can participate in.

[Roger Greendeck]

From the information available so far it would appear that neither approach continued to the minima. Both missed approaches would appear to be commenced from about 1000' above the aerodrome which would hint more at not meeting stabilised approach criteria, possibly due gusty winds. Given the casual sounding radio calls when the missed approach commenced it would appear that the control issues started after and not before commencing the missed approach.

As others have mentioned a lot of training is done on missed approaches from the minima, often on one engine. A missed approach from higher, earlier, and at light weight can be completely different. All it takes is a bit of finger trouble (easy to do when tired) and all of a sudden you're in a completely unfamiliar situation with different modes, attitude, and performance from what you were expecting. When was the last time any of us practiced unusual attitudes at 2,500' instead of 30,000' as part of our cyclics?

The ATR72-600 that crashed in Laos a few years back is a good example of how quickly a missed approach gone wrong ends up with wild changes in pitch and roll trying to recover and then running out of sky.

[DH_call]

alainthailande:
Would you kindly explain what makes you so sure that the two cases are absolutely unrelated? I've read the full document and I can figure out a lot of similarities in the onset of the situation, if not in the final outcome (especially the plane's attitude during the last moments is obviously very different in this case)

One tragedy happened a few days ago while the other happened over 15 years ago. Was that a kind enough explanation for you?

Do you by any chance have the final report on this current tragedy to be able to compare the two?

[transilvana]

Rostov is quite a tricky airport on bad weather, all the area is. On 2 ocassions I couldn´t land there and GA to Anapa and Krasnodar which is quite close for pax. Also runway is sleepery due to tyre residues on touchdown and rwy 22 is upslope giving you false approach sensations

But if locals don´t land there neither do I, even if you have enormous amounts of fuel on board. This pushing crews to the limit is getting nosense.

[bsieker]

The thread-search function didn't turn up anything but in many ways it looks similar to Afriqiyah Airways Flight 771 at Tripoli in 2010. That was an A330-200, and it was in daylight (albeit in IMC), but the speed and altitude curves are quite similar up until shortly before impact. In Tripoli the crew tried to pull up again, whereas in Rostov we don't really know yet if any late recovery was attempted since we do not yet have any control-input information or any pitch information execpt some low-quality CCTV footage.

Here's the final report (https://aviation-safety.net/investigation/reports/771/FINAL_5A-ONG-1.pdf).

Bernd

[A37575]

A missed approach from higher, earlier, and at light weight can be completely different. All it takes is a bit of finger trouble (easy to do when tired) and all of a sudden you're in a completely unfamiliar situation with different modes, attitude, and performance from what you were expecting.

Your point is taken. But if a pilot is current and competent it should not be an unfamiliar situation. The GA procedure is comprehensively covered in the FCTM. The FCTM states at typical landing weights, actual thrust required for a normal go-around is usually considerably less than maximum go-around thrust.

Observations in the simulator often reveal that with an all engines go-around, the tendency is for pilots on a manual throttle GA to instinctively shove the throttles to the stops because they don't have the time to take their eyes from the PFD, to fiddle with N1 readings when everything is happening at once. . With an automatic GA that doesn't happen because the autothrottle initially command thrust levels sufficient for 1,000 to 2000 fpm climb rate.

I found out in the simulators that I was teaching that may be 80 % of the airline pilots have they raw data flying skill so deteriorated that they cannot fly a go around where pitch and bank is involved close to the ground. It usually took a 45 minutes of hard manual flying before they would get the skill back at least within private pilot limits

Why am I not surprised at that statement? Pilot instrument flying competency both manual and auto flight, particularly in a low altitude go-around situation at night or in IMC, is vital. As we have seen from accident reports this is not always a given.


So far no one has mentioned the possibility that harsh pitch control movements (over-controlling) during a go-around often leads to the flight director pitch bar oscillating up and down, exacerbated by the pilot chasing the pitch bar. At low altitude, chasing a flight director pitch bar which momentarily is demanding a nose down input by the pilot because of over-controlling, can easily turn into a steep dive caused by the pilot over-reacting to pitch bar movement.

[seen_the_box]

I subscribe to the belief that, making the approach, they realized they couldnt be stabilized at company criteria stabilization minimums, then went missed. Probably due severe turbulence etc

Most companies seem to have a caveat that states something along the lines of "Transient deviations from the stability criteria due to atmospheric conditions are acceptable if corrected promptly."

Does FlyDubai?

[bsieker]

I have tried to make a transcript of the ATC communications from the posted youtube video and made it available here:
http://nuxi.homenet.org/misc/FlyDubai-981/ATC-Transcript-20160319.txt

I'd be grateful for any feedback and corrections, and maybe someone can fill in a translation of the Russian parts if they seem pertinent to this case.

Nothing quite out of the ordinary as far as I can see.

In the opinion of line pilots, is there anything especially unusual about announcing to climb to FL80 after a go-around rather than the normal 2250 (or 3240) ft?

Could that be an indication that they intended to divert after this second attempt?


Kind regards,
Bernd

[ManaAdaSystem]

Fl 080 was probably to get above the turbulence.
Does the Misap procedure for Rostov contain a hard altitude in the FMC? Or maybe they set the MCP altitude to a lower altitude than FL 080.
A manual go around followed by a flight director level off, thrust cutback to reduce to speed at altitude capture, pitch down, confusion and ...

[bsieker]

ManaAdaSystem,

Thanks.

According to the chart posted here (https://postimg.org/image/4zdtpy0pb/), missed approach procedure is

218º - at 940 LT
intercept QDM 080 KS to KS
climb 2250

or by ATC:
218º - at 940 LT 038º -
climb 3240

No idea about altitude in the FMC.


Bernd

[MrSnuggles]

Here is some kind of transcript along with a supposed flight path, even in 3D.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRUVDZjBAAs

[Vc10Tail]

Transport Jock "last time i checked when i did 2 cat3a approaches in a week in December in a 737, the autopilot was NOT engaged as it has to be manually flown and disconnected by 1000ft AGL.."

Did you mean AP disconnected at 1000 ft and manually flown

[Alice025]

Rostov is quite a tricky airport on bad weather, all the area is. On 2 ocassions I couldn´t land there and GA to Anapa and Krasnodar which is quite close for pax. Also runway is sleepery due to tyre residues on touchdown and rwy 22 is upslope giving you false approach sensations

But if locals don´t land there neither do I, even if you have enormous amounts of fuel on board. This pushing crews to the limit is getting nosense.

(In the Russian blogs) Norilsk city pilots say their airport, like a handful of others, in the Russian Far North, tends to. how to say. be partial to old Soviet safety rules rather than modern international when it comes to bad weather. Namely - diverts them all 1500 km away :o, leaving pilots no choice to attempt landing or not in bad weather, and never mind fuel cost, feeding pasengers, accomodating them in the hotels, all the additional costs incurred. They say that's why they are all still alive in the Far North, as safety interests are authoritatively ranked higher than any commercial or financial ones. There are no roads nor railroads in the Far North, safety of aviation is paramount to keep northerners in place. Norilsk Nickel company is tsar and God in those quarters and it wants people. It is also able to stand law suits in case of local airports being overly careful with weather.

[5 APUs captain]

2. Alice025:

They've crashed during Go-around... So, there is no reason to talk about Norilsk and Rostov RW and so on.
Looks like the GA altitude had been set on MCP instead of 8000 ft with in manual flight.

[airsound]

bsiekr

Thanks for your good work on the ATC transcript, Bernd. Very helpful.

Of course, as I've said before, we don't know if the audio was edited, and we don't know what might be missing - for instance, did they actually call on 121.2 at the end?

But.... the conversation does sound normal, so whatever went wrong after "121.2 bye bye" must have happened pretty quickly.

airsound

PS It would be helpful to have some translation of the Russian speech - anyone? I presume the exchanges in Russian were with other aircraft.

[singleacting]

I might be wrong here, but listening to the transcript, was there confusion between QFE and QNH? ( 998 & 988 )

[FlyingOfficerKite]

... just out of interest, what's that white 'stuff' on the external parts of the aircraft shown on the Wikipedia photographs? snow, ice, foam? It seems to be on the exterior parts but not on the (remains) on the internal components ...


FOK

[furbpilot]

Just wondering if engine anti ice might have been left off..

[Airbubba]

If they had a lower altitude set in the window, e.g. the published miss of 2260 feet, as they climbed to FL80, would the autothrottles come alive and pull the power back to idle as they zoomed upward in manual flight past the window altitude? This is what happens in some of the so called EFIS Boeings.

Does the Misap procedure for Rostov contain a hard altitude in the FMC? Or maybe they set the MCP altitude to a lower altitude than FL 080. A manual go around followed by a flight director level off, thrust cutback to reduce to speed at altitude capture, pitch down, confusion and ...

Looks like the GA altitude had been set on MCP instead of 8000 ft with in manual flight.

Yep, a very real possibility that the published missed approach altitude (2250 feet or 2260 feet depending on the chart maker) was somehow set in the window even though ATC said 'roger' to the climb to FL80.

And, ManaAdaSystem's question about the hard missed approach altitude in the FMS sure sounds pertinent. Even with 8000 feet in the window the autothrottles and flight director would still see the altitude constraint in the box if they were engaged in a vertical navigation mode.

In the opinion of line pilots, is there anything especially unusual about announcing to climb to FL80 after a go-around rather than the normal 2250 (or 3240) ft?

Great transcript, thanks for doing it. :ok: About the only thing I would normally do differently is phrase the climb to FL80 as a request. And a climb to FL80 in a light airliner would normally be more comfortable than leveling 2000 feet off the ground as long as things went well.

I overfly Russia but don't land there so I'm not sure what would be customary. Some places in South America you are pretty much on your own as far as ATC and you are expected to tell the controller what you are going to do next.

I might be wrong here, but listening to the transcript, was there confusion between QFE and QNH? ( 998 & 988 )

I don't think so, the crew explicitly read back only the QNH numbers. There is a gotcha that I've experienced on other Boeings where you are in an altitude capture mode and make a large altimeter setting change, say going from QNH to QNE as you would in this case on the missed approach to FL80. Twisting the altimeter knob as you start to level off can induce a noticeable pitch excursion.

Another update on the analysis of the flight and voice recorders:

The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) informs that the investigation team keeps working at the accident site. Today the examination of the site of the aircraft air collision is conducted, the wreckage map is constructed, the aircraft fragments' recovering is almost completed. The IAC specialists together with UAE representatives analyze the radar surveillance data, the flight crew-ATC communications, and the weather information.

On March 21st NTSB (USA) experts together with the Boeing experts will join the investigation.

The IAC Laboratory experts together with UAE and BEA (France) representatives have performed the preparation works on the extraction of the memory modules from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) crash-protected cases, as well as the data readout. The preliminary analysis shows that the recorder was operational in flight, and was recording the flight data till the aircraft ground collision. The quality of recording is satisfactory. The experts start the recording data decoding and analyzing.

The Cockpit Data Recorder (CVR) shows the mechanical damages. In course of these damages the data cable was destroyed. The X-ray radiographic examination of memory module and interface cable was performed. The interface cable recovering, as well as the module non-volatile memory state examination are continued.

[Aluminium shuffler]

For those speculating about autoflight ILS approaches and go arounds on the 737, they are normally flown single channel autopilot for Cat I and most companies only allow dual channel for Cat II/III or practice autolands. On disconnection of the single channel on Cat I, the autothrottle is also disconnected - manual control, manual thrust; Boeing insist on an all or nothing method on the 737, unlike their other types.

However, pressing TOGA while on a single channel app will give TOGA autothrottle while instantly disengaging the autopilot, putting the pilots in an unfamiliar position of having manual control but autothrottle. This is a big set up for one nasty mode reversion habit of the 737 (Classic and NG alike) - when the aircraft approaches its level off altitude, the AFDS goes from its current pitch mode (in this case TOGA) to Alt Aquire. As it does so, the MCP speed window opens at the current speed, not the FMC speed or previously set MCP airspeed. So, with the autothrottles engaged, it is very easy on the level off, especially if ROC was high, to have the engines throttle back to a commanded speed much, much less than the one previously set, possibly much less than the minimum speed for the flap setting (which may be being retracted post GA). This nasty mode reversion really sets you up for a stall just as workload is very high in a way that is not as easy to spot as it should be. This is compounded by the target airspeed airspeed being commanded in a two engine go around by the flap lever, the only time it is ever controlled by anything other than the MCP window or FMC, often causing a level of confusion. So, on each stage of flap retraction, the target speed jumps up a bit higher than the minimum speed for the selected flap, and eventually you see a target faster than clean speed. This flap lever speed selection is overridden by that Alt Aqu reversion, so unless you are watching the mode annunciations or see the speed bug jump, you probably won't know it happened. So, you have seen a safe speed selected, and then, all by it self, it drops by up to 40kts. Not good, especially in shear. It is a quirk that should be emphasised during training, but it doesn't seem to be.

[furbpilot]

I listened to ATC and there is confusion between QFE/ QNH indeed.They seem to be descending to 600 on QNH while cleared to 600m on QFE. They are obviously starting to show symptoms of fatigue. Fact is that many operator using FDP/FTL limits as the norm..this was just waiting to happen..and it will happen again...

[Rananim]

I dont post on this site much since new management but I'll try again as this accident may well prove to be critical in highlighting yet again what is seriously wrong in our industry.We are all speculating with whats available.That's a given.Certainly speculation is no reason to actually ban a post.Its a rumors network supposedly for pro pilots,for Chrissakes.Investigators start with speculation...
I recognize some old names here like Centaurus and what they're saying is what we've all been saying for a long time now;there's an endemic problem in how a pilot is being trained today.Simply put,they're not being trained to "fly the plane" but rather manage the flight via the AFDS.Pilot vs flight manager.This is why we're getting the AF447,the Asiana,the THY at Schiphol,the pull not push when faced with something as basic as a stall etc...
Then you have the apologists who throw in things like fatigue and somatogravic illusion as a blanket to explain away and camouflage the real issue;pilots cant fly the plane anymore.Automation complacency and reliance have been eroding piloting skills for decades.Aided and abetted by focus on SOP as opposed to airmanship(the wrong people becoming trainers),and compounded by new management styles(beancounter focus on bottom line and not much else..tell these idiots there is nothing more costly in aviation than a crash).
I hope for the sake of the 62 souls that perished that it was an unsurmountable environmental encounter that would have defeated any line "pilot" with moderate stick and rudder skills and a scan.Because if it was more evidence of destitute flying skills(chasing a FD as someone suggested,not being able to fly a simple GA without AFDS,overtrimming your HS-a great big flt ctl surface that demands respect,likewise rudder-or not diverting when even the hardy locals are doing so which relates to judgment/airmanship)).then we need to sit down and rethink things.
The right people need to become trainers again,pilots need to be back on the decision-making board level,defocus SOP and rote push-button mentality,and start training pilots again not flt managers.

[Aluminium shuffler]

Distrust of automation is a healthy thing, and old school mentality is why things didn't get far out of shape whenever the above was done to me, Rananim, but we also have to accept that culture and mentality have changed over the past few decades. People trust computers now more than the older generations did. Whatever we think of it, that is the world we live in.

However, my post was not a hypothesis of what happened or why, or any kind of supposition about the pilots in this sad event. It was to clarify the autoflight system operation for the sake of the discussion as many on here are making assumptions about how it is used that are not right for the 737.

[furbpilot]

I might agree..but after 8 hours duty in them middle of the night what makes flying possible is automation. So train the pilot to fly but give'em the the intellectual capabilities to do it...cause some times..we are all counting on good luck and you know it.

[too_much]

Anyone have an updated QNH for time of approach? And how much it differ from
The QNE in terms of real altitude?

Maybe it could explain why the GA was not at minimums but an incorrect QNH setting called minimums early??

[JammedStab]

Concerning the fatigue issue, perhaps they were fatigued and perhaps they were not. Based on personal experience, even if tired, it tends to go away for me during an approach, especially when the weather is poor or challenging. And if a missed approach is thrown in, one wakes up quite quickly. So while I can see fatigue being an issue for forgetting to reset an MCP altitude or some other similar thing, I find it difficult to believe that it will be a major issue in terms of flying a missed approach manually unless one is grossly fatigued. As someone mentioned, mistakes happen to non-fatigued crews as well. Fatigue tends to be thrown around as an automatic excuse for a mistake. Many of us are starting our flights in the evening, so fatigue is just part of the job.

Concerning the weather, it appears that the weather is little different than is frequently encountered by crews around the world every day in which approaches are made. It was windy but nearly down the runway and there were reports of turbulence. An approach was made as is done in similar conditions around the world. Possibly, it got turbulent and they went around. Nothing out of the ordinary although one should expect that some of the passengers would not be happy with the expected turbulence. That being said, the statement that one pilot made of not attempting an approach if the locals are not making it in seems like a wise thought.

Concerning the holding and people asking why would the pilot hold for two hours, there is nothing unsafe about that at all as long as you have the fuel to do so. Perhaps the forecast was for improving weather.

Concerning the CB's, I just checked the Petropavlovsk weather as we use it as an alternate every time we fly by it. Once again, CB's in the Metar and forcast. It is 0 degrees C and snowing. Every time I check the weather at this airport there are CB's including throughout the cold weather which is ridiculous weather forecasting and observations. Seeing as this appears to be something that happens all across Russia, I say that their weather reporti g lacks credibility, at least when it comes to CB's, meaning that I don't believe that there was a thunderstorm at Rostov that night as it was still winter there as well.

[Airbubba]

This nasty mode reversion really sets you up for a stall just as workload is very high in a way that is not as easy to spot as it should be.

So, you have seen a safe speed selected, and then, all by it self, it drops by up to 40kts. Not good, especially in shear. It is a quirk that should be emphasised during training, but it doesn't seem to be.

However, my post was not a hypothesis of what happened or why, or any kind of supposition about the pilots in this sad event. It was to clarify the autoflight system operation for the sake of the discussion as many on here are making assumptions about how it is used that are not right for the 737.

Wow, thanks for the detailed explanation. :D

[furbpilot]

Two ( Russian) aircraft went around and continued to the alternate..frontal weather with little chance of improvement more probably worsening...holding for two hours makes no sense.if not that you are under commercial pressure or worried of possible consequences...

[bsieker]

too_much, while already on final approach, just before initiating the go-around, they were given an updated QNH 997, when shortly before it was 998. The difference is less than 30 feet, so I can't see that playing any role here.

The difference to standard pressure setting is roughly 27 ft/hPa * (1013-997) hPa = 432 feet.

Do we have any indication if or when they set the altimeter setting to standard during their go-around? At one point they would have to do it since they had announced that they would climb to FL 080 (transition altitude being 3240 ft (900 m QFE)). Increasing the setting in the Kollsman window also increases the indicated altitude, so how would that influence things?


Bernd

[Callsign Kilo]

Aluminium Shuffler makes an extremely valid statement about the ALT AQR gotcha with a two engined go around in the 737. A low missed approach altitude or failure to set the correct altitude, should it be higher than the platform altitude at which the approach was commenced can lead to a nasty shock. It's worth re-emphasising that this isn't completely understood by all 737 pilots and very often isn't discussed in training. It wasn't until I started training folk In the -800 sim that I was able to witness such an occurrence. Flight director pitch command leading to a rapid forward pitch input by PF, coupled with the A/T in speed mode, retarding thrust to control the commanded speed resultant from the speed window opening at ALT AQR. The forward pitch input was so abrupt (due to startle factor as both crew hadn't expected to level off as soon - the MCP altitude hadn't been correctly set for the GA) that it overshot. An equally abrupt reverse pitch input was added, leading to oscillations in pitch and resultant speed excursion.

I'm not at all saying that this is what happened in Rostov, however it's easy to see where things can go wrong. It has amazed me how many guys that I fly with are unaware of this trap and it is something that should be briefed as a relative TEM item. It also stuns me how many people want to engage level change during flap retraction in a two engined missed approach and don't discuss what will happen with commanded speed. Definitely a focus area for training departments.

[ManaAdaSystem]

If we go with the botched go around scenario, what puzzles me is this: How did they end up with a 60 degree bank? That is a strong indication of a stall before they lost control. Or possibly poorly handled engine failure followed by loss of control.
The aircraft will issue a bank warning, and the reflex is to correct this when it happens, IF you have positive control over the aircraft.

[too_much]

Ok that perhaps explains the controller making a mistake saying QFE when he
Ment to say QNH. By sheer habit I guess.

[Herod]

too-much. I did suggest earlier that they may have descended to 630 FEET. It would tie in with the point at which they commenced both go-arounds. That doesn't explain what happened afterwards though.

[bsieker]

too_much, I transcribed what was available and never heard anyone mix up QFE/QNH. What do you mean?

As far as I can tell, QNH is only given on request, or when the controller already knows that one flight is flying according to QNH altitudes, and even then apparently always gives QFE as well.


Herod, there is no indication that anything was wrong with the glidepath up until such time as they went around, both times. Both final approaches sit snug on top of each other in the 3D flight path representations I have seen, such as this one (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRUVDZjBAAs&t=6m25s).

They also always explicitly acknowledged "metres", and will almost certainly have had charts with the conversions.

[Airbubba]

Anyone have an updated QNH for time of approach? And how much it differ from
The QNE in terms of real altitude?

Maybe it could explain why the GA was not at minimums but an incorrect QNH setting called minimums early??

The QNH was low at 997 hPa. If they forgot to set it and still had 1013 set for QNE, the minimums call would come lower, not higher above the ground, right?

I don't think this was the case here but that type of mistake has certainly resulted in a mishap before.

[604driver]

Elsewhere, its been stated he was leaving to start a new job with RyanAir. If he was due to leave the UAE shortly after returning from this flight, say the day after getting back, a diversion and subsequent rest period might have caused him to miss his booked flight out of there or caused him to be late for any number of things that ordinarily wouldn't affect our planning, so maybe this might explain the 2 hour holding... To get back home. The EK flight to Lca from Dxb departs around 0830L from memory. Just putting it out there.

[ManaAdaSystem]

If he was holding when other aircraft went around and diverted, that could have made him extend his holding time. That is what I would have done.
If the local guys can't land, that is a strong indication for me to stay away, or wait for an improvment in the weather.
He had fuel, and lots of it.

[Vortex Thing]

For the love of god!!! The 2 hours holding is standard FDB operations. We are routinely sent to somewhere we knew we couldn't get into with little prospect of being able to get into it with boatloads of fuel and told give it a go. If you didn't then you came under the scrutiny of the chief pilot who had a penchant for bullying crew and making careers untenable.

9/10 times we would do just that fly 3/4/5hrs get their hold have a look try again if necessary and more times that not we would divert.

The route they were flying was not one that more senior pilots would ever pick as it is known for crap weather, is captain only landing and its dark o'clock. It was just one of those places that you hoped to not get on your roster and if you did and if you couldn't swap it then you hoped you had one of those nights where there was a break in the crap weather and you could get in. If not you rocked up with extra stuff as you knew you could easily end up in a hotel.

FDB heap commercial pressure on crews way past the normal anyone else but if you have your family stuck in the middle east you have a choice do what they ask be it carry lithium batteries, operate outside of FTLs, ignore assaults on crew etc or loose your job and possibly your career.

It wasn't that we didn't know that but most of us just took the money and hoped to not be the crew of FZ981 before we got either enough money/hours/experience in LHS, etc to move to somewhere else.

The chief pilots favourite saying is "if you don't like it leave!" it was his solution to every problem given and the culture of fear has eroded the culture of safety to such an extent that most pilots were unlikely torpor anything but the most serious incidents as they knew they were simply raising their heads above the parapet.

Re the numerous posts from experts on here who have not operated in the Middle east, who have not flown in Russian airspace and who do not know anything about HGS/HUD ops suggest you use the two ears more than the one mouth and though of course you are interested but your conjecture does nothing to help do anything other than muddy the waters.

FDB never ever do coupled approaches. All CAT3a, CAT2 and CAT1 are manually flown to the ground. All low vis is hand flown. All low vis is hand flown on the HGS. All approaches in Russia are flown on QNH we have LIDO tables with a conversion table on EVRY Plate.

If you find a pilot in FZ unfamiliar with flying in metres and getting wind in metres per second then they are very very new indeed. There would have been little to no confusion in the crews mind about altimeter settings, when to set or change and wind in mps as it is an almost every day occurrence in Russia and we have/had 18 routes to Russia which is pretty significant.

What happened, I have a guess the same as any other pilot and more so with other 737 pilots and even more so with 737NG pilots. The factors are facts and everything else at this stage is clearly conjecture. Did they make and error in the GA, was their catastrophic failure of something or other, was it an act of god? That will all come out pretty soon.

What isn't conjecture however is that colleagues are dead and the weather was crap on departure, estimated to be crap at ETA, estimated to be crap until way past the point of full tanks and they left with the FDB standard cunning plan of well maybe it will be okay. If you want a fact it is that not many airlines would consider that normal they would simply wait at base until it was at least predicted to be likely and then leave.

FZ don't do that why? ask the Chief Pilot. He as an uber pilot and uber human knows better than everyone else he evens knows that black is in fact white and can prove it when called upon to do so and is above the law as demonstrated on innumerous occasions.

So yes whilst of course factors such as starting a new job etc would have been a factor the reality is FDB take 7 days minimum to sort your visa out when you leave and frequently take longer because we the crew do not matter, were not humans are simply slaves to be abused at their whim so why would looking after us or our families matter. So yes these factors exist but lets be honest we have all heard the tape. They called the GA and did it so the why were they there and why wait so long is simple, that is what NCC demanded they do. Why because the Chief Pilot lets them do whatever they please and refuses to exert any control over what is directly his area of responsibility because nothing is important except his pay check.

I hope the money is worth it and I hope the families of the departed get to see him face to face, look him in the eye in the full knowledge of how he runs his ship.

[silvertate]

Two ( Russian) aircraft went around and continued to the alternate..frontal weather with little chance of improvement more probably worsening...holding for two hours makes no sense.if not that you are under commercial pressure or worried of possible consequences...

Actually, it is fairly standard.

You will note all the brow-beaten captains in certain airlines diverting immediately, because they have no fuel. While I like to take extra if possible, and hold. Not having to divert can save shed-loads of money, if you get it right. Which I have done on many occasions - while everyone around me was diverting - and ending up as the first one in (after two hours holding, you are invariably at the bottom of the stack).

But I do remember holding for two hours once, and having to go back home. :-(

[AtomKraft]

Vortex Thing.

Roger.:(

[Jetpipe.]

I don't know if it 's been mentioned before but what if they missed pressing the TOGA button.. I know it's an amateur mistake to make but if it happened, FDs would point down to the Rwy and lead to crew confusion.

[langleybaston]

Come on, don't beat about the bush, say what you really think!

[Lost in Saigon]

For the love of god!!! The 2 hours holding is standard FDB operations. We are routinely sent to somewhere we knew we couldn't get into with little prospect of being able to get into it with boatloads of fuel and told give it a go. If you didn't then you came under the scrutiny of the chief pilot who had a penchant for bullying crew and making careers untenable................................................... ..............
......................................................
.................

hope the money is worth it and I hope the families of the departed get to see him face to face, look him in the eye in the full knowledge of how he runs his ship.

EXCELLENT POST! Thanks very much for your insight.

[tatelyle]

Vortex:
FZ don't do that why? ask the Chief Pilot. He as an uber pilot and uber human knows better than everyone else he evens knows that black is in fact white and can prove it when called upon to do so and is above the law as demonstrated on innumerous occasions.

Thanks, Vortex, for that nice summary of modern aviation.

Now where have I seen this management attitude before? Ah, I know ... XXX airline, XXX airline, and XXX airline, and let's not forget XXX airline. And then there is XXX airline, XXX airline, and.......

.

BTW. Was this particular aircraft on V-bars?

[ManaAdaSystem]

They will most likely be expecting to go around the second time and possibly over breif the procedure.

For sure highly unlikely that anything went wrong with go around.

Plus the call to the tower "going around" normally comes after TOGA/thrust set flap 15 and positive rate gear up. Normally....

Nobody told you they crashed during this go around?

[too_much]

I was referring to technique and configuration

I am aware of what happened after yes...

[misd-agin]

HOTAS - Hands On Throttle And Stick.

Military term for modern switchology design. But the BASIC concept still applies, fly with one hand and have one hand on the thrust/throttle levers, even when the A/T's are engaged.

I've seen 105 lbs (48 kg) women fly airliners with one hand so I'm constantly amazed, and dismayed, by 105 kg (230 lbs) men that think they need two hands to fly an airliner.

A hand on the thrust/throttle levers (ignoring AB a/c) gives instantaneous feedback if the engine power changes when you don't expect it to.

[sinusake]

Vortex Thing. +1
Well said colleage.
And don't forget those really bad rosters for the 85% of the pilots, several nights in a row with minimum rest and continue with body clock changes all along the month.

[olster]

Vortex Thing - good post, mate. Condolences to your colleagues both sides of the cockpit door and their families / friends.

[what-to-do]

Vortex Thing has it pretty much spot on.

The flight was loaded with maximum fuel, allowing 6 tons of tankering fuel. This equated to roughly 2 hours of holding time, which fits nicely with the reported facts. This would have been arranged by the company (NCC). The mantra here at flydubai is to hold as long as possible, whatever the weather, in the hope that there will a window of opportunity to land. The company would rather spend money holding than diverting/ delaying or even cancelling a flight.

The captain had indeed been offered a job with Ryanair, but was not leaving on Monday (as suggested). I understand he was due to start with Ryanair in April.

I also understand that the captain flew to India the previous night, another long night flight. Whilst I cannot say that fatigue was an issue, he would have certainly been tired. If, like me, you are unable to get an appropriate amount of sleep post a night flight, the next night flight is that much harder. All one has to do is go through the Flydubai thread on the middle east thread and read all the posts regarding fatigue and rostering. You will see that fatigue has been an issue for a few years now, something that the safety department is powerless to do anything about.

Flydubai lost appx 80 pilots last year alone. The primary reason for the resignations was rostering, as the level of fatigue was simply unmanageable for some. I also understand that we had 21 resignations in January alone.

Each month, a safety bulletin is released detailing most of the ASR's for that period. You would be amazed at the amount of fatigue reports submitted. It is truly frightening that an airline can operate with such an unsafe rostering culture.

I have no wish to speculate as to the cause of the crash, I will leave that to the investigation. However, IF fatigue is found as a contributing factor, I can honestly say that I am not surprised.

I am just so sad that so many people lost their lives that night and that the investigation is swift and thorough. Flydubai will never be the same again.

[lomapaseo]

Too many I told you so and blaming it on management in this thread.

Please, lets look at corrective actions as an output of an investigation and not blame.

I have no idea how to fix a blame.

We can address the product and the operation under regulations. I have no idea how to change somebody's personality or human fraility

[Vortex Thing]

Hmm corrective actions. Get a broom. Start a sweep go to the top floor of FZHQ sweep left, sweep right.

There is no shortage of experienced, well balanced people in FDB who could/should be doing the job. There is however a huge amount of inertia in the race to the bottom perpetuated by two men in particular who have proven track records of not giving a monkeys about anything other than themselves and with no regard for their legacy and the very real effect on very real peoples lives.

So no sorry I do not agree that we should not being saying "I told you so" and I do not agree that operations has any bearing here as the regulatory environment does not exist in Dubai.

There is one law for the rich and NO law for management. They signed on the dotted line and they take the money. You cannot contract out of responsibility and when its due its due.

People are dead and though the exact cause is yet to come out it is as always only the last chain in the swiss cheese model. The facts that we have and those who operate at FZ know without doubt is that undue commercial pressure exists, morale is poor, the culture is vindictive, accusatory and manifestly unjust. That in sum had no little part in the chain of events leading to this sad chapter in the history of the airline.

You are asking for a moratorium on fact. Sorry now is the time for ALL the facts not just the convenient ones.

You ask how to change someones personality, well the answer is simple, Carrot or Stick.

The reason we have a justice system and a prison service is because sometimes we cannot change personality. You cannot tame every tiger and lion. However that is why we invented weapons and cages. When we get past the physicality then that is why we have law and process. Hiding behind the veil of incorporation is right up there with, " I was only following orders" It wasn't a defence at Nuremberg and isn't one now.

So sorry, no we will not go quietly into the night and let them brush away the facts and replace them with believable truths. People are dead. You can't unring a bell and it is called culpability. They rolled the dice and had a choice. If you want to believe that JV and KG had nothing to do with it and that their culture of fear, oppression and bullying was irrelevant then you say that in your post.

In mine I say. I told you so.

[notapilot15]

tatelyle

I see what you did there, deflecting the blame to entire industry.

When EU OPS introduced new FDTL rules based on fatigue monitoring, they didn't expect one regulator to tweak those so much. Basically one pro-airline regulator figured out introducing fear (of losing your job/livelihood) reduces fatigue.

There are still airlines in some countries using FAA FDTL rules, unfortunately they are as productive as these airlines.

[coffeezone]

How about the possibility of a rudder hardover?

[Callsign Kilo]

How about the possibility of a rudder hardover?

In an NG? Don't discount anything, however I think it would be unlikely. Despite parts of the aeroplane being cut & paste jobs of earlier variants, the rudder system was modified, partly in response to hardover events with the classics. I don't believe there have been any hardover events with the NG series. I believe it would take multiple failures involving separate systems for this to occur.

[de facto]

The captain seems to be requesting the second approach right after getting a weather update (windshear)from ATC,did not seem to leave much room for the F/O to give his opinion.
Gusty headwinds of up to 36 knots,very low pressure,low mist and rain showers are all but signs of a thunderstorm(s) nearby if not on the field.
During the approach,the first officer voice and requests of confirmations seems to show that he may be worried about what he is seeing and not comfortable with the situation he is in.
The call of go around seemed that of a "yep i told you so",blaze tone.
Vortex,one may blame all the industry,fatigue,bad training,poor handling but unfortunately it seems a case of poor judgement which turned out deadly.
Diverting would have been easier,explanation to the boss as well,and worse case a meeting with no biscuits but a chance to show him the finger and tell him to sit and spin before leaving to better pastures.

Weatherwise,do they use the term CB/SHRA for TSRA?to be honest,one scares me more than the others...

[Vortex Thing]

To be fair tatelyle was just being sarcastic. Its a bit like saying that all airlines are like FR.

They aren't. I have flown for enough airlines to know that some have a culture that is like FZ and most though unlikely to be awarded medals for being touchy feely are nothing like FZ. FZ is a special type of management. In FR everyone is treated badly and equally badly but it isn't closeted. You know how it is when you join, it doesn't change when you are there or when you have left. There were few surprises. However the treatment isn't personal it is generally just a lack of flexibility, due diligence or care for you and yours.

However FZ sells itself as something different, it says all the right things to all the right people but poke even a millimetre under the veneer and you find cabin crew so terrified of calling sick that they go to work when they should be in hospital. Back home in Europe you don't have the chance of your family being stuck with their visa cancelled and or going to jail for a debt incurred by the necessity to have a place to live and school fees to pay upfront.

Therefore the fact that you may be treated badly is just an annoyance. In FZ it could cost you your liberty and worse yet it doesn't matter if you are innocent, guilty or otherwise. If JV or KG take umbrage with you, you are done.

Basically JV could be found standing over the body with a smoking gun in his hand. He would say it was your fault for discovering him about to clean it and blame you for startling him. He would then stop paying you so that you couldn't testify otherwise just to make sure. He's a nice guy like that. FZ makes FR look like Virgin!

[Noxegon]

Not related to this incident in any way, I thought I'd just throw out there that I almost flew FZ once as a passenger. However, they cancelled my flight. They refused to refund me in cash, but instead issued a voucher that could be used against any other FZ flight in twelve months – which was precisely zero use to me given that I don't live in Dubai. After that experience I swore that I'd never give them another penny.

[Mr Angry from Purley]

Vortex
Great but sad post. Not much else to be said. Let's hope for the sake of the crews and passengers that there is no cover up and lessons learned.

[Vortex Thing]

de facto

I would have hoped and likely thought that the skipper and FO having had almost two hours to discuss it. Went through actions on seeing the required visual references and actions on one or both being unhappy and if 'you' perceive a little quelle surprise in one or other pilots voices it is likely a joint one of , 'why are we even here in the first place'. Which having flown for 6 hrs and flown two go arounds is not that unreasonable a question!

In any other airline diverting would a) likely not have been necessary as they likely wouldn't have dispatched and b) if they had done so would have been patted on the back by the aboves for taking the decision.

FZ doesn't work like that. NCC send you ACARS messages saying. DO NOT DIVERT, CONTINUE, Chief Pilot says continue, YOU ARE LEGAL TO CONTINUE. NCC will tell you that you will be reported if you don't hold. NCC tell you that you cannot offload passengers who assault crew or are drunk. NCC of course aren't legally responsible as you correctly say the crew had the ability to say no. But in reality they had as much ability to say no as people had not to get in the box cars back in the day.

[JammedStab]

What is the background for JV and KG?

[ManaAdaSystem]

Thank you, Vortex Thing!

It has taken some time before somebody dared to let the skeleton out of the closet, but if you have kept an eye on FZ in the ME forum, what you say has been out there for a long time. For some odd reason, they all went mute when their predictions came true with this accident.
This is about FZ, but could just as easy have been EK, QR, EY or WY. Or any other ME carrier. It's not about how good they are, it's about how bad they treat their crew. Some are worse than the others, but none are good.
You can only fire pilots when they make mistakes. When they die, you can't.
I can only hope ALL aspects of the way FZ is run is brought to the surface.
The public should then be aware it is pretty much the same with the other ME carriers.

[kungfu panda]

Would it be factual to say that the management received many fatigue reports and as a corporation chose to disregard them?

[Chronus]

I might be wrong here, but listening to the transcript, was there confusion between QFE and QNH? ( 998 & 988 )
Yes there could well be. Initial descent clearance given was to 600 meters QFE height. Crew were not sure and requested confirmation. Their call sign 981, QNH 998 and QFE 988 all potential sources for confusion.
It would seem they had set QNH for the approach.
However I do not believe it would be altimetry errors that would be a major contributory factor. The all important factor is the sudden and catastrophic pitch down. More likely cause for such uncontrollable sudden pitch change is stab trim . If the stab runaway all the way to nose down, pull back on the control column will cause the stab chord line to increase and increase acceleration towards the ground.
My question therefore is what may have initiated stab change.

[de facto]

Hardly they would have come to an agreement to start the second approach right after being cautionned of windshear on final....but time will tell.
From your description of the airline management, it is at the opposite spectrum of any airlines i have worked for..(low cost to legacy, US to Asia),eventhough some decisions had to be explained face to face and understood.
Hopefully,the airline issue on that subject will be brought to light,and such ACARS messages kept for future reference...

[AtomKraft]

If only half of what Vortex Thing says is true, then this airline must have an awful work culture.

Now, I know, they aren't the only ones......:rolleyes:

VTs post explains a lot. If I tried and couldn't get in, I'd come off the go around with a mind to divert, unless there was some hope that the wx would improve mightily, and soon.

I might shoot another approach straightaway, and then bugger off to my div. no way would I hold for 2 hours. In some 13,000 hours, I've never done so.

I suspect, as Vortex Thing states, that this companies operating culture played some part in what took place here.

[Vortex Thing]

They're your countrymen JammedStab!

But I believe previous jobs were Beelzebub's henchmen and aide de camp.

Chief Commercial Officer of Mephistopheles Air.

Architect of Bodgitandscarper Operations Manuals.

Or something like that. If its not entirely true then that may be because after years of their training I understand that you should never let the truth get in the way of a good story.

[RussianPilot2]

https://youtu.be/-AlAjy7hg_Y new crash video from camera cctv

[xollob]

Vortex Thing has it pretty much spot on.

The flight was loaded with maximum fuel, allowing 6 tons of tankering fuel. This equated to roughly 2 hours of holding time, which fits nicely with the reported facts. This would have been arranged by the company (NCC).

I'm interested in this, is there ever concern of ice formation on tanking fuel and landing with more than 5 tonnes when tanking, sounds like a relatively long flight this one and then holding, is it possible the temperature of the fuel in the wings in contact with the wing upper surface (if full to the brim) and the moist weather could have led to some serious wing icing.

We have seen the affects of severe ice on wings before throughout history, the relatively mild weather one might not have wing or engine A/I on but the fuel and moisture is doing its thing... ? (No expert just wondering). Various airlines have various guidance on maximum to land with to avoid wing ice from tanking on turn around.

[ExDubai]

If only half of what Vortex Thing says is true, then this airline must have an awful work culture.

Have a look to the FDB Thread in the middle east forum. No difference what he said today and what he said 12 Months ago.

[Alientali]

Better view... quite a bank/rate of descent :(.

-AlAjy7hg_Y

[Capt. Inop]

For those speculating about autoflight ILS approaches and go arounds on the 737, they are normally flown single channel autopilot for Cat I and most companies only allow dual channel for Cat II/III or practice autolands. On disconnection of the single channel on Cat I, the autothrottle is also disconnected - manual control, manual thrust; Boeing insist on an all or nothing method on the 737, unlike their other types.

In my airline (Dutch loco) Cat1 app are flown single channel or handflown. Dual channel Cat3/Cat3B. or training.

pressing TOGA while on a single channel app will give TOGA autothrottle while instantly disengaging the autopilot

Yeah that's how our NG's works.

[Chronus]

Vortex Thing is busy boss bashing, others are busy with A/T, TOGA buttons and things alike, some think the crew were dog tired and here is me thinking what sort of thing would make it reverse direction of travel from up to straight down, well the only thing bigger and more powerful than the boss and all the other bits is the stab.

[notapilot15]

lomapaseo

There are tons of posts about fatigue and issues on this forum going back few years, so I told you so doesn't apply.

Lot of other forums completely discounted pprune by call them handful of whiners. Airline PR teams did a great job keeping this issue under wraps.

Now there is a carefully crafted wording about ACARS messages will tell the real story, makes me think any Do Not Divert instruction from NCC was relayed thru some other means.

[maDJam]

http://cdn2.24live.co/images/2016/03/22/1458593232976763.jpg
Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) has received mechanical damage including data cable destroyed but specialists of the laboratory of the Interstate Aviation Committee, together with specialists of UAE and France have completed the copy from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR).

[AtomKraft]

Chronus.
If the stab is not where it should be, all aboard are screwed...until it's back where it needs to be.

I sometimes wonder if my fellow pilots understand this.

If, for whatever reason, that THS is out of place- so are you.

And you will remain in a world of **** until it's back where it needs to be.

Having said that, I think this is another badly handled GA.

If it turns out to be so, I don't think many will be surprised.

[too_much]

That latest YouTube video is by far the best angle I've seen to date and confirms for me the aircraft is not stalled, that is a direct pushing down if the nose it clearly shows.

[flash8]

The descriptions of the repressive culture of the Airline are appreciated, however they are not surprising in the least, having flown for a SE Asian airline (737 Classic) I can unequivocally say that the reason I resigned were similar. In the hold for 2 hrs ffs... even if this were only contributory I certainly know where the blame lies.

[Airbubba]

That latest YouTube video is by far the best angle I've seen to date and confirms for me the aircraft is not stalled, that is a direct pushing down if the nose it clearly shows.

Not sure I see it that way. Looks to me like it is coming down in almost a 90 degree bank.

Also, visibility and ceiling appear to be good and probably not a factor on the approach down low.

[RealUlli]

(Disclaimer: just an interested SLF with a copy of X-Plane)

I have a question: The plane was supposed to have 2+ hours worth of extra fuel on board at the time of the crash, even after two hours of holding. How are these two hours calculated? Is the endurance assumed to be at cruise altitude or is it at the assumed hold altitude?

What I'm driving at is, they were holding first at 8000, then at FL150. Is it possible the increase in fuel burn at that altitude compared to cruise was high enough to eat up the 2 hours? Is it possible the aircraft indeed ran out of fuel during the GA, stalled severely and impacted the ground while trying to recover?

:confused:

[Chesty Morgan]

Chronus.
If the stab is not where it should be, all aboard are screwed...until it's back where it needs to be.

I sometimes wonder if my fellow pilots understand this.

If, for whatever reason, that THS is out of place- so are you.

And you will remain in a world of **** until it's back where it needs to be.

Having said that, I think this is another badly handled GA.

If it turns out to be so, I don't think many will be surprised.
Not really true. Even with total hydraulic failure it's possible to control the aircraft with a stab trim out by more than 23 turns. Ask me how I know.

[Vortex Thing]

Chronos

I'm not boss bashing. I'm telling the facts as they are having flown that specific aircraft, having flown with some of the departed, having flown for the airline, having been subject to its "just culture" for many years, having had my family live in Dubai and having seen good men and women come and go.

Not only am I giving my opinion what I am saying is accompanied by rock solid irrefutable proof.

Now I am not saying the sole cause was two men but the devil is in the detail. Accountable Manager or post holder de facto has responsibilites.

The last 5 mins of the flight are indeed very important for many reasons but whatever those reasons be they act of god, mishandling, catastrophic failure they were made possible by the launch of the aircraft from base in weather in which they not only predicted not to be able to land ut was predicted for the entire duration of their fuel to be highly unlikely to allow them to do so.

I've been dispatched from Dubai in similar enough circumstance that their for the grace of god go I. FZ mgt make Enron look clean.

If you think that the whole company ethos and modus operandi has no bearing on why the plane was even airborne and not on the ground either at the ALTN or in DXB then I fear you misunderstand the swiss cheese model.

Why have any form of regulation if we never ever invoke it! This is why the resignation rate is where it is.

One of our pilots in his exit interview was asked why he was leaving. He told them I've been in the airline here for 3 years. You have not been remotely interested in anything I have to offer, anything I can bring to help or used any of my skills other than flying a plane. Now that I am leaving you want to know why! This is why!

This goes so deep it is so deeply engrained that it is rotten to the core. People have a right to know.

[172_driver]

What I'm driving at is, they were holding first at 8000, then at FL150. Is it possible the increase in fuel burn at that altitude compared to cruise was high enough to eat up the 2 hours? Is it possible the aircraft indeed ran out of fuel during the GA, stalled severely and impacted the ground while trying to recover?

The crew will actively monitor the fuel situation and not let it get anywhere near fuel exhaustion. The FMC is a good help and gives you hrs+min available for holding before you need to divert, based on the diversion fuel you've entered in the FMC. Either it uses current fuel flow or predicted fuel flow at best holding speed at present altitude. Either way, it's good enough.

[Vortex Thing]

Sorry Chesty just noticed your excellent post. Of course I would love to know how you know, definitely not to question but to add to my own knowledge and to aid my understanding of the plane I've operated for almost 10 years.

To anyone discussing fuel exhaustion. A) think whats in the triangle of fire and b) look at what happens milliseconds after the impact in the CCTV footage we have seen so far! Listen to the transcript and even if you dont believe they climbed to 4000' on the second go around the 737 does not fall out of the sky at that angle with just a dual engine failure/flameout.

Though I have only tried in the sim and the TRE discussed things like windmilling versus not engines and other factors they all have very little dramatic effect. Contributory factor of course right now in the absecence of the FDR anything is possible but as the main cause it would seem unlikely.

Ex Dubai
I wish, I really wish half of what I said was true the real facts are that this is toned down. There is waaaay more and I'm just giving it to you in bite sized chunks. Not only is it all true, this is not even half of it. There is more and we can prove it. Now wether anyone actually wants to listen or see the proof only time will tell.

[RoyHudd]

FlyDubai are the sister airline of Emirates and are wholly owned by their government. No comment.

[CSENG]

I have to start by giving my condolences to everyone affected by this most unfortunate accident.

I believe I have a slightly different view from other people that commented as I'm both a licensed pilot ( fATPL ) and lucky enough to have an Eng. degree and a separate career (my main occupation).

I, as most of you, pursued the cockpit career out of passion, but the current employment situation in many airlines is just ridiculous and isn't compatible with it being my professional occupation. Sure, you might still have good conditions and be treated accordingly at some legacies, some smaller/exec operators but that seems the exception nowadays. Paying for training? Low salaries? Bad roster? Lack of appropriate holidays? Relocation as/when needed? Freelance work without managing owns finances? One contract fits all without unions to fight unacceptable terms? It's just plain ludicrous.
The industry just reminds me of this boiling frog anecdote (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boiling_frog)

I had a very sad discussion with a European lcc last year about their T&Cs, when the time came to sign the contract. Obviously they didn't budge as the line was long and someone else is always in line to take a vacant place. Fortunately I don't have to accept that and gracefully declined.

Unfortunately everyone already committed to the job has to stick with it and do the best they can, which means enduring the pressures and stupidities described by Vortex, and accept the existing terms. After all, everyone's got to make a living. But for new joiners? How is this considered acceptable? It's probably the only industry technically complex and with high responsibility where this is happening. Sad, very sad....

These people paid the ultimate price and deserve all the respect we can give them so I won't even attempt to speculate on what happened those final minutes. The FDR and CVR were found and look readable so hopefully they'll return good data and more lessons can be learnt and changes implemented from this. But... and there's always a but, there is certainly greater factors at play. If you have a company that has your back when you diverge for safety reasons, if you are allowed to use your better judgement as a crew, if your health and well being are taken into account when you're assigned work, situations like these would be avoided. If not for other reasons, at least because you wouldn't be there in the first place.

I leave a question for the NG pilots out there. Do you ever revert to flying raw data, manual controls and manual throttle on critical situations where you are not in sync with the automation?
There's a lot of discussion here about what mode becomes what after which input depending on a window setting, etc.. That requires a lot of flow diagrams in your head on a time where mental capacity is lacking. If you're not coping, can you just pitch, power, flap settings and execute the missed app as published/briefed/instructed?

Do SOPs restrict plain old manual flight according to a chart and only then reprogram whatever automation is useful once you have mental capacity back?

The FDs are based on automation and if G/A reverts to manual throttle and manual controls then it's meant to be flown manually. Shouldn't you follow your manual flight, or at a maximum have some guidance from the FD but always with a pinch of Salt and not fully trusting it regardless of whether it shows you the brown or the blue? The same can be said about manual controls with A/T active and so on.

It seems to me that these mixed manual and automated procedures just cause more problems than what they solve once our SA and mental ability becomes reduced.

I've had instructors to whom the FDs were to be followed at all times, others that disconnected it during manual flight to avoid such confusions. This during basic training, MCCs, JOCs, NG Sim training (non TR). I really don't function well unless it's full auto or full manual. Would really like to know the opinion of NG line pilots on that.

[pole shift]

Sadly the loss of people was the icing on the cake. Fatigue issues, endless night flying for the huge majority of pilots there, and an arrogant chief pilot that ironically smiled when captains of thousands of hours were handing in their resignations, made FZ a very bad place to be. Unless of course you were there during the first two months in the beginning and helped the Indian workers mount the air conditioning units on the wall, then no, you were ok, in all aspects. Does fatigue impair your judgement? Yes it does. If heads are not chopped after this, then it's pointless to even consider thinking for such a company.
Looking down at your pilots as slaves can work and usually you get away with it, with a huge bonus check into your pocket, but - once in a blue moon - unfortunately so - the **** hits the fan and your butt starts shaking.

[Alice025]

... just out of interest, what's that white 'stuff' on the external parts of the aircraft shown on the Wikipedia photographs? snow, ice, foam? It seems to be on the exterior parts but not on the (remains) on the internal components ...


FOK

Can be the snow that fell on Rostov in the morning, when first TV crews arrived there.

[Kulverstukas]

Media reports that CVR was successfully read tonight.

[Airbubba]

Media reports that CVR was successfully read tonight.

From the latest IAC posting looks like the recording is of good quality:

Скопирована вся зарегистрированная информация вплоть до столкновения самолёта с землёй. Качество записи хорошее.

Google Translate:

Copied all registered information up to the aircraft colliding with the ground. Good recording quality.

[parabellum]

Pilot's are their own worst enemies, I am not sure if some have been to long in the job that they can't even see the reality themselves.

Given that two thirds of the current pilot work force will have started their aviation career in the last twenty years or so it is far more likely that it is the 'youngsters', who have joined by whatever means, a proper cadetship, Pay2Fly etc. that are the major influence on current terms, working practices and conditions, not the 'oldies'.

[TwinJock]

Chronos

I'm not boss bashing. I'm telling the facts as they are having flown that specific aircraft, having flown with some of the departed, having flown for the airline, having been subject to its "just culture" for many years, having had my family live in Dubai and having seen good men and women come and go.

Not only am I giving my opinion what I am saying is accompanied by rock solid irrefutable proof.

Now I am not saying the sole cause was two men but the devil is in the detail. Accountable Manager or post holder de facto has responsibilites.

The last 5 mins of the flight are indeed very important for many reasons but whatever those reasons be they act of god, mishandling, catastrophic failure they were made possible by the launch of the aircraft from base in weather in which they not only predicted not to be able to land ut was predicted for the entire duration of their fuel to be highly unlikely to allow them to do so.

I've been dispatched from Dubai in similar enough circumstance that their for the grace of god go I. FZ mgt make Enron look clean.

If you think that the whole company ethos and modus operandi has no bearing on why the plane was even airborne and not on the ground either at the ALTN or in DXB then I fear you misunderstand the swiss cheese model.

Why have any form of regulation if we never ever invoke it! This is why the resignation rate is where it is.

One of our pilots in his exit interview was asked why he was leaving. He told them I've been in the airline here for 3 years. You have not been remotely interested in anything I have to offer, anything I can bring to help or used any of my skills other than flying a plane. Now that I am leaving you want to know why! This is why!

This goes so deep it is so deeply engrained that it is rotten to the core. People have a right to know.

Well said C! The perils of working in this part of the world are numerous, and difficult to explain to the non-believer. Management will remain arrogant as long as there are applicants knocking on the door.

[B737SFP]

Hey guys...

Does this incident ring a bell?

https://flightglobal.com/news/articles/norwegian-near-stall-to-spur-737-modification-393527/

2 hours holding in icing conditions... I'm starting to belive that it's possible they had some kind of flight control lock up caused by ice.

Thoughts?

[porterhouse]

Unlikely connection with the Norwegian incident.

[sets]

Concur with Porterhouse, no obvious link between incidents.

[B777Heavy]

For those speculating about autoflight ILS approaches and go arounds on the 737, they are normally flown single channel autopilot for Cat I and most companies only allow dual channel for Cat II/III or practice autolands. On disconnection of the single channel on Cat I, the autothrottle is also disconnected - manual control, manual thrust; Boeing insist on an all or nothing method on the 737, unlike their other types.

Not true, even on Cat 1, you can arm BOTH autopilots on approach which in turn would give an autopilot go around if required.

[Cloud Cutter]

Not true, even on Cat 1, you can arm BOTH autopilots on approach

It is true. While you CAN arm both, Aluminium shuffler said that Cat 1 approaches are NORMALLY flown single channel, which is absolutely correct. Although, I don't agree regarding autothrottle being disconnected on the go-around - normally the go-around is executed by selecting TOGA, which disconnects a single channel A/P and sets reduced go-around thrust.

[win_faa]

Although the visibility on the surface looks clear on the CCTV, youtube link by alientali shows at 04:45:04 that FZ 981 seems to have emerge out from a low level cloud as shown by the scattering of landing lights from the aircraft

[B777Heavy]

It is true. While you CAN arm both, Aluminium shuffler said that Cat 1 approaches are NORMALLY flown single channel, which is absolutely correct. Although, I don't agree regarding autothrottle being disconnected on the go-around - normally the go-around is executed by selecting TOGA, which disconnects a single channel A/P and sets reduced go-around thrust.

Right, i guess its a company variable. We encourage arming both APs on all ILSs we are a Cat 1 airline. Yeah saw the AT disconnect later on, I agree with u on that.

[Ngineer]

Hard to tell 100%, but the aircraft looks well lit up as it descends in both videos I have seen. This would also rule out fuel exhaustion and subsequent engine/idg failure. Looks like a definitive stall for whatever reasons.

[Cloud Cutter]

Right, i guess its a company variable. We encourage arming both APs on all ILSs we are a Cat 1 airline. Yeah saw the AT disconnect later on, I agree with u on that.

Yip, there will always be different ways of doing it.

[Denti]

Yip, there will always be different ways of doing it.

Indeed, in the 15 years i was on the 737 i had to fly every CAT I approach dual channel if i still used the autoflight system at that point (manual raw data approaches were encouraged and very often flown). We knew we could do it single channel in case that one AP was u/s, but SOP in the airlines i flew was always use dual channel.

Now, from what i have read in this thread it is different at flydubai and they only use one AP during CAT I approaches, which of course leaves an automatic go around out of the question, but if above 400ft AGL it is simple enough to just re-engage the autopilot right away if one wishes to do so.

[Judd]

Yip, there will always be different ways of doing it.


Judging by the various comments in this thread, it makes me wonder if airlines permit their crews to fly an ILS manually, anymore? Is it that dangerous to do so? Or is that for CAVOK approaches only?

[Aluminium shuffler]

B777 and Cloud,

My post was unclear. What I was saying is that it is Boeing policy on disconnecting the AP on a single channel app to also disconnect the autothrottle, so when the pilot disengages one, he will also disengage the other, so full autoflight or full manual. The exception to that policy is when conducting a GA from a single channel app, where TOGA applies TOGA thrust through the autothrottle but disengaged the AP (AP remains engaged only on dual channel app). So, in a missed app, the pilots now have the unusual cicumstances of manual flight with autothrottles, which then sets them up for the trap with the AT mode problem on Alt Aqu. I did not say the AT disengaged on pressing TOGA.

For what it's worth, some companies do things contrary to Boeing guidance, as B777 said. Excel used to do dual channel for every ILS, though that brings in trim issues for low disconnects for manual landing, and would deselect speed of the MCP AT when flying manually. Seemed a smarter way of doing thins, IMO.

[porkflyer]

When I heard of a 737 falling out of the sky in Russia immediately Turkish came to my mind...why? If FZ pilots are worked to death.. give try a THY 737 roster..and than you tell me if you would fly as passenger. Done that..never again.

https://www.rt.com/news/336514-flydubai-pilots-fatigue-crash/

[Chesty Morgan]

AS, whilst you're technically correct I'd argue that it isn't all that unusual - 99.99% of take offs are manually flown with the AT engaged.

[Cloud Cutter]

My post was unclear. What I was saying is that it is Boeing policy on disconnecting the AP on a single channel app to also disconnect the autothrottle, so when the pilot disengages one, he will also disengage the other, so full autoflight or full manual. The exception to that policy is when conducting a GA from a single channel app, where TOGA applies TOGA thrust through the autothrottle but disengaged the AP (AP remains engaged only on dual channel app). So, in a missed app, the pilots now have the unusual cicumstances of manual flight with autothrottles, which then sets them up for the trap with the AT mode problem on Alt Aqu. I did not say the AT disengaged on pressing TOGA.

Yip, if you are landing or going manual prior to executing a missed approach. Some operators choose to deselect the active AT mode (i.e. 'MCP speed') rather than disconnecting the AT - this retains TOGA functionality and low speed protection.

Judging by the various comments in this thread, it makes me wonder if airlines permit their crews to fly an ILS manually, anymore? Is it that dangerous to do so? Or is that for CAVOK approaches only?

I don't think it's dangerous as such, but it is definitely more risky (generally speaking). Most operators these days seem to be of the opinion that crew should use autoflight where possible as a risk management tool, and not 'practice' with an aircraft full of punters. Of course, the problem with this is that skills are less polished on the rare occasion they are actually needed.

[framer]

one may blame all the industry,fatigue,bad training,poor handling but unfortunately it seems a case of poor judgement which turned out deadly.
When long term fatigue sets in a real laissez faire attitude is one thing that often occurs, with that comes cases of poor judgement.
I am in no way suggesting that this occurred here because we simply don't know what happened at this stage.

[framer]

I would be very interested in the photo of the f/o's roster if I could read it properly.
If someone who lives in Dubai could take the time to convert all the sign on and sign off times to Dubai local time and reproduce it in a post then pilots from all around the globe could read it, understand how similar or dis-similar it is to their own rosters and we could have a really meaningful discussion around the fatigue topic that is dominating this thread.
The photo can be found in the link at post #444
Thank you in advance.
Framer

[LLuCCiFeR]

When I heard of a 737 falling out of the sky in Russia immediately Turkish came to my mind...why? If FZ pilots are worked to death.. give try a THY 737 roster..and than you tell me if you would fly as passenger. Done that..never again.

https://www.rt.com/news/336514-flydubai-pilots-fatigue-crash/Very interesting schedule of the F/O... :ooh:

[framer]

The schedule of the f/o needs to be posted on here in a way that all of us can relate to. ( ie easy to read and all in Dubai time) This is pretty serious stuff we are dealing with, if someone could take the time to do it we could gain an appreciation of what he personally, and we as an industry are dealing with.

[HDP]

The roster appears to be in Dubai time already. The scheduled departure time of the flight to Rostov is 21:45, which shows on the roster with a duty check-in time of 20:45.

[Hidalgo737]

Image - TinyPic - Free Image Hosting, Photo Sharing & Video Hosting (http://tinypic.com/r/30wr2is/9)http://tinypic.com/r/30wr2is/9

[FlyingOfficerKite]

Can be the snow that fell on Rostov in the morning, when first TV crews arrived there.

Yes, it looks like snow/ice on the fuselage side, ice on the emergency exit, but nothing on the internal components?

[Aluminium shuffler]

Chesty, the difference is that on take off, the speed is controlled through the MCP window, not the flap lever, and both target speed and level off tend to be higher, so a wider margin over minimum speed is commanded and usually attained before Alt Aqu can knock it back to a speed below safe flying speed for the flap position.

[wingbar]

A terrible incident - one of the MANY reasons I left FDB was this kind of roster. The tiredness is something I have never experienced before.
And Vortex is absolutely spot on.
This company is dangerous, the people in accountable positions should now be held fully accountable.
A disgrace.

[Please Call Crewing]

Actually that roster looks quite good compared to a certain UK TP operators one especially now EASA FTLs are now in.

[HDP]

I'd be more interested in the captain's roster, as it was rumoured he'd flown 11 days previously with only one day of full break.

[kungfu panda]

A terrible incident - one of the MANY reasons I left FDB was this kind of roster. The tiredness is something I have never experienced before.
And Vortex is absolutely spot on.
This company is dangerous, the people in accountable positions should now be held fully accountable.
A disgrace.

If a catastrophic accident such as this occurred to a Chinese Airline you would already have the management involved jumping from high positions.

[Chesty Morgan]

Chesty, the difference is that on take off, the speed is controlled through the MCP window, not the flap lever, and both target speed and level off tend to be higher, so a wider margin over minimum speed is commanded and usually attained before Alt Aqu can knock it back to a speed below safe flying speed for the flap position.
Take off and go around the speed is controlled by pitch.

The speed bug is controlled by the MCP and the flap lever...until ALT ACQ. There's no real difference in the way you fly it (hand flying with AT engaged) up to that point.

[de facto]

Judging by the various comments in this thread, it makes me wonder if airlines permit their crews to fly an ILS manually, anymore? Is it that dangerous to do so? Or is that for CAVOK approaches only?
Yes,thanks god.
I do it each day i fly to base,about 15/20 mins of manual,no FD...done a go around raw data at 50 feet due to a blocked runway,yeah an extra 10-15 of manual.
We not only do it but enjoy it but yes some who dont do it may find it stressful rather than enjoyable.

[tatelyle]

When I heard of a 737 falling out of the sky in Russia immediately Turkish came to my mind...why? If FZ pilots are worked to death.. give it a try a THY 737 roster..and than you tell me if you would fly as passenger. Done that..never again.


I have seen and flown worse rosters, with more night work and multiple sectors. This is pretty much industry standard, in the low end of the market. And yes, sleeping on duty was fairly standard, esp at 03:00 or 05:00. Someone mentioned I was blaming all airlines. Not at all, but there is a significant section at the low end of the industry where this is quite normal.

But nothing changes. You can shout at the authorities all you like, but they don't even have the decency to reply. All they are interested in is an easy life and a nice pension, and squaring up to the likes of these shouty managers and owners is not on their priority list. Iy will take more than 60 deaths to get them out of the office.

[wheelbarrow]

The guy on RT News is evidently now based in Qatar, I don't fancy his chances of keeping his job too long.......

[jfkjohan]

IMHO the first officers roster from 11 MAR to day of crash still looks "manageable", (definitely legal), however I did see a minimum rest between one particular duty of 12/13hrs. Not sure the distance between the airplane to his residence/place of rest-- but if he could be home in under 2hrs, from airplane chocks on to bedroom, that would still be OK. As in, not ideal working conditions but then again ideal is subjective.

For some people, all they want to do is just fly fly fly. If you had a kid, like me, bouncing on your bed because he just got up (and you are just about to go to bed), now this roster becomes rather tough(er), but still manageable, yes? We manage our own rests and should know/respect our own limits.

Am interested to see the Captains roster.

Also, are they paid a flat salary at FlyDubai or based on sectors/hours etc. If flat salary monthly, you could just "call in sick" and you would be given XYZ days a year, right? Just asking.

[bsieker]

Airbubba,

Thanks for the heads-up on the progress on reading the CVR. I thought they would succeed, since it was mostly an interface problem and not damaged memory modules.

Turns out the MAK (or IAC as they prefer to call themselves internationally) has an English-langauge page on the investigation (http://mak-iac.org/en/rassledovaniya/boeing-737-800-a6-fdn-19-03-2016).

Bernd

[Avenger]

The advanced discussion on use of automatics etc somewhat detracts from the core question of situational awareness and decision making. The roster is not that punishing compared to many loco, however, the decision to hold in turbulent conditions for 2 hrs raises questions. If the crew were fatigued the reliance on automation or missing what's actually happening when buttons are pressed is normal we see it in the sim every day. Failing a catosphrofic failure this looks like a loss of SA and pilot capacity for whatever reason. I very much doubt airline management or bean counters in our industry will take stock of the reasons

[arcdu]

Whilst fatigue may well have played a part, it is interesting to see that the accident flight and the previous two night flights are flights the f/o had bid to operate (indicated by the "R" at the bottom of the column for Friday - the day they reported for work).

I would not contest that this may be a fatiguing work pattern, but at the risk of being flamed would suggest that you can't really ask to fly three nights in a row and then complain about being fatigued. Whilst it may not be fashionable to defend Flydubai in this thread, I am far junior to both of these guys, but on the same day operated a much easier flight ending about 9pm local time, so presumably had they bid for day flights they would have got them, as I did.

[Chronus]

Chronos

I'm not boss bashing. I'm telling the facts as they are having flown that specific aircraft, having flown with some of the departed, having flown for the airline, having been subject to its "just culture" for many years, having had my family live in Dubai and having seen good men and women come and go.

Not only am I giving my opinion what I am saying is accompanied by rock solid irrefutable proof.

Now I am not saying the sole cause was two men but the devil is in the detail. Accountable Manager or post holder de facto has responsibilites.

The last 5 mins of the flight are indeed very important for many reasons but whatever those reasons be they act of god, mishandling, catastrophic failure they were made possible by the launch of the aircraft from base in weather in which they not only predicted not to be able to land ut was predicted for the entire duration of their fuel to be highly unlikely to allow them to do so.

I've been dispatched from Dubai in similar enough circumstance that their for the grace of god go I. FZ mgt make Enron look clean.

If you think that the whole company ethos and modus operandi has no bearing on why the plane was even airborne and not on the ground either at the ALTN or in DXB then I fear you misunderstand the swiss cheese model.

Why have any form of regulation if we never ever invoke it! This is why the resignation rate is where it is.

One of our pilots in his exit interview was asked why he was leaving. He told them I've been in the airline here for 3 years. You have not been remotely interested in anything I have to offer, anything I can bring to help or used any of my skills other than flying a plane. Now that I am leaving you want to know why! This is why!

This goes so deep it is so deeply engrained that it is rotten to the core. People have a right to know.
VORTEX THING I do of course share your sentiments, whole heartedly, and fully appreciate the rigours of work for dubious operators. It is just that at this stage I thought it rather premature to speculate on things such as company culture.
My thoughts were entirely focussed on the most likely cause, given all that is known thus far.
On the issue of operators, perhaps you may recall the Isparta MD83 crash. A few from management and authority are having to get used to porridge as kebabs are no longer on the menu for them. But hey, what comes first, corporate greed or safety. After all who are we to dispute it.

[Otto Throttle]

The "R" on the roster can't be taken to mean very much. Aside from asking for a particular trip, you could request a start or finish time. However, the system has a cruel sense of humour, as "Finish by 0200L" could easily see you with a duty commencing at 0300L as technically it complies and thus your "requested" bid is successfully granted.

[bud leon]

I would not contest that this may be a fatiguing work pattern, but at the risk of being flamed would suggest that you can't really ask to fly three nights in a row and then complain about being fatigued. Whilst it may not be fashionable to defend Flydubai in this thread, I am far junior to both of these guys, but on the same day operated a much easier flight ending about 9pm local time, so presumably had they bid for day flights they would have got them, as I did.

The pilot can't complain about being fatigued because he is deceased.

Many of the comments in this thread, if truly representative of industry operations and perceptions, indicate the aviation industry is lagging a long way behind other high risk industries when it comes to understanding and managing fatigue.

Humans are notoriously bad at responding to fatigue, it's why driving and resting times in the heavy vehicle industry in most advanced economies is heavily regulated.

[skadi]

This video shows the GA into the clouds followed by the steep descend to the ground.

7a2MJQbc5Zg

skadi

[glad rag]

Poor guys, just listened to the transcript, very difficult, with the change of units back and forth.

Terrible accident.

[HDP]

If (and that's a big if) pilot error is blamed for this accident, then it's going to be terribly hard for their 2 widows who are both pregnant. I hope flydubai will provide them with counselling, but I don't get my hopes up.

[Alain67]

Hard to tell 100%, but the aircraft looks well lit up as it descends in both videos I have seen. This would also rule out fuel exhaustion and subsequent engine/idg failure. Looks like a definitive stall for whatever reasons.
Is a 60° pitch down compatible with a stall ??

[NeuroAvGeek]

Vortex Thing,

I know it goes against industry dogma, but if the safety culture is so bad and it stems from the chief pilot's office, why not leak something to the media? The public loves a scapegoat especially one with a face to blame, why not let that be Vial's (or whomever's) face?

Especially if the company takes a financial hit, they'll be looking to reform their public image...

[armchairpilot94116]

Stalls/Upsets:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TFRAQ-71U8A


Ci 676:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUNeI-JOgKA

Ci 676: stall / crash during approach / 1000 feet higher then alt indication.
The Crash of Flight CI676, a China Airlines Airbus A300, Taipei, Taiwan, Monday 16 February, 1998: What We Know So Far (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/Research/Rvs/Misc/Additional/Reports/taipei/taipei.html)



AA recovery techniques:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=35Zy_rl8WuM

[Alain67]

armchairpilot94116, thanks for these links !

[Continental-520]

I have seen and flown worse rosters, with more night work and multiple sectors. This is pretty much industry standard, in the low end of the market. And yes, sleeping on duty was fairly standard, esp at 03:00 or 05:00. Someone mentioned I was blaming all airlines. Not at all, but there is a significant section at the low end of the industry where this is quite normal.



Being the norm doesn't mean it is right. If you take the deeper meaning of what Vortex Thing has said in his numerous good posts, the culture that permeates in FZ and others in the region is such that people are very reluctant to draw the line in the sand and say no to operating a duty when things like fatigue and sickness mount up. In the western unionised world, getting a black mark against your name might be the extent of what lingers in the back of your mind. In the Middle East, losing your job is a consequence that is always close to the front of your mind.

Fact.


520.

[Vortex Thing]

CSENG

We fly manually all the time. FDB are not an automated airline. Hand flying is encouraged and practiced as often as viable. We use the autopilot in the cruise and that is pretty much it. for everyday. Some guys put the autopilot in at 1000ft after take off, some wait until flaps up no lights, some hand fly up to FL410. (If were not too heavy or first cruise ALT)

We frequently hand fly from well above platform to touchdown.

Whenever in the NG you disconnect the autopilot you disconnect the auto throttle. It was something that I had to unlearn when I did my 777/787 type rating as in that aircraft you never (I'll put very rarely as a caveat) disconnect the authothrottle.

The only time in an NG that you fly mixed auto manual is if you disconnect the AP, then deselect the auto throttle but not disconnect it. This is known as deselecting speed and is something I have down, AS SOP, in other airlines but something that FDB DO NOT DO. (for the avoidance of doubt)

So in FDB it was simple if you disconnect the AP then the AT comes out as well. As there are no automatic approaches flown most of the above conversation about modes and trim bias etc are simply not relevant in this or any other FDB case.

[Aluminium shuffler]

Chesty, you are arguing against me while repeating some of my points. So did B777 and Cloud. Guys, read a post properly before arguing with it. With 13k on type, I'm well aware of how the system works, its flaws and how to use it.

[Alice025]

Poor guys, just listened to the transcript, very difficult, with the change of units back and forth.

Terrible accident.

It is also that for other planes on arrival to Rostov that night, it was easier to decide on the alternatives, as they would picture nearby airports and their runways, likely (the same bad) weather conditions there, if their pax require international? customs. passports/ can that be a domestic airport or one would need an international one. Then, their passengers would be from the area, not necessarily in bad want of Rostov arrival exactly. All the small things helping to take the decision. In that case locals opted for Krasnodar and Taganrog, instead, one int'l one domestic and partly out of operation but operating nevertheless ; (little demand, crisis, but runway there).
Rostov-Taganrog 70 km; Rostov-Krasnodar 280 km. Normally would be Rostov-Donetsk as a spare airport - 200 km, international, but that's now Ukraine, but no visas, but the runway there is bombed out. Etc. quick thoughts. Easier for locals :o(


I mean, if passengers are all local as they were in the case, they might be happy to run away from the plane at another nearby airport as in reality closer to their homes and won't incur any costs to the airline upkeeping them until the flight to Rostov.


Instead, the pilot asks the airport, very carefully, if the weather is any better, clearly would be glad to know more. is replied strictly technically in not the best English.
second tongue for both.

[Airbubba]

armchairpilot94116, thanks for these links !

I posted links earlier to descriptions of the China Airlines A300 crashes in Nagoya and Taipei but they were removed, perhaps as not pertinent to a B-738 mishap. However, both of these crashes had stalls involving misuse of automation on approach.

One of the links armchairpilot94116 posted is an article by Professor Peter B. Ladkin. His formal analysis of accident causality has had broad influence in aviation safety the past couple of decades. And, he often posts here in PPRuNe as PBL.

Is a 60° pitch down compatible with a stall ??

I'd say it would be compatible with the departure from controlled flight after the stall. As someone pointed out, almost inevitably, one wing stalls first, there is a roll moment and once the bank goes near vertical recovery down low is not likely. Whether the plane is in a stall as it descends nose down in a near vertical bank is academic and I don't claim to know.

[CAT1]

I'm surprised no-one has mentioned the possibility of a flap mis-selection on the go around as a possible cause of the stall.......it's been done to me once in the past, fortunately not with the same results.

[oicur12.again]

"If (and that's a big if) pilot error is blamed for this accident"

Is it a big "If"?

The vast majority of accidents are pilot error.

This probably is too, statistically.

There but . . . . .

[HDP]

"If (and that's a big if) pilot error is blamed for this accident"

Is it a big "If"?

The vast majority of accidents are pilot error.

This probably is too, statistically.

There but . . . . .

It was sarcasm, which probably isn't too appropriate right now... :rolleyes:

[Comanche]

Another possibility is A/P selected after Go-around (which they would normally do) but not actually engaging due insufficient pilot trimming (or Control Wheel Steering engaged instead of A/P) and unnoticed by crew causing excessive pitch and stall with insufficient altitude to recover

[Otto Throttle]

With regard to domestic carriers diverting, in fairness it is very doubtful they arrived at ROV with close to 4 hours worth of fuel and probably did not have the option to hold. Right or wrong, FZ at least had that additional option and chose to exercise it without compromising any subsequent decision to also divert.

The forecast at the closer diversion fields to ROV also wasn't great, so not very many appealing options that particular night.

[Vortex Thing]

Chronos - It is not at all premature.

Rather like your relationship with Mrs or Mr Chronos or your cat(delete as required) is based on physical AND Emotional factors.

Every pilot knows that there are numerous factors involved in the chain of events leading up to an accident.

The physical what happened on night, that is speculation right now.

The emotional, how pilots feel, morale, conditions of work, work ethic and why they were even there on a dark and dirty night are likely "more" responsible whatever the outcome of the NTSB/AAIB pure technical & flight factors. The we already know. That is what we're talking about.

It is not premature discussion at all it is highly pertinent. Now thanks to a brave soul in Doha on RT breaking international news and massively relevant. In fact so relevant that I would wonder why anyone would think it not!

[Vortex Thing]

Vortex Thing,

I know it goes against industry dogma, but if the safety culture is so bad and it stems from the chief pilot's office, why not leak something to the media? The public loves a scapegoat especially one with a face to blame, why not let that be Vial's (or whomever's) face?

Especially if the company takes a financial hit, they'll be looking to reform their public image...
NeuroAvGeek I think you'll find that happened already!

[Machinbird]

In the video posted above by skadi, following go around, the aircraft is out of sight in the clouds for approximately 36 seconds, reappears and impacts in about 3 1/2 seconds.
The interesting thing to me is that the azimuth of disappearance and azimuth of reappearance are extremely close to each other.
This implies that the pull up was extremely steep, possibly greater than 30 degrees nose up.

The other interesting thing in the video was the way that the trees above the building on the left side of the video were whipping around in the wind. It was a rather wild night even if the visibility was reasonably good.

[punkalouver]

One of the links armchairpilot94116 posted is an article by Professor Peter B. Ladkin. His formal analysis of accident causality has had broad influence in aviation safety the past couple of decades. And, he often posts here in PPRuNe as PBL.

Actually, he has no posts since 2011. It was unfortunate that when he did, he came across frequently as completely arrogant when questioned on his opinion. Do a search and decide yourself. I was repeatedly insulted when I questioned his statements on the 757/Tupolev midair over Germany in which he stated that the Tupolev pilot was justified in ignoring the RA, which was directly responsible for that accident by the way. It was quite a disappointing attitude for someone who appears to have written some interesting information.

Anyways, back to thread subject.

[de fumo in flammam]

Its a good point comanche. Reminds me of the go around in Hong Kong, where the AP was disengaged (or not properly re-engaged) without the crew realising, and the aircraft wallowed around for many seconds completely uncontrolled in FD (towards Lantau peak I think).

[Organfreak]

Apologies if this has already been posted:
https://www.rt.com/news/336514-flydubai-pilots-fatigue-crash/:eek:

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

On that last video the aircraft does not appear to have made any forward progress over the ground at all between disappearing into IMC and re appearing. That would seem to indicate a vertical or near vertical climb in IMC, or even a loop if it went over onto its back at the apex.

[Cloud Cutter]

I'm surprised no-one has mentioned the possibility of a flap mis-selection on the go around as a possible cause of the stall.......it's been done to me once in the past, fortunately not with the same results.
Interesting idea - the kind of mistake that's more likely when pilots are fatigued, (it's quite a deliberate effort to actually go past Flap 15 thanks to Mr Boeing's go-around flap notches, but of course the muscle memory is quite adept at moving flaps from 30/40 to 0 after landing). Add a bit of negative sheer at the wrong time and that could do it. Anyway, pure speculation for now - hopefully the FDR will yield some answers soon.

[cessnapete]

Fatiguing rosters is not just an ME problem. Apparently even BA has many pilots off sick for fatigue. Hence the large recruitment programme.

[Mr Angry from Purley]

Cessna
BA pilots don't file fatigue reports I've been told so there is no fatigue problem

[limahotel]

Judging by the latest video, my rough estimate would be that they their approximate ROC was 4100 ft/min (considering cloud base at 1500 ft, roughly 19 s before they disappear into the clouds and G/A at initiated at the minimums). If I haven't miscalculated anything that would suggest full G/A thrust. Unfortunately, they came down a lot faster (22000 ft/min).

[Mr Angry from Purley]

The link to first officer roster 452 has gone, can anyone repeat it?

[alainthailande]

It's part of the rt.com article linked in a post of the previous page.

[Airbubba]

Or, try this link:

https://cdn.rt.com/files/2016.03/original/56f0e884c36188924c8b456f.jpg

[vorra]

The link to first officer roster 452 has gone, can anyone repeat it?
Image - TinyPic - Free Image Hosting, Photo Sharing & Video Hosting (http://tinypic.com/view.php?pic=30wr2is&s=9)

[Infieldg]

Latest CCTV video was deleted, found it again here linked from RT ;


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ifJ9osyLRqQ

[Organfreak]

Terribly sorry about the bad link. It should work properly now. The editor added an "https://" where I didn't need it.

[TypeIV]

Vorra, are those hours on the roster local time or Zulu?

[cessnapete]

You don't file reports. You call in sick, reason fatigue. This guy off for 4 weeks.

[Skyjob]

Just a thought for those not considering a stall or part of one.
Reports of very strong LOW LEVEL jet have been around.
It does not indicate the direction of these winds. Maybe it can be derived from other data?
Should a sudden wind change occur during the missed approach, flying at clean speed up to possible even FL080, this could've possibly caused a stall on a wingtip, then (pitch) up and (wing) over is possible with this design when one one wing is affected.
Not saying this has happened, but with a speed of 197 it appears logical and thus possible as the clean speed for the aircraft is not much higher then this at the weights flown.

[weatherdude]

Just a thought for those not considering a stall or part of one.
Reports of very strong LOW LEVEL jet have been around.
It does not indicate the direction of these winds. Maybe it can be derived from other data?
Should a sudden wind change occur during the missed approach, flying at clean speed up to possible even FL080, this could've possibly caused a stall on a wingtip, then (pitch) up and (wing) over is possible with this design when one one wing is affected.
Not saying this has happened, but with a speed of 197 it appears logical and thus possible as the clean speed for the aircraft is not much higher then this at the weights flown.
This type of weather situation would not allow for any kind of "sudden wind change". There was no thunderstorm involved. Just frontal zone with everyday windshear on approach. It is winter in Russia, not May in DFW. The attempts to imagine some weather mystery are misleading. As posted earlier, a situation like the one is being dealt with worldwide dozens of time daily. Everything may have ended differently under a clear full moon sky (which is speculative), but rain, wind and temperatures involved have not been special at any time around the sad event.

[Chronus]

Chronos - It is not at all premature.

Rather like your relationship with Mrs or Mr Chronos or your cat(delete as required) is based on physical AND Emotional factors.

Every pilot knows that there are numerous factors involved in the chain of events leading up to an accident.

The physical what happened on night, that is speculation right now.

The emotional, how pilots feel, morale, conditions of work, work ethic and why they were even there on a dark and dirty night are likely "more" responsible whatever the outcome of the NTSB/AAIB pure technical & flight factors. The we already know. That is what we're talking about.

It is not premature discussion at all it is highly pertinent. Now thanks to a brave soul in Doha on RT breaking international news and massively relevant. In fact so relevant that I would wonder why anyone would think it not!
Yes, got a mog and a TC ( tank commander ). Both of us, owing to our well past mature stage, are dependant on TC for daily sustenance.
So quite understand human factors. It`s just that am not so much enthusiastic on the subject as it always brings into question so called pilot error. I `d prefer to consider other factors first.
On the matter of corporate culture, others have touched on whistle blowing. Something which has found its way into Western legal systems, but I`d assume not yet found its way in some other corners of the planet.

[Vc10Tail]

Agree on the dual accents detected in FZ981 r/t just before leaving the hold for the FINAL approach.

Initial voice I easily made out as Cypriot (Capt.Aristos Socratous)and sounded more collected and assured.Was probably just trying to personally "sense"what the ATC 's judgement of the weather was(he was not replied to as desired instead got a smattering of wxr reports..as though ATC was reluctant to opine of relative change of weather if any better than before as requested.Initially was advised by ATC "negative WS" and soon after updated with severe turbulence on final and MOD WS" The commander wanted to hear it for himself(despite his PF role) when he twice asked "what does the wxr look like outside the your window".He did sound a little lethargic(fatigued?Stressed?Fear?) even resigning to me by his inflexion .He probably commenced that second approach half heartedly knowing the reported perils awaiting him..which is what prompted the early GA at the suggested height.

The second crew member voice sounded distinctly Spanish "Sky Dubai nine ehrr wwahn" He also sounded erratic and needing more clarification on the metric initial approach clearance.A in A little nervous compared to the more vomposed Capt Socratous indicated to me the first voice was in command. The pilot announcing the GA i PM anbeis normally the non handling pilot.again was F.O. Mr.Cruz).I doubt if FZ operates a monitored approach from earlier posted ops specifications.

The "bye bye" after handover from Tower hsd an eerie finality to it.I believe they had enough! The cheerful melodic " SkyDubai 981 Going Around" had an sense of relief in its inflexion..I believe they were imagining going somewhere less perilious...but little did they or their poor souls know that within a minute it would all end as a devastating tragedy.

May God rest their soul on peace..ALL 62 Souls on board that fateful night.The decease deserve our respect and a moment of silent contemplation particularly as some of us are active Pilots and could be met with a similar fate...God forbid,but that is part and parcel of chosing such a career that we love and have made much sacrifices for.May the families of all those affected crew and passengers be rewarded strength to recover from this terrible trauma.

The culture of us Pilots trying to look bold and calm and collected for passengers is undoubtedly commendable toninspire confidence...however such bravado does not have to spill over the r/t with ATC..yes by all means AN+C first..but let the folks down under have some inkling of WTF is going on uo there..in brief followed by STBY! If the recorders are indeed destroyed by the catastrophe we shall be at a loss to learn what can be prevented in future..and like the Kazan 732 accident we shall repeat this accident in some other unlikely location...hopefully not Russia again! May the Russians authority and FZ both be open about sharing the findings of this tragedy.

I have not trained on B73NG but only with rudimentary knowledge like many nin rated pilots herein.I have trained om Airbus FBW and just wonder if had FZ 981 been a bus whether we would have had this accident due to added protections and higher level of automation? The FBW concept I recall was born partly to minimize crew workload to enable a more effective Flight deck management and a more efficient and safer flight outcome...was it not?

[Old Boeing Driver]

Their landing lights are visible from 03:44:55 until they are in the GA at 03:45:25. About 30 seconds.

They are in the clouds again until 03:35:57. About 32 seconds. That's a long time. In a straight and level line, at 140 KTS, that would have taken them about 1.25 NM

Also, the point at which the lights disappear and become visible again do not seem too far apart. I know we don't know the real perspective on the camera.

The first flightaware posts showed a pitch up near the approach end and the subsequent crash about midway down the runway.

The CVR and FDR should be very interesting.

[portmanteau]

If the limits for Flight Crew are not more than 100 duty hours in a 28 day rolling period and 900 in a rolling year then there are bound to be high work and low work periods occasionally while still within those limits. Need to know first if these ( or the current UAE DGCA limits , if different,) have been exceeded.

[Infieldg]

Link to the longer embedded video


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7a2MJQbc5Zg

[notapilot15]

Well one thing PR teams circling social media should realize, even if it is human (pilot) error, weather or technical, it is still management's fault. That's how aviation works.

Fatigue if applicable, is management induced.
Lack of training is management fault.
Sending into bad weather knowingly is management fault.
Bad maintenance is management's fault.

I know it is virgin territory and bosses are working on scripts to deal with it, but proving it as pilot error doesn't make management not guilty.

Roster may look legal on paper but when you consider all off-the-record things like wake up calls 3 hours before ... humanly impossible in the long run.

But we all know as long as these airlines offer cheaper fares and sleepy blue eyed FAs pax wouldn't care if the flight crew got any sleep or not. That is a fact.

[captplaystation]

There is already a fairly public "paper trail" of fatigue reports on the RT link. Of course, with FlyDubai being Govt owned that will probably just "evaporate". Nonetheless, a decent solicitor could make a very big case against them if someone engaged him/her. I won't speculate on the cause ( I have flown 737 long enough to know "her" foibles & to understand my own human weaknesses when dealing with them) but, a decent legal honcho should assuredly destroy the little scrotes who run the flt ops Dept with no regard for the health/state of alertness of their employees having ignored multiple fatigue reports over the years.

[Wrist Watch]

And yet, you get these areas of responsibility in FZ:

• Ensure the safe day to day operation of the aircraft as part of the crew.
• Set an example to be followed by all flydubai crew to preserve the corporate image of flydubai.
• Ensure all policies and procedures are adhered to by all members of crew.
• Notify the company or GCAA of any breaches in SOP or safety through the appropriate reporting medium so that lessons can be learnt by the company to enhance safety.
• Ensure he/she is fit to fly at all times and notify the company if not.
• Operate the aircraft according to the approved policies and procedures as determined by flydubai and the GCAA.

Reading this thread makes you wonder...

[RatherBeFlying]

Any consultant can decorate any slave shop with all the huggy fluff HR and Just Culture speak.

Your local CAA will look upon all the copious pious manuals and bestow its blessing:}

[captplaystation]

Indeed, given that the Airline & probably the local CAA are entirely "owned" by the State, don't expect any worthwhile conclusions/revelations from their side. . . .will the Russians have the "Cojones" to rock the boat by making "obvious" the truth, or will it ( & any failing of our "trusty" 737 ) be buried. Pilot error I reckon :D

[787PIC]

I hate to speculate since we know very little details at this time.
However, every pilot and especially airline management must remember that FATIGUE is the silent killer!
Captain Ross Aimer
UAL Ret.

[framer]

Am I right that First Officer Cruz's duty on the tenth March was 17.2 hours long and then he had about five hours from hitting the hay to being on call?
If that is correct it is astounding. ( and a criminal offence where I am from).

[donpizmeov]

I would suggest the finish time for the DXB-DMM-DXB on the 10th is incorrect. Its not that far away. Check the pattern length on the 14th for comparison.

[Alice Clarr]

If they went around higher than normal at 1500', and didn't press TOGA..because they were light, didn't have far to climb etc then things can become tricky with the FD and autopilot.. Even the best can become confused when HDG SEL and LVL CHG won't engage and you've got double CWS on the FMA.. Bad weather, middle of the night, tired etc autopilot won't engage because you're still trying to control the aircraft with stick.. Things can go bad fast. Gotta press TOGA but I see its often not done if the G/A is not at minima. Just a thought

[_Phoenix_]

Alice Clarr,
Yes, this is exactly my thought too.
Also, V10tail said
... The commander wanted to hear it for himself(despite his PF role) when he twice asked "what does the wxr look like outside the your window".He did sound a little lethargic even resigning to me by his inflexion. He probably commenced that second approach half heartedly knowing the reported perils awaiting him..which is what prompted the eearly GA...
The "bye bye" after handover from Tower hsd an eerie finality to it.I believe they had enough! The cheerful melodic " SkyDubai 981 Going Around" had an sense of relief in its inflexion..I believe they were imagining going somewhere less perilious...but little did they or their poor souls know that within a minute it would all end as a devastating tragedy...
I would add, in clouds, heavy turbulence, both noses into FMS, unaware of A/P not engaged, yes things go bad very fast... God rest their soul on peace.

[xollob]

Well one thing PR teams circling social media should realize, even if it is human (pilot) error, weather or technical, it is still management's fault. That's how aviation works.

Fatigue if applicable, is management induced.
Lack of training is management fault.
Sending into bad weather knowingly is management fault.
Bad maintenance is management's fault.

I know it is virgin territory and bosses are working on scripts to deal with it, but proving it as pilot error doesn't make management not guilty.

Roster may look legal on paper but when you consider all off-the-record things like wake up calls 3 hours before ... humanly impossible in the long run.

But we all know as long as these airlines offer cheaper fares and sleepy blue eyed FAs pax wouldn't care if the flight crew got any sleep or not. That is a fact.

Yep and sadly despite all that somehow "IF" it was pilot error something along the lines of "the pilots failed to report fatigued" or words similar would appear, let's hope if that is the case that, there is a little deeper digging that goes along the line of, " it is believed the reasons for this is ......" and a deep digging into the safety culture, rostering, previous fatigue reports, actions taken to improve things etc etc..... Sadly I doubt that will happen, fatigue only ever seems to get s glancing mention when in reality is likely one of THE major contributing factors.

[framer]

I would suggest the finish time for the DXB-DMM-DXB on the 10th is incorrect. Its not that far away. Check the pattern length on the 14th for comparison.
Yes but either the flight pattern was rostered to have a lengthy delay on the ground, or, as with my company, once the duty has been completed the 'actual' times are displayed on the roster which are sourced from the acars OOOI message. I think it is much more likely that the times shown are correct and are what actually occurred and that the original roster showed a standard pattern.
In all airlines I have worked for the crew would have realised they would bust duty limits and go off to a hotel.

[donpizmeov]

Framer, rather than guess check the airlines time table. Flight 863 departs DXB at 0730 (dxb) and arrives DMM at 07.55 local, departs 0840 local arriving DXB at 1110. Even if he did a double shuttle flight 865 departs DXB at 1410 and is back into DXB at 1725. So yes, I still believe that the roster shown may be in error in this case.

Its great to know you would not bust FTLs (you legend). There is nothing saying this FO did either. Unless you have facts stop trying to degrade him.

[Infieldg]

Another CCTV camera

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nzc4LHF4Xls