Qatar 77W at MIA

[Lord Bracken]

Er....


Accident: Qatar B773 at Miami on Sep 15th 2015, struck approach lights on departure

By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Sep 17th 2015 14:02Z, last updated Thursday, Sep 17th 2015 14:02Z
A Qatar Airlines Boeing 777-300, registration A7-BAC performing flight QR-778 from Miami,FL (USA) to Doha (Qatar), departed Miami's runway 09 but struck the approach lights runway 27 during departure. Both tower, departure controllers as well as crew maintained routine communication. The aircraft continued to destination for a landing without further incident about 13.5 hours later.

On Sep 17th 2015 the FAA reported the aircraft struck approach lights on departure from Miami and continued to destination. The aircraft received substantial damage to its belly, the occurrence was rated an accident.

Related NOTAMs:
09/160 (A3018/15) - RWY 27 ALS U/S. 16 SEP 18:28 2015 UNTIL 16 OCT 20:00 2015 ESTIMATED. CREATED: 16 SEP 18:28 2015

09/159 (A3017/15) - RWY 27 ALS U/S. 16 SEP 17:55 2015 UNTIL 16 OCT 20:00 2015. CREATED: 16 SEP 17:55 2015

Metars:
KMIA 160353Z COR 09008KT 10SM FEW025 BKN200 28/26 A3009 RMK AO2 RAE06 SLP189 OCNL LTGIC DSNT NE CB DSNT NE P0008 T02830256
KMIA 160253Z 07016G23KT 3SM +RA SCT028CB BKN033 OVC080 28/25 A3010 RMK AO2 RAB53 SLP192 CB OHD MOV NW P0000 60000 T02830250 51014
KMIA 160153Z 10009KT 10SM FEW025 FEW045 SCT150 OVC200 28/25 A3009 RMK AO2 SLP190 T02830250
KMIA 160053Z 04005KT 10SM SCT029 SCT045 SCT150 OVC200 27/24 A3009 RMK AO2 RAE23 SLP188 OCNL LTGIC DSNT NW CB DSNT NW MOV NW P0000 T02720239
KMIA 152353Z 00000KT 7SM +RA SCT025CB BKN085 BKN180 OVC250 27/23 A3006 RMK AO2 RAB34 SLP178 CB NE-SE-SW-W MOV NW P0006 60006 T02670228 10317 20267 58001
KMIA 152253Z 05009G19KT 10SM SCT025 SCT055 BKN180 OVC250 29/22 A3006 RMK AO2 SLP179 CB DSNT SE-SW AND NW-N MOV NW T02890217
KMIA 152153Z 09008KT 10SM SCT033 SCT180 OVC250 31/24 A3006 RMK AO2 SLP179 CB DSNT SE AND W MOV NW T03060239

[llondel]

That sounds a bit scary, obviously the damage wasn't severe enough to breach the pressure vessel but they didn't necessarily know that at the time.

[twochai]

I wonder how they assured themselves that the pressure hull or tailplane structure had not been compromised?

[Orestes]

Were they simply unaware that they had hit anything and only realized it when they arrived at their destination? It seems a bit reckless to proceed with a transatlantic flight knowing that they had struck something and not knowing how much damage it did.

[G-CPTN]

The collision report was issued two days after the incident, which suggests that the actual collision wasn't noted at the time - a sort of hit-and-run . . .

[llondel]

I wonder when the airport became aware of the broken approach lights. I guess even if that was spotted within the hour, there's still the job of deducing which aircraft hit the structure.

[Sober Lark]

there's still the job of deducing which aircraft hit the structure


Apparently they found a note on the outer marker "I bumped your runway lights, please call me if you notice anything. .."

[RAT 5]

2 engine a/c are massively over powered for obvious reasons. MIA-Doha is a long way = heavy a/c, but the performance is calculated assuming losing 50% of thrust, which they did not. Therefore one would expect the a/c to lift off and clear the approach lights of the opposite runway by considerable more than 35'. So what happened & why? To suggest they did not know is one thing, but I'm sure there were more than sweaty palms as they hurtled towards the end of the runway. There is more to this than is being reported here.
Remember the Russian freighter in Aus that cut the grass in the stop-way? ATC were encouraging it to fly. This must have looked something similar. I'm amazed if ATC didn't call for a light inspection and inform the crew. Surely they have tell-tale monitors in the tower for the lights status?
There are also lots of spotters at airports such as MIA. I'm sure there is a video somewhere that will burst on to the scene.

[B-HKD]

Takeoff was on RWY09 from intersection T1 (not full length). That leaves a TODA (Takeoff Distance Available) of ~2600m/8500ft, no way that is sufficient for a -300ER near/at MTOW.

QR has Boeing Class 3 EFBs (electronic flight bags) fitted in all of their 777s, used for takeoff/landing performance, charts etc.

Question is was full length 09 not available? Did they base their numbers off full length and then end up departing from T1??? (Full length 09 is no problem for the -300ER at MTOW).

I doubt they accidentally took off from the wrong intersection (ATC would notice) but most likely they had incorrect performance numbers.

The Boeing OPT tool (used for takeoff/landing perf calcs.) within the EFB, allows crews to enter the intersection and thus knows the distances available from that point for takeoff performance calculations.

However, if they accidentally forgot to enter the intersection T1 during their calculations (big Nono because each crew member is to do a separate calculation and then cross-check, they each have their own EFB)

In any case, near/at MTOW there is no way the OPT would output takeoff data for a RWY09 T1 intersection departure. Instead it would show the maximum takeoff weight from that intersection and the crew would have to re-calculate using that weight to receive the relevant speeds etc.

This could easily have ended a lot worse. I am curious to know if the crew fire walled the thrust levers when they saw the end of the runway approaching.

Note: The first three orange light structures should all be cross shaped and of equal size. They passed over the freeway at barely 100'.

https://farm1.staticflickr.com/754/21492621105_dba130ab8a_o.jpg

[RAT 5]

Sounds very plausible. I wonder what speed they rotated at? It couldn't have been much over V1. It would have been daylight, yes, so surely they must have realised that the far end was getting closer than normal. Oh wait, that's what we said about the G-1V over-run crash.

[737aviator]

If it's going to take them a month (NOTAM) to repair the approach lights, it must have been a bit more than a scratch!

[MarkerInbound]

Transport aircraft rarely use their full thrust for takeoff. To save wear and tear on the the aircraft a takeoff thrust setting is computed to just meet the performance requirements. At structural weight with a long runway there is often a large reduction in the takeoff thrust setting because full thrust wasn't needed.

[B-HKD]

Transport aircraft rarely use their full thrust for takeoff. To save wear and tear on the the aircraft a takeoff thrust setting is computed to just meet the performance requirements. At structural weight with a long runway there is often a large reduction in the takeoff thrust setting because full thrust wasn't needed.

Indeed that would have been the case with a full length departure off RWY09.

However, they departed from RWY09 intersection T1. Leaving a TODA of ~2600m/8500ft in which case with APU to Pack, and TOGA, under the prevailing conditions would have allowed for ~325,000kgs. A good 25,000kgs under MTOW and QR778 is consistently going out near/at MTOW.

Im going to say they calculated full length RWY09 with ~3900m TODA available. And ended up taking off with from T1 (fact) ~2600m of pavement available.

[TOWTEAMBASE]

A G IV (I think) took out the ILS at STN 2 years ago in thick fog with its mains gear, they claimed not to have noticed either. Closed runway 22 for quite a while I seem to remember until it was ILS capable again

[G-CPTN]

Sunset at MIA on 15th was 19:25 with nautical Twilight @ 20:15.
Was it cloudy?
Scheduled departure time was 20:20.
Actual departure time was 20:37 - was it already dark?

[neilki]

This Emirates mishap (https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2009/aair/ao-2009-012.aspx) and the Jo'berg BA 747 Slat Retract incidents are the 2 'closest to disaster' accidents i can recall for a long time.
I'm sure the NTSB report will be a fun read, but the Aussies did a great job too..

[320goat]

I think it will turn out not to be an issue with wrong weights but an issue with the intersection take off versus the selection in the OPT.

Hopefully we will find out in due course.

Firstly I am thankful that this was not more serious, and secondly I feel for all the guys involved. They are not the first and will not be the last to have this sort of incident. Thomson, Thomas Cook, Emirates, BA but to name a few. I just hope lessons can be learned and all 4 stay employed.

Regards

[Ian W]

From a comment in Aviation Herald
Accident: Qatar B773 at Miami on Sep 15th 2015, struck approach lights on departure (http://avherald.com/h?article=48c78b3a&opt=0)

If the OPT calculate performance from any intersection then the symbol is a slash. It would be like that " 09/T1 " . Devils coincident . T1 = temporary runway in the OPT and the name of the intersection is T1.

Looks like an EFB software Human Factors issue. No symbol used in the software should match real world runway symbology or intersection signage. Asking for a Murphy with that :=

[055166k]

Pilot knew where he was....he reported at T1. He was cleared to line up at T1. [This assumes flight was Sep 16 0029-UTC etc.] You can delete this if the time/date/flight are wrong! Tapes available on liveATC.net

[Longtimer]

PS & SAFETY LIGHTING-COLLISION QATAR 777 CONDUCTED INTERSECTION DEPARTURE
Lighting-collision Qatar 777 conducted intersection departure

18 SEPTEMBER, 2015 BY: DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW
Investigations into a Qatar Airways Boeing 777-300ER’s collision with lighting during departure from Miami will examine whether the intersection take-off played a role in the accident.

The seven-year old aircraft (A7-BAC) struck approach lights while taking off from Miami’s runway 9 at around 20:30 local time on 15 September.

It had been conducting a departure to Doha, as flight QR778, from the T1 intersection which would have reduced the runway length by around 30% to some 2,800m (9,190ft).

The aircraft travelled along taxiway S, running parallel to the runway, before being cleared to line up at the intersection.

This clearance was acknowledged by the 777’s crew, according to air-ground communications from Miami tower.

Investigators have not released any details of the weight and performance calculations, or the thrust settings, used for the departure.

All 777-300ERs are powered by General Electric GE90 engines.

There is no immediate evidence that the crew was aware of the lighting collision with the lighting to air traffic control after the departure.

The US FAA says the aircraft continued to its destination without further incident but that subsequent inspection revealed “substantial” damage to the underside of the fuselage.

Meteorological data for Miami at the time of the departure – which would have taken place after sunset – indicates only light winds, and good visibility, although there was rain in the vicinity.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/lighting-collision-qatar-777-conducted-intersection-416895/

[1978]

To me is seems very strange such accident can apparently go unnoticed for some time.

Shouldn't the pilots know they went outside the "envelope" of the runway and report this such that a runway inspection is initiated?

Do the ground structures not have electronic status checks such that airport authorities immediately know something is very wrong?

[ATC Watcher]

Do the ground structures not have electronic status checks such that airport authorities immediately know something is very wrong?


I do not know the system MIA has but in all the airports I know you will only get a warning when you put the lights on . On this direction for take off those lights will have been off. It was night, so most probably nobody noticed until next morning during runway inspection I would say. ( or/unless if they changed QFU in the meantime)

[LLuCCiFeR]

Originally posted by 1978 To me is seems very strange such accident can apparently go unnoticed for some time.

Shouldn't the pilots know they went outside the "envelope" of the runway and report this such that a runway inspection is initiated?Very strange indeed, as you'd expect an experienced crew to know where a normal (even at max de-rate/assumed temperature) rotation point lies on a runway.

The bold METARs out of the inevitable list (:rolleyes:) seem to suggest a take-off between 23:53Z and 00:53Z, which would be 19:53LT and 20:53LT. So it would have been nighttime in MIA.

[RAT 5]

T1 = temporary runway in the OPT

Amazing. The provider of this EFB probably had a committee deciding what codings to use for what situation. How does anyone come up with T1 = temporary? What has '1' got to do with it, or was this 'phase 1' of runway maintenance? Isn't "Temp" a better coding?

The aircraft travelled along taxiway S, running parallel to the runway, before being cleared to line up at the intersection.
This clearance was acknowledged by the 777’s crew,

This would suggest the crew requested T1. It would not be for ATC to offer it. I wonder if anyone in ATC thought, "that's odd, they've never done that before." It's not for ATC to 2nd guess the crew. It would have been unusual for ATC to ask, "are you sure about T1." but it might have closed the holes, except the crew might have said, "yes."

Back to a discussion there was a while ago about an AF trying to rotate a heavy a/c many kts too slow. Naturally it was the wrong weight in the EFB. The discussion brought up the point about having a 'feel' and 'mental gross error check' for performance calculations & takeoff speeds. Surely the same could be said for this case about TORA/TODA. I assume the crew knew the TODA from T1. With a little thought about past operations I would have expected there to be a "seems a little short to me. What do you think?" moment, before punching numbers into a computer and accepting the results willy nilly.
Sadly that is what the modern human has become. In all my cadet teachings, as an old fart, I gave examples of various gross error checks and mental estimates for different scenarios, both on grounded in the air, aligned with stories about the consequences of those who didn't make them. I don't think too many airlines, even on command courses, educate their crews in this time aged technique. It is disappointing, in cadet training, to see load sheet figures added up with a calculator. What ever happened to brain power? Even worse considering that cadet pilots are usually required to have a maths/science orientated education.
It was still quite common to see low hour F/O's blindly follow VNAV PTH and not consider Distance v Height. Often VNAV was rubbish and they then asked why it was adding thrust and suddenly changed to 'below path' or dived, accelerated now being 'above path'. The answer had been staring at them for a few minutes, if they had cared to observe.
I have some nervousness that EFB's, though great in paper saving and perhaps allowing higher TOW's, might also lead to more erroneous takeoffs. The gross error checks is perhaps one defence. Having both pilots use their own EFB's to cross check the performance result doesn't help if the basic data that is entered is duff gen. Rubbish into both EFB = same rubbish out of both.

[320goat]

As has been mentioned and I alluded to. I would put money on this being confusion between T1 and #T1.

[320goat]

The chap who is PNF certainly doesn't sound like he knew he had run out of runway and hit something, at least to my untrained ear.

[7478ti]

Thank goodness for the decision to use frangible light post designs many decades ago (an idea that was once even strongly resisted by some facilities advocates due to higher costs at the time, thus precluding adding more lighting installations elsewhere).

Is this perhaps another case underscoring the need for human factors review the designs of supporting systems like EFBs? as well as the administrative aspects of denoting performance/V speed calculation methods used by flight crews?

This kind of event has happened a lot over jet transport history. Is it also time to again push for implementing readily technically addressable acceleration prediction advisory methods, giving much earlier advisories to the crew if an error in acceleration versus available runway distance is detected?? Let's hope and advocate that those efforts now may again advance?

Thank goodness for the robust damage tolerant design of recent modern jets and especially the T7. This event also may perhaps be shown to underscore the utility of a FADEC's ability to quickly and accurately re-set thrust at the max limit, if and when needed, and if commanded. It also again points out the inherent advantage of twins to have more robust runway distance remaining margin to a safe liftoff and initial climb, to accommodate either unexpected adverse met conditions, or performance calculation weight errors, ...for the all-engine takeoff case.

As to the earlier comment about wheel height versus aft fuselage height, and what part of the aircraft hits light stanchions first,...I's suggest the comment author watch the pictures of a T7 Vmu test liftoff. The wheels may not necessarily or always be the lowest point of the aircraft for some period (distance during climb away) after liftoff, depending on T/W, theta dot after liftoff as a result of the aircraft's center of rotation changing, acceleration rate, and liftoff speed above stall margin.

[Mr Angry from Purley]

2020 Local dep Miami what's that on Crews local Doha time 0320 Local.
How long is the slip @ MIA?
:\

[FullWings]

Some similarity to Emirates 407 ("https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emirates_Flight_407”) although that was a ZFW entry problem rather than an inappropriate intersection. The result was not much different, though.

It shouldn’t be beyond the wit of man to have a simple, autonomous check from the aircraft’s point-of-view that it can actually take off on the runway and/or intersection that has been selected. When you line up, it knows the TORA, OAT, thrust setting, wind component, flap, weight, etc. A master caution like RAAS “CAUTION, SHORT RUNWAY” could prevent accidents like this happening in the first place.

[fdr]

The potential for error with the OPT is substantial. A latent risk factor within a defined process is difficult to detect. SOPs may provide for the flight crew independently working all of the calculations out, but operational expediency tends to result in short circuiting of such protocols. A takeoff chart gives some level of awareness of the overall situation, but it still is open to errors, in fact, more error opportunities exist.

The good news is that indeed two engine aircraft tend to perform well, on two engines, but 8500' at heavy weight is a tough deal for a 773ER, at sea level at warm temperatures. If the engines work, you are doing OK, the same error on a B747 A380 would be catastrophic, AEO liftoff is not much earlier than OEI case, and so normally happens well beyond mid field and towards the DER.

Part 25.113(a)(2) requires a 115% margin for distance to attain 35' for the TODA. So for say a 12,500' runway+clearway, the 35' point is at 1630' before the end of TODA. For a large aircraft, the aircraft is also assumed to be at V2 plus a maximum margin, but more importantly a minimum margin of V2 (25.111(c)(2)) ... which is going to be around 90m/sec ~ 300FPS. That means about 5.3 seconds after getting to 35' you should be passing the end of the clearway. On all engines, the 4 engine aircraft, and 2 engine aircraft as well have climb rates of around 2000FPM or greater, (minimum 2nd segment gradients apply for OEI, 25.121(b)(1)... all is better...), which gives about... 210' above the departure end of the TODA (35'+175'). In the real world, the speed is allowed and does rise above V2, and the outcome is that there is an initial reduction in the climb gradient until establishing a constant target speed, but the rate of climb once established is higher than V2's rate of climb. Overall, the crossing altitude is slightly lower, around 180'... So... when you look out the window and see the neat takeoffs that just get over the fence, know that if the aircraft had done a reject, that probably would end badly, and if the aircraft isnt getting to the types of heights that the all engine case shows, (and which are noted as information in every Boeing FCTM) then you do well not to have an engine failure. If you want to take the analysis a step further, the FCTM also indicates the time to achieve liftoff after commencing rotation, and that gives you a simple spot on the runway where the rotation should occur. The same manual, the FCTM also gives pretty simple analysis of the visual cutoff from the cockpit, and that gives a simple indication as to what should and what should not be observable in front of the aircraft as you reach Vr. As an example, for a B744, that is around 3800' from the end of the TODA if you are on a limiting 12,500' runway, with maximum clearway. Rotate gets to be done around 2 seconds before you lose sight of the first of the TDZ markings for the opposite end of the runway. For the B777, and other twins, you get much more runway in front at that time... should not be exciting at all on all engines, just gets more interesting with the failure case.

Bottom line is that awareness of the performance of the aircraft is worth the effort, even if you don't get comfort from the outcome. Lets see... B773ER, 6700nm GC route right hand down... making money... TOW will be over 725,000lbs, and need over 9200 ft of runway, (still air, 300 pax, 12T cgo... ). still air, 490K ZFW would need 10,500' ISA +15 SL, 0WC, packs off... Stated as a ZFW limit, the T1 taxiway would need a 440K ZFW in still air, and that would increase by around 15K per hour of flight time reduction from still air.... i.e., +390 lbs per knot of TWC overall on the flight plan... None of these
calculations are hard, and they can be done by the system easily, and provide the flight crew a choice of acceptable options which they confirm with the OPT.



Final point, this latest event is more or less a rerun of an event that I personally experienced from the cabin of a B777 once while dead heading. Being aware that the runway being used is too short is pretty unpleasant to experience. luckily on the day, the workers on the runway ducked. Crew even took a derate... The company involved eventually examined the issue, and held the pilots accountable, for known deficiencies in the processes and practices of the system; hardly a global solution and barely surprising management behaviour for a pathological flight operations department.

Short runways and big airplanes on long flights don't mix, and if the computer says they do, then checking the assumptions is probably what your family and customers may appreciate. Big picture prior to walking to the jet is worth the effort, there is a relatively simple correlation between weights and runways that can be considered before leaving the hotel or the despatch office...

The crew of this flight should not be beaten up by the management for a latent error, however, the flight crew are the guys and girls at the pointy end of the spear, and they have a vested interest in keeping the blue side up, they are the first to the scene of the accident. Punitive response by management would be adverse to flight safety, but is pretty much a standard industry response; shooting the messenger is untidy and hardly improves outcome reliability.

Will QR and the QCAA improve operational flight safety? Always interesting to see.

[Airbubba]

When they press the tab RUNWAY for the calculation from the EFB they show this " 09#T1 ". They deemed that was the performance from the intersection T1. This symbol " #T1 " means temporary runway. It is just a NOTAM for the runway 09. The symbol for the performance from intersection if would existed should be " 09/T1 " with " / " not with " # ". From runway 09 for the 777 there is no any intersection performance . They confused with the symbols.

As has been mentioned and I alluded to. I would put money on this being confusion between T1 and #T1.

T1 = temporary runway in the OPT

Amazing. The provider of this EFB probably had a committee deciding what codings to use for what situation. How does anyone come up with T1 = temporary? What has '1' got to do with it, or was this 'phase 1' of runway maintenance? Isn't "Temp" a better coding?

This is the legacy codebreaking stuff where the user interface is designed by engineers to 1960's IBM command line standards (back when people were cheap and computers were expensive).

Remember all the FMS route mods and 'you forgot to enter the leading zero on the 610 foot crossing restriction in the box'?

I've also ranted here before about the cryptic flight plan paperwork and the obscure NOTAM format suited to 1930's teleprinters.

We've come a long way in trapping errors and closing the holes in the cheese. However, we need to streamline the user interface more so these idiotic gotchas with the slant and hashtag (as the symbol is now called by some) never make it into the cockpit.

The Sky-God era where some folks bragged proudly about how complicated the departure and preflight procedures were and how they would never make the same mistake as a mishap crew is over, here in the U.S. at least. On the other hand, the era of playing video games on a phone while PF in metric RVSM airspace has arrived, I'm afraid.

The tablet EFB's are far from a mature product with their own quirks but adding more graphics to the interface sure helps me see when I'm looking at the wrong data.

Sunset at MIA on 15th was 19:25 with nautical Twilight @ 20:15.
Was it cloudy?
Scheduled departure time was 20:20.
Actual departure time was 20:37 - was it already dark?

I get the same numbers, actually, nautical twilight ended at 20:15 local so they were in astronomical twilight which is, for takeoff in an urban area, already quite dark. The sun would have been 16.8 degrees below the horizon at 20:37 EDT from what I see on Heavens-Above (http://www.heavens-above.com).

[ve7pnl]

Would it be crazy (or even supported by hardware) for the EFB to know the long/lat for the entered intersection takeoff point and make bad noises if the GPS does not agree? Simple automatic check of the entry?

[RAT 5]

Nice couple of posts, guys.
I still think many see the solution as adding more automated internal system checks; i.e. the computer will say "entry error" or some such. I've noticed over the past 30 years that the more 'safeguards' are put in place the more they become relied upon; and that was before Microsoft & Apple took over the world. Pilots were told that there were inbuilt safety guards so they could not make a mistake. Guess what, sometimes they didn't work e.g. the G-IV crash in another thread. The auto throttle inhibition didn't work. The Spanair (MAD) takeoff config didn't work. etc. etc. And let's not get into FBW stuff. In human factor terms this is dulling to the educated brain, and we pilots are all supposed to have one of those. It has been said so many times that one problem with modern a/c is the human has become a monitor; our educated brains are acting at too low a level of activity. We are lulled into complacency and blind trust. It's almost as if there is no more fear about aviating. It's as if we think, arrogantly, that we belong aloft. It is our world. It is not.
Even the AA Cali crash was lack of X-check in a rush, and by todays standards that was a simple a/c. What will be the pitfalls of the future? Engineers will be trying to eliminate pilot screw ups with technology. I wonder if we are reaching the point of diminishing returns?
One thing is already happening: the level of education and ability to be sitting up front has been diluted. It is now seen as a basic job. Follow the SOP's, QRH, EFB and you'll be fine. T's & C's have reduced accordingly. MPA, MPL, self funded jet training with 150hrs etc. etc. See the thread on robots & pilot replacement. Project forward 100years.
However, we are here today. I think technology is progressing at the pace of the design engineers and not at the pace of pilot (human) adaptation. I see all the reports from the human factor professors about the change from command pilot to monitoring pilot. Where were they at the design phase? It seems a lot of hind sight; meanwhile the basic training/checking remains the same as yonks ago. There is a lack of coordination in the whole process.

[172driver]

Serious question, and to be clear I only fly small stuff (as my handle indicates), but why would any crew elect to take off from an intersection with a 777 fueled for a LH flight and - presumably - full pax/cargo?

[GlobalNav]

Bravo - RAT5 - spot on!

"I've noticed over the past 30 years that the more 'safeguards' are put in place the more they become relied upon"

I think there's another aspect of this reliance - less attention to the issue, since "George" has it. The automation may work well, within its limitations, engendering "blind trust" as you put it, but inattention born of honest experience that the automation "always works" is hard to overcome. Help Captain Sullenburger!

Cali was also a case that since the pilots were not giving position reports, the actual progress of the flight was not readily on their minds in any detail. Again the navigation system doing its (limited) job very well and when the unanticipated change of plan occurred, the fact that the pilots were not had its sad consequences. This is real human factors, I'm afraid, and we need to design flight deck automation with that in mind.

So, perhaps the automation, where it can really help, should be used, but we need to design it so the pilot's head and hand must still be engaged.

[WhatsaLizad?]

Is this trip crewed with 3 or 4 pilots? 24 hour layover/3 day trip?


As a side note, the above picture appears to be taken from the fence looking west. The road is airport service road inside the fence. Just outside the fence is Perimeter Road, running around the east and south side of the airport.


Just east of perimeter road is a canal, 80' or so wide, some vegetation and trees followed by the large MIA Employee parking lot just east. My estimation from driving the road and parking for two decades is the tail cleared the west lot boundary trees by 100' or less.


Always thought I stood a chance getting wiped out by the overloaded old corrosion corner, straight pipe DC-8's clawing for altitude off RW09.


It was always humorous with the old car alarms. 3000+ cars wailing and flashing at once for 5+ minutes after those max power pipes thundered and crackled by overhead..


The entry error does make a lot of sense if the verbiage is accurate. Once we read something electronic as true, it's tough to realize it's BS.

[Airbubba]

Always thought I stood a chance getting wiped out by the overloaded old corrosion corner, straight pipe DC-8's clawing for altitude off RW09

Fine Air had a DC-8-61F in 1997 that load shifted on takeoff and plowed into the area off the end of 27R:

The DC-8 crashed on its belly on a field directly west of the end of the runway (about 300 yards) traveling in a straight line.

The DC-8 missed the auto transport loading facility at the south end of the Miami City Rail Yard just north of the end of the runway, and also busy cargo operations facilities along the very busy NW 25th Street feeder to the airport's cargo area just to the south of the end of the runway. The aircraft nearly missed two factories, a commercial building, and the Budweiser Distribution Center in unincorporated Miami, Florida between the populated residential suburbs of Miami Springs and Doral, FL. It skidded across the open field and onto NW 72nd Ave, a roadway that is typically full of traffic during the lunch hour but was surprisingly quiet at 12:36p EST when it came down. The plane's wreckage skidded quickly across the roadway and onto the parking lot of a commercial mini-mall across the street from the empty field; it took out 26 cars in the lot. At that time the mini-mall was a hub of computer parts distributors specializing in South American commerce.

The plane's wreckage fell four feet short of the entrances to three shops. It missed two occupied cars and a truck that were waiting for the traffic signal at the intersection of NW 31st Street and NW 72nd Avenue, less than 30 yards (27 m) away. Inside one of the cars in the parking lot sat a man who had just arrived back at his shop in the mini-mall after picking up lunch for his wife and himself. He was unable to make it out of the car and was caught up in the fireball that engulfed the multi-lane avenue, field, and parking lot.

The only deaths were those of the three aircrew members, a company security guard on the flight, and the man in the parking lot.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine_Air

And I remember going the other way off runway 9R on a hot afternoon to the islands with Caribbean hand luggage (televisions and heavy boxes that don't show on the weight and balance). In a 727 with the smaller engines you could read license plates on Le Jeune Road as you got airborne. :eek:

I also remember Sarkis and Pan Aviation and the Jetstar...

[Capn Bloggs]

but why would any crew elect to take off from an intersection with a 777 fueled for a LH flight and - presumably - full pax/cargo?
For the same rerason we use derated power... to save time and money. If there is no need to spend another 10 minutes taxiing, especially if you're running late, going from the intersection is a sound idea. You just have to get the numbers right... :ouch:

[alexb757]

RAT 5: good posts, but......

This would suggest the crew requested T1. It would not be for ATC to offer it. I wonder if anyone in ATC thought, "that's odd, they've never done that before." It's not for ATC to 2nd guess the crew. It would have been unusual for ATC to ask, "are you sure about T1." but it might have closed the holes, except the crew might have said, "yes."

Not at all sure that was the case. At my airport, you hardly ever hear a crew asking for an intersection takeoff; 95% of the time it's ATC asking "can you accept an intersection X takeoff?" followed by "we'll run the numbers and let you know". Besides, why would a heavy like a 773 going all the way to Doha want an intesection takeoff? That does not sound right to me.

Again, at my airport (KLAS which is hot and high - 2200'AMSL) the daily KAL 773 always takes the LONGEST runway and sometimes even the OPPOSITE direction (which is slightly downhill) taking sometimes an hour delay in doing this while ATC traffic management clear the airspace. Nothing in my previous life as a pilot rated on a half dozen Boeings and one Airbus and 4+ years airport operations experience working with ATC, would make sense for this type of departure.

Having said as much, I have to wonder if ATC did not think it unusual. Did this flight/aircraft type previously takeoff from T1?

I think there might be more to the story and certainly the nomenclature T1 and #T1 needs to be looked at closely. That, to me, sounds like a big no-no but I can only speak from an Airbus EFB, not Boeing......

[WhatsaLizad?]

Airbubba, minor point, but Fine Air went down off the west end of 27R on the north side, now known as 26L.


Terrible things happen from the simplest mistakes, not much different from those done daily in office cubicles around the world where nobody dies.

[WhatsaLizad?]

FYI, in over two decades operating from MIA, I've never seen anyone use the T1 intersection departing runway 09 (09R). Never.

[Airbubba]

Airbubba, minor point, but Fine Air went down off the west end of 27R on the north side, now known as 26L.

Absolutely right, I had it bass ackwards with my lysdexia. :ugh:

It was 9R where my small motor '72's were clawing for altitude as well.

I'll try to edit my post with the correction.

[WhatsaLizad?]

It may have been weak in the climb with those motors, but once airborne, it flew far better than anything built after it except maybe the 747 and Concorde.








757/767/777, close but no cigar. The 737? A grocery shopping cart with one wiggling wheel. Airbus? I doubt it. ;)

[EGPFlyer]

Are QR required to check the TOD in the EFB for the selected runway/intersection against the TOD on the chart? That would have flagged up the 1300m difference.

[VNAV PATH]

SOP procedures are to make precalculation of take off performance during preflight with estimated gross weight etc.

Good practice is to set the estimated V2 on MCP.

Also a good practice is to read an other page on OPT called "take off details" with associated runway distances such as engine inop go distance, accelerate stop distance and all engine go distance. That's helps for situation awareness.



http://nsa38.casimages.com/img/2015/09/19/150919095447224693.jpg (http://www.casimages.com/i/150919095447224693.jpg.html)

[aterpster]

whatsa:

It may have been weak in the climb with those motors, but once airborne, it flew far better than anything built after it except maybe the 747 and Concorde

727? We had both -100 and -200s with the 14,500 thrust engine. Lousy airplane, both models.

727-200 taking off on Runway 8 at ABQ was an "E Ticket" ride. The wallowing at altitude in the -100 was a delight...not.

[TowerDog]

Same thing happened to Pan Am in San Fransisco years ago:
The 747 crew screwed up their performance numbers and hit the approach lights on take off. The light structure ripped open 2 hydraulic systems (or was it 3?)
The return and landing was filmed. Hard landing on partial main gear.
Probably on You Tube somewhere now.

Never seen anybody doing intersection take offs on RWY 09 in MIA.
With 31 degrees and light winds it is hard enough to get airborne using full length :sad:

[Iron Duke]

A couple of thoughts ...

1. The A/C knows from which point the EFB has calculated the T.O. performance, and it also knows via GPS where it is when it lines up on the runway ... it would not be too technically difficult to follow the Boeing concept of " not being in the demanded position" ( switch or geographical) and make a light/warning ???

2. I find it disgraceful that there is such obvious and legitimate confusion over the nomenclature used to describe 2 different geographical positions .. a complete bypass of imagination. This despite the facility in the Boeing OPT to check the TODA/TORA used for the calculation and therefore the option to check against NOTAMs and Runway charts ..

3. I feel tremendous sympathy for the pilots in this unfortunate situation .. we have no idea what other operational circumstances added to the confusion. Like for example 10 pages of poorly written NOTAMS which have the tendency to hide important information and highlight trivia .. I wish there was a concerted effort to by ALL agencies to help the flight deck have easy access to vital information and not overload them with poorly documented non vital info i.e. to prioritise before presentation. I am not for a second inferring there is any conspiracy to make our complex pre flight preparation more difficult, more a little understanding of what we are trying to digest.
There are many things ( weather, ETOPS/MNPS, NOTAMs, Performance,Technical, Plotting, operational and Commercial issues, fuel etc) that have to be scrutinised before any ULR flight, and due to FTL's not an excess of time to complete this important task .. We are all on the same side in the constant pursuit of Flight Safety so let us hope that the information that is presented to crews in the briefing room is as free from confusions and "gotcha's" as possible. I cannot imagine how the 4 crew felt when the engineer after his post flight inspection said .. " what happened on the T/O guys ??"

4. It is quite conceivable that the crew were unaware of any impact until they arrived in Qatar .. I would imagine though that their "fundamental orifices" were doing the "half a crown/sixpence" in the first 2 segments of the climb ..

5. I am heartened to see most people empathetic and I hope we can all learn some valuable lessons in whatever role we have to play in the safe dispatch of a commercial flight ...

I.Duke

[farefield]

" I am heartened to see most people empathetic and I hope we can all learn some valuable lessons in whatever role we have to play in the safe dispatch of a commercial flight ..."


Me too,I've read the whole thread and it's quite heartening to find no slagging off or blame apportioned.This is what I want to discuss in human factors training,not what so and so said to cabin crew member to offend them.

[WhatsaLizad?]

"When they press the tab RUNWAY for the calculation from the EFB they show this " 09#T1 ". They deemed that was the performance from the intersection T1. This symbol " #T1 " means temporary runway. It is just a NOTAM for the runway 09."

Not familiar with the Boeing onboard EFB. Is there a regular Runway 09 data selection and a RW09#T1 selection choice? With a RW09#T1 selection choice, would be the intention of that choice be to use temporary runway data to correct the standard data for takeoff computation due to Notams uploaded into the EFB?


Thx

[FlyingCroc]

No there is no regular Rwy09 only Rwy09#T1. However there is also no option for Intersection takeoff T1. I calculated with a manual shortening for Rwy09 with T1 and the max TOW would be around 315000kg with Flaps 15.
The all engine Run from full length with Rwy09#T1 (full lenght) would be around 3000m with Flaps 5. It looks like they must have rotated before Vr in order not to end up in the grass:ooh:

[Airbubba]

Same thing happened to Pan Am in San Fransisco years ago:
The 747 crew screwed up their performance numbers and hit the approach lights on take off. The light structure ripped open 2 hydraulic systems (or was it 3?)
The return and landing was filmed. Hard landing on partial main gear.
Probably on You Tube somewhere now.


It is indeed on YouTube:

https://youtu.be/tl_wXfSwRzM

More here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_Am_Flight_845

The runway change scenario continues to be a high threat situation in my view. New speeds, new numbers, change it in the box, reselect a departure, reset the heading bugs, recheck the NOTAMS, update the ACARS etc. all while either taxiing or sitting still with an impatient controller and ten planes behind you if you've already left the ramp.

Multiple opportunities to make the chief pilot's hotline. :eek:

[viking767]

Qatar parks on the North side of the terminal in MIA. Most departures from there will use runway 8R which is 10506 feet or 3202 m long.
Only if too heavy for 8R will a crew spend the extra 15 minutes it takes to taxi to rwy 9 which is 13016 feet, 3967 m long.
It would not make sense to me to spend the extra time and fuel taxiing to the longer runway and then use an intersection that gives you less distance than would be available on the closest runway 8R.

[RAT 5]

IMHO this is a real human factor issue rather than a technical one. As has been suggested, with GPS, there could be a technical safety net with a warning when lined up. That should get the juices of the IT & lab boys running. In the meantime the sharp end jockeys need to be sharper. It has been discussed that more technical safety nets leads to possible complacency and lack of gross error checks.
It really is a difficult dilemma to solve.

[bullfox]

For the same rerason we use derated power... to save time and money. If there is no need to spend another 10 minutes taxiing, especially if you're running late, going from the intersection is a sound idea. You just have to get the numbers right... :ouch:

Guys,
To someone such as myself looking in from outside your world it appears that not going to the end of the runway in this circumstance is a data entry mistake compounded by the unyealding desire to save time and money oberpowering common sense and caution gained through experience.

[WhatsaLizad?]

"Guys,
To someone such as myself looking in from outside your world it appears that not going to the end of the runway in this circumstance is a data entry mistake compounded by the unyealding desire to save time and money oberpowering common sense and caution gained through experience. "

Thanks for your input, but respectfully, like all accident/incident threads on PPrune, it would help actual aircrews/engineers/ops personnel/airport personnel and aircraft manufacturer personnel if the enthusiasts would remain in their forum during discussions. Most endless threads become useless for aircrews attempting to learn from others worldwide about events.


So far there is a good discussion here.

Thank you.

[PersonFromPorlock]

Back in the day, computer memory was expensive and CPU speeds slow, which led to all sorts of abbreviations being used to save bytes and CPU cycles. The practice continues, even though memory is now inexpensive and CPU speeds are so high that any amount of interface processing is instantaneous from a user standpoint.

So, maybe one solution is to quit using abbreviations? Just spell out what's meant and avoid a source of confusion.

[WhatsaLizad?]

"No there is no regular Rwy09 only Rwy09#T1. However there is also no option for Intersection takeoff T1."


If I understand correctly, every runway displayed has the "RwyXXX#T1" displayed similar to the above?


Thanks

[FlyingCroc]

No only if there is a NOTAM there is a temporary appendix #T1, #T2 etc. In MIA there is one for Rwy 09 unfortunately called T1. I suspect the crew made a wrong assumption that this means a takeoff from T1.

[Phantom Driver]

Rat 5-


IMHO this is a real human factor issue rather than a technical one. In the meantime the sharp end jockeys need to be sharper. It has been discussed that more technical safety nets leads to possible complacency and lack of gross error checks.
It really is a difficult dilemma to solve.


Right on. Sad fact is that 4 guys on the flt deck failed to spot the anomaly. QR are/were pretty hot on requiring everybody cross check every minute detail (to the extent of obsession, as B (augmenting) crew would sometimes get very involved, much to the annoyance of A crew trying to get on with the pre-flight job with minimal interference/distraction), so very surprising this one was missed.

However, as we have all seen in our CRM "exercises", all it takes is one strong individual to impose his views, and the rest of the group follows blindly against better judgement. "He knows what he's doing/saying". Human Factors indeed.

[WhatsaLizad?]

"No only if there is a NOTAM there is a temporary appendix #T1, #T2 etc. In MIA there is one for Rwy 09 unfortunately called T1. I suspect the crew made a wrong assumption that this means a takeoff from T1."

Thanks again Croc. I couldn't find a runway/departure NOTAM for Runway 09 at MIA.


The "#T1" designation would seem to be a very poor wording choice for the EFB performance selection, shades of AA into Cali with two close fixes named "Rozo" in fix choices.


I can see the cheese holes lining up. Not sure when looking right while taking the active didn't ring a bell with a view of the unused runway runway back to the start point, but understand there are plenty of factors to look at. Sometimes the elephant is right in front of us staring and nobody sees it for whatever reason.


It was a close one, glad everyone is safe.

[Phantom Driver]

AirBubba.


The runway change scenario continues to be a high threat situation in my view. New speeds, new numbers, change it in the box, reselect a departure, reset the heading bugs, recheck the NOTAMS, update the ACARS etc. all while either taxiing or sitting still with an impatient controller and ten planes behind you if you've already left the ramp.


Very true. Some airports in the Far East (BKK, PEK, et al) used to be notorious for runway change after pushback; it was my habit to do performance calcs etc and brief for both runways in the pre flight.

Some of our US friends had the same inclination. But with multiple unfamiliar runways/taxi patterns (to we the infrequent visitors) at some of these places, it could be quite a challenge after pushback. I had no hesitation in setting park brake while we did EFB performance, reprogrammed FMC, reset MCP etc etc and rebriefed taxi routes. Not too popular sometimes with ATC, but better safe than sorry.

I will admit though that things had improved worldwide quite a lot recently before I hung up the old headset.

[peekay4]

thanks again croc. I couldn't find a runway/departure notam for runway 09 at mia.
!mia 08/311 (kmia a2795/15) mia rwy 9/27 cl markings obsc 1508271543-1509252000

[FlyingCroc]

Yep, that is the only NOTAM that I could find, has nothing to do with performance. There is a NOTAM about obstacles on Rwy27. Wondered too why there is no information about the #T1 on the Opt or the NOTAMs, not even in the FAA FDC NOTAMs? :ooh:

[Una Due Tfc]

It is indeed on YouTube:

https://youtu.be/tl_wXfSwRzM

More here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_Am_Flight_845

The runway change scenario continues to be a high threat situation in my view. New speeds, new numbers, change it in the box, reselect a departure, reset the heading bugs, recheck the NOTAMS, update the ACARS etc. all while either taxiing or sitting still with an impatient controller and ten planes behind you if you've already left the ramp.

Multiple opportunities to make the chief pilot's hotline. :eek:

I am not and have never been tower rated, haven't done tower stuff since my initial training years ago, however if you get a spanner like this thrown into your works, advise the controller that you need time to run the numbers, and advise how long that will take to comfortably and thoroughly do.

If you say it's going to take you a couple of minutes to work out your numbers and you need to be fully stopped to do it, depending on airfield layout the controller might take you onto an adjacent taxiway and leave you alone or decide it's not worth the delay and leave you on the original departure.

The vast majority of us don't know company specific procedures (unless told when we get to meet you, which is very, very helpful), just like most of you do not and cannot be expected to know the various nuances of every airspace you fly through. At the end of the day you were promised X and now ATC are asking you for Y at the last minute. A last minute runway change is ATC discomoding you, it's your privilege to refuse. In almost all cases we are just trying to get you on your way faster, so normally it's worth looking at, for anything bar heavies near MTOW at least!

[atpcliff]

Per the question about taking off from an intersection:

Sometimes, the intersection takeoff is all that is available, due to various circumstances.

Sometimes ATC assigns an intersection takeoff, due to various circumstances.

When I look at our box that shows runways available for takeoff, it has shown 3 or ever 4 options for the same runway...one will be the full runway length, and the others are all intersection takeoffs with varying length remaining.

[Flytdeck]

Some of our US friends had the same inclination. But with multiple unfamiliar runways/taxi patterns (to we the infrequent visitors) at some of these places, it could be quite a challenge after pushback. I had no hesitation in setting park brake while we did EFB performance, reprogrammed FMC, reset MCP etc etc and rebriefed taxi routes. Not too popular sometimes with ATC, but better safe than sorry.


I am with Phantom. If the performance figures change, park the aircraft and get everyone on the flight deck involved. Changing the plan involves examining the consequences to ensure that there are no safety issues, sometimes hard to do when one's head has been focused on a different plan of action.

Qatar Airways now uses a checklist when any performance or runway items change after the initial planning. Good move on their part. Concerning this accident, thinking the #T1 issue is going to have a bearing though can't get my head around taking off with 2600 TORA off a wet runway for an 11:30 flight.

[wanabee777]

No triple 7 pilot in their right mind would have used T1 intx at the gross weight required to fly MIA-DOH!!

That the other three pilots agreed to it is incomprehensible.

[Flaperon777]

Why are we even assuming that there was a runway change?
And even if there WAS a runway change, QR uses a very comprehensive checklist for a runway change/intersection departure.
It involves stopping the aircraft (if moving), changing all relevant parameters, and it requires both pilots to recalculate and revise all performance figures. I doubt anyone could mess up any figures with this new procedure and checklist in place.

What begs an answer however is WHY was the crew trying to take off from intersection T1 when this is almost never done. I seriously doubt it was thru simple choice or simple 'go gitis'.
Get that answer and the rest falls in place. #T1 selected incorrectly simply lined up the holes.

[framer]

It has been discussed that more technical safety nets leads to possible complacency and lack of gross error checks.
It really is a difficult dilemma to solve.
The XAA's need to assess what has changed in the last decade and re evaluate the training required and also the time required. As an example, I get on average four emails a day from my company, normally three of them are propaganda that I can safely delete, but one of them requires me to think about how I operate. I get the emails at all times of the day including public holidays and days off yet I get zero time allocated to read and assess the information. Most of the time I manage to allocate personal time to do this but every now and then when home life requires my full attention I arrive at work with a less than ideal understanding of changes that have taken place. The XAA's need to say to the Airlines " We know it is easy for you to fire off changes in operational circumstances to your pilots via digital means, but there is a price to pay, you must bring all of your pilots into work for a day every three months to check their understanding of the information you have promulgated."
At my Airline we have had major changes to performance requirements that were promulgated via email and many of my colleagues are unsure of what their legal obligations are. The appropriate safety forms have been filed which results in more emails. The digital age is a threat in itself.

[FullWings]

No triple 7 pilot in their right mind would have used T1 intx at the gross weight required to fly MIA-DOH!!

That the other three pilots agreed to it is incomprehensible.
I think that’s a little harsh. With the large variation in TORR between F5 derated and F20 full power, it’s not a given. With a headwind it might even be OK. We don’t use OPT on our T7s but I can see the issue with /T1 and #T1.

Had any of the crew operated that sector before and were familiar with MIA? Does it say 2600m TORA at the T1 intersection? Like others say, this looks like a classic design/HF issue where it was bound to happen eventually and these guys copped it. Will be very interested in the report when it surfaces.

[Airbubba]

Why are we even assuming that there was a runway change?

The runway change was with the Pan Am mishap at SFO in 1971 discussed above.

Nobody said there was one with QR at MIA. :)

[aguadalte]

RAT 5:
Back to a discussion there was a while ago about an AF trying to rotate a heavy a/c many kts too slow. Naturally it was the wrong weight in the EFB. The discussion brought up the point about having a 'feel' and 'mental gross error check' for performance calculations & takeoff speeds. Surely the same could be said for this case about TORA/TODA. I assume the crew knew the TODA from T1. With a little thought about past operations I would have expected there to be a "seems a little short to me. What do you think?" moment, before punching numbers into a computer and accepting the results willy nilly.
Sadly that is what the modern human has become. In all my cadet teachings, as an old fart, I gave examples of various gross error checks and mental estimates for different scenarios, both on grounded in the air, aligned with stories about the consequences of those who didn't make them. I don't think too many airlines, even on command courses, educate their crews in this time aged technique. It is disappointing, in cadet training, to see load sheet figures added up with a calculator. What ever happened to brain power? Even worse considering that cadet pilots are usually required to have a maths/science orientated education.
It was still quite common to see low hour F/O's blindly follow VNAV PTH and not consider Distance v Height. Often VNAV was rubbish and they then asked why it was adding thrust and suddenly changed to 'below path' or dived, accelerated now being 'above path'. The answer had been staring at them for a few minutes, if they had cared to observe.
I have some nervousness that EFB's, though great in paper saving and perhaps allowing higher TOW's, might also lead to more erroneous takeoffs. The gross error checks is perhaps one defence. Having both pilots use their own EFB's to cross check the performance result doesn't help if the basic data that is entered is duff gen. Rubbish into both EFB = same rubbish out of both.

Spot on, RAT 5. We're loosing that intuitive sixth sense that used to call our attention ("something is not right here!"). Did they slammed thrust levers to TOGA somewhere during the take-off run? I would dare to doubt so, since we're so used to see eroded margins in EFB calculations (done to the infinitesimal) and rotations so close to the end of compensated runways.

What ever happened to brain power?

Its been lost somewhere between the continuous fight for economic sustainability of the airline companies and an operational acceptable level of risk...

[Fbwdude]

Hi all,
I totally agree with Airbubba concerning rwy change(#54).I usually do not accept last minute rwy change for TO and APP as well if I have that option .
We have a rwy change checklist that helps a lot but anyway it is a treat.
I never accept intersection TO unless there is a Notam .
Fly safe,
Fbwdude

[radken]

Maybe I missed it but has anyone addressed what "demystification" the FDR/CVR's will surely provide in time? Guess that's just understood in this entire conversation and needn't be mentioned? A very interesting discussion though.

[ATC Watcher]

A few comments from the ATC side :
Listening to the VHF recordings everything sounds normal there: It looks like ATC did not " suggest" an intersection dep and pilot knew where he was as he repeated T1, and took the line up and wait at T1, and later the take off clearance from there.
Unusual situation to ATC ? no, some departure are made from T1, and the controller is not there to ask " are you sure" everytime someone does. He/she will get funny replies if they did.

As to a 777 long range not using full runway,and " only " 2600m. and why controllers did not flag the problem to the crew :

Controllers today , especially the young ones, are not trained to detailed aircraft performance numbers, too many types and engine variants around, and the actual T/O weight is not distributed to them anyway. The aircraft could be empty and/or with minimum fuel , or making an intermediate stop , a last minute change not mentioned on the departure strip, etc..many possible factors why ATC will not normally challenge an intersection dep, especially one with 2600m left..

Lastly, on a lighter note , seen the average knowledge of geography of my US friends and colleagues, I wonder how many really know where and how far Doha is ..:E

[ironbutt57]

I wonder how many really know where and how far Doha is ..

or really care for that matter

[TowerDog]

. Lastly, on a lighter note , seen the average knowledge of geography of my US friends and colleagues, I wonder how many really know where and how far Doha is ..

Quite a few of us have served time in the sandbox and know the area quite well, unfortunately :sad:

[deefer dog]

There's a lot to be said for the old adage that there are only three types of data that can be trusted - raw data, raw data and raw data.

FMS data, and that derived from iPads, EFB's, and a multitude of "magenta era" computers are all very convenient, and perhaps in the short term save a bit of paper and a lot of money, weight and time.

On the other hand it only takes a few sheets of paper to tell us the important numbers and, for those who haven't learned them, the rules of thumb associated with our craft.

[Pointer]

Deefer, I do agree, when flying you can't lose sight of the basics! But as these planes get bigger and optimization is the magic word that management uses.. the rule of thumb for this specific aircraft isn't that clear anymore.

TOW on the 777 vary between 156T-351T.. (all types flown by most of us) take your pick, and we see the end of the runway closer and more often than we would like to see, because of these optimizations.

Off-course.. being dead tired (not just from 1 flight but roster systematics) will be not looked at in this region.. the word fatigue is now a magic word the management uses to make all things right.. because that way they can blame anything else except their malevolent practice of Bonus optimization.

a slower than normal rotation could have caused them to scrape it.. or anything else.. interesting to discuss and eager to find out the cause.

Pointer :E

[Airbubba]

Maybe I missed it but has anyone addressed what "demystification" the FDR/CVR's will surely provide in time?

If the crew was not aware of the incident until hours later and didn't pull the CVR breaker there probably wasn't anything significant on the CVR, most of them seem to record only the last 120 minutes these days. At least that is what we are told.

The FDR certainly might have data of interest if it was pulled after the flight. Things like power settings, rotation rate and MCP stuff. Does it perhaps capture FMS data in some installations?

A few comments from the ATC side :
Listening to the VHF recordings everything sounds normal there: It looks like ATC did not " suggest" an intersection dep and pilot knew where he was as he repeated T1, and took the line up and wait at T1, and later the take off clearance from there.

I would guess that whatever discussion took place about using T1 was probably on the ground control frequency which wasn't archived on Listen to Live ATC (Air Traffic Control) Communications | LiveATC.net (http://www.liveatc.net).

[OldLurker]

I do wonder whether the crew was really unaware of the incident until hours later. The damage to the approach lights was significant – would no-one have noticed an unusual sound? Dare I wonder whether the crew might conceivably have said to each other, we seem to be in one piece, no indications, let's carry on and avoid the hassle of going back (and we didn't say that, so don't pull the CVR breaker)? No, no, of course not ...

[OldLurker]

Deefer, there's also the old adage that if the real world you can see out of your window doesn't match what your computer says, reality is almost certainly correct. (That applies to your car's satnav too.)

On the one hand, you might think someone would have looked out at the runway and said, wow, isn't that a bit short for a max weight takeoff? On the other hand, it was dark or at least dusk, so the shortness of the available runway may not have been so obvious?

[JammedStab]

I think that’s a little harsh. With the large variation in TORR between F5 derated and F20 full power, it’s not a given. With a headwind it might even be OK.

Did a max weight 777-300 takeoff yesterday at moderate temperature and no wind near sea level with about 30.00 on the altimeter.

With Flaps 15 and an 11,000' runway we used full thrust with no ATM allowed.

[ATC Watcher]

The damage to the approach lights was significant – would no-one have noticed an unusual sound?
Airport lights are designed to be frangible , I.e breaking off easily. The mast arms cut off and the one bent that we see in the photo. , if in aluminum with a plastic fuse, will offer little resistance against a 350 tons aircaft. From the voice of the PNF on the frequency after departure my bet is that they did not notice anything.

[wanabee777]

Quote:
The damage to the approach lights was significant – would no-one have noticed an unusual sound?
Airport lights are designed to be frangible , I.e breaking off easily. The mast arms cut off and the one bent that we see in the photo. , if in aluminum with a plastic fuse, will offer little resistance against a 350 tons aircaft. From the voice of the PNF on the frequency after departure my bet is that they did not notice anything.

I would be curious as to what the Flight Attendants heard or felt.

[Airbubba]

I do wonder whether the crew was really unaware of the incident until hours later. The damage to the approach lights was significant – would no-one have noticed an unusual sound? Dare I wonder whether the crew might conceivably have said to each other, we seem to be in one piece, no indications, let's carry on and avoid the hassle of going back (and we didn't say that, so don't pull the CVR breaker)? No, no, of course not ...

I'm reminded of the time Dynasty took off on a taxiway at ANC with an A340 and continued on to TPE. Surely they must have figured something was wrong even though there was little or no damage as they brushed a snow berm at the upwind end of the taxiway. Or, maybe not? :confused:

A discussion of this ANC incident from the PPRuNe archives:

China Airlines taxi-way take-off! [Archive] - PPRuNe Forums (http://www.pprune.org/archive/index.php/t-1600.html)

Like the QR crew in MIA, CI was very fortunate to avoid disaster. :eek:

This article compares the China Airlines mistake with the SQ wrong turn at TPE, which was deadly, in a table at the end:

Aviation Today :: China Airlines' Takeoff Shows Breakdown in Situational Awareness (http://www.aviationtoday.com/regions/usa/China-Airlines'-Takeoff-Shows-Breakdown-in-Situational-Awareness_2650.html#.VgC8qjZRESk)

Unlike CI and SQ, QR at MIA knew where they were but it was the wrong place to turn onto the runway for a heavyweight takeoff.

Did the QR crew know something was wrong on climbout and chose to face the music back in Doha instead of reporting it to MIA departure? I don't claim to know.

I'm reminded of a saying from the 89th Airlift Wing, the outfit that operates Air Force One: 'You are allowed one mistake, and they won't fire you until you get back from the trip.'

[radken]

On Sep 17th 2015 the FAA reported the aircraft struck approach lights on departure from Miami and continued to destination. The aircraft received substantial damage to its belly, the occurrence was rated an accident.

The above from the very first entry on the thread begs questions as to who first found the "substantial" damage, who it was reported to, and the like. The infamous "Who knew what, and when did they know it?"
"Substantial damage" would seem to have been obvious to bag handlers chocking the a/c at the arrival gate? Well, maybe. But surely seen by the first line mech to visit the scene whenever that was. But somebody informed FAA. When? The latter, however, would not have been the first people to be properly informed of whatever was found. Logic says, though, that the discovery had to have been made in time to preserve complete FDR data right there at the beginning when the a/c was first grounded. I don't know what exactly would be the investigatory protocol, but I can envision it would have begun very soon after landing, and would have resembled something like the proverbial "flies on stink."

[Capn Bloggs]

Logic says, though, that the discovery had to have been made in time to preserve complete FDR data right there at the beginning when the a/c was first grounded.
FDR data lives for many days after an event. It doesn't get wiped on landing.

[wanabee777]

Have any photos of the damaged areas of the aircraft surfaced yet?

[ironbutt57]

Made the Qatari local English and Arabic newspapers...no photos yet...4 expats...no news otherwise

[RAT 5]

We will hear nothing further.

Surely MIA will send Qatar a bill for repairs. If they do not pay it, or deny knowledge of it, either could start an interesting process.

[320goat]

FAA and NTSB are in Doha.

[Twiglet1]

Have any photos of the damaged areas of the aircraft surfaced yet?

Don't expect to see photo's until the FAA report comes out in xx months.
Strange that folk are expecting to see photo's, no need to elaborate surely?

[VNAV PATH]

We will hear nothing further

Come on... Few years ago, a QR 777 made a landing on a closed runway by night on a visual approach in Osaka (ATC and markings quite not correct...)

The report is availble on Jap' NTSB. As said above, NTSB and FAA are in DOH; time to explose the " booze permit" !

We'll have a report, quite sure.

[wanabee777]

Have any photos of the damaged areas of the aircraft surfaced yet?

Don't expect to see photo's until the FAA report comes out in xx months.
Strange that folk are expecting to see photo's, no need to elaborate surely?

Maybe the press got it all wrong and there, in fact, wasn't "substantial" damage done to the aircraft.

[DaveReidUK]

Maybe the press got it all wrong and there, in fact, wasn't "substantial" damage done to the aircraft.

"Substantial" is the FAA's assessment of the damage, based on subsequent inspection of the aircraft (which hasn't flown since).

[wanabee777]

At what point is the FAA required to relinquish control of the investigation process to the NTSB?

[lomapaseo]

At what point is the FAA required to relinquish control of the investigation process to the NTSB?

a simple sentence answer to a simple sentence question.

"anytime they are asked" :hmm:

Fundamentally the FAA is a regulator and seeks information in order to act against it's regulations.

The NTSB is an investigator and seeks answers to causal chains and weighing of contributing factors. They also look for holes in regulations as well as unregulated procedures.

Together they do a pretty good job. In many cases the FAA action is taken even before an investigation is finished.

[wanabee777]

So, in essence, both the FAA and NTSB will be investigating this incident but for different reasons.

[netstruggler]

Come on... Few years ago, a QR 777 made a landing on a closed runway by night on a visual approach in Osaka (ATC and markings quite not correct...)

The report is availble on Jap' NTSB.


It didn't land.

QATAR AIRWAYS
BOEING 777-300, A7BAE
ABOUT AN ALTITUDE OF 1,000 FT, 3.8 NM NORTHEAST OF
RUNWAY 24R, KANSAI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, JAPAN
AT ABOUT 21:55 JST, AUGUST 30, 2010 (http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/eng-air_report/A7BAE.pdf)

[DaveReidUK]

So, in essence, both the FAA and NTSB will be investigating this incident but for different reasons.

No, the NTSB will carry out the investigation, after (or during) which they will make any Safety Recommendations that they consider appropriate, directed to the airline, manufacturer, regulator, etc.

[wanabee777]

Thanks for the clarification.

[aterpster]

DaveReidUK:

No, the NTSB will carry out the investigation, after (or during) which they will make any Safety Recommendations that they consider appropriate, directed to the airline, manufacturer, regulator, etc.

The FAA is involved in this one, too. But, for flight crew conduct of the flight; i.e., an enforcement investigation. Because it is a foreign crew if the FAA determines there was regulatory non-compliance they will forward it to the State Department for a diplomatic resolution.

[peekay4]

No, the NTSB will carry out the investigation, after (or during) which they will make any Safety Recommendations that they consider appropriate, directed to the airline, manufacturer, regulator, etc.
It's not so black-and-white.

The NTSB is a relatively small agency tasked to handle 1,500+ accidents and incidents each year. It just doesn't have the manpower to investigate each case by itself.

So when an accident or incident is serious but does not involve fatalities, the NTSB will routinely delegate the field investigation work to the FAA. I.e., the FAA will collect and take into custody all the evidence including photographs, any wreckage, CVR/FDR data, crew/witness interviews, etc., then forward them to the NTSB for final analysis and determination of Probable Cause.

Plus in this case, Qatar is a Part 129 carrier under supervision from an FAA International Field Office (IFO Frankfurt, until the end of the month).

[DaveReidUK]

The NTSB is a relatively small agency tasked to handle 1,500+ accidents and incidents each year. It just doesn't have the manpower to investigate each case by itself.

So when an accident or incident is serious but does not involve fatalities, the NTSB will routinely delegate the field investigation work to the FAA. I.e., the FAA will collect and take into custody all the evidence including photographs, any wreckage, CVR/FDR data, crew/witness interviews, etc., then forward them to the NTSB for final analysis and determination of Probable Cause.

Point taken.

Interestingly, the number of events handled annually by the NTSB has fallen steadily from around 3,500 per year in the early/mid 80s to fewer than 1,500 last year.

[onbiscaynebay]

On 24Sep15 local Miami TV station NBC6 posted a story and a video (poor quality at that) regarding this subject.

FAA Investigating 'Frightening Near-Miss' at Miami International Airport: Experts | NBC 6 South Florida (http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/FAA-Investigating-Frightening-Near-Miss-at-Miami-International-Airport-329310051.html)

The reporter: Willard Shepard of NCB6 Miami & a USAF Lt. Colonel. Flew A-10's. Has 52 combat sorties over Iraq and Kuwait.

Willard Shepard | NBC 6 South Florida (http://www.nbcmiami.com/on-air/about-us/Willard-Shepard-NBC-Miami-134063533.html)

[aterpster]

peekey:

So when an accident or incident is serious but does not involve fatalities, the NTSB will routinely delegate the field investigation work to the FAA.


True enough with light aircraft accidents. But, not with air carrier operations. The fact it is a foreign carrier has relevance to the FAA but not the NTSB. The location of an air carrier accident establishes NTSB jurisdiction.

I.e., the FAA will collect and take into custody all the evidence including photographs, any wreckage, CVR/FDR data, crew/witness interviews, etc., then forward them to the NTSB for final analysis and determination of Probable Cause.

That's a new one on me. The Board is not inclined to analyze work by FAA investigators unless they were assisting the NTSB investigators in the field. Further, the FAA has neither the facilities nor expertise to assess CVRs and FDR data. Finally, the Board does not issue probable causes when the FAA does an accident investigation.

[babyjet787]

QR adopted changes to its FTL's about ULR and SLR flights. The crews for half the year do these 15+ hour flights (which used to be ULR) with less than 24 hours rest in the hotel and back to their base. This is followed usually by a trip east bound after minimum rest. Multiple west-east-/east west trips, less than 24 hours rest because they changed "their" definition of ULR Flights, and "factored" hours resulting in the crews working actually over 100 hours a month. Could fatigue/accumulated fatigue be a factor in this incident/accident?

[360BakTrak]

Could fatigue/accumulated fatigue be a factor in this incident/accident?

I would suggest highly likely. They're not known for their rostering skills.

[peekay4]

That's a new one on me. The Board is not inclined to analyze work by FAA investigators unless they were assisting the NTSB investigators in the field. Further, the FAA has neither the facilities nor expertise to assess CVRs and FDR data. Finally, the Board does not issue probable causes when the FAA does an accident investigation.
Nope. On delegated investigations, the FAA will conduct all fieldwork up to and including the preparation of the "Factual Report". This report is then passed on to the NTSB Investigator-in-Charge. The NTSB may then conduct analysis and determine the "Probable Cause."

49 CFR § 831.2 Responsibility of Board.
"(a) Aviation.
(2) Certain aviation investigations may be conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), pursuant to a “Request to the Secretary of the Department of Transportation to Investigate Certain Aircraft Accidents,” effective February 10, 1977 ... but the Board determines the probable cause of such accidents or incidents.

Under no circumstances are aviation investigations where the portion of the investigation is so delegated to the FAA by the Board considered to be joint investigations in the sense of sharing responsibility. These investigations remain NTSB investigations."

[Feathered]

That's a new one on me. The Board is not inclined to analyze work by FAA investigators unless they were assisting the NTSB investigators in the field. Further, the FAA has neither the facilities nor expertise to assess CVRs and FDR data. Finally, the Board does not issue probable causes when the FAA does an accident investigation.

This is not true. The NTSB regularly and routinely issues probable causes for accidents when the FAA does an accident investigation.

Look for this notice in the accident reports: "NTSB investigators used data provided by various entities, including, but not limited to, the Federal Aviation Administration and/or the operator and did not travel in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft accident report."

[aterpster]

Never seen one of those.

[Twiglet1]

QR adopted changes to its FTL's about ULR and SLR flights. The crews for half the year do these 15+ hour flights (which used to be ULR) with less than 24 hours rest in the hotel and back to their base. This is followed usually by a trip east bound after minimum rest. Multiple west-east-/east west trips, less than 24 hours rest because they changed "their" definition of ULR Flights, and "factored" hours resulting in the crews working actually over 100 hours a month. Could fatigue/accumulated fatigue be a factor in this incident/accident?

2000 LT dep MIA is 0300 Doha Time. Flight arrives at 1700 so midnight Doha time. By time crew go off duty and in Hotel say 0200LT = Yikes rather you than me.

[dingy737]

Normal east departures from Miami are from 8R. Can anyone say if Qatar 77W requested RWY9? Also is it Qatar policy to request RWY 9 for departure because of its length?
What runway have previous or subsequent Qatar departures of this scheduled service used?
A 777 crew on a 14 hour flight would be well aware of runway required so for now I have to believe they thought they were entering RWY 9 for its full length.

[Flaperon777]

Fatigue COULD be one of the causal factors in the crews using full length(temporary runway) take off figures for an intersection(T1) takeoff.

That however, still doesn't explain why four crew members CHOSE to use an intersection T1 takeoff instead of the full length. Was there ANY ATC subtle suggestion or pressure? And if not, then why?
It is simply not normal. And it begs an answer.

[dingy737]

I am suggesting that if they were on Tango taxing for RWY 9 instead of RWY8R it was by request for the said purpose of using the longest Runway. If so, they would not THEN decide to to do an intersection departure.
From the runway diagram, when at T1 you have to turn left and enter the runway, there is nothing straight ahead... OR right , then a Left onto Sierra. If disoriented, T1 could appear like the entrance at "S" and that you have reached the start of Runway9. Disorientation seems to be a factor.

[Airbubba]

I am suggesting that if they were on Tango taxing for RWY 9 instead of RWY8R it was by request for the said purpose of using the longest Runway. If so, they would not THEN decide to to do an intersection departure.
From the runway diagram, when at T1 you have to turn left and enter the runway, there is nothing straight ahead... OR right , then a Left onto Sierra. If disoriented, T1 could appear like the entrance at "S" and that you have reached the start of Runway9. Disorientation seems to be a factor.

Have you listened to the tower tape on the link posted earlier?:

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/kmia/KMIA-Twr-Sep-16-2015-0030Z.mp3

24 seconds into the recording the tower explicitly clears QR 778 Heavy to line up and wait runway 9 at T1 and they acknowledge the clearance with a readback including T1.

At 1:38 on the recording QR 778 Heavy is cleared to takeoff runway 9, no mention of 'at T1' as I would expect from ATC and QR doesn't question it in the clearance readback.

From an FAA runway safety brochure:

ATC must state the name of the intersection to a pilot before a line up and wait instruction. You should question ATC if this does not happen.

Pilots should state that they are at an intersection when requesting a takeoff clearance. A controller must also state the name of the intersection when issuing a takeoff clearance.

From:

http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/publications/media/Runway_Safety_Best_Practices_Brochure.pdf

At the very least, if QR 778 did a runway verification callout, they would have two clues, the T1 sign and the lack of runway numbers to tell them they were not at S and the full length of runway 9.

But as you say, if for some reason they were taxiing on T, T1 could sure look like full length as T ended with a turn onto the runway at T1.

Fatigue COULD be one of the causal factors in the crews using full length(temporary runway) take off figures for an intersection(T1) takeoff.

That however, still doesn't explain why four crew members CHOSE to use an intersection T1 takeoff instead of the full length. Was there ANY ATC subtle suggestion or pressure? And if not, then why?
It is simply not normal. And it begs an answer.

I'm not too optimistic that the CVR recording was preserved but the ATC recording of the ground control conversation should give some insight into how they were cleared to line up at T1.

[ironbutt57]

#T1 vs /T1......

[alexb757]

It does become intriguing when no one can answer why there were NO readbacks by either the controller or the crew to the takeoff clearance.

Also,

Normal east departures from Miami are from 8R. Can anyone say if Qatar 77W requested RWY9? Also is it Qatar policy to request RWY 9 for departure because of its length?
What runway have previous or subsequent Qatar departures of this scheduled service used?

Not sure about 8R, but if 9 was requested, they'd have to cross RWY 12-30 at some point. Any ATC tapes on that part? Also, 8R full length is in a totally different direction!

As for the last part, I asked the exact same question about 20 posts ago: what runways have they previously requested or used for that departure?

A lot of unanswered questions........

[peekay4]

This is a transcript of what I hear from the LiveATC recordings. Times are approximate, UTC.

Unfortunately the recordings seem to interleave at least two different sectors/positions so some parts of the conversation are missing and/or garbled.

00:26 [QR-778] Good day, Qatari 778 Heavy on Sierra
00:26 [KMIA Tower] Qatari 778 Heavy, Roger

00:28 [QR-778] I'm able to take Tango 1 for departure, Runway 09

00:29 [QR-778] We hold short of Tango 1 on Runway 4, er 09, Qatari 778

00:30 [KMIA Tower] Qatari 778 Heavy, Runway 9, line up and wait at Tango 1
00:30 [QR-778] We uh line up and wait, at Tango 1, Runway 9, Qatari 778 Heavy

00:31 [KMIA Tower] Qatari 778 Heavy, Traffic on a one zero mile final
00:31 [QR-778] Copy, Qatari 778 Heavy

00:31 [KMIA Tower] Qatari 778 Heavy, turn right heading 105, runway 9, clear for takeoff
00:31 [QR-778] Right heading 105 after airborne, we're clear for takeoff runway 09, Qatari 778 Heavy

00:33 [KMIA Tower] Qatari 778 Heavy, contact departure, heading 105
00:33 [QR-778] (garbled) departure, with heading 105, Qatari 778 Heavy, bye bye

00:33 [KMIA Departure] Qatari 778 Heavy Miami Departure, Radar Contact, climb and maintain one six, uh, climb and maintain seven thousand say altitude leaving
00:34 [QR-778] (unintelligible) maintain seven thousand, Qatari 778 Heavy

00:35 [QR-778] And departure, Qatari 778 Heavy requesting speed uh two, 280 due performance
00:35 [KMIA Departure] Qatari 778 Heavy that's approved, fly heading 090, climb maintain 16000
00:35 [QR-778] (unintelligible) Copied, now heading 090, and we climb and maintain 9000 Qatari 778 Heavy
00:36 [KMIA Departure] Qatari 778 Heavy, (unintelligible) the altitude is one-six, sixteen thousand
00:36 [QR-778] Roger, one six thousand, sixteen thousand, Qatari 778 Heavy

[pattern_is_full]

Of note - in the radio calls after takeoff, the crew sounds slightly behind the curve. Tower has to remind them of their departure heading 105. On the Departure tape, they fail to check in and Departure has to call them with "radar contact" and ask for their current altitude.

Sounds to me like they were shaken up just a bit, probably from seeing the runway end rushing at them and taking evasive action, not because they suspected a collision, necessarily.

Others have said it, but the cheese holes (in hindsight) are rather glaring:

- /T1-#T1 confusion
- Taxiway that dead-ends at T1
- nighttime
- "routine" radio calls on the ground, with neither ATC nor crew questioning the location and clearance, plus the missing bits Airbubba mentions.

My guess is the NTSB will have choice words to spread around among all the various parties, and while the cockpit crew are always on "the pointy end of the stick" in all senses of the phrase, in this case there were traps set for them not entirely of their own making.

Think paranoid. The Universe, with the help of Murphy, is always out to get you.

[Airbubba]

#T1 vs /T1......

That explains how the takeoff performance got messed up.

But, did they originally request T1 do you think? Numbers looked good with the mistake, save a little time and fuel perhaps. Still, I can't think of many situations where I'd do that in a loaded widebody on a warm evening.

Or, for some reason did the ground controller ask them if they could take T1 for, say, a plane holding with a problem ahead on S? And they checked the EFB, made the #/ mistake and said OK?

I'm hoping the ground control recording will resolve some of these questions.

[wanabee777]

But, did they originally request T1 do you think? Numbers looked good with the mistake, save a little time and fuel perhaps. Still, I can't think of many situations where I'd do that in a loaded widebody on a warm evening.

Agree.....

[Airbubba]

This is a transcript of what I hear from the LiveATC recordings. Times are approximate, UTC.

Thanks so much for taking the time to do this, the liveatc links will be gone after 30 days. :ok:

Of note - in the radio calls after takeoff, the crew sounds slightly behind the curve. Tower has to remind them of their departure heading 105. On the Departure tape, they fail to check in and Departure has to call them with "radar contact" and ask for their current altitude.

Sounds to me like they were shaken up just a bit, probably from seeing the runway end rushing at them and taking evasive action, not because they suspected a collision, necessarily.


They were originally filed for the VALLY 2 departure, I'm thinking it may have been changed by ATC to the MIAMI 3 departure to avoid a conflict with departures off 8R, there is no heading 105 on the VALLY 2.

The tower clearing them for takeoff with an assigned heading would be normal for the MIAMI 3 departure, it's 'Climb on assigned heading for RADAR vectors to assigned transition. MAINTAIN 5000', or assigned lower altitude. EXPECT filed altitude 10 minutes after departure.'

I would guess that they were on the PADUS transition since like the VALLY 2, it goes over JANUS intersection.

But you are right, whoever was on the radio for QR 778 was having a little trouble verbalizing, maybe even before the takeoff when they (possibly, it's hard for me to tell) said they were going to hold short of T1 on runway 09, think they meant hold short of runway 9 on T1.

And QR 778 later mistakenly readback the 16,000 climb clearance as 9,000. It was a busy frequency and even the controller had to correct himself on an earlier altitude clearance for QR 778.

As peekay4 points out, the recordings are scanning multiple frequencies so some of the transmissions are inevitably missed or truncated. This might explain why we don't hear QR 778 checking in with the departure controller.

It does appear that QR 778 and the tower both thought they were taxiing on S, not T from the radio transmissions. A landing aircraft was instructed to taxi behind QR on S as well.

[dingy737]

Thanks for the transcript . Therefore Airbubba post #125 sums it up.
The crew will know what occurred and the data to clarify any discrepancy is all available so the truth shall be revealed.
Out of curiosity i wonder:
1. Did they rotate at the planned Vr or by survival instinct in the red lights and what was that speed?
2. Did they apply max power at any stage?
3. Did the flight attendants or passengers hear or see anything and notify the crew?
4. Not a comment from the tower as " Are you OK?" Surely from their point of view it was visibly inches from disaster..

99.9999% of all my mistakes were as a result of at least one my top 5 reasons for error.
1. Haste
2. Complacency
3. Fatigue.
4. ignoring red flags, because of commercial,ATC pressure or Personal pride.
5. Mind set/ Situational awarness

[viking767]

Repeat of my post on Sep19;

Qatar parks on the North side of the terminal in MIA. Most departures from there will use runway 8R which is 10506 feet or 3202 m long.
Only if too heavy for 8R will a crew spend the extra 15 minutes it takes to taxi to rwy 9 which is 13016 feet, 3967 m long.
It would not make sense to me to spend the extra time and fuel taxiing to the longer runway and then use an intersection that gives you less distance than would be available on the closest runway 8R.

[TowerDog]

. It would not make sense to me to spend the extra time and fuel taxiing to the longer runway and then use an intersection that gives you less distance than would be available on the closest runway 8R.

Unless there was a long conga line waiting for 08R departures.
If so 09 could be a short cut.
Even better, save more time doing an intersection T/O from 09. :sad:

Pure speculation of course, but can't see no better reason to do what they did.:bored:

[Check Airman]

1. I've been based in Miami. It isn't difficult to mistake T1 for the full length of the runway as you're making your way down taxiway T. Does QTR have a moving map display in the cockpit?

2. QTR will usually (but not always) depart runway 9. It's not at all uncommon to see a passenger widebody on a long flight request runway 9. It's a much longer taxi, and I've never heard anyone request T1.

3.Regarding the 105 heading, all departures are assigned a heading initially. Perhaps when departing late at night (after maybe 11pm), you'll fly the SID as published. However, it's typical to be vectored to join the SID. The 105 heading was probably given because of a need for separation with the traffic departing 8R, which is the primary departure runway.

I can easily spot the problem with #T1 and /T1

[flyingchanges]

Just saw an A320 accidentally depart from 12 KMIA intersection Q2. They continued to taxi down the runway as tower tried to get them to understand they were departing from an intersection. Finally around Z takeoff power was set. Nothing like pissing away 3,000 feet of concrete.

[Flaperon777]

The QR crew COULD NOT have calculated performance for T1 intersection take off. The EFB platform on board their aircraft would not LET them do it. Period.
It would say "No Intersection".
However it would quite definitely churn out figures for a #T1 departure. That is Temporary runway 09('Temporary' due earlier notams), but full length of runway 09.
They would therefore, at best, have performance figures for full length 09 and have taken off from T1 intersection, with full length assumed!

Having said that, we're they poorly informed of the phonetics of the EFB/OPT performance tool?
Would be my guess too.

[WhatsaLizad?]

Heard second hand there may be some CCTV footage of the event.


The description was it was dark, not much of a view of the aircraft, maybe some sparks flying as the approach lights were hit. No other real details.


Again, second hand info, but wouldn't surprise me that some partial footage exists. The nearby employee parking lot has cameras spaced about.


Not sure of the value anyway. GPS equipped aircraft should have better position info unless Hillary Clinton's crew is guarding the data ;)

[Airbubba]

Heard second hand there may be some CCTV footage of the event.


The description was it was dark, not much of a view of the aircraft, maybe some sparks flying as the approach lights were hit. No other real details.


Again, second hand info, but wouldn't surprise me that some partial footage exists. The nearby employee parking lot has cameras spaced about.

The video is featured in this local news story posted earlier on this thread:

FAA Investigating 'Frightening Near-Miss' at Miami International Airport: Experts | NBC 6 South Florida (http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/FAA-Investigating-Frightening-Near-Miss-at-Miami-International-Airport-329310051.html)

GPS equipped aircraft should have better position info unless Hillary Clinton's crew is guarding the data.

Well, it actually was Al Gore, inventor of the internet, who turned off GPS 'selective availability':

Gore announces improvements to civilian GPS system | chronicle.augusta.com (http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/1998/03/31/tec_225238.shtml#.VhMNGzZdE9d)

[WhatsaLizad?]

Thanks Airbubba.


One of those hints that I'm flying too much and need to back off. Thankfully, I don't work for EK and can back down from 90+ hours to 60 with 10 days off in a row on my own terms to take a break.


I've also have the winning Powerball numbers from last week if you're interested ;)

[nacluv]

Interesting video clip, red flash and all, but I'm curious about where the nav beacons are on the belly of a 777?

[LLuCCiFeR]

Frightening Near-Miss'

Bla bla bla bla.

To quote George Carlin: "no, it was a NEAR-HIT!! When two planes collide it's a near-miss. Poof! Look...they nearly missed." :}

p.s. interesting that Qatar hasn't replied to emails from NBC6. Don't they have a public relations/media department?

[RAT 5]

I would have thought FAA, the airport authority and the mayor of MIA would all be in direct contact with Qatar ASAP and be DEMANDING an explanation as to how some of their property was damaged, and sending a repair bill. From the FAA's point of view it would be from a safety perspective to prevent any other 'pilot' making the same error. It may be that american TV does not have the same clout, contrary to their own beliefs, but the FAA could ban Qatar from US airspace if they refuse to answer and give a full and open explanation tout suite. After all they have the crew to ask what happened. I'm sure Qatar would have held a tea no biscuits meeting once the engineers had grounded the a/c and a replacement required. Has it been fixed yet?

[DaveReidUK]

Has it been fixed yet?

No, it hasn't flown since its arrival at Doha at the end of the incident flight.

[Stone_cold]

How about overshooting final into a parallel runway path , subsequent go around , busted altitude , by senior Captain a couple of years ago .. Stalled until .......nada , nada ...it's the middle ages/east . If they don't talk about it , it never happened .

[Landflap]

Yes, exactly. Someone posted earlier "We won't hear anything further" but the post was removed by the mods. and it doesn't matter if the drivers were ex-pats or locals or initial reports made it to the local press (heavily edited, no doubt). You cannot lose face if you don't show your face.

[320goat]

So having had the NTSB and FAA here, you think there will be no report?


I beg to differ, but I guess time will tell.


I believe the original link is still there, just watched it.......pretty scary.

[ExDubai]

Update:

Incident: Qatar B773 at Miami on Sep 15th 2015, struck approach lights on departure (http://avherald.com/h?article=48c78b3a&opt=0)

On Oct 18th 2015 the NTSB reported the occurrence was rated an incident, the investigation was delegated to the Civil Aviation Authority of Qatar, the NTSB have assigned an accredited representative to assist the investigation.