What do you think is the greatest hazard?

[NorthernSky]

To get a ball rolling on BIG safety issues, can I ask this of fellow PPRuNErs?

What do you perceive to be the greatest hazard you encounter in day-to-day operations, and (briefly) why? Try not to be overly specific please - let's discuss hazard areas rather than specifics.......

[trolleydollylover]

The drive to work.

[touch&go]

missing meals and not drinking enough, well thats the problems working on short uk flights, no crew meals.

[A Very Civil Pilot]

Boredom - not in flight as I do UK regional of less than an hour sector length; but by being stuck in some poxy regional airport hotel for the morning or the rest of the day. Also a 2 3/4 hour turnaround (fortunatly only 1 a week).

I know it's not a direct safety issue to the flight deck, but it reflects on quality of life and state of mind that does reflect in the flight deck.

[fireflybob]

Approach and landing in very heavy rain.

Potential distraction factor with all the noise and then the aquaplaning risk etc

[wryly smiling]

From an engineers point of view
Pilots being allowed anywhere near my aircraft



sorry had to say it

[Wee Weasley Welshman]

Fatigue. Turns the best aviator into a potential incident. CAP371 is in need of re-working in my very humble opinion.

WWW

[PPRuNe Towers]

The impact of short term financial management tools, styles and career advancement on safety critical areas. Operations, Engineering and ATC.

[ehwatezedoing]

We often refer safety as a "rubber band".
So I would say, any one trying to stretch it.

[Three Wire]

In a word - management. The things that they decide and do can lie in wait for a crew for years, and then one dark and stormy night.....:eek:

[Captain Stable]

The attitude that, if something has not been a factor in an incident so far, it will not in the future and can therefore be disregarded.

This leads to erosion of safety margins for all sorts of reasons.

As Towers points out, short-termism in management can do this vary rapidly. Most of us have seen it in effect. We see over-fast taxying to cut down turnaround times, we see reduction of fuel margins, we see pressure on pilots to launch when not satisfied with the weather conditions, etc. etc.

As WWW points out, fatigue. What if your airline hasn't had an incident in living memory through pilot fatigue? Does this mean that it's safe to reduce minimum rest requirements? Of course it doesn't.

Touch&Go points out crew meals. Can these be safely degraded in availability, quality etc.? I would suggest not. If you want a machine to work well, you oil it. Dehydration can very rapidly lead to fatigue and stress. Reducing quality of diet leads to medical problems. Pilots work some very odd hours. Any diet needs to be consistent. It is not enough for airlines to assume that pilots are eating well at home, therefore need not have care taken of their diet when at work. They can't nip out of the office the same as any office worker.

All the factors that others mention such as weather, maintenance, etc. etc., are not accident causes in my view. They are the trigger functions that allow an accident that has been waiting to happen finally to arrive.

In a good safety culture, such trigger actions don't cause an accident.

[phd]

Excellent thread on a superb new forum, and already generating extremely high quality posts. Congratulations Danny for having the foresight to add this forum to pprune.

As a safety manager for an airline I have talked to virtually every type of professional involved in the civil aviation process, including engineers, baggage handlers, refuellers, caterers, pilots, cabin crew, security officers, air traffic controllers and tug-drivers. In my opinion the biggest barriers to improving safety within aviation are the ones we all create by not communicating with each other openly and honestly. These barriers are ignorance, mistrust and misunderstanding.

Aviation safety, both in the air and on the ground, would be greatly improved if there was regular interaction and honest, frank communication between the different groups of people who all come together to make it happen. We can all learn something about safety by seeing aviation opertion from the other persons viewpoint. The greatest allies of safety are humility and the willingness to learn.

Keep up the good work Danny and all you other fine people who make pprune tick!

[redsnail]

Inadequately trained trainers.
No formal training for line training captains.
No study guides for FO's under training.
ie poor or no transfer of satisfactory information to enable the crew to fully appreciate the operation or the aircraft.

[yotter]

Weather related problems.

I've certainly felt most stress when operating in really strong winds. Flying into areas such as the Mid West USA where microburst phenomena are commonly encountered can also be hazardous, as can the big storms found in the tropics and especially the Far East.

Icing still seems to be a problem with smaller aircraft, whilst reducd visibilty procedures and equipment have improved a lot over the years.

Yes, my vote goes for that awful moment when go around power is on, and you still desending!

[vff]

The greatest hazard in aviation to day is errors in various databases in GPS and FMS systems.

Often you dont realize until very late in the process of using it.

Especially when the error is in a SID or STAR.

The biggest problem is that there is no official place to report it

I have tried several times to report this kind of errors to
the CAA
the database supplier (Jeppesen)
the hardware supplier.

Nothing is done to correct these errors.

Is a malfunction happens to an ILS or VOR station it will appear imidiately in a NOTAM in order to warn everybody.
But a database error which is often harder to detect is not reported in the NOTAM.

[john_tullamarine]

We can all go on at considerable length listing examples ...

Could I raise the thought that, as well as offering examples, we could venture into a more controversial arena and discuss useful ways of either getting rid of a problem or, at least, reducing its insidious consequences ?

One of the advantages of this sort of forum, as opposed to a specialist venue .. is that the guys and gals at the end of the problem chain .. who get to see the effects of such problems day in and day out .... and are often able to see simple workarounds or solutions which are effective and safe ... can have their say on the matter ...

[blueball]

The Unknown

[Son Of Piltdown]

Fatigue and 'management' pressures.

My worry is that the next major accident/incident will be due to a crew operating when they really should be resting. I am most concerned about high rotation operations in low cost carriers.

SOP

[redsnail]

Some possible solutions to the hassles I raised.
Management/owners of companies ought to realise that well trained individuals and clear, readily available ops manuals are a good safety net to their operation.
In many smaller operations, safety and training seems to be at logger heads with the "operation". It takes a strong person to stand up to "commercial pressures" and demand good training takes place. Funnily enough, it is often easier to train someone correctly than it is to retrain them.... Let alone cheaper.
Good clear concise ops manuals that are distributed to the crew can go a long way in alleviating the SOP hassles that can arise. If the crew know and understand the SOPs and more importantly, see the upper level/management pilots following them, then they are more likely to obey the book too.
It takes a long time to write them however, the difference to the operation is chalk and cheese.
The ops manual has to be approved by the CAA (or any other regulatory body) and thus you can't be in "trouble" for following it.
eg, a cyclone/extreme wx is approaching the base. What do you do? It is far better to have this scenario thought out prior to the event. Scrambing during the event is often too late.

[Shadowpurser]

- Management cutting back and shaving costs!!

- Captains and In-charge crew members that are deemed unapproachable or unchallengeable by their co-pilots or crew, therefore human error (or the possibility of it) goes unchecked or unchallenged. :eek:

[rupetime]

My worry, for not only safety but also the future expansion and prosperity of this industry is the wind of very unhealthy anti- management feelings amongst aircrew.

Take a glance at some of the posts and see how many lead to
management jibes, I think a high percentage of members of this
forum would actually like the whole "pilot error" theory renamed "management induced pilot error".

Come on guys knuckle down before this industry ends up like the rest of the public transport system in the UK.


RT

[Captain Stable]

rupetime, since this is a Safety forum, I shall leave aside your comments on future expansion, as that is a discussion for elsewhere.

I don't believe in the concept of "pilot error" as such, so I don't feel there's much use in renaming it to anything - the entire concept is useless.

But please explain how anti-management feeling on the part of aircrews affects safety.

[Jump Complete]

Complancency? Especialy when connected to fatigue.

[Mowgli]

A closed safety and management communication line. A lack of "openness" brought about by crews feeling that they risk criticism or reduced promotion prospects through sharing their experiences within the company, or that management make them feel as if they are criticising the system by highlighting potential problems. Also, a frustration that inertia will succeed, and that their laudable attempts to highlight hazards will be filed in a circular out tray.

Efforts to make the operation safer do not produce fast efficiencies and savings; they will not lower the bottom line; they will only win the individual responsible praise and advancement if made in an organisation that has a healthy safety culture, not one which plays lip service to it.

The real bottom line (to steal the words from someone else on PRUNE) :

"if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident".

[El Mirador]

Mowgli. An excellent and precise response. It is encouraging to know that safety is a very real issue to certain pilots.:D

[Captain Stable]

Excellent answer, Mowgli.

And whatever the situation of the company, a very good argument for having the Flight Safety department completely independent of Management.

Of course, also a very good argument for having a company that actually values the input of its aircrew and not simply viewing them as "human resources".

Any member of staff (not only aircrew) must be able to raise safety concerns without fear of negative results for them personally. For this reason, Flight Safety Officers must have access to secure and private phones, email and letterboxes (an open pigeonhole in the crewroom is not sufficient). The company that does not have a fully private (and, if needs be, anonymous) method of raising security worries cannot be said to have any sort of safety culture.

The Flight Safety Officer cannot be held to be accountable to the Chief Pilot, the Flight Operations Director, the Chief Training Captain or anyone below the CEO.

There may be good reasons why a recommendation from him is not acted upon. However, a CEO should think very hard indeed before turning him down.

As Mowgli points out, the feedback loop must be closed. If precursors are not acted upon, then there may be a prima facie case for culpable negligence or, worse, corporate manslaughter in the event of any later accident.

Many, many Flight Safety Officers in the past have been hounded out of their jobs. It is not a popular position with management. Pressure has been put on many - perhaps their last base check was not all that satisfactory all of a sudden? Keep him occupied - put him in the sim for a couple of days. Suggest he's taking on too much responsibility. See if he resigns and appoint someone who may be a bit more malleable instead.

But for truly enlightened management, one surefire sign the FSO is doing his job is if he's being a PITA. If he's not a PITA, you can be sure he's ineffective as an FSO.

Why? Because Flight Safety is all about being proactive. You can never rest on your laurels. You always have to be examining the system, plugging possible holes in the cheese. As soon as you don't hace a load of recommendations for safety improvements, you need to ask "Why not?". Why are there not a load of suggested changes to SOP's, to the Ops Manual, to checklists, to crewing structures, to this that or the other form? Are the crews being kept informed of everything that is happening? If not, why not? Because if they're in the dark, they can't do a lot to improve their safety performance.

And that's where the bottom line stands. Not on the balance sheet, but with the front-line troops.

[john_tullamarine]

.. and to add/emphasise a couple of points ..

The system safety boss, in the same way as the QA boss, must have direct access to the Board and CEO and be empowered by Board policy directive to bypass the administrative systems totally if that is required from time to time in order to get things done.

The Board/CEO must be committed to improving the operation in these areas ... otherwise it is all idle posturing. More importantly, that corporate level must be seen to be committed.

The operative sections have to be funded and resourced adequately and appropriately .. this infers that section heads budget and plan appropriately ... an unplanned safety related surprise cost might be acceptable the first time it arises .. but its causal cost factors must, subsequently, be addressed in budget processes.

[Firestorm]

vff,
Should errors of that sort be reported via the ASR system?

I have encountered a number of occasions where a beacon has been out of use, and would have expected a NOTAM or AIS to have been published, but not found one. And a couple of occasions where NOTAM have not been passed to crew by our ops staff, even when they are obviously relevant.

I often find that our AERADS are either out of date, or have been damaged beyond use.

Our compnay has an internal system for reporting all manner of problems encountered during a duty, which is accountable. The person filingthe report is kept informed throughout, until a satisfactory conclusion is achieved. It's quite new, but seems to work well.

[unwiseowl]

Junk NOTAMS - You know, trench 10m from side of R/W, crane behind the terminal, ILS off in two weeks time - there could be something important lost amongst all that crap!

[machone]

Does the word "assumptions" not spring to mind. I assumed he would do it. I assumed they knew I meant gallons not litres/pounds etc. I assumed the other engineer fixed it.there are loads more but it can kill all of us.:confused:

[b55]

Pilots themselves are the greatest hazard. the accident stats prove that. We all want to think we are a safe pilot, but this is not a constant truth. You are only as safe as your next choice in the next situation. There are alot of pilots flying right now for badly managed companies, in poorly maintained a/c, in adverse conditions, but doing it safely for themselves because they are making the right choices(delay the takeoff, divert, u/s the a/c, take a break, etc.). There are too many "drivers" out there. There are still many improvements to be made to aviation safety, but it will always be the kind of person who is PIC in the end who makes the biggest difference, good or bad, to safety. Medicine has "quacks", legal has "sharks" and aviation has "drivers".

[West Coast]

As funny as it sounds...the hotel van ride
In the past two years as a pax I have been involved in 3 accidents, two minor, one somewhat more. None of us would think about flying with out the harness on, but many crew members think nothing of not wearing a seatbelt. The drivers are often doing double duty at the hotel and happen to be available when the crew arrives. The drivers are often very young with minimal training.

[bird on the wire]

again - fatigue.

The low cost combination of some very long days with no breaks ( illegal anywhere else), max duty/ min rest rostering, constant body clock changes from earlies to lates to daytimes and back several times a week and a poor diet (if the airline doesn't provide meals then the crew tend to grab one of those very healthy and nutritious ready made meals) tend to send everyone a bit strange by day 6.

For a short while this is do able. Over the whole summer season, oh dear.....
:rolleyes:
maybe not an airline problem so much as an FCL problem?

[CAT1]

Bad CRM. I've seen crews operating together who are just not compatible, ie a domineering captain and a passive first officer (or a new one who doen't know the ropes yet). When you've got an overbearing captain who is a bit behind the drag curve, coupled with some bad weather at the end of a long night, it can become a major safety concern.

At the other end of the spectrum, I've met captains who appear to be totally lacking in self-confidence, not a good basis for engendering trust in the other crew members.

I agree with b55, there's a lot of "drivers" out there, a situation not helped in my view by basing promotion strictly on seniority, as all the American and a lot of European airlines do.

Bring back three crew aircraft!

[safety_worker]

A CEO/PCE/(whatever) with a BAD/NO flight safety policy. It all stems from the top. If you haven't got the right man there, you've got an 'organizational accident waiting to happen'! That, IMHO is the greatest hazard.
After that is sorted out, hmmm, 'where do we go now sweet child of mine...'

[b55]

Forget all the indirect, casual causes. There are hundreds of them in the accident stats and yes, they all are very real and yes, alot of them should be and can be eliminated by the industry, including BAD CEO's. But even in the best safety regulated country, in best safety managed airline, run by the most devoted safety people and pilots, there will always be choices left open to the individual pilot and that is where the most danger is. What YOU choose for whatever problem it is YOU need to make a choice. Why that 20,000 hour pilot, his fellow pilots thought of as a good pilot, with 10,000 hours on type, in a brand new a/c, working for a good company, that has an accident? Suddenly question, "No, he really was a marginal pilot." ?! We, the pilots, are the CEO's of our next flight. No one else. We make the choice, right or wrong. each time. Doctors, Judges, Pilots, making choices, life/death choices. every day.

For Safety-Worker, there are actually FOUR P's :
Philosophys, Policys, Procedures, and Practices(that's us!)
Safe flying!

[*Lancer*]

Biggest overall hazard to operations?

CHANGE

That's what I think anyway... A lot of people have difficulty in adapting to new requirements and procedures. Does anyone really know what's going on with all the new (and not standardised) security procedures at airports around the world? It takes time, and in that time, there is a lot of confusion.

[snooky]

If I owned a £50 million pound machine capable of making me vast profits but equally capable of bankrupting me if poorly operated I would take every care to see that I employed the best and most experienced operators I could find, and I would ensure that they were happy with their renumeration and kept well fed and rested.

I am puzzled as to why many airline managers aim for the exact opposite.

[HugMonster]

You and me both, snooky... :confused:

[NorthernSky]

Colleagues,

Thanks for your excellent debate.

May I now throw in a few of my own:

(i) No minimum qualifications or standards for those involved in airport, air traffic service, and airline management and senior training positions. These people receive no more training and are checked no more often (indeed, often far less often) than those on the line. Those I work with are good people, elsewhere they're not.

(ii) Dangerous international 'standards'. We don't spend nearly enough time influencing proposed regulations before they become the rules which we fly by. Much of what ICAO puts forward is ill-considered and introduces or fails to address significant hazards.

(iii) Believe it or not, insufficient regulation. Look at the figures for errors caused by poor operational paperwork of all sorts, and then examine the regulations it must satisfy. There are almost none.

(iv) Insufficient standardisation. I'm not too worried which language I speak on the RTF, but I'd like everyone on the frequency to be sharing the same one. This is an international business, too often regulated on national lines.

(v) A very poor reporting system, industry-wide. The very presence of CHIRP, for example, shows that the operational world is failing in this respect. Everyone should have a voice - and use it with care and forethought.

I wonder if the ball will keep rolling...

[Plane*jane]

From CRM courses the real stressors (aka hazards) from HF point seems to be
Long haul :sleep pattern disruption. Some can't sleep on the aircraft, or when it's light / noisy / hot on the ground. Very serious when one guy told me he stayed awake for 52+ hours, and only sleeps when he gets home. Some only have bursts of 4 hrs ie no REM sleep(quite common) So problems too when travelling home from tours, as was highlighted on a previous thread
Short haul: Although not flying longer hours, exacerbated by mentally busy short sectors(1-4 hour) short turnarounds, with any slight delay having a compounding knockon effect to whole duty period, and the extra workload involved by being "out of synch" re slots / stands / fuelling / fractious pax. Manageable on an infrequent basis, but very telling when frequent or at the end of a long tour of duty. (Example Air Ontario) I think we have all heard the plea bargaining of crews trying to reestablish or recover their position flying in and out of airports. Some in my opinion cut unacceptable corners.
Certainly management in my opinion have to take responsibility of such legal but physically demanding tight schedules. And please not let us hear the hollow excuses of commercial viability. Some of the financial housekeeping I have seen has been breathtakingly incompetent, and substantial savings available on better organisation of the business outside scheduling.

Biggest gripe of both? Roster changes / days off / holiday mismanagement