Virgin ATR grounded in Albury

[ozaub]

It’s shameful that ATSB took five years to investigate a potentially deadly structural failure of Virgin’s ATR 72. And all that’s been done to stop recurrence is tell pilots to be more careful!
By comparison Indonesia completed its investigation of AirAsia 8501 break-up within a year; including wreckage retrieval. Likewise we want Indonesia and Ethiopia to complete their investigations of 737 MAX accidents within a year.

[PoppaJo]

Another serious one that I’ve been waiting for.

I wonder if they are consulting and communicating with the said operators during the investigation? Or waiting 3-5 years then at fault company implementing said ‘safety alerts’. In which time the same problem could have occurred again and again.

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2016/aair/ao-2016-084/

[das Uber Soldat]

See what happens when we let these low cost carriers from South East Asian countries (with their poor crew coordination and lax maintenance oversight) fly in our airspace!! CASA should ban them!
Oh, hang on...
Yeh, because of that one singular, totally isolated time when there was a major safety breach by any of those carriers. Right?

[josephfeatherweight]

Hi das,
Whilst this incident (the mishandling, collapse of crew coordination in flight) in itself appears to be an "isolated time", the investigation revealed an endemic, systemic FAILURE of the entire maintenance system supporting the ATR fleet. In my opinion, absolutely appalling and the sort of behavior that many contributors to these Aussie forums (often rightfully) sling mud towards some of our northern neighbours, when they are found lacking in the same way.
Hence my (admittedly sarcastic) post...

[KABOY]

Yeh, because of that one singular, totally isolated time when there was a major safety breach by any of those carriers. Right?


https://www.afr.com/business/transport/aviation/virgin-puts-brakes-on-regional-arm-20140114-iya4s

Yeah, must have been a singular event, CASA and the ATSB don't seem to agree and the Virgin Board as well...... anyone else I have left out?

[Capt. On Heat]

Engineering aspects post event aside and purely from the piloting standpoint, I was hopeful what I would consider the actual root cause for the event in flight would at least be listed as a contributing factor - but sadly no and so a huge learning point is lost for the industry.
The answer lies in the question - why would a pilot respond in that way to what would have a been a minor over speed event?
From the report it seems to me the 'distraction' element (still valid but to a far lesser extent) was a far easier and more politically safe factor, instead of scrutinising the bigger issue.

In any event, some other good lessons were learned and I'm very glad (the tragic CC injury notwithstanding) it didn't take more severe consequences as is often the case.

[machtuk]

The answer lies in the question - why would a pilot respond in that way to what would have a been a minor over speed event?





One single reason.....punitive action! Every single pilot knows that a transgression in SOP's means " you are in trouble"
This mentality is on every cockpit on every flight, we carry it around with us like a loaded gun!

[VH-FTS]

One single reason.....punitive action! Every single pilot knows that a transgression in SOP's means " you are in trouble"This mentality is on every cockpit on every flight, we carry it around with us like a loaded gun!

Yep pretty much. And did the ATSB read the letters MM mailed directly to every VARA pilot (prior to the pitch disconnect event) telling them they’d be punished if they kept being naughty. I’ve heard the culture was at an all time low with pilots scared to slip up. Could that have been the real reason for the overreaction in the flight deck that day?

[josephfeatherweight]

One single reason.....punitive action!
Was that it? Makes sense - I thought there were also suggestions of fatigue, limited experience or both?

[dr dre]

Was that it? Makes sense - I thought there were also suggestions of fatigue, limited experience or both?

As far as experience goes it looks like from the ATSB report the FO was a former overseas ATR Captain with thousands of hours of ATR experience who was relegated to the right seat. Whilst the Captain (who surprisingly joined the company after the FO) was a former Australian military pilot who seems to have gained a direct entry command with zero ATR or commercial flying experience. Given it seems the inadvertent control movement emanated from the Captain it seems that's where the experience gap was.