Virgin ATR grounded in Albury [Archive]

Sarcs

22nd Apr 2014, 00:04

training wheels good catch and interesting article (& photo) from the Border Mail (http://www.bordermail.com.au/story/2136758/bird-puts-plane-out-of-service/)...:cool:

VH-FTSHow are CASA and the ATSB hiding things? I didn't realise they were the ones obligated to tell the press every time there was an accident or incident? Once the report is finalised, yes, but not during the initial investigation. I'd say they are probably doing their job properly behind the scenes - just because you, the pruner, doesn't know about it doesn't mean it's being handled poorly.
FTS I'm sure that you're probably right in regards to the investigators on the coalface doing their job properly, however I beg to differ with the rest of your statement.

Both of the occurrences in this case were listed as 'accidents' and both are being investigated. History shows that anytime a serious incident/accident is notified to the ATSB they will invariably post a media release within a day, if not hours, of the occurrence.

It is interesting that the BM article was released on the 08/03/14, some 11 days after the 2nd incident/accident, yet the article states: The incidents are being treated as separate.

A Virgin Australia spokesman, Nathan Scholz, said there was no evidence linking the two matters.

Mr Scholz said that on February 20, the Sydney-bound flight struck turbulence that led to a crew member being injured and Virgin notified the bureau.

He said five days later the pilot reported a bird strike mid-flight and found damage to the outside of the aircraft upon landing to Albury. However if we refer to the ATSB weekly summary lists for the 28 Feb 14 (http://atsb.gov.au/media/4723915/AWS_28Feb2014.xls)(entry 168) & 7 Mar 14 (http://atsb.gov.au/media/4772590/AWS_7Mar2014.xls)(entry 182) we get the following notifications for the apparently unrelated occurrences (formatted differently but you'll get the picture):20/02/2014 *201400786*Accident Yes - AO-2014-032* near Sydney Aerodrome* NSW* ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A*
Air Transport High Capacity*Passenger* C * CTA

During cruise, the aircraft encountered severe turbulence resulting in a cabin crew member receiving a serious injury. The investigation is continuing.

25/02/2014*201400985*Accident Yes - AO-2014-032* near Albury Aerodrome* NSW * ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A*
Air Transport High Capacity*Passenger* D * CTR

During a post flight inspection, substantial damage to the aircraft's tail assembly was detected. The investigation is continuing. From this information we can establish that; (a) both events were listed as accidents and; (b) for some strange reason (& unbeknown to the BM reporter & VA spokesman) the bureau has given these (unrelated) events the same investigation number.

{Comment: It is also passing strange that the bureau makes no mention of the PIC's notified bird strike incident}

OK clear as mud so far??:rolleyes: Then we move further down the article to this bit right at the end...

"...The bureau spokesman in Canberra said a preliminary report would be prepared within 30 days..."

The 30 days passed on the 27th of March apparently without a prelim report being issued...:confused: However if you refer to investigation number AO-2014-032 (http://atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ao-2014-032.aspx) you will see that it was last updated on the 25 March 2014. So technically speaking the bureau has come within it's promised deadline of 30 days. What is unclear is how the two occurrences were notified to the required parties (as per Annex 13 para 7.1) and whether there was a Preliminary report issued (to those parties) prior to the 30 days (as per para 7.4 of Annex 13).

Oh well I'm sure it is all above board..:E However if that is the case when is the bureau going to make the Prelim report available to the rest of the world??:*

DutyofCare

22nd Apr 2014, 23:12

Top post SARCS (http://www.pprune.org/members/172498-sarcs) !!!

Will we see people / personal / organisations being accountable for this one ??

I can feel another Norfolk Is Westwind / 4 Corners story coming up though !!

Wally Mk2

23rd Apr 2014, 02:41

I hear on the grapevine that this plane maybe end up being a 'pole sitter':)

Humans make errors, we do it every day of the week.

Wmk2

Sarcs

23rd Apr 2014, 05:05

All quiet (so far) on the MH370 western front, so..
Was it a bird, or a stuff up? The Virgin ATR questions (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/04/23/was-it-a-bird-or-a-stuff-up-the-virgin-atr-questions/)

Whatever it was that the ATR hit, it was definitely too damaged to continue to operate in the state in which it come to rest in Albury
http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/files/2014/04/Sounds-of-Music-cover-610x414.jpg (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/04/23/was-it-a-bird-or-a-stuff-up-the-virgin-atr-questions/sounds-of-music-cover/)

Julie Andrews in Sound of Music, or the ATSB in Albury? PR photo 20th Century Fox

There are unresolved issues about the Virgin Australia ATR turbo-prop currently but not always hidden from view (http://transform.fairfaxregional.com.au/transform/v1/resize/frm/silverstone-feed-data/807a47ae-3695-46d9-b568-b214178eaf7a.jpg/w1200_h678_fcrop.jpg) at Albury Airport following the discovery of significant damage to its airframe after it landed there on 25 February.

The aircraft was also involved in a serious turbulence incidence on the a flight between Canberra and Sydney on 20 February, and in an earlier post (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/04/18/virgin-australias-leg-breaker-atr-now-atsb-double-header/) we have described how the ATSB linked that incident to the later Albury incident in a manner which no doubt by pure coincidence rendered it invisible to public scrutiny.

Among the questions awaiting answers is the extent to which, if at all, the public was exposed to risk between 20-25 February by the aircraft continuing in service.

It is important to ask the question without prejudice. The ATSB could be completely mistaken in linking the two incidents and to have done so without any substantive reason whatsoever.

Virgin Australia had the ATR inspected after the turbulence incidence by a contractor, who may well have correctly concluded that the aircraft was fit to fly.

The pilot who thought he hit a bird on approach to Albury and made an external investigation of the turbo-prop to discovered what could be one of the more ruinous bird strikes in the history of such incidents in Australia could have been correct in his suspicions.

But whatever it was that the ATR hit, it was definitely too damaged to continue to operate in the state in which it come to rest in Albury, where according to Virgin Australia:

An ATR-72 is currently in Albury awaiting repairs, the aircraft is currently under ATSB control and the repairs will commence once the ATSB’s investigation is complete.

Virgin Australia also said “Virgin Australia pilots conduct a pre-flight inspection of their aircraft prior to every flight”. This tells us that whatever was bent on inspection in Albury after landing wasn’t bent before take off in Sydney more than an hour earlier and infers that either a prior condition suddenly manifested itself in the airframe or was caused by hitting what must have been a very large bird with its T-tail.

Finding out the truth is obviously a matter of considerable importance, and there is a sequence of events from the actions the pilots took on 20 February to respond to turbulence through to the post turbulence inspection and on to whatever event caused the airframe to deform on 25 February that all need to be fully understood.

The most important matter of all might be whether the airliner flew while in an unsafe condition between 20-25 February, and if it did, what steps need to be taken to prevent this happening again.

But the integrity of the post turbulence inspection process is obviously also critical to the above.

Answers to these questions are needed.

In a transparent and accountable air safety administrative process these issues would be explored NTSB style, at public hearings. Documents would be produced and examined. Responsible people would publicly account for their actions. In Australia such matters are settled out of sight through a process of negotiation when it comes to the wording of the final report between the safety authorities and the commercial and professional parties to an inquiry, leading to an agreed final document, although the ATSB does have the power to publish its findings over the objections of other parties.

For the time being Virgin Australia isn’t proceeding with its originally intended expansion of its regional arm, which was Skywest Airlines of WA , which it purchased from Singaporean shareholders last year.
{Comment: Love the pic & caption Ben..:ok:}

A bit like the VH-NGA airframe fame that lies 47m under the ocean off Norfolk Island, the longer the VARA ATR sits in the hangar at Albury the more the intrigue, mystery, cover up theories etc will grow...:rolleyes:

dubbleyew eight

23rd Apr 2014, 12:33

a rumour is that this airframe is so damaged that it will be scrapped.

this may be the first time in australian aviation history that a bird strike saved an aircraft full of passengers.
if it had flown again ..... faaarrrkkkk.

problem for virgin is that they are scheduled to put over a hundred of the design into service.

look up ATR fatal accidents and just look at the number of ATR's that have crashed killing all on board. FFFFAAAARRRRKKKKK. and that is not just one dumbassed operator. those operators were from all over the world and all different cultures.

I will never fly on one ever.
If ever there was an aircraft that should be banned from australian skies it is the ATR.
ymmv.

Engineer_aus

23rd Apr 2014, 12:41

That Horizontal stab is pretty bent. I would not be surprised if the aircraft was not flying straight either.

Kharon

28th Apr 2014, 02:46

Sandilands – "Just what-the-hell is really going on?"

Bloody good question Ben. There are some older questions hanging about, unanswered by ATSB in relation to the VARA operation. As someone remarked, there may well be some clammy hands at Virgin HQ. Like the strange doings at Emerald. Now it just may be me loosing the marbles again; but, as told, it's a passing strange tale. Seems the Albury ATR was on service Brisbane – Emerald Qld, when a FA noticed 'fumes' at the rear of the aircraft on the climb out. It appears these 'fumes' conveniently disappeared and all was well; the aircraft completing the service to Emerald. The FA put in a report, the ATSB did a 'move on – nothing to see' report and the issue duly placed in the tidy bin - endit. Except, the return sector started normally but ended in a return to Emerald with a 'minor engine failure' (whatever the hell that is), which was serious enough to keep the aircraft on the deck for two days. There is no ATSB follow up report on that incident that I can find available.

Now, while fumes disappearing may well be no cause for great alarm; no ATSB report on the same aircraft, on the next sector, on the same day, returning to land with 'engine' issues could not be construed as insignificant. You could, quite reasonably expect an ATSB report on that part of the story; being a two day fix and all. Benefit of doubt, maybe it's buried in that tip the ATSB call a web****e. What with this incident, then Moranbah (x2), plus the Canberra and Albury events, are we starting to see a form of interesting pattern emerging?

So yes, what precisely and exactly is going on. Hmmm, can I feel a Lockhart coming on?

004wercras

28th Apr 2014, 04:46

Kharon,
So yes, what precisely and exactly is going on. Hmmm, can I feel a Lockhart coming on?YES

TICK TOCK

ZFT

28th Apr 2014, 05:19

ook up ATR fatal accidents and just look at the number of ATR's that have crashed killing all on board. FFFFAAAARRRRKKKKK. and that is not just one dumbassed operator. those operators were from all over the world and all different cultures.

I will never fly on one ever.
If ever there was an aircraft that should be banned from australian skies it is the ATR.

Somewhat over the top comment. Around 1000 built and very few have crashed. Certainly none have suffered structural failures.

Sarcs

28th Apr 2014, 06:24

Kharon:Except, the return sector started normally but ended in a return to Emerald with a 'minor engine failure' (whatever the hell that is), which was serious enough to keep the aircraft on the deck for two days. There is no ATSB follow up report on that incident that I can find available.
You are correct "K" it is very hard to find the ATsBeaker connection to this...:confused:... Virgin Australia Regional Airlines (VARA) ATR 72-600 VH-FVR Makes Emergency Landing at Emerald Airport (http://cqplanespotting.********.com.au/2014/01/virgin-australia-regional-airlines-vara.html) ...but after much trolling through (half-arsed) weekly summary lists I was able to finally track it down...:rolleyes:

{Note: While in the process, out of academic interest (as there seem quite a few), I compiled a list of all recorded incidents for the calendar year '14 of ATsBeaker weekly summaries, so the incident in which you refer is in red..:rolleyes:}
29/11/2013 201311663 Incident No Canberra Aerodrome ACT ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTR During take-off, the aircraft struck a bird and takeoff was rejected.

02/12/2013 201312655 Incident No Port Macquarie Aerodrome, S M 37Km NSW ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional Unknown ATR72-212A----- Unknown Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTA During descent to 9,000 ft, the ATR - GIE Avions ATR72 received a TCAS RA on an opposite direction aircraft descending from its assigned level of 10,000 ft. The ATR72 climbed to maintain separation.

08/12/2013 201312411 Incident No Canberra Aerodrome ACT ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTR Passing 1,000 ft on approach to runway 35, the aircraft struck a bird.

15/12/2013 201312198 Incident No Rockhampton Aerodrome QLD ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger D CTR During the take-off run, the crew received a digital air data computer (DADC) warning and rejected the takeoff. The computer was reset and the message cleared. During the next takeoff the warning reappeared and the aircraft returned to Rockhampton. During the engineering inspection, a bee was found lodged in the pitot tube.

21/12/2013 201312681 Incident No Port Macquarie Aerodrome NSW ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger G CTAF During the landing in windy conditions, the aircraft bounced and the tail bumper struck the ground.

24/12/2013 201312732 Incident No near Brisbane Aerodrome QLD ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTR During the initial climb, the crew received a flight control system warning and returned to Brisbane.

29/12/2013 201312847 Incident No abeam Bundaberg Aerodrome QLD ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger E CTA During the cruise, the aircraft was struck by lightning.

30/12/2013 201312942 Incident No near Brisbane Aerodrome QLD ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTA During the descent, the crew detected fumes in the cabin. An engineering inspection did not reveal the source of the fumes.

05/01/2014 201400163 Incident No Canberra Aerodrome ACT ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTR Passing 500ft on approach, the aircraft encountered windshear and sink which resulted in a GPWS TOO LOW GLIDE SLOPE. The crew conducted a missed approach.

07/01/2014 201400176 Incident No Sydney Aerodrome NSW ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTR The aircraft did not taxi in accordance with ATC instructions.

08/01/2014 201400233 Incident No Canberra Aerodrome ACT ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTA Passing 1,000 ft on visual approach on runway 35, the aircraft encountered overshoot and undershoot windshear.

10/01/2014 201400335 Incident No Brisbane Aerodrome QLD ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTR The crew did not taxi in accordance with ATC instructions.

22/01/2014 201400641 Incident No Brisbane Aerodrome QLD ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTR The aircraft did not taxi in accordance with ATC instructions.

23/01/2014 201401027 Incident No near Brisbane Aerodrome QLD ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTA Passing 10,000 ft on climb, a cabin crew member detected air and fumes coming from under the seat. The fumes dissipated after short time and flight continued to Emerald.

23/01/2014 201400157 Incident No near Emerald Aerodrome QLD ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger G CTAF During the climb, the crew detected abnormal engine indications and the aircraft returned to Emerald. Engineers replaced the No. 1 propeller valve module.

26/01/2014 201400610 Incident No Brisbane Aerodrome QLD ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTR During final approach, the aircraft encountered moderate windshear and the crew conducted a missed approach.

28/01/2014 201401147 Incident No Brisbane Aerodrome QLD ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTR During final approach, the aircraft struck a bird.

28/01/2014 201401130 Incident No Brisbane Aerodrome QLD ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTR Incomplete coordination details were passed on an aircraft approaching the airspace boundary.

20/02/2014 201400786 Accident Yes -

AO-2014-032 near Sydney Aerodrome NSW ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger C CTA During cruise, the aircraft encountered severe turbulence resulting in a cabin crew member receiving a serious injury. The investigation is continuing.

25/02/2014 201400985 Accident Yes -

AO-2014-032 near Albury Aerodrome NSW ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger D CTR During a post flight inspection, substantial damage to the aircraft's tail assembly was detected. The investigation is continuing.

05/03/2014 201401150 Serious Incident Yes -

AO-2014-041 Moranbah Aerodrome QLD ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger G CTAF The GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR-72 landed while the safety car was on the runway. The ground staff and aircraft crew reported not hearing any radio calls. The investigation is continuing.
Unfortunately the list is somewhat lost in electronic interpretation but you get the gist "K", as for your assumption of the ATsBeaker..."move along nothing to see here"...(SOPs for a cash strapped State AAI..:D) you were spot on (i.e. that is what the "No" signifies) as there is no investigation number designated to the incident (unlike the Albury incident)...:ugh:

Hmm wonder how many of the above incidents (prior to 25/02) were also related to the ill-fated VH-FVR??:rolleyes:

Chadzat

28th Apr 2014, 06:44

Sarcs- dis you even look at the description of each 'event' in your list there? Two thirds are for completely 'normal' occurrances - ie bird/wildlife strikes and windshear. :ugh:

Good try on getting a conspiracy going.

Id like to know how a PVM failure and fumes in the cockpit are related?:=

j3pipercub

28th Apr 2014, 06:56

W8, am I correct in assuming that your current steed is a wittman tailwind? It's kinda ironic that a person who flies an experimental homebuilt is having a go at a certified airliner with potentially hundreds of thousands if not millions of flying hours.

j3

Mail-man

28th Apr 2014, 07:03

Sarcs, Good to see VARA operating 42's out of BK :rolleyes:

TBM-Legend

28th Apr 2014, 07:36

Sarcs, Good to see VARA operating 42's out of BK

My read is it was an ATR42-300.....Toll..

dubbleyew eight

28th Apr 2014, 14:02

experimental homebuilts???

you guys miss the point totally.

when aeroplanes are designed the designers don't go to basics and work out how the air loads will affect the flying.
air loads, gust considerations and such are built into the design and strength requirements which are typically FAR23.

pilots are limited to loads and forces known as the "limit load".
how do you keep an aeroplane light enough to fly well? well you only design it to be 50% stronger than the limit loads. this is known as the "ultimate strength".
an aeroplane is supposed to be able to be stressed to "limit" any number of times without failure. you only expect component failure to occur if the aircraft is loaded beyond its ultimate strength.
(btw I'm using Normal Category figures here, roughly)

ok so how does an aeroplane flown within limits by competent pilots suffer such catastrophic failure in the empennage that VARA are going to scrap the entire airframe.

something is drastically wrong here.

either something has been shonkied through the certification process
or
the design standards aren't up to snuff
or
the air has more energy in it than previously thought and the design standards relating to strengths need updating.

as I mentioned in my post on the truss thread I think the pilots were competent.
VARA are competently operating the aircraft.
ATR have designed the aircraft competently.

so either I am wrong in one of the three assumptions or the design standards are in need of urgent review.

aircraft components should never fail catastrophically while exposed to loads below "limit"

the authorities can bury this all they like but it will not go away.
VARA will end up with 163 ATR's.
if all the 163 had been flown identically through identical weather to the candidate aircraft. VARA would now have all 163 parked at Albury with catastrophic damage.
it is a part of the identical nature of certified aircraft. all have the same strengths and all have the same weaknesses.

thankfully there is lots of parking space at Albury. :E

halfmanhalfbiscuit

28th Apr 2014, 14:23

I assume this issue has been reported to the Type Certificate holder ATR. It seems strange that if this aircraft has not suffered any unusual event to cause this why there is not an AD or mandatory SB to inspect the other aircraft in service?

I have seen an AD relating to a previous issue of cracking around the cockpit windows.

The cracking could be related to errors made in production such as scribed markings or failing to deburr holes and edges. The DH comet problems were related to this and the square windows causing stress cracking.

For anyone interested in the detail of the certification this is the TC.
http://easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/EASA-TCDS-A.084_ATR_42---ATR_72-03-17102012.pdf

Australopithecus

28th Apr 2014, 14:37

Part 25 for transport category, and transport load limits also apply which differ from normal or utility category part 23 certification.

Otherwise: pretty much yes.

Having flown or flown on most things transport, including Tupolevs, Ilyushins, Yaks and almost all of the western stuff post 1936, I am less-than-comfy in an ATR. Or a 146 for that matter, but in either case they are only slightly more worrisome than (say) an HS748 or a SUD Caravelle.

ad-astra

28th Apr 2014, 19:59

either something has been shonkied through the certification process
or
the design standards aren't up to snuff
or
the air has more energy in it than previously thought and the design standards relating to strengths need updating.

as I mentioned in my post on the truss thread I think the pilots were competent.
VARA are competently operating the aircraft.
ATR have designed the aircraft competently.

so either I am wrong in one of the three assumptions or the design standards are in need of urgent review.

I think you may find that your assumptions are wrong.
Wait for the final wrap up!
You cannot arbitrarily discount some of the factors to make things fit.
How the aircraft was flown needs to be considered!

Snakecharma

28th Apr 2014, 20:11

Where the hell did you get the number of 163 airframes from?

Try deducting about 140 or more from that number and I reckon you will get close.

There isn't a market for 163 regional turboprops in this country for all operators let alone Virgin by itself!

weighman

28th Apr 2014, 22:06

Google "Use of rudder on Boeing aircraft" and have a read. The IFALPA article especially.

Kharon

28th Apr 2014, 22:50

Thanks Sarcs for the info – as suspected, it just needed teasing out. Cock up was always the short price favourite; VARA would have done it all properly – just ATSB systems, as usual. Chaz has the right of it on the rest though, all fairly normal routine events.

Chadzat "Two thirds are for completely 'normal' occurrences – i.e. bird/wildlife strikes and wind-shear.

M12 # 90 –"As best as I understood it (and yes this is a rumour) somehow the crew separated the control columns in flight (this can be done in case of an elevator control cable jam, but does require about 170 lbs of pull force)"

Somewhere in this, the aircraft was subjected to approximately 3.5G of force, causing significant stress and twisting forces to the vertical stabiliser. Believe the aircraft continued to operate for an additional 2 days. Understand the aircraft is likely to require a new tail.

S. Pete # 103 – "The inference earlier in the thread is that the controls were inadvertently split by the two pilots and that during the ensuing mayhem large and opposite elevator inputs caused severe torsional forces on the tail".

Before I get savaged by a bunch of screaming Virgins (be still my beating heart), let me state that without any form of 'official' report to work with, I am speculating : without facts, just thinking out loud. Some of the reports and tales herein, considered at face value could be disturbing. I am not, as yet disturbed, just very curious. There is the potential here to create real headaches. I expect the ATR, ATSB and VARA troops at the coalface will do what they need to, diligently and without fear or prejudice, no doubt at all. ATSB troops have done all that and more before now; but, regrettably the shades of Pel Air linger, which creates a miasma of suspicion over any published outcome. The report on this incident needs, like Caesar's wife, to be above suspicion, without blemish and a benchmark for excellence; for everyone's sake. Lets try and keep them honest this time.

So many questions arise. It's my serious doubts over the integrity and competence of our present ATSB/CASA management ethos to allow production of a honest report and to transparently manage this domestic episode, hopefully avoiding another 'pilot error' cop out which prompts the questions. Nothing to do with VARA or it's flight crews.

So, for starters, is the split yoke story even true?? The very idea that two 'competent' pilots could manage to exert (accidentally?) enough 'diametrically opposite' force during the translation of a 'bumpy' situation, with enough 'grunt' to separate the yokes is, stand alone; (when you think about it): a terrifying thought. The notion that two of them even exercised any serious control force, let alone 114 lbs, in an 'opposite direction', while correcting a trimmed flight attitude deviation simply begs questions. Industry cannot wait for another two years just to see what the ATSB eventually makes of it all and I'd bet a beer VARA won't be waiting about. Were there two sets of hands on the controls?, if so, why?. Was the AP engaged?. Any ideas on Speed, ROD, configuration at the time? SOP's?

The turbulence about Canberra is, on rare occasions, as bad as anywhere in the known world. A known fact, operational wisdom handed down, from Father to son. Seconds may go by where the aircraft is simply not 'manoeuvrable'. A wise child will not, in the first instance overload the airframe. But rather offer short prayers to pagan gods that this all stops soon, stabilises the airframe attitude early and 'works with it' to go quietly through the lumps with light hands, tender words and an understanding of basic aerodynamics. Once reunited with terra firma, (and having recovered some cool); it is time to scream for the 'grown ups'. "Please sir, I've just given this airframe a hell of a beating, to the extent that the FA has broken a wing" (hint-hint). "Could you have a real butchers-hook at the old girl (not the FA ya pervert) and see that all is well".

Now I wonder, is there a specific briefing in the VARA port operations manual sections which clearly warns pilots of the so very real dangers which, once or maybe twice in a career, can be found on approach to Canberra. Or is there just some mind numbing CASA pacifying 'buzz words'; slightly hysterical 'guest etiquette' briefings and other associated, stultifying twaddle. Are there specific notes on how to manage a Canberra approach, when it's 'cooking'?. Notes specifying caution during certain temperature/ wind range combinations, noting the inherent stability of the weather patterns which "may" just start the pot boiling. Not knocking the crew or standards here, but forewarned and forearmed is always better.

Was the FA strapped down, long before the expectation of bumps?. Were the bumps forecast? Was the crew made aware that conditions that day were within the range of the real McCoy severe turbulence, Canberra style?, was a precautionary allowance made for just such an event (just in case)? You could reasonably expect the crew to have this sorted, so how come a busted leg?

Speculation, for example, has the damage done during turbulence event been camouflaged, i.e. by a weakened, but not busted internal part or structure, only revealing the flaw after further flight? This speaks highly of airframe design integrity, but does beg some questions. It would be prudent to examine the quality of initial reporting, the subsequent examination and Safety Management procedures.

Hindsight - Should the aircraft have been grounded, the tapes pulled and perhaps, some in depth analysis completed? On the face of it: granted with 20/20 hindsight and no hard data, the answer IMO, is Yes. Like we do for any reported seriously 'abnormal' event.

Fact - There is one savagely mauled aircraft shrouded and parked, which (in the fullness of time) could become more 'problematic' than it already is, (or needs be) if the ATSB insist on keeping to their beyond reason CASA dictated approach.

Don't know and pre-empting a report is really non of my business; but sometimes, when you get an itch you just have to scratch.

Just saying.

Beer Baron

29th Apr 2014, 00:33

I'd have thought a control column link breakage would be pretty obvious. I can't see the crew not picking it up for 2 days!!! I expect the ATR requires a preflight control check like every other aircraft I've ever flown.

muffman

29th Apr 2014, 01:42

I've never flown the type, but my understanding is the ATR has a clutch mechanism in the elevator control run to protect against control jams. If the differential force between the two control columns exceeds about 52kg, it will decouple the two control columns and each pilot then flies their half of the elevator separately. It's not designed to be recoupled in flight...

Kharon

29th Apr 2014, 03:22

Solved a couple of puzzles: the force required to spit the yokes, through the pitch coupling system is 114 pounds (52 daN).

For those with a curious mind (or not type rated) the link- HERE (http://www.737ng.co.uk/atr72fcom.pdf) – takes you to an ATR-F.C.O.M. which at least provides some clarification and information on the aircraft pitch control system. Pages 253, 257, 464, 465, 468, 490, 492, 493, and for Beer Baron, page 510 are of interest.

There is also an -AD (http://casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_assets/main/lib100154/2008-0137-e.pdf) -which turned up in the search, probably worthy of a read.

Curse this curiosity thing, there must be cure; of course I blame Marcus Aurelius. "This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution? What is its substance and material? And what its causal nature [or form]? And what is it doing in the world? And how long does it subsist?"

That's it, now what's for lunch.

Blueskymine

29th Apr 2014, 04:09

I heard the turbulence was pilot induced and the control split is what has caused the damage?

Either way, I hope the folk at Skywest keep their noses clean!

j3pipercub

29th Apr 2014, 04:12

If that was the case, please note speed limits on page 702 of Kharons document, with elevators uncoupled.

Lookleft

29th Apr 2014, 08:05

The SAAB also has a split roll capability. From memory it was to allow roll control
in the event one control channel jammed. As with the ATR if both pilots elect to control the aircraft but want to go in different directions the control channels will separate and in the words of Frank Spencer "we both have contro!".

The same thing happened to a Hazelton SAAB going into Bathurst when it very nearly stalled and came close to hitting the ground. Both pilots attempted to control the aircraft with the inevitable results. From memory that incident only came to light because a high profile "ironman" pilot was sitting down the back and reported it.

dubbleyew eight

29th Apr 2014, 08:46

so an aeroplane that breaks in 1g unaccellerated flight is causing some questions now.
GOOD!

So, for starters, is the split yoke story even true?? The very idea that two 'competent' pilots could manage to exert (accidentally?) enough 'diametrically opposite' force during the translation of a 'bumpy' situation, with enough 'grunt' to separate the yokes is, stand alone; (when you think about it): a terrifying thought.

yes it is true. 0.8 of a second is all it took in a big bit of turbulence.

now that the world is awake I'll bow out and go back to my restoration work.
....I'm never going to be a passenger on an ATR. amazingly I really do think my homebuilt is safer to fly. toodle pip guys.

Chadzat

29th Apr 2014, 08:53

Aaaaand now we can get back to the 'Professional' in Pprune.......

Lookleft

29th Apr 2014, 10:26

So does that mean you also won't fly on a SAAB? Looks like you are stuck flying in the dash 8 or Metro for all your turboprop flights to regional destinations.

The Bullwinkle

29th Apr 2014, 10:54

Looks like you are stuck flying in the dash 8 or Metro for all your turboprop flights to regional destinations.

Bring back the Otter!

Ethel the Aardvark

29th Apr 2014, 11:53

Dash 8 has resettable elevator and aileron disconnects in flight.
Emb 120 are only ground resettable much to the embarrassment of a long ago flight west pilot

Snakecharma

29th Apr 2014, 20:50

The Embraer ejet family (170/190) have the ability to split in pitch and roll

Jenna Talia

30th Apr 2014, 07:01

Oh dear! There will not be any aircraft left for W8 to pax in :ugh:

Kharon

30th Apr 2014, 07:58

It is grossly unfair and professionally offensive to criticise either this or any another 'transport' class aircraft, or the operating crews during this passage of play. Even if speculation and 'informed', professional discussion are the meat and potatoes of the Pprune forum.

The ATR series, for those who have not had the pleasure; is a mighty fine aircraft. One which has seen and survived much hard service (and some abuse), in many tough ports, world wide, often providing survivability where little was available, (read the accident reports). It was designed, built and tested by professional engineers who have their names and; in some cases, their signatures on the type certification data sheet. The aircraft has, even after being in some manner 'abused', served faithfully and flawlessly, many times over, often above the call of duty. Same –same the trusty Dash, Saab and Twotter, the peerless Metro, Shorts and Fokker variants. They all fly lots of hours, countless sectors in a wide variety of weather conditions and made many 'safe' landings in some bloody awful conditions. They stand as testament to the visible, viable engineering and pilot skills, hard won over the decades. Cheap shots and bickering; - save them for the kids footy club.

There is no data to support a crew stuff up. I, for one have no doubt that VARA fulfil, at very least, the minimum crew competency requirements and would not allow any pilot to 'captain' an aircraft who was anything else but competent and qualified, same for the FO. I wonder if SLF have any idea of what it actually takes to 'qualify' an operation; such as VARA. Hint, if it were that easy and guaranteed profitable; every one would be doing it. There is little fun in the doing of it and you do need deep pockets to even contemplate such a venture. No one sane is going to bet all that on a 'dodgy' aircraft or a 'suspect' crew. Certainly no one with a business brain; it just don't make sense. QED.

So, must we look deeper? On surface hearsay, somehow and in some way, something got busted, and claims of "Bird strike" just don't (for me at least) seem to cut it. Perhaps that explains the almost indecent haste of the ATSB and the marked lack of a preliminary report.

So, what about it Beaker?, hows about throwing the hungry, unwashed a bone to chew on. Preliminary report 'on time', that sort of stuff. (It's probably there, but the 'new' ATSB site makes things remarkably difficult to find).

Heigh Ho. Back to my knitting.

BackdoorBandit

30th Apr 2014, 12:38

No shortage of emotion in that one.....

dubbleyew eight

30th Apr 2014, 14:49

It is grossly unfair and professionally offensive to criticise either this or any another 'transport' class aircraft

utter dribble

an aircraft sits in albury that will be scrapped by its owner.
the mechanics who have looked at the aircraft believe that the entire tail would have parted company with the aircraft should it have flown again.

....but you are content that as long as the paperwork was in order, as long as it was certified then that would make it all ok.

are you nuts?

the aircraft was just flown in normal operations and it broke in fairly usual turbulence.
the disconnect of the two halves of the rudder is nothing but an inconvenience to be sorted on the ground by the mechanics.
what is the bother is that the structural integrity of the tail was so badly compromised that it came close to failing in flight. because of this VARA are going to scrap the aircraft.

so what you are all saying is that because it didn't actually crash and kill a hundred or so souls ah "nothing to see folks, move along now...she'll be right"

you have little idea just how stupidly incompetent I think you people are.
it is ok to have aircraft deficient in strength in RPT operations is it?

I think I'll stick to my homebuit.
at least I can take it to Vne and flog it through turbulence without it breaking.

Mail-man

30th Apr 2014, 15:40

I'll take a professional in a "compromised" airframe over an amateur at Vne through turbs in a homebuilt anyday of the week.

liffy2A

30th Apr 2014, 18:14

Double 8 and co,

You are all entitled to you opinion, but the aircraft speaks for itself, you can compare it to the Dash and that's it. all other aircraft are for bush pilots. I'm sorry to say the ATR and Dash are the only 2 built for real airlines. ATR are winning contracts all around the world ahead of the Dash for good reason with huge backlogs. It's it built and tested in Toulouse France by the same engineers and test pilots as Airbus.EADS, which owns 50% of ATR. It flies everyday in the Himalayas, Northern Russia to the dusty deserts of Pakistan with very few faults. I have flown it myself for 10 years and love the aircraft. My ten cent is wait for the report to come out. All I can say is an aircraft that weights over 22 ton can't be flown and flung around like a beach bacon/Barbie whatever..... or metroliner :rolleyes: Get well soon to the cabin crew. As for not flying an ATR, great I'm not sure I would be too fond of your company.

43Inches

30th Apr 2014, 22:22

I agree with W8 on the ATR, it's had a very chequered history, whilst it has good economic credentials it has had a lot of accidents and incidents due icing.

Some excerpts from a few different online sources;

Roselawn accident;

3.2 Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots because: 1) ATR failed to completely disclose to operators, and incorporate in the ATR 72 airplane flight manual, flightcrew operating manual and flightcrew training programs, adequate information concerning previously known effects of freezing precipitation on the stability and control characteristics, autopilot and related operational procedures when the ATR 72 was operated in such conditions; 2) the French Directorate General for Civil Aviation's (DGAC's) inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72, and its failure to take the necessary corrective action to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; and 3) the DGAC's failure to provide the FAA with timely airworthiness information developed from previous ATR incidents and accidents in icing conditions, as specified under the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement and Annex 8 of the International Civil Aviation Organization.
Contributing to the accident were: 1) the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's) failure to ensure that aircraft icing certification requirements, operational requirements for flight into icing conditions, and FAA published aircraft icing information adequately accounted for the hazards that can result from flight in freezing rain and other icing conditions not specified in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 25, Appendix C; and 2) the FAA's inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72 to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions.[5]

In short ATR knew there was problems with the aircraft in icing and did not promulgate this to operators.

While the ATR 42 and ATR 72 aircraft are now compliant with all icing condition requirements imposed by those 18 ADs, the de-icing boots still only reach back to 12.5% of the chord. Prior to the accident, they had extended only to 5% and 7%, respectively. They still fail to deal with the findings of the Boscombe Down tests, conducted by British regulators, which demonstrated that ice could form as far back on the wing as 23% of the chord, and on the tail at 30% of chord. Both percentages remain well beyond the limits of the extended deicing boots, installed in compliance with those FAA ADs.

The fix to the wing/de-ice boots did not even address half the recommendation of the investigators.

It is likely that the lack of further ATR icing accidents is attributable to the changes in pilot operating procedures, as well as the moving of those aircraft to operating areas where severe icing is not a problem, rather than to the modest extension of the de-icer boots to 12.5% of the chord.[7]

None of the other turbo-props operated in Australia have this record.

If you think the problem was fixed this is a summary of the accident flight Aero Carribean 883, November 2010;

The Instituto de Aeronáutica Civil de Cuba took responsibility for investigating the accident in Cuba with assistance from ATR and the French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile (BEA).[19][20] On November 16 the investigation authority presented the final report following analysis of the flight data and cockpit voice recorders. It concluded that a combination of extreme weather conditions caused severe icing which along with bad crew operating procedures ultimately led to the loss of the aircraft in a similar set of circumstances to the American Eagle Flight 4184 incident which occurred with the same type of aircraft in 1994. ATR confirmed that the aircraft was in optimal technical condition.[citation needed]

The report available online for TransAsia Airways cargo flight 791 is worth a read as well. 2002 accident very similar circumstance to Roselawn.

The 2012 UTAir accident in Russia probably had a similar cause but the ice accumulation possibly happened prior to take-off.

One thing is absolutely clear with the ATR, that is you must identify and exit severe icing very quickly or bad things can happen. Other Turbo-props like the Dash and SAAB are susceptible to icing but only to the normal stall issues, all problems these aircraft have had is too low speed with ice. The ATR problem is not a normal stall, it is a control hinge reversal that renders the aircraft almost uncontrollable if not accounted for early on, this can happen at high speed. A big problem with high wing aircraft like the ATR is you can not see how much ice is accumulating on the upper surface of the wing and where. The consistent rate of accidents following Roselawn and possibly numerous undisclosed incidents shows that if mishandled in icing this aircraft is still very unforgiving. If you compare this to the various Dash models there are very few instances of problems in icing, different wing design, these aircraft can motor through large amounts of icing and only need to change level when speed becomes an issue. This also accounts for the big difference in accidents, the ATR-72 having 7 fatal accidents (4 icing related) vs the Dash 8 300/400 having only two (all crew related). I did not include the ATR 42 and Dash 8 100/200 but the ratio is similar, but far less due icing.

Hopefully the 500/600 series ATR have modifications that fix the problem and it never shows again.

j3pipercub

30th Apr 2014, 22:54

43Inches, have you flown the ATR, any model?

w8, i thought you were bowing out? Furthermore, if you think we are incompetent, just imagine what some of us think of you.

43Inches

30th Apr 2014, 23:02

I have not flown it, I have flown in it and probably would do so again with reputable operators.

What I have been told by those that have is that training now focuses on these events, where as pre-Roselawn it was basically all blamed on pilots. I've flown other large turbo-props and have experienced severe icing on a number of occasions. In any turbo-prop it can overcome the de-ice systems very quickly and performance loss is rapid.

What I'm pointing out here is that the aircraft does not have a great history, it requires vigilance when operating in and around icing or it can bite a lot harder than other turbo-props in this regard.

j3pipercub

30th Apr 2014, 23:17

What I would say to you is that your obsession about ATRs and icing isnt healthy (not the first time you have mentioned it on these forums), especially if you have not operated one in and around icing conditions or at all for that matter. Yes, I have flown them.

I think any turbo-prop operated for prolonged periods of time in Severe Icing will 'bite hard'. Should I mention Colgan Air? There are no aircraft that I know of certified for flight into Severe Icing Conditions. Happy to be corrected.

But back to the twisted tail of doom and w8s VNE 4g pull ups.

43Inches

30th Apr 2014, 23:24

The Colgung air Q400 was not icing related, if you watch the the FDR recreation they left the PLs at flight idle during configuration until the aircraft stalled, the reaction to the stall was what then caused the accident.

There are no aircraft that I know of certified for flight into Severe Icing Conditions.

This is correct however you will encounter severe icing on occasion without it being forecast, sometimes it's easy to get out of other times it can take a while to get to a point to shed the ice.

KABOY

1st May 2014, 00:00

Have a look at 'Unheeded Warning', written by an American Eagle ATR pilot.

Here you will gain an insight into global politics and the high price of grounding an aircraft.

Kharon

1st May 2014, 01:37

The article – HERE (http://www.airlinesafety.com/letters/atr.htm) – is well worth a read, particularly for Prop jet pilots in this neck of the woods, where the freezing level is often high with plenty of moisture (and mixing) when the cloud tops are just 'out of reach'. Boser, the editor has been fair though and mentioned other nasty icing incidents which have occurred with other types. Was it a SAAB ? at Bathurst? had a nasty go with ice one dark and stormy. I believe one of the most worthy elements of any PJ type rating is a look at the certification standard which define the various types of 'icing' and the protection required for flight in those icing conditions. The 'type' of icing, for which the aircraft is certified to operate in, may surprise some.
FAA (http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/73465)
FAA (http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsid=10398)
• Freezing rain (FZRA): Precipitation at the ground level or aloft in the form of liquid water drops. The raindrop diameters are greater than 0.5 mm. Freezing rain exists at air temperatures less than 0degC (supercooled), remains in liquid form, and freezes on contact with objects on the surface or airborne.

• Heavy icing: A descriptor used operationally by flight crews when they report encountered icing intensity to air traffic control. The rate of ice buildup requires maximum use of the ice-protection systems to minimize ice accretions on the airframe. A representative accretion rate for reference purposes is more than 3 inches (7.5 cm) per hour on the outer wing. A pilot encountering such conditions should consider immediate exit from the conditions.

• Light icing: A descriptor used operationally by flight crews when they report encountered icing intensity to traffic control. The rate of ice buildup requires occasional cycling of manual deicing systems to minimize ice accretions on the airframe. A representative accretion rate for reference purposes is 1/4 inch to one inch (0.6 to 2.5 cm) per hour on the outer wing. The pilot should consider exiting the condition.

• Moderate icing: A descriptor used operationally by flight crews to report encountered icing intensity to traffic control. The rate of ice buildup requires frequent cycling of manual deicing systems to minimize ice accretions on the airframe. A representative accretion rate for reference purposes is 1 to 3 inches (2.5 to 7.5 cm) per hour on the outer wing. The pilot should consider exiting the condition as soon as possible.

• Severe icing: A descriptor used operationally by flight crews reporting encountered icing intensity to traffic control. The rate of ice buildup results in the inability of the ice protection systems to remove the buildup of ice satisfactorily. Also, ice builds up in locations not normally prone to icing, such as areas aft of protected surfaces and any other areas identified by the manufacturer. Immediate exit from the condition is necessary.

While acknowledging the 'ice' problems, we digress. As far as anyone knows, this incident was structural and unless the chook they allegedly hit was frozen solid, still in the bag, then icing has little to do with the event being considered.

Anyone know if the ATSB have broken cover yet on this event? they are overdue.

Sarcs

1st May 2014, 03:39

Kharon: Anyone know if the ATSB have broken cover yet on this event? they are overdue. According to the ATSB investigation number AO-2014-032 (http://atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ao-2014-032.aspx) page, the Prelim report is still outstanding but the bureau still stand by their intention of putting out a final report within several months. Which would be a world record for the bureau on what is obviously a complex and very sensitive investigation: Summary

The ATSB has commenced an investigation into an ATR72, VH-FVR near Sydney NSW on 20 February 2014.

During cruise, the aircraft encountered severe turbulence resulting in a cabin crew member receiving a serious injury.

As part of the investigation, the ATSB will interview the aircraft crew and operator.

A report will be released within several months.
The stated good intentions of the ATSB in investigating these two, apparently related, accidents (ATSB classification) is all well and good but are they in fact contravening their obligations under Annex 13 paragraph 7.4...:confused: Dispatch

7.4 The Preliminary Report shall be sent by facsimile, e-mail, or airmail within thirty days of the date of the accident unless the Accident/Incident Data Report has been sent by that time. When matters directly affecting safety are involved, it shall be sent as soon as the information is available and by the most suitable and quickest means available. Or is it ICAO that are sitting on the Preliminary report?? If so the ATSB (much like the Malaysians have done) should have made a media statement stating the reason for the delay so that all interested parties are kept informed. To do nothing only further adds to the distrust the industry has with the bureau after the findings of the Senate PelAir inquiry.

Perhaps the importance of the issuance of the Prelim report is perfectly highlighted by the speculation, Chinese whispers, conspiracy theories etc already displayed in this thread. If we had the prelim report we would all be able to see where the investigation is being 'scoped' and where the good investigators on the coalface are indeed looking for the answers to how an apparently certified and proven HCRPT turbo-prop could be so critically bent that it may end up being written off. To not have any facts revealed so far does the worldwide aviation industry (& travelling public) a huge disservice and does nothing to enhance, the already dodgy, credibility of the ATSB...:=

Q/ Not to discredit the professional investigators at the bureau (I truly believe they are doing their jobs to the best of their abilities and resources available to them) but is the middle to executive management in total disarray since the PelAir debacle has been publicly revealed??

Example:Yesterday I went to the ATSB website and noticed that the weekly summaries link had been deleted and in its place was this: ATSB National Aviation Occurrence Database (http://atsb.gov.au/avdata.aspx) This probably explains why the weekly summary lists were nearly 2 months behind...:ugh: Maybe this bureau initiative will end up being extremely useful but at the moment it appears to be yet another barrier to accessing any useful safety information derived from the many, responsibly notified, incidents/accidents...:= What is more staggering is that this change to accessing the ATSB database was totally un-notified or adequately explained...:ugh: Err..WTF is going on at the ATSB?? :{

Sunfish

1st May 2014, 05:36

The simplest explanation is that the ATSB is doing its level best not to rock the Boat, not the CASA boat, not the Departments Boat and especially not the Ministers Boat.

Nothing must be published that reflects poorly on Regulator, Department and by implication the Minister. This includes any comment on an operator which calls into question CASA regulation and oversight of the same.

To put that another way, until the ATR incident can be blamed on pilot error or unforseen weather nothing will be reported.

By way of example. the British Government ordered a review into the horrific conditions for the British wounded in the Crimean war of 1853 - 1856. Their finding was that it was all caused by the non arrival of a shipment of hay due to weather, so no ones fault of course.

You can already see that approach in ATSB incident reporting here:

21/12/2013 201312681 Incident No Port Macquarie Aerodrome NSW ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional ATR72-212A Air Transport High Capacity Passenger G CTAF During the landing in windy conditions, the aircraft bounced and the tail bumper struck the ground.

That is an example of justifying the conclusion in advance.

DutyofCare

1st May 2014, 14:47

Once again Sarcs (http://www.pprune.org/members/172498-sarcs), another top posting !

Kharon (http://www.pprune.org/members/341006-kharon), your research is outstanding: however I know that this one is " a so called experienced now unlucky colour of green " FO who's had a Barry Crocker.

When the Skip says:" Slow down " why not just reduce the power / raise the nose ???

MOREOVER why are you sitting in MY CHAIR I'll show you how to fly this boat !!!

j3pipercub (http://www.pprune.org/members/76766-j3pipercub) is on the $$$ now: As in HB, an oz knows not to fly into CB - with a SIGMET CURRENT FOR TURB - at VMO without your mouthgard in.

The thing of interest is why didn't the dept release spare airframes to replace the (now flagpole/ground based unit) grounded one: or do they feel somewhat responsible for forcing VARA to this so called " experienced os " factor to be more the issue atm ???:{:{:{

We really want VARA to succeed & relieve the bush from the Qprop overpriced cancer: But gee Warren, you should of never allowed this to happen under your watch...

ACCOUNTABILITY: Do both Dept's know the meaning of this word ???

Kharon

1st May 2014, 19:33

Loud and clear DoC. That possible scenario was discussed. Years back, (in the day), a couple of major carriers had similar issues, some of the BA episodes come to mind. The speedy resolution was truly a benchmark in what, these days is called "Safety Management". No one got fired; but major changes were made to the 'cardboard cut out' pilot model (HR), some attitude changes were enforced (vigorously) (flight ops), some additional training modules developed (training) which cured many issues. The whole process, ably assisted by the CAA was open, honest, very quietly but very effectively executed. Defining the root cause and creating 'real' solutions has probably saved more lives than crucifixion.

Whatever happened, the outcome must not be another slam dunk, supported by another round of Senate or ICAO investigation; the last one still makes me cringe. . I read/hear (somewhere) that CASA have stepped away from 'investigation' this time and are doing this one according to Hoyle (wonder why?).

Aside: one problem with cockroaches is, the moment the lights are off they think they can sneak back to continue the feast. Old technology eh.

-2-7. REPORTING TURBULENCE IN PIREPs

a. Turbulence reports must include location, altitude, or range of altitudes, and aircraft type, and should include whether in clouds or clear air. The degree of turbulence, intensity, and duration (occasional, intermittent, and continuous) is determined by the pilot.

1. Light. Loose objects in aircraft remain at rest.

2. Moderate. Unsecured objects are dislodged. Occupants feel definite strains against seat belts and shoulder straps.

3. Severe. Occupants thrown violently against seat belts. Momentary loss of aircraft control. Unsecured objects tossed about.

4. Extreme. Aircraft is tossed violently about, impossible to control. May cause structural damage.

b. Report Clear Air Turbulence (CAT) or CHOP if used by the pilot to describe the type of turbulence.

The link – HERE (http://www.navyaircrew.com/blog/2009/08/30/light-moderate-or-severe-turbulence how-are-they-defined/) – may be of some value, especially to those with a penchant for calling 'Severe wind shear' on final; but that's a story which will keep for another day. Remember the yarn about the boy who cried wolf, once too often.

discus2

3rd May 2014, 10:28

Duty of care,
Would you tell us where you get this solid info from ?
You seem to be so certain about what happened...

It s already your second post against a crew member...

Mail-man

3rd May 2014, 16:36

Kharon, would you make a report if you knew no other "low level" turboprops were following or would you minimize radio chatter as we've been trained to do?

waren9

3rd May 2014, 20:50

pireps are radio chatter?

they also help forecasters for next time

Kharon

3rd May 2014, 21:56

MM – I only posted the 'definitions' to clarify and define turbulence in 'official' (standard if you like) jargon. As for reporting, general questions are very hard to answer, but most 'seasoned' aircrew can (mostly) tread the fine line between wasting time and giving a heads up to those who need to know. They also know why, when and how to make a Pirep which is correctly phrased, useful, informative, quickly and easily disseminated. The USA have a good 'system' which is tied to the national weather base; interesting stuff. Have a Google, there's some good info available.....

Speaking of which has anyone managed to dig out the forecasts (area and TAF) for the time/day in question? I've not had a lot of luck (admittedly, Sunday half hearted).

Cargo744

9th May 2014, 11:27

The info i have recieved relates more to crew competency than the aircraft which looks like a write off. What is going on at VARA? CASA won't allow any more ATR's to be added either.

004wercras

9th May 2014, 11:40

What is going on at VARA? CASA won't allow any more ATR's to be added either.
CAsA did a similar thing to the then Virgin Blue back in around 2001 or thereabouts. The new kid on the block was bringing in an additional aircraft every 6 weeks or so, sometimes less, so Fort Fumble panicked and put the brakes on VB until they ramped up supporting departments manpower and supporting systems etc to handle the additional workload that is generated during a rapid growth phase. CAsA had been used to the QF/AN duo where the wheels turned relatively slowly. This new LCC thing spooked the laconic CAsA retirement village.
Could be a similar sort of concern once again. Or there could be some serious and systemic safety concerns that have the Regulator rattled? Then again maybe all of CAsA's limited supply of inspectors are off sick, on annual leave, filing paperwork and drinking coffee so they have asked VARA to slow up?

sunnySA

9th May 2014, 12:26

CASA won't allow any more ATR's to be added either.

I hear that Virgin want to add more E190s to their fleet, ATR replacements?

Saratogapp

9th May 2014, 12:31

So, what was the result of the ATR in question? Was it written off or reinstated? Can't see a complete write off for an a/c with a perfect hull but a severely damaged tail plane.

KABOY

9th May 2014, 12:31

Then again maybe all of CAsA's limited supply of inspectors are off sick, on annual leave, filing paperwork and drinking coffee so they have asked VARA to slow up?

Here is several pages relating to serious damage of a high capacity aircraft, that involves an ATR operator in its infancy trying to expand its fleet and you make that remark?

Don't you think the above posts may actually absolve CASA of that decision?

Chocks Away

9th May 2014, 12:43

Instead of throwing mud at CASA as the big scapegoat, I suggest the operator (WA); their recruitment (the whole process); training and safety/support mechanisms need a good hard look at ,in a room full of mirrors... because there is a very disturbing track record of multiple dodgy approaches and poor flight management (not avoiding turbulence/foul weather).

"That's what you get when you recruit kids to do a mans job"

Up-into-the-air

9th May 2014, 22:59

The May 2011 inquiry involves some of the issues you raise. Doubtless Kelpie would be interested in these ATR occurrences.

Here is some reading that may be useful. (http://vocasupport.com/senate-inquiries/2011-hearings/)

TWOTBAGS

10th May 2014, 01:19

I hear that Virgin want to add more E190s to their fleet, ATR replacements?

Close but no cigar...... think of another 100 seat dinosaur jet the company operates that is nearing the end of its life. Ask Alliance how long it too to do the last 24 year check.... and you answer will be clear.

yowieII

10th May 2014, 12:34

I hear that Virgin want to add more E190s to their fleet, ATR replacements?
Close but no cigar...... think of another 100 seat dinosaur jet the company operates that is nearing the end of its life. Ask Alliance how long it too to do the last 24 year check.... and you answer will be clear.

I can't see a new type in that operation for a while....

The Baron

11th May 2014, 06:08

The boss has said that VARA will eventually be an all ATR show, end of story.

sled_driver71

11th May 2014, 06:37

" very disturbing track record of multiple dodgy approaches and poor flight management (not avoiding turbulence/foul weather)."

Evidence Chocks away?

Also your comment:

"That's what you get when you recruit kids to do a man job."

Are you saying the age of VARA ATR pilots is too low?

ASY68

14th May 2014, 09:41

TB - IF VARA was to become an ALL ATR fleet, what would come of the FIFO and DIAC work? Unless VA is going to make another order for more E190 aircraft I think the F100 - atleast - will still be in the fleet until such time as a new aircraft is found.

Going Nowhere

14th May 2014, 09:50

2 additional F100's due shortly for VARA

Skiddymark

14th May 2014, 11:58

Can anyone answer the following:

1/ How long I can be in the VARA hold file before I have to re-interview? I believe it's 2 years for Virgin Mainline but not sure about VARA, any thoughts?

2/ Any one able to shed some light on when things might get moving again on the recruitment/hiring front?

Thanks for any info.

Skiddy :ok:

27/09

14th May 2014, 21:59

SHVC

14th May 2014, 22:41

Well Skiddy how long is a peice of string! I'd be looking elsewhere as at the current rate nothing will be going on untill next year at least, as VARA as an excess of around 30 pilots on the ATR.

Skiddymark

14th May 2014, 22:47

Keep ya toys in the pram .....I didn't see the point creating an entirely new thread for two simple questions.

In fact , the thread has covered many topics, none more so than incidents regarding the ATRs has a whole. I can draw a direct correlation as can CASA between these incidents and the temporary suspension of their expansion and therefore a halt in recruiting.

If it's such a massive thread drift and that concerns you so much don't fuel it by responding .....:ugh::ugh:

Skiddy

Skiddymark

14th May 2014, 22:49

G'day SHVC,

Just the kind of response I was looking for . Appreciate that. Got something else in the pipe line so you have made the waters a little less muddy .

Skiddy :ok:

The Baron

15th May 2014, 05:41

The F100 will be there as long as it is cost effective. They're fully depreciated and competing against similar aircraft in the Mining market. Rising maintenance costs and fuel burn will eventually catch up with them. When it does VARA will be a ATR operation, that was the primary reason Virgin Australia took them over.

RATpin

15th May 2014, 13:46

Not my understanding Baron,Mainline would like to dispose of F100/F50 to be replaced with E190/ATR,however,lease costs on some F100's make that uneconomic at present.For what it's worth.

Australopithecus

15th May 2014, 14:46

Is there some time or cycle limit to the life of an F100? From an outsider's perspective they appear to be in the sweet spot for size and economics. Am I wrong about that?

Also: I had the occasion to pay retail for a couple of flights on E190s recently. Leaving aside the grotesque circumstance of a pilot paying retail for anything, I have to say that I was profoundly impressed with the cabin furnishings, the crew and the whole vibe of the thing. It is my new favourite aeroplane to pax in.

Skystar320

16th May 2014, 04:26

Skywest/Virgin Regional are taking delivery of another Fokker F100 so they must be cost effective.

They are nice to fly in 'pax' wise as long as they have had a refurb.

dubbleyew eight

16th May 2014, 13:30

I am told that the Fokker 100 has superb aerodynamics. far better than some of its competitor aircraft models.

if Fokker was resurrected to build the F100 with updated systems aboard they would sell like hotcakes.

halfmanhalfbiscuit

16th May 2014, 16:24

Fairchild Dornier was developing the 728 prior to insolvency in early 2000's. Could have been a competitor to the Embraer. Apparently both project teams had links to the failed Indonesian regional jet.

I don't think Fokker will ever design and build a new or updated aircraft again. Fokker Elmo appears to be one company that rose from the ashes.

Regional jets are a good way to make a small fortune (from a large one )

Berealgetreal

16th May 2014, 20:32

Aviation Business: Turboprops to compete in the 100-seat-plus market? (http://www.aviationbusiness.com.au/news/turboprops-to-compete-in-the-100-seat-plus-market)

It's a matter of numbers.

The Fokker does no doubt a sterling job on the mining runs (couple sectors a day) but wouldn't handle the 24 hour schedule of the mainline fleet.

As a mate of mine who flies them says : it's a dinosaur, guzzles fuel, breaks down if pushed. Reckons it has some nice features but is pretty gutless. As for aerodynamics, I noted the wing looks more like a turbo prop wing (no sweep and fat). Old tech.

With fuel prices heading north the future would have to be a 90-100 seat turbo prop. Numbers. Exactly why ATR got the go ahead in the first place.

SHVC

16th May 2014, 21:26

As others have said the Fokkor is old, guzzles fuel etc, the ATR is cheap to run but is also cheaply built, the money they save in running cost goes directly back to repair, maintenence as often one is always U/S.

no-hoper

16th May 2014, 21:55

"the ATR is cheap to run but is also cheaply built, the money they save in running cost goes directly back to repair, maintenence as often one is always U/S."

details please SHVC

27/09

16th May 2014, 23:03

Aren't ATR planning to build a 90 seat turbo prop aircraft?

Skiddymark

17th May 2014, 04:04

Hey 27/09 .... How quickly you forget :ugh:

Quote:
Can anyone answer the following:

1/ How long I can be in the VARA hold file before I have to re-interview? I believe it's 2 years for Virgin Mainline but not sure about VARA, any thoughts?

2/ Any one able to shed some light on when things might get moving again on the recruitment/hiring front?

Thanks for any info.

Skiddy

I thought this discussion was about an ATR with some scratch marks on it? Talk about thread drift.

Bellcrank 74

17th May 2014, 05:54

Isn't this a thread regarding an ATR 72 grounded in Albury??? :rolleyes:

Pimp Daddy

20th May 2014, 11:08

Isn't this a thread regarding an ATR 72 grounded in Albury???

Yes, and from what i have heard she is rooted - apparently that photo isn't an optical illusion - the empennage is twisted and cracked.

Hempy

20th May 2014, 12:04

Well there is no way that damage was caused by a 'bird strike' as per the ATSB, so either there was another incident during the YMAY flight or heads will roll somewhere for ever letting it leave the ground. It's all leading towards the CB turbulence event to me, so how was this not noticed?

Paragraph377

20th May 2014, 13:08

I'm not so sure that the ATSB has the ability to properly investigate this one, based on their record over the past 5 years.
Interesting as the below accident just happened to be on TV tonight, great timing. The show was a bit overdone in its dramatisation in some parts but the basics of this accident was there. A more analytical and succinct account obviously can be found within the NTSB report. I read this some years ago, and it is worth a look for those of you who are interested in this field;

http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2004/AAR0404.pdf

Yeah I know, different a/c type in the attached report, different circumstances, different root cause and contributing factors, but in the AA accident the F/O's inputs sealed their fate and caused the destruction of a perfectly good aircraft. And it took some NASA scientists to do the calculations on what level of wake turbulence it would have taken to bring the a/c down. Even a very capable NTSB needed some additional help, so god help us if the VARA incident is too complex because the ATSB will fold like a cheap deck of cards.

It's also too early to know what the VARA investigation will produce, however I am pretty sure that crew input, training and culture will be right under the microscope. I find it difficult to believe that some form of turbulence alone could have produced the level of airframe damage we are being lead to believe. That's not to say that turbulence wasn't a factor, I just doubt that it was the only factor. It takes a hell of a lot of force to twist a frame.
The bigger issue at stake here is when did the aircraft actually get damaged? When was the damage noticed and how many sectors were flown before it was discovered? There are some very unsettling issues to be examined in this incident.

markis10

10th Jun 2014, 01:31

Updated report published.

Investigation: AO-2014-032 - Flight control event involving an ATR72, VH-FVR, 47 km WSW Sydney Airport, NSW on 20 February 2014 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ao-2014-032.aspx#.U5ZcUAlOZDU.twitter)

Kiwiconehead

10th Jun 2014, 04:29

Replace the tail!!!

Bloody hell.

fruitloop

10th Jun 2014, 06:50

Replace the vertical stab as well...I wonder what the lower vertical stab attach points are like with all the torsion events that happened....

Paragraph377

10th Jun 2014, 09:55

Well there's the answer - 13 sectors flown with a horrifically damaged aircraft. This is a disgrace. How the hell can you fly 13 sectors with that level of damage without it being detected? As for Virgins response of the event being 'isolated', well maybe the nature and depth of this damage is an 'isolated' outcome, but what of all the contributing factors, are they isolated? Very unlikely. Something has gone very very wrong in VA's system of oversight and assurance. One wonders whether VA's former strategy of one aircraft type is better suited to their actual capability, rather than a mixture of 737's, ATR's, A330's, Embraers, 777's........
Heads simply must roll over this, and I can't see why Borghetti's shouldn't be included? I hope you haven't forgotten who the accountable person is in your organisation John?

And finally, I know, a silly question but CASA you truly are asleep at the yoke, are you not??? This incident should hopefully open a lot of eyes by receiving the due attention it deserves. And not to be left off the list of VA woes;

http://m.smh.com.au/travel/travel-incidents/jetstar-virgin-planes-in-tarmac-bingle-at-melbourne-airport-20130810-2roct.html

http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/03/07/virgin-australia-safety-regulators-wake-in-fright-in-moranbah/

http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2013/06/21/virgin-mildura-fog-update-this-is-getting-interesting/

Sunfish

10th Jun 2014, 10:01

Remind me if I ever fly Virgin, to check that the wings, tail and rudder are roughly orthogonal. Oh, and Symmetrical!...

dubbleyew eight

10th Jun 2014, 10:07

in all fairness to VARA, it is reported to me (reported??? gossiped probably) the maint techs followed the ATR maint schedules. it is just possible that there is some optimism in some of the ATR info regarding performance and maint.
I may be wrong on this but CAsA would never realise would they....

KABOY

10th Jun 2014, 10:30

The aircraft manufacturer’s job card for a turbulence inspection specified a general visual inspection of the fuselage, stabilisers and wings with more detailed inspections if any anomalies were found.

How does a pilot inspection identify a problem with the horizontal stabiliser and an engineering inspection does not. The QAR also confirmed a 3.3g load with control disconnect which was outside the aircraft limits for weight! Does that not warrant a further investigation beyond the 'turbulence inspection'.

It appears the initial defect entry(control disconnect) may have been understated and it was only after further queries by engineering that they mentioned moderate turbulence.

I am sorry, but scratching at the surface of this reveals some fundamental errors by ground and air crew.

dubbleyew eight

10th Jun 2014, 10:37

How does a pilot inspection identify a problem with the horizontal stabiliser and an engineering inspection does not.

hmmm I'm sure that hole wasn't there before....

(I'm taking the piss. I'm not sure what was said :E:E )

Phalanger

10th Jun 2014, 13:31

Heads simply must roll over this, and I can't see why Borghetti's shouldn't be included? I hope you haven't forgotten who the accountable person is in your organisation John?
So what about the group who got themselves in a situations where the the damage occurred and failed identify this to other parties? This was not a great display of team work:

Flight control occurrence

The captain believed he indicated his intention to take over control and while the first officer could not recall it being verbalised he was aware of the captain’s actions. The first officer recalled that he took his hands off the controls, releasing touch control steering in the process. Shortly after, concerned about a high nose-up attitude, the first officer put his hands back on the controls. To both crew members, what happened next was unexpected and unclear. Suddenly, the crew felt high positive g, the controls felt different and spongy, and cockpit warnings activated.

...

Initial examination

The airspeed increased again and then both the first officer and captain pulled on the control column. Shortly after, when the vertical load factor was increasing through 1.8 g, the first officer began to push the control column. The differential force on the control column that resulted from the captain and first officer applying an opposing force exceeded the differential force required to generate a pitch disconnect. Each pilot was then controlling the elevator on their side of the aircraft in opposite directions for a brief period before the first officer released his control column.

Now there is a situation where they are putting a load on the elevators in a twisting motion, that would of been opposing the ailerons to keep steady flight and something has got to give.

The crew advised the engineers that they weren’t sure what had happened but that the pitch controls had disconnected, with a possible overspeed. From the onboard equipment, the engineers were able to establish that there had not been an overspeed but a vertical load factor of 3.34 g was recorded that exceeded the acceptable limit for the aircraft weight. One of the engineers took the opportunity to conduct a preliminary walk-around visual inspection and did not observe any aircraft damage. The flight crew entered the pitch disconnect in the aircraft’s technical log and, after a request from the engineers for more information, added that the aircraft had sustained moderate turbulence.

Now if the engineers were actually told by the pilots that they were operating the two sections of the elevators in an opposite manner during the event, as opposed to simply turbulence causing the issue, do you think the engineers would of taking a different approach to their work? Would this of not meant the engeneers would realise they are no longer dealing with simply an turbulence inspection, but rather need to look at damage related to a different set of stress point? It is possible that there was internal damage at this time which didn't manifest itself till after further flights. Why are you jumping to calling for the head of one man who was the least responsible, when it really looks like it is a lesson for different groups including the pilots, engineers and ATR?

No Hoper

10th Jun 2014, 20:31

Whilst the cause of damage to the empennage was pilot "error", the reason for the aircraft flying with the damage was a maintenance error.
An inspection by torch light perhaps wasn't an ideal method for checking for external damage.
All maintainers should have empathy with the LAME who carried out the first inspection.

halfmanhalfbiscuit

10th Jun 2014, 20:45

Yes, if the maintenance engineer was left to inspect with a torch casa and Atsb should be looking at why and the human factors involved. Wasn't the 1-11 window blowout investigation one of the first to understand human factors. Job done in the middle of night poor ground equipment etc. All good James Reason stuff. Although beaker has been reported as beyond reason

skiinoz

11th Jun 2014, 00:31

Seems obvious to me who the ATSB are trying to pin the blame for this on, both engineers still suspended from duty, but both pilots back flying again, unbeleivable! They had to be told to go back to the A/C and put an entry in the tech log, even after a 3g load, a pitch disconnect and a broken leg. And as for the turbulance report, BS if you ask me. An over reaction to correcting a possible overspeed more like. There is more than one failure going on here, but appears the crew flying it are not one of them.

desmotronic

11th Jun 2014, 00:59

Is it possible that the initial damage was not easily visible and was then exacerbated over the next 13 sectors?

Sarcs

11th Jun 2014, 03:52

On the bureau tabloid article: Flight control event involving an ATR72, VH-FVR, 47 km WSW Sydney Airport, NSW on 20 February 2014 (http://atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ao-2014-032.aspx)

"K" in regard to your comments – Fluff and nonsense (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/429828-merged-senate-inquiry-99.html#post8516114) - on the latest ATsB press release being worthy of a tabloid journalist; one of the IOS (an editor of such..:D) has suggested some minor amendments : The Australian Transport Safety Bureau, an equal opportunity employer, has revealed that at 1640 and about 8,500 ft, the crew noticed the airspeed going up quickly and the speed trend excessively high. Beads of sweat poured off the first officer as she clawed at the throttles to reduce engine power and use touch control steering to temporarily disconnect the shattered autopilot before straining desperately to lift the leaden nose and prevent the doomed plane and its terrified passengers plummeting to disaster.

The aircraft felt ‘heavy’, requiring the first officer’s two hands on the controls to move from the then -4° pitch angle (aircraft nose-up/down). The first officer gambled that the pitch correction would be sufficient to prevent the mortally damaged plane from smashing through the dreaded sound barrier. The editor also suggests providing a more punchy headline starting with something like..."Seconds from disaster..etc" or "Plummeting to Earth uncontrollably..etc"...:E

Will fwd the final suggested edit prior to the next print (Final Report) deadline...:ok:

dubbleyew eight

11th Jun 2014, 04:23

it is possibly alleged...

the reaction to the atsb report from the lawyer boss is interesting.

paraphrasing "now guys the report is coming out, we all need to stand shoulder to shoulder on this, don't impugn the company reputation. remember it was some body else's fault"

apart from fits of laughter my thoughts are, lady you own the aircraft, you schedule the aircraft, you employ the staff. it isn't someone else fault.
bad luck happens as they say, but duckie YOU need to sort out the company so that it doesn't happen again.

....of course I'm easily ignored. I don't work for you and I don't fly with you.

yr right

11th Jun 2014, 05:23

The inspection that would have had to be carried out would due to the aircraft being in class A come from the maintenance controller. They would have had to issue the correct paper work. One can not say if the damage was there or not when the initial inspection was carried out. But it seams like a lot of cover up has taken place.

Cheers

No Hoper

11th Jun 2014, 07:08

but duckie YOU need to sort out the company so that it doesn't happen again. W8, which part of zonal inspection of the empennage don't you understand? The aircraft was released to service after the inspection by the LAME, not the company.
But it seams like a lot of cover up has taken place.
Yr Right, Gday nice flight back? What sort of cover up? By the LAME or CASR PArt 42 Organisation?

dubbleyew eight

11th Jun 2014, 12:51

no hoper a manager who creates a culture of "it wasn't me it was someone else" is incompetent.
the buck stops here as they say.
I'll say it again. Lady you are the big kazoola. it is YOUR job as big kazoola to ensure that the company gets its act together and this never happens again.

yr right there was no cover up. the maintenance people followed the ATR maintenance and repair schedule. trouble is that ATR expect descents to be about 180 knots in turbulence and not Vmo of 230 knots. ATR did not expect that the damage to the rudder would occur so the maint schedule doesn't fully inspect to the level that was needed.

VARA have been caught and ATR have been caught. in the regulated environment of atpl flying something occurred that none expected.
they'd better sort out the cause of the problem hadn't they.
a severed tail gets the attention of people who cannot be ignored. ...and a lot of teary irate families as well.

(I'll just add that the chief pilot of alligator airways had the same someone else's fault attitude it seems. or he was dopey. alligator was shut down.)

No Hoper

11th Jun 2014, 20:03

a manager who creates a culture of "it wasn't me it was someone else" is incompetent. the buck stops here as they say.
W8, you are correct, senior management drives the company culture.
What affect did the culture have on the maintenance performed?

Kharon

11th Jun 2014, 20:07

Big smile – thanks Sarcs (I think) – just goes to show how easily the 'prose' in the - press release (http://atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ao-2014-032.aspx) - can be readily adapted. As this is a significant incident, was some BRB interest in deconstructing the entire thing to try distilling some sense, or useful information. But, to be Frank, it's not worth the effort. We tried, but finished up rolling about the floor, laughing. Some of the more inane comments in the ATSB 'press release' were just too risible and proved irresistible. We gave up in the end and spent the evening with Mickey Bliss, damning Beaker and mourning the loss of the real ATSB.

The Canucks must have finished their 'audit', no way that 'report' could be released while they were here and on the job. We have sent a TSBC (BRB) colleague a copy though, just for more laughs.

Anyway, to contribute anything sensible to this thread, based on the press release would be a waste of time and effort. Best we can all do is ask the minister for our ATSB back, or give the job to AMSA; or, better yet get shut of it altogether and save the dollars.

No Hoper

11th Jun 2014, 20:21

From the report:
he engineer borrowed a nearby stand to provide a platform at about wing height.While on the stand positioned behind the left wing near the fuselage, the engineer inspected the upper surface of the wing, rear fuselage and tail by torchlight. Consider the height of wing and then height of tailplane upper surfaces

no-hoper

11th Jun 2014, 22:37

Whilst the cause of damage to the empennage was pilot "error", the reason for the aircraft flying with the damage was a maintenance error.

I fully agree.Who is doing the maintenance?Metro,737,ATR ???

Ultralights

12th Jun 2014, 07:35

am i reading this correctly,
The ATSB says its initial examination showed that “differential force on the control column that resulted from the captain and first officer applying an opposing force exceeded the differential force required to generate a pitch disconnect”.

“Each pilot was then controlling the elevator on their side of the aircraft in opposite directions for a brief period before the first officer released his control column.” The ATSB investigation is ongoing.

so, each yoke/stick or whatever they use on the ATR can independantly control both sides of the elevator? 1 stick forward, and one aft, means one elevator moving up and the other side down? i have only ever seen such control movements in millitary aircraft, with the computer doing the work...

something doesnt make sence..

Goat Whisperer

12th Jun 2014, 07:58

so, each yoke/stick or whatever they use on the ATR can independantly (sic) control both sides of the elevator? 1 stick forward, and one aft, means one elevator moving up and the other side down? i have only ever seen such control movements in millitary (sic)aircraft, with the computer doing the work...

something doesnt make sence (sic)..

It does make sense.

Many, if not all, transport aircraft can separate control surfaces with sufficient force, as a design feature to deal with jammed controls/surfaces. Some (Dash 8 IIRC) can be reconnected in flight, some can't (Brasilia IIRC). It takes considerable force, so it doesn't (shouldn't) happen inadvertently.

Oktas8

12th Jun 2014, 10:36

On a slightly broader topic.

After more than ten years teaching punters how to fly, including aerobatics, I learned that snatching at the yoke to prevent an over speed condition was a bad idea. Even if the PF was someone I didn't fully trust (student, FO, whoever.)

My current employer asks us to descend at Vmo-10. Occasionally, we get close to over speed. Anecdotally, the control column gets pulled if it looks really close.

I think an over speed buzzer, with paperwork, is preferable to snatching at the yoke at Vmo.

Thoughts?

yr right

12th Jun 2014, 11:47

What he would have been looking for on the upper surfaces is wrinkling. This even at night via a touch would have been clearly evident if the surface was over stretched. Shame ful that the engineer cops it and yet the pilots didn't write it straight up.
Welcome to we will look after you engineering. When you turn around your all on your own. And you wonder why engineers are leaving the industry and not being replaced.

Cheers

Capn Bloggs

12th Jun 2014, 12:09

I think an over speed buzzer, with paperwork, is preferable to snatching at the yoke at Vmo.

Training and education! No need to snatch, probably the same guys who will try to pull the wings off during a TCAS RA. Train it in the Sim or do it with a checkie on the line. Good doses of regular hand flying will teach the technique of leaning into the controls if a big movement is required. Yank it around the sky normally and you'll probably yank it during an overspeed.

Agree though, if a good "lean into it" doesn't hold the speed, let it happen.

feetonthedash

13th Jun 2014, 00:09

They reckon it takes five mistake to have an accident.......this must have been close.
Imagine if Barrier Aviation had done this same thing.CASA would have shut them down...........hang on CASA did shut them down for a lot less!

Up-into-the-air

13th Jun 2014, 04:33

This was published this morning:

Regional aviation - ATR report by ATSB released | Assistance to the Aviation Industry (http://vocasupport.com/regional-aviation-atr-report-by-atsb-released/)

TBM-Legend

13th Jun 2014, 05:05

NTSB summary of over controlling in American Airlines A300 accident:

Aircraft Accident Report
In-Flight Separation of Vertical Stabilizer
American Airlines Flight 587
Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053
Belle Harbor, New York
November 12, 2001

NTSB Number AAR-04/04
NTIS Number PB2004-910404
PDF

Executive Summary: On November 12, 2001, about 0916:15 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, crashed into a residential area of Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the airplane. The airplane’s vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and were found in Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The airplane’s engines subsequently separated in flight and were found several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the airplane and 5 people on the ground were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 587 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program.

The safety issues discussed in this report focus on characteristics of the A300-600 rudder control system design, A300-600 rudder pedal inputs at high airspeeds, aircraft-pilot coupling, flight operations at or below an airplane’s design maneuvering speed, and upset recovery training programs. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration and the Direction Général de l’Aviation Civile.

halfmanhalfbiscuit

13th Jun 2014, 18:10

UK newspaper has picked up the story. (Poorly written!) but this story is getting noticed.

First look at cracks on tail of Virgin plane which flew 13 times | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2656884/Pictured-First-look-cracks-tail-Virgin-plane-flew-13-times-engineers-noticed-damage.html)

500N

13th Jun 2014, 20:21

The story made the major newspapers here in aus.

Kharon

14th Jun 2014, 04:10

Half baked - UK newspaper has picked up the story. (Poorly written!) but this story is getting noticed. Someone should tell them (the Brits), that the story is almost verbatim, cribbed from the ASTB press release. (was there a wrong tail plane piccy in the mix?). After the Pel Air smack bottom and an 'aberration' excuse being graciously accepted the Rev. Forsyth's crew; you'd reckon the Beaker outfit could at least try to shine on this, fairly significant event. How often can we get lucky – there have been some very close calls this year; mathematically, at current rate, we are about due. My Grand-mamma always said – when you're in a hole, stop digging.

Reading submissions, eating muffins and watching Pprune tick over. Quite relaxing really......

FlexibleResponse

14th Jun 2014, 07:03

"At 1640 and about 8,500 ft, the crew noticed the airspeed going up quickly and the speed trend excessively high. The first officer reduced engine power and used touch control steering to temporarily disconnect the autopilot before manually raising the nose to control the speed. The aircraft felt ‘heavy’, requiring the first officer’s two hands on the controls to move from the then -4° pitch angle (aircraft nose-up/down). The first officer expected that the pitch correction would be sufficient to arrest the speed trend.

The captain was unsure if the first officer’s control inputs were sufficient to avoid an overspeed so put one of his hands on the controls and disconnected the autopilot to raise the nose further. The captain believed he indicated his intention to take over control and while the first officer could not recall it being verbalised he was aware of the captain’s actions. The first officer recalled that he took his hands off the controls, releasing touch control steering in the process. Shortly after, concerned about a high nose-up attitude, the first officer put his hands back on the controls. To both crew members, what happened next was unexpected and unclear.

Suddenly, the crew felt high positive g,[3] the controls felt different and spongy, and cockpit warnings activated. The crew then verified that the aircraft was under control at a stable attitude and speed. It was level or in a slight descent at an airspeed of about 230 kt.

One of the cockpit warnings was ‘pitch disconnect’, indicating the left and right elevator control systems had been decoupled. This allowed for independent movement of the elevators via the captain and first officer control columns."

An explanation of the how the damage occurred is inferred, but not clearly explained in the updated ATSB Report IMHO.

From the report, it would appear that one pilot (Capt) was pulling on the pitch control and the other pilot (FO) was pushing and that opposite load caused the disconnect of the two elevators as per the system design for elevator jams. After the elevators disconnect each pilot still had independent control of his respective side (L/R) elevator only (no elevator jam). The sum of the two pilot's pitch inputs at the time of disconnect and conflict over who was in control resulted in the + g overstress. The flight loads from the asymmetric highly deflected (assumption from high +g loads generated) elevator control surfaces (one elevator up and the other down) at near to Vne also caused excessive loads which resulted in structural damage to both elevators and including their attachments to the horizontal tailplane. In turn the asymmetric loads imparted on the horizontal tailplane gave rise to over design limit loading to the vertical stabiliser attachment and surrounding structure resulting in permanent deformation. Some damage was also done to the rudder. So far no reference has been made to whether or not the vertical stabiliser attachment points to the fuselage have also been damaged...but one would assume that the manufacturer's inspection has cleared that area.

The message to aviators from this event so far indicates that a strict handover/takeover of control must always be implemented in SOPs and strictly enforced.

ATSB Report:
Investigation: AO-2014-032 - Flight control event involving an ATR72, VH-FVR, 47 km WSW Sydney Airport, NSW on 20 February 2014 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ao-2014-032.aspx#.U5ZcUAlOZDU.twitter)

Phalanger

14th Jun 2014, 10:53

The message to aviators from this event so far indicates that a strict handover/takeover of control must always be implemented in SOPs and strictly enforced.And tell the LAMEs what actually happened so they can do their job properly, instead of trying to write something that avoids criticism of ones own actions, leaving them to have to come back guessing what to do. The sequence of events in the report seems more like the LAMEs failed because they were being mislead about what really happened in the air, even after having once realised the story was not good.

dubbleyew eight

14th Jun 2014, 13:32

no the message to aviators is that big transport category aircraft are not as strong in some areas as a lightie and shouldn't be flown like a lightie.

they also shouldn't be flown in high speed Vmo descents in bloody turbulence!

you can actually fly these aeroplanes to death (overstress them) as was nearly done in this instance.

halfmanhalfbiscuit

14th Jun 2014, 18:12

. Kharon Someone should tell them (the Brits), that the story is almost verbatim, cribbed from the ASTB press release. (was there a wrong tail plane piccy in the mix?). After the Pel Air smack bottom and an 'aberration' excuse being graciously accepted the Rev. Forsyth's crew; you'd reckon the Beaker outfit could at least try to shine on this, fairly significant event. How often can we get lucky – there have been some very close calls this year; mathematically, at current rate, we are about due. My Grand-mamma always said – when you're in a hole, stop digging.

I reckon interested parties will read the article realise it's junk and decide to read the Atsb report to get the real information. Then realise it ain't much better than what was in the paper!

Half baked reporter.

B772

15th Jun 2014, 02:49

Interesting to see the 'rear end' of a B737 in the Daily Mail story about the ATR72 at Albury.

j3pipercub

15th Jun 2014, 07:35

W8,

If you put your wittmans tailplane under the same stress as what was experienced, pretty damn sure it would fail also.

The moral of the story is follow the SOPs and be honest with the Engineers when you f@ck up.

j3

The Big E

15th Jun 2014, 11:55

The moral of the story is follow the SOPs and be honest with the Engineers when you f@ck up.

The latter is probably more important. I once had a know all (knower) F/E chasing the EPR figure on a high ambient takeoff, and in the process he exceeded the N2 operating limitations on all 4 engines through being fixated on the EPR readings.:= It took some coercing to get the truth out of the preek, and to get it actually written in the Tech Log.

The Industry operates on honesty, integrity, trust, and truth. This should be practised and remembered at all times, instead of a tendency to use the smokescreen at times.

Regards to ya all, TBE.

Ngineer

18th Jun 2014, 02:40

Whenever an incident plays out on an aircraft it often weighs very heavily on the minds of the engineers involved, whether they are at fault or not, and regardless of the outcome. It is a sickening feeling.

Fortunately the damage was noticed. We can all learn from this experience.

Arnold E

18th Jun 2014, 08:25

Pictures dont always tell the full story but, I have to ask was the fist inspection done with a biro. The damage "looks" fairly significant, looks like it should have been picked up with even a cursory check. :confused:

Anthill

18th Jun 2014, 08:37

There are no secrets on the flight deck- Anon.

TwoFiftyBelowTen

18th Jun 2014, 08:44

Lucky they had a spare ATR in the West. I think it arrived last September and they have only just wheeled it out! Happy to be corrected. (VH-VPI)

no-hoper

18th Jun 2014, 08:58

Arnold E,i fully agree.3 LAME failed to perform their job.

BPA

18th Jun 2014, 09:02

VPI went into service a few days ago operating flights to BUD and ROK.

j3pipercub

18th Jun 2014, 09:34

No hoper,

This entire thread you have been trying to shift blame solely to the LAMEs. My question is why and why are you also not criticising the operating crew?

j3

thorn bird

18th Jun 2014, 09:41

"Arnold E,i fully agree.3 LAME failed to perform their job."

Mate, a Tad extreme suggestion I think.

Regardless of the repartee' between them that break em and them that fix em, its our ass..es that our brothers in overalls protect.

In 47 years I've never known one that hasn't protected us from ourselves.

Why this aberration occurred I have no idea, but them that fix em can only work on what we tell em, ie. "there's a Clunking noise coming from the KAfoofle valve"..any blame for this incident cannot be laid at the door of them that fix em.

no-hoper

18th Jun 2014, 09:56

The damage was visible from the ground.The force to disengage the columns
is >120 LBF.You have to start thinking why and what happened... and then read the JIC.It is not too complicated. For the performance of the flight crew there is only "no comment"
from my side.

http://s14.directupload.net/images/140618/c8hzuj7z.jpg (http://www.directupload.net)

The picture of the white tail was taken from the ground.

Servo

18th Jun 2014, 11:32

Geez the pictures of the tail look as if the aircraft was an old GA aircraft that has had years of neglect, not a shiny new ATR :ooh:

No Hoper

18th Jun 2014, 20:30

For those who subscribe to James Reason paradigm, was this a maintenance error or wilfull violation?
SKYbrary - Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Human_Factors_Analysis_and_Classification_System_%28HFACS%29 )

Errors

Skill-Based Errors: Errors which occur in the operator’s execution of a routine, highly practiced task relating to procedure, training or proficiency and result in an unsafe situation (e.g., fail to prioritize attention, checklist error, negative habit).
Decision Errors: Errors which occur when the behaviors or actions of the operators proceed as intended yet the chosen plan proves inadequate to achieve the desired end-state and results in an unsafe situation (e.g, exceeded ability, rule-based error, inappropriate procedure).
Perceptual Errors: Errors which occur when an operator's sensory input is degraded and a decision is made based upon faulty information.

Violations

Routine Violations: Violations which are a habitual action on the part of the operator and are tolerated by the governing authority.
Exceptional Violations: Violations which are an isolated departure from authority, neither typical of the individual nor condoned by management.

j3pipercub

18th Jun 2014, 21:43

On that note No Hoper #2,

Was the crews actions to report moderate turbulence as opposed to the truth an error or violation?

Servo, I think the white tail is a different ATR.

No Hoper

19th Jun 2014, 07:05

J3pipercub
Perhaps a skills based error on part of pilots

Chocks Away

19th Jun 2014, 10:12

Yes, both #1 & #2 boys, having personal insight into the recruiting and watching this from a distance for some time now.
Alot of ass covering from a crew who have showed to be out of their depth, who shouldn't have had "it" at speed in areas of turbulence with the cabin not secured (flighties seated & not braking legs)... AND not reported an AIRREP to ATC immediately for following aircraft; PLUS not disclosed such occurrence(s) to the ginger-beers after landing... SO they can adapt their inspections accordingly.
Airmanship is severely lacking today... but that's just my take on the matter.
Happy landings :ok:

The Big E

20th Jun 2014, 02:38

PLUS not disclosed such occurrence(s) to the ginger-beers after landing... SO they can adapt their inspections accordingly.
Airmanship is severely lacking today..

Yes, one would have to agree with the latter. During my 54 years of Industry involvement I have noticed a decline in real Stick and Rudder manipulation, particularly over the last 20 to 25 years. Those who take excessive time to go solo, and the like, should be told it is probably in their best interests to find another vocation, rather than the training organisation just continuing to clip their ticket through student loans etc. irrespective of their poor handling skills :ugh:

tfx

22nd Jun 2014, 05:52

Anyone remember Viscounts? We imported two of them, right? two broke up in the air. After the second the then department grounded the type finish, wouldn't even let them be ferried out of the country. Broken up where they stood.

Australian flying conditions and European flying conditions are two different things, it seems.

KRUSTY 34

22nd Jun 2014, 06:33

Interesting though, if I recall correctly. One broke up over Botany Bay after penetrating a thunderstorm. That led to the mandatory carriage of Radar for all RPT turbine aircraft.

The other lost a wing on descent in WA due to an incorrectly installed engine mount, or something similar.

Glad to stand corrected.

Flingwing47

22nd Jun 2014, 08:29

Dec 1968

From NTSB report of MMA crash - 26 souls perished

"It was determined that the fatigue cracking and primary failure of
the starboard inner wing main spar lower boom occurred at Station 143 which
almost coincides with the outboard edge of No. 3 engine nacelle."

poor buggers didn't have a chance...:sad:

Capt Claret

22nd Jun 2014, 08:48

Anyone remember Viscounts? We imported two of them, right?

Lots more than two. 28 at least.

tfx

22nd Jun 2014, 10:11

Oops... twenty two I meant to say. However it was a long time ago and you are probably right.

Brian Abraham

23rd Jun 2014, 01:32

Anyone remember Viscounts? We imported two of them, right?Australia operated a total of 27 (includes 2 RAAF). All removed from service by 1970.

Had a sad history in Australia

VH-TVA crew training Mangalore 31/10/54 3 fatal
VH-TVC thunderstorm Botany Bay 30/11/61 15 fatal
VH-RMI fire in cabin pressurisation blower #2 engine caused wing failure Winton, Queensland 22/9/66 24 fatal
VH-RMQ wing failed at #3 engine due incorrectly installed bush in the lower spar boom 31/12/68 25 fatal

PPRuNeUser0161

26th Jun 2014, 10:10

Why is it if this happened to Qlink, QF or JQ the media would go to town and there would probably be some governmental enquiry?????

SN

VBA Engineer

26th Jun 2014, 15:40

Because Virgin employees don't hate their employer.

They don't run off to the media or to the easily misled senator with wild accusations.

They allow due process to be followed and corrections to be implemented as intended.

no-hoper

26th Jun 2014, 20:54

Flying passengers around in a wreck for five days.And only bs in this thread.

Arnold E

27th Jun 2014, 11:11

VBA Engineer

Just as a matter of interest, did you inspect the aircraft in the first instance?

VBA Engineer

27th Jun 2014, 22:29

No I did not.

I would have performed a thorough inspection using the required stands.

Strong rumour - Wait for the final report where they publish what the CCTV of the inspection shows.

All will be revealed.

TBM-Legend

29th Jun 2014, 05:27

A well deserved pat on the back for Australian engineers; funny, none of the much loved 'off-shore' providers picked it up. Well done I'd say.

Pity those engineers didn't inspect the ATR72 before releasing it for further flight and putting many at risk...

Dagegen

30th Jun 2014, 09:56

A well deserved pat on the back for Australian engineers; funny, none of the much loved 'off-shore' providers picked it up. Well done I'd say.

What makes you think it wasn't one of the much loved off-shore providers that picked it up?

Kharon

30th Jun 2014, 18:25

O, FFS - Post removed – sense of humour removed – interest removed.

wishiwasupthere

25th Nov 2014, 11:35

Looks like it's been repaired to a flyable state. Due to fly out of Aus in the next few days, possibly back to France?

http://flightaware.com/live/flight/VHFVR

ASY68

25th Nov 2014, 11:41

Probably to Seletar where all maintenance for the VARA ATRs is occuring

ProProp

28th Nov 2014, 23:52

As FVR is now 2 years old, I think you'll find that this is the second to last C Check that will be done in Seletar with all future (apart from the next one) heavy maintenance checks to be done in the Southern Hemisphere.

dubbleyew eight

1st Dec 2014, 10:31

I'd hate to be the poor bugger who invested the millions to buy that aeroplane.
you have to wonder just what the cost has been to Virgin and the aeroplane's owner.

ever so glad they started off as multi millionaires. :}:mad:

smiling monkey

1st Dec 2014, 10:52

I'd hate to be the poor bugger who invested the millions to buy that aeroplane. you have to wonder just what the cost has been to Virgin and the aeroplane's owner.

Wouldn't the insurance cover it?

DutyofCare

5th Dec 2014, 05:31

It was one of the 1st such repair attempted in the world.

That's only partly the reason for such a very long delay to VH-FVR's return.

The owners would of liaised with the Frogs & the lawyers to help fix this mess.

I for 1 would of loved to be a fly on the wall during those meetings :ooh::ooh::ooh:

Make no mistake, it was a very close call to being the 1st hull loss for ...

If I was the MLO, I would of forced the dysfunctional crew to attend these liaisons.

AND AS FOR THOSE CREWS ??? That's right = all's now OPS NORMAL :ugh:

More of the same in this politically correct,ever becoming $ wasting industry

williwonka

14th Dec 2014, 05:10

Looks like VH-FVR is on its way back from Seletar, having arrived there on 27 November, returning on 14 December. Two weeks work. How major was that?

wateroff

14th Dec 2014, 10:23

MLO..................

You'd be unemployed...........

Counter-rotation

17th Dec 2014, 07:40

The Industry operates on honesty, integrity, trust, and truth. This should be practised and remembered at all times, instead of a tendency to use the smokescreen at times.

Cripes, did someone just actually say that?! A nice sentiment, and how I wish it were true. But come on, what fairyland have you been working / flying around in?

Because Virgin employees don't hate their employer.

Or that? Speak for yourself, and no offence to you, but individual mileage may (ie. will) vary...

They allow due process to be followed and corrections to be implemented as intended.

Sadly this is not always an available option.

Flame away, whatever...

wombat1

20th Dec 2014, 08:25

Pretty sure its in Wagga having a paint job done on the damaged section

snooza

20th Dec 2014, 09:26

Back in service Sunday BNE-PQQ-SYD-CBR

dubbleyew eight

22nd Dec 2014, 13:05

I am advised that the previous post must be in error.

the ATR was repaired sufficient for flight and it was flown back to Toulouse by two of the manufacturer's test pilots.

I think it's destination was Toulouse le rudder in France. :-)

ymmv.

TWT

22nd Dec 2014, 18:52

It landed in CBR 6 minutes ago from SYD

VH-FVR ? FlightAware (http://flightaware.com/live/flight/VHFVR)

dubbleyew eight

24th Dec 2014, 11:01

rego has been transferred to another aircraft.
the damaged airframe is back in europe.
I have that from a good source.

Going Nowhere

24th Dec 2014, 13:36

Well your source is having a lend...

Still shows registered from 06 Nov 2012. C/n 1058.

Does anyone check facts before posting anymore?

Facts are;
It broke
It got fixed
It's now back in service.
:ugh:

Merry Xmas everyone!:ok:

TWT

24th Dec 2014, 19:21

W8,as Going Nowhere says,the CASA rego details make no mention of the rego being transferred to another airframe

CASA Search -- CASA Aircraft Register (http://casa-query.funnelback.com/search/search.cgi?collection=casa_aircraft_register&profile=_default&collection=casa_aircraft_register&form=&query=&meta_v_sand=FVR&Search=Search&session=1344335542)
mmmmmmm
nnnnnnn
nnnnnnn
nnnnnnn

VH-FTS

24th Dec 2014, 20:17

W8's comments show you shouldn't believe everything you read in this thread, let alone pprune as a whole.

Capt Claret

25th Dec 2014, 09:19

IIRC, in the good ole days, a rego couldn't be transferred from one airframe to another of the same type. Any idea is this is/was correct?

Fris B. Fairing

25th Dec 2014, 20:22

IIRC, in the good ole days, a rego couldn't be transferred from one airframe to another of the same type. Any idea is this is/was correct?

Capt Claret

It certainly was the case in said good ole days. I don't know what genius changed the rule but it's caused no end of confusion. One of the more notable results being two DC-3s registered VH-PWN (although not simultaneously).

Rgds

Chocks Away

26th Dec 2014, 12:08

Facts are;
It broke
It got fixed
It's now back in service

Instead of sweeping an extremely serious series of occurrences under the carpet... how about some answers for all ?:rolleyes:

Why was it broken? - The pilots were incompetent. Poor CRM, lack of experience... lack of systems knowledge... lack of maturity to report the actual inflight happenings to the on-ground ginger-beer... non-adherence to SOPS... lack of adequate SOPS for such situations... the list goes on. That is why VB stepped in!
What has changed and what has been learnt?
This is what needs to be asked.

dubbleyew eight

29th Dec 2014, 06:59

Facts are;
It broke
It got fixed
It's now back in service

those are not the facts.

the aircraft was flown in turbulence on descent at Vmo (maximum operating speed) the turbulence penetration speed is some 50 knots slower than Vmo.

the pilots did not realise that the aircraft was being structurally damaged by the descents.

aircraft continued in service until a bird strike caused a mechanic to have a look at what the damage was.

the inspection showed structural damage that had escaped the manufacturers inspection procedures, (built as they were on slower speed assumptions and lesser structural loads.)

there is obviously more to it than this potted history.

two of the manufacturer's test pilots flew that repaired aircraft back to Toulouse. presumably this will allow the designers to investigate what will be needed in the design to prevent a recurrence.

your mileage may vary.
have a safe flight.
W8

SimBud

29th Dec 2014, 07:19

two of the manufacturer's test pilots flew that repaired aircraft back to Toulouse. presumably this will allow the designers to investigate what will be needed in the design to prevent a recurrence.

False: FVR did not fly any further west than WSSL.

there is obviously more to it than this potted history.

True:

ProProp

29th Dec 2014, 10:40

Time to squash the rumours and share some facts.

Fact 1.
The reasons that it took 10 months to get the aircraft airborne:
A. When the ATR work team leader arrived at the hanger to start work, it was not in a state to complete the job - both cleanliness, and OH&S issues needed addressing. He went back to France until the hanger was up to standard and he had time available.
B. On second visit, the entire ATR work team came over - they completed the job including checking of the main wing and all bolts. A new tail was fitted and it was checked over by 3 separate engineers and specialist with fancy laser tools. The only reason it did not fly then was that there was a hold up with the CASA approval of the licences of the ATR pilots that were coming out to check the aircraft.

Fact 2.
ATR did send over two test pilots to put the aircraft through it's maintenance verification flight. VARA does not have any pilots trained or approved to conduct the procedures that were required. The aircraft did 2 flights as it required a small adjustment to the pitch trim. Apart from that it passed all of the other requirements.

Fact 3.
The aircraft was flown to Seletar by two VARA line pilots as it was due for its 'C Check' as although it did not have 5,000 hrs on the clocks it was past the 2 year limit. Had it not required this check it would have gone straight back onto the line - following a repaint of the tail.

Fact 4.
From all accounts, the crew that flew the aircraft to WSSL were impressed at how well it flew and did not report any problems with it.

Fact 5.
It is now back on the line and apart from a few small and very MINOR issues which is what you would expect from an aircraft sitting on the ground for over 10 months, there has been no issues with this air frame.

Those are the facts. Lets stop making assumptions about things we don't know or understand.

That is all.

VH-FTS

30th Dec 2014, 00:13

Dubbleyew-eight, you're either trolling very hard or someone's telling you some very wrong information. Best to keep your mouth shut before you sound even more like a fool.

ad-astra

30th Dec 2014, 04:18

VH-FTS.....

He (W8) is way past making a fool of himself.

ProProp

Facts and knowledge are a rare commodity on PPRuNe. Thank you.

aussie027

30th Dec 2014, 04:58

Proprop, Thanks very much for your informative post.
Waaay too much speculation and misinformation in this thread over the past 10mo.

The aircraft fixed and back in service and hopefully steps taken at VARA, modified procedures etc to ensure that this type of incident is not repeated.:ok:

The Big E

30th Dec 2014, 04:59

Those are the facts. Lets stop making assumptions about things we don't know or understand.

PP - As you say, a well set out collection of the facts.

Well done, by someone who can call a spade a shovel when the need arises.

Happy New year to ya all, and all the best for 2015 and beyond.

Regards, B E.

Chocks Away

30th Dec 2014, 08:47

Instead of bagging him (W8) on his last comments how about answering the first half of his post, regarding WHAT happened to CREATE this mess? :rolleyes:

PP's list of Facts may be well and good now, once the fat lady has sung, but who cares, you're "sweating the small stuff". :ugh:
Why did she sing and how can this same song not be sung again?
There is a history of bad handling and poor CRM, non-adherence of SOPS (or own interpretations of them!), breaking of minima (QLD) etc etc. :hmm:

What has changed to prevent this reoccurring? (honest question)

VH-FTS

30th Dec 2014, 23:39

It's unlikely that those who really know what went on, and are aware of the contributing organisational factors, are going to comment on a public forum while the investigation is still continuing. Until then you'll continue to have Qlink pilots throwing mud and plane spotters speculating.

j3pipercub

31st Dec 2014, 01:47

And VARA FOs fervently defending the company's honor...

VH-FTS

31st Dec 2014, 02:56

More than likely as well...therefore you won't get a true picture of what went on.

Dagegen

31st Dec 2014, 23:19

"It's unlikely that those who really know what went on, and are aware of the contributing organisational factors, are going to comment on a public forum while the investigation is still continuing."

This is one of the most accurate comments on this thread.

Although, I'd add that they are also highly unlikely to comment once the investigation has been completed.

DutyofCare

13th Jan 2015, 21:29

"It's unlikely that those who really know what went on, and are aware of the contributing organisational factors, are going to comment on a public forum while the investigation is still continuing."

So true, So very true...

Never launch an investigation unless you know the result !!!

The results of which can already be realised: the big boys won't let the facts be scrutinised or a blackeye publicly noticed :ouch: :ouch: :ouch:

Whilst VARA has cleaned up it's act - thx largely to the V safety system & personal - past bad employment is killing a great business model.

They have a huge issue in crewing & the ole Aussie work ethic is hard to find.

I really do wish them well >>> BUT THE ATR IS A 2 CREW AIRCRAFT OPERATING WITHIN A HIGH CAPACITY AOC...

MOST OF THESE INCIDENTS SHOULD OF BEEN MADE IN EITHER A C206 OR A ISLAND IN A CHARTER ENVIRONMENT BEFORE YOU GET INTO SUCH AN ESTEAMED, WELL PAID, PRIVILEGED POSITION...

WSSS

14th Jan 2015, 01:57

MOST OF THESE INCIDENTS SHOULD OF BEEN MADE IN EITHER A C206 OR A ISLAND IN A CHARTER ENVIRONMENT BEFORE YOU GET INTO SUCH AN ESTEAMED, WELL PAID, PRIVILEGED POSITION...

Really? An ATR job is an "ESTEAMED, WELL PAID, PRIVILEGED POSITION"? In most other countries its an entry level job.

scrubba

14th Jan 2015, 06:16

but only if you can spell... :ugh: :ugh: :ugh:

training wheels

14th Jan 2015, 14:18

Well, it's definitely flying again .. would have been nice to finish it off with a decent repaint of the tail, though ..

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B44nnz4CYAAtjy7.jpg

Source: Twitter (https://twitter.com/BidgeeWagga/status/544416185077362688/photo/1)

Going Nowhere

14th Jan 2015, 19:30

Read post 189. It went to Wagga for a touch up before re-entering service.

hoss

15th Jan 2015, 01:46

That picture looks like WGA to me, down by the old Kendell hangar.

rexxxxxy

14th Jun 2016, 07:14

Understand the final ATSB report comes out tomorrow with CASA in Bowen Hills today threatening to ground the entire ATR fleet.

VH-FTS

14th Jun 2016, 10:20

Understand the final ATSB report comes out tomorrow with CASA in Bowen Hills today threatening to ground the entire ATR fleet.

If they were going to ground them over that incident, they would have done it a long time ago. Plus it's now on a different AOC with a different maintenance provider.

megle2

14th Jun 2016, 10:43

I thought Casa had all moved from Bowen Hills out to the BN Airport

VH-FTS

14th Jun 2016, 12:37

Think he/she means CASA were at the Virgin Village in Bowen Hills.

Snakecharma

14th Jun 2016, 19:59

Let's face it, if casa had an aoc they couldn't keep it. They are a do as I say not as I do organisation and unfortunately do not have a huge amount of respect within the industry.

I was kind of hopeful the new boss would see through a few people but that doesn't appear to have happened.

Raider1

15th Jun 2016, 04:25

The interim report has been released today. Interesting reading.
For those that haven't seen it. Here is a link:

Investigation: AO-2014-032 - In-flight pitch disconnect involving ATR 72 aircraft, VH FVR 47 km WSW of Sydney Airport, NSW on 20 February 2014 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ao-2014-032/)

Wimbles

15th Jun 2016, 07:57

But no comment on the failure of maintenance to spot the damage

Kiwiconehead

15th Jun 2016, 10:04

That pic of it taxiing in is pretty worrying, especially when it was inspected and flew again!

PoppaJo

15th Jun 2016, 10:59

A non level elevator cleared to fly again?

What the hell is wrong with people??? I hope everyone involved in signing it off is out of the industry....

I'd like to know what else these people cleared to fly.

squib66

15th Jun 2016, 22:52

Good summary here:-
ATR 72 In-Flight Pitch Disconnect and Structural Failure (http://aerossurance.com/safety-management/atr72pitch-disconnect/)

http://aerossurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ATR72-VH-FVR-ATSB-AO2014032.jpg

http://aerossurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/art72-figure-7-300x198.jpg
http://aerossurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/art72-figure-8-300x165.jpg

http://aerossurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/atr72-figure-9-300x172.jpg

Was there not a suggestion of maintenance personnel fatigue?

ozaub

23rd Jun 2016, 06:31

The ATSB report isn’t getting the attention it deserves. Can I please draw invidious comparisons with attitudes to the loss of AirAsia QZ 8501 later in 2014. In both cases the crew mismanaged an upset with opposite control inputs.
The AirAsia A320 broke up in flight for many reasons, not least the language confusion and Captain telling FO to “Pull Down, Pull Down”. The airline was vilified and Indonesian aviation denigrated. However Indonesia’s report is timely and thorough.
For the ATR all we have is an interim report with many unanswered questions.
Opposite control inputs from ATR’s Captain and FO caused the left and right elevator control systems to uncouple from each other. It may not be common knowledge that many aircraft have separate control runs to each side of the elevator. The sides are connected by a clutch which in event of a jam disconnects and allows safe flight. In this incident independent and opposite movement of the left and right elevators via the captain’s and FO’s control columns respectively subjected the tail to asymmetric loads well beyond design requirements.
Subsequent ATR analysis found that the maximum load on the horizontal stabiliser exceeded design ultimate load by about 47 per cent, and the exceedance lasted about 0.125 second.
Somehow the ATR’s tailplane held together. Damage was so severe that the tail was visually twisted, yet nobody noticed. The plane continued in service and extent of damage was discovered almost by chance after a suspected bird strike. The aircraft was so severely damaged that ATR required complete replacement of both the vertical and horizontal tails.
Once again Australia kept its aviation reputation intact more by luck than competency. If you think that’s a harsh judgement read another recent ATSB report, into how two Boeing 737s nearly ran out of fuel and had no option but to land in fog with fuel and visibility below legal minima. Final report is at https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5770548/ao-2013-100-final.pdf

ozaub

10th Jul 2016, 23:27

There's an extended version of post above at Plane lucky: an aviation escape (http://www.smh.com.au/comment/plane-lucky-an-aviation-escape-20160708-gq1i4k.html)

Oakape

11th Jul 2016, 00:38

The question remains - what are two pilots doing on the controls at the same time? There are very few occasions where this may be appropriate these days & I don't believe that this is one of them.

The AirAsia A320 accident almost defies belief. The following quote got my attention -

"The captain needed the co-pilot to assist by pushing his control forward to make the aircraft pitch down." Correct me if I'm wrong, but I do not believe that the A320 requires forward sidestick on both sides in order to obtain a maximum nose down command. If the captain had full nose down input on his side, no amount of input on the F/o's side would make any difference. The captain didn't need the F/o to assist as asserted in the article & if he felt he did, it shows an extreme lack of understanding of the aircraft systems & of the principles of multi-crew operations.

I had a senior pilot riding shotgun in a Chieftain one night who thought he had the right to manipulate the controls at any time he saw fit. Not that I had any idea of what he was doing until after. As I was about to commence the flare, just starting to put pressure on the control column, it jerked back & the aircraft leapt upwards. I was wondering if the control column was sticking but, having enough speed & runway eased the aircraft down & commenced the flare again. Same thing. After the aircraft 'arrived' rather firmly the 3rd time, I discussed the possibility of the control column jamming with him later in the roll-out. He then sheepishly admitted that he had thought I was flaring too late & had pulled back on the controls. The combined input from both me & him lead to the control column jerking back & the aircraft pitching up vigorously. He is now a QF captain & I hope he learnt a lesson that night.

If the captain on the ATR thought that the F/o wasn't doing a good enough job, he should have said "I have control" & the F/o hopefully would have let go.

I am really starting to worry about training and basic airmanship these days.

PLovett

11th Jul 2016, 09:43

"The captain needed the co-pilot to assist by pushing his control forward to make the aircraft pitch down." Correct me if I'm wrong, but I do not believe that the A320 requires forward sidestick on both sides in order to obtain a maximum nose down command. If the captain had full nose down input on his side, no amount of input on the F/o's side would make any difference. The captain didn't need the F/o to assist as asserted in the article & if he felt he did, it shows an extreme lack of understanding of the aircraft systems & of the principles of multi-crew operations.

Oakape, I suggest something has got lost in translation in the report. My understanding was that the FO was PF and in response to the autopilot disengagement he had full back stick as he was unaware the aircraft had dropped out of normal law with its stall protection. The captain was more aware of what was happening and initially told the FO to "pull down". This certainly got lost in interpretation as the FO continued to apply back pressure on the side-stick. The captain then applied forward pressure but without using his command button all that did was counter the FO's input so nothing happened.

Certainly it could be argued that he should have taken control by telling the FO to #@z*^\ well let go, but he didn't and the rest is history.

SHVC

11th Jul 2016, 12:00

What amazes me is the CAPT of the ATR is still a CAPT, seems for so much damage caused to the aircraft and FA there has been no consequence.

Oakape

11th Jul 2016, 21:20

Thanks for the clarification PLovett.

The Green Goblin

12th Jul 2016, 02:35

I think what needs to happen with Airbus control law is any movement on the captains stick overrides the FO stick. If the FO needs to take over, or lockout a malfunctioning Cm1 stick , they push the takeover push button.

If this was the case, AF wouldn't have happened. Neither would Air Asia.

You could argue these crew didn't follow the correct procedure and if they had, they wouldn't have found themselves in the situation. True, however from a human factors perspective it's happening quite often. Despite what we are taught in the sim, when the skipper needs to grab the stick quickly, the PB is often overlooked and the stick is manipulated with a dual input alert.

VH-FTS

12th Jul 2016, 03:29

So back to this topic, an ATR that doesn't have any fancy Airbus control stick gizmos - how did it come about that the FO (who was flying at the time) wasn't aware of the CPT's intentions? Did the CPT announce taking over, and if he did, did he communicate it poorly? Why has this possible active failure not been discussed properly in any reports yet?

What was VARA's organisational culture like at the time? A couple of serious incidents had taken place in the previous 12 months. Was there a notion of fear amongst the crew about a possible punitive culture following an error? Was the CPT so scared of being investigated for a possible over speed that he completely over reacted?

Will the ATSB investigate the contributing organisational factors to this incident (like organisational culture)? Doubt it....

ozaub

27th Jul 2016, 05:25

On 11 July Fairfax Media published my account of the Virgin ATR 72 debacle at Plane lucky: an aviation escape (http://www.smh.com.au/comment/plane-lucky-an-aviation-escape-20160708-gq1i4k.html). ATSB took umbrage and published a rebuttal on 14 July at https://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/correcting-the-record/. I stand by my article and deny it “contains factual errors and misunderstandings”.
Since ATSB is so defensive of its lengthy investigation let’s spell out the timeline and compare it with Indonesia’s investigation of the AirAsia QZ8501 accident.
On 20 February 2014 the pilots of a Virgin ATR 72 mis-handled control inputs and overloaded the tailplane by 47 percent beyond ultimate design capability. Nowadays we design aircraft precisely, with no extra strength “for Mum and the kids”. So it is pure luck that the structure held together. For the next 5 days nobody noticed serious damage and a visibly twisted tailplane. The critically weakened airliner stayed in service and carried hundreds of passengers until the damage was found largely by luck.
On 10 June 2014 ATSB published an interim report of the accident, which described the damage but not its cause or why the damage went unnoticed.
On 15 June 2016 ATSB published a second interim report which quantified the overload, explained its cause and alerted operators that inadvertent application of opposing pitch control inputs can catastrophically damage ATR 72 and ATR 42 aircraft. ATSB seems not to have warned operators of other aircraft with similar controls. And 28 months after the accident ATSB is still analyzing why post-occurrence inspections failed to detect such gross damage.
Meanwhile on 28 December 2014 an AirAsia Airbus A320 crashed after a series of mistakes culminating in somewhat similar control mis-handling by the pilots. It took Indonesian investigators just 12 months to recover wreckage, extract flight data, analyse a complicated accident scenario and publish a thorough analysis of what went wrong.
ATSB must explain why its investigation is taking so long, and Virgin and CASA must be held to account for why so many passengers were put in jeopardy. Otherwise Australia’s aviation luck may run out.

swh

27th Jul 2016, 14:32

"Nowadays we design aircraft precisely, with no extra strength “for Mum and the kids”. "

Aircraft are designed to ultimate loads which are 150% above the design limit load.

Chronic Snoozer

27th Jul 2016, 18:14

Agreed ozaub. It seems to take an interminably long time for an investigation to bear fruit. The ATSB rebuttal appears to be obfuscation at best.

ozaub

27th Jul 2016, 23:17

SWH - the tailplane was loaded 47% beyond ultimate, i.e. over twice limit load.

BuzzBox

27th Jul 2016, 23:26

I agree that it's taking an excessive amount of time for the final report to be released. Mind you, I guess it doesn't help when the aircraft manufacturer is tardy in providing data requested by the investigator. The interim report released last month states that it took the manufacturer around 12 months to provide some of that data.

If the report had contained an analysis of why the damage wasn't found for five days, then I guess it wouldn't have been labelled an 'interim' report. As the ATSB said in its 'Correcting the record' dated 14 July, the initial focus was analysing the safety issue that caused the accident in the first place, ie the opposing control inputs by the pilots. The investigation of the subsequent maintenance issues is ongoing and will be included in the final report, supposed to be released in December.

swh

28th Jul 2016, 01:32

SWH - the tailplane was loaded 47% beyond ultimate, i.e. over twice limit load.

I don't believe that for a second, the tail does not have a singular load case. There are load cases for flight control inputs, gust response, ground loads etc.

On any aircraft there are literally thousands of different load cases.

An individual ultimate load case maybe exceeded without causing damage due to an additional margin of safety that case has inherited by meeting the requirements for a different limiting load case.

For example a flight control ultimate load case maybe less than the minimum weight gust response ultimate load case. Aircraft are designed so that the limiting case has a 150% safety factor.

If the limiting ultimate load case was exceeded it would result in failure.

ozaub

28th Jul 2016, 02:59

ATSB is clear:
“The limit load for the:
- vertical load on the horizontal stabiliser was exceeded
- vertical load on the wing was reached
- bending moment on the wing was exceeded
- engine mounts were exceeded.
The ultimate load, in terms of the asymmetric moment on the horizontal stabiliser, was exceeded.
ATR’s analysis found that the maximum load on the horizontal stabiliser coincided with the maximum elevator deflection that occurred 0.125 seconds after the elevators uncoupled. At that point, the ultimate load was exceeded by about 47 per cent, and the exceedance lasted about 0.125 second.”
I suspect that the aircraft survived because the load exceedance was so short. Also surplus static strength can arise from meeting fatigue durability requirements and from aeroelastic stiffness requirements. For whatever reason, the passengers were very lucky.

swh

28th Jul 2016, 09:24

I had downloaded the pdf before posting.

Components have multiple load cases they are designed to under the certification requirements. They are designed for the ground loads, vertical load factor, braking, bumps, turns, rejected takeoff, incomplete gear extension, ground winds, and break away. In flight they are designed for maneuver, gust, control deflection (normal and failure abnormal cases), buffet, inertia, vibration, aeroelastic/flutter loads. Additionally there are the other requirements such as jacking, pressurization, crash-worthiness, bird strike, lightning strike, hail, power plant failure, fire, fatigue, damage tolerance, fail safety, acoustics, and ground handling/towing.

Aircraft are designed so that the most limiting design case has 150% safety margin. Other non-limiting load cases at ultimate design load can have a additional margin of safety from a different load case which overlaps that component. For example the skin on the wing may need a ultimate load of X for bending moment, however requires 10 times X for crash worthiness. If the skin sees 2 times X bending moment load is is not going to fail as it still has significant margin for the crash worthiness requirement.

If we only had to look at 5 load cases when designing an aircraft we could do that in the afternoon, in reality it takes years because the task is a smidge more complicated.

Chronic Snoozer

28th Jul 2016, 15:49

Near Miss (http://www.smh.com.au/business/aviation/airasia-and-jetstar-flights-narrowly-avoid-collision-at-gold-coast-airport-20160728-gqg752.html)

Incident 21 Jul 16. Report by July 2017. Seems excessive. Nothing to do with Virgin ATR but indicative of the slow investigation pace of ATSB.

JammedStab

12th Sep 2016, 11:57

those are not the facts.

the aircraft was flown in turbulence on descent at Vmo (maximum operating speed) the turbulence penetration speed is some 50 knots slower than Vmo.

the pilots did not realise that the aircraft was being structurally damaged by the descents.

aircraft continued in service until a bird strike caused a mechanic to have a look at what the damage was.

the inspection showed structural damage that had escaped the manufacturers inspection procedures, (built as they were on slower speed assumptions and lesser structural loads.)

there is obviously more to it than this potted history.

two of the manufacturer's test pilots flew that repaired aircraft back to Toulouse. presumably this will allow the designers to investigate what will be needed in the design to prevent a recurrence.

your mileage may vary.
have a safe flight.
W8
Based on the report, it would appear that your accusation about flying at high speed in turbulence on the descent was wrong. To quote "In summary, the recorded data shows that: leading up to the occurrence, there was no indication of turbulence". It was also not at Vmo. A good example of the erroneous information that can be found after an accident/incident.

That being said, it appears from the report that the captain applied a significant amount of pull force into the control column. I suspect that once the disconnect happened the application of force of both pilots was no longer meeting the resistance from each other allowing their input to have a sudden increased effect in terms of elevator deflection at a relatively high speed with the resulting structural effect.

It would be interesting to see what was actually written in the logbook(and verbalized to maintenance, if anything) to get an idea of what the maintenance person would be triggered to specifically look for. If it was just about the pitch disconnect which was quite possible that this was the area of concentration. There must have been several walkarounds done by pilots during the following flights that did not detect the visual structural damage although the distortion damage was probably much less noticeable from close up than from a distance while the cracking and wrinkling would not be visible from walkaround distance. An example of how giving an overall look at an aircraft from a distance as it is approached could catch a defect.

I looked up the pitch disconnect procedure from my old ATR notes from several years ago and see nothing about any advisory about possible damage from this sort of scenario. Over 3g was applied to the aircraft. I wonder if this could happen while attempting to disconnect from a jam. If so, something to consider when attempting to do this and how it will affect the people in the back although in a jammed flight control situation, aircraft control is obviously the priority.