NTSB update on Asiana 214

[ExSp33db1rd]

There is a transition going from round dial to tapes. It's like going from an analog to digital watch.

That's why I don't wear a digital watch. One doesn't have to "read" an analogue watch, or instrument, one just "looks at the picture "

On the LSA aircraft I now fly I'm happy if the Old Fart's ASI indicates "approx" 4 o'clock whilst I'm LOOKING OUT OF THE WINDOW on finals, I don't have to move my eyes to read the tape, but when I fly the digital display machine I get anxious and worried - i.e.I stop looking out to read the tape, and .... My God ! I'm doing 66 knots and I should only be doing 65.

OK, I exaggerate ( slightly ) but I'm sure you know what I mean ?

Life was easier before computers - we used commonsense.

[FGD135]

That's why I don't wear a digital watch. One doesn't have to "read" an analogue watch, or instrument, one just "looks at the picture "And that "picture", is indeed, the BIG PICTURE. The airspeed tape, on the other hand, gives only the small picture, requiring further scrutiny to build a bigger picture.


Excellent comment, ExSp33db1rd

Why is this little reality not bleedingly obvious to the designers of the modern cockpits?

[porterhouse]

The airspeed tape, on the other hand, gives only the small picture, requiring further scrutiny to build a bigger picture.Not true.
You don't have to read the small number in the box to get very quickly an idea what's happening with your speed. You got bugs, you got magenta trend vector, you got the ticks in the tape running visually showing the speed is not 'stable', etc. You actually get much more visual cues than with any analog gauge. I fly with G1000 and prefer clarity of speed presentation over the old aircraft, there is no comparison.

[AviatorTB]

+1 tho i wish the g1000 would reverse the speed tape's direction so that the higher speeds are below the waterline and slower speeds above it. I have seen that in another EFIS avionics display and it made much more sense to me, esp when I was working on my IR.

[porterhouse]

would reverse the speed tape's direction so that the higher speeds are below
Wow, that would be really, really strange, that would also contradict how altitude tape works so unless you also revered the altitude tape that could confuse a heck out of a pilot. Big guys - Rockwell, Honeywell, Tales - as well as major GA suppliers like Garmin, Avidyne, Bendix, CMC or Aspen all adhere to the same standard. If you can find who has it 'reversed' let me know, first of all I have my doubts such a (certified) system exists second in case I were wrong I would like to find out who decided on such an unorthodox solution. In an experimental, uncertified avionics that would be probably more likely.

[Bergerie1]

ExSp33db1rd
That's why I wear an analogue watch too.


FGD135 and Cool Guys
Thanks for your good posts.

[blind pew]

It's about how the brain works.
Camouflage works by breaking up the shape of the object.
Similarly we recognise shapes and motion.
The gliding and free flying scene have lots of young and not so young innovative instrument designers. Whilst I have had digital and strip displays the easiest and quickest to interpret are pictorial where a glance is enough rather than reading what the digits (strips) actually say.
Examples are the old wind arrow or a semicircular vario dial (with a trend arrow).
Whilst all work efficiently when one is in a high work load (stress) situation surrounded by twenty other pilots in close proximity, in turbulence and next to a mountain face the "modern" instrument presentation is virtually useless as my ageing brain doesn't have enough capacity.
And this isn't after 10 hours in a rarefied atmosphere in the middle of my biological night.

[jmmoric]

I've been looking at this thread and a few others where pilots didn't see a stall comming.

I know that most commercial pilots don't fly anything besides their "big" jets, and most don't even have the papers for smaller aircrafts anymore, and have only flown them a few hours during their initial training.

I was wondering if training in smaller aircrafts, like old-school Pipers and Cessnas with old fashined instruments (clocks), would actually help even airline pilots getting better in the basic understanding of flying. the kind of flying where every action requires a proper reaction.

What I mean is, if you loose speed you shouldn't get confused and try to figure out what the computer does, you should push the throttle and lower the nose a bit without even thinking about the computer, and what it does, or why it does it.

Guess aircrafts that can actually spin could be good training as well :E

It's really sad to see accidents that could've been saved by very basic flyingskills.

[olasek]

where a glance is enough rather than reading what the digits (strips)And modern tape readout is far better for such a "glance", comparing modern aircraft speed indicator with a consumer digital watch is a sign of ignorance, only a non-pilot can make such a comparison. The modern tape-based AI gives you a lot more information than just a 'number'. This is another's pilot take on this topic:

http://airfactsjournal.com/2011/09/a-tale-of-two-panels/

[RetiredF4]

@ olasek
No news there, flying 9 hours on autopilot is less tiring then without autopilot, regardless wether you do the crosscheck on analogue dials or glass cockpit.

So what is your point there?

[olasek]

huh??
Said nothing about an autopilot, said something about a digital watch. :rolleyes:

[AirRabbit]

Just glanced at my digital watch, 13:49 in a nano second, that information is translated in my brain to a clock face for alternative perspective from numbers, to a identifiable time. Try it, our brains take us to a clock face.
I understand your premise … but, and with no criticism intended, you are expressing your personal preferences. Not everyone sees things, and interprets what they see, in an identical manner to your preferences … and not necessarily identical to anyone else’s, for that matter. That may be due to some aspect in your, and any other individual’s, personal past where a personal conclusion is reached that expresses the concept of “the-current-time” in a specific manner that is more preferable to you – yourself – which may be different from the preferences of others. And, it may be that the reason for the glance at the clock in the first place may have differing motivations. For example, IF you need to KNOW when a specific hour-minute-second is reached (regardless of what “time” that is), using a digital display is likely to be preferential. If one is interested only in being informed as to where they are in terms of the progress of the day (in terms of time), a general clock face is likely more relevant and easily understood.

The whole problem with the tape is that it requires way too much brain power, so when the chips are down, the brain will avoid it. This is a natural thing about all humans, and is related to that well-known tendency of humans to "task-shed" when the going gets busy/stressful.
I understand your premise, as well … but, equally true, and with no criticism intended toward you either, you are also expressing your personal preferences. Again, not everyone sees things, and interprets what they see, in an identical manner to your preferences … and, once again, not necessarily identical to anyone else’s, for that matter.

The fact is that a person is going to use first those things that they have been trained to use – the more training and the better the training – the more likely it will be that this is true. Failing any training, or if presented with a circumstance where the training has been less or inaccurate or incomplete or some other compromising circumstance, the person is much more likely to use what has become most comfortable to them as an individual – and the specifics can be widely different depending on the background, the experiences, and/or the training (if any) of that individual person.

I almost agree with you – in a way – that it might be useful – note, I said “might” be useful – to, as you said, “…for some proper human factors studies to be done under these (simulated) conditions.” However, personally, I would be surprised if there were to be a definitive answer that could be claimed to be the “best” answer, and equally applicable to everyone.

The most obvious examples of command indications are glideslope, localiser and course CDI. If the localiser needle is "to the left", you must make a correction "to the left" in order to correct. If the glideslope needle is "down", you must go "down" to correct. I'm sure everyone is highly familiar with the idea of command indications - we use them almost everyday, almost instinctively - with almost zero brain power.

The speed tape gives indications that are the OPPOSITE of command indications! If you are climbing after takeoff, with one engine out, and the V2 bug is "above", well, guess what? You have to go "down" - that is, lower the nose to increase airspeed (and bring the bug down towards the lubber line).
Again, I understand your premise … but, and yet again, I think this is more a “personal observation and an adopted practice” than a “command indication.” See below: The most basic example I can think of off the top of my head is a Flight Director’s “command bars:” as anyone familiar with these systems will recognize there are the “single cue” and “double cue” kinds of displays. As likely most of us would recognize, the single cue is a “V-shaped” figure into which the pilot is trained to place the nose and the wings of the “airplane representation” within the flight director. As the “V-shaped” figure is positioned within the “Attitude Display Indicator” (ADI), the pilot changes pitch attitude to match the “apex” of the V-shape, and rolls the airplane to match the “legs” of that V-shape. As we all have probably seen, when the pitch and bank “commands” displayed by the “command bars” have been matched by the pilot by “flying” the ADI miniature airplane into that V-shape, the current position of the airplane will, as the command bars are moved by the flight guidance system, eventually reach the desired pitch and bank as displayed by the flight director.

However, with the dual cue system … it is different. Two bars are displayed within the ADI … one displaying vertical movement (i.e., pitch) and the other displaying lateral movement (i.e., bank). If the horizontal command bar is elevated, the pilot must pull back on the controls to increase the pitch attitude (and vice versa) – However, if the nose of the miniature airplane is increased to match the “elevation” of that horizontal command bar … OR if the bank angle is increased (either left or right – depending on whether the vertical command bar is displaced either left or right in the ADI), inevitably, the pilot will find that as he/she is increasing the pitch attitude to bring the miniature airplane nose up to the horizontal command bar, that command bar will, inevitably, move toward the bottom of the case – indicating that the pilot must now move the elevator controls forward (nose down). But, again, inevitably, as the nose is moving down, the horizontal bar will, again, begin moving toward the top of the case … once again, “commanding” the pilot to increase the pitch attitude.

While the term “command bar” is likely the most logical descriptor of the role of the flight director display, for it to be followed as a specific “command” it would have to be immediately followed in both direction and magnitude of the correction instantaneously computed and displayed. However, this would likely require intense and riveted attention be paid to the command bar location and require immediate control application (pitch and bank – together with appropriate power adjustment, when and where required) to follow the “commands” as presented. However, if the pilot’s response is gauged as the initiation of movement in the direction of the commanded pitch or bank (or both) while realizing that once the direction and rate of pitch or bank change is recognized by the computer, subsequent calculations will display a continuous and immediate airplane attitude appropriate for when that calculation was completed. However, since this calculation is a continuing operation, continually showing the desired pitch and/or bank at THAT moment and what kind of adjustment would be required at that specific moment would be required.

It wasn’t until I had an opportunity to “play” with this particular type of flight director, did I begin to learn that the initial position of the command bars – either horizontal or vertical – was an indication of the direction of movement of the airplane’s pitch or bank. With my “understanding” that the “command” that was being given by the position of the “command” bar was not a position, but a direction. Of course, this is a simplification that I adopted to more easily understand when and how I should adjust the airplane flight controls to satisfy the flight director “commands” … i.e., if the horizontal command bar was positioned above the miniature airplane within the ADI, the “command” was understood as “…pitch up, and as you pitch, the computer will compute the existing pitch angle and the rate of pitch and adjust the commanded display accordingly.” As the airplane began to move, the command bars would re-position to a lesser position with respect to either pitch or bank or both. This understanding allowed the amount of “chasing” of the command bars to be decreased and thereby allowed smoother flight profile adjustment in accordance with the computer’s commanded attitude.

Again – training is the bed-rock (i.e., the foundation) that all airplane operations simply MUST be based upon. There is certainly more than a singular way for an instructor to get across to his/her students what they must do to fly the airplane the way it was designed to be flown. And when that instructor can find what kind of things make more sense to that particular student, that instructor will likely find a much more proficient way to have that student understand and assimilate the several aspects of flight training – knowledge based, rule based, and skill based behaviors. Of course it is significant to recognize the level of sophistication of any/all systems - particularly flight control systems - that the pilot must have full functional knowledge of and complete mastery of that/those system(s) in order to fulfill the role of "pilot flying" ... I am of the sincere belief that one of the pilots must be "flying" the airplane at ALL times ... even when the autoflight systems are engaged and functioning. Letting "George" do the flying is a mistake that all of us should seek to eliminate whenever, and where ever it is discussed or described.

[RetiredF4]

Olasek

huh??
Said nothing about an autopilot, said something about a digital watch.

You posted a link that should prove the point made by yourselve?. In that link a pilot is comparing flying the same route with an aircraft with old round gauges and no autopilot to flying with glass cockpit with autopilot and being more relaxed after the later flight.

your post, my bolding:



And modern tape readout is far better for such a "glance", comparing modern aircraft speed indicator with a consumer digital watch is a sign of ignorance, only a non-pilot can make such a comparison. The modern tape-based AI gives you a lot more information than just a 'number'. This is another's pilot take on this topic:

http://airfactsjournal.com/2011/09/a...of-two-panels/



So again: what do you want to prove with this link?

[olasek]

And does it have to be always a 'point'? :ugh:
Also the article says more than just about the autopilot, if you cared to read in in its entirety...

[Schnowzer]

Lots of great gen about instruments. Speed tape gives a subtlety different indication to a round dial but a pilot still flies pictures. Above the bug is ok, below it is bad just like on a round dial.

Didn't they just miss the runway on a beautiful day in SFO? Sorry, the only contributing factor I can see is base incompetence.

[ThreeThreeMike]

Didn't they just miss the runway on a beautiful day in SFO? Sorry, the only contributing factor I can see is base incompetence.

It just keeps coming back to that, doesn't it? Strange. :hmm:

[bloom]

_"And modern tape readout is far better for such a "glance", comparing modern aircraft speed indicator with a consumer digital watch is a sign of ignorance, only a non-pilot can make such a comparison. The modern tape-based AI gives you a lot more information than just a 'number'. This is another's pilot take on this topic:""

"That's why I don't wear a digital watch. One doesn't have to "read" an analogue watch, or instrument, one just "looks at the picture ""

Ahh, the old analog vs digital (as in numbers, not electronics).

Referencing the above red: That is a sign of pilot ignorance.

They both have their place.

An analog watch quickly shows the "arc". For a 9 0'clock appointment, my digital watch says it's 9:50, and I have to do the math mentally. My analog watch displays an arc that is faster to interpret.

Analog shows a "rate of change" better than a digital display. By the time you read the number, you have already exceeded the limit (Think EGT, Torque, RPM, maybe speed).

Ever notice that your "digital display" ("electronic display", in this case) actually displays an analog gauge?

"Human factors" has , is , and will always be a factor in all the future accidents. The interface between man and machine will always be a problem.

[Volume]

"Human factors" has , is , and will always be a factor in all the future accidents. The interface between man and machine will always be a problem.Absolutely correct. However, people do change with times. Modern People grow up with digital devices. Modern people develop a totally different style of receiving and processing information. Therefore of course Human Factors will allways be a factor, but the perfect human interface will allways change. The "Dos Generation" will find it easy to press three keys at a time, the iPhone Generation will find it easy to swipe across a touch screen and vice versa. Some peple will find it easier to have the same key with the same function at the same place all the time, others will find it easier to always have the most important key in every situation on top. Some find it easier to recognize a switch position with a glance, others find it easier to recognize it by its color changing with its setting. Some will be more alarmed by a warning light, some by a sound. I never found speed tapes easy to read, and probably never will. The main issue of Human Factors is that there is not a single standardized human on this planet...

[RAT 5]

An analog watch quickly shows the "arc". For a 9 0'clock appointment, my digital watch says it's 9:50, and I have to do the math mentally. My analog watch displays an arc that is faster to interpret.

Either watch display you are late.

You are also aiding the tape/command bug argument. In your case you had to know the appointment was at 09.00. You had a CMD bug in your brain, it was not visible. Thus you had to first identify 09.00 on the clock face, then interpret the current time and visually decide the error. On a tape there is a CMD bug visible, your current parameter is visible and the error is there at a glance. Even on round dials in big jets, in the latter days I flew them, there was a V2 bug & a Vref bug that was set manually. Only in Cherokees etc. did we fly fixed memory speeds in critical phases. True, on B732's the Vfly was about 4-5 O'clock as we flew about the same weight every time, but there was still a bug set; thus there was a visible datum and error arc. One is an arc and the other linear. A common argument is 'the rate of change is more understandable on a dial than a tape'. True, when the dial is unwinding or winding up at very high speed. Neither is common on a passenger jet during normal ops. I wonder what the reaction was when the move from 3 pointer altimeters to a combination of digital and single pinter was made? There is no doubt the latter was a major safety enhancement. Sometimes, with pointers, less is more.
Imagine the old T-scan. You had to interpret the ASI needle, the VSI needle, the Alitmeter needle, and perhaps even a VOR/ADF needle. All were in different 'clock' positions. That is a lot of brain power and skill. Now you can scan/glance across the displays and see if the a/c bug = CMD bug. The brain power required is far less and allows much more time to assess and decide. It allows more time to maintain better SA; it is so much more relaxing and allows a better overview of the operation. Specific errors in all the performance parameters are more evident with less work. What's not to like about that?
I flew B767 in the early days of speed tapes. One a/c we had had both ASI & speed tape; another only speed tape. By luck, or bad luck, I seemed to fly the ASI a/c mostly. I found myself looking at the ASI: old habits. Then I flew the other tape only a/c with an LTC. He took the time & trouble to explain in depth how to use the speed and all that it portrayed. The mists lifted, the fog cleared and I was converted. More importantly I then knew how to teach it myself.
To the sceptics we have to "agree to disagree". To those who say a pilot should be aware of the numbers; I agree, but in a different way perhaps. I know what I expect to see as Vr & V2 and Vref after a calculation; also N1% for takeoff. It's a mental 'gross error' check that I've adopted after years of seeing the computer calculations. If I agree and accept the number then I fly the CMD bug it gives. There is no doubt that this 'gross error' check is not part of the culture of todays cadets. Incidents have happened because of errors that went un-noticed. This opens up a whole other debate about blindly accepting answers from computers/calculators etc. That has been thrashed before, so I do not wish to resurrect it.

[Jwscud]

I am from the younger generation and I still prefer an analogue watch.

This is however because (a) I'm not a hipster and (b) this isn't the 1980s.

Surely as pilots we should have massive diameter overly heavy and complicated watches with E6Bs built in?

[Bergerie1]

As usual AirRabbit speaks words of wisdom. Back in the late 1980s I spent time with Boeing as they were developing the new CRT displays for the PFD on the Boeing 747-400. They experimented with a number of different presentations, round dial, tapes, different sizes, different colours, etc. and also the scales and sensitivities on each element of the displays and the relative sensitivities between them. The pilots involved were given a number of flying exercises, short routes that involved multiple turns and level-outs, etc. all ranging in difficulty. Then we, and the Boeing engineers, rated our performances and discussed preferences.

Some of the displays I found almost un-flyable, others were easy and intuitive. The final displays used by Boeing on the -400 PFD I found very easy to fly. I liked the tape presentations for speed and altitude but found the VSI too small. I also very much liked the way the FMA information was grouped at the top, the way speed commands and limitations were displayed, the large central ADI, and the colours used.

However, the thing I found hardest was to shed my personal preference for the round dial instruments that I had used for the previous 30years. It is very hard to separate basic ergonomic factors from learned personal preferences that have become ingrained from years of training and use. I am sure there is a huge amount of research information on the interesting topics that are being discussed in this thread which AirRabbit could direct us to.

[PerAsperaAdAstra]

Interesting stuff, the human factor cockpit ergonomics. Personally (totally a pre computer ager) I like to glance at a dial, needle position, rate of movement tell me all I need to know, the actual numbers are at times not impotrant. Most changed to oil pressure, temp etc I've encontered drew my attention because the needle was sitting in the wrong place. The Bell "Jetdanger" 206-B3 I instruct on has some glass instruments fitted and a digital TIT gauge. However apart from the number, it also has the running segments or bars in a radial around the gauge. After a few starts trying to interpret the numbers, I soon changed to watching the sweep if the segments, like a needle, rate and position tell me what I want to know. However having an exact number to look at in steady operation, is good. The glass MFD AI and HSI with coupled GPS data is good I will admit. It has speed and alt readouts right there on the sides of the displays but my very ingrained habit of scanning the other instruments, ASI, Altimeter etc, is too strong. It feels uncomfortable interpretting that info off the tape displays.

I recall the C5 Galaxy had some of the first tape cockpit displays and there were issues? One being the movement of the tape, is up an increase or decrease? To me with a fixed pointer, an upwards movement should be an increase?

The other point is so much talk of speed related to stalling? In the military when we taught stalling, speed had nothing to do with it, if there was buffet you were stalling, no buffet, no stall. Are we not associating speed with stalling too much? Yes speed is important but to so closely link speed and stalling? Most airliners have an AoA indicator, are the crew taught to use thyis in identifying an approaching stall? Do the MFD's start flashing somthing attention grabbing as crit alpha approaches?

[FGD135]

This is another's pilot take on this topic: ...olasek, that pilot's "take" refers to the modern glass presentation versus the older "round dial" instrumentation. Please understand that that is NOT what I and others have been discussing on this thread for the last couple of weeks.


The discussion has been about the presentation of airspeed in the scrolling "tape" format (as opposed to the big round dial of yesteryear). Nobody in this thread, including me, has raised any objections to the modern glass cockpits in general.


It is my opinion that glass cockpits dramatically improve on the way information is made available to pilots. I'm sure that would be the opinion of everybody on this thread.


But in the case of indicated airspeed (IAS), the presentation is significantly less effective, and I believe this fact has played a key role in the crashes of those 4 passenger aircraft since 2009 (Asiana 214 the most recent). (I believe the presentation of vertical speed (VS) is also less effective, but don't believe this was a factor in those crashes).


I believe that an habitual reliance on automation also played a key role, but this belief seems to be almost universally held, so I feel no need to dwell on that.


Another point you seem to be missing, by linking to that article, olasek, is that nobody has any difficulty with the speed tape when in the normal, low stress situation.


I have made the point many times now, that it is only when the chips are down that the differences between these two styles of presentation become significant.


For the 3 minutes that it took Air France 447 to fall to the ocean, the round dial airspeed indicators would have been pointing to the 1 o'clock position - if they had them. But unfortunately for them, they had the tapes. Perhaps someone here with Airbus experience can detail what those tapes would actually have been showing.


I can bet it was nothing like the simple, but big picture of a needle pointing at 1 o'clock.


... comparing modern aircraft speed indicator with a consumer digital watch is a sign of ignorance, only a non-pilot can make such a comparison.olasek, it is you that is ignorant, as you cannot see why so many of us make that comparison.


The point of that particular exercise is to get you to examine what your brain does when you look at an analogue clock, because what it does then is very similar to what it does when glancing at an airspeed dial.


If you can't work it out for yourself, I will now tell you. Your brain makes an assessment of the angular separation between the pointer (or minute hand) and the particular datum of interest (the 12 o'clock position in the case of the ASI).


Human beings are extremely good at working with angles. That is, estimating angles and angular distances/separations and repeating angular displacements. This is an ability that evolution has bestowed upon us and refined over millions of years. This natural ability has been referred to by numerous posters to this thread, which brings me to this statement, by Volume:


The main issue of Human Factors is that there is not a single standardized human on this planet... Wrong, very wrong. Every human is highly, highly "standardised". When it comes to how the human machine works and behaves, we are all, in fact, virtually identical.


This means that it does not matter whether a pilot learnt to fly with a speed tape, or the old dial. Those millions of years of evolution still make it far easier for him to assess airspeed via the angular displacement of a pointer.


Look at this photo. Note the engine instruments. Only the top 4 sets are visible, but there are 6 sets of gauges on the King Air. Beechcraft, in their wisdom (or perhaps copying someone else), deliberately arranged the gauges so that the needles all point in the 8-10 o'clock position when the engines are in the normal, cruise power range.


http://www.pcaviator.com/store/images/D/26-06.jpg


Below the 4 visible sets of gauges are the fuel flow and oil temperature/pressure. Those gauges have also been arranged so that their pointers all point to the 8-10 o'clock position when everything is normal.


I have flown King Airs and can testify that, because of this deliberate gauge arrangement, it is extremely easy to assess that all is normal with both engines. We are not even in the cockpit of this King Air, but we can instantly see that all is well! We can also see a healthy airspeed!


Which brings me to my next point, which clearly illustrates just how poorly the tape communicates airspeed to us.


Airspeed, as we all know, is a very, very important and fundamental aspect of flight in our flying machines. In terms of importance, it is BIG. It could be said that airspeed is even more important than attitude.


But when we look at a typical in-flight photo of a glass cockpit instrument panel, we cannot tell whether the airspeed is healthy or not, because the central area of the tape display is so tiny. We can see the attitude very well, however, and this is as it should be.


Something as BIG as airspeed should be so communicative that it could clearly be seen in even a fuzzy photo.


If you can tell that the airspeed is healthy (or not) from a fuzzy photo, then you know you have the best and most appropriate presentation of airspeed. This is the case with attitude, so why not with airspeed?

[OK465]

Here is what AF447 would have seen with an electro-mechanical round dial:

https://images.search.yahoo.com/images/view;_ylt=A0SO8x.ocutTt.QAqThXNyoA;_ylu=X3oDMTB0a3FrN2JpBHNl YwNzYwRjb2xvA2dxMQR2dGlkA1ZJUDQ0OF8x?p=airspeed+indicator&back=https%3A%2F%2Fsearch.yahoo.com%2Fsearch%3Fei%3DUTF-8%26p%3Dairspeed%2Bindicator%26fr%3Dyfp-t-901-s%26fp%3D1&w=2729&h=2721&imgurl=img.readtiger.com%2Fwkp%2Fen%2FAirspeed_indicator_DC-10.jpg&size=3788KB&name=Airspeed_indicator_DC-10.jpg&rcurl=http%3A%2F%2Freadtiger.com%2Fwkp%2Fen%2FAirspeed_indic ator&rurl=http%3A%2F%2Freadtiger.com%2Fwkp%2Fen%2FAirspeed_indica tor&type=&no=2&tt=115&oid=d12b7763f9dcd9b6fa865c3fb942c222&tit=Airspeed+indicator+and+Machmeter+of+a+large+jet+aircraft +with+moveable+...&sigr=11eui1ss6&sigi=11lpt9h9j&sign=10s51mu7d&sigt=103ooeh2o&sigb=12h8619eb&fr=yfp-t-901-s

[Volume]

Wrong, very wrong. Every human is highly, highly "standardised". When it comes to how the human machine works and behaves, we are all, in fact, virtually identical.Maybe at birth, but at the age we enter cockpits we are more a product our education and experience than of our ancient genes. Otherwise we would not discuss ethical aspects for the Asiana crash...
the round dial airspeed indicators would have been pointing to the 1 o'clock position.I think they were pretty sure that it is an unreliable (even senseless, or how they worded it "ridiculos") indication, so they would have ignored it anyway.

[porterhouse]

. I think they were pretty sure that it is an unreliable (even senseless, or how they worded it "ridiculos") indication, so they would have ignored it anyway
Correct.

And as far as Asiana crash - I very much doubt these pilots even once glanced in the direction of the airspeed, or even if they did their brain was simply shut out of processing any such info, so contention that a round dial would have saved them is a pure poppycock.

[AirRabbit]

Hi Bergerie1 – first, let me offer my most sincere “thanks” for the very nice compliment … and second, your comment that “It is very hard to separate basic ergonomic factors from learned personal preferences that have become ingrained from years of training and use” is another way of precisely saying the same point I was trying to make.

I am fully aware of (well … maybe not “fully aware, ” but certainly knowledgeable about…) the extent to which airplane cockpit designers go to provide complete and accurate information to the occupants of those cockpits – and, in addition to the amount of information provided, these professionals strive diligently to make that information easily recognizable and immediately useful to those pilots. As I have noted in many of my previous posts in this forum, in my somewhat sordid past, I’ve had the opportunity to see and work with, and for, some of the finest pilot instructors I’ve ever known – and in that process perhaps the most valuable concept to which I was introduced was to find a way to allow the student to use the preferences he/she has come to know and understand to perform any specific task.

The point I had to understand, and to which I had to be willing to commit, was that doing this caused my expenditure of time, effort, and awareness to “skyrocket.” While I readily acknowledge that it is certainly possible that I had to work harder at instructing than did my counterparts … it is equally true that the more I did it, the more I came to recognize that each of the instructors I observed and learned from, also worked very hard to achieve any notable success. The good thing was that when a student’s “light bulb” finally illuminated, I usually felt better than did the student! All of which is to say that ... when you recognize what the student has actually assimilated (not merely regurgitated) the satisfaction far outweighs any thought of "work"

The problem I see today is that instructors often wholly and absolutely depend on the training syllabus (i.e., the lesson plan) and, much to my chagrin and even greater disappointment, the training equipment itself, to “teach” the student what he/she needs to know. What instructors must come to understand is that a fully qualified pilot doesn’t just “happen” at the completion of a training “program” simply by having completed that program. Perhaps the 2 most important things a pilot instructor must know and must know how to address are the following:

1) The structure of a competent training program must include what a pilot must know, what skills a pilot must possess, and what rules a pilot must follow … and all of that has to fit into what that pilot can understand and use – and do so correctly … when things go as planned and when the plan goes askew (i.e., amiss, muddled, twisted, off-center, or just plain wrong); and

2) The flight simulator doesn’t “know” anything – and when such equipment is used without the direct involvement and oversight of a qualified, competent, and relatively experienced instructor, the result is likely only to exacerbate any unwanted and ill-conceived conclusions imaginable by an innovative novice pilot! Toward this end we all MUST recognize that an important aspect of "simulator use" is that merely having the student complete each of the tasks contained in the “syllabus-for-the-day,” even satisfactorily, is no guarantee that the student pilot will have learned what is necessary, will have practiced what is important, or will be able to satisfactorily perform in the real world in a similar set of circumstances.

Therefore, my friend, your comment…
I am sure there is a huge amount of research information on the interesting topics that are being discussed in this thread which AirRabbit could direct us to.
…can only be addressed by referring anyone interested to the on-going UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society’s efforts … 2 of which are described below:

Tuesday 23 September
INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT CREW TRAINING CONFERENCE 2014
The International Pilot Training Consortium: Next Steps?
The Annual International Flight Crew Training Conference is a premier event in the Royal Aeronautical Society’s annual calendar. The 2014 Conference on Tuesday 23, Wednesday 24 and Thursday 25 September at the Society’s Headquarters in London will examine the work undertaken by the International Pilot Training Consortium (IPTC) and seek to determine what further work is required and under what auspices it should be conducted.

Wednesday 12 November
The Future of Flight Training Devices
The objectives of this conference are to examine the recent advances made in the design and use of this class of devices and to identify specific areas of simulation design and data provisioning that requires future enhancement so that further training capabilities and fidelity can be realised.

[Naali]

Though a bit far from Asiana accident, i like to see the whole scale of an instrument when i need information from it. with fixed pointer and rolling background my brain takes additional moment to comprehend.

[barit1]

i like to see the whole scale of an instrument when i need information from it. with fixed pointer and rolling background my brain takes additional moment to comprehend.

Is there an echo in here? http://www.pprune.org/8584972-post932.html

The other advantage is an intuitive sense of the direction, and rate of change, of the indication.

[Chronus]

"Human factors" has , is , and will always be a factor in all the future accidents. The interface between man and machine will always be a problem".

Absolutely incorrect. Fully automated robot aircraft, without expensive holes cut out all over the airframe, are just around the corner. The airborne pilot is now basically a computer monitor, not long before taking a seat alongside his ATC counterpart.
Contentious, yes, but highly likely.

[DozyWannabe]

This discussion of displays was touched on in another Tech Log thread, and with your permission, I'll cross-post a snippet:

As far as primary flight instruments go, a bit of Google-bashing drew my attention to a seminal 1949 report for the Journal of Applied Psychology by one Walter F. Grether - probably the best retrospective can be found at this link:

http://repository.asu.edu/attachments/93949/content/tmp/package-2QGKqm/English_asu_0010N_11979.pdf

However, further supporting info on the study can be found with a Google search on "Grether 1949 altimeter".

The gist of the findings was that the traditional three-pointer dial design proved to be by far the most susceptible to misreads, and the optimum dial design used a single pointer with a dual-drum digital counter (which I'm guessing evolved into the combination drum/pointer altimeter that later became nearly ubiquitous prior to the advent of the PFD). The study also noted, however, that the vertical "tape" design (at a concept/experimental-only stage at the time of the report) was very close in terms of speed of reading and not far off in terms of reading accuracy.

It's worth reading through the article linked above, as it gives a very useful precis of how the modern civil PFD evolved, and some very interesting background info on the primary design considerations - the short version being that, as ever, it was a compromise.

As an aside, I dug up this image which purports to be a real A330 PFD:
http://i1088.photobucket.com/albums/i331/turricaned/a330pfd.jpg

As you can see, at FL400 the most significant three digits are emphasised on the numerical display, and because of this emphasis it should be fairly easy to determine that the numbers are winding down (even more obvious in concert with the "tape" and the V/S pointer).

[safetypee]

FDG135, Bergerie, AR, et al :ok:

For those still not convinced that dials have an advantage over tape displays consider a small simulator experiment involving tape displays and pilots who might not expect …
Night IMC, limiting performance takeoff, without FD / AP (MEL).
Engine failure before V2; then introduce the need to accelerate for an emergency turn.
You may only have one chance to learn.

Tape displays are adequate for many situations, particularly when supported by AT, AP, FD, but without these (or even with them) there can be a range of scenarios where combinations of training standards, levels of experience, and task demand, can erode human capacity so that even if only a little extra focus is required on a tape, it is too much; cf recent accidents, and ASAGA. (http://www.bea.aero/etudes/asaga/asaga.study.pdf)

DW, beware the assumption “should”; in the conditions shown Mach is more important and can change by relatively large values vs a change in airspeed.

[DozyWannabe]

Right, but another thing touched upon in the other thread is that the V/S pointer (to the right of the ALT tape) does change angle, so I would suppose that this particular design decision was intended to give a "best of both worlds" approach.

[OK465]

From before the stall, until the moment it hit the Atlantic, the airspeed indications were correct and proper!

FGD135,

You need to look at the graph appendix in the actual report.

From ~24,000 feet on down there were only two very, very short periods where computed airspeed was not NCD. Even prior to that there were periods of NCD interspersed with inaccurate values. NCD on a round dial would have looked similar to what I posted earlier. It was an air data computer problem, not an airspeed indicator problem.

As a matter of interest, if you were to encounter icing induced unreliable airspeed in whatever you fly, what is your benchmark for categorically stating, "airspeed is now reliable again". This is somewhat problematical if you've ever encountered it, round dial or tapes, until you can unequivocally correlate it with pitch attitude and power setting or AOA if so equipped. It's easy to fly thru it, less so to be sure it's over, especially if one induces as many flight path variables as they did.

[DozyWannabe]

From before the stall, until the moment it hit the Atlantic, the airspeed indications were correct and proper!

No they weren't. They came back correctly from around 02:10:36 to 02:11:43, but after that point the AoA exceeded approximately 30 degrees, which caused the vertical airflow to foul the pitot tubes and render airspeed data useless. This disruption of airflow meant that there was no useful airspeed information from that point until impact at 02:14:28 - a little over two and a half minutes.

[FGD135]

Dozy and OK465,

The traces of "computed airspeed" from the final report show a mixture of spikes (high and low) and valid readings for the final 3 minutes. But that is "computed" airspeed, not necessarily the same thing that you would see if you were trying to display the pitot-static quantity on a big round dial.

[porterhouse]

until you can unequivocally correlate it with pitch attitude and power setting or AOAVery true, using airspeed was useless here, their own checklist (that they didn't bother to read) prescribed using only pitch with power setting for such an occasion. Their AI was functioning just fine throughput the whole ordeal.

[ExSp33db1rd]

....only a non-pilot can make such a comparison

Really ? 22,000 + hrs over 37 years of commercial / airline flying, and not once hitting a sea wall because I let the speed get too low - QED methinks ?

However, I accept that in this accident it really didn't matter whether or not the ASI was digital or analogue, there was a requirement to monitor the airspeed, and the crew would know where to look for that information if they chose to, whether they would have noticed a rate of change more easily with an analogue presentation will never be resolved.

On the Classic 747 there was a block of 20 engine instruments, 5 for each of 4 engines, in the centre instrument panel. With take-off power selected, all 20 'clocks' pointed to 4 o'clock, not be accident but by design. Should one parameter change, it stuck out like sore thumb. I can't comment on how this was dealt with on the 747-400 digital display, i.e. is it so patently obvious when something is wrong ?

I have very little experience of digital 'glass cockpits', but the few I have flown have had 'standby / backup ' instruments that were analogue. Surely, in the event of an emergency requiring scrutiny of a back up instrument, shouldn't this also be digital ? How will an experienced digital pilot react to a stressful situation at low level, in bad weather maybe, and having to cope with a totally unfamiliar analogue instrument as well ? How to achieve digital back ups isn't my problem, but surely it should be the goal ?

I fly two LSA aircraft, one long in the tooth and equipped with a totally analogue display, the other new and 'glass cockpit', but on this aircraft I can, with a press of a couple of buttons ( if I can remember which ! ) change the 'picture' to a digitalised display of 'round' instruments, to increase my comfort zone.

OK, I'm an Old Fart and don't have to change, but I have to fly as passenger - and do wonder sometimes ? Have we really gone in the right direction ?

[AirRabbit]

"Human factors" has , is , and will always be a factor in all the future accidents. The interface between man and machine will always be a problem".

Absolutely incorrect. Fully automated robot aircraft, without expensive holes cut out all over the airframe, are just around the corner. The airborne pilot is now basically a computer monitor, not long before taking a seat alongside his ATC counterpart.
Contentious, yes, but highly likely.

Hmmm … it must be nice to have such an infallible “crystal ball” at your elbow. Personally, I have no idea about what the next 20 – 50 years of aviation is going to see. Could it include “fully automated airplanes” ?? … sure … it could but if that does happen I would suspect that the cost of an airline ticket might preclude all but the wealthiest of persons from traveling by air. All that will be necessary to ensure proper and accurate “telemetry” transmissions to and from each airborne airplane and its assigned ground-based “pilot” can only be described as horrendously complicated and commensurately expensive. We just discussed the logic (or the absence thereof) for having telemetric “black box” flight data transmitted to the ground for each airline flight – result – not likely to happen … waaay too expensive. And that is just for one-way transmission of “record-and-send” – who knows what complications would be involved and I’m not going to even guess at what it might take to retain signal priority and exclusivity … after all it just wouldn’t do to have a ground-based pilot command a shallow left bank to maintain course after deviating around a T-storm, and realize that 15 other airplanes also make the same “course correction” because of signal over-ride or some other kind of interference.

To prevent this kind of potential I imagine the brighter minds today could come up with all sorts of potentials – each and every one of which would have to have a “fool-proof” (AND “idiot-proof”) methodology that would ensure such signal failures (over-rides, multiple receipts, fading, etc., etc.) would not – and could not – occur. Yeah, I know … 65 years ago RADAR was a “wet dream,” so maybe there will be a way to ensure the kind of signal sender/receiver individuality that such a system would require … but that, in and of itself, may make the whole idea impractical. Again, even if it may be possible to develop and deploy such a system, it’s not likely that such a system would require only some small addition to the price of an airline ticket! I wouldn't hold my breath waiting for something like this to appear in your local airline operating plan.

[FGD135]

A few posts ago (#1034) Dozy posted a link to a study related to cockpit instrumentation. That link is:


http://repository.asu.edu/attachments/93949/content/tmp/package-2QGKqm/English_asu_0010N_11979.pdf


It reports on numerous other studies and experiments involving instrumentation, including tapes. The reports are almost universally damning of the tape displays.


Here are all the relevant passages from that work, including those "favourable" to tape displays. (Bolding is mine).


Dear oh dear. So why do we have tapes today? Because they display the information better? Not at all. As you will read below, it is most likely due to the airlines preference for weight and maintenance savings!


A single digital number can be quickly and precisely perceived (Hosman & Mulder, 1997), but limitations with single readouts include poorly displaying dynamically changing data (Sanders & McCormick, 1993; Rolfe, 1965), problems with making quick qualitative estimations (or ‘check readings’) (Sanders & McCormick, 1993; Harris, 2004), and not allowing for easy comparison with reference values ...In the following, he is initially referring to two altitude tape presentations that were trialled:
Both these moving tape concepts tested very well for speed and accuracy, presenting the required resolution and sense of temporal qualitative movement by a employing a moving linear tape and restricting the displayed range. Moving scales with fixed pointers do however have the considerable disadvantage when compared to a fixed scale and moving pointer that can display the whole range, as a quick glance will not yield an approximate picture of system state ...Ten years after the Grether study, the USAF has a working model of the moving tape display constructed using 16-mm movie film. Testing in a Link simulator found the tape display to be workable, but pointers resulted in a superior flight performance. Further experimentation with expanded scales and more training was recommended (Mengelkoch & Houston, 1958).In 1959 the Martin Company did extensive simulator testing of vertical tape instruments, with mixed results but predicting with design improvements that they would become valuable assets in the cockpit (Mengelkock, 1959).NASA conducted simulator experiments with X-15 cockpits equipped with either conventional needle instruments or a vertical-scale fixed-index (ACDS) instrument suite with six tapes and found that, “missions can be carried out as accurately and successfully with the ACDS panel as with the ‘standard’ model” (Lytton, 1967, p. 12).

It was noted that experienced pilots were able to “garner a great deal of information from pointer rates and positions without having to ‘read’ parametric values,” (Lytton, 1967, p. 4) but more precision was expected with longer use of the tape displays due to their considerable gain in display sensitivity (one instrument had 40 inches of tape wound behind the window).A problem with moving tape/fixed pointer displays is possible confusion caused by mixing this format of presentation with fixed tape/moving pointer displays in the same cockpit (known as the principle of the moving part, see Christensen, 1955; Roscoe, 1968; Johnson & Roscoe, 1972). However tape displays have been shown to be still readable when used with a variety of other instrument formats, and offer the practical advantage of a very compact form.Sanders and McCormick conclude that:
Although fixed scales with moving pointers are generally preferred to
moving scales with fixed pointers, the former do have their limitations,
especially when the range of values is too great to be shown on the face
of a relatively small scale.Electro-mechanical moving tape displays for airspeed and altitude entered service in transport category aircraft in 1964 with the introduction of the United States Air Force C141 aircraft, and were also deployed in the C5 fleet starting in 1969 (Hawkins, 1987). The tape-based “Integrated Flight Instrument System” (IFIS) was used in several U.S. front-line fighters (e.g. the F-105) developed in the 1960’s, as well as in the initial Space Shuttle cockpit (Lande, 1997).

Following the IFIS, small (five-inch rather than eight-inch) tape displays for altimeter and airspeed indicators were evaluated by Tapia, Strock, and Intano (1975) at the USAF Instrument Flight Center.

While the airspeed display was found to be adequate for future use, the altimeter display had some problems with the lack of range presented by the smaller size of tape. An indication of the limitations of tape displays in dynamic flight environments is seen in the midseventies when the USAF moved away from tape displays for heads down primary flight displays but retained their use for Head Up Display (HUD) symbology, seen for example in the F-15 (Lande, 1997). Air Force research presented in 1990 found HUD pointers better in basic flight performance than HUD tapes (Ercoline & Gillingham, 1990), and pointers rather than tapes are recommended by several sources for HUD applications (for an extensive review of HUD issues see Newman, 1995).

A reminder that tape displays are also not optimum when a pointer can cover the required range was seen in testing of several formats for an F-16 vertical velocity indicator (Cone & Hassoun, 1991).The Airbus A320 introduced moving tapes with all flight
instruments presented on two eight-inch CRTs (Coombs, 1990). The Boeing Company conducted extensive research in the mid 1980’s into vertical tape instruments, finding some concerns:

They lacked relationships that were used extensively by pilots in performing flight tasks. This perception was strengthened by human factors research, which also concluded that, in general, moving scale displays are not as effective as moving pointer displays. The design constraints for the 747-400 PFD and the controversies that surrounded the vertical tape presentation provided a significant challenge to the display design engineers. (Konicke, 1988, p. 1)

Driven by explicit airline demands for the maintenance savings of CRTs over electromechanical pointers and the space requirements of matching the Airbus eight-inch screens, Boeing eventually chose vertical tapes for the 747-400.

Tape displays for airspeed, altitude, and often heading have since become standard in electronic flight displays both civil and military aircraft (Long & Avino, 2001).The analog (airspeed indicator) display maps an abstract
conceptual quantity, speed, onto an expanse of physical space. This
mapping of conceptual structure onto physical space allows important
conceptual operations to be defined in terms of simple perceptual
procedures. Simple internal structure (the meanings of the regions on the
dial face defined by the positions of the speed bugs) in interaction with
simple and specialized external representations perform powerful
computations. (Hutchins, How a cockpit remembers its speeds, 1995, pp.
285-6).This limitation was noted by Mejdal, McCauley and Beringer (2001):
Today’s designers are less constrained by technology and do not have to present the entire scale or compass or airspeed dial. They now have the tempting option of presenting only the current value of the indicator, which can easily lead them into designing a poorer interface. (Mejdal, McCauley, & Beringer, 2001, p. 45)In the following, he is referring to how the bugs on the airspeed tape can be for speeds that are outside the range currently displayed on the tape:
Not all the reference values disappear; the most important reference speeds are presented in an offscale manner (figure 9) when they exceed the normal range, but this is not an elegant solution. Understanding the difference between that speed and current system state now requires the operator to perform mental mathematics, rather than directly seeing the difference.

The problem is that bug values can be close to system values, but not visible to the operator as they are moved off scale. The current partial solution is to present a numerical value offscale (figure 12) but this is limited to one or two values and requires cognitive rather than perceptual processing.Hutchins writes:
As technology changes, there is always a danger of discarding useful properties that were not recognized in the replaced technology. In their current form, the airspeed tapes that have replaced round-dial instruments in the state-of-the-art cockpits defeat some of the perceptual strategies of pilots.

The new instruments offer few perceptually salient cues that pilots can map to their concept of fast/slow in the performance envelope of the airplane. This requires pilots to read the displayed speed as a number and to subject the representation of that speed to further symbolic processing in order to answer the questions that were answered simply by looking at the earlier display. (Hutchins, 2000, p. 69)Harris, 2004, noted, “the windowed design can be quite poor at providing the pilots with anticipatory information. On the electromechanical counter-counter altimeter, the altitude ‘bugs’ were always visible.” (p. 87). Although new displays have been tested before entering service into aircraft, the aircraft cockpit may not yet be fully mature.

Billings, 1997, reported that there were, “disquieting signs in recent accident investigation reports that in some respects our applications of aircraft automation technology may have gone too far too quickly, without a full understanding of their likely effects on human operators.” (p.34)Glass cockpits allow designers to present huge amounts of data, indeed:
Information management technology has all but erased the problem of
insufficient data in the system. Data, however, is not information. It
becomes information only when it is appropriately transformed and
presented in a way that is meaningful to a person who needs it in a given
context. (Billings, 1997, p. 42)Being able to present more bug and reference values graphically on the tape display would fit the principle of proximity compatibility (Wickens & Carswell, 1995; Wickens & Andre, 1990), a concept that is broken by (the common current solution) displaying important values numerically next to a graphic tape.

Proximity compatibility is a movement towards expanding a single perceptual object display rather than forcing the human to cognitively integrate several inputs (Carswell & Wickens, 1987).Instrumentation has moved from being initially designed around mechanical practicalities (e.g. the pitot pressure driven round airspeed dial), to more humancentered electro-mechanical presentations (e.g. the tape airspeed indicator), to today’s fully electronic computer graphic presentations (e.g. the A320 PFD with its dynamic bugs and limitation arcs added to the tape display). We may now be overdue for a redesign of these displays to more match human perceptual and cognitive abilities.

Writing in Science, Hirschfeld (1985) noted that, “more effort in
display psychophysics will be needed to match instrument output to brain input.

[Volume]

Absolutely incorrect. Fully automated robot aircraft, without expensive holes cut out all over the airframe, are just around the corner.That only means the interface between man and machine will move, from the pointed end of the aircraft to an office where the machine is programmed or from where it is controlled. Human error can happen there as well, when programming the software and as well when using it (when programming the actual flight, just like using the FMS today). If the software interface for fully automated robot aircraft is poor, accidents due to issues in the man machine interface will continue. The only difference is, that the person doing the error will be among those who survive and can tell the tale...

[DozyWannabe]

@FGD135:

What you're not taking into account in your posts is that a lot of the examples cited are from decades before the introduction of glass cockpits, and would have thus been constrained by the limits of analogue technology on tape displays (which would in effect have been a large drum).

The Boeing research in the 1980s and the paper quoted does not take into account the possible bias inherent in the results due to most pilots of the day being more experienced with dials than tapes.

If you take these quotes into account:
Understanding the difference between that speed and current system state now requires the operator to perform mental mathematics, rather than directly seeing the difference.
Harris, 2004, noted, “the windowed design can be quite poor at providing the pilots with anticipatory information. On the electromechanical counter-counter altimeter, the altitude ‘bugs’ were always visible.” (p. 87).
a concept that is broken by (the common current solution) displaying important values numerically next to a graphic tape

and then look at the A330 PFD I posted earlier:

http://i1088.photobucket.com/albums/i331/turricaned/a330pfd.jpg

you can see that the bugs and relevant information are all in fact there, displayed graphically alongside the tape. In effect, the "proximity" perception is preserved in this manner (i.e. work from the yellow bug and avoid close proximity to the red [overspeed] and orange [alpha] bars - the lower red [stall] bars being off the bottom of the scale). The quotations above are inaccurate.

On the Classic 747 there was a block of 20 engine instruments, 5 for each of 4 engines, in the centre instrument panel. With take-off power selected, all 20 'clocks' pointed to 4 o'clock, not be accident but by design. Should one parameter change, it stuck out like sore thumb. I can't comment on how this was dealt with on the 747-400 digital display, i.e. is it so patently obvious when something is wrong ?

I'd imagine that a noticeable EICAS warning would be generated, and hopefully tell the PNF exactly where the problem lay (in effect bypassing the previous method where the PNF would have to ask the FE what they thought the problem was).

[AGL_Guy]

After reading all this about automation of cockpits etc. and not looking out the big window in front, I ask m myself as an AGL Guy, why do we design and install PAPIs, Threshold Lights, Approach Lights, Runway Edge Lights and RWY Centre Line Lights if the Modern Pilots with all the smart stuff in their kit bags don't need them. Huge savings for the airport operator to leave them out.

But I suggest, there are a few fly boys out there who glance at these little luminaries from time to time, even if just to confirm that where they think they are is where they think they are.

[OK465]

....so that even if only a little extra focus is required on a tape, it is too much; cf recent accidents, and ASAGA. (http://apicdn.viglink.com/api/click?format=go&key=1e857e7500cdd32403f752206c297a3d&loc=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Frumours-news%2F526333-ntsb-update-asiana-214-a-52.html&out=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bea.aero%2Fetudes%2Fasaga%2Fasaga.study .pdf&ref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Frumours-news%2F526333-ntsb-update-asiana-214-a-53.html)

safetypee,

the eye-tracker data in the referenced ASAGA study deserves comment in light of your comment about 'a little extra focus'.

Firstly, the two ASAGA simulator types (330 & 777) were both tape equipped. How do you derive the above conclusion without a comparison to eye-tracker data obtained in a round dial equipped simulator under the same circumstances.

Secondly, the percentage duration of eye-tracker time centered on airspeed by the PF on GA 1, 2 & 3 respectively were ~12%, 15% & 24%. GA 1 & 2 were hand flown, GA 3 was autopilot flown and one would expect that would allow for more time available to monitor anything and everything.

The average 777 runs were 67 seconds and the average 330 runs were 90 seconds. This equates to 8, 10 & 16 seconds for the T7 and 11, 13, 22 seconds for the 330. Are these times excessive and indicative of 'extra focus'? This is time the eye-tracker is centered on airspeed and not necessarily indicative of 'focus'. (Oh yes, we seem to be missing comparable round dial data)

If Asiana 214 had 'focused' on airspeed for any of these durations during the last 1-1 1/2 minutes of the flight we wouldn't be discussing relative merits of round dials versus tapes....or their apparent eye-tracker score of "0".

FGD135,

Good discussion, but you need to get into 447 threads and find out what that graph is really telling you about the speeds displayed and what you call 'spikes'. Computed Airspeeds are the values sent from the ADRs to the ASIs and NCD is No Computed Data and in that situation the tapes rest on around 46 KIAS (ADRs below 30) just like an electro-mechanical round dial pointer would with no air data input.

But that is "computed" airspeed, not necessarily the same thing that you would see if you were trying to display the pitot-static quantity on a big round dial.

It certainly is if the round dial is ADC fed. Otherwise....

I had pitot icing (rainy overnight and the required pitot system draining wasn't accomplished) in the last airplane I flew without a sophisticated ADC, the F-100. Climbing out of Sacramento, airspeed pointer dropped and pegged at the lower stop, flew pitch and power of course, and on that unusually cold day the nice folks at Nellis scrambled an F-111 to bring me down thru the wx on his wing. Told him to give me 180 KIAS on final and sure enough a little while after we got below the freezing level, the airspeed popped back to 180. If the plumbing gets blocked it doesn't matter whether ASI is fed by ADC or calibrated pitot pressure.

214 & 447 are not good examples to prove your psychophysics fueled point.

[BARKINGMAD]

Is all this stuff about modern instrumentation the reason why BA ordered their shiny 737-436s from Mr Boeing with big fat white needles behind glass, instead of the "new improved engine EFIS" criticised in the G-OBME Kegworth Accident report?


Let's rediscover the wheel again, spending lotsa money rounding off the edges of the hexagon.


Doesn't matter what the techno-geeks at the manufacturing end believe, we're still a primitive animal getting confused by all the shiny hi-tech gubbins which is installed with the aim of making our lives easier and maybe longer.


Back to the drawing board and try research on the human interaction with these sometimes user-unfriendly developments.


After the Strasbourg Airbus accident, it was suggested by some that the presence of a big fat VSI needle parked in the 5 o'clock position instead of the 7 0'clock mark, may have alerted that crew to their excessive RoD.

[safetypee]

OK465, whilst the discussion is about airspeed, the ASAGA study, and inference in this accident, suggests that it is the combination of factors which challenge pilot’s mental resources. In the extreme, and for a short period, the overall situation / task appeared to be beyond human capability. I doubt that any simulator experiment would accurately determine the combined effects; neither would a comparison with a dial equipped fight deck. In addition, the study involved more conventional approaches and automation which worked as imagined, … up to the point of GA.

All that might be deduced about the speed display in this accident is that it is possible that the tape display contributed higher mental workload than might have a dial instrument, based on background research, but what the effect was in comparison to the mental effort in understanding the state of automation or aircraft flightpath cannot, and should not be judged.

Other aspects with potential for greater influence could arise from management policies. It is reported that the operators automation policy was to maximise the use of automation, which could be interpreted in three ways: AP+AT, Man pilot+AT, and Man thrust+AP, but there was no specific clarification or advice. Yet the excluded combination Man pilot+Man thrust, if used could have had significant influence on the approach and crew performance.

Also, aspects of the report could be interpreted as the training policy / economics only allowing (allocating) one attempt at each training scenario, thus both the trainee and instructor may have expected to succeed at all times. If this view influenced the crew then there could have been greater pressure on the trainee to resolve the situation, and for the inexperienced instructor not to fail a candidate (a form of press-on-itis). Whereas the situation (from hindsight) actually required early intervention, which without judging pass/fail or allocating blame, was an ideal learning opportunity (experience) from the debrief.

As with airspeed, the contribution of policy cannot be judged, but these should be considered under ‘what if’, inviting individuals and organisations to look at the details or interpretations of their policies and procedures.

[DozyWannabe]

Is all this stuff about modern instrumentation the reason why BA ordered their shiny 737-436s from Mr Boeing with big fat white needles behind glass, instead of the "new improved engine EFIS" criticised in the G-OBME Kegworth Accident report?

Which sidesteps the fact that the other reason the gauges were misread in the Kegworth accident was that the analogue dials used to display engine vibration on the -300 series were considered notoriously unreliable and difficult to read, whereas Boeing's electronic replacements were simply difficult to read.

[AirRabbit]

After reading all this about automation of cockpits etc. and not looking out the big window in front, I ask m myself as an AGL Guy, why do we design and install PAPIs, Threshold Lights, Approach Lights, Runway Edge Lights and RWY Centre Line Lights if the Modern Pilots with all the smart stuff in their kit bags don't need them. Huge savings for the airport operator to leave them out.

But I suggest, there are a few fly boys out there who glance at these little luminaries from time to time, even if just to confirm that where they think they are is where they think they are.

Thanks for opening this particular door … as what I’m about to say is very likely the completion of the thoughts you’ve initiated with your comments …

Actually, pilots should be using ALL of those “little luminaries” together WITH ALL of what you’ve labeled “smart stuff” (presuming you mean all the instrument presentations currently available – where ever and how ever they are presented in any specific airplane) and using all of this information ALL OF THE TIME – including CAVU at high noon! The more information pointing to the current position and status of the airplane that the pilot can and does reference, the more that pilot will be able to select those pieces of information on which he/she feels most comfortable in using – AND referencing - ALL of that information, ALL of the time, allows the pilot to see how activation of the controls affects the resulting position and condition of the airplane, as that position and condition is displayed in ALL of those pieces of information … collectively and individually … in effect, providing a training exercise each and every time he/she brings the airplane in for a landing. If any current pilot does NOT know and recognize these basic aspects, then the instructors they have had have not done their job as well as they should have (and remember that instructors have a regular and recurring opportunity to ensure that the pilots they train are, in fact, trained and competent aviators) – and those pilots who have been "cheated" on their training are, in turn, increasingly likely to become involved in an accident or incident – or at the very least, in a personal crisis that may be known only to him/her – and hopefully THAT will all it will be!

I, for one, have stood at the edges of far too many “smoking holes” that should have never existed - and might NOT have occurred if the pilot had a better understanding of what the airplane was doing and what he/she should have done to correct it!

[ExSp33db1rd]

............I'd imagine that a noticeable EICAS warning would be
generated..........


How ? Just a word on a display that one is not looking at at that time ? or maybe a warning light? maybe a horn? whatever, the eyes have to be taken off the job in hand and a computer screen scrutinised, buttons pressed, information read, understood and processed.

Wot's esier than noticing a problem out of the corner of the eye and KNOWING INSTANTLY the problem whilst still controlling the task in hand?

Apologies for reptition, but I've mentioned before that some of the WW II Captains I started flying with had trouble ( some of them ) flying a rudimentary instrument approach, even just a simple NDB approach, but pop out of cloud at minimums, too fast, too high, no flaps etc. and say "The runway's over there, Sir" (never forgetting the Sir ! ) and they would straighten up and fly an immaculate visual approach to a perfect manual touchdown. 40 years later I was teaching co-pilots, brought up on a diet of Space Invaders and Bill Gates' latest toy, who would fly an instrument let-down better that I ever could, or would, but pop out of cloud at minimum, in the slot, configured for landing,stabilised but then couldn't put a real aircraft on to the real Earth without assistance.

Somewhere we've gone wrong in the intervening years.

[safetypee]

AR, if we consider your views without judgement, this might help us to identify alternatives to the idealist situation described.

We are experts in what crews ‘should’ have done after the fact, and how to use this distorted knowledge for futuristic solutions. Alternatively we might consider what the crew ‘could’ have done in the particular circumstances, what were they actually capable of, and thus what insight this gives us.
The mantra of “use everything - all available resources”, is continually repeated, more often without thought as to what is meant. Is it possible to use everything, what is ‘everything’, does it vary with situation, training, experience?
Does the industry teach what aspects are required in each situation, how to identify what information to use (data with understanding), vice those cues we might feel comfortable with. Is all information the same, what is important and why, how are these aspects referenced, prioritised, rated, individually and particularly collectively?

How might we know if pilots do not recognise appropriate factors? There may have been many successes in training and previous operations, but encountering an unusual situation then the application of previous skills could fall short of the performance required for any number of human factors reasons.

How do pilots acquire that ‘understanding’ which is so easy to identify with hindsight; yet the industry continues to churn out mantras full of assumption, and perhaps without the necessary thought and explanation to ensure understanding.
We cannot use ‘all of the information all of the time’ (a limit of human performance); but we might use an adaption of the rest of Abraham Lincoln’s quote; perhaps there is something to be learnt from that.

The industry appears to be blinded by hindsight, attempting to find patterns and trying to resolve past problems with the same fixes, resulting in few real gains in improving safety – how can we move forward by looking backwards.

[FGD135]

What you're not taking into account in your posts is that a lot of the examples cited are from decades before the introduction of glass cockpits ...Dozy, that makes no difference. In fact, it makes no difference whether the human subjects are pilots or not - all humans will have the same problems with tapes. This is because of how our brains work.


The Boeing research in the 1980s and the paper quoted does not take into account the possible bias inherent in the results due to most pilots of the day being more experienced with dials than tapes.Do you actually know how the Boeing research was conducted? You make it sound like they just asked a couple of old-timers for their opinions. Here is that bit about Boeing again:
The Boeing Company conducted extensive research in the mid 1980’s into vertical tape instruments, finding some concerns:

They lacked relationships that were used extensively by pilots in performing flight tasks. This perception was strengthened by human factors research, which also concluded that, in general, moving scale displays are not as effective as moving pointer displays.

Driven by explicit airline demands for the maintenance savings of CRTs over electromechanical pointers and the space requirements of matching the Airbus eight-inch screens, Boeing eventually chose vertical tapes for the 747-400.
I'd imagine that a noticeable EICAS warning would be generated, and hopefully tell the PNF exactly where the problem lay ...That would be a poor solution - which would also make the cockpit just that little bit more complex.


20 needles that should all be pointing in the same direction, combined with a human eye and experience, is to me the most optimum relationship that we can have between man and machine. From just a glance the pilot could see that 20 big and important parameters were normal - can it get any better than that?


Some of those needles might have been dancing around or jittering, but the human is so good at filtering such observations that that would have made no difference to the big picture. To a computer, however, jitter or noise on the parameters may give rise to nuisance warnings.


When instrumentation was using the big pointers and making use of the human sensitivity to parallelism we were at the pinnacle in cockpit ergonomics, in my opinion. Since then, we have gone backwards.


After the Strasbourg Airbus accident, it was suggested by some that the presence of a big fat VSI needle parked in the 5 o'clock position instead of the 7 0'clock mark, may have alerted that crew to their excessive RoD.Excellent point, BARKINGMAD. I have been meaning to comment on the VS presentation as I believe that too is woefully deficient. VS is not as important as airspeed, hence my silence until now.

I agree that, had that crew had the big VS dial of yesteryear, they may well have noticed that something was not quite right.

Look at that picture of the A330 PFD that Dozy posted. I have complained about the size of the tiny patch in the middle of the airspeed tape before, but the VS indication area is even more tiny! (On that PFD design, anyway).


OK465, do you know exactly how the A330 arrives at "computed airspeed"? Please enlighten me if you do. If the aircraft had had the big round dial from day 1, then the way the airspeed was computed may not have been the same as it was for the PFD. Also, to save me delving into the report, which ADC was feeding the FDR?


... with a press of a couple of buttons ( if I can remember which ! ) change the 'picture' to a digitalised display of 'round' instruments, to increase my comfort zone.ExSp33db1rd, you and the round dials are a good fit. Not because you are an 'old fart', but because you are a human being. Keep using them. You and your passengers are safer for it, and we now know that there is some scientific support for this conclusion!

[porterhouse]

and we now know that there is some scientific support for this conclusion!
there is none regardless how many times you will write it. :uhoh:

[Volume]

Actually, pilots should be using ALL of those “little luminaries” together WITH ALL of what you’ve labeled “smart stuff” (presuming you mean all the instrument presentations currently available – where ever and how ever they are presented in any specific airplane) and using all of this information ALL OF THE TIME – including CAVU at high noon!This is a dream and will probably never happen. If you have redundant information available, it is quite normal that you concentrate on the most convenient one and ignore the others. It takes a lot of training and discipline to make people use redundancies.
If you want redundant information to be noticed, it must "jump" at you. One light of a PAPI changing from white to red might indeed draw more attention, than an indicator moving constantly and slowly along a scale from the white into the red. Hence digital information (and a PAPI is nothing else, although older than the term itself) might be harder to understand when you try to monitor it, but easier to recognize if it changes.
With respect to this, the PFD shown above will draw more attention when the first 3 altimeter digits "jumps" from 400 to 399, compared to the speed tape numbers just constantly and slowly shifting vertically. If you want changes to be noticed, the indication must change in a very obvious way.
If a change in speed indication would obviously "jump" every 5 kts (or make a sound passing a round 5 kts number, different for increasing and decreasing, just like the clicking noise old fashioned electromechanical instruments made), it would be much more obvious to the pilot than a dial passing a certain position (unless that position is a very distinctive one, e.g. the 9 ´o Clock position)
An indication designed for quick and accurate reading, an indication designed to se a trend, and an indication designed to draw attention when changing must be designed differently.

So I think the first thing we must agree on is what a pilot in a highly automated aircraft should do about airspeed. Monitor it? Manage it? Track it? Notice it if it changes? Notice if it is too low? This all required different design of the instrumentation for optimum performance.

[oblivia]

Hmmm … it must be nice to have such an infallible “crystal ball” at your elbow. Personally, I have no idea about what the next 20 – 50 years of aviation is going to see. Could it include “fully automated airplanes” ?? … sure … it could but if that does happen I would suspect that the cost of an airline ticket might preclude all but the wealthiest of persons from traveling by air.

The history of commercial aviation to date is one of increasing automation, reduced cost and reduced real incomes for pilots. I don't think these things are unconnected and see no reason why further levels of automation would produce an opposite trend.

The costs of processing power and wireless communication are only going in one direction. And computers don't need rest breaks, hotel rooms, sick leave or holidays, don't sue for wrongful dismissal, don't ask for pay rises and are already responsible for fewer mistakes than humans. They would probably also mean lower insurance premiums.

IBM's Watson is already better at medical diagnosis than the average doctor — and that's not based on it being given a data set; it speaks to patients. Is flying a plane vastly more difficult than medical diagnosis? And yes, I realise the challenges are different, but they're still just computational.

Indeed, the obstacles probably aren't even technological at this point. The obstacles are pilots and passengers, neither of whom are massively keen on the idea. But it will be passengers who make the final decision — and they will vote with their wallets, as they've done throughout the history of aviation.

And if we don't do it, the Chinese will — because they won't care about firing pilots and their passengers only care about price, not least because their mistrust of humans is ingrained by decades of experience at the hands of incompetent and corrupt institutions.

Indeed, the industry's growth is not going to be in Europe or the US — it's all in poor countries where passenger growth can be in the double digits. Where will all the pilots come from? Will they be adequately trained? Would you be so sceptical of automation if you lived in Bangladesh or Uganda?

[Volume]

Is flying a plane vastly more difficult than medical diagnosis?It is. Reaction time is essential, timing is crucial. In decission making without time contraint it is hard to beat a computer. In reacting to a surprising situation never thought of, it is hard to beat humans.
However, computers in airplanes are still very, very basic using very simple algorithms and laws. There is no doubt that a computer could do many jobs much more accurately than a human. However, the more complex you make it, the more bugs can remain hidden until they are discovered by accident (by an accident or after an accident more probably...). It is also much easier to install true redudancy with humans (they are all different, except for one in the brian movie ;-) than with computers, where preventing commom mode failures is really rocket science.

[AirRabbit]

Hi Volume: It seems to me that you’ve outlined the necessities of improving the training that ALL pilots really should be provided – even though I think you were headed down a somewhat different path, what you said can easily be focused on the necessity of reviewing, revamping, and fortifying the training we provide to all pilots … but particularly to airline pilots.


If you have redundant information available, it is quite normal that you concentrate on the most convenient one and ignore the others. It takes a lot of training and discipline to make people use redundancies.
I completely agree … ALL of aviation requires “…a lot of training and discipline…” hence, my recommendation – nee, my urgent recommendation – that we (as participants in an ever-changing industry) MUST receive the necessary training so as to develop and understand what we see, hear, and feel, so as to recognize and use the displays provided and the information presented.

If you want redundant information to be noticed, it must "jump" at you.

Certainly, when redundant information does indeed “jump” from one indication to another, that change in the display is likely to draw some attention. The issue is to train the user to notice that display – even if it doesn’t change, but certainly if it does … even a minor amount.

One light of a PAPI changing from white to red might indeed draw more attention, than an indicator moving constantly and slowly along a scale from the white into the red. Hence digital information (and a PAPI is nothing else, although older than the term itself) might be harder to understand when you try to monitor it, but easier to recognize if it changes.
First: IF the brightness of that PAPI light is such that any change will garner the attention of the pilot (who should]/i] be busy monitoring ALL of the indications and controlling the airplane) it is very likely to be noticed. HOWEVER, such brightness is not typically present [i]until and unless the distance to the PAPI lights is relatively short and the weather conditions are such that there is little if any obscuration, and, even then, particularly if the airplane is further out on final approach, if the pilot is focusing on some other display or indication where a majority of that pilot’s attention is being focused on that “other” issue (whatever it may be), such a change in the PAPI display may only be recognized when/if the pilot’s attention is again returned to the PAPI display and the pilot recognizes that the display now being seen is different from what was seen when it was last observed and recognized. “Seeing” something is not necessarily the same thing as understanding the meaning of what is being seen (particularly so when the current display is different from what was displayed previously). Additionally, pilots are expected to, and must be able to, see, hear, note, analyze, decide, and react to the numerous information sources we all know is present in an airplane cockpit – at any time – and particularly during an approach … either visual or instrument.

Second: It should be obvious that “…an indicator moving constantly and slowly along a scale…” should warrant an increased amount of awareness of that movement, even if the movement is desired. Is it moving in the correct direction? Is it moving at an acceptable rate? Can that movement be immediately stopped/reversed, if necessary or desired? How do you know?

If you want changes to be noticed, the indication must change in a very obvious way. If a change in speed indication would obviously "jump" every 5 kts (or make a sound passing a round 5 kts number, different for increasing and decreasing, just like the clicking noise old fashioned electromechanical instruments made), it would be much more obvious to the pilot than a dial passing a certain position (unless that position is a very distinctive one, e.g. the 9 ´o Clock position).
The rate of change of most things of interest to a pilot when flying an airplane (particularly when on final approach), is critical; but if it were true that such changes would be noted ONLY through some “obvious, attention grabbing manner,” it would be necessary to provide a bombarding cacophony of new sounds, changes of sound, flashing lights, lights changing colors, and whatever myriad of other “immediate attention grabbing” features that might be considered “obvious.” In the alternative, I seriously believe that the recognition of “changes” has to be achieved through constant vigilance and constant awareness on the part of the pilot flying the airplane. Some of those changes will be anticipated and be recognized as supportive, and some very well may be indicative of something other than what is desired, and may require an immediate intervention/correction by the pilot. Additionally, the pilot monitoring should ALSO maintain that same amount of vigilance and constant awareness – temporarily interrupted only by necessary checklist requirements or radio calls – and that is both temporarily (not continuously) and then only interrupted (meaning that the conscious effort regularly returns to “vigilance” ASAP). However, this kind of vigilance and needed recognition cannot be achieved in the absence of determined, directed, and meaningful training.

An indication designed for quick and accurate reading, an indication designed to set a trend, and an indication designed to draw attention when changing must be designed differently.
I’m not at all sure that the “different” design has not already been achieved and employed. What I’m reading here is, in my opinion, a description of every flight instrument in every airplane.

So I think the first thing we must agree on is what a pilot in a highly automated aircraft should do about airspeed. Monitor it? Manage it? Track it? Notice it if it changes? Notice if it is too low? This all required different design of the instrumentation for optimum performance.
Actually, ALL of these things are required! ALL the time! ALL related to ALL the parameters involved in airplane flying! Airspeed, altitude, rate of climb, rate of descent, heading, pitch attitude, bank attitude, coordination, engine parameters, airplane configuration, and on and on and on……..

Reaction time is essential, timing is crucial.
In a great many areas – and very easily, a majority of areas – this is certainly true.

In decision making without time constraint it is hard to beat a computer.
Actually, computers do not “make decisions.” They do one of 2 things: 1, (passively) they present information that has been sensed; and 2, (actively) they compare parameters and, depending on the peripherals involved, make adjustments to settings as have been previously programmed, until what is sensed matches what has been programmed.

In reacting to a surprising situation never thought of, it is hard to beat humans.
I would agree, whole heartedly … but ONLY when the human(s) we are describing has/have been thoroughly, properly, and completely trained. An unprepared human is very much like a computer without an operating program … the lights may be “on,” but rarely is “anyone home.”

[AirRabbit]

The history of commercial aviation to date is one of increasing automation, reduced cost and reduced real incomes for pilots. I don't think these things are unconnected and see no reason why further levels of automation would produce an opposite trend.

The costs of processing power and wireless communication are only going in one direction. And computers don't need rest breaks, hotel rooms, sick leave or holidays, don't sue for wrongful dismissal, don't ask for pay rises and are already responsible for fewer mistakes than humans. They would probably also mean lower insurance premiums.

Of course, if we use computers aboard airplanes to do what pilots do today … the uninformed may well conclude that the direct operating costs would decrease. The point I was making in my earlier post on this issue did not address pilots being replaced with computers (more on that in a moment) … I was addressing the point brought out by Chronus when he posted…
The airborne pilot is now basically a computer monitor, not long before taking a seat alongside his ATC counterpart.
…in which he was clearly referencing the on-board pilot being replaced with an “off-board” pilot (taking his/her seat next to his Air Traffic Controller counterpart) flying the airplane through air-ground “telemetry” … much like the “UAVs” drawing such public and private rumblings in current news stories. It was on this basis that I made the statement that the costs involved would likely soar out of sight and the only recouping of such costs would likely fall to an increase in airline ticket prices – and, while I’m not an expert at such economically driven issues (an woe were that to ever occur!) but it seems logical that this would be the most direct and meaningful way to disperse that increased cost.


IBM's Watson is already better at medical diagnosis than the average doctor — and that's not based on it being given a data set; it speaks to patients. Is flying a plane vastly more difficult than medical diagnosis? And yes, I realise the challenges are different, but they're still just computational.
Indeed, the obstacles probably aren't even technological at this point. The obstacles are pilots and passengers, neither of whom are massively keen on the idea. But it will be passengers who make the final decision — and they will vote with their wallets, as they've done throughout the history of aviation.
Not being a medical doctor, I’m probably not the best person to determine if flying a plane is vastly more difficult than completing medical diagnosis. But, to get to the full effect of such an analogy, all of the difficulties in flying an airplane should not, in my not-so-humble opinion be compared to medical diagnosis, but, rather, to actually performing the operation for which the diagnosis was indicating is necessary.

However, all of that not-with-standing, I am of the opinion that when medical patients, with the full confidence and agreement of the families of those patients, are willingly wheeled into an operating room, completely devoid of medical staff (doctors and nurses) and are, instead, staffed with the most current version of computer-run robotics, complete with anesthetics, antiseptics, and other drugs, scalpels, saws, drills, clamps, swabs, sutures, and all the other paraphernalia that are typically used/required in even the most basic of surgical operations – all of which will be under the control of, and actually wielded by, a preprogrammed computer, or a bank of such computers – I think we may have reached the point where some healthy persons may think it appropriately safe to place their lives in the hands of a preprogrammed computer flying from one point to another point on the globe – but until that medical scene becomes reality, I think the airplane load of passengers at the mercy of an autonomous computer is still some distance in the future.

As I understand the current “state of the art” in what I believe is referred to as “robotic surgery,” the use of “robotic systems” is limited to aiding in surgical procedures where the surgeon uses one of several methods to control the instruments; either through some kind of direct manipulator or in rare situations, through computer control. Again, as I understand it, the primary benefit of using such “robotic capabilities” is in performing certain actions with much smoother, controlled motions than could be achieved by a human hand. The main object is to reduce or eliminate the tissue trauma traditionally associated with open surgery without requiring more than a few minutes' training on the part of surgeons. All of which are controlled by and under the direct participation of the surgeon. This sounds to me like a pilot using an “autopilot” to fly the last portion of an instrument approach procedure … and the very advanced systems actually land the airplane at the conclusion of the approach. Pretty smart stuff, I’d say!


And if we don't do it, the Chinese will — because they won't care about firing pilots and their passengers only care about price, not least because their mistrust of humans is ingrained by decades of experience at the hands of incompetent and corrupt institutions.
I’m not at all sure about the accuracy of this opinion … however, … if someone with a similar disregard for the potential problems were to determine what part of the world would be most suitable to introduce such a program, it might just be thought that a section of the world that could most likely endure the potential sacrifice of a good portion of its population to verify the viability or confirm the absurdity of such a practice, perhaps those countries with burgeoning populations might prove to be the most logical to attempt such a feat. I sincerely believe that the pivotal aspect of such an enterprise would not be the hiring or firing of airline employees … but the potential longevity of its customer base might be critical in such business decisions.


Indeed, the industry's growth is not going to be in Europe or the US — it's all in poor countries where passenger growth can be in the double digits. Where will all the pilots come from? Will they be adequately trained? Would you be so sceptical of automation if you lived in Bangladesh or Uganda?
I’m not at all sure that my position is correctly described as being “skeptical of automation,” and I have virtually NO knowledge of what level of skepticism currently exists, toward anything, among the populations in those countries. Personally, I am a very big proponent of properly designed and properly employed automation – and I believe we haven’t yet seen the end of improvements and capabilities. Additionally, I would suspect that the younger citizens of the kinds of countries you reference are likely not as “current” with the existing status of automation, nor its potential problems, solutions, or applications as some younger citizens are in other parts of the world, but I am at a loss as to how that might affect the design, development, deployment, or anticipated problem areas with any current or future capability or desire for the application of automation.

[Chronus]

AirRabbit says

I think the airplane load of passengers at the mercy of an autonomous computer is still some distance in the future.

But work in the field of full automation is well underway. The case in point is the ASTREA PROJECT which is for the use of UAS in all classes of airspace without the need of special or restrictive conditions of operation.

Surely a project of this magnitude is not without a specific aim and purpose.

[porterhouse]

But work in the field of full automation is well underwayIn terms what is feasible in the near future in passenger aircraft it is not an unmanned aircraft but SOP - single pilot operations. In other words an aircraft cockpit with single pilot only. There would be another "virtual" pilot on the ground. NASA is actually in the midst of extensive studies/simulations of this very topic. I work at NASA Ames and this is the hottest topic pursued at the moment in the aeronautics division of NASA. Air Rabbit is correct - a fully autonomous passenger aircraft is not yet on anybody's drawing boards, but SOP is very much on the drawing boards.

[AirRabbit]

AirRabbit says

I think the airplane load of passengers at the mercy of an autonomous computer is still some distance in the future.

But work in the field of full automation is well underway. The case in point is the ASTREA PROJECT which is for the use of UAS in all classes of airspace without the need of special or restrictive conditions of operation.

Surely a project of this magnitude is not without a specific aim and purpose.

I am well aware of the UAS efforts underway in the US – in fact I have several colleagues who are intimately involved on both sides of the regulatory fence on this very issue. But, I say again, in each of these situations, one of the serious issues facing the operation is the connectivity between the “pilot” on the ground and the airborne UAS – which presents its own interesting set of problems and solutions. In fact expanding the existing UAS program into a world-wide airline operation is not only not in a similar neighborhood, it’s not even on the same or a similar planet – something a lot closer would be playing with a 4-piece, slip-together, balsa-wood airplane in preparation for operating the space shuttle replacement.

[DozyWannabe]

How ? Just a word on a display that one is not looking at at that time ? or maybe a warning light? maybe a horn? whatever, the eyes have to be taken off the job in hand and a computer screen scrutinised, buttons pressed, information read, understood and processed.

I believe EICAS warnings come with both aural and visual cues. Reading and interpreting the EICAS warning onscreen is the job of the PNF, so the PF just continues flying - no need for them to take their eyes off the job in hand.

Wot's esier than noticing a problem out of the corner of the eye and KNOWING INSTANTLY the problem whilst still controlling the task in hand?

With all due respect, the engine instrument cluster on the front panel of the 747 Classic would tell you *where* the problem was, but not *what* it is (or even what it might be) - you'd have to get the FE to look at their panel and try to make a judgement call before knowing what the source of the problem is. If EICAS (or ECAM on the Airbii) is doing its job properly - then the systems themselves will inform the PNF where the problem lies, what it is and in many cases (certainly in the case of ECAM) the correct drill to solve the issue. The PF doesn't need to stop paying full attention to flying the aircraft while that's happening.

40 years later I was teaching co-pilots, brought up on a diet of Space Invaders and Bill Gates' latest toy, who would fly an instrument let-down better that I ever could, or would ... then couldn't put a real aircraft on to the real Earth without assistance.

Again with respect, I think you're over-generalising. Certainly if blind pew's book is anything to go by, the ability gradient of FOs coming out of training has remained fairly consistent, and even back in the Hamble/Trident days (late '60s/early '70s) there were examples of cadets being fast-tracked into jetliners to recoup the company's training money as quickly as possible who maybe should not have been at that stage.

Dozy, that makes no difference. In fact, it makes no difference whether the human subjects are pilots or not - all humans will have the same problems with tapes. This is because of how our brains work.

I suspect you're taking certain conclusions as an absolute when they should not be. If I read those reports right, the (marginal) difference between perception of a raw tape display and the round dial was due to the change in angle being perceived a fraction more quickly - as such the modern PFDs like those in the image I posted have the (angled) VS indicator right next to the altimeter tape to take advantage of this. It is the perception of angle change - not the round dial display itself - which humans perceive slightly faster.

Here is that bit about Boeing again:

Right.
"They lacked relationships that were used extensively by pilots in performing flight tasks."

As I said before, this phrase misses the caveat that those pilots had been used to round dial displays for their entire careers, which would skew the results somewhat.

Then "This perception was strengthened by human factors research, which also concluded that, in general, moving scale displays are not as effective as moving pointer displays"

I'd want to see that research itself before blindly accepting the conclusions as a given.

I linked to that paper because it provided the best summary I could find of the Grether study, but the paper itself I have issues with in terms of several of its conclusions. For one thing it ignores the point that while the Boeing study related to the 744, the 757 and 767 had been using CRT-based PFDs for several years by that point. Boeing's 744 development team would have been very aware that a move to PFDs incurred a greater level (and therefore cost) of conversion training from the 747 Classic, and that in turn would have caused a greater resistance to switching to PFD from some of them.

20 needles that should all be pointing in the same direction, combined with a human eye and experience, is to me the most optimum relationship that we can have between man and machine.

To you, yes. A pilot who has spent all or most of their career with modern PFDs would probably feel differently. What was interesting about the original 1949 Grether study was that the experiments used a control group of non-pilots - so if we look at the summary:

http://www.bainbrdg.demon.co.uk/Figures/Grether.bars.gif

You can see that round dial type "D" and tape display type "G" are roughly comparable in terms of percentage error and interpretation time (in fact the tape display seems superior to the dial in terms of percentage error). The interpretation time is interesting to compare because the non-pilots interpreted both in the same amount of time, but the AAF pilots interpreted the dial marginally faster. From this one could argue that the pilots' prior experience with the dial might have skewed the results.

Look at that picture of the A330 PFD that Dozy posted. I have complained about the size of the tiny patch in the middle of the airspeed tape before, but the VS indication area is even more tiny! (On that PFD design, anyway).

If what I've read is true, size isn't really that important - what makes up for it is that the *proximity* to the ALT tape is much closer. What this means is that - in theory - a scan of the right-hand side of the screen will tell you your current altitude as well as whether you're climbing, descending or neither at a glance. What the photo does not convey is that the VS indicator, as well as changing angle, changes colour from green to amber to red depending on the situation. Similar colour changes affect the digital display of the altitude and the airspeed when outside of the acceptable range. And as I said before, the presence of the various bugs that scroll alongside both tapes allows for "at-a-glance" proximity perception - it's not just reading numeric data as is assumed in some of the studies.

The history of commercial aviation to date is one of increasing automation, reduced cost and reduced real incomes for pilots. I don't think these things are unconnected and see no reason why further levels of automation would produce an opposite trend.

Right, but that situation is not faced by pilots alone - I'd go so far as to argue that it has, over the last 30 years, been the norm for almost all professions with the exception of management and finance. There's a widespread misconception that working in technology is a direct route to wealth and respect, and I can tell you as a software engineer of 14 years' standing that it is completely untrue. I know quite a few junior doctors that would tell you the same.

I can say to oblivia - as a techie with a fairly decent background education in the area - that pilotless airliners are probably not going to be a reality in my lifetime based on the current and projected abilities of technology. The claims regarding China and the developing nations are off-base too. If anything, China's population density would be a brake on that kind of development.

Going back to my previous point though, it's saddening that some pilots see technology as a threat in itself - it's not us tech engineers who benefit from daft corporate policy regarding use of automation and minimal training, in fact we're very much in the same boat as pilots (as are many professions which involve actually doing or making stuff). I'd point out that it suits management and "bean-counters" to have pilots see technology and automation as the enemy, because pilots' enmity gets directed towards us techies and not them.

[AirRabbit]

First safetypee let me say that I very much appreciate the questions/positions you’ve posted. While I’ll certainly attempt to be a bit more explanatory, I think I must explain that this is a subject that is both broad and deep, and therefore, does not lend itself very easily to discussions on an internet forum – in fact, books and books have been written and/or planned on this or similar topics – and one would grow weary in wading through all that “stuff.” I know. I’ve done it. And, I’ve done it on more than one occasion. I don’t believe that the only way we can move forward is by looking backwards.

Of course, being aware of previously committed errors is only good practice – and will hopefully prevent committing those errors yet again. What I’m advocating is an overhaul of how we approach training – and ensuring – to our best ability – that each pilot we train is provided all the aspects of rule-based behaviors, knowledge-based behaviors, and skill-based behaviors … and in do so, that we provide all of the cueing aspects that are available in an operating airplane – by that I mean the cues provided by motion, visual, sound, and feel systems on today’s flight simulation equipment. AND I have to apologize up front for the length of the following – bear with me – or if there is a lot of grumbling, I promise to take extra precautions to avoid such verbosity in the future. Of course, if you have any questions or comments – let me know.

Let me start with the concept that I’ve attempted to describe on this forum at several times previously … having to do with each of us having our own preferences in what to use, how to use, how to interpret what it is we each use, in order to accomplish any given task in an airplane. In several instances I’ve offered my own personal explanation on “how to land an airplane.” That is a pretty straight forward task – every pilot lands airplanes – every pilot does it quite well at least some of the time, and we’ve all had landings that none of us would want ANYone to remember! So, as an instructor, how does one teach another pilot “how to land the airplane?”

Most instructor pilots (well, maybe not most, but certainly some … I think it’s most, but I don’t know “most” instructors) will tell their student what they believe that student should know and that comes primarily from what that instructor “knows.” The most logical follow-on is to attempt to have that student use the same cues, to the same degree, in the same order, to accomplish the same thing. Sounds simple. If it were possible to have each student do exactly that, each time, all the time, every pilot would be making very satisfactory landings all of the time. However, we all know how accurate that statement is.

Personally, I come from the perspective that each of us is an individual first – and foremost. It just so happens that we’ve all decided to get into the aviation business for one reason or another. But, what I think we sometimes forget is that individuality is always present. And, it is present to the extent that it will raise its attitudes and rely on its understandings to the extent that we will even attempt to take some newly introduced task or procedure or understanding and force it through our prism of “individuality” until we are satisfied that we “have it.” But, what we have is only a “version” of what was originally offered – at least in many, if not most, cases.

Of course there are some aspects of almost any task, procedure, or understanding that are based in hard, cold fact – regardless of how we attempt to modify that/those fact(s), we will inevitably be bound by the hard, cold fact. Let me give you an example.

Airplanes are designed to actually “land” when they are in the level flight attitude for the existing gross weight, configuration, and the associated airspeed. We could disregard the airspeed issue if we were attempting to land on Roger’s Dry Lake Bed in the Mojave Desert of Kern County, California, USA. To give you an idea of the size of this long-time used airplane testing facility … there are seven runways "drawn on" the hard-packed dry lake bed, crisscrossing the surface of Rogers, with the longest extending 7½ miles – which is just a bit less than 40,000 feet. It wouldn’t likely be that we would “overrun” a runway that is 40,000 feet long. But, because we don’t have runways quite that long as a normal situation, we DO have to be aware of and fly the appropriate airspeed.

To go a bit further, and to provide an example of the kind of individuality concerns I believe should be taken into consideration – the following is a post I’ve previously posted in on the forum:

How to Land an Airplane
(This primarily addresses transport category or commuter category airplanes … but the basic premise is applicable to every airplane with wings.)

On short final with wings level and the airplane configured for landing, the airspeed should be at the recommended approach speed – which should be VREF plus any appropriate additive. If VREF speed is not stated, 1.3Vso should be used (where Vso is the calibrated power-off stall speed of the airplane in the landing configuration … usually with a forward CG). However, and importantly, the airspeed flown on the final approach, starting at the Final Approach Fix (FAF), should be above VREF … more specifically, the pilot should add ½ of the headwind component value (… but never less than 5 knots – for safety considerations) … plus all of any wind-gust value reported.

As the runway threshold is approached, the added headwind component should be allowed to bleed off while retaining the wind-gust value, such that when crossing the threshold the airspeed should be VREF plus only that wind-gust value. The height of the airplane when over the threshold should be at or very slightly above the minimum threshold crossing height (TCH). Normally, for transport category airplanes, this height is between 50 and 80 feet. From over the threshold, the position toward which the pilot should fly the airplane is a point on the runway surface about 2/3 of the way between the threshold and the painted “aiming point markings” at the 1000 foot point down the runway – we used to call these painted blocks, the “fixed distance markers.” For reference, the pilot should know that the point to which the airplane is actually being flown is that point that does not move “up” or “down” in the windscreen. During this portion of the final approach, the airplane will continue to descend through those remaining 50 to 80 feet toward that aiming point. However, prior to descending that entire distance, the airplane’s rate of descent should be slowed, and brought to the “level flight attitude.” This task is called the “flare.”

The “flare” should be initiated at a point above the runway that will allow a continuously increasing back pressure on the elevator controls to move the nose up to a level flight attitude … and, in case you didn’t already know, the landing attitude I’m describing is the attitude it would take if you were to continue flight down the runway at THAT height above the runway … without accelerating, without decelerating, without climbing, and without descending. Of course, to do this, it would be necessary to adjust the power to maintain THAT airspeed and a very careful control of both pitch and bank to ensure that the airplane tracks down the centerline of the runway – again without climbing, without descending, without accelerating, and without decelerating – and, in case you forgot, this is the definition of “straight and level flight at a constant airspeed.

This cannot be accomplished if the airplane is NOT in a level flight attitude. It is this “level flight attitude” that I am driven to have you be able to recognize and find again – time after time after time. Also, there are 2 specifics that I would ask you to meet … first, this “level flight attitude” should be achieved with the main landing gear between one (1) and five (5) feet above the runway surface (about 1 foot for the smaller machines and about 5 feet for the bigger machines - yeah, I know, that’s not much height, but, after all, you ARE striving to be a professional … right?), and second, this change in the attitude from when you initiate the flare to reaching the flare attitude should take just about 3 seconds (about 2 seconds for the smaller machines and about 4 seconds for the larger machines).

Under normal circumstances, during the last portion of the final approach, the power will have been held relatively constant, and as the flare is initiated – and no later than upon reaching the level flight attitude – the power will be gradually reduced toward the idle position. The power should be in “idle” at the time of the main landing gear touchdown – and if it is not yet at idle when the gear touches, at that point the throttles will be reduced the remainder of the way to the idle position.

HOWEVER, before we get to that part, and in order to get sufficient practice in determining how you can best determine the rate and magnitude of the control applications and the attitude you want to see at the end of the flare, I would normally have you plan on leveling the airplane at that one (1) to five (5) feet above the runway (yes, you read that correctly!) and from there to maintain the airspeed you’ve reached when airplane reaches that level flight attitude (and you read that correctly, as well) … AND I would ask you to ACTUALLY fly the airplane the full length of the remaining runway – at that altitude and at that airspeed.

For this specific training application, I would have you advance the power to maintain that indicated airspeed (the speed achieved at the end of the flare – which will mean that you’ll have to add a slight bit of power – but I’d even volunteer to help you do that) and then you would fly down the entire length of the remaining runway – understanding that we’d execute a normal missed approach just prior to reaching the runway end. Again, you would maintain the altitude achieved at the end of the flare, and you would maintain the airspeed achieved at the end of the flare; again, without climbing / without descending / without accelerating / without decelerating.

Additionally, there is a very good likelihood that I’d ask you to do this same maneuver several times (4 or 5 times probably) – and depending on your adaptability, we might do it again the next time we fly. The point I’m making here, with this post, is that what I’ve just described is the actualization of my point of ensuring the student uses whatever is easiest for him/her to grasp. Note that I did not say, “flare to X degrees of attitude” … I did not say “flare to put the departure end of the runway 2 inches above the bottom of the forward windscreen” … I did not say “flare to put the bottom of the side window at a 15 degree angle with the side of the runway,” … I did not say “flare to put the vertical speed indicator needle just on the top of the ‘zero’ reference” …and so on. I want the pilot to determine the most definitive way to determine the attitude he/she needs to maintain that level flight attitude, AND what kind of control applications (pressure and or magnitude) will achieve the desired corrections – presuming corrections are necessary – and they usually are. We would do this exercise until the pilot finds the way he/she best achieves the parameters I’ve defined.

When we’ve achieved the goal of determining when, how, how much, of whatever controls are required to move the airplane from the final approach condition to the “landing attitude” (and that’s what we’ve been doing), now we’ll go back to the power reduction – initiated with the initiation of the flare – but not any later than the main landing gear touchdown. The attitude will remain constant, but with the power reduction – and ensuing decrease in airspeed – the nose of the airplane will want to descend. We would discuss NOT letting that happen. The flare puts you into the landing (i.e., touchdown) attitude. With the increase in elevator back pressure – gained by additional elevator surface deflection (but NOT a change in the position of the nose of the airplane!) the airplane will rate of airspeed deceleration will increase, and the rate of descent will also increase. The idea is to have the main landing gear touchdown within the first 3,000 feet OR within the first 1/3 of the runway length, whichever is shorter! If the pilot recognizes that the landing may not occur within these parameters, immediate consideration for executing a “go-around” must be made.

If the above tasks have been mastered and are able to be repeated, there is very little likelihood that the touchdown will be delayed beyond the touchdown zone. Of course, any release of the elevator back pressure currently being held, will almost immediately result in Main Landing Gear contact with the runway. The normal touchdown will be noticed as a bit on the “firm” side (but not “hard”) and is exactly what is desired to ensure positive tire contact with the runway surface in the event of rain or snow accumulation. Of course, any slippery runway conditions will require appropriate aerodynamic and/or ground control to be used as soon as practicable.

Additionally, in the event a crosswind is present, as the flare altitude is approached, the airplane should be in an “angled” position relative to the runway surface, sometimes called a “crab,” such that a point on the belly of the airplane exactly between the main gear (between the body gear the larger machines) is over the runway centerline and the airplane is tracking to maintain this lateral position. In anticipation of landing, power reduction may begin as early as crossing the threshold, and power reduction should begin no later than achieving the “flare” attitude prior to touchdown. Most pilots start the power reduction AS the flare is initiated … and is the same point any crab alignment with the runway centerline is initiated. The rate of power reduction is entirely up to you (and/or your company) … but once started, power reduction should be continued all the way to the flight idle position.

This will reduce the likelihood of having to increase or decrease the rate of back pressure control on the column/stick to continue the flare and subsequently to achieve “level flight” attitude (yes, THAT level flight attitude) as the power reduction is continued. The power should be in the idle position no later than upon main gear touchdown – simply because with some airplanes equipped with auto-spoiler activation/deactivation, having the throttles physically positioned ahead of the spoiler auto-retract position may initiate spoiler extension when the landing gear contacts the runway surface, and then experience immediate spoiler retraction due to that throttle position … which is certainly not something you want at this point.

As you pull the throttle(s) back, you will notice the nose getting heavier – don’t let the nose move down. You will notice the necessity to continually, but slightly, increase the back pressure on the elevator controls … initially to move the nose from the position in which you have been holding it while approaching the flare initiation point, up to that level flight position (more on that in a moment), and once that attitude has been achieved, you will notice the necessity to continue that back pressure increase – no longer to move the nose up – but now, since the level flight attitude has been reached, in order to maintain that level flight attitude as the airspeed decreases – and the more the airspeed decreases, the more back pressure will be required to keep that level flight attitude.

Of course you would recognize that because you have been reducing the throttle(s) position AND you’ve been raising the pitch attitude, the airspeed will be decreasing. Because you will have been reducing the power (maybe to idle) the airspeed will continue to decelerate, and the airplane will continue to descend, going from just above the runway to ON the runway. When performed precisely and accurately, the touchdown will occur exactly AS the airplane reaches that level flight attitude. BUT, and very importantly – humans are rarely perfect – and performing this task to that degree of accuracy is not regularly accomplished – but it IS accomplished – and the more you practice doing this, the more you will be successful in doing it perfectly.

Your touchdown should be firm but not hard. The kinetic energy of the airplane should be moving in the right direction, and the nose should be able to be flown to the runway rather quickly as the attitude will not be unnecessarily high to arrest an unwanted high sink rate. You should be over the center of the runway, with the controls already properly positioned for the landing run. Also, you should be acutely aware of the fact that the longer the power is maintained above the idle position, the farther down the runway it will be that the main gear will actually touch the runway surface.

If you had been carrying a crab angle to counter a crosswind, the crab should be removed in exactly the same time as the flare takes – i.e., approximately 3 seconds – and should be done AS the airplane is being flared. This is done by applying pressure to the rudder pedal to pressure (do not "kick") the nose around to line up the airplane centerline with the centerline of the runway while simultaneously increasing the back pressure on the control column to flare. As you probably know, because of the forward sweep of the upwind wing when removing the “crab” will tend to make that wing rise, it may be necessary to counter with some “into-the-wind” aileron to counter that … but, unless the wind is quite strong, you won’t be in the air long enough to have the wind blow you downwind off the centerline. Of course, if the wind IS quite strong, you may have to add a bit more aileron to slightly (very slightly) dip the up-wind wing into that wind (of course, referencing any flight manual requirement for maximum wing down applications on landings).

I probably do not need to say that once all the landing gear are on the ground and the airplane is tracking down the runway, immediately ensure the throttle(s) is(are) in idle, extend ground spoilers, apply appropriate wheel brakes, and use reverse thrust as your operations manual dictates.

Let me offer a quick “aside” … for practice … I would probably have you “fly down the runway … at THAT flare altitude … no climb, no descent, no acceleration, no deceleration;” and I’d tell you that “we’ll go around at the end of the runway.” If there had been a crosswind present, I would have you keep the crab angle you established and tell you to fly down the runway with no climb, no descent, no faster, no slower, keeping that point on the belly of the airplane exactly over the runway centerline – and to do that with whatever crab angle you need to do it. Of course, with or without a crosswind present … you’d have to add a bit of power – since you likely would have had the throttles back, but I would allow you to do that since we wouldn’t be landing anyway. I’d have you do this exercise as many times as was necessary to get you comfortable with the timing as to when to initiate the flare, how quickly to flare, and to what attitude you need to stop the flare with the main gear just off the runway surface – and the key point would be to have you use whatever cues made sense to YOU to accomplish all these things.

This would enable you to recognize and become familiar with your position … know how to recognize when to start the flare … and get comfortable with how quickly you need to adjust the elevator controls to achieve the flare you desire … and, perhaps most importantly, have you recognize what attitude you should have at the end of the flare … using whatever cues are important and understandable … to YOU – and again, the attitude we are discussing is called the LEVEL FLIGHT ATTITUDE – which is THE attitude from which all airplanes should be landed – and I mean ALL airplanes! One more thing ... this exercise can be successfully accomplished in most higher level simulators ... and because of the inevitable deficiencies (regardless of how minor) that exist in the simulated environment, there may be some slight modification required to the cues you will use when landing the airplane as opposed to the simulator - and if it is necessary, go ahead and make that/those adjustment(s) ... with the practice you've had in the simulator, it should be a reasonably easy adjustment to your recognition processes.

Clearly, while I stand by what I’ve said here, and I’ve practiced it throughout my career, as you probably have heard me say, over and over, all of the above is my opinion, and does not reflect the position of any other individual, any company, any enterprise, or any agency … despite whatever desire I may have to the contrary.

[ExSp33db1rd]

DozyWannabe ...
Again, with respect I think you're over generalizing ....

I wouldn't disagree, but there was a trend and I wasn't the only Old Fart to remark upon it.

(Also ... Sorry about my Maths. it was more like 30 years, not 40 !! )

[andrasz]

I think the airplane load of passengers at the mercy of an autonomous computer is still some distance in the future.

A very long way...

And not because of the lack of technical capabilities (let's face it, already most large commercial aircraft out there, if properly set up, could be landed by anybody with the simple instruction 'don't touch it'...), but because the balance of risks and associated expenses.

I'm not a pilot but one of those usually referred to as engaged in doing arithmetic involving the seeds of a certain legume species. In the past I have been involved in designing and operating a very complex automated data extraction systems. One of the key realisations during the project was that you can design a good robust software that handles 99% of the envisioned scenarios (lets not speak of the un-envisioned ones), but to automate the remaining 1% will take 9x the effort so far (directly translating into cost), and the result will still have an unacceptable error rate (which was defined as less than one error for every 1,000 processing events). The solution was to design a system with a human operator to handle and decide upon exceptions, with automation aiding to spot errors and correct manually. This achieved an error rate better than 1 in 10k events.

The scenario in aviation is similar. We have reliable automation to handle 99% of scenarios, and the pilots are there to cope with the remaining 1% and monitor what the automation is doing and take control if needed. That is not going to change, simply because the potential error rate (and the associated costs) with a remote pilot or full automation is too high to be acceptable. Military drones is another story - there the increased payload and reduced complexity for 99% of missions provides more savings than the cost of losing 1% (or less) of expendable airframes.

[oblivia]

@Air Rabbit

Everything you say makes sense and is totally reasonable, and I of course am a total layman with unsophisticated thoughts on the subject — motivated largely by a boyish desire to have a go on a robot plane (and to spitefully deny pilots the opportunity to fly for a living). ;)

But to bring it back to the discussion at hand... even with today's technology this 777 could in fact have landed itself just fine, right? Is there a safety argument for not doing that more often?

My suspicion is that pilots, perfectly understandably, prefer to fly landings themselves. But is pilot preference really the best way to make such decisions? And is safety the guiding factor?

Humans will always have the same flaws, but computers just keep getting better. I'm not convinced that the human added value will stay above zero forever.

As for us passengers, we can't see you guys anyway. Our experience would be near identical, so hardly the same leap of faith as letting a robot cut you open with no doctors present! Most of us tend to assume that you're just sitting up there playing on your iPads anyway. :p

[roulishollandais]

Reliability of 99% is OK for an ordinary toy.

[blind pew]

Dozy and air rabbit enjoyed your posts...would have liked to have been taught to land an aircraft like that but.....more like pitch up to X degrees, close throttles and wait for the thump....lower the nose ...but not too fast and keep straight.

Oblivia...there are times when I have been so nackered that I've preferred that the automatics or the other guy did the landing.
Fatigue has a huge amount to play in accidents but the remedy is expensive so it is often sidelined.

[AirRabbit]

@Air Rabbit

Everything you say makes sense and is totally reasonable, and I of course am a total layman with unsophisticated thoughts on the subject — motivated largely by a boyish desire to have a go on a robot plane (and to spitefully deny pilots the opportunity to fly for a living).
Believe it or not I understand your comment about wanting to “spitefully deny” pilots the opportunity to earn a living by flying airplanes, and I might have had the same feelings had I not had the opportunity to do just that … however (and it is a significant however), having such a feeling today is not necessary (at least for a good portion of today’s pilots) because the pittance often tendered would not likely be misinterpreted as a “living wage” in many cases.

But to bring it back to the discussion at hand... even with today's technology this 777 could in fact have landed itself just fine, right? Is there a safety argument for not doing that more often?
The simple response to this interrogatory, obviously, is YES. However, there are a couple of prerequisites that would have to have been in place for that to have happened. The flight crew would have had to allow adequate time, and flight distance, to descend, to configure and slow the airplane accordingly; tune and identify the appropriate navigation receivers; set the appropriate airspeed and heading references; set, ensure that the appropriate systems (i.e., autopilot, auto-throttle, and any other required/suggested systems) are correct, and properly engaged; compute appropriate go-around settings (speed, altitude, heading) with a full understanding of where any missed approach would take them; and then, at the appropriate times and locations, make appropriate adjustments to any of these systems/settings that may be appropriate or required depending on the heading, altitude, airspeed directions received and subsequent approach/landing clearances and requirements are issued. Typically in such circumstances, the flight crew would be well advised to “pre-think” the next logical set of instructions or clearances that are likely to be issued – maintaining both positional and situational awareness, typically through recognizing and understanding the clearances/updates issued to any preceding airplanes, as well as the responses from those other airplanes in the traffic area.

This kind of cockpit/pilot activity is quite typical of experienced flight crews, when not flying a specifically cleared “instrument approach” (which is sometimes asked for – even in CAVU weather conditions – primarily to ensure a minimum of “thinking errors” after a long flight at the end of a longer work day. Should the pilot flying elect to manually fly the descent, traffic pattern, approach, and landing, it is fully logical to presume that all of the above kinds of issues would have to be addressed and then followed, pretty closely to the manner in which the automatic systems would be expected to do, except that the pilot flying would have manual control of the flight controls and throttles. The typical advantage to manually conducted approaches (in addition to the obvious point that manually flying an airplane in a safe and efficient manner is also quite a bit of fun) is that when it may become available to do so, some of the “rigid corners” that are typically flown under “radar control” can be foreshortened to the extent that the airplane can often be landed some 12 to 20 minutes earlier than the more formalized and “squared” radar contact methodology – without compromising one bit of safety and perhaps saving a bit of flight time on the airframe, running time on the engines, and a commensurate reduction in the fuel quantity used – all of which translates to corporate cost savings.

My suspicion is that pilots, perfectly understandably, prefer to fly landings themselves. But is pilot preference really the best way to make such decisions? And is safety the guiding factor?
Of course, it is no secret that pilots – at least most of them that I know, personally – like the idea of flying. And, in that regard, taking off and landing are easily the 2 most “pilot-like” activities they get to accomplish. I know I would plead guilty to that concept. I am not at all sure that the decision to program the automatic systems and then allow those systems to “land the airplane” is measurably “more safe” than having a competent and qualified pilot perform those same tasks. If there were such a “safety-measurement” ever to be objectively developed, there might be an effort mounted to adjust the regulatory requirements accordingly. However, the more the “automatics” are inserted and the more the “manual” aspects are eliminated – the greater the amount of confidence in the error-free operation of those automatic systems has to be able to be depended upon.

As we’ve said previously in other threads in this and in other categories, while computerized systems are becoming better and better at what they are designed to do ... however, and with no “tongue-in-cheek” attitude on my part, computers DO NOT think … they merely compare sensed values to the degree of accuracy provided by whatever sensors are used and the transmission capabilities of the connections, where those sensed values are compared to what has been previously set - either by the system’s programmers during development and assembly or by one or more of the crew members aboard that flight.

However, even with all of the attempts to incorporate “redundantly comparative” loops in such programming, the bottom line remains essentially unchanged - computers do not think. Computers do not look out front and make decisions as to what is likely to happen or what course of action would be the least interruptive to the flight path of the airplane. Computers ONLY compare what is sensed to what has been programmed – and, then, first - within the parameters previously programmed into that computer and then, second - within the availability and extent of the authority granted to that computer response, will insert some amount of control (and/or power) adjustment, until what is then sensed and compared to what has been programmed, and then the computer follows another set of pre-programmed responses – retain the control application, reduce that application to ½ the value (or some other factor), return the control application to the initial position, etc. Of course, those sampling and comparison rates are substantially faster than what can be accomplished by humans. However, the computer’s primary DISADVANTAGE is its inability to think, plan, and establish alternatives that might be equally or more advantageous when their activation is required or implemented.

Humans will always have the same flaws, but computers just keep getting better. I'm not convinced that the human added value will stay above zero forever.
Of course, I understand the premise you describe. However, I think you’d have to agree that the “thinking ability” of humans, in that this is what is responsible for whatever has been developed and/or improved in the computer world as we know it today. Equally true, as long as this remains a fact, I cannot see how computers will ever be "better" than the human who developed it. Faster? Sure! ... but Better? No way! Now, if you’re advocating either the possibility or the inevitability of computers designing, constructing, and developing even better computers than humans have or will have in the future, it might be more advantageous for you to spend your time in discussions with the likes of Lionel Fanthorpe, Mercedes Lackey, Piers Anthony, or Isaac Asimov.

As for us passengers, we can't see you guys anyway. Our experience would be near identical, so hardly the same leap of faith as letting a robot cut you open with no doctors present! Most of us tend to assume that you're just sitting up there playing on your iPads anyway.
Well, I don’t think that is necessarily so … at least the few times I have been subjected to “a doctor’s knife” … and in those cases, the last person I saw beforehand was either the paramedic or the floor nurse, and I didn’t meet the doctor until well after the surgery was complete – nor do I have any memory of being IN an operating room … and THAT’s the way I prefer it (thank you very much!). But, I went into the process with a full awareness that someone who had passed all sorts of training and tests, and that someone else who had a similar background and capability, actually certified this person to exercise the authority and competency to wield that knife over (and into) the only body I’ll ever have! No … I think that we’re a least a modicum of time away from turning over surgery to Doctor Automoton and “IT’S” staff of equally robotic nurses and aides. When I stop to think that the first humans who had to have limbs removed or wounds to stitch-up or similar human tragic negatives some 7,000 to 10,000 years ago – and recognizing that while the equipment those kinds of folks use has gotten bigger (or smaller – when necessary), sharper, and better – and the knowledge of the person wielding those instruments is obviously and vastly more educated, trained, and tested … it surely seems to me that we’re some additional 7 to 10 thousand, hundred thousand, million (where to stop?) years before computers are likely to be on a “par” with humans … despite the Television and Movie Theater repeated attempts to convince us otherwise.


there are times when I have been so nackered that I've preferred that the automatics or the other guy did the landing.
Fatigue has a huge amount to play in accidents but the remedy is expensive so it is often sidelined.
Just a quick comment (and, for me, THAT is saying something!) I think that recognizing when and under what circumstances turning to the automatic systems for descent, approach, and landing is an exceptionally confident thing to do. In my book, that level of confidence is more than just “likely” to be justified, as I believe it indicates that this person is quite comfortable with his/her professional abilities and is not dependent on others to recognize and comment on it, including the status of their mental acuity and physical ability. Just like executing a missed approach … some pilots would “never” consider missing the approach for fear that it might tarnish his/her reputation. I believe that a pilot who has such recognition of his/her own skills and abilities, can, and more importantly, WILL, objectively decide to reject the continuation of an approach that may have begun to deteriorate, is a pilot I would have on my payroll at any time! The same thing holds true for those who recognize their own mental acuity and physical ability as likely being a slight bit slower than normal (due to a myriad of reasons, but fatigue is certainly one of them) – is the mark of a true professional who has to make NO apologies for exercising what he/she KNOWS to be the right decision.

By the way - I've spent quite a bit of time in the UK - and I thought I had the "vernacular" pretty well understood ... but, I admit that I had to turn to a truly "English" dictionary to learn about the term "nackered!" At least I can point to the fact that even at my advanced state of ... well ... never mind about that ... at least I'm still able to Learn something new .... thanks.

[RayCee]

I loved that read!
That is exactly the procedure my instructor used when I was training for CPL, he hated sloppy flares with a passion.
Every dual outing, over and over. Then he started narrowing the alt and AS limits and then having to do the same procedure at night, and in a full crosswind. (Without landing)
I never had much trouble with landing attitude since, whatever I flew.

[Tee Emm]

The power should be in “idle” at the time of the main landing gear touchdown – and if it is not yet at idle when the gear touches, at that point the throttles will be reduced the remainder of the way to the idle position.

The throttles might be against the idle stop when the gear touches but the engine power will certainly not be at idle power because it takes a finite time for the RPM to reduce to idle N1. In fact to get the best out of immediate reverse thrust on touch down one method is to touch down with approach thrust still applied then at the moment of touch down close the throttles against the idle stop and select full reverse as quickly as possible. This takes into account that by the time the reverser sleeves are full open the N1 is still well above idle N1 and spool up time is significantly less. In turn this means reaching full reverse power more quickly (highly desirable) than happens if idle N1 is first reached before the spool up process starts to happen

[safetypee]

AirRabbit, thank you for the detailed comments (#1066). Many of my questions were rhetorical, inviting thought (which you provided), and consideration of the human task in these scenarios.

The detailed description of how to land is just that – a description; this is valuable theory, but not knowledge in application (in context). Knowledge should be based on theory but also requires the action skills of when (or not) to apply the theory.
Landing is one of many aspects of flying which involves tacit knowledge – those skills which cannot be taught from a book, only by demonstration, by doing, and then improving, gaining experience.
There may be weaknesses in these areas, but choosing one aspect or the other for accident resolution might not have considered where or how the significant aspects in accidents arise.

The vast majority of operations are extremely safe. Many of the contributing factors in accidents are within the regulatory assumptions, and also noting that crews had met the training requirements. Thus why require more of what already exists. We should be asking what contributes to the rare circumstances which lead to accidents – human variability? We could consider eliminating variability, but equally must not to forget how often we rely on variability to maintain safety and an economic operation. Instead of seeking to zero variability, we might better bound it – understand the performance spread in operations, rethink regulations and requirements for human tasks, and then look at systems and environment interactions.

Flying would be very boring if all approaches and landings were consistent – lacking the challenge of variability

[AirRabbit]

The power should be in “idle” at the time of the main landing gear touchdown – and if it is not yet at idle when the gear touches, at that point the throttles will be reduced the remainder of the way to the idle position.
The throttles might be against the idle stop when the gear touches but the engine power will certainly not be at idle power because it takes a finite time for the RPM to reduce to idle N1. In fact to get the best out of immediate reverse thrust on touch down one method is to touch down with approach thrust still applied then at the moment of touch down close the throttles against the idle stop and select full reverse as quickly as possible. This takes into account that by the time the reverser sleeves are full open the N1 is still well above idle N1 and spool up time is significantly less. In turn this means reaching full reverse power more quickly (highly desirable) than happens if idle N1 is first reached before the spool up process starts to happen

I am more than a little disappointed in this attitude. While the physics of what is described here may be generally correct, at least to some, it leaves far too many “negatives” open for possible (and likely?) occurrence.

1. Because the distance from the threshold to the touchdown point is simply matter of speed and time, retaining the thrust used during the final approach all the way to touchdown will lengthen the touchdown point substantially. Real potential for unacceptable outcome.

2. Touching down with same thrust maintained during the final approach would require the touchdown attitude to be one where the nose is well below that normally achieved for landing – which increases the potential of the nose gear touching down prior to the main gear. Real potential for unacceptable outcome.

3. Touching down with substantially higher airspeed significantly increases the potential of a “touchdown skip,” or becoming airborne immediately thereafter. Real potential for unacceptable outcome.

4. Should the airplane actually skip back into the air simultaneously with the pilot selecting full reverse thrust, there is an increased possibility of not having the main gear triggering of the thrust reverser lock-outs to be completely released. Real potential for unacceptable outcome.

5. If the one or more of the thrust reverser lock-outs are not released, one (or more) of the engines may not have the reversers deployed while at least some (perhaps all?) of the engines are being fed an increased fuel flow. Depending on the rigging and the touchdown firmness, there is a substantially increase potential for experiencing an increasing asymmetrical thrust potential, complicating both directional control and the aerodynamically controlled pitch attitude. Should that pitch control be negatively affected, either the tail may strike the runway surface, or the airplane may reach the critical AoA and could aerodynamically stall. Real potential for unacceptable outcome.

6. If the skip is immediate (which is more likely with any increase in airspeed) and if all the reverser lock-outs are retained as the pilot, now futilely, attempts to increase reverse thrust, the airplane momentum (which in addition to continuing to move forward) will be increasing in pitch attitude but without any increase in engine thrust. This must necessarily result in at least one of three outcomes; 1) an increasing pitch attitude, a decreasing airspeed, but no increase in height above the runway, resulting in a tail strike; 2) an increasing height above the runway, no increase in pitch, resulting in an aerodynamic stall; or 3) in response to either the increasing pitch or the increasing height, the pilot releases all, or most, of the currently held elevator-up control, allowing the nose to drop, precipitously, resulting in a nose-gear-first re-contact with the runway, resulting in an increase downward pivot, driving the main gear down and also onto the runway. It would be complete conjecture to attempt to predict whether or not the pilot could immediately attempt to stow the thrust reversers, unlocking the throttle advance interlock, advance the power, and adjust the flight controls to maintain a flyable attitude at whatever airspeed is current, and safely recover the airplane. Real potential for unbelievably unacceptable outcome.

Would any of the above potentials actually occur? I sincerely doubt that anyone knows the answer. However, it is certainly true that the potential for any one, or any combination, of the above outcomes is certainly increased should a pilot elect to follow the procedures described here. That is not the way pilots are trained and it is not the way most pilots operate their airplane. Certainly, the only way to totally prevent airplane accidents is to put all airplanes in a hangar and lock the door. HOWEVER, the risks that are inherent with aviation have long-been examined, and reasonable procedures, practices, and policies have been examined, altered, refined, and implemented. We’ve come too far to cavalierly toss together some knowledge pieces and convince ourselves that we’ve discovered a new and better “wheel.”

To me it’s way too much like some of the “Do You Believe It” television programs that capitalize on the almost hilariously comedic, and at least bordering on tragic, “stunts-gone-wrong” that a whole series of "someones" have caught on film or video. I think that most of us would (certainly I do) wind up wincing in our seats, audibly uttering “OH!” or “OUCH!” when we observe the results of the “devil-may-care-attitudes” that must have been present in the minds of the persons (who at least appear to be young and likely woefully inexperienced persons) who deliberately attempt such stunts while very likely being fully aware of the potential outcomes.

I would hope that as professional aviators none of us would disregard the safety factors that have been (or should have been) driven into our thought process and throw caution into the wind in favor of gambling that the “physics” of a potential “stunt” could work if precisely conducted, while not knowing for sure that all of the associated parts and pieces will work precisely as designed and are not troubled with any wear or tear or fatigue that might exist. Has anyone ever heard the oft repeated and sarcastic lament "shoulda, coulda, woulda" ?? I won’t do it – and no one on any airplane over which I have any influence will do it – THAT is for sure!

[Chronus]

APPLICATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES IN
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLE FLIGHT
Warren R. Duji-ene, Jr., Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences, Nova Southeastern
Universig, Ft. Lauderdale, FL.

The full text of the above paper may be found at

http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20040082071.pdf

Here are a couple of extracts from the paper.

Current research efforts are looking at
advancing the UAV to full autonomous operation
and flight. While there seem to be many definitions
of what the autonomy encompasses, each discipline
has highlighted its meaning and benefits.

These systems attempted to formulate
the art of flying an aircraft into logical series of
events to maintain control of specific functions of
the aircraft. This concept will still be a key
component with systems designed for future use.

Porterhouse may be aware of the work currently being undertaken in AI and UAV`s.

There seems to be no mention in any of the current research studies involving Air Rabbit`s balsa wood craft as replacement for the space shuttle.

The researcher`s description of piloting as an "art"as being the key concept , is perhaps note worthy.

[AirRabbit]

Many of my questions were rhetorical, inviting thought (which you provided), and consideration of the human task in these scenarios.

The detailed description of how to land is just that – a description; this is valuable theory, but not knowledge in application (in context). Knowledge should be based on theory but also requires the action skills of when (or not) to apply the theory.
Landing is one of many aspects of flying which involves tacit knowledge – those skills which cannot be taught from a book, only by demonstration, by doing, and then improving, gaining experience.
There may be weaknesses in these areas, but choosing one aspect or the other for accident resolution might not have considered where or how the significant aspects in accidents arise.

The vast majority of operations are extremely safe. Many of the contributing factors in accidents are within the regulatory assumptions, and also noting that crews had met the training requirements. Thus why require more of what already exists. We should be asking what contributes to the rare circumstances which lead to accidents – human variability? We could consider eliminating variability, but equally must not to forget how often we rely on variability to maintain safety and an economic operation. Instead of seeking to zero variability, we might better bound it – understand the performance spread in operations, rethink regulations and requirements for human tasks, and then look at systems and environment interactions.

Flying would be very boring if all approaches and landings were consistent – lacking the challenge of variability

Hi safetypee:

Of course my post consists entirely of my thoughts … but those are the processes I’ve personally used to train more than a few pilots on how to land an airplane (from small SE recips; to swept wing, single/tandem seat “fast-jets,” to some of the largest jet transports in the air) – not simple theoretical thoughts or expressions of thought. These procedures work and for the most part, work quite well. Of course, after a student goes on about his/her professional career, how much of the techniques and habit patterns they each learned during that relatively short stint as a student is almost anyone’s guess. Additionally, not everyone adapts to the training provided equally – and, for sure, I’ve had some students who vehemently refused to do anything unless I told them precisely what to do. In at least some of those cases, it wasn’t simply up to me – although I did attempt to move some such “caged-thought” persons to other instructors and was reasonably successful, certainly there were some with whom I had to get specifically adamant about what they were to do.

The persons with whom and for whom I worked in those situations, thankfully, were almost always agreeable to allow me to place in such a student’s training profile, my notes on why I did what I did, and I managed to insert additional comments that I thought to be relevant. Of course, as anyone would recognize, there is no way for me to go back over those years (dare I say decades) and recall the names and locations of each “student-of-concern.” Although, it is certainly possible that some became good pilots, never to have experienced any problems – and it is also possible that some of the students about whom I was genuinely proud have ultimately committed errors of commission or omission, about which I would certainly be professionally surprised to learn.

However, and notwithstanding all of the above, I feel quite confident that a vast majority of those pilots who had the duty (good or bad) to have endured my instruction have turned out to be competent and capable aviators. However, THAT is not entirely due to my level of professionalism or competence – merely an acknowledgement that those pilots recognized what it was that THEY used to understand and ultimately to actually accomplish something they were attempting or were required to do … and THAT is all that I was attempting to convey to them.

I am NOT, at all, against thorough examination of airplane accidents – in fact, I am a committed advocate of “the more thorough, the better!” As I’ve said multiple times, pilots are humans; humans make mistakes; and therefore, to presume that for whatever reason any pilot would be incapable of making a mistake would be the height of arrogance and/or stupidity. I hope I’m not seen by anyone as flaunting such personal characteristics … as, for no other reason, my own list of committed errors would very likely be impressively long … and I hope that I’ve learned from each one.

The point that I continually stress and advocate is a desire to see the regular and complete review of training goals, tasks, methods, and equipment. Not everything that goes wrong can or will be traceable to a training issue. However, certainly some problems, correctable by training, might be essentially eliminated or at least mitigated to the extent that a safe outcome could be achieved. But without such a regular review, conducted by competent professionals who are capable of recognizing not only the problem but also the logical correction for that problem – those problems are likely to continue and just as likely to become more complex – making further corrections even more difficult to define and difficult to correct.

[AirRabbit]

There seems to be no mention in any of the current research studies involving Air Rabbit`s balsa wood craft as replacement for the space shuttle.

Hi Mr. Chronus

First – My intent is NOT to insult you or your beliefs. Second, I do know a little (in comparison to some of my colleagues, a VERY little) about UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) or RPV (Remotely Piloted Vehicles), and am fully aware of the research project you referenced. In fact one of the comments in that report says, “Some of the problems that still exist today include the fact that an expert pilot’s decision-making process is difficult to imitate with computers” … which goes directly toward only some of the basic concerns I mentioned to you earlier. I stand by my earlier comment where I said, “…one of the serious issues … is the connectivity between the “pilot” on the ground and the airborne UAS – which presents its own interesting set of problems and solutions.” What I didn't say, but is even more true (presuming relative "levels of truth" even exist), are the problems of developing the necessary algorithms, with the appropriate separate interfaces, with the required accuracy and the capability of handling the sheer amount of primary and necessary redundant data, to satisfactorily and safely operate a "pilotless" airplane, at passenger carrying gross weights, over passenger carrying distances, at passenger carrying altitudes and airspeeds, into, over, and through, the various kinds of weather systems and temperatures encountered around the globe, at the levels of repetition that todays data would suggest would be required.

As I said, I know some of the folks who are looking at, dealing with, administering, and/or overseeing, the development of UAVs in all of their present, and what are hoped to be future, applications. What they are doing is not a big secret. Yes, there ARE some aspects of UAV operations, conducted by or for Military interests, that remain under the “classified” banner, but it doesn’t take a “rocket scientist” to logically guess at what those problem areas might be. As long as the pilot on the ground has the ability to have the control inputs transmitted to the UAV quickly and without error, the conduct of UAV missions are notably successful.

I fully recognize that this RPV/UAV industry is expanding … and good for them. Even more so … hopefully, anyway … good for the rest of us, as well! We even have organizations such as Federal Express (the US based package delivery company) who, by the way, essentially pioneered the small airplane, hub-to-hub, overnight delivery process, have announced an intent to develop either an RPV or a UAV that would be capable of delivering packages directly to a client’s home or office. They weren’t terribly specific in their proposals but it wouldn’t surprise me to see something along those lines in the not terribly distant future.

In fact, today RPVs and some UAVs are used extensively in power line inspection and highway surveillance (for maintenance purposes), and a myriad of other similar emerging technical applications. But, as prolific as some these applications are, none of them, in my not-so-humble opinion, even remotely approach the capability or the sophistication that would be minimally required to begin thinking of carrying passengers around the globe without pilots involved – either with pilots on the ground remotely located or with completely autonomous on-board computers flying the machine. While it is true that flight is flight … even more true, or important, at least, is that one kind of flight isn’t necessarily comparable to all other forms of flight. Hence, 4-piece balsa wood gliders that 6-year-olds play with are not remotely similar to something like the space shuttle. That doesn’t mean that the 6-year-olds should stop enjoying what they are doing – merely that an interested onlooker, shouldn’t immediately conclude that what they are observing those 6-year-olds doing must be similar to all other flying vehicles (including the Space Shuttle Replacement) and can be achieved with a similar amount of "simple."

[roulishollandais]

UAV and pilotless A/C are two very different things.

Statistics of drones accidents and losses, with pilots on ground, are still very bad !

@Chronus
Thanks for the link. Which is the date of that study? Is it just theoric from students working for some compilation thesis, or is the aim of that study to be a part of an actually project with real $$$ ?

[safetypee]

AR, at this point our views diverge. You favour continuance of a training approach, although I applaud the need to ‘review’ and ‘not everything is training’ caveats.

Yes, accidents usually involve complex interaction, which calls for a different way of thinking about them; but can we change our thinking.
Humans dislike complexity and have difficulty in representing the many interconnections, thus tend to deal with contributing factors separately – training, systems, environment; and having separated them, tend to prioritise them according to time association with the accident. Thus the NTSB, identifies the human with the probable cause (cause is a poor term), then examines the contributory factors with respect to the human, thus training appears in the first recommendations, and the recommendations aim to ‘fix’ the human with more of the same variable human attributes.

An alternative might be to use a TEM approach; the dominant threat was the system complexity, not the human who suffered difficulty in managing the system.
Classic TEM should first avoid the threat; in systems terms eliminate it, or at least ensure that the risk of error is minimal. However, the NTSB approach starts with error management and mitigation - human activities which were shown to be weak. The recommendations then add to the training, documentation, and checking burden, but without assurance that the threat will be countered at some future date.

There are similarities here with AF447; the threat was (is) ice crystals, but the ‘management’ management of this threat concentrated on the resultant of an adverse encounter with the threat, not as might be first considered its avoidance. We cannot remove Cbs, but we can avoid them by a greater margin, and if we don’t, then we might have to use error management and procedural mitigation.

The significant safety issue in this accident is not the crew’s mismanagement of the approach, but the higher level mismanagement of design, systems approval, approach procedure, and operational regulatory oversight (experience), and the industry's continued belief that these can be mitigated by the human with more 'training'.

Comments relate to NTSB summary - Board Meeting: Crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 (http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2014/asiana214/abstract.html)

[aterpster]

safetypee:

The significant safety issue in this accident is not the crew’s mismanagement of the approach, but the higher level mismanagement of design, systems approval, approach procedure, and operational regulatory oversight (experience), and the industry's continued belief that these can be mitigated by the human with more 'training'.


What was wrong with design?

What was wrong with system approval?

What was wrong with the "approach procedure?"

When my college professors threw out glittering generalities we threw out the gantlet. :)

[olasek]

aterpster - I am with you, there was absolutely NOTHING wrong with all those things. :ooh:

By the way, what's TEM - Tunneling Electron Microscope. :}

[FGD135]

What was wrong with ... I'm with safetypee. I'm not sure what was wrong with the approach procedure, but wrong with "design" and "system approval" were:

1. The presentation of airspeed in the tape format, making it much more difficult for pilots to monitor airspeed (and become aware of incorrect airspeed);

2. The abysmal man/machine interface. There is nothing wrong with airliners being highly automated, the issue is how well the automation can be operated/managed. In this case, and with all other modern airliners, the pilots are just not trained anywhere near well enough - because it is just not possible to train a human to that degree. A robot, yes, but a human - no.

The sheer number of modes makes the modern cockpit too complex for the average human. The aircraft can remain just as automated, or even more so, but how the aircraft is operated must be changed.

How about just 5 or so modes, with one manual mode, where everything is manual? The aircraft would then either be fully automatic, or fully manual - no mixtures of modes with varying levels of automation. The auto modes would be "takeoff", "climb", "cruise", "hold", "land", etc.


... and the industry's continued belief that these can be mitigated by the human with more 'training'.Indeed. There are limits to what can be achieved via training. At some point, other factors need to be addressed.

[porterhouse]

- because it is just not possible to train a human to that degree. Utter rubbish. :ugh:
Enthusiasts amateur pilots on asvim flight simulation forum learn and handle very high fidelity 737/777 flight simulation (made by PMDG) in no time at all.

[FGD135]

Enthusiasts amateur pilots on asvim flight simulation ...
So you could put those Microsoft Flight Simulator pilots in the real aircraft, and they could operate the automation effectively, day in, day out, with all manner of interruptions and variations?

[olasek]

You could not put somebody in the cockpit who isn't even a real pilot.
But this is a good point, folks purchase a $100 simulation from PMDG, which is very detailed by the way and includes typical equipment failures, and can read a 200 page manual (to effectively teach a typical Boeing autopilot you need say only 20 pages out of it) and can operate successfully such simulation, there are thousands of them and the VATSIM international network is a testimony of how popular this hobby is. You don't hear anything about how impossibly complex it is, it isn't, it is simple. If a 10000 hr ATP pilot can't perform at the same level as a 20-hr amateur (who has no FO to help out) than I wonder what else. By the way FGD135, you would have to ask other XXXX 777 pilots what do they think about the complexity of their aircraft, your lonely voice doesn't really count, it is your opinion only, you probably even aren't Boeing rated.

[FGD135]

My lonely voice, olasek? Add these lonely voices:


The "one change that I would like to see: Improving the human-machine interface," said former NTSB chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman, who oversaw the crash investigation.


"The Asiana crash involved an inherently safe aircraft that performed as designed and a very experienced crew," Hersman said.


"But it demonstrated that commercial pilots are trained to rely heavily on sophisticated automation, which can become a trap if they don't understand what the system is doing behind the control panel."


At a December hearing, the safety board heard evidence that the Asiana pilots were confused by autopilot modes, believing the auto-throttle would maintain the plane's speed.


"Automation has unquestionably made aviation safer and more efficient. But the more complex automation becomes, the more challenging it is to ensure that the pilots adequately understand it," current safety board acting chairman Christopher Hart said last month.


"In this instance, the flight crew over-relied on automated systems that they did not fully understand. As a result, they flew the aircraft too low and too slow and collided with the seawall at the end of the runway."


The NTSB ruled that "complexities of the auto-throttle and autopilot" systems contributed to the accident.What will be the legacy of Asiana Airlines Flight 214? - CNN.com (http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/07/travel/asiana-214-legacy/)

[Capn Bloggs]

it is your opinion only, you probably even aren't Boeing rated.
So what are your credentials in this? Your Boeing ratings?

[AirRabbit]

Hi again, safetypee:

I was initially motivated to immediately respond to your post by acknowledging your recognition of my comments about the need to ‘review’ and ‘not everything is training’ – but I decided to put it aside and re-read once again, later. Well, it IS later now, and I have re-read your post – but I don’t think that our views are diverging quite as much as you might think. Please don’t misunderstand my intent here … I am fully aware that the last time I was correct about EVERYTHING must have been a very long time ago, as I don’t remember such a time … and … I also fully recognize that there is almost always more than one way to solve any given problem … and not everyone will agree with the method I choose, and that disagreement certainly doesn’t mean that I’m correct and everyone else is incorrect.

Because I am, and have been, for a long time (a very long time), an educator of one type or another, I think it is logical, for me anyway, to be prone to look at the “training” issue(s), or those issues that might well be resolved through training, at least initially – and, I think, logically conclude that “training” may indeed provide the necessary correction or, at least, provide some degree of correction for the issue under assessment. BUT, I think that I probably should define my understanding of the way I use the term “training.”

There are many who feel that “training” is what occurs in order to provide someone with an understanding of how “something” works. Simple things requiring less training and more complex things requiring not only more training, but usually training that is more sophisticated. But, in either case, once the individual grasps the fundamentals of the workings of that “something” the value of training has been recognized and is of little further use. I am NOT one of those kinds of training advocates. Of course, teaching individuals how “something” works is fundamentally necessary – whether that “something” is uncomplicated and straight forward or is vastly more complex and convoluted. But once that basic training is completed, I come from the position that the “real” training is only just begun. When I explain this specific aspect of my beliefs, I find it often useful to use “sports analogies.”

In the US, the sport of baseball is considered to be one of the country’s most recognizable “pastimes.” Certainly, teaching someone to play baseball for the first time is or can be quite challenging – but it happens across the country, in most towns and cities, in almost every vacant field. But once the youngsters who have learned “the basics” of the game get older and more understanding of the sport, additional “training” is almost universally appropriate. Even when the best of those youngsters have played the game in their town’s vacant lot, in the schools’ playgrounds, in the universities’ professional looking fields – and have decided to become “professional” baseball players … those now professionals spend 4 to 8 weeks, every year, prior to baseball season beginning, gathering for what is known here as “spring training.”

Certainly, one could easily recognize that these now-professional baseball players are not in “need” of any additional training – and, in fact, many of them conduct their own training for their own hometown “little leagues” for the new generation of players wanting to learn the game. EVEN then, these professional players, after spending that month or two at the beginning of each baseball season, go through a warm-up training session, including batting practice and fielding practice for an hour or so before EVERY game they play. It’s certainly not to “teach” these professionals anything new about the game … Certainly, these professionals do not need additional training on how to swing a bat, how to run the bases, how to catch or throw a baseball … it is rather an opportunity to, once again, review the mind-muscle interconnects, revise and “wakeup” some nerve endings, to more easily acquire the increased vigilance, the more heightened awareness, and the more attentive observations that often makeup the differences that often determine who wins and who loses a given baseball game.

The kind of “training” that I believe should be undertaken by professional pilots, would be much like the “training” undertaken by professional baseball players each year … however, certainly not to the extent or the time involvement as baseball players, and also not so much to “learn” new skills (although, in piloting, there ARE times when new or modernized equipment finds its way into the cockpit – and ground school or a bulletin added to an operating manual just may not fill the requirement as completely as what may be necessary!), as it would be to once again, review the mind-muscle interconnects, review how to revise and “wakeup” necessary nerve endings, to practice the acquisition of an increased vigilance, a heightened awareness, and an attentive observation of what is presented inside and outside of the cockpit – which, similar to what happens in baseball, but here, providing a reminder of what a refreshed diligence looks and feels like, which, in turn, just may determine the degree of efficiency and the level of safety with which any given flight may be conducted.

Of course, pilots don’t have a simulator session or a “practice flight” immediately prior to each scheduled flight – nor is it really necessary to warm the muscles and increase the adrenaline flow – as it is when preparing to engage in a physically demanding game – although, in a more perfect world it might not be completely out-of-the-question to suggest such a practice … 

No, my desire with regard to such training is two-fold – just as baseball training is two-fold. First, to teach newly required skills, when and where necessary. Second, and at least as importantly (and often much more so), to provide a regularly accomplished, professional overview of what kinds of skill sets may require review and practice for each individual in such training, and an assessment of what kinds of tasks might be or should be revisited, a review of what kind of complications might be or should be included in such a skills revisiting – focusing on the full length and breadth of piloting skills, and most commonly, provide an opportunity for each pilot to revisit all of the above with a mind-set devoted to the tasks, the skills required to perform them, and an opportunity to practice, practice, practice – of which, as professional athletes of all sports regularly remind us – one never can get too much!

This is not to ignore the kinds of issues that may complicate any normal flight operation. Threats to the safe operation or safe completion of the flight can be, and when important or recently experienced, should be reviewed during such training, as should be the rather continuous “management of errors” training. Of course, as I’ve said somewhat regularly, pilots are humans, and humans make errors – and as such, we should expect pilots to make errors – AND we should train those pilots (and revisit that training on as frequent a basis as deemed appropriate) on how to recognize and correct those errors when they do occur. Again, a knowledgeable review of recently recognized errors occurring during flight could easily be included within any robust training session.

So, I hope I have provided you with a more clear view of my objective when I say I am a full and vigorous supporter of pilot training – including the equipment that is used to conduct that training. The goal I have in mind for such training is to rid pilots of the “rust” that may occur after some amount of time away from dealing with some functions that are not often seen or are encountered infrequently – but, because of the consequences of improper or incomplete addressing could create unwanted and potentially dangerous situations. It is my sincere belief that regardless of the kinds of instrumentation or the location or particular display type of some informative instrument, gauge, or light, with proper, regular, and appropriate training, there should be very few, if any, instrument display or location that will regularly contribute to accidents or incidents. Additionally, I think such training sessions, provides the instructor with a front-row seat to ensure that line pilots are not misunderstanding or applying incomplete or inaccurate applications of something out of a training syllabus or manual. Close scrutiny of what happens during training sessions is not only appropriate ... it could easily be the only recognition of an improper understanding of control applications, habit patterns, or some other flight parameter or practice that might cause problems - and if noted during training could be corrected and prevent some untold degree of grief.

Again, ALL accidents and incidents should always be carefully and diligently examined and considered. When, if, or where it becomes known that some instrument, display, system, or system operation does, in fact, either complicate or confuse the pilots using that system, we should take all necessary steps to repair or replace or, if necessary, re-invent that particularly offensive equipment. And then train the pilots correctly, completely, and regularly on how to use that replacement equipment!

[MrDK]

Isn't this a pretty simple matter.

Clear day, perfect visibility, no cross wind, no wind shear, ... on and on ...
All mechanical systems operating as designed.
Seawall not excessively high.

... what could possibly be attributed to a disaster like this?

[BOAC]

By the way, what's TEM - Tunneling Electron Microscope. - no. it is 'Threat (and) Error Management', a term well-known - to those in professional aviation involved in Flight Safety.

[AirRabbit]

Isn't this a pretty simple matter.

Clear day, perfect visibility, no cross wind, no wind shear, ... on and on ...
All mechanical systems operating as designed.
Seawall not excessively high.

... what could possibly be attributed to a disaster like this?

Well, that is what this particular thread is examining – and so far, I think, the crash was very likely caused by one of the following two prevalent positions:
1) an extremely difficult to read set of instruments, to the extent that it created an inability to accurately understand what was being displayed resulting in confusion about what was happening, or was recognized at some point but physical action was not taken due to an expectation that the “automatics” would be properly applied and correct any noted anomaly with the approach path and/or airspeed; or
2) the pilot flying was inadequately and/or incompletely trained in manual operation the airplane with or without assistance provided by whatever automatic systems which may have been desired or which were unsuccessfully or improperly attempted to engage.

Either scenario was very likely exacerbated by fatigue of both pilots after a transpacific flight from Asia to the US (San Francisco).

[OK465]

The presentation of airspeed in the tape format, making it much more difficult for pilots to monitor airspeed (and become aware of incorrect airspeed);

...an extremely difficult to read set of instruments, to the extent that it created an inability to accurately understand what was being displayed...

Well we've gone from 'not as easy' to 'difficult' to 'much more difficult' to 'extremely difficult'....

When do we get to 'nearly impossible'?

[FGD135]

When do we get to 'nearly impossible'?
Gidday OK465, that's an easy one.


Just get the workload and/or stress level up high enough, and the tape will be nearly impossible to use.


A cinch to read when unstressed and relaxed, but, as I said earlier, the airspeed effectively becomes invisible when the chips are really down.

[AirRabbit]

Well we've gone from 'not as easy' to 'difficult' to 'much more difficult' to 'extremely difficult'....

When do we get to 'nearly impossible'?

As for me (?) … I'm only trying to provide the folks on “that end of the discussion” with a position that doesn’t sound like I’m trying to minimize the premise they’ve presumed to be correct.


Gidday OK465, that's an easy one.

Just get the workload and/or stress level up high enough, and the tape will be nearly impossible to use.

A cinch to read when unstressed and relaxed, but, as I said earlier, the airspeed effectively becomes invisible when the chips are really down.

Clearly, at least some here are of the opinion that regardless of the training received initially and recurrently, and whatever the frequency of use of such “difficult to use” systems on whatever regular flight exposure is typical, will inevitably result in a relatively complete loss of usefulness of those specific systems when some things don’t go as planned … or someone forgets to plan. Others here are of the opinion that regular, competent, professional training, conducted by professional and observant instructors, would go an exceptionally long way toward ensuring that such “difficult to use” systems lose their “difficult” or “mystical” characteristics – much as anything unknown becomes less strange when known more completely.

[olasek]

.So what are your credentials in this? Your Boeing ratings?
None, but at least I am not making definite proclamations about safety of instrumentation on 777. I defer such judgement to real 777 drivers which I see none here.
.My lonely voice, olasek? Add these lonely voices:
I see nothing there about airspeed tape.

2) the pilot flying was inadequately and/or incompletely trained in manual operation
That's the most likely scenario.

[safetypee]

aterpster, Re “What was wrong with design?
What was wrong with system approval?
What was wrong with the "approach procedure?"

Under the vast umbrella of hindsight, weaknesses can be identified in most processes. The skills in design and approval, and for procedures stem from lessons learnt – how do we learn from hindsight?

The NTSB identifies “the complexities of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems” as a contribution, but then qualifies this with inadequacies in documentation. Complexity can add significant mental workload, which in turn accentuates the opportunity for error, as might the need to recall documented descriptions/warnings or trained-for ‘gotchas’ from memory.

Certification requirements clearly state the need for awareness and the predictable of, and an unambiguous system operation (25.1302), and that “systems and controls, including indications and annunciations must be designed to minimise crew errors, which could create additional hazards” (25.1309).
There is extensive explanation and guidance on these issues in the lengthy AMC 25.1302; a document, AFAIR which was not initially adopted by the FAA in the harmonisation process with EASA.

The design and approval of these aspects ultimately comes down to judgement by skilled humans (equally subject to error as are crews); however the industry does enjoy some safeguard from the process of continued airworthiness for systems (hindsight), but less so for operations.
Judgement is subject to bias; there are examples either side of acceptable boundaries; the US (NTSB/FAA) appears to rate the effectiveness of human intervention higher than other regulators, e.g. advisory nature of landing distance margins vs EASA/Airbus use of Operational Performance margins.
Judgement might also be influenced by the availability of human intervention vs system failure, e.g. B777 off-runway landing due to fuel-icing resulted in a mandated system modification, the non-fatal outcome being due to exceptional human intervention. Conversely the Asiana accident involving a system weakness focusses on the less than adequate human intervention and unfortunate outcome, and thereafter chooses to ‘improve’ the human, yet the aspects of human behaviour in both accidents have similar (same) cognitive roots (perception, judgement).

With increasing complexity the greater is the need for ‘generalities’. There is no universal ‘Truth’, only those local truths formed by individual perception; e.g. the truth of how the Asiana crew perceived the approach vs our truth of the event with hindsight.
The difference between College Professors and Pilots involves theory vs practice. Scientific truths are formed because they can be repeated, checked, and verified; in aviation you only get one attempt at an approach in specific (non repeatable) circumstances.

If only we could revisit the circumstances of our last error; instead we have to rely on learning how to avoid the next adverse situation from the results of the previous one.

[safetypee]

aterpster, FDG135, the ‘procedural aspects’ concern the reported need to fly higher than the ideal flight path to avoid traffic patterns below, which AFAIR was shown not to be warranted.
Thus all approaches had to adjust the vertical profile from high to lower to achieve stabile conditions later in the approach.
With ILS available the magnitude of the deviation is more easily identifiable than for visual assessment, and although PAPI is available this has a range limitation vs visibility, and is an ‘on-off’ display vs an analogue ILS display. These seemingly minor factors, unstable approach, lack of ILS, can in combination contribute to workload and reduce the time available for adjusting the approach.

[MrDK]

1) an extremely difficult to read set of instruments, to the extent that it created an inability to accurately understand what was being displayed resulting in confusion about what was happening, or was recognized at some point but physical action was not taken due to an expectation that the “automatics” would be properly applied and correct any noted anomaly with the approach path and/or airspeed;

Surely (if this is the case) many 777 pilots must have filed complains about this difficult and confusing machine following countless 1000's of flights and landings.
Are any such reports available?

[AirRabbit]

There is extensive explanation and guidance on issues in the lengthy AMC 25.1302; a document, AFAIR which was not initially adopted by the FAA in the harmonisation process with EASA. The design and approval of these aspects ultimately comes down to judgement by skilled humans (equally subject to error as are crews); however the industry does enjoy some safeguard from the process of continued airworthiness for systems (hindsight), but less so for operations.
The only reason that operations does not benefit as frequently from, and is not required to conform to, some specific set of approval processes, is that few humans come complete with standard specifications that can be tested against a set of specifically prescribed criteria, as are systems and components.

Judgement is subject to bias; there are examples either side of acceptable boundaries; the US (NTSB/FAA) appears to rate the effectiveness of human intervention higher than other regulators, e.g. advisory nature of landing distance margins vs EASA/Airbus use of Operational Performance margins. Judgement might also be influenced by the availability of human intervention vs system failure, e.g. B777 off-runway landing due to fuel-icing resulted in a mandated system modification, the non-fatal outcome being due to exceptional human intervention.
Actually, I think that any human endeavor is subject to “bias” because, I believe, that is the nature of “humanness” (if there is such a word), and therefore, human judgment is no more and no less subject to bias than any other human action or function. We continue to strive to establish reasonable regulatory boundaries within which we know/suspect/hope that all things, when the regulations are complied with and/or met, will demonstrate a standard level of operations, providing a continuous “target” against which safety features can be constructed, applied, accomplished, and eventually ranked and compared. I’m not at all sure that any kind of specific association can or should be made through the comparison of human intervention (and as long as humans are in control – it would be hard to exclude humans from being “involved”) with any given system failure, other than should there be either an aspect or the whole system, that failed directly due to human failure or mistake. But, we have to acknowledge that sometimes machines/equipment fail to operate correctly or at all. And all too often we cannot determine if that is that due to, or despite, human intervention!

“…the Asiana accident involving a system weakness focusses on the less than adequate human intervention and unfortunate outcome, and thereafter chooses to ‘improve’ the human, yet the aspects of human behaviour in both accidents have similar (same) cognitive roots (perception, judgement).”
Of course the “cognitive roots,” as described (perception, judgment) have the same origin – they’re both “human.” But (and yes, here I go again), that should NOT restrict anyone’s suppositions to the resolution that these cognitive attributes (i.e., the ability to see, identify, perceive, and judge) cannot be modified, but are locked into a perpetual state of existence. Of course they can be modified – those kinds of attributes are modified every day in multitudes of ways … perhaps the two most prevalent methods to effect such modification are “practical exposure” and “training.” Perhaps someone might want to argue that “practical exposure” isn’t sufficient to modify, either perception or judgment.

An Analogy: Let’s presume a young lad has a habit of running into the house from the garage, and does so under an open step ladder. It’s “cool” to run right under that thing and it’s a shorter route to the kitchen. This young lad does this almost every day for months. However, one day, he starts to run into the kitchen, again under the step ladder, but this time he smacks his head on the support arms holding the ladder legs firmly in place. He rubs his head a bit, and proceeds on into the kitchen. A few days later, the lad once again, finishes his play in the garage and, again, starts to run into the kitchen. Again, he smacks his head on the same portion of the ladder. Again, he rubs his head and proceeds into the kitchen.

Later that week, again the lad finishes his play, jumps up and runs toward the kitchen via his usual path under the open step ladder. But, this time as he approaches the open ladder, he ducks his head and slips under the support arms without hitting them and smiles as he runs into the kitchen. His cognitive state has been modified – and the modification impetus was the physical annoyance of beginning to hit his head. Very likely, in addition to recognizing the discomfort experienced, he must have analyzed why he began hitting his head – the ladder had not changed – it had not been moved – it had not been touched. Therefore, the “something” that changed simply had to be “himself.” Further analysis is likely to have led to his recognition that he was growing taller, and would have to alter his posture to be able to pass under the same ladder without hitting his head. In short, he “learned” something.

It doesn’t take the proverbial “rocket scientist” to recognize that the same realization could have been reached had someone else observed the lad’s regular actions and noticed that he was getting older and growing taller. That observant person could have informed the lad of the potential problems, and either let him reach his own conclusions, or that person could have explained the changing situation sufficiently well such that the lad could have understood the practical application of the situation – he was changing and the ladder was not – and to continue the practice, he would have to make a modification to his behavior … ducking under the support arms was one acceptable alternative. There certainly is a potential that reflective thought could lead to eventually recognizing the problem as continuing as he continues to grow taller – and depending on his desire to avoid discomfort in the future, it is increasingly likely that he would recognize future circumstances, and make a decision to more radically modify his behavior – in terms of modifying his path into the kitchen, avoiding the ladder completely. If this recognition takes place, the lad has “learned” something else, and once again we see a modification of the cognitive basis of human performance. It IS possible to affect the cognitive aspects of human performance.

With increasing complexity the greater is the need for ‘generalities’.
Well, I think this is the description of a preconceived and inaccurate supposition. Whenever a person is confronted with a situation at an increased level of complexity, particularly if that confrontation is a complete surprise, not only for the confrontation itself, but should the make-up of the nature of that confrontation be more complex than any previously experienced – that person is almost guaranteed to search his/her personal experiences for something that could be satisfactorily applied in the immediate situation. With no such background to search, the person may believe his/her only option is to freeze and stop thinking. However, with the practice of providing a prior physical experience (we call this “training”), the individual will be provided with the most constructive preparation for incurring such an unexpected and potentially complex circumstance, and will, quite reasonably, allow for a potentially high level of successful response selection to the presented circumstances highly likely yielding a satisfactory outcome.

To increase the potentials for recalling a specific set of responses, it is necessary to understand that had this person has to have been provided the opportunity to be exposed to varying degrees of complex situations in a theoretical or training scenario, where the leader or instructor has the opportunity to “walk through” the confrontation, from initial presentation, through the addressing of individual steps or sequence of applications of knowledge or skill, and doing so on numerous occasions (where the number of such exposures would likely be directly related to the anticipated actual complexity of the circumstance) the person will have been provided a method for recalling, reflecting on, and choosing to act – or potentially selecting the specific action to be taken from a sequence of potential actions previously seen and “practiced” – on which the decision to act can be relied upon to be applicable with a reasonable expectation of a satisfactory outcome.

Clearly, structuring the opportunities for exposure to critical circumstances in a non-threatening environment, will allow this person to more logically, more quickly, and more confidently recall and select the most logical sequence of actions to neutralize any potential threat or problem when or if something like that should occur. Contrary to the supposition presented, the specific requirement is for detailed responses based on observed circumstances, and relying on “generalities” is, at best, a recipe for failure.

There is no universal ‘Truth’, only those local truths formed by individual perception; e.g. the truth of how the Asiana crew perceived the approach vs our truth of the event with hindsight.
IF the intent for this statement is to acknowledge that there is no standard response to the myriad of potential confrontations that may present themselves to an airline flight crew, I would agree. But the fact is that for any specific confrontation, there is very likely a minimum number of progressively satisfactory actions that can be taken – where the sequence of those actions may, or may not, benefit from altering that sequence depending on the specific nature of the confrontational circumstance. However, and inevitably, those kinds of decisions, unless the specific confrontation has been provided in previous training scenarios, the sequence of reactions will be completely at the option of the pilot flying.

The difference between College Professors and Pilots involves theory vs practice. Scientific truths are formed because they can be repeated, checked, and verified; in aviation you only get one attempt at an approach in specific (non repeatable) circumstances.
This would be true if, and only if, the confrontation actually experienced during any line operation is completely and entirely new, having never been seen, discussed, or analyzed previously. This is what training programs are designed to address … taking situations that might have been thought to be exclusively benign and interject one or two circumstances that have the effect of negatively impacting the functioning of the airborne equipment on the aircraft, or negatively impacting the aerodynamics of the aircraft. When done in a non-threatening environment, where the whole process can be “frozen” in time, discussed, analyzed, debated, recalled, and repeated … even if those receiving the training are later exposed to a set of circumstances that are only similar to those seen and experienced during training, that similarity will provide that flight crew with invaluable information about how to respond and what to expect with each pilot response. Is there a guarantee that what is seen in the real world will be “exactly like” what was experienced during training – of course not. But, having been exposed to something similar, having seen the airplane responses during that “similar” exposure is valuable beyond calculations when compared to potential option to freeze-up and stop thinking.

If only we could revisit the circumstances of our last error; instead we have to rely on learning how to avoid the next adverse situation from the results of the previous one.
Rather than lament the fact that we have no such thing as predictive crystal balls in which we can accurately “see the future,” the circumstances that will be confronted tomorrow or the next day may not be exactly what was experienced today, but there are only two sets of variables that are available – the environment and the airplane. Any airplane difference may be due to a malfunction, but the malfunctions are finite, not infinite. Any environmental difference may be due to the temperature, moisture content, pressure altitude, winds, and turbulence and the rather immediate change of any of these factors. That is not something we can anticipate with a high degree of confidence … nor can we specifically train and test for all such circumstances. However, we can understand … we can be aware … we can keep up with the current conditions outside of our airplanes … we can keep an interest out for what is to come – through weather reports – previously obtained briefings and forecasts – radio communications of preceding aircraft – and the like … we can also practice rule-based, knowledge-based, and skill-based behaviors that are required of airline pilots. These particular issues are reasonably well recognized and while I could go into some additional detail – I suspect none of you would really welcome additional verbiage from me right now … as I suspect I’ve already trampled on your willingness to continue reading. So let me say that we can also sharpen our piloting skills by practicing the kinds of tasks that are being outlined by some of the newly established international working group efforts. Training should not be dismissed as an unproductive “eye-wash” that is designed only to make us “feel” good. If done properly and competently, training is, I believe, the most basic and provides the best opportunity to continue to improve the level of airline operational safety … which today is pretty darn good!

[edmundronald]

Instruments and controls in airliners are so well designed, under lab conditions, that under a normal workload pilots can monitor and attend most of them and perform all other required tasks.

When the workload of the "other tasks" goes though the roof, that is when we find out which instruments and controls are badly designed.

[olasek]

When the workload of the "other tasks" goes though the roof, They go through the roof when crew is inept.
For some even nice sunny weather, perfectly functioning aircraft and they are already perspiring. Imagine their workload when this aircraft was actually malfunctioning ...

[FGD135]

... which instruments and controls are badly designed.Thankyou Edmund, this is my point, exactly, about the airspeed tape.


Surely (if this is the case) many 777 pilots must have filed complains about this difficult and confusing machine following countless 1000's of flights and landings.
Are any such reports available?Excellent question, MrDK. I'm glad you asked. You seem to be referring to the airspeed tape. There are two parts to the answer.


Firstly, and as I have been saying for several weeks now, the pilots, under normal and low workloads, don't notice how poorly the airspeed is communicated via the tape.


It is only when the stress and work load starts to get up towards the "emergency" levels that the brain, in a process similar to "task shedding", starts to avoid referring to the airspeed tape. This is because of how much brain power is required to use the tape.


So, for 99.95% of flights, everything in the cockpit is too relaxed, and the pilots just don't notice the problem.


Secondly, on those rare occasions when the crisis level has gotten into, or close to the emergency levels, the pilots, for the reason given above, don't refer to the airspeed.


This means that, if they survive the emergency, they have no recollection at all of what the airspeed was doing during the critical moments. They can't then file a report about it, because it's as though it never happened.

Of the 4 stall-crashes to passenger aircraft since 2009 (all to aircraft with the speed tape), 5 of the pilots survived. If they were questioned as to their recollections of the airspeed, you would find them giving only a blank look.


This should answer your question as to why there are not thousands of reports about the inadequacy of the airspeed tape.

[Volume]

2) the pilot flying was inadequately and/or incompletely trained in manual operation the airplane with or without assistance provided by whatever automatic systemsI think the issue is about the "with or without assistance provided" part of this sentence. The pilot thought he would fly the aircraft "with assistance provided" while in fact he was flying it "without assistance provided" (because he unintentionally and unnoticed asked the "assistant" to quit).
All the other issues (adequacy of the instrumentation etc.) are just secondary, the main issue is that the pilot thought he would do something different from what he was actually doing. It was about understanding how to work together with systems. Obviously he was not trained to question what the systems are doing. Obviously he was not trained to monitor the systems. He was trained to trust in the systems.
It is hard to blame any single aspect, but it is easy to identify where everybody can improve (airplane designers, training organisations, pilots, airlines, authorities....), and that is just what we should do now.

[Gretchenfrage]

Reports of pilots about any kind of inadequacies are often brought up, mostly by citing them as absent, so apparently everything is ok.

We have to get away from that concept.

Every report about any inadequacy points, voluntarily or not, to somebody to blame. In today's environment this is highly critical and not welcome.
Pilots are often discouraged to maintain such reports, for many reasons, but mainly because they would cost money or incite lawsuits. Friends working at the big one in the ME even experience open harassment if filing safety reports!

In the case of the airspeed tapes, there is basically no big surprise. Everyone know that a round display is easier to discern in stress moment than any tape. Pilots can get used to tapes, but will never perform as good as with round instruments.

However: The underlying problem with this accident is the switch between moving throttles and fixed ones. The same findings apply: Pilots can get used to fixed ones, but perform better with moving ones. The real problem is when they were trained on one and then switch to the other design. It takes a long time to get the new one under your skin, especially when moving from fixed to moving.

That is what should be addressed, because a change of any display or system will be "discouraged" by the lawyers and bean-counters, often leaving the pilots with the lesser adequate solution.
Either give pilots more training when changing, or leave them on the system they have been trained initially.
But again, this might involve cost and will therefore be decried.

[safetypee]

AirRabbit, assuming that I have interpreted your commentary correctly (#1101), then there may not be any significant difference in our views. However, there are some interesting points within the differences and in the viewpoint.

The training views appear to follow a linear cause-effect-fix path, identifying and improving an aspect which has an acceptable, but not guaranteed probability of success (the human).
The alternative is an attempt to understand a dynamic interaction of factors, like a flywheel which cannot be totally fixed (stopped) because then nothing would be achieved, thus the task is to apply a brake to maintain an acceptable speed range (influence human behaviour with small changes in the overall operating system – man, machine, and environment).

Rather than go into detail, there may be better explanation in the documents:
‘How to be safe.’ (www.tekna.no/ikbViewer/Content/817242/%281%29%20Erik%20Hollnagel%20ESRA%206%20april.pdf)
‘Myths in safety’. (http://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/72/40/98/PDF/Besnard-Hollnagel-2012--Myths-industrial-safety-Tech-Report.pdf)
‘A Tale of Two Safeties.’ (www.resilienthealthcare.net/A_tale_of_two_safeties.pdf)

[DozyWannabe]

how poorly the airspeed is communicated via the tape.

Just a minute here...

What was interesting about the original 1949 Grether study was that the experiments used a control group of non-pilots - so if we look at the summary:

http://www.bainbrdg.demon.co.uk/Figures/Grether.bars.gif

You can see that round dial type "D" and tape display type "G" are roughly comparable in terms of percentage error and interpretation time (in fact the tape display seems superior to the dial in terms of percentage error). The interpretation time is interesting to compare because the non-pilots interpreted both in the same amount of time, but the AAF pilots interpreted the dial marginally faster. From this one could argue that the pilots' prior experience with the dial might have skewed the results.

I'll say that again.

Round Dial "D":
Percent error - 0.7 (pilots), 0.7 (non-pilots)
Interpretation Time - 1.7s (pilots), 1.9s (non-pilots)

Tape Display "G":
Percent Error - 0.3 (pilots), 0.4 (non-pilots) [Note both figures are superior to round dial "D"]
Interpretation Time - 2.3s (pilots), 1.9s (non-pilots) [Pilots take slightly longer to interpret this one by 0.6s, but non-pilots interpret as quickly as they did the dial].

How is the tape display poor or inferior?

With the overspeed, alpha and stall zones clearly marked alongside the tape as well as the speed bugs, this satisfies the "proximity" perception as well, plus with the PFD you can use colour changes to alert pilots to developing abnormalities in a way you cannot with analogue gauges.

I'm well aware of the psychological studies you're talking about, but as far as I can see all of the potential issues have been addressed. You may prefer the old gauges, but to say they're objectively "better" is incorrect.

However: The underlying problem with this accident is the switch between moving throttles and fixed ones. The same findings apply: Pilots can get used to fixed ones, but perform better with moving ones. The real problem is when they were trained on one and then switch to the other design. It takes a long time to get the new one under your skin, especially when moving from fixed to moving.

Turkish 1951 says otherwise (i.e. three pilots who'd flown with nothing but moving thrust levers missed them rolling back too far). As with FGD - it's absolutely fine to have your own personal preference, but it's intellectually dishonest to state that your preference is fundamentally better with no significant proof. "Everyone knows..." just doesn't cut it.

[barit1]

There are a couple common features between Turkish 1951 and Asiana 214:

o Boeing moving throttles, with inadvertently disabled autothrottle system
o Approached the g/s from above
o Three people in the cockpit - one of them a 'safety' pilot
o Despite six eyeballs, very late recognition of airspeed/altitude awareness

This seems to be a witches' brew of factors, none of which individually has been a problem over the decades. Rather than isolating them, let's look at the synergy they create when together.

[DozyWannabe]

There are a couple common features between Turkish 1951 and Asiana 214:
Indeed, but I don't think the A/THR was "disabled" in terms of being off or not functioning. The Asiana A/THR was inadvertently set to "HOLD" by the crew, and the Turkish A/THR went into "RETARD" (i.e. rolled back too much and too early) because of a faulty RA input. The crew moved the levers forward the first time, but did not disengage A/THR, so it simply pulled the levers back again.

[barit1]

You're right of course, but the net effect was the a/t didn't provide the protection the crew had assumed.

In Asiana's case it was software behaving "correctly" (and contrary to the crews' expectations); in the other case it was hardware in a failure-intolerant system.

[Machinbird]

Round Dial "D":
Percent error - 0.7 (pilots), 0.7 (non-pilots)
Interpretation Time - 1.7s (pilots), 1.9s (non-pilots)There is something misleading with this data.:=

The recognition time might be true for an initial scan where you note the significant digits that you are interested in, but a rescan of the same instrument, once you have found the landmarks, takes only a fraction of a second.

I operate in re-scan mode when I'm flying instruments. At least most of the time.

[FGD135]

How is the tape display poor or inferior?Dozy, Dozy, Dozy,

That Grether study is almost completely useless to this discussion - because the way the subjects were assessing the dials/tapes is completely different to how a pilot uses his airspeed display.

Given that Grether was measuring how accurately the person could read the instrument, and how quickly, I imagine that the method was to simply flash an instrument in front of a subject, and then time how long it took him to discern the value - then record how accurate his readings were.

So what the subjects were doing was very, very, very different to what a pilot's brain is doing when using instruments to fly an aircraft.

And to really underline this difference, look at the scores for instrument 'I', which is just a purely digital reading. According to the scores, this form of presentation is the best of all!

But if you seriously tried to give pilots just a purely digital value (instrument 'I') for airspeed you would be laughed out of town!

That instrument 'I' scored so well shows that this test is not at all relevant to pilots and aircraft instruments.

To properly test tapes vs dials - as used by pilots - you would have to use a flight simulator, with the pilot trying to accurately fly the virtual aircraft. The pilot would also have to be in a high workload, high stress situation.

Do this with two simulators - one with tape for airspeed, the other with dials, then look at how accurately the aircraft was flown.

From that study you linked to earlier, it sounds like testing along these lines has already been done. Here are the relevant quotes:

Testing in a Link simulator found the tape display to be workable, but pointers resulted in a superior flight performance. Further experimentation with expanded scales and more training was recommended (Mengelkoch & Houston, 1958).and:
A reminder that tape displays are also not optimum when a pointer can cover the required range was seen in testing of several formats for an F-16 vertical velocity indicator (Cone & Hassoun, 1991).and:An indication of the limitations of tape displays in dynamic flight environments is seen in the midseventies when the USAF moved away from tape displays for heads down primary flight displays
It seems that you, and a few others on this thread don't like these quotes, but I believe we should be attaching considerable weight to them, as they relate specifically to how pilots use instruments when flying.


... this satisfies the "proximity" perception as well, ...Dozy, I think you misunderstand what "proximity compatibility" is. The "proximity" is not so much about physical separation, but more about "similarity". See the following:

"The Proximity Compatibility Principle: Its Psychological Foundation and Relevance to Display Design" by Wickens, Christopher D.; Carswell, C. Melody - Human Factors, Vol. 37, Issue 3, September 1995 | Questia, Your Online Research Library (http://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-17952075/the-proximity-compatibility-principle-its-psychological)

Human?computer interaction - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human%E2%80%93computer_interaction)


You may prefer the old gauges, but to say they're objectively "better" is incorrect.This is a stunning statement, in light of what that list of quotes had to say. I think you need to have another read, slowly and properly, of all those quotes. That post here:


http://www.pprune.org/8607329-post1043.html


... it's intellectually dishonest to state that your preference is fundamentally better with no significant proof.Dozy, Dozy, Dozy. That list of quotes contains some very significant proof. Making it more significant is the absence of anything saying that tapes are superior. You and some others seem to have blinkers on when it comes to the message carried by those quotes.

[Oakape]

You're right of course, but the net effect was the a/t didn't provide the protection the crew had assumed.

Protection is there to try to avoid an accident if the crew make a mistake or miss something. It is not there to become the normal way of operating the aircraft.

If both of these crews had been 'flying' the aircraft, as their duties require them to, both accidents would not have happened. Crews are required to monitor airspeed at all times & to ensure the power is set correctly to maintain the required airspeed. If this basic requirement of flying had been done, neither aircraft would have been involved in an accident.

Not so many years ago, the concern among aviation professionals was that that the manufacturers were designing too much automation into their aircraft & that that was a threat to both safety & pilot careers. It seems a little ironic that these days a lot of pilots are concerned that there is not enough automation on the flight deck & that it does not fly the aircraft 100% accurately, all by itself. Perhaps pilotless aircraft are closer than I used to think & that part of the reason for that is that some pilots seem to want to design themselves out of the flight deck.

[Oakape]

Here are the relevant quotes:


Quote:
Testing in a Link simulator found the tape display to be workable, but pointers resulted in a superior flight performance. Further experimentation with expanded scales and more training was recommended (Mengelkoch & Houston, 1958).
and:

Quote:
A reminder that tape displays are also not optimum when a pointer can cover the required range was seen in testing of several formats for an F-16 vertical velocity indicator (Cone & Hassoun, 1991).
It seems that you, and a few others on this thread don't like these quotes, but I believe we should be attaching considerable weight to them, as they relate specifically to how pilots use instruments when flying.


Perhaps pointers resulted in superior flight performance in 1958, but was that more to do with the fact that tape displays were relatively unknown & therefore the test subjects were significantly more familiar with the round dial & pointer presentation?

Also, with regard to the second quote, vertical speed is somewhat different to airspeed & the best indication for each is not necessarily the same.

[olasek]

This is a stunning statement, in light of what that list of quotes had to say.No, it is not a stunning statement, perhaps you and others "fell" for the quotes but they hardly represent objective truth, they are fragments of someone's opinion, they aren't even a full opinion. To call them "proof" for anything is a folly. You would have to dig a lot deeper to provide a 'smoking' gun because so far there ain't one. By the way, the discussion is getting highly repetitive, some clearly have a lot of time typing voluminous arguments, thousands of words, quotes, fancy editing, etc. that actually show or prove nothing. This is just another forum with a lot amateurs, some pilots who flew something and by the way with no single 777 pilot as I can tell.

[Capn Bloggs]

This is just another forum with a lot amateurs, some pilots who flew something
You can say that again. Your simplistic "it was the idiotic, incompetent pilots fault" view shows just how much you don't understand the situation with Asiana 214.

[olasek]

Could be simplistic statement on my part but is is actually simplistic to focus entirely on the speed tape. There is zero evidence they even glanced in the direction of the speed tape or had capacity to process whatever data was there in whatever format. Since they were incapable of processing high angle of attack visual cues outside the window or 80 lbs force on the yoke it is even more unlikely they had capacity to process any instrument readout, analog or digital. But if you 'understand' Asiana 214 better than anybody else perhaps you can explain what happened then...

[FGD135]

... is actually simplistic to focus entirely on the speed tapeolasek,

I have not focused entirely on the speed tape. If you had been reading my posts properly you would know that I said that "an habitual reliance on automation" was also a factor in this crash.

Read the posts properly.

... they are fragments of someone's opinion, they aren't even a full opinion.Perhaps you are not familiar with research papers and how they sometimes make references and summaries to other, similar research.

Those quotes were all one or two line SUMMARIES of earlier research/studies. That is not OPINION. That is nothing like OPINION.

[olasek]

Those quotes were all one or two line SUMMARIES of earlier research/studies.Ok, so..?? I don't see any consensus there, anyone reading those "quotes" of yours will have impression that there research in progress, some seem skeptical, some see some faults (some see faults in the round dial too), see need for my work but no one blasts tape as unacceptable, NASA is clearly favorable and so are others. Situation is more like 50-50, undefined. Also these are all fairly old quotes, anything new, anything recent? Clearly if some would find the tape so objectionable that would be a flurry of research, studies, simulations, culminating with some definite outcome - nothing of the sort is present.

[Gretchenfrage]

@ Dozy

You are right, "everyone knows .." does not cut it. I should have gone the more scientific way, as FGD135 does perfectly.
Read his contribution very carefully and you might grasp what we meant.

A part from these data, let me state that i have flown 6 airliners of three manufacturers, 3 with round instruments and 3 with tapes. I can only sustain the above mentioned quotes and data.

What airliner with what dials have you flown??

I don't want to belittle your knowledge, but please acknowledge that the pros out there might have some more experience before you call them intellectually dishonest when they put their opinion up front. Especially when backed up by scientific data.

[Clandestino]

Congratulations Gretchenfrage, FGD135 and Machinbird. You have discovered that the whole aeronautical world is wrong and that replacing round dials with electronic speed tapes in every airliner and increasing number of GA types is grave mistake. Now, this valuable piece of information should be brought to attention of every aeroplane certifying authority in whole wide world until they mend their wrong ways and I'm afraid that just posting your valuable opinions here won't help that cause. Gentlemen, you should be more proactive towards the well-meaning but obviously misinformed folks that design and certify our cockpit instruments and go straight to them with your amazing discovery. Your unquestionable expertise on cockpit design has realy overgrown the bounds of PPRuNe.

let's look at the synergy they create when together.Maybe to add one ingredient more - idea that having instructor in cockpit somehow abolishes "spooled up" part of stabilized approach criteria.

[Gretchenfrage]

Congratulations Gretchenfrage, FGD135 and Machinbird. You have discovered that the whole aeronautical world is wrong and that replacing round dials with electronic speed tapes in every airliner and increasing number of GA types is grave mistake. Now, this valuable piece of information should be brought to attention of every aeroplane certifying authority in whole wide world until they mend their wrong ways and I'm afraid that just posting your valuable opinions here won't help that cause. Gentlemen, you should be more proactive towards the well-meaning but obviously misinformed folks that design and certify our cockpit instruments and go straight to them with your amazing discovery.

Very valuable contribution not, quite in line with most of what you write.

1. Not one of the aforementioned has stated that the "whole aeronautical world" is wrong. It's your paparazzi-style journalism. We stated that one design is better than the other, which is a very different statement, at least for the educated.

2. This and other statements about design have been brought to attention of manufacturers and authorities, you might just haven't noticed or read. These bodies didn't ignore such statements, but deemed the existing systems adequately enough. Both standpoints can be accepted, there is no black and white, not right or wrong here, at least for the educated. Even remaining on one's opinion is no crime.

3. That this problem suddenly came back, after it was discussed abundantly in the early 90ies with the advent of the MD11 and A330, has to do with a unexpected rise of accidents in airliners lately with loss of speed and subsequently loss of control. It is a privilege of the free and educated world, and paramount to our all's professional strive for the highest level of safety, to reconsider design deficiencies almost forgotten and to re-discuss them.

[DozyWannabe]

... in the early 90ies with the advent of the MD11 and A330, has to do with a unexpected rise of accidents in airliners lately with loss of speed and subsequently loss of control.

Including the Birgenair B757 and WCA MD-82, both of which have round-dial analogue airspeed gauges, if I'm not mistaken.

FGD's summaries are of papers (one of which was a commercial study for Boeing in 1985) - *not* scientific studies. As such, of course it's possible that those papers would have an inherent bias towards the round dials, if that was what the author of the paper was trying to prove. In fact a significant number of those quotations come from a paper I linked to, and I've already said that the particular paper doers not seem to be scientific or sufficiently rigorous. Much of it does indeed read like an opinion piece.

[Gretchenfrage]

Dozy

You are so data and scientific-proof based, you should also be as pedantic as to what you state, read or interpret.

If i said there was an "unexpected rise" in accidents with one design, that does not preclude that other accidents with older designs did not happen! :ugh:

The professional thing is to go and discuss why such a rise.

The puerile thing is to brush such questions aside by stating "... bah, the others did the same, so nothing can be wrong here."

[olasek]

If i said there was an "unexpected rise" in accidents with one design, This statement in itself is just an opinion, an anecdote, I don't see any rigorous statistical/probabilistic analysis that in fact one can deduce that there was any such 'rise', and even it was it could then be attributed to whatever cause rather than being a statistical 'noise'. Probabilistic events can naturally occur in clumps, I can walk into a casino and observe roulette 'red' going 10 times in a row, not enough to deduce that the game is rigged or table is faulty. So the "professional" thing to do is to a) prove that in fact there is a 'rise' that can't be explained by a statistical noise b) that the 'rise' has anything to do with instrument design.

[DozyWannabe]

You are so data and scientific-proof based, you should also be as pedantic as to what you state, read or interpret.

To be fair, I'm not - mercifully there have been so few accidents of this type in the last couple of decades that the numbers involved are so low as to make scientific statistical analysis practically impossible. All we can base it on is "anecdotal-plus".

If i said there was an "unexpected rise" in accidents with one design, that does not preclude that other accidents with older designs did not happen!

You didn't state that there was an unexpected rise in one design only, you said:

"a unexpected rise of accidents in airliners lately with loss of speed and subsequently loss of control"

implying the rise to be across all types.

The professional thing is to go and discuss why such a rise.

Well, you tell me - has there been a rise in LOCi accidents due to loss of speed, and if so, which ones?

A cursory glance at the aviation-safety database does not seem to indicate a greater number of LOCi accidents since the '90s, and certainly not that those with speed tape displays and non-moving thrust levers are more prone to them.

The puerile thing is to brush such questions aside by stating "... bah, the others did the same, so nothing can be wrong here."

Well, let's take a closer look.

Off the top of my head I can think of Birgenair 301, West Caribbean 708, Asiana 214 and Air France 447. The first two had round dials, the second pair had tape displays. A quick search also reveals Austral Líneas Aéreas Flight 2553, which also had round dials - so despite being "unscientific" due to the paucity of data, these loss of control crashes due to poor speed management are currently standing at 3 round dials and 2 tape displays. Hardly a ringing endorsement.

Your own assertion that the transition from non-moving thrust levers to the moving type was a causal factor (and thus that the moving type is inherently better) in Asiana 214 ignores that only one of the pilots on that flight deck was converting from a FBW Airbus - there should have been at least two pairs of eyes capable of making the distinction even if your assertion were true. And as I said, there's Turkish 1951 in which none of the pilots were recent converts from Airbus FBW types.

With all due respect, I think it's pretty bizarre that with an accident that happened to a Boeing FBW type and in which Airbus had no part, you're still capable of finding a way of holding Airbus technology (in this case passive thrust levers) partially responsible.

Of course, you're welcome to your opinion and I'd never presume to state otherwise. But I must admit that I find this "traditionalist" view a bit obtuse, and the "you're not a pilot" ad hominem more than a little insulting. Yeah, I'm not a pilot, but if you think that means I'm not well aware of how technological changes and consequent changes in interfaces affect the work I do, then you're very much mistaken.

Using my profession (Software Engineering), my 14 years of professional experience and 10 years of personal experience before that as an analogy, I've gone from pure text-based interfaces, through early graphical interfaces up to modern graphical interfaces (which themselves seem to be rearranged every few years). And yes, each change is initially a real PITA and I spend a fair amount of time cursing the changes and those responsible for them before getting used to them.

Furthermore, if you ask me about it, I'll swear up-and-down that the best interface I know belonged to an OS and a machine that has been obsolete since the mid-90s - and I will be very vociferous about it! But the truth is that I keep one of those machines around for old times' sake and while light-years ahead of its time, the lack of more modern features that I am now used to actually makes the experience more frustrating in terms of actually getting stuff done than the warm fuzzies I get from wearing that familiar old "coat" again.

Anyhoo - enough of the analogy itself. The point is that as humans we're all hard-wired with a tendency to prefer the surroundings we learned on and "grew up with". But, referring back to my analogy, one hard-won lesson I've learned in my professional life is that kvetching about the old ways I miss never got me anywhere. What did get me somewhere was realising that once I understood the core concepts (which have never fundamentally altered much from the very beginning), it was possible to adapt much more easily to any changes that came along, and I believe this is analogous to the example of the airspeed displays.

Whether you're using the angle of an old analogue pointer to closely monitor small changes in acceleration/deceleration, or whether you're using the red bars and bugs on the tape display to do the same, the truth is that adapting between them is not that hard if you're willing to try, because the fundamentals are the same. It may be annoying and you may prefer the older method, but that does not, in and of itself, make it better.

[AirRabbit]

I find myself in agreement with whomever it was who said, sometime back in this thread, that the subject has now wandered a good bit back and forth across the vastness of the potential subject matter that wraps around such a narrow-pointed topic as “aviation,” where it seems that most who offer opinions and observations are just a guilty as the next person in jumping in with an advocacy of the issue “really centering” on whatever that person’s personal “axe to grind” happens to be. And, YES, I include myself in that mix. I, too, have an opinion – and I, too, have advocated it here, probably more than some but not necessarily as much as others who have advocated their own “axe.” So … let me drag out my recently sharpened “axe,” but, in doing so, I have to remind everyone that I’m in the US – my only exposure is to US operations – moderately exposed to other nation’s efforts – but not to the same extent. So with that understanding …

Oh! First … for those who are unfamiliar with the colloquial reference to “having an axe to grind,” perhaps I’d better explain … at least a bit. The phrase essentially means to have an ulterior motive; or to have private ends to serve, such as desiring to take up and settle a dispute with someone. Commonly attributed to Benjamin Franklin, who allegedly told a story concerning a recounting of an incident from his youth, where a passing stranger takes advantage of him, by flattering and complimenting him on his “clearly obvious” ability to sharpen an axe. By so complimenting the youngster, Ben is duped into turning his grindstone to sharpen the stranger's axe – which was the stranger’s only goal, getting his axe sharpened – giving rise to the meaning of having "an axe to grind" as a metaphor for having an ulterior motive.

This thread has essentially settled into a difference of opinion (and some would, no doubt, disagree with my describing the differences as “opinions,” I’m sure – and would likely prefer me to use the term “facts”) but I digress … and those differences seem to be centered on the type of instrumentation that should be in airline cockpits today – either “round-dial-based” or “linear-tape-based.” My particular “axe,” I believe, addresses both of those positions collectively. My “axe” is ‘training,” and the “dullness” of my axe is what I see as a lack of recognition of the value of training – both initially – and recurrently - regardless of the type of instrumentation involved. While I am quite sure that everyone here would immediately say that “they” understand and acknowledge the value of training – I think they look upon training as a necessary “stepping-stone” (or series of stepping stones) that pilot “candidates” use to get across their “river of desire” … to get into the cockpit and fly.

My advocacy comes from the point of view that training certainly can be grossly considered to be “stepping stones” … but the true function is not of “stepping stones” but is rather one where each "stepping stone" is located, one finds “knowledge and familiarity buckets” where the crossing of that “river of desire” requires one step into each successive bucket, and thereby have some of whatever is “in” that bucket wind up clinging to the person when he/she steps on into the next “bucket.” And that process continues through the entire set of “buckets” that lead to that airplane cockpit. It used to be that we would have that “would-be” pilot flail around in those buckets hoping to completely cover him-/her-self with the contents of that bucket. The hope being that whatever was in those buckets would have the time to penetrate the clothing, penetrate the skin beneath the clothing, and permeate the mind/body of the pilot candidate – essentially providing each candidate the opportunity to fully “absorb” the content (the topic) of each individual bucket such that the candidate’s understanding of that content would be absorbed “down to the bone.” However, the guys who hold the purse strings found it necessary to tighten up on those strings for those efforts that were not generating “income,” and every airline owner/manager recognized that the training of their own crew members did not (and still does not) directly generate income … so … the time spent “in training” was reduced.

The problem is that because of the “time is money” concern, we try to “run” our flight crews across that river at ever increasing speeds – getting them to the cockpit quicker and therefore saving money. The problem created in the “training department” was how to ensure that each candidate was thoroughly immersed in each bucket. So, the instructors were now required to specifically direct each candidate into, and when necessary, back into each section of each bucket, to better ensure the candidate was covered with as much of the bucket’s content as time would allow.

This seemed to work reasonably well – for a while … but … the source that had been providing a robust number of pilot candidates began to dwindle – slightly at first, and then rather substantially. This source (the military - who, very wisely, had previously run those same now-candidate airline pilots through their own version of “knowledge and familiarity buckets” to train them as military pilots) was beginning to realize the value of “hanging on” to those persons into whom they, themselves, had invested so much time and “bucket content” that they wanted to retain those persons for longer periods. At about the same time, the airline industry began to expand – flying into more airports, flying longer distances, and buying increasing numbers of airplanes to expand their money-making potential. This left the airline need for pilots to find another viable source. They turned to the private sector – and supplemented this, at times, with establishing their own “ab initio” pilot training efforts. While this method has generally produced a “shaky” solution to the numbers, there has often been a suspicion that the “down to the bone” understanding of at least some (perhaps a majority?) of the newly sourced pilots was not quite at “bone” level. Airlines revamped their attitudes toward instructor requirements – increasing the numbers, at least in some cases, rather substantially.

Because there was an overriding concern to speed up the pilot training process, but there wasn’t money in the budget to do so … it fell to the instructor staff to solve that problem – to ensure that each trainee, when they were in each “training bucket,” was redirected to other areas of the “bucket” to ensure “maximum dunking.” Unfortunately, when the substantially experienced line-pilot source of instructor candidates dwindled down to those who showed up looking for a job, but whose “bone-level understanding” was becoming more highly suspicioned as being at least somewhat inadequate, it was the regulator who stepped in, attempting to play the role of the “shining Knight on the white horse” and offered several alternatives – only some of which seemed to be logical, and rare was there anything that really stood out as a potential for a substantial savings in direct training costs.

Together with a broad cross-section of the airline representatives who were at a loss as to what programs might be approved by their own management, AND be acceptable to the regulator – there was an eager participation for one such plan. Several rather meaningful steps were taken to “study the problem” and just prior to being able to settle on one that might work, as if by magic, some of the regulators, supported by some of the airline managers, submitted a program, modified from its original intent (originally a test program to examine the proper interval between training exposures – known as the Advanced Qualification Program, or AQP) announced a change in direction and some allowances that could be authorized should airlines be interested. This modified test program appealed to several of the larger operators (as their “training budget” heavily impacted the bottom line cost for the airline) and adopting this newly modified program was seen as an instant savings.

The “axe” I carry is oriented more toward the assurance that the training requirements actually ensure that the student pilot fully understands what equipment is installed on his/her airplane, and that each student is fully, completely, and competently trained on how to operate each piece of that equipment, individually and collectively, in normal, abnormal, and emergency situations, and actually demonstrates his/her ability to do just that - in each case, for each situation. In addition, the tasks that each student must be exposed to and learn to perform correctly and completely should cover, as a minimum, all of the tasks that the pilot may encounter (routinely or in the event of an abnormal or emergency situation), demonstrate a complete and knowledgeable understanding and demonstration for each encounter, both physical ability and coordination, adequately assessing each situation, determining the appropriate response, and then demonstrating proper airplane and flight control use.

Additionally, a comprehensive review of each system, each system interface, each flight task – under normal, abnormal, and/or emergency situation – causing the pilot to understand the operation and function of the complete set of systems and controls, and, if/when asked to do so, could perform the required functions under the direct observation of a professionally qualified and competent instructor. In my view, this is the only method that will allow an unbiased assessment of each individual pilot's current state of knowledge, understanding, and ability with respect to the aircraft he/she is currently operating. That instructor has a front-row-seat, and presuming he/she is observant, should be able to note any misunderstanding and/or misuse of any system or control used in the completion of any assigned flight training task. This should be done regularly, for every one of the pilots flying for every airline – with a particular attention paid to the awareness of pilot understanding of normal, abnormal, and/or emergency operations of systems, procedures, and tasks independently and inter-operably.

Unfortunately, I have known of some authorizations for some, specific training programs, that allow a specific task, for which a specific set of flight controls are used, to substitute for at least some, perhaps ALL, other specific tasks using a similar set and/or sequence of flight control applications such that the other (ALL other?) similar task(s) are not addressed, used, seen, or evaluated during that pilot’s operation history with that airline – UNLESS some “rouge” instructor throws some unexpected requirement at some point. To me, that is an abrogation of responsibility by the instructor, the airline, the pilot union, and the regulatory authority.

It is my opinion that if the above were accomplished regularly and thoroughly – situational awareness and specific system and control operation competence can be best determined, and do so on an on-going basis. Of course, errors are going to be made – and there is a good likelihood of students in a training environment may make errors. And, if or when this occurs, the instructor should ensure that the error is recognized and understood by the “student,” and that he/she is properly corrected to the point that understanding and competence can be assured. Again, I must stress that a pilot in training should not be unduly criticized or ostracized should that pilot make an error. The goal should be to enforce the knowledge, skill, and/or regulatory basis for why an error was committed and ensure to the best possible degree that the pilot understands and is less likely to make the same, or the same kind of, error in the future.

It would be my preference to see this training conducted the same way for the same tasks from airline to airline and pilot to pilot - but I'm not "hard-over" on that aspect. What I DO believe, however, is that the evaluation of each pilot should cover all of what they should have been trained on (and that should only differ when, where, and how that particular operation actually differs), and determine that competency exists to the same level. At my home airport, there is enough diversity of operations that we could easily see 3 different companies have airplanes taxiing out at the same time - but each company could easily use the same aircraft type (say a B-737-800). But because these 3 different operators could rather easily operate under 3 different sections of the rule (airline operations, business/commuter operations, and private operations) the requirements for their training and therefore their testing could easily be markedly different, even though the airplane is exactly the same! To me, this makes no sense. The airplane does not know what section of some rule under which it may or may not be operating.

No … I don’t have a fully structured and fully researched basis on which any such diligent training program should be based – if I did, I would have turned every screw and knocked on every door to attempt its application. However, I DO have some of that knowledge and have done some of that research … but this approach, to be fully successful, will demand the direct participation of professionals from several disciplines (systems, systems integration, aerodynamics, propulsion–to some degree, flight controls, and education ... particularly in flight training and testing) to structure a set of program requirements, and alternatives, if or where appropriate. I know of some such initiatives – and the very best source would be the Training Group or the Flight Simulation Group of the UK's Royal Aeronautical Society. But, from me, that sounds much like a broken record (as I've said such things previously) – we need others shouting the same recommendations – and so many more who are willing if not eager to participate and employ what I believe could/should easily result in meaningful advances in pilot proficiency - directly impacting the safety of airline operations around the world.

OK – axe, partially honed … once again. But, I’m quite sure it will need additional honing many more times before I graduate to a chain saw!

[FGD135]

FGD's summaries are of papers ... *not* scientific studies.Dozy, you're drawing rather a long bow there to say that "papers" are not "scientific studies". One of the products of a scientific study/test/experiment is always a summary paper, detailing, among other things, the method and the results.


That paper, sometimes called a "white paper", will frequently make references to other, earlier research that has been done on a similar topic. Those references will consist of a one or two line summary of the research, together with citations of the name of the study and the authors (and the year).


Because that summary is only one or two lines, it may sound like mere opinion, but in reality, that summary will almost always be representative and accurate. It is in the author's interests to be accurate as he has made his name public, and his reputation is at stake!


... these loss of control crashes due to poor speed management are currently standing at 3 round dials and 2 tape displays. Hardly a ringing endorsement.Dozy, I respectfully suggest you are being a bit selective with which accidents you are citing.


At issue is the fact that we have had a spate of accidents over the last five years where the aircraft has crashed due to stalling, and the airspeed decay prior to the stall went unnoticed by the pilots. It is only accidents with these circumstances that are relevant.


Birgenair 301 does not count. It stalled, yes, but the airspeed indicators were misreading. WCA 708 also does not count, as the co-pilot was aware of the airspeed and had correctly diagnosed the stall. Austral Líneas Aéreas Flight 2553 also does not count, as it did not even stall.


NWA 6231 also does not count, as it too had misreading airspeed indicators.


In the last five years, we have had the following 4 high profile accidents. All have shared the relevant circumstances:


Colgan Air 3407,
Turkish 1951,
Air France 447,
Asiana 214


All of these aircraft had the airspeed tape. When we look at the accident record for the 30 years of commercial aviation with the big round dial for airspeed, we cannot find anything remotely resembling this current trend.


To my knowledge, there is only 1 accident to a round dial aircraft that possibly fits the circumstances. That was United Airlines 553, the B737-200 that stalled on final approach to Chicago Midway in 1972, but given that it was the inadvertent flap retraction that brought on the stall, there is the possibility that this accident too, may not count.

[Lonewolf_50]

FGD, just a thought: Sully did OK with the tapes in a stressful situation. ;)

While I prefer round dials for the usual brain / peception channel reasons, acclimating to the tapes and using them may not be quite the tall order being advertised.

[glendalegoon]

Lonewolf_50

Actually, the NTSB report shows difficulty in maintaining a proper airspeed in the sully case.

[safetypee]

Dozy, in your analysis (#1107) you might have overlooked what question ‘interpretation’ was asking.
‘What is the accuracy of reading the speed value’ vs time is not the same as understanding the speed value in context, task, limit margin, rate of change, manoeuvre capability, altitude effects. As per FDG135 #1112.

Also, for context we should consider the background assumptions in design and operation; With/without auto flight, accuracy demands, workload, automation policies.
Airbus favours the use of automation as an entity; the accidents relating to this are dominated by system failure cases.
Boeing opt for flexibility, the pilot can choose, but not always with appropriate training or guidance to limit the situations which might be generated; thus accidents more likely involve operational implementation.
Also both manufactures have encountered the parallel problems of automation dependence; this involves much more than design or policies, individuals, etc, but also the changing operating environment and assumptions made by the planners.

With the Next Gen of GA aircraft, with tape EFIS, but perhaps without the same extent of automation, particularly autothrust, or even more so the lack of guidance and training, then whatch this space … Clandestino (#1121).

[olasek]

Actually, the NTSB report shows difficulty in maintaining a proper airspeed in the sully case.
The same report in no way suggests or gives any hint that difficulty in maintaining proper airspeed has anything to do with instrument design. Instead they suggest "high stress" situation and "tunnel vision", both have been known for years and predate any electronic cockpit.

[AirRabbit]

FGD, just a thought: Sully did OK with the tapes in a stressful situation.

While I prefer round dials for the usual brain / peception channel reasons, acclimating to the tapes and using them may not be quite the tall order being advertised.


Lonewolf_50

Actually, the NTSB report shows difficulty in maintaining a proper airspeed in the sully case.

Actually, the NTSB report said the following:

14. Despite being unable to complete the Engine Dual Failure checklist, the captain started the auxiliary power unit, which improved the outcome of the ditching by ensuring that a primary source of electrical power was available to the airplane and that the airplane remained in normal law and maintained the flight envelope protections, one of which protects against a stall.

15. The captain’s decision to ditch on the Hudson River rather than attempting to land at an airport provided the highest probability that the accident would be survivable.

16. The captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted in high angles-of-attack, which contributed to the difficulties in flaring the airplane, the high descent rate at touchdown, and the fuselage damage.

17. The captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted, in part, from high workload, stress, and task saturation.

So, yes, there was some problems with airspeed control encountered during the approach flown with either one engine not operating and one engine operating, but only at idle power, or not; having one or both engines rotating to some degree, or not; which may have resulted in substantial drag (either symmetrical or asymmetrical), or not; which may have, in turn, provided sufficient cause for airspeed control problems, or not. Bottom line – Capn Sully done, not just good, but great! That indicates to me that the references he was using - both inside and outside the cockpit - including the references he used for airspeed, were sufficiently adequate to allow the resulting piloting performance, which, again, was pretty impressive - and even more so given the intended landing location, with all of those yet-to-addressed contingencies!

[FGD135]

Actually, the NTSB report shows difficulty in maintaining a proper airspeed in the sully case.
Ah, now this is indeed the kind of situation where the deficiencies of the tape would be most apparent. Thank you, glendalegoon.


Following incidents like these in the tape aircraft - where the flying pilot has survived - he should be asked how easy he found it to keep to a particular airspeed.


I bet I know what Sully's answer would have been. I think he wrote a book on it. Does he mention anything in his book?

[Machinbird]

17. The captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted, in part, from high workload, stress, and task saturation. Slightly off topic but.....
Probably much harder keeping a powerless C* aircraft on correct glide speed than one you can trim. For the C* aircraft (like the Airbus), about all you can do is set a nose low attitude and note the speed trend, then adjust from there and keep repeating the process.

For a a powerless jet that can be trimmed, trim to the desired speed, then avoid applying heavy forces on the yoke as you handle the rest of your problems.

[AirRabbit]

I think some here may be forgetting at least 2 things about the Miracle on the Hudson: first - that Sully was an accomplished glider pilot – and second - the “difficulties” in maintaining a constant, let alone the desirable, airspeed, were even more complicated by the fact that both engines were essentially at zero thrust, and the only way to control airspeed was to control the rate of descent – go down faster to increase airspeed – go down more slowly to reduce airspeed. That’s probably OK if you don’t care where you eventually get to the earth’s surface. However, in that Sully knew, within a reasonably short distance where he “had” to put the airplane down – “over this bridge but prior to the next bridge.” If you come down too fast, you will either splash-down too hard OR if you let a higher airspeed bleed off to reach a more logical (i.e., survivable) water touchdown, you’ll touchdown too close to that next bridge. I can’t tell you for sure as I haven’t talked with Sully, but I would imagine that he kept adjusting the pitch attitude to get down and to do so a rate of descent that would get him where on the river he wanted to be, AND at an airspeed that wouldn’t result in a stall or in such a horrific splashdown that passenger evacuation would be improbable. The result was quite likely seen as a rather “jittery” airspeed trace on the FDR – but that wasn’t the indication of a problem in being able to read the airspeed indication, that was the result of what Sully was deliberately and professionally trying to do - and he had to rely on being able to see, recognize, and understand what the airspeed was - throughout the entire ordeal - and he was using the only control he had to manage that airspeed - while, at the same time, properly managing the rate of descent to get where he wanted to be when he "had" to put it down.

[SEA&ski]

Original Asiana 214 threads are locked. This is a recently released tower video of crash and aftermath: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CHYg3gleQzA. Quite an interesting perspective and I'm sure it will be helpful for many groups.

[Koan]

Saw on KPIX site today. About 2 minutes to begin evac. No leadership from crew apparent.

[bud leon]

You can tell that from the video can you? That's some perception you have. There were significant forces involved in the incident. Of the twelve cabin crew, eight suffered serious injuries and 2 suffered minor injuries. Four cabin crew were ejected from the aircraft when the tail separated and two were temporarily trapped by evacuation slides that inflated inside the aircraft. I think the relative speed of evacuation in this particular case is one of the impressive aspects of the video.

The video supports the investigation report finding that the person in command of firefighting had no aircraft rescue and firefighting training.

[hoss183]

Theres a longer version of that video, actually showing the final approach and crash.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jvb_Tq0vZ10

[mickjoebill]

You can tell that from the video can you? That's some perception you have. There were significant forces involved in the incident. Of the twelve cabin crew, eight suffered serious injuries and 2 suffered minor injuries. Four cabin crew were ejected from the aircraft when the tail separated and two were temporarily trapped by evacuation slides that inflated inside the aircraft. I think the relative speed of evacuation in this particular case is one of the impressive aspects of the video.

The video supports the investigation report finding that the person in command of firefighting had no aircraft rescue and firefighting training.

Passengers had already exited and are visible at the rear, when the camera zoomed in.
But according to video timecode, 4 minutes after the aircraft came to rest numerous passengers/crew were still exiting the forward slides.
Presumably delayed due to obstructions? Passenger injuries?

[atakacs]

The video supports the investigation report finding that the person in command of firefighting had no aircraft rescue and firefighting training.

I would tend to agree that, even with the benefit of hindsight, there is much to be said about the firefighting aspect of this accident and that NTSB report is relatively tame on the subject. Bit surprising, would have expected a top notch response.

[3FG]

One of my coworkers was on that flight with his wife and teenage son. There were seated in roughly row 20, and were not hurt. We kidded him about being filmed carrying off luggage, and he pointed out that it wasn't their luggage; in fact they lost their laptops. Instead, he was carrying luggage which was blocking the aisle. He said that to the extent he could see toward the rear of the plane, the overheads had all opened and the aisles were severely blocked. In his view, the evacuation was quite expeditious considering the mess.

[JammedStab]

Just happen to have recently finished the BA 777 accident report in LHR back in 2008. Now I am reading the merged PPrune thread about it. Just today I came across these interesting posts which if had been read and understood by the Asiana crew, might have prevented an accident...

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/309075-ba-b777-incident-heathrow-merged-35.html#post3848116

"just a hunch from another angle, though not impossible. don't flame me. aircraft correcting from low on glidepath to slot on FLCH SPD mode? correction left too late? Capt handed control to Co-pilot on short finals. Why? Did Capt have to takeover and then hand over? Was co-pilot on training or a check? Did he goofed on FLCH SPD mode with throttle at idle. waiting for it to wake up to hold speed but did not, until a/c stall and too late to spool up manually. just speculation at another angle."

Reply...

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/309075-ba-b777-incident-heathrow-merged-35.html#post3848143

"No-one flies it at FLCH SPD at that stage on the approach"

[bud leon]

Passengers had already exited and are visible at the rear, when the camera zoomed in.
But according to video timecode, 4 minutes after the aircraft came to rest numerous passengers/crew were still exiting the forward slides.
Presumably delayed due to obstructions? Passenger injuries?

It's probably worth reading the report to get the answers to questions like this.

Slides on doors 1L and 2L were activated about 1 minute 33 seconds after the airplane came to a stop.

If you read the report the flight crew were briefly trying to ascertain the condition of the aircraft from the tower as the dust cleared before ordering the evacuation. The cabin crew were in various states of consciousness and awareness or trapped by the slides. One of the cabin crew members saw the external engine fire and unilaterally initiated evacuation.

From the report:

"The 1R slide/raft was found deployed and deflated inside the airplane on the exit passageway floor, extending forward into the forward galley and aft into the right main aisle about 1 to 2 ft.

The 2R slide/raft was found deployed and deflated inside the airplane on the exit passageway floor, extending across the right main aisle, through the midcabin galley, and ending about 1 ft short of the left main aisle."

"The 2R slide/raft inflated into the midcabin galley and blocked the right aisle between B-zone and A-zone, preventing B-zone passengers on the right side of the airplane from moving forward into A-zone and crossing to door 1L. Instead, these passengers crossed B-zone to reach door 2L creating a bottleneck at door 2L, making it difficult for passengers to move forward to reach door 1L. This helps to explain why the flow of passengers out of door 2L remained constant and heavy for about 2 minutes 30 seconds while the flow of passengers evacuating out of door 1L slowed considerably after about 30 seconds.
Despite fastening her restraint before landing, flight attendant R3 was thrown to the floor and seriously injured during impact, and passengers assisted her from the airplane through door 3R after it was opened by passenger 30K. Therefore, flight attendant L3 was the only crewmember in the back half of the airplane who was capable of assisting with the evacuation. Her attempt to open door 3L was unsuccessful,103 so she stayed in the area of her jumpseat and directed passengers to evacuate from both doors 2L and 3R.
In summary, the evacuation was accomplished by 5 of the 12 flight attendants (the cabin manager, L1B, L2A, L2B, and L3) using 3 of the 8 doors (1L, 2L, and 3R)."

I think you really can't seriously criticise the evacuation in this incident.

[hunterboy]

I'm always amazed at how professional and altruistic people are in these kind of events. One would naturally assume it is human nature to save oneself first in a life threatening situation like this, and yet time and time again, ordinary people more than rise to the occasion and do far more than can be expected of them. Kinda makes you proud to be a human being sometimes.

[sb_sfo]

4 years ago yesterday. Had forgotten what a poor show by SFFD. I remember the Korean MoLIT had decided on a 6 month suspension of OZ flights into SFO, then bargained down to 45 days, but still on appeal?

[Koan]

You can tell that from the video can you? That's some perception you have. There were significant forces involved in the incident. Of the twelve cabin crew, eight suffered serious injuries and 2 suffered minor injuries. Four cabin crew were ejected from the aircraft when the tail separated and two were temporarily trapped by evacuation slides that inflated inside the aircraft. I think the relative speed of evacuation in this particular case is one of the impressive aspects of the video.

The video supports the investigation report finding that the person in command of firefighting had no aircraft rescue and firefighting training.

Was there any leadership decribed in the NTSB report? None is apparent in the video. I've lead hundreds of briefings with "pretties" taking notes. My experience they lack initiative, whether dealing with difficult pax or other irregularities, always needing guidance from a superior for approval. Nice to look at but In an emergency reckon I'd rather still have one of our old dags.

[gearlever]

KOAN

I agree, but was there any "leadership" on the flight deck ?

[Huck]

What in the cat-hair is that shooting out of the left pylon at 4:01?

Engine fire bottle, perhaps?

[giggitygiggity]

Saw on KPIX site today. About 2 minutes to begin evac. No leadership from crew apparent.

Well, in a nice quiet sim that has not fallen to bits after a crash it takes about 1 minute to run an A320 evac checklist (not a 777 pilot), so is 2 minutes hardly surprising? Perhaps that is too long but it might not have much to do with leadership and more to do with procedure although I assume in this case it was almost impossible to actually run the checklist as the engines weren't even attached and the PA probably useless.