NTSB update on Asiana 214

[Volume]

FAA and NTSB are supposed to be completely independent. So it is OK, that NTSB criticises what FAA has certified. That ist the whole idea behind, and it is an ICAO requirement.
FAA certified that the aircraft complied with the rules, not that it is foolproof, nor that it is the best possible aircraft one could build. The certificate determines that the minimum requirements are met, not the maximum anyone could require.

[olasek]

. So it is OK, that NTSB criticises what FAA has certified.
It won't happen. There won't be any criticism of Boeing's auto pilot logic, it woudn't make any sense based on work NTSB had done before on other similar accidents. The whole story that NTSB is 'debating' is totally bogus.

[hifly787]

Just out of curiosity , has there ever been another serious incident/accident to the T7 because of the auto throttle misunderstanding ?

[Sqwak7700]

Spot on Volume.

Just out of curiosity , has there ever been another serious incident/accident to the T7 because of the auto throttle misunderstanding ?


There have been many incidents. At my airline, I know that they've had several on the 777 just like Asiana. The only difference being that crews caught their mistake early on.

Even the regulator suffered from this FLCH trap during a certification flight on the 787, with the same logic. Boeing chose to ignore the recommendations as a result of that incident claiming that the FCOMs covered such a trap with sufficient clarity (even though it was more emphasised on the 787 FCOMs)

As much as I believe the crew in the AAR accident were incompetent, having 10K hours in 747s I personally think there is room for improvement in the automatics.

[BOAC]

I am puzzled by the choice made to inhibit min speed protection with AP or FD engaged and FLCH selected with Throttle 'HOLD'. I understand it also happens in VNAV speed. Does anyone know why this was chosen as a function? I never tried it in a 737 with LVLCHG so maybe it was the same there!

[Capn Bloggs]

I am puzzled by the choice made to inhibit min speed protection with AP or FD engaged and FLCH selected with Throttle 'HOLD'.
Minimalist design philosophy? Obviously, if the AP is engaged, speed well never decay, as the AP will lower the nose to maintain, until it hits altitude capture (or whatever it's called), then the ATS comes alive. One could argue similarly with the FD engaged; if pilot is hand-flying it is a reasonable assumption that he/she would be following the FD, which would also be commanding a nose-down to attain/retain speed.

Now if the AP and FD are off or FD ignored (dunno if exactly relevant to the 777) and pilot pulls back on stick, the AT does not react and speed decreases. This happens in my machine (not a real Boeing) when it is in equivalent of FLCH. Speed will reduce BUT, when Vmin is reached, even if the ATS is off, Lo Speed Protection engages, ATS comes alive and controls to Vmin. A similar function appears to be fitted to Airbii. Not so, it seems, 777 or by the sounds of it 787?

This, from the CNN article, will answer your question, BOAC:
Boeing said it was without fault.

"All airplane systems were functioning as expected prior to impact and did not contribute to the accident," it told the safety board.

Asked why the "hold" mode did not protect against dangerous drop-offs in speed, Boeing told the board, "To do this would violate (Boeing's) design philosophy: the pilot is the final authority for the operation of the airplane."

"If the auto-throttle automatically (switched mode to prevent an aerodynamic stall), it would be overriding the crew's selection," Boeing said.

[BOAC]

"If the auto-throttle automatically (switched mode to prevent an aerodynamic stall), it would be overriding the crew's selection," Boeing said - Hmm - so what about all the other 'low speed' overrides Mr B puts in? Presumably Mr B there means not overriding the crews decision to stall crash and burn?:confused: I'm all for freedom of choice, but as a fare-paying pax now......................

[thf]

8MFPSfGoT1U

[porterhouse]

I'm all for freedom of choice, but as a fare-paying pax now
As a paying passenger I would be a lot more concerned how airline is doing maintenance or whether they have dumb pilots with cultural issues, autopilot, envelope protection, how it is desgined has absolutely no discernible effect on accident rate.

[Jet Jockey A4]

All I can say is they are very lucky only a few passengers died in this accident.

For those who were quick to blame SFO ATC, I hope you eat your shorts... This was no slam and dunk approach, he was brought in on a 14 mile final!

For those trying to blame Boeing for this, I don't agree.

This comes down to not knowing how the systems works (A/P and A/T), not following your own company's SOP, having a check pilot obviously not doing his job properly and ultimately a Captain trained on the B777 that can't fly his aircraft on a VFR day on a visual approach to a runway without the assistance of auto flight, in other words, manually.

[Lonewolf_50]

BOAC, as a fare paying pax, I must say that I have no time for pilots who, when twenty knots slow on final approach with a full plane of pax, remain in the "pull on their own yokes" mode rather than make a correction to their approach.

If you were ever 20 knots slow on final would you have passed the check ride?
No. Why?

At the risk of boring our audience here, the pilot's check ride is executed to determine if you are fit to be in charge of flying the airplane (and nowadays, making sure your many systems fly the airplane in support of your efforts), in accordance with standards.
30+ knots slow in final (37, IIRC from the report) is so far beyond standards as to begger belief. It amazes me that apologists are still cropping up on a Professional Pilot's forum, and where professional pilots contribute, professional pilots who day in and day out bring people safely to their destinations by flying to standards.

As fare paying pax, it is not too much to ask that the pilots fly to standards, and that the company offering the seats for a payment of money ensures same.

[DaveReidUK]

This comes down to not knowing how the systems works (A/P and A/T), not following your own company's SOP, having a check pilot obviously not doing his job properly and ultimately a Captain trained on the B777 that can't fly his aircraft on a VFR day on a visual approach to a runway without the assistance of auto flight, in other words, manually.Judging from today's hearing, the NTSB doesn't see things quite that simply.

[Jet Jockey A4]

Oh pleeease!

Yes Boeing could have made their understanding of the system better in their manuals and did a better job at it on the 787...

However the fact remains and the bottom line is that this crew (3 of them in the cockpit) and in particular the PF/captain screwed up big time.

- He may have thought the A/T would "save" him but he did not understand the system and it came back and bit him.

- Fact, they did not even follow company SOPs

- Fact, he selected a higher altitude in the preselect which in FLC mode will try to climb (and add power) to that selected altitude. This is not a B777 only FLC mode of operation, it works that way in many aircrafts.

- Fact, even after A/T and A/P disconnect he couldn't fly the aircraft of a prescribed track, laterally and most importantly vertically.

Fact, the PF did not even notice the increase in pitch attitude while looking outside.

Fact, when the speed bleed way below the calculated Vref and was heading towards a stall, he did not even notice the increase in back pressure required to keep the aircraft from continuing its descent below G/S, up to 100 lbs back pressure at one point!

Some of you guys would like to blame SFO ATC, some of you guys would like to blame Boeing (and yes their manual should be better written), but in the end it was the PF's responsibility to get that aircraft down safely and he did not to his job.

[olasek]

Fact, the PF did not even notice the increase in pitch attitude while looking outside.It is even worse, at 240 AGL they had 3 red PAPI, at 200 AGL they already had all 4 PAPI red, the pull on the yoke started to require over 40 llbs (culminating with close to 80 lbs) and these guys were simply charging ahead as if nothing mattered, as if they were on a different planet. We knew they weren't looking at instruments but they weren't looking outside either.

[fast cruiser]

Completely agree Jet Jockey..

Total Pilot(s) error…

simples...

[glendalegoon]

I agree with fast cruiser and others who share the view.


BUT for those who insist the gadgets are to blame, a question: We depend on gadgets like engines to keep planes flying, but we train for engine failure and can handle it. Even an ALL Engine failure we can handle. ARE WE SAYING that we (the pilots of asiana have already proven they can't) can't handle a failure of a gadget like an autothrottle?

If the pilots were the president of the united states, I would be calling for impeachment.

[BOAC]

I'm really not quite sure what fault 'all the above' are finding in my recent posts. I am on record here for considering the TC and the Line Captain (u/t) incompetent and the F/O of unknown questionable competence. I am not arguing against that.

The question I asked in #758 has not been answered, apart from Capt B who posed further questions.

I will re-phrase in the hope we can get some sensible answers.

Why, when we know that pilot skills are at probably the lowest point for decades, does a manufacturer take away a 'protection' - so as not to 'spoil' the 'choices' of a crew to crash an aircraft? What would have been wrong if the A/T had cut in and applied power as they sank into oblivion?

'All the above' (well, most) are calling for 'better pilots' as the solution. Wake up. Smell that coffee. You are NOT going to get that solution quickly or easily. Best come up with a different solution?

For glendalegoon can't handle a failure of a gadget like an autothrottle? - heard of THY at AMS maybe?

[olasek]

does a manufacturer take away a 'protection' - You can only take away something which was there before, clearly this isn't the case.
As to your original question I suggest you google "Pilot Authority and Aircraft Protections", an elaborate 50+ pages analysis of what aircraft envelope protection should and shouldn't be written by some captain who is on a certification committee and prepared by ALPA. If this fails I suggest you go directly to Boeing.

[RAT 5]

From the information that has been published and discussed over many months given it does seem an accident contributed to by a crew not monitoring the performance of the ac/; assuming that an automatic system would safe-guard the performance and not being ready/aware to take over manually when the performance was compromised.
I have not read the NTSB report, but some here seem to suggest they have a slightly different slant on the event. Hm! I remember when AA stuffed a B757 into the mountains near Cali with the speed brake still deployed during an EGPWS escape manoeuvre. They blamed Boeing for not having an auto-retract on the speed brakes when TOGA is pushed in the air. (Has it ever been rectified? as per the NTSB recommendation?) They blamed Jepesson for having the wrong 'R' wpt as the first on the FMC legs page. That seemed like another slam-dunk crew screw up for multiple reasons. Why is it so difficult to say so?
OK, they can try to learn from the screw ups and redesign the a/c & SOP's etc to mitigate against a repeat, but ultimately if the human at the coal face screws up as the primary cause then why not say so? It could be engineering, ATC, the company attitude or the pilots' actions (or lack of), but is it not better to be honest with the root cause and then the best solution for future prevention can be found? If there is a technical hidden gotcha, as there seems to be here, then OK, let them design it better, but surely the predominant root cause should always be front and centre and not brushed under the carpet.
Maybe, having not read the NTSB comments, I stand to be corrected. if so, then I accept it.

[captjns]

Total Pilot(s) error...


Way beyond pilot error. It applies to every air carrier, and aviation agency world wide on the 6 continents that subvert the requirement of pilots demonstrating the basic four fundamentals of flight with manual flight without any automation whatsoever other than the grey matter between their ears.


Passenger on the jets as well as the innocent people on the ground above the flight path deserve better.

[BOAC]

So, in short, none of the 'experts' here know why min speed reversion in that FLCH mode was not incorporated. That's worrying.

I have looked at all(54) pages in olasek's reference and the author appears to support the option for crew to deliberately stall a 777 on finals if they 'wish'.

God help us all.

[Lonewolf_50]

BOAC, the design is a couple of decades old.
First flight 1994
First used by United Airlines 1995.

You assert something taken away with over twenty years of foresight into the state of pilot hand flying skills / proficiency today. You may wish to compare the date of final design approval for the 777 with the issuance of the lecture/video on The Children of the Magenta Line. I think the former prededed the latter. (IIRC, COTML was produced in 1998)
(Snarky aside: In any event, I doubt if management gave bloodyforkall about such man to machine interface details at various airlines ... )

Even if you didn't mean that, no problem, but t's how it came off.

[tdracer]

BOAC, the A/T was put in HOLD. Since the A/T can't read the pilots mind, it has to assume that was intentional.

Are you really advocating an A/T that can unilaterally apply thrust, even when the pilot has commanded it not to? What if there was an issue with unreliable airspeed (been known to happen), do you want the A/T to firewall the throttles against the pilots wishes to maintain the erroneous airspeed during landing? Boeing design philosophy says the pilot has the final say.

As an aside, I'm not a pilot, but I am a driver - and sometimes a race driver. As an experience driver, coming into corner I can evaluate my speed relative to what would be an 'appropriate' speed for that corner and adjust my speed accordingly (without using a speedometer). Shouldn't an experienced professional pilot be able to do the same thing while landing on a beautiful summer day? Or is that an invalid comparison?

[glendalegoon]

I am familiar with the thys at ams.


the animation says it all.

I get mad at myself if I get 5 knots slow. I mean really mad and it doesn't happen often. But this pilot got 34 knots slow. animation is interesting, esp that after full power they accelerated by 2 knots!


dear race car driver. a pilot can perceive speed in many ways, the airspeed indicator is the most important. but sometimes your eyes are not on the airspeed indicator (SHAME ON THEM). There is a gadget called a stick shaker which physically shakes the control wheel to WAKE UP a pilot. Stick shaker at the least should make you LOOK AT THE AIRSPEED INDICATOR and add thrust unless the stick shaker has fired off in error. It is an electric motor mounted eccentrically to vibrate things to wake you up.

In older planes the controls would shake and you would feel it, but with computers and hydraulics between the wheel and the controls something artificial had to be added.

Clearly, these pilots were not top of their class.

[BOAC]

Are you really advocating an A/T that can unilaterally apply thrust, even when the pilot has commanded it not to? What if there was an issue with unreliable airspeed (been known to happen), do you want the A/T to firewall the throttles against the pilots wishes to maintain the erroneous airspeed during landing? Boeing design philosophy says the pilot has the final say.

As an aside, I'm not a pilot, - thus you are not familair with min speed reversion on the 737 which is an "an A/T that can unilaterally apply thrust, even when the pilot has commanded it not to?" Oh, and the A/T was not 'put' in HOLD - it put itself there.

All this anxiety about 'what to do with a rogue A/T" - turn the ***** off!

I'm still waiting for the logic in removing msr from this mode. I hear "the pilots need the choice" - well, they plainly are not up to it, are they?

[joema]

"why min speed reversion in that FLCH mode was not incorporated"

Below from the NTSB transcript. Sorry about the all caps and typos, that is how it was transcribed.

DID BOEING CONSIDER PUTTING ON AN AUTOMATIC AUTOTHROTTLE ACTIVATION AT A MINIMUM SPEED, REGARDLESS OF THE STATUS OF THE MODES?

(John Cashman, former Boeing chief test pilot during 777 development): WE CERTAINLY ALWAYS LOOK AT POSSIBILITIES. THE MAIN PROBLEM WITH THAT GOES BACK TO THAT ORIGINAL PHILOSOPHY -- NOT CHANGING MODES AND AUTOPILOT THAT THE PILOT IS NOT COMMAND. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF YOU JUST ACTIVATED THE THROTTLE IS YOU WOULD HAVE TWO CONTROLLERS OF ONE PARAMETER. THE AUTOPILOT WOULD BE CONTROLLING SPEED BY PITCHING, AND THE AUTOTHROTTLE WOULD BE CONTROLLING SPEED BY CHANGING THRUST. IT DOES NOT WORK FOR A WELL, SO YOU HAVE TO MAKE A MODE CHANGE, BUT THE AUTOPILOT IN A DIFFERENT CONTROL MODE, AND/OR THE TRUST. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DO, AND IT WAS VIOLATING ONE OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL FIND CONCEPTS.

>> CAPTAIN CASHMAN, YOU TALK ABOUT AUTOTHROTTLE WAKE UP. ISN'T THE ISSUE OF AUTOTHROTTLE FOR PROTECTION?

>> THE ENVELOPE PROTECTION OF THE AUTO ENGAGE OR WAKE-UP FUNCTION IS AN ELEMENT OF THE STALL PROTECTION, BUT IT IS NOT THE STALL PROTECTION SYSTEM. IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS RELATED TO OPERATION WHEN THE AUTOTHROTTLE IS TURNED OFF OR HAS BEEN DISENGAGED INADVERTENTLY OR A FAILURE TO DROP IT OFF, THAT IT WILL ENGAGE ITSELF. IT IS NOT A FUNCTION THAT IF THE AUTOTHROTTLE IS ALREADY IN ANOTHER MODE, IT WILL CHANGE THE MODE AND DO SOMETHING TO CONTROL SPEED. IT WAS REALLY THERE TO COME ALIVE AND ENGAGE ITSELF WHEN A HAD BEEN SELECTED OFF.

>> CAPTAIN CASHMAN, WHY NO AUTO THRUST PROTECTION IN -- MODE?

>> THE AUTOTHROTTLE PROTECTION FEATURE OR WAKE-UP FEATURE IS ONLY WHEN THE AUTOTHROTTLE IS TURNED OFF. IN A FLIGHT LEVEL CHANGE MODE, THE SPEED IS BEING CONTROLLED BY PITCHING THE AIRPLANE, NOT BY MOVING THE THROTTLE.

>> GIVEN THAT, THE SITUATION WHEN THE FLIGHT LEVEL CHANGES IN THE AUTOTHROTTLE IS AN HOLD, DO YOU CONSIDER THAT TO BE AN ERROR-TOLERANT DIVINE? -- DESIGN?

(Bob Myers, Boeing Chief of Flight Deck Engineering): I THINK I SHOULD REITERATE BRIEFLY WHAT CAPTAIN CASHMAN WAS TALKING ABOUT. WE LOOKED AT THIS DESIGN, AND WE WERE FACED WITH A DIVINE CHOICE. -- DESIGN CHOICE. IF WE GET A WAKE-UP OR A MODE TRANSITION OF THE AUTOTHROTTLE FOR A LOW-SPEED CONDITION, SAY, WE WOULD HAVE HAD CONDITION -- IN HOLD MODE FOR A LOW-SPEED CONDITION, WE HAD TO TRANSITION THE PILOTS AUTHORIZING THAT INCOME OWED-- IN COMMAND MODE CHANGE. THEY WOULD HAVE HAD TWO SYSTEMS CONTROLLING SPEED. WE HAD TO RECTIFY THAT SITUATION . IN THAT CASE, WE WOULD END UP WITH TWO MODE CHANGES AND A THRUST INCREASE, AND IF THIS LOW-SPEED CONDITION CAME ABOUT BECAUSE OF AN ENGINE PROBLEM, WE MIGHT ALSO BE PUSHING THRUST UP INTO THE ASYMMETRIC THRUST CONDITIONS. WE WOULD HAVE POTENTIALLY TWO MODE CHANGES UNCOMMITTED BY THE PILOT, A THRUST INCREASE, POSSIBLY ASYMMETRIC THRUST INCREASE, AND WE WOULD BE VIOLATING OUR PHILOSOPHY OF THE PILOT HAVING AUTHORITY. WE THOUGHT THE LESS CONFUSING OF THE SITUATIONS WAS THE DESIGN WE CHOSE.

[tdracer]

Oh, and the A/T was not 'put' in HOLD - it put itself there.

Not quite. Because of what the pilots told the A/T to do, it started advancing the throttle - the pilot grabbed the throttles and manually overrode the A/T to put them to idle which puts the A/T into HOLD.

I hear "the pilots need the choice" - well, they plainly are not up to it, are they?

If the pilots are not up to the task of flying an airplane on a nearly perfect summer day, they are not qualified to be pilots. No amount of automation can fix that.

[porterhouse]

So, in short, none of the 'experts' here know Yours is pretty limited world if you are looking for relevant 'experts' HERE. It's your choice but don't try to stipulate there is no valid reason because you can't find answer HERE.

[TheBigD]

I'm perplexed. Nothing in the NTSB's report mentioned use of non standard American R/T being the reason, as was suggested in a previous thread.:rolleyes:

PROBABLE CAUSE
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew’s mismanagement of the airplane’s descent during the visual approach, the pilot flying’s unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed control, the flight crew’s inadequate monitoring of airspeed, and the flight crew’s delayed execution of a go-around after they became aware that the airplane was below acceptable glidepath and airspeed tolerances. Contributing to the accident were; (1) the complexities of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems that were inadequately described in Boeing’s documentation and Asiana’s pilot training, which increased the likelihood of mode error; (2) the flight crew’s nonstandard communication and coordination regarding the use of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems; (3) the pilot flying’s inadequate training on the planning and executing of visual approaches; (4) the pilot monitoring/instructor pilot’s inadequate supervision of the pilot flying; and (5) flight crew fatigue which likely degraded their performance.

[Ollie Onion]

Jesus, there doesn't always have to be 'other' contributing factors. This crew screwed things up right royally. There were so many clues during that approach that were all either ignored or badly handled. 'Misunderstanding' a system could be a contributing factor to 99% of crashes or incidents and we ALL have the ultimate tool in our arsenal if we get in too deep...... GO AROUND. At what point was this fool 'stable??'.

I most certainly don't know all the in's and out's of my aircraft's FBW system, I probably know 90% of it but every week I see something new, difference is that when the aircraft does something I don't like or is in an 'undesirable' situation I have no issue disconnecting and hand flying and then if required 'rebuilding' the automation back in. The ironic thing here is that these guys are almost 100% reliant on a system they seem to only have a very basic knowledge of... and that is dangerous.

[BOAC]

joema - interesting, but which language is that transcribed from??? I had great trouble understanding what the supposed 'logic' was - in Asiana's case there was only 1 'system' in use - A/T and NO aircraft 'system' controlling speed.

porter -"don't try to stipulate there is no valid reason..." - not sure where you saw that 'stipulation'?? I have not and I am asking HERE. I agree with the futility of the search for answers here, however - I have not had one 777 pilot 'justify' this mode.

It is apparent that there is resistance amongst many, including non-aviators, in incorporating protection to aircraft in a world of significantly diminishing pilot ability. That spells one thing to me and it is not pretty.

[DaveReidUK]

Oh pleeease!

Hey, don't shoot the messenger. :ugh:

If you don't agree with the NTSB's findings and the results of their investigation, take it up with them.

[porterhouse]

I have not had one 777 pilot 'justify' this modeToo bad you did not meet the right one in case you really met so many of them.

[olasek]

there is resistance amongst many, including non-aviators, in incorporating protection to aircraft in a world of significantly diminishing pilot abilityPerhaps in the world of 'diminishing' pilot ability we should remove all protections, maybe then pilot abilities would improve because going the opposite way seems to make things worse. Frankly I did not know that among regressing pilot "abilities" we should include such difficult and arcane tasks as "watch instruments" or "watch PAPI lights of the runway" or "start thinking when pulling 80 lbs on the yoke".

[sflaperons]

@BOAC If you ever do find the design rationale for not including airspeed protection in FLCH mode, please do post it. I've searched in vain. At first I thought I was overlooking something basic but the more I searched the more it seemed to be the product of maintaining an internally coherent design philosophy that most pilots aren't really conscious of. Which I doubt is a complete answer.

@those who think it would be dangerous to include airspeed protection in FLCH mode, please explain how this would be so, particularly in light of the fact that some form of speed protection is included in every other mode. See also airbus (no need to start a B v. A war though; I'm not saying A is better; just that airspeed protection whenever the A/T is on is possible).

@those making the argument that B didn't take away the protection in FLCH mode because it was never there, that's a semantic point--it doesn't answer the question. If you prefer the question be rephrased as "why was airspeed protection given in every other mode but not FLCH mode," so be it.

@those who think it doesn't matter if you have airspeed protection or not because you're suppose to watch your airspeed, that's a point about culpability, not an answer to the question.

All-caps disclaimer: I'M NOT TRYING TO ABSOLVE THE PILOTS AND I'M NOT TRYING TO BLAME BOEING.

Rather, like BOAC, I am genuinely curious as to the design rationale behind no airspeed protection in FLCH mode.

[swh]

Rather, like BOAC, I am genuinely curious as to the design rationale behind no airspeed protection in FLCH mode.

The simple one line answer is that it is not required for certification.

[olasek]

By the way, none such protection are available to us lowly GA pilots, we must know "how to fly", we can't hide behind "Cessna why didn't you help us", but I guess if you are 10,000 hrs captain all of a sudden someone must help you wipe your nose, you forgot how to do it.

[Capn Bloggs]

Defending the indefensible. Put in Min Speed Protection, you lot. Or remove ABS, seatbelts, traction control, and anything else man invented to save himself if he gets out of his depth (for whatever reason) with technology! :rolleyes:

Are you really advocating an A/T that can unilaterally apply thrust, even when the pilot has commanded it not to? What if there was an issue with unreliable airspeed (been known to happen), do you want the A/T to firewall the throttles against the pilots wishes to maintain the erroneous airspeed during landing?
Ever heard of an AFS Override switch? :rolleyes:

[barit1]

Kindly educate someone who's been out of the loop a while:

I think we all have a basic picture of the 777 a/t "hold" logic now, and maybe even Boeing's rationale for it. But paint me a picture, please, of how this logic compares to other Boeing products - 748, 767, 737NG, maybe 737MAX if anyone is in the know.

Offhand, I'd think Boeing would make them as similar as possible, for a number of reasons.

[Capn Bloggs]

Offhand, I'd think Boeing would make them as similar as possible, for a number of reasons.
To a point. Surely though you have to start changing designs/features in the light of experience or technology improvements? You can't go on living in the past forever. Standardisation can only go so far.

[Sheep Guts]

All the crew except the Jump seat guy were asleep here guys. Bad tradesman always blame their tools not their technique or system knowledge. The Captain under training was coming off an A320 where the Thrust levers don't move when Auto Thrust is engaged. Opposite to Boeing. I wonder if that played a factor aswell. If we are considering all factors.

[olasek]

. The Captain under training was coming off an A320
He was coming off A320 but has had thousands of hours in a Boeing aircraft in his logbook but could suffer from amnesia.

[Sheep Guts]

Olasek,
Exactly right! Airbus induced "Boeing Amnesia" it's encouraged when you arrive at Toulouse for training by the way.

[TightSlot]

For the record, I'm posting this as an ex-FA with zero experience of flying an aircraft and just enough knowledge to be a nuisance. Caveats over, here we go...


The aircraft started above the appropriate glide path and never actually seems to have been on it, despite indications from PAPI's and what one might (optimistically, it turns out) expect from somebody on the flight deck monitoring the profile.

Flaps 30 was called for at a time when the aircraft speed was in excess of that appropriate for this setting.

Autopilot settings were inappropriate and not fully understood by the crew.

Despite all those wise heads in the cockpit, apparently nobody was monitoring airspeed or altitude.

The weather conditions were perfect.


I guess that what I'm saying is this - On a perfect day, four pilots watched the aircraft fly itself into the ground: I can't think of any circumstances under which this is acceptable, or for which they should be regarded as blameless. I cut my teeth working down the back on Boeing charters around the med, where our pilots routinely flew visual approaches with few navaids into such delights as Funchal, Samos, Mykonos and Gibraltar. I would like to go and the record and acknowledge a level of skill and professionalism involved that so far exceeds that visible in SFO that it is barely recognisable as the same industry.

I apologise for sounding cross: I think we have a right to expect better, much better and blaming the equipment just doesn't cut it!

[BOAC]

Thank you sflaperons and C Bloggs - maybe we can get some sensible answers in this morass.

swh - I sincerely hope you are never involved in design, certification or operation of aircraft.

Please - we do NOT need to still be discussing the 'competency' of this crew. That is obvious. We do not need to be discussing the wiping of 10,000 hr Captain's noses either - it seems that designers and certificators believe they should be wiped. The question is why is the msr protection NOT there in one mode when it is there in others. I understand the current thinking on SOPs for these a/c is that A/T is to be used at all times. In that case it needs to work properly and to me, if I HAVE to use it, having HAL go to 'HOLD' with no msr when I close the throttles is not 'properly' - nor necessary.

This is NOT an attempt to pass any blame to manufacturers - the 'guilty parties' are obvious. If there is no good reason for the feature (and I have not seen one) it will be simple to correct it.

[lederhosen]

My understanding is that the pilot flying was a highly experienced instructor transitioning from the Airbus A320 (with its different philosophies) to the 777. He was still flying with a training captain in the right hand seat, so probably less than half way through his line training.

Trainees (even experienced ones) make mistakes and he pretty thoroughly messed up the approach. The instructor in the right hand seat was on his first solo flight in that role in the aircraft. The instructors amongst us will know that there is a fine line in when to step in. He pointed out that they were high, but does not seem to have been providing height to distance information e.g x miles x feet above path. Where he comprehensively failed was in not calling for a go-around when the approach became obviously unstable.

Arguably this point was reached earlier. But by a thousand feet the aircraft was clearly not stabilised and latest then they should have gone around. Skybrary has interesting information about people pressing on with unstabilised approaches. In my opinion it continues to be one of the most frequent breaches of standard operating procedure.

The discussions about lack of manual flying skills and minimum speed protection are valid. But in this case an equally important conclusion is that even instructors do not seem to be go around enough minded. Particularly in line training we should be emphasising the need to for a missed approach if you are not stable.

[joema]

joema - interesting, but which language is that transcribed from??? I had great trouble understanding what the supposed 'logic' was - in Asiana's case there was only 1 'system' in use - A/T and NO aircraft 'system' controlling speed.

It was manually transcribed from English, probably by a stenotype machine (aka court reporter machine). Below is a modified version I converted to lower case and corrected some obvious transcription errors, and tried to clarify it without changing the intent:

(NTSB): Did Boeing consider putting on an automatic autothrottle activation at a minimum speed, regardless of the status of the modes?

(John Cashman, former Boeing chief test pilot during 777 development): We certainly always look at possibilities. The main problem with that goes back to that original philosophy -- not changing modes and autopilot that the pilot does not command. What would happen if you just activated the throttle is you would have two controllers of one parameter. The autopilot would be controlling speed by pitching, and the autothrottle would be controlling speed by changing thrust. It does not work very well, so you have to make a mode change, put the autopilot in a different control mode, and/or the thrust. It is difficult to do, and it was violating one of our fundamental find concepts.

(NTSB): Captain Cashman, you talk about autothrottle wake up. Isn't the issue of autothrottle for protection?

(Cashman): The envelope protection of the auto engage or wake-up function is an element of the stall protection, but it is not the stall protection system. In other words, it is related to operation when the autothrottle is turned off or has been disengaged inadvertently or a failure to drop it off, that it will engage itself. It is not a function that if the autothrottle is already in another mode, it will change the mode and do something to control speed. It was really there to come alive and engage itself when it had been selected off.

(NTSB): Captain Cashman, why no auto thrust protection in flight level change mode?

(Cashman): The autothrottle protection feature or wake-up feature is only when the autothrottle is turned off. In a flight level change mode, the speed is being controlled by pitching the airplane, not by moving the throttle.

(NTSB): Given that, the situation when the flight level changes and the autothrottle is on hold, do you consider that to be an error-tolerant design?

(Bob Myers, Boeing Chief of Flight Deck Engineering): If we get a wake-up or a mode transition of the autothrottle for a low-speed condition, say, we had to transition the pilots authorizing that command mode change. They would have had two systems controlling speed. We had to rectify that situation. In that case, we would end up with two mode changes and a thrust increase, and if this low-speed condition came about because of an engine problem, we might also be pushing thrust up into the asymmetric thrust conditions. We would have potentially two mode changes uncommitted by the pilot, a thrust increase, possibly asymmetric thrust increase, and we would be violating our philosophy of the pilot having authority. We thought the less confusing of the situations was the design we chose.

[Lonewolf_50]

Rather, like BOAC, I am genuinely curious as to the design rationale behind no airspeed protection in FLCH mode.
As I understand that feature (which is imcompletely, as I've not flown it) it occurs to me that the mode wasn't intended as a tool for bringing the aircraft in for landing / on short final.

"What is the design rationale for an emergency brake on a car that you can't pump" would seem to me a similar question.

I accept that I may misunderstand the system feature.

[BOAC]

Jo - thanks for the work on that transcript. I still do not understand Boeing's 'reservations' on multi-modes, since all we are looking at in the Asiana case is manual flight with A/T. One thing puzzles me in it - it appears that Boeing designed it to work with A/T off and talk of it 'engaging' in that condition - not what I would want having selected it off! At least the 73 msr function was inactive with A/T off.

LW_50 - Indeed not - it is, I think, simply designed to allow altitude change, but we know the crew was well confused with modes etc. as shown by the selection of it with a higher altitude selected BUT I still argue that msr would be a good idea whatever it is being used for.

[Capn Bloggs]

If we get a wake-up or a mode transition of the autothrottle for a low-speed condition, say, we had to transition the pilots authorizing that command mode change. They would have had two systems controlling speed. We had to rectify that situation. In that case, we would end up with two mode changes and a thrust increase, and if this low-speed condition came about because of an engine problem, we might also be pushing thrust up into the asymmetric thrust conditions. We would have potentially two mode changes uncommitted by the pilot, a thrust increase, possibly asymmetric thrust increase, and we would be violating our philosophy of the pilot having authority. We thought the less confusing of the situations was the design we chose.
Hang on. For the speed to decrease, whatever is controlling the speed (with Pitch) has stuffed it up (in this case, pilots pulling the nose up). So a min speed protection feature would work to stop the speed slowing further. If the nose goes higher, the thrust comes up further to prevent a further slowdown. If the nose gets lowered, the ATS reduces thrust to maintain Vmin. While technically it is a case of "two systems controlling speed", practically it's not, certainly after the "WTF is it doing?!" screech by the pilots and they either hit TOGA or re-engage normal (VS, FPA) modes. As for the thrust being put up automatically up during assy, that would be just as good an idea as if both donks were running and the speed got below Vmin, I would have thought...

[Ian W]

LW_50 - Indeed not - it is, I think, simply designed to allow altitude change, but we know the crew was well confused with modes etc. as shown by the selection of it with a higher altitude selected BUT I still argue that msr would be a good idea whatever it is being used for.
(my bolding)

No the function is as it says there for Flight Level Change. This was used several times in the NTSB questions.
(NTSB): Captain Cashman, why no auto thrust protection in flight level change mode?


and

(NTSB): Given that, the situation when the flight level changes and the autothrottle is on hold, do you consider that to be an error-tolerant design?

The response should have been - that the function is there, as you have just stated, for 'Flight Level Change' it is not there for use below the Transition Level. The function was being misused by the crew.

[emjanssen]

What I miss in the NTSB report are remarks about the stall protection feature of the 777. Did it in this case work for them or against them?

If I am not mistaken the 777 has a feature that the closer you are to te stall speed the harder you have to pull the yoke. I think it stops trimming at a certain speed.

YES ik know they should have made a GA at 500ft and YES more things went wrong. BUT when I read this (http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2014/asiana214/abstract.html):

As the airplane reached 500 ft above airport elevation, the point at which Asiana’s procedures dictated that the approach must be stabilized, the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) would have shown the flight crew that the airplane was slightly above the desired glidepath. Also, the airspeed, which had been decreasing rapidly, had just reached the proper approach speed of 137 knots. However, the thrust levers were still at idle, and the descent rate was about 1,200 ft per minute, well above the descent rate of about 700 fpm needed to maintain the desired glidepath; these were two indications that the approach was not stabilized. Based on these two indications, the flight crew should have determined that the approach was unstabilized and initiated a go-around, but they did not do so. As the approach continued, it became increasingly unstabilized as the airplane descended below the desired glidepath; the PAPI displayed three and then four red lights, indicating the continuing descent below the glidepath. The decreasing trend in airspeed continued, and about 200 ft, the flight crew became aware of the low airspeed and low path conditions but did not initiate a go-around until the airplane was below 100 ft, at which point the airplane did not have the performance capability to accomplish a go-around. The flight crew’s insufficient monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance.

I have the feeling we are missing something.

I see the following scenario:

- Long flight, tired, wrong timezone, "your head says night, your eyes say way to bright".........recognize that feeling?
- Two pilots not comfortable with a visual. (NOT GOOD at ALL, but we all know those guys DO exist)
- Just before 500ft instead of adding the necessary power or making a GA the poor guy starts pulling the yoke. BUT why did he not notice the drop in airspeed?

Was it just:

The flight crew’s insufficient monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance.

Or was there more? Why was he not suffently monitoring the airspeed? And why did it take him so long to start doing that. Could it be that the protective system distracted him? He pulls. The speeds drops. He has to pull harder, this distracts him even further. Tunnel vision on the yoke..........situation out of control even further?

YES I know, without the feature he might have stalled the aircraft, but do we know that for sure? Was this optimal protection?

[armchairpilot94116]

SFO firefighters missed 'window of opportunity' to save girl - SFGate (http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Run-over-killing-of-girl-at-SFO-never-should-5575261.php)

A true tragedy and a miracle not a whole lot more people died. The pilots were not up to speed on that aircraft with anything out of the ordinary. The fire fighters should have removed the young girl from where she was, even if they thought she was dead, and brought her to a location where she could not be run over. Not once but twice. Even if they thought saving those who were alive were more important at that point in time.

Well meaning people (crew and firefighters) doing their job, but they mucked it up. They were not up to the task at hand.

[BOAC]

No the function is as it says there for Flight Level Change - while I sniff pedantry, I am prepared to bow to your expert knowledge of aircraft systems, but would expect FLCH to be for ANY altitude change, above or below MSA (especially when in North America - do you serioisly believe it cannoit be used below18,000'?) - just as 'LVLCHG' in the 737 is for all 'vertical positioning' (if you prefer that) and I believe the AB family refer to 'Altitude' to encompass above and below TA.

[Turbine D]

BOAC,

If you have not read it, here is an Australian investigation and report on a triple seven involving FLCH during approach to landing.

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2298.pdf

[Lonewolf_50]

Turbine D, from the linked (and well presented) Australian report:

Worldwide, errors associated with the use and management of automatic flight systems have been identified as causal factors in more than 20% of approach and landing accidents.
As our old NATOPS officer used to preach:
You have to know your systems inside and out.
This imperative is doubly true, IMO, when you are flying the trusting and paying public from one place to another.
One's ignorance can cost their lives as well as one's own.

[RVF750]

On the 737NG, FLCH is fine to use on approach. You can use it to descend to the platform altitude you capture the G/S from!


You usually find you can't get adequate descent while slowing down while vectoring towards an approach in VNAV PATH, so LVL CH is ideal to simplify things. It is indeed a pitch mode, the logic is that when you select it you get an aircraft that either descends on closed throttles or goes up in N1 climb.


It does not take much mental idea to work out what is going on. Simple types would have an IAS button and you move the levers to go up or down.
It works just the same.


In this mode, you have the speed window open so altering the speed alters pitch. slowing a 737NG down near up speed and it really doesn't go down much without the "Stick of Shame".


No idea about the 777, but common Boeing philosophy should apply to a mode so easy to use like this.


Why in god's sake these pilots were using this mode to descend on a final approach though is a different matter. Then again I can't grasp why airlines don't let pilots use the damn thrust levers either.

[BOAC]

TD - thanks but not relevant to my query. This was totally differnt 'event'. They were using A/P in FLCH, Asiana were not (at the end) and there was no mention of speed as it was never a problem.

[porterhouse]

If I am not mistaken the 777 has a feature that the closer you are to te stall speed the harder you have to pull the yokeYou missed many posts on the subject.

Why was he not suffently monitoring the airspeed? Nobody knows. It is not NTSB's role to psychoanalyse a pilot. Perhaps if there were sufficient distractions in the cockpit - fire, smoke, failing engines, etc - there will be plenty of excuses, not here. By the way it is not HE, it is THEY.

Did it in this case work for them or against them?Maybe yes, maybe no, a purely academic exercise. Many pilots before them committed similar errors and there was no stall speed protection of any kind. Again, NTSB doesn't answer questions it has no answers for. By the same token you could say in this case weather worked against them too - weather was too good, if it were IMC they could have shot an ILS and possible survived.

[emjanssen]

Hello Porterhouse,

Your are probably right that I am missing some points on all that fly by wire stuff. I am flying the old lady with her old fashion cables.

And YES I ment THEY in stead of HE.

BUT is it an academic exercise?

When I look at the NTSB video. I see at 560 an aircraft on centre-line, on speed and on glide-path, with not enough thrust with a high rate of descent (although not dramatic). I dare to say this happens many times a day in the world, for several reasons. Most of those flights increase power and land normally. Some of them probably do that while knowing that the should have made GO-ARROUND because they were not stabilized at 500ft. A few of them might even have the same problem as the ASIANA guys but were saved by an AT, because that time they made other MCP selections.

I think it's quite interesting to try to find out WHY the Asiana guys did not increase power earlier.

Do you agree that the system must have kicked in?

I am not saying it was a contributing factor........I am just keeping the option open.

I don't agree with your remark about the weather. Weather we can't control........we can however control system design.

[porterhouse]

Do you agree that the system must have kicked in? No, it did not kick in by design.
If you fly an 'old lady with cables' nobody is pushing throttle for you, you must do it.
If you fly with AT it is your basic duty to monitor what AT is doing - if it is not doing what's supposed to do (say it is broken or failed or computer failed, etc) you must do it manually. Pilots must be able to handle adverse scenarios, if a pilot is surprised that AT did not do something for him and he crashed - that's epitome of stupidity and dereliction of duty. Reagan used to say during nuclear arms negotiation with USSR his famous "trust and verify", it applies to flying too.

[emjanssen]

@porterhouse

I am not talking about the AT.

Did you read my post?

I am talking about the steering column.
You need to pull harder the closer you get to the stall speed.
I understand this is a feature of the 777.
I think it stops/adjusts the trim(rate) at a certain speed.

Any 777 pilots around?

[olasek]

You need to pull harder the closer you get to the stall speed.For God's sake read previous posts, it had been discussed ad nauseam. They were pulling close to 40 kG of force.

[emjanssen]

@olasek

Do you have link of the post?

Was also discussed what happens to your brain, when you are pulling 40kg?
Specially when this al happens in matter of seconds? From 560 ft to the ground in 30seconds?

[safetypee]

‘it is not required for certification’; correct, but any installed system has to operate as intended (described, trained for, and operational expectation), and must enable the crew to manage errors resulting from interactions that can be reasonably expected in service. CS25.1302 and CS AMC.1302, which is one of the few requirements where the FAA and EASA did not initially use similar (same) text; however both the FAA and Boeing were significant contributors to the drafting of CS25.1302

‘… qualified flight-crew members trained in its use can safely perform their tasks associated with its intended function by meeting the following requirements:
… enable flight crew awareness, if awareness is required for safe operation, of the effects on the aeroplane or systems resulting from flight crew actions.
Operationally-relevant behaviour of the installed equipment must be:
Predictable and unambiguous, and
Designed to enable the flight crew to intervene in a manner appropriate to the task.
To the extent practicable, installed equipment must enable the flight crew to manage errors resulting from the kinds of flight crew interactions with the equipment that can be reasonably expected in service, assuming the flight crew is acting in good faith.’

Thus as much as some posts wish to cite pilot error, consider where the error originated?
The NTSB’s Probable Cause wording has been chosen carefully. Although aspects of the flight were mismanaged there is no explanation of how or why the automatic speed system was ‘unintentionally deactivated’ – unintentional is one view of error. Neither is there any consideration of the airspeed display being adequate for monitoring in these circumstances – cf many other poor speed awareness incidents.
The references to system description and training bias judgement of CS25.1302 in this accident towards the expectation that will pilots are expected to detect errors (cf other 777 incidents). This pilot dependency could a significant problem where automation is assumed to reduced training requirements, - less ability to detect error, reduced system knowledge / experience, and particularly so where automation is used in increasing complex operational environments.

The alternative interpretation is that manufacturers and regulators (and the industry at large) should improve equipment tolerance to error and balance the assumptions made about crew interface with automation in the changing operational and social environment; this assumes that automation weaknesses cannot be rectified in a suitable timescale.
The issue here is the balanced judgement of the requirements, who makes the judgement, what assumptions are in the judgement, and if these assumptions are published for operator / crew awareness.

[emjanssen]

@olasek

Found it (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/526333-ntsb-update-asiana-214-a-35.html#post8436009).

They had absolutely zero reaction to the fact that they were pulling on the yoke by about 40 kg!!!! and you tell me that a lousy EICAS msg would change their awareness - you are in a dreamland.

Did it cross your mind, that maybe because HE/THEY were eventually pulling 40kg they had zero reaction?

Did the system work for them or against them? Are you sure you can give an answer to that question?

I can't.

[olasek]

that maybe because HE/THEY were eventually pulling 40kg they had zero raction?
If someone is dumb is enough to pull 40 kg and considers it normal - no wonder they had zero reaction. Dumb pilot = dumb (zero) reaction.

[emjanssen]

@olasek

How do you know he considered it normal?
I bet he was fighting for his live because for some reason he ended up in situation were he did not wanted to end-up in.

You must be an ace. Lot of aces end up the same way as this guy did.

You did not answer my question.

Did the system work for him or against him?

My bet is that it distracted him more than it did good.

I would love to hear an opinion on this by some smart NTSB guys. Maybe aviation can learn something from it.

[porterhouse]

Did the system work for him or against him?
No, you got it completely backwards.
HE worked AGAINST the system.

[iceman50]

Safetypee

As usual your psychobabble to make excuses for the pilot and how the A/C system let him down. The A/THR hold mode may be a "trap" but as a PILOT you still have to FLY your aircraft.

It was an 8/8 blue day and all he had to do was look out the window and see he was about to land almost a mile short of his aim point and DO something about it. Runway aspect is taught in initial training and practiced many times. If you then cannot recognise you are well below the normal flight path with 4 reds as well, even though you will have monitored the A/P fly an ILS many many times, giving the ideal glidepath, then you have NO place on the flight deck of a commercial aircraft! This was BASIC piloting skills and a complete lack of them was being shown by the PF and the monitoring "Training" Captain.

The excuse of coming from the Airbus with no moving throttles, does not hold out either. If the A/THR in the "bus" does not keep the speed as you would like it, guess what you can MOVE them and many an Airbus pilot has done.

[Junkflyer]

Regardless of the protection systems on board the a/c-the crew is the final protection.
Idle thrust at 500' is a clue that something may be amiss, being on the proper glide path and monitoring the airspeed are basic tenets of flying a jet.
There were passengers in that cockpit, not pilots.

[Capn Bloggs]

That's it then. Next! :rolleyes:

[joema]

: "maybe because HE/THEY were eventually pulling 40kg they had zero reaction? Did the system work for them or against them?"

The flight control system was trying to prevent a stall by automatically pushing the nose down. Of course speed was dropping -- the pilot pulled the thrust levers back to idle and left them there.

The back-driven thrust levers continuously indicated their idle position by not moving.

As the plane tried to save itself by preventing a stall, the pilot fought against this, pulling back with increasing pressure.

The pitch control system was definitely working for him. Had it not resisted the pilot, he'd have probably have stalled it at a higher altitude out over the water.

[Capn Bloggs]

The flight control system was trying to prevent a stall by automatically pushing the nose down.
It never stalled, just ran out of trim. :cool:

[Methersgate]

AF 447 - pulling up on the sidestick.
Asiana 214- pulling back on the yoke.

coincidence?

[emjanssen]

@joema, others,

I am not defending the guy.
I am not saying they didn't make mistakes.

I am just interested in what happened below 560 ft and WHY?
I am interested if the protection feature(the 40kg) had any influence on his brains. Because if that's the case maybe we can learn something from that.

It happens several times a day in the world that aircraft for some reason end up high. I bet that even the selection made on the MCP aren't that uncommon. YES it is not clever to press LVLCHANGE with go-arround alt selected. But these things happen. NOT GOOD but they DO happen.

After ending up high, energy wise the Thrust Levers needed to be at idle until aprox 600 ft to be stabilized at 500 ft. This happens also several times a day, somewhere in the world. This approach was still do-able from 600ft. The only thing needed was the right thrust setting.

YES I know. Probably he thought that the AT would take care of his speed.
YES I know. He should have checked is airspeed.

I just can't believe that after pulling the yoke below 560 ft and after expecting the AT would take care of his airspeed there wasn't another reason why he/they increased thrust so late.

Anyway......enough said by me.

[Reverb_SR71]

Hmmm pilot error indeed .

From what i can tell the 777s systems do have some holes in them , but its a pilot's job to know them all and operate the ac safely.

And for all those people debating the fbw and whose incharge all i can say is on an a320 the alpha floor would have advanced the throttles and this might not have happened.

[porterhouse]

I just can't believe that after pulling the yoke below 560 ft and after expecting the AT would take care of his airspeed there wasn't another reason why he/they increased thrust so late.you can believe whatever you want but probably there was no 'other' reason.
Both pilots are alive and one of them tried to put a blame on a Sun reflection (that he was bothered by) - some very lame excuse. If there were some semi-valid reasons we would have heard it by now. NTSB report would probably mention it too, they interviewed both pilots extensively.

[barit1]

Reverb_SR71:From what i can tell the 777s systems do have some holes in them , but its a pilot's job to know them all and operate the ac safely.

I know of NO airplane that doesn't have a quirk, perhaps a potentially fatal one.
I could even argue the more complex the plane, the more quirks may be found. But in a twenty-year-old, universally successful airliner, the quirks have all been found out and widely discussed and trained for, haven't they?

Or is Asiana exempted from this practice?

[RAT 5]

I know of NO airplane that doesn't have a quirk, perhaps a potentially fatal one.

Of course; you ain't supposed to be there. You are in a 'mother nature' environment. Gravity and many other factors are trying to force you back to terra firma. It is your job to be alert to anything that is against you in this battle. They could be aerodynamic, mechanical or an off-spring of said mother-nature. When they try to wrestle control from you it is your task to resist with all resources at your disposal. That includes over-riding those delinquents that are under-performing. There is always manual over-ride. Just do it when necessary. Be it at your peril if you do not.

[Turbine D]

Original Quote by Reverb: And for all those people debating the fbw and whose incharge all i can say is on an a320 the alpha floor would have advanced the throttles and this might not have happened.

-Speed very slow and reducing to reach maximum possible angle of attack
-Engines speed at flight idle
-Late application of go-around power

Sound familiar?

This was the A-320 at Habsheim, Alpha floor didn't advance the throttles, there are no guarantees.

[noske]

And for all those people debating the fbw and whose incharge all i can say is on an a320 the alpha floor would have advanced the throttles and this might not have happened.
That's a surprising conclusion, especially since the similarities between Asiana 214 and the A320 crash at Bangalore have already been mentioned several times on this thread. And on the Bangalore flight, alpha floor did indeed activate, about two seconds before the PF realized that "Hey, we are going down" (and finally took manual control of the thrust levers), but still too late for the engines to spool up in time.

It might be more interesting to discuss if the Airbus implementation of the low speed warning ("Speed Speed Speed" spoken by the CMV, as opposed to a quadruple chime and a text message on the EICAS) would have been a better help to this Asiana crew.

[Capn Bloggs]

It might be more interesting to discuss if the Airbus implementation of the low speed warning ("Speed Speed Speed" spoken by the CMV, as opposed to a quadruple chime and a text message on the EICAS) would have been a better help to this Asiana crew.
I thought that too. My current steed says everything. No deciphering arcane tones that you may not have heard before. Also, the Helios 737 comes to mind.

[SteinarN]

The pitch control system was definitely working for him. Had it not resisted the pilot, he'd have probably have stalled it at a higher altitude out over the water.

Think about it, hadn't the system had this feature to gradually resist pull on the yoke as the speed neares stall limit, then the pilot most likely would have encountered the stick shaker at this earlier and higher altitude. The plane still wouldnt have stalled obviously, but it would be clear to the pilot at an earlier time that he was on the stall limit, maybe he would understand it was from lack of speed and actually manually increase thrust.

As this "yoke resists pull" feature obviously comes gradually it might be suitable to delay a less observant pilot in intuitively understand the speed is way low.

[safetypee]

iceman50, your comments (#823) infer that pilots have to be infallible, be able to cope with all system related ‘traps’ or holes irrespective of the operational situation.
There is no need to defend either pilots or aircraft systems, they have been judged against standards set by others – training / certification. If with hindsight this judgement appears to be inadequate, then perhaps we should look at the processes of training / certification.
Training has been discussed, certification less so, thus my reference to part 25. I recommend that pilots read the advisory and explanatory material in 25 AMC 1302 to understand the balance required in system certification to avoid error and the difficulties of ‘quantifying’ human behaviour.

This accident could be an indication of weakness in the processes of training / certification. However, instead of considering the human or the machine independently, consider them in combination, as a unit which together are necessary for safe operation; thus one view of this accident is that the effectiveness of this combined unit was inadequate for the situation (human, aircraft, operations, training). We could question if the original balance of these factors made several years ago is still relevant in today’s increasingly complex operational environment, or with pilots under training, and the influence of modern commercial pressures, etc.

Fundamentally humans don’t change; they still err, more often influenced by the situation. Aircraft systems rarely change, but the situations in which both elements have to provide an adequate margin of safety do change. Thus look at the situation first, consider the combined human and the aircraft view of this, and then consider each element's view of each other - what was trained / taught, what was designed / certificated, and finally what assumptions were made about these to achieve a safety balance.
Although the NTSB’s recommendations are directed at specific issues – each side of the balance, the overall theme is to readjust the balance in order to maintain the required level of safety.

[olasek]

this "yoke resists pull" feature obviously comes gradually it might be suitable to delay a less observant pilot in intuitively understand the speed is way low.
Yoke resists pull is a very important feature in Boeing, frankly in any aircraft apart from some Airbus-like.
If a pilot is "less observant" there is no technology that can make up for pilot's lack of attention regardless what "type" of control feel you have - for example AF447 and AF296, etc illustrate it well.

[Lonewolf_50]

I know of NO airplane that doesn't have a quirk, perhaps a potentially fatal one.
I know of no airplane that doesn't have an airspeed indicator.
An airspeed indicator is placed in the cockpit for the benefit of a pilot, who is supposed to use it as a key reference to maintain or change aircraft performance to fit the desired performance for the maneuver being undertaking and remain flying, rather than falling, until back in touch with the ground in a controlled manner. (it is also supremely useful in determining when it is safe to take off and when one must abort a take off, another key performance criterion).

Get back to fundamentals: airspeed.

Root cause: airspeed decay well beyond standards and beyond acceptable limits, with no correction in a timely manner.

Who is flying the aircraft?

Bloggs, if the Company is happy that their flight deck crew are more or less passengers, rather than pilots, then the root cause certainly goes beyond the flight deck crew ... but it raises the question of why that Company remains in business.

[The Range]

Watch your airspeed

[Piltdown Man]

...but it raises the question of why that Company remains in business?

Answer: Modern aircraft are so capable and reliable you can have highly restrictive SOPs and employ moderately trained chimps to fly them. For 99.999% of the time, that will work fine. But the whole thing turns to worms just as as soon as the unexpected arises. So just as long as the unexpected doesn't happen too often and not too many people are killed, it's not a problem.

[ExSp33db1rd]

Watch your airspeed

No question about that, end of story, but ........... wasn't this guy fresh off the Airbus, and if he "thought" that the A/T was engaged he wouldn't be concerned that the thrust levers were stationary, being what he was used to?

Never flown an Airbus, so sorry if I'm off beam, but isn't it true that the Airbus throttles don't "hunt" all the time, but remain fixed ?

Just a thought, 'mindset' can be a real enemy.

[porterhouse]

"thought" that the A/TPerhaps but he was also a former Boeing pilot.
Moreover "thinking" is not good enough - the mode of A/T was displayed in front of him and it said HOLD. It means only one thing - A/T throttle is in a 'dormant' mode, don't expect it to work. As a matter of fact everything is displayed for him right in front of his very nose - airspeed, A/T mode, A/P modes, the size of area to look at - about 4 x 4 inches. Pilots are taught to always verify that the automatics are doing what they are thinking they should be doing.

[aterpster]

The Range:

Watch your airspeed

The modern school house calls it "energy management."

I call it attitude instrument flying.

Either way, grandma was wrong when she said, "Fly low and slow, sonny."

[olasek]

and if he "thought" that the A/T This brings another accident crash from my memory - both accidents share the same core - after 10+ hrs flight you are only 3 mins from destination runway, weather is perfect, aircraft is sound, what can possibly go wrong? I (pilot) am so close I can practically get off the plane and walk...;)

In this other accident decades ago a business JetStar was flying from South America to Hawaii, its owner and crew were returning home. After a long 10+ hrs flight they landed in Honolulu to clear the border/customs. What awaited them was a mere 20 min hop to another island, weather was perfect but it was going to be a night flight. Pilots were almost there, why bother with a longer arrival procedure specially in such a magnificent clear weather, they took a shortcut. One of them suddenly spotted something black blocking their view but another remarked .. Ehh, I think it is just a puff of a cloud. It wasn't, there wasn't a single cloud around, it was a rim of a volcano, they hit it with predictable results...

[DaveReidUK]

In this other accident decades ago a business JetStar was flying from South America to Hawaii, its owner and crew were returning home. After a long 10+ hrs flight they landed in Honolulu to clear the border/customs. What awaited them was a mere 20 min hop to another island, weather was perfect but it was going to be a night flight. Pilots were almost there, why bother with a longer arrival procedure specially in such a magnificent clear weather, they took a shortcut. One of them suddenly spotted something black blocking their view but another remarked .. Ehh, I think it is just a puff of a cloud. It wasn't, there wasn't a single cloud around, it was a rim of a volcano, they hit it with predictable results...Are you thinking of the May, 2000 CFIT in Hawaii?

Those circumstances sound vaguely similar, though it was a Sabreliner rather than a JetStar and it was enroute from Argentina via Maui, rather than Honolulu, to Molokai when it hit a ridge about 3nm from its destination shortly after the CVR recorded the captain asking "That's the clouds, huh?".

[olasek]

Yes, that's the one.

[safetypee]

Airspeed is the primary reference, but instrument formats have changed in recent years – although not in the lifetime of the 777.

Tape speed-scales do not have the same qualities as dial instruments; although tapes are inferior they have been accepted as satisfactory for speed control, particularly with the availability of auto-thrust. Changes in operations and training resulted in greater use of auto-thrust, perhaps with less attention to the actual airspeed (and difficulty reading it) – vice the selected value. Also, A/T use reduces opportunity to gain experience in energy management using the combination, the interchange between pitch and thrust.
With autopilot control, energy is managed with system modes, this is not always consistent with manual flight techniques, and to a similar extent for manual flight with A/T. Thus the only way to improve understanding and gain experience of the pitch–speed interaction (energy management) is with full manual control of pitch and speed. Many calls for more manual flight overlook this critically important aspect – turn the A/T off.

Also, some A/T systems do not have consistent logic for speed / thrust. Most A/T systems are integrated with the autopilot; A/T speed=pitch on elevator, A/T thrust=speed on elevator. However, the advent of speed protection and additional interactive modes has led to quiescent A/T operation - speed hold / ARM, each with additional complexity and ‘minor’ inconsistencies.
Whilst human behaviour can be inconsistent, automation up to a point should be consistent; where this is not achieved then the human needs greater understanding (training) and additional resource for situation/workload management according to operational scenario.
Thus it is perhaps not surprising that there are more speed (awareness) related incidents; not only with tape displays, but also with dials as the influences of increased A/T use can degrade (change) the basic instrument scans associated with normal operation. Pilots also lack experience of the pitch – speed interaction – the ‘feel’ of manoeuvring the aircraft in manual flight.

[porterhouse]

Tape speed-scales do not have the same qualities as dial instruments;
I personally beg to differ. I grew up with round dials and now fly behind Garmin G1000 and find the current representation very convenient and intuitive and in fact superior to the old stuff.

[roulishollandais]

it raises the question of why that Company remains in business.Insurance pay when the company kills its passengers, and insurance is too cheap

@Safetypee
Excellent analysis of how low respect of pedagogy rules and decreasing standardisation but increasing number of modes are working

[Mozella]

safetypee says: Pilots also lack experience of the pitch – speed interaction – the ‘feel’ of manoeuvring the aircraft in manual flight.

If that is true the pilot shouldn't have been allowed to fly his first solo flight.

It seems to me that about two thirds of the people posting in this thread are searching for excuses; i.e. what quirk of the aircraft could possibly be to blame.

The other third have it right. Bottom line: These guys can't fly. The pilot flying, at least, proved that he didn't have a understanding of how to fly an airplane at the very basic level. In addition, he proved didn't have an understanding of how the sophisticated auto flight system of his airplane worked.

And none of the guys in the cockpit had an appreciation of the relationship between cultural idiosyncrasies and their basic responsibility to keep from killing their passengers. Shame on them.

If your premise is correct, someone should have told the pilot something most of know, "Pull back and you go up. Pull further back and you go down".

[IcePack]

When work load is high and things get out of hand. How many pilots have found they fixated on something to the detriment of something more important. More than the perceived experts here methinks. However whatever it still comes down to pilot error, but to coin a phrase. Those that throw the 1st stone!

[Machinbird]

When work load is high and things get out of hand. How many pilots have found they fixated on something to the detriment of something more important. More than the perceived experts here methinks.Day, Visual Conditions with the airfield in sight, and a properly functioning aircraft.

Where did the high workload come from?

IMO, they just weren't ready to fly outside the little box that they trained for.

[fireflybob]

How many pilots have found they fixated on something to the detriment of something more important.

True but what about the role and function of the monitoring pilot(s)?

[601]

Where did the high workload come from?



IMO, they just weren't ready to fly outside the little box that they trained for.

...........:ok:

[RVF750]

The really sad thing is there are turboprop pilots all over the world who could have sat in that seat and flown a perfect visual approach with no training on the aircraft at all. Just tell them the speed and hand over control.


The question that really needs answering is why the crew on that flight, who many years previously could probably have done it too, no longer have the skills. Where do they go and why?


My outfit doesn't discourage hand flying, they just say you shouldn't mix, if you disengage the autopilot, disengage the auto throttle too.


You'd think it was rocket science from some people. It's just an airplane. The Wish panel is where you push the buttons, and the FMA is where it tells you what it's doing. In nice big clear letters.

[HundredPercentPlease]

If they had observed the modern industry-standard stable approach criteria, then they would have gone around at both 1000' and failing that 500'.

I see the failure to go around off an unstable approach as the primary cause, because it is a fundamental mistake, it is the first mistake and it would have arrested all the subsequent mistakes.

After that, it is clear that the PF was flying it as if he were in an Airbus (static levers, a/t on), when he in fact had the a/t off. A poor Airbus pilot has poor speed monitoring, because the standard way to fly a visual is with a/t on, and the a/t does an exceptionally good and reliable job.

Therefore he was not monitoring speed, and the levers were doing "as expected" (ie as per the Airbus - nothing).

But that's all irrelevant - he flew a criminally bad intermediate approach, and neither pilot observed the stable approach criteria. The real answer to why this happened, is why did they not go around at either 1000' or 500'? Training, company culture, negligence, recriminations, SOPs, something else...

Qualification: I have gone between Airbus and Boeing several times in my career.

[IcePack]

Work load includes being watched assessed etc. whilst no excuse for not looking out of the window & monitoring speed. I have seen many a pilot getting themselves into similar situations, hence me saying about throwing stones.
(Some pilots have a very short memory of their mistakes e.g me hearing a check airman saying to a f/o under training that he'd never done a rushed approach! I resisted the urge to butt in & say is that apart from the one you did with me when you were an f/o)

[safetypee]

porterhouse, there are often many views, but the interesting aspects are generally in understanding why they differ. You suggest a comparison with older equipment, but is this with greater experience with the old than the new, has A/T been considered, and in what situations.
My view is based on research texts, but applied to airspeed displays, and a comparison of a high quality ASI e.g. 3ATI MD80 with modern EFIS. I am 'old school', but with experience of military speed tapes and total immersion in early civil EFIS development.
The significant features I relate to are the range of speed in view – dial max to min, EFIS +- 30 kts, and the speed value in relation to an extreme; additionally the dial has an angular relationship to the speed range and rate-of-change of speed.
Speed rate is interesting as many people would cite an EFIS trend vector as useful – but who looks at it when the workload is high. The early history of trend vectors ranges that they were there because the parameter could be computed, or were needed to support the ‘deficient’ airspeed tape in this area.


Mozella, I use ‘experience’ as something above the basic requirements of being qualified, these are the abilities more often required specific situations and of being 'safe':-

http://oi58.tinypic.com/24wdj4y.jpg

Re "Pull back and you go up. Pull further back and you go down". But do we tell pilots that pulling back results in reducing airspeed (unless energy is managed) or without managing pulling up further that the aircraft may stall. Do we teach how to manage - plane, path, people?
Education and understanding reinforced by experience and the willingness to improve are among many factors which enable pilots to manage energy, the aircraft, the situation, and themselves.
And even when we have taught pilots, is the information always recalled or applied as we might judge with hindsight?

[400drvr]

I have said this many times about this particular crash. "I would expect better from a post solo student pilot!" This is not rocket science and we all know it. A visual approach an a clear day, come on. I would never have believed that such a simple approach would have such disastrous results, but I guess I was wrong.

As far as what was doing what when, Auto Thrust Vs Thrust lever position, who cares. I'm normally looking out the window. Keep the same sight picture in the window, again we all know that works to.

So lets keep the blue side up.

Basics

[fullforward]

Spot on, mate!:ok:
Simple like that. Bare bones airmanship.

[Mozella]

Do we teach how to manage - plane, path, people?
Education and understanding reinforced by experience and the willingness to improve are among many factors which enable pilots to manage energy, the aircraft, the situation, and themselves.
And even when we have taught pilots, is the information always recalled or applied as we might judge with hindsight?

I'm not sure what point you're trying to make. Is it that these pilots were never taught how to fly? Did someone forget to tell them not to run out of altitude, airspeed, and ideas all at the same time? If so, I won't argue with that.

Is it true that some airliners are piloted by crews with just enough skill to not crash until some unanticipated circumstance pops up? Perhaps so.

Are you saying they couldn't help it because they didn't know what they were doing since the training they received was so poor? Is it possible to find airline pilots with a big metal tube full of innocent and unsuspecting people riding along behind them while they don't have a basic understanding of how the flight controls work? It might be so in this case.

But that doesn't make it OK by me.

[barit1]

I believe it's worse than that. There are airlines so imbued with nepotism, and cronyism, to the point they do not differentiate between skilled and marginal pilots.

In other words, the social hierarchy overwhelms the technical needs of the flight deck. I then have to wonder about the shop situation. :*

[safetypee]

400driver, fullforward, Mozella. “Blue side up, airmanship, not OK”; so what should be done?
Blame might be self-satisfying, but it does nothing for future safety; neither will firing all the errant pilots.

More training; how much and for which situations? Many people appear to be bound by hindsight, demanding more training for ‘the last accident’ and attempting to cover every detailed eventuality.

If the industry is as barit1 suggests, then the attitudes above might back everyone into an impossible safety corner – fewer qualified pilots, more training, more cost, more operational restrictions …. more ‘violations’ (erroneous activities defined by requirement).
However, considering the industry at large, it is very safe; aircraft are flown manually and landed safety every day. Look at what goes right; consider the positive role of pilots in providing this safety, what freedoms do they have. If we can provide more of what is right, then there should be less opportunity for what is wrong.

There is significant focus on ‘the last accident’, with gut reaction demanding fixes, but will these fix the future – not entirely. Thus it is essential to understand the widest range of issues in major accidents, learn from them and make small but potentially effective changes in order to maintain the current level of safety. Most of the NTSB’s recommendations are in this category.

[400drvr]

I do not believe I blamed anyone other than stating the obvious.

[barit1]

By no means did I mean to imply the industry as a whole is contaminated; but a review of accident statistics will quickly highlight certain carriers, in certain regions, in which management must be suspect.

BTW, if ferryboat statistics align with airline statistics, for me this is a double red flag.

[Gretchenfrage]

or do you mean a red and blue circle?

[AirRabbit]

safetypee, you make some really good points … i.e., “more training?” … “Ok, how much and what for?” as well as … “understanding the widest range of issues in major accidents; learn; and then, make small but effective changes to correct the recognized errors…” Of course, I can’t speak for the kinds of rules, regulations, authorizations, “do's and don'ts,” traditional and non-traditional aspects, etc. etc. for aviation systems other than those in the US – But, for the US, I DO know and HAVE experienced the full gamut of most of those characteristics. However, that doesn’t change the validity of what you’ve pointed out … I merely want to add the following:

Even as good as the NTSB is at determining the “probable cause” of accidents and investigated incidents, the training recommendations they make either as a result or seemingly to prevent a similar situation in the future – while quite logical, at least most of the time, if an FAA regulation was created for each of the safety recommendations made – the increase in requirements and all the resulting time and cost concerns would be much more than theoretical. Over the recent 20 – 30 years, or so, I have seen a good effort on the parts of all the major players – and by that, I mean individuals representing each … the FAA, the NTSB, several individual airlines, a couple of pilot unions, appropriate airplane manufacturers, several training organizations, etc., who have, on multiple occasions, got together, laid all of the issues on the table, and mutually agreed to work to find logical, realistic, and workable recommendations. Profit margins, ticket sales, advertisement schemes, etc. were all set aside for these discussions.

Within these “working groups” there was, initially surprising, but later quite expected, quite logical, sensible, workable, realistic recommendations that were distilled out of all of the conversations and professional “give ‘n take” that was provided from ALL of the participants. Sounds pretty good … eh? Well, not so fast. As good and as logical as these recommendations were, it was still necessary to get those recommendations through each of the participants’ management structure at home. Even when some potentially productive efforts were put into operation – even if it was only to gather information which was to be later used to refine the rules and regulations, while at the same time provide instructive recommendations, there was the inevitable “head-shed” decision that either blew apart the effort or changed its direction so dramatically that all of the original intent was no only lost but provided substantial logic to go in a completely skewed direction.

I think almost everyone who participated in more than one or two of these efforts eventually came to understand that to see any of the recommendations become an industry wide practice – it would have to be 1) simple to adopt, easy to administer, provide superlative aviators, and add “depth” to the corporate coffers, be they airline or manufacturer, training organization or individual pilot pocket; or it would have to be 2) required by regulation. You may have, but I’ve never seen (and probably will never see) anything that might be even close to having the features of number 1 … and that leaves only number 2.

Also, I think that, while everyone here recognizes that a government entity does not have an exclusive capability to generate “bureaucracies,” virtually all corporations that have more than 2 employees have their own version of such a “head-hurting” processes … but NONE of those corporations have that process down to the level of “science” that the government manages to provide 25 hours a day, 9 days a week, and 15 months out of every year! The effort it takes to outline the necessities for having to modify an existing rule is quite major … but it doesn’t hold a candle to what happens to construct, write, review, modify, re-review, and then defend either a “major” overhaul of an existing rule, or, heaven forbid, the initiation of a brand new requirement!

The very notable exception to this point – as would be jumped on by the regulatory managers and some of the management officials of those airlines currently participating in one such “major” effort … in the US it is known – either affectionately or not-so-much (depending on your position) as the “Advanced Qualification Program,” or AQP. This was a working group-developed concept that was originally designed to provide data that did not exist at that time. It was proposed to provide that data, get a “hands-on” working familiarity with some of the then-understood philosophies, and help determine the logic of maintaining those philosophies or of changing them … which would be accomplished in accordance with the data gathered from this effort. It was initially planned to have something like 3 to 4 or 5 airlines entered into this program, and was predicated on a rather sophisticated data gathering process and a really well-laid-out record keeping process. The initial queries were to focus on the logic of continuing to have airline Captains return to the simulator every 6 months for a recurrent proficiency check, while requiring First Officers to return every 12 months for the same kind of check … particularly when there were some local FAA offices that thought that it would be appropriate to allow one recurrent training period each year to substitute for that visit’s proficiency check. That meant that Captains would get 1 course of training and 1 recurrent proficiency check each 12 months – equally spaced.

Unfortunately – that thought process didn’t quite make it through to frontal lobes of some … who, apparently blindly, allowed First Officers to get the same one recurrent course of training each 12 months. If one were to stop talking (and thinking) at that point, it would be fine. But, First Officers were only coming in once each 12 months – now that visit was going to be a training session … not a proficiency check. Of course, some operators and a few regulatory offices recognized this and allowed every other proficiency check for First Officers be satisfied with the course of training in the simulator. But, even then, that allowed F/Os to be checked only once every 2 years. During the first 18 – 24 months of this “data gathering effort” there were several management changes in the FAA – both locally and at the HQ level. At the same time, there was an influx of accidents and incidents that kept aviation – with the emphasis on the airline portion thereof – firmly on the front pages of most of the newspapers and all the local media outlets in the Washington, DC area. Naturally, no one in the FAA – particularly the senior managers – were very happy about having to be questioned by the Department of Transportation officials and the occasional Congressman or Senator – or the local TV, radio, and/or newspaper reporters, and the kind of questioning was quite pointed. Lucky for them the FAA had two on-going programs that were very highly thought of by members of the airline community.

These programs were the National Simulator Evaluation Team (NSET) and the Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). The airlines liked the efforts to clearly define both the technical requirements for simulators and the authorized uses for each such device (as it standardized the quality of the devices, making them more reasonably priced through competition of the manufacturers of simulators) and clearly set out the capabilities such that no one airline was getting more authorized in a simulator, requiring them to use the airplane more frequently – now it was more of a “level playing field.” At the same time, the idea of using the AQP to gather data, was discarded. The authorized training frequency was converted to a permanent factor, and any airline could petition to have its training program approved under the AQP … and doing so for one airplane fleet for a given airline, came with an authorization for all the other airplanes operated by that airline to move to a “single-visit training” function for all their crewmembers – Captains and First Officers.

This meant that, for larger airlines, this authorization immediately reduced their training budget by the cost of one simulator recurrent check or training for each captain they employed every year. If the airline had, say, 8000 crewmembers – 4000 captains and 4000 first officers – what used to be 8000 pilot training sessions for captains (2 per year) and 4000 pilot training sessions for first officers (one per year), for a total of 12,000 training sessions per year – instantly became a total of 8000 training sessions per year (one for each captain and one for each first officer) – which, using the appropriate number of calculators, means that 4000 pilot training sessions could be saved each and every year. THAT could mean a substantial cost savings – authorized by your friendly neighborhood regulator. And there were airlines in the US that had well over 10,000 pilots on their seniority lists … meaning a substantial savings … presto.

Yes, there were some requirements that the training program would have to meet some “high-power sounding” metrics, requiring some PhDs to be added to the payroll – at least for the development of the program – but if one were to carefully review just exactly what was required, the “high-power sounds” were … well … over-stated. Next, there was the offer from the regulator that the airline could establish their own standards of performance – regardless of what was indicated in the rules. Additionally, not all tasks contained in the regulations would necessarily have to be conducted during training. The “official sounding” justification for this said …
AQP was established to permit a greater degree of regulatory flexibility in the approval of innovative pilot training programs. Based on a documented analysis of operational requirements, a certificate-holder under AQP may propose to depart from traditional practices with respect to what, how, when, and where training and testing is conducted. This is subject to FAA approval of the specific content of each proposed program. All departures from traditional regulatory requirements are to be documented and based upon an approved continuing data collection process sufficient to establish at least an equivalent level of safety. Because AQP provides a systematic basis for matching technology to training requirements and for approving a training program with content based on relevance to operational performance, an applicant may propose to replace certain requirements of the regulations with an AQP curriculum, subject to FAA approval.

An AQP may also employ substitutes for the practical test requirements. The application to the specific issue of two alternative approaches to any single issue shows how risk based techniques may be used to demonstrate that an alternative methodology achieves a level of safety equivalent to traditional methodology. In order for an airline to “depart from traditional practices with respect to what, how, when, and where training and testing is conducted” that airline must provide “a documented analysis of operational requirements. Once the authorization to “depart” from the “traditional practices” has been issued, the continuation of that authorization will be dependent on “an approved continuing data collection process sufficient to establish at least an equivalent level of safety.” This is further explained by stating that this process must also include a “systematic basis for matching technology to training requirements” as well as the process of “approving a training program with content based on relevance to operational performance.”

A real-world example of substitution of one task for another task – with supposedly an equivalent level of safety - was the authorization for the conduct of recovery from a windshear encounter would replace the necessity for a pilot having to demonstrate satisfactory recovery from either an approach to stall or an aerodynamic stall. Take a moment and re-read that … this says that airline pilots training under AQP would not have to be exposed to recovery from either an approach to stall or an aerodynamic stall. There were other such “authorizations” … but because each training program approval was deemed to be “proprietary,” no one outside of the AQP office that constructed the “approval” and the specific FAA Operations Inspector assigned to that specific airline, would be able to read and understand what that airline was authorized and on what tasks they had to actually be trained and demonstrate proficiency.

After the terrible accident in Buffalo, NY, when this specific authorization was made known to other, more senior managers in FAA Headquarters, the AQP office was notified to “ensure that all AQP-authorized airlines would contain a requirement for training and evaluation in approach-to-stall/stall recognition and recovery.” It might be interesting to find out what other tasks have been “substituted.”

The point for all delving into all of the above is to point out that even when the regulator takes up the task of modifying the rules, someone, someplace, should be held to some level of accountability that the resulting implementation of said-regulation, will have the intended results – and not be left to the potentials that are clearly possible. In this particular case, the cost savings recognized by the airlines involved in AQP tend to make the management officials feel quite positive about complimenting the regulatory officials that allowed such a “modernized” approach to airline training. Those regulatory officials, after finding themselves being complimented for their foresight and courage for allowing a modernized and advanced training program, particularly one yielding the kind of well-trained pilots claimed by those airline management officials, also find themselves being seriously considered for further advancement within the regulatory structure – increasing their income and, at least as importantly, their stature among their superiors, their peers and their subordinates. The epitome of the mutual admiration process … achieved without any direct communication or agreement.

Of course, as all of my posts certainly are, this is simply another of my own, individual opinions. ....right?

[aterpster]

400drvr:

As far as what was doing what when, Auto Thrust Vs Thrust lever position, who cares. I'm normally looking out the window. Keep the same sight picture in the window, again we all know that works to.

What about IAS?

[Petercwelch]

Any pilot who can't successfully land the aircraft they are flying on a clear essentially no wind day on an 11,000 foot runway should not be flying, period!

[400drvr]

I learned how to maintain a flyable airspeed when I was a student pilot in 1974. I still remember my instructor saying Pitch Power Trim. Airspeed is like breathing for a pilot, or at least it should be, because if you don't maintain it you may stop breathing, permanently. So I still find looking out the window works for me, and yes the occasional glance at the airspeed tape is always a good idea.

[400drvr]

Yep, complete agreement.

[CDRW]

AirRabbit

What a gloriously enlightening missive!!

The un-mentionable Middle eastern airline is full of this!

[Mozella]

I wonder if flying skills and democracy are similar in that you can't successfully jam either one down people's throats. Consider Iraq, for example. No matter how much money, blood, and treasure is spent by the U.S. and the rest of the world, forcing a people to embrace democracy when they actually don't much care for the concept is an exercise in frustration at the very least. Dipping one's finger in blue ink to show that you are now a democrat is not the whole story, especially if the opposition cuts that finger from your hand. Certainly the democratic process developed in this way is different from that famous dustup between the colonies and Great Britain in 1776 when the Continental Congress declared independence. Americans didn't have democracy thrust upon them; they fought for it.


Pilots can be trained in ways which are analogous to the democracy example . Many of the world's pilots come from countries with significant aeronautical histories like the U.K., the U.S.A., France, and Germany. If you're from one of those countries, like me, you may have built (and experimented with) model aircraft to one degree or another. Surely all of us have held our hands out the window of a moving car and experimented with angle-of-attack and lift vs. drag long before we know any of these terms, building our personal aeronautical background even if we didn't know it at the time.


Most of us were presented with an opportunity to learn how to fly only after some kind of a struggle. In the old days, kids swept out hangers in return for an impromptu flying lesson. Some scrimped and saved to buy lessons. Some, like me, signed up with a military force which taught us to fly in exchange for serving many years of military service. But what we pilots educated in this way have in common is that we fought and struggled to have the opportunity to learn flying. Training was something we all craved. We took it. We thirsted for it. We thought about it often even when not in a training environment. Our instructors didn't force the secrets of aeronautics on us; we sucked the knowledge out of them. We really wanted to learn to fly and, most of us anyway, wanted it with all our hearts. In that respect, many of us ended up as qualified pilots in a way not unlike like the colonists became Americans; i.e. we battled for it.
As we know, not all pilots get qualified in this way. For example, I lived in Iran for several years trying to train the Imperial Iranian Air Force pilots how to fly the F-14. Nearly every pilot was the son of some influential political or military officer. None of them, not a single one of them, were what I would call good. Although some of them could actually operate a high performance aircraft, even the F-14, they were far from having what you might call "the right stuff". Their understanding was something like a lake a mile wide and an inch deep.



Part of that is because neither the pilots, their culture, nor their country had any real aeronautical background or history. In fact, because they were all wealthy, these pilots didn't have any mechanical background either. Once, when was struggling to explain how the TF-30 igniters worked, I likened them to an automotive spark plug. I invited one of my students to point to a spark plug in his brand new and very expensive BMW. Not only couldn't he do it, he was amazed that anyone would be even interested in knowing such a thing. He actually scoffed. Mechanical work (and the understanding that went with it) was for the lower class.
These Iranians could more-or-less fly as long as everything was going OK, but throw the slightest surprise at them, and the results were totally unpredictable. These men were being trained by forcing knowledge down their throats. They, would rather do anything other than learn how to fly. One senior officer even refused to attend ground school and went water skiing or goat hunting most days instead. This resulted in the operations officer causing over a million dollars damage on the very first Iranian F-14 flight.



These Iranians were weren't interested in flying They were more interested in the prestige associated with being a military pilot. Until their first day at flying school, none of them had ever given a thought to what makes an airplane fly. None of them ever held their hand out the window of a moving car when they were children. That sort of stuff simply wasn't part of their culture or background.


Can a country without any aviation history eager to have its own nationals flying aircraft for their national airline pluck someone out of the population and MAKE them a pilot by jamming flight training down their throat, so to speak? The answer is yes. We all know that. Is there a certain risk associated with this policy? I think so.



What say you?,

[Jet Jockey A4]

First of all you forgot Canada in your list of countries with aeronautical background. :=

Second, I agree with you and your statements that there is a cultural baggage that does help in one becoming a good pilot.

Anyone like you said, can learn to fly an aircraft but not all will become good pilots for various reasons. The same can be said about driving a car or any other motorized vehicle.

One of my hobbies is to teach people how to drive their usually expensive cars on a race track in high performance driving schools so that they can learn how to drive properly and understand the physics behind driving. Let me tell you that not all of them will ever "get it".

I also believe one of the ingredients required to be a good pilot is "common sense". Some people just don't have it and will allow themselves to get deeper in trouble when someone with common sense will back off prior to getting in trouble.

[John Marsh]

Mozella:

An interesting and worrying picture you paint. What about fear?

Fear of failing the course, sure; but more importantly, fear of dying. Doesn't that sharpen the appetite for training?

I suggest that a small degree of fear, or at least wariness, is healthy and useful in all aircrew and pax. As the latter, I need to pay attention to the safety demonstration. Flight crew who are continually wary of unexpected events can seek to prepare for them.

Has the advent of highly-reliable cockpit automation served to annul fear?

[RAT 5]

Fear of failing the course, sure; but more importantly, fear of dying. Doesn't that sharpen the appetite for training?

Culture is a very real thing. It can a help or hinderance, and knowing which and how to use it is what good leaders should be all about. Sadly not always the case. The story told is not unreal.

Certain people are very good a academic studies and will work harder than I to succeed. Others are better at the physical and will never give up. All are where they want to be. Put someone in the wrong place for the wrong reason and when the going gets tough they collapse. A cockpit is not the place to be when that happens.

[barit1]

Common highway accident of natives in the sandbox is encountering speed bumps (Norteamericanos call them 4 by 4s) at 150 clicks on what had once been a clear road. This frequently removes the undercarriage, and leaves the rest of the Jag, Mercedes, etc. tumbling end over end, spilling contents all over the desert. Happens with enough frequency that it's evidently a cultural thing. :ooh:

[safetypee]

AirRabbit, #869 “… right?” Yes, as far as I follow the points, and these seem to have a distinctly US/FAA cultural approach. However, the safety scenario remains the same, where expert groups seek detailed solutions by examining a very small data set (accidents / incidents), where there are many unknowns and great supposition, with an objective of further regulative constraint ... there is no action, no change.

In order to improve or just maintain the industry’s high level of safety we have to find alternative methods to complement the existing initiatives. There are several eminent views ranging from ‘high reliability’ and ‘resilience’ to a simple change in thinking in ‘Safety1 and Safety 2’.
But all of the ideas involve the need to change the way in which we think about safety.

The blocks in our safety thinking are not solely due to national culture; professional culture also involves group beliefs etc, and all of these depend on the overall operational environment. Thus ‘cultural’ aspects seen in one county could easily appear in another country, or in a professional group under a different guise, more so as the safety environment continually changes. The harder we try to be safe, the greater the process complexity, the greater the pressure to be safe, the harder we try ...; a cycle which frustratingly appears to be active, but actually makes little or no progress.
The safer we appear to be, the less we feel we need to know, to do, to think of.

[deefer dog]

Didn't have time to read all of above (so it's been probably stated already), but too many times I've seen pilots trying to correct something "slightly unusual" by sole use of the autopilot when a quick disconnect would achieve the goal far quicker....presumably something desirable while conducting an approach.

In my day the main route of progression was by old fashioned "hands on" hour building. Now it seems that fewer hours are a requirement for trainee FO's, and of these most are spent pushing buttons and monitoring computer screens.

Is it any wonder therefore that the culprits don't have the confidence to hand fly when the need arises, and God forbid, how would they ever manage without a flight director?

[RAT 5]

...too many times I've seen pilots trying to correct something "slightly unusual" by sole use of the autopilot when a quick disconnect would achieve the goal far quicker....presumably something desirable while conducting an approach.

'Children of the magenta line' should be compulsory viewing for all new pilots and all instructors: come to think of it, ALL pilots, even the older ones.

[BRE]

JetJockey A4: "One of my hobbies is to teach people how to drive their usually expensive cars on a race track in high performance driving schools so that they can learn how to drive properly and understand the physics behind driving. Let me tell you that not all of them will ever "get it"."

Do those who have never driven anything besides an automatic transmission ever get it? Do those who have never tested out the limits on a car without ABS, ESP and no or a very direct power steering ever get it?


Turnin back to aviation: does it take have done hundreds of visual landings on a single engine propeller plane to be able to be confident about doing visuals in a heavy jetliner?

[glendalegoon]

Regarding Visual Approaches.


AS with any aspect of flying (even tying your necktie), you have to practice to get proficient and maintain proficiency.

Does visual approach experience in one plane transfer to another. I say: yes.


Can visual approaches be taught? I say: YES.


Can meaningful aids, such as distance vs altitude and ground speed vs descent rate be taught: I say: YES.


How much time would I guess the pilots involved in this accident spent on considering the visual approach? I say: negative ten hours.

[safetypee]

RAT, et al, I have made this point before, but worth repeating.
“Children of the Magenta Line’ is a useful training tool, but one specifically designed for a particular operator with a specific ‘culture’, thus it is important to understand this before use.

A major message is ‘Click – Click’, the need to disengage automation, but there is little guidance as to how a pilot determines when to disengage. There may be operator / culture specific assumptions about this; thus before using this video it is important to understand the operator’s assumptions and think about any others which you might apply.
What might be obvious with hindsight might not be so obvious to a crew in ongoing situations.

There is an important need to provide guidance (tools) to aid pilots identify situations where there is a need to change the mode of operation – both autopilot and A/T; when to change the mode of thinking.
There range of possible situations is endless, thus publishing specifics is very restrictive, perhaps only those which you can think of beforehand. Or issues which you dismiss as ‘no one would do that – I couldn’t’ possible believe anyone would do that’, as in many posts in this thread.
The industry needs to identify generic advice and training to help in this process, this probably involves aspects of Airmanship or how to ‘keep the Blue - Side up’; can we answer these points?
What is airmanship, how is it taught, and what do we mean by ‘up’.

[BOAC]

Firstly, COTML IS an excellent training tool - not for pilots but for those in management and who set the priorities of the airline in training pilots‘Click – Click’, the need to disengage automation, but there is little guidance as to how a pilot determines when to disengage. - never mind 'when' - more of a problem is the trepidation in so doing, since
a) They have little idea how to fly manually
b) There is almost certainly an underlying culture or pressure not to do so but to 'use the automatics'
c) Sometimes there is concern that the other pilot wil be 'spooked' by the disconnect

The days of being 'proud' to execute a safe, comfortable visual approach from anywhere around the airfield have gone. Now it is more important to be an 'ace' with the buttons. I have lost count of the times my co-pilots have declined a visual downwind in CAVOK and gone out to 15 miles for an ILS - well, tried to decline, shortly to lose the 'PF' status.

What is airmanship - you DO have some good questions.... how old is that one?
Is it
a) The desire to save one's skin, thereby
b) looking after pax, crew and tin/plastic
c) the desire to constantly strive to learn more and become a better pilot.

for starters? I think one is either born or brought up wirh the mindset but there is huge scope for improving the faculty. 'UP' is easy for airline pilots.

[safetypee]

BOAC, :ok:
Beware generalisation - “They have little idea how to fly manually”
Is ‘they’ a reference to the participants in ‘handling’ accidents, or is it a more general industry-wide view.

Given the number of successful everyday operations the industry does not appear to be suffering handling problems; yet a very few individuals, in specific combinations of circumstance, fail to provide the performance expected of them, for which general they have been trained and examined.
The latter is not the best basis for an industry wide ‘campaign’ on handling, but this must not overlook less available evidence of non-accident problems in normal operations, nor the possibility that we have discovered the tip of an iceberg; how might we know.
Re ‘up’, this assumes that your view (or any operator / regulator) of an airline pilot’s knowledge is the same as yours which defines ‘up’; if it is then how was this obtained, can it be shared, and can it be assured that the views will remain in sync.

You and I are from the same school of flying – perhaps the best in its time. I believe that we were taught airmanship, although not aware of this at the time. As a late learner I have come to appreciate the value of the training, but even some 40 years on I cannot describe what ‘it’ is, or the mechanism of training to achieve ‘airmanship’. However, ‘it’ appears to be a combination of aspects human behaviour and a continuing willingness to learn and improve.

[BOAC]

Is ‘they’ a reference to the participants in ‘handling’ accidents, - that is what this thread is about, - but trending towards a more general industry-wide view. which seems to be the landscape we see. Here's a thought for your grey matter should it become idle....regarding our common experiences, has the 'last resort' of ejector seats in military aircraft affected the number of pilot error accidents?

I am a little lost on developing the 'UP' topic now.:)

[IcePack]

Makes me laugh. Airbus saying more basic flying skill should be trained. It was them that decided to invent an aeroplane with no "feel" static Throttles sorry thrust levers. Even if you use them they have all of 2.5 " of movement. So it would seem that a lot of these "skill" problems fall fairly & squarely at their door.
(40 yrs exp. Started on raw data 4 eng props to the a330)so seen it developing over the years so find it is QED when someone does what caused this accident.

[alf5071h]

Ice Pack, perhaps a pedantic point, but if non-moving thrust levers (not feel) are a contributory factor then this should only apply with A/T engaged.
It should not be a problem with A/P + A/T engaged, but may require a slightly different scan pattern to balance the loss of visual cue.

If the A/T is used for manual flight then pilots may have to adapt their way of flying; point the aircraft (flight path management) and trust in auto speed, but if speed mode is not engaged … ...
another view considers that the thrust levers set the energy level (fixed values for climb / decent), and that the elevator distributes the energy – the attitude / speed relationship, which might be better understood with manual thrust conrtrol.
IRRC this subject has been discussed elsewhere, where the descriptive ideas originated from work by the eminent Dr Werner Pinsker (RAE).

[safetypee]

Excuse a slight thread drift:- ‘has the 'last resort' of ejector seats in military aircraft affected the number of pilot error accidents?’ I don’t know, but I prefer not to use ‘error’.

A life-long memorable event from training:-
Shortly after ‘first-solo’ with continuing attention on aerobatics and judgement of engine-out landings - altitude, speed, high/low key, geographic position, and speed/wind; the weather pattern changed more conducive to instrument flying. After an introductory flight, the next flight was with an alternative instructor, with an overbearing reputation, and included a GCA. Shortly after stabilising the descent the instructor closed the throttle without further comment; my thoughts immediately focussed on speed, altitude, high/low key, … perhaps overlooking geographic position in deference to altitude, etc. After what appeared to be an age, the instructor said “what now”; I was lost for an answer - wrong mind set – “this is a situation in which you eject – not an engine-out landing”. The GCA was resumed; only then with debrief and extensive self-analysis was the overriding importance of understanding the situation made so clear – the basis of a decision to eject - quality training.

This has remain with me ever since, and particularly the vital importance of understanding the situation to aid selection of an appropriate course of action, which helps reduce exposure to ‘error’, but hinging on timing – the appreciation of time available, and an understanding of the developing situation ahead of time, and furthermore having an optional course of action – an undo button; knowing what is important in specific situations … requiring knowledge and situation awareness, ad infinitum.

Does modern training provide sufficient practice for situation assessment, consideration of courses of action, and appreciation of ‘time’? Are training syllabuses sufficiently flexible to enable learning from error, vice one attempt / demo, which must succeed, else … no more time, money, etc.

“Time is the reef upon which all our mystic ships are wrecked.” ― Noël Coward, Blithe Spirit

[AirRabbit]

Hi safetypee, et al:

You may be correct with your statement that “…in order to improve or just maintain the industry’s high level of safety we have to find alternative methods to complement the existing initiatives.” However, I still believe that we may be able to “improve or maintain the industry’s high level of safety” by understanding more completely – perhaps only more basically – what it is we expect out of the training we currently accomplish. I fully understand the concerns voiced regarding “cultural issues” being at least a contributing factor, if not more basic, to the successful completion of training – but I think that the basic premise of training has to return to the basic premise of training.

I firmly believe that this premise is, or certainly should be, to train a pilot to the degree that he/she is able to recognize correctly what the airplane is currently doing; make an immediate decision as to whether or not what the airplane is currently doing is what is desired by that pilot; and if the airplane is NOT doing what is desired, be able to make an immediate decision as to what must be done to the airplane’s control systems to correct that condition, and execute that decision quickly and accurately. Lastly, during this execution, continually monitor the condition of the airplane with respect to whether or not the resulting airplane condition is correcting in the right or desired direction and magnitude – again, correctly identify the changing airplane condition, determining whether or not that change is what is desired. This process is a continual process – taking place all the time – and in situations that are rapidly changing, requiring more directly focused attention to the airplane condition by the pilot flying.

Of course – all of the above is contingent – exclusively contingent – upon the pilot flying having accurate knowledge of what is expected of the airplane – at all times – and having accurate knowledge of what control applications are appropriate to make adjustments in the airplane condition at any time under any circumstance – and knowing when, where, how, and how much of those proper control applications have to be made. Additionally, having these knowledge aspects is only part of the solution – as the pilot flying must be able to apply that knowledge, using the controls and indications available to him/her while performing the duties of the “pilot flying.”

From here, to ensure that the pilot flying, does, indeed, have this knowledge and ability, the training program must be designed to provide that pilot with the opportunity to experience various scenarios where such recognition, decision making, decision execution, and continual evaluation of each, is provided initially and then sufficiently repeated, throughout the multiple combinations of conditions and situations, to provide that pilot the recognition and reinforcement of actions and what kind of reactions and responses that will occur. Throughout this exposure, the instructor must take careful notice of when, where, and how the student addresses each scenario, judging whether or not the student’s performance should be modified, and if it should be modified, understand why, and then how, that modification can be accomplished. This process has to be completed for each required scenario, with each appropriate modification, and the results of each such exposure.

Initially, it should not be unusual for the instructor to provide input in the form of suggestions or critiques … and corrections when and where necessary. As the number of times each appropriate scenario is addressed, the instructor should be aware of the level of repetition of previous suggestions, critiques, or corrections – which should provide the instructor information regarding the advancement of the student toward satisfactory completion of the training program – and whether or not that student is ready for the evaluation of his/her skills.

It probably shouldn’t come as a surprise to understand that all of the above should be able to be accomplished with the use of manual controls AND with the use of auto-flight controls as may be appropriate for both the airplane configurations and gross weights, the existing weather conditions, the pilot position involved, and the type of operations expected to be flown by the pilot being trained and checked. Additionally, I should acknowledge that what I’ve described here, is a rather extensive amount of training – and the specifics are very likely to be heavily influenced by the background and the experience level of the pilot beginning the training on any specific airplane type, and may be influenced even more by the pilot position to be flown by the respective pilot. The same is likely true of recurring training and the frequency of such recurrent training.

If an outline for the above type of training is systematically developed for each airplane type, for each pilot position involved – throughout a range of potential experience levels – the satisfactory completion of such training – to the extent that satisfactory performance can be assured on the end-of-course proficiency check – there is a good likelihood of that proficiency being able to be demonstrated regardless of cultural background. However, I say this with the acknowledgement that it is at least somewhat likely that the amount, the sequence, and the duration of training may be different – perhaps significantly different – due to the sometimes wide variation of cultural backgrounds. However, with those training issues being recognized upfront and appropriate training courses developed and followed, the resultant competency/proficiency levels should be essentially met and be able to be used properly and efficiently.

Of course, as with any training program, I think it quite logical, if not imperative, that very careful records be kept – and USED – for each pilot going through each training program. One of the reasons for defining and requiring recurrent training is the upfront acknowledgement that periodic review of learned tasks – both mental and psychomotor – be regularly revisited, the tasks practiced, and, if necessary, an old skill renewed. Of course, the frequency may vary with the level of difficulty of the required tasks, and with the current level of experience of each of the respective pilots involved … which, naturally, should be (will be, no doubt) influenced by the level of complexities of the overall operation in which each pilot has been or will be expected to operate. Additionally, there should never be a task accomplished without the very careful consideration of the safety factors involved.

In that vein, there should be included, in each training course, an acknowledgement that not everyone’s abilities will be guaranteed to be identical – to the extent that some conditions (weather, airplane conditions, urgency – up to an including emergencies) should be able to be attempted by all pilots all the time in every set of combinations of factors. Sometimes, acknowledging that attempting to do something unusual or abnormal may not be within a particular pilot’s ability level – and there should be little or no sigma assigned to anyone who makes such an acknowledgement. Operating within one’s own abilities should always be expected – and the highly infrequent occurrence of such a situation should not be the encouragement for someone to attempt something that they should not attempt – unless there is absolutely no other option.

Finally (yes - you can relax soon....), this is not an acknowledgment that what we are doing with training at the moment is what I've described above. We can shut one eye and "squint" the other, read very fast, and conclude that what we do today is like what I've described ... but the fact is, this would not be true. I think that today we are focused on the accomplishment of tasks - to the end of having accomplished the task. The nuances of performing those tasks, the decisions involved, the progressive analysis of progressing through those tasks, and making any appropriate adjustments - are not necessarily the focus - the task completion is the focus.

Of course, that can be adequate in a lot of situations, but it leaves out a lot of what the individual pilot may be needing - which means that pilot is formulating his/her own understanding of what is happening - and, unfortunately, that may or may not be what is really intended. THAT should be at least one of the targets we logically seek to hit in a properly constructed, administered, and completed training program.

[Zionstrat2]

Rat5-
Never seen this before- What a clear, direct, and convincing presentation. Thanks so much for sharing and I'll be watching for your future recommendations-

[chrisN]

Air Rabbit, what sort of training scenarios, in your ideal world, would you have wished for the Commander of AF447? And for its two FOs? And for the pilots of Asiana? And for the pilots in the Gulf Air Flight 072 which plunged into the sea (Somatogravic illusion)? And for the captain and FO of Airblue Flight 202 which crashed on 28 July 2010 near Islamabad? And the FO on American Airlines 587 (use of rudder in wake turbulence)?

I could go on – Helios oxygen system, Staines Trident, etc. etc. – all involved pilots not doing it right, but in so many different ways.

Is it practical to train for all these in some generic ways, so that people do the right situational analysis, don’t fixate on the wrong problem, and do take the right corrective actions?

[400drvr]

Rat_5, I saw that a few yrs ago and I think it should be required viewing for all airline recurrent ground schools. But sadly we will waste time on things that make the regulators happy.

[Centaurus]

After an introductory flight, the next flight was with an alternative instructor, with an overbearing reputation, and included a GCA. Shortly after stabilising the descent the instructor closed the throttle without further comment; my thoughts immediately focussed on speed, altitude, high/low key, … perhaps overlooking geographic position in deference to altitude, etc. After what appeared to be an age, the instructor said “what now”; I was lost for an answer

Of course you were lost for an answer and that is not your fault. After all, did this bloke first demonstrate what he perceived you should do before giving you a go at embarrassing yourself while he had a quiet sneer under his oxy mask? I bet he didn't. As you said, the instructor had an overbearing reputation. What you probably didn't know then was he was "a smart-arse". These personalities exist both in the military and civilian flying.

Judging by your later comments on how much you learned a lesson from this character, I would say you were probably a victim of Stockholm Syndrome. It was the fault of your imbecile RAF instructor who was presumably tasked to train - repeat - train, not "test" you. Again from your description of the event he displayed piss poor instructional technique by throwing you in the deep end - sink or swim. I look back at my own student days in the Air Force and can only sympathise with those unfortunate students who were scrubbed for perceived lack of flying ability, when in fact most of the time the instructor was the problem - we called them Screaming Skulls behind their backs of course. Passing an instructors course does not necessarily mean that one automatically is transformed into a good instructor. Far from it in fact. The Commanding Officers of these characters in general never have a clue what was going on under their command since no student in the military would dare to complain.:sad:

[tdracer]

Something that occurred to me while driving home last night. The car has a six speed manual, which means a fair amount of the time I only have one hand on the wheel.


To the best of my knowledge, SOP (at least on Boeing) is to keep one hand on the throttles and one on the column during approach. I've been on the flight deck for countless approaches during flight test, and many, many simulator sessions, and that's what every pilot has done.


By accounts, the Asiana PF was having to pull back with as much as 80 lbs. force as his speed decayed. I dare say most people would be hard pressed to apply 80 lbs. to the control column with one hand on the throttles...

[Ian W]

By accounts, the Asiana PF was having to pull back with as much as 80 lbs. force as his speed decayed. I dare say most people would be hard pressed to apply 80 lbs. to the control column with one hand on the throttles...

Why would he have a hand on the throttles- they are automatic and never move in an Airbu........ oh :eek:

[DozyWannabe]

By accounts, the Asiana PF was having to pull back with as much as 80 lbs. force as his speed decayed.

Hold up - was that T7 envelope protection in action?

Why would he have a hand on the throttles- they are automatic and never move in an Airbu........ oh :eek:

You would (in a FBW Airbus) if you were flying the approach with manual thrust of course...

[AirRabbit]

Air Rabbit, what sort of training scenarios, in your ideal world, would you have wished for the Commander of AF447? And for its two FOs? And for the pilots of Asiana? And for the pilots in the Gulf Air Flight 072 which plunged into the sea (Somatogravic illusion)? And for the captain and FO of Airblue Flight 202 which crashed on 28 July 2010 near Islamabad? And the FO on American Airlines 587 (use of rudder in wake turbulence)?

I could go on – Helios oxygen system, Staines Trident, etc. etc. – all involved pilots not doing it right, but in so many different ways.

Is it practical to train for all these in some generic ways, so that people do the right situational analysis, don’t fixate on the wrong problem, and do take the right corrective actions?

Wow, chrisN – I guess you believe that my comments are either “off the mark,” “irrelevant,” “overly simplistic,” or a combination, perhaps all, of the above. It may surprise you to know that my world is no more “ideal” than is your world. It may also surprise you to hear that I’m not a terribly big believer in “training for” a recently occurred accident. Sure, there is probably nothing wrong with demonstrating what a crew may have encountered, or observed, either approaching or through-out a sequence of events that preceded, or were present during, the on-set of the accident or incident. BUT that is not what you asked. I believe that the training that is provided to pilots should provide them with a complete and accurate understanding of what kind of “control” that pilot has over the condition of his/her airplane (and by “condition” I mean attitude, configuration, and the ability to achieve either more or less airspeed) and what kind of limitations may be inherent with any specific condition with respect to the airplane achieving any other condition.

Obviously, the amount of “control” a pilot may have over any of these “conditions” changes with the specific condition in which the airplane is in currently, and what condition is desired by that pilot. This is the reason for including a somewhat comprehensive listing of “in flight tasks,” tasks with which the pilot is usually familiar. As the task unfolds during the training, differing factors come into play – some (but only some) are orchestrated by the instructor – that may well entice the pilot to make adjustments in either the “plan” they have determined mentally – or may cause an overhaul of that plan completely – maybe even abandon the process for which the flight crew was planning and progressing, in favor of a plan more in line with whatever circumstances have most recently been recognized. All of this provides the pilots in training an opportunity to ‘think through’ the circumstances they face … and good instructors often get a lot more training accomplished through strategic altering of the conditions presented to that flight crew.

And, before you ask, no … there is no “course of training” that exists (to my knowledge), or should be developed, to address “airplane conditions.” But, as the pilot is taught the tasks that make up the training syllabus, the combined instruction on each such task should include the information/facts that allow the accumulation of such knowledge. For example – you referenced somatogyral illusions. As you probably know, but for some who may not, these are illusions involving the semicircular/somatogyral canals of the vestibular system of the ear that occur primarily under conditions of unreliable or unavailable external visual references and result in false sensations of rotation. The results of these kinds of illusions, particularly with new-entry student pilots, include the leans, the graveyard spin and spiral, and the Coriolis illusion. Did anything like this happen in any of the accidents you mentioned? What do the investigations reveal? While I would not absolutely rule-out any such involvement, I think there are much more likely and more identifiable causes for each of these cases.

Here’s a link to more information on this subject: Sensory illusions in aviation - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensory_illusions_in_aviation)

Actually, most of these kinds of “sensory illusions” have been, certainly should have been, addressed, or at least introduced, during basic flight training – and some even introduced prior to allowing a student to “solo” for the first time.

Additionally, you should also know that there are currently several international “working groups” focusing on just these factors – and there is at least one such working group currently looking at what kind of training should be designed and incorporated for training of the instructors and evaluators. We ARE moving in the right direction.

You ask if it is practical to train for all these situations in some generic way … so that pilots would be able to analyze the situation in which a pilot may find himself/herself, and not identify the wrong problem and thereby take the proper corrective action. Of course, THAT is the ultimate goal of virtually ALL training programs. The best way that I’ve seen to do this very thing, is to employ competently and completely trained instructors to teach a competently and completely constructed training program, using the very best of training aids available. In my book, the most meaningful training aid introduced into the aviation community has been the simulated airplane – initially those devices were … well … as good as they could be AT THAT TIME – however (!) we’ve advanced by several orders of magnitude in the last 50 years! Today, simulation is the best it has ever been … now, we have to be sure that we train our instructors on how to best use that equipment! A part of that training simply has to include a focus on where any specific simulation device is weak with respect to its fidelity to the airplane, in either performance or handling qualities; what tasks must be trained, how they should be trained, how to recognize the difference between competent understanding and indecisive luck, etc., etc.

Additionally, we should recognize that from time to time, we will very likely recognize a necessity to expand the kinds of things that really need to be trained – the following is an example of the most recent change to the requirements in the US, published by the FAA as part of its training regulations for airlines:

§121.423 Pilot: Extended Envelope Training.

(a) Each certificate holder must include in its approved training program, the extended envelope training set forth in this section with respect to each airplane type for each pilot. The extended envelope training required by this section must be performed in a Level C or higher full flight simulator, approved by the Administrator in accordance with §121.407 of this part.

(b) Extended envelope training must include the following maneuvers and procedures:
(1) Manually controlled slow flight;
(2) Manually controlled loss of reliable airspeed;
(3) Manually controlled instrument departure and arrival;
(4) Upset recovery maneuvers; and
(5) Recovery from bounced landing.

(c) Extended envelope training must include instructor-guided hands on experience of recovery from full stall and stick pusher activation, if equipped.

(d) Recurrent training: Within 24 calendar months preceding service as a pilot, each person must satisfactorily complete the extended envelope training described in paragraphs (b)(1) through (4) and (c) of this section. Within 36 calendar months preceding service as a pilot, each person must satisfactorily complete the extended envelope training described in paragraph (b)(5) of this section.

(e) Deviation from use of Level C or higher full flight simulator:
(1) A certificate holder may submit a request to the Administrator for approval of a deviation from the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section to conduct the extended envelope training using an alternative method to meet the learning objectives of this section.
(2) A request for deviation from paragraph (a) of this section must include the following information:
(i) A simulator availability assessment, including hours by specific simulator and location of the simulator, and a simulator shortfall analysis that includes the training that cannot be completed in a Level C or higher full flight simulator; and
(ii) Alternative methods for achieving the learning objectives of this section.
(3) A certificate holder may request an extension of a deviation issued under this section.
(4) Deviations or extensions to deviations will be issued for a period not to exceed 12 months.

(f) Compliance with this section is required no later than March 12, 2019. For the recurrent training required in paragraph (d) of this section, each pilot qualified to serve as second in command or pilot in command in operations under this part on March 12, 2019 must complete the recurrent extended envelope training within 12 calendar months after March 12, 2019.

Below are listed the specific accidents you referenced along with a very brief description of the accident provided by the investigative authority involved:
July 6, 2013, Asiana Airlines Flight 214
The NTSB concluded that the flight crew’s insufficient monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance and that the Pilot Flying’s faulty mental model of the airplane’s automation logic led to his inadvertent deactivation of automatic airspeed control. In addition, Asiana’s automation policy emphasized the full use of all automation and did not encourage manual flight during line operations. The flight crew’s mismanagement of the airplane’s vertical profile during the initial approach led to a period of increased workload that reduced the pilot monitoring’s awareness of the pilot flying’s actions around the time of the unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed control. Insufficient flight crew monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach likely resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance. Furthermore, lack of compliance with SOPs and CRM were cited as additional factors.

23 August 2000, Gulf Air Flight 072
The A320 with 143 passengers and crew on board approached the landing at higher speeds than normal and carried out an unusual low altitude orbit in an attempt to correct the approach. The orbit was unsuccessful and a go around was attempted. While carrying out a turning climb, the aircraft entered a descent at 15 degrees nose down. The aircrew did not respond to repeated GPWS warnings and approximately one minute after starting the go-around the aircraft disappeared from radar screens. There were no survivors. There were 36 children on the aircraft. The accident investigation concluded that the primary cause of the crash was pilot error (including spatial disorientation), with a secondary factor being systemic organizational and oversight issues.

28 July 2010 Airblue Flight 202 crashed near Islamabad
This accident was primarily caused by the aircrew who violated all established procedures for a visual approach for RWY-12 and ignored several calls by ATS Controllers and EGPWS system warnings (21 times in 70 seconds) related to approaching rising terrain. The Captain violated the prescribed Circling Approach procedure for RWY-12; by descending below MDA (i.e., 2,300 feet instead of maintaining 2,510 feet), losing visual contact with the airfield, and resorted to flying a non-standard, self-created PBD based approach, transgressing out of protected airspace of maximum of 4.3 NM into Margallas, and finally collided with the hills. The Captain not only clearly violated the prescribed procedures for a circling approach but also did not at all adhere to FCOM procedures of displaying reaction / response to timely and continuous terrain and pull up warnings (21 times in 70 seconds) – despite these very loud, continuous and executive commands, the Captain failed to register the urgency of the situation and did not respond.

On November 12, 2001, American Airlines Flight
The A300-600 took off immediately after a Japan Airlines Boeing 747-400 on the same runway. It flew into the larger jet's wake, an area of turbulent air. The first officer attempted to stabilize the aircraft with alternating aggressive rudder inputs. The strength of the air flowing against the moving rudder stressed the aircraft's vertical stabilizer, and eventually snapped it off entirely, causing the aircraft to lose control and crash. The NTSB concluded that the enormous stress on the rudder was due to the first officer's "unnecessary and excessive" rudder inputs, and not the wake turbulence caused by the 747. The NTSB further stated "if the first officer had stopped making additional inputs, the aircraft would have stabilized."

Obviously, I don’t have a lot of knowledge of what each of the above crews were exposed to, were required to understand, or what the thought processes where that each may (or may not) have discussed with either their flying partner or their instructors. However, I can say that each investigation clearly noted what, in the respective professional opinion of the investigators involved, was “at play” in each of these terrible tragedies. Do I believe that these tragedies could have been avoided through appropriate training earlier in the respective careers of the pilots involved? … Absolutely – Yes. However, I don’t mean being exposed to training on a task that would have mirrored the conditions into which each of the above airplanes was flown. However, training on operating the airplane, including at least some depth into how the airplane was to be flown, could have made a significant difference. The first three examples seem to have a common thread of having made a decision and on 2 of these 3 examples there was an unchallenged deviation from what was logical, and very likely, deviated from what would have been expected, and in all 3 examples, there was an apparent “closed-minded” attitude of acting upon and completing a specific decision – even to the apparent and complete disregard of the on-board warning systems.

The 4th example, the AA587 accident, the pilot flying actually experienced 2 successive encounters with the vortices generated by the preceding B747. The first of these encounters was handled quite satisfactorily, and, in fact, again notwithstanding my aging brain cells, the first recovery from inadvertent wing-tip-vortex encounter was suitable to have been included in a text book, describing “how to do it correctly.” What happened on the 2nd such encounter allows only speculation. He had literally had just demonstrated the correct recovery process, and now he completely abandoned that process. I have speculated that he had not yet “gathered his wits” from the first encounter when his airplane was yet again struck with yet another, very likely a more “robust,” wing-tip-vortex. I think that took this pilot by surprise. I think he was so surprised that he quickly slipped into what I would characterize as a “panicked response.”

Further, I believe that:
1) This panicked response initially resulted in a “pilot induced oscillation.”
2) I think he either didn’t recognize the PIO or did not know how to recover from one.
3) I think he was not aware of the sensitivity of the controls, particularly of the rudder, and how much rudder he was getting with very little force applied, and
4) I think he was unaware of how little pedal deflection generated full surface deflection.

Also, because the certification of any aircraft includes a maximum rudder deflection, held at maximum deflection, and then released to neutral. Also, if, instead of releasing the control to the neutral position, the control is moved to the opposite side at maximum deflection – the loads on the structure go up dramatically. And IF the maximum reversal deflection is achieved while the structure is moving in the opposite direction, those dramatically increased loads are again dramatically increased. And IF, on top of all of this, the reversal is repeated several times, and includes reversals while the structure is moving the other way … well, you get the picture; we are definitely in an uncharted area.

My question here would be, how does a pilot, having the training, background, and experience of this particular pilot, become apparently unaware of these limitations … or … did his panic-induced actions preclude him from recognizing and/or understanding what would help and what would exacerbate the problem?

Apparently, some airlines train to use the rudder. Others train to NOT use the rudder - remember the UA B747 departure out of SFO? That pilot used the rudder, and dependence on the rudder was proper and very likely resulted in the happy ending that ensued. So, which is correct … use it or don’t use it? Airplane designers put a rudder on airplanes for a reason. Clearly, it can be used for other applications, both to the benefit and to the detriment of the safety of flight. Wouldn’t it be nice if ALL pilots were trained on the proper use of all the available flight controls – and how their use can be a detriment to the reason they are in training?

[chrisN]

Air Rabbit, thanks for your comprehensive reply.

Apologies for leading you to think I might have been believing that your comments are either “off the mark,” “irrelevant,” “overly simplistic,” or a combination, perhaps all, of the above. I meant no such thing, and was taking them at face value.

My interest lay in my perception that now many of the old causes of airliner accidents have been largely eradicated by technology, what is left is a much lower incidence of diverse ways of human failing. (By contrast, in my world of gliding, our major fatal and serious accident causes – at least in the UK – are much the same from one year to another, because we keep doing the same things the same way, and rarely see significant improvements in technology or human behaviour. One notable exception was a big reduction in the last few years in launch-failure-related stall/spin accidents, following a big effort in training including post solo recurrent training. But all too often I have seen evidence of the pilot either acting wrongly when faced with a problem he/she recognised, or failing to evaluate correctly a problem and becoming fixated on the wrong solution. It seemed to me that the AF447 FO did that too.)

I wish I knew how to improve the human weak link – in my world and yours. I have a perception that good test pilots coolly, calmly and methodically evaluate situations and mostly come out with a good outcome. I don’t suggest that all pilots are put through test pilot training, and anyway I think they are selected from the best of the best. Many/most professional pilots are selected as the best of the rest. We ordinary mortals at the bottom of the aviation pyramid of abilities are least equipped to do well in unusual circumstances – the evidence is that all too many fail at the expected events, let alone at the unusual.

So, my genuinely intended question was about whether some form of training can help pilots cope better with very unusual, even unique, events.

(By the way, I am no paragon of virtue – I have had accidents, thankfully without injury, by departing from practices I was trained in. I have also experienced an unusual, and not trained for, event – some form of turbulence which led me to think at first that the glider had developed a mechanical fault – which I did not know how best to handle.)

[AirRabbit]

Hi chrisN

Many thanks for your clarification – and I appreciate, very much, how you took my response … and, also, I admit a twinge of “jealousy” in that gliding is something I’ve watched in amazed interest for a quite a large number of years – I actually worked with one of the primer glider instructors in the US for quite a number of years – and have never flown one – I guess because I’m afraid I’d screw up the landing and need to “go around.”

Today, I think that a good share of the accidents/incidents in the airline industry could easily be attributed to some aspect of “technology” – or at least the misunderstood way in which it should be operated, or the way(s) in which it provides the information that it is supposed to provide – and, unfortunately, the culprit that is growing most in its contributions to accidents or incidents is the over dependence on automation to save one’s backside. Personally, I think that kind of “over dependence” on automation played a major role in the accidents of both Asiana Flight 214 and Gulf Air Flight 072.

Of course having ALL the facts of any accident or incident is paramount in making any decisions about the cause or causes. But there are some issues that almost jump off the page into your face. In these 2 accidents, it is quite clear that no one in the cockpit was paying any attention, or certainly not enough attention, to what the automatic systems were doing – or more appropriately NOT doing. What is surprising to me is how long 2, supposedly competent, aviators sat right there, with all the controls available on the airplane and consciously decided to “leave the flying to us.”

I’ve spent a good portion of my career involved in training and simulation issues – and it is clear, at least it’s clear to me, that there was something very definitely lacking in the training provided to the pilots in these 2 cases. I don’t think there was any specific task left out of the training provided to the pilots in question – but certainly there was a significant lacking in what was trained in at least a portion of the tasks that were addressed throughout the training they all received. My guess is that if one could go back and watch a video of the training that these pilots actually received – somewhere along the line an astute instructor could very likely point out when and where the omission was made and how it was made. Unfortunately, there is a good probability that the same omission was made, time after time after time.

And the reason I can say this a bit more forcefully is that the guy sitting in the right seat of the Asiana flight was supposed to have been a former instructor. That tells me that what he was seeing is what he would have expected to see in the simulator or that someone routinely provided a subtle “hint” as to what that pilot should do and when. However, even then, this “former” instructor simply sat there and let the other guy wait on the automatics to “kick in.” At some point, the instructors I know would have had a “not-beyond-this-point” clearly identified, at least to themselves, and had the pilot flying not taken control manually or made the appropriate correction to the automatics, when that point was reached, they each would have taken control of the airplane, and, depending on the point they each decided for themselves, would have manually controlled the airplane either through the landing or initiated and flown a missed approach/go around.

So it’s not necessarily a matter of some specific addition to any specific training program – it’s more of an assurance of what instructors are to teach, how they are to teach it, how they make corrections (when appropriate) and how they determine that each student has reached a point where that student can be legitimately defined as “competent.” It comes in stages, of course – and periodically throughout the remainder of any yet-to-be-accomplished training aspects, a good instructor will either boldly, or surreptitiously, slip in something to verify that the student really has “learned” what he/she was supposed to have learned. It's not "rocket science" - but neither is it something that can be "plugged in" or "unplugged." It is a cultural thing, based on sufficient and adequate training of the instructing staff.

You described a “pyramid” of aviation abilities … of course there certainly is a “pyramid” of sorts, with the most proficient aviators at the top. However, the difference I see is that the pyramid has to have a predetermined base level – and each and every airline pilot (at least for my discussion point) MUST be able to be at or above that base level of abilities or competency - that is a combined level of satisfactory knowledge and personal performance on each and every task that each pilot may potentially be asked to accomplish. Sure, there may be others who are better in some areas – but everyone in that pyramid should be basically competent in each and every task – broken down into each control use, each cross-check accomplished, each trim adjustment, each and every everything, including what passes as acceptable performance – must be able to be demonstrated at that minimum level of competency – or that pilot should do something else for a living.

And the reason I can say that, and say it unapologetically, is that, someday, one of my family members may be on THAT pilot’s airplane.

[FL XXX]

Well said! AirRabbit.

Let's not forget that the ones that really should be held responsible are the Airline CEO's!! These people ultimately make the decision how much manual raw data flying is allowed on the line. They all look at this at a money perspective. Most of them have absolutely no faith in their flight crews. If they would have it absolutely 100% their way, then no "pilot" would be allowed to touch any of the controls on the flight deck. They would do everything automatically, from T.O to Landing. They play a statistical game, eg, complete statistical risk management. They put their faith/MONEY in the reliability statistics of automatic systems! If a pilot is used to regular manual raw data flying regardless of which airplane he/she flies, then it becomes a routine experience and manual flying is not considered an extra workload since it all comes natural. You automatically look at all your instruments in your scan, you feel as a one package with the airplane, it all comes natural. Anything that would be out of the ordinary will be picked up immediately. This Asiana crash and AF 447 are a direct result of Airline CEO's policies! If an airline pilot is no longer capable of manually flying an airplane as a result of Airline automation policies, it is not the fault of the pilot. He/she is restricted to how much manual flying is allowed. A lot of airline pilots incl. myself were used to manual flying and we had a high level of manual flight skills because we didn't sometimes have not even a flight director!! Forget about an autopilot. Manual flight wasn't a workload! It came all natural, because you were used to it. Then all of a sudden you get a job with another airline with strong automation policies and all of a sudden you're been told that raw data flying is a safety risk and 'dangerous'. You think what the heck are these people thinking! But you keep quiet in order to not jeopardize your job, before you know it since you are not been given the opportunity to learn to fly your new airplane your manual flying you had slowly become a thing of the past. You operate your airplane everyday but you actually have never flown it.

Between the Airline CEO's and their MONEY!! and the Airplane manufacturers wanting their MONEY!! They design their new airplanes to the tastes of the Airline CEO's which means as automatically as possible. Does all this automation really contributes to safety as the CEO's all think? Yes, the airplanes have become a lot safer over time but their automatic systems make them to complicated sometimes for human brain. Especially when you combine this with fatigue. KEEP THESE AIRPLANES SIMPLE PLEASE!!! For me a basic mode non-precision approach is easier than a managed/VNAV mode approach. Too many automation options to think about, it takes your brain power away especially when you're tired.

My solution: we have arrived beyond a point of no return, trying to retrain pilots how to manually fly an airplane will require an onslaught on the training resources of airline training departments which most airlines don't have and mostly are unwilling to fund since it is a lot cheaper to play the statitical game. Yes, pilots make mistakes, but no one talks about how many times the pilot has saved the day and has prevented accidents because the automation messed up.

My message to the Airline CEO's: It's mostly your fault if your pilots seriously lack manual flying skills because you restrict them with your policies. Retrain them in raw data flying, as soon as they have shown to have recovered sufficient raw data manual flying skills, give them the freedom to regularly manual fly on the line. Taking fatigue issues into consideration.

[autoflight]

Expats in Asiana complete normal induction and examination standards. Citizens have somewhat enhanced pre-information re examination questions and examiner desired answers. My understanding is that there are absolutely no surprises at examinations or during the sim.

Examination and training is done by numbers. No need to think, just get the boxes ticked.

Of course, there is little or no need for CRM in the cockpit. Being Korean is most important, and seniority rules without question. The company is always right, and let us not blow away thousands of years of tradition!

It is no surprise that there is no culturally accepted procedure for less senior PNF to alert PF of developing danger.

Like some ME airlines, there is serious loss of face with a missed approach. In fact a fairly senior Asiana F/O failed to call my high ROD with tailwind at a difficult airfield. I made a missed approach anyway, and he was so disappointed to be associated with it, he complained though the whole missed approach procedure. It was obvious that his nationality and years in the airline needed to be made clear. It did not seem to matter that I was following proven correct procedure for the circumstances to remain safe.

Maybe that same F/O is now a training captain.

[joema]

...Now it is more important to be an 'ace' with the buttons...

The problem is the Asiana pilot was *not* an ace with the buttons -- he didn't understand how the autothrottle worked. He wasn't a whiz-kid "child of the magenta" unable to hand fly the plane when faced with an outright automation failure. Nothing failed.

Rather he did not understand the autoflight system or exploit its features. E.g, if uncomfortable with a non-precision approach without glideslope, they could have made a GPS precision approach. This was a published approach, and in fact the FAA urged this usage (after the accident): Foreign airlines urged to use GPS at San Francisco (http://news.yahoo.com/foreign-airlines-urged-gps-san-francisco-135919704.html)

Total reliance on automation and inability to hand fly an approach in perfect conditions is not good. However if he just used the available automation, it would have landed OK. If you can't hand fly and *also* can't properly use automation, that is a bad combination.

If he was more proficient in hand flying but still did not properly understand the automation, an accident could still happen in other circumstances due to that lack of understanding.

[BOAC]

joe - this thread has actually moved on from where you are! That bit is 'done and dusted'.

[Mozella]

If you can't hand fly and *also* can't properly use automation, that is a bad combination.

As far as I'm concerned, you've neatly stated why this accident was just waiting to happen. What failed to stop the chain of events were cultural problems. Unfortunately, those cultural problems changed a "bad combination" into a deadly combination.

[safetypee]

Centaurus, our conclusions re my training experience differ (#891, 896).
The instructor turned out to be a good guy and a competent operator, although slightly reserved; a good lesson in not judging people on reputation.

Your view suggests that demonstrations precede repetitive and reinforcing training, which although this is a good starting point (effect of controls), training must diverge to in order to generate independent thinking (situation recognition) and the ability to transfer situation/action to similar, but not identical ones.
The demonstration and handling-skill reinforcing was complete – ‘how to land on a paved runway after an engine failure’. The training was in benign situations and followed set procedures – thus ‘success’; the next stage was to recognise situations where success was not assured, where detailed procedures did not apply, and thus alternative action was required. This is typical of military training which is perhaps based on a philosophy of ‘you never fight the war you planned for’.
Whereas a typical commercial aviation approach, with certificated aircraft operating in closely regulated situations, often biases training to ‘expected’ situations – within the scope of cert/reg – a bounded environment. This approach tends to prejudge expected situations, limiting the nature of threats, using predetermined checklists and standard scenarios (SOPs); - the general need is to understand a situation sufficiently to fit it to a procedure.
The problems in the choice of training to improve the ability to understand situations involve cost/effectiveness and the extent required for the anticipated threat – as bounded by cert/reg.

These differences are reflected in other posts; either by assuming specific situations and the need to provide detailed training, or a more flexible approach based on generic situation awareness training, avoiding prejudgment, and having a wide ranging knowledge base. The ideal is no doubt somewhere in between, but views can be biased by recent events.
The unexpected nature (components) of recent accidents has been a fundamental surprise to the industry – the assumptions in certification, regulation, and training were meant to avoid these.
Thus, is the problem a weakness in the process of cert/reg/trng, that the assumptions being made about human performance are optimistic, or that the situations being encountered no longer match expectations. Or perhaps the operational environment is now too complex for a regulated approach which may be overly dependent on human performance.

An analogy is like trying to kill a fly on a wall – either a wide angle shot-gun hoping to hit everything, or a well-aimed rifle for precision. These are extremes, neither assuring success and thus require compromise, but there are also other parameters – the size of the wall and the robustness of the fly (the environment and threat). The industry needs to consider what adaptations are required for these, and who is best placed to adapt - CEOs, design and certification, regulators, operators, or individuals at the sharp-end?
Everyone within their capability.

[Lonewolf_50]

From my first go as an instructor I was strongly advised to assume that the student is always trying to kill you....this training Captain evidently didn't get that advice.
It is easier to believe of a novice than of an experienced pilot, but this point is worth repeating.

Anecdote: on a refresher flight after too much time at a desk, I was being "refreshed" and we knocked most of the rust off of my flying skills.

As the PIC came in for final landing, as we passed abeam ... I casually mentioned that the gear were still up. At the 90 / base position, him having reviewed "landing checks complete," I said with a bit more energy "gear has three up indications" and moved my hand to the gear handle with the intention of lowring it should he have missed my point.

He lowered the gear and all was sweetness and light after that. :ok:

Any of us can make a boo boo, no matter the number of hours in our logbook.

[OK465]

LW50,

Yep, the Training Captain's overriding purpose for being there was to exercise supervisory discretion to prevent exactly what occurred.

He was the linebacker, the free safety (pun intended) and the goalie....and he dropped the ball....

....regardless of the fromage, the ancillary findings or the excusatory human factors findings. All of which he was put there to deal with (including the fromage).

I get weary of the view that this class of accident somehow provides wonderful opportunities to learn from and improve the system when there is really no novel magic reason to be sought out to 'explain' what absolutely shouldn't have occurred with existing knowledge levels and within the current system. Every accident is not revelationary, some just sad repetition.

And relative to higher experience levels....

On a 727 recurrent training flight with an 'on paper' very experienced ex-airline type, the FE instructor who had flown with him previously as his pilot instructor passed me a folded note that said,

"Roger is capable of surprises."

Training Captains are specifically there to minimize the effect of any such surprises. That is the job, however there's always that bell curve lurking.

[fireflybob]

The three most important words I was taught when I did my instructor's course a little while ago were "I have control".

[bloom]

"The three most important words I was taught when I did my instructor's course a little while ago were "I have control"."

Yah, I saw Captain Al Haynes (United flight 232} in a speech about his ordeal............And he said that he had said about the same thing.

Just after his F/O said that he had no control.

[AirRabbit]

He was the linebacker, the free safety (pun intended) and the goalie....and he dropped the ball....
....regardless of the fromage, the ancillary findings or the excusatory human factors findings. All of which he was put there to deal with (including the fromage).

All right, OK465 – I don’t think I’ve laughed, out loud, for quite as long as after having read your post that included the above quote! Probably for a multitude of reasons, but perhaps the most prevalent, besides the fact that someone actually used the word, is the fact that someone used the word correctly, in both its definition and its normally understood application – and did so twice!

I have long ago recognized your competence with the subject matter normally bantered about on these pages, but I now have a new and most interesting insight into your knowledge of aviation and of linguistics (particularly the background of some specific references) and your propensities to use either or both!

Thanks for the laugh!

[barit1]

Forgive, please, the repetition:
PROBABLE CAUSE
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew’s mismanagement of the airplane’s descent during the visual approach, the pilot flying’s unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed control, the flight crew’s inadequate monitoring of airspeed, and the flight crew’s delayed execution of a go-around after they became aware that the airplane was below acceptable glidepath and airspeed tolerances. Contributing to the accident were; (1) the complexities of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems that were inadequately described in Boeing’s documentation and Asiana’s pilot training, which increased the likelihood of mode error; (2) the flight crew’s nonstandard communication and coordination regarding the use of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems; (3) the pilot flying’s inadequate training on the planning and executing of visual approaches; (4) the pilot monitoring/instructor pilot’s inadequate supervision of the pilot flying; and (5) flight crew fatigue which likely degraded their performance.

...And not one word about the management structure of the airline that permitted three incompetent pilots (regardless of their logbooks) behind that locked door.

[bubbers44]

Also how could any pilot knowing his level of incompetence not do anything to correct it? In this case all three of them.

[aterpster]

They became passengers around 500 feet, or more.

Yes, I expect a deletion for gross redundancy.

[thf]

Descent Below Visual Glidepath and Impact With Seawall, Asiana Airlines Flight 214, Boeing 777-200ER, HL7742, San Francisco, California, July 6, 2013 (PDF) (http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2014/AAR1401.pdf)

[AirRabbit]

Well, I don’t often jump into a position of “waxing philosophic” … but there are times when I fall victim to just exactly that. So, with apologies to all who may believe it necessary to be apologetic ...

I’ve never been one for deliberately kicking dirt on someone else’s ethnicity, nationality, religious beliefs, their occupational “position” or rank, or even their preferences in food and/or beverage … but all the respectful attitudes and the politeness that may govern verbal or physical responses to whatever someone else does, does not do, says, or does not say … are way down on my priority list when it comes to staying alive! It would, I would think, be appropriate for someone to review not only the training program content, but also review and understand how the provisions of such a program are conducted and how assurance is achieved that the students going through that program actually demonstrate their competency. If there is any potential for students to be provided “cheat sheets” or be provided “foot stompers” during the training, on which those students could then depend to achieve a “passing” score, someone should exercise the discretion to disallow that to continue.

And, of course, if the actual pilot training includes a dependence on subtle hints, or small control inputs on dual-control airplanes, intended to prevent an otherwise lackluster performance by any student pilot – at any point in that pilot’s career – we should all recognize that someone simply HAS to point out that this attitude is a huge disservice to that pilot … and may be paving the way, or greasing the skids, for that pilot to wind up being the first one to the accident scene. THAT isn’t helping that pilot, nor the passengers and crew who might be serving with that pilot when he (or she) gets into one of those situations where his (or her) training had to be supplemented with hints, or gouges, or cheat sheets. In the real world, there won’t be anyone who can, or will, provide those factors.

Before anyone rolls their eyes too much … I fully understand the hierarchy that is entrenched in some societies … but even there, it is very likely that someone understands when and where acknowledging and conforming to that hierarchy is appropriate, and where adherence to such hierarchy is potentially disastrous. Any organization that, for whatever reason, denies the logic of such understanding, should not be authorized to engage in activities where such adherence could result in those disastrous consequences.

Yes, yes, I know the arguments against such a statement. I am fully aware of the cultural aspects that are more seriously ingrained in the psychological makeup of some persons. And, I am fully aware of the challenges that present themselves were this position to be attempted to be applied and enforced. But, I think that the simple knowledge that these propensities exist should be reason enough for concerned professionals to combine their energies to come up with a solution … or at least a stop-gap process or method to mitigate the kinds of tragedies that have been seen, and are apparently (at least in my limited scope) on the increase.

No … I am certainly not saying that whatever can be done would be easily accomplished. But, rather than stand around the smoking hole, kicking dirt with the toes of our shoes, and lamenting what has happened, yet again … certainly the amount of knowledgeable, committed, and innovative professionals we have in this business should be able to come up with a “plan” on how to educate pilots … of all backgrounds, cultural differences, religious and other differing beliefs … that competency simply MUST be achieved and simply because one grew up the son of the village chief, or for that matter, the daughter of that chief, doesn’t necessarily mean that individual will assimilate the necessary skill sets AND, I think, most critically, understand whether or not he (or she) has the necessary understanding to know if he (or she) really does have a mastery of those skills.

Landing the airplane, each time, every time, regardless of the winds, rain, runway conditions, etc. is not always the best of decisions – sometimes (not all the time … but certainly some of the time) a decision to “go around” is the very best professionally determined decision that could be made … and no one should ever feel any less professional for recognizing when the circumstances are either beyond their capabilities, or at least questionable. The professional participants in aviation should pool their collective understandings and make sure that this philosophy becomes the bedrock on which ALL pilot training and evaluation must rest …and no, I don’t have a recommendation right now about how to do that … but someone might … and others may reach that point … but only IF they try!

Before anyone jumps down my throat for speaking this way … I’m not saying that “us smarter folks” should go in and “lay down the law” to those “lesser smarter folks.” But I think a mutual participation in determining the causes of such inattentive or speculative accidents should be the topic of multicultural discussions that address the reasons and the solutions. Those who have been … and I’ll say “victimized” … by their belief systems, will be able to understand and accept the logical corrective attitudes ONLY IF they are integrally involved in determining the causes and the potential solutions.

They have to recognize the validity and OWN the responsibility for coming to the conclusions that are the correct conclusions. Perhaps one of the ways in which such an understanding might be achieved may be through a sports analogy – and by that I mean critically pointing out how a specific person – whether basketball, hockey, soccer (football, to some), or almost any other sport that can point to some clearly good players. If you talk to those players, they’ll likely be the first to point out that it is their teammates that allow them to “look” like the hero. Of course they are quite good – maybe none better – but I think each one would easily point to their teammates as those who are regularly instrumental in achieving the success they each enjoy …and they are invariably correct.

[PAXboy]

Some extracts from this article, looking at the final report: Asiana Airlines flight 214 crash caused by Boeing planes being 'overly complicated' - Americas - World - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/asiana-airlines-flight-214-crash-caused-by-boeing-planes-being-overly-complicated-9562331.html)

I have added amphasis to the points I found most interesting.


Acting chairman Chris Hart said that, between them, the three veteran pilots were found to have committed between 20 and 30 errors in their final approach to San Francisco International – varying from minor to highly significant.Perhaps the most serious came from the 45-year-old captain Lee Kang Kuk, who was new to the 777. Kuk inadvertently prevented the plane’s “autothrottle” system from maintaining speed on approach for landing.US investigators called on the manufacturer to make changes to the increasingly complicated automated controls which, they claimed, pilots no longer “fully understand”.Hart said the accident underscores a problem that has long troubled aviation regulators around the world – that complicated automated aircraft controls, designed to improve safety, are creating new opportunities for human error.


The Asiana flight crew “over-relied on automated systems that they did not fully understand,” Hart said.

It is interesting that he says "has long troubled aviation regulators around the world" no mention of the numerous flight crew who have been shouting about this. :rolleyes:

[AirRabbit]

I believe that if we continue to insist that, as an industry, we should be “depending on technology” to get every group of incompletely or incompetently trained pilots, some of whom, apparently, at least at times, place “cast hierarchy” above competency (which has apparently resulted in serious incidents or accidents), we are going to continue to see, and perhaps see an increase in, the occurrences of this kind of “what the @#$% were they thinking” questioning … after the fact. I was under the impression quite some time ago, that we humans finally admitted that technology certainly aids, but does not, cannot, replace human thinking and the application of human recognition and logic. Sometimes I am convinced that we have, perhaps conveniently, forgotten the fact that these so-called “automatic” systems do not think and they do not plan … they do not predict or anticipate the future … they ONLY compare the specific existing status against what a human has set as a very specific and limited scope of a desired outcome. The result is then that these automatic systems attempt to use the range of pre-set (i.e., programmed) capabilities to achieve what was set by that human ... regardless of what happens during the interim.

Of course, these systems perform these comparisons and executions at a rate that is beyond (sometimes well beyond) the range of human capability … but these “systems” do not understand (are not capable of understanding) the ultimate goal of that particular flight crew member. And before anyone becomes offended or thinks I am being insensitive, let me add that I am not advocating the elimination of “cast hierarchy” in those instances where it is tradition or an issue of national pride … far from it … BUT … we MUST recognize that personal belief preferences are not always conducive to the safe and productive operation of at least some technology advancements – particularly in those cases where mismanagement, or incomplete or inaccurate management of those systems can lead to kinds of tragedies we have witnessed recently – and they seem to be occurring at an increasing rate.

However, because it is not likely that an international aviation regulation would be effective in eliminating such “hierarchical cast preferences,” it may be that such a position may have a much better chance of being accomplished through the airplane or airplane system manufacturers. This would require something like these manufacturers refusing to stand behind the equipment they provide when the practice of any such “hierarchical cast preferences” result in the overdependence on such systems and cause, or contribute to, accidents or incidents like those we’ve seen recently. Will this work? Maybe. However, such an action should clearly bring these concerns to the attention of those cultures that embody such “class recognition and/or reverence” that has been seen to raise its presence in airplane cockpits - at least, at times, resulting in tragic consequences.

[porterhouse]

US investigators called on the manufacturer to make changes to the increasingly complicated automated controls which, they claimed, pilots no longer “fully understand”.
This is not going to happen. 99.99% of pilots understand it very well. Also changing design right now would probably confuse things even more and cause more harm than good.

[BOAC]

porterh - adding low speed protection to FLCH would surely confuse no-one of average intelligence?

[olasek]

BOAC - we have been through this countless times, nothing more than "average intelligence" is required to understand current logic, also there were arguments presented why actually it is more logical they way it is. Let's not start another futile running in circles discussion.

[IcePack]

IMHO those that say they fully understand the system, actually don't completely.
Granted the nuances that are forgotten when under stress & the aircraft has done something odd are minor & taking manual control instantaneously solves the issue. But I have yet to see a pilot who under all circumstances has a full & complete grasp of the more complex aircraft. Unlike in days of old, when most did.

[olasek]

IMHO those that say they fully understand the system, actually don't completely. It doesn't matter. Clearly no one has equal understanding as those who actually developed/designed the logic/system. But you don't need to study one million lines of code to operate them safely. A beauty of those systems however is they are telling you exactly what they are doing at any moment - one glance at the top of the PFD and 777/737/747..etc pilot knows exactly what autopilot/throttle are doing at the moment - if you don't like what they are doing - either force them to do what you want or fly manually. When I transitioned from an old Cessna to a highly sophisticated G1000 equipped aircraft the first thing they force feed you during training is to always check the autopilot status bar - don't assume it is doing something unless you verify what it is actually doing. In other words flipping switches or pressing buttons without verification is simply a very poor airmanship which as no place even among amateur aviators least commercial ones.

[Capn Bloggs]

nothing more than "average intelligence" is required to understand current logic, also there were arguments presented why actually it is more logical they way it is.
No, there's no current logic, and it is not at all logical that an allegedly highly sophisticated but simple jet can be stalled so simply. :cool:

[porterhouse]

Baloney, all jets can be stalled, Boeings, Airbuses (AF447,AF296), Gulfstreams, Falcons, Hawkers, Bombardiers, etc, get used to it. All very sophisticated by the way. It takes a determined pilot to do it but as string of accidents shows it can be done, "simply".

[aterpster]

Bloggs:

No, there's no current logic, and it is not at all logical that an allegedly highly sophisticated but simple jet can be stalled so simply.

This airplane has been in service since 1998 or so. How many stall crashes have there been with this type since then?

Further, it seems that flight level change is not an appropriate mode for final approach, wouldn't you agree?

[ironbutt57]

Further, it seems that flight level change is not an appropriate mode for final approach, wouldn't you agree?

agreed especially if one sets G/A altitude at which point the aircraft will climb to MCP altitude....

this fellow obviously was in "airbus mode" in regards to the thrust automatics..which IMHO is a better system than the Boeing...after several thousand hours in both...both types have their merits, a properly trained pilot, and a vigilant crew can safely operate any modern jet....

[FGD135]

Would Asiana 214 have crashed had the airspeed indicator been the big round dial of yesteryear?


I bet it would not.


Would Turkish 1951 have crashed at Amsterdam if its airspeed indicators were the big round dials of yesteryear?


I bet not.


For those on this thread convinced that "cultural factors" are the explanation for the Asiana crash, consider the previous fatal accident to a scheduled airline service in the USA.


That was Colgan 3407, the Dash 8 Q400, that stalled on approach to Buffalo, New York in 2009. That aircraft had an American crew.


But note that it too, stalled. Would it have crashed if, for airspeed indicators, it had the big round dials of yesterday? I bet not.


All of these aircraft had airspeed "tapes", which is typical for "glass cockpit" aircraft.


To the pilots of glass cockpit aircraft: Have you noticed how much more brain power is required to use the airspeed tape?


To assess airspeed, you must train your gaze at a tiny 1 inch x 1 inch patch on your glass panel (the PFD), then read and process the digits.


With the big round dial of yesteryear however, you only need to glance at a point within about 3 inches of the pointer. The angular position of the pointer instantly tells you whether your airspeed is too fast, too slow, or "about right". No need to read digits.


What about Air France 447? It too stalled. Would a big round dial for airspeed have helped those highly stressed pilots? I bet it would!


The airspeed tape may be 3-5 inches long, but the bit where you look is the central 1 inch x 1 inch. This is where the action is. But this size is too small - and the brain power to use it is just too much.


You don't notice the extra mental processing demands created by the tape in normal, low workload, low stress situations.


In high stress, high workload situations however, the airspeed tape might as well be invisible! The brain ignores it - either because it takes the eyes too long to land on the little patch, or turbulence makes it too difficult to hit the patch, or because the brain knows it will need too much work to process.


With airspeed indicators that become "invisible" at high workload moments, with the aircraft in a low speed flight phase, we should expect they will stall every now and then.


And this is exactly what we are seeing.

[ATC Watcher]

FGD135 : excellent point, which I share, but I am not that young anymore and have made all my flight hours ( since 1967) with round dials and still use them today in my aircraft, so I feel more confident with them of course.
That said the young generation seems to have no problems with Glass /Garmin displays and speetapes. We have.

I have read last week an interesting article about 4 Cirrus SR20 and 22 recent accidents in France , where overconfidence in glass cockpits info and automation was a contributing factor in all cases.
The article did not say round dials would have saved their days, but with a traditional aircraft probably more caution would have been used , elimating this sense of " computer is allowing me to that" , or "to go beyond " . that we saw also in the Asiana case.
And you are right , this is not an "Asian " thing . It could have caught anyone overconfident in automation.

[barit1]

Interesting comment, FGD135.

This was the subject of a study (studies?) of analog indicators on electronic panels (radio dials, etc.) - maybe 50 years ago. In that case, it was:

o Moving pointer against fixed background scale - vs.

o Fixed index pointer over a moving background scale.

I do not remember the overall outcome, but each had its own pros and cons. For quick comprehension, however, the former (older technology) was deemed superior.

I guess there is nothing new under the Sun.

[Pontius]

What tripe.

Look at the speed tape on the big sheet of glass. See the pointer is in the big, bad, red & black bit and you know instantly that's not good.

Look at the pointer on the big round dial of yesterday and see that it's pointing at some arbitrary point. It might be bad, it might not be so bad. But you don't know until you compare it to the stall speed for the weight of the aircraft at the time. That is NOT something that is done as instantly as seeing the pointer in the amber (not so bad) or the red/black (bad) on glass.

It's all very well going on about maintaining hand flying skills etc and I agree with that. But suggesting that we revert back to old style instruments just because that's what they did 'back then' is just nonsense. Many of the modern instruments have been developed so that we can instantly ascertain the situation and the speed tape is certainly one of them.

IF the Asiana crew had looked at their speed tape they would have known the situation. They either didn't look or they obviously didn't do the correct thing to resolve the situation if they did look. The lack of A/T awareness was key in this lack of correction.

[RAT 5]

Pontius: I agree with you on this. An analogue dial had to be used to fly a number. You had to interrogate the instrument to confirm what it was telling you and decide if it was what you wanted. The glass tape display cockpit is a picture. Is the a/c performance bug lined up with the command bug. The number doesn't matter. The error can be seen and corrected with intuitive reaction; if taught how correctly at the beginning. A scan is now much faster than before and more relaxed. The trouble comes with the F.D. tunnel vision pilots. No scan.
On the speed tape the added picture of the manoeuvre margin and stall margin bands adds a greater sense of comfort that a raws dial. Critical information gleaned at a glance. Excellent.

[Lonewolf_50]

This airplane has been in service since 1998 or so. How many stall crashes have there been with this type since then?

Further, it seems that flight level change is not an appropriate mode for final approach, wouldn't you agree?
This, in spades.

Also, if the investigators are going ape on the manufacturers, they utterly miss the point. The industry all over the world, which is the companies that provide passenger service, need to have the training and currency tools in place, and stress on the basics (see recent FAA commentary on same) as a requirement, not on an "if we can afford a bit now and again" basis.

It's the cost of doing business to keep your aircrew current and proficient.
Current and proficient aircrew who know their aircraft inside and out is a reasonable expectation of the fare paying public. A great many professional pilots meet that description, but as we can see from Asiana, not all do.

A basic principal:

Don't send partially or poorly trained, or non-current, pilots out to carry people about.
Seems a basic rule of airline management to me. :mad:
But is it?

[olasek]

.I have read last week an interesting article about 4 Cirrus SR20 and 22 recent accidents in France , where overconfidence in glass cockpits info and automation was a contributing factor in all cases.
The article did not say round dials would have saved their days, but with a traditional aircraft probably more caution would have been used
Speed tape is one thing but there is also aircraft attitude much better visible on new glass avionics. I fly a 'glass' Cirrus and I have much better info on my PFD about the pitch attitude - a very important indication. On old style steam gauges pitch was specially poorly visible, it was in fact so bad it was almost useless. With Cirrus I think it is more overconfidence that stems from capability of the aircraft itself (speed, performance, CAPS) than with glass avionics.

. But note that it too, stalled. Would it have crashed if, for airspeed indicators, it had the big round dials of yesterday? I bet not.
You are welcome to have your own opinions but multiple studies (including NASA's) on this subject do not support your conjecture.

[Cows getting bigger]

If we're digging around in human factors, I think that power indication is more important than speed. Personally I don't warm to speed tapes but that is because I spent over 30 years looking at dials. The youngsters are far more comfortable with the TV screens. However, so many seem to forget (not attribute enough weight) to the Power + Attitude = Performance mantra. Asiana crashed because of a lack of basics, together with (semi)-automation, CRM, cultural etc. Letting the aircraft manage the power, or worse thinking that the aircraft is managing the power, takes away a key indicator of how the aircraft is performing. FFS, point and power.

[KatSLF]

This document explains every study done between WW2 and about 2000.

http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/793/78868.0001.001.pdf?sequence=2

Upshot of ~100 pages is
if you need accurate details (how fast am I going) = numeric display is best (accurate to smallest detail)
if you need to check something (am I going too fast or too slow) = pointer display is best (shows surrounding ranges for comparison)

In both cases of course you'd need to have some mental idea of what you SHOULD be doing ... or colour sections on the display can indicate for you. But pointer position indicators in every test led to much faster acquisition of the data than numeric, which has to be "read" not just recognised at a glance.

[AirRabbit]

It's the cost of doing business to keep your aircrew current and proficient.
Current and proficient aircrew who know their aircraft inside and out is a reasonable expectation of the fare paying public. A great many professional pilots meet that description, but as we can see from Asiana, not all do.

Of course you are correct, Lonewolf 50, however, or, in addition, I believe that focusing on the Asiana accident is far and away much too narrow, as it doesn’t begin to focus on a situation that I have been harping on for what seems to be decades … and that is first, the complete and competent training of the pilot, but just as important is the complete and competent training of those who are charged with the responsibility of training those pilots (the instructors) and those who will evaluate those pilots against an appropriately documented standard. I am currently aware of the following on-going efforts that have been mounted by some of the most prestigious aviation oriented groups around.

Initially, the UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society started the ball rolling with the development of an international working group – subsequently named the International Committee for Advanced Training in Extended Envelopes (or “ICATEE”) supported by a wide-based representation through out the aircraft industry, simulator manufacturers, training providers, regulators, researchers and airline customers. Participants include Boeing, Airbus, CAE, Opinicus, ETC, APS Emergency Maneuver Training, Calspan, FAA, NTSB, NASA, NLR, DLR, ALPA, IFALPA, KLM Flight Training, IDT, UTIAS and many others. ICATEE is chaired by Dr. Sunjoo Advani, Mr. Peter Tharp, and Capt. Gordon Woolley (Chairman of the RAeS Flight Simulation Group) where all three are members of the RAeS Flight Simulator Group.

Following this, another group began to form with a slightly different focus … this one being the International Pilot Training Consortium or “IPTC.” This working group was created to improve the safety, quality and efficiency of commercial aviation by developing international agreement on a common set of training and evaluation standards for pilots, instructors, and evaluator. Initially, this effort has focused on training and evaluation standards for pilots, but, it is hoped that the process will then be extended to address exactly those features for both instructors and evaluators. The ultimate goal has always been the development of recognized and logical processes for the benefit of the industry worldwide and which will hopefully result in clearly stated provisions that would then, hopefully be adopted, first by ICAO, and then individual national regulatory authorities.

You may be correct with your statement that “…in order to improve or just maintain the industry’s high level of safety we have to find alternative methods to complement the existing initiatives.” This precisely the goals of the 2 working groups I described above. I still believe that we are able to at least maintain, and more likely, improve the industry’s safety record by understanding more completely – perhaps only more basically – what it is we expect out of the training we currently accomplish. I fully understand the concerns voiced regarding “cultural issues” being at least a contributing factor, if not more basic, to the successful completion of training – but I think that we have to return to the basic premise of training.

I firmly believe that this premise is, or certainly should be, to train a pilot to the degree that he/she is able to recognize, correctly, what the airplane is currently doing; make an immediate decision as to whether or not what the airplane is currently doing is what is desired by that pilot; and if the airplane is NOT doing what is desired, be able to make an immediate decision as to what must be done to the airplane’s control and power systems to correct that condition ... and to execute that decision quickly and accurately. Lastly, during this execution, continually monitor the condition of the airplane with respect to whether or not the resulting airplane condition is changing in the desired direction and magnitude. Once again, this part demands that the pilot correctly identify the changing airplane condition, determining whether or not that change is what is desired. This process is a continual process – taking place all the time – and in situations that are rapidly changing, requiring more directly focused attention to the airplane condition by the pilot flying.

In summary, the pilot flying must have an accurate knowledge of what he/she is expecting of the airplane – at all times – and have accurate knowledge of what control applications are appropriate should any adjustments in the airplane condition become necessary at any time under any circumstance – and knowing when, where, how, and how much of those control applications have to be made – and then make them, accordingly.

Lastly, to ensure that the pilot flying, does, indeed, have this knowledge and ability, the training program must have been designed to provide that pilot with the opportunity to experience various scenarios where such recognition, decision making, decision execution, and continual evaluation of each, is provided initially and then sufficiently repeated, throughout the multiple combinations of conditions and situations, to provide that pilot the recognition and reinforcement of actions, recognized responses, and, when or if appropriate, reactions that will ultimately be required. Throughout this exposure, the instructor must take careful notice of when, where, and how the student addresses each scenario, judging whether or not the student’s performance should be modified, and if it should be modified, understand why, and then how, that modification can be accomplished. This process has to be completed for each required scenario, with each appropriate modification scrutinized, and, obviously, the resulting airplane condition properly and completely evaluated.

[FGD135]

You are welcome to have your own opinions but multiple studies (including NASA's) on this subject do not support your conjecture.What studies, olasek? Can you give some pointers or links to at least one, please. There is just no way that a speed tape, which requires reading digits from a 1" x 1" patch of panel, can be better than the big dial with pointer - which requires only a glance for assessment of angular position, with no reading and processing of digits required.


Would be very interested to know about any studies that have been done. I suspect that no proper studies have actually been done. I did a search myself recently but couldn't find anything. I am in the process of writing to the NTSB to question them about the human factors of tape vs pointer. I will be asking them about studies.


See the pointer is in the big, bad, red & black bit and you know instantly that's not good.That is AFTER THE PLANE HAS STALLED, Pontius, you clown. The key issue in all of these stalls is the airspeed decay (prior to the stall) that went undetected by the pilots.


Look at the pointer on the big round dial of yesterday and see that it's pointing at some arbitrary point. It might be bad, it might not be so bad. But you don't know until you compare it to the stall speed for the weight of the aircraft at the time.Are you even a pilot, Pontius? Let me tell you how the pilot brain works when making an approach using the big round dial of yesteryear. Given that you have been trained on the aircraft, and done several approaches, you are familiar with where the airspeed pointer should roughly point, for each stage of the approach.


At the initial fix, for example, you know roughly where it should be. A quick glance will confirm whether it is. No need to read any digits. After the final fix, ditto. If you were seconds from stalling, the angular position would be very different and you would pick this, almost instantly - without having to read any digits.


One study I would really like to see is whether there is a correlation between stall-related accidents and the introduction of the glass cockpit speed tape. Over the last 5 years, 4 of the highest profile accidents have all involved a stall.


Many of the modern instruments have been developed so that we can instantly ascertain the situation and the speed tape is certainly one of them.That is laughable, Pontius. Airspeed was made into a tape for the same reason that altitude was - because there was not enough room on the little screen to display them any other way.


IF the Asiana crew had looked at their speed tape they would have known the situation.I suspect you are agreeing with me when I said that their speed tape had, in effect, become invisible. This is the whole problem with the speed tape - it requires way too much brain power to use.


When humans are in high work load and high stress situations they "task shed" - the more difficult the task, the sooner it gets shed. Reading a speed tape is easy in a low stress situation, but for Asiana 214, preoccupied with AFCS perhaps, Colgan 3407, Turkish 1951 and Air France 447, it is obvious that the tape indication was not utilised.


The plane was unable to tell the pilots about its airspeed, in other words. With the big round dial of yesteryear, the indications would have been so strong, the dial would have been practically yelling at them. With the tape, you have to ask it for what it has. But listen carefully for its reply, for it is only a whisper.

[amos2]

Started flying speed tape only aircraft in 1989.Didn't like it then, and still don't like it now, compared to the big round dial mentioned above. I have no doubt whatsoever that the speed tape has contributed to many of the prangs over the last 20 yrs! AF 447 to mention one.

[BOAC]

Ditto - first experience with the Lightning in 1971 and I STILL prefer the rotary. One of the great advantages is that rotary motion is more easily absorbed by the brain than linear.

[MrSnuggles]

FGD, amos2, BOAC

You are correct in your personal assessment of the rotary dial (angular motion) versus the speed tape (straight motion).

I have not checked with NASA but to say it short: The human eye detects motion much better than still objects. The human eye also have an affinity to remember angular displacements better than straight displacements. That is, it is easier to remember the position of a rotary display than the position of a speed tape.

The longer story:
What is more alarming in an aviation context is that the eye will have problems detecting digits on a moving speed tape - because the movement "silences" the underlying information. That is, a pilot can see the speed tape move, but it takes a concious effort to understand what it means since the movement itself blocks the information on the tape. One study found that the movement even could block colour information - dangerous when approaching stall speed!

We are designed to detect movement first and foremost. A heritage from our nomad ancestors. Movements were often dangerous (predators etc). Digits came much much later and we need extensive schooling to understand their abstract meaning.

I hope that some intelligent airplane designer puts back the rotary speed indicator. Not everything is better with a glass window.

You can have a bunch of references here:
Effects of stationary and moving textured backgrounds on the visuo-oculo-manual tracking in humans (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/004269899400185O)

Visual perception of biological motion and a model for its analysis - Springer (http://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/BF03212378)
(discusses human movements but they are in fact all angular - rotary - movements in some way)

Is it just motion that silences awareness of other vis... [J Vis. 2013] - PubMed - NCBI (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23814072)

Spatial and temporal selectivity of the human motion detection system (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/004269898590104X)

[RetiredF4]

There had been some cars with digital speed display, but they never succeeded enough to become standard.

Tachometers on cars still come with dials and pointers, that' s why?

[LiveryMan]

What studies, olasek? Can you give some pointers or links to at least one, please. There is just no way that a speed tape, which requires reading digits from a 1" x 1" patch of panel, can be better than the big dial with pointer - which requires only a glance for assessment of angular position, with no reading and processing of digits required.

Well, from this laymen's perspective: Pilots have been stalling their planes out of the sky a lot longer than the electronic PFD has been around.

As the saying goes: "Keep they airspeed up, less the ground cometh from below and smite thee" Something passed on to many a student learning to fly.

A diligent crew should be able to monitor their speed and notice a deterioration. A diligent crew with a backup crew sitting behind them doubly so. A diligent crew with instructors sitting behind them should be flying gods.

Seeing as airliners are not dropping out of the sky on a daily basis due to the pilots not being able to understand what the speed tape is telling them, I think it's pretty but a moot point.

The Asiana 214 crew screwed up.

[FGD135]

Pilots have been stalling their planes out of the sky a lot longer than the electronic PFD has been around.Was there a period, ever, in the days of the big round dial where there were 4 stall-crashes in the space of 5 years (to scheduled passenger flights)?


There had been some cars with digital speed display, but they never succeeded enough to become standard.I read something the other day about the automobile industry, having gone to tape-like instrumentation, now going back to dials. Perhaps someone here knows more about this. If true, if wonder if that industry, unlike our industry, has actually done its homework!

[barit1]

Without reviewing the past half-million comments, I wonder if we are not back to the old AOA indication argument? USN pilots, always flying approaches on the ragged edge, seem to be advocates of AOA. While I've never personally used it, and recognize it's not a foolproof cureall, there is obvious merit here.

[tdracer]

Tachometers on cars still come with dials and pointers, that' s why?
Take a look at a modern F1 car (or most modern racing cars - I haven't seen an analog tach on an open wheel race car in two decades). Oh, and my daily driver sports car (8,900 rpm redline) has a 'speedtape' tach and digital speedometer.

[notfred]

They are staring at 4 reds on the PAPI and not going around. Do you really think changing from speed tape to a dial is going to make them go around?

The lack of go around is the big problem here. Yes, they messed up the automatics but if they'd pressed TOGA when it first started going pear shaped I suspect that we'd be looking at an incident report about the automatics rather than a fatal accident report.

[porterhouse]

Was there a period, ever, in the days of the big round dial where there were 4 stall-crashes in the space of 5 years (to scheduled passenger flights)? Such question makes no sense from the statistical point of view. Air traffic in the old days was a tiny fraction of what it is today so you can't be looking at absolute numbers but on the other hand we know that the accident rate say in the 60-ties was 30-50 times higher than it is today (depending on aircraft type). For example 777's accident rate is almost 40 times lower than 707's. You get pretty good aircraft accident studies that go back to 1959, as for accident 'causes' there are almost 30 categories and stall isn't one of them, however they have LOC-I (Loss of Control in Flight). You would have to dig into archives to see how LOC-I rates vary over time however I suspect you could not prove in numbers that "stall" today is more common today than before - there are simply way too many technical factors and they are all interrelated so isolating cause to "round airspeed" versus "tape speed" would be simply impossible.

[RetiredF4]

notfred
They are staring at 4 reds on the PAPI and not going around. Do you really think changing from speed tape to a dial is going to make them go around?

The lack of go around is the big problem here. Yes, they messed up the automatics but if they'd pressed TOGA when it first started going pear shaped I suspect that we'd be looking at an incident report about the automatics rather than a fatal accident report.


You miss one vital point though.
They saw 4 reds, because they had been dropping quite low on speed, thus being unable to arrest the descent.

Being not quite familiar with the switchology, but would have pressing TOGA reactivated Autothrottle?

[olasek]

Being not quite familiar with the switchology, but would have pressing TOGA reactivated Autothrottle?
You are right, it wouldn't reactivate A/T because their autopilot was off.
This is a good source:

Take Off / Go Around (TOGA) - Explained - Journal - Flaps 2 Approach (http://www.flaps2approach.com/journal/2013/7/10/take-off-go-around-toga-explained.html)

[notfred]

Good point, they would have needed to manually add power. Even if they were confused like me :) and pressed TOGA then the lack of response would surely trigger them to pushing the levers forward.

Yes, I agree that they got low on the approach because the speed dropped with the AT off, but they still had plenty of time to fix it. Nobody called for a go around until the aircraft was about to hit.

[FGD135]

Such question makes no sense from the statistical point of view.
Ok then, just name one or two where the aircraft stalled, following a period of airspeed decay of which the pilots were apparently unaware.


We have had 4 accidents since 2009 where these factors were the key ingredient in the crash.


I have been a long time student of air safety but cannot think of even ONE accident like this from the era prior to the airspeed tape.


The closest related accident that I can find was to the China Airlines A300 that stalled during a go-round at Nagoya in 1994, but in this case the pilots were highly aware of the airspeed (the CVR revealed a comment about the aircraft being likely to stall). A fight had broken out between the PF and the autopilot - all because the FO had bumped the TOGA button on late finals.


There was an almost identical accident 4 years later at Taipei. Same airline, same type. During the go around there was a struggle between the pilots and autopilot, with a stall resulting.

[olasek]

I have been a long time student of air safety
OK, then roll up your sleeves and get to work, dig historical data, crunch the numbers, you have to sift through a lot of reports, etc but stop this silly 'anecdotal' approach to drive your point because so far you got absolutely nothing. :ugh:

[Turbine D]

FGD135,
Ok then, just name one or two where the aircraft stalled, following a period of airspeed decay of which the pilots were apparently unaware.
Here is one:
http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/dvdfiles/US/1974-12-01-US.pdf

[FGD135]

Here is one:
http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports...4-12-01-US.pdf (http://api.viglink.com/api/click?format=go&jsonp=vglnk_jsonp_14067842242676&key=1e857e7500cdd32403f752206c297a3d&libId=4e69eca5-d429-4b24-86eb-a77d66eecd9f&loc=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Fnewreply.php%3Fdo%3Dnewrep ly%26noquote%3D1%26p%3D8587193&v=1&out=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fss.aero%2Faccident-reports%2Fdvdfiles%2FUS%2F1974-12-01-US.pdf&ref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Frumours-news%2F526333-ntsb-update-asiana-214-a-48.html&title=PPRuNe%20Forums%20-%20Reply%20to%20Topic&txt=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fss.aero%2Faccident-reports...4-12-01-US.pdf) Turbine D, I was well aware of that one but did not mention it because it was nothing at all like the 4 recent. For starters, that was not a scheduled passenger service. Secondly, and most importantly, the pilots were well aware of the airspeed (they had the big round dial). Their problem was that the airspeed reading was incorrect, due icing, and they misinterpreted this.


I will go over it yet again. Since 2009, there have been 4 fatal accidents to scheduled passenger aircraft. The stall, and the apparent unawareness of the airspeed decay were the key ingredients.


Can you point to any similar accidents that occurred prior to the era of the speed tape? I have not been able to identify any. There was the BEA Trident stall crash at Staines, but that does not qualify (there was no period of airspeed decay - the PNF rectracted the "droop" leading edges at too low an airspeed, causing an instant stall).


... because so far you got absolutely nothing.olasek, I have identified that there has been 4 stall-related accidents in the last 5 years, when for the entire period of commercial aviation prior to the airspeed tape, there was nowhere near this rate. You call that "absolutely nothing"?

In an earlier post I asked you for pointers or links to just one of those studies you claimed NASA had done on how good the tape was. You have not come up with anything. I do not believe any proper studies have been done on the human factors of the speed tape.

[pax britanica]

Why look at anything hi tech here, how long did digital watches last. Not long because the brain can determine all kinds of things from the hands on a watch -like, I am late I am early I can catch that train after the merest glance.
As a regular passenger and aviation enthusiast I would hope that Boeing and Ab choose the optimum form of display of key parameters for pilot interpretation rather than what fits on the screen -that's not to say that it would have made any difference in this incident since instruments were pretty much superfluous anyway but people might well have a point about bad weather/night especially as many pilots on here have commented they couldn't read the panel easily in bad turbulence and a general position on a dial is easier to determine than numbers surely
Anyway just a view from a customer perspective , important in all businesses except aviation where only price matters, and that's dig at both sides of the equation industry and consumer

[Mozella]

Here is one:
http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports...4-12-01-US.pdf (http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/dvdfiles/US/1974-12-01-US.pdf)

Oh come on! This accident has almost nothing to do with the subject of this thread. In a nutshell, it was the result of not turning on the pitot heat, flying into icing conditions, and subsequently failing to control the aircraft. Although you're technically correct to claim that they were unaware of decreasing airspeed, it's because the instruments were telling them (incorrectly) that they were flying too fast. It has nothing to do with not paying attention or cultural problems. The airspeed was lying to them and everyone in the cockpit was focusing on the speed even though one might argue they didn't react in the best possible way. Most of us would say, "I hope I would have reacted differently by recognizing the real problem more quickly and flying attitude and power setting while ignoring the false airspeed problem". But most of us would also say, "If I'm telling the truth, I could imagine myself doing the same thing these guys did if I happened to run out of luck on that particular day".

The subject of this thread is quite different. In SFO the pilot flying apparently failed to notice (or ignored) decreasing airspeed and the collection of pilots backing him up failed to do anything about it, perhaps because they were not paying attention or (more likely in my opinion) their culture got in the way of good airmanship. Most of us would say, "I can't imagine letting the airspeed get so low on final, but if I did make this kind of huge mistake, I can't imagine my fellow pilots wouldn't be calling for POWER long before I got into real trouble". We would also say, "Even if I were catching a ride in the cockpit and not part of this company, I would speak up and start yelling POWER to save my own skin, and if I were a check pilot for this company, I absolutely know that I would".

Apples and oranges, as they say

[ironbutt57]

FDG 135,,,United in Chicago Midway 737....more than one in commercial jets with nobody minding the store...two (or 3) sets of eyes and all looking outside....


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_553

[olasek]

.when for the entire period of commercial aviation prior to the airspeed tape, there was nowhere near this rate.
You don't know this, you are simply making things up as you go. You don't know the 'rates', you don't have any numbers besides those 'four' (which are not rates) and you don't even know whether those four could be attributed to the 'speed tape' (your guess is not a proof) and then you were claiming you were an astute student of aviation safety. If you were you wouldn't be writing such nonsense.

[Oggi]

Maybe this helps:

http://www.airbus.com/company/aircraft-manufacture/quality-and-safety-first/?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=39258

[tdracer]

I have a vague recollection of a (now retired) Boeing manager telling about his unpleasant experiences investigating 727 crashes shortly after the 727 EIS where the crew failed to properly manage airspeed during approach. He had told me that the 727 had a reputation as a 'hot rod' and the crew would let airspeed drop too low before applying power and would get behind the power curve. So I did a quick web search and found the following 727 accidents that occurred during approach where poor airspeed management may have been a contributing factor:
16 August 1965; United Airlines 727; Flight 389; near Lake Forest, IL: The aircraft had a controlled flight into the waters of Lake Michigan while on approach to Chicago. There was no indication of any unusual problem prior to impact.
11 November 1965; United Airlines 727; Flight 227; Salt Lake City, UT: The aircraft crashed about 340 feet (103 meters) short of the runway after an excessively steep final approach.
4 February 1966; All Nippon Airways 727; Flight 60; near Tokyo, Japan: During a night approach, the aircraft crashed into the waters of Tokyo Bay about 6.5 miles (10.4 km) from Haneda airport.
16 February 1968; Civil Air Transport 727; Flight 010; near Linkuo, Taiwan: The aircraft impacted trees and a house short of the runway during a night approach in poor weather.
5 January 1969; Ariana Afghan Airlines 727-100; Flight 701; near Gatwick Airport, England: The aircraft hit trees and a house about 1.5 miles (2.4 km) short of the runway during approach.
4 June 1969; Mexicana 727; Flight 704; near Monterey, Mexico: The aircraft hit high ground during descent. The crash happened in daylight under poor weather conditions.
21 September 1969; Mexicana 727; Mexico City, Mexico: The aircraft undershot the runway and landed about 0.9 miles (1.5 km) short of the runway.

Now, I haven't gone into the detailed accident reports (I have a life, after all). But all fit the basic premise of running out of altitude and airspeed at the same time. Seven approach crashes in the first five years after EIS. Compare that to those glass cockpit speed-tape deathtraps - 767 certified 1982, went 12 years after EIS before the first accident, no approach/stall accidents to date. 777 certified 1995, 13 years after EIS before the first accident (due to engine power loss during approach), one other approach/stall accident to date (Asiana). Or to put it a little differently, 727 lost more aircraft to approach/stall accidents in it's first five years than the 777 has lost to all causes in the nineteen years since EIS.

Yep, we need to get rid of those glass cockpit speedtape deathtraps and return to round dials :ugh:

[TriStar_drvr]

I believe that those early 727 accidents came from mistakes made by pilots transitioning from props to jets. The engines took a while to spool up from idle, and the landing flaps added a tremendous amount of drag. If you didn't anticipate the spool up time the airplane could get slow in short order. Also, I don't think the stabilized approach concept was universally accepted then.

[aterpster]

I believe that those early 727 accidents came from mistakes made by pilots transitioning from props to jets. The engines took a while to spool up from idle, and the landing flaps added a tremendous amount of drag. If you didn't anticipate the spool up time the airplane could get slow in short order. Also, I don't think the stabilized approach concept was universally accepted then.

After the UAL SLC crash (a merged Capitol Airlines pilot) Flaps 40 for landing was made optional, with Flaps 30 preferred.

My company (TWA) blocked out Flaps 40.

The 727 was quite stable on approach provided you knew how to fly a jet. :)

[barit1]

To add to tdracer's list, American Airlines Flight 383 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_383) occurred within a few days of the SLC accident. No, it wasn't "low and slow", but merely awful damn low: 225 feet below the runway of the hilltop airfield.

Drum-type altimeter was cited as a possible contributor. (Wasn't this also cited in an early L-188 accident at LGA?)

[Capn Bloggs]

Yep, we need to get rid of those glass cockpit speedtape deathtraps and return to round dials
What a ridiculous conclusion. As already pointed out, the 727 was the transition from props to jets. Second, all those lessons/skills learnt over decades flying round-dial 727s, 737s, 747s and myriad other round-dial jets carried the industry through the glass age. Now that, at last, those flying skills are being lost, so the crashes are now increasing. Lack of flying skill combined with non-optimal ASI.

OK465, yet another sweeping generalisation. Nobody here is suggesting we return to the three-pointer altimeter. We're talking about airspeed.

[FGD135]

tdracer, I would echo what TriStar_drvr and aterpster said about the likely reason for those 727 EIS crashes, which means that they were nothing like the 4 stall crashes we have had since 2009.


My point is that for the recent crashes, there was a period of airspeed decay, of which the pilots were unaware. This airspeed decay allowed the aircraft to stall, and it was this stall that was the primary reason for the crash. Oh, and the pilots were trying to fly the plane - they weren't gazing out the window.


I am of the belief that this tendency to be unaware of the airspeed decay is a recent development, and that the presentation of airspeed via the "tape" (as opposed to the big round dial of yesteryear) has got a lot to do with it.


If it can be shown that the industry did not experience similar accidents in the period prior to the glass cockpits than this would tend to support my assertion, hence my interest in this period. I thank those on this thread that are assisting me identify similar accidents from that period.


So far, only one has been identified that has the prerequisite period of airspeed decay, of which the pilots appear to have been unaware. This was identified by ironbutt57 and I thank him for that.


That accident was in 1972. It was a 737-200 that had levelled at the MDA, with speed brakes extended. It had just been instructed to go around, and that instruction was acknowledged. The stickshaker had been operating for a good 20 seconds, but the airspeed did not decay all the way to the stall, so it is possible the PF was aware of the airspeed. It was the retraction of the flap to 15 degrees that brought on the stall. The full report here:


http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR73-16.pdf

[FGD135]

Now that, at last, those flying skills are being lost, so the crashes are now increasing.
Excellent point, Capn Bloggs, and that increasing accident rate is evident in that Airbus safety summary linked to by Oggi, a few posts ago.

[tdracer]

Now that, at last, those flying skills are being lost, so the crashes are now increasing.

Excellent point, Capn Bloggs, and that increasing accident rate is evident in that Airbus safety summary linked to by Oggi, a few posts ago. If that's the conclusion you reached from the Airbus report, I must question your reading comprehension.


"Number of fatal accidents per year statistically decreasing since the 1960s despite rapidly increasing number of flights."
Lets take some numbers from that Airbus Report:
Number of fatal accidents/year:

2000: 10
2001: 9
2002: 8
2003: 7
2004: 4
2005: 9
2006: 7
2007: 8
2008: 8
2009: 8
2010: 8
2011: 5
2012: 4
2013: 6

So, 2013 had the 4th lowest number of fatal crashes in the last 20 years, 2011 had the 3rd lowest, and 2012 tied (with 2004) for the lowest - despite a 40% increase in the number of flights over that time period. Further, every generation of aircraft has had a better accident rate that the preceding generation.


I'm with olesak - now you're just making :mad: up.


BTW, even if you can't be bothered to read that number in the box, just exactly how much brain power does it take to recognize that the pointer on the speed tape and the barber pole are rapidly approaching each other? The PFD on the 777 is nearly twice the size of that on the 767 (64 sq. in. vs. 36 sq. in.) yet so far no ones stuffed a 767 because they couldn't read the airspeed. Asian didn't recognize that their airspeed was decaying dangerously BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T LOOK :ugh:

[FGD135]

If that's the conclusion you reached from the Airbus report, I must question your reading comprehension.tdracer, a picture tells a thousand words.


Have a look at the graph on page 9. That is the "10 year moving average accident rate per million flights". Look at the yellow line, representing 4th generation jet airliner types. You can see that line has been gradually increasing from its lowest point in 2005. Ditto the graph on page 10.

And, all the LOC-I graphs show an increase from 2005 (albeit with a slight decrease in recent years).

[Spooky 2]

The UAL 727 did not land short of the runway. If you can't get your facts right please go post on something like airliners.net where they believe all the BS that's posted:mad:

[Capn Bloggs]

you guys have a perverted interest in airspeed being taken care of by something other than the pilot.
Err, no, merely an interest in presenting said airspeed info in a nice clear easy-to-interpret form.

I would quite happily disconnect the ATS and do it myself most times... if they'd let me! :)

Let's face it, as has been said before, the only reason they went to tapes was coz they couldn't fit a round dial in, because pilots didn't need to fly the nice new shiny glass machines, just use the autos... oh how wrong have they been proved.

[tdracer]

The UAL 727 did not land short of the runway. If you can't get your facts right please go post on something like airliners.net where they believe all the BS that's posted:mad:


Spooky:
Fatal Plane Crashes and Significant Events for the Boeing 727 (http://www.airsafe.com/events/models/b727.htm)
United Airlines Flight 227 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_227)


Would you care to elaborate on what facts I posted that were incorrect?


I'm OK with spirited debate - the other stuff you can go :mad:

[FGD135]

tdracer,


That 727 accident was not the result of a stall. I suspect that most of the others on that list were also not stall related. I've lost count of how many times I've asked for stall related accidents.


Are you having trouble comprehending what I have asked for?

[porterhouse]

I've lost count of how many times I've asked for stall related accidents.What the ...? No one here has better things to do than spend a day (or more) sifting through accident reports (many of them in 'legacy' format that are not easily searchable) and provide you with a number. And then it would be a wasted effort anyhow because as other remarked you have no clue about statistics, you simply shoot from the hip and think it will stick.

[tdracer]

That 727 accident was not the result of a stall. I suspect that most of the others on that list were also not stall related. I've lost count of how many times I've asked for stall related accidents.


Are you having trouble comprehending what I have asked for? Perhaps I am. Asiana didn't stall, at least not in the conventional sense. Asiana crashed because the airspeed dropped dangerously low before the aircrew attempted corrective action. The 727 crashed because the airspeed dropped dangerously low before the crew attempted corrective action. Perhaps I'm being simplistic, but sounds the same to me :eek:

Setting aside the inconvenient fact that the original glass cockpit aircraft - 757/767 and A310, have never had a stall caused crash that wasn't due to bad air data (which you've chosen to ignore), explain this:
The Airbus report (which, BTW, mirrors similar reports from Boeing) says that Gen 1 aircraft (round dials) never got below 2/million fatal crashes. Gen 2 aircraft (round dials) did better, but never got below ~0.7/million fatal crashes. Gen 3 (glass), once the numbers became statistically significant, never got ABOVE 0.5/million (and are currently running ~ 0.2/million), while Gen 4 (glass plus) again once the numbers became statistically significant, has never been above 0.2/million and currently has, aghast! increased over the last few years from ~0.05 to ~0.10.


Oh the humanities!!!! :(


So, again, what is your justification for saying the accident rate is getting worse?

[FGD135]

... the original glass cockpit aircraft - 757/767 and A310, have never had a stall caused crash that wasn't due to bad air data (which you've chosen to ignore) ...
Those aircraft all had the big round dial of yesteryear! Careful now, you're supporting my hypothesis!


explain this ...Explain what, exactly? With one exception, all of those trends are perfectly understood and accepted. (The exception is the gradual rise in the accident rate of 4th generation types since 2005).


You seem to think that I am saying the round dial airliners are safer than the glass cockpit types. That is NOT what I have been saying at all. Not even close. Go back and have a look at what I have been suggesting. Hint: airspeed "tape" vs airspeed as a big round dial.

[Jwscud]

It is worth pointing out that you are not necessarily actually reading numbers when you look at an airspeed tape. You will have the facility to input at least one reference bug and also a movable (usually magenta) speed bug. Surely when you scan the speed it is the position of the speed line relative to the bug and the trend if visible that you are looking at and not necessarily the digits themselves?

[RAT 5]

Surely when you scan the speed it is the position of the speed line relative to the bug and the trend if visible that you are looking at and not necessarily the digits themselves?

Absolutely spot on; and is true of all the magenta bug displays. Is the a/c white performance speed/hdg/alt lined up with the magenta cmd bug? Quick & easy to ascertain at a glance. In B732 I had to fly 210, 190, 170, 150kts etc for the various flap settings. Now on NG I just fly the green F bug which is high;lighted by the CMD bug. Simple easy. Am I + or - not a specific number.

[LiveryMan]

Seems to me this whole speed tape vs round dial argument is on the same vein as the old "3 vs 2 cockpit crew" argument, "metal skin vs fabric skin", "stagecoach vs railway" or "horse vs walking."

There are people who get to used to a certain way of doing things and are staunchly anti-change.

Not all change is for the better. But the in this case, I cannot see the benefits of old analogue gauges over modern MFDs.

[RetiredF4]

RAT 5
Absolutely spot on; and is true of all the magenta bug displays. Is the a/c white performance speed/hdg/alt lined up with the magenta cmd bug? Quick & easy to ascertain at a glance. In B732 I had to fly 210, 190, 170, 150kts etc for the various flap settings. Now on NG I just fly the green F bug which is high;lighted by the CMD bug. Simple easy. Am I + or - not a specific number.

Simple and easy, that is, but........
it is also a good example, how disconnected you might get. Not the numbers to be flown are remembered, but the correct composition of the display bug to bug to color to whatever. Developing trends like getting fast or slow are clouded by the perfekt working system, the autothrottle takes care of it. Actually there is no need to check it at all, as everything is fine day in and day out. You still remember the speeds it should show with different configurations? The thinking process has been replaced by limitless faith into the technical solutions implemented in those modern cockpits. That was the trap the Asiana crew ended up at last.

I sometimes wonder, why there are still switches, dials and other manual operated input devices available. Evverything goes to some input box first, before it is transfered to respective aircraft systems. When will the time come where you talk to the machine instead of making archaic manual inputs?

Back to the speed indication. There are several digital informations displayed in some analoge display form like some pressure gauges, the reason is? If the speed information would be considered as a vital information, or lets say if the autothrottle system would not jet have been invented and speeds would need to be manipulated manually, we would imho see normal analogue looking (but digital working) speed displays.

Then comes the day when the system is mishandled (Asiana) or goes on leave (AF447) to name two examples and nobody is able to mind the speed store anymore. To compare accident rates of different years and models is for no use at all, as the difference between a 1. generation 737 and a 737NG is not restricted to a different airspeed display. There are tons of other improvements leading to those low accident rates.

On the other hand the airspeed display of todays modern jets is not unsafe in itself, if training and proficiency reflect the inherent importance of monitoring the speed and enforce the knowledge, how those handles (stick and throttle) influence speed trends. But this speed display has been degraded from one of the few main instruments in the center of the crosscheck to a tiny speck of digital numbers on the edge of a display. What should we then expect from training?

[barit1]

That 727 accident was not the result of a stall.

Of course not. The aeroplane got to the crash site just before it stalled.

Put another way, trees and cows got too big. :ugh:

[RetiredF4]

OK465
RF4, have you ever flown tapes?

No, i have not.
And note my comments please, i dont think they are harder to fly, but they are easier to overlook due to their size, their design to display numbers, and their location. And training seems not to emphasize the importance of the speed and the trends of speed anymore. Speed is a given, and the management of speed as well. It is no longer a task of the pilot, but a task of the machine.

Remember few posts before where it was stated that the problem of Asiana was not to go around when 4 red papis showed? Tat was the first error. Speed was the problem. Next sentence was pressing Toga would have been suficient. That was the second error. The autothrottle was disengaged and would not have delivered the power necessary. Two basic mistakes in analyzing the cause of an accident and the way to prevent it. Nearly the same habit with wich the Asiana crew managed to crash short of the runway. There seem to be more "Asiana" crews out there than on their rooster.

Concerning AF447: it would have been easier to observe pointers jiggling around on a big round display on a prominent location like those old analogue gauges than observing some glibberish on this tiny dislocated speed display. And when the failure was over some ten seconds later, it would have been obvious too.

My point is, the importance of the speed indication has vanished in the mindset of some crews and that might be due to the change in size and location of the speed display and the asociated training.

[RetiredF4]

OK465
And face it, in the F-4 one rarely looked at actual analog airspeed anyway after configured for landing (overhead or straight-in), you verified and just listened to the comforting steady AOA tone.

Airspeed was primary, aoa secondary information. The Aoa tone was not good for comunicating a trend, not each unit had its individual tone. The tone changed when going from fast to onspeed, from onspeed to slow in stepped and not fluid way.

Your comment concerning monitoring exact speeds with those digital indications my flights in the cockpit of A320 gave another impression. The crew dialed the speed into the respective window and the automation was doing the work, same like the Asiana crew was doing.

I know it should be different and should be closely monitored, but I have my doubts. If you would asked the average pilot out of the blue what his indicated airspeed would be, he would read you the numbers he dialed in before?

[aterpster]

Retired F4:


I know it should be different and should be closely monitored, but I have my doubts. If you would asked the average pilot out of the blue what his indicated airspeed would be, he would read you the numbers he dialed in before?

If he or she has a solid grasp of flying, and is properly trained in the 777, it would be obvious that one is a command (request, if you will), the other is actual IAS.

Having many years with round dials, and in recent years with tapes, I like both although I believe tape to be superior.

[AirRabbit]

Humans are fallible – pilots are humans (for the most part, anyway) – therefore, pilots are fallible. What’s interesting is that when those humans/pilots are deprived of one or more of the things that “make them whole ‘n healthy” … like adequate nourishment, adequate hydration, and adequate rest/sleep; or if those humans/pilots are put into a circumstance where they are to be closely monitored and their resulting performance will have potentially significant ramifications; or if one of these humans/pilots has some significant personal circumstance (death in the family, birth of a child, just won the national lottery) … or some combination of the preceding … it isn’t wholly abnormal to see a pilot make a mistake (perhaps more than one), and, also depending on what kind of circumstance that individual may have been exposed to or deprived of … it is increasingly likely that the commission of an error may, in fact, go unnoticed.

Now if that error is something that has historically been a “habit pattern,” particularly throughout training, the individual may have been demonstrating a behavioral tendency in development, where, perhaps, that tendency was either compensated for by an unusual intervention (like an instructor or flying partner mumbling a memory jogger … like … “OK, we’re settling into the slot nicely now, looking for (and then casually mention either a power setting or rate of descent), and 100 feet over the threshold…” and doing so in a tone of voice that isn’t terribly noteworthy. As a result, it just may be that the individual may not pick up on the fact that he/she has become overly dependent on that nonchalant cue (whether it was verbal or something else) … so much so, in fact, that unless he/she is razor sharp, fully rested, fully awake and cognizant, properly nourished and hydrated, with his/her mind fully riveted on the task being accomplished at the moment, that unrecognized and unresolved potential “habit pattern” or “behavioral tendency” could be the making of yet another “pilot error accident.”

These kinds of tendencies are more prevalent than some may recognize or want to acknowledge … but they DO exist … and it is the instructors’ mission to notice, and correct, those kinds of developing tendencies. With a proper understanding of how to recognize such habit patterns or behavioral tendencies, and an understanding of what to do, as well as when, where, and how to do it, a successful intervention can definitely be accomplished to the degree that such tendencies might not ever raise their sometimes “ugly heads” again. BUT, that takes instructor awareness – and that almost always requires really good instructor training. If those kinds of instructors are developed and used, the frequency with which line pilots return to the “training school” should be sufficient to negate the development of any newly developing behaviors or habits that might, without proper training, develop into the makings of an accident or incident.

Almost no matter how you cut it … training is going to be the bottom line mechanism that we all can and should be prepared to use to at least maintain, if not improve, the safety level we all desire.

[tdracer]

Those aircraft all had the big round dial of yesteryear! Careful now, you're supporting my hypothesis!I assume you're speaking of the "standby" instruments, which (at least on the 757/767) the pilots are trained to use ONLY if the glass PFD failed, and they are not exactly "big". I suspect most flight crews seldom if ever look at the standby instruments (especially during a 'high workload' situation such as landing) (BTW, the 777 has round dial 'standby' instruments, granted they are LCD displays and not real round gauges - Asian apparently didn't look at those either). We had a problem back around 1990 with the 767 standby instruments blanking - and they were in service something like 9 months before we got the FIRST squawk (and that from a Boeing flight test pilot):=

As for the size of the speed tape display on the 777 being "tiny", the speed tape takes up ~8 sq. inches on the PFD. That's the same area of a 3.2" diameter round dial, and the digital reading is nearly a square inch - several times the size of the digital reading on a typical 3" round dial.

[misd-agin]

3000 hrs of tape airspeed indicators and 18,000 hrs of round airspeed indicator.


There is a transition going from round dial to tapes. It's like going from a analog to digital watch.


Once you get adjusted to modern airspeed tapes, IMO, it's better than round dial Mk 1. Buffet margin, stall speed, etc, is constantly displayed.


The biggest weakness, but a more related to altimeter and VVI/VSI instruments, is that you can't glance at the gauges and INSTANTLY get feedback (a la an analog watch). Altimeter at 12 o'clock is the required altimeter and VVI/VSI at 9 o'clock means the airplane will stay there. With tapes it's harder (a la a digital watch).

[FGD135]

I assume you're speaking of the "standby" instruments ... Sigh... tdracer, you are really not at all with it. The whole discussion for the last 3 pages of this thread has been:


The airspeed indicator


No, not the standby instruments, not the altimeter. The airspeed indicator. You made a statement about first generation glass types such as A310, B757/767 having apparently zero fatal stall crashes, and I then suggested that this, in fact, fits my hypothesis perfectly - that aircraft with the big round dial (AIRSPEED INDICATOR) have not had anywhere near the rate of fatal stall crashes that aircraft with the tape have had.


The A310, B757/767 and others from that time ALL HAD THE BIG ROUND AIRSPEED DIAL. Can you now see how your statement supported my hypothesis?


The aeroplane got to the crash site just before it stalled.So that qualifies it as a stall crash does it, barit1? That is just silly. Here is the one sentence summary of that crash from the NTSB:


REMARKS- PILOT FAILED TO TAKE TIMELY ACTION TO ARREST AN EXCESSIVE DESCENT RATE DURING THE LANDING APPROACH


Back to the issue of airspeed tapes versus airspeed as a big round dial:


A lot of posters are saying things like "I have no trouble using the tape". Sure, none of us have a problem using it in the low workload, low stress situation. Our brains have to work a bit harder than they would with the dial, but we don't notice that because it is a low stress situation.


When the chips are down, however, it is a very different story, and I would dearly love for some proper human factors studies to be done under these (simulated) conditions.


The whole problem with the tape is that it requires way too much brain power, so when the chips are down, the brain will avoid it. This is a natural thing about all humans, and is related to that well-known tendency of humans to "task-shed" when the going gets busy/stressful.


Why does it require so much brain power? For a number of reasons:


1. You can't just glance at it. In normal, low stress situations such as an approach, yes, you can theoretically "glance" at the spatial separation between the lubber line and the Vapp bug, then make a speed correction based on that degree of separation. But, in these situations, and even though you don't need to, you tend to read the digits - you can't stop yourself.


But if the bug is some distance from the lubber line, you may not see it in your peripheral vision (because that bug may be tiny), so you must move your gaze to a point further along the tape (a point where you think the bug may be) in the hope that it comes into view. This all takes time. Whilst your gaze is transferring, you cannot see anything at all (a well known aspect of human vision). At the end of all this, you will have completed your assessment of spatial separation between bug and lubber line.


And how do you then go at deciding what action you must take to correct the speed? There is a concept known as "command indication" when it comes to aircraft instrumentation. A command indication is when you must "go towards" the indication in order to make a correction.


The most obvious examples of command indications are glideslope, localiser and course CDI. If the localiser needle is "to the left", you must make a correction "to the left" in order to correct. If the glideslope needle is "down", you must go "down" to correct. I'm sure everyone is highly familiar with the idea of command indications - we use them almost everyday, almost instinctively - with almost zero brain power.


The speed tape gives indications that are the OPPOSITE of command indications! If you are climbing after takeoff, with one engine out, and the V2 bug is "above", well, guess what? You have to go "down" - that is, lower the nose to increase airspeed (and bring the bug down towards the lubber line).


2. The area of interest on the speed tape is tiny - typically 1" x 1". The vertical size of the total tape display may be 5-8 inches, but all that extra space is only rarely used. It takes time to get the gaze into the right spot, and turbulence and g forces can exacerbate this.


3. The biggest problem with the speed tape would be that it does not, and cannot, show the big picture. To get an idea of what I mean by "big picture", consider the big round airspeed dial of yesteryear.


Lets say you're in an upset or some other crisis and your attention has been elsewhere for the last few seconds. If a glance at it revealed the pointer in about the 2 o'clock position, what would that instantly tell you? In simple terms, it tells you that you are about 2/12ths of good.


In the same situation with a speed tape, you would have to get your eyes focused into that 1" x 1" patch and read the digits. There may be red bits and patterns on the tape. The whole thing may be red. You may have to look at several points on the tape. Let's say you read 80 knots. Now you have to work out where that speed fits into the big picture.


At this point, some of you are probably saying that you would instantly know that 80 knots means "bad". But, that does not actually happen instantly. There is some brain processing required to read and assimilate a group of digits. In a roundabout way, you would end up with the view that you were about 2/12ths of good!


With the big dial, one glance gives you the big picture. The airspeed tape can only ever give a small picture.


For the 3 minutes it took AF447 to fall to the Atlantic Ocean, the airspeed indicators, if they had been the big dial, would have been pointing in about the 1 o'clock position.


But those poor souls had only the speed tapes. How much use would the tapes have been? The entire tape may have been red, or showing some other patterns that the pilots had only seen once before (years earlier, in a classroom).


What would the pilots have made of that? Would they have avoided them altogether because they thought they were malfunctioning? Or because the computers were playing up? Did the zero G fall make it more difficult to get the eyes into the 1" x 1" patch?

[MrSnuggles]

I posted in this very thread about how the human vision differentiates between different kinds of motions and what processes are most instinctual deep in our brains. It is an interesting piece of research and one that is extremely relevant for airline pilots.

So, some of this will be repeat from my previous post.

But, the human vision is adapted to quickly and accurately discover angular movement and it's rate of motion. (Remember, most of our movements are angular - arms and legs like pendulums rotating around a "stiff" torso.) This ever touches the subject of navigation by stars.

Linear motion is discovered second, but - and this is a biiiig BUT - it is the MOTION that is discovered, not necessarily any shapes, colours or digits. This might seem unintuitive but imagine you stand on the prairie and something comes rushing towards you (linear motion). You don't wait to see what kind of predator it is, or if it is a dark blue or grey Land Rover. To notice this you need to make a concious effort to overcome the motion in order to see the license plate.

To make vital instruments in a cockpit (speed is kind of vital, right) like round dials therefore does not seem to be such a big deal. It's just a matter of programming.

If there is a huge reluctance to do so, I would suggest a speed tape someting more like the old speedmetres in old cars where you have a reference point that is absolute - ZERO km/h in the case of a car.

http://www.usabil.nu/message/bilder/20120618_191327.JPG

This design makes it easier to see where on the tape you are, generally, and if you really need to get your momentarily exact speed you could look at some fancy gadget somewhere else.

My line of thinking is that you rarely* need to know the EXACT speed. You need to know your speed is around-ish, below max Mach but above stall speed.


Vr, V2, etc are of course very familiar exceptions, but the old speed bugs will do just fine on a round dial. When in cruise the exact number is rarely used.

[CaptainEmad]

Fgd135 has a point.

Digital watches, any number of novelty presentations never really caught on.

Analogue dial, like my watch and yours too probably, requires almost no processing.
I would suggest that the brain is able to use the dial presentation raw.
One brief glance will give you all the information you need.

[slf4life]

Digital watches may never have caught on as in cd replacing vinyl, but certainly digital presentation of time is commonplace, and instantly processed as a single piece of information. Perhaps a similar, singlular clear presentation of speed would assist in the modern flight deck?

[dazdaz1]

Just glanced at my digital watch, 13:49 in a nano second, that information is translated in my brain to a clock face for alternative perspective from numbers, to a identifiable time. Try it, our brains take us to a clock face.

[Cool Guys]

I have designed many user interfaces in industry. I have seen people get confused and make mistakes on a badly designed interface. I agree with the majority of posters here, in particular FDG135.

As mentioned earlier the cognitive mind has a limited capacity. In a high demand situation when we get more and more things we have to process we can get to a point where we can no longer process any more information. This is commonly called task saturation. The number of tasks we perform at once is relevent, but the issue we are disscussing now in this thread is the amount of mental processing a particular task consumes.

Some tasks consume more cognitive “energy” than others (cognitive “energy” is the best description for me). Reading a technical manual will generally consume more than glossy magazine. An intense political debate will consume more than a casual conversation. A well designed interface consumes less cognitive “energy”, leaving more for any demanding situation that may arise. A clear and quickly recognisable display is important.

When flying or driving our cognitive mind takes inputs from the various senses such as sight, sound and feel. The less cognitive “energy” consumed by these inputs the more there is left over for analysing these inputs and implementing the correct or most survival response based on our training and experience.

In normal situations the digital display is fine, but they do require more mental processing than a typical analogue display, which results in less mental processing capacity for other tasks such as flying the plane. In a high demand situation it can mean the difference between life and death. AF447 and Asiana214 pilots did have a higher demand on them at the time than what they were used to. Whether or not a different interface would have affected the outcome is of course debatable.

The physical and mental condition of a person at a particular time also affects his cognitive capacity. This includes stress, sleep, diet, training level, experience etc

[Jwscud]

The point I was trying to make again is that you are simply not thinking about how you use a tape. You as the pilot set the bug so you know what your target speed is. You then scan the position of the bug relative to the speed and direction it is moving.

The speed bugs on both types I fly have a total width of 5 knots, so if the needle is within the confines of the bug you are at most 2.5kts from your target speed. You do not read the numbers. Is it not possible that those whose scans focus on and read the numbers are simply scanning the wrong thing? From my limited experience, scanning technique is not well taught - nobody has really been through it since the days of initial IR and the 6-pack despite training on 3 completely different EFIS systems. After the G-THOF stall on missed approach, Thomson carried out some tests on pilots' scans in the sim and found some experienced pilots' scans to be seriously deficient.

The issue of intuitiveness and corrections to make is difficult as it depends on which way you are controlling speed. When you are controlling speed with thrust it provides correct sensing - bug up, thrust up. When controlling sped with pitch in a fixed thrust situation, surely it is fairly basic airmanship to know the correct pitch input on the correct end of the drag curve?

[A340Yumyum]

Basically, this accident was the result of 2000 ft's worth of MCP 'Bingo'. An attempt to control the poor approach capture coupled with extremely poor knowledge of the automatics. They almost had it sorted (albeit late) until FLCH was selected with the GA alt set. After that, it only went downhill but they had every opportunity to firewall the TLs and do a standard GA until about100' RA.

A sad and unnecessary loss.

[aguadalte]

I remember a couple of decades ago, that one had to calculate the approach speed, write it in a card and fly it (without ATHR or AT) until the landing flare...

Today, if you ask your co-pilot or captain, at the end of the landing roll: "What was our Vapp, today?", most of them will hardly remember...

Its not a question of having a round dial or a speed tape in your cockpits, its the way computers have interfered with our flights nowadays...

The only solution IMHO is awareness, and awareness must be called up in all training sessions.

[BOAC]

The only solution IMHO is awareness - great fun also - turn down the wick in the co's map display and ask him/her where you are.

[roulishollandais]

You need to know your approach speed, but also your pitch and power at the actual weight in case of UAS in the successive configurations of approach... How are they doing ?:}

[aguadalte]

BOAC - (What's wrong with you, man? You're one of the guys I've learned to respect in this forums...and I don't need to turn down the wick in the co's map display and ask him/her where you are, a double FMGS failure will do the work in the Flight Sim...) I wasn't joking or trying to make fun of the discussion around analog dials vs speed tapes.

I was questioning the fact that, since approach speeds are chosen noawadays by FMGCs (not calculated by the pilots), pilots tend to rely on flight computers. And I was saying that, that particular feature comes with a price: pilots are more and more "disconnected" from basics.

In the past, a flight instructor had a hard work remembering his students, again and again, to "mind their speed"... Today, we see pilots stalling aircraft because they thought the AT was doing their job...

By the way, roulishollandais, my students are doing well thank you, they have never landed on a wrong strip, nor stalled any aircraft. UAS is one of the first things I teach in the Flight Sim, as well as how to use their heads, in order not to get killed.

[BOAC]

a double FMGS failure will do the work in the Flight Sim... - see PM - indeed it will, but the opportunities for such an exercise are few and far between, whereas 'turning down the wick' does not need a TRI/SFI/simulator and can be done at any time if you wish to demonstrate 'disconnection from basics'?

[aguadalte]

Agree BOAC, (please see PM). Although some things can't be done inflight nowadays, there are plenty of minor questions that may show that sort of "disconnection".:ok: