Incident at Heathrow

[EcamSurprise]

Might be that way in flight sim flaps 5 but not in reality.

PF does walk around in BA (pilot flying...as in if the captain is flying, he also does walkaround). And the comment about captain wanting first sector is comedy.



Sounds like an interesting way of doing it.

At my outfit (short turns..) the PNF does the walk around while the PF sets up the cockpit.
From a 'monitored' POV, the other way around would probably make more sense!

[Ian W]

Heathrow Harry: that is not so. The risk is small (actually vanishingly small) but it is there. There have been ignitions on retail forecourts. Commercially available Mobile phones are not intrinsically safe and non "Ex" devices are banned in refineries and terminal process areas.

Yes, you have to try really hard to ignite fuel in a vehicle tank (and it usually happens from static from the phone across the filler neck rather than RF into vapour) but as an ex-oil company HSE person who investigated several retail site fires I assure you the risk is always there.

UKPIA - Refining Britain's Fuels - Mobile Phones on Filling Station Forecourts (http://www.ukpia.com/industry_issues/health-and-safety/mobile-phones-on-forecourts.aspx) sums it up (the Energy Institute is the former Institute of Petroleum).

Rob (Member: Energy Institute)

NONE of the incidents on forecourts was due to the mobile phones this is stated in the report you provide.
Jet A does NOT lead to an 'explosive mixture' on an open pan in the same way that gasoline or AvGas conceivably might close to a refuelling hose.
Almost all the staff working around the aircraft now use handheld radios which are also not rated for within 'explosive mixture' environments.
Perhaps less concern should be given to 'vanishingly small' (unquote) possibilities of a smart phone causing a fire if they can obviate real proven risks.
'

[cessnapete]

In BA the PF always does the preflight walk around. On the the LongHaul fleets I am most familiar with the SOP is a complete role reversal including engine start.
All the types I flew had nose wheel steering on the FO side as well,l which facilitated this operation.
I think you will find Bond'll Dos don't tust the FO method, is a hark back to earlier times. I never carried out a preflight walk around with the Capt. Holding my hand!!

[Hand Solo]

Doesn't really matter if the PNF loads the FMC, the PF will still have to check it and brief the contents.

[BOAC]

It doesn't really matter who does what as long as SOP tasks are completed and checked (and crew thumb-twiddling allocated as per). Out of interest, in DanAir as an F/O I often flew the outbound sectors, and the same in BA at LGW. When I did my command training in BA I gingerly asked TCs why it was that Captains seemed to do the outbound sectors and was told "There is nothing written down, old boy, its just the way we do it ......." As a Captain in BA and Astraeus I ignored the "unwritten rule" and only with two F/Os regretted it.

Probably time to draw our own conclusions, boys and girls and drag this back on topic?

[Dan Winterland]

It sounds like BA have some fairly unconventional SOPs. Does this also extend to re-writing the manuals? Do the cowling latches actually feature in the walk around check?

[NigelOnDraft]

NoD - agreed, but it seems to me as a complete outsider that there's a big list of things which need to be checked, all of which are mission critical, and so they all need to be checked, not just some of themUmmm... well let's start by pointing out that the walkround check is, by definition, limited to things that can be reached / seen by someone the height of whoever is doing the walkround, not opening any panels, nor allowed any tools except a torch. I would suggest that covers <5% of the "mission critical" items ;)

[lomapaseo]

Things to keep in mind

You can't eliminate human error, only minimize it

Some ideas for minimization are

by rote

duplication of tasks

Tolerance to the error

The one lesson I learned in this incident was that the tolerance bit was not as much as I expected from my experience.

I suspect it's rather easy to recommend BA clean up their possibility of human error and SOPs but that just pushes a repeat downstream to somebody else next time for a different reason altogether.

I've seen lots of collateral damage to aircraft from small bits being dislodged and no loss of safe flight and landing that I can think of (I know somebody's gonna come up with one but it's the likelihood I work with)

I am surprised about the collateral damage as reported to the right hand engine leading to a fire. I would want this looked at very closely by the AAIB for opportunities for minimization of effect.

[EcamSurprise]

With regards to the captain doing the outbound sector- surely this depends on the weather conidtions and other factors
My outfit mainly does 4 sector days so in any case as a FO I will (usually) do one outbound and it's usually my choice which.

Sometimes it will be dictated by weather. For example
If the crosswind is crosswind is outside of my 25kt limit.

[Alber Ratman]

I'm an engineer and while I do believe that the PF should carry out his preflight walkaround in accordance with Flight Crew Operating Manuals, I feel its totally unfair that the Capt/FO who did the check in this particular case is should be lambasted in any way.. A task that has been stated in other forums by engineers in the know of this companies proceeduresand that would be stated on a task card as requiring signing as a duplicate inspection was signed and not done.
Just culture applies so the reasons why it wasn't done must be investigated..

The wording AMS's comes into play.. I have heard that before at another company.. Approved Mechanics? AKA Car Mechanics who have been crash coursed A Modules and given approvals after a couple of years? Am I on the ball?

[worrab]

The Times today:

"The large metal covers...worked loose...severing a fuel pipe and hydraulic system. This led to a lack of thrust from the engines and both sets of landing gear."

:)

[Flap 5]

Well according to our QRH for the A320 the PNF does the walk-around. I guess this company specific, however from what I recall this was also Airbus QRH procedure / SOP's.

Exactly right Syntax. However I had forgotten how different BA can be! But then it is 25 years since I flew for them. It is standard operating Airbus procedure.

Of course if the Captain did the walk around in this case then he should indeed have checked the cowls. Of course the Engineer signing the aircraft off should have secured them but then it is normal for the pilot to check and the engineers don't get offended, unlike some on this thread!

[Max Angle]

I believe some airlines don't even let the FO call stop on a rejected takeoff.
The majority of the worlds airlines follow the Boeing and Airbus recommendation that the Captain makes the decision and actions the reject, BA are relativity unusual in allowing the FO to call and action a stop.

[greatwhitehunter]

Alber

In BA an AMS is an aircraft maintenance supervisor. An AMS is B1 or B2 licenced. There are LAEs, licenced aircraft engineers, again B1 or B2 licenced. Technicians are A licenced. Lastly BA has mechanics with no licence. Mechanics are either ex-apprentices or direct entry. The direct entry mechanics vary from people with experience and possibly licences to guys who have little or no engineering experience of any sort.

Just for clarification.:)

[Airlifter]

Some interesting reading...

Transportation Safety Board of Canada - Aviation Investigation Report A00O0199 (http://www.bst.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2000/a00o0199/a00o0199.asp)

And for those wondering what an unlatched cowl might look like, see the accompanying photos.

[Jo90]

Apologies if someone has already asked this question. I can't claim to have ploughed through all 39 pages of the thread!

Why don't the cowling hinges incorporate a spring to partially but readily visibly open the cowlings any time the latches are not secured?

[Alber Ratman]

Thanks "Great White Hunter" for that clarification..

AMS being the shift supervisor then..
LAE's Under the AMS and so on..

[Helen49]

As someone who has sat in terminals many times watching aircrew pre-departure inspections I would make the following comment......

I have seen and even timed some incredibly fast PDIs, often with the pilot scarcely looking at the actual aircraft, just a few cursory glances! As an unscientific generalisation, I have never seen a female pilot do anything but a very thorough inspection!

I sometimes get the impression that the inspection 'assumes' that everything will be OK having been checked previously by an engineer and that the aircrew inspection is merely a 'tick in the box'.

I have always taught that the inspection [in any circumstance] is the opportunity, may be the last opportunity, to discover a problem before that problem causes an even bigger problem. It requires time, concentration, thoroughness, detailed knowledge of the subject matter and the state of mind which 'expects' the unexpected.

I have only read about 50% of this thread, so please forgive any duplication and I make no comment on the specific incident concerning the BA aircraft.

[ZFT]

It requires time, concentration, thoroughness, detailed knowledge of the subject matter and the state of mind which 'expects' the unexpected.

I have only read about 50% of this thread, so please forgive any duplication and I make no comment on the specific incident concerning the BA aircraft.

Oh the irony

[pax2908]

So on this occasion, a maintenance-related problem ended up in the news. On the other hand concerns have been raised about the continuous degradation of the working conditions, staff reductions, shorter turnarounds and so on. So it should be possible to quantify the effect - for example by looking for problems that have been spotted e.g. during walkaround(s) or problems which later developed during flight but were not serious enough to require reporting. Would the AAIB look into this matter?

[Wingswinger]

I feel its totally unfair that the Capt/FO who did the check in this particular case is should be lambasted in any way..

I don't agree. I wouldn't choose the word "lambasted" but the unlatched cowls really should have been spotted during the exterior inspection.

For the record, I am a current Airbus TRE (and an ex-BA training captain) and have flown several thousand hours on the aircraft with both V2500 and CFM engines. The nature of the V2500 cowl latches is no secret. The flight crew member doing the inspection really needs to get down to check them. That used to be strongly emphasised to all converting pilots during line training.

It was dinned into me during my tyro days as a pilot (in the RAF) that one should never assume but always check. It is, after all, one's own pink body up there, not the engineer's. I'll leave it at that.

[Megaton]

That used to be strongly emphasised to all converting pilots during line training.

Really? :=

[Draft Dodger]

I am really sorry if this has already been covered, but does anybody know what happened to the cowls when they detached from the aircraft. Where did they land. I have not seen any reports of them in a field anywhere.

[bugged on the right]

In a former life as a Flight Engineer our company proceedures were that the captain also carried out a walk around on every sector. I am ashamed to say that they sometimes found defects which I missed during my inspection. There were no recriminations, they kept an eye on me and I kept an eye on them. I am amazed at today's 25 minute turnarounds, I guess if it flew in it will fly out.

[Dysonsphere]

I am really sorry if this has already been covered, but does anybody know what happened to the cowls when they detached from the aircraft. Where did they land. I have not seen any reports of them in a field anywhere.

found on the runway I belive

[piperr]

Does anyone know if the 'hold open' stays mounted on the inner face of the cowl door actually flail about when a door opens during T/O /flight ?

The Youtube vid showing cowl doors being opened and 'stayed' doesn't show the stowage fixing for the engine end of a stay - spring clip(s) or requiring a tool - or both ?
The demo' engineer appears to merely unclip a stay.

If these items flail around in the slipstream prior to door breakup one could imagine engine ancillaries possibly taking a fair old whacking.

[Wingswinger]

Really?:=

Yes. It was to me and I passed it on to people I trained.

[slip and turn]

Just for clarification ....

Where might this thread be going? 25 minute turnarounds were mentioned a few posts back. The more observant might note that usually means a different type on a different airline - one perhaps where unsecured latches on the tops rather than the bottoms of CFM56-7s are more likely to go unnoticed by all except observant wing seat passengers?

Is this thread not mostly about what happened when time or diligence were spared incorrectly ? And does the big picture that includes this incident not suggest a whole host of potential latent defects (perhaps within some of the other 95%+ 'mission critical' stuff poor NigelOnDraft can but assume specialists got right before handing over the aircraft to him for service?

Are we tempted to run for the dubious cover of incident statistics when we ask ourselves what other latent defects are being flown daily? Are we everyday missing defects which are mitigated or held together only by that thin but marvelous veneer of robustness and reliability in design that was honed from experience during an era when far more attention was paid to getting basic checks right?

Are we getting to the point that the human bit is the most unreliable part of the system? :oh:

[4468]

Wingswinger

Why haven't you posted your thoughts on the BA BALPA forum? It's not difficult to guess who you are, and I'm pretty sure I've seen you post there before, along with many other retirees. That way perhaps you could prompt a discussion amongst BA Airbus pilots as to how this item has been trained since your departure????

Rather than making anonymous, judgemental pronouncements when investigation's findings are a very long way from being made public!

[Fargoo]

Does anyone know if the 'hold open' stays mounted on the inner face of the cowl door actually flail about when a door opens during T/O /flight ?

The Youtube vid showing cowl doors being opened and 'stayed' doesn't show the stowage fixing for the engine end of a stay - spring clip(s) or requiring a tool - or both ?
The demo' engineer appears to merely unclip a stay.

If these items flail around in the slipstream prior to door breakup one could imagine engine ancillaries possibly taking a fair old whacking.

They clip into a bracket on the cowl when stowed, I'd imaging they would detach from this bracket when the cowl comes apart in the airflow though.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

Rather than making anonymous, judgemental pronouncements

That's hypocritical coming from you as you did the very same thing about me. What's good for the goose...

[garpal gumnut]

As a frequent flyer, as a passenger, on both Airbus and Boeing of a similar size, I am amazed by the angels on a pin discussion on this complete cockup.
It is purely through chance that this aircraft returned safely to Heathrow.
Everything from cowling Engineer checks to the walk around by the Pilot appears to be a failure of SOPs and good practice.
Even the return of the aircraft to Heathrow over large populated areas rather than to peripheral airports with low population density appears to have been unwise.
Negligence abounds in this sad and sorry tale.
Luck won out.
The only saving fact is that the aircraft survived this Fawlty Towers flight, and lessons can be learnt.
Implementation of failsafe , simple SOP's and checks seems in order, with appropriate penalties for failure to do so.

[BARKINGMAD]

Alas once again the spotlight and the rifle sights have swung back onto the ramp, instead of being firmly aimed at the ivory towers of (mis)management!

Fascinating to see all these individuals designing or highlighting various "widgets and gizmos" to try to prevent this happening again, even though the might of Toulouse, the prime contractor, seemed unable to prevent it at the drawing board stage?

Unless we in our various roles as airframe drivers and airframe fixers exert the maximum pressure on the architects of the 25 minute turnround, the inadequate reporting times and the crazy devaluation of the engineering profession (it was one once), then the entire story will soon be re-enacted by another fleet & another company

I used to watch Captains and later found myself rushing to try to get ontime departures in order to compensate for the shortcomings of other areas of the industry which initiated the delay which we were now trying to minimize through rushing.

One day the haze cleared and I realised we were shooting ourselves in the foot by covering up the defects in other parts of the operation and leaving the beancounters and managements various with that warm wet feeling they were doing a good job. "Hey folks, look at our punctuality figures!", forgetting what sweat and tears had been shed on the line by the aircrew and engineers to achieve that result.

Now when the schedule looks like it's crumbling, through no fault of mine, I will enquire and initiate what little action I can as a mere line dog and then the "thumb-twiddling" starts and I recline the seat, close my eyes and wait for those responsible to catch up with their act.

I appreciate that they are probably having problems due to the same cost-cutting, manpower-pruning, resource-trimming exercises which got the company executives their promotion and bonuses in the first place, but the hasty action of airline "support" departments is rarely as deadly as the haste of engineers and pilots.

So once again I plead with the responsible contributors to this thread, can we please get away from the niff-naff and trivia of latch and cowling redesign, mirrors, phone cameras and overalls for pilot to lie on the apron, and concentrate our ire and our fire on where the ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY lies, including the sleeping dinosaurs in CAA/SRG and EASA? :ugh:

[Yaw String]

Hear hear Barking....
We are all too often our own worst enemies....

Fudging off chocks times,whilst appearing to help,will, in the end, never heal the problem, or expose the shortcomings..
Ever tighter schedules, serviced by an ever decreasing man/womanpower can only decrease flight safety in the long run.
One thing I have learned...when the rush starts...ask for another cup of coffee, take a deep breath,and, regroup your thoughts.
A crew that has been rushed towards an ontime departure is far less likely to cope with the unexpected..IMHO..

Ladies and gentlemen...RESIST!

[Filler Dent]

Good post Barkingmad.

The cost cutting HAS affected safety and the CAA and EASA don't appear to give a damn. Proposals are under way to get rid of the engineers licence completely - can we see where that's going to end up?

The failings in this incident highlight the erosion in standards over the years.
The removal of the engineer from the PDI.
The dilution of the licensing system to suit EASA and the airlines.
BA's obsession with "A" licence working and "self-motivation" without proper supervision by a "B" licence engineer.

I stood up in the crew room and told them 10 years ago! :ugh:
No one listened then........but someone got a bonus I'm sure.

[woptb]

Even the return of the aircraft to Heathrow over large populated areas rather than to peripheral airports with low population density appears to have been unwise.
Negligence abounds in this sad and sorry tale.
Luck won out.
The only saving fact is that the aircraft survived this Fawlty Towers flight, and lessons can be learnt.
Implementation of failsafe , simple SOP's and checks seems in order, with appropriate penalties for failure to do so.

Garpal,I guess you've never made an error or broken a rule ? In aviation (as opposed to less critical fields of endeavour) the outcomes can be VERY different.
Unfortunately people make errors,which can have devastating outcomes, for the same reason they forget to post a letter.

All aviation professionals do battle with their Human fallibilities eveyday,on our best days we can still screwup,add short turn rounds,bad design,fatigue,time pressure & its amazing that there aren't more problems.
Its because as professionals we work hard, train hard & realise ultimately we hold peoples lives in our hands.
The designers, operators & the regulators have a duty to ensure that they set us up to GET IT RIGHT - NOT WRONG, this is not the case.
If PAX realised the stresses & strains placed upon flight crew & ground crew they might vote with their feet. They don't realise that we can become so focussed on 'achieving' that bending/breaking the rules becomes the norm.
It would be nice if things changed across the piste,but unfortunately that takes something far more serious for things to change, people have to die, before the right questions are asked. The ripples from this event, particularly outside the aviation community, will fade quickly.

[4468]

garpal gumnut:
It is purely through chance that this aircraft returned safely to Heathrow

How astute you are. Whatever were those two lunatics in the front doing playing with all those knobs and buttons, whilst the a/c was suffering engine fire, engine failure, hydraulic failure, gear problems, etc!

Purely by chance did that superior machine manage to ignore all input by those pesky pilots and heroically deliver itself back to terra firma!

Makes one wonder why we bother having pilots at all? I'm sure a computer, or ground based pilot would have coped MUCH better! Those faultless designers, manufacturers and managers could rig something up for the travelling public, I'm sure of it!

[frequentflyer2]

In fairness to garpal gamnut, I don't think he's suggesting the pilots displayed anything other than flying skills second to none when the chips were down. He's simply pointing out had the chips descended any lower, all the expert flying in the world would not have been enough to save the aircraft, its passengers, crew and those on the ground who would have died had it plunged into even a moderately populated area following the potential "Kegworth-esque" final loss of power in the damaged engines.

[lomapaseo]

As a frequent flyer, as a passenger, on both Airbus and Boeing of a similar size, I am amazed by the angels on a pin discussion on this complete cockup.
It is purely through chance that this aircraft returned safely to Heathrow.

Everything from cowling Engineer checks to the walk around by the Pilot appears to be a failure of SOPs and good practice.
Even the return of the aircraft to Heathrow over large populated areas rather than to peripheral airports with low population density appears to have been unwise.
Negligence abounds in this sad and sorry tale.
Luck won out.

The only reason you are still alive is by chance. Everything you do in life chances an unwelcome outcome.

You really need to take your dramatization elsewhere or simply state an opinion in a poll someplace.

[NigelOnDraft]

garpal gumnut

Rather an over-dramatised post ;) Please NB this is at least the 33rd occurrance of this. So 32 previous occasions where ground and aircrew "SOPs" have similarly failed.

So how would you prevent it happening again? Just threaten the individuals:with appropriate penalties for failure to do soor maybe look at the design, the management processes, the pressure ground and aircrews are under?

As a frequent flyer, as a passengerMaybe whilst passengers are so intolerant of delays, the managment taking far more interest in why we were 3 minutes late off stand than Safety Reports we file over issues like this, we may get "commercial" and "safety" interests in a better balance ;)

For instance, if I wanted a robust system of checking the cowls were shut prior departure, I will leave my walkround until the loading is complete, any engineering taks are complete, and it becomes a genuine "last check". If you are happy we then go 5-10 minutes late, maybe an hour if we miss a slot, please say so :ok:

[Count Niemantznarr]

Does anyone know why many BA Engineers fly as cabin crew, and how much rest do they get after a long overnight flight back to Heathrow before they commence work on the aircraft?

[Megaton]

As usual Count, you're barking up the wrong tree. In fact, that sort of insinuation should be beneath even you :yuk:

[Count Niemantznarr]

How do you know whether that is relevant or not HP?

Why are Engineers flying as cabin crew?

[BARKINGMAD]

Why are Engineers flying as cabin crew?

Maybe M O'L is doing management consultancy work in "Watership Down" whilst Wee Willie is away sorting out the ill-fated marriage with Iberia?

Any chance WW would stand up in front of the press and explain what is going on during his watch??

Just to stress the orientation of where the fault(s) are hiding in the woodwork and urge us all to keep the 'sights elevated!! :rolleyes:

[TomU]

What I find interesting, is that when I was working line maintenance at Gatwick in the late 1970s early 1980s, it was normal that a certifying engineer/technician (as a minimum, qualified to sign the pre-flight/departure check) would be on the headset for departure. When all the servicing vehicles were away, and all doors closed, I would do a last action walk around and panel "thump" check. Then I would be on the headset to clear the pushback and engine start. This was standard procedure.
Even on aircraft with a Flight Engineer, the the last eyeballs on the aircraft were the certifying Eng/Tech before the aircraft pushed back.
I think I am glad I do not work line maintenance in this 'advanced' day and age.

[BOAC]

can we please get away from the niff-naff and trivia of latch and cowling redesign, - it would be good, wouldn't it? However, you know well that the chances of achieving what you call for are close to zero - King Canute sort of stuff, really, so why not try and improve the technical/operational bits to REDUCE the numbers of incidents? How many more cowls do you wish to see come off while you 'educate' management and the regulators? You also know that there are enough pilots out there either frightened to delay a flight or seeking managerial 'glory' by being 'the most punctual', so again, dream sheet stuff. How often do the 'attached' CAA pilots fly 4 sector days with 25 min turn-rounds so they actually KNOW what they are putting their signature to?

Your dreams are long-term, and, I fear, unachievable - a tech/procedural fix is much quicker. A pilot union that recognised the problems and did something about them would be useful too.

You are, as always, quite right about how to handle the delay. The only caveat is to log times accurately - paperwork, passage through security, crew transport/access to gates, baggage loading, fuel, catering, pax, ops cock-ups etc etc - all the hundreds of 'bits' that go wrong, and make SURE you have done your best to sort things out where your remit allows.

[gazumped]

The whole hoo hah about flying over a populated area is just so much rubbish!! The aircraft performed an OEI approach, big friken deal! Big news item, they fly on one engine, the second engine did not fail.
When an airliner declares a PAN the captain basicly follows the safest most logical route for him, his F/O, his crew, and passengers, and lastly his aircraft. Consideration about people on the ground is way down the list, as it should be.
The area you fly over has no bearing on the decision making process with a simple OEI approach, or for that for any QRH procedure, granted these guys had a bit more of a handful, but the aircraft was not in jeopardy, so it is a non issue.
The crew did a good job of getting it back safely, just as a vast majority of well qualified crew would have done, ie they did their job, nothing more and nothing less. They did what they were paid to do.
In the final wash up there may some egg to wear on face about the walk around, people make mistakes.
Enough about flying over populated areas. I have done a couple of OEI approaches in anger and I can very honestly say I did not give a single seconds thought about people on the ground, my brain space was fully occupied with the job in hand. You see if the captain is very very selfish about these situations and concentrates on saving his own ass, you will generally find most of the passengers follow closely behind, and everyone on the ground have no idea about what is happening, much like you Garpal!

[BARKINGMAD]

BOAC, you are right that my dreams are maybe too ambitious, but it seems to me to be an ideal opportunity to expose the structural failings in our industry and use this horrible incident/ accident as a stick with which to beat the perpetrators, wake up the public and the "regulators" and try to get a fundamental shift in the attitude and practices of those responsible?

If it's not engine cowlings next week, month or year, it will be something else traceable to the modern practices which will cause another disaster. Fine by all means address THIS failure with a metal-bending and cutting fix, but the fundamental rot goes deeper and wider.

Keep reading the CHIRPs as they arrive and then marvel it's taken this long to happen?

[woptb]

Barking,totally agree.
We are short-termist,airlines have become too fixated on the 'prize' ie money. Whilst the fan cowls beiing unlocked is 'partly' a design issue that must be addressed, it was not the only cause.The end result is a symptom of the wider issues affecting us.

If we don't address the causes,we'll have similar failures,until redundancy by design & the proffessionalism of maintainers & operators, is finally overcome & we have fatalities.

[RTM Boy]

The mindset of so many on here baffles me.

Gazumped, are you being serious, or just being controversial for the sake of it? What you are basically saying is that people on the ground are irrelevant and the captain is always right. Well, he should be. Just as he or the first officer should have spotted the unlatched catches. It's up to the aircrew where they come back to - but if the mayday had occured earlier in the flight, would they have come back to LHR???

As for people making mistakes, that you dismiss as egg-on-face, given the damage to the starboard engine and airframe it was a miracle they made it back to LHR at all. If the fuel line to the port engine had been severed also, where would they have landed? Victoria Station? The Natural History Museum? Kew Gardens? The Great West Road?

I genuinely think there is a real lack of appreciation by very many of the political and practical consequences of a plane on approach to LHR crashing on a populated area. The ramifications was extend far beyond the loss of the crew, PAX and anyone on the ground. It was sheer luck this did not happen last week.

If this risk is not factored into airline safety thinking it will be only a matter of time before it does happen and then forget a third runway - forget LHR altogether - and the consequences will spread far and wide to all other airports and airlines. The attitudes portrayed by some on here do not bode well for reducing the risks to the whole airline industry.

[greatwhitehunter]

Alber,

Not quite, there is a shift manager who has a number of AMSs under him at each location.

Each AMS looks after a number of staff and will be responsible for a given number of aircraft each day. :)

[gazumped]

I can find nothing in my QRH or AFM about considering the area I am flying over, it's not there and never will be.
Captains are not always right, they make mistakes, that's where CRM comes to the fore and a good F/O speaks up, that's the beauty of two crew.
This cowl V2500 thing has happened some 32 times before, your assertion that it was a miracle that the aircraft didn't end up as a crash is laughable. It was pure bad luck that a fuel pipe was fractured on the right engine. In all of the other events the cowls left the scene at rotation, just as these did, none of those fuel pipes were fractured.

I stand by claim, apart from an inadequate walk around, the crew did a good job. They got handed a certified airworthy aircraft, correctly signed off, engineering should wear most of the egg on face. Management /manufacturer/and regulator sowed the seeds for this many many years ago, but will hide behind their desks.

[Fargoo]

I stand by claim, apart from an inadequate walk around, the crew did a good job. They got handed a certified airworthy aircraft, correctly signed off, engineering should wear most of the egg on face. Management /manufacturer/and regulator sowed the seeds for this many many years ago, but will hide behind their desks.

Well put summary, questions need to be asked that will be painful for many not just the chaps who put their hands on the engines. Remains to be seen if the authorities have the teeth to ask these questions and follow through on any outcomes.

[woptb]

Gazumped,why should engineering have most of the egg on their face ?
You don't know (as yet) all the contributing factors,yet your happy to apportion blame? So much for just culture!
Its not about blame,its about finding out why it happened & mitigating against it happening again.

[NigelOnDraft]

If the fuel line to the port engine had been severed also, where would they have landed? Victoria Station? The Natural History Museum? Kew Gardens? The Great West Road?Quite an achievement to have flown the whole BPK SID from 27L, east of LAM and then to Victoria Station - all on no engines :D

but if the mayday had occured earlier in the flight, would they have come back to LHR???Yup :ok: Maybe a bit quicker, taken in N London as well.

I genuinely think there is a real lack of appreciation by very many of the political and practical consequences of a plane on approach to LHR crashing on a populated area.Doubt there is, but if the overflight risk is deemed unacceptable, then LHR closes. And many other airports worldwide as you say. Suspect it won't happen...

Do NB the aircraft that most closely came to taking out serious London population did not know it had a problem. So the crew's decision to overfly is not really the issue...

[1979 Engineer]

Great posts, Barkingmad 787 and 802, and Filler Dent 789.

Dear Airline management,
Once upon a time someone forgot to remove the ground lock pins in the u/c before departure and the a/c had to return after dumping the best part of 100 tons of fuel.
So the pins were fitted with big red flags with the words 'Remove before Flight' to make them very visible.
This helped and reduced the number of incidents of washing Hounslow in Jet A1.
However there were a more few incidents, and it was decided that when an engineer fitted the pins they must put an entry in the tech log, thus acting as a reminder to the departing engineer and the flight crew. The tech log entry would have to be signed off before departure.
This was the state of play when I was a young PDI engineer. I never witnessed an incident of the pins being left in.

So when the management wanted to reduce the number of engineers (because they were expensive! not in my pay packet), they wanted the towing crew to fit the pins but were not happy that they should be allowed to write in the tech log, therefore the requirement to create the 'tech log reminder' was lost.

I guess you have worked out what happened next..... when the aircraft returned the pins were found fitted (not the ones kept in the flight deck, but a set that the towing crew had managed to procure for their own use, with NO FLAGS.

At least the story ends with a happy ending in as much as no one came to any harm, but the cost of these incidents is not small and on a bad day people lose their lives.

Please remember that all these controls /countermeasures /procedures /remove before flight flags, were adopted for a reason and while they are in place you may not 'see' that reason because they are working.

Anyone can save money, you simply stop doing things, any schoolboy knows that.
The trick is to keep doing stuff, but do it more efficiently.

Wake up and smell the Jet A1 and I don't mean in Hounslow! :ugh:

[marvo999]

The AAIB recomended in a similar case involving a Virgin A320 mentioned earlier in this thread to modify the V2500 fan cowls such that when closed but not latched they would sit proud of flush and therefore more likely to spotted on a walk round and until such times as a Mod was in place carry out Duplicate Inspections of the latches.

I wonder what the AAIB will recomend now as it would appear that this Aircraft had the Mod and BA were still doing Duplicate Inspections!!

Perhaps what they should recomend is that all tasks carried out in Line and Base Maintainance are actually inspected by Licenced Type Rated B1 or B2 Engineers who are given the time and the work culture etc etc to do the job right first time. Duplicate Inspections become 'diluted' in thier importance when they are used as the sticking plaster fix for Human Factor errors.

I may be jumping the gun here as the final report is yet to be released but I think the incident details so far are timely reminders for us all.

[fireflybob]

To an extent these events of cowls not being latched and detaching from the aircraft over circa 30 times with a number of different operators reminds me of the phrase coined after the Space Shuttle disaster after the O ring failure, namely "normalisation of deviance". (This is no criticism of BA and their procedures but if all these events happened with one or maybe two operators then maybe there would be a bit more joined up thinking as to devising a bullet proof system which means this can never happen again)

As professional aviators and engineers involved in flight operations we all know how important various checks are but are also too aware of our own limitations when doing such items especially when under pressure of quick turnrounds etc.

If I was in AIB I would be looking to recommend a physical fix to ensure this can never happen again.

Normalisation of Deviance

[G-CPTN]

http://www.pprune.org/private-flying/304275-pilot-fined-over-falling-concrete.html

When a GA pilot can miss a foot-square lump of concrete (and still take off without noticing the effect on the aircraft balance) . . . :ugh:

[Basil]

1979 Engineer,
Agreed. A long time ago I realised that, if you have a system that works, then think long and hard before you change it; then take advice and think hard again; and, if possible don't change it.
Edited to say, that means all your own little personal checks and procedures as well.

[RomeoTangoFoxtrotMike]

The Normalisation of Deviance, first described by Diane Vaughan:

Professionalism/Diane Vaughan and the normalization of deviance - Wikibooks, open books for an open world (http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Professionalism/Diane_Vaughan_and_the_normalization_of_deviance)

[Joetom]

So, Airbus recorded 32 cowl events up to the summer of 2012.

So now, at least 34 recorded, plus some un-recorded I could guess.

I wonder if any data exists of incorrect fitment of cowls picked up after cowls closed. ie. Second inspection by maint. Pilot PDC. Ground crew/push back people.

I can only guess the number of incorrectly latched cowls after closure must be huge, but so many times before it gets picked up before flight by the 2nd inspection, pilot or ground/push back crew.

The industry records the data year on year, makes a few changes and hi-lights the events from time to time, job done.

The old saying that " History shows us that we don't always learn well from history events "

I would be very surprised if a good fix is not already designed, made and tested. It just needs the Industry/FAA/EASA to press the button and get it fitted.

Paying for the fitting of the fix ? with just about 5,300 320's in service, the total cost will not be cheap in £ terms.

I have just plucked/guessed of a 100,000 USD per Aircraft, if my mobile battery is working ok, the answer it gives is 530 M USD. That as they say is a " whole chunk of cake "

By the way. Looks like a great job by the pilots and cabin crew, well done.

[Finbarr]

It's quite simple really - in some (most?) companies PF does the walk round, except if it's raining, then the FO does it.

Incidentally, just done my usual MPL - LGW commute with EZY. Watched (presumably) PF do the walk round out of the window - he carefully examined the underside of the engine - looked to be about 18 inches (about 45cm) from the ground - he didn't need to lie on his back!

[Nopax,thanx]

On the subject of flying over built-up areas, today's Sunday Express stated that the aircraft "overflew millions of houses" :ugh:

That's one hell of a diversion, must have gone over every dwelling in the UK....

[26er]

I was the first officer on the early morning departure MAN- LHR in a BA Super 1-11 when after take off we had a nose wheel green. We returned to MAN and having had a quick inspection by an engineer took the aircraft back to the gate. I still occupied the flight deck when an engineer appeared carrying the nose wheel ground lock which had caused the problem. It should have been stowed in the u/c ground locks box to the left of the captain's seat. With a grin and a "how stupid pilots are" expression on his face which quickly disappeared when he opened the box to find one already in its correct place. I'm sure that would have never been mentioned had I not still been there.

One of the pre departure checks was "ground locks stowed" and only one set was supposed to be used on each BA aircraft but obviously not in this case!

[marvo999]

Normalisation of deviance is surely one of the most fundamental reasons we have a Regulator, EASA should be aware of any 'creep' of inspection standards in Airline Maintenance and stop it from happening, not sure if the FAA had anything to do with the space shuttle but I suspect they didn't, they probably left most of the technical stuff to NASA who got it wrong with the O rings and anyway the feds are too busy with the Airline boys.

What worries me is if the outcome of this investigation is 'Normalisation of Deviance' then what happens next? What will EASA and the CAA do about it? Our national flag carrier oh dear.........................don't hold your breath!

[Ye Olde Pilot]

You can try to pass the buck as much as you like but the responsibility for this incident rests squarely on the captain and co-pilot. In this case it was unlatched cowlings but it could just as easily been something else. The incident was the result of a poor walkaround.

I question the logic of flying the track below instead of diverting over less densely populated area to Stansted.
http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/06/02/article-2334648-1A1BF1A4000005DC-672_634x527.jpg

I see that ground crew are facing the blame.
It is now believed two engineers, one of them a supervisor, have been suspended while an investigation is carried out.

[1979 Engineer]

Ahh the 1-11, that takes me back.
I had been sent out to refuel a 1-11 ready to be a 'backup' in the days of Shuttle (sheds a tear).
The a/c was on one of the 'November' stands, I think it was N41. As the fuel went on I did a walk around and took the nose gear lock out and put it on the flight deck.
The a/c was then 'stood down' and I returned to the crew room. Half an hour later, I was then told 'it's back on' can you go and depart the aircraft. So off I go, did another quick walk around and shut the hold doors all ready to push.
As I sat on the tow bar I noticed something just poking out of the nose u/c bay. It was the flag on the lock!.... quickly removed and delivered to the flight deck just before the doors were shut.
I was somewhat confused as to how it had been fitted, only to find that in the 30 mins I was in the crew room the a/c had been moved to the next stand (not sure why) and the towing crew had put the lock in.
I have gone to the a/c and located it by it's reg and not the stand, as there were so many 'November' stands in a line it was easy not to spot it had moved.
There but by the grace of God go I...

[silverstrata]

.

Quentic - can you explain, exactly, how you avoid populated areas in the south of England in a jet flying at several miles a minute...



Easy, you build a new London Gateway airport in the Thames estuary.


.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

How about diverting to Manston with little traffic and approaching along a sparsely populated coastline? If it all goes wrong few on the ground will die.

http://www.kentnews.co.uk/polopoly_fs/new_aeri_1_1187124!image/3982365733.jpg_gen/derivatives/landscape_630/3982365733.jpg
Of course we all know the pressure is on to get the bird back to base and when it goes wrong we have another Kegworth.

Looking at this picture I'd say the captain was reckless to take this aircraft back to Heathrow.http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/06/02/article-2334648-1A1BD0BF000005DC-680_634x630.jpg

[Airclues]

So, if we can't use LHR due to flying over a built up area, what about Sydney, Manchester, New York, Los Angeles....etc, etc?

[Ye Olde Pilot]

In the case of Manchester I'd be poking my nose at Hawarden which is 2,043 metres long and once again available without flying over built up area's.

Have you tried looking up from the newspaper and out of the window?

In the case of New York Sully managed to park in the river Hudson knowing full well if he failed to pull it off only the crew and passengers would die. I'm sure he had that option in mind for many years of operating out of NY.

In my opinion a multitude of current captains cannot think outside of the loop.
We now have a lot of 'systems managers' who fail when it goes wrong as the Air France disaster proved.
The BA crew could have flown a straight line out of Heathrow and been on the deck at Brize quicker that flying around London and caused a lot less hassle.

They knew just after rotation the cowls had departed. Why fly around the M25?

[A and C]

What a wonderful thing 20/20 hindsight is !

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Not 20/20 hindsight but foresight.
As I've said for a departing aircraft from Heathrow with a major problem Brize has to be a logical alternate. It has all the safety infrastructure in place and presents no risk if the aircraft has to crash over open countryside.

Given the reliability of modern aircraft I wonder if any crew ever play the game of where would we go if it all goes wrong?

In this case too casual to do a proper preflight.

How hard is it to kneel down on one knee and count all seven latches?

[Super VC-10]

Eureka!

Just realised how to prevent cowl doors from being left unlocked and falling off aircraft in flight.

Take the bleddy things off! If they ain't there, they can't fall off! :ooh:

[Ye Olde Pilot]

I think you'll find that affects the aircraft's performance and certification.:ok:

[Del Prado]

the fan cowl doors from both engines detached, puncturing a fuel pipe on the right engine and damaging the airframe, and some aircraft systems. The flight crew elected to return to Heathrow. On the approach to land an external fire developed on the right engine. The left engine continued to perform normally throughout the flight. The right engine was shut down and the aircraft landed safely and was brought to a stop on Runway 27R

YOP, The decision to return to Heathrow seems to have been made under a PAN call having lost one engine, the fire in your picture happened during approach when the nearest runway was 27R (I'm basing that supposition on the AAIB quote above).

Do you think it best to div to STN rather than single engine return to LL (and if so is that warranted in all engine failures) or is it the 'damage to the airframe, and some aircraft systems' that you think warranted a div to STN?

[genuine question]

[ramble on]

A twin jet that I got to fly some time ago has an avionics door that was right in front of the RH engine intake.

That door, if left just unlatched would hang flat. The fact that it was unlocked was then prone to being missed on a walk around.

It was in fact missed on one or two occasions and engine replacements followed.

The fix:

When opened it was to be latched on its hold open arm. This was impossible to miss. If you were the one that took it off the retaining arm then it had to be locked before you walked away. Miss doing this at great penalty!

Me, I still liked to give it a thump anyway.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

A direct approach to Brize would have been shorter, safer and presented less problems. The RAF have all the infrastructure in place to cope.

If you read the report the crew were aware just after take off that debris was left behind them and they would have been aware of the noise.

In my opinion this was more than a pan call scenario.

[cessnapete]

As you obviously have a fund of up to date knowledge in this area. Could you tell me how in the middle of carrying out my emergency procedures I navigate around built up areas?
If the sun is out I can presumably look out of the windowand use a topo chart leaving the other pilot to fly the aircraft and carry out the checklists etc.. If its IMC none of my nav aids in the aircraft show built up areas??
I would need a lot of maps to cover my companies extensive route structure worldwide,not enough room in the cockpit unfortunately. Please enlighten me how to carry out your wishes.

PS Brize not a good diversion in poor weather, only Cat1 and restrictions on auto coupled approaches. But fine in good weather as I can use my built up area map and look out the window.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Sully managed it OK..suggest you ask him.

I don't think he bothered with 'company procedures'.

I still maintain to fly an aircraft with these problems around the M25 was reckless to say the least when straight ahead was a large airport with all the infrastructure available to cope.

A simple mayday call asking to divert to Brize and you'd have help coming out of your ears.

[cessnapete]

How would Sully do it with a 300ft cloud base?

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Once the crew declared a mayday they were vectored to approach at LHR having staying aloft longer than necessary. Just look at that meandering track I posted earlier.
They would have had the same assistance much quicker in to Luton, Stansted or Manston.

What is mind boggling is given the state of the aircraft they even considered flying back over central London.

[FERetd]

Silverstrata Quote:- "Easy, you build a new London Gateway airport in the Thames estuary."

Even a Tom Tom or Garmin GPS with an out of date database will tell you that the Thames estuary is nowhere near London - which is where passengers wanting to go to London want to go!

Calling it a "Gateway" doesn't get the passengers any closer to their chosen destination or prevent bits of aeroplane from falling on Southend, Rochester, Whitstable or any other built up area surrounding the Thames estuary.

[4468]

Old Pilot:
I still maintain to fly an aircraft with these problems around the M25 was reckless to say the least when straight ahead was a large airport with all the infrastructure available to cope.
I maintain it was nothing of the sort. Where does that leave us?

No doubt the AAIB/CAA/EGLL/Government et al, will all have a view ONCE THE FACTS ARE KNOWN. Shall we leave it to them and see if they close EGLL/Publish Emergency Departure Procedures?

In the meantime, no doubt we will see house prices in Twickenham/Central London plummet???

[doubledolphins]

What utter tosh you all talk. Any one criticising the pilots is missing the point, and probably isn't a pilot. No one was hurt as a result of the decision to return to Heathrow, so they acted correctly. End of. :ugh:


Ps I'm going back to Facebook to swap pics of night stops with my cabin crew. You're all so boring.

[ask26]

I have worked for 3 operators and on 2 different aircraft types.

When doing the Airbus type rating for an overseas carrier, the walkaround training involved a group of 12 of us doing a zip about the airframe with an F/O from that carrier, making sure that everything looked in place, looking at gear pins and so on. And that was it. No mention of cowlings, no videos of best practice etc...

On joining my current carrier, the assumption being as a DEP I was Airbus trained meant no check was done of my knowledge, nor a proper physical observation of it.

Only after years on the fleet and reading of my own, asking other Captains and so on, do I feel better qualified to know what to look for in a walkaround.

And I've always considered myself to be a diligent pro-active pilot. Worrying.

[Uplinker]

What is mind boggling is given the state of the aircraft they even considered flying back over central London.

I shouldn't really, but: The state of the aircraft ??

As far as the pilots knew, they had lost some panels but one engine was working normally. They had lost one of three hydraulic systems, and were having to fly with manual thrust. The right engine only developed a fire on finals. No great drama then for a professional flight crew, who practice such events every 6 months in the SIM. So tell me; why would they have needed to land at Brize? What was the urgency? Brize is a military airbase; do they have steps for an A319? What is the landing distance required for an overweight A319 with no yellow hydraulics? How long is Brize's runway? Was the wind at Brize within limits for landing? Would they have all their braking, antiskid, reversers, flaps and spoilers available? (I know the answers, but do you?)

Or they could have landed at EGSS, but again; where was the urgency? If they had gone there, would there be a stand available for them? Would BA staff have been there to assist? Where would the passengers have gone and who would have looked after them? Are any BA engineers based at EGSS?

Had there been an uncontained fire, of course they would have landed at the nearest suitable runway. But there wasn't. So they didn't.

Most of the "why did they fly over London" brigade seem to be thinking of an engine failure in a Cessna 152. In that instance, you MUST find a field and land in it - you would not dream of doing anything else, and certainly would not attempt to cross a large city, (and it would be physically impossible anyway). However, modern jets with single hydraulic problems and perhaps an engine fire do not fall out of the sky. There are so many more factors a professional flight crew in charge of a modern commercial jet take into account.

What is actually mind boggling is all the armchair 'experts' who have clearly never flown a modern jet, but who think they know better than the actual flight crew who were there.

[gazumped]

This whole thing about SLF bumping their gums about flying over heavily populated areas is complete and utter twaddle. An aircraft experiencing an engine fire /failure needs every assistance from ATC, that's why the PAN is declared. You see PAN means, I NEED assistance, not some mumbo jumbo cr@p about where you can and can't fly over.

In captain Sullenberg's case, his aircraft was totally disabled, to attempt a landing anywhere other that the Hudson meant certain death to everyone on board. So basically Sullenberg was extremely selfish, in that he wanted to save his own skin. Gues what, when the crew save their own skin, almost always the passengers follow along dumbly. He did a great job, and then went on to display true gentlemanly behaviour in how he carried out the evacuation.

News break, most aircraft that come to grief have little or nothing actually wrong with the machine. Crew do dumb things with perfectly serviceable aircraft, ie Lionair, AF447 Air India Express, need I go on.

Rant over

[gazumped]

I appeared to have made my post almost at the same time as you. I am absolutely in agreement with your sentiments, armchair SLF who wouldn't know their ass from their elbow should stay on Facebook. The crew did a thoroughly professional job, just as you would expect of all of BA's crew, for that matter any reputable airline crew would have done a very similar job, it's what we train for.

Only in the sim expect to miss out at the minima, and have to do a different approach because the airport has just had a major lighting strike, and the slope guidance has failed, and on short final you get a landing gear fire warning, and after landing the right main gear collapses, unexpectedly and you then have to run through the evacuation CX list and carry it out.

A simple OEI approach in VMC (slightly complicated by a previous engine fire, ) is a bit of a yawn, it's what we all train for every six months.

[CISTRS]

from gazumped:
Crew do dumb things with perfectly serviceable aircraft, ie Lionair, AF447 Air India Express, need I go on.

dumb things like leaving two fan cowls unlatched?

gazumped again:
A simple OEI approach in VMC (slightly complicated by a previous engine fire, ) is a bit of a yawn, it's what we all train for every six months.

obviously not as much of a yawn as the walkaround.

Please - less arrogance here. The pre-flight inspection may not be as glamorous but it remains as important. Prevention remains better than cure.

[Megaton]

Uplinker

That's the most sensible posting on the whole thread :ok:

How many times do crews screw it up in the sim when they rush an approach under pressure. Learning from the numerous mistakes made by pilots that went before us, it is drummed into us that unless a wing is in imminent danger of falling off or the cabin is full of choking smoke, there really is no good reason to throw an aircraft onto the first available piece of Tarmac.

Well done to the crew

[quentinc]

What was the urgency?
No idea but maybe a combination of the issues you mention and the "significant fuel leak", which the report states they were aware of, was enough for them to have some "urgency"... FWIW The report says after the loss of yellow Hydraulics, they declared a PAN. This was all before the fire. As a PPL I knew a definition of PAN, maybe its different for better pilots. After the fire... they declared a MAYDAY.

do they have steps for an A319?
With a significant fuel leak, maybe the crew weren't expecting to be using any steps.

[A and C]

Just how much uninformed rubbish can this forum generate ?

The bottom line is the crew got the aircraft on the ground and no one was hurt.

Objective achieved !!!!!!

In my veiw ( as a 737 & A320 type rating holder & former holder of CRS maintenance approval on the A320) the guys did a good job and as well as could be expected with the information that was unfolding to them over the time of the problem.

The pre-flight could have picked up the problem but, the system is not encouraging pilots to give more than a quick glance around the outside, in the UK you can't have any form of personal tooling and so my very usefull screwdriver is unavailable to me thanks to the security system.

I have to ask the Monday morning quarterbacks what do you expect the crew to consider when they have a problem? As far as I can see the guys acted correctly when in a high workload situation with the information that they had avalable as events unfolded.

[framer]

I agree, congratulations to the crew on getting everyone home.
All you guys giving them a hard time for the walk around are hopefully retired or PPL's who don't understand the pace and pressure that the esteemed leaders have created. For all you know the walk around was done 45 minutes prior to push back and the cowls were fully open with Engineers working on the engines.
If that turns out to be the case what do you say then?

[Allan Lupton]

After ten days and nearly 850 posts I'd have expected this thread to have come to its natural conclusion, but the anonymous "we know it all" brigade keep it going round in circles.
I can easily see why some of them have "forum names" that hide their true identity whereas I and a few others prefer to write in our own names to give what we write some accountability.
"Uplinker" and "Gazumped" have posted some commonsense (most recently at 3 a.m. today UK time) and I assume they have professional reasons for posting under aliasses so I'm not getting at them or some of the others whose "forum name" hides a straight and level mind!

[overstress]

gazumped: You see if the captain is very very selfish about these situations and concentrates on saving his own ass, you will generally find most of the passengers follow closely behind, and everyone on the ground have no idea about what is happening, much like you Garpal!

Bonzer post! Wiping coffee off keyboard as I type :D

[gazumped]

I post anonymously because I choose to, however I take my hat off to for using your own name. It does give your posts extra weight. 3.00 am London time is wide awake time in Australia!

[pbeardmore]

first ever post and not an expert but I do have a question re risk management and the perception of the correct decision. Several posters have claimed that the pilots made the correct decision based on the fact that the outcome was a good one. In terms of managing the risk, is it right to judge if the decision was correct based on the outcome? This may seem intuitive but it may have been that they were extremely lucky. Not to dumb the post down but trying clumsily to explain my thoughts: if I gamble £100 on roulette and win £360, it is a correct decision but in hindsight. If I knew in advance that there were safer investments, at the time, it may have been the wrong decision based on what I knew. So, in theory, a particular decision making process may be wrong in that it places the aircraft at a higher risk. If the outcome is a good one, does it make the original decision correct? I hope there are some experts on risk management on the forum who can explain this better than me.

[gazumped]

Jet aircraft have triple, and sometimes quadruple redundancy with most systems, when a fault occurs you follow the QRH ( quick reference handbook) complete the required procedures, secure the aircraft, and if it is a relatively serious event, land at the nearest SUITABLE airport. Suitable, taking into account, distance, weather, approach aids, ground support, ATC, familiararity, severity of the occurrence, etc. The captain in making the decision ( in consultation with his F/O) decides on a course of action, and carries it out. Given that the aircraft can stay airborne for say 5 minutes, it is a reasonable assumption that it will stay airborne for 55 minutes, so there is no need to rush. The only reason to rush is if you have a fire on board that you cannot positively confirm is extinguished.
This particular aircraft, though suffering significant damage, still had many redundant systems available to it and could have diverted to a wide array of airfields. The captain made a decision based on the best information available to him.
Does all that make some sense ?
Cheers gazumped

[slip and turn]

I agree, congratulations to the crew on getting everyone home.
All you guys giving them a hard time for the walk around are hopefully retired or PPL's who don't understand the pace and pressure that the esteemed leaders have created. For all you know the walk around was done 45 minutes prior to push back and the cowls were fully open with Engineers working on the engines.
If that turns out to be the case what do you say then?

I say aircrew should act neither like sheep nor lemmings. Nor conversely should they behave as immovable objects, save for when insisting on standards. Some clearly need to get out more.

Commercial Pilots are paid to use the privileges of their civil licences to conduct public transport operations safely, not just to prostitute themselves up front in their chosen cigar tube, reluctantly or otherwise, as small-time Commercial Warriors about whom no beancounter actually gives a damn.

MBWA (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Management_by_wandering_around) is a pnemonic from management training going back a few decades also much neglected in other industries now too.

It's going to be your aircraft when doors are closed. If you've been planted in your seat 45 minutes since you last had a look outside then manage the bloody thing by getting out and looking at it whilst you still have the chance so you know no other bugger fiddles with it again before you depart. If you don't know that the ground crew talking to you on pushback or their mate giving you the thumbs up and wave have done their own dligent external check on your aircraft too, and are competent to do it, then why are you leaving the apron? ... because everyone else does without a second thought ... or because it isn't clear anymore who is supposed to do what ??

If you think the beancounters are endangering safe operations by pressuring you or anyone else to take shortcuts then CHIRP or scream blue murder or both. Sometimes you have to risk your job to make it plain what isn't right. That's life. If you are not up to it then find another job where it is less of a risk to people in your care when you kowtow to beancounters.

We don't count on pilots for amazing cheap fares, or for marvelous fire-eating or sword-swallowing feats of recovery. We count on them to stamp their standards on everything and make operations safe and uneventful.

Rant off.

[pax britanica]

Alsoa low pax but I have bene interested in the 'debate' if thats not too grand a word over the why return to LHR issue.
More recent posts point out that the fire , potentially the greatest hazard , did not start until already established or close to finals and at that point Brize is miles away and STN behind you.

When the probelms started however I would have thought that the crews decsion to continue at least initially on the SID was very sensible, it takes them towards LTN or STN if things go pear shaped in a hurry but more importantly they are in protected airspace and so do not need all sorts of vectors etc from atc to avoid traffic in what seems to be an extremely busy bit of airspace.

Overall it gave me s a regualr passenger agenerally good feeling about BA as the crew seemed to have adapted toa difficult situation ina very calculated way and I felt the outcome reflected very well on BA flight crew ( leaving aside the issue of whether they could or should have seen unlatched cowl doors) ,. Perhaps not so good on the maintenance organsiation but even then there seem to be questions asked about whether a decade of cut backs have perhaps gone too far.
One thing does seem a real issue though is that with aparently 30plus instances of cowl doors falling off or being unsafe after getting the responsible contractor AB or IAE really does need a better method of latching

[gazumped]

I don't think pilots can be accused of being lemmings, or anything like that.

Will relate a story that I know about, that occurred several years ago.
The captain was delaying boarding for his own ( justifiable) reasons, the CEO just happened to be at the airport, and intervened and basically ordered the captain to commence boarding the passengers immediately. The captain after some fairly heated exchanges, eventually took off his epaulettes and gave them to the CEO, and said " you better work out how much fuel you want and start briefing the SID... Because I'm not flying that aircraft!" Guess what, the passengers didn't start boarding and there was a significant delay finding another captain at short notice.
Most captains worth their salt would decline to be influenced operationally by any CEO, or any other non qualified person. That would not fit the definition a " lemming"
We have a very responsible job, which we don't take lightly, the " buck stops here" applies very much to the captains role. We, as a crew end up capturing the vast majority errors before that have an operational effect, and we, generally manage the few errors that get through fairly well. This was one case in point, the error got through the engineering system, and the walk around, but in the end it was managed pretty well.

[Sillert,V.I.]

The only reason to rush is if you have a fire on board that you cannot positively confirm is extinguished.

It seems to me that's exactly what they had.

However, they may not have realised that until on final. In the absence of fire, calling a PAN & following the SID & QRH is entirely justified. Once they were aware of the uncontained fire, they called MAYDAY & landed immediately at LHR, which was by then the nearest suitable runway. I don't see how the crew could have acted differently without the benefit of hindsight.

But if as has been posted here they were dealing with an engine fire, the cowlings gone, a significant fuel leak, both fire bottles blown and all containment options exhausted, I'd say there was just one hole left in the cheese & all concerned were fortunate that on this occasion it didn't line up.

[BOAC]

But if as has been posted here they were dealing with an engine fire, the cowlings gone, a significant fuel leak, both fire bottles blown and all containment options exhausted, - can you link to that post please?

[Sillert,V.I.]

- can you link to that post please?

It's my best recollection of the key facts taken from a number of different posts.

[bbrown1664]

During the approach to land, an external fire developed on the
right engine. An engine fire warning on the flight deck prompted the crew to
declare a MAYDAY. Although both engine fire extinguisher bottles were
discharged and the right engine was shut down, the fire was not completely extinguished. The left engine continued to
perform normally throughout the flight.



That will be in the AAIB report here (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/AAIB%20S3-2013%20G-EUOE.pdf).

[4468]

I'd say there was just one hole left in the cheese & all concerned were fortunate that on this occasion it didn't line up.
I'd say there was just one hole left in the cheese & all concerned were fortunate that the pilots did everything necessary to ensure, on this occasion, it didn't line up.

Well done them!! Exemplary stuff.

[gazumped]

It would seem that anyone with apparent extensive jet time is totally behind the crew actions, once airborne. The dissenters appear to be generally an eclectic bunch of PPL's SLF, or wannabe's.

Can anyone with industry experience honestly level genuine criticism at the crews actions(one airborne, of course)?

[Blondie2005]

gazumped: once airborne, they clearly did a magnificent job and deserve much credit for it.

As SLF who hasn't much of a clue how these things are done, I'm still - even after all the posts on this thread - none the wiser as to whether checking the cowl latches is a standard part of the pilot's walk round.

[gazumped]

Cowls unlocked should have been picked up on the walk around! S##t happens!
Cowls unlocked should have been picked up by the engineer who signed it off, and presented it to the crew. Bigger s##t happens.

Once airborne the crew did a good job, as expected.

[Centreline747]

After 863 posts, I feel you have just summed it up perfectly!! :ok:

[WHBM]

Can anyone with industry experience honestly level genuine criticism at the crews actions(one airborne, of course)?
Try the AAIB and MATS 10.10.2 here (page 7) and Safety Recommendation 2005-069 (page 16).

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/N481EV%201-06.pdf

[LeadSled]

Can anyone with industry experience honestly level genuine criticism at the crews actions(one airborne, of course)?
Gazumped,
No, because the only ones who knew the exact situation, as they knew it, were those on the flight-deck.
Of course, that will not stop all the official Monday morning quarterbacks in the various "inquiries" that will take place, once the media have lost interest, from finding all sorts of faults.
Just like happened to Sullenberger ---- and so many others over the years --- remember right back to the Elizabethan at Munich, the BOAC L-049 (or was it a 749) Connie at Singapore/Kallang, the QF "Bahrain Bomber" ---- and so on.

[slip and turn]

Cowls unlocked should have been picked up by the engineer who signed it off, and presented it to the crew. S##t happens!

(if) the crew did a good job, Cowls unlocked should have been picked up on the walk around!

as expected Bigger s##t happens Once airborne.Or have I misquoted you? :}

[RTM Boy]

Sh!t happens, does it gazumped? Well that's alright then - no need to rethink anything because 'sh!t happens'. No need to check the things on your checklist properly because 'sh!t happnes'. Don't check the latches on the cowls because you might get your overalls dirty and anyway 'sh!t happens'. Overflying a major populated area is irrelevant because 'sh!t happens'. Let's not bother to try to design out avoidable human error because 'sh!t happens'.

You must work at Morton Thiokol.

[20driver]

WHBM, thanks for the link. Incredibly interesting and well worth the read.
The crew and ATC executed like a well greased machine.
A lot of good info there and plenty to think about. Sometimes there are no perfect answers, just the right choices.

[Davey Emcee]

Spot on RTM Boy spot on.

[LookingForAJob]

I'd say there was just one hole left in the cheese & all concerned were fortunate that the pilots did everything necessary to ensure, on this occasion, it didn't line up.The pilots are a potential hole in the cheese!

Or are you one of those people who thinks that pilots are little short of superhuman and whose role in life is to sort out other peoples' screw ups?

If you are going to comment using Jim Reason's model please, at the very least, understand what the holes mean!

[flapassym]

The pilots are a potential hole in the cheese!

Or are you one of those people who thinks that pilots are little short of superhuman and whose role in life is to sort out other peoples' screw ups?

If you are going to comment using Jim Reason's model please, at the very least, understand what the holes mean!

What arrogant guff. Yes the pilots are a potential hole in the cheese but on this occasion they weren't were they? Yes they missed it on the walk round as many before them have, but when faced with the airborne problem no further 'cheese holes' were lined up.

Go back to flight sim!

[lomapaseo]

Too much "reasoning" about cheese holes and what ifs. Unless you truly can define the various holes you really shouldn't be arguing about how many are left.

How close is not suitable for argument among non-professionals. What we are really interested in is the adequacy (not perfection since **** sill will happen) of the expected AAIB recommendations after they finish their investigation of contributing factors

[quentinc]

Try the AAIB and MATS 10.10.2 here (page 7) and Safety Recommendation 2005-069 (page 16).

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...1EV%201-06.pdf

WHBM, in a single post you have restored my faith in civil aviation!

In the full report it will be interesting to see what happened between the crew declaring PAN, with the intention of returning to Heathrow and subsequently ATC providing radar vectors to 27R.

Either:

ATC simply provided the vectors over central London, with no suggestion of alternatives. Hopefully we'd be told the reasoning behind ATC not following the procedures suggested in the N481EV report.

OR

The crew were given alternatives to Heathrow but elected to remain with their original request. ATC would then have complied with the crew's choice. Hopefully we'll find out the reasoning behind the crew's decision to goto Heathrow.

[airsmiles]

Easy, you build a new London Gateway airport in the Thames estuary

Re; avoiding the need to overfly built-up areas, won't the Thames Estuary airport have runways aligned East-West like LHR? If yes, they'll still be a fair degree of over-flying London of approaching from the west. If taking off eastwards, the North Atlantic traffic will still need to turn west and overfly Greater London.

Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't see a vast difference in overflying London for either LHR or the Thames estuary airport.

[Sillert,V.I.]

I am noticing a striking similarity to the 1990 G-BJRT depressurisation.

In that incident, the primary cause was quickly identified as the failure of engineering to properly carry out a safety critical task.

The correct procedure was documented in company maintenance manuals, but not followed.

Have a read of the AAIB's summary report (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Summary%20%20AAR%201-1992%20BAC%20One-Eleven,%20G-BJRT%2005-92.pdf) on G-BJRT.

Same operator, 23 years later - something to think about?

[slip and turn]

Where's the striking similarity in that?? :hmm:

Oh wait - I see it now - recommendation #7 CAA said someone needed fresh spectacles :rolleyes:

[Sillert,V.I.]

Where's the striking similarity in that?? :hmm:


As I see it, the similarity is not in what happened, but in why it happened.

[Sillert,V.I.]

Where have you been?

G-CPER; G-YMME; G-VIIA. All on the AAIB website.

It seems they just keep coming...

IMO taking disciplinary action against the chaps directly responsible will do nothing to stop something similar from happening again.

[Safety Concerns]

IMO taking disciplinary action against the chaps directly responsible will do nothing to stop something similar from happening again.

Totally agree.

[framer]

Slip n turn It's going to be your aircraft when doors are closed. If you've been planted in your seat 45 minutes since you last had a look outside then manage the bloody thing by getting out and looking at it whilst you still have the chance so you know no other bugger fiddles with it again before you depart. If you don't know that the ground crew talking to you on pushback or their mate giving you the thumbs up and wave have done their own dligent external check on your aircraft too, and are competent to do it, then why are you leaving the apron?
With your logic the Captain would have to get out of the aircraft after the baggage doors were closed and the refuelling finished and do a walk around to check up on everyone just before departure on every single flight. If another department is working on the aircraft just prior to pushback the flight crew have to trust them to do their jobs to a degree. That's just modern aviation. You can't know for sure that they have " done their own diligent external check", you have to trust that as professionals, they have done their job. You're living in a fantasy land.

[halfmanhalfbiscuit]

I want to ask a question and it is how do you feel the CAA and EASA is doing with regulating the industry and improving safety?

My reason for asking is related to the recent issues in Australia regarding the Pel Air accident its investigation which resulted in a very comprehensive Senate Inquiry into the failings of both CASA and the ATSB.

This Avweb link gives a pretty good summary
AVwebFlash Complete Issue (http://www.avweb.com/eletter/archives/avflash/2519-full.html#208753)

There is a forum running on the Australian section. Would be interesting to hear from some new voices.
http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/468048-senate-inquiry-hearing-program-4th-nov-2011-a-100.html

[bvcu]

A pilots walkround check on the average airliner at a station where engineers do the check shouldnt have anything to find. Should have all been found by the the guy certifying the job as done. Crews do find things , and i for one am glad that another set of eyes is having a look as we are all human and can miss things ! So i disagree with those putting the blame on the crew walkaround as these cowls are very difficult to see unlatched unlike most other types. How many JT9D core cowls got left on runways a few years ago !

[Piltdown Man]

Blame, cause whatever you want to call it will come back to maintenance (again)

Blame will fix nothing. The solution is to determine what failed (design, system, procedure, training... or whatever) and address those. And then we have the actions of the flight crew, before during and after. Personally, I think they did well but I'm sure, if asked, they could suggest improvements. And given 20-20 hindsight, others may also be able to suggest where, given similar circumstances, an even better job could be done.

Blame, punishment, reprimands, sacking, compo claims etc. do nothing to improve safety.

[A and C]

I wondered when the BLAME culture would rear its ugly head, thank you for being the one to the standard bearer for the "hang em high" brigade. Between those with your attitude and the ambulance chasing lawers we should be able to drive flight safety back into the dark ages.

[BOAC]

.....err - you did read the post, didn't you?

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Uplinker
What is mind boggling is given the state of the aircraft they even considered flying back over central London.
I shouldn't really, but: The state of the aircraft ??

As far as the pilots knew, they had lost some panels but one engine was working normally. They had lost one of three hydraulic systems, and were having to fly with manual thrust.

So that's OK then? The initial track suggests they were still heading for destination.


The right engine only developed a fire on finals. No great drama then for a professional flight crew, who practice such events every 6 months in the SIM.
I recall many years ago sitting in the right seat of a 747 at Cranebank. A seasoned training captain of 30 years asked me to give him any problem and he would sort it out. I pulled both r/h fans on a fully loaded sim and he was on the ground in seconds.
So the r/hand engine only developed the fire on finals. What would you have done 15 miles out?


So tell me; why would they have needed to land at Brize? What was the urgency? Brize is a military airbase; do they have steps for an A319? What is the landing distance required for an overweight A319 with no yellow hydraulics? How long is Brize's runway? Was the wind at Brize within limits for landing? Would they have all their braking, antiskid, reversers, flaps and spoilers available? (I know the answers, but do you?)

If you have been flying for more than just a few years you'll know Brize can handle anything. As for steps for an A319 are you having a laugh? Was that the reason the crew returned to Heathrow? If so the steps were not used.

Or they could have landed at EGSS, but again; where was the urgency? If they had gone there, would there be a stand available for them? Would BA staff have been there to assist? Where would the passengers have gone and who would have looked after them? Are any BA engineers based at EGSS?

Now I know you are trolling.

Had there been an uncontained fire, of course they would have landed at the nearest suitable runway. But there wasn't. So they didn't.

Nice to know these sim events are so well organised. Perhaps you can tell me where you would have popped in for a cup of tea with both engines gone?

Most of the "why did they fly over London" brigade seem to be thinking of an engine failure in a Cessna 152. In that instance, you MUST find a field and land in it - you would not dream of doing anything else, and certainly would not attempt to cross a large city, (and it would be physically impossible anyway). However, modern jets with single hydraulic problems and perhaps an engine fire do not fall out of the sky. There are so many more factors a professional flight crew in charge of a modern commercial jet take into account.

I suggest you look at Kegworth or the Air France incidence.

Another question is why they aircraft was cleared for an approach given its problems over a heavily congested area such as central London where the loss of life given a total engine failure could have been considerable.

[gazumped]

Keg worth is worth a good look. The crew incorrectly identified an engine fire, and shut down the good engine. The only remaining engine. Performed ok at flight idle on descent, but was unable to provide sufficient thrust when spin up was required after configured for landing.
AF447 , failed to carry out the UAS check list(on my type is extremely complicated.......... 3 items ....... From memory), and then failed to recognise a stall, .....a deep stall.

Mate not only are you not comparing apples with apples, you are attempting to compare apples with a skungy spat out orange pip!

As for your hero who got a fully laden B747 back on the ground in seconds with a double right hand side engine failure, did he do it single pilot? How did he actually confirm the problem that he actually had, and then work out a course of action in that time. From another era of a man and his dog perhaps?

Kegworth was caused (largely) by rushing to judgement, they would have done a much better job if they had sat on their hands for a little while an examined very closely exactly what the problem was.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

If you can't recognise a stall you should not be flying. I take it you have never flown helicopters where the collective is your friend when things can go wrong very quickly.

In the case of AF447 three pilots could not read the information in front of them and must take the blame.

I say again to take a passenger aircraft with major problem on an approach over
central London begs a lot of questions on strategy via regulation and procedures for future incidents.

[BARKINGMAD]

HALFMAN. Good posting, dragging the discussion back to where it belongs!

Obviously we wait til the report is out and then watch fascinated as the bosses responsible duck and weave and make sure none of their clique are named, shamed and possibly charged under HSE or other legislation?

May I suggest we as PROFESSIONALS in aviation raise the profile of the background to this near-disaster with our elected representatives in the UK and EU Parliaments and try to shake them out of the complacent torpor which afflicts them, even as the awful EASA FTL proposals grind their way into law.

The lawmakers are hand in glove with big business, but is there a chance that the prospect of a major legal action after the disaster, against those whose responsibility it was to ADEQUATELY SUPERVISE AND REGULATE the industry, might stir them to listen to the obvious failures highlighted in such programs as CHIRPand take EFFECTIVE action?

CHIRP has demonstrated the concerns of both pilots and engineers on the topics of overstretch, fatigue, distractions and delays due to "security" etc, and downgrading of engineering practices, supervision and manning levels.

The management and regulators may try to claim that they didn't know how bad the situation was before the inevitable fatal accident, but I hope the prospect of having collars felt, handcuffs applied and public trials with jail sentences for corporate negligence may work where all else has failed to move their attention from balance sheets to the prospect of bent metal and blood.

This incident/accident serves as a wakeup call to all of us to try harder, but after too many years in aviation I suspect the the attitude/practices change will not occur in the areas where it is most needed viz THE VERY TOP!

P S. With EASA, why do we have an expensive CAA in this country, with no apparent powers and unable to tell me whether my licence is valid? But they are very good at charging pilots and engineers loadsa money for bits of paper/e-mails delivered late or not at all?

[woptb]

If you can't recognise a stall you should not be flying. I take it you have never flown helicopters where the collective is your friend when things can go wrong very quickly.

In the case of AF447 three pilots could not read the information in front of them and must take the blame.



Have you never made an error or not followed SOP's,because of things outside your control or perhaps a belief it was the right thing to do given the circumstances ? Why they were in that position,why they made those errors, in the case of the AF or BA crews is the single most important issue.

Whether it's design,systemic,time pressure,fatigue,culture or automation,it must be the aim of ANY accident/incident investigation to find out why & mitigate against it happening again,rather than look for people to blame.Anything else is a complete waste of time/energy & is both practically & ethically unsound;Most importantly does little advance safety.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

I'm not having a go at the crew on this one although on a short sector out of LHR they should have spotted the problem on the ground and as it was morning they had no doubt been feeling fairly fresh on a short first sector.

However the greater safety issue is that they were allowed to return to Heathrow over central London not knowing if the aircraft could make it.
The view from the ground said it all and a quick walk through the cabin during the orbit over Chelmsford would have told them they were flying with both engines damaged.

How sensible is it for clearance to be given for a return over a heavily built up area in these circumstances?

In this case they got away with it.

[gazumped]

The regulators main job appears to keep public servants in jobs, and has little to with safety. Safety is up to us.

Unfortunately the "system" has at least two bunnies to hang this event on, and will gladly get back to lavish lunches and wasted talk.

Ok call me a cynic!

[FullWings]

As for your hero who got a fully laden B747 back on the ground in seconds with a double right hand side engine failure
It was probably upside-down, though. ;)

For those who are not professional pilots, the crew in question appear to have followed standard procedure, which is to find out what has happened / is happening to their aircraft then take the appropriate action. They ended up shutting down one engine, which on a twin means landing at what most pilots call the "nearest suitable airfield".

Considering they had a hydraulic problem as well, the 3,900m of 27R at LHR (the UKs longest runway) would have seemed quite suitable, plus they would be familiar with the approach and have all the charts to hand. From the position they were in when the decision to land was made, in terms of distance to fly, taking the circuit pattern into account, LHR was likely the nearest in time and distance too.

It is not standard procedure to worry about what's underneath you during a single-engined approach. For one thing, pilots have no information about the population density under their flightpath, so unless they could see an endless urban sprawl, they couldn't avoid it. Also, this type of aircraft is certified (and the pilots trained) to be able to take off, suffer an engine failure and either continue to destination, divert to an alternate or return back to the airfield of origin. The rules and regulations are written around this capability.

If you had the luxury of a choice of airfields that were all "suitable" in terms of safety, then most crews would rather go where they had a stand, engineering, company support, passenger transfer facilities, etc. rather than an empty aerodrome or a military field with all the attendant difficulties. Also, somewhere that is aware of your problem(s) and has briefed the emergency services about them would be attractive as well.

So, I'm pretty sure that although the possibility of landing elsewhere was discussed, for some of the above reasons they chose to land back where they came from.

[4468]

'A walk through the cabin', on a flight of 20 minutes? Hilarious!!

I'm afraid I can't continue with this thread any longer. I guess I'll just wait for the official report.

I'm outta here, as so many people posting don't seem to inhabit the world in which I have plied my trade for the last 35 years!

I just want to tell you both good luck. We're all counting on you.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Fullwings I take your point but we live in a 'risk assessment' culture where even a toilet floor that has been cleaned has to have a wet floor sign.

It's OK to say the crew got away with it but another time that might not work.
I'm sure there is company pressure to get back to base but look at the outcome.
Bad publicity and major problems for Heathrow for days.

I'd say a kid of seven would tell you it's not a good idea to take a fully loaded passenger aircraft with serious problems back over central London.

The flight crew must have been aware of the serious damage but they could not know what other nasties could occur when they did the approach?

I ask you to look again at this picture and tell me it's OK to fly a crippled aircraft over central London looking like this?
http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/06/02/article-2334648-1A1BD0BF000005DC-680_634x630.jpg

[rottenray]

However the greater safety issue is that they were allowed to return to Heathrow over central London not knowing if the aircraft could make it.One of the most ass-backwards things I've ever read on Pprune, and that's saying quite a lot.

It would be a great safety issue if they were allowed to return to LHR knowing the plane wouldn't make it.

As far as "knowing it would make it," do you ever really know?


On this subject:

I can't see a diversion to a military airstrip being a good thing, unless it's the closest place to land and you have to land immediately.

You have to consider logistics, like ambulance access and the ability to deal with perhaps hundreds of injured pax.

Commercial fields are well versed in this, military fields are not - they don't serve the human factor in those numbers.

Finally, I've had the pleasure of calling 6 airline pilots and 11 private pilots "friend" - and with the exception of one black sheep, they were all EXTREMELY SERIOUS and considered the safety of those on the ground just as much as their passengers. None of them would consider doing anything that might harm a passenger or an innocent bystander.

I truly believe that (at least in the Western world) most if not all commercial pilots feel this same way.

All this ranting about flying over London is just what someone has previously described it as - twaddle.

As if they're sitting there betting they can make it without making a smoking hole out of a school for seriously handicapped but oh-so-cute children who were unfortunately clustered outside at just the point of impact.


Cheers!

[Uplinker]

The initial track suggests they were still heading for destination.

Er, no, the initial track suggests that they were following the SID, which is very sensible, given the high concentration of traffic in the London TMA.

The view from the ground said it all and a quick walk through the cabin during the orbit over Chelmsford would have told them they were flying with both engines damaged.

Says who? Are YOU having a laugh? The indications available to the pilots in the cockpit told them that both engines were running. One appeared normal, the other had some issues.

So the r/hand engine only developed the fire on finals. What would you have done 15 miles out?

Landed at Heathrow.

I ask you to look again at this picture and tell me it's OK to fly a crippled aircraft over central London looking like this?

Who says it was "crippled"? Do you know how many systems and back-up systems are built in to modern jets? I've looked again at your picture and, Yep, I still say that the indications to the crew in the cockpit were that one engine was running normally and the other engine was also running but with some issues. It's just the cowls that are missing or mashed up. Would your car engine fail utterly if the bonnet detached on the motorway? No. You have been watching too many films.

What may look to you like a total disaster was actually a yellow hydraulic issue, an auto thrust problem and a fuel leak. Professional crews are trained to fault-find calmly and not to panic as you seem to be doing.

However the greater safety issue is that they were allowed to return to Heathrow over central London not knowing if the aircraft could make it.

Oh good grief. Do you seriously think they would have turned away from EGSS and headed for EGLL if they thought for one minute that they would not make it???? We are talking about a BA crew flying a modern Airbus here.

Please, change the record, it is getting very boring. And by the way I take great offence at being accused of 'Trolling' and ask you to retract that sir.

Good night from me, and good night from him. (I hope).

[Ornis]

It boils down to what is best for the people on board versus what is best for the people on the ground (which is obvious).

The crew made a judgement and they were right. This time. Generally, when a cowl departs the aircraft there is no fuel leak or fire, so there are statistics to back their decision. (Known at the time?)

Apart from the obvious questions this particular incident raises about engineering and walk-arounds, the big question remains unanswered: How much risk is acceptable to the people of London?

Because some time it might be more serious and the controllers might need to consider refusing Heathrow. How would they know (and what happens then)? Convenience of passengers and presence of an engineering base may influence the crew to underestimate the problem. (Not to mention other problems: Royal Air Maroc B734 at Amsterdam on Jun 6th 2010.)

What happens if any aircraft nearby needs to land in an emergency? Is Heathrow available regardless? Passengers must trust pilots but must city dwellers?

There are competing interests here; that explains the divergence of opinions.

[lomapaseo]

It boils down to what is best for the people on board versus what is best for the people on the ground (which is obvious).

The crew made a judgement and they were right. This time. Generally, when a cowl departs the aircraft there is no fuel leak or fire, so there are statistics to back their decision. (Known at the time?)

Apart from the obvious questions this particular incident raises about engineering and walk-arounds, the big question remains unanswered: How much risk is acceptable to the people of London?

Because some time it might be more serious and the controllers might need to consider refusing Heathrow. How would they know (and what happens then)? Convenience of passengers and presence of an engineering base may influence the crew to underestimate the problem. (Not to mention other problems: Royal Air Maroc B734 at Amsterdam on Jun 6th 2010.)

What happens if any aircraft nearby needs to land in an emergency? Is Heathrow available regardless? Passengers must trust pilots but must city dwellers?

There are competing interests here; that explains the divergence of opinions.

This flight-diversion argument is like robbing peter to pay paul. How does one plan a route vs the likelihood of parts dropping vs the likelihood of hitting something important vs the likelihood of extending the risk to the aircrafts flight itself by not saving the aircraft first?

Some legal arguments might indicate the surprise increase in risk to the people along the intended route need be warned at the time. Does one set of air-raid sirens?

This kind of extension of safety goes way beyond the control of the aviation sector and doesn't need to be discussed here (Jet Blast maybe)

[FullWings]

I'd say a kid of seven would tell you it's not a good idea to take a fully loaded passenger aircraft with serious problems back over central London.
Luckily for you and the rest of the travelling public, the airlines, the CAA, ATC, et al. don't allow seven year-old kids to formulate policy or give advice to aircraft in flight.

If an aircraft had failures that made landing short a real possibility *and* it overflew suitable airfields and open countryside in order to make it to LHR for convenience, then that might be an issue. The flight in question started in a highly populated area and stayed mostly over it because that was the standard departure. By the time the problem(s) had been diagnosed to the best of their ability, they were in a good position for a near straight in approach to LHR. As I understand it, one of the engines functioned normally for the whole flight, so they only declared a full emergency (mayday) when the damaged engine gave a fire warning shortly before landing.

Once airborne, this scenario was handled in what the vast majority of airline pilots would call a textbook manner. They had multiple failures but the aircraft was still flying and controllable, so they elected to land on the nearest, longest runway after actioning necessary drills and discussing options. It doesn't matter what the aircraft looked like, it is how it was performing that matters and the pilots were the only true judges of that.

[SLFandProud]

Ye Olde Pilot wrote...
I ask you to look again at this picture and tell me it's OK to fly a crippled aircraft over central London looking like this?
http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/06/02/article-2334648-1A1BD0BF000005DC-680_634x630.jpg

...I believe you've discovered a previously overlooked and far more important safety issue, here.

If the PF could see that and still decided to fly over central London, then he should have been on the bloody flight deck instead of sitting on the ground looking up.

[Sillert,V.I.]

Be careful when looking at that photo not to mistake the landing light for a fire.

That said, I think the risk posed by the engine fire has been downplayed on this forum & has raised the stakes on the consequences of a cowl detachment.

[BBK]

From the interim AAIB report I've gleaned the following facts:

The crew felt vibration which they thought might be the nose wheel running over the lights on the runway during the take off roll.

ATC reported to them that debris had been found on the runway.

They had a failure of the yellow hydraulic system and a significant fuel leak.

They had an indication of a fire warning on the right (no2) engine and upgraded their PAN to a MAYDAY.

Lastly, and here's the most important item, IMHO, the left engine continued to OPERATE NORMALLY.

By the way the Commander had 14337 hours of which 8036 are in type. That's quite a few LPCs under his/her belt not to mention years on the line. I said before "well done" and still see nothing except, perhaps, the issue of the walk round to criticise them. As others have said the walk round is frequently done with numerous doors/hatches still open.

[pax2908]

"[...] the walk round is frequently done with numerous doors/hatches still open "

This actually (if confirmed) seems to show that time pressure is a main contributing factor. I read this statement as "walkaround is often done while maintenance work is still ongoing". I have missed many of the posts where this was explicitely stated, I shall read the thread again.

[Bealzebub]

The assumption in all but the most extreme cases, is that you will safely navigate the aircraft back to an airport for landing. I cannot see why Heathrow is precluded because it is in a built up area.

[Safety Concerns]

time for a reality check.

Damaged aircraft returning to Heathrow possibly worth a small discussion but nothing major.

Crew not spotting unlatched engine cowls during walk around. Worth a small discussion but nothing major.

Crew performance following incident. Worth a large discussion on how professionally they behaved and deserve nothing but praise.

Design issue. Worth a small discussion just to be sure but same design failure occurring at the same time on BOTH engines. That would be a major coincidence so look elsewhere for the cause. ALL aircraft types lose engine cowls normally because of a maintenance oversight.

The fact that maintenance left both cowls unlatched. Worth a major discussion as this company has history.

And especially for those like A&C who can't read, hang the engineer, blame the engineers. Absolutely not as has been consistently posted and I must thank BOAC for his observation.

BLAME the regulator and/or the company should there be findings of a systematic nature. ABSOLUTELY DUE TO PREVIOUS.

[BBK]

Pax2908

Not necessarily! You have to understand that the normal flow, at least in my company, is that the walk round is conducted earlier rather than later so if there are any issues you can contact the engineers to get them rectified.

Basically, if the engineers are working on the engines you trust them to close the cowlings afterwards, it is that simple. Clearly, something did go wrong and we should leave it to the AAIB to determine the cause.

Prior to pushback the crew, captain in my company, asks the ground operative to confirm their checks and the reply should be "all doors and hatches closed etc".

[NigelOnDraft]

I disagree about the "both engines" aspect in this case.

It is valid where the work, if not carried out correctly, would lead to loss of both engines e.g. the BMI 734 incident.

Until the recent BA event, no A320 series cowl loss had seriously risked an engine AFAIK? If the BA event had followed that pattern, there was little more thought involved for the crew in returning with 1 engine sans cowls, and 2.

This incident alters that aspect, as noted by the AAIB, in that the RH Engine damage / fire was something not yet seen. We shall see what recommendations are made, and cruically which are followed up. I am "optimistic" that the severity of certain aspects of this event might see some "mitigations" or "traps" put in place. It is fine for the MS Simmers just to be interested in HF and "blame", but apart from appeasing their smugness, it does little to enhance safety in the future. 32+ events suggests we need to do more than rely on HF ;)

This actually (if confirmed) seems to show that time pressure is a main contributing factorAs noted, so long as the Pax are willing to regularly see 15+min delays. With short Turnrounds, the walkround is often performed before the refueller even arrives / baggage holds opened / engineering taks etc. If we find something requiring rectification (not infrequent) this is lttle scope to go out and reinspect. We have to give engineers 20+min notice*, they often rectify during Pax boarding, and the paperwork is signed by the engineer, then Capt and as the Engineer then leaves the door closes with pushback required within 3 minutes of that. Else we get the "blame" for the delay (which is all the airlines and Pax / compensation are really interested in it seems).

It is our job to resist these commercial / admin "trivialities" over safety. But just to be clear, it is not "safety comes first". It is always a "risk balance", and human nature means that balance will be judged differently by different people.


* PS and the first concern of the engineers is then whether they, or we, will cop the delay code.

[quentinc]

I cannot see why Heathrow is precluded because it is in a built up area.

Its not precluded. It is however undesireable and as per the AAIB report on N481EV provided by WHBM earlier here, if the Safety recomendations, have been implemented, then since the crew had already declared a PAN, ATC would be required to either come up with a routing that doesn't fly over a densly populated area (just a little hard here) or suggest alternative aerodromes... From the report:

10.10.2 It is desirable that aircraft in emergency should not be routed over densely populated areas. If this is inconsistent with providing the most appropriate service to the aircraft, for example when any extended routeing could jeopardise the safety of the aircraft, the most expeditious route is the one which should be given. Where possible, when expeditious routing is not required, suggestions of alternative runways or aerodromes together with the rationale that the routing would avoid densely populated areas and be consistent with safety, shall be passed to the pilot and his intentions requested.


It would be good to understand if ATC did offer the appropriate advice, and if they did, why the crew rejected the advice and continued to Heathrow.

[Bealzebub]

During the emergency briefing prior to departure, it is quite normal for the Pilot flying to brief that, in an emergency they will return to the departure airfield. Indeed, to that end they will both normally have the approach plate easily accessible to facilitate just that scenario. Poor weather, difficult terrain, likely contaminated sole runway, or other significant performance limitations would also sensibly require the nomination of an alternate airport. Heathrow (usually) has none of those considerations, and its use to facilitate the emergency scenario is perfectly normal.

What may be "desirable" for ATC, homeowners, daily mail readers, or anybody else is entirely secondary to the aircraft commanders intentions in such an emergency scenario, as indeed your quote makes clear.

[gatbusdriver]

For those that say we as flight crew should always make sure that all panels, cowls, latches etc are closed you would never get anywhere on time, and I would go as far as to suggest if we don't trust other professionals to complete their tasks as trained then you would never be able to fly in known icing conditions.

Could you imagine getting to the drive through deicing in Toronto for example, after deicing you would have to go back to an area with steps, get off the aircraft to check the wings and the tail have been deiced properly then go again, oh hang on my holdover time has run out!

I trust our engineers to close and latch cowls, I trust deicing crews, I trust refuelers to close fuelling panels, I trust ground handlers to close GPU panels and so on and so forth. We are all trained professionals and as such we expect each and everyone of us to carry out our respective jobs on the ramp.

My 10 pence, the crew seemed to have managed, what was a dynamict situation very well. I'm grateful, as ever, to learn from other people's mistakes (you can bet your bottom dollar that engine cowls are being more vigorously checked on walk around now).

[Airbanda]

I'm not a pilot but I've observed the UK civil aviation scene from the standpoint of an (I hope) informed observer for 40yrs.

The AAIB Special Report refers to the fire on right engine as follows:

During the approach to land, an external fire developed
on the right engine. An engine fire warning on the
flight deck prompted the crew to declare a MAYDAY.

Whereabouts on the approach was the aircraft at the time of the fire warning? It seems from press reports of eye witness observations that it was fairly late on when the machine was over Central or West London. Not a good time to G/A and head elsewhere.

Until we know the definitive answer answer to that question speculation about alternatives to Heathrow is fruitless.

Before fire was detected this was surely a 'routine' engine out landing with a certainty of reaching the runway which was absent in the Evergreen 747 case.

Or am I missing something?

[slip and turn]

What's all this about taking off in a densely populated area and remaining in it? That wasn't how it was. Another refresher needed from Ye Olde Pilot perhaps:
You can try to pass the buck as much as you like but the responsibility for this incident rests squarely on the captain and co-pilot. In this case it was unlatched cowlings but it could just as easily been something else. The incident was the result of a poor walkaround.

I question the logic of flying the track below instead of diverting over less densely populated area to Stansted.
http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/06/02/article-2334648-1A1BF1A4000005DC-672_634x527.jpg

I see that ground crew are facing the blame.
It is now believed two engineers, one of them a supervisor, have been suspended while an investigation is carried out.
When the sh|t hit the fans the aircraft was 14 miles west of Charing Cross and heading away from London. From the moment it left the runway heading west it was over a sparsely populated area not a densely populated one. It then flew round London outside the M25 over open country (M25 wasn't built through conurbations and hasn't spawned that many yet!) until it was decided to go back to Heathrow.

As Airbanda says perhaps the emergency situation wasn't realised until they were back over East/Central London and track distances to Heathrow versus Stansted then made it no contest. We'll no doubt learn the full story when the full report comes out on that.

So back to lessons to be learned - yes BA maintenance clearly have a chequered history when you go digging for dirt but no maintenance company gets applauded for getting it right I guess. BA maintenance have for years had a very large and varied fleet to maintain and no doubt many other operations have learned from BA mistakes. You can find Investigation reports on many types where unsecured latches have been missed on walkarounds in all sorts of operations, not just Airbus and BA. That's why unsecured latches is something the lowliest student PPL has drummed into them as a BAD THING all round the world! Engineers no longer do walkarounds at Heathrow - but the sad thing is that it seems that due to time pressures no-one else seems to do them particularly effectively either - anywhere perhaps.

Instead we now learn of some kind of "risk balance" regime from NigelOnDraft. Is he really saying that it is down to the gut feeling of individual pilots on the day whether they feel lucky/comfortable? I am not sure that a commercial pilot is an expert in probabilities any more than a derivatives trader and I believe some are now the other anyway!

The likelihood of two engines both failing simultaneously is designed to be so low as to mean we have had 2 engine EROPs for well over 20 years, but contrary to what you might be tempted to believe when installed on the flightdeck you are not flying in a neatly designed world. You are of course flying in a real world within an environment that tests human design mercilessly on every flight. What we may have neatly skipped in our walk-around the argument is that it has always been known that if the same external/environmental cause affects both engines (didn't BA38 get us thinking?) then you end up stuffed just the once and that's enough.

I take NoD's point that it is perhaps an argument for introducing more mitigation or capture traps, and I wonder if that might for example mean that no work shall ever be carried out on both engines by the same engineer in the same session even to the point of checking oil levels.

That talk of who cops the delay code is a bit worrying, so is gatbusdriver's blind trust in everyone else on the ramp who apparently warrants the label "professional" just because they are there! That's bloody scarey actually. Do you ever fraternise with ramp agents and de-ice crews gatbusdriver? Many may be well meaning boys and girls but they ain't professionals. They get a bit of training in this and that and bits of paper may swap hands but do you realise what you are saying?

[Safety Concerns]

So back to lessons to be learned - yes BA maintenance clearly have a chequered history when you go digging for dirt but no maintenance company gets applauded for getting it right I guess. BA maintenance have for years had a very large and varied fleet to maintain and no doubt many other operations have learned from BA mistakes. You can find Investigation reports on many types where unsecured latches have been missed on walkarounds in all sorts of operations, not just Airbus and BA.

In isolation this would probably be a genuine mistake, human factor. There are however other factors here that need to come out and I hope they do. Then it should be very clear why this happened.

engineers forum:

at the end of the day its clear that the cowls were left unlatched ,one may have been a fault but two maybe not .

It will never come out that we are very short of the correct manpower ,we may have had a few new starters and a load of mechanics that are pushed onto the Licensed Engineers but we dont have enough experience people at the front end.

The Aircraft Maintenance Supervisors (introduced due to a previous incident) are a complete waste of time because all they do is chase ADDs and try to make themselves look good so that they can get an even bigger bonus, there are some AMSs that dont even know what the hell to do and this has been reported to quality with no help from them either.

I understand that these cowls have a second inspection or a verification check ,that means there may be two engineers on suspension and as it led to the aircraft and its passengers being in danger ,we know where that will lead .

Pressure of work ,not enough of the correct manpower and running the damn operation on continual overtime so that we have an overworked and tired engineer. nothing will be done about all this because we like overtime as it supplements our low pay ,yes low pay

but as i say nothing will be done about it , BA will say that things will be changed ,there will be more human factors things which do sod all apart from create a job for the instructors .......what we need for this is far more real engineers not bloody mechanics that dont know the front from the back and are put with the LAE because the teams do not want them .and we need to get rid of the self serving AMSs and replace them with the supervising LAE who is not TMG .
i
unless somthing is done it will get worse and one day things may not be so lucky........i like my job at BA at times but we seem to have lost our way in what we do and why ,why are we engineers .......

[quentinc]

Or am I missing something?

They declared a PAN, stating the intention to return to Heathrow after they had fully assesed the situation. At this point, with an emergency declared, ATC are to provide a route that doesn't overfly built up areas, or suggest alternative aerodromes. We don't know if that happened or not.... It's not in the brief report we have. We do know that ATC provided vectors to Heathrow and then later the crew declared MAYDAY.

[gatbusdriver]

It's not blind trust. i go to work knowing that the peolple who carry out most jobs on the ramp are trained to do that job. If I undertook responsibility to oversee every operation from maintenance actions to deicing with everything else inbetween the aircraft would never get off the ground.

I think they call it workload management.

There is an element of risk getting into a metal tube and getting airborne then getting it back on the ground. There is SMS in place to look at all the risks involved and mitigate them as best as possible whilst still managing to perform commercially in all sorts of weathers etc.

[gazumped]

All this flying over entral London garbage, is just ridiculous.

Nothing is going to stop an aircraft commander from executing his judgement as to what field he takes his aircraft to after a PAN. You can bleat on endlessly about re-directing an re-routing, if the crew don't like , they simply won't do it.

You see the overall responsibility for the aircraft and its compliment rests with the captain, and we do not take our responsibility lightly. If the crew do all in their power to bring the aircraft back safely, they are also saving everyone's lives under the flight path, the two outcomes cannot be separated.

Now having made that clear, I doubt there is a pilot who has ever drawn breath, (kamikaze pilots excepted), would attempt to minimise the risk to people on the ground if faced with a totally stricken aircraft. Captain Sullenberg, is an excellent example. As soon as he was aware the he was going no place but down hill, he did two things, maintained flying speed, and sought out an area to minimise the impact on the poor unsuspecting. It just so happens that minimising the damage on the ground is almost always going to be the best outcome for the crew and passengers.

Let me restate my firm belief, no amount of pressure from ATC (or anyone else), re population centres, is going to change the track an aircraft operating under emergency procedures flys over. Save for the extremely rare event when the aircraft is rendered unflyable(as in Sullenberg's case).

This aircraft did not look pretty, but it was eminently flyable, and would have remained so for a significant amount of time.

I am an aircraft captain, and I have high praise indeed for the way this crew handled themselves.

If I ever find myself in a similar circumstance, I would not at all take kindly to someone telling where I should fly over. (I could probably be convinced by a couple of close formation Tornados).

All heavy jets operate IFR, and as such have no way of avoiding a certain flight path IMC. The whole concept is so utterly ridiculous.

So all you concerned citizens on the ground, rest assured that every crew will do their best to save their own skin, and by default be saving yours as well.

[BOAC]

I would guess that attitudes like "It's just the cowls that are missing or mashed up." - which may well have been 'trivial' incidents to some folk in the past - need to be reviewed in view of what happened this time. The thought of LP fuel-line punctures on two engines does not make for relaxation.

[overthewing]

I interpret the AAIB report to say that both engines were functioning through most of the event. It was only during the approach to land that the right engine was shut down in response to the fire alert. The pilots were told by cabin crew that both engines had panels missing, but presumably had no reason to think that this was likely to dangerously compromise the engines.

So, for most of the flight the pilots had a reasonably stable two-engine plane whose main problem was going to be stopping after touchdown - is that right? Landing at Heathrow seems quite sensible to me in those circumstances.

[Del Prado]

Slip and turn We'll no doubt learn the full story when the full report comes out on that.

So back to lessons to be learned.

:ugh:

[Airbanda]

They declared a PAN, stating the intention to return to Heathrow after they had fully assesed the situation. At this point, with an emergency declared, ATC are to provide a route that doesn't overfly built up areas, or suggest alternative aerodromes. We don't know if that happened or not.... It's not in the brief report we have. We do know that ATC provided vectors to Heathrow and then later the crew declared MAYDAY.

Isn't PAN intended to convey urgency or a need for possible assistance rather than a 'full on' emergency? No emergency until MAYDAY or other phraseology invoked.

[Safety Concerns]

I think the loss of both cowls should be kept in perspective. All eng cowls can detach from all aircraft if not properly closed. Any panel detaching from anywhere on an aircraft can cause unpredictable damage.

Eng cowls have long been seen as a weak point and so a second inspection by maintenance that they are in fact closed is pretty standard.

To miss both engines as in this case does perhaps suggest a more systematic failing in the system rather than an individual error or a design error.

British Airways has always been a leading airline and many will want to throw mud at it just for being there. That should not prevent justified criticism however.

Therefore and as they are a repeat offender I believe it is in everybody's interest to properly investigate and ensure that maintenance is being given proper funding and the respect it deserves.

And I will say again. If it should turn out that shortcomings are uncovered the CAA should be made to explain why they didn't uncover it.

[slip and turn]

Slip and turn
We'll no doubt learn the full story when the full report comes out on that.

So back to lessons to be learned.:ugh:OK so now I am being edit-quoted out of context :ouch: I was suggesting that the reason it went back to Heathrow (if there was any conscious reason) would come out in the full report.

So I should then have said "So back to other lessons we might be able to learn immediately" or some such.

This ain't the usual type of incident where we all have to wait to discover the prime cause lest we go off half-cocked, now do we? The facts are already out there in the interim report.

You can speculate the engineers had a bad day or toothache or last night before finishing the job had just had a blinding row with the boss but it doesn't add up to much.

The bald fact was that no bugger on the ramp saw the latches were open before it went ... that's the one that demands heads banged :ugh:

I tell you, if pilots everywhere this week are not more conscientiously doing the walkaround checks and asking questions about how well ramp staff communicate doors and hatches closed and whether they are seen to be very diligently checking then it is a rum do. We don't need a final report before we learn that one.

[quentinc]

Isn't PAN intended to convey urgency or a need for possible assistance rather than a 'full on' emergency? No emergency until MAYDAY or other phraseology invoked.

Both PAN and MAYDAY are emergency calls.

[Meikleour]

It will be very interesting to see how great the fuel leak was and whether the FUEL LEAK checklist was in fact actioned. If it was not then that may have been why they ended up with an engine fire!

[A and C]

The cowl latches were most likely closed, that is why no one picked up the fact that they were not engaged.

The reason for them being latched is that once they are disengaged and the cowl is opened to enable engine work to be done the catches hang down, if you catch your head on one of these usually it hurts a lot and requires the use of lots of industrial language. To avoid the chance of injury the catches are latched back into the closed position when work is taking place.

The cowls were the closed without opening the latches and engaging the hooks and re latching them.

I'm sure that if the latches had been in the unlatched position some one would have spotted this error.

[quentinc]

WRT the fuel leak checklist, if the fuel leak is from an engine and the checklist is followed, would you expect the relevant engine to have been shutdown?

[Sillert,V.I.]

I would guess that attitudes like "It's just the cowls that are missing or mashed up." - which may well have been 'trivial' incidents to some folk in the past - need to be reviewed in view of what happened this time. The thought of LP fuel-line punctures on two engines does not make for relaxation.

I would guess this too, and judging by the last paragraph before the safety recommendation in the special bulletin, so would the AAIB:

"This event has shown that the consequences of fan cowl door detachment are unpredictable and can present a greater risk to flight safety than previously
experienced."

This ain't the usual type of incident where we all have to wait to discover the prime cause lest we go off half-cocked, now do we? The facts are already out there in the interim report.
We know what happened; we do not know why it happened.

The bald fact was that no bugger on the ramp saw the latches were open before it went ... that's the one that demands heads banged :ugh:

I don't agree.

Disciplining those immediately responsible won't address the underlying cause. If they are replaced with others who are trained, managed & motivated in the same environment, I'd suggest it's likely a similar type of incident could happen again.

We need to seek understanding, not blame.

[John Farley]

I have had to deal with a pilot who goofed. We were together in a two seat aeroplane at the time and luckily I was able to recover from the goof.

I decided it was the sort of mistake any of us could have made (in his circumstances at that time) and that he was the least likely one in the team to make that mistake again.

He never did make that or any other mistake and I never mentioned our incident to anyone else.

Judgement is needed. Assuming the Captain fully accepted he should have spotted the unlock then he would have my total backing all the way as he will never make that mistake again. . If he wants to blame Airbus or the mechs I would feel very differently.

[robert f jones]

Can you explain, to a non Airbus (ex) pilot, how would they know there was a fuel leak on the right engine from their onboard instruments ?

[Right Way Up]

Ask the cabin manager to look out the window.

From QRH:

Engine fuel leak can be confirmed by excessive fuel flow indication, or a visual check.

[slip and turn]

When John Farley posts, we must all take special note.

I hope my post here which I've been knocking around for the last hour or two doesn't detract too far from what he posted in between times:


That was interesting information A and C and as you have been around these parts longer than most I imagine you are very sure of it. I apologise if the information was available elsewhere in this thread.

I thought others had shown diagrams including one appearing in Canadian incident report that explained the position of latches as quite clearly standing proud when not secure ? BOAC reminded us in his post #656 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/515531-incident-heathrow-33.html#post7871356) that there is a risky but still visible half open latch situation where "they will protrude about one inch underneath the cowling . This is the normal condition of the latches after maintenance opens the cowling". He pointed out the Canadian Report which includes this photo:
http://www.bst.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2000/a00o0199/a00o0199_Appendix_A.jpg

The interim report is quite clear that there is photographic evidence of G-EUOE leaving the stand with unsecured latches - so if it isn't quite as I read from BOAC and from the Canadian photo then that's worth knowing about. Nevertheless AAIB say LHR stand photos show the unlocked position plainly enough, so the walk-around error is the same, isn't it, unless you are insisting now that unlatched cowls the way BA and others set them are totally unnoticeable except when the aircraft rocks slightly during pushback, or when engine starts or during taxy and that's when the evidence photos must have been taken?

If it is so difficult to spot until things start moving then all the more reason for walk-arounds to be bombproof everytime?

Perhaps A and C highlights a new risk that BOAC didn't mention, but kenjaDROP's post #641 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/515531-incident-heathrow-33.html#post7871222) then did i.e. that he thought it possible for maintenance to open the cowling and then click those latches back flush with the cowling even though they aren't locked? And that then the only way to notice it during the walk-around inspection is for someone to routinely thump the cowls or prise an anti-static rubber screwdriver type implement to test the latches are working? (I did see that mentioned quite some pages back as an old-times aviation procedure not necessarily for this type).


Sillert VI, I apologise for my use of language on banging heads - I was rebounding off that head-banging smiley used to comment against my earlier post. I am not really talking about hanging any one individual out to dry because there but for the grace of God and all that, but I'd have thought a 14,000 hour captain would be on top of this rather than prone to go with the modern aviation flow which NigelOnDraft talked about. From what he said, there seemed to be questionable, unconventional and inconsistent transfer of risk going on as the norm relying on individual pilot "judgement".

So I was rather talking metaphorically about all pilots needing to up their game on walk-around inspections if even at this stage they are still minded that it is an engineering problem. Not their job to be the back-stop on this kind of thing, maybe? The pilot's job/role may have been well and truly messed with over the years, but walk-around checks most definitely are still very much on the captain's accountability list, aren't they? That's the disconnect which is most surprising to me and might need reconnecting or banging into quite a few heads IMO.

All aircraft types have their quirks but this isn't really a quirk unless maintenance have modified the latches so they don't behave per the book - should not a pilot be able to name and locate with his eyes closed every single quick release panel on external skin of the airframe (and some). And if any is easily removable or unlockable without tools, surely each and every external one should be inspected on walk-around? I would expect them all to be in the FCOM external checks.

We have heard lots about how difficult it is to complete those checks in the time available especially with multi-tasking on the ramp. But how the captain actually ensures each panel latch is inspected immediately prior to flight is a whole different question. Ensure it he or she must however.

One thing is clear: the captain must not simply abdicate that accountability to some inanimate or abstract such as the SMS agreed with his employer or with the airport or the ground handler or maintenance department. The captain surely must remain consciously accountable and yes, always be prepared to testify convincingly that the system works, else he just shouldn't go?

[tubby linton]

I think that we are making a lot of the photographic evidence but we know nothing of its' source or how much manipulation has taken place of the image to obtain the evidence of the open latches.

[Safety Concerns]

tubby do be serious please.

[tubby linton]

I was being serious . The cctv picture has not been published and neither has the location of the camera. With the modern software manipulation of photographs a very fuzzy picture can be made razor sharp or have you never heard of photoshop?
The other important question is ,was there any human monitoring of the image ,and if there was why were the crew not alerted ?

[slip and turn]

Blimey TL - AAIB say
Following the event photographs of the aircraft, taken
prior to pushback, were provided to the AAIB. These
photographs show the fan cowl doors unlatched on both
engines

Surely you are not implying AAIB might have been sucked in to a particular agenda by doctored ramp photos?

[Ian W]

Airsmiles

Re; avoiding the need to overfly built-up areas, won't the Thames Estuary airport have runways aligned East-West like LHR? If yes, they'll still be a fair degree of over-flying London of approaching from the west. If taking off eastwards, the North Atlantic traffic will still need to turn west and overfly Greater London.

Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't see a vast difference in overflying London for either LHR or the Thames estuary airport.

You are wrong

Of course if the airport were to be build just East of the Dartford crossing then you would be right. However, the current plans put it somewhere South East of Canvey Island and North of the Isle of Sheppey. Given the use of curved RNP approaches there would be no need for extended straight in approaches or departures, I accept what everyone will say about transport to London although that would be achievable.

The incident in this thread was handled as one expects it to be handled recovery ASAP to the nearest suitable airport controllers keeping everything else away and the flight crew handling the emergency and upgrading as required landing safely no lives lost. Nevertheless, had that engine fire turned into a really bad fire on long finals and it was only luck that it didn't - or had the other engine been equally sick or perhaps loss of another hydraulic system then that recovery could have been a little too exciting. This incident is perfect ammunition for those who would close Heathrow and who object to a 3rd runway on safety grounds. The very people who are hurrying/harrying their engineers and thus raising the chances of these incidents are the ones that would lose most if the 3rd runway does not go ahead.

[framer]

The motivation of individuals analysing incidents/ accidents is key to weather the industry gets safer after an event. Those who seek blame are often motivated by a need to feel good about their own abilities and work history. True motivation to improve safety shows itself within statements like these

Disciplining those immediately responsible won't address the underlying cause. If they are replaced with others who are trained, managed & motivated in the same environment, I'd suggest it's likely a similar type of incident could happen again.

The mistakes and differing levels of diligence will always be part of our flight line folks.when the Engineer makes a mistake, our pilot needs to have the time and brain space to catch it. When our pilot makes a mistake, the Engineer needs to have the time and brain space to catch it. When our refueller makes a mistake, our Engineer and pilot need to have the time and brain space to catch it. Appropriate allocation of manpower and regular high quality training is the weakest link in the chain at the moment, we should ensure the regulator addresses it.

[Ornis]

When I remove the top cowl of my light aircraft I put the screws and screwdriver on my seat. To remind me, should the cowl be replaced, it is not secure.

One reason people "forget" is distraction. When the latches are unlocked at least one needs to be flagged; a hole and a hook might do it, or even an elastic band.

Other than that, what else can you say except "be careful"? As banal as it sounds it need repeating regularly. This is too simple a task to be ignorance.

Speaking as an airline passenger, I don't expect pilots to check engineers have locked latches. I expect engineers to do that.

On the other hand, I do not accept pilots may demand to fly a damaged aircraft over large populations. Whatever some claim, it is a compromise and the people on the ground have a say.

[A and C]

You are starting to catch on as to how the securing latch position can me ambiguous, in the photo in your last post the catch B positron is seemingly clear but when veiwed from some positions and with the cowling not quite together as in this picture.

As said about six hundred posts ago I at one time carried a screwdriver that I could use to ( among other things ) use to load the cowling and test the security of the latches. The screwdriver was with me during the time I was in line maintenance, then as a flight engineer and finally as a pilot.

Unfortunately a few years back the aviations security system in the UK decided that as a pilot I could not be trusted with such a dangerous impliment as a screwdriver so the days of by being able to check cowling security or even the level of the fuel on the aircraft using the sticks are over.......... I will let you draw your own conclusion as to the relationship between flight safety and the security system.

What I do find totaly stupid is that some people think that Boris island is the answer to the fallout from eight cowling latches being left undone, we need to look much closer to home and see what pressures and distractions are imposed of the working lives of pilots and maintenance staff that was at the root of this problem.

[Lonewolf_50]

On the other hand, I do not accept pilots may demand to fly a damaged aircraft over large populations. Whatever some claim, it is a compromise and the people on the ground have a say.
The same canard is once again raised.

First off, on a practical basis, no you don't have a say. You (or me were I in London) are already on the ground, the pilot is trying to get there with his load of pax. All of them.

Secondly, they have to fly over a populated area any time they want to get to that airport, damaged or not.

Thirdly, pilot has X evidence of the extent of the damage 'in situ' and you are looking at this with hindsight.

Fourthly, with the cowlings gone, in the terminal area, there is a limited ability to triage (i.e. go back out of the cockpit and have a look) if what one needs to do AS A CREW is get that thing back to the airfield safely. (Or at another field, which is a PILOT's judgment call, not a "I am standing on the ground" person's judgment call.

This line of wrong has been addressed again and again in this thread already. With respect, sir, you are out of line regarding the bolded part of your post.

EDIT: for ye olde pilot and your picture. See my last sentence in the paragraph above this one in re your game with photographs.

[Blondie2005]

A and C - once you've cleared security and are in the environs of engineers, can't you borrow one of their screwdrivers?

[Contacttower]

Apologies if this has been mentioned previously but would it not be possible to design a cowl door that would simply close itself under the influence of the airflow if it had been left unlatched?

[Ye Olde Pilot]

The Guardian are reporting the following
The leading safety adviser in global aviation has added to calls for investigation of the Airbus engine cowl latches that triggered an emergency landing at Heathrow by a British Airways plane, describing the number of incidents as "very significant".

Günther Matschnigg, the International Air Transport Association's safety chief, said it was "definitely an area we need to look into".

Last week an interim report from British investigators said that the emergency occurred after a BA maintenance team failed to ensure the cowls – the engine coverings – were properly locked. The 40kg parts were torn away from both the engines as the BA flight to Oslo took off from Heathrow on 24 May, with one causing damage to the Airbus A319 plane's wing, fuselage and landing gear, leading to one engine catching fire in the air.

The Air Accident Investigation Bureau's report pointed to the difficulty in checking whether the latches on the cowls were properly secured.

Airbus reported in July 2012 that there had been 32 incidents of cowls being lost on the A319 and similar models.

John Leahy, the chief operating officer of Airbus, said that the number of incidents was small and the company had no plans at the present time to review the engine latches. "You just have to follow appropriate maintenance. People have to be careful.

"Every two seconds a [A320 family Airbus] plane is taking off or landing."

However, asked if the numbers were statistically insignificant, Matschnigg, Iata's senior vice-president in charge of safety, said: "I would count those kinds of incidents as very significant … it is definitely an area we need to look into."

He said it was "absolutely" time for Airbus to review the latches. "When you have an incident like this it is very important that the community – the aircraft manufacturer, the engine manufacturer and the airline – look into how this happened. It might be an improvement of the latches or the procedure."

Willie Walsh, the chief executive of British Airways' parent company IAG, said he would not comment while the investigation was ongoing.

Passengers on flight BA762, who feared for their lives as the plane returned to Heathrow on one, exposed engine, are consulting a specialist aviation lawyer with a view to legal action.

The 75 passengers and crew aboard BA762 were evacuated via emergency slides on returning to Heathrow. Both the airport's runways were closed briefly, leading to BA cancelling short-haul flights for much of the day, leaving thousands stranded.

[Del Prado]

Slip and turn
Are we everyday missing defects which are mitigated or held together only by that thin but marvelous veneer of robustness and reliability in design that was honed from experience during an era when far more attention was paid to getting basic checks right?

Well you're not. You're not a commercial pilot.
Yet you seem to post with an air of great authority even in the face of overwhelming facts or the strongly held beliefs of many of the professional pilots who post here.

Have you ever flown an A320? Have you ever been a pilot or engineer for BA?
I haven't. (Well, I got half an hour in a 320 once but that's a long story)

I'm going back to read only mode from now on.

And try and filter the facts from the BS.

[CISTRS]

Framer states:
When our pilot makes a mistake, the Engineer needs to have the time and brain space to catch it. When our refueller makes a mistake, our Engineer and pilot need to have the time and brain space to catch it.

When the airframe / engine designer makes a mistake with a vulnerable design, those listed above also need to catch it.

With random and unpredictable damage to the fuel system, hydraulic system, airframe and U/C in this instance, the outcome could have been much worse.

A critical weakness has been exposed, and the overall management of this systemic failure needs to be recognised and addressed. This is about much more than six-monthly drills in the sim.

[Ornis]

In a democracy, the people's representatives do decide, in general terms, what is acceptable, not airline pilots. They have one vote like anyone else. That is clearly demonstrated by some noise abatement procedures that may not suit pilots.

In the event an aircraft is stricken on take-off or climb-out there may be no option but to continue over dense populations. And crash onto people, as Concorde did.

In the event of a damaged aircraft from any aerodrome needing to land promptly there may be choices. That is a simple fact. To repeat myself, like it or not, the people on the ground do have an interest, and, in a general sense, a say.

Happily severely damaged aircraft don't request or demand to overfly London or other conurbations regularly. Because, I suggest, it would not be acceptable.

As far as cowls being opened and latches left unlocked are concerned, how idiot-proof must fasteners or routine procedures be?

[steelbranch]

As a humble PPL holder and not a professional pilot, and at the risk of having my head shot off, it is interesting to note the issues raised regarding organisational culture and how this can impact the decision making process of the pilots. There seems to be a disconnect between the fact that the buck supposedly stops with the Captain, and the operational considerations and management diktats which he/she must also balance sound decisions against.

It has been mentioned that maintenance was being completed while the aircraft was still on stand and the question also asked, well, does the pilot go back out and check that the engineers have closed the cowl doors properly? When time is of the essence? When the engineers are also professionals?

Flightglobal mentioned the following in a piece about the incident last week:

"Incidents involving the A320, notably those caused by failure to latch the doors upon closure, have plagued the type for more than two decades.

Airbus has previously noted that the A320 is particularly vulnerable because the engine pods have a ground clearance of less than 70cm (27in), and checking them during walk-round requires the observer to crouch low.

Some operators have introduced procedures requiring dual independent checks on the doors.

Airbus has been reluctant to pursue a cockpit warning system."

As an observer, it does seem that there are many links in the chain, outside the pilot's direct control, but for which he is ultimately responsible. Would this be fair to say? It would be interesting to hear from line pilots on this. Does BA, for instance, require dual independent checks on cowl doors?

While the actions of the crew have been praised widely, it would also be interesting to know their current status, i.e. active or otherwise pending investigation. I wonder will they ultimately end up carrying the can on this one, like the poor Captain of G-AWNO. I hope not.

Finally, since the aircraft is certified to fly safely on one engine in certain abnormal circumstances, under which this incident would seem to fall, then is it right to talk about the irresponsibility of flying over central London in such a condition? Unless of course it's known for sure that they shut down the wrong engine.

[NigelOnDraft]

As a humble PPL holder Maybe so, but a far better / balanced overview of the whole situation than many have offered :ok:

It has been mentioned that maintenance was being completed while the aircraft was still on standI am not sure it has been stated with regard to this incident? However, it is a factor on occasion

[A and C]

At some stations engineering support is thin on the ground or non existent, the engineering staff night shift may well be at home n bad by the time you get to the aircraft. Also at some places there is no engineering support what so ever, at places like this I can't even manually check the fuel load !

I must admit that having a B1 engineering licence I am a bit more proactive than most pilots but the fact remains that the security system is blind to flight safety issues.

[garpal gumnut]

Garpal,I guess you've never made an error or broken a rule ? In aviation (as opposed to less critical fields of endeavour) the outcomes can be VERY different.
Unfortunately people make errors,which can have devastating outcomes, for the same reason they forget to post a letter.

All aviation professionals do battle with their Human fallibilities eveyday,on our best days we can still screwup,add short turn rounds,bad design,fatigue,time pressure & its amazing that there aren't more problems.
Its because as professionals we work hard, train hard & realise ultimately we hold peoples lives in our hands.
The designers, operators & the regulators have a duty to ensure that they set us up to GET IT RIGHT - NOT WRONG, this is not the case.
If PAX realised the stresses & strains placed upon flight crew & ground crew they might vote with their feet. They don't realise that we can become so focussed on 'achieving' that bending/breaking the rules becomes the norm.
It would be nice if things changed across the piste,but unfortunately that takes something far more serious for things to change, people have to die, before the right questions are asked. The ripples from this event, particularly outside the aviation community, will fade quickly. My point wotb is that professionals have a duty of care to consumers, not the other way about, as you imply. Whether one is a pilot, engineer or doctor, the duty of care rests with the professional. Not the consumer.
I have no doubt that the pilot in this case did a magnificent job, given a short timeline with conflicting information to get the aircraft back to Heathrow. Nonetheless it was a complete cockup.
Passengers have no duty of care in this situation.
The duty of care rests with the professionals in the industry.
I have made cockups in my area of expertise which have cost lives and understand your angst, but you, as I, are a professional and it comes with the territory. Learn from your mistakes, admit them honestly to consumers and keep the other slack bastards in your industry honest, is the best way to go.
Passengers and consumers I would agree do not care, until there is a disaster.

[framer]

As an observer, it does seem that there are many links in the chain, outside the pilot's direct control, but for which he is ultimately responsible. Would this be fair to say? It would be interesting to hear from line pilots on this. Does BA, for instance, require dual independent checks on cowl doors?

As a line pilot of a similar sized aircraft carrying out similar flights ( B737) I can say that there are many many things that the pilots are " ultimately responsible" for that are fairly well out of their control.
That the latches on the engine cowls have been closed is one example ( if they were still being worked on when the walk around was conducted).
That the pitot tube has been re connected after maintenance on the system is another example ( recently had a situation where it had not been done).
That the cabin pressure controller has been re connected after maintenance is another ( had that a couple of years ago).
That the center of gravity of the aircraft has been calculated correctly for departure. ( we just get a print out telling us what it is).
That the load is distributed in the correct holds in the belly of the jet as per the load calculations. ( we don't get told where it should be so can't tell if it is wrong).
That the dangerous goods we are carrying have been packed correctly and are separated when they should be separated.
That we don't have intoxicated passengers boarding the aircraft ( ground staff load them sometimes if they don't want to deal with the grumpy pax and the paperwork).
That the fuel loaded has been checked for water.
Etc etc etc
The are many things that we are technically responsible for that we have to trust other people to do.
That's just airline flying. But who is responsible for ensuring all those people are well rested and well trained and checked for competency? Take a guess......

[pax britanica]

Re the posta bout captains responsibilities which is very sensible since in todays environment the captain cannot possibly be held responsible for everything on the basis that he signed for it. How about the person who authorised him to sign in the first place. But more to the point what happens if the FO did the walk round in accordance with BA procedures and missed the latches-is that's till the captain's responsibility

[steelbranch]

Nigel, thanks for the reply. There were a few earlier posts which had referred to maintenance being performed before pushback, but I guess that is to be officially confirmed.

Framer - thanks for the details. Main question is the real risk of being scapegoated if/when something goes wrong in spite of having done the best that was humanly possible in the circumstances, and under the limitations present. Management will do their best to shrug off responsibility, even if their rules and procedures occasionally (perhaps often) do not line up with the daily operational limitations the pilots face.

[ukengman]

The air crew are not employed to do duplicate inspections for maintenance staff; the engineers are required to complete the task and present the aircraft in a condition ready for flight.

[Back at NH]

If I see one more post about cheese and holes I'm going to vomit. What a worn out cliche.

The flying over London argument is irrelevant in my book.

With your logic the Captain would have to get out of the aircraft after the baggage doors were closed and the refuelling finished and do a walk around to check up on everyone just before departure on every single flight. If another department is working on the aircraft just prior to pushback the flight crew have to trust them to do their jobs to a degree. That's just modern aviation. You can't know for sure that they have " done their own diligent external check", you have to trust that as professionals, they have done their job. You're living in a fantasy land.

Now that's an appalling indictment of modern aviation. That's just the way it is so you just have to put up with it? If that's the way the guys at the front think these days then I grieve for the industry.

And as for "you have to trust that as professionals, they have done their job", could you please explain the pre-flight walkround check as printed in the FCOM and the crew responsibility for actioning said check? In particular, the item that the Fan Cowl Doors are closed and latched.

I agree the crew did a good job in bringing the aircraft back to LHR but rather too much of the arsonist joining the fire brigade for my liking?

[Lonewolf_50]

Finally, since the aircraft is certified to fly safely on one engine in certain abnormal circumstances, under which this incident would seem to fall, then is it right to talk about the irresponsibility of flying over central London in such a condition?
No, it is not.
Unless of course it's known for sure that they shut down the wrong engine.
Indeed.
Ornis:

Your argument is poorly presented, black and white, acceptable not acceptable. The fact is that it is acceptable in some circumstances.
In a democracy, the people's representatives do decide, in general terms, what is acceptable, not airline pilots. They have one vote like anyone else. That is clearly demonstrated by some noise abatement procedures that may not suit pilots.
You are mixing domains here between policy development and the execution of an emergency procedure. The noise abatement procedures were developed for a variety of reasons, over time, between government and the industry. The reasons included people building homes and businesses under already established departure corridors and then bitching about the noise. It took a combined effort to get the procedures codified to balance flight safety and public interest.

Likewise, the crew on that damaged aircraft had to balance their immediate need for returning a distressed but STILL FLYING aircraft to the field, the public interest you mention, and the choices of airfield ... versus time and risk of no longer having a flying aircraft before touchdown ... given that at the time the extent of the damage beyond missing cowls as unknown.

To repeat myself, you don't get a vote in that situation (nor do I).

The democracy (and a few despotic sorts) have already put into place the public interest input via a whole series of qualification requirements, coded into law, operational constraints (see also speed restrictions at some altitudes) and the requirement that the pilot is required to get his crew, craft, and passengers safely to earth.

The pilot in command balances the competing intersts in a brief time, not over hours or years, and then makes a decision to get his crew, craft, and passengers back to terra firma.

That too is In The Public Interest.
In the event an aircraft is stricken on take-off or climb-out there may be no option but to continue over dense populations. And crash onto people, as Concorde did.
Indeed, that is a risk society takes in keeping the airports operational in densely populated areas. THIS burden isn't all on aircraft operators. Your veiled allusion to it being so is wrong due to cherry picking areas of interest. The interests interact, which is how policy, and policy changes, are formed.
In the event of a damaged aircraft from any aerodrome needing to land promptly there may be choices. That is a simple fact.
Of course. This crew, as I mentioned above, used the judgment they are expected to exercise as part of getting the certification to carry passengers.
To repeat myself, like it or not, the people on the ground do have an interest, and, in a general sense, a say.
That interest is already accounted for in the regs, rules and training processes, and certification.
Once the event hits, You Get No Vote, and I don't either. With that said, pilots of the professional sort are already attuned to the matter of populated areas as part of their professional development. They are aware of the public interest with each take off.
Happily severely damaged aircraft don't request or demand to overfly London or other conurbations regularly. Because, I suggest, it would not be acceptable.
The industry and regulatory domains agree, indeed, that in most cases, it's not preferred, but in some cases it must be.

So, in some cases it is acceptable. Your black and white framing of this matter is, to repeat myself, out of line.

(We may actually agree more than we disagree on this, and it may also be a matter of word choice which presents your argument in a poor light to me).

I have tried to edit this response to keep it civil, but if I have failed, please accept my apologies.

[fireflybob]

Lonewolf 50, nice post.

Perhaps it is also worth mentioning that it is legal to depart from the Rules of the Air to avoid immediate danger.

Some people here don't seem to be aware of the fact that the aircraft Commander can do anything he/she deems necessary to secure the safety of the aircraft and it's occupants. He/she might have to explain his/her actions afterwards but that is another matter.

[Bealzebub]

Happily severely damaged aircraft don't request or demand to overfly London or other conurbations regularly. Because, I suggest, it would not be acceptable
No. It is because there are so rarely severely damaged aircraft.
This has been explained to the n'th degree. You don't accept it? Fine.

[lomapaseo]

When will it end?

We have a Tech section and I believe an ATC section why can't we take some of these what-if flight path arguments there?

That way we could devote more time to this incident's causal factors and fixing it responses while waiting for more details from the AAIB

[gatbusdriver]

Back at NH

A quick question if you don't mind.

Is there any job on the ramp that you would not check yourself?
Loading?
Deicing?
GPU panel?

I can make driving very safe tomorrow, the new speed limit is 5mph on all roads. If everyone abides by it road deaths would drop dramatically. Is it practical?

[CAAAD]

I'm afraid I disagree with Mr Leahy.


(John Leahy, the chief operating officer of Airbus, said that the number of incidents was small and the company had no plans at the present time to review the engine latches. "You just have to follow appropriate maintenance. People have to be careful.

"Every two seconds a [A320 family Airbus] plane is taking off or landing.")

The safety of the aircraft seems to depend upon a task which appears to be troublesome and difficult in certain circumstances, and which is definitely subject to human frailty.

Hence the latching system design is not fit for purpose and should be redesigned even if this leads to expenditure,

Mr Leahy should be rolling his sleeves up and fixing the problem.

The fact that an Airbus takes off every two seconds or whatever merely emphasises the need for action before the numbers game catches up again.

[A and C]

There is nothing wrong with the cowling latches on the A320 and it has a good safety record, to the best of my knowlage no properly secured cowl has ever departed the aircraft.

So lets start looking for the underlying reasons for the failure to secure these cowls and not rush to mandate another expensive mechanical system to solve this problem.

Your solution to the problem will only secure A320 cowls, a look into the underlying problems will improve the whole maintenance system and is likely to also identify other issues that are not related to A320 cowls.

[walterthesofty]

Correct A and C the method of latching the fan cowls on this aircraft is no different than any other engine whether that be a RR GE PW or a CFM they all employ virtually identical methods.
The only difference is some aircraft have a lot more ground clearance which makes seeing a latch that is unlocked far easier during a walk round

[lomapaseo]

Like many things in our lives the guarantee on a product is not good unless used as directed in the Manf specifications.

OK, history has told us that the manf. specifications were not clear enough or easy to comply. Thus the Manf. updated his info with a later SB.

I'm waiting for the AAIB to tell me if it was complied with, if not, why not?
about this. Resurrecting old history, pre-service Bulletin, is not appropriate to these questions.

[r75]

I feel that once the full report is issued,we may see a lot of references to "Human Factors" in future case studies of this incident.Let us wait and see the full facts in the report.

[Back at NH]

None of those items are part of the pre-flight external check of the aircraft. The fan cowl door latches are.

[archae86]

The only difference is some aircraft have a lot more ground clearance which makes seeing a latch that is unlocked far easier during a walk round
That raises an interesting question. The enormous fleet of CFM56-equipped 737s represents an awful lot of low ground clearance engines operated by a really diverse set of operators. Do we have any information of the rate of cowl-loss per cycle on 737 Classic plus NG fleets vs. IAE-equipped A320-series aircraft? If it is far lower, then perhaps there is a difference in design or procedure worth thinking about.

And within the A320-series aircraft, is there a substantial difference in rate of this problem on the CFM56 vs. the IAE2500-engined portions of the fleet?

I'm genuinely curious, and not trying to engage in A vs. B or IAE vs. GE/Snecma contest.

[A and C]

The cowl on the B737 NG hangs open in such a way as to be blindingly obvious.

[keel beam]

So the answer for future Fan cowl designs is Not to have them the same size. One cowling slightly larger than the other will cause it to show as unlatched when not latched, if you see what I mean.

[Ornis]

@Lonewolf. No need to apologise for what you write, you write well. It's just that you can't read.

[Ornis #900] "The crew made a judgement and they were right." I suggested that competing interests (passengers V inhabitants) explained the divergence of opinions on this.

[Ornis#941] "Speaking as an airline passenger, I don't expect pilots to check engineers have locked latches. I expect engineers to do that." The comment that put the cat amongst the pigeons: "On the other hand, I do not accept pilots may demand to fly a damaged aircraft over large populations. Whatever some claim, it is a compromise and the people on the ground have a say."

The opposing view is that any pilot in any circumstance can demand to fly into Heathrow. That is absurd. It is not I guilty of strawmen arguments and psychological splitting.

The fact is there might be other suitable aerodromes. Luton certainly presents a shorter trip than an orbit around the M25. I wouldn't presume to opine on suitability.

I guess the point I struggled to make is, can we be assured someone has thought about what is best should this happen again?

[Lonewolf #943] "Secondly, they have to fly over a populated area any time they want to get to that airport, damaged or not." Tautology.

[Beazlebub #961] "No. It is because there are so rarely severely damaged aircraft." Exactly my point. [Ornis #949] "Happily severely damaged aircraft don't request or demand to overfly London or other conurbations regularly. Because, I suggest, it would not be acceptable." We get away with it because it is rare. Getting away with it does not make it best practice.

[DaveReidUK]

And within the A320-series aircraft, is there a substantial difference in rate of this problem on the CFM56 vs. the IAE2500-engined portions of the fleet?Yes, 80% (possibly more) of the occurrences to date have involved V2500-powered aircraft.

[FE Hoppy]

I can't believe the length of this thread.
It's simple.
The last guy to do maintenance and the pilot who did the walk round both failed to do their jobs properly.

It's as simple as that.

Aircraft take off with panels not closed or gear pins still in. It happens. Because individuals fail to do their job.

You can try to push the responsibility wherever you like but the fact remains.

I once left the pitot heaters on and melted the covers onto the probes. It was my fault, nobody else. The procedure was sound. I failed in my duty.

Live with it!

[4468]

FE Hoppy:
You have perhaps described WHAT may have happened.

Can we reasonably presume that all the individuals concerned would have started that day with the intention of doing the best job they could? The most professional they could be. Exactly the same as many of us?

The generally accepted point of investigation is to attempt to explain WHY things happen to (or are omitted by) reasonably conscienscous people, so that we can prevent similar things happening again.

At least this way we don't ALL have to make EVERY mistake, in order to increase our experience. We can learn from others who are probably very, very similar to ourselves!

(To be fair this type of incident HAS happened numerous times before, so it seems, so far, we haven't learned enough !!:rolleyes: - Maybe this time eh?)

Nobody here has the foggiest AUTHORATITVE idea WHY this incident occurred, nor WILL any of us until the full story is known.

Is there anything else to say until the report is published?

[Ornis]

Only one thing is certain: people "forget". It's often when something disrupts the plan. At a South Island air show the fuel truck arrived and my "copilot" loosened the flush-fitting caps. The driver suddenly departed saying he would be back. The day finished and we were anxious to leave promptly. We had just enough fuel. Flew across Cook Strait for half an hour and landed after another hour and half.

At the pumps found the fuel caps hanging by the earth wire, banging on the flaps. We won't make that mistake again. Either remove the caps entirely or leave them tight: that is our rule.

Here's the thing. If we know there is a problem then smart trained people deal with it better. If we don't recognise a problem then we all stuff up equally badly.

Perhaps it takes an engine fire to reinforce exhortations: check the latches, prop the cowl open or leave it locked. If it were me now, I would tie something to the cowl, a flag or even myself. I know how easy it is to "forget" something "unforgettable".

[EcamSurprise]

Why all the talk of getting on the knees to properly check the cowls?
Whilst I fly with CFM engines, the height is the same and it is perfectly easy to crouch down and have a good look to check that the latches are secure - it isn't like we need to lie on the ground!

As a commuter I seem to watch more then my fair share of walk arounds, and some of them are frankly appalling and that is from all ranks..
I am sure I am not the only one who has seen someone miss more than half the plane or the "walk around but not looking at anything" type.
I've seen this so many times recently.

We need to start pulling our fingers out and realising this is what we are paid for, this isn't just a stretch of legs, this is a safety check before departure.

[wiggy]

The last guy to do maintenance and the pilot who did the walk round both failed to do their jobs properly.

It's as simple as that.

Maybe, but in the interests of it not happening to me or anyone else here I'd like to know in depth what happened that morning before the walkround.

In the crew's case I'd be asking if there was any hassle over the crew bus to T5 running on time? When they got to T5 did they struggle to find a serviceable PC, printer and/or stapler (that's a long story that I suspect will prompt a few :rolleyes: from the likes of NOD.) Was it possible the queue for crew screening was backed up well into crew report (:rolleyes: again). All this might have been against a background of subtle but publicy displayed management demands that the first wave should depart on time.

Not excusing the fact that the latches may have been missed, and that the walkround was the last line of defence, but I'd rather not string my colleagues up quite yet..

[hunterboy]

Wiggy I doubt that any problems at security, the car park or delayed buses will feature in any outcome if it will be easier for BA to pin blame on something/somebody else. BA management has a long history of taking the path of least resistance, even if it means breaking the law in some cases.

[wiggy]

hunterboy,

If I may borrow a phrase from elsewhere:

"You might think that, I couldn't possibly comment"

[silverstrata]

Silverstrata Quote:- "Easy, you build a new London Gateway airport in the Thames estuary."

Even a Tom Tom or Garmin GPS with an out of date database will tell you that the Thames estuary is nowhere near London - which is where passengers wanting to go to London want to go!

I think you will find that:

a. Many LHR passengers are interlining, and don't want to go to London.
b. The journey Thames to London on a high-speed train would be quicker than the Paddington Express (and much faster than the tube-link).

See this thread:
http://www.pprune.org/airlines-airports-routes/469575-new-thames-airport-london.html

[slip and turn]

A320 walk around demo

[Lonewolf_50]

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/515531-incident-heathrow-48.html#post7878875

Ornis: read that.

Secondly: broad statement "that's not acceptable" is wrong as a broad generalization, because sometimes it is.

Repeated for emphasis: when the situation arises, it isn't your vote.

I think we've beaten this horse about into glue.

Lastly: "A good plan, implemented now, is usually better than a perfect plan implemented tomorrow." G. S. Patton, Jr.

The dwelling on "what might have happened" (which didn't) is armchair quarterbacking and out of line.

[framer]

It's not as simple as " the pilot and the engineer didn't do their job".
That's an outdated way of viewing incidents and accidents.
Put it this way, if you are a passenger on an aircraft, would you rather the Engineer dealing with your aircraft had three aircraft to dispatch in the next 90 minutes or just the one? Which Engineer would be more likely to miss something?
I think working hard is something to be proud of and I don't mind getting my hands dirty, I'm not a "Union guy" either, but there comes a time when the resources allocated to the job are insufficient to maintain the acceptable level of safety that Joe Public expects. It's great to have a £30 airfare, but it's better to have a £35 airfare and frontline operational staff that aren't pressed for time even when things are running to schedule.

[neila83]

To try to introduce some balance to this thread. The pilots mostly think the pilots did an amazing job and cannot be blamed for anything, if they missed the walkaround it's because it's too hard to lie down, god forbid. (by the way ask the average coach driver about getting mucky on the job). And you don't need to lie down as I'm sure all the pilots here know but it's inconvenient for them not to correct. It's on the SOP, if maintenance was being done on walkaround the interim report would mention it. Please don't another pilot excuse them because it's not their job. I imagine if a pilot of an airline named zion (i can think of 2) said that what the reaction would be.

On the over London issue. I think most rational people assume that a pilot, amongst all his decisions, considers the impact on people on the ground. Especially in planes/loadings where there could be more deaths on ground than on board. Until this incident I've never seen pilots before say people on the ground bear no consideration in their decision making. The arrogance displayed on this thread is breathtaking, some pilots really do take their 'commander had the right' far too literally and seem to think you can break any law in the land and if you save 3 people and kill 500 that's fine.

Sensible pilots I've heard value a life on the ground as much as one in their plane. And in situations where going to another airport doesn't extend risk to the aircraft, but does reduce risk to the ground, that is what they do. It terrifies me how much many current pilots think that a BA pilot wouldn't know that going to Stansted involves less time traveling over a population centre. It's open countryside there. Or that it would be 'challenging'. I'm not flying BA anymore after all these proclamations of how hard they find diverting to a world class airport in their own city bounds.

Sorry, I know this is a pilots club and I'll be shot down. Hell if BALPA hadn't immediately fingered the engineers I might not have felt the need to (I'm not a BA engineer, just a bystander fairly shocked at the closed ranks). Anyway I hope the more self aware BA pilots are taking on board the need for better checks, less complacency, engineering too, and remembering the walk about is not just for exercise.

[Lonewolf_50]

On the over London issue. Especially in planes/loadings where there could be more deaths on ground than on board. Until this incident I've never seen pilots before say people on the ground bear no consideration in their decision making. The arrogance displayed on this thread is breathtaking, some pilots really do take their 'commander had the right' far too literally and seem to think you can break any law in the land and if you save 3 people and kill 500 that's fine.
You need to learn how to read. What you said there, bolded, is a false characterization of the discussion.

I think most rational people assume that a pilot, amongst all his decisions, considers the impact on people on the ground.
As I explained in some detail before, the consideration for avoiding populated areas under various conditions is part and parcel to what professional aviators, aviation companies, and the regulatory agencies establish as a baseline.

The "all or nothing" nonsense is what I objected to before, and the lie that you just wrote (in bold) is what I object to now.

Remember: the plane was still under power, and still flying.

Go back and read that sentence again.

Consider the profound difference between this scenario, and the problem Sully was faced with when he had a twin engine failure. Part of his decision process was to avoid landing in a densely populated area. There were pilots second guessing that decision (and some posted here on PPRuNe in the thread dedicated to that incident) claiming he ought to have dead sticked it into one of the nearby airports. That's a risk he had to weigh in a very short period of time, and make a decision. For my money, the right one.

Funnily enough, most pilots agreed with his decision.

As to the preflight issue, your characterization is again a lie regarding this extended discussion.

There are a lot of pilots who have posted in this thread who are critical of what appears to be a blown pre flight inspection.

Your summary is no better than bird feces.

[Ornis]

I think the issue may be wider than you are considering. There is less discipline in society now and more people are unwilling to accept their responsibilities; less fear of consequences.

I'm with you, for what it's worth; pilots rely on engineers - they should check their work themselves. Have a protocol and stick to it. No excuses. Aviation is unforgiving.

I very much doubt fan cowls will depart aircraft again for a very long time. So what will be the next serious incident due to "I forgot"? And where might it be?
Chances are a big busy aerodrome, eh.

[BitMoreRightRudder]

The pilots mostly think the pilots did an amazing job and cannot be blamed for anything, if they missed the walkaround it's because it's too hard to lie down, god forbid

The pilots (and cabin crew) did their job to the letter once the engines encountered problems. They safely got back on the ground and evacuated the aircraft in textbook fashion. That the aircraft got airborne in an unsafe condition is a separate issue that will be thoroughly investigated. What the (very few) pilots contributing to this thread have said, is that there are a number of factors at play here that could have led to the cowl latches not being secured closed. It isn't simply a case of people not being "bothered" to complete checks and inspections properly.

I think most rational people assume that a pilot, amongst all his decisions, considers the impact on people on the ground. Especially in planes/loadings where there could be more deaths on ground than on board. Until this incident I've never seen pilots before say people on the ground bear no consideration in their decision making. The arrogance displayed on this thread is breathtaking

All this media-esque chatter about avoiding built up areas really is the preserve of sky news anchors who have to fill air time. Look at it this way, if an aircraft lost both its engines over London tomorrow what do you think the captain of that aircraft would elect to do - look out the window and locate a field with no houses that he can crash into? Or find the longest runway available (Heathrow) and attempt to save the lives of everyone aboard by landing there? In a Hollywood script he may well head for the farmers field. I can assure you in real life he would head for the runway and not worry himself unduly that he might be flying over a few houses to get there. The root cause of this hand wringing about the rights of those the aircraft may fly over comes from mis-guided and entirely sensationalistic media coverage. The Captain of the BA aircraft involved in this incident elected to fly an aeroplane that was flying perfectly safely back into Heathrow because that was the safest option available to him. At no point was anyone under the flight path in danger.

What you need to understand (and you are not alone on this thread) is that no pilot ever plans to crash. So this decision making process you suggest that must involve a risk analysis of how many houses we might take out if we were to hit the deck is I'm afraid a bit of a misnomer. If an aircraft encounters problems we consider the safest course of action to get back on the ground. How long we have to make the decision, how soon we need to be on the ground, where/how we are going to land and what we may need to do once safely on the deck are some (but not all) major parts of the process. Whose house we fly over on the way to the best available airport is the least of our worries. It's not that we don't care, it's just we are planning to land safely, nothing short of that.

Sensible pilots I've heard value a life on the ground as much as one in their plane. And in situations where going to another airport doesn't extend risk to the aircraft, but does reduce risk to the ground, that is what they do.

I'm not too sure what this mythical problem is that would render an approach to an airport unsafe to those on the ground but would present no risk to those in the aircraft. If anyone has any examples of such a strange situation then lets hear them. I can only refer you to my point above. The crew of this aircraft chose a perfectly safe option and landed at heathrow. At no point was anyone in danger on the ground.

I know this is a pilots club and I'll be shot down.

Pprune (R&N in particular) ceased to be a pilots club some time ago. It is now largely the preserve of armchair quarterbacks, enthusiasts and amateurs. I present you this thread as a prime example. You are perfectly entitled to an opinion, but you have made some suggestions and offered some assumptions that I'm afraid are entirely wide of the mark.

[WHBM]

All this media-esque chatter about avoiding built up areas really is the preserve of sky news anchors who have to fill air time.You are presumably implying that the AAIB report into the last time this happened at Heathrow, and their conclusions and recommendations, all referred to above, was somehow written by Sky News journalists .....

Furthermore, the westerly approach to Heathrow is about the only one in the South-East of the UK which is sustained over a built up area. Any who are actually looking out of the window on approach to Gatwick, Stansted, etc will have noticed they are almost entirely over clear country. It follows that comments like "you would need London airport in the Hebrides to avoid built up areas" are just unprofessional hyperbole.

[Hotel Mode]

Safety Recommendation 2005-069
The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) should review the guidance provided in the Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS) Part 1 and Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 475 (The Directory Of CAA Approved Organisations) and consider whether ATC unit Training for Unusual CircumstancesandEmergencies(TRUCE)plansadequately prepare controllers to handle aircraft in emergency, and in particular, whether sufficient guidance is provided on the avoidance of built-up areas when vectoring aircraft in emergency. Where considered necessary, this guidance should be amended as soon as practicable.

The AAIB make no recommendation about pilots decision making, just ATC and how they vector aircraft in distress.

[simple-simon]

FUEL LEAK

A fuel leak may be detected if:
The sum of FOB and FU is significantly less than FOB at engine start, or is decreasing, or
A passenger observes fuel spray from engine/pylon or wing tip, or
The total fuel quantity decreases at an abnormal rate, or
A fuel impalance develops, or
Fuel quantity of a tank decreases too fast (leak from engine/pylon, or hole in a tank), or
A tank is overflowing (due to pipe rupture in a tank), or
Fuel flow is excessive (leak from engine), or
Fuel is smelt in the cabin.

If visibility permits, leak source may be identified by a visual check from the cabin.

WHEN A LEAK IS CONFIRMED
LAND ASAP

LEAK FROM ENGINE/PYLON CONFIRMED:
Engine fuel leak can be confirmed by excessive fuel flow indication, or a visual check.
-THR LEVER (of effected engine): IDLE
-ENG MASTER (of effected engine): OFF
-FUEL X FEED: USE AS RQRD
if the leak stops the crossfeed valve can now be opened to re-balance fuel quantity, or to enable use of fuel from both wings. Do not restart the engine.

[lomapaseo]

Safety Concerns

I don't understand your post above

What or who are you replying to?

The recommendations cited are OK but to what incident do they apply?

They sound quite general in nature and quite easy to state that they have been adopted after the fact of what might have prompted them.

[archae86]

The recommendations cited are OK but to what incident do they apply?
The incident appears to have been the G-CPER matter of September 7, 2003, for which a summary of the aaib accident report appears here (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/G-CPER%20AAR%202-2005.pdf)

[DaveReidUK]

Synopsis on the above link, full report (93 pages) at http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Pub%20Version%20G-CPER.pdf

[lomapaseo]

Thanks to all for the replies immediately above.

Now, regarding the subject incident in this thread we'll have to wait and see what the AAIB says about the level of compliance.

I expect a restatement (nothing new other than human error again) but also a possibility of something more from their expert knowledge and lessons learned that didn't work out.

[Capot]

The essence of Safety Management, now so beloved of all Regulators, is that when you identify a flight safety sensitive hazard you do something about it very promptly indeed, preferably remove it. (Avoid or Mitigate are the other 2 options, if Remove is not available.)

Obviously the cowling latches are such a hazard. "If it can go wrong, it will", and should never have been designed that way in the first place.

If EASA were not the useless bunch of whatsits that they are, shackled by EU Commission bureaucracy, some incompetence and political infighting, effective action would have already been completed to force Airbus to design within, say, 60 days a modification to eliminate this hazard totally and produce an AD to instal the mod, with all the necessary maintenance instructions, that must be complied with within another 90 days by all operators. Meanwhile some robust mitigation is needed.

All costs to be reimbursed by Airbus, which produced this blatant Murphy in the first place.

The cowling is not safe because thousands of flights take place every day without a problem. It's unsafe because a few flights have departed with the cowling improperly fastened, creating a hazard to flight safety, and it could happen again.

Ah well, let's not dream. When someone gets killed, if that ever happens, is time enough to get excited about it, in aviation's traditional way.

[Tinribs]

A long time ago when I was serving that great lady our Queen I recall a light trainer, Bulldog perhaps, having a donkey quit because the oil filter had not been tight after a change. He did a forced landing into a field and hooked an unseen wire fence on top of a wall

Guess what, pilot error because he should have been competent to make the forced landing

The philosophy seemed to be that pilots aught to cope and if the risk is increased by others to create a hazard this makes no difference. That attitiude seems to continue. Of course blame or not is according to the circumstances at the time

[Back at NH]

The cowling is not safe because thousands of flights take place every day without a problem. It's unsafe because a few flights have departed with the cowling improperly fastened, creating a hazard to flight safety, and it could happen again.

If it had been properly fastened and then come off, I could go with you, but :ugh:

[neila83]

Lonewolf:

There was no lie, and this is exactly what I mean. Maybe you didn't see the posts, but pilots earlier were quite direct in saying people on the ground should not factor into their decision at all. And seemed quite proud in saying it. That's the kind of attitude we don't need in passenger transport. An AAIB report has been quoted saying that they think it matters and still these guys think they know better, that is what bothers me. Of course if you're on 3 mile final from Heathrow you are commited but if you have time to make a decision that means not flying a plane dropping bits over a city, that makes sense no? Even if this plane wasn't about to fall to the ground, they were told bits were falling off it, which makes me wonder if they were too 'SOP' oriented. Why is this kind of not even particularly creative thinking so sneered at? Some humbleness would be good to see, particularly from those who love to condescend to other airlines.

It seems to me these guys are getting a lot of slack because of who they fly for. the walkaround is part of their job. People have claimed every pilot goes into work wanting to be a professional, that they couldn't possibly have screwed up by anything other than the system. I contest that like any profession, there are gifted, average, bad, hard working, and lazy pilots. Some maybe just don't take the walkaround seriously. If that is the case, yes we need to reform the system, but I don't think blaming someone in a safety critical position for not taking it seriously is unfair? Train drivers who go through red lights and kill people are prosecuted, truck drivers who crash into trains are prosecuted, why do pilots think they are above the law? If someone is negligent about this, what else might they be negligent about? Are people really saying there is no-one in a cockpit who shouldn't be there?

[framer]

@Framer
I think the issue may be wider than you are considering. There is less discipline in society now and more people are unwilling to accept their responsibilities; less fear of consequences.
I'm all for considering the issue broadly and don't disagree with you. What I do disspear at is when it is considered so narrowly, ie only the front line operational staff's actions are considered. People who are focussing only on the actions of the pilot and the engineer are considering only half ( or even less) of the factors/ decisions that lead to the incident.
This has been well accepted since the mid 90's and I can only assume that the people focussing so narrowly have never recieved any education in the basic anatomy of an accident.
The working environment that the incident occurs in is a key player in determining why it happened and it is likely that changes to the environment ( shifts worked/ training matrix/ workload/ communication lines/ SOP's etc) will be more effective in reducing further incidents than changes to individual front line staff......very likely.

[Luc Lion]

Remember: the plane was still under power, and still flying
The Captain of the BA aircraft involved in this incident elected to fly an aeroplane that was flying perfectly safely back into Heathrow because that was the safest option available to him. At no point was anyone under the flight path in danger.
@Lonewolf_50, @BitMoreRightRudder,
I also think that choosing a return to Heathrow was as good a decision as diverting to Stansted. There are so many little things that matter when dealing with an emergency : staying with the same APP controller, assessing controlability at low speed, checking what is lost...

However I can only disagree with the suggested reasoning : "One engine was providing enough thrust, therefore the airplane was safe". The crew of G-EUOE was aware of or suspecting structural damage and must have been worried of low speed controlability. I guess that the length of the flight before final landing is caused by a climb request to a level where low speed controlability tests could be performed safely.

Remember El AL 1862 : the crew was unaware that a safe landing was impossible unless coming in at high speed (>260 kt) and on a steep slope.

[Uplinker]

It terrifies me how much many current pilots think that a BA pilot wouldn't know that going to Stansted involves less time traveling over a population centre. It's open countryside there. Or that it would be 'challenging'. I'm not flying BA anymore after all these proclamations of how hard they find diverting to a world class airport in their own city bounds.

It is clearly not easy to convey to the flying public how we pilots manage emergencies, but I will have another go.

Firstly, an Airbus A319 has:

2 Pilots,
3/4 Cabin crew, (trained for aircraft emergencies such as smoke, fire, evacuations, and a wide range of medical emergencies, such as CPR and defibrillator use)
2 Engines,
3 separate hydraulic systems,
4 Hydraulic pumps, 2 main engine driven, 1 main electrical, 1 standby electrical,
4 Electrical generators, 2 main, 1 standby and 1 emergency,
5 separate fly-by-wire computers,
2 Flight augmentation computers,
1 emergency hydraulic generator "Ram Air Turbine" (RAT), which can be deployed into the slipstream to provide back-up hydraulic power for the flight controls and/or the emergency generator.
2 Batteries,
2 Autopilots,
2 Flight management and guidance computers (some have 3),
6 flight display screens,
3 Display and management computers (which drive the display screens),
3 "artificial horizons"; 2 main plus 1 back-up,
3 Altimeters; 2 main plus 1 back-up,
3 LASER gyro Inertial reference systems
2 GPS receivers
3 main fuel tanks including 2 'collector' tanks which feed the fuel pumps,
6 electrical fuel pumps,
2 engine driven low pressure fuel pumps,
2 engine driven high pressure fuel pumps,
2 Air conditioning packs,
1 Auxiliary Power Unit, (APU), which can provide electrical power and high pressure air to run the air conditioning and pressurisation systems, and for starting the main engines, (and restarting them in the air if necessary),
2 Separate and independent wheel braking systems, plus one emergency wheel braking system.
2 Fire extinguishers per engine,
1 Fire extinguisher for the APU,
2 Fire extinguisher systems for the cargo holds,
Each main flying control surface has 2 separate sources of hydraulic power, the rudder has 3, and each hydraulic system powers 1 or 2 pairs of spoilers.

In addition, every control system for all of this has 2 channels or more, providing automatic back-up.

Now; An Airbus A319 can continue flying straight and level, and land with just ONE each of ALL the things I've listed above, (including the pilots).

For example, either one of the engines can continue a take off with a fully laden plane if one of the engines fails DURING THE TAKE-OFF ROLL. The remaining engine is designed and certified to continue the take-off, climb to a safe altitude (safe in this context being clear above any high ground), and fly to a suitable runway or holding pattern so the pilots can deal with the consequences of the engine problem. These may be for example the loss of an engine driven hydraulic pump which might lead to the loss of one hydraulic system, leaving 2 working ones left.

In such a (totally unlikely) eventuality of all except one of each system failing, the flight won't be as comfortable or refined as you are used to, (and you won't be continuing to Oslo), but IT WON'T fall out of the sky. Any one who thinks it will has been watching too many films, (where the slightest engine 'cough' has both pilots wrestling with the controls as the aircraft inexplicably dives to towards the ground???? Why would it do that??).

{Even Captain Sullenberger (spelling?) who suffered a once in a billion chance of a major bird strike taking out both engines (and by the way, airports have ways of keeping birds away), continued flying under full control. Obviously, he could not fly level, and although he initially tried to reach another runway, ran out of height and used the Hudson - a completely brilliant tactic and landing, Sir}.

It may need a longer than normal runway to land on. Luton's runway is quite short, and is on a hill with a steep drop at one end onto a dual carriageway. If an aircraft had reduced stopping ability, pilots would obviously elect to use a longer runway.

So an aircraft with both "bonnets" missing, (is that the "hood" in America?) may look awful but apart from having lost one or two systems from the list above, and probably needing a longer runway, is going to be able to fly perfectly safely. So no reason to make a drama out of a situation by landing at a non-company airfield if there is no need to. At one's home base, there will probably be a spare airplane and crew who can take the passengers on their way. (THIS IS NOT THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION, OF COURSE).

None of this is arrogance at all, but a crew calmly and professionally assessing the situation and taking the appropriate actions to ensure a safe flight.


Why the cowls were not checked is another argument.


(I am not a BA pilot by the way).