Incident at Heathrow

[widebody69]

Could be possible that crew were not aware BOTH sets of cowls were gone and treated it as single engine failure. Only the damage from one engine would have shown up in cockpit, doubt ATC saw both sets of cowls gone. Reports from cabin could have been linked to damaged (known about) engine only.

[Basil]

Land ASAP needs to be balanced with Know Your Aircraft. . . . . knowing the drills are complete than chucking the aircraft down on the nearest piece of concrete. I vote we give the crew the benefit of the doubt on the Stansted/LHR decision.
WTF's the applaud thingy? Perhaps that's a different website - anyway :ok:

[FERetd]

Jackharr :- Quote, "It’s not a matter of IF but WHEN something major occurs at/near Heathrow.........or over London.

And the “wise men” (except of course Boris & Co) want to rule out an airport in the Thames Estuary.

Is it being so cheerful that keeps you going through the day?

As a reasonably frequent flyer I use Heathrow, I do not want to travel to Southend to catch a flight from London - neither do the majority of passengers wanting to arrive in LONDON.

You might also realise that Bumbling Boris, the Lord Mayor of LONDON, does not have his offices in the Thames estuary, probably for a good reason!

[mary meagher]

The choice to return to Heathrow with cowls flapping was a decision best made by the aircrew who could ascertain what power was still available and what systems were working. Any other suitable nearby airport is just as likely to be surrounded by heavily populated areas.

As for diverting to Stansted, they needed that place later in the day for the PIA diversion from Manchester.

[ILS27LEFT]

Thanks Rimmer, I personally have no doubts now on what happened, tricky and misleading design indeed. Hopefully this will be a lesson and V2500 cowl latch will be redesigned as too easy to miss. It can't be a coincidence. Very clear, thanks so much.

[ayroplain]

I think the most important factor here is not who did or didn’t do what or who was operating the aircraft. The fact is that Airbus designed this cowling latching system which quite plainly:

1. Could cause catastrophic damage to an airliner

2. appears to be not suitable for purpose judging by the number of recorded incidents and now highlighted by this major one because it’s BA

Once established that the design was not good enough a redesign should have been demanded rather than placing the responsibility on humans always doing the right thing which they are never always going to do.

I think this is as serious as the DC10 cargo door. If someone doesn’t check that the cowls are locked and they’re not then the a/c and its pax and crew are in serious jeopardy.

It is perfectly obvious that this could happen again, anytime, to any airline operating this aircraft type.

[Dream Land]

Happened at our outfit:

http://i63.photobucket.com/albums/h159/180MPH/image.jpg

Aircraft brought into service on short notice, preflighted by the crew, but maintenance turned the latches flat to avoid hitting themselves, the cowling lays tightly against the engine, impossible to notice unless you check for a small gap underneath the engine.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

impossible to notice unless you check for a small gap underneath the engine.

So....check for a small gap underneath the engine.

I don't wish to sound flippant, but this seems to be a major recurring problem which is widely known about. I don't think I flew an aircraft that didn't have at least one of these. Doesn't matter what the procedures say; get dirty, check it.

[ILS27LEFT]

V2500 COWL LATCH, just Google it and then you find many incidents, exactly the same as today. Rather than blaming an engineer or a Team of them Airbus should have never allowed a mechanism of this type, the tricky part is that the cowl looks safely latched even when still unlocked whilst other engine cowls clearly look open/unlatched when not locked, clearly a misleading design in my opinion, therefore it will happen again as we cannot rule out human factor on such a simple task which should be clearly visible to all, unacceptable design here.:mad: Are we also expecting pilots to pull the handle then to check all latches? Crazy approach indeed. Let's be quick Airbus and fix this design once and for all. We cant carry on being so lucky and this type of incident is totally avoidable, new design and warning sensors.

[BARKINGMAD]

So far we appear to have a Toulouse product with a questionable design of cowling latches and possibly a maintenance organisation which, because it was not ordered to, ignores the lessons inherent in recommendation 4.4 of the UK AAIB investigation into G-OBMM.

Does it have to be made compulsory by regulators for engineering departments to do something sensible like NOT affecting the airworthiness of 2/2 powerplant in the same procedure?

A major UK operator was pushing 737s onto the line, post DUAL MCD checks and the Daily being signed up on the same page by the same authorised signatory, in the early 2000s and no one seemed to see it as cause for concern!

When will we ever learn from the mistakes of the day before yesterday? Or has commercial pressure to wrap double engine inspections into the same event been assessed as a statistically acceptable risk?

I have every sympathy for the unfortunate line engineers who may have to carry the can for this whilst those higher in the food chain who set the policy slink unseen around their ivory towers. It will take a brave inquiry to hang them out to dry! :ugh:

[Dream Land]

I was informed that this situation end happened so often, Airbus had a special team to make repairs, in our case, the leading edge flaps were accidentally dropped during the repair, making the cost of our repair $1,000,000.00 USD 😳

[ILS27LEFT]

Solution: flight deck warning of all unlatched access panels or doors that could hazard the aircraft if left unfastened, unlatched engine cowls are the most important, why Airbus is still ignoring this recurring issue is a mistery. All incidents of this type have occurred despite multiple visual checks by engineers and pilots, clearly a misleading design which must be fixed asap.:p

[slacktide]

With all due respect, the faulty parts not designed or built in Toulouse. They are designed in Chula Vista, California, and assembled in Foley, Alabama using latch components from Placentia, CA.

[DH_call]

With all due respect this is not about a faulty part. It's a faulty design.
Big difference.

[slacktide]

Correct sir.

[DaveReidUK]

Solution: flight deck warning of all unlatched access panels or doors that could hazard the aircraft if left unfastened, unlatched engine cowls are the most important, why Airbus is still ignoring this recurring issue is a mistery. All incidents of this type have occurred despite multiple visual checks by engineers and pilots, clearly a misleading design which must be fixed asap.Sorry, but that's not the way the world (and the regulators/manufacturers) work.

The comparison with the DC-10 cargo door is a good one. Yes, the cowl latches will be redesigned, but only once the current design has killed a planeload of passengers.

Today's incident hasn't changed anything, it's just another statistic.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

My old lot has had, I believe, 3 instances of cowl departure on, umm, departure. 3 different types.

The 146 engine 3 cowls opened and snagged the throttle linkages/control lines and smashed the throttle back to the stop hard enough to bend it. Result was effectively an engine failure.

An E195 lost one in Jersey because the latches hadn't been fastened post maintenance. Continued to, I think, Birmingham with no adverse handling. They only found out after landing when someone mentioned they may have left something behind. Jersey airport authorities then found the bits, in the grass luckily

Q400 had one on rotation which damaged the leading edge deice boots, swift RTB but no adverse handling effects. Red faces were apparent, apparently.

It was only after the 195 incident that the cowl latches became part of the external check. They are right at the bottom of the engine and hard to see even if you're looking for them.

Maybe BA will amend their external checklist now, if it wasn't included already.

[neilki]

Airbus A320 (V2500) Opening & Closing of Engine Cowl Doors - YouTube
8.30 into the clip. i believe these are the original latches without later mods and really bright paint, however, snapped shut without engagement isn't easy to see as the panels naturally sit flush. Inspection does require a pretty low stoop. It's certainly not the most elegant or foolproof design, and after a long overnight shift and an early walkaround in the dim light on stand, well, i see a pretty big hunk of unfortunately positioned swiss cheese doing the T5 to Oslo run.
Cool heads prevailed. People make mistakes. I'm very glad to see they were all made prior to V1.

[FairWeatherFlyer]

Is the simple solution to this to add a few bungee cords around the engine to ensure that everything stays done up? Belt and braces at its finest.

[Sky Wave]

I can't believe the idiots on here criticising the choice to return to LHR.

It was a successful and safe outcome. Just because you're closer to one airport when you're at 10000ft doesn't make it the best choice.

These pilots did a great job and I'm gobsmacked that posters claiming to be professional pilots are commenting when they weren't on the flight deck and they have no idea of the thought process that the pilots undertook. The aircraft landed, no one was injured and the aircraft will fly again. what more do you want?

[AtomKraft]

Knowing BAs' 'just culture' as I do, I'm glad I wasn't the Captain of this a/c.

Poor guy is up for a giant bottom reaming session.

They're jolly nice to the passengers tho........

[Agnostique75]

It is always unpleasant to see facts get in the way of a good session of Airbus bashing… but could we put to rest the misconceived notion that the V2500 engine is manufactured by Airbus, in Toulouse, clumsily assembled by nonchalant, garlic scented workers, fully equipped with « bérets » and « baguettes »?

The V2500 is made by IAE International Aero Engines AG, a Swiss-based joint venture between Pratt & Whitney United States, Pratt & Whitney Switzerland, Japanese Aero Engine Corporation of Japan and MTU Aero Engines of Germany. Sad, I know.To add insult to injury, as “Slacktide”put it diplomatically in post #267: “With all due respect, the faulty parts (are) not designed or built in Toulouse. They are designed in Chula Vista, California, and assembled in Foley, Alabama using latch components from Placentia, CA.” Ooops… Freedom fries anyone? :rolleyes:

Furthermore, A319 operators are free to choose between various IAE engines or CFM power plants…

So the likelihood to see Airbus “redesign” on its own initiative engine cowls developed by IAE and manufactured by the finest of the U.S. industry is pretty slim indeed. And, no, any comparison with the infamous DC-10 cargo door is not “good” but totally baseless.

[james ozzie]

At risk of drawing fire here with all the name calling and abuse I see in this thread, can someone explain where the walk around crew member stands in the blame game? Is this something he/she should reasonably have seen or is it a thing that is taken as being outside the scope of a walk around?

Thanks

[lomapaseo]

Since when does an airplane inreface part like an engine cowl come under part 33 of the airworthiness regulations ?

It makes little difference who manufactures it or even designs it? It is certified as airworthy by the aircraft maker to his standards and thence to his airworthiness authority.

So who's name is on the Service Bulletin that addressed this issue in the past?

[DH_call]

Thanks Agnostique75,

What I can't believed is that it took 275 post for the American bashing to begin. Ppurne is getting slow.

[Teddy Robinson]

It is appearing like an engineering wardrobe malfunction .. let the investigatetors do their work .. the report will be published in due time.

[PlatinumFlyer]

Excuse me, but is not to big issue when these 'things' come loose is that there is no way to know where they will go. What would happen if they severely damaged the horizontal stabelizers? I would posit that the crew and passengers really did dodge a bullet.

[Agnostique75]

No American bashing here, DH call. I just got a little annoyed by the repeated references to the V2500 as a product designed and/or manufactured by Airbus and the subsequent questioning as to why Airbus failed to redesign the offending parts.

I would certainly not suggest that the V2500 is anything than a good and reliable engine, proven over many flight hours, as are the CFM products, resulting from a joint-venture between Snecma from France and General Electrics from the United States.

And I’m sorry if putting the facts straight has hurt anyone’s national pride…:)

Now, in this particular case and at this stage, most sensible people would not discount the plain good old “human factor”. We’ll see…

[Love_joy]

Lots of talk here about aircraft design, maintenance procedures and so on.

If the final report shows that the engines were left un latched, then it boils down to an inexcusable act by both the engineering team AND the pilots.

Aviation learns from its mistakes, thus why we have second engineers checking and counter signing work once complete. The flight crew should also have noticed this on their walk around. It is a known area of concern, not just on this aircraft/engine, but any where the cowl latches are of a 'stealthy' design. If they didn't look, they didn't see it, and thus inexcusable.

Not to take away from the skills demonstrated later, just to to say this could likely have been avoided all together.

[Ejector]

Question, Does Boeing have latch warnings for the engine cowls ? :mad:

[NSEU]

V2500 Cowl Video....

I digress, but that engineer seems mighty brave standing inside the reverser cowl whilst his partner releases the cowl pump pressure during the opening procedure. You certainly wouldn't rely on the soft close system on a larger engined aircraft.

As always, these videos are staged in a nicely lit, dry and stress free environment. They don't portray reality, where, out on the line, it may be cold and dark and oil and water is dripping on your face as you close the cowls.

I can see that there will be some kind of kneejerk reaction to this incident. New time-consuming safety procedures/paperwork will be implemented adding to the burden of the engineer, yet not being allowed the extra (ground) time by beancounters/management (in reality). :ugh: I see this happening in my own airline.

Comment on sensors: Sensors are fine, up to the point where they start breaking down themselves. Engines cowls don't provide a very friendly enviroment. Then you start getting intermittent nuisance messages which eventually lead to complacency (perhaps a factor in the Lauda Air 767 engine reverser tragedy). Having said that, they may just work for fan cowls, as cowls can be visually, tactilely checked if there is a doubt (unlike reverser components).

[ayroplain]

I just got a little annoyed by the repeated references to the V2500 as a product designed and/or manufactured by Airbus and the subsequent questioning as to why Airbus failed to redesign the offending parts.
You are right, of course, and I stand corrected in that Airbus didn't actually design the engine but the bottom line, in this case, is that it is their aircraft which is affected and, despite the previous occurrences, both they and the regulatory authorities are happy to leave the design as it is and rely on humans to spot something that can and does easily happen and could bring an aircraft down rather than just, maybe, providing a bit of inconvenience for everyone.

The comparison with the DC10 cargo door is not out of place. They were also relying on "someone" to check that the door was properly closed. If, God forbid, there was a crash with loss of life everyone would be saying exactly the same thing "Ah, sure this happened before but nobody did anything about it".

[Shaman]

Thanks for the video link neilki - in 13 years of V2500 and CFM walkrounds the latches were always closed. Would I have noticed a partially open latch I wonder...

[iflytb20]

I do apologise if this has been asked before but do you really have to open the cowling to service the engine / IDG oil? In the 737s there are small access hatches on the sides of the engine cowling, I'm sure there is something similar in the IAE cowling too. Please feel free to correct me if I got it wrong.

[ThirstyBoy]

Agree with Rik. As a lowly frequent flyer, it seems there is no doubt the crew did a fantastic job. Well done guys and this IS what we expect from full service airlines. However, let's see why this happened. IF it was poor maintenance and ignoring FAA advice, then ...

[pattern_is_full]

Avherald now has that same picture originally from a German publication, with a magnified view:

Incident: British Airways A319 near London on May 24th 2013, problems with both engines, doors on both engines missing (http://avherald.com/h?article=462beb5e&opt=0)

The old donks do look a little motheaten. :eek:

Whatever transpired before takeoff will eventually come out - the flying afterwards was well done. :D

[ballyctid]

Who says it was just oil servicing that required the cowls open? There are a multitude of reasons why they were opened that night, servicing, part number checks, lessor inspections, trouble shooting.

I have carried out many lessor inspections on overnight stops and we always ask for the cowls to be opened.

[talkpedlar]

The time has surely come for this website (or forum) to be censored in order that the tripe, drivel and absolute :mad: spouted by pax, armchair captains, plane-spotters, playstation jockeys, the ignorant and the illiterate can be weeded out.

Posts by ILS27 and so many others reduce this 'site to a social-network place full of clueless gossiping teens :ugh:

[fox niner]

I suppose at BA the flight crew does not do a preflight inspection before flight, when departing from their home base. That is done by the AMT...?
At least this is how we do it in our airline. I never do the preflight at my home base, only at outstations.

[FlightCosting]

It is normal practice nowadays for the airframr manufacturer to have the engine manufacturer to supply the power plant package to hang on the wing, including the nacelle. Differences in engine design will mean that the cowling and inspection hatches will be different for for a IAE or GE powered aircraft. All engine related checks are regulated by the power plant supplier, which lets Airbus off the hook in case of some failure. 40 years ago when I was flogging aircraft, things were lot simpler, no engine choice and the customer only got to choose the paint job!!!

[Chox Off]

Can somebody explain why an aircraft returns to LHR causing further disruption to both the airports and airlines operations. Given that there are other suitable 'quieter' airports to divert to LTN,STN,MSE for example where the impact of the arrival would not cause such upheaval. I appreciate that the passenger and crews safety is of paramount importance but was wondering if there is a procedural input into a diversion of this type as to where to land.
Thanks in advance

This question in no way detracts from the excellent airmanship involved in this specific incident, my question is of a general nature.

[RTM Boy]

I am very surprised by some comments regarding actual circumstances of maintenance activities being 'difficult' eg it's dark, cold, stressful, etc. and potential 'knee-jerk' reactions and 'time consuming' changes to procedures in response to whatever exactly happened.

Hello? We're talking about 75 passengers and crew flying over the heavily built-up capital of the UK.

They were very lucky that the cowls separated when they did without damaging the airframe. Given the starboard engine fire, can you imagine the consequences of the flight having been unable to make it back to LHR coming down anywhere along the approach to LHR?

[Megaton]

Fox Niner

Incorrect. At BA the pilots complete a preflight inspection before every flight whether at home base or down route.

[fox niner]

Ham Phisted, thanks for info.

Where are the cowlings now?
Have they been found near the runway? or in Chelsea/Westminster/Kensington?

[A and C]

This thread has attracted a lot of very uninformed comment from people who have clearly never flown an airliner or opened and closed a set of cowls on a large fan engine.

The first thing I have to say is a big "well done" to the crew, your actions resulted in a sucsesfull outcome in an unusual situation and in my view any critsisum of the crew is totaly unwarranted. ( more about the "walk around" inspection by the crew later).

It is by now clear that the engine cowls had been left unlatched and these large composite structures departed from the aircraft due to the airflow and it is likely that the departing cowl damaged part of the engine fuel system. ( if this was a CFM56 I would have speculated that the cowl had damaged the outputs from the HMU that use fuel pressure to control the turbine and rotor active clearance control. This was a V2500 so comment on the likelyhood of this requires comment from someone who knows the V2500).

No doubt the BA engineering management are looking to hang someone for this maintenance error but it is likely that the root of this error is he fact that BA maintainence has been understaffed for some time and dispite finally belatedly realizing this it takes three years to get new maintenance staff online and a lot longer to get them to be 100% effective, so BA maintenance is well behind the drag curve on recruitment and manning levels. I am going to speculate that undermanning and the extra pressure of work put on those staff is at the root of this maintenance error ?

Could this mantanence error been picked up on the flight crews "walk around" inspection ? To this I have to say a very big YES !!!
At one time I had a nine inch flat blade screwdriver and one of the used of this was to check engine cowl security ( the other was to check the fuel dip sticks). I like all pilots are prohibited from having this tool as in this age of security paranoia I am not trusted as captain of the aircraft to carry such a dangerous weapon. If the guy doing the walk around inspection had access to a screwdriver he might have picked up the maintenance error but without such a tool there is no chance to do so.

So here we might well have the first clear link between the oppressive security culture and its adverse effect on flight safety.

The AAIB will no doubt investigate all of this bit just like the departure of the windshield from the BA BAe 1-11 twenty years or so back it is likely to be largely a human factors investigation.

[Jazz Hands]

All incidents of this type have occurred despite multiple visual checks by engineers and pilots, clearly a misleading design which must be fixed

Multiple visual checks, or cursory glances? Not the same thing.

[EGCA]

Interesting piece on BBC Radio 4 just now. Their presenter happened to be at Swanwick yesterday recording a piece about future London airports, and asked the top man there about the decision to bring an aircraft in difficulty back to Heathrow over a large populated area with limited options, rather than go to say Stansted.
Controller chief's answer was that ultimately it is the pilot and crew who make the decisions, and they (ATC) are there to assist the crew. So presumably the implication is that ATC cannot "insist" that an aircraft diverts away from a populated area in case --in this instance--the crew might have found themselves committed to a Heathrow approach and the other engine failed.

Hell of a responsibility on the crew, maybe unfairly so.

[TURIN]

Excellent and well informed post A & C.

However, lets not assume the cowls were left unlatched until the facts are known eh. Unlikely as it sounds, there could be a common mechanical failure or external factors. :ok:

Agnostique75

It is always unpleasant to see facts get in the way of a good session of Airbus bashing…

Indeed, you missed the fact that Rolls Royce was one of the founders of IAE and remains a huge supplier even though it sold it's share holding in the group a couple of years ago.
Nothing to do with cowlings/latches though. :O

[A and C]

Yes you are correct about my speculation as to the security of the cowl latches but it is difficult to come to any other conclusion.

It is clear from video evidence that the upper attachment of the cowls was secure and the simultaneous failure of multiple fasteners on two engines is so unlikely that I think it can be dismissed.

In short the evidence for the cowls being unsecured is overwhelming and knowing how they are secured I can't see any other explanation for the departure of the cowls on both engines.

The reason that the system failed to pick up this error before the aircraft left the ground is what is unclear BA has clearly got some very good flight crew but engineering has always been the Cinderella department of BA both in terms of finance and the way highly trained staff are treated by the management, I have to speculate that the reasons for this error are buried deep in the culture within BA maintenance as with the BAe1-11 incident, add to this the removal by airport "security" of the flight crews ability to double check the cowl security and all the holes in the Swiss cheese line up.

I am sure that the AAIB will get to the truth of the matter.

[TURIN]

Unfortunately, I have to agree. :sad:

[DaveReidUK]

Where are the cowlings now?
Have they been found near the runway? or in Chelsea/Westminster/Kensington?Previous fan cowl door separation events would suggest that the doors (carbon fibre/honeycomb construction, with metal access panels) may not be found intact.

[NigelOnDraft]

So presumably the implication is that ATC cannot "insist" that an aircraft diverts away from a populated area in case --in this instance--the crew might have found themselves committed to a Heathrow approach and the other engine failed.That piece summed up a lot of what is said above - both for and against. The question was posed "who" is responsible for noting / avoiding built up areas. The response was correctly "the crew" (not ATC), but as also above, crew do not take this into account, at least in my experience.

I have flown out of LHR as main base for nearly 20 years with 2 large operators. Not once has the matter been raised (nor at other similar airfields near cities) in training, publications nor pre-flight emergency briefs at routing clear of built up areas.

It might be a valid question to ask, but if it becomes unacceptable, it basically means LHR is unacceptable as an airport. Unless we develop a special MEL type document for each airport / approach specifiying minimum required equipment (all engines & cowlings fitted / working ;) ) that applies even in emergency I cannot see any progress?

Reverse the situation, and say yesterday's events had turned out to be the worst case i.e. failures mutiplied, and the aircraft did end up in London with loss of life. Who would history "blame"? I doubt the crew, or airline, or ATC. It would have to be the whole "system" had not factored this in. And the end result would be Boris Island, but that's another debate ;)

NoD

[NigelOnDraft]

Where are the cowlings now? Have they been found near the runway? or in Chelsea/Westminster/Kensington?I think there are enough annecdotal quotes around to suggest they do not need to be looked for. Maybe they were found and collected before 27L reopened :oh:

[ballyctid]

2 at the end of the runway and 2 in the reservoir according to a certain social networking site....

[hunterboy]

I understood that LHR ATC have a standard pro forma that they read out to aircraft in distress notifying/asking them of the risks of overflying built-up areas?

[F900 Ex]

NOD
I have flown out of LHR as main base for nearly 20 years with 2 large operators. Not once has the matter been raised (nor at other similar airfields near cities) in training, publications nor pre-flight emergency briefs at routing clear of built up areas.

It might be a valid question to ask, but if it becomes unacceptable, it basically means LHR is unacceptable as an airport. Unless we develop a special MEL type document for each airport / approach specifiying minimum required equipment (all engines & cowlings fitted / working ) that applies even in emergency I cannot see any progress?


Completely impractical, almost every major airport in the world is surrounded by a built up area, maybe we should start only operating aircraft with 6 engines just in case 4 might fail at the same time :)

But using that logic it would mean 6 times as many cowling fasteners to miss being locked at some point, it's happened before and it will happen again so long as management continue to cut corners and bean counters continue to cut costs.

[NWT]

Funny coincidence that BA have been advertising recently for licensed engineers (full licence not A) Word from inside is that they are seriously short, and stretching the existing fully licensed qualified staff to the limit. Also hear the recruitment dozens of non experienced unqualified 'mechanics' has not been received to we'll by the CAA

[Megaton]

F900

I can assure you that NoD is well aware of the geographical layouts of airports around the world even if he is a FEW these days.

[NigelOnDraft]

Unless we develop a special MEL type document for each airport / approach specifiying minimum required equipment F900 - can I suggest you sit back and re-read my post - then I think you will see we are in violent agreement about:Completely impractical;)

[A and C]

That seems to tie up with what I said

[Dan Winterland]

The Airbus flight safety magazine, Safety First carried an article in the July 2012 edition entitled "Preventing Fan Cowl Door Loss".

http://www.ukfsc.co.uk/files/Safety%20Briefings%20_%20Presentations/Airbus%20Safety%20First%20Mag%20-%20July%202012.pdf

It mentions that there are more instances on the A320 than the wide body Airbus types, probably due to the low level of the cowling latches meaning thay are missed. It also empahsises the importance of checking the latches during the crew walk around check.

An article which will soon be required reading in BA I think!

[Nevermind]

F900 Ex (and many others)

A post typical of this website, where you have not understood what is being said and use that wall butting nonsense.
I have a look at the site occasionally to see if anyone has brought up some interesting points, or perhaps a healthy debate of the FACTS, but you learn far more about the personalities than the facts. I realise the words " Rumour" and "professional" are not exactly compatible but the lack of "IMHO" on this site is staggering. By all means speculate, but it's the pontificate that is so off putting.

[RTM Boy]

Of course it is entirely true that built-up areas cannot be avoided around LHR given that it is hemmed in on all sides, but the industry cannot ignore the potential consequences of relegating this aspect of safety to the point of a quick decision in the event of an emergency.

I think you are right NoD - a worst case scenario would strongly increase political pressure for Boris island to the point that LHR would be history. Indeed this may yet result from this incident if the AAIB blames BA procedures and questions the return to LHR from a public safety perspective - BA's case for a third runway will be seriously undermined. Such a situation would call into question the whole way maintenance is managed and carried out, which would mean very difficult questions for the CAA, BA and individuals managing and doing the work.

Over-worked, under-staffed and under-qualified maintenance staff suggests under-paid maintenace staff. But none of that can in any way excuse not knowing how to, or worse forgetting to, fasten the cowls to the engine. And it is entirely legitimate to ask why it was not picked up in pre-flight checks, if only to ensure changes make such an invent less likely.

[fox niner]

I read the airbus flight safety magazine article (PDF) an in this magazine the latches are RED. So more easily visible.
In the youtube video a few pages back, the latches are identical, but GREY (metal) so less easily visible.
What color were they in this case?

[TURIN]

Over-worked, under-staffed and under-qualified maintenance staff suggests under-paid maintenace staff. But none of that can in any way excuse not knowing how to, or worse forgetting to, fasten the cowls to the engine.

Excuse, No.

Reasons, Yes.

All of the criteria quoted above have been common factors in many accidents and incidents. That is why millions have been spent on Human Factors training and it is also part of the CAA Maint Licence syllabus.

Unfortunately, some employers choose to pay lip service to it.

[DaveReidUK]

It mentions that there are more instances on the A320 than the wide body Airbus types, probably due to the low level of the cowling latches meaning thay are missed. It also emphasises the importance of checking the latches during the crew walk around check.Interesting contrast between the recommendation in the Airbus Safety Magazine:

Latches on open doors should always be left in a “not engaged” position, which means that they will hang down when the doors are closed and not latched (fig.2) . This ensures easy identification of an unlatched door conditionand the comment by the Canadian TSB in the report on the Skyservice A320 cowl door separation:

After opening the latches and disengaging the hooks from the eyebolts, the normal practice is to re-close the latches to prevent the hooks from protruding and misaligning with the eyebolts when the door is subsequently closed;

[oldlowandslow]

Given the inevitable slight confusion on the flight deck as events unfolded, I guess Luton was ruled out due to the less-than-ideal r/w length and the possibility of one or both TR maybe being inoperable. I do however wonder why STN - with its v long r/w, was not chosen.

[Megaton]

Why not choose STN? You've got problems with potentially both engines and you're downwind at your familiar homebase. You can't just drop into an unfamiliar base without getting charts, plates, performance and briefings. On the other hand, an approach into LHR is a non-event for BA airbus pilots.

[Nevermind]

F900 Ex

Armchair? Yes, till 12, then off to LHR to run an LPC thanks

[hunterboy]

I wonder if this may change BA ETOPS engineering procedures? I believe that I am correct in saying that the same engineer checks both engines.

[A and C]

As TURIN says excuse NO reason YES !

I think you should try to think how you would cope at the B1 guy who has six or seven aircraft to ramp check, your help ranges from the guy just out of his appreniceship who is smart but inexperienced to the semi-skilled mechanic. It is the early hours of the morning when you circadian rythem is at its low, add to this its pi**ing with rain. The management are on your back needing all your aircraft serviceable, you are chasing spare parts and you are unable to get around the airport because you and three other B1 guys have one van between you.

Now do you get the line maintenance picture ?

[oldlowandslow]

I fully appreciate that, but the two gentlemen up the front were potentially the proud owners of a 75t glider. I would have thought that the nearest strip of concrete would have been the best. However, I am SLF - and a midnight man at that - so I bow to the professionals knowledge.

[4468]

Well, at last some good contributions amongst all the bull!

Post #295 from AandC is well worth a read, as are some subsequent contributions from folks such as NigelonDraft who clearly knows his onions!

This incident will have been a case of all the holes in the Swiss cheese lining up. Or put another way, many of the contributing factors will be present on many days, but only rarely will they ALL be. I believe it has also been termed the 'accident chain'? No big single event caused this incident, but that is overwhelmingly also true in most. Any errors are relatively small, and all well understood, which is why we attempt to 'trap' them by having procedures to combat those pesky fallible humans that we ALL ARE!!!!

Somebody earlier said they wouldn't like to be the people most closely involved in this, as 'BA will come down hard'! In my personal experience you could not be more wrong! BA are an extremely mature and enlightened airline. The only time they would play hard ball is where they find wreckless negligence. I have seen absolutely no suggestion of that here, nor do I expect to.

Again in my personal experience, there will be a tendency for those most closely involved to beat themselves up. To them I say, don't. Even those pompous gobby idiots on here are only human.

An absolutely top job was done in the air. Of that all professionals can agree! Made me very proud to be fortunate enough to be doing this job.

Thank you.

[Herr Bus]

Well said that man.:ok:

[HEATHROW DIRECTOR]

<<I understood that LHR ATC have a standard pro forma that they read out to aircraft in distress notifying/asking them of the risks of overflying built-up areas?>>

Would someone from ATC confirm this please? The only arrangement I am aware of is that in the case of a major problem involving an aircraft, e.g. something which may prevent it from landing and leaving the runway, ATC maybe asked to relay a message from the airport authority asking the captain to consider diverting to a less busy airfield. Of course, the captain has the final decision.

[Ian W]

RTM Boy
Of course it is entirely true that built-up areas cannot be avoided around LHR given that it is hemmed in on all sides, but the industry cannot ignore the potential consequences of relegating this aspect of safety to the point of a quick decision in the event of an emergency.

I think you are right NoD - a worst case scenario would strongly increase political pressure for Boris island to the point that LHR would be history. Indeed this may yet result from this incident if the AAIB blames BA procedures and questions the return to LHR from a public safety perspective - BA's case for a third runway will be seriously undermined. Such a situation would call into question the whole way maintenance is managed and carried out, which would mean very difficult questions for the CAA, BA and individuals managing and doing the work.
NoD and you have made valid points.

ATC handling an aircraft in emergency - even local ATC who know where urban areas are - will NOT reroute an aircraft recovering with an emergency as if they do so and the aircraft for whatever reason lands short it will be "their fault" for extending the aircraft track. There will have been a lot of work going on in the background making sure nobody got in the way of the emergency aircraft and that everyone involved or who 'needed to know' was aware of the problem(s). It would appear that from the declaration of the emergency to the safe landing and evacuation of the aircraft everyone successfully did as they should. :ok:

Inventing new low-risk procedures for those on the ground is NOT something for the flight-deck or the control room in an emergency; if they are necessary such procedures have to be developed, tested, simulated and briefed before flight and are only appropriate if the captain considers they are safe in a particular situation.

However, as NoD points out - doing as you should in aviation terms may not be politically acceptable. I have no doubt that there are going to be many hypothetical questions posed in the next few weeks thanks to video of an aircraft 'trailing smoke' over the centre of London. It is obvious that further development of Heathrow in many respects is hanging by a thread. Had this aircraft crashed at 6 miles finals all the logic of the arguments on this thread would be eclipsed by the political fall out and all the justifications for the return back to Heathrow - however valid - would be disregarded. Indeed there would also be impact worldwide on acceptance of airports like LGA where normal patterns are directly over major cities.

I do think the likelihood of the Heathrow 3rd runway must now be in increasing doubt.

[NigelOnDraft]

oldlowandslowI fully appreciate that, but the two gentlemen up the front were potentially the proud owners of a 75t glider. I would have thought that the nearest strip of concrete would have been the bestWhen the decision was made to divert, which was the nearest strip (in suitable track miles) of concrete (please confine yourselves to runways "suitable" for a commercial A319).

Since you are SLF, I will leave out the factors that mean the "nearest" might not be best e.g. briefing / familiarity. I will also leave out, for the same reason, the 'R' in DODAR which will make it a complex answer, especially in a changing scenario (as apparently here).

I am 95% certain it was LHR 27R

were potentially the proud owners of a 75t gliderwhy? Or rather, why ere they to any greater extent than when they reported yesterday morning?

[Lon More]

ATC maybe asked to relay a message from the airport authority asking the captain to consider diverting to a less busy airfield. Of course, the captain has the final decision.
certainly as high on the controller's list of priorities as on the crews. Most controllers would be busy keeping everything else out of his way "The sky, and the runways, are all yours Sir"

[Vlad the Impaler]

<<I understood that LHR ATC have a standard pro forma that they read out to aircraft in distress notifying/asking them of the risks of overflying built-up areas?>>
Nope. Certainly nothing to that effect in the tower. The captain is always best placed to decide where he should put his aeroplane and we are just there to provide any assistance we can and generally keep everyone else out of the way. If the incident occurred a long way out and they were overflying other suitable airfields then the aerodrome authority would rightly want to question if Heathrow was the best place but at the end of the day it's the decision of the guy at the pointy end with the big hat and in this case, a job very well done.

[NigelOnDraft]

Would someone from ATC confirm this please?HD - I think he refers, as you do, to the message that, as an example, was read to the VS skipper. Who took the appropriate regard of it in his decision :D

[mog1098]

4468 wrote: This incident will have been a case of all the holes in the Swiss cheese lining up. Or put another way, many of the contributing factors will be present on many days, but only rarely will they ALL be. I believe it has also been termed the 'accident chain'? No big single event caused this incident, but that is overwhelmingly the case in most. Any errors are relatively small, and all well understood, which is why we attempt to 'trap' them by having procedures to combat those pesky fallible humans that we ALL ARE!!!!


All very correct except: thankfully the very last hole in the Swiss Cheese didn't quite line up this time. I can think of two ways it could easily have happened and brought the aircraft down.
1) When the cowls were ripped off the l/h engine no fuel and oil pipes were ruptured (unlike the r/h engine), so there was no fire and (presumably) the engine continued working well, giving high levels of thrust.
2) Had any of the departing cowls damaged the tailplane, possibly disabling the control surfaces.

I believe this was a very close call......

[aeromech3]

Most engines, I have had the pleasure to work on, had axial (forward and aft) safety pin latches which engaged into the nose cowl and only after the eye bolt latches had been tensioned, (eg: classic B747 JT9D installation) they are omitted in this installation and I wonder why?
As I recall, engine fan cowls are not the remit of the engine manufacturer; you certainly will not find them in their engine manuals or parts list; in IAE's interest, they should be jumping on the airframe pylon bods for a positive modification.

[widebody69]

Regarding the decision to return to LHR, I don't think you can discount that pilots weren't aware both engines were damaged. The incident happened on take-off, passenger reports wouldn't have made it to the cockpit and only the damage to 1 engine would have shown up in the cockpit. Single engine failure, return to origin.

[Agaricus bisporus]

I think that most crew when faced with a serious incident would consider using another airfield but in this case with both engines in trouble, and one on fire by all accounts I can picture the ECAM workload must have been utterly bewildering. In such a circumstance it would hardly be surprising if they were to dismiss the thought of diversion almost instantly as too much extra work and revert to the traditional assumption that we brief on every departure, to turn back and re-land where we started from.

Go back to the audio of Sully setting up for the Hudson landing. He's so maxed out he can barely spare the brain cells to speak coherently, and then so briefly it is not readily apparent what he means and on one or two occasions doesn't have the capacity to reply to RT calls - if he even registered haring them. That's the reality.

Beating the guys up for not thinking about STN which was very possibly just as close and might have been self-evidently more suitable in a simulator exercise is to ignore the overwhelming pressure they were under just to contain the situation and LAND IMMEDIATELY. They're only human after all.

Perhaps this incident will strengthen the argument for pilotless aircraft as a computer would clearly have handled all this better...

Wouldn't it?

[mog1098]

Widebody69 wrote: Regarding the decision to return to LHR, I don't think you can discount that pilots weren't aware both engines were damaged. The incident happened on take-off, passenger reports wouldn't have made it to the cockpit and only the damage to 1 engine would have shown up in the cockpit. Single engine failure, return to origin.

Quite possibly this is the case. And even if the cabin crew at some point managed to inform the flightdeck that both engines had visible damage, the decision to turn back to Heathrow may have already been made. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, I guess we'll learn all the facts when the AAIB report is published.

[sitigeltfel]

What would the procedure be if an alert pax noticed the problem while taxying, or during the T/O roll, and rushed forward to warn the cabin crew? Would the CC contact the flight deck immediately during a critical stage of departure, or do a visual check first?

[racedo]

Is the simple solution to this to add a few bungee cords around the engine to ensure that everything stays done up? Belt and braces at its finest.

Gaffer tape.............................£8.98 a roll at B&Q or through BA supply chain £160 a roll.

[Above The Clouds]

sitigeltfel
What would the procedure be if an alert pax noticed the problem while taxying, or during the T/O roll, and rushed forward to warn the cabin crew? Would the CC contact the flight deck immediately during a critical stage of departure, or do a visual check first?


You probably would have been number 2 to the PIA in to Stanstead with a pair of follow me Typhoons.

[NigelOnDraft]

PS for those still harping on about EGSS, a "downwind, base, 10NM final" from LAM is 40NM (and does not allow for turn radii). A LHR 27R interecept @ 10NM final is 28NM. OK they went a bit further SE, but I would venture that a realistic min dist never placed EGSS closer than EGLL on their entire routing.

[Fargoo]

I wonder if this may change BA ETOPS engineering procedures? I believe that I am correct in saying that the same engineer checks both engines.

On this engine type you have a verification check or duplicate inspection.

Two Engineers, one on each side to latch. Then swap over to verify.

The 319 doesn't come under ETOPS.

Ideally the crew would review the log entries before flight and see the cowls have been opened and shut. In practice it may be hard to see that the are unlatched, this needs to be addressed.

[Good Business Sense]

Got to say that there is a serious amount of rubbish being talked about here with respect to diverting to another airport and avoiding built up areas.

On the basis of some of the contributions in this thread London's new airport will be built in the Outer Hebrides with a 16 hour bus transfer to the city.

Had the misfortune to have had far more than my fair share of jet engine failures over the years - the most difficult thing is finding out what the problem is and also the extent of it (the sitting on hands period) - in the meantime, there's a bit of aviating and navigating required and during this period you don't want to up the workload any more than you have to (thinking time) - turning up at a strange airfield who don't expect you whilst you try and find the charts sounds to me, in many cases, like bad airmanship.

The wonderful team at LHR ATC would have had their plan promulgated through LHR tower/app/ground and emerg services within a minute or two of the Airbus rotation and apparent problems.

Going back to understanding what you're problem is and gathering the information to take action - if you've never had a major emergency/failure with an EICAS or ECAM you're in for a shock - 20-40 warnings on the display constantly changing as the priority system keeps changing their order and, of course, what you don't get from reading the cockpit voice recorder transcript - the noise !! The funny thing is, you can have 20-40 warnings and you still don't know what the problem/cause is - the warnings displayed are, in most cases, just the symptoms !

If the guys had panels ripping off I'm sure that much of the information presented to the pilots would have been suspect due to the condition of the sensors.

Great job BA and LHR ATC.

[RTM Boy]

"I think you should try to think how you would cope at the B1 guy who has six or seven aircraft to ramp check, your help ranges from the guy just out of his appreniceship who is smart but inexperienced to the semi-skilled mechanic. It is the early hours of the morning when you circadian rythem is at its low, add to this its pi**ing with rain. The management are on your back needing all your aircraft serviceable, you are chasing spare parts and you are unable to get around the airport because you and three other B1 guys have one van between you.

Now do you get the line maintenance picture ?"


A &C - I hope I would manage to check vital aspects of the work before releasing the aircraft. Mistakes can be made, of course, but although you rightly observe it is not an excuse, it does read like it is.

If your description is the reality of how things are at BA, it is manifestly unsafe. It should be reported to the CAA and AAIB. If no-one wants to risk their jobs spilling the beans, get in touch with Channel 4's Dispatches programme...

[Alber Ratman]

Great reactions from LHR and the two guys in the front. As for the rest of the people on here ranting about the locking mechanisms on A320 series fan cowls, the system isn't off a 747 or a 757.. Somebody is propably in a devestated mood with worry at the moment because he forgot to do a simple operation, for reasons we are all unaware of and a MEDA investigation will get to the cause with honest answers..

[wheelie my boeing]

In a situation like they were in then disruption is not even considered. The pilots would need to decide what to do, where to divert etc. As it was a significant problem then disruption to LHR's passengers is irrelevant. Priority is get it on the ground safely. ATC don't tell the pilots where to divert, the pilots make the decision and they tell ATC where they are diverting. ATC can offer help (and in the UK are very good at doing so).

As for not flying over a populated city, losing both engines could happen at any time anywhere, it's just very unlikely. BA38 incident at LHR for example. The pilots would have been busy enough dealing with the ECAM and handling the aircraft, their priority would be to get it on the ground safely and keeping their passengers safe, as they weren't in a glider scenario then they wouldn't have been looking for a green field to land on. Perhaps it was considered, even momentarily, but given one engine seemed to provide thrust (fire included or not) meant they could land on a runway.

[itsresidualmate]

BA could man up their maintenance tomorrow with dozens of experienced licensed engineer contractors, many including myself are ex-BA anyway.

But to get them, they'll have to pay a decent amount.

[Richard J.]

I see from the radar track that is now available on Heathrow WebTrak at WebTrak: Heathrow (http://webtrak.bksv.com/lhr) that on the aircraft's landing approach, there were a number of unusual deviations from the extended runway alignment. Between Battersea and Hounslow, it followed a sort of sinusoidal track, deviating to the north and south by up to about 300 metres, with a heading at one point that appears to be at least 25 degrees off course.

Would this indicate a handling problem, or would there be a reason for deliberately following such a course? Altitudes and speeds appear to have been normal.

For some reason, WebTrak have decided to censor yesterday's situation by removing all information of flight numbers, destinations, aircraft types. BA762 can be identified as the one that departs LHR at 08:17. Aircraft symbols are coloured according to their actual final destination, so BA762 is the departure that is coloured red as an arriving flight! There are also about 20 aircraft in the arrival stacks at that time which are coloured blue, because they later had to divert elsewhere.

[scotbill]

Does anybody know why it was necessary to close Heathrow?
Did this incident really require so many fire appliances that there was insufficient cover for further ops?

[Ian W]

BA could man up their maintenance tomorrow with dozens of experienced licensed engineer contractors, many including myself are ex-BA anyway.

But to get them, they'll have to pay a decent amount.

Perhaps allocate a small percentage of the PR and lobbying money they are using to keep LHR operating rather than Boris Island as it will all be a total waste even if they only have another land safe after a maintenance problem.

[Hotel Mode]

Reasonably obvious I'd have thought. 1 runway was closed as the aircraft was on it and the other because it was the runway it departed from and therefore did/may have had debris on it.

[Megaton]

Perhaps, the other runway was closed while debris was cleared. Do you not think that an airfield licensed for dual runway operations does not have sufficient fire cover for both departures and arrivals? More ill-informed rubbish. Perhaps, and its been suggested before, that only professional pilots are allowed to post on certain forums.

Edited: beaten to it by Hotel Mode.

[A and C]

This thread is is most interesting because of the crystal clear way it shows who has been in the hot seat ether as flight crew or as the B1 certifier on a busy line station, some above have shown that they can walk the walk and others have shown that they can barely talk the talk.

What seems to be emerging over a number of posts is that BA maintenance is both under manned and under funded.

[scotbill]

Ham phisted
Perhaps, the other runway was closed while debris was cleared. Do you not think that an airfield licensed for dual runway operations does not have sufficient fire cover for both departures and arrivals? More ill-informed rubbish. Perhaps, and its been suggested before, that only professional pilots are allowed to post on certain forums.This is the sort of gratuitously rude contribution that gives Pprune such a bad name.
Heathrow seemed to be closed for much longer than would be necessary for a runway inspection - thereby causing massive disruption for thousands of passengers and major losses to airlines. The emergency was not as extreme as others which LHR has experienced so why was not more effort made to get the show on the road?
If Ham Phisted is indeed a professional pilot, I hope he is not so quick to leap to judgements in his job.
(It's really none of his business, but I operated out of LHR for 25 years)

[wilsr]

Several posts talk about things being not spotted by the pilot's walk-around.

Wishful thinking!

The reality is that the walk-around happens typically at least twenty minutes before the doors close - there are one or two other things to achieve in the flight deck as well, after all. Twenty minutes prior to doors closing there are many things still going on: cargo doors are open, engineers are still doing their own tasks, refuelling is under way and so on. It's not possible in the real world to actually check many of the things that can and are omitted at that stage. The only way a walk-around could be said to be realistically useful is to do it when everything has been completed and only the one door is left open - the one the walkee will use to get back in.

Like so many other parts of the operation, many things have to be on trust in the real, as opposed to the legal, world.

[VCC]

After the 4 chimes all comms to the flight deck must go via the sccm who will decide if the flight crew need to know or not. Once the engines roll up for takeoff to gear up there is no communication with the flight deck. Even if the sccm tried to call if the flight crew had an fire bell ringing they would not answer anyway.

[NigelOnDraft]

This is the sort of gratuitously rude contribution that gives PPRuNe such a bad name.I trust you are referring to the ***** you then write, and not Ham Phisted?

I am sure it did not take long to inspect the runway (27L). I suspect the inspection found some bits :ooh: How long do you think it took to log / photograph their positions, and possibly get AAIB clearance to move them? And then thoroughly clear the runway. F1 illustrates how well (or not) CFRC stays intact when it takes an unintentional flight :8

Or maybe they should have just sent more aircraft down the runway and just hoped an AF Concorde did not happen? After all:thereby causing massive disruption for thousands of passengers and major losses to airlinesis clearly more important than safety for you?

I am not sure how long 27L was closed, but I do not think it was very long. I think the major disruption was getting 27R open again, and recovering the diverisons.

[sitigeltfel]

After the 4 chimes all comms to the flight deck must go via the sccm who will decide if the flight crew need to know or not. Once the engines roll up for takeoff to gear up there is no communication with the flight deck. Even if the sccm tried to call if the flight crew had an fire bell ringing they would not answer anyway.

Thank you for an informative answer to my query. :ok:

[FairWeatherFlyer]

Can these things be designed so the airflow keeps them near closed and not flapping if they are left unlatched?

On the inspection front there are plenty of other environments where mirrors are used for both looking underneath things and acting as a prompt.

The cheapness of HD cameras and image recognition nowadays means you could even have the aircraft do certain basic/limited visual surface checks automatically. I want royalties if anyone nicks that idea.

[Ivanbogus]

It was a wise decision to return to LHR, i doubt they even declared an emergency. I just wonder why they continued to climb on the BPK SID when they lost the cowlings right after takeoff and at what point the starboard engine failed?:hmm:

[BBK]

Scotbill

I think you're being very harsh on ham phisted. The reason, in my humble opinion, that PPRUNE has the reputation it has, among professional flight crew at least, is the uninformed nonsense that you see written from people who clearly are NOT pilots. I am not advocating that PPRUNE be restricted to pilots but it gets frustrating, at times, to see ill informed comments that indicate the poster's ignorance of modern airline operations.

There's nothing wrong with the general public asking questions and seeking to understand a complex subject but making judgements when they lack the facts is unwise - only my opinion of course. For example, the eye witness on the BBC who said the: "the plane was going in and out of cloud". What does that add to our understanding? However, a passenger on board who says he saw the cowling come lose at such and such time will be invaluable to the AAIB.

The discussion about whether to divert to STN/LTN is a case in point. I imagine that very few airline pilots will have problems with that because we understand the workload in a diversion to somewhere unfamiliar. Of course it may turn out that STN was an option but we don't have the facts yet. In this absence of good info I vote the crew a "well done".

[DaveReidUK]

I am sure it did not take long to inspect the runway (27L). I suspect the inspection found some bits http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/icon25.gif How long do you think it took to log / photograph their positions, and possibly get AAIB clearance to move them? And then thoroughly clear the runway.No doubt all true, though it doesn't invalidate the proposition (widely reported in the press, though of course that's no guarantee of accuracy) that adequate fire cover was temporarily unavailable for normal operations on 27L.

Out of interest, what happened in the immediate aftermath of BAW38? Were sufficient RFFS resources held in reserve to support an immediate switch to single-runway operations on 27R? Obviously there was no requirement on that occasion to inspect the other runway.

[lomapaseo]

I continue to read hogwash about who owns the cowl latches Airbus, IAE etc.

It makes little difference to who designed them or who manufactured them. The AAIB, if they choose, will address their recomendations to the certifying agency that covers their airworthiness. Wait for that to find out if you need to blame somebody.

Or just keep up with manufacturer issued service bulletins and who signs them.

Meanwhile we need to wait for some AAIB investigation findings to be released in order to put a dampner on this free for all of should ofs, would ofs, could ofs

[scotbill]

Nigel
I trust you are referring to the ***** you then write, and not Ham Phisted?Yet another example of playing the man and not addressing the question. It is not acceptable in civilised debate.

Would you care to quote an example of the ***** that I write? You will not find that personal attacks figure in any of my posts.

I think you're being very harsh on ham phisted.

On the contrary, I could have followed NoD's example and been a lot harsher. NoD "suspects" they found something and that there would be all sorts of forensic investigation. (He admits he does not know) My own experience of witnessing incidents at LHR much more serious than this was that every effort was made to get the airport back in operation as soon as possible.

Nobody has attempted an authoritative answer to my original query. Did Heathrow commit so many appliances to this emergency that the required cover was reduced? If not, what was the reason for the delay?
Safety is crucial to us all. But causing massive disruption to passengers and airlines does not necessarily have to be a consequence and should worry any professional pilot.
What part did bureaucracy and fear of litigation play in the shambles?

[DaveReidUK]

On the inspection front there are plenty of other environments where mirrors are used for both looking underneath things and acting as a prompt.See post #295 - even a visual inspection won't necessarily detect the situation where the latches have been pushed flush but the hooks haven't been engaged with the eyebolts. In those circumstances gravity will hold the doors almost completely closed (they weigh about 100lbs each) and the only way to know that they aren't secured is to spot a very slight increase in the gap between them, or to physically try to pull the doors open.

[BBK]

Scotbill

Those are valid questions. My guess about why the delays were so bad is that LHR runs at such high capacity it has little or no room to accommodate delays of any kind. The same thing happens with Low Vis Ops you will recall I'm sure.

[Max Angle]

Its a pretty basic problem that should have been sorted out years ago after the first few incidents, the cowls have a latching mechanism that allows the panels to appear correctly fastened when they are not.

I am quite sure, given suitable motivation (threatened withdrawal of type certificate perhaps), the manufacturer could design a mechanism that solves that anomaly. A pin with a large "remove before flight" tag that must be inserted into the latch before it can be opened and can't be removed until its properly closed would be one approach but I am sure there are others.

We can only hope that this incident finally provides the impetuous to get what is a long running problem sorted out before it kills. However, knowing how this business works I will not be holding my breath.

[Wirbelsturm]

But causing massive disruption to passengers and airlines does not necessarily have to be a consequence and should worry any professional pilot.

Neither airlines nor airport operators 'want' to cause delays. The unfortunate truth is that incidents happen. In this case the departure was from 27L and the recovery was on 27R, and quite correctly so.

Many years ago I sat behind a 767 on 27R that spat it's engine internals out onto the runway. There was a lot of expensive twisted metal on the runway that had to be collated, logged and collected. It took time.

The decision to close both runways was, IMHO, correct as no one at the time of the incident could categorically state what had caused the failure be it bird strike (carcasses and engine blades on the runway), catastrophic engine failure (as in the 767 above) or FOD ingestion during the take off roll.

Initially Operations called the closure to 12:00 local. I know, I was due to depart that morning. Once the situation was refined they brought forward the opening of 27L. I was only minimally delayed on departure and only 20 minutes late to destination.

At this point you have long haul traffic coming in from all over the globe, SH traffic feeding in to Heathrow and generally carrying minimum fuel for the ambient conditions. We don't want aircraft to be heavy over London burning extra fuel and fumes now do we.

Those pilots now have to make a decision based upon the operations closure time of 12:00 local. Many, quite rightly, diverted early. As SLF you wouldn't understand how quickly suitable diversion airfields around Heathrow become congested. Once those aircraft have diverted you need crews, pilots, ground handling resources, busses, tugs, fuel etc. etc. etc. organised BEFORE you even start applying for slots into an already over capacity airport.

Once a LH aircraft diverts it becomes a question of legal (CAA not Airline) crewing hours for what has now become a multi sector day, albeit with, potentially, a short sector. Pilots and crew need to be rotated, aircraft recovered and turned around etc.

All in all it becomes a logistical nightmare within a time and slot constrained environment.

All that considered do you really think that rash decisions were made by operational planners who run this airport every day, extremely well? As usual the operational team, ATC and the fire services covered what was a relatively benign emergency that, unfortunately, put out both runways extremely professionally and in the quickest time frame possible. This is, as always, done to reduce operational disruption in order to reduce the impact on the customer.

The incident and it's immediate consequences are purely the proverbial 'tip of the iceberg'.

Obviously all IMHO.

[ILS27LEFT]

Max Angle , spot on, nobody can disagree with your post. Hopefully they ( the various bodies involved) will not decide to hold those critical and absolutely necessary changes until loss of life is involved.

[Agaricus bisporus]

this free for all of should ofs, would ofs, could ofs

Quite disgraceful, very sloppy, I do agree.

It's should/would/could "have" as eny fule no.

:ugh:

[Richard J.]

There were no departures from 27L between BA762 at 08:17 and 09:24.
Runway 27R was closed from BA762's arrival at 08:43 until 10:46.

So presumably 27L was initially closed for inspection and clearance of cowling debris. Possibly the closure had to be extended because of a lack of fire cover, but we don't know how long it took to confirm that 27L was clear.

The times above are taken from WebTrak and should be correct to within 1 minute.

Talking of WebTrak, anyone got any comments on the curvy approach track of BA762 (see my post #347)?

[A and C]

Your comments about cowl latches are spot on, that is why I carried my trusty screwdriver on a walk around inspection, put the screwdriver in the slot between the cowls and apply a little pressure, if the cowl moves then it is not secure.

Unfortunately the security people in the Government are more worried that I will use the screwdriver to hijack the aircraft that I am in command of rather than the safety of the aircraft and its passengers. I do miss being able to check little things like cowl security and how much fuel was actually on the aircraft but these little things clearly rate a poor second to the unblemished career of the civil servants and politicians who mandate security policy.

[FlightCosting]

Aeromec 3 said: Most engines, I have had the pleasure to work on, had axial (forward and aft) safety pin latches which engaged into the nose cowl and only after the eye bolt latches had been tensioned, (eg: classic B747 JT9D installation) they are omitted in this installation and I wonder why? As I recall, engine fan cowls are not the remit of the engine manufacturer; you certainly will not find them in their engine manuals or parts list; in IAE's interest, they should be jumping on the airframe pylon bods for a positive modification.

When aircraft manufacturers offer customers more than one power plant, the procedure is to put the responsibility of everything that hangs on the wing to the engine manufacturer including the nacelle with the guarantee that the powerplant package must deliver must deliver a pre contract installed SFC which the air frame manufacturer passes on to the customer. This allows Airbus/Boeing to pass the buck back to AEI/CFM if the customer says that the aircraft is burning more fuel than the FM or ops manual says. There was actually one aircraft where the airframe was designed around the engine - the IL76. The ministry of aviation had an engine, the D30k and told Ilyushin to build a transport aircraft around it.

[BOAC73]

Where I work, if we have to consult the manufacturer with a problem with D ducts we liaise with the airframe provider.

[overstress]

I just wonder why they continued to climb on the BPK SID when they lost the cowlings right after takeoff

Your use of :hmm:, rather like Sally Bercow's *innocent face* clearly implies some criticism of the alleged actions of the crew.

One would continue on the SID as it is

a) Your clearance
b) Safe
c) Requires no additional R/T transmissions
d) What the aircraft is programmed to do

This allows the crew capacity to diagnose what may well have appeared to be a complex problem.

If the SID was flown initially, it would have been entirely in accordance with the crew's training.

Unfortunately, PPRuNe once again becomes a magnet for every armchair quarterback who has ever drooled and pointed at an aeroplane up in the sky...

[alwaysontime]

These cowls on the IAE engines have a plunger that drops down when the cowls are opened this then weights a mechanism that holds the doors out a few inches so that the doors are either obviously open or obviously locked. To lock the cowl doors you would have to push the plunger up and lock the doors otherwise the plunger falls and the doors spring open a few inches again. This was a mod after a similar thing happened a few years ago - there was a picture on the net that a passenger took in flight with the cowl doors missing similar to the BA ones.
This means therefore at least one of the 6 laches was fastened and therefore the pilots would not have noticed anything strange on a walk around does it not?

[thewisealderman]

I never post on this forum as quite frankly I find it embarrassing to my profession. It's interesting that on the BA Balpa forum this incident has seven pages of praise for a job well done as opposed to the drivel on here. I thank god that some of the posters on this forum were not at the controls. Perhaps if some of you spent less time speculating (admittedly with your useful MS flight sim experience behind you) and got some life skills you might one day get a decent flying job. Rant over.

[DaveReidUK]

This means therefore at least one of the 6 laches was fastened and therefore the pilots would not have noticed anything strange on a walk around does it not?Six latches ?

[4468]

scotbill:
But causing massive disruption to passengers and airlines does not necessarily have to be a consequence and should worry any professional pilot.
Well I've been a professional pilot for 30 plus years now, and I'm sorry to have to tell you I couldn't give a sh1t about inconveniencing ANYONE for the sake of safety.

I'd happily inconvenience the Queen, the Prime Minister, the President of the USA, or face the wrath of Naomi Campbell, rather than compromise the safety of the dustman in seat 48C.

That's my job!

Others have their jobs, and their responsibilities.

Operations at LHR resumed as soon as it was considered unambiguously safe to do so. Why would anyone presume otherwise? (41 minutes to deal with a significant emergency involving the discharge of foam from the emergency vehicles, before reopening 27L, sounds pretty good to me!)

[Not my job mate]

Alwaysontime - You are getting a bit confused with different ducts. The FAN COWLS have four latches and NO drop down indicator.

[willl05]

thewisealderman:
"I never post on this forum ..."

If only that were true.

[JW411]

Now, I have been away from Prune for a couple of days and I have just waded through 19 pages of the usual drivel from the unpromising hysterics interspersed with some good stuff from the engineers and the obvious professional flyers.

Now I am getting a bit elderly and I am not as sharp as I used to be and I do not intend to read all 19 pages again, but do we really know, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, from a reliable source that the crew actually shut down ANY of the engines or did they land with both engines running sans cowlings?

[NigelOnDraft]

but do we really know, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, from a reliable source that the crew actually shut down ANY of the engines or did they land with both engines running sans cowlings? I reckon nothing has been stated as "confirming" it. As someone else said, who knows if there were any indication problems on the L Eng? History seems to suggest when the cowlings go, they take enough with them to give a few warnings.

But likely due:
Pax statements R Eng "loud bang" / flames etc sometime into flight
Smoke from accessories area on R Eng (upper right?) side
Flt Crew parked aircraft offset to R
I am surprised none of the "spotters" have found the RT transcripts yet which would add some more definitive info?

[Piper.Classique]

A question from a humble pilot who has never flown a heavy (FI on SEP)

How long does it take to do the pilot preflight, or rather how much time is available,and how much of the aircraft is visible/accessible without ladders etc?

Leaving aside type specific aspects, just a general idea for a two, three or four engine heavy.

And what typically would you focus on? The "gotchas" ?

Thank you for your informed replies.

[Hand Solo]

5 mins on a small twin (A319) 10 mins on a big quad (B747). Everything you need to see is visible from the ground except the upper surfaces of the wings and stabiliser. Nobody has a ladder on a walk round.

[ILS27LEFT]

Airbus A320-231 London Gatwick 20 January 2000 AAIB Bulletin: 7/2000 FACTOR: N/A Synopsis Accident No.1 engine cowling debris left on runway after take off. Aircraft diverted to Stansted and landed safely on full emergency. SAFETY RECOMMENDATION – 2000-026 It is recommended that the DGAC mandate aircraft modification aimed at appreciably reducing the likelihood of A320 fan cowl doors inadvertently remaining unlatched after maintenance. It is considered that, while measures to exhot maintenance personnel to ensure that doors are latched and to improve the conspicuity of unfastened latches may assist, they are unlikely to be fully effective and modification aimed at providing obvious indication of unlatched doors is required. Response Recommendation treated in ARS71.0014 for A319/320/321. IAE engines: A modification aiming at improving the visibility of an unlatched fan cowl door has been mandated on May 2nd 2001 by CN 2001-106(b). A second modification aiming at preventing that unlatched cowl doors be closed has been mandated on September 5th 2001 by la CN 2001-381. CFM engines: DGAC considers that for these engines no modification is to be mandated as the visibility if unlatched fan cowl doors is sufficient. Airbus will netherless put forward a modification aiming at improving the visibility of an unlatched fan cowl door. Its implementation will take place on a voluntary basis. Status - Accepted - closed SAFETY RECOMMENDATION – 2000-027 It is recommended that, until measures to satisfy the intent of Recommendation No 2000-026 are incorporated, the DGAC and Airbus Industrie recommend A319, A320, A321 and/or A330 aircraft maintenance organisations to record the unlatching and latching of fan cowl doors and to specify a duplicate inspection to confirm latching. Response Actions taken for the treatment of recommendation 2000-026 allow closing this recommendation. We may nevertheless stress the fact that, via OIT 999.0105/00 Airbus reminded the operators on July 13th 2000 that the following procedures shall be followed: a) check the closure of fan cowl doors for both engines b) check the adjustment of latch engagement tensions Status - Accepted - closed

[WHBM]

Airbus A320-231 London Gatwick 20 January 2000 AAIB Bulletin: 7/2000 FACTOR: N/A Synopsis Accident No.1 engine cowling debris left on runway after take off.

Aircraft diverted to Stansted ....
Oh, the irony.

[freespeed2]

I just wonder why they continued to climb on the BPK SID when they lost the cowlings right after takeoff

In addition to overstress's valid comments:

I've operated out of Northolt many times. The CPT 4Y departure that we use steps from 3,000 to 4,000 then 5,000ft while flying North then North West from runway 25. This SID cuts straight across the path of the BA flight. If he hadn't climbed he might have had to deal with a TCAS in addition to everything else. Just because one aircraft has an emergency doesn't mean all the others disappear. It takes time to move them out of the way. He made a good call to stay with the clearance. That's what ATC would expect so they would vector other traffic on that basis. He couldn't know that as it transpired there were no departures from EGWU at that time.

[Basil]

ILS27LEFT, v interesting tks for posting.

Piper.Classique, It's a final backup; a quick walkround to see that nothing is hanging off, that a tyre doesn't look 'a bit odd' nor does anything else, there are no obvious dents, it just looks normal.
One I will never forget is departing Frankfurt when a young ground engineer noticed a shadow on a windmilling fan and climbed into the cowl and stopped the rotation. Three or four blades were damaged by tyre debris from a previous burst and this had not been noticed. Regrettably, whilst the damage was just within limits, the vibration levels were not and, because the whole thing was now recorded, I had to refuse the aircraft. IMO it was OK to fly but because it was just outside limits it was a no no.

[DX Wombat]

4468 - Thank you! It's good to know somebody has their priorities right. :ok:

[DaveReidUK]

do we really know, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, from a reliable source that the crew actually shut down ANY of the engines or did they land with both engines running sans cowlings?No, we don't have any conclusive evidence, AFAIK, that the crew did or didn't shut down any engines.

But if an engine was shut down, we known it wasn't No1 (or if it was, it was restarted before the landing, which is a tad unlikely). How do we know? Because we have video evidence of the deployment of No1 thrust reverser during the landing rollout.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

Why not choose STN? You've got problems with potentially both engines and you're downwind at your familiar homebase. You can't just drop into an unfamiliar base without getting charts, plates, performance and briefings. On the other hand, an approach into LHR is a non-event for BA airbus pilots.

Yes you can. You press the PTT and say "what's your ILS frequency and inbound course?"

[Lord Spandex Masher]

5 mins on a small twin (A319) 10 mins on a big quad (B747). Everything you need to see is visible from the ground except the upper surfaces of the wings and stabiliser. Nobody has a ladder on a walk round.

Yes they do, ask a Q400 pilot between September and maybe May.

[CISTRS]

Regrettably, whilst the damage was just within limits, the vibration levels were not and, because the whole thing was now recorded, I had to refuse the aircraft. IMO it was OK to fly but because it was just outside limits it was a no no.


Vibration levels not within limits. Right decision Basil. No need for regrets.
Well done the young ground engineer.

[jolihokistix]

If a glance at the gap underside shows the cowls to be unlatched, despite the levers being in locked position, and insertion of fingers and tugging would confirm swinging, unlocked state, then surely to save the bending over and peering in poor light, an indented grip one-third-way-up the cowling exterior would allow for a quick tug by any or all concerned on final check? :8

Just an idea, please rip apart as necessary.

[TURIN]

Jolihokistix.
One could always flick open the oil service access panel and grab a hold there.

[scoobydoo44]

Regarding the heathrow airbus incident on Friday , the Rffs resources would have been exhausted very quickly with crews dealing not only with a full evacuation , but also because of the possible engine fire and also the problems surrounding returning a/c which are generally overweight landings which can cause hot brakes on landing . From experience of the full evacuation of a virgin a340 at gatwick last year the minimum requirement of firefighters at the bottom of each chute is a minimum of 1 with a preference for 2 when dealing with multiple pax exiting under emergency evac conditions

[Apollo Overseas]

The gas turbine engine will happily run with no cowlings fitted. Regular occurrence when ground running for leaks etc. However there is no fire protection in this config as the cowlings form part of the air tight cavity for the retardant to be ejected around the engine. Both left and right cowls were not fully latched (for whatever reason) and when the right hand cowl came off it punctured something, possibly a fluid pipe on the side of the engine this resulted in that fire.Its possible the fire warning system was not triggered because, again the cowlings play a major role in ensuring the fire wires around the engine quickly pick up any abnormal sudden temperature rise

[cwatters]

A friend of mine pointed out that in another transport sector it was made mandatory to install door sensors and change proceedures after they departed with open doors....he was thinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise accident.

[LeadSled]

Please let us know which airline you fly for, or hopefully none :ugh: We can then steer well clear. At the airline in question today, which I might even fly for, we tend, maybe rather unusually, to brief for an approach. Such a brief requires preparation, interaction and check of understanding. Not just select it in the box and watch the aircraft fly it :=

NigelOneDaft,
Come down off your high horse, the poster who suggested what he would do in a dire emergency was entirely reasonable in his comments. If time was critical, I would do exactly as he suggested ---- and I have a lot of P1 on FMCS equipped aircraft --- in an airline with an excellent safety record --- for longer than BA/BEA/BOAC has existed
Indeed, you might look into the incident history of your company,( if you are really a Nigel) you will find several examples (that I know of, in one the Captain was an old mate of mine) where all the long winded procedures had to be truncated (a technical term for "chucked out the window") because of the nature of the emergency.

[Tevoro]

Sorry Dave but deployment of reversers is not dependant on engines running, at least not on a/c I have operated. Indeed, deployment of both reversers is the normal action on landing so could have been simply a motor response or perhaps to avoid the yaw induced if only one is deployed on touchdown.

[LeadSled]

in 1968 was BOAC 707-465 G-ARWE (EX EAGLE BTW) had an engine fire after t/o and returned immediately to LAP on now long gone runway 05

Folks,
That report is well worth a read, pre- CRM --- and never forget the stewardess who lost he life looking after her passengers.

[ZFT]

Barbara Harrison was the young lady's name. (I unfortunately witnessed the tragic event that April close up whilst I was working at British Eagle)

[DaveReidUK]

Sorry Dave but deployment of reversers is not dependant on engines running, at least not on a/c I have operated.Isn't there a minimum N2 (50%, I believe), below which the A319/A320/A321 ECU logic will inhibit reverser deployment?

[40KTSOFFOG]

Barbara Jane Harrison - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbara_Jane_Harrison)

[rog747]

as mentioned in my previous post re 707 WE retuning to land on 05,
eagle Brit had the manston diversion
on a foam runway when the MLG got stuck in an awkward place....

here is a pic
http://britisheagle.net/pictures/G-ANCG%20crash%202.jpg

[Megaton]

Leadsled

I'm with NoD here. There wasn't a dire emergency. The wing wasn't burning through, for example, or a double engine failure a la Sully. There was some urgency to get the aircraft on the ground but there's no point rushing into an approach at an unfamiliar field to stuff it up. At one of our flight safety days we discussed an incident (no names, no pack drill etc) where an airborne return was rushed with inappropriate/nonexistent briefing with the end result that they ended up high/fast and a go-around. Do it once, do it right.

[Yaw String]

With the benefit of hindsight,and sitting over a cup of coffee..

"Captain, Sally here,,the pax seem a bit distraught, as they say they can see the inside of at least one engine"

" Bugger, seems at least one cowl is flapping around, I remember a fatal Danair incident where the stabiliser was hit by part of detached fuselage."

"MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY" request vectors for immediate return and landing!"

"Lets reduce speed now,and make a minimum speed approach to reduce likelihood of cowls exiting airframe,and get on the ground as soon as possible, where we will be given tea n biscuits, and congratulated for being heroes, whilst just doing our job...anything to add or suggest Smithers?"

"No Nigel..that's all clear...just,...oh nothing Nigel"

"Come on Smithers, out with it, it may be vital"

"We'll, may I suggest we don't log on to Pprune for a few days!":eek:

And I suggest,..more or less,...that's what they may have done..

P.s. PAN PAN,PAN PAN,PAN PAN if you like..but I reckon it had potential to suddenly turn critical!

[Super VC-10]

Leadsled - post #400

Folks,
That report is well worth a read, pre- CRM --- and never forget the stewardess who lost he life looking after her passengers.
Tootle pip!!

I see that 40KTSOFFOG has posted the link to the article on BJH over at Wikipedia. There is also an article on the accident itself.

BOAC Flight 712 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BOAC_Flight_712)

[Apollo Overseas]

I think we could only test TRs when the engine was not running by connecting muscle air or hyd power externally.
The aircraft would have had to have at least one engine operating to successfully stay airborne and maneuver the way it did

[Max Angle]

FADEC logic prevents reverser deployment with the engine shut down.

[jaymag1]

True, if you pay peanuts,you get monkeys!!

[DaveReidUK]

FADEC logic prevents reverser deployment with the engine shut down.Thanks for the confirmation, makes sense.

[Uplinker]

To any non commercial jet pilots on here; an in-flight problem or failure can take a while to work through. It is not just a case of wheeling it round and landing in the nearest field. On has to go through the checklists for the failure of course, in this case perhaps at least two separate engine related problems. Then we have to secure other systems, for example alternative electrical power generation (start the APU), and decide which air conditioning packs to use (because they might have been contaminated), and hydraulics. Then we have to decide where to land. With most failures, we need to work out what landing distance will be required for the particular failure - which might for example be causing stopping issues (for example no reversers) - and this would be a very good reason NOT to go to Luton for example. The aircraft may be overweight for normal landing, in which case with no fuel jettison system available, we might need to burn the fuel off, or decide to land overweight - again another set of considerations, and longer runway needed. If the emergency is not life threatening, (it wasn't), one then has time to consider what engineering will be available, where on the airport the aircraft will be able to go once landed, and how the passengers are going to be looked after once the aircraft has landed. In most cases, weather permitting one's home-base that was departed from a few mins ago will be the best bet, (and it is familiar to the pilots). In addition, one needs to speak with the cabin crew so they know what is going on and what to expect - in this case an evacuation after landing using the slides. And finally speak to the passengers and reassure them what has happened and what is going to happen. All the while flying the aircraft and liaising with ATC. For some complex failures with bad weather around, all this can take 45 minutes to complete - I know, because I've done it.

All those who say they can't believe the aircraft flew over London to land have obviously never had to do this sort of thing for real or even in a SIM. Modern aircraft with engine problems do not fall out of the sky - indeed they are certificated not to.

What ever the causes for this, the crew and ATC did a textbook job, and all deserve our congratulations.

[CATIIIBnoDH]

Well said Uplinker. I know, I was there......

[blind pew]

Uplinker.
I can think of several occurances where in 45 mins all would have gone down the pan including the afore mentioned BOAC 707.
In my last company we briefed for an emergency return before we took to the skies.
Nigel..
.yes they parked with respect to the surface wind...glad you mentioned that - perhaps you should also mention how your company discovered the importance of the manoeuvre when others had been following a similar procedure for a decade or more...

[quentinc]

I respect your experience but suggest that in a scenario where bits of the aircraft have fallen off, whatever the procedures you have been trained to perform, getting back on the ground, flying over the least populated areas, might be a good idea.

Presumably the captain disagrees with your view that the emergency was not life threatening or he wouldn't have put the passenges through the chance on injury, with a slide evacuation.

[Hand Solo]

Grapevine says the fire chief recommended the evacuation and no catastrophic situation was evident in the cockpit or cabin. Evacs don't always happen immediately.

[Good Business Sense]

Quentic - can you explain, exactly, how you avoid populated areas in the south of England in a jet flying at several miles a minute... perhaps you could give us definition of "least populated" - last question - do you have a CPL?

[FullTanks]

Quote: "Presumably the captain disagrees with your view that the emergency was not life threatening or he wouldn't have put the passenges through the chance on injury, with a slide evacuation".


An emergency evacuation is carried out if there is any evidence of fire or catastrophic damage. This would normally be initiated by the flight crew, but may be triggered by the cabin crew if they consider it to be necessary and no command is heard from the flight deck - with, of course, due consideration for which side or part of the aircraft is affected. Cabin crew are trained to check outside the door for evidence of fire before opening it.

[Sillert,V.I.]

Uplinker.
I can think of several occurances where in 45 mins all would have gone down the pan including the afore mentioned BOAC 707.

And equally with flight 712 you could argue that if they had flown the SID & concentrated on following the briefing, with better CRM they'd have extinguished the engine fire & returned for a more controlled landing, saving 5 lives & the aircraft.

Or you could say that if there'd been a similar engine fire on the Oslo flight, the loss of the cowls would have left the crew with no way of extinguishing it & this incident would have ended in disaster.

In any particular incident, we can speculate retrospectively from the comfort of an armchair that disaster could have been averted if only procedures had/had not been followed (delete as appropriate for your chosen incident), but, statistically speaking, there's more likely to be a successful outcome if the PIC follows the briefing and stays in the loop than if they throw away the book.

That said, there will always be situations where acting instinctively and in contradiction with the briefing is the only way to save the day (Cpt Sully being one obvious example).

Recognising the difference & making the correct decision, in seconds whilst under extreme pressure, is perhaps the real test of an aircraft commander. In following procedure in this incident and not following it in the Hudsdon river ditching, the respective commanders made the right judgment call in each case.

In my book, they are both heroes.

[ayroplain]

If the emergency is not life threatening, (it wasn't)
Your first-hand information is appreciated but, for the record, can you (or anyone else, for that matter) confirm that the loss of these cowlings was not a life threatening situation. This will come as some relief to those piloting (or flying on) aircraft fitted with these engines in the future.

[MATELO]

I just wonder why they continued to climb on the BPK SID when they lost the cowlings right after takeoff Freespeed added
If he hadn't climbed he might have had to deal with a TCAS in addition to everything elseAlso, height buys you time.

[gcal]

As I was taught many moons ago:

'You can never have too much runway in front of you or too much air beneath'

[VinRouge]

Uplinker,

I would agree for 95% of cases but an uncontained engine fire is the one (main) situation where I think you are justified in deviating from standard if your Immediate Actions dont put out the fire.

Onboard Fire would be the other one. In these two occasions, limits especially max landing weights go out the window as history has shown, these scenarios are true fights for survival.

Not that this applies here, of course.

[Agaricus bisporus]

Am I alone in feeling there is a worrying amount of rigidity being expressed in terms of "what to do if..."

The following stood out as an example;
acting instinctively and in contradiction with the briefing
OK, it's nitpicking but its the word "contradiction" that makes me uncomfortable. It suggests to my ears that the briefing is regarded as a procedure first of all when it surely is only a suggestion or a guideline at best, and furthermore one that requires sticking to and implies that to do otherwise is questionable as it goes against the brief. We need to keep an open mind about what we will do in practice, and surely we should be at pains to make sure this is expressed and understood. It also ignores the fact that the briefing only covered a single engine failure and did not address the total loss of power and so was not applicable in any way at all.

Another example are the numerous suggestions that diverting to one's home base is preferable to going somewhere "unfamiliar" due to the need for a briefing, finding plates, landing performance, and apparently general unfamiliarity whatever that is, etc. Do professional pilots need "familiarity" with a field to land there safely? I ask you, how many of us have the home ILS plates directly to hand on every departure? Many/most won't I suspect. Do professional airmen esp those with modern FMS need plates to shoot an ILS? Why? Do professional airman usually have any trouble shooting an approach at an airfield as "unfamiliar" as STN? Do professional pilots not know how much - ballpark figures - length they need to land in non normal configs? And thus dismiss LTN's 2400m as unsuitable out of hand? To do the same for STN is even more far-fetched. What on earth do you need a plate for if the ILS is self tuning, you've declared a mayday and its a blue sky day? Even if it claggy and you need to get down - and all of these remarks are based on need to do it - you know that 200ft aal is a DA that won't kill you no matter what at fields you know aren't terrain restricted. So you do grab a plate, just how much do you need to brief at a place like STN, even if you do regard it as somewhere in Outer Mongolia? It could probably be done in twenty seconds.

I don't mean these thought to refer specifically to the recent incident, its more some musings on our seemingly ever increasing reliance on procedures that were meant as guidance but morph over time into something far more rigid to the extent that some of them have all but become "law". From this follows a lack of awareness that they can be varied and eventually an inability to consider it. I don't think that is altogether the best way.

We all know why procedures are there and why we stick to them almost all the time, what bothers me is the ever decreasing awareness that sometimes it is better if you vary from them, or even abandon them on rare occasions. The human factors firewall we've built up around "sticking to procedures" could usefully have a few more gates in it I reckon.

I know this involves the development (read re-invention in some companies) of Airmansh*** . Oh B@llox! I nearly said it again, I'll get my coat ...

[Jazz Hands]

can you (or anyone else, for that matter) confirm that the loss of these cowlings was not a life threatening situation

One suspects the cowl itself isn't essential to flight, at least in a temporary sense, but that the real issue - given that it weighs 40-odd kilos - is what it might hit or tear out during its divorce from the aircraft.

[BOAC]

is what it might hit or tear out during its divorce from the aircraft. - as witnessed by the trail from No2?

........or hit on the ground, of course?

[LeadSled]

Ham Phisted,

I didn't say there was a dire emergency, but maybe you should re-read the original poster's comments. As I said, they were entirely reasonable on the basis of his whole post, and the sniffy ripost was uncalled for. You and Daft Nigel aren't "children of the magenta line", by any chance??

I well recall a double engine failure in an aircraft on approach to EGLL, fortunately it had two more ---- on the flight deck one reaction was to burn off fuel, as the SOP recommendation was to reduce weight to a minimum for a two engine approach.

However, the command decision was to get on the ground ASAP, given the strange but similar symptoms of two engine failures in quick succession, an emergency was declared, and believe me, the briefings were very brief, almost limited to "what the bug speed?"

It was a good decision, the problem was caused by contaminated fuel in Bahrain, either of the two remaining could have quit at any time. An SQ 747 staggered into EDFF on the same morning, same reason, same fuel source.

In a somewhat similar case, double engine failure on approach, this time already past Stonecutters for RW 13 at the old Hong Kong ---- what would you do there --- no time for the whole two engine approach briefing ---- and would you want to try a two engine missed approach there, with the gear already down.

A B747 almost ran out of fuel (no fault of the crew) going into Newark, diversion from KJFK, the symptoms were two engines quit in quick succession. The Captain short-circuited the normal approach,(and all the preparation and briefings for a two engine out approach) and joined the ILS at the OM, a third engine quit just after touchdown. What do you think the result might have been if they just "followed standard procedures". Could you hand fly and capture the ILS at 1200 feet, and "fly the aeroplane" in IMC.

Sullenberger was able to do what he did, because he could fly the aeroplane, almost instinctively.

An adequate briefing is a statement of intent, unfortunately, in some airlines an departure or approach briefing is more like a student briefing for a flying lesson --- and pilots who are so constrained that they locked into briefing of the latter kind, and are incapable of anything else become a hazard in an emergency.

And, after some 25,000h, I don't think I need somebody like you to teach me how to suck eggs. Fortunately, I come from a training background where SOPs (nice simple ones) are the norm, and thinking "outside the box" when necessary is all part of the training and indoctrination system ---- some people call it airmanship, I call it common sense.

[Super VC-10]

Sillert, V.I. in post #420

And equally with flight 712 you could argue that if they had flown the SID & concentrated on following the briefing, with better CRM they'd have extinguished the engine fire & returned for a more controlled landing, saving 5 lives & the aircraft.

Having researched this accident extensively, I rather suspect that had they done that, there would have been a similar result to the onboard fire on an Air Union Blériot 155 in October 1926.

Not familiar with that one?

October 1926 Air Union Blériot 155 crash - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_1926_Air_Union_Bl%C3%A9riot_155_crash)

[wiggy]

LeadSled

You and Daft Nigel aren't "children of the magenta line", by any chance??

Ummmm this could be fun.......I'll grab some popcorn, pull up a chair and await with interest NOD's reply.......(or maybe he'll be too polite to rise to the bait)

[fireflybob]

In the case of the BOAC 707 GARWE - I recall the fire handle was never pulled which, amongst other things, arms the fire extinguishers hence the reason why the fire continued.

From wiki:-

The crew's omitting to shut off the fuel to the engine was blamed for the rapid growth of the fire and the loss of the aircraft.

This was a long time before CRM etc - the correct accomplishment of the fire drill was entirely on the shoulders of the Flight Engineer who was, I believe, on his first trip not under supervision.

One result of the inquiry was that when the fire drill was read after the memory items the Captain was required to also check that the fire handle had been pulled.

One aspect which I don't think has been mentioned in all suggestions of urgency to land that, in the event of various parts departing the aircraft, it might be prudent to do a low speed handling check at height - you don't really want to find the aircraft departing in roll (say) when you extend flaps on the approach with less height available for correction and recovery.

There are very few cases (like -WE) where you need to get back down on the ground ASAP. If you are not sure what to do it's often better to sit on your hands and do nothing (other than safe aircraft control) before regretting hasty action.

Well done to all crew, ATC and emergency services.

[Super VC-10]

No good having a fire extinguisher on the engine if the engine has fallen off and it's the actual wing that is on fire. Had they not got Whiskey Echo back on the deck, the wing would almost certainly have failed. I can't see that there would have been any survivors in that scenario.

[Megaton]

LeadSled

I can't even be bothered to legitimise your childish dig with a proper reply.

As for NoD, I sincerely hope he does enlighten you as to his background.

[ZFT]

It’s a long time ago but IIRC the ex British Eagle aircraft had the Fire Handles located on the forward glareshield whereas the standard BOAC aircraft had them located on the overhead P5 panel. It was very difficult for the FE to reach and see them from his position.
Interestingly, all other non standard aircraft that had the Fire Handles located on the glareshield were modified after this accident.

[Sillert,V.I.]

No good having a fire extinguisher on the engine if the engine has fallen off and it's the actual wing that is on fire. Had they not got Whiskey Echo back on the deck, the wing would almost certainly have failed.

I'm wondering if the engine would have fallen off if they'd pulled the fire handle when carrying out the engine fire drill? I don't know enough details of this accident - was the fire the result of the engine departing the wing, or did the engine depart the wing because of the fire? IIRC the booster pumps were left on, which wouldn't have helped.

And in the current incident, with all the cowls gone & one engine trailing smoke, just how far away were they from an uncontrollable fire?

Following the SID buys time & space to assess the problem, but equally this could have ended in disaster if it had caught fire when they were at BPK @ FL110 with no effective means of extinguishing it.

I don't see this as a clear cut decision, but of course I have no idea what information was being presented to the crew at the time.

[Super VC-10]

The engine fell off because of the fire. But the wing continued to burn after the engine had fallen off. I'd recommend a read of Fire Over Heathrow by Susan Otway, Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2008; ISBN 184415739-3 for the full story behind that accident.

[Two's in]

Has any airline ever considered a new flying position, let's say "Captain" for arguments sake? Maybe on those days when you can't get throught to Ops or Dispatch to solve your immediate crisis this "Captain" person could make a decision on the flight deck based on experience and judgement while remaining responsible for the safety of the aircraft and its occupants? Bit radical I know, and I don't think it'll ever catch on but it's a hell of an idea.

[DownIn3Green]

CRM is great and I'm all for it. However that does not mean the cockpit a democracy. Only one person's decision counts in the final analysis. There is no substute for years and hours of experience.

[hyatt_1_alpha]

As for 'real world' Vs 'legal world', sorry numpties, there is no difference.

As for walk-arounds, look AND see, yes?

If the Captain signed for an aircraft that was unsafe to fly irrespective of engineering shortfalls, then he should be dismissed without notice, he/she would be only too aware of their responsibilties under PART A(1) and this is why salaries are substantial. End of.

[ayroplain]

If the Captain signed for an aircraft that was unsafe to fly then he should be dismissed without notice, he/she would be only too aware of their responsibilties under PART A(1). End of.
If the regulatory authority signed for (and continue to sign for) an aircraft attached to which is an engine that can be made unsafe to fly by simple and inevitable human error (and which has already had multiple occurrences to date) they must be held accountable.

[hyatt_1_alpha]

Ayroplain, if there have been multiple previous occurancies even more reason to dismiss the Captain if it is found he/she failed in their responsibilities under Part A(1).

[idol detent]

As for walk-arounds, look AND see, yes?


...and if there was nothing to see?

Have you read but not assimilated, or have you just spouted your 'opinion' for the benefit of the rest of mankind?

Troll. :ugh:

[ManaAdaSystem]

I have always been trained to position a burning aircraft with the fire on the downwind side, not into the wind. I would consider into the wind as a fairly good second, if time is really critical.
I'm a bit puzzeled by all this talk of runway lengths. This was a A320, and I don't see many problems that would warrant checking landing distance if the shortest runway is 2400 m.
I'm also a bit worried as people are talking about EICAM (?) stopping you from landing immediately. What ever happened to gear, flaps and brakes?
It's just an aircraft!

[Meikleour]

fireflybob (http://www.pprune.org/members/4759-fireflybob): I used to fly the -436 and my recollection is that at the time of WE when the start switch was moved to OFF it only closed the HP valve. The LP valve was a separate action to be performed. Closure of the LP valve was what was missed and fuel continued to be supplied at pressure to the pylon and hence the subsequent engine/wing fire. The aircraft were modified later such that the HP and the LP valves were activated by the closure of the start lever. There was also a valve transit light fitted. So, in summary, the fire drill was actioned however the fierce fire was fed fuel via the pylon.

[hyatt_1_alpha]

Idol

... for the benefit of apologists of a job badly done. Rules is rules, Sonny Jim.

[fireflybob]

fireflybob: I used to fly the -436 and my recollection is that at the time of WE when the start switch was moved to OFF it only closed the HP valve. The LP valve was a separate action to be performed. Closure of the LP valve was what was missed and fuel continued to be supplied at pressure to the pylon and hence the subsequent engine/wing fire. The aircraft were modified later such that the HP and the LP valves were activated by the closure of the start lever. There was also a valve transit light fitted. So, in summary, the fire drill was actioned however the fierce fire was fed fuel via the pylon.

Meikleour, thanks -me too, was a long time ago!

[idol detent]

Ah, judge, jury & executioner...

Hark all! Hyatt has spoken....

Your position of ignorance speaks volumes....do you have even MS FS?

[hyatt_1_alpha]

Idol

try 23,000 hrs

[Busbert]

Perhaps this time Airbus and IAE will quit hiding behind the sticky labels, fluorescent paint and warnings in AMM procedures and actually do something to improve the design??? It's fair to say that the writing is on the wall.

Somehow though I imagine that the last engineer to sign the AML and the pilot who did the WAC will hung out to dry (again), after all scapegoating is a lot cheaper and more expedient than fixing the design.

Deputy heads will roll, and the lesson will be repeated until the student learns.

[Cows getting bigger]

A couple of thoughts:

If it is demonstrated that the latches were not secured, then heads certainly deserve to roll and in our industry their is only one place where the buck stops.

Regarding decision making, I come from a military environment where we predominately reacted to an emergency by doing something, quickly. When I moved into commercial aviation, the process was almost completely reversed - we rarely do anything quickly, we ensure things are safe and then DODAR. Each of these two routines have their place and this is often based upon the equipment we are operating and the environment we are in. In this week's example it would have been easy to hack the aircraft into a quickie visual circuit, bomb burst everyone else and then land without ever having ascertained the nature of the problem. I would suggest that our aircraft are designed such that this should rarely be a reasonable option and the safer thing to do is to adopt a considered approach.

It would seem to me that our flight crew on the one hand may deserve some form of admonishment for sub-standard pre-flght but on the other handled an aircraft emergency in an admirable and entirely correct fashion.

[hyatt_1_alpha]

Cows getting Bigger

"It would seem to me that our flight crew on the one hand may deserve some form of admonishment for sub-standard pre-flght but on the other handled an aircraft emergency in an admirable and entirely correct fashion"

Admonishment? You are joking, right? What's that then, a little slap on the wrist between pals??

Video of a British Airways jet burning in the sky overhead London, trailing a plume of thick black smoke, broadcast all over the planet, causing the company untold reputation damage at a time when it can least afford it, and you think it's okay to praise the way 'OUR CREW' handled an 'aircraft emergency' that even you infer may have been self-induced because of a 'sub-standard' pre-flight (we'll know the truth behind this soon enough).

'Our crew', who are you?

Other pilots have lost their lively-hoods for far less than this and even in situations where flights safety or company reputation wasn't an issue inside and outside of BA. I suppose if the face fits they'll be fine and keep their jobs, because BA pilot management has it's own reputation does it not?

[Agaricus bisporus]

Regardless of the rights and wrongs - or even the wrongs and wrongs of what someone may or may not have done by mistake it is truly pathetic, shameful, to see people who really don't sound like pilots at all spouting asinine assumptions about the integrity and honesty of people and organisations they clearly have no clue about. Who do you think you are?

It may well, in our sick and cynical world be trendy and somehow "clever" to voice the opinion that everyone but me is a slimy, twisting dishonest fraudster. It's a line that shows those people up for the shallow, negative and intellectual bankrupts they are. Not to mention raising the question of "takes one to know one". Grow up and shut up, or bugger off back to the world of the gutter where your sleazy gutter "beliefs" belong.

There is, I think, one thing that the Professionals here know will come from this as far as the Airline is concerned. And that is a rigorous, professional and totally dispassionate investigation that will see the correct and appropriate action taken by both the crew involved and the management handling it.

Calling BA's corporate honesty into question over this is simply disgraceful. Unless, of course, you have some evidence to back yourselves up.

No??

I thought not.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Weeeell, in the local news a day or two ago, BA blamed this incident on a technical problem.

[Alexander de Meerkat]

hyatt_1_alpha - you may or may not have 23,000 hours, but you are certainly the Monday Morning Quarterback. I too have been round the aviation industry many years and have found that those most judgemental are those who receive the least grace when they mess up - which humans have the propensity to do. I do not work for BA and indeed have much to gain from any loss to their reputation. I nonetheless can guarantee that the crew involved only ever wanted to be the best professionals they could, but appear to have made a mistake on the walkround. I am used to CFMs, but I am told that V2500 doors are very difficult to spot as to whether they are latched or not. The problem would be compounded if both sides looked identical - as appears to have been the case here. I do not recall ever seeing the engine doors unlocked by way of a demo - I daresay that is now about to change for us all! To me this is systemic and boils down to training, so sacking pilots would really be counterproductive. These guys may indeed have blown the preflight inspection, despite sincerely wanting to do it well. The answer is to retrain all Airbus pilots to ensure they can identify when the cowling doors are closed or not - the absolutely wrong response would be to fire someone.

[Bengerman]

Ah! The AAIB are not usually as quick as this to publish the whys and wherefore's of an incident.

"What? They haven't reported? But surely all the knowledgable people here on Prune are in receipt of all the facts? It sounds like they know it all!"

[WHBM]

There's some disappointing nonsense on here, but in between there are some notable questions, which I am sure the AAIB will address. Some have already dismissed them, but lets summarise.

1. As the IAE latches are a known "gotcha" from previous incidents, do they feature as a specific attention item in the BA walkaround SOP ?

2. As ATC reported to the crew on liftoff that they had dropped engine parts, did they really need to get as far as Lambourne/Brentwood before returning. Does the BA departure briefing SOP include a brief on immediate return ? Does that route via Brentwood ?

3. Is it really so difficult by then to divert then to Stansted, as some are saying here, rather than come all the way back to Heathrow. If I were the crew I'd be a bit insulted at people saying here that such a diversion for me was "too difficult". Bear in mind that they would have been visual with the Stansted runway at this point.

4. There have been AAIB/ATC reports before about the inadvisibility of diverting into Heathrow when on westerlies with known significant problems (and I would count problems with both engines as significant). Why has this not been actioned ?

5. If we really are relaxed about diverting all the way back to Heathrow, why the evacuation by slides on arrival rather than using steps ? It's well known that a slide evacuation regularly leads to injuries, and is a last-ditch thing to do. And in this case we did get injuries, fortunately minor.

[lomapaseo]

I recall that these cowls have come off before and the engines were not actioned to be shutdown.

Why are we presuming that to this crew there was a double engine failure that should have affected their actions :confused:

We really do need to wait for more factual data before we carry our presumptions all the way thorough a Failure effects analysis to a near crash.

I'm not sure that what the passengers or people on the ground think they see should override what the pilot sees in their instruments regarding engines. I prefer the pilots fly the plane as trained and only when it doesn't fly move to other considerations.

And lets keep this blame and punishment talk out of R&N and let the AAIB professionals assign some causal factors and recommendations to prevent another incident first.

[TCXCadet]

1. Good question
2. We don't yet know what indications were being shown on the flight deck. The crew MAY have seen engines operating normally or with minor damage. What's the rush?
3. See above
4. See above
5. See above - with addition that fire crew MAY have recommended evacuation rather than indications on the flight deck.

AAIB report will probably give us the answers - there is nowhere near enough information yet.

[A and C]

The more I read on this thread the fewer people I have respect for, now just who above has had command of a jet airliner or has opened and closed the cowlings on an A320 ?

Oh while I'm about is who knows the difference between the fan cowl and the C duct ?

Perhaps when we have sorted the sheep from the goats we can return to a reasonable debate based on real knowledge and experience, not on hours of Microsoft flight sim or half baked ideas of how an engine is constructed and maintained.

[EcamSurprise]

The problem would be compounded if both sides looked identical - as appears to have been the case here. I do not recall ever seeing the engine doors unlocked by way of a demo - I daresay that is now about to change for us all! To me this is systemic and boils down to training, so sacking pilots would really be counterproductive.

Indeed, I had this discussion at work today.

I work for the same outfit as you ADM and I think it would be really beneficially to have some sort of an 'engineering' day where we get taken around the aircraft and shown so of these things.
It is interesting at the least and may have the potential benefit of preventing a incident.

[Yaw String]

Got to say, if I had looked out of the window and seen a large piece of metal flapping around, I would be extremely vocal about it.

I would expect my crew to get me back on terra firma ASAP.

As has been mentioned umpteen times on here,...the crew are expected to diverge from standard operating procedures, if those same procedures are deemed to be inappropriate,given the current circumstances.


Modern glass cockpit has soo many aides to situational awareness.

A worst case scenario briefing regarding lowest safe altitude, and shortest track miles to touchdown in case of emergency,reflected on Fix page with simple range/altitude arc....should be included in everyone's brief!

Autopilot in,....Vref for required flap setting....Max Autobrake,(if evacuation expected)..brief PA informs both cabin staff and passengers...whilst pilot monitoring completes as much as possible of emergency checklist..Quick review on finals....Down in minutes,tea and sandwiches on the lawn... 6 or 7...even at 250 tonnes!

I assume that the flight time in this incident was due to flying at lowest speed possible in order to retain the cowls...??

[Mk 1]

Just your maligned (with good reason seeing some of the comments) SLF here with a Q for those who sit up in the pointy end.

If on the walk around an engine cowl was found to have not been secured, does the pilot secure it himself or bring it to the attention of the ground engineer to be rectified?

I'm guessing the latter?

[LeadSled]

----- aren't "children of the magenta line", by any chance??
Ham Phisted,
Clearly, you are unaware that the above expression is in common use in discussions of increasingly obvious shortcomings in current training systems and some operational systems.

Increasingly, it is obvious that those who know nothing but modern flight decks are showing, all too often, an inability to handle scenarios "outside the box".

In large part, the problem is often operators (and the regulators who approve) with increasingly complex SOPs and a punitive management approach to perceived non-compliance with SOPs. SOPs that are all about company CYA, and quite divorced from any reasonable version of "best practice".

It is a particular problem in Australia, with a regulator (CASA) that demands "Check Lists" that are, in fact, procedures lists, not vital actions check lists, at all. And Flying Operations Inspectors who have no respect for the AFM and the collected experience of the manufacturers, as reflected in the typical modern AFM.

Back to the incident, if the problem in this case turns out to be cowls that were not latched, I do hope that BA engineering and operations take a reasonable approach.

"Off with their heads" is not a reasonable approach. The way Qantas handled VH-OJH going off the end at Bangkok is a good example of how to handle a systemic problem, without destroying anybody's career. There was no shortage of proponents "fire the bastards", but "Reason" prevailed.

Looking through the incident record in the public domain, and the clear design problem of the latches, not limited to being hard to see during a walk-around, it is about time for an AD to fix the problem, once and for all.

Based on the published record, the basic design fails the "Reason" test.

I note that you haven't bothered to address the entirely legitimate examples I raised, where immediate and substantial departures from SOP's saved the day.

[BOAC]

If on the walk around an engine cowl was found to have not been secured - many times in my life I have arrived to 'take' an a/c to find the cowls open as the eng team do something under the bonnet - even to see the process still on-going during the walk-round. In aviation we trust the professionals - the engineers - and rely on them to secure the cowls in this case. I do not 'get out' again and check.

SC - according to an earlier post the a/c night-stopped LHR so that theory can probably go to bed.

[GreekIslandLover]

Video of a British Airways jet burning in the sky overhead London, trailing a plume of thick black smoke, broadcast all over the planet, causing the company untold reputation damage at a time when it can least afford it, and you think it's okay to praise the way 'OUR CREW' handled an 'aircraft emergency' that even you infer may have been self-induced because of a 'sub-standard' pre-flight (we'll know the truth behind this soon enough).

I don't pretend to know anything about the technicalities - I'm SLF. I have read the entire thread, and my observations are:-

We know nothing until the official investigation reports in it's own good time. Speculation is pointless.

Regarding damage to BA's reputation, in my opinion as a passenger it enhances BA's reputation as they have shown on two occasions in recent years that when one of their aircraft develops troubles on takeoff and landing they have been able to bring the aircraft down safely at Heathrow, without loss of life, and in this instance the plane will (I assume) be flying again at some point. I dread to think what could have happened if it had been another airline run on a shoestring budget. So yes, the crew DO deserve praise for that happening no matter what the investigation finds.

[BOAC]

Post #46 any good?

EDIT: For the terminally confused, this and some subsequent posts were in reply to 'Safety Concerns' 'BA Engineering Glasgow' conspiracy theory from which I note he/she has retired 'hurt'

[FlyingEagle21]

G-EUOE

BAW747 seen @ 2013-05-23 18:56 UTC on route from SVG to LHR
BAW746 seen @ 2013-05-23 16:27 UTC on route from LHR to SVG
BAW335P seen @ 2013-05-23 14:07 UTC on route from ORY to LHR
BAW334P seen @ 2013-05-23 11:55 UTC on route from LHR to ORY
BAW991 seen @ 2013-05-23 08:59 UTC on route from TXL to LHR
BAW990G seen @ 2013-05-23 06:17 UTC on route from LHR to TXL

[DaveReidUK]

Loss of one cowl relatively regular event.If you call roughly one a year across the world's entire Airbus narrow-body fleet "regular", then yes. :ugh:

Go back a few more legs and I will be happy.Why?

The suggestion that the aircraft in question completed even one prior flight with the cowls unlatched is ridiculous.

[Epsomdog]

"As all other airlines, BA have a swath of paperwork required by the ANO and EU legislation eventually filtering down via proceedures and work instructions to describing "what should be done" and "how it should be done". All this information is promugulated by the company to satisfy the CAA. But when it comes to trying to comply with these proceedures, it can be neigh on impossible to comply. In the end you knowingly flout the rules to enable the task to be completed in a timely fashion."


ABSOLUTE RUBBISH!

Knowingly flouting the rules is unacceptable, criminal behaviour. If you can't comply with the rules, then you cannot certify a CRS. Next step raise a query note.

Please tell me you don't work for BA.

[F900 Ex]

Yotty
As all other airlines, BA have a swath of paperwork required by the ANO and EU legislation eventually filtering down via proceedures and work instructions to describing "what should be done" and "how it should be done". All this information is promugulated by the company to satisfy the CAA. But when it comes to trying to comply with these proceedures, it can be neigh on impossible to comply. In the end you knowingly flout the rules to enable the task to be completed in a timely fashion.


Wow thats a hell of a statement to place on a public forum.

Would it not be more prudent to discuss issues like that with your management, or use the company SMS procedures.

[Safety Concerns]

ABSOLUTE RUBBISH!

Knowingly flouting the rules is unacceptable, criminal behaviour. If you can't comply with the rules, then you cannot certify a CRS. Next step raise a query note.

Another punter is dreamland. Well done for being so honest yotty. It is the only way to force change. Too many remaining too quiet.

[angels]

BOAC - As I (SLF) read through the weekend's posts on this thread I wanted to raise the point you've made.

Quite a few times I've been on a plane where engineers are working on one of the engines (or at least one cowling has been up). Both pilot and co-pilot having been sitting up front -- the walk around presumably having been done.

The cowlings have been shut and off we go. There comes a point where you surely do have to trust the professionalism of others. Or are you meant to leap out and have a decko?

I assume baggage hold doors which are generally shut minutes or seconds before departure are not subject to being checked because there are warning lights in the cockpit to indicate that something is open.

[LeadSled]

As all other airlines, BA have a swath of paperwork required by the ANO and EU legislation eventually filtering down via proceedures and work instructions to describing "what should be done" and "how it should be done". All this information is promugulated by the company to satisfy the CAA. But when it comes to trying to comply with these proceedures, it can be neigh on impossible to comply. In the end you knowingly flout the rules to enable the task to be completed in a timely fashion. http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/yeees.gif

Folks,
Probably not very well phrased, particularly the "flout the rules", but the fact remains that there has been a vast expansion of very prescriptive regulatory paperwork in recent years, although the basic job to be done had changed little.

Very little of it advances aviation safety. Those of you who see it in "black and white" simplicity do not appreciate the problem.

Indeed, it is very clear (despite being criminal law) that much of the regulation is capable of interpretation to suit the whim of the inspector or investigator. This is not confined to aviation, ever more complicated environmental or taxation law are just two more areas where the problem proliferates.

Australian aviation law has become so complicated, and capable of almost infinite interpretation, that it is a standing joke that, if you become airborne, you must have committed a crime. But it is no joke, when laws are written so that they cannot reasonably be complied with, or you have to break one regulation to comply with another.

We live in an are where we are moving from the "rule of law" to "rule by law". It does nothing for air safety.

[Capot]

In the end you knowingly flout the rules to enable the task to be completed in a timely fashion."

Classic "Human Factors" cause of consequent error. Just shows that almost 10 years of HF training for maintenance staff is as nothing if the organisation is such that this kind of thing is tolerated (at best, or even encouraged (at worst).

The reason that all the training has been wasted, in the UK at least, is that the CAA has, as always, failed to do anything effective to make sure that organisations actually have a good HF programme that highlights issues just like this and then does something to eliminate them. All the average Surveyor wants to see is a neat pile of certificates for HF courses so that he cam tick the box marked "Complies with HF Requirements" while ignoring the fact that the organisation does nothing of the sort.

Now thew CAA has produced one of the most fatuous documents I have ever seen emanating from SRG, about its HF strategy for the next decade, apparently completely independent of EASA and ICAO, full of fluffy management-speak. I pretty much switched off when I got to how we are all going to go on a journey together; that was on Page One, and it gets worse.

There's a glamorous pic of the now-departed Gretchen to decorate this piece of nonsense, but that's all you can say for it.

Sorry, it's not actually thread-drift although it might seem like it. Whatever happened to the flight in question, it is likely that human error was the cause, and the the root cause is the organisational culture, NOT the deliberate flouting of instructions/procedures by any one person. But will anything be done apart from lots of meetings? Don't hold yor breff.

[A and C]

As usual here we get bogged down in paperwork, legislation and SMS systems that are all grist to the mill of those who sit in offices and polish the seat of their trousers while producing reams of paperwork to try to avoid repetition of the incident.

The simplest safety management system starts with having the discipline to step back from a task and take time to review the work done, this can be very difficult when faced with the pressure encountered on a busy line station.

Oversight is another thing that is necessary be it self inspection as above or another person inspection the task. All of this requires common sense........ And that is something that is very hard to write into procedures. ( I know of one company that insists its maintenance staff put on protective glasses when ever they leave the crew room, this is a typical Elf & safety overkill that hampers vision for very little benefit most of the time.......... The eye protection issue should be left to the common sense of the individual when they think that the risk requires such protection)

Totally independent inspection......... That is what the "walk around" inspection by the pilots is about, this should be a broad overview and gross error check.

All of this is of course not posable without the tools to do the job be that time, company culture or external pressure, I have alluded to this in post #295.

[RetiredBA/BY]

Mikleour, Fireflybob:

I am not sure, dont think, the fire handle WAS pulled on WE. When I joined BOAC on the VC 10 it was stressed that there was only ONE way to shut an engine down in the event of fire/failure etc. The drill was always to complete the fire drill upto the point if firing a shot into the engine ( no fire indication, no shot). It was explained that this was the result of the WE accident when there were numerous ways of shutting down an engine, with all crew members involved, and everyone on WE thought someone else had actioned the fire handle. Remember that very clearly even after 40 years.

When my own critical failure arrived (failure of the HP turbine on a v heavy take off for NBO on a v warm night not long after we had passed the 400 feet height, the minimum BA height for any action) everything went like clockwork using that drill and the engine failure became almost a non event.

Perhaps it IS time to fit a warning system on the ecam to advise if cowls are unlocked, even on my car, unless doors are fully closed I get a warning and it won't allow me to engage drive.

[BOAC]

Quite a few times I've been on a plane where engineers are working on one of the engines (or at least one cowling has been up). Both pilot and co-pilot having been sitting up front -- the walk around presumably having been done. - yes

The cowlings have been shut and off we go. There comes a point where you surely do have to trust the professionalism of others. - yes

Or are you meant to leap out and have a decko? - no. This sort of work would normally require a Tech Log entry to clear which the eng would need to come into the cockpit, and you cannot 'accept' the aircraft until the entry is cleared. Nothing to stop you, of course 'leaping out' (ah! - in my younger days.....:hmm:), but if you cause a 'delay' to 'doors closed'/push back you may be asked (by a 'suit') why you did not 'allow' the system to work.

I assume baggage hold doors which are generally shut minutes or seconds before departure are not subject to being checked because there are warning lights in the cockpit to indicate that something is open.- yes

It is all about 'trust' in a team. There are other hatches which may be opened for servicing but have no 'warning system'. I hoped in my time that the pax like you 'trusted' me to operate safely, although admittedly there was a distinct personal incentive so to do as I was going to be in the same aircraft:)

[angels]

BOAC - many thanks for your quick response.

And re trust from your pax, I always recall the words of of a school mate's dad who was a pilot for BEA (blimey, that makes me feel old). "The pilot wants to get home as well!"

[mad_jock]

Something similar in my company's maint manual for engine runs.

Strange thing is if they have a Captain in the LHS they only need one engineer on-board in the RHS.

So I do a lot of engine runs.

[newfoundglory]

Video: Passenger Captures Engine Cover Shattering During Takeoff at NYCAviation (http://www.nycaviation.com/2012/05/video-passenger-captures-engine-cover-shattering-during-takeoff/)

[hec7or]

but if you cause a 'delay' to 'doors closed'/push back you may be asked (by a 'suit') why you did not 'allow' the system to work.

I have myself been on the receiving end of exactly that kind of phone call as a result of a U/T captain going back outside to confirm that de icing had been completed correctly, but the dispatcher noting the entire delay as "crew".

Safety seems to be way down the list of priorities nowadays.

[BOAC]

the dispatcher noting the entire delay as "crew". - how else would his/her family have any turkey to eat at Christmas....................?:) (Rumour alert.....!)

[DaveReidUK]

Video: Passenger Captures Engine Cover Shattering During Takeoff at NYCAviation (http://www.nycaviation.com/2012/05/video-passenger-captures-engine-cover-shattering-during-takeoff/)Interesting that during these events it usually seems to be the outboard cowl door that departs first, close to rotation (and hence normally found on the runway), followed soon afterwards by the inboard one, presumably as a result of the differing airflow characteristics either side of the nacelle.

[CF6-80 C2B2F]

One of the greatest improvements lately in relation to flight(and medical) safety is the Non-Punitive Culture Philosophy. That is probably alsowhy both the FAA and EASA have included it in their texts.

Luckily a major part of the armchair-and-MS-FS foundedPPRUNE’ers are not involved with SMS, as we would probably have never been ableto evolve from the “Bad Apple” attitude that is so easy to apply. History showsthat it doesn’t solve any safety issues but heck… at least it provides the basic non-educatedpart of the population with a culprit to hang – preferably in public.

A lot of the self-appointed judges seem to forget that noneof us get up in the morning with the determination to screw up our jobs badly enoughto become part of the evening news.

We all want to return safely to our families. With that inmind we can start working on the systems and procedures needed to fix theproblem.

I once travelled a short leg with the nose gear extended.

The aircraft had non-standard, without my knowledge, beenmoved during the day to free the parking spot. For that, gear pins had beeninstalled. During external inspection I missed the fact that a pin was forgottenin the nose gear, partly perhaps because the “remove before flight” streamerwas worn and very short.

Standard decision could be to throw out the mechanic forforgetting the pin, and me for not performing my inspection thoroughly enough.

After analyzing a couple of similar incidents it was decidedthat gear pins and pitot covers needed a logbook entry. Since then it has neverhappened again.

Executing me, and all the next guys :mad: up wouldn’t havesolved anything.

[newfoundglory]

On the BA flight, it was said that the cowling hit the fuselage after becoming detached. On that video, you can also hear it hitting something...

Should we be expecting an AAIB interim report by Friday?

[Lord Spandex Masher]

- how else would his/her family have any turkey to eat at Christmas....................?:) (Rumour alert.....!)

Ooooh naughty boy! Everyone knows all delays go down to "crew procedures". 67 isn't it?

[A and C]

Other departments in airlines have their priorities and have to be paying attention to them, flight crew and maintenance staff have flight safety at the top of their list............... Defending flight safety is what you are paid to do and the occasional clash of priorities is inevitable when dealing with staff who don't have the big flight safety picture that is available to pilots and maintenance staff.

It is the way you deal with these incidents is what matters, it is your choice to turn the incident into an interdepartmental bun fight or try to educate them to be more proactive towards flight safety.......... I prefer the latter option.

[HEATHROW DIRECTOR]

And the crew blame ATC - SOP surely?

[Basil]

And the crew blame ATC - SOP surely?
No, no; we'd never do that ;)

[TURIN]

A final element that has not been mentioned yet is the chap who mans the headset during pushback. It used to be a Mech/Tech/Eng. It is now an appropriatly trained individual who, depending on the operator/ground handling agent, may have years or only hours of experience.
On of their tasks prior to push back is to do a walk round to ensure all doors and hatches are secure.
I'm wondering if all the hire and fire brigade will want their head on a plate too.

[frequentflyer2]

As simple SLF I don't want anyone's head on a plate. All I want is to be sure when I board an A319 or A320 operated by BA or any other airline, these bits of the engines are not going to fly off and hit some vital piece of the tail, sending me and everyone else onboard into a quick dive to eternity. I used to have a boss who said the most important thing to do when any mistake was made, was not to apportion blame, but to ensure procedures were put in place to prevent such a mistake being repeated.
Couldn't a system be introduced whereby someone has to tick a box and sign their name beside it to say they've checked to ensure these bits of the engines are securely in position before the aircraft leaves its stand. This would ensure a manual check was made before each and every flight.

[DaveReidUK]

Should we be expecting an AAIB interim report by Friday?It would be very unusual for the AAIB to issue either an Initial or Interim Report other than in the case of a fatal accident (for example the Bond Super Puma) or a complex investigation (such as BAW38).

This

Air Accidents Investigation: Deployment to Heathrow 24/05/13 (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/latest_news/deployment_to_heathrow_24_05_13.cfm)

is likely to be all we see until the investigation is complete.

[diginagain]

This would ensure a manual check was made before each and every flight. No it wouldn't, it would simply show that a box had been ticked.

[Jazz Hands]

On the BA flight, it was said that the cowling hit the fuselage after becoming detached

There are white marks along the lower rear fuselage on both sides - don't know if that's scuffing from debris, or just regular wear-and-tear.

[FERetd]

frequentflyer2, Quote:- "Couldn't a system be introduced whereby someone has to tick a box and sign their name beside it to say they've checked to ensure these bits of the engines are securely in position before the aircraft leaves its stand. This would ensure a manual check was made before each and every flight."

Such a system is already in place and is more robust than a tick in the box, as mentioned by diginagain. However, I have never seen the system in use for engine cowlings, but it could work like this:-

A defect is entered in the Aircraft Technical Log to the effect that the engine cowlings have been opened.
When the cowlings have been closed and checked secure a statement to that effect is entered into the rectification part of the Aircraft Technical Log. The engineer or inspector responsible signs for the rectification , along with his/her licence or approval number and a new Certificate of Release is signed.

This is pretty much how defects are managed - varies a bit from one Operator to another.

It does require the maintenance staff to retrieve the Aircraft Technical Log from the cockpit or the line office to make this entry and as we have read and I have witnessed, they are usually pressed for time.

It is just a thought, though.

[spannersatcx]

the AMM will stipulate at the beginning of the task, open cowls IAW.... and at the end of the task it would be something like close cowls iaw AMM.... Therefore when the task is signed for in the tech log iaw AMM.... the closing and securing of the cowls is covered.
It would be rare to have a statement in the log to say fan cowls opened, please close.

interesting article especially page 16 on.....closing cowls! (http://www.ukfsc.co.uk/files/Safety%20Briefings%20_%20Presentations/Airbus%20Safety%20First%20Mag%20-%20July%202012.pdf) :sad:

[Lonewolf_50]

I'd happily inconvenience the Queen, the Prime Minister, the President of the USA, or face the wrath of Naomi Campbell, rather than compromise the safety of the dustman in seat 48C.

That's my job! Others have their jobs, and their responsibilities.


:D

In a nutshell, that's what gets people home in one piece. :ok:

[lomapaseo]

It would be very unusual for the AAIB to issue either an Initial or Interim Report other than in the case of a fatal accident (for example the Bond Super Puma) or a complex investigation (such as BAW38).


All true except where there is an immediate safety interest beyond the affected parties as demonstrated in the case of multiple pages on PPRUNE !

Perhaps somebody should send an E-mail to the AAIB asking for a prelim summary before their next rostered flight.

[EEngr]

the AMM will stipulate at the beginning of the task, open cowls IAW.... and at the end of the task it would be something like close cowls iaw AMM....That will work if there is only one task being conducted inside the cowl. Once they are opened, its possible that several maintenance items will be taken care of. Each MM procedure will have an 'open cowl' and 'close cowl' step. But if you've finished your work and there is another task or two under way, you'll be leaving the cowl open. Whoever is finishing up the last task may not have been the person who opened the cowl in the first place. And they might not know whether anyone else is still working in that area.

So, log books (or other records) need to be used to track all out of configuration changes. And there needs to be a process wherein all such changes are accounted for before the aircraft is released from maintenance.

[Thunderbirdsix]

GreekIslandLover

I dread to think what could have happened if it had been another airline run on a shoestring budget. So yes, the crew DO deserve praise for that happening no matter what the investigation finds.


What a load of rubbish so any pilots flying on a shoestring budget can you tell us which airlines they are, would have gone straight in with out trying to save the aircraft, the mind boggles with some of the posts here :ugh:

[FERetd]

Spannersatcx, surely this rather depends on why the cowlings were opened in the first place. If it was for a maintenance task, I agree with what you say.

As a F/E I could enter a defect into the Aircraft Technical Log for anything about which I was unhappy e.g. No.1 engine cowlings open. It is then up to you, the licenced engineer to clear the defect.
You could do the same.

Many (minor) defects are cleared without reference to the AMM.