AF447 final crew conversation - Thread No. 1 [Archive]

TheShadow

14th Oct 2011, 00:01

AlphaZuluRomeo

14th Oct 2011, 00:42

Gentlemen, there already is an AF447 thread (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/460625-af-447-thread-no-6-a.html) in the tech log. ;)
Mods, if you merge topics, feel free to erase this as well :ok:

bubbers44

14th Oct 2011, 01:13

I know they were new pilots but why couldn't they figure out what was happening to them? pulling back for 3 and a half minutes goes against all of our survival instincts.

Burnswannabe

14th Oct 2011, 01:24

Gentlemen, as a former military pilot who has had the benefit of a surfeit of sim instructors who love to play the “he’s doing ok, but how would he cope with this…..” game, I can only stand back and be glad I did not experience these confusing events for real. However, I find it difficult to understand the misidentification of the stall, I can remember trying to setup many a stalling sequence only to have the first indication of the stall being the high rate of descent with no other definite signs other than my own expectation due to control inputs.

I admit I am lucky, I have only flown older aircraft that do not have modern automation, I have not had to sacrifice physical feedback to the demands of efficiency, but perhaps, even given erroneous readouts, the pilots should have had enough overall awareness of there situation that a stall should have been self evident. If the throttles are back and you are losing height then who cares if the system says pull up, it is nose forward and power on time …..

I know that I speak from a legacy viewpoint but the current fear that manual flying skills will atrophy as systems take more of a role appears to be valid. Until recently I would have been of the opinion that that the perseverance of inclusion of human fallibility in the flying system was detrimental to overall safety, now I sit confused; there is now doubt that increased automation has improved safety but the major accidents I can think of recently, in the western world, have been in spite of automation or directly/indirectly caused by it.

Perhaps we need, as an industry and as a fraternity, to invest more in operator input at the design stage. Perhaps all pilots under training should make themselves available for 2 weeks of simulator testing at industry expense, not for the benefits of the pilots but for the benefit of the designers, let them see what an inexperienced pilot will do, not a 20,000 hr test pilot would. It is oh so easy to sit in the sim expecting trouble but it is rare in life to find ourselves outside of the norms. I am not criticising modern training techniques, I am certainly not suggesting we go back to fully manual control systems, rather, I suggest that we all need to spend more time in the sim being surprised as opposed to just knocking out the stats, even if this means more expense. Longer scenarios and more insidious errors combined with long scenarios with sudden error would be useful although I would never suggest a reduction in the current training, this would be as well as not instead of.

Thoughts?

Intruder

14th Oct 2011, 02:09

Lyman

14th Oct 2011, 02:11

Confusion came from entering an unknown land, a regime of which there was no knowledge, least of all experience. The accident began when the autopilot stopped. Perhaps some several seconds earlier. The Shadow, as is his wont, has laid it out explicitly.

The only aircraft system that may have had a part to play in the Stall was the THS, and it is completely unknown if the crew could have recovered with the Trim Back at 3. I think they could have, but they should not have climbed at the outset, and that climb is not well understood.

I am sorry this has leaked out, after the apex of the climb, nothing of value is to be captured by reading their last few comments.

If under some circumstances an aircraft can STALL whilst carrying passengers, it needs to be trained, not ignored, at the altar of self serving "mastery" of the craft. We are all buffoons, some more culpable than others, but it is an industry abdication of responsibilty that this happened.

dlcmdrx

14th Oct 2011, 04:59

So there was an aurall warning of pull up during the descent??

Locked door

14th Oct 2011, 06:47

Of course there was, from the GPWS as they closed in on the sea. Nothing to do with Fly By Wire and probably too low to recover from a stall by then anyway.

BOAC

14th Oct 2011, 07:24

e. autorotational wing-drop trends are "managed" by the flight control system - so there is no "give the game away" tendency towards spin entry. - I am puzzled by this - do you know that for sure? I cannot believe the software was designed to REVERSE aileron response OR apply rudder in a fully stalled condition? I would have expected the 'managed' response (if there was one) to worsen the wing drop.

Croqueteer

14th Oct 2011, 09:00

:confused:n
Now retired and never having flown fly by wire, I still wonder if the mode of operation of the side-stick contributed. With a traditional column if it is back past a certain point the wing is stalled, and it is pretty obvious that the a/c is being held in a stall, ie the stick position gives a idea of attitude.

4468

14th Oct 2011, 09:40

These words should never have been made public. What on earth is the point??

Just so ghouls and idiots like amos can pontificate in the luxury of utter ignorance?? In all my years of flying, I have learned that people like amos are EXACTLY the kind of person you never want to be at the controls. Whether you are sitting next to them, or down the back! (He doesn't even know it's possible to stall an A320 in normal law. The type he claims to fly!!:rolleyes:)

Deepest sympathies to all affected.

windytoo

14th Oct 2011, 09:44

Burnswannabe, possibly the most erudite and sensible post on this subject. Unfortunately due to cost it will never be implemented. Pax will not pay realistic prices for a ticket and a huge proportion of modern pilots would never reach the required standard to leave the simulator, leading to massive pilot shortages. Even with the current recruiting and training systems too many people with genuine natural flying ability and enthusiasm never get near an aeroplane.

in my last airline

14th Oct 2011, 10:12

I believe that self regulation in the Training dept is not the way forward. It's too self serving. Some depts are ineffective due to an old boys club feel where checkers are 'looking after' their buddies regardless of their output. Others are quite happy to accept minimum standards with no wish to spend any extra cash on more education, whilst other depts are simply inept and are run by politicians that were never any good in the right seat never mind the main training management positions. The way forward is for an externally delivered LPC (regulator) every 3 yrs covering all the normal items plus any number of potential items. Let's get back to 'hard, firm and fair' training and checking.

Skipskatta

14th Oct 2011, 10:16

Burnswannabe: "If the throttles are back and you are losing height then who cares if the system says pull up, it is nose forward and power on time ….."

Is it that simple?

BOAC

14th Oct 2011, 10:31

Indeed - it is a strange quote and could confuse some Flt Sim folk:hmm:

wet vee two

14th Oct 2011, 10:38

Ok children, back to the topic with one question for all?
How often have you all practiced unusual attitude/unreliable airspeed scenarios?

Please go on right now and without looking it up, answer to yourself with honesty, at what indications you will have during climb or any flight regime due to a blocked pitot tube, or static port or a combination of both.
How would you recognise it and how would you manage it?The size of a modern flight deck, the eyes have a long distance to travel across all instruments and make the right right diagnosis in such a pressured situation with coupled with the vast data available.

So its easy to sit in your comfy chair and slate the actions of others forgetting that we are all human and often enough react just the same!

(except for amos2 and mates of course 'cause they are super humans)

Recognising one's own deficiencies(or telling the truth) are the most difficult of all demands that face adult humans.

Loose rivets

14th Oct 2011, 10:44

Gentlemen, there already is an AF447 thread in the tech log.
Mods, if you merge topics, feel free to erase this as well

I fell this thread started out very well. It's very specific to one aspect and time-band of the accident. There have been two superb posts - some points I didn't agree with, but they had me thinking, which is what it's all about. However, other points really were thought-provoking.

My comment about transparency. It would be ideal to let concerned professionals know those last words, while not allowing them to stab at the sensibilities of families and friends. It really is important we know - those words reveal so much.

I've mentioned this before, but there must have been an absence, or at least a major reduction, of white noise. Ten degrees or more nose up would have had me feeling uneasy, but had been coupled with the kind if silence they must have been in, I would like to think I'd have taken that into account as a major factor. Remember, by now they must have known much of their normal information was suspect, and should have been looking outside the box for other clues. The cockpit noise from way back on the drag-curve, to a good flying speed is chalk and cheese.

BOAC

14th Oct 2011, 10:52

The 'new' quoted 'lines' add nothing to the pot over the 4000' quote except to confirm that even the Captain did not appear to recognise a stalled situation which should be another cause for concern in AF.

Loose rivets

14th Oct 2011, 10:54

w v t I was being checked by a very experienced Viscount captain, when we suddenly got a crazy airspeed indication. His reaction was to pitch down so hard passengers touched the ceiling. Hard-wired brains can be as dangerous as badly written software.

BOAC. I'm not at all sure about that. Getting into the minds of aircrew is something not really covered by ordinary training and so-called CRM. Trying to feel what they felt, and then understand why they didn't react in the way we'd expect, is a vital part of learning. It may well not alter the facts, but will hopefully aid enlightenment.

Huck

14th Oct 2011, 11:16

We do practice erroneous air data indications.

The solution is to manage the triangle of Pitch / Power / Airspeed. Power can be obtained by charts in the QRH. Or you can just set it somewhere in the middle.

But I have found, the best solution to unreliable indications is to use the flight path vector. Just put it on the horizon, set a normal power setting and you're golden. When it is time for the approach just put it 3 degrees below the horizon. No idea why this isn't taught.

BOAC

14th Oct 2011, 12:03

Getting into the minds of aircrew - there's no need for 'psychology' here - it is plain as the nose on your face that at 4000' the Captain had not absorbed from the clues that they were fully stalled. THAT is the area of concern I am expressing here.

Huck - without trawling through the immense quantity of pages on all the threads, are you sure the FPV was available and visible? No-one should have to rely on a computer generated FPV symbol in order to fly an aircraft with working 3 x attitude indications.

rudderrudderrat

14th Oct 2011, 13:26

Hi BOAC,
I cannot believe the software was designed to REVERSE aileron response OR apply rudder in a fully stalled condition? I would have expected the 'managed' response (if there was one) to worsen the wing drop.
You are correct. There is no software control reversal.

Once the wing was stalled, any aileron deflection downwards would have increased drag and yawed the aircraft, causing a roll the wrong way (due sweep). Fortunately the secondary effect of dihedral levelled the wings.

Gums explained it from his experience in Viper days.

are you sure the FPV was available and visible?
When the FPV (Bird) was turned on, the 10,000 ft/min rate of descent probably caused it to be out of view below the visible part of the PFD.

The training philosophy of manual flying on the AB is either with the FDs on or FDs off & Bird on. There is very little exposure to basic raw data flying - because it's expected to have both of those aids available.

I agree with your final comment and I hope it will be a recommendation to practice basic flying skills again (without the use of FD or Bird) - like it used to be in the old days.

punkalouver

14th Oct 2011, 15:04

Can someone post the entire transcript please.

oldchina

14th Oct 2011, 15:07

Only the BEA has the entire transcript.

punkalouver

14th Oct 2011, 15:17

Not anymore it would seem.

Diamond Bob

14th Oct 2011, 15:25

What did the other crews do when their pitots were blocked? Supposedly this occurred 32 times on A330s and A340s before AF 447, but I've never seen any accounts as to how this was handled in those situations.

Northbeach

14th Oct 2011, 15:42

Can someone post the entire transcript please.No, not for years-decades maybe. "Entire transcript" maybe never.

The lawyers prevent that, (accident investigation protocol, past practice and "agreements", all the usual important sounding terms, that tell most of the rest of us to get lost) powerful corporations and even nations have a vested interest in the outcome. It doesn't matter whether it is Boeing or Airbus; European Union or the United States.

I have no inside knowledge or opinion regarding AF447. As far as I am concerned Airbus makes a wonderful airplane and AF pilots are among the best in the world.

If one controls the information one can control or greatly influence the decision or opinion held by others. Few entities want the TRUTH, most want a favorable outcome (from their prospective); after all so much is at risk. The TRUTH can be embarrassing, painful, awkward and horrendously expensive. (This is not the position I advocate, just my "take" on how the world of business, commerce, religion and politics works.)

The accident investigation will run its course over time. The professional pilot community will have to learn what we can from it. Is it a perfect system; no far from it. From a transparency and a honest effort to learn perspective, what we have in aviation is probably better than what is available in many other industries .

No; none of us here on PPRuNe are going to get the entire transcript released for our reading, entertainment and pontification benefit.

DozyWannabe

14th Oct 2011, 15:52

Read the other thread guys - this is *not* the complete transcript. The BEA transcript contains the flight-relevant conversation on the CVR only. This publication apparently adds some non-relevant words (for the sake of sensationalism) and actually leaves out some of the flight-relevant conversation, the better to push the side of the story being argued.

Come on, this is a Daily Mail article - sensationalism at the expense of accuracy is their stock-in-trade.

ATC Watcher

14th Oct 2011, 16:12

Northbeach. While I do not disagree with you on your brillant analysis of the world we live in , there is a new factor coming in : the small black thing everyone now carries in his pocket that can not only take photos , but also record anything discretely and e-mail it to the outside in seconds. That is changing drastically the picture and keeping somethiing confidential today is becoming a serious challenge.

On this perticular topic a few days ago, a book ( in French ) by JP Otelli ( a well known French Aviation author) has released the (almost) AF447 full CVR . I suspect the UK article linked in this thread is based on that book.
The transcript in the book has also the audio warnings added, and that is interesting.

One Outsider

14th Oct 2011, 16:20

Once a CVR was a tool for investigators. Now it is a source for entertainment and pandering to rubberneckers.

It stinks.

Mr Optimistic

14th Oct 2011, 16:46

Anyone know how this sort of information stands with respect to the Freedom of Information act and its kin ?

jackharr

14th Oct 2011, 16:53

I am sure this has been covered before but it’s been a very long thread (threads).

Had the deep stall been recognised at say 30,000 feet, was recovery possible? Or was the situation akin to the BAC 1-11 deep stall crash or the Gloster Javelin fighter when recovery was just not possible from a stall?

Jack

DozyWannabe

14th Oct 2011, 17:01

If the throttles are back and you are losing height then who cares if the system says pull up, it is nose forward and power on time …..

With the important caveat that in jets with a podded and wing-mounted engine design, increasing thrust will cause a pitch-up that must be monitored and corrected if necessary.

I know that I speak from a legacy viewpoint but the current fear that manual flying skills will atrophy as systems take more of a role appears to be valid.

What bothers me is that this was not the intent of the designers, but something that has been assumed by airline management over the last 20 years.

Perhaps we need, as an industry and as a fraternity, to invest more in operator input at the design stage. Perhaps all pilots under training should make themselves available for 2 weeks of simulator testing at industry expense, not for the benefits of the pilots but for the benefit of the designers, let them see what an inexperienced pilot will do, not a 20,000 hr test pilot would.

Both Airbus and Boeing did just that when they developed their more recent ranges - contrary to what appears to be received wisdom, the A320 was not developed in a vacuum with management and engineers making all the decisions. The problem here is that the PF in this case appears to have done something that would be anathema to any pilot that had undergone stall training, which was to pull up and hold the stick back both prior and during the stall warning.

@jackharr - No one is willing to state it definitively, but the consensus on the threads seems to be that all the crew had to do at 30,000 feet was push the stick forward and recovery was in all likelihood possible.

Mr Optimistic

14th Oct 2011, 17:08

Jack, yes it has been on the other thread. Helluva job finding it though. Opinions differed, some , I think, optimistic to 10k feet. Others doubtful through 30.

Clandestino

14th Oct 2011, 19:32

Is mr. Otelli's latest book available in hardcover? :hmm:

Ashling

14th Oct 2011, 19:58

Remember they were in alternate law so roll was in "Direct Law" therefore no aircraft induced correction of wing drop.

The crew failed to recover the aircraft because they failed to diagnose why they were out of control. They died not knowing what had gone wrong. To me its surreal that they could not recognise the stall but it would seem that the situation was beyond their training, experience and competence. How could they be allowed to be in command of a commercial jet in that environment when they didn't possess the skills required to cope when it all went wrong?

Automation has allowed corners to be cut in pilot experience, training and supervision. The more sophisticated the automation the more streamlined the training becomes. The crew may well be found culpable but they were products of a system and it is that system that is at fault every bit as much if not more than the crew.

Lonewolf_50

14th Oct 2011, 20:20

Robert: 'Damn it! We’re going to crash. It can’t be true!'
Bonin: 'But what’s happening?!'
If those are indeed the last two things spoken in the cockpit, Bonin's frustrated question needs to be trace back to its root cause. Until that is done, thoroughly, this crash teaches the industry nothing.
(Besides the already known axiom that pitch and power results in performance ... which the industry would hopefully already know.)

DC-ATE

14th Oct 2011, 20:33

jackharr-
Had the deep stall been recognised at say 30,000 feet, was recovery possible?

Don't know about this particular type of aircraft, but recovery from a deep stall is possible [from 10000 feet above ground] in a 737-200. Been there, done that !! No problem.

Lonewolf_50

14th Oct 2011, 20:40

The trick to recovering from a stall is to first recognize being in a stall, or entering one.

That critical step never seems to have been reached. :uhoh:

DozyWannabe

14th Oct 2011, 20:48

...powerful corporations and even nations have a vested interest in the outcome. It doesn't matter whether it is Boeing or Airbus; European Union or the United States.

I'm not sure that's much of a factor in this case to be honest. If we were talking about a new airliner that the manufacturer had bet the company - and by extension the aerospace industry of the host nation(s) to produce, then it might be a factor (although experience has shown that the truth tends to out in the end, just ask the former board of McDonnell-Douglas).

But we're not - the A330 is already a successful airliner. It has been flying for 20 years, recouped it's costs years ago and has been proven to be as safe as pretty much any contemporary airliner you care to name, safer than the previous generation to a noticeable degree - and a large majority of the pilots who fly it speak very highly of it. In terms of legal responsibility, Airbus are already partially in the frame because of the pitot tube issues - there's no question that they will shoulder some responsibility so there's nothing to be gained by hiding anything at this point.

IMO the reason that the data in the report cannot be entirely unexpurgated is not because of any nefarious desire to protect any of the players involved, because the French government is going to be on the hook to pay out either way. It is because the report should only deal with the factors relevant to the conduct of the flight - which this book seems to contravene. There is nothing to be gained scientifically or in terms of aircraft safety by publishing lurid details of how confused and scared the crew were in those last few minutes, and I think even those trying to argue for the release of raw FDR data would agree with me there.

wwittonnless

14th Oct 2011, 21:06

There's no mystery to any of this. The current generation of pilots being churned out can't actually fly, or will they ever be able to .They have had no practice or will they ever get any.

DozyWannabe

14th Oct 2011, 21:15

Don't know about this particular type of aircraft, but recovery from a deep stall is possible [from 10000 feet above ground] in a 737-200. Been there, done that !! No problem.

Were you trans-oceanic in night IMC in the middle of patches of turbulence? I'm pretty sure you wouldn't consider it "no problem" if you had been.

Lyman

14th Oct 2011, 21:23

Believe it or not, Dozy, the conditions for 447 do not mitigate their performance. One knows, or one doesn't. DC-ATE is right. Good bad or indifferent, it shouldn't make any difference. To try to soften their foulup is a wheeze. If the conditions were sudden onset, or out of the ordinary, fine, some slack.

None is given. Eyes wide open, no room to hide. No excuses.

Stick to Computers.

Loose rivets

14th Oct 2011, 21:23

Don't know about this particular type of aircraft, but recovery from a deep stall is possible [from 10000 feet above ground] in a 737-200. Been there, done that !! No problem.

Is the Boeing 737 subject to true deep stalls?

PuraVidaTransport

14th Oct 2011, 21:43

IMO, the last few seconds of the CVR doesn't impact the 'why' or 'how' of this accident and is therefore irrelevant to the investigation outcome. Below 4000ft. they were obviously scared and in a state of panic. What would interest me is the time from departure to AP cutoff (dependent on length of the CVR which was reported to be over two hours in Interim Report #3) to answer the following questions:
1) During the early portion of the flight, were standard procedures followed including the mandated checklists, challenge/reply etc?
2) Did they follow all rules/regulations concerning a Sterile Cockpit (or would those apply to an Air France flight outside the U.S.)?
3) How did they use CRM in the early stages of the flight versus the abomination we see in the transcripts of the last 4 minutes?
4) Complete discussions on weather, route diversions, radar etc.
5) Any abnormal 'glitches' with the aircraft earlier in the flight.
6) Leadership by the Captain including delegation of responsibilities and if there was a professional environment in the cockpit or just a laissez-faire attitude.
7) Did the PF have any trouble remembering standard checklists early in the flight?

This is the one place I feel BEA isn't being totally forthcoming. They know these things are vital to the investigation but have refused to put the transcripts from early in the flight into the record. IMO, when you are dealing with an accident where the obvious cause is pilot error caused by poor training, the performance of those pilots earlier in the flight is VERY relevant.

DC-ATE

14th Oct 2011, 22:41

DozyWannabe-
Were you trans-oceanic in night IMC in the middle of patches of turbulence?

Well, we weren't trans-oceanic, but it was night, solid IMC.

-------------

Loose rivets-
Is the Boeing 737 subject to true deep stalls?

No, this was a training flight.

software_developer

14th Oct 2011, 22:46

From reading the available transcripts I get the feeling that the software played a role in disorienting the pilots.

My understanding is that as the pilots approached zero forward air speed, there was an audible alarm, but once the pilots achieved something near zero forward air speed the stall warning was silenced.

From then on, the warning was inverted. Pushing forward on the stick (and causing the plane to recover some air speed) caused the stall warnings to sound again. Pull back, the warnings are silenced.

Was this a contributing cause of the cabin confusion?

Loose rivets

14th Oct 2011, 22:49

That slips to the side of the question. Is the B 737 subject to true deep stalls?

You see, were dealing with an aircraft that was mushing down, probably not due to some tendency to enter a true deep stall, but because man or machine (computer) was holding it into something resembling a deep stall.

I've slogged away at this question since the threads (plural) started. They have I think, been ignored, and the same reverence to deeps stalls keeps reappearing.

jcjeant

14th Oct 2011, 22:52

Hi,

DW
There is nothing to be gained scientifically or in terms of aircraft safety by publishing lurid details of how confused and scared the crew were in those last few minutes, and I think even those trying to argue for the release of raw FDR data would agree with me there. I think the opposite
The full transcript is very important
Every word and every action counts, not just fragments of the 4 minutes
Moreover, the BEA is certainly a very busy analyzing (the panel human factors) the entire transcript (or at least the entire record available)
They will also certainly lead survey (if the BEA is serious investigation office) for the time schedule of the crew during the stop over in Brazil
All this as the result of an image of the state of mind .. rest and the seriousness of this crew
The last 4 minutes of the CVR show the result of the expertise of these pilots
This expertise has been acquired not a minute before disconnection of the AP
We must go back very far to examine the past of those pilots .. and then .. hours before the flight and flight hours after the departure of Rio are very important

DozyWannabe

14th Oct 2011, 22:53

@PuraVidaTransport:

The Interim Report No. 3 summarises the conduct of the flight and the crew perfectly adequately by the standards of any modern accident investigation report I've read.

In short, it states that nothing out of the ordinary was observed during the earlier portion of the flight with either the crew or the aircraft. No-one bar the crew entered the flight deck, nothing untoward happened with the aircraft. The only question mark over CRM concerns the apparent lack of specific role delegation when the Captain summoned the PNF in order to take his rest period, and the implication seems to have been that the Captain left the PF (junior F/O) in charge. This may or may not have affected the PNF's decision making during the accident sequence, but to me his apparent concern with getting the Captain back ASAP indicates that he felt his options were limited. Weather was clearly being discussed prior to the PNF's arrival (which is included in the BEA's transcript) and continued to be discussed with the PNF present prior to the accident sequence.

Because nothing out of the ordinary happened prior to the accident sequence, it is unlikely that the PF would have had trouble recalling memory items, as they are both rote and routine. Emergency memory items are a completely different case.

Loose rivets

14th Oct 2011, 22:57

Well, I've made my feelings clear. The psychology has to be dissected, just as a pathologist would dissect a cadaver - no part left unopened just because it might offend someone.

had trouble recalling memory items, as they are both rote and routine. Emergency memory items are a completely different case.

I don't know how long rote and routine checklist would have applied. the flying was fairly routine, though getting demanding, by the time checklists would have become appropriate, I think the slew of confusing data would have made them next to worthless. They needed to be calling on some sound airmanship in the relatively early stages.

OK465

14th Oct 2011, 23:01

Night, IMC stall training? :eek:

Where do we find such men?

(737 Max AOA with the column held full aft in a stall is somewhere around 17 degrees. FPV (if selected) never leaves the PFD pitch scale, however the HUD (if so equipped) FPV will drop to the bottom of the HUD FOV and be 'ghosted'.)

DC-ATE

14th Oct 2011, 23:11

OK465-
Night, IMC stall training?

Ya...sounds like fun doesn't it? It wouldn't have been a problem except for ICE. The 737-200 did NOT have tail de-ice capability. I tried to explain our early stall indications to the instructor but it took the 'deep stall' to convince him. I looked over at him as we were falling after following the 'book' recovery procedure and he just did NOT know what to do. I merely pulled the throttles [excuse me; thrust levers] back, nose dropped, and I pulled out of it no problem.

But.....we digress.

DozyWannabe

14th Oct 2011, 23:15

Well, I've made my feelings clear. The psychology has to be dissected, just as a pathologist would dissect a cadaver - no part left unopened just because it might offend someone.

I agree absolutely, and I'm sure once the Human Factors team have done their work, they will release the necessary information, along with relevant excerpts of any available transcript.

The BEA have effectively said not to expect a final report until the middle of next year at the earliest, which suggests to me that they are indeed taking it very seriously. I'm not sure if people have got into their heads the idea that the investigation and release of material stops with the release of the last interim report, given some of what I'm reading here...

I don't know how long rote and routine checklist would have applied. the flying was fairly routine, though getting demanding, by the time checklists would have become appropriate, I think the slew of confusing data would have made them next to worthless. They needed to be calling on some sound airmanship in the relatively early stages.

Again, agreed totally. I was just attempting to point out that the ability or otherwise of the PF to recall routine memory checklists earlier in the flight (that the BEA have said nothing was amiss implies he had no problem) would have little to no bearing on his ability to recall emergency checklists.

OK465

14th Oct 2011, 23:37

Night, IMC stall training in ICING conditions. :eek::eek:

17 degrees AOA is not a "deep stall" nor a persistent one. Are you referring to a "full" stall as opposed to "deep stall"?

DC-ATE

14th Oct 2011, 23:45

Well, IMHO, it was a DEEP stall.

PuraVidaTransport

14th Oct 2011, 23:57

Dozy
My point was IF the PF had any problems with those well-used checklists, even a momentary lapse in responding, it would indicate to me he had problems with remembering checklists, especially emergency procedures which he rarely, if ever, used.
I'm having trouble finding where the BEA said everything was normal or that no one besides the crew entered the cockpit. I did find, in the Interim report 3 where the cockpit door was opened and closed several times and had been left open for "some time on several occasions" (page 25, English version).
This one example goes to the core of my previous argument. I may be wrong, but I doubt opening the cockpit door "several times" and the having "it stayed open for some time on several occasions" is standard procedure for Air France these days.
This one small notation from the BEA tells me the pilots were not following standard procedures with regard to the security of the cockpit door so what other procedures did they ignore. Without the CVR transcript release, we may not know.
My questions in this regard come from the Colgan 3407 investigation where the earlier parts of the CVR were instumental in establishing a cause, not just what happened in the last few minutes.
I too think that once the Final Report is ready, many of these questions will be answered but a release of the first part of the CVR shouldn't harm anyone or the memory of the pilots as it should have been just 'another day at the office' for them.

HPSOV L

15th Oct 2011, 03:04

They were an average crew on an average day. Maybe even above "average" when you consider their experience and the fact that they continued to try to understand the problem and regain control all the way down. Its not like it was just one pilot who couldn't figure it out; it was a sample of three.
Statistically then it is likely that most of the posters on this forum, thrown into the exact same circumstances, would also end up in the ocean. And I include myself in that, hand flying skills and all..

rmac

15th Oct 2011, 05:10

I think that software developer in post 50 not only brings us back to a major causal factor, but also explains it in a perfectly understandable way that for me makes it potentially the most important factor in the accident.

The stall warner was "inverted" or you could say reversed. Surely having a reversed/inverted stall warning in a night stall situation with unreliable indications will generate the same potentialy fatal conclusion as discovering (or in fact not discovering) that you have reversed aeliron controls as you correct a roll tendency at 200ft on departure ??

ManaAdaSystem

15th Oct 2011, 07:44

How do Airbus crew train stall recovery?
Generally speaking.

lyo

15th Oct 2011, 07:54

Hi all
Had a conversation with an AI FE. He told me about a test flight last summer.
3 test pilots, an air asia 330 And a flight test program. Vmc day light over the Jay of Biscaye in a dedicated flight test area.
This guys reconfigured the lad in alternate 2, stable fl 350, zoomed to fl380, entered a Stall. It developed into a deep Stall. No information about ths position though.
Eventually, they recovered at ...6000ft... As the elevator authority was lost, deep Stall, they found themselves powerless using standard techniques to recover from it. A rudder input induced a spin which Led to a dive And our test pilots recovered This tricky Stall. These guys reported that they felt the end was near...
I hope the live feed he witnessed that day Will be Made available for all pilots to learn from guys who were prepared And trained for that event.

BOAC

15th Oct 2011, 08:04

We are getting a bit confused here between 'full stall' and 'deep stall' I think, and in the case of 447 it was being held in a (amazingly stable) full stall (not a 'deep stall') by THS setting and elevator, although I don't think any research has been done (for obvious reasons) on the longitudinal stability of the 330 in those conditions and it may be that there is an unexpected aerodynamic strong nose-up moment (Edit: I have just seen Lyo's frightening post regarding loss of elevator function, so yes, it looks as if could be described as a 'deep stall'). Regarding min recovery height, it is simply enough to do the sums, and I chucked my hat in the ring way back to say that I thought 20k would be the last point for recovery without hitting the water. This simply based on a descent rate of 10k a minute (2 minutes to impact) and a required pitch change of something like 40-50 degrees nose down, taking a few seconds (which would drastically increase the 10k down) reducing the remaining time, and then add the altitude required to transition from that descent to level flight without pulling the wings off or entering a manoeuvre stall. All subjective, of course - I have no desire to check my estimate.

DC-ATE - are you saying you were in a 'deep stall' (whatever you think that is) with 10kfpm down at 10k in IMC? Sounds like some really smart flying there to achieve that. I think I would have taken control a little earlier and called for a psychologist to meet the a/c on arrival.

jetopa

15th Oct 2011, 09:48

I am not an Airbus pilot.

When I attended a seminar on the topic of loss of control incidents and accidents, which was held by EASA in Cologne last week, there was a lot of discussion about these issues and pilot training in general.

It has been agreed, that stall training has to be revised and that merely 'powering yourself out of it' isn't enough.

Modern simulators do not replicate all aspects of aircraft behaviour 100% realistically, but they are considered to be close enough to the 'real thing' and also: they are the best we have.

Pilots should receive more training doing hands-on flying at all altitudes and in all configurations of their aeroplane.

Mr. C. Lelaie, a former Airbus test pilot and a well known capacity in the community, told me that the A330 is entirely controllable at all flight levels and in all modes or laws the airplane has to offer.

I know it must sound easy to somehow with Mr. Lelaie's background, but point he (and others, representing Boeing, NASA, the FAA, simulator providers and so on) was trying to make: scenarios like these should be practiced during training from time to time...

Interesting point made by someone from Lufthansa CityLine: SIM time is precious. Why not practicing system malfunctions in simpler cockpit procedure trainers rather than expensive full-motion flight simulators, thus leaving more time for manual flying of the aircraft?

punkalouver

15th Oct 2011, 11:02

recovery from a deep stall is possible [from 10000 feet above ground] in a 737-200. Been there, done that !! No problem.

Well, we weren't trans-oceanic, but it was night, solid IMC.

What amazes me is that you appear to have still not figured out how incredibly poor airmanship you had on that night. In fact you talk like you think you are a good pilot. Try scary.

DozyWannabe

15th Oct 2011, 12:12

I think that software developer in post 50 not only brings us back to a major causal factor, but also explains it in a perfectly understandable way that for me makes it potentially the most important factor in the accident.

The stall warner was "inverted" or you could say reversed...

Only towards the end of the sequence. The Stall Warning was sounding perfectly correctly for nearly a minute, during which the PF was still hauling back on the stick.

The reason the SW stopped sounding was because EAS (I think) was below 60kts. Not many flights encounter that kind of speed in mid-air.

BarbiesBoyfriend

15th Oct 2011, 12:41

Punkalouver

I wouldn't be too quick to criticise 'DC-ATE'. I suspect if he'd been on 447, things might have turned out better. :rolleyes:

It was basic flying skill (lack of) that did for AF447. Whatever people say about 'ye olde dinosaur' pilots, they do have certain advantages over the children of the magenta line.

xyze

15th Oct 2011, 12:58

rmac agree that the stall warning 'inversion' that occurred in this accident was likely a significant contributor to the confusion on the flight deck in the later part of the descent.

My understanding is that although the aircraft remained stalled throughout its descent, the stall warning ceased because the forward airspeed was too low to allow valid AOA measurement. Is there a flaw in this logic? Surely an aircraft is always stalled if it is in the air and has a forward airspeed so low that AOA cannot be measured, whatever the AOA. Why would you program the stall warning to stop under these conditions?

Related to the absent stall warning and the confusion it may have created; to what extent does the group feel that, absent reliable airspeed indications, the crew assumed that with engines at full thrust throughout the descent and no stall warning, it was not possible to be or remain stalled?

DC-ATE

15th Oct 2011, 13:24

BOAC-
DC-ATE - are you saying you were in a 'deep stall' (whatever you think that is) with 10kfpm down at 10k in IMC?

Hi, BOAC. I don't recall now [it was over 40 years ago !!] what the descent was, but it was nowhere near 10K FPM. Probably on the order of 1500 FPM. As to 'deep' or 'full' stall, I think it was deep. There was NO elevator control at all. I think it was because we had at least 4 inches of ice on the stab. That's how much was on the wing when we turned on the ice light and then the wing heat. [No tail heat on that bird, as I said earlier] Maybe ice was involved in AF447; that hasn't been mentioned. All I know is I managed to recover "my way" vs the "book" way. But, again, we digress.

punkalouver-
What amazes me is that you appear to have still not figured out how incredibly poor airmanship you had on that night. In fact you talk like you think you are a good pilot.

Not sure what you're getting at. This was a training flight and I was flying right seat at the time. It's the Instructor who showed "poor airmanship" as far as I'm concerned by being there in the first place and NOT knowing WHAT to do to recover.

PuraVidaTransport

15th Oct 2011, 13:46

I love all the stories we keep hearing of a 'deep' stall and the notion that AF447 was being held in the stall by the THS and elevators. People, get this out of your heads.

Please go look at report #3 and the traces. At about 2:11:45, N1 was greatly reduced and the nose fell through with the pitch angle falling from 15 degrees nose up to 10 degrees nose down in about 10 seconds. The THS was at max nose up and the PF had full back stick yet the nose still fell through. Also notice, the airspeeds became valid and the stall warning sounded. The aircraft gained sufficient speed and the PF inputs and THS raised the nose ten degrees to a pitch of 0. However, as speed fell off, the nose again fell to 10 degrees nose down. Recovery at this point was not only possible but easily accomplished IF the pilots had recognized the REAL problem.

If you doubt this, look later in the flight at 2:14:10 when N1 was again reduced with the THS in full nose up and BOTH pilots pulling back on the sidestick. Again, the nose fell through from almost 20 degrees up to 5 down. Granted, by this time recovery was not possible.

If it was the THS and pilot inputs holding the nose up, please show me the proof. And all these stories of 'deep stall' and losing elevator authority etc... Please give me a link not just the story because looking at the AF447 traces, appears to me all you have to do to reduce pitch angle is reduce N1.

In addition, commercial aircraft must have positive longitudinal stability which means the nose is going to fall through no matter what the flight controls are trying to do at a certain speed/angle of attack as long as the center of gravity is within the prescribed limits. However, with the power of the engines today and being under-wing, with full N1, you can get a situation like we see in AF447.

Jig Peter

15th Oct 2011, 13:58

With all the learned (and others) discuisions about stalls, deep or otherwise, the point has been missed that when the airspeed became unreliable, the PF seems to have started at once to hold the stick back.
Until the event started, everything was normal: the aircraft was in trim, straight and level, and all was calm. Perhaps too calm for a relatively inexperienced, but no doubt keen to prove himself, young man, who may even been in a slight doze - not an unusual thing to happen, as I well remember from experience (thank goodness for an alert navigator who was always pernickety about heading).
Where calm analysis was needed, the PF started to thrash the stick about ("stirring the mayonnaise"), having probably never heard the adage (or its French equivalent) "Don't just do something, sit there", not forgetting the rider "but not for too long". Precipate actions started the whole sorry chain of events going.
From experience again, it's very, very hard when friends and "mates" foul up, and on occasions I had to protest strongly when an Inquiry seemed to be about to jump to conclusions, because drawing the right conclusions is the only way for lessons to be learned.
That's why I trust the BEA and its thorough methodology to "get it right" and why I haven't posted on this thread before (and for the last time).

DozyWannabe

15th Oct 2011, 14:00

The THS was at max nose up and the PF had full back stick yet the nose still fell through.

And came straight back up again because of the inputs and THS angle. Reducing thrust would have helped, certainly - but positive action needed to be taken to effect a recovery by keeping the nose down.

I can't help but think this conversation is off topic (which is the book and accompanying Daily Heil article), and properly belongs in the Tech Log thread however.

@BarbiesBoyfriend - saying that poor airmanship on the part of the F/Os at the controls is all there is to it is a very narrow viewpoint. The net needs to be cast wider - firstly to take into account the poor CRM on the part of the Captain in failing to explicitly assign roles to the crew dring the relief phase and finally to take into account the industry-wide misuse of automation to cut back on manual handling training. A side issue relates to the methods relating to the pitot tube repair/replacement schedule and whether more could have been done on the part of the regulator and manufacturer there.

Clandestino

15th Oct 2011, 14:48

You really cannot blame the crew.
They experienced (i.e. quietly slipped into) a pitch-up (and thrust-) induced, and very insidious, deep-stall entry at high altitude - a straight unapparent and unremarkable entry into a very high descent rate, featuring a quite misleading and almost normal pitch attitude. That could be good analysis of some accident that has not much in common with AF447. Before we go on having a productive discussion, please clarify: are you writing about AF447 at all? If so, do you have more reliable sources than BEA preliminary reports, because most of what you have written flies in the face of the data released by BEA so far.

I know they were new pilots but why couldn't they figure out what was happening to them? pulling back for 3 and a half minutes goes against all of our survival instincts. Well, they were 58, 37 and 32. Not young. Not new. Not inexperienced. Pulling back goes against pilots' survival instinct but it doesn't go against the earthlings' survivor instinct when flying: ground is dangerous, I have to get away from it as quickly as possible. Most of people undergoing initial pilots' training have to be taught not to climb too steeply after takeoff.

Not understanding the relation between pitch control and stalling, consequently pulling no-matter-what, was identified as cause of stall related accidents by Wolfgang Langewiesche as early as 1944. There's old aeronautical cliche: to go up, pull the stick back. To go down, pull stick back further. Still applicable.

even given erroneous readouts, the pilots should have had enough overall awareness of there situation that a stall should have been self evident.Correct.

the current fear that manual flying skills will atrophy as systems take more of a role appears to be valid.Company and pilot dependent. When I was on bus, I was allowed to take out all the automatics and fly even without the FPV (birdie) in CAT1 and above weather, provided my capt was comfortable with that. They always were.

there is now doubt that increased automation has improved safety but the major accidents I can think of recently, in the western world, have been in spite of automation or directly/indirectly caused by it. That's quite selective view, helped by noticing something is wrong only when number of dead westerners in an aeroplane crash goes above the detection threshold. We never had less killed passengers per RPK than nowadays. If you'd like to propose different criteria of measuring safety, be my guest.

Perhaps we need, as an industry and as a fraternity, to invest more in operator input at the design stage.Perhaps we do, perhaps we don't. Some things could be improved, but overall methinks designers are paying attention to pilots input. All the ergonomic problems I've came across while flying were results of grandfathers' rights - it was cheaper to do the things way they were done 40 years ago than to invest in redesign.

It is oh so easy to sit in the sim expecting trouble but it is rare in life to find ourselves outside of the normsNot true. Just take a look at the Aviation Herald and that's just a part of it. Troubles happen everyday but they're dealt with as expected. Someone with just a passing interest in aviation will notice them only when they lead either to spectacular incident or accident.

I am certainly not suggesting we go back to fully manual control systemsIt would make no difference whether you suggested it or not. We still carry them as backup and are supposed to know how to use it to extract us out of any corner autos have driven us into.

I suggest that we all need to spend more time in the sim being surprised as opposed to just knocking out the stats, even if this means more expense.Totally agree.

What would have happened if the pilots just took their hands off the stick altogether.Probably not much. Some altitude excursion, some roll, unlikely to be as severe as were the one commanded.

What would the computer have done?Nothing. It usually does nothing. In AF447 case as it was confused by disagreeing airspeed, it wouldn't even intervene as the aeroplane was approaching the edge of the envelope or attitude limits active in normal law.

With a traditional column if it is back past a certain point the wing is stalled, and it is pretty obvious that the a/c is being held in a stall, ie the stick position gives a idea of attitude. This is so wrong that is bound to be quite lethal if one is to try it in real world, especially in THS equipped aeroplane where column drives elevators only.

He doesn't even know it's possible to stall an A320 in normal law.It would be beneficial for our discussion if you would be so kind to explain in exactly which way can be any FBW Airbus stalled in normal law. Your words or copy-paste. Please.

The way forward is for an externally delivered LPC (regulator) every 3 yrs covering all the normal items plus any number of potential items. Let's get back to 'hard, firm and fair' training and checking. You're onto something but I'd rather see the G-man on OPC and a bit more frequent than three years.

How often have you all practiced unusual attitude/unreliable airspeed scenarios?UA every 2 sims, unreliable airspeed every 4 sims. Bound to get more often. Last one was total static blockade at crusing level. Brought it down in one piece, didn't even overspeed gear or flaps, which is average performance expected of pilots in my gang.

The size of a modern flight deck, the eyes have a long distance to travel across all instruments Well, then the Airbus flightdeck is positively postmodern with its smallish, yet big enough PFD.

What did the other crews do when their pitots were blocked? Supposedly this occurred 32 times on A330s and A340s before AF 447, but I've never seen any accounts as to how this was handled in those situations.Kept on flying. Some were so unmoved by the experience they even did not report it and it was only through thorough analysis of QAR data that some occurrences were discovered. Interim 2, pages 50-53 refer.

The crew failed to recover the aircraft because they failed to diagnose why they were out of control. They died not knowing what had gone wrong. To me its surreal that they could not recognise the stall...so far so correct, but... but it would seem that the situation was beyond their training, experience and competence. How could they be allowed to be in command of a commercial jet in that environment when they didn't possess the skills required to cope when it all went wrong?... you have moved a bit offtrack here. That they didn't posses the skills to cope with the situation just when they needed to have them is quite certain. However, we'll need thorough HF analysis to see whether their ineptitude in handling the incident and turning it into an accident was deeply rooted or it was just fatal momentary lapse of airmanship, brought on by fatigue or whatever else. You might be right, Ashling, but currently only by pure chance. We still don't have enough data to make correct conclusion.

They were an average crew on an average day. Maybe even above "average" when you consider their experience and the fact that they continued to try to understand the problem and regain control all the way down. They tried and failed. Their methods were found to be wanting. Whether they were average, or even above-average crew, we'll need deeper HF analysis to tell us.

Statistically then it is likely that most of the posters on this forum, thrown into the exact same circumstances, would also end up in the ocean. And I include myself in that, hand flying skills and all.. You are right, as most of the posters on this forum are not A330 rated and quite a lot have zero hours TT therefore your claim is not particularly relevant in discussion about AF447. Interim2 is pretty clear on how other crews resolved similar situations. It's 37:1.

How do Airbus crew train stall recovery? Currently, line pilots don't. Subject to change soon. That large majority of PPRuNers have no ability to tell stall from stall warning and consequently "stall recovery" from "approach to stall recovery" has lead to quite large waste of bandwidth and I don't expect it to change.

Had a conversation with an AI FE. He told me about a test flight last summer.Wow. I mean: wow! Such a spectacular flight and no one heard about it before you decided to share it with us. Either Toulouse is more secretive than Kelly Johnson's Skunkworks or someone let his imagination run wild.

References, please! Even if you have to shoot me after you tell me.

We are getting a bit confused here between 'full stall' and 'deep stall' I think, and in the case of 447 it was being held in a (amazingly stable) full stall (not a 'deep stall') by THS setting and elevator
Don't forget the engines. Low q, high trust.

I have just seen Lyo's frightening post regarding loss of elevator function, so yes, it looks as if could be described as a 'deep stall'I've seen many posts like it and stopped considering them frightening, As long as we don't see some solid confirmation of it, I'll classify it as "sad".

Whatever people say about 'ye olde dinosaur' pilots, they do have certain advantages over the children of the magenta line. Have a look what Aviation Safety Network to see what real 'Ye olde dinosaur' pilots did. Not everything was related to not having autos or nav and safety equipment we enjoy today. Like hitting the ground below airport elevation.

TTex600

15th Oct 2011, 14:50

I usually just read these threads and remain silent because "it's better to keep your mouth shut and be thought stupid, than open your mouth and remove all doubt", but I keep reading something that must be addressed.

Stall recovery vs. "approach to stall" recovery. Actual pilots can now skip to the last paragraph.

To those of you not studied in stall training above the private/commercial level, we DON'T train nor practice "stalls" at the ATP (US) level. We train for "approach to stall". Pilots of my generation fully understand that you must reduce the angle of attack - lower the nose - to unstall the wing. We also know that the ATP (an instrument rating) requires that we recover from an approach to stall with minimum altitude loss. In an approach to stall, the wing never stops producing lift. When the system senses the onset of a stall, it provides warning; warning that if followed will result in preventing the stall and avoiding altitude loss. This is simply due to the type of aircraft we fly in the air transport business (those being transport category birds that are certified to give proper stall warning), and to the rules which apply to those aircraft and their airline operation.
Airline pilots fly transport category certified aircraft and train to instrument procedure standards, a situation that demands that approaches to stalls are dealt with by increasing power ( to recover from the low speed condition) and maintaining altitude (to prevent hitting the ground if the approach to stall happened near the ground - as in an instrument approach).

Those of you who continue to stress your disbelief that the pilots didn't dump the nose need to recognize that the pilots were not trained to do so. They were trained to follow their instruments and use a specific procedure to deal with the situation. The AF447 pilots were faced with instruments that couldn't be trusted and a situation for which they had never trained.

In the Airbus I fly, the only concrete information I can see from my seat is the horizon in front of the windscreens. EVERYTHING else is computer/electronically generated. Please remember that when you question the actions of three pilots who were faced with: dark skies, thunderstorms, unreliable instruments, turbulence, no visible external cues, myriad ongoing nuisance warnings, .............. This was NOT an accident caused by a single factor!(IMHO) The final finding will likely indict everything from aircraft systems and philosophy to government oversight to airline training philosophy. In the mean time, let's not waste the opportunity to change things for the better by taking the easy way out and blaming the dead guys.

Lyman

15th Oct 2011, 15:16

The only addition to the STALL discussion is that these guys were NOT treated to the standard airframe cues of STALL. Did they hear the actual STALL WARN? Did they feel vibration, loss of noise of airstream, etc?

Later, out of energy and PITCHED up, there was no NOSE drop, and prior, there had been no BUFFET, a clue to imminent loss of lift.

What were the feel cues? What about this STALL entry was so unlike what might have reasonably been expected in Vanilla Stall? Further, what about this entry hypnotized all three into functionally eliminating STALL from the list of possible failures?

It is not complicated. Yet it continues to be passionately discussed. In the Flight environment of the instant, one only has instruments with which to troubleshoot. Before making judgments, it would be best to more fully understand the instruments, and those that failed.

And try not to be seduced into a post mortem of the part of the flight that is selling newspapers, and is virtually bankrupt of lessons, and ultimate justice.

BOAC

15th Oct 2011, 15:20

I can't help but think this conversation is off topic (which is the book and accompanying Daily Heil article), and properly belongs in the Tech Log thread however. - good call, Sir.

lomapaseo

15th Oct 2011, 15:25

DozyWannabe

15th Oct 2011, 15:31

@TTex600

For what it's worth, I'm not a pilot and am well aware of the difference between approach-to-stall procedure and stall procedure. I'm also aware that the ATP training only deals with the former. However I'm pretty sure that stall training itself should be part of the pilot's toolkit before getting anywhere near a jet - i.e. at the PPL level.

It looks like airline training was relying on that being somewhere in the background (at the 'riding-a-bike' level) and focusing on the approach-to-stall procedure to the exclusion of stall recovery, and I think all people are suggesting is that in future this might not be such a good idea.

Finally, the only instruments that were "untrustworthy" were the ASIs, and any gizmos that relied on them. Crucially, they had a working altimeter, working ADIs and working engine instrumentation - which was more than enough to stabilise the aircraft using pitch and power *if you know how to do it*. Transducers have been used in aircraft instrumentation since the 1970's and are no less reliable than their mechanical forebears.

Again, I think this discussion is better suited to the Tech Log thread.

FLEXPWR

15th Oct 2011, 16:36

Agree with DozyWannabe,

Most displays would show the correct indication IF actually only the ASIs were affected. May I add, and raise a question at the same time (maybe already noted somewhere before), what about the VSI readings in front of each pilot? According the A320 manuals (my current aircraft), it is given by both the static ports AND the IRUs, I would imagine the A330 to be wired with the same logic, so even in case of FULL loss or ADR DATA or ADR voted out by the system, the VSI should (was?) still be showing from the IRUs inputs.

Despite the apparent confusion, night IMC, probable turbulence at some point, the VSI would have been a good confirmation that the aircraft was going downhill?

Of course this is just one aspect and does not pretend to invalidate any findings, I am just curious I have not seen it here.

Flex

BOAC

15th Oct 2011, 16:56

OK, Dozy - I give in..........let's see how many AF447 threads we can generate.

FLEX - VSI is normally 'instantaneous' inertial then tapered by barometric.the VSI would have been a good confirmation that the aircraft was going downhill? - you mean apart from the rapidly unwinding altimeter? (and thought possibly to be 'off scale' and not visible?)

Aileron Drag

15th Oct 2011, 17:14

It's a very different type of aeroplane, but I used to demonstrate this type of stall to Air Cadets learning to fly the Venture motor-glider. The stall scenario to be taught was the classic reducing IAS, buffet, and nose-drop. But I liked to demo also a more subtle stall where you end up with a reasonably normal attitude and power, but with the stick hard back, very low airspeed, and the VSI off the clock.

The only indications that you were stalled were the control column position, IAS, and the vertical speed. It was even a very smooth ride!

Simply releasing the back-pressure effected immediate recovery.

I suspect that simply releasing the back-pressure in this case might have been sufficient to recover very rapidly.

Having flown an aircraft type, of which two were lost to deep-stalls (HS 121), and several other types where the HS is not blanked by the stalled wing, I think the former were your worst nightmare. The latter could almost be likened, aerodynamically (and for the pilot-held-stall-condition) to those old RAF motor-gliders.

I realise that is a gross simplification, but few pilots (I suspect) were ever demonstrated the pilot-maintained stall.

Mr Optimistic

15th Oct 2011, 18:17

Hope you have a tin hat DA !

This thread is like an echo from the edge of the universe, back to deep stall and THS authority. There was a mountain of stuff on this in Tech Log Thread #4 including (916),

"If THS > 8 up (and no autotrim available), full elevator pitch down authority may be insufficient for speeds above 180 knots."

...at reasonable attitude of course. However is the distinction between stall, deep stall relevant as no apparent sustained attemp at ND is evident, less that it was wanted but the THS frustrated it. Back to Tech Log !

TTex600

15th Oct 2011, 18:21

Quote:
Originally Posted by DW
I can't help but think this conversation is off topic (which is the book and accompanying Daily Heil article), and properly belongs in the Tech Log thread however.

- good call, Sir.To the contrary, pedantic rants discussing the nuances of pitch characteristics in various AB FBW laws belong in the tech section. ;) (not accusing you of rants btw)

This string is about the final statements uttered by the doomed crew and I suspect that many readers can't understand why something as simple as a stall killed 200 someodd persons. And why the crew would be so totally confused. That in itself is quite a different subject than the latest AF447 string. Contrary to the name, it's quite obvious that professional pilots make up something less than the majority around here. I think it reasonable to keep this string alive and out of the purgatory called AF447 string 1,2,3,4,5,6, and so on.

TTex600

15th Oct 2011, 18:47

Aileron Drag: It's a very different type of aeroplane, but I used to demonstrate this type of stall to Air Cadets learning to fly the Venture motor-glider. The stall scenario to be taught was the classic reducing IAS, buffet, and nose-drop. But I liked to demo also a more subtle stall where you end up with a reasonably normal attitude and power, but with the stick hard back, very low airspeed, and the VSI off the clock.

The only indications that you were stalled were the control column position, IAS, and the vertical speed. It was even a very smooth ride!

Simply releasing the back-pressure effected immediate recovery.

I suspect that simply releasing the back-pressure in this case might have been sufficient to recover very rapidly.

Having flown an aircraft type, of which two were lost to deep-stalls (HS 121), and several other types where the HS is not blanked by the stalled wing, I think the former were your worst nightmare. The latter could almost be likened, aerodynamically (and for the pilot-held-stall-condition) to those old RAF motor-gliders.

I realise that is a gross simplification, but few pilots (I suspect) were ever demonstrated the pilot-maintained stall.In the Airbus 320 series (I don't fly the 330 but believe it to be the same), releasing the side stick would have simply resulted in the computers attempting to maintain one g-force. The AB trims for g-force, not for speed. Your technique works in aircraft that trim for speed. The Airbus is somewhat different, to say the least.

Anything more belongs in the tech section.

Aileron Drag

15th Oct 2011, 19:20

TTex600,

The principle is, perhaps, the same. It doesn't matter what the autoflight system is aiming at if the back-force is released - a trimmed speed or a certain 'g'.

Fact is, these guys were positively demanding maximum pitch up. Or, to put it another way, max positive 'g'.

Sorry, my knowledge of the Airbus range is nil - I was a Boeing dude. All I can see here is this crew failed to realise that a very high pitch attitude, full power, stick hard back, zero speed, and VSI off the clock was indicative of a pilot-maintained stall.

I know it's easy to pontificate from my retirement armchair, but I had noticed in my final years of professional flying (B777) that the 'new generation' of F/Os had poor basic flying skills - having been brought up in a fly-by-wire world, and in an ab initio system which had banned spinning training because it was 'dangerous' !

The Tech thread, by the way, has become a little ethereal for some of us!

Lyman

15th Oct 2011, 19:34

I think most pilots understand what was happening here, and only in hindsight, of course. To those who have not been confused whilst flying an aircraft, hats off. Ordinarily, sit on hands is wise advice.

These guys were forced to sit on their hands and try to think themselves out of a crash. That's hard, and deserves more respect than some are showing.

They had tried "everything" (according to them), and nothing had worked.

What sort of mindset would paint them so far into the corner?

Loud airstream: High velocity. Common sense.

Astonishing Descent: Fear factor.

Fairly stable g loading: "Stable Flight", suggesting "In control"

Pitch "Stable", but "NOSE DOWN": "Obvious", the controls were chronically commanding NOSE UP, and no sense of climb, or rotation is felt.

They had agreed already they were out of options, they told the Captain that, on his entry into the flight deck.

So it seems simple, and not difficult to get. They didn't get STALL data such that they followed it in, and not knowing they were STALLED, they did not think to control out of it.

It isn't so obvious that they were "stupid", and it is outrageous that anyone would continue to dismiss their efforts at recovering the a/c.

This deal to me is mostly HF, and some non-serendipitous events that conspired to trap the crew into their destiny.

There is also no firm foundation for faulting "training". It is difficult to justify the lack of attention paid to UAS likelihood on long flights. To me, there is not one person here who has the chops to criticize the "lack of Manual Flight skills" exhibited once the a/p was lost to faulty speeds.

It is arrogant to be dismissive of the pilots' efforts.

Aileron Drag

15th Oct 2011, 19:43

Get real, Lyman. They kept the stick hard back. There was little or no attempt at recovery. They did not know they were stalled.

tubby linton

15th Oct 2011, 20:43

My two pennorth worth-. The Airbus Efis layout on their FBW aircraft can be cluttered in comparison to a traditional aircraft.All the info is there on one screen and it is up to the weak link(the pilot ) to unpick it. I do not believe a tape altimeter stands out as well as a needle and a drum altimeter as they unwind rapidly. Imagine a needle unwinding rapidly and how easy that is to interpret. The VSI also on the EFIs is very small .i noticed that my scan when I flew 320/330 was very poor as you basically were looking at one screen . Contrast that with having to scan individual instruments and process what they were telling you. You probably spend a few microseconds longer doing this but that extra time can trigger something that tells you something is wrong. With an older aircraft I have a healthy disrespect about what it is telling me and i qualify this by looking at pitch power and performance. When I convert to a new type I always look at the unreliable airspeed checklist to learn the pitch and power combinations that work. i do my best to fly by these and no matter the complexity or sophistication of the aircraft they can all turn back into a basic aircraft with in this case was a very simple failure.(blocked pitots).
I have had the same failure in a non fbw airbus but it was flyable as we hand fly it a lot,we don't trust it ,and we flew pitch and power. The 330 shouts stall at you in a loud masculine voice and whenever i heard it in The sim my arm always wanted to push the nose down so why didn't this trigger a similar response?

edmundronald

15th Oct 2011, 21:13

The pilots flew a perfectly good plane, straight into the salty sea.

It seems that the FBW automation has led to an ergonomic failure, normally certified pilots are simply not capable anymore of figuring out what the instruments are telling them and flying this plane in the presence of fairly minor mechanical faults like pitot blockage.

I suspect that we will see a major redesign of future automation control interfaces and cockpit instrumentation as Airbus digests the data of this accident. We will probably also see some major changes in pilot training, maybe even a greater emphasis on seeing pilots handfly the plane to keep their hand in.

I suspect that the smarter souls at Airbus and the certification authorities already suspected most of this, and their suspicions informed the huge search operation which provided the proof to push home aircraft design and pilot training changes.

BarbiesBoyfriend

15th Oct 2011, 21:55

We will all learn from this accident, at least I hope we will. Well I have, anyway.

BIG RoD, Smooth flight:

Levers back, nose down.

And........................

Recover.:)

Surely a message from the (AF447) Grave, for all who'd care to hear it.

bubbers44

15th Oct 2011, 22:22

Holding yoke or side stick all the way back for 3.5 minutes is not in any flight manual on how to fly an airplane even if you don't know why the airplane is out of control. These guys were poorly trained and were not qualified to be flying that airplane. The only qualified pilot was taking his rest break so when he got up there he had little time to figure out how they had gotten into their situation. How can airlines keep hiring pilots of this low capability to fly these wide body aircraft when they know the junior guys will be flying together with little experience?

We know it is illegal to make the captain stay in the cockpit at all times if the flight is over 8 hrs. Make them put two qualified captains on long range flights so at least one pilot knows how to fly if the automation fails. That is how we did it on my first airline job. My last one was like AF but the FO's were qualified high time pilots. Not like these noobys.

DozyWannabe

15th Oct 2011, 22:34

These guys were poorly trained and were not qualified to be flying that airplane. The only qualified pilot was taking his rest break so when he got up there he had little time to figure out how they had gotten into their situation.

That's a little harsh. Look at the transcripts and you'll see that the senior (albeit not by much) F/O - acting as PNF - seems painfully uncomfortable with how the aircraft is being handled, but it is only when the Captain arrives in the flight deck that he feels he has the authority to act (notably *emphatically* preventing the PF from deploying the speedbrakes). Up until that point he tries to correct the PF verbally, but does not take control of the aircraft.

The way I read it, it looks like he knew something was wrong, but because the Captain had implicitly put the junior F/O in charge, he felt he was unable to act beyond a certain point.

The situation that bothers me is that the Captain did not explicitly determine responsibilities before heading for his rest break. On top of that he elected to put the junior F/O, who was returning from vacation, in charge during the relief phase of the crew roster. This is illogical to me, especially given that he knew that they were about to transit the ITCZ during a time of year when it is known to be challenging to fly through. I don't know how it is for pilots, but when I'm back at work from vacation, it takes me a day or two until I'm properly "back in the groove".

glad rag

15th Oct 2011, 23:29

Again? whatever.:hmm:

bubbers44

15th Oct 2011, 23:32

DW, so you think the way the FO's handled the situation was correct and a fully qualified captain in the cockpit is not necessary? What fully qualified captain would hold the controls all the way back for 3 and a half minutes? Non that I know of. If the captain had been in the cockpit when they lost airspeed he would have handled it like all of us would have. Flown attitude and power setting until clear of the weather, not pulled up and stalled. I guess every country is different but that is what we do.

BarbiesBoyfriend

15th Oct 2011, 23:37

I think Bubbers' post was correct.

In addition:

Can't fly: Not a pilot.

Machinbird

16th Oct 2011, 00:03

That's a little harsh. Look at the transcripts and you'll see that the senior (albeit not by much) F/O - acting as PNF - seems painfully uncomfortable with how the aircraft is being handled, but it is only when the Captain arrives in the flight deck that he feels he has the authority to act (notably *emphatically* preventing the PF from deploying the speedbrakes). Up until that point he tries to correct the PF verbally, but does not take control of the aircraft.

Dozy, it isn't exactly a democracy in the cockpit. It is more of a meritocracy. You warn the other person that they are f'ing up if time permits and then act if you hope to be bouncing your grandkids on your knee.

Problem is that PNF did not act, he punted the problem to the Captain. That is as much of a problem as is PF's handling of the aircraft.

The reasons the PNF did not act need to be understood and corrected.

Desert185

16th Oct 2011, 00:03

ttex600: In the Airbus I fly, the only concrete information I can see from my seat is the horizon in front of the windscreens. EVERYTHING else is computer/electronically generated. Please remember that when you question the actions of three pilots who were faced with: dark skies, thunderstorms, unreliable instruments, turbulence, no visible external cues, myriad ongoing nuisance warnings, .............. This was NOT an accident caused by a single factor!(IMHO) The final finding will likely indict everything from aircraft systems and philosophy to government oversight to airline training philosophy. In the mean time, let's not waste the opportunity to change things for the better by taking the easy way out and blaming the dead guys.

Getting back to the fact that pitot tube failure/blockage was the initial cause, I have temporarily lost both ASI's during atmospheric research until clear of clouds in a DC-8 due to the amount of water encountered inflight. The result? I'm still here. The airplane didn't fall out of the sky. The only 'law' we had was pitch/power (with moveable power levers, BTW)...and the autopilot will not trip off (if on) due to lack of airspeed. No auto-throttle and the FD is usually off. Amazing stuff, eh? Given AF447's experience, I wouldn't want to do the same research in a Scarebus.

As 411 used to say: "Them's the facts."

DozyWannabe

16th Oct 2011, 00:12

DW, so you think the way the FO's handled the situation was correct and a fully qualified captain in the cockpit is not necessary?

That's not what I said at all! I said that the senior F/O seemed to have more of a clue what was going on, but only intervened verbally until the Captain arrived. I also said that the way the Captain performed the handover was an example of poor CRM, because he did not explicitly brief the F/Os on who would be acting as relief pilot, nor did he provide the senior F/O with any boundaries at which he could take control (which, according to Interim 3, should have been standard AF procedure).

What is necessary in the flight deck is at least one competent pilot, preferably two. Rank can sometimes be immaterial - remember Palm 90, where the F/O was clearly the more qualified and switched-on pilot of the two, but did not feel he could override his Captain.

What fully qualified captain would hold the controls all the way back for 3 and a half minutes?

The Captain of Birgenair 301 and the Captain of ColganAir 3407 for starters.

Organfreak

16th Oct 2011, 00:56

Quote:
What fully qualified captain would hold the controls all the way back for 3 and a half minutes?
The Captain of Birgenair 301 and the Captain of ColganAir 3407 for starters.

If I may beg to differ....:8 The captain of CG3407 had failed several checks.

The only qualifications whatsoever that I hold for commenting is that I have read all of the posts in all of the AF447 threads! :O

Lyman

16th Oct 2011, 01:50

Aileron Drag @ #88

He held back stick...... What could go wrong, he flies an Airbus?

He's in ALTERNATE LAW, what could go wrong, he is Alpha protected?

Wicked speed, insane descent, He'll wait for the a/c to "raise" the nose.

What else could be wrong, it can't be STALLED.

He had it figured, wrong, but figured. His idea of recovery was to allow the a/c to recover, as it always does.

Ultimately, all three figured to PULL was the call. ALL THREE.

It happened another way? Funny thing, Airbus pilots aren't quite as harsh on these three, wonder why? They know something we don't?

before landing check list

16th Oct 2011, 03:52

Blubbers44m Spot on. I have been following this(s) threads for a long while. Clearly a combination of lack of basic flying skills by at least one, lack of ability to take command of the situation (other FO, he knew something was wrong but did not act) and the poor captain who opened the door and saw a freakin mess.
I still say we need basics in the cockpit, some glider and acro time (just an intro course will do) and at least two pilots on board who know more then FMS operation. Not harsh at all. However that being said it is easy to point fingers from the comfort of your living room.

ATC Watcher

16th Oct 2011, 04:57

Disgressing a bit : A joke in France for long is that Air France FI/FE thought they were so good they would teach birds how to fly .

Take a cup of coffee and watch this 1 min APP video, (full screen mode )
Amazing nature - The Eagle Owl (http://www.dogwork.com/owfo8/)

Particular attention to the winglets, the course correction when on the localizer, the full flaps extensiom, the slats, and if you can, (but you have to be very good ) the stall warning device.

Now back to PPruNe and explaining the world how it should have been done...

jcjeant

16th Oct 2011, 07:57

Hi,

The latest movie about AF447 (in french)
http://www.stream-tv.fr/reportage-tv/air-france-enquete-de-securite/

Mr Optimistic

16th Oct 2011, 08:32

Is post #63 to be interpreted as a test conducted to duplicate AF447 ? Presume they used manual trim.

Anyway, what did this snippet from the conversation add, other than that they believed the altimeter ?

amos2

16th Oct 2011, 10:14

The crew were lacking in flight management knowledge...Isn't that obvious?

Mr Optimistic

16th Oct 2011, 10:17

Obvious, yes but wasn't it already from the previous extracts? Can't see anything new here. The FULL extract from the start of the incident up until stall would help as it would clear up what was going through their minds and, maybe, what they thought the instruments were telling them.

Lancelot de boyles

16th Oct 2011, 10:46

quote- bubbers44 (i can't seem to quote directly, but that's another issue)
And sorry to digress a little.

'These guys were poorly trained and were not qualified to be flying that airplane. The only qualified pilot was taking his rest break so when he got up there he had little time to figure out how they had gotten into their situation. How can airlines keep hiring pilots of this low capability to fly these wide body aircraft when they know the junior guys will be flying together with little experience? '

There is little doubt that the situation was not handled correctly, but that is not quite the same as poorly trained.

In your statement above, you say the 'only qualified pilot', implying that the 2 F/Os were not qualified?
Would you elaborate, as I feel there is a misconception here? The 2 F/Os were of less experience than the captain, maybe. But surely all were qualified to be there.
In my time, I have flown as F/O, with another F/O as relief, for the captain and myself, on very long trips. All are qualified.

Experience does not automatically produce great ability, nor does great ability infer lots of experience. No matter what the insurance companies and bean counters think.

ManaAdaSystem

16th Oct 2011, 12:04

He held back stick...... What could go wrong, he flies an Airbus?

He's in ALTERNATE LAW, what could go wrong, he is Alpha protected?

Wicked speed, insane descent, He'll wait for the a/c to "raise" the nose.

What else could be wrong, it can't be STALLED.

He had it figured, wrong, but figured. His idea of recovery was to allow the a/c to recover, as it always does.

Ultimately, all three figured to PULL was the call. ALL THREE.

It happened another way? Funny thing, Airbus pilots aren't quite as harsh on these three, wonder why? They know something we don't?

I think you hit the nail right on it's head.

You can't expect a crew to handle an emergency situation in which they have not been trained.
An Airbus can't stall (well, actually they can, but you know what I'm talking about). Airbus crew do not train stall recovery. It's possible these guys more or less grew up on Airbus aircraft, and the last stall training they had was many years ago?
I've never flown Airbus aircraft, but I've seen many demonstrations where the pilots fly the aircraft with the stick max aft to show what it's capable of.
So why are we surprised the pilots tried to recover with this procedure?

Last time I trained high level deep stall (in the sim) on the 737, it took some 10000+ ft to recover. It's not just "close the thrust levers and pitch forward--> recover". You need to push hard and use trim, then wait, wait, wait (and prey you have enough altitude), then hopefully you start to fly before you hit the ground.

These guys had a multitude of other problems as well. I just hope I never have to face a similar situation myself.

Mimpe

16th Oct 2011, 12:07

Lance

the figures still show that the lowest incident/accident rates in commercial flight are in the 50-55 years old pilot group, so experience must mean something, even if its just that the guys not wanting to be there have all left!

.....and interestingly, the 55-65 year olds are safer than the 40-50 year olds, but not by much.

ManaAdaSystem

16th Oct 2011, 12:13

Interesting!
Are you talking about 50-55 year old captains, or average age of the crew?
Can I have your source, please?

DozyWannabe

16th Oct 2011, 12:40

If I may beg to differ....:8 The captain of CG3407 had failed several checks.

But they kept checking until they passed him, which means he was technically a qualified Captain in spite of his questionable competence. This was why I made the distinction between competence and rank.

@ManaAdaSystem - You know as well as I do that there are no hard protections in Alternate Law - Lyman's trying to muddy the waters again. If he had been properly trained he would have known that Alternate Law = no hard protections. They only followed the suggestion to pull up after it was way too late (about 4000 ft I think?).

Lancelot de boyles

16th Oct 2011, 12:50

the figures still show that the lowest incident/accident rates in commercial flight are in the 50-55 years old pilot group, so experience must mean something, even if its just that the guys not wanting to be there have all left!

.....and interestingly, the 55-65 year olds are safer than the 40-50 year olds, but not by much

I don't doubt that.
The point I was (obviously badly) aiming at, is that the 2 F/Os were not just very low time newbies, with no type rating. Unless my understanding of the AF accident is wrong.

Of course experience does count for a great deal, but only when coupled with actual ability, and not just luck.

The assumption seemingly being made in Bubbers44 post was that only the captain was qualified, the 2 F/Os being what?
This is adding an aspect to the discussion which is not supported by the facts so far, nor by the JAA regs. Surely?

If this accident is being discussed with a view to extracting as much information for the rest of us to learn from, then there is a responsibility for the facts to be presented or determined, without adding ambiguity. Hence my question.

Aileron Drag

16th Oct 2011, 14:05

I think the point being made is that the two F/Os may (possibly) have been the product of the 'new' training regime. That is, no exposure to stalling, spinning, and aeros, then after the CPL has been obtained straight onto a fly-by-wire computer-with-wings.

I met so many people like this. Fail the FMC and GPS and they're hopelessly lost. I guess it's inevitable in a high-tech environment.

I often got back from a trip thinking 'I wouldn't want to be with that F/O on a dark night with multiple failures'.

Of course these guys were qualified. It's just that it's a lot easier, these days, to 'qualify'!

Lyman

16th Oct 2011, 14:22

Whomever caused the last minutes to be released of the CVR aside, fairness and fairplay demand a release of the CVR contents of the period prior, thorugh, and beyond a/p loss to STALL.

It is virtually certain there will be no hysterics, overt drama, or strictly personal proprietaries.

Was there other discussion at disconnect a/p a/t? Does PF KNOW and immediately respond to UAS? Misunderstood or unavailable, the data at manual flight start informs of his thought process.

"He pulled into a STALL". Is not a lie, but it doesn't contain much truth, looking at the whole of the currently unsupported HF data made available.

Instead of focusing attention on the unfortunate exposure of some extremely stressed pilots in a seeming hopeless situ, BEA should release the data that would inform a better understanding of why and how this crew acted as it did. To allow shrill and amateur slanders to continue without protecting the performance of this crew with the truth, is to me inexcusable.

Lyman

16th Oct 2011, 14:27

FAA stopped requiring SPIN training long ago, they did not make it illegal.
And that for the Private certificate. So what is preventing commercial requirements for spin/acro for the ATPL?

NOTHING.

FAA sets MINIMUMS, it does not prevent further progress, and skill training. Gliding, spins, and enhance UA recovery should be requirements. They're not, more's the pity, but professional advanced training is available.

DOZY. Relative to the PF's training, and Protections. His handling in Pitch is protected. It isn't closeout, but it is not DIRECT, as ROLL. I am not trying to muddy the waters. The PF found the waters muddy enough, I am suggesting to us that he was less than clear (possibly) of the LAWS in 2 that made Roll a challenge, and PITCH, gentle, though definitely deadly.

It isn't what you think that is important, or what I think, it is what was going through the PIlot's mind that matters.

I think PITCH DIRECT in A/LAW 2 may have prevented this accident. And please eliminate autoTRIM also.

WHY? Because with ROLL so demanding, PITCH was relegated to second tier priority, due its computer filtered inputs. I say this figuratively, for of course it was crucial, but DIFFERENT.

It is this one Failure in programming that caused the crash, I believe.

In slipping from NORMAL to ALTERNATE, a consistent degrade should be the rule, not ROLL this way, PITCH that way, etc.

Had the Pilot pulled hard enough, the a/c would have STALLED with gusto, a la vanilla, cues and all. Do they recover from this early STALL?

Did they recover from the "Weird" STALL that happened when the airframe was paid off in energy? When at the top of a "leisurely" climb, non-DIRECT in PITCH?

jackharr

16th Oct 2011, 16:55

"I realise that is a gross simplification, but few pilots (I suspect) were ever demonstrated the pilot-maintained stall."

I go back a long way, but we used to do just that in the RAF's Varsities. I don't think "normal" students did that exercise, but it was certainly part of the training for instructors. I was a "Waterfront" instructor's instructor (why was it called "The Waterfront"?) at Central Flying School. You could hold the Varsity in a full stall, stick (yoke) hard back and it would just float downwards nose in the air. It was a long time ago that I used to do this exercise (best part of 40 years) so my memory is perhaps incomplete. But I seem to recall that even in a steady full stall, there was still some degree of aileron control.

Our exercise all those years ago bears a remarkable resemblance to AF447. Our recovery technique - giving an instantaneous result - was simply "stick forward"

Momoe

16th Oct 2011, 17:19

In reply to post #109

You can't expect a crew to handle an emergency situation in which they have not been trained.
Why not? Flight crew don't get qualified by opening the right cereal boxes, although this crew's handling of the situation is questionable, other aircraft/crew have had situations which were unforeseen and have dealt with them.
So in effect they were trained, albeit not for this specific instance. However, if flying the Bus makes you dependent on the inbuilt protection to the extent that you can't recognize a deep stall regardless of instrumentation then the training wasn't sufficient.

Lyman

16th Oct 2011, 17:21

jack. It is a well known tool in emer. descent, provided the a/c is up to it, and in a sufficient emergency, it doesn't really matter, does it?

Stick back, held, and descend with roll control, and recover as you say when a spot is found to plant. If the ground is not visible, and depending on the a/c, impact is to some extent "survivable" (see Schiphol).

Fast jets do this, though not the "impact" part, hopefully.

Also in the quiver is Flat Plate, a 90 degree AoA fast brake.

As we see in 447, much of the a/c was isolated from the more destructive impact in the tail and belly. Witness the pristine galley, tray shelving, and other bits.

Though not fully addressed, the survivability of the impact is not discussed. For good reason. God Forbid some survived, only to drown, or die of exposure. Imagine the PR disaster that would be. Only the most gruesome autopsies are released, as they herd the conclusion to "No Survivors of Impact". For those with some patience, and a sceptic's eye, this investigation is.....fishy.

Momoe: They did handle it, and your expectation is of success. Analyze the "handling"? Listen to them, completely, there was no abdication of handling. You make it sound as though the pilots were quitters at the outset. Of course the expectation is of success. Failing that, the baby goes out with the bathwater?

From the CVR, at the outset with Captain's arrival, the pilots state they are out of ideas, and that they do not know what is wrong. That leaves us to figure out what they missed, not difficult, as the data is found, reasonably complete, we think.

That leaves the Captain's training. I will admit I am not fond of this Captain's apparent leadership skill. For what we think from the other pilots comments, he is expected to sort the mess out, and ostensibly becomes instead merely an audience of one.

At this point, I believe the pilots messed up, with "help" from Airbus. I cannot excuse the apparent lack of good planning in programming the aircraft to degrade into touchy ROLL, yet remain same in PITCH feel, and with the loss of Alpha Protection. It is a trap.

Who wants to handle an airplane that changes the way it flies in one axis, but retains the response in another, and there is loss of STALL protect on top of that?

One should not have two commanders at the controls. The BUS, and the PF.

Tourist

16th Oct 2011, 19:15

"You can't expect a crew to handle an emergency situation in which they have not been trained"

Erm..
I believe that the one thing that a human can do better than any computer is react well to an unforseen/unplanned/untrained for event.

That expectation is pretty much the whole reason for having us nowadays.
The vanilla stuff is computer food all the way.

GlueBall

16th Oct 2011, 21:02

I think most pilots understand what was happening here, and only in hindsight, of course. .

Huh...?
Voice generated stall warning, "STALL, STALL, STALL..." intermittent up to 53 seconds.
My ears are not pots to piss in. I WOULD hear that, and I WOULD respect a stall warning, and I WOULD respond to it! To be sure, I WOULDN'T be pulling back on the stick and climbing 3000 feet, no matter what the Indicated Air Speed says. ...But maybe that's because I'm a captain with 20,000 hours.

They didn't get STALL data such that they followed it in, and not knowing they were STALLED, they did not think to control out of it.

Huh...? They didn't hear the stall warning? Didn't know that it MEANS stall?

From 2 h 10 min 05, the autopilot then auto-thrust disengaged and the PF said "I have the controls". The airplane began to roll to the right and the PF made a left nose-up input. The stall warning sounded twice in a row. The recorded parameters show a sharp fall from about 275 kt to 60 kt in the speed displayed on the left primary flight display (PFD), then a few moments later in the speed displayed on the integrated standby instrument system (ISIS).

At 2 h 10 min 51, the stall warning was triggered again

After the autopilot disengagement: The airplane climbed to 38,000 ft,
the stall warning was triggered and the airplane stalled, the inputs made by the PF were mainly nose-up, the descent lasted 3 min 30, during which the airplane remained stalled. The angle of attack increased and remained above 35 degrees, the engines were operating and always responded to crew commands. The last recorded values were a pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up, a roll angle of 5.3 degrees left and a vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min.

These were 2 copilots who couldn't fly manual in IMC. :{

infrequentflyer789

16th Oct 2011, 22:10

He held back stick...... What could go wrong, he flies an Airbus?

Why ? Why did he climb ? His first action should be level off. PNF doesn't know either - his comments seem to imply PF is not aware he is climbing.

And what could go wrong if you climb inexorably - Airbus is the first a/c without a service ceiling ?

He's in ALTERNATE LAW, what could go wrong, he is Alpha protected?

He doesn't know his a/c flight modes / laws then.

Wicked speed, insane descent, He'll wait for the a/c to "raise" the nose.

Nose is already up - so you suggest he isn't looking at pitch either ?

What else could be wrong, it can't be STALLED.

Yep, because otherwise we'd have had a stall warning... oh, we did, for 50odd secs, but that's ok that's gone now because we've recovered from that stall, without ever putting the nose down...

He had it figured, wrong, but figured. His idea of recovery was to allow the a/c to recover, as it always does.

But it doesn't - or at least not as I understand it - in particular if you get into alpha-prot mode, you have to act to get out of it. Leave it there and I think you'll end up in a phugoid around your max alt.

Ultimately, all three figured to PULL was the call. ALL THREE.

It happened another way? Funny thing, Airbus pilots aren't quite as harsh on these three, wonder why? They know something we don't?

Maybe they also had no training (at all says the report), and no practice, in hand-flying at altitude. Maybe they have since had 447 scenario thrown at them in sim, before such training, and it didn't go so well... (or they have had the training and then the excercise and are thinking how they might have done untrained).

bubbers44

16th Oct 2011, 22:11

If every pilot had to be trained for every possible situation he could get into to be a qualified pilot he would be in his 40's to get his first job on his own. Pilots are usually people that learn the basics and understand the results of altitude, type of airplane and how thousands of situations can confront you.

A qualified pilot knows how to deal with never before encountered problems. We all did but some people here believe these FO's were not at fault because they were not taught high altitude full stalls in an airplane advertised as stall proof. Well they got into alternate law and couldn't deal with it because it did stall and they didn't know how to recover. Who is at fault for that? I don't blame AF or AB, I blame the pilots. If AF hired them knowing they were not able to handle a stall at all altitudes then maybe they get some blame too.

If these two were allowed to fly by themselves without the captain in the cockpit they should have been more qualified in my opinion.

infrequentflyer789

16th Oct 2011, 22:19

Dozy, it isn't exactly a democracy in the cockpit. It is more of a meritocracy. You warn the other person that they are f'ing up if time permits and then act if you hope to be bouncing your grandkids on your knee.

Problem is that PNF did not act, he punted the problem to the Captain. That is as much of a problem as is PF's handling of the aircraft.

The reasons the PNF did not act need to be understood and corrected.

I think (hope) there will be signficant work on that in the HF report. BEA has already expressed opinion and recommendation (see 4.1 of latest interim report)an absence of training and practice for a crew consisting of
two copilots does not guarantee a level of performance equivalent to a crew consisting of a Captain and a copilot when faced with a degraded situation.
[recommendation] define additional criteria for access to the role of relief Captain so as to ensure better task-sharing in case of relief crews.
AF have already made some changes - 5.1.2 in the report refers.

Lyman

16th Oct 2011, 22:33

GlueBall. Not like you to be coy. He had a STALL WARN at the drop, and the STALL WARN with STALL was concurrent with NO CUES. He'd been briefed STALL could be bogus with UAS, so let's dismount the high horse?

Immediately with the elevated noise in the cockpit, and what do YOU do?

You and others keep repeating data that is not untrue, but needs to be considered with other data. And you do it to frame the Pilots as stupid, newby, ne'er do wells. ENOUGH.

His screen was not recorded, remember? What did he see? What do you think he saw sufficient to condemn him? Was there no data to be recorded? OR was there data that was corrupted, and after boluxing up the deal, did not make it to the DFDR?

You are stuck on "54 SECONDS OF STALL WARN...bla..bla..bla.." Without completeing the picture with what I just posted.

UAS when this deal happened was a crapshoot. 31 crews landed safely, this one went in the drink.

31:1. You like those odds? I cannot believe an underwriter would indemnify anyone with the state of UAS and the sloppy workarounds given the crews forced to fly with it.

After 447, the AF pilots went on strike to cause the Line to get serious about r/r Pitots. Airbus was later forced to issue bulletins, one of which said: DO NOI RESELECT AutoPILOT, the a/c may climb without command.

Come to think of it, 447 did just that.

This: Your A/P disconnects. What do you do? the a/c is trending down, and rolling right. You don't know UAS is what caused the loss, it may be MET. You do nothing? Or do you risk losing something against which to frame PITCH and POWER, NOT KNOWING that is indicated?

ENOUGH.

Infrequent flyer, I've posted this too many times, you know what I think,. and rehashing it solves nothing.

I believe, Heartr and Soul, that taken with some objectivity, there is reasonable explanation for the mistakes that were made.

Except: With UAS, you get AL2. ROLL is direct, PITCH is not, it is commanded through a filter, and Elevators are subject to AUTOTRIM.

To me, what's left of NORMAL LAW amounts to a half assed autopilot, not FBW, so why would you want partial autopilot sharing command of your controls?

seriously

kweken

16th Oct 2011, 22:51

I am not a pilot but I have read this whole thread and would like to get this clarified. The captain was saying 'No, no, no, don't climb'. Doesn't that indicate that he is aware of the stall? And after the computer voice is saying 'pull up, pull up', the captain replies 'Go on: pull'. Is he saying that because he realizes that it is impossible to recover from a stall at below 4000 ft?

Also, why doesn't the captain resume control? Is he just standing there the whole 3.5 minutes?

bubbers44

17th Oct 2011, 00:19

kweken

17th Oct 2011, 00:23

No, he got there in the last minute and couldn't figure out what they had done. He needed to be there in the beginning to know what was happening.
He is the only one I feel had nothing to do with the crash. He was taking his required rest. The two FO's got it into the stall situation it was in. It was too late for him to fix it.

Maybe I wasn't clear enough; because that doesn't answer my question: Doesn't the fact that he told the pilot not to climb, point to that he was aware of them being in a stall?

Also the claim you make that he had to be there to know what was happening doesn't really jive what I have read in this thread. Shouldn't he have been able to tell they were in a stall judging from the loss of altitude? And why didn't he resume the control of the airplane? Why did he just stand there?

CONF iture

17th Oct 2011, 00:37

And why didn't he resume the control of the airplane? Why did he just stand there?
Correct, it is surprising he did not push to get back on his seat and have control on the sidestick.
Actually he came back 2 min 40 sec before the end.

AP remained disengaged, but could we know if they tried to re-engage one ?

kweken

17th Oct 2011, 00:40

What do you mean by "but could we know if they tried to re-engage one"?

bubbers44

17th Oct 2011, 00:54

I don't think any captain with less than one minute of observing what is happening out of sleep could figure out why they are descending 10,000 fpm with the nose up. We normally have competent copilots so don't think this can happen. I always trusted mine. Mine had lots of experience too. These two didn't. We didn't hire people with under 5,000 hrs. It makes a big difference when you hire unqualified people.

CONF iture

17th Oct 2011, 00:54

As the crossbars were visible by intermitence, maybe the crew may have been tempted to re-engage one AP. Would the FDR register an action on either AP pushbutton ?

DozyWannabe

17th Oct 2011, 00:55

... in an airplane advertised as stall proof.

That's a misconception. The protections were "advertised" as being able to prevent stall, this is true - but the "FBW Airbus can't stall" myth came out of press misunderstandings and public misinterpretations. Other modern myths include things like "Apple computers don't crash and can't get viruses" and "ABS in modern cars means braking distances are shorter".

The common thread running through all these myths is that they contain a grain of truth, but have been transmogrified through retelling until they actually become untrue in themselves. Apple computers do crash (and how - believe me!), and in some situations ABS can extend overall stopping distance. People who work with these machines are supposed to know this, but they can't stop the myths from gaining traction.

In the case of the Airbus myth, it is the Normal Law protections that make it almost impossible to stall the thing as long as all systems are functional, but with the failure or disengagement of systems that those protections rely on the aircraft becomes no more difficult to stall than any other airliner in the sky. If the PF was not trained to know that, then it is a massive dereliction of duty on the part of those who trained him. If the PF was trained to know that and in a moment of panic - or under pressure - forgot, then it was a tragic mistake - and one that many more experienced pilots, including senior and decorated Captains, have also made in the past.

kweken

17th Oct 2011, 01:18

I don't think any captain with less than one minute of observing what is happening out of sleep could figure out why they are descending 10,000 fpm with the nose up.

He left the cockpit 9 minutes earlier (if I recall correctly). Do you think he had fallen asleep by then?

And what other cause can there be descending 10,000 fpm with the nose up other than a stall?

bubbers44

17th Oct 2011, 01:23

My neighbor flies All Airbuses and claims alpha protection would make the Hudson River Sully landing easy. Now you are saying that is not true????

DozyWannabe

17th Oct 2011, 01:38

The Hudson landing was accomplished with Normal Law active due to the decisive action of the crew in getting the APU going. Had they not done so and relied instead on the RAT, then the ditching would have been in Direct Law, the protections would not have been active, and it would likely have eroded the safety margin somewhat.

That said, I'd take issue with use of the term "easy" regardless of the context - no water ditching could be considered that based on the things I've read and learned over the years.

Lyman

17th Oct 2011, 01:51

Indeed, what do we know of PF's screens? If a/p was tried, (it had been tried, with uncommanded climb as a result before), and he was confused by his FD, well, who knows? For many reasons, including comment on the second STALL ("pas valide?"), no conclusions re: the right side actions are legit, at this point.

jcjeant

17th Oct 2011, 02:16

Hi,

Lyman
His screen was not recorded, remember? What did he see? What do you think he saw sufficient to condemn him? Was there no data to be recorded? OR was there data that was corrupted, and after boluxing up the deal, did not make it to the DFDR?Indeed, what do we know of PF's screens?May I ask .. what do we know of the NPF screens ?
Recorded ,remember ?
What did he see ? what do you think he saw was sufficient for not bother to take the command of the plane .. and let the PF to condemn him and al ?

bubbers44
than one minute of observing what is happening out of sleepThe captain was not out of sleep .. this is a urban legend
Please check the time chronology .. BEA report N°3 and make some maths to know time gap of captain leave flight deck and captain enter again flight deck
How he can be already sleeping in this amount of time ?
I know that during the two last WW there was soldiers who marched asleep and falling on the ground like a ripe apple ..
If the captain was so tired .. I ask questions about his day of rest at Rio :eek:

bubbers44

17th Oct 2011, 06:36

Ok, even though my neighbor gave the Hudson river ditching credit to the autopilot I didn't agree with him because Sully had to manage his speed to stop his descent rate prior to contact with the water. Landing wings level is quite easy so I give all the credit to Sully for making the best out of a bad situation. I always flew Boeing aircraft by choice so know very little about what it is like to fly the AB. I retired before I had to be concerned with it.

amos2

17th Oct 2011, 06:51

That's a shame bubba, to have finished your career without experiencing the beauty of flying a FBW Airbus. A truly remarkable airplane.

wiggy

17th Oct 2011, 07:28

I don't think any captain with less than one minute of observing what is happening out of sleep could figure out why they are descending 10,000 fpm with the nose up. We normally have competent copilots so don't think this can happen.

Agreed...whilst I agree his handover prior to leaving the flight deck perhaps wasn't the best I think it's a tough ask to expect him to walk onto the flight deck having perhaps been asleep seconds earlier and immediately assimilate all that had gone before (and yes, it is certainly possible to be asleep within 9 minutes of leaving the Flight Deck; been there, seen it, done.... ZZZZZZ).

Lord Spandex Masher

17th Oct 2011, 07:38

Glueball,

I WOULD hear that

Interestingly, at a time of very high stress, you probably wouldn't.

glofish

17th Oct 2011, 07:42

Anyway, the captains role should not weigh in this accident. He was on his break and it is considered legal to leave the two FOs alone. Period.

At a big ME airline, they stow the crew bunks in the furthermost corner of the aircraft, between zillions of passengers and trolleys. Captains would never ever make it to up front again in a panic situation, and it's considered legal by all authorities.

If anyone thinks, the captain could have easily shifted his break, then consider:

- There is not only the very one zone of increased danger on such flights, maybe the other one is 3 hours down the road.
- Each crew member has to have 3 hours of uninterrupted break to have it legally considered.
- Generally the first and the last hour is when the captain is in his seat, legally I think it is only above 20000ft when FOs may occupy the left seat.

Now fit this into the AF flight and you will see, that he was almost constrained to be on his brake at the time.

To me this accident shows that a crew composition of 3 should contain 2 captains. Not only or necessarily because of more experience, but moreover because of the lack of leadership training and inhibit of take-over capabilities. This was very much displayed by the PNF-FO.

Dani

17th Oct 2011, 07:50

blubber, off topic, the Hudson rider was not in normal law because of RAT but because both engines still delivered residual thrust and all hydraulics kept going. I agree that it is much easier to settle down an Airbus in normal law than a conventional aircraft (you just pull - aircraft does the rest, that's where the myth is coming from).

SFI145

17th Oct 2011, 07:54

I think even in these days when training emphasises CRM we are still bound by training scenarios from the piston engine era. All type rated pilots today are proficient in dealing with an engine fire/failure at V1. The chance of actually encountering this with a modern jet aircraft is very small. Apart from seeing a chart labelled 'flight with unreliable airspeed'. I have never been exposed to any simulator training similar to the AF scenario. Should there be a major re-think of initial and re-current type rating requirements?

skip.rat

17th Oct 2011, 09:27

Slightly off-topic, I know, but:
That's a shame bubba, to have finished your career without experiencing the beauty of flying a FBW Airbus. A truly remarkable airplane.

"beauty" - I don't think so. Clever it may be, especially the general ergonomics, comfort & system design, but as far as getting a kick out of flying them; well, it's rather like eating a toffee with the wrapper still on.

jcjeant

17th Oct 2011, 10:26

Hi,

He was on his break and it is considered legal to leave the two FOs alone. Period.So .. no problems .. all were killed .. but with respect of the law..
Dura lex sed lex

DozyWannabe

17th Oct 2011, 13:29

Ok, even though my neighbor gave the Hudson river ditching credit to the autopilot...

OK, now either this is getting lost in translation or I'm seriously concerned. If this neighbour of yours flies the FBW Airbus and is not aware that the autopilot/FMC and the FBW architecture/FCU are completely separate entities, then I'd suggest remedial training!

So - last time, because this is offtopic. Hudson landing was FMC/AP off (i.e manual control), Normal Law (i.e hard protections active).

Clever it may be, especially the general ergonomics, comfort & system design, but as far as getting a kick out of flying them; well, it's rather like eating a toffee with the wrapper still on.

I dunno, looks like it can be fun to me!

IKBABNL-DDM

[EDIT : The video is there as a bit of light-hearted fun, and as a demonstration of two of the Normal Law protections - it is certainly not meant to be considered a serious part of the discussion! ]

DC-ATE

17th Oct 2011, 14:58

I dunno, looks like it can be fun to me!

Well, I dunno, but it looks like a piece of juck to me !! More like an arcade game, NOT something to EVER leave the ground. Guess I'm just too old.

jcjeant

17th Oct 2011, 15:17

Hi,

Notice:
Mostly time ..the right seat pilot keep his hand on the thrust levers :8

Lyman

17th Oct 2011, 15:18

Rather narrow in scope, this video shows the potential problems of a philosophy that has as its goal to prevent pilots from exceeding the a/c limits.

There is nothing fundamentally wrong with such an approach, but the devil is in the intent.

Intention drives every human endeavour, and goals have brackets.

First of all, it presumes to fill a void in aviation that wants expansion. What are the statistics of Loss of Control accidents and parenthetically, CFIT. The answer is there are none that cannot be massaged.......

A premier example of CFIT is the introduction flight of the very aircraft that "introduces" a solution to CFIT. Habsheim.

The pilot exceeded the limits of the a/c, and it crashed. Embarrassing.

The upshot is there are still professional and wellfounded discussions surrounding the philosophy, and "statistics", of course, are utilized parochially to push one or the other agenda.

Clearly, AF 447 exemplifies problems this philosophy has yet to wring out of its expression in commercial flight. Criticism comes from her own pilot crews, and those of the main competitor.

There are first hand criticisms of real time events in the record.

"Je ne comprends riens". "What is wrong?" "What do we do"?

"Disregard the STALL". "Do NOT disregard the STALL". "Do NOT re-select the autopilot". "The aircraft may climb unexpectedly"

These are incendiaries, to be sure. The important part of the conversation is the conclusion that there is no conclusion. This is troubling at every level.

AF 447 is too full of failures to isolate the philosophy of the design as cause. Did it contribute? That is the question.

And that there is such a question remaining is troubling. Doubt is no friend of safe travel.

ChristiaanJ

17th Oct 2011, 16:31

A premier example of CFIT is the introduction flight of the very aircraft that "introduces" a solution to CFIT. Habsheim.
The pilot exceeded the limits of the a/c, and it crashed. Embarrassing.Quoting the "Habsheim Clown" in this context is enough to get you discredited wih the few remaining people here that try to come up with valid (and occasionally valuable) comments. Keep it up.

before landing check list

17th Oct 2011, 17:19

From the video (and many earlier posts) Seems like the design enable mediocre pilots the ability to fly with ease if there are not too many demands on them. Let's visit the bank limiter. Apparently it is there so a person with little ability/situational awareness will not exceed what the software engineer figured out what the limits shall be. Can anyone imagine why you would ever need to exceed them? What about to avoid a mid air? Not that it would require a 90 degree bank but it is nice to know it is there if needed, but wait, you have to be able to actually fly in that regime in order for it to be effective. What? No prior experience/training in those 1000 hours of experience?
Next lets discuss the system that prevents a stall. Why is it there? Maybe so inexperienced pilots can cope with most situations. We need an aircraft for the masses, check this out....ERCO Ercoupe - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ercoupe)

I am not actually belittling the airplane or design. All if I am saying that is if we keep designing airplane so foolproof we need to stop producing fools that fly them with little or no practical experience.

Chronus

17th Oct 2011, 18:18

Any of you on the forum with test flight experience, particularly with fast jets may well wish to consider why large aircraft cannot be equipped with stall recovery parachute systems.

DozyWannabe

17th Oct 2011, 18:18

From the video (and many earlier posts) Seems like the design enable mediocre pilots the ability to fly with ease if there are not too many demands on them.

Or, you know, giving good pilots the knowledge that, more than 99% of the time, there's something covering their back if they make a mistake, or knowing that they can push the limits of the airframe safely if they need to make a positive evasive maneouvre.

Let's visit the bank limiter. Apparently it is there so a person with little ability/situational awareness will not exceed what the software engineer figured out what the limits shall be.

The text in bold makes me sad. How many times can I say that the limits were set by the aerodynamicists and aero engineers - and discussed with the engineering pilots (in consultation with line pilots) - before the software engineers got anywhere near it until it sinks in?

Can anyone imagine why you would ever need to exceed them? What about to avoid a mid air? Not that it would require a 90 degree bank but it is nice to know it is there if needed...

A 90 degree bank would endanger the structural integrity of the airframe, especially if pulling G's in the pitch axis. The protections in the A320 allow the pilot to order a full right bank up to 67 degrees and will keep the G loading below 2.5 if pulling, as specified by the aero engineers who designed the thing - if you need more than that for an escape maneouvre then you shouldn't be on the flight deck in the first place.

but wait, you have to be able to actually fly in that regime in order for it to be effective. What? No prior experience/training in those 1000 hours of experience?

That's the point, the protections allow you to do it safely - whether you're the best pilot in the world and know the precise airframe limits or not - because pilots like Gordon Corps tested the thing to the aerodynamic limits and discovered what was safe, and included those limits in the design. In Normal Law you can pull full back and bank and the aircraft will give you the maximum possible response without fear of doing damage.

Next lets discuss the system that prevents a stall. Why is it there? Maybe so inexperienced pilots can cope with most situations.

As I said before, even the best pilots have bad days, just ask KLM. The point is that if you exceed the safe AoA in Normal Law then the aircraft will have your back.

I am not actually belittling the airplane or design. All if I am saying that is if we keep designing airplane so foolproof we need to stop producing fools that fly them with little or no practical experience.

Cutting back on training was never the intent of any FBW airliner design no matter which side of the Atlantic they are built. That particular SNAFU belongs squarely at the door of airline management.

TTex600

17th Oct 2011, 18:30

Before Landing Check List,

I doubt that Airbus attempted to design an aircraft for the lowest common denominator. As someone else stated, airline management has mistakenly decided that the protections/etc are a substitute for stick and rudder skills.

In my short six years flying narrowbody Airbii, I've realized that the airplane demands a masters degree level of understanding in order to deal with any situation other than normal. In A447's case, the pilots were faced with the need to properly evaluate the situation, to understand what changed in the 330's flying characteristics depending on the exact failure/control law downgrade, to hand fly an aircraft with different flight characteristics than they had likely EVER experienced, etc.

Airline management, especially in my US LCC experience, attempts to short cut training to save money. For example, my carrier only trained UAS after this accident. IOW, the manufacturer is not responsible for the cost cutting in training.

I'd still rather fly a Douglas.

DozyWannabe

17th Oct 2011, 19:00

As someone else stated, airline management has mistakenly decided that the protections/etc are a substitute for stick and rudder skills.

Hurrah - he gets it!

In my short six years flying narrowbody Airbii, I've realized that the airplane demands a masters degree level of understanding in order to deal with any situation other than normal.

Really? The fact that a planeload of people got out of the Hudson River cold, wet, but very much alive would tend to go against that suggestion, especially given that that A320 involved was not much more than a sophisticated glider for the few minutes it was in the air, and those few minutes were all the crew had to troubleshoot and land it.

I mean sure, ECAM output can look very dense and not especially human-friendly, but it's no different than Boeing or MD's equivalent, and you don't need to process pages of ECAM to keep the thing in the air - that's your colleague's lookout, and he or she will tell you what you need to know.

In A447's case, the pilots were faced with the need to properly evaluate the situation, to understand what changed in the 330's flying characteristics depending on the exact failure/control law downgrade, to hand fly an aircraft with different flight characteristics than they had likely EVER experienced, etc.

Well, seeing as they apparently hadn't manually handled *any* jet at high altitude, that's going to be a problem no matter what they were flying.

While it's very easy to say this from my little office/den, and I acknowledge that - the handling characteristics don't change a great deal between Normal and Alternate Law - pitch handling is practically identical, and roll is slightly more sensitive in the latter.

To the best of our knowledge, what was presented at the start of the sequence was this:

FMS/AP Disconnect - So you're going to have to handle her manually. Be prepared, but first of all do nothing with the controls for a few seconds to see what she's doing by herself. Any inputs you make must be slow and gradual.

Unreliable Airspeed indications - OK, so you don't know how fast you're going via the usual channels, and you're in moderate turbulence, so just keep her straight and level using small and gradual inputs if you have to. Use pitch and power to keep her stable.

Alternate Law 2 - So now you have to fly the aircraft manually with no hard protections, so be even more careful with your inputs. She wants to fly, so keep pitch and power steady (bring power up a little if you have to - if, say, you pulled the power back to transit turbulence earlier on).

If any of that seems more difficult than it would be in any other airliner, for what it's worth I can't see it.

I'd still rather fly a Douglas.

As an SLF well-versed on some of what that company did in the '60s and '70s I can assure you I wouldn't!

Fly380

17th Oct 2011, 19:21

Is it all not progress? When I did my A320 course in Toulouse in 1988 ( course 4 I think ) not many people had mobile phones. I used to fly to Lagos frequently before that and there was no telephone service that worked in Nigeria. All of a sudden mobile phones arrived there and the problem solved. Should the Nigerians have been taught to use the old system first or was it cheating to use mobiles? We have millions of motorists using GPS systems and a good majority couldn't read a map I would guess. It's the same with ships that still seem to run aground/sink etc. There have been many aircraft accidents recently like THY into Amsterdam where they actually unbelieveably managed to stall on the approach. Technology will continue to make a pilots' job easier and it can't be stopped. Does anyone really think that Airbus are going to give up the sidestick and non-moving thrust levers. It's progress. The horrible truth about AF447 is that they didn't avoid the thunderstorms and everything that happenned after was a result of this.
All the talk about heavy crew, captain going on his/her rest at the wrong time is irrelevent as the remaining 2 pilots in control should have been just as competent as the Captain. The fact that they were not would seem to point to Air France training issues. I guess what I am getting at is that technology is trying to make the pilots job easier and that is not likely to change because in theory it makes the whole flying operation safer and that's what the passengers and everyone else wants. Gone are the days of us old Jet Provost pilots, now it's all autopilots, flight management systems, TCAS, ACARS and the rest of it. I don't think pilotless airliners are anywhere in the near future (passengers wouldn't fly on them) but look at the success of the Drones against Al Quaida.
I flew the Air France route more times than I can remember and it was always dodgy around the ITCZ but we always deviated the cbs by as much as was necessary. The reactions of the AF pilots was amazing by initially not avoiding the weather and then allowing the most junior of the 3 pilots to a) fly into the weather and b) allow him to control the situation catastrophically whilst the other co-pilot appeared to let it happen without questioning it until it was too late. The poor old Captain appeared when it was far too late, hardly his fault and whether it was a bad decision to have taken his rest at that time I would dispute as his copilots should have been just as competent as him. That's the way it was in the airline I flew for. Anyways that's my view as one of the first A320 pilots and a great believer in the product and subsequent variants ie 340, 330, 380 and future products.

Lyman

17th Oct 2011, 19:32

The aircraft was designed to protect itself against just such clowns. I agree, but he was not a clown, nor was he anyone's concierge. He was a line pilot, I know little about him, and of course it shows that any aircraft will foul up.

The knock on Airbus has always been that the aircraft is aloof, and can be mystifying, to even qualified pilots.

I'd have thought that the builder of the aircraft would have exercised better judgment in selecting a pilot to show off.

Look, the aircraft crashed, and it must have been embarrassing all around.

Irony, or maybe comeuppance?

Off to a bad start, then.

Great hoorah here about "Interface". What a disastrous word. It is generally applied to more sophisticated models than pilot/plane.

It is a machine. It is not complex, and it is not someone's poodle. The part about flying this machine with some special deference is pathetic. No quarrel with the platform.

I admire the spunk it must have taken to continue with the idea. Most designers and builders after such a kerfuffle would get into building tractors, or summat.

Habsheim is a mythic, Chris, an epic, even. Beowulf, or the Odyssey. Acceptance of its majesty brings one peace.

Wait. Achilles, then.

Smilin_Ed

17th Oct 2011, 19:44

Dozy:
To the best of our knowledge, what was presented at the start of the sequence was this:
FMS/AP Disconnect - So you're going to have to handle her manually. Be prepared, but first of all do nothing with the controls for a few seconds to see what she's doing by herself. Any inputs you make must be slow and gradual.
Unreliable Airspeed indications - OK, so you don't know how fast you're going via the usual channels, and you're in moderate turbulence, so just keep her straight and level using small and gradual inputs if you have to. Use pitch and power to keep her stable.
Alternate Law 2 - So now you have to fly the aircraft manually with no hard protections, so be even more careful with your inputs. She wants to fly, so keep pitch and power steady (bring power up a little if you have to - if, say, you pulled the power back to transit turbulence earlier on).
If any of that seems more difficult than it would be in any other airliner, for what it's worth I can't see it.

(My bolding above.)

Absolutely correct! But there is a bit more. Someone, maybe Dozy, asked me earlier what an experienced pilot would do when confronted with the AF447 situation. My response was essentially Dozy's answer above. But, it seems to me that the big thing missing in training of pilots flying highly automated aircraft is the absolute need for the crew to constantly be monitoring just what the autopilot and the flight control system are doing. You need to be fully aware of the situation every second. You might be a bit relaxed in daylight and VMC, but at night in foul weather the PF needs to have his eyes glued to the attitude indicator with occasional glances at other instruments such as altimeter, airspeed indicator, and engine instruments. If he does that, he will instantly know the situation when something goes amiss and the autopilot and/or autothrottle click off. As long as attitude doesn't change too drastically, airspeed won't either. Then he simply needs to ride it out while discussing things with the other pilot. If power was set properly to begin with, the natural stability of the aircraft will keep everything else in line. As soon as he changes anything, he upsets the apple cart. I think complacency has caused pilots to assume that the autopilot and flight control system will correct for all problems. As we can see from this most regrettable incident, they won't.

SeenItAll

17th Oct 2011, 19:52

While I have been reading all of this stuff for the last 2+ years, I may have forgotten something -- but here goes anyway. This most recent discussion has been whether the crew could have done something better to identify and recover from the stall. But doesn't this beg the question of, "why did they get into the stall in the first place?"

The plane was cruising in level flight at FL350, when (presumably) the pitots iced, speed indications became unreliable, and the autopilot clicked off. The PF reacted to this "situation" by hauling back on the sidestick and zoom-climbing to FL380. This zoom-climb then caused the stall.

Now has any reason been presented explaining why the PF's reaction to the aforementioned events was logical and appropriate for an A330-trained and rated pilot? Unless such an explanation exists, I think the source of the problem (and an important contributor to why there was no successful subsequent maneuvering to a recovery) becomes fairly apparent.

Dani

17th Oct 2011, 20:08

Of course the initial mistake was the biggest one, but people are discussing here what could have been done if they would have realized what had happened in the first place. Normally, in an accident, it is possible to react and save the plane. But in this accident it might have been very very difficult.

DC-ATE

17th Oct 2011, 20:51

SeenItAll-
The PF reacted to this "situation" by hauling back on the sidestick and zoom-climbing to FL380. This zoom-climb then caused the stall.
Now has any reason been presented explaining why the PF's reaction to the aforementioned events was logical and appropriate for an A330-trained and rated pilot?

Maybe he was trying to get closer to the Sun to melt the ice ?!?!

bubbers44

17th Oct 2011, 21:13

DC, it was night time so hopefully the reason he pulled up was just that he didn't know how to hand fly and decided to pull up for no good reason. Now we can prevent this from happening again by teaching people how to hand fly an airliner so it doesn't happen again.

To do this you have to hire more qualified people to fly your jets. People that could pass an ATP check ride for instance without an autopilot. Remember, that is what we did back when even with that you were lucky to get an airline job. We could even figure out how to do things in an airplane we hadn't been trained for because we were pilots, not programmers.

Only this will require paying more than 18K per year for a 300 hr pilot mill graduate. That is the part airline management hates.

DC-ATE

17th Oct 2011, 21:36

Ya.....I know it was night, bubbers44. Just tryin' to make a funny.
Good luck with your proposal for new pilots !! Just glad I'm outta this racket. The highest I EVER get off the ground now is getting in and out of my 4-wheeler !!

Dani

17th Oct 2011, 22:11

Not sure if you can really avoid this type of freak accident by hiring more/better people. AF might have one of the more traditional approach to aviation with more and more experienced crew per aircraft than any other western airline. It's more of a mindset, less of a training issue. This will change after the final report or at least we hope so.

Even with the best training in the world (which AF probably doesn't) you can never avoid that one pilot gets it wrong. The one who gets it wrong was the one at the wrong time at the wrong place, the holes of the cheese fit together and bummm there we are. As someone correctly mentioned, there were dozends of similar incidents of pitot icing on A330/340 during the last few years and never ever did something happen.

I remember being in a simulator with a fellow captain in a well reputable TRTO when we trained TCAS/ACAS and the captain beside me turned out to be completly inproficient in his reaction, pulling up to the hard stop when he heard Mr. Airbus calling "climb, climb". When we asked him, he said he never trained TCAS before. It's as unexcusable as the AF FOs, but it happens, there is always something happening, because we are not living in a perfect world. And when several mistakes happen at the same time, people are dying. And it will happen again, but in other circumstances and with other failures. Just because there were two incapable persons in the cockpit doesn't mean that our aviation system is wrong, training is wrong and bean counters are wrong. Because 99.9999% of all pilots would have handled the incident completly sufficient and safe.

We can safely argue that there must have been a lack of knowledge and/or training in Air France, after the second pull up exercise, so this problem will be solved, hopefully, soon. Then everyone back to his/her station and then we can finally finish this discussion. Anyone agree?

Smilin_Ed

17th Oct 2011, 22:52

A freak accident is one where an unusual situation brings it about. The situation was not unusual or unique. Different types of aircraft from various airlines transit the ITCZ multiple times each day. It just so happens that two, or maybe three, of the pilots assigned to this flight were not up to the challenge and a failure of an aircraft system occurred when these three were assigned. While it is true that the holes in the cheese did line up for this one, that happens for every accident and, in this one, there are readily identifiable contributors to the final result. I was once a passenger on a flight where the holes lined up to cause a crash but they lined up again and I was able to escape. In that case, the authorities recognized the multiple causes and took appropriate action. We must not allow anything less than full effort in correcting those multiple causes. Calling this a freak accident reduces the impetus to correct the identified problems.

bubbers44

17th Oct 2011, 22:52

No, I don't agree because there are thousands of pilots a day flying around commanding a wide body airliner with experience like these two that couldn't handle a simple loss of air speed and autosystems without crashing. Flying attitude and power must have been above their flying skills with their low time.

I would hope that we learn from this crash and make sure at least one competent pilot who can fly manually is in the cockpit. One way is to require two real captains, not type rated copilots who haven't really been given a real check ride. I know this sounds harsh but the pressure is on to pass the FO type rated pilot so they can fly over 8 hrs on international flights. They get a lot of breaks so they pass. Usually the captain check is made to guaranty he can command the aircraft.

This is my observation. It may differ elsewhere.

before landing check list

18th Oct 2011, 05:03

I see your point Dozy but I have to make exception to this...A 90 degree bank would endanger the structural integrity of the airframe, especially if pulling G's in the pitch axis. The protections in the A320 allow the pilot to order a full right bank up to 67 degrees and will keep the G loading below 2.5 if pulling, as specified by the aero engineers who designed the thing - if you need more than that for an escape maneouvre then you shouldn't be on the flight deck in the first place.

The 320 that ended in the Hudson was flown with more then basic training given by the company I am sure. Who is to say YOU will not need the "escape maneouvre" when you fly tomorrow dude?

Bank angle itself is almost irrelevant pertaining to "G"loading. I'll bet I can roll one without exceeding much more then 1.5 at the bottom. It will depend on how much and at what rate your pull (pitch). Right? (A basic acro course would sort that out rather fast)
I still say it is nice to be able to have the bank angle and pitch authority not dictated by the computers of the aircraft but a will trained crew who actually knows how to fly.
As far as the "escape maneouvre" goes it is still better to have the tools and not need them (the ability to fly beyond normal limits) then the inverse eh? However that would require more then basic flying skills and FMS management.

charron1

18th Oct 2011, 05:21

One thing always puzzled me is why AF447 never made any attempts to alter the flight path to navigate a major storm? All of the other 5 flights, including the one right behind (ELY10) made some attempts to avoid the storm while 447 seems to hit it head on without any corrections. Is it possible that the crew thought that they were above the storm cloud or did they choose to disregard the weather warnings?

andianjul

18th Oct 2011, 07:25

Sorry for the OT, but, wait, Dozy, I always understood that a car (sorry, automobile) with ABS will stop in the shortest possible distance - all I have to do is stomp on the brake pedal and let the 'computer' do the rest... Is this untrue? :confused:

GerardC

18th Oct 2011, 08:05

andianjul, you are not entirely "OT". What Dozy means is that, in modern times, we are lead to believe that "computers" do it better than you.
This is not always the case : any professional car racer will beat any ABS stopping distance any day.
The point with cars/automobile ABS is NOT achieving shorter stopping distances but to keep directional control of the car by preventing wheel locks.
To prevent wheel locks, the "computer" releases the brakes : it is easy to understand that braking action is lower when brakes are released.
On the other hand, a professional car racer is smart enough to keep braking to the maximum sustainable braking power without locking the wheels thus retaining braking power AND directional ability.

There is a big training issue here : drivers are not (enough) aware that ABS has been installed to keep directional control of the vehicle in order to avoid obstacles, not to get the best possible stopping distance.

The same is true with A/C "autobrake" : if pilots were smart enough to "feel" the maximum braking power they can get without locking any wheel, they would achieve shorter stopping distances (no brake releases).

before landing check list

18th Oct 2011, 09:30

Exactly. Well said.

AlphaZuluRomeo

18th Oct 2011, 10:54

"soft" limits vs "hard" limits, an old debate...

The evaluation team preferred the flight envelope limiting features ("soft limits") of the B777 design to a "hard limit" design. This was a subjective judgement based on the premise that there may be situations unforeseen by the designers where the pilot might need to achieve full aerodynamic capability as opposed to being software/control law limited.
Source : Comparative study, CFIT avoidance, A332/777 (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/Research/Other/Article/RogReports/Rogers_99_CFIT_FBW.pdf) (worth the reading!)

That's about statistics... if more accident because pilot overstress/stalls/overbanks the aircraft, than from aircraft preventing pilots to go to the (aerodynamical) limits, then hard protections seems better.
Other advantage of the latter are to offer constant/guaranted performance (more than pilots, in fact, who are human...)

O/T about the ABS : Braking action (from brakes to wheels) is lower when brakes are released, that's true.
But OTOH, on most surfaces, breaking is more efficient (and distance shorter) when the wheels are not locked (IIRC).
=> ABS provides:
- on all surfaces (dry, wet, mud, snow) the best directional control. 100% of the time.
- on most surfaces (dry, wet) shorter stopping distance than most of drivers can achieve. 90% of the time.
As an educated driver, I would like to be able to switch off the ABS when I drive on fresh snow. I can do that by pulling the breaker, but it's not very practical so most of the time I let it on (and know that I won't be able to achieve the shortest stopping distance).

Gretchenfrage

18th Oct 2011, 11:43

Very good link indeed AZR.

I guess the pilot's statement says it all.

What is even more compelling, is the continuation of this recommendation:

Another approach may be to incorporate “hard limits” with a pilot override capability such as an “instinctive cut-out” switch. Or alternately, the CFIT recovery capability on the 777 could be enhanced if the aircraft’s Primary Flight Computers (PFC) were design to recognize aggressive pilot inputs as a desire for maximum aircraft performance. The PFCs would then provide maximum pitch rate consistent with AOA or g limits (depending on airspeed). If the resultant aircraft performance was not sufficient, the pilot could then pull to the full aerodynamic capability of the aircraft. Additionally, automatic speed brake retraction, in the event of a go around or CFIT escape maneuver, should be provided in the 777 design. This system although somewhat complex mechanically, can be implemented since the PFCs will control any undesired pitch excursions.

I have repeatedly asked for such a cut-out switch on Airbus.

A little further away from CFITs, there are the two recent 0 power (or almost 0 power) accidents: Hudson and LHR.

It has been fastiduously pretended, that Sully only could succeed in putting his 320 on the hudson, due to the Airbus FBW. I believe if you can do that with a Cessna or a 320, it is just as much possible with a T7. The Aethiopian might have succeeded, if the thug was not strangling the pilot.
So no advantage to AB-FBW here.

I just wonder now, if with a 330 the LHR accident would have been as benign. Didn't the pilot oversteer the impending stall to reach the runway? In an Airbus this would have been inhibited .....

Again, to me the, although as stated "subjective", the verdict of the test pilots clearly says it all.

Airbus might simply consider to implement that cut-out switch! Their version consisting of a bulletin to tell the pilots to switch off two Prims and one Sec, is not practicable, allthough basically admitting, that such a possibility is necessary.

Who knows, it might have helped on AF447

DozyWannabe

18th Oct 2011, 11:51

I'll bet I can roll one without exceeding much more then 1.5 at the bottom.

I'll bet no manufacturer would let you try!

I still say it is nice to be able to have the bank angle and pitch authority not dictated by the computers of the aircraft but a will trained crew who actually knows how to fly.

Where do you think the numbers in the computers came from, if not the engineering pilots (one of whom was the best in the business) who tested the thing and worked out it's limits?

Just because the protections are there doesn't mean you should go out of your way to use them - you can still be a brilliant hand-flyer and stick to your normal limits. Perhaps it would help if pilots saw the computers as there to help (which they are) rather than something to be fought against.

I'm prepared to bet that aerobatically trained pilots were incredibly rare on the line during the entire history of modern aviation - the lack thereof now has nothing to do with "FMS programming".

GF - we've had the BRB argument on the other threads - we don't need another one here. Also, the pilot of BA038 elected to stretch the glide by raising the flaps - that is all, and nothing in the Airbus flight envelope protections would have stopped him.

Dropp the Pilot

18th Oct 2011, 12:27

You can really shorten the whole Airbus-design-flaws conversation with the following observation.:

Two of Airbus' own test pilots fatally crashed an A330 one mile from where it was built after 1 minute of flight time because even they didn't understand the repercussions of ALT*, a mode less-prepared pilots will see dozens of times a day.

Any further observations?

DozyWannabe

18th Oct 2011, 12:39

Actually the test pilots were at the end of a long day, when most mistakes happen, and in any case - after that accident, Airbus changed the design.

CONF iture

18th Oct 2011, 12:43

I'll bet no manufacturer would let you try!

Ra_khhzuFlE

Gretchenfrage

18th Oct 2011, 12:46

.... and pilots are never at the end of a long day.

We all fly our butts off, at the back side of the clock, after 12 hours in noisy hotels or resting in crew bunks that would shock animal rights activists!
Days of legal 22 hours duty time, one inflight-rest accorded, maybe maximum 7 hours. Consecutive night shifts, paired with a superb dayshift and minimum days off, somewhat 8 a month.

And you come up with such a lame excuse.
Get real Dozy, under which stone were you hiding???? :ugh:

DozyWannabe

18th Oct 2011, 13:14

@CONF - And what did the Chairman of Boeing say to Tex Johnson after that little exercise?

@GF - it's not an excuse, it's just the way it was. Nick Warner's crash was to do with FMC (i.e. autopilot) mode confusion rather than flight laws however.

GlueBall

18th Oct 2011, 13:23

It's noteworthy how many Bus drivers appear on this thread who seem to diverge on what exactly the flight controls and protections do under different Laws.

DozyWannabe

18th Oct 2011, 13:37

It's worth bearing in mind that not all who claim to be 'Bus drivers in fact are, and if they are and don't know, then it says more about them than anything else. The basics are covered pretty well on Wikipedia, fergawd'ssake!

[CAVEAT : I'm not a 'Bus driver, nor even a line pilot, for those who don't already know - never been ashamed to admit it. ]

saltyfish

18th Oct 2011, 13:56

Dear All,

In view of the length that the AF447 thread(s) are reaching, I'm afraid that most of us who care about aviation will have to face the cold reality:

1- The blame will be pinned on the crew (because irrespective of what truly took place, dead guys cant defend themselves).

2- AF will make some amendments to its crew training (to try to prevent this from happening again, and mostly to save face).

3-AB will not be held liable, but will make a few software changes in the background (because doing otherwise would be an admission of guilt).

4-The next of kin will get much less compensation than they deserve (because they don't have AB's and AF's deep pockets and cant afford a hire lobbyists and politicians).

5-The bean counters will consider that accidents such as this one constitute an "acceptable risk" and the whole thing will be filed under the "cost of doing business" category.

6-Back to business as usual and if something like this were to happen again, then something will be done about it but only if it is cheaper than paying compensation/lawyers/politicians/lobbyists/legal fees/courts etc. and the dead will fade into statistical anonymity.

There's my two cents worth.

Regards;

ChristiaanJ

18th Oct 2011, 14:50

Dozy and CONF,

Concorde was an FBW aircraft (although an earlier generation), and could be and has been barrel-rolled repeatedly.

Unfortunately there is no video....

TTex600

18th Oct 2011, 16:14

Dozy wannabe,

Are you a pilot?

cyflyer

18th Oct 2011, 16:24

Concorde was an FBW aircraft (although an earlier generation), and could be and has been barrel-rolled repeatedly.

Thats an absurd claim. Where did you get this info from ?

CONF iture

18th Oct 2011, 16:31

Concorde has been barrel-rolled repeatedly
No video is a shame ... but the Big question seems to be : Did it repeatedly get the approval's manufacturer to do so ... ?

saltyfish, do not forget 1A in people's mind : Pilots are cause number 1 for crashes, we need less of them and more automation ...

DozyWannabe

18th Oct 2011, 16:33

Dozy wannabe,

Are you a pilot?

No, nor do I pretend to be (I would be if I could afford it!). But neither am I an idiot, and I make up for not having controlled an aircraft for real since my AEF Chippy days with a whole bundle of book-learnin'.

@CJ - Concorde's structure is a lot more rigid than your average widebody, as well you know. :)

@cyflier - You'll find out... *gets popcorn*

@CONF - That's because people don't read properly. I think the number banded about is that around 80% of aviation accidents are down to human error. What people don't realise is that number includes maintenance, ground staff and ATC as well as pilots.

Organfreak

18th Oct 2011, 16:46

Thats an absurd claim. Where did you get this info from ?

Anecdotal evidence, but trustworthy.

Concorde Captain talks about Barrel Roll - YouTube

Tourist

18th Oct 2011, 17:08

Erm...
I think you'll find 100% are down to human error if you look deep enough.

Lyman

18th Oct 2011, 17:27

From the part of the CVR that has everything to do with the impact:

1. The PNF appears to have the suss of the a/c better than PF.

2. PNF repeatedly cautions PF's PITCH and rate excursions.

3. PNF alerts PF to excessive "Lateral Control"

4. PNF's screen was recorded.

Pilot Flying's screen did not show up as recorded. 1+1=2. What did the flying pilot see? Will we hear more of the CVR? Given PF was so clearly unsure of his attitude, is anyone else going to entertain that he could not establish level for a reason? He had ROLL, but unless a determination of the DFDR traces shows conclusively A/P was NOT reselected, a question.

Was The Pilot Flying commanding the climb?

Or was he trimming to it?

If no history of uncommanded climb existed, it would not probably be a question that comes to the fore.

But there is such a history, in the record. One should look for proof that PF was causing the climb to 38. Not the aircraft.

OK465

18th Oct 2011, 17:30

I think you'll find 100% are down to human error if you look deep enough.

Ingesting an unseen flock of birds into an engine or two is human error?

Lyman

18th Oct 2011, 17:33

OK465

HUMAN error, senor, not PILOT ERROR. Twas humans what built an airfield on the flyway. We're all guilty, even those who are not.

ChristiaanJ

18th Oct 2011, 17:38

Thats an absurd claim. Where did you get this info from ?A long tale, but it's common knowledge in the Concorde world.

Jean Franchi, one of the French Concorde test pilots, did it repeatedly, until it was spotted by a journalist, who had the common sense of phoning Aerospatiale before publishing his 'scoop''.
As it happened, he was put through directly to André Turcat, then director of Concorde flight test, who, at the time, more or less said "You must have mistaken a Mirage (delta-wing plane) for Concorde. You should know one doesn't roll an aircraft the size of Concorde." Hence the story was never published.

History has never recounted what passed between Turcat and Franchi.... but it was probably in the same style of the original 707 meeting... "I know you've done it. I know it can be done. I know you'll do it again. But please, do it outside the view of nosey journalists."

And yes, Jean did it again....
There is a video of Brian Walpole (BA) where he confirms doing the same kind of barrel roll with Jean Franchi (Organfreak posted the link).
And during a fairly recent conference, Turcat himself also confirmed it. I was there, and I still remember his remark.... "One of the things I most regret was never having done it myself....".

And, slightly O/T, maybe you remember the Concorde "Airport" movie? With the daft looping, and Alain Delon opening the DV window at Mach 2 and firing flares? All the low-altitude flying over the "Alps" (in reality the Pyrénées) in that movie is real, and it was Jean Franchi the pilot. It was before the days of CGI.

Jean Franchi suggested doing a barrel roll in front of the LearJet, instead of the loopy 'looping', but somehow it never happened.
Or maybe one is still on film somewhere, now hidden in an archive....

CJ

OK465

18th Oct 2011, 17:43

...if you look deep enough.

That IS looking pretty DEEP. :)

From my perspective as a bird lover and animal rights semi-activist (my dog gets his annual shots), I would say there would also be a measure of avian error involved. :}

ATC Watcher

18th Oct 2011, 17:47

Ingesting an unseen flock of birds into an engine or two is human error?

Yes, today it can . In areas of known bird migration equipment and checking with people watching those birds know where they are , time , altitude direction , etc... Collecting and disiminated that info cost ressources and money. Someone somewhere has made the decision that this is not cost effective. Hence no detailed warning.
The Hudson A320 bird strike for instance could have been prevented, but at a cost. Probaly a big one, but someone ( a human ) has decided this was not worth the money. We can continue with more such examples if you want .
Yes. ultimately, whether it is FBW programmers, Certification aithorities, someone , a human, is behind. So 100% human error is not far off. That is also what Sydney Dekker is advocating today BTW.

OK465

18th Oct 2011, 18:09

I don't know whether to laugh or cry.....

Mr Angry from Purley

18th Oct 2011, 18:31

"The beancounters will accept such accidents as acceptable risk"
What a load of bollixs, have you attended a Safety Board? :ugh:

John Farley

18th Oct 2011, 18:44

OK465

I cannot agree with you that all aircraft accidents are not down to human error.

In my view birds and lightning are both down to us as we know they both exist where we fly and we chose to press on and fly regardless.

Only humans design, build, develop, service and operate aircraft. God does not - whichever God you have.

JF

before landing check list

18th Oct 2011, 19:10

I'll bet no manufacturer would let you try!

I'll bet you are correct. I was just trying to dispel a common misconception that bank angle automatically equates to loading. You do not have to be "aerobatic trained" to know this, all you need is some experience. That is why I made the comment the aircraft is for the masses. Like the Ercoup.

Lyman

18th Oct 2011, 19:23

Of course the 330 will roll. And STALL.

It is perfect only in NORMAL LAW, and before the bank gets >67, or the AoA crit, it changes clothing, as a chameleon. It is this different iteration that is problematic, as this crew found it.

"Tire, Tire, Tire....."

By day, an Ercoupe. By night, able to leap tall buildings.......kind of.

Why so much emphasis on NL training? Isn't the "other" the presenting problem?

A Capeless Superman? Waiter! This fish has bones!

saltyfish

18th Oct 2011, 20:07

Nope, but I'm a bean counter :E

Dani

18th Oct 2011, 21:08

Thanks for that, Studi, agree 100%. :ok:

Alley Oops

18th Oct 2011, 21:13

http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/statusicon/post_old.gif 14th Oct 2011, 22:54 #63 (http://www.pprune.org/6751971-post63.html) (permalink (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/466259-af447-final-crew-conversation-4.html#post6751971)) lyo (http://www.pprune.org/members/113648-lyo)

Join Date: Jun 2005
Location: earth
Posts: 14

Hi all
Had a conversation with an AI FE. He told me about a test flight last summer.
3 test pilots, an air asia 330 And a flight test program. Vmc day light over the Jay of Biscaye in a dedicated flight test area.
This guys reconfigured the lad in alternate 2, stable fl 350, zoomed to fl380, entered a Stall. It developed into a deep Stall. No information about ths position though.
Eventually, they recovered at ...6000ft... As the elevator authority was lost, deep Stall, they found themselves powerless using standard techniques to recover from it. A rudder input induced a spin which Led to a dive And our test pilots recovered This tricky Stall. These guys reported that they felt the end was near...
I hope the live feed he witnessed that day Will be Made available for all pilots to learn from guys who were prepared And trained for that event.

Had some discussion with my checkees prior to a LOFT session and the checkee captain ( a TRI ) was scathing in his criticism of these AF447 pilots. We all agreed to do some manual flying exercises after the LOFT session and the LOFT exercise would be a little bit non standard, a little bit out of the ordinary.

I improvised by giving the Captain a very light aircraft climbing to FL390 in night IMC, with some small electrical problems, window arcing then with a badly cracked left forward windshield window ( verbally simulated, with the outer pane cracked impairing visibility ). We then obscured the left windshield with a manila card board; the TRI was in his element as they went through the ECAM and QRH, transferring control to his F/O.

Earlier I had programmed the loss of all PRIMs and SEC 1 together with unreliable airspeed/radome loss with turbulence with a TCAS climb event; as we were messing around with taping up the manila card, the crew's checklist procedure and simulated ATC calls, all the programmed events kicked in with all the crazy warnings. To cut a long story short; it wasn't pretty, the sim ended up in the drink!!!

We then had a very, very quiet session of many visual circling approaches which both checkees performed to acceptable standards ( they were obviously still rattled after ending up in the drink! ). Both looked were very chastised; we then revisited the previous LOFT scenario with each failure coming sequentially one by one which they managed reasonably well.

During the debrief, we had the litany of usual excuses. However they were more circumspect and understood that we might never know the actual " atmosphere and displays " in the AF447 cockpit. To this day, I am not 100% confident that had I been in the Af447 cockpit that night that I could have recovered before we hit water; sorry I am just an average pilot who happened to be a TRE!

Octane

18th Oct 2011, 21:14

Cyflyer,

I believe ChritiaanJ is an ex Concorde pilot, he would know.........

Aileron Drag

18th Oct 2011, 21:32

Alley Oops,

To this day, I am not 100% confident that had I been in the Af447 cockpit that night that I could have recovered before we hit water; sorry I am just an average pilot who happened to be a TRE! Oh goodness, speaking as one (non-AB) IRE/TRE to another, I cannot believe that your reaction to an unreliable ASI and A/P disconnect would be to pull the stick back to the stops and attempt Trans-Lunar-Injection.

I further cannot believe that any pilot would sit like a dummy for several minutes with the stick hard back, the ASI on zero, the VSI off the clock, and the altitude unwinding rapidly.

Further, I cannot understand a captain swanning off on rest just as his aircraft is about to transit the ITCZ. There is no way I would ever have done that, even with experienced F/Os.

Dani

18th Oct 2011, 22:00

windshield cracked, all PRIMs and SEC 1 together with unreliable airspeed/radome loss with turbulence with a TCAS climb event

well, that's maybe a tad too much, don't you think? Of course you can bring every crew to its knees. This has nothing to do with AF447. It was a simple case of unreliable instruments. Nothing more. We are not saying that you can have multiple failures that makes you unable to survive. AF447 had a single failure. An aircraft should never crash out of a single failure (but they do and sometimes even without one).

fullforward

18th Oct 2011, 22:21

The latest previous few posts are the best on this thread.
Take your gloves gentleman and your arms, touché!
Go on!

FF

bubbers44

18th Oct 2011, 22:45

Studi, first of all I know hundreds of wide body boeing pilots and not one of them would pull up to a 15 degree deck angle at 35,000 ft and expect to survive. We all know it would cause a full stall. We learned this in our basic Cessna trainer. I don't think any competent pilot on this thread can say what the PF did made any sense at all. You shouldn't have to teach common sense in flight training.

OK465

19th Oct 2011, 00:02

Earlier I had programmed the loss of all PRIMs and SEC 1...

Doesn't that put them in Direct Law?

So much for the advantages of Direct Law.

Now all you gotta do is fail the remaining SEC and you've got them in Mechanical Backup.

Very realistic...

OK465

19th Oct 2011, 00:08

I cannot agree with you that all aircraft accidents are not down to human error.

John Farley: I respect your opinion.

TTex600

19th Oct 2011, 00:20

Cozy, no offense intended with the question. Your perspective is actually fairly apparent in your writings, but I didn't want to assume.

Please don't assume that I am attacking the Bus. It's not my favorite transport category aircraft but I'm not a "hater". I'm a relatively intelligent, fairly well educated, PILOT. I'm not an engineer, nor a techno-geek of any sort. I'm your typical American civilian trained pilot with 29 years of flying in my logbook. In our system (at least when I was in training) the FAA requires excellent stick and rudder skills and minimal academic knowledge. For example, knowledge testing consists of a multiple choice written (the answers to which are available beforehand) and a few oral questions given during the flight check. I don't mean to portrait American aviators as uneducated, I've got two college degrees and am typical of my peers; I do mean to show that the FAA emphasizes hands on flight skills.

That's where I'm coming from, a background of "flying". To me, flying is like riding a bicycle. I don't have to think about riding my bicycle. My bicycle always reacts the same and gives me the same "feel" no matter where I ride. My bicycle doesn't require any conscious consideration to change course, ever. No matter what goes on around me, no matter the trail's condition, the connection between my feet and the pedals - my hands and the bars - my butt and the seat remains faithful and true. The same can be said for the yoke of a Lear and my hands - it's seat and my backside- the rudder pedals and my feet.

The same can't be said for the Bus. I've hand flown a DC9 at altitude, both fast and slow, etc. If the maneuver is in the McBoeing DC9 production flight test guide, I've done it , including full stalls. (some inadvertent :ok: ). But this isn't about me, it's about how a pilot flies an airplane.

Which is why I say that the Airbus requires a masters level of learning when things go abnormal. Simply, one can't rely on flying being an "auto" function when flying the Bus because: 1. No feel exists, and 2. the control response changes with flight law degradation. It's all a visual/mental exercise. One must focus on the PFD, understand the meaning (in a time critical way) of small and seemingly insignificant symbols, process the info while dealing with a cacophony of other signs and noise in order to derive a course of action. None of which allow me to rely on thousands of hours of experience actually flying the aircraft.

i'm a bit tired of non-Airbus pilots judging the AF447 Airbus crew from a non Airbus perspective.

Alley Oops

19th Oct 2011, 00:28

Dani and OK; well the checkee TRI was a gungho kickass type who wanted a few of the surprises. You have to appreciate all the aural/visual warnings the AF447 crew got; someone wrote a simple case of unreliable instruments............sigh. The A330 has SSGs, calvary charge, etc plus a host of ECAM messages when there are failures which lead to other degradations. All these are very hard and too much for arm chair know - it - alls to appreciate.

Plectron

19th Oct 2011, 02:48

Then...CV-600 school on the Dowty Rotol prop (RR Dart engine) 2 days total time on the prop alone. And an exam.

Flash forward quite a few and the Fokker school on the same prop. About 2 hours. Including: "When the red light illuminates, push the red button." No exam.

B777 Power Plant School at a prestigious Airline. Yep boys, them are big engines out there. Trents. Work good good, last a long time. Well, that's enough on that - let's talk about the autopilot.

This is no exaggeration.

cyflyer

19th Oct 2011, 04:01

ChristiaanJ, I stand corrected. That is an amazing fact I didn't know. Thanks to the poster of the video clip.

Gretchenfrage

19th Oct 2011, 04:47

Autotrim, stall warning design, ergonomics, etc. might be contributing, but at the end the only plane which would prevent you from such bad pilots inputs is actually an Airbus in Normal Law! Funny, isn't it, when you read most contributions here from non-Airbus pilots.

I commend you and some other Airbus pilots writing here for your displayed and porttraied knowledge and thus utmost confidence in this system.
If every Airbus pilot would display the same, encompassing your faith in the system, we would maybe not be debating.

I just want to inject that, as I understand, AF447 was no longer in Normal Law!

And it's right there where the problem starts.

citing TTex600

Which is why I say that the Airbus requires a masters level of learning when things go abnormal.

The very central questions now are:

Do we want this?
Do the SLF want this?
Is such a sophistication necessary, in view that another FBW product, less complicated, has even a better safety record?
Do we get enough capable people to be sufficiently trained for a more complicated flying?

Any pilot blessed with common aviatic sense would have to say no to all.
The KISS principle is still one of the basics for commercial aviation.

Glorifying the system and blaming the pilots who supposedly were just not mastering it won't help eradicate the facts pointing at multiple factors.
It will simply stay around and continue to haunt you, as long as no improvements are made.

And that wisdom does not originate from aviation, but from psychology.

Dani

19th Oct 2011, 07:29

You have to appreciate all the aural/visual warnings the AF447 crew got

I fully appreciate the misery the AF447 crew was in. It was not easy, and it's easy to loose oversight.

One thing that helps clearing your mind is: Master Warning Cancelling. You might have to do it several times. After that at least the cockpit is calm. Then you have to start doing your pilots job: Stabilize aircraft, memory items, organize cockpit. That's pretty basic stuff and what TTex600 describes as "it's about how a pilot flies an airplane".

You cannot generalize but with these tools in your mind, you can survive most incidents, on an Airbus and on any other aircraft. Because an Airbus is not different. It's obviously the thinking of some pilots on it that is different.

Dani

BOAC

19th Oct 2011, 07:56

Ah well, I might as well join in since the thread has lost its direction and is now 'AF447-xx'.

in a Boeing, if the PF would pull the plane violently to 15° pitch and keep it there, they would also crash. - this is, of course, absolutely correct. However when trying to draw a rather simplistic comparison to a different a/c in the same situation, I think that in order to keep a balance it is important to ask (NB for 'Boeing' read 'different type') :-

1) Would a 'Boeing' trim the tailplane fully nose-up all on its own in the same situation? (NB talking manual input now, not A/P)

2) Would a 'Boeing' cease a stall warning in the same situation?

3) Is the 'transition' between one set of control laws in a 'Boeing' with degraded IAS inputs as complicated as with the 330?

4) Would the instrument displays in a 'Boeing' degrade the same way?

5) Would the 'Boeing' physical 'stick shaker' acting over the same period have more or less impact on PF than a voice warning?

6) Would the 'Boeing' stick displacement give a clearer indication of control input to another pilot?

I believe 1, 3 and 4 are 'NO', 5 and 6 'YES' and I don't know about 2 but I suspect not.

rudderrudderrat

19th Oct 2011, 08:33

Originally Posted by studi
in a Boeing, if the PF would pull the plane violently to 15° pitch and keep it there, they would also crash.
As BOAC correctly points out - true.
However in a conventional aircraft the pilot would have to pull back considerably harder as the speed washed off and manually trim like fury to hold it at 15° whereas on the AB in ALT2 Law he could simply let go of the stick.

"What the :mad: is it doing now?" probably sprang to mind.

IcePack

19th Oct 2011, 08:41

Alley oops & TTex600
At long last a sensible reality check on this thread. Well said I too am getting fed up with all these Chuck Yeager brilliant pilots who reckon they would have saved the day.
The Bus is a great aeroplane but it can have it's moments. Bit like her in doors actually.
:)

fireflybob

19th Oct 2011, 08:41

One aspect which I don't think has been mentioned is the basic training these pilots received.

Habits and attitudes are inculcated very early on methinks. What stall training did these pilots have when they were training to be commercial pilots?

HazelNuts39

19th Oct 2011, 08:48

on the AB in ALT2 Law he could simply let go of the stick.
Did he do that?

Dani

19th Oct 2011, 09:06

1) Would a 'Boeing' trim the tailplane fully nose-up all on its own in the same situation? (NB talking manual input now, not A/P)

2) Would a 'Boeing' cease a stall warning in the same situation?

3) Is the 'transition' between one set of control laws in a 'Boeing' with degraded IAS inputs as complicated as with the 330?

4) Would the instrument displays in a 'Boeing' degrade the same way?

5) Would the 'Boeing' physical 'stick shaker' acting over the same period have more or less impact on PF than a voice warning?

6) Would the 'Boeing' stick displacement give a clearer indication of control input to another pilot?

I'm no Boeing pilot so I can speculate as Boeing pilots do about Airbus:

1) Boeing don't seem to be very famous in communicating very well with crews if it comes to aural warning. Helios Athens springs into my mind...

2) If you are overloaded with aural warnings, it is rather unimportant if the aircraft suppresses one or the other warnings. I speculate that a Boeings flight crew wouldn't hear it neighter. Birgen Air shows in front of my eyes.

3) you are right that there are no different "laws" on a B. But you don't have to know in which law you are in in an Airbus to handle the aircraft correctly. That's why you never find a word of "law" in your Airbus checklists. It's - from a practical stand point - irrelevant. Just fly the aircraft as if it would be a normal aircraft, and you will do the correct thing - in any law.

4) almost certainly. It's called unreliable instruments and its main feature is that instruments degrade. Boeing don't seem to have a very much lower loss-off-control record lately... (Beirut accident, others)

5) a wrong sensed stick shaker would increase the turmoil in the cockpit considerably. And it's most certain that the stick shacker would have come on.

6) no it wouldn't, because the guy pulled the stick on purpose, his hand was not "forgotten there". He pulled for the only reason that he wanted to pull. Because people told him that you can do that on an Airbus any time.

All in all, no, you are not correct at all by assuming that a Boeing would have been safer in this situation. The only difference was that these pilots knew that they are in an Airbus and thus thought they could misshandle the aircraft.

rudderrudderrat

19th Oct 2011, 09:17

Hi HN39
Did he do that?No he didn't.
He injected a couple of small nose down inputs on the way to the stall, then once he was stalled he continued to assist the aircraft, which was attempting to hold the requested 15° nose up, with the use of full back stick.

Hi Dani,
Just fly the aircraft as if it would be a normal aircraft, and you will do the correct thing - in any law.I wish that were true. Have a look at QRH 1.26 Windshear. It mentions the use of Full Back Stick twice on that page. A conventional aircraft would mention "respect the stick shaker". There is a different mind set to flying the AB.

Hi fireflybob,
What stall training did these pilots have when they were training to be commercial pilots? I don't know what AF pilots had, but the only aircraft I've stalled is a Piper Cherokee when I was training and a TriStar during an air test. I've been to the stick shaker in the simulator in previous aircraft types and then recovered.

In the simulator I've had the demonstration that's it's impossible to stall an AB in Normal Law no matter what stupid inputs I was invited to make (like full back stick) at very low speeds.
Our new simulator package now includes Alt Law at FL 350, reduce speed to the "Stall" warning and recovery.

BOAC

19th Oct 2011, 09:24

All in all, no, you are not correct at all by assuming that a Boeing would have been safer in this situation. - ??? Who said that? Not me. Read the post again.

TTex600

19th Oct 2011, 10:10

3) you are right that there are no different "laws" on a B. But you don't have to know in which law you are in in an Airbus to handle the aircraft correctly. That's why you never find a word of "law" in your Airbus checklists. It's - from a practical stand point - irrelevant. Just fly the aircraft as if it would be a normal aircraft, and you will do the correct thing - in any law.

You can't "fly the aircraft as if it would be a normal aircraft". It isn't a normal aircraft and doesn't fly like one. It auto trims and gives no tactile feedback. A true aviator flying a normal aircraft uses touch and sight. The Airbus takes touch out of the equation, which effectively forces the pilots eyes to be the only sensor.

To bring this back to the topic, CVR shows that the AF447 crew, three trained and experienced pilots, was confused by what they saw and acted improperly. We, the aviation community, need to understand why they failed to recognize their condition. Continually claiming that the aircraft is just another aircraft diverts attention away from the effort to understand why they were confused to the point of death.

Gretchenfrage

19th Oct 2011, 10:25

@Dani

The examples you mention are with conventional Boeings, no FBW T7 incident.

Therefore irrelevant. I am sure all Airbus freaks would turn in disgust and discard any reference to non-FBW 300 or 310 incidents.

Apples with apples please

Dani

19th Oct 2011, 10:44

A true aviator flying a normal aircraft uses touch and sight.

Oh, I didn't know. So in your opinion all fighter pilots nowadays are no true aviators anymore... - gives me comfort when I share my cockpit with them (I can promise you, they still are). I never understood the "tactile feedback concept" on modern airliners since you are not getting feedback at all but working against springs and hydraulic units. Let alone these clumsy scratching autothrottles that are never completly aligned and where you spend most of your brain capacity to figure out how to put them in the position you want them (and they move again away from there).

No let me tell you, a true aviator is the one that understands that every aircraft is a true aircraft, that you have to handle her gently, moderatly, sensibly, intelligently and foresightedly. You can bring down every aircraft if you want to, be it an A300 American Airlines over NY 2001 with weired rudder input, or forgetting moving throttles like Turkish in Amsterdam. It's not easy, but you can do it. If you are no true aviator. They are spread over A and B about evenly...

Trim Stab

19th Oct 2011, 12:27

Habits and attitudes are inculcated very early on methinks. What stall training did these pilots have when they were training to be commercial pilots?

Are you trying to imply that somehow they were awarded a CPL without stall training? It is really ridiculous that some on here are trying to imply that they couldn't recognise a simple stall. Clearly there were was a lot of confusing feedback in the cockpit.

FWIW, the French CPL syllabus contains a great deal of stall training - full stalls, incipient stalls, stalls in the turn, stalls in different configurations, stalls without airspeed reference, stalls at constant deceleration, all under the hood. But as others have pointed out, recognising and dealing with stalls in a light aircraft is a very simple matter compared to in a complex heavy aircraft at altitude.

neville_nobody

19th Oct 2011, 12:31

Can I state the obvious here and ask how do we know this was from the CVR?

You have the French government investigating a French airline crashing a French Aeroplane. The French have much to lose if it is proven there is some design flaw in the A330. Saying that they're not releasing the CVR then releasing some part that makes the pilot's look like fools raises my suspicions. There were also some convenient leaks to Bloomberg that pointed the finger at the pilots earlier in the investigation.

So how about we get to listen to the ACTUAL CVR with all the bells whistles and God knows what else before we pass judgement.

It is quite possible that the pilots made a mess of the whole situation but without hearing the entire CVR I for one am not buying the current story. To many things have fallen into place for Air France and Airbus for my liking without releasing the CVR for public consumption.

CONF iture

19th Oct 2011, 13:00

This is not about the CVR neville_nobody.
This is about the FDR first :
Why the Judge refuses to include the full FDR data to the procedure ... ?

SLFinAZ

19th Oct 2011, 13:06

I have a very basic general aviation question. In my limited unusual attitude training the "golden rule" was to unload the airframe and "step on the sky" and then adjust pitch and power as needed. I am still at a complete lose to understand the PF's initial actions here.

I am also somewhat confused about how the AB functions. My understanding is (please correct if wrong) is that the AB retains the last input if you release the stick...it would seem that this robs the pilot of a very important tool in unusual attitude recovery. I realize that technically the 330 was not in an unusual attitude at AP disconnect...however in the conditions the PF did not really know his attitude at that moment.

I find myself constantly amazed at the proportion of professional pilots who seem to feel the need to defend such a basic lapse in airmanship. This is not
a failed attempt to resolve a mechanically induced event. From every indication the PF flew the airplane into a stall (no "autozoom").

Once in the stall I cannot fathom that at no time was the airframe unloaded or did the pilot give any indication he was actually responding with any meaningful intent to explore his flight envelope.

fireflybob

19th Oct 2011, 13:21

Are you trying to imply that somehow they were awarded a CPL without stall training? It is really ridiculous that some on here are trying to imply that they couldn't recognise a simple stall. Clearly there were was a lot of confusing feedback in the cockpit.

FWIW, the French CPL syllabus contains a great deal of stall training - full stalls, incipient stalls, stalls in the turn, stalls in different configurations, stalls without airspeed reference, stalls at constant deceleration, all under the hood. But as others have pointed out, recognising and dealing with stalls in a light aircraft is a very simple matter compared to in a complex heavy aircraft at altitude.

Trim Stab, not at all and thanks for the information.

But I would be interested to trace all relevant training that these pilots have had back to initial. If they seem unable to recover from a stall (and yes I agree there many other factors here) then this is a product of the overall "system" part of which is their training at all stages.

rudderrudderrat

19th Oct 2011, 14:01

Hi DozyWannabe,
Had he let go of the stick, the "soft" AoA protections available in Alternate 2 would have corrected the pitch back to a safe level.
I don't have a copy of FCOM for A330 so my source is very dubious:
http://www.smartcockpit.com/data/pdfs/plane/airbus/A330/instructor/A_0-Flight_Laws.pdf
Please see note 17) "Protection totally lost if DUAL ADR failure or ADR disagree."

DozyWannabe

19th Oct 2011, 14:14

You're right, I was forgetting that it was Alt 2 (No Prot), the soft protections would not have been active. I'll flag that in my post.

That said, even with the trim the way it was, the extreme attitude was being held with the elevators - letting go should have brought the nose down to some degree - so in that regard the only difference between conventional and Airbus controls is that more physical effort needs to be expended in the case of the former - I'm told that it does take a fair amount of effort to hold the Airbus SS back against the stop for any length of time - considerably more force than it would take to hold a home computer analogue stick in the same position.

I go back to what I was saying the other day though, sometimes the best thing is to do nothing at first and allow the aircraft's inherent stability to ride the problem out - if the problem doesn't improve, *then* it's time to make positive corrections, albeit gently at first unless you're *very* sure of what you're doing.

DozyWannabe

19th Oct 2011, 14:43

As a simple user, however, I only judge by crashes and my PC does that regularly more often than my two Macs.

How much did you pay for your PC versus your two Macs? You'll find a lot of the time it's due to volume manufacturers using cheap components, whereas Apple (as well as premium Wintel manufacturers) tend to cherry-pick theirs. Windows' file system requires more user maintenance over time than a Un*x-based equivalent. The machine I'm typing this on has crashed precisely once since I installed it, and that's because I was doing low-level development - it's running Vista, which is commonly regarded as the worst NT-based OS Microsoft have released. This is because I built the thing myself from top-grade components and I know how to maintain it, however I recognise that's a route that may not appeal to everyone.

Now wasn't it Airbus who pretended to make a system that's easier in it's operation? Wasn't that the main selling argument? Less pilot training due to easier operating and better protection?

It is easier in normal operation, there's no question about that. Like all complex machinery though, the issues occur when things go wrong.

I'm not convinced that the "less pilot training due to easier operating and better protection" wasn't a misunderstanding of the press, or possibly Airbus's marketing department. Airbus's sales pitch has always been about less *conversion* training between its FBW models compared to other manufacturers. The safety aspects of the protections and FBW systems were a separate issue, and were backed up by some *very* distinguished pilots during the development phase.

It seems they got caught out by their own pretension. Almost all Airbus defenders today however shift to the argument that lack of system-knowledge caught the AF pilots. - A distinct change of paradigm!

The same as it would have been in any other aircraft. You can't get away from the fact that immediately pulling the stick back upon FMC disconnection was the precise opposite of what should have been done on a basic airmanship level, let alone anything above that.

In fact from my reading it has been the anti-Airbus crowd that have been arguing that the systems are too complex and that the pilots could not possibly have understood them. Those who I know are actual Airbus crew have always maintained that the system is designed to be flown like any other aircraft and that the only thing one needs to remember is the loss of hard protections once outside of Normal Law.

Even if the underlying programming of a T7 is more complex, its operation is simpler and more easy to grasp and operate for pilots.

I largely prefer that and it seems to work better.

That is your opinion and you are very much entitled to it, but that does not make "T7 = better" incontrovertible fact. The very fact that people are talking about "real" aviators flying by feel suggests that at the heart of this distrust lies some bitterness at the romantic aspect of flying going the way of the dodo, but Airbus are not solely responsible for that - it's just the way things go.

With the knowledge I have now, had I been born a decade earlier I could have been happily ensconced on a six-figure salary with automatic respect from management for the technical decisions I make. Things changed and my skills are much more commonplace now, but I don't waste my time being bitter and grouching about it.

Up to now there is no victim to be mourned from a T7 accident.
That counts a zillion, at least to me.

That could have been very different but for the skill of the crew at the controls of BA038 - don't forget that!

Gretchenfrage

19th Oct 2011, 15:03

Agreed, because they could oversteer the protection ......

Lyman

19th Oct 2011, 15:43

If the last ten minutes had been a sim session....

Pass? Fail? Suspension? I try not to put my feet into this pilot's moccasins, at least not very often.

Dozy: At A/P disconnect, He did not pull "Full back stick".

Master Caution. Cavalry Charge. Loss of Auto Throttle.

First knock. Identify and correct. Manual control required. This means the ship will need handling if the flight path wanders, no a/p to arrest a bad. He input roll left and nose up. I assume to correct a deviation in S/L flight.

Does he know Speeds are duff? Immediately? Because without knowing that, there is immediate danger. Any handling will tip a baseline attitude, and Pitch and Power becomes more difficult. Like an instructor who cobbles together an UA whilst you look at the floor. When you take over, you need a quick and correct read, a nails scan that drives everything you will do subsequently, to recover the aircraft. Did you blow it? Switch off, let's start over.

A nightmarish sim session such as the real deal 447 encountered would have failed (pick a percentage) pilots. Prolly everyone here.

There is no record established to condemn without conclusion. This was one off. Every accident is.

Sim? "Follow me through, right, this, not that. Pass. Off you go." Except for one thing. Not even the Sim could be recovered. The flaws were known, the workarounds were "best guess", not best practice, and the equipment was ready to fail.

He was not ready. Nor was PNF, and later, the Captain. The salient issues remain, and absent the full record, I couldn't possibly condemn this crew. Nor should anyone. Should the full record establish PE as the main cause, it will still be difficult to condemn. The environment that presented at 447's fatal entry was pre-ordained by Human error, and a confluence of Natural and Unnatural settings.

rudderrat. "He was assisting the a/c in maintaining 15 degrees nose up."(At STALL).

This is what I meant earlier when I suggested he may have been attempting to trim into the climb, rather than commanding it. With TOGA, and an effort to PITCH at 15, he is responding to windshear? Now that is not cute, but, in an effort to understand what presents as a rather inexplicable record of manual control, what was in his head? Did speeds indicate a shear? Was there a WARN? There is a record of ACARS that shows a Mx message re: shear and TCAS. If slow (did he know?) how is windshear at altitude different than at lower levels? (To him?) There is still a danger of STALL, and how was he to know the STALL (WARN) wasn't the result of actual shear? How does he know without the normal cues that he is STALLed and needs to recover the STALL? If he is confident the STALL WARN is approach to STALL, when is he supposed to "get" that the a/c is actually STALLed?

Near top of climb, and for whatever reason, this aircraft was essentially operating at what presented as low altitude. Low speed, PITCH up, and clean. Plus quiet, at least until the RoD increased. That is a domain that triggers certain things in all pilots, and I venture it would be difficult to not lapse into muscle memory with all those familiar (but wrong altitude) cues?

Reason enough to not Push the Nose Down? A mistake, of course, but since there never were STALL responses, a mistake quickly forgotten, and an interruption in continuity, repeating all the way down.

There was no recognition of STALL, by anyone. Now one can condemn utterly this crew as incompetent, and an absolute aberration in performance. That would be ill advised. It assumes there were no reasons to behave as they did, which is triply absurd.

ChristiaanJ

19th Oct 2011, 16:29

Slightly O/T, I admit. Just to close this O/T subject.

Cyflyer,
I believe ChritiaanJ is an ex Concorde pilot, he would know.........I wish...

No, I was a flight test support engineer for the Concorde AFCS in the earliest days, and I got drawn back into the 'Concorde world' after the 2000 crash... like many, I asked myself "what did we do wrong, for this to happen?"

The Concorde 'barrel rolls' may sound like an 'urban legend', but they've been confirmed by enough truly reliable witnesses....

And no, I didn't get the impression that Jean Franchi had "formal" permission from the Flight Test Director at Toulouse (Turcat) for each of his barrel rolls.....
It could be done... and he did it.

PS, strictly for the MS FlightSim pilots on here.... (no, I'm not one, although I tried to help out with some of the system issues for the Concorde 'add-ons'): you can 'barrel roll' Concorde quite realistically.
But AFAIK, nobody has ever 'looped' a Concorde (as in the movie), even in FS, and even less in the real world.

Machinbird

19th Oct 2011, 16:35

That said, even with the trim the way it was, the extreme attitude was being held with the elevators - letting go should have brought the nose down to some degree Dozy, I don't think that is correct. Letting go would cause the aircraft to hold an attitude as long as it was above stall speed. Below stall speed it will bobble its nose up and down. It needs nose down input on the controls for a significant period of time or actually running the trim down manually to have a hope to recover.
The elevators have some influence, but the THS and the pitch up moment from the engines' thrust hold the trump cards.

The PF didn't actively hold the nose on the level flight pitch attitude when he took control and all bad things flowed from that.

When the nose tried to fall through at the stall, the PF actively fought it and that is the reason for most of his nose up input after the stall. Do you agree?

DozyWannabe

19th Oct 2011, 16:51

Agreed, because they could oversteer the protection ......

Nothing of the sort - Capt. Burkill himself says that all he did was raise the flaps while his F/O tried to keep the aircraft as on track as he could - no "oversteering", no disabling of the protections.

The Air Transat Azores incident proved that you can deadstick an A330 quite handily too.

@Machinbird, agreed - to be clear the nose coming down "to some degree" means exactly what you're describing - not enough to change the situation in itself, but the FCU would not be trying to hold the elevators in place if the PF let go.

Lyman

19th Oct 2011, 16:55

Maintain altitude, full (or 'enough') power, indicated at approach to STALL.
Use back stick to maintain level.

TOGA, PITCH 15 degrees NOSE UP, indicated at Wind Shear.

Full back stick, full power, CFIT recovery.

All published, all trained, all wrong. Everything is in the "Stick". And the stick is 'invisible'. Without full disclosure, this gets stuck on myth, and bias. Or on a guess at the Pilot's thinking. Excellent way to improve safety, eh?

HazelNuts39

19th Oct 2011, 17:18

Let's have a look at the DFDR traces:

Dozy,
the FCU would not be trying to hold the elevators in place if the PF let go.The PF released (sort of) back-pressure on the sidestick between 02:12:15 and 02:12:30, without any change in the elevator (full nose-up). When he then moved the SS forward, the elevator moved away from the up stop, pitch attude decreased, and lift (normal acceleration) increased. Similar but slightly lesser responses between 02:13:45 and 02:14:00.

Machinbird,
The traces show similar responses in pitch when thrust is reduced between 02:11:45 and 02:12:15.

SLFinAZ

19th Oct 2011, 17:23

Lyman,

I am constantly amazed at what I perceive to be total fabrication and mis-statement. Their is absolutely no indication that the PF acted in any logical or correct manner. He was totally incorrect in his actions and the PM knew it but for some reason did not take control of the plane.

ChristiaanJ

19th Oct 2011, 17:33

As an ancient engineer, and one not fully familiar with all the Airbus FCS subtleties, I hesitate to bring this up once again....

But, wasn't there a suggestion, early in one of the earliest threads, that AB pilots are 'not encouraged' to use manual trim (except after full reversion to "mechanical")?

Not to mention the absence of a "bicycle bell" while autotrim was winding the THS to full nose-up, contributing to a lack of "configuration awareness"?

Is "trim" still being taught, or is it now left to George entirely?

ManUtd1999

19th Oct 2011, 18:05

Capt Scribble

19th Oct 2011, 18:19

Basic training used to emphasise the importance of not only recovering from a stall but also to recognise it. As MU99 says, slow speed, high nose att, RoD all give it away. I feel that these guys were disorientated, they had forgotten their basic flying training and were engulfed by the wrong mental model. As a general principle, if an aeroplane does not respond as you expect, reduce the AoA and try again. That's good for anything that you put in the air, fast or slow.

Organfreak

19th Oct 2011, 18:22

Maybe I'm missing something here, but I fail to understand how none of the pilots recognised (or mentioned anyway), that the plane was stalling. As far as I know the vertical speed/altimeters and attitude indicators were functioning correctly. Once the plane was in a rapid descent despite the fact the nose was pitched up, I'm sure most trainee pilots or even aviation enthusiasts could tell you the aircraft had stalled.

A close reading of the thousands of posts shows that, apparently, there would have been little or no sensation of falling. Having said that, had I been on board, I would have "stormed the cockpit." (Yeah, right, buddy!)

It's clear to me, after having read everyone's input here, that there is a fundamental difference between 'A and B,' and that difference amounts to: to fly B, you need to be a thoroughly-trained pro. To fly A, you don't need to be unless the poop hits the fan. And so, they all died. :sad: So far, without complete information, there will be plenty of blame to go all around.

DozyWannabe

19th Oct 2011, 18:33

Dozy,
The PF released (sort of) back-pressure on the sidestick between 02:12:15 and 02:12:30, without any change in the elevator (full nose-up).

He blips the controls forward from full back-stick to half-forward for a second, if that - there's a corresponding blip in elevator movement (which will take a second or two to respond in any case), before he returns to ordering half-nose-up pitch, which pushes the elevator back to max nose-up position

When he then moved the SS forward, the elevator moved away from the up stop, pitch attude decreased, and lift (normal acceleration) increased. Similar but slightly lesser responses between 02:13:45 and 02:14:00.

Yes, and if you follow the overall trend during those periods, the stick spends more time around neutral than it does during the 2:12:15 to 2:12:30 period (of which approximately 1s is spent with the stick forward of neutral, the other 14s is spent with it back). I don't need to tell you that hydraulically-assisted controls need a few seconds to respond to demand now, do I? :)

@CJ - As I recall, it was only 1 poster, Svarin IIRC, who stated that his airline were very strict about their Airbus crews not touching the manual trim wheel. This is worrying to me because even if autotrim is there more than 99% of the time, you still need to know how to recover the aircraft if it isn't - so it should be trained for regardless. The trim "whooler" was deleted from the A320 onwards, probably because it would be an annoyance with autotrim active during turbulence - it would be sounding almost constantly. Maybe a compromise with the whooler sounding if the trim goes beyond a certain limit could be looked into?

Erm...
I think you'll find 100% are down to human error if you look deep enough.

I was referring to aviation accident investigation terminology, in which "structural failure" and "adverse meteorological conditions" are considered distinct and separate.