AF447 final crew conversation - Thread No. 1

[Lyman]

Nothing. What makes you think he did not? Seat #2 had no belts attached at impact, why do people assume Captain did not take RHS? Or, for that matter his own seat, #1? How does any of the dialogue disqualify such a supposition?

[Hamburt Spinkleman]

The CVR has multiple mentions of urgent "requests" to get the nose down.Not really. There are commands to "go back down" while the aircraft is climbing. After the altitude has peaked the concern shifts towards keeping the wings level.

At no time is there any direct mention of pitch attitude or expressed concern about the pitch attitude.

[Aileron Drag]

At the end of the day the Captains decision to place the least qualified officer on the flight deck "in command" was the critical hole in the cheese (in combination with the CRM deficiencies that precluded the PM from assuming control).

It doesn't matter a damn who the guy nominated as his replacement i/c.

With an aircraft approaching the ITCZ, and with two F/Os of limited nouse, there is no way that captain should have left the flight deck.

Many times have I been in a similar position. I would say, "Oh, I'm not tired, I'll chill out here....", or some such.

I would only ever leave the flight deck if there was at least one 'hairy old SFO' there, and even then ONLY if there were ZERO tech or wx problems.

This captain must have been barking mad to have left the flight deck for his 'rest' whilst the wx radar was a mass of red and purple.

[Lyman]

Of the several salient FAILS, Aileron Drag, that might be Numero Uno.

+1

BUT, not just to bird dog the FOs. It was the ship that needed tending, also. It may even have been too much for all three. We know that because it was too much for all three at the end. Unless one can pinpoint the transition from sweet to bitchy, the answers are in flow.

imho.

[mbar]

At no time is there any direct mention of pitch attitude or expressed concern about the pitch attitude.
But there is. Almost at the end.

[Aileron Drag]

Lyman, you're right, but if the captain had never left the flight deck, he probably would have prevented the initial pitch up, and would have been 'oriented' as to the developing problem.

[Hamburt Spinkleman]

What makes you think he did not?The CVR transcript makes it clear that he did not. It is quite remarkable what can be learned if the available data is relied upon rather than guesswork.

mbar, yes at the very end the Captain does mention pitch and commands a specific pitch attitude. However, neither the PF or the PM does despite there being at least 20 major pitch changes of 10 degrees or more with pitch varying between approx -10 to +20 in the 4:30 minutes that elapses from A/P disconnection to impact.

[Lyman]

Well, there would have been a relief seat switch anyways, but if the Captain had remained, he still has the chronic problem of the invisible stick, and the PF's screen snafus? Would not PF have been PF anyway?

You're on the money. Had he been in the middle seat, just for a while, I think 447 lands in Paris. He would not have tolerated the confusion and the improper division of skills/responsibilities. That he left as though the challenges were ho-hum was incredibly shortsighted. imo.

Herr Spinkleman: The PF's screen was not recorded, and his apparent confusion suggests he did not have full panel, PLUS, the PNF "I will give you ATT". Why do that, if he had PITCH? Why the stick work that suggests he could not suss PITCH?

[iceman50]

Lyman

For goodness sake give it up! You contradict yourself continually and come up with all these weird and wonderful theories that have no basis in fact. If the PF had NO attitude indicator and STILL kept control then he would have been criminally negligent, there is NO reason nor indication that the PF did NOT have a working PFD.

[Razoray]

Slickster:
I find it very difficult to believe that any pilot of my 737 would sit there, for three minutes, with the yoke in his stomach, the stick shaker rattling, and the altimeter unwinding. Boeings have their faults, and all automation has its traps, but this accident does nothing to quell my Luddite fears of Airbus.
I am not buying this theory. Yes I believe that a pilot on your 737 wouldn't do this. But I do not think this relates to AF447.
The PF was confused and he clearly states that he had been pulling back for over 3 minutes. It is hard to believe neither the Captain nor the PM had any idea of these actions and didn't try to correct them. Pulling back a yoke or pulling back a side-stick equal the same action...pulling back! I cant blame the aircraft for this.
Either the PM or the Captain should have clearly directed the PF on what to do, or taken the controls the second the sh#*t started hitting the fan...I would expect this type of response on any type of flight deck.

[fireflybob]

Either the PM or the Captain should have clearly directed the PF on what to do, or taken the controls the second the sh#*t started hitting the fan...I would expect this type of response on any type of flight deck.

Razorray, good point - have we got too carried away with all the touchy-feely crm stuff? Logic surely says the more experienced FO who was in the seat he was used to should have taken over.

[worrier]

"Razorray, good point - have we got too carried away with all the touchy-feely crm stuff? Logic surely says the more experienced FO who was in the seat he was used to should have taken over."

Its been reported that the PF (Bonin, the least experienced) was in the right seat and the PNF (Robert) in the left. Apparently Robert was woken up and then he swapped with Dubois while Bonin stayed in his seat. Presumably Dubois gave Bonin authority because he provided continuity when the crew changed.

[Razoray]

Its been reported that the PF (Bonin, the least experienced) was in the right seat and the PNF (Robert) in the left. Apparently Robert was woken up and then he swapped with Dubois while Bonin stayed in his seat. Presumably Dubois gave Bonin authority because he provided continuity when the crew changed.
Apparently it was Dubois worst executive decision ever. I could see letting Bonin Fly if Dubois stayed in the cockpit, but with weather approaching he should have handed the controls to the most experienced pilot.
Continuity? Who needs continuity...the A330 was flying itself...right :confused:

[Class_Y]

A lot of speculation. A lot of good guesses. A lot of confusion - not within the flight deck - but within this thread. :)

What are we going to do about it? Right. Let's try to get things together and wrap it up in a reasonable way. How? Take a look at the end of each and every AAR an there are the most important sentences:

Probable Cause

The [PPRuNe jury] determines that the probable cause of this accident was

- the pilot flying's inappropriate response to ... which led to aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover.
- Contributing to the accident were...

Who want's to give it a try?

Volunteers step forward!

[Zorin_75]

The [PPRuNe jury] determinesThere's an investigation going on, and a lot still not on the table yet, so what's wrong with waiting for the actual accident report?

[Class_Y]

Nothing at all. It is just a proposal for having a more structured discussion after more than 500 postings...

[Zorin_75]

after more than 500 postings...
Good one. I'm sure I've missed a few smaller threads, but there have been at least 28600 posts here on that subject so far...

[Class_Y]

All the more time to put it all in a nutshell...

There are many very good postings all around the whole forum. They are bits and pieces of a broader picture. So why not use this source of "collective intelligence" to have a structured approach to these questions:

- What was the leading cause of the accident?
- What factors were just contributing to it?

...by interpreting what we know so far...

It would be quite interesting to compare the structured opinion of the forum to the final AAR.

[CONF iture]

Pulling back a yoke or pulling back a side-stick equal the same action...pulling back!
HUGE difference :

One is fully obvious to all in the flightdeck.
The other is simply unvisible to all PNF.

[Razoray]

Class Y,

It would be quite interesting to compare the structured opinion of the forum to the final AAR.

We know what happened. The only question is why did the PF pull back the stick. Right now no one knows the answer, and we may never know....:ugh:

[Razoray]

HUGE difference :

One is fully obvious to all in the flightdeck.
The other is simply unvisible to all PNF.



Yes, I understand this. But in that situation the PNF or the Captain should still be observing what the PF is doing. There should have been open dialogue between the 3 and the Captain should have taken a leadership role. From what we read this was not the case. Furthermore they are all AB pilots and understand this and should be able to work around it with that knowledge....

[Class_Y]

Razoray,

given your opinion as the "probable cause", the "why" is part of the contributing factors. So far, we had a lot of keywords for those factors, e.g.:

- CRM
- Man-machine-interface (stick vs. yoke, aural warnings, ...)
- (poor / mediocre / too much sim) Training
- Psycho factors
- Weather
- Darkness
- Software issues
- ...

Assessing and prioritizing them is the challenge. Some forum members tackled a lot of those keywords. Adding them to their opinion in a structured way would very much add to the value of this thread.

[CONF iture]

Furthermore they are all AB pilots and understand this and should be able to work around it with that knowledge....
What a sick concept really when pilots need to work things around ...

Sidestick is a sure way to waste valuable information in a multi crew operation.

[Lyman]

There are some interesting comments on the CVR that address what the PF might have been doing. Can they be related to this design flaw?

"What's HE doing now?" LOI leads to LOC. And sustains it?

[bad bear]

mmmm. I knew there would eventually be a "gem" if I carried on reading the AF447 threads.
Pilots recognize they are causing the stall if the control column/ stick is in their gut and they are pulling it, perhaps the Nintendo side stick does not give the same info?

Would any real pilot sit with the stick in their gut for 3 min and not think they are stalled?

Should Airbus fit a "stick shaker" which activates at a given angle of attack?

[BEagle]

Pilots recognize they are causing the stall if the control column/ stick is in their gut and they are pulling it, perhaps the Nintendo side stick does not give the same info?

Would any real pilot sit with the stick in their gut for 3 min and not think they are stalled?

Anyone so pig$hit thick as not to be able to recognise and recover from a stall shouldn't be flying. Whether hi-tech Airbus, lo-tech Bubba Boeing or whatever.

I can't believe this thread is still crawling along. A mix of ignorant speculation and hillbilly rhetoric, it is surely time to close it.

Please!

[TTex600]

BEagle. Maybe you are correct. Maybe the AF crew was "pig$hit thicke". Maybe they should't have been there.............

But they were there; and now they and 225 other people are dead.

If this accident were as easy to understand as you want to believe, then anyone with like selection, training and background needs to be grounded immediately.


All of these AF447 threads have " jumped the shark", but that isn't grounds to close them. If you don't like it, stop reading.

[lomapaseo]

If this accident were as easy to understand as you want to believe, then anyone with like selection, training and background needs to be grounded immediately.


Sounds like a plan, it's about time we move forward with something other than rhetoric on how to redesign an aircraft

[Dani]

I have an even better plan: Put everyone in a sim and expose them to the same scenario. If they survive, they can continue to fly, if they don't, they don't. We call it check.

[jcjeant]

I have an even better plan: Put everyone in a sim and expose them to the same scenario. If they survive, they can continue to fly, if they don't, they don't. We call it check. :D
I suspect some airlines will suffer pilots shortage

[bubbers44]

I have a feeling the airlines with that big yoke in their gut would end up with a lot more pilots left than the airlines with that little sidestick. Since I have been called a caveman for suggesting this in the past I will let you guys decide.

[alainthailande]

Frequent SLF here, flying most of the time aboard A330/340's, better informed than average but that's it. I very seldom post. Feel free to ignore or delete if inappropriate.
I have two questions. It's not humanely possible to read each and every post on AF447 here (although I've already read a large part of them over the past years) so I've tried searching but failed to find answers.

1) when reliable airspeed information was recovered, did the flight control system switch back to normal mode with all the protections available or not? (I presume not). Is this by design?

2) would some kind of automated high altitude stall recovery be conceivable on such a plane? at least forcing a stick push action?
I find it so disturbing that the AB has so many protections to prevent incursions outside of the flight envelope and that none of this automation could no anything while the PF was holding the stick full aft for long minutes and the plane was stalled.

Sorry for the naive questions. This is *not* a attempt at restarting a new FBW pro-con war and I would be very frustrated if it did.

[ABBOT]

'The Captain returned from a break'. Quite possibly he may have been sleeping in a legal in flight rest period. if woken from sleep, sleep inertia may well have made his decision making skills somewhat erratic for anything up to twenty minutes after he awoke. On the assumption that he was alerted of the situation immediately by the cruise crew, he had only three and one half minutes to regain his composure. Posiibly not long enough to provide a valid input to the situation. Just a random thought.

[1066]

I don't think the sidestick was invisible to the LHS PNF or PM.
OK you have to look across the flight deck, unlike having a yoke in your gut, but even with the lights down you can see RHS sidestick from the LHS in a 319/320. I am prepared to be corrected by a 330 capt but I don't believe that the two cockpits are that different.
Chances are that the cockpit lighting would have been up somewhat if lightning was around.

[Zorin_75]

1) when reliable airspeed information was recovered, did the flight control system switch back to normal mode with all the protections available or not? (I presume not). Is this by design? No and yes.

2) would some kind of automated high altitude stall recovery be conceivable on such a plane? at least forcing a stick push action?If you trust a computer (and the data it's fed with) enough to do an automatic recovery you could just as well let it take action before the actual stall occurs. Then you have what an Airbus gives you in normal law.
There are devices like stick shakers (literally rattling the yoke to alert the pilot by other means than just the aural stall warning) and stick pushers (required on some a/c with unfavourable stall characteristics, automatically pushing the controls ND to initiate recovery). Both systems help but are no sure fire solution. There have been incidents where the action of the stick shaker has been mistaken for mach buffet (a sign of the aircraft being too fast) thus provoking exactly the wrong actions. Even stick pushers have been overridden right into the ground. As they say, invent something foolproof and nature will come up with a better fool.

[acbus1]

It's not humanely possible to read each and every post on AF447 here..
I agree; 'humanely' is the correct spelling.


Let's face it, this looks to have been one massive screw up by not just one, but all three 'pilots'. I've observed co-pilot manual flying skills and the application of straightforward common sense/airmanship deteriorate over the last thirty years. I've no idea what the 'old school' AF447 Captain's excuse would be, but I doubt it could be even slightly convincing.


Sidesticks in the present configuration(s) are clearly an extremely bad idea, most especially given the potential for the inputs of unbelievable incompetents to be concealed or too subtly annunciated.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

The 'sidestick v. Yoke' issue is surely a factor in this accident.

Maybe not the only factor, but a factor nonetheless that shouldn't be discounted.

The captain would surely have instinctively summed up the problem instantly, had he seen both yokes full aft.

I think most pilots would. Especially if he saw that yoke kept full aft for minute after minute.

I'm not an Airbus pilot, but who actually benefits from the use of sidesticks?

I don't see any benefit for the pilots, except when using that table.

Explain to me why a pilot should have a table in front of him instead of the controls.

[BOAC]

Explain to me why a pilot should have a table in front of him instead of the controls. - it's SO much easier to eat your meal?

Humour aside, a s/s offers a much more attractive way to get digital info from the controls than that large thing thrashing around between your legs.

For combat a/c, having a s/s with an armrest to support the limb means that high g manoeuvring becomes far easier too.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

BOAC. Yep. I know that it makes it easy to input digital stuff. That's a benefit for a manufacturer, but not to a pilot.

What are the benefits of a SS for a pilot?

The other obvious drawback is that yokes move together. With SS, opposing unputs are possible (I know they have a way of summing them or for one SS to take priority, but how can either of these features benefit the pilot???)

I know the F-16 has a SS, but most F-16 are single seaters and in the two seaters (mostly) one pilot is an IP.

The yoke (OK, why not take digital input from a yoke?) has the benefit of being in clear view and both are linked mechanically.

These features might have helped or even saved 447.

[Zorin_75]

Who knows what a lightning strike can do? Possibly some wires got messed up so that a forward input had the opposite effect.

I have seen the strangest things happening after a lightning strike.
Come again?
Did it also mess up the FDR traces of elevator position to compensate?

How many lightning strikes did you experience?

[BOAC]

Who knows what a lightning strike can do? - excuse me, Mr Oozlum - which lightning strike are you referring to for AF447?:ugh:

[fireflybob]

I remember an Airbus incident some years ago, where some wires were crossed so that a left stick input resulted in a right bank.

svhar, please supply details/reference for this.

[BOAC]

Monarch, I think, and a brilliant bit of flying to get it back on the ground.

[iceman50]

The wires were not crossed. I believe the sidestick transducer was put in the wrong way around reversing the roll inputs, even though it was designed to fit only the correct way. The flight control check may have also have been done without looking at the flight control page (as is the norm now) and only the sidestick position Cross, on the PFD, which gave the correct indications.

This has no bearing on AF447!

Lufthansa I think and the FO's sidestick worked correctly as he took control.

[KBPsen]

Lufthansa in 2001. A faulty repair to an ELAC plug.

http://www.bfu-web.de/cln_030/nn_226462/EN/Publications/Investigation_20Report/2001/Report__01__5X004-0__Frankfurt__A320,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.p df/Report_01_5X004-0_Frankfurt_A320.pdf

[Razoray]

The yoke (OK, why not take digital input from a yoke?) has the benefit of being in clear view and both are linked mechanically.

These features might have helped or even saved 447. Quote from tech log:
The main goal of unusual-attitude training is breaking the deeply ingrained and nearly universal “panic pull” reflex that causes pilots to haul back on the stick or yoke when bank angles exceed their comfort levels.The PF was pulling back regardless if he had a side stick or a yoke...and that's what caused the stall in the first place. The fact that he kept pulling back puzzles people, but the real problem is that the crew never knew they were in a stall.....if the PF, or for that matter any of the 3 pilots on the flight deck knew they were in a stall, I am sure he would have stopped pulling back...

PM to PF: "Climb, climb, climb." PF responds: "But I've been pulling back on the stick for a while now."That pretty much sums it up...

[Coagie]

The Captain wasn't as "old school" as his age might indicate. I think he changed from steward to pilot around 1980.

[Coagie]

There was the crash that killed Aristotle Onassis' pilot son, where either cables or hydraulics were transposed and right bank and left bank were switched.
Of course, on AF447, the PF said he had the stick back, and the data reflects that.

[DozyWannabe]

What are the benefits of a SS for a pilot?

More room to work and less chance of bumping the thing inadvertently for starters.

(I know they have a way of summing them or for one SS to take priority, but how can either of these features benefit the pilot???)

By clearly delineating who is in control. Because the controls are digital and decoupled from the controls (as are modern yoke designs), there's no need for two yokes to provide extra leverage, so that's half the reason for having them linked gone. With a procedure that is based around only one pilot having control at any given time you've got a significant dent in the other half of the reason.

I know the F-16 has a SS, but most F-16 are single seaters and in the two seaters (mostly) one pilot is an IP.

And in the FBW Airbus, only one pilot is supposed to be in control at any one time, so it's much the same.

The yoke (OK, why not take digital input from a yoke?) has the benefit of being in clear view and both are linked mechanically.

Well, I'd be interested to have it confirmed or denied that the 777/787 yoke "connections" are not mechanical, but in fact controlled by the software-based force-feedback system. Bearing in mind that one of the rationales for FBW is weight saving, it would be counter-productive to retain a mechanical link.

These features might have helped or even saved 447.

There have been LOC accidents in yoke-equipped aircraft - so it's just as likely they might not have. Right now we're all basically arguing from our own positions, and I'm trying to stay as neutral as I can, because as with all engineering solutions there are benefits and drawbacks to both. :)

Re: The Lufthansa cross-wiring of the controls. I've said this before, but imagine how difficult the thing would have been to control if the sticks were linked via force-feedback as opposed to the priority-button design!

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

'more room to work and less chance of bumping the controls'.

Is that it?

Because, I've never felt short of room (the seat moving helps if I need a wee bit more for some reason) and as for 'bumping' the yoke-must have bumped it a few times in 10,000 hours worth? No major issues so far.

So, what's in it for the pilots?

B**ger all as far as I can see.;)

[DozyWannabe]

That's your opinion and you're as welcome to it as anyone. Someone asked me why I brought up EAL401 a while back, and it was precisely for that reason - the initiating event that caused the deviation from assigned altitude was an inadvertant bump on the column (with a background loss of situational awareness due to the faulty nose gear bulb).

All my position has ever been is that the sidestick approach solves some of the shortcomings of the yoke design, but has shortcomings itself. No system is perfect.

[kwh]

...that if the fact that two pilots couldn't see what inputs the third was making WAS a factor in this crash, then it shouldn't require two dirty great control yokes to fix it - just a little tell-tale on the instrument panel with a crosshair on it and showing the current 'virtual stick position', as familiar to anybody who has ever played a computer flight sim game using a keyboard instead of a joystick. If the little glowing dot was at the bottom of the circle, everybody would know that 'the stick is being held all the way back', without needing to re-engineer the entire cockpit to stick a big old yoke into their crotch...

[DozyWannabe]

I think it's far more worrying that despite verbally handing control to the PNF twice, the PF continued to make inputs. The concept of a single pilot in control at any given time is a fundamental aspect of the Airbus operating procedure and it should be drilled into cadets and pilots as soon as they start their type rating.

Yes, the fact that the PNF could not see or feel that the PF had not relinquished the controls can be considered a shortcoming of the design, but ultimately the PF should have known that "you have control" means immediate hands-off-the-stick unless or until control is explicitly handed back. Even in the old Chippy I used to fly, if I was physically stronger than my instructor I could have overpowered his inputs - and had I done so and lost control as a result, few would argue that the brute-force aspect of the old cable controls was at fault.

[jcjeant]

The SS is very old technology (already a caveman tool)
The way to go for modern management of FBW computer flying (actual technology) is touch (tactil) screen (even it can be wireless .. so portable)
Very safe and more space to "work" :8

[kwh]

Which conjours a mental image of the pilot sitting in the aft economy lavatory, enjoying a 'constitutional', all while flying the plane on his iPhone...

[DozyWannabe]

Nah, I suspect that stage will be skipped and they'll go straight to brain-mapped control, which if it keeps advancing at it's current rate will probably be plausible in about 30-50 years.

Although this is off-topic silliness, in all seriousness the idea that the sidesticks offer as little resistance as a common-or-garden home analogue controller is completely incorrect - these are industrial-grade, certified components (I've never flown an Airbus, but we visited a Level D A320 sim with Uni - not that I was on that course mind, but a friend sneaked me along for the day).

[1066]

If LHS PNF/PM wanted to take control he grabs his SS, presses and holds down the takeover button and says the usual, "I have control". The aircraft is under the control of the LHS SS all the time he has that button down.
Done it in the sim, practising baulked landings by RHS in case, as has happened, they freeze on the RHS SS.

I repeat my 535 post as no 330 capt has disputed my 320 view that the RHS SS is visible from the LHS even if the lighting is down. You just have to look across the flight deck. OK when the capt appeared from the bunk he would struggle to see either SS from the jumpseat.

[alf5071h]

Beagle’s view at #527 is a dated and unhelpful view of safety. Even during training and within limits, it might be possible to weed out the less capable pilots, but the process should be based on a deeper understanding of an individual’s capabilities and reasons for poor performance, and not just on a the outcome of a single event.
Humans learn (or should learn) from their variable behaviour; the source of our success is the same as for the ‘failures’. Throwing out the ‘failures’ does little to help others avoid similar situations.

A key issue throughout this event is human performance - situation assessment; similarly the technical aspects of the flight system and human interaction, but another contributing area, the regulatory process is generally overlooked.
With hindsight, why was the aircraft allowed to fly with ‘suspect’ pitots, or if, with reasoned argument, flight was allowed, why into conditions which might result in problems.
These judgements are typical of airworthiness processes, similar to MEL approval, arguing that flight with ‘suspect’ pitots would be safe – the reasonable containment of risk, and based on previous events, knowledge of the environment, technical system behaviour, and human performance. All of these involve assumptions and thus ‘expert judgement’.
However we should not conclude that the regulators ‘failed’, as this too would be the same as blaming the pilots; each group experienced variable performance, which with hindsight was insufficient for the conditions encountered.

Thus the industry might learn from this and manage to turn some of this hindsight into foresight. In this event, a primary assumption was that the human would manage an ice crystal encounter, recognise the ‘system failure’, and fly the aircraft until conditions improved.
We can reflect that a better strategy would have been to avoid the weather situation and only use the human resource in the event of misjudgement of this first step; there would be greater depth in the safety defences. Obviously fixing the pitots would be better, but this alleviation is similar to the balance of risks taken every day and necessary for operation, and which regulators and crews managed very successfully.

In the view above there are also similarities with other recent accidents. In the 737 AMS approach accident and the Madrid MD-80 take-off, the human was relied on as the first line of defence where existing technical solutions were available. The 737 with grandfather rights used a lower (unmonitored) standard of rad alt, and similarly the MD-80 had an unmonitored TOCWS, where other aircraft have improved systems.
Therefore we might review the process of design and certification, and of continued airworthiness (MEL), and enquire if in modern, complex operations, the industry relies too much on the human as the first line of defence.
Also, we might consider that human performance may not be as assumed due to different training standards, fewer opportunities for experience, and different social attitudes to flying modern aircraft – automation dependency, instant gratification (information) Wiki-Google-geeks, and reliance on SOPs.

Has the industry drifted too close to a safe boundary, or have we identified a new boundary involving a complex interaction of the many factors in modern operations?
Alternatively, in our ‘very’ safe industry, the rare and unusual accidents stand out and our natural human bias focusses on the most salient aspects or easier ‘blame’ option; this might be the public perception, but it should not be that of the industry if we are to learn from this event.

[CONF iture]

...that if the fact that two pilots couldn't see what inputs the third was making WAS a factor in this crash, then it shouldn't require two dirty great control yokes to fix it - just a little tell-tale on the instrument panel with a crosshair on it and showing the current 'virtual stick position', as familiar to anybody who has ever played a computer flight sim game using a keyboard instead of a joystick. If the little glowing dot was at the bottom of the circle, everybody would know that 'the stick is being held all the way back', without needing to re-engineer the entire cockpit to stick a big old yoke into their crotch...
As long as you don't further overload the PFD ...
Then which sidetick displacement will you display ?

left
right
sum of both
all these answers

[CONF iture]

1066

Tray table OUT or IN ?

[1066]

CONF iture

Certainly with the table stowed the other SS is visible. I'll have do another check with the table out. Not 'til 13 Nov though.
My original check was to do with visibility in a dark flight deck.

[kwh]

You would show whatever the aircraft thought the stick was doing. So if pilot A was pulling back and pilot B was pushing forward, the little glowing dot would indicate whatever the aircraft had picked out of the two inputs and understood. Either pilot would be able to see that they were not the only person making inputs, if the little dot was doing something other than reflect the inputs they knew they were making.

You could perhaps add a red dot overlaid by the white, that showed you what input the aircraft had 'allowed', if a pilot was hauling back on the sidestick for all they were worth and the computer was saying 'no you don't, I'm pushing forward...' for some reason...

[lomapaseo]

Beagle’s view at #527 is a dated and unhelpful view of safety. Even during training and within limits, it might be possible to weed out the less capable pilots, but the process should be based on a deeper understanding of an individual’s capabilities and reasons for poor performance, and not just on a the outcome of a single event.


Nobody said they would be weeded out with just one event. If that were the case they could bypass the sim and go direct to a real test5 aicraft.

Screwing up the sim is a learning process, that's why instructors carry pointer sticks.

It's the lack of learning and/or lesson retention that is the issue

[infrequentflyer789]

As long as you don't further overload the PFD ...
Then which sidetick displacement will you display ?

left
right
sum of both
all these answers



Or none of the above, because they are all completely irrelevant / useless ?

I've watched the side stick vs. yoke debate go round and round on these threads, and come to the conclusion that either I don't understand the controls / laws, or the whole debate is completely missing the point. I can't see that it matters on a bus what size the stick/yoke/whatever is or where it is - and that is not because I think there cannot be a feedback problem, but because I think if there is one, it is elsewhere.

However, I don't think anyone one else has made the point / connection, so maybe I am completely confused.

Perhaps someone who acutally flies the thing can answer the following to clarify:
Assuming a 'bus in normal law, as PNF you scan the current position of PF's controls - be it the sidestick, a hypothetical yoke, or a dot on the pfd, or whatever. You see PF, right now, has "stick" in neutral. What does this tell you about what PF is commanding the a/c to do ? [say pitch axis, is the command to climb, level, descend... that's what you want to know, right ? ]

[Capn Bloggs]

I think it's far more worrying that despite verbally handing control to the PNF twice, the PF continued to make inputs. The concept of a single pilot in control at any given time is a fundamental aspect of the Airbus operating procedure and it should be drilled into cadets and pilots as soon as they start their type rating.

Yes, the fact that the PNF could not see or feel that the PF had not relinquished the controls can be considered a shortcoming of the design, but ultimately the PF should have known that "you have control" means immediate hands-off-the-stick unless or until control is explicitly handed back. Even in the old Chippy I used to fly, if I was physically stronger than my instructor I could have overpowered his inputs - and had I done so and lost control as a result, few would argue that the brute-force aspect of the old cable controls was at fault.
I don't agree with any of that. Sure, the PF may be so confused, or not even hear the command "my controls" to not hand over, but that will be painfully obvious to the new PF had a control column been involved (or indeed a Chippy stick). You will know immediately, even if you can't see his hands on it, because of the resistance to your inputs on the controls. No so with a side stick.

it shouldn't require two dirty great control yokes to fix it - just a little tell-tale on the instrument panel with a crosshair on it and showing the current 'virtual stick position', as familiar to anybody who has ever played a computer flight sim game using a keyboard instead of a joystick.
At night, totally confused, alarms/lights going crazy, buffeting... let's look at the "little telltale on the panel"? This is a cockpit, not an office desk.

[iceman50]

Capn Bloggs

Not true, although I cannot remember if there is a mention of it in the interim report, but you will get an aural and visual indication of "DUAL INPUT" plus if either pilot presses the "RED" button then a "Priority Left/Right" aural and visual indication as well. So you WILL know if there are dual inputs. So the indications are already there.

As for the "telltale" there is one on the ground to show control input but not airborne, it used to be available during lift off and initial climb, but then some "pilots" were incorrectly being "trained" to use it for rotation rather than attitude!!! An interesting Emirates departure from Jo'burg comes to mind. Airbus then removed the indication at nosewheel liftoff.

To confirm for 1066 the sidestick is visible in the A330/A340. The PM in this case did not need to see it, as he knew they were climbing, from his PFD indications, and that nose up inputs were being made, hence his comments.

[CONF iture]

As for the "telltale" there is one on the ground to show control input but not airborne, it used to be available during lift off and initial climb, but then some "pilots" were incorrectly being "trained" to use it for rotation rather than attitude!!! An interesting Emirates departure from Jo'burg comes to mind. Airbus then removed the indication at nosewheel liftoff.
100% sure of all of it or you could be mixed up a bit ... ?

[Gretchenfrage]

Defend the SS as much and as fervently as you want (by the way, I actually liked it if it had drive back). With the yoke however, the last xx years there has never been confusion as to what the buddy next to you was exerting and there has never been a false switch mount.

Airbus has invented these phenomenons.

Now as to how much it has contributed to this accident, it's up to interpretation, but it does not bode away that it might have contributed.

I have learnt from all my instruction and experience, that in aviation operation, and that is what pilots do and engineer should do, you should strive to eliminate each and every hole, even the remotest potential hole, in the Swiss cheese.

By staying in denial, you just disqualify yourself as safety driven professional.

[iceman50]

CONF iture

Absolutely, I see it every time I get airborne.

Gretchenfrage

We are never going to convince you so it does not matter. Please explain all the other stall incidents on A/C that had yokes and still stalled as the PF held it fully back. By you staying on your pet hate of the Airbus you are in denial as well.

[Capn Bloggs]

Capn Bloggs

Not true, although I cannot remember if there is a mention of it in the interim report, but you will get an aural and visual indication of "DUAL INPUT" plus if either pilot presses the "RED" button then a "Priority Left/Right" aural and visual indication as well. So you WILL know if there are dual inputs.
Thanks. I stand corrected, although it is conceivable that those warnings would be lost in the chaos. If the control column isn't moving the way I'm pushing/pulling it, that's going to be the most obvious.

[fireflybob]

So if your aircraft is stalling, how far forward should you move the control column/yoke/sidestick in order to recover?

[Gretchenfrage]

We are never going to convince you so it does not matter. Please explain all the other stall incidents on A/C that had yokes and still stalled as the PF held it fully back. By you staying on your pet hate of the Airbus you are in denial as well.

No, you'll never convince me against common sense and human logic, that's true.
Furthermore I do not hate Airbus, as my comment about preferring a SS to a yoke demonstrates.
I hate everything and everyone that is not willing to concede some error and then apply the appropriate correction.

To reverse the denial reproach is a very common and somewhat childish tool of people who cannot see through a genuine proposal to improve design and increase safety: I have repeatedly said, keep the SS but incorporate a drive-back!

Last but not least, I did not contest your perpetual mentioning of "... mama, mama,but the others crashed too, even with yoke .... ". You are spot on with that, no excuse.
Reread what I effectively said, namely that we should all strive to improve design and safety without any taboos. With the SS there has come some new errors. They need to be tackled, and they need not only to be tackled by increased pilot training and telling pilots off what to do if the system displays its flaws:

Improve the design to the better as well, FGS, even if it means conceding that some well meant gadgets did not work properly. You will only lose face if constantly denying the flaws, but never if you learn of mistakes.

[Capn Bloggs]

So if your aircraft is stalling, how far forward should you move the control column/yoke/sidestick in order to recover?
The forward stop. :ok:

[HazelNuts39]

The forward stop.Possibly. I would think that depends to some extent on the airplane's response to forward stick movement. IMHO the important thing is to maintain the pitching down motion until the stall warning stops, and if it returns, pitch down some more.

[fireflybob]

The forward stop.

Capn Bloggs, thankyou.

You move the stick (or yoke/cc) forward until the stall identification ceases - which means, if necessary, the forward stop.

This is basic to stall recovery

When the stall identification ceases you can then level the wings and select an appropriate attitude.

[before landing check list]

When the stall identification ceases you can then level the wings and select an appropriate attitude.

But not too fast. There are always secondary's to think about.

[BOAC]

There are always secondary's to think about.and select an appropriate attitude. - that is probably why FFB said that bit?

[acbus1]

I'm beginning to wonder if the three AF447 pilots were regular PPRuNe posters. The extent to which this forum manages to complicate simple matters and completely miss the essential points borders on the hilarious. I suspect that observers (media, authorities, whoever) will eventually (if not already) come to regard PPRuNe as nothing more than an easy source of amusement, rather than a worthwhile platform for meaningful debate.

To clarify my criticism of sidesticks (by now located underneath three pages of waffle):

(1) - You might be able to see the other pilot's sidestick. You might be able to see that he's holding it. But can you see, without referring to tiny annunciators, what input he's making?

(2) - The comments regarding current annunciations and the proposals to introduce additional ones miss the point, which is that too subtle an indication of pilot control input is unacceptable.

(3) Two coupled yokes, in clear view, with visible, physical input movements (as opposed to 'motionless' pressure inputs to transducers) presents clear, immediate and unmistakable information.
AF447 would not have ended in disaster had such control yokes been installed. That conclusion applies, despite the unbelievable lack of competence displayed by all three 'pilots'.

[Landflap]

Not a Airbus pilot , Boeing for about , well, ok, all of my life. But, don't you chaps have a sidestick posn indicator? I played in our A340 sim and noticed that there was one, right in front of my face. It was repeated on the other side. Oh, and about Captain's returning after a short break; mate of mine converted to A340 after years on Boeings. During Line Training, Instructor felt safe enough to leave the Flight-Deck. Matey spotted some weather, did a bit of smart Nav, reduced speed to Turb penetration (which was below that lovely little fella... 'Green Dot ' !).Trainer returned and roasted my mate for 'Allowing the speed to fall below green dot'!Big lecture ensued regarding the A340, hot & heavy and not being able to recover the speed loss other than inducing a shallow decent. For the most part, the debate is valuable. safe flying.

[FOUR REDS]

Probably good time to close this thread!!!!!!! :rolleyes:

[CONF iture]

As for the "telltale" there is one on the ground to show control input but not airborne, it used to be available during lift off and initial climb, but then some "pilots" were incorrectly being "trained" to use it for rotation rather than attitude!!! An interesting Emirates departure from Jo'burg comes to mind. Airbus then removed the indication at nosewheel liftoff.
iceman50,
You're not as mixed up as I initially thought - My apologies.

Airbus made, without fanfare, some modification :
The sidestick position indication now dissapears when the Nose Landing Gear is fully extended.

Be aware that the modification is not for all serial numbers. Some still work the old way :
The indication dissapears when the aircraft passes from ground to flight (No weight on wheels).

To my knowledge, it has never been displayed for the initial climb.

FOUR REDS,
You do not have to stick around.
This thread is obviously a nice place to learn.
If you don't like it, leave it.

[GearDown&Locked]

Airbus made, without fanfare, some modification :
The sidestick position indication now dissapears when the Nose Landing Gear is fully extended.


Why not make it available if current law degrades from normal, or any other control related errors appear -e.g. hyd problems, unreliable speed, etc.

[xcitation]

Without a full transcript I don't think we can get an accurate picture of the lead up to the incident. With the ColgenAir transcript you have a clear lack of focus from the get go. That would be one of the many contributing factors.
The giant elephant in the cockpit being the stall warning that none of three mentioned even once - even to dismiss it!

[Class_Y]

Does anybody know, if the cockpit designers of our two main competitors (yes, the sidestick company and its yoke rival) or their avionics suppliers conducted an in-depth testing of their respective man-machine-interface?

This includes scientific sound eye and motion tracking under normal circumstances and simulated emergencies.

Furthermore: Is the max deflection of a sidestick clearly visible for the other crewmembers - taking into account their position in the cockpit (left / right seat or standing in the middle of the flight deck) and the illumination?

[safetypee]

… if the cockpit designers of our two main competitors or their avionics suppliers conducted an in-depth testing of their respective man-machine-interface?

Yes, there were extensive human factors based evaluation programmes in order to meet the requirements of CS 25.1302 and AMC 25.1302.

The main regulation states:-
(d) To the extent practicable, installed equipment must enable the flight crew to manage errors resulting from the kinds of flight crew interactions with the equipment that can be reasonably expected in service, assuming the flight crew is acting in good faith. This sub-paragraph (d) does not apply to skill-related errors associated with manual control of the aeroplane.”

Note the last sentence.

For info, the background information in the AMC states:-
“Flight crews make a positive contribution to the safety of the air transportation system because of their ability to assess continuously changing conditions and situations, analyse potential actions, and make reasoned decisions. However, even well trained, qualified, healthy, alert flight-crew members make errors. Some of these errors may be influenced by the design of the systems and their flight crew interfaces, even with those that are carefully designed. Most of these errors have no significant safety effects, or are detected and/or mitigated in the normal course of events. Still, accident analyses have identified flight crew performance and error as significant factors in a majority of accidents involving transport category aeroplanes.
Accidents most often result from a sequence or combination of errors and safety related events (e.g., equipment failure and weather conditions).”

And the AMC allows the designer to assume that the crew is qualified and trained in the use of the installed equipment.

[SLFinAZ]

Sadly it appears that this sums up the entire incident...

...skill-related errors associated with manual control of the aeroplane...

[iceman50]

CONF iture

My choice of words "initial climb" was not very good as it gave the wrong inference, I meant until airborne, apologies.

My airline has had the modification fitted to all A/C old and new.

[chrisN]

xcitation wrote: “The giant elephant in the cockpit being the stall warning that none of three mentioned even once - even to dismiss it!” Several others have also thought that the commander missed it, as well as the PF and PNF.

The commander was not there until afterwards, AIUI. Nor was he there for the whole 3+ minutes of the descent. When he returned, he was not told that the SW had gone on for 54 seconds in one session, and twice more briefly when PF tentatively tried less SS NU, also AIUI.

(No doubt one of the real experts who have thoroughly analysed the FDR and CVR times will correct me if I am wrong.)

It seems to me that the commander was dealt a difficult hand to deal with at that stage. Would all his critics have sussed it out with the same limited exposure and briefing (or lack of it)?

[Aileron Drag]

chrisN

It seems to me that the commander was dealt a difficult hand to deal with at that stage. Would all his critics have sussed it out with the same limited exposure and briefing (or lack of it)? No, certainly not. However, he made a terrible decision to leave the flight deck at all, considering the weather up ahead.

He should never have been out of the loop at all.

[GarageYears]

No, certainly not. However, he made a terrible decision to leave the flight deck at all, considering the weather up ahead.

I don't have all the history of the Captains prior flights/routes, but this was not the first time he had made the Paris/Rio/Paris flight. It was also not the first time the ITCZ had a few storms. It was also not the first time the Captain had taken his rest period for the second 'shift'. It would not surprise me one bit to find out that this was standard practice.

Is it the considered opinion of the majority, that the one person who would have brought AF447 through this event was the Captain? So why bother with the other two? Were they there as highly paid seat warmers? I presume A/F figured they were competent crew.

A pertinent question - why is it assumed the Captain would have done a better job? Is there any special reason to assume the Capt has more hand-flying in cruise experience. Or did he simply have many more hours sitting in the cockpit watching the autopilot?

[chrisN]

“ . . . he made a terrible decision to leave the flight deck at all, considering the weather up ahead. He should never have been out of the loop at all.”

And:


“Is it the considered opinion of the majority, that the one person who would have brought AF447 through this event was the Captain? So why bother with the other two? Were they there as highly paid seat warmers? I presume A/F figured they were competent crew. “



Both opinions have been expressed before. I have no view, preferring to leave it to ATPLs to opine.

If there is not unanimity, what then?

I also believe that somebody said that the commander HAD to take a break to stay within permitted hours on duty. I wouldn't know.

--------------
[Hampster wheel/o-bird.]
---------------


FWIW, my take on the whole thing is that:

AF FO trainee selection might need looking at;

AF (and other majors?) training definitely needs revision. Some has started.

Regulation of training may need a look, too.

Manual flying practice needs more attention, particularly at high FLs, cruise speed,

SOP/QRH at high FLs, cruise speed needs more attention.

AF CRM needs thorough review and retraining.

-----------


Two psychological factors are still open, and I see no easy way to overcome them, nor have the experts here put forward solutions that I have seen:

Highly stressed people can be oblivious to audible warnings. What has been described as the “cavalry charge” happened when the FOs were handed control manually which they had never practiced and in circumstances they didn’t understand, or agree about (PNF showed some sign of awareness);

And the reason I followed this from the outset through all threads – when a stressed pilot forms the wrong conclusion, he/she tends to stay with it regardless of ineffective attempts to correct the wrong problem. I have seen this in my field (gliding safety and accident analysis) – only test pilots, or rare individuals, can keep a clear head and systematically fault find.

A wild suggestion – DW will probably shoot me down, as well as all the professionals.

After the system gives up and hands a basketful of trouble to the pilots to hand fly their way out of it without any training (or only inappropriate training), the “system” should know enough that it then stalled and stayed stalled, even when speed fell below 60 (it thought). How about for one second out of every 4, the glass screen blocks out everything else and displays;

” STALL! You are staying stalled! Get out of it!”

Would it be beyond the wit of man to even devise a “computer knows best mode – it will recover as the pilots have not realised” before it’s too late?

Told you it was wild.

[HazelNuts39]

the “system” should know enough that it then stalled and stayed stalled, even when speed fell below 60 (it thought).I wonder if the system knows enough. It is latched in Alternate law because it doesn't trust airspeed anymore. Can it really trust AoA (one of the three is not functioning properly)? I would like to understand why, when the system reconfigures to Alternate law, the High-AoA protection reconfigures from an AoA reference to an airspeed reference. Is that because it doesn't trust AoA? Finally, the AoA value is zero when IAS<60kt. The system also 'knows' attitude and vertical speed. Is that enough?

[jcjeant]

About FDR stuff recorded
Is the movements (opening-closing latch) of the flight deck armored door is recorded by the FDR ?

[Mr Optimistic]

HN39, given the huge number of possible failure states and combinations, is it possible to devise the logic to always deliver the most appropriate response ? Hell of a FMECA. Perhaps a minimalist approach might be easier given that eventually human beings have to deal with the situation and how do you train for so many eventualities ? . So tell them what you think the problem is, tell them the state of their aircraft, and let them get on with it maybe ?

[notfred]

Is the movements (opening-closing latch) of the flight deck armored door is recorded by the FDR ?If not then it can probably be deduced from noises picked up on the cockpit area mike channel of the CVR.

[Coagie]

In an early transcript/translation of the CVR that was "leaked" not long before "official" CVR transcripts were released, when the first stall warning sounded, one of the co-pilots said "What's that about?", as if he'd never even heard the word "stall" before. I remember seeing it on an Austrailian web site. I hope I can find it again and compare it to the "official" transcript. Anyway, if it's true, that would be an acknowledgement that, at least, one of the crew heard it.

[stepwilk]

one of the co-pilots said "What's that about?", as if he'd never even heard the word "stall" before.

That's an entirely unreasonable assumption. "What's that about?" hardly means "What is a stall?" More likely it means something like, "Why are we stalling?" or "What's causing that warning?"

[1066]

Re the Capt's rest,

With 3 crew to operate this long sector that exceeded the FTLs for 2 pilots the capt is required to take a rest period.
If it was his sector it is perfectly reasonable that he should take the middle rest period. The company AF provided him with two 'qualified' pilots to ensure that he could take that rest period. The ITCZ transit should have been, and on previous transits probably had been, less of a hazard than a early morning, tired arrival at CDG. Thereby avoiding an AMS/THY scenario.

Without the benefit of hindsight, most longhaul captains, that I have flown with, would have taken the same rest period if it was their sector.

IMHO it was a reasonable decision; I would almost certainly have done the same. OK we don't know his assessment of P2 and P3 from the outbound sector. In some roster patterns he may not have flown outbound with both of them.

[Lonewolf_50]

Nah, I suspect that stage will be skipped and they'll go straight to brain-mapped control, which if it keeps advancing at it's current rate will probably be plausible in about 30-50 years.
Brain mappping for flying should be a snap.

Pilot thinks about sex, plane goes up.
Pilot thinks about his ex wife, plane goes down, unlike ex-wife.

Secret to flying is a ready supply of Hooters waitresses, lap dancers, and other exotic auxiliary members of the flight crew for the duration of the flight. Oh, yes, pre flight planning requires that oysters are always on the in flight menu.

What? :confused:

[Aileron Drag]

GarageYears
Is it the considered opinion of the majority, that the one person who would have brought AF447 through this event was the Captain? So why bother with the other two? Were they there as highly paid seat warmers? I presume A/F figured they were competent crew.

A pertinent question - why is it assumed the Captain would have done a better job? Is there any special reason to assume the Capt has more hand-flying in cruise experience. Or did he simply have many more hours sitting in the cockpit watching the autopilot? 1st Nov 2011 11:05
Any experienced pilot will appreciate that there are fully qualified and inexperienced pilots, and fully qualified and very experienced pilots.

When I saw tech or Wx problems as a junior F/O, I wondered what 'the Old Man' would want to do about it. Later, with several thousand hours experience, I thought I knew better than he did. Later, when the whole damned aeroplane was my responsibility, I took things very seriously indeed, and was not about to trust qualified but inexperienced F/Os with my bleedin' aircraft.

No, I didn't "have many more hours sitting in the cockpit watching the autopilot", I had decades of going around the block, seeing failures both technical and of CRM. Further, I had the emotional constraint of being responsible for the aeroplane. NO F/O can know what that is like.

This man should not have left his aeroplane in the hands of qualified but inexperienced pilots.

1066
Without the benefit of hindsight, most longhaul captains, that I have flown with, would have taken the same rest period if it was their sector.

IMHO it was a reasonable decision; I would almost certainly have done the same. OK we don't know his assessment of P2 and P3 from the outbound sector. In some roster patterns he may not have flown outbound with both of them. The captain takes his/her rest when the captain deems it fit. It is the captain's decision.

His was a very, very bad decision. You do not leave inexperienced (albeit qualified) F/Os to penetrate the ITCZ.

[Landflap]

On extended leave but just got the BBC Ent (Polish) a full report of this incident. Old ground too but it does seem to be a case of blocked pitot tubes caused by supercooled water droplets. This was after a careful study of the meteorological conditions at the time. Looks like the crew were faced with a number of confusing indications. I have to say, at great risk on the PPrune pages, that 'Flight with unreliable airspeed indications' is a regularly practiced exercise in my present company. Another fave is to leave the seat, pretend to be in the forward loo, return (after closing your eyes) to find Handling pilot confused with a series of events. Sort it out as a crew. Most agree, good value & that was the point of my earlier offering. Return to the Flt-Deck and face something that needs to be corrected, quickly. That is what the Trainer did on my mate's Line Training even though it provoked much heated debate, later.

[infrequentflyer789]

Would it be beyond the wit of man to even devise a “computer knows best mode – it will recover as the pilots have not realised” before it’s too late?

Told you it was wild.

Not wild - that is exactly what AB Normal Law is.

Unfortunately in this case, normal law bailed out because of sensor failure, on the not-entirely-unreasonable logic that computer may not know best when it knows it is half-blinded.

[bubbers44]

Unfortunately when normal law went off line the pilots were not capable of going on line. It is a new problem caused by over reliance on automation and not competent pilots. I think the clock is ticking until the next one because nothing has changed. Competent pilots are expensive, new hires out of school are cheap. The bean counters have full control.

[infrequentflyer789]

I wonder if the system knows enough. It is latched in Alternate law because it doesn't trust airspeed anymore. Can it really trust AoA (one of the three is not functioning properly)? I would like to understand why, when the system reconfigures to Alternate law, the High-AoA protection reconfigures from an AoA reference to an airspeed reference. Is that because it doesn't trust AoA? Finally, the AoA value is zero when IAS<60kt. The system also 'knows' attitude and vertical speed. Is that enough?

Two levels of Alt law. If speeds have not failed, then it trusts those to keep some protections in place (Alt1). If speeds have failed, then it will latch the lower level of Alt law, with no protections in place.

Quite possibly it's this way round because airspeed was considered one of the more reliable air-data parameters...


Is attitude and vertical speed enough to warn on ? - I'm not sure. VS is coming, I think, from the same airdata that's dubious. What if there's static port failure ? If anything. I'd want to go to just the inertials - accelerometers should be plenty reliable enough over short time frame - and engine data only. Something like "if pointy end up, and engine power up and IRU says we going down, must be still stalled, or wings fallen off".

Need to be careful though that we're introducing a lot of complexity, and hence additional failure risk, into a very simple system (currently more or less "is aoa > threshold"). Stall warning failure is not good either.

[IcePack]

Inexperienced pilots ? Both co-pilots had more hours than a lot of low cost carrier captains.. The pnf more than a lot of not so low cost captains. Methinks quite an experienced crew over all. As for rest periods you have to take them at some point. Who knows what reasons the capt took that break, maybe the lesser demanding part & he trusted his crew.
At least unlike some airlines where the co pilots only have 150-200 hrs which apparently is fine if they have appropriate training.

[bubbers44]

150-200 hrs does not qualify anybody to fly an airliner across the Atlantic. 2000 hrs doesn't either. In our country it was 5,000 hrs minimum to be an FO on an airliner. Recently the bean counters have found a way to get cheap help at 350 hrs. Good luck.

[SLFinAZ]

"Hours" are less and less relevant unfortunately. Especially for FO's flying long haul routes. Somewhere back in one of the previous threads this was covered with the approximiate math that the PF probably had something on the order of 9 hours a month of actual "PF" time with actual stick time literally measured in minutes (if any at all). So over the course of a year he might have 90-100 total flying hours with possibly a dozen takeoffs and landings and potentially less then an hour of "hands on" line flying.

So how unexpected is it really that under extreme stress and in totally unexpected circumstances he would fall back on the protections that had been heavily stressed in a low altitude stall recovery....in effect he appears to have been instinctively flying a missed approach type "recovery".

So the reality is that a bright carefully selected 300 hr (actual type specific with significant hands on stick/sim time) would be more likely to respond correctly then a more experienced pilot whose training was far in the past.

Personally I think this incident highlights how important actual hand-flying is toward maintaining situational awareness. My thought is that the over reliance on automation decreases the ability of the "PF" to actually be mentally "flying" the airplane which can lead to a mental "brain lock" when suddenly forced to assume flying responsibility. From all I've seen the AP disconnect left the plane relatively trimmed and stable with a slightly banked and nose down attitude at (or immediately after) disconnect. The flight control inputs required should have been very minimal and consistent with normal inputs in mild turbulence.

I've got to belive that the combination of surprise and a focus on low altitude upset recovery procedures led to an ingrained response that was completely incorrect for the specific circumstances.

[TTex600]

Personally I think this incident highlights how important actual hand-flying is toward maintaining situational awareness. My thought is that the over reliance on automation decreases the ability of the "PF" to actually be mentally "flying" the airplane which can lead to a mental "brain lock" when suddenly forced to assume flying responsibility. From all I've seen the AP disconnect left the plane relatively trimmed and stable with a slightly banked and nose down attitude at (or immediately after) disconnect. The flight control inputs required should have been very minimal and consistent with normal inputs in mild turbulence.

If only the Airbus could be flown by hand.

The only time we get to fly by hand is the first and last 50 feet, or if something goes terribly wrong and we find ourself in direct law. As long as the FBW is in normal law, the SS is nothing more than a autopilot input device. Adding a bank request through the SS is the same as turning the heading select knob on the flight control panel. Both actions result in the autopilot turning the aircraft.

Hand flying an Airbus in normal law does not prepare one for hand flying an Airbus in degraded law. And we haven't even discussed hand trimming. It is virtually impossible to practice hand trimming. Yes, I have tried.

I routinely turn off AutoThrust, Autopilot, and Flight Director when flying visual approaches. All I'm accomplishing is to maintain my instrument scan. I have no confidence that my hand "flying" practice will translate to proficiency in degrade law ops.

[Gretchenfrage]

I repeat my 535 post as no 330 capt has disputed my 320 view that the RHS SS is visible from the LHS even if the lighting is down. You just have to look across the flight deck. OK when the capt appeared from the bunk he would struggle to see either SS from the jumpseat.

Tray table OUT or IN ?

Certainly with the table stowed the other SS is visible. I'll have do another check with the table out. Not 'til 13 Nov though.
My original check was to do with visibility in a dark flight deck.


This just made my day, that was funny!

How about a "smoke in the cockpit", AP unavailable due to some electrical cock-up that concoctes the smoke?
You have your goggles on and are battling to read and work the ECAM on old and faded screens. With no feedback whatsoever just try to "see" what kind of inputs your buddy is swinging ...

I bet you'd give one nut for some tactile feedback then.

[Zorin_75]

You do not leave inexperienced (albeit qualified) F/Os to penetrate the ITCZ.
FWIW, the older F/O had many more hours on type than the captain as well as considerably more experience in the ITCZ...

[Razoray]

Zorin 75

the older F/O had many more hours on type than the captain as well as considerably more experience in the ITCZ...

So then why didn't the Captain put him in control...Wouldn't have that made much more sense???? :confused:

[brantlyb2b]

I fly helicopters and dont fully understand fixed wing. I sort of follow the stall that caused this crash but I dont understand how the Aircraft got into the stall in the first place.I seem to remember it happened at night so no external reference , and it happened in a storm so was the cause windshear caused by the updrafts downdrafts etc?Any explanation appreciated.

[kwateow]

The stall was caused by the pilot flying mishandling the aircraft.

[worried SLF]

Things like 'experience' and 'qualification' seem to become more and more relative. Unless requirements are uniform, "qualifications" generally can be achieved in two ways - extensive and intensive training plus a certain dedication on part of the trainee OR by lowering requirements and artificially reducing the fail rate. Pretty much the same goes for ''experience" that is measured in hours/days/years. All depends on what person does most of this time. With advances in technology and increases in its reliabilty there must be pilots that would have thousands of hours and not a single malfunction just as there ARE people who never experienced things like a light bulb going off when they were alone and had to "deal' with it and there will be more people like that in the future.

In this context praising someone for obtaining "qualifications" or passing exam is premature unless you know what is required to qualify and what questions are asked at the exam.

It happens everywhere but it's very sad and definitely wrong that it seems to be happening in aviation. Human capital is the most expensive of all, this is where the costs always seem to grow and this is the one single area management ALWAYS look into when they want to increase the profit margins. I heard that aviation cannot be taken out of the context of the wider economy, but I think that it has to be. I suspect if regular economic enterprises were physically at the height of 10000 meters above the ground and keept there by the quality of the personel, the attitude to outsourcing scr*w-ups would be little bit different and the ratio of professionals knowing which buttons to press and WHY these buttons and not the others to office plankton only capable of pressing the learned combinations of buttons would be a bit higher.

The fact that both FO were "qualified" and type-rated yet there are number of things that they had never even been trained for speaks volumes. And its a huge regulator's failure that despite that they were allowed in the cockpit of a commercial passenger flight, and what's worse BOTH of them at the same time in the same cockpit. But unless this is strictly regulated to ther point of directly criminalising deviations it will be happening and will be happening more and more often. Nothing illegal after all, whereas it should be illegal just as its illegal to sell contaminated aviation fuel. And coming from corporate finance I know that generally companies will do as much (as little) as the regulation let them get away with. Humans in general do not often do more than is formally required.

And this is precisely the reason why I believe that Air France will be let off lightly considering that they just killed 228 people including their own staff. Unless regulation changes other big airlines might be tempted to follow their example. It's easier for them too - they are the ones that can afford the newer aircraft and better mainainance, so their estimated technology fail rate is lower and human factor doesn't play as big a role when everything works 100%.

[hawker750]

Punching through the ITCZ is not a habit to be recommended, serviceable pitots or not. I have done it several times and it is one of the worst flying experiences you can have. The Captain would have known that.
We will never know why they did not deviate 100, 200 or 300 miles to go around it. It is plausable the 1st and 2nd officers did not feel they had that sort of authority and did not want to wake the old man up for his say so. I think it was a grave mistake of the Captain not to have been there and the talk of him needing rest so as to be rested for the approach is laughable, there was another 7 hours for him to sleep after the ITCZ.
My guess is the plane would have deviated if he had been there. I mentioned at the vey beginning that I suspected the Captain not to be in the cockpit and was shouted down by the experts.
IMO it raises other issues of whether the younger generation of pilots are too hestitant to do things without a clearance. Did they ask for a deviation? Perhaps they did and could not get through or it was denied? Descend 500 feet and deviate anyway without a clearance but I think this sort of thinking outside the box is not encouraged in pilots anymore.

[fireflybob]

hawker750, you talk much sense there.

Surely it would be prudent for the Captain to be on the flightdeck when approaching an area of hazardous weather such as the ITCZ? Is there not anything in the Air France Operations Manual which states this?

I think this sort of thinking outside the box is not encouraged in pilots anymore.

Sadly it often isn't know apart from some notable exceptions by some operators but you can't blame it on the individuals - they are merely a product of the "system".

There are times when you just have to have the moral courage (aka b***s) to do what you consider necessary and face the music later.

[BOAC]

Punching through the ITCZ is not a habit to be recommended, serviceable pitots or not. I have done it several times and it is one of the worst flying experiences you can have. The Captain would have known that. -ah! That must be why a/c do it day in day out then, including several that night on that track. Are we not being a touch melodramatic? It's only a big front (think Dolly Parton...)

[hawker750]

BOAC
The two times I have had the misfortune of being caught in a cell in the ITCZ (both times because the radar lied) were not fun. Firstly in a King Air I went in at 28,000 feet and it spat me out at 38,000 feet, the 10,000 feet climb was dome with zero thrust. It destroyed the nose cone and had two lightning holes in the leading edge. The second time in a Hawker only destroyed the nose cone and dented the leading edges. I would deviate as much as it takes to avoid lines of CB's in the ITCZ

[hawker750]

BOAC.
We probably flew together VC10's or 707's?
Quote:
ah! That must be why a/c do it day in day out then, including several that night on that track. Are we not being a touch melodramatic? It's only a big front (think Dolly Parton...)

I do not think I am being melodramatic. In a cell your margins for safe flight are dramatically reduced and it is crews' responsibities to mitigate risk as much as possible.
I'll bet the souls of the passengers now wish perhaps the crew had been a bit melodramatic

[BOAC]

Punching through the ITCZ is not a habit to be recommended is the melodrama. You did not say 'punching through CBs' which we all agree is not a good idea. Remembering the ITCZ effectively encircles the world it makes it a bit of a challenge to 'go round the ITCZ' as you were suggesting - which is why hundreds of a/c have for YEARS flown through it.We probably flew together VC10's or 707's? - no.

Do we have, yet again, to tell YOU as well that they did not, as far as we know, 'punch through a CB' - unless you know differently, of course.

I can hear that Oozlum bird flapping again.:ugh:

[Lyman]

"The older I get the better I used to be....."

Along with command comes discretion. Command diminishes a degree at a time, so's you wouldn't even notice......

hawker and fireflybob sound a lot like the Captains of old, and in a very good way. With the loss of Power in the cockpit, even as power on the wing increased, we lost a safety margin. A big one.

That there was any ambivalence on 447's flight deck as to who had command as the Captain left, speaks volumes. If it isn't important enough to make clear to one's subordinates, it isn't important at all.

I am weary of picking on the aircraft. One does not seek risk for thrill, but when it presents, one gains focus and self confidence, or one need ride in back. And weather is risk.

"What do we do?"......

[SLFinAZ]

TTex your comments are way beyond my experience and understanding. I've got a bit of PPL time (long ago) but limited to 152/172 VFR. What your saying scares the hell out of me as an SLF. If I understand you correctly even under "manual" control the airbus is actually flown by the AP??

That seems at odds from what I have read....my assumption based on everything I've read is that it has all the built in AB "safety" but that within those parameters when off autopilot it is still equivalent to a corresponding Boeing model. Is that incorrect?

[hawker750]

BOAC
I agree, picking your way throught the ITCZ is done daily. But I think it is clear that they went through a cell, I doubt if the pitots would have iced up by flying through the rest of the stuff. My question is why did they choose not to deviate a long way away from a cell? This may have been discussed before and I appologise if it is old ground. My comment is that IMO the Captain should have been there. Putting it another way, it would not have been detrimental to the situation if he had been, so I cannot understand the view that he need not have been there.
There will be lessons learned from this tragedy and I guess after a decent time interval it will be used in CRM classes. I just hope the lessons will be remembered.

[DozyWannabe]

@SLFinAZ

I don't think so - I think what he is saying is that in a lot of cases airline management decree use of the autoflight system to the extent that manual handling tends to fall by the wayside.

However, when he says...

As long as the FBW is in normal law, the SS is nothing more than a autopilot input device. Adding a bank request through the SS is the same as turning the heading select knob on the flight control panel. Both actions result in the autopilot turning the aircraft.

...he is actually incorrect, and conflating the FMS/autoflight system with the FCU system.

You are correct in stating that they Boeing FBW setup is exactly the same in terms of high-level function. The FCU (which mediates the flight control inputs and commands the flight surfaces) can be considered roughly equivalent to the old "Q-feel" system on hydraulically-controlled conventional airliners in that it translates the pilot's inputs to flight-surface deflection.

I suspect that TTex600 considers the FCU to be a quasi-autopilot because of the bank angle and pitch limitations in the Normal Law protection suite, whereas the Normal Law limitations in fact give a pilot more than twice as much leeway (in terms of bank angle limitation) as the old-fashioned autopilot bank and pitch limits.

[White Knight]

My comment is that IMO the Captain should have been there.

For both Hawker750 and BOAC - from the POV of a skipper that often punches through the ITCZ with two F/Os. I am ALWAYS on the flightdeck through the weather:ok::ok::ok: Every single time. As I would expect my fellow captains to be when I'm taking advantage of staff-travel through the same areas.

Likewise I am always in my seat when crossing the Himalayas - FL280 being the on airway MSA... Why some of my fellow skippers aren't is a source of endless confusion to me:=

[BOAC]

But I think it is clear that they went through a cell- where is your evidence for this? You do not need 'CB' to produce icing cloud, do you? I doubt if the pitots would have iced up by flying through the rest of the stuff. - see previous

My question is why did they choose not to deviate a long way away from a cell? - so you know they didn't?This may have been discussed before and I apologise if it is old ground. - certainly has, and we are forever pointing out that there is NO evidence they did fly in or near a cell. You have around a week of reading to do I think - it is all on PPrune somewhere in one of the many threads.

The rest of your statements I agree with, and there are few who support the absence of the Captain. In view of your career it may interest you to know that some of the 'old' BOAC/BA chaps I contacted in 2009 assured me that they would always 'take their rest as rostered' regardless???.

I am sorry to say that your story of your KingAir and Hawker 'adventures' leads me to say you got what you deserved and it should have been little surprise. Was the radar u/s?

[Slickster]

This talk of the Captain not being there, and taking his rest, is a red herring, as far as I'm concerned. If the aircraft had crashed at some other point in the flight for some other reason, you would argue exactly the same point.

I regularly "punched" my way through the ITCZ, as an FO, on a 747, heading to Jo'burg etc. with the other FO sat next to me, and the Captain sound asleep, in the bunk. Occasionally, between the two of us, we even had the wit to deviate several hundred miles, past weather.

To be an FO on long haul in my airline, you need to have an ATPL, be qualified to P1 standard, and have several thousand hours experience. For sure, the Captain is in charge, but he has to delegate that responsibility, make sure his FO's are briefed, and are happy to call him if they feel the need. Using the weather radar, and course deviations are not really a big deal. They happen all over the place, as can any other emergency, whilst the Captain is asleep.

I am now a Captain on short haul, and to judge by some of the comments on this thread, I'd better never go to the toilet, in case something happens, whilst I'm chatting to the CC, and the "200 hour wonder", or whatever you want to call them is at the controls.

These AF FOs were deemed qualified to act as P1, by their company, whilst the Captain took his rest. They could easily have been captains, on another fleet, or in another airline. Let's move away from this "man and boy" concept, and "if only the captain was there" rubbish. Frankly, if you's seen some of the captains' flying skills I've seen, you wouldn't be saying such things!

Of course there is the emotional concept of "being responsible" when one is a captain, and I take that very seriously, but I doubt anyone wants to die really, do they? When I was an FO, I would frequently look left, for advice, whilst now, I only see my own reflection, but hopefully always remember to then look right, and share the problem. These sorts of moments are almost invariably not QRH actions, or "flying the aircraft" ones, but more typically, tricky ones on the ground, involving ATC, passengers etc.

There should be no reason why 2 experienced FOs could not navigate, using the weather radar, or fly their aeroplane equally as well, if not better than their captain.

[TTex600]

[quote =SLFinAZ]oTTex your comments are way beyond my experience and understanding. I've gOot a bit of PPL time (long ago) but limited to 152/172 VFR. What your saying scares the hell out of me as an SLF. If I understand you correctly even under "manual" control the airbus is actually flown by the AP??

That seems at odds from what I have read....my assumption based on everything I've read is that it has all the built in AB "safety" but that within those parameters when off autopilot it is still equivalent to a corresponding Boeing model. Is that incorrect?
[\quote]

Incorrect. Every Boeing (less 777and 787), Douglas, Embraer, Canadair, etc, places the pilots hands and feet in direct contact with the control surfaces. Airbus places a battery of computers between the pilot and the control surfaces. The 777 and 787 place computer there also, but the computers don't modify the pilots request before they order acontrol deflection. The Bus only gives me what it decides I need, not what I ask for.

The FMGC flys the airplane. FMGC = master computer in simple terms. The pilot communicates with the FMGC through the MCDU - keyboard that programs, the FCU - glareshield mounted knobs and buttons used to request specific speeds/altitudes/headings/vertical speeds- and the SS. Regardless which input device the pilot uses, the FMGC flys the airplane. Unless the computers give up and hand the pilot the aircraft because the computer can no longer do the job. That is the case withAF447, BTW.

I actually operate/program/"fly" an Airbus unlike certain persons on is site with obvious agendas and positions to protect. In simple terms, the Airbus is flown by the various computers. The SS is nothing more than an input device to the computers. The pilot does NOT receive the control outputs he commands unless the computers agree with his requests.

The thousands of posts on this forum alone indicate that there is more to the Airbus than just "it flys like a normal airplane"

[DozyWannabe]

@TTex600

I disagree completely.

The last Boeing to have directly-connected controls was the 737. Everything since (and that goes for the DC-10, L-1011, 747 and onwards in terms of US-built airliners) had fully-hydraulic controls, which ran through a Q-feel system that modified the outputs to the flight controls with weighted feedback to the pilots to simulate the feel of direct connection. Without that mediation, it would have been possible to yank the flight controls from neutral to maximum in less than a second (and tearing the airframe apart in the process), as the hydraulics were performing the movements and *not* the pilot's muscle power. D.P. Davies explains the development of these systems in great detail. Indeed, the reason Capt. McCormick was able to effect a landing when he lost most of his hydraulics over Windsor, Ontario was precisely because he was unsatisfied with Douglas's assurances that complete hydraulic failre was impossible and therefore direct connection was unnecessary.

The 7(7/8)7 systems mediate the inputs and feedback - of course they do. They may be designed to simulate the more traditional control systems, but that's all it is - a simulation, like the Q-feel units before them.

The Airbus design simply takes that one step further, reasoning that since direct connection had been done away with for nearly two decades prior to the A320 starting development, they might as well start from a clean slate, which is where the G-loading and rate command control technology comes from. Yes it's different, but only marginally so and as I understand it the difference in behaviour between Normal versus Alternate versus Direct is more than manageable.

The 'bus in fact gives you what you ask for unless what you're asking would take it outside the flight envelope. It even goes beyond that and tries to accommodate what you're asking by managing thrust if necessary.

I'd like to know what "agendas" and "positions" you see, and who you think is "protecting" them, as well as why you think that's the case. In my experience the ones with the agendas seem to be the ones taking every opportunity to bash the 'bus.

[Aileron Drag]

Slickster

I have a feeling that you might be one of the 'nightmare' F/Os of my experience in a very large British airline. Senior F/Os who spent their entire working lives shuttling to and from "Jo-Burg", racking up the credited hours and 'Box' payments.

I am now a Captain on short haul, and to judge by some of the comments on this thread, I'd better never go to the toilet, in case something happens, whilst I'm chatting to the CC, and the "200 hour wonder", or whatever you want to call them is at the controls.
I spent years on short-haul, and your biggest decision is normally whether to have the steak or chicken. I contend that you would think about this matter in a different way if you were 50 years of age, about to penetrate the ITCZ, and you were looking at two kids on the flight deck who had shiny new ATPLs in their briefcase, and an ego the size of the moon.

There should be no reason why 2 experienced FOs could not navigate, using the weather radar, or fly their aeroplane equally as well, if not better than their captain. You guys have grown up in the job being totally spoiled by technology. You couldn't do a better job than your old captains if they had one hand tied behind their backs. You would probably be lost without GPS. You probably haven't had to manually set take-off power in your life! You just hit 'EPR'.

Your attitude reinforces my opinion that there is no way I would fly as a passenger in my retirement with guys like you up front.

[fireflybob]

There should be no reason why 2 experienced FOs could not navigate, using the weather radar, or fly their aeroplane equally as well, if not better than their captain.

Slickster, that may be true but they're not qualified Captains

[Clandestino]

The FMGC flys the airplane. FMGC = master computer in simple termsBy severe stretch of imagination, it just might be true. FMGS is integrated FMS/FD/AP/Autothrust. It calulates navigation and guidance parameters for FD, sends commands to FCCs and FADECS via AP and ATHR respectively. Kick out the AP and ATHR and FMGS has no authority over aeroplane anymore. ATA22.

The pilot communicates with the FMGC through the MCDU - keyboard that programs, the FCU - glareshield mounted knobs and buttons used to request specific speeds/altitudes/headings/vertical speeds- and the SS.
You are wrong on sidesticks - they are not connected to FMGC but rather to flight control computers - ELACs/SECs on minibus, PRIMs/SECs on widebodies. ATA27.

[SLFinAZ]

Dozy,

I recognize that my views are fundamental not professional in the sense that my actual first hand experience is limited to basic airman-ship (152/172) vs flying more complex aircraft. With that caveat out of the way my personal feeling is that the entire airbus concept is the single worst development in professional aviation. It unquestioningly takes flying to the lowest common denominator and I think that AF447 has to be taken as the wake up call.

In spite of the endless drivel and speculation this should have been a non-event. For a professional pilot to lose an air frame that was handed off from the AP in an entirely stable configuration is unfathomable (vs a circumstance where the AP "spun out" until the airplane was in an entirely unstable configuration).

In effect the specter of "what is it doing now" has met the reality of why isn't it doing what it needs to? Evan as an "amateur" pilot the total lack of airmanship in this incident astounds me. At the end of the day the blunt truth is that the PF was fundamentally incompetent...and that is a scary reality.

[Brian Abraham]

my personal feeling is that the entire airbus concept is the single worst development in professional aviationYou are not alone SLFinAZ. Know of a gentleman who cut his teeth flying the A-26 in Vietnam and went on to an airline career with a major US carrier. Not only did he refuse to fly Airbus products but also refused to fly as a pax on them. Now living out his days in a nursing home unfortunately.

[Slickster]

I have a feeling that you might be one of the 'nightmare' F/Os of my experience in a very large British airline. Senior F/Os who spent their entire working lives shuttling to and from "Jo-Burg", racking up the credited hours and 'Box' payments.


Well, you go with your feelings then. For the record, "Box payments" are ancient history, and the credit hours for a Jo'burg ain't that good. There may be a trade off, if you love your golf, but in a very large British airline, credit is king. In any case, you might find yourself flying over the Bay of Bengal, or in severe turbulence to LA, on a 3 crew, which was my point.

No senior FO has spent their entire lives racking up credited hours. They've either done it in said same airline on short haul, come from another airline (where they've racked up their golf, no doubt), or the forces, where they've racked up their points by demonstrating their talent (even though they probably have low hours?). No doubt, whilst doing all of that, they've managed to kid the selection process. Well, if they're that clever, good luck to them.

You guys have grown up in the job being totally spoiled by technology. You couldn't do a better job than your old captains if they had one hand tied behind their backs. You would probably be lost without GPS. You probably haven't had to manually set take-off power in your life! You just hit 'EPR'.


There is much talk of this, but I don't see it. I occasionally have to depart with the autothrottle u/s, and we deal with it. So, yes, I have had to set take off power, manually. My aircraft does not have GPS, we fly on N1s on it, and universally, we call "set power", so I'm not sure what you're talking about.

Your attitude reinforces my opinion that there is no way I would fly as a passenger in my retirement with guys like you up front.


Well, I couldn't give a toss whether you're on my aeroplane or not, providing you behave yourself. In the meantime, I'm curious to know which airline you will fly with, based on your rational assumptions above.

[TTex600]

Dozy, does it disturb you that someone such as myself actually flys the Bus? I obviously don't know much about flying it or anything else.

Maybe you forgot that this string is about the crews final conversation. Some of these readers may not be interested in pedantic and anal analysis. That's over in the tech log.

My generalizations regarding the way an Airbus is hand flown are correct.

NOTHING you say or write will change the FACT that the SS does not directly control the control surfaces in other than direct law. Lateral SS movement is translated into roll rates and longitudinal SS movement is translated into load factor requests. I've flown cable controlled, steam gauge, jets for thousands of hours and I assure you that an lateral yoke deflection in a Lear does not result in a roll rate; it results in an aileron deflection which results in a roll rate depending on the airspeed and other factors. Likewise, yoke movements in pitch do not directly result in load factor changes; yoke movements in a Lear result in elevator movements which result in load factor changes depending on A/S etc.

I am NOT anti Airbus FBW. I'm anti the continual statements to the effect that it flys like any other airplane. It does not, and most anyone who actually operates one understands that fact.

I do have a question for you. Why is it that old dogs like myself, reared on the likes of DC9s, (NWA crews for example) manage to maintain control of UAS A330s in the ITCZ while the only airframe lost was flown by Airbus only pilots? BTW, everyone who's read more than my last three posts knows that I defend the pilots and am insulted by those who want to blame this accident on them.

[TTex600]

Quote:
The FMGC flys the airplane. FMGC = master computer in simple terms By severe stretch of imagination, it just might be true. FMGS is integrated FMS/FD/AP/Autothrust. It calulates navigation and guidance parameters for FD, sends commands to FCCs and FADECS via AP and ATHR respectively. Kick out the AP and ATHR and FMGS has no authority over aeroplane anymore. ATA22.

Quote:
The pilot communicates with the FMGC through the MCDU - keyboard that programs, the FCU - glareshield mounted knobs and buttons used to request specific speeds/altitudes/headings/vertical speeds- and the SS. You are wrong on sidesticks - they are not connected to FMGC but rather to flight control computers - ELACs/SECs on minibus, PRIMs/SECs on widebodies. ATA27.I may be technically incorrect about the exact function of the FMGC, but that doesn't matter. My point is that the SS's are not connected to the controls, the SS's are connected only to computers; a point that you yourself concede.

[Organfreak]

:D:D:D:D

I'm makin' the popcorn!

--The Peanut Gallery

[TTex600]

In spite of the endless drivel and speculation this should have been a non-event. For a professional pilot to lose an air frame that was handed off from the AP in an entirely stable configuration is unfathomable (vs a circumstance where the AP "spun out" until the airplane was in an entirely unstable configuration).

In effect the specter of "what is it doing now" has met the reality of why isn't it doing what it needs to? Evan as an "amateur" pilot the total lack of airmanship in this incident astounds me. At the end of the day the blunt truth is that the PF was fundamentally incompetent...and that is a scary reality.

SLF, the airframe might have been entirely stable when the A/P and A/T dropped off line, but they dropped off because of false inputs. The pilots were not faced with a stable situation. They were faced with the same bad data and had to quickly separate good data from bad data - and deal with a control law situation they had likely never before experienced.

I'm not ready to declare the PF fundamentally incompetent. :Let's wait until the entire CVR and DFDR data is released before we pass judgement.

It does appear on that pilot actions were incorrect, however that in no way exonerates the machine. The crews last comments indicate extreme confusion and I maintain that the machine was causing that confusion in large part.

[TTex600]

Organfreak,

I spent an hour pecking away at rebutals on my iPhone during my commute home today, but never hit send after I got a signal. Had I done so, you'd need an adult beverage to go along with the popcorn.

Alas, I decided that I don't have the interest to pursue it further than the last three posts. The "experts" can have it. They aren't going to convince me that the Airbus flys like a normal airplane and I'm not going to convince them of anything. Besides, I initially followed this string for education and I actually have benefited from the information guys like Dozy provide. And..................I don't have a position to protect, an airplane to defend, a concept to justify. So we'll have to see where it goes from here. In the mean time, I'm certain that certain posters will continue to provide entertainment. ;)

[Organfreak]

You're a wise man.

[BandAide]

When the airbus reverts to direct law, it is an airplane again, just like the DC-9 (I'm old Northwest, too).

The problem Air France had was that bad data from frozen pitot/static sensors drove the autothrust and normal law protections the wrong way.

I'd like to think I would sense the deck angle, check the ground speed on the data/gps page, determine my airspeed input is wrong, disable the automation, and recover from the stall in the middle of the night over the middle of the ocean in thunderstorms. I'm ready to face that challenge now, with help from the Air France experience.

The airbus method does a lot for you, but you always need to be ready to turn off the magic and fly the airplane. When you turn off the automation, she'll do anything a DC-9 would do.

[IcePack]

BandAide, yep but it needs to be in DIRECT law.
Not alt 1 or 2 or "unusual attitude law."
TT has it right::D

[slowjet]

TT, absolutely correct & controlled contribution when it might be tempting to be a bit more colourful! I flew 73,75,& 76 before going A340. Hated the latter. You do not fly the plane. All autopilots out, no, you are NOT connected to the controls. You are still connected to computors. Tough, high speed conditions gave us those lovely things called PCU's. Lose all hydraulics in the 73 & you really were connected to the contol surfaces. It was called Manual Reversion. Very tough to fly , especially with an engine out. 75 made me scared when I read the clear statement in Mr Boeing's manual..."There is no manual reversion". Three hydraulic systems and a RAT made it unnecessary. 76 was the same. Forced on to the A340 made me rethink my career. Horrible. It flew me. Even when esteemed Instructor told me once, "Knock it all out & fly it like any other plane" ! Oh yeah, side stick was kinda fun & the plane did go where I pointed it. But, no thrust levers ! I mean they are there but they do not move. Going way off thread here though. I am a bit late into this discussion but I did notice pure Airbus pilots think through the automatics. Not their fault, they are trained that way & recurrently tested that way. Boeing pilots think like stick & rudder men. The AF pilots were faced with very confusing indications but it disappoints me to note (like a previous contribution) that 'Flight with unreliable airspeed' manouvres were not followed or were not properly understood.Oh, glad to be back on the Boeing.

[Intruder]

Let's wait until the entire CVR and DFDR data is released before we pass judgement.
I hope you wait forever. CVR and DFDR data were NOT designed for public release!

[DozyWannabe]

I recognize that my views are fundamental not professional in the sense that my actual first hand experience is limited to basic airman-ship (152/172) vs flying more complex aircraft.

I've never flown anything more complex than a DHC Chupmunk, and that was 15 years ago, not to mention heavily supervised! All opinions here are usually welcome, that's one of the reasons I like it.

With that caveat out of the way my personal feeling is that the entire airbus concept is the single worst development in professional aviation. It unquestioningly takes flying to the lowest common denominator and I think that AF447 has to be taken as the wake up call.

Why do you think that? If you're referring to the reliance on autopilot from climb-out to finals then you've got the wrong target. The A300 series did pioneer the use of digital computers in flight management systems, but it was the B757 and B767 that made the technology mainstream. These systems are completely distinct and separate from the FBW aspect.

A question I'd like to ask you, and I throw it out in general too - and I'd like an honest answer. If the FBW technology used in the Airbus was developed in the USA, would you feel so strongly about disliking it?

Dozy, does it disturb you that someone such as myself actually flys the Bus? I obviously don't know much about flying it or anything else.

Not at all, as long as you're willing to learn more about how the thing works (and possibly lose some of the preconceptions in the process), and the same is true about any line pilot on any airliner. The fact is that given the amount of off-base commentary on the Airbus FBW technology and how it relates to other airliners (slowjet's post is a good case in point), it seems that some B757 and B767 pilots (not to mention those on the B777) are completely unaware as to just how much the computers were tied into their aircraft from the outset.

Maybe you forgot that this string is about the crews final conversation. Some of these readers may not be interested in pedantic and anal analysis. That's over in the tech log.

I'm well aware, but as long as the commentary demonstrates a misunderstanding of the concepts and technology involved, as well as a knee-jerk dislike of computers in aviation (including the false idea that Airbus was alone in pushing the technology) then someone has to make it clear, and it might as well be me.

My generalizations regarding the way an Airbus is hand flown are correct.

No they are not. The amount of control the sidestick gives you is *way* in excess of what the autopilot turn control in a conventional airliner gives you.

NOTHING you say or write will change the FACT that the SS does not directly control the control surfaces in other than direct law.

You're missing the point I made that the yokes of more conventional airliners do not directly control the control surfaces either, and that has been the case since the late '60s.

I've flown cable controlled, steam gauge, jets for thousands of hours and I assure you that an lateral yoke deflection in a Lear does not result in a roll rate; it results in an aileron deflection which results in a roll rate depending on the airspeed and other factors. Likewise, yoke movements in pitch do not directly result in load factor changes; yoke movements in a Lear result in elevator movements which result in load factor changes depending on A/S etc.

This is true, but you cannot make an aircraft the size of a DC-10, B767 or indeed an A330 without sacrificing that directness of control, simply because the surfaces are too large and powerful to be moved by muscle force alone. Slowjet is correct when he says that even the little B737 was an absolute nightmare to control under manual reversion - which was why you had hydraulic assist. When the widebodies came along, they were hydraulic only, because muscle power could not move those surfaces *at all*.

Of course there's a difference between commanding roll rate directly and controlling ailerons directly, but of those Airbus pilots without an axe to grind who have controlled the thing in Normal, Alternate and Direct, the vast majority state that the difference is not that pronounced, and very easy to get used to - I think someone a long time ago compared it to losing power steering in a car, the only difference being that it was slightly more sensitive as opposed to more heavy.

I am NOT anti Airbus FBW. I'm anti the continual statements to the effect that it flys like any other airplane. It does not, and most anyone who actually operates one understands that fact.

Would the addition "more-or-less" help there? The fact is that it is controlled by exactly the same flight surfaces as any other airliner, you have speedbrakes to slow down and disrupt lift, flaps and slats as high-lift devices and tricycle landing gear to get 'er on and off the ground. That the connection to the ailerons and elevators uses a system that's marginally smarter than the old Q-feel systems is a difference, but in the long run it's not really such a big one.

I do have a question for you. Why is it that old dogs like myself, reared on the likes of DC9s, (NWA crews for example) manage to maintain control of UAS A330s in the ITCZ while the only airframe lost was flown by Airbus only pilots? BTW, everyone who's read more than my last three posts knows that I defend the pilots and am insulted by those who want to blame this accident on them.

If you can point me to anywhere I've blamed the pilots I'd be happy to concede, but I'm pretty sure I've done no such thing. Given that of the 30-odd UAS incidents that occurred - not to mention the thousands of safe flights that transit the ITCZ every year (many of which are on FBW Airbuses), only one ended up in an accident, don't you think you're overgeneralising a bit there? If you're saying that airlines have skimped on training because of the presence of these new technologies - which, remember, are not solely Airbus's domain - then that is a question that the airline training departments must answer, and for what it's worth I think it is AF's training department that has the most questions to answer in the case of this accident.

As an aside - the DC-9 is one thing, but Douglas made the mistake of trying to keep things too simple when they made their first widebody and disregarded some basic mechanical and physics principles - with the result that the DC-10 became notorious and the company eventually ceased to exist in its own right. Plenty of pilots loved the DC-10 when she was working, but when she developed a fault she could, and often would bite you badly.

You do not fly the plane. All autopilots out, no, you are NOT connected to the controls. You are still connected to computors.

On the B757 you were connected to an electronic feel unit hooked up to the hydraulics. It may have felt like you were directly connected, but you weren't.

75 made me scared when I read the clear statement in Mr Boeing's manual..."There is no manual reversion". Three hydraulic systems and a RAT made it unnecessary. 76 was the same.

If you want to see what happens when the pitot tubes or static ports are blocked on a 757, I suggest you look up the Birgenair and Aeroperu 757 crashes respectively. The computers were *heavily* tied in to the warning systems on those aircraft.

Going way off thread here though. I am a bit late into this discussion but I did notice pure Airbus pilots think through the automatics. Not their fault, they are trained that way & recurrently tested that way. Boeing pilots think like stick & rudder men.

Massive, *massive* overgeneralisation. You have only to look at the posts made by Airbus pilots on the Tech Log threads (though admittedly that would take a while) to see that you're incorrect there. Posters to look out for include PJ2, Lemurian, HazelNuts39 among others.

[Shorrick Mk2]

Of course there's a difference between commanding roll rate directly and controlling ailerons directly, but of those Airbus pilots without an axe to grind who have controlled the thing in Normal, Alternate and Direct, the vast majority state that the difference is not that pronounced, and very easy to get used to - I think someone a long time ago compared it to losing power steering in a car, the only difference being that it was slightly more sensitive as opposed to more heavy


That kind of comment / comparison only underlines the lack of understanding of the difference between commanding roll rate and commanding deflection. On a car the failure of power steering doesn't affect at all wheel deflection per number of steering wheel turns.

If you wanted an actual comparison you'd have a car where your steering wheel would not be connected at all to the steering rack, and the "steering assist" would modulate your steering inputs according to speed. If it were to fail, probably 99% of the time it wouldn't make a difference and you wouldn't notice - except if you were to say drive on the autobahn at 250km/h and fail to adjust your steering wheel deflection to your speed and gallantly drive off the road into the side barrier thinking "what the hell just happened".

[Clandestino]

I may be technically incorrect about the exact function of the FMGC, but that doesn't matter. My point is that the SS's are not connected to the controls, the SS's are connected only to computers; a point that you yourself concede.It matters quite a lot. Not all computers are same or serve same purpose. It is very different ballgame when you are connected direct to flight computers as opposed to via FMGC. It is basic Airbus systems architecture. Every bus rated pilot must know that.

I do have a question for you. Why is it that old dogs like myself, reared on the likes of DC9s, (NWA crews for example) manage to maintain control of UAS A330s in the ITCZ while the only airframe lost was flown by Airbus only pilots?Interim 2 lists 37 UAS events in 330/340 that ended completely uneventfully (pages 50-53 & 99-102). Nowhere is the experience of the crews involved listed so your statement is not based on BEA reports. Would you be so kind to provide your source(s)?

[DozyWannabe]

@Shorrick Mk2:

I believe it was someone describing the way it *feels*, not the way it *works*. It's easy to mistake one for the other, especially given the misunderstandings as to what constitutes "direct control" of the flying surfaces. I've even read articles where people assume that the controls on the B777 are directly connected when they most certainly are not.

[Zorin_75]

If you wanted an actual comparison(...)
Is that based on actual experience of flying a bus in roll direct?

[SLFinAZ]

Dozy,

I could care less where the aircraft is made and it's not the technology....it's the core concept. Conceptually the Airbus does everything possible to remove aviator from aviation....right down to the name....BUS. In effect it trivializes the pilots and equates them with being a bus driver. Accordingly many are now paid like one.

TTex,

This is the core of my question/concern. My understanding is that the stall itself is a direct result of the PF's initial actions. The plane was literally flown into a stall. The elevator trim was a direct result of the pilots continued back pressure on the SS. So this creates two issues for me...

1) Completely incorrect initial response to a known issue resulting in loss of control.

2) Continued application of SS appears to be a lack of system knowledge on two fronts. Once a nose up condition is achieved (regardless of the correctness) continued back pressure is incorrect. Beyond that the maximum deflection wound the trim up all the way. Should not the PF be aware of the effect of this pressure??

To me the "autotrim" in response to stick input is another horrific idea from AB. Under manual control the only thing trimming an airplane ought to be the person flying it.

My perspective is that the PF was attempting to abdicate his responsibility to actually fly the plane and mistakenly expecting the computers on the airbus to figure things out for him. A pilot "flys" the plane with control inputs...the moment the input achieves the desired effect on attitude the stick is returned to neutral until additional input is required. As a general rule any individual deflection is limited to a relatively small range of the sticks total movement range.

How does one pilot judge anothers "airmanship"....isn't it via the deftness of his control inputs. Generally newer pilots tend to over control an aircraft via larger control movements leading to the need to "correct" their own inputs and creating a self induced scenario where they are behind the airplane.

So how does a professional pilot with thousands of hours dial in such a massive sustained control input and for what reason???

[Shorrick Mk2]

Is that based on actual experience of flying a bus in roll direct?

Was your experience different?

[DozyWannabe]

Dozy,

I could care less where the aircraft is made and it's not the technology....it's the core concept. Conceptually the Airbus does everything possible to remove aviator from aviation....right down to the name....BUS. In effect it trivializes the pilots and equates them with being a bus driver. Accordingly many are now paid like one.

So your belief stems from a knee-jerk emotive response rather than a well-reasoned one. I don't say this to denigrate what you're saying, but if this is all it's about then it's the honest truth.

The use of the term "Airbus" was in fact originally a design specification for BEA (meaning British European Airways, not the French accident investigation branch), and this goes all the way back to 1965. See DeHavilland's HS.134 design to meet this specification below (and in the process note how much it looks like the eventual configuration of the B757 - now remember this was drawn up in *1967*.)

British Airliners 'Nearly Get It Right' Shock! (http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/post-war/british-airliners-nearly-get-right-shock-17298.html)

The concept is not therefore about "remov[ing] the aviator from aviation" and turning him into a bus driver - although let's be honest, the glamour was fading from the airline profession even by the mid-'70s, and Ronnie's union-busting antics meant that the only way pay and conditions could go from the '80s onwards was down. In fact the aviators who were instrumental in designing the Airbus FBW system would probably be mortally offended by that insinuation, and I for one wouldn't blame them.

"Airbus" was simply (at the time) a convenient umbrella name for the collaboration of European aviation companies - nothing more to it than that.

Anyways, back to the topic at hand...

[TTex600]

.
I hope you wait forever. CVR and DFDR data were NOT designed for public release!

Intruder, please don't mistake my comments. I'm not requesting that the CVR recording be played in public. But in case you aren't aware, the CVR transcripts are released in the US and obviously (proven by present leaks) the French also release transcripts.

see, NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board (http://www.ntsb.gov) and you'll find that every report includes a complete CVR transcript.

[TTex600]

Interim 2 lists 37 UAS events in 330/340 that ended completely uneventfully (pages 50-53 & 99-102). Nowhere is the experience of the crews involved listed so your statement is not based on BEA reports. Would you be so kind to provide your source(s)?


We have one UAS event that resulted in a airframe loss. AF447. If I read interim 3 correctly, the AF447 PF had no other significant non Airbus experience. Therefore the only UAS that resulted in an accident was piloted by Airbus only pilots. It is entirely possible that the other 37 were Airbus only crews, but that doesn't change the fact that the accident pilot was Airbus experienced only.


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[TTex600]

My generalizations regarding the way an Airbus is hand flown are correct.
No they are not. The amount of control the sidestick gives you is *way* in excess of what the autopilot turn control in a conventional airliner gives you.

Quote:
NOTHING you say or write will change the FACT that the SS does not directly control the control surfaces in other than direct law.
You're missing the point I made that the yokes of more conventional airliners do not directly control the control surfaces either, and that has been the case since the late '60s.

Dozy, I'm through going counter point - point with you. You argue like a politician. You restate your opponents questions into the question you want to answer.

I never mentioned autopilot turn control in a conventional airliner. I stated this in post #613: "As long as the FBW is in normal law, the SS is nothing more than a autopilot input device. Adding a bank request through the SS is the same as turning the heading select knob on the flight control panel. Both actions result in the autopilot turning the aircraft". Nowhere in that statement did I in any way compare the SS to an conventional (your word - which I find quite ironic)autopilot turn control.

[SLFinAZ]

Dozy,

There is nothing emotive or knee-jerk in my reasoning. The simple reality is that aviation is unforgiving and 99.9% wont get it done on the day you need the other .01%. Military aviation training comes with a sustained and quantifiable loss rate. The bottom line is that real mission capability requires realistic training and that leads to fatalities.

"Old School" professional pilots tended to have a military pedigree and while that might entail other issues by and large they had a very well qualified "stick and rudder" skill set.

The philosophical move away from aviation skill set to a sophisticated software designed to minimize or eliminate "pilot error" has led to less and less qualified pilots overall IMO. Flying will always entail risk and anything that minimizes a pilots actual ability to handle that other .01% will eventually come into play. The moment that "automatics" went from being an aid to the pilot and became a replacement aviation went backward 50 years.

[Organfreak]

TTex600:
If I read interim 3 correctly, the AF447 PF had no other significant non Airbus experience.

Responding more to a previous post that I can't find right now, one that called PF "very experienced," from the first Interim Report at
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e1.en/pdf/f-cp090601e1.en.pdf
is an abridged paste of his experience:
 Flying hours:
 total: 2,936
 on type: 807
PNF had approximately 4.5 times as much type experience.

[DozyWannabe]

Dozy, I'm through going counter point - point with you. You argue like a politician. You restate your opponents questions into the question you want to answer.

Not at all - I think I answered them pretty directly.

I never mentioned autopilot turn control in a conventional airliner. I stated this in post #613: "As long as the FBW is in normal law, the SS is nothing more than a autopilot input device.

Well, that is fundamentally incorrect as the FCU is *not* an autopilot. It is a flight control unit and feel system which is slightly smarter than the previous generation (which went into the A300, B757, B767 and MD-11). You may choose to see it that way, but that doesn't make it true. If the sidestick simply input to the autopilot it would be routed through the FMS (which is a completely different and separate system manufactured by a third party, usually Honeywell), which it isn't.

Adding a bank request through the SS is the same as turning the heading select knob on the flight control panel. Both actions result in the autopilot turning the aircraft".

Again, incorrect - because the sidestick is not routed through the FMS and never has been, and also incorrect in a more material sense because the heading select knob orders a manouevre that is limited by the FMS in terms of turn rate and bank angle. With the sidestick you can command any bank angle (and consequent turn rate) up to 67 degrees, which is the limit of the flight envelope as discovered in testing.

Nowhere in that statement did I in any way compare the SS to an conventional (your word - which I find quite ironic)autopilot turn control.

Well, you didn't specify make or model of aircraft, so I went with the most generic term - so sue me.

I'm not trying to annoy you or start an argument here, I'm just pointing out that you have a fundamental misconception as to how the Airbus control and autoflight systems are implemented.

"Old School" professional pilots tended to have a military pedigree and while that might entail other issues by and large they had a very well qualified "stick and rudder" skill set.

Tell that to those poor buggers in that B-52. Also, if you have a look in AH&N, you'll find a number of posts that relate to the early days of BEA and BOAC - the ex-WW2 pilots were known as "the barons", and some of them literally scared their junior officers with the chances they'd take and their apparent lack of knowledge of their limitations. Military training has one more problem as well, and that is ingrained adherence to chain-of-command. The F/O on the ill-fated Palm 90 flight was a former Navy pilot, I believe, and the CVR in that case shows that he was aware something was not right, but never felt he could contradict his Captain even though his Captain came up via turboprops and small charters in FL, and his own experience was in fast jets.

The philosophical move away from aviation skill set to a sophisticated software designed to minimize or eliminate "pilot error" has led to less and less qualified pilots overall IMO. Flying will always entail risk and anything that minimizes a pilots actual ability to handle that other .01% will eventually come into play. The moment that "automatics" went from being an aid to the pilot and became a replacement aviation went backward 50 years.

But that was never the case - you show me a single trade-level article proving that automation was designed to minimise pilot ability or replace the pilot in the cockpit, and I'll give you that point, but the fact is even in the early days that was not the intent at Airbus or anywhere else. If the current breed of MBA jockeys running airlines have decided that should be the case then it is their fault, and not that of Airbus. People obviously forget the flipside of FBW development which was that the protections actually allow pilots to perform things like evasive maneouvres more safely. FBW has nothing to do with autoflight reliance either - those are two completely different aspects of modern airliners, and as I said, it was Boeing who popularised the latter with the B757 and B767 (the A300 had it first, but it's market share was too small to make much of a difference on it's own).

[ChristiaanJ]

.....right down to the name....BUS. In effect it trivializes the pilots and equates them with being a bus driver.I see this has already been answered, but I would like to suggest that you also read the story of the A300 and A310 (neither were FBW).
IIRC (it was a long time back), "airbus" in those early days was a generic term we used for widebody-shorthaul-twin designs in general, until "Airbus" snapped up the term and made it a trade mark.
To me the "autotrim" in response to stick input is another horrific idea from AB.Sorry, but "autotrim" is not an AB idea. It's much older than that. Concorde had an auotrim system, and apart from having to do some clever tweaking during flight testing, it never really was a problem. But then the Concorde pitch trim had the "bicycle bell", so you knew when it was doing its job.

[jcjeant]

But that was never the case - you show me a single trade-level article proving that automation was designed to minimise pilot ability or replace the pilot in the cockpit, and I'll give you that point, but the fact is even in the early days that was not the intent at Airbus or anywhere elseIf you read all with a closed or rigid mind .. of course you will find not a word about automation was designed to replace the pilot in the cockpit
But if you made ​​a critical reading (reading between the lines) you will quickly inform you of the possibilities and prospects (proposed) has not said or written about the automation
If you've read (closed and rigid mind) about the beginning of automation in industries .. it was written that it would relieve the worker of the painful and repetitive work and more leisure was assured ... he was not told at the time that this would send workers to unemployement :8
A this time some had already foreseen the danger (read between lines)

[DozyWannabe]

IIRC (it was a long time back), "airbus" in those early days was a generic term we used for widebody-shorthaul-twin designs in general, until "Airbus" snapped up the term and made it a trade mark.

In fact it was a narrowbody specification originally (in 1965 - see link in previous post), but I imagine that the design quickly became a widebody with the advent of all major US manufacturers introducing theirs. The UK had their own proposal in the form of the BAC Two-Eleven, but ultimately this was squelched politically in favour of buying US-made designs in.

Sorry, but "autotrim" is not an AB idea. It's much older than that. Concorde had an auotrim system, and apart from having to do some clever tweaking during flight testing, it never really was a problem. But then the Concorde pitch trim had the "bicycle bell", so you knew when it was doing its job.

Well, you can know when it's doing it's job on the FBW Airbus as well, all you have to do is glance inboard. I suspect that given the near-constant operation an audio warning would have quickly become a nuisance - which is not to say that an audio warning when the trim goes past a certain point would be a bad idea - if any change was to be made, I think that would be the one to go for.

CJ's well aware of this, but the initial sidestick development and testing was done on a Concorde airframe. Someone kindly provided me the documentation, but I lack the requisite French to read it thoroughly. Maybe one day...

@jcj - This is only my opinion, but if someone decided that by, as you say "reading between the lines", then they got it wrong. The only training cost that the FBW Airbus series was designed to reduce was *conversion between types* by keeping a virtually identical flight-deck layout throughout the range.

[infrequentflyer789]

Hi,

If you read all with a closed or rigid mind .. of course you will find not a word about automation was designed to replace the pilot in the cockpit
But if you made ​​a critical reading (reading between the lines) you will quickly inform you of the possibilities and prospects (proposed) has not said or written about the automation

Which automation at what level ?

The higher level A/P flight-director etc. - maybe. But, they were never intended to be a safety-critical must-be-working item, if they have become a crutch for less well trained pilots who cannot fly without them, that is operational failure (and cost cutting at expense of safety).

The FBW is more interesting. Look at the AB control law and particularly the way it is path-stable - it was designed to reduce pilot workload in hand-flying. Why spend effort on that if the intention is to get rid of the pilot ?

The real irony of course is that since AB designed this system, it appears that higher level automation SOPs and regulation has all but eliminated hand flying. If designing today, why would you bother reducing workload on a task pilots hardly ever do ?

[SLFinAZ]

The PF had 61 hours over the last 30 days and 368 hours with 18 take-offs and 16 landings over the previous 6 months (more then either the captain or other FO). Obviously he was getting significant "grooming" {looking at take-offs/landings}.

[vapilot2004]

You're missing the point I made that the yokes of more conventional airliners do not directly control the control surfaces either, and that has been the case since the late '60s.

I think in the case of this discussion, the phrase "direct control" is meant to refer to a mechanical, or more accurately, a hydro-mechanical connection between the cockpit controls and the aircraft's flight control surfaces.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

These guys rarely fly.

How do you expect them to recover from a stall?

Especially when other weird stuff is introduded like tempo loss of airspeed.

Modern pilots DO NOT expect to see a stalled aircraft.

They are 'aircraft managers'.

[Organfreak]

These guys rarely fly.
How do you expect them to recover from a stall?


A better question would be, can't I expect a professional transport pilot to not cause a stall in the first place? After all, I paid my money and I'm trying to get some sleep back there.

Here's another better question: If this pilot(s) was confused, why should that have happened? Eh? :(

[chrisN]

Organfreak, FWIW, I have recalled tentative conclusions drawn by others in my post no. 1646 on the “thread 6” in tech log. Briefly, some ATPL’s thought PF confused the status with overspeed.

I was reminded of other accidents, and also by somebody posting earlier, that stressed people can fix on a presumed problem and keep trying to correct it, even when their efforts are unsuccessful – it is a “how the brain works” thing.

[jcjeant]

Well .. reading some stances of the CVR (Otelli book) not published by the BEA is chilling and I understand why the BEA is not happy with this publication

- à 00h54mn37s : PCB : Tu fais le message ou tu veux que je le fasse ? Tu veux que je fasse la première partie ou..." MD : "SID, c'est quoi ? C'est Natal ? puis dix secondes plus tard PCB : "SID c'est à Sal... Oui, c'est ça, SID, c'est Sal. Tu demandes carrément le changement du point d'appui et MD : "Oh oh, ça va pas changer grand-chose pour nous. Pui PCB se rend compte que Sal peut être ouvert en cas d'urgence et à 00h57mn41s : PCB : "Ah merde... Ah ben oui... C'est permis, ils ont raison"
Après une explication des vols ETOPS à une hôtesse venue les voir dans le cockpit pour faire régler la température dans la soute (elle rapportait de la bidoche !), reprise du dialogue
- à O1h05mn32s : MD :"Alors, je leur ai demandé un autre point d'appui... C'est pas compliqué... (incompréhensible)... Réponse de PCB : "Donc, euh, sa réponse , on s'en contente ? MD : "Hein ? et PCB :"On s'en contente de sa réponse ?" MD : "Oh oui... ça m'inquiète pas trop, hein" et PCB insiste : "oui, ben moi non plus... Donc tu lui demandes un changement de point d'appui..." MD : " T'as pas l'air inquiet ?" PCB :" Ce qui est un peu dommage, c'est que tu ne lui as pas demandé son avis... (incompréhensible)... pour trouver un autre point d'appui... Et il te répond : ben non, ce sera comme ça quand même." MD : "C'est pas grave" PCB :"OK , alors on lui envoie les trucs..." MD : "Il est où... la réponse, là... du... Ah tu l'as rentrée." PCB : "Tu pourras la remettre à David... Tu pourras lui dire que... (incompréhensible)..
L'Hôtesse quitte le cockpit à 01h12mn 53s : "Bon, bien, je vous laisse. MD : "Bien, bienà tout à l'heure." L'hôtesse : "A tout à l'heure."
Erreur de MD sur le point où ils doivent appeler le contrôle
- à 01h14mn30s : "Air France 447, on a passé "Femur" à 01h13 minutes , niveau 350... On contacte Atlantico en fréquence HF sur 6349."
réponse du contrôleur de Recife :"Négatif, après "Intol" appelez Atlantico en fréquence HF sur 6349."
A l'appel d'Atlantico, arrivés à Intol à 01h31mn34, le contrôleur de Recife appelle l'avion : "Air france 447 ?" MD à PCB : "On arrive à Intol" puis Puis MD au contrôle :"Air France 447, allez-y ?" Le contrôleur de Recife : "Air France 447, contactez maintenant "Atlantico" sur la fréquence 66195565... (incompréhensible)... fréquence 6535...
réponse de MD :" J'ai compris : 6649 et 5565 et 6535" réponse du contrôleur : "Ce sera 6535 seulement après le point"Tasil" avec Dakar, Air France 447" le contôleur n'a pas remarqué le mauvais collationnement des fréquences
- à 01h56mn16s MD : Euh, qui c'est qui pose, c'est toi ? bon ben, il va prendre ma place.
- à 01h56mn20s : MD :3T'es PL, toi ? réponse immédiate de PCB : "Ouais"
- arrivée de DR dans le cockpit et MD recule son siège pour lui laisser la place
- à 01h59mn32s : MD : "Bon, ça y est ?"
- à 01h59mn38s PCB : "T'asdormi ?" Réponse de DR : "Moyen" puis MD : "T'as dormi, non ?"
- à 01h59mn47s PCB : " Il dit, moyen, moyen, moyen" et DR s'assoit en place gauche
- à 02h00mn08s MD : "Bon allez je me casse." discusion sur les turbulences et la couche et l'impossibilité de monter en raison de la température trop haute (standard + 13) et allusion au contact avec Atlantico
- à 02h01mn20s : PCB : "Le logon a échoué avec Dakar.. On a bien entendu le contact avec le dispatch.
- à 02h01mn22 : PCB à MD : "Tu veux bien nous rappeler les fréquences exactement que ça a donné,s'il te plaît ?"
- à 02h01mnéçs : MD : "Hein ?" et immédiatement PCB : "Les fréquences ? Qui est qui ?
- à 02h01mn31s : MD : "Euh... 6649, 5565 et après c'est 6535.
- à 02h01mn 39s DR : "A partir de "Tasil", c'est 6535 !

Who can find in these dialogues a bit of professionalism ?

[ehwatezedoing]

Who can find in these dialogues a bit of professionalism ?
Genuine question.
Is it Mr Otelly who did this CVR trimming !? Sort of the other way around of the BEA, leaving only the crap talking in the CVR or is it you ?


No quotation for example of what the Captain is actually saying for is briefing when he leaves. Just a notation about it.
discusion sur les turbulences et la couche et l'impossibilité de monter en raison de la température trop haute (standard + 13) et allusion au contact avec Atlantico
While making sure to leave for all to read "Bon allez je me casse"

:confused:

[jcjeant]

Genuine question.
Is it Mr Otelly who did this CVR trimming !? Sort of the other way around of the BEA, leaving only the crap talking in the CVR or is it you ?


No quotation for example of what the Captain is actually saying for is briefing when he leaves. Just a notation about it.All from Otelli
Well seem's that MD (captain) tell no more during the briefing (words in Otelli book + words in BEA preliminary report N°3)
In fact the briefing is made by the two copilots .. the captain "assist" .. likely a spectator ...
In all those chatters between pilots I don't perceive (my feeling) any signs of authority from the captain MD

[andianjul]

Could someone possibly translate the excerpt from this 'unofficial' CVR publication into english - for those philistines like myself who never had the privilege of learning French, please?

[Dani]

There is absolutley no need to translate this. It has nothing to do with the accident and the information value of the discussion is zero. They are just casually talking. Which is not uncommon during a flight of 12 hrs or more. What professionalism? Do you expect a crew to sit on their mouth for all this time? Obviously you have never visited a cockpit on a long haul flight.

I agree that the hand over briefing is somewhat minimal but in reality you don't need to talk a lot (except a CRM question: "Did you sleep?" - "mediocrly" he replies, which means not really). Specially if it is the captain who has to be briefed, and nothing has happened, there isn't anything to be briefed except "everything is normal". You see with one glance the point you are flying to, the state of the Satcom and of course also the technical condition of the aircraft.

This is again a useless discussion to find answer in areas where they aren't, for the reason that they don't understand the real ones.

[SLFinAZ]

The "real issues" here are readily apparent and surprisingly simple...

1) the PF completely failed in following SOP for the event. Instead of flying pitch and power when confronted with unreliable airspeed he commanded the aircraft to climb. Beyond that initial failure he maintained maximum control surface deflection (full back stick) for most of the descent.

2) The PM failed to exercise command authority even though he was the senior pilot on the flight deck and was well aware that the PF was not handling the situation correctly.

3) The Captain did not assume command upon return the the flight deck in any meaningful way.

[jcjeant]

Obviously you have never visited a cockpit on a long haul flight.I'm waiting a formal invitation from you
BTW .. you will be outlaw to allow me in the cockpit
Those chatters are maybe not DIRECTLY tied with the accident .. but the tone (if you read between the lines) used between the pilots show a real lack of authority and discernment of MD (captain)
Lack of CRM .. already before the event

[Lyman]

SLF.

Sorry. You are quite out of line. You have a pov, yes, but let's look at it more closely.

1. You are a line pilot flying for AF? How did you become so adamantly conversant with SOPs?

2. Explain how you have conclusively linked "Senior" with "Command"?

3. Captain issued orders that were followed. Smells like "Command" to me.

Defense? Because of your powerful and irrefutable pronouncements, I am interested in the trail of thought that produced them.

Seriously.

[Mr Optimistic]

Can't we just stop now ?

[Zorin_75]

Can't we just stop now ?
Can't say you're not doing your alias justice...

[HarryMann]

Can't we just stop now ?

Obviously not...

[SLFinAZ]

Lyman,

Are you a pilot of any sort, meaning have you solo'd any airplane...

I think that the answer is no from what you've written. My observations here have nothing at all to do with any given airlines "SOP". Things like unreliable airspeed can happen on any type of plane. Learning how to deal with these types of issues is a fundamental aspect of learning to fly. From what I can recall no mention of any checklist or procedural conversation has been highlighted.

The immediate response to unreliable air speed is to fly pitch and power and then once the plane is stable the PM can begin to sort out the details. The PM knew the PF was not responding correctly but i'm unaware of him initiating a formal scan related dialog. Meaning at no point did he read off pitch and power to the PF...which may very well been all that was needed to put the PF's head back in the game.

Aircraft law is derived from admiralty law. On any plane or ship there is always a chain of command. with the captain off the flight deck the PM was the senior staff member on the flight deck and unless otherwise specifically stated command authority was delegated by the captain he legally was in command of the airplane until the captains return.

By the time the captain returned it is entirely possible that the airframe was no longer recoverable. However from what dialog has been released and conversations here the Captains actions were entirely incorrect. He was unable to clearly see the PF's inputs or instruments. By relieving the PF and having the PM assume control during the brief transition he would have accomplished two things. The PM seems much more capable and coherent so he would have gotten a much better situation update in the 15 or seconds it would take to strap in and do a scan. He could then assume control and have both the best experience level and most accurate information.

It is inconceivable to me that the airplane crashed without the captain at the controls.

My comments needed no defense simply because they are so self evident and fundamental. Any pilot candidate would be fully expected to know that you fly pitch and power under those initial circumstances as well as understanding that the 1st step in unusual attitude recovery is to unload the air frame. It was fundamentally incorrect for the PF to apply any back stick pressure beyond what was required to level the airplane. The moment he began to climb the PM knew it was a mistake and failed to exercise his legal obligation to take command of the aircraft until the captains return...period end of story.

[Organfreak]

It is inconceivable to me that the airplane crashed without the captain at the controls.

Actually, we do not know that. Right seat had no restraints fastened, see report.

[HarryMann]

It is inconceivable to me that the airplane crashed without the captain at the controls.I too, found it extremely surprising, that the Captain did not automatically retake his seat immediately.
It seems to have been accepted without much comment...

...perhaps because he was assumed to be focusing on taking-in the situation, perhaps because he was still disoriented and not immediately aware of the extreme emergency.

Think I've said before that from his seat, he would then have initiated a full scan, likely including the trim-wheel!

I would say this was more than surprising, and tantamount to condemning the flight, although this is seen and easily said in retrospect, that appears to be the case.

[Lyman]

SLF

1. Pilot initiated roll left, and Nose up. There's PITCH. Don't confuse aft stick with anything but an adjustment in PITCH. You know different? Better? Some wags puffed..."Sit on yer hands". Wrong, she needed handling. So far, then, PF has addressed PITCH. There was discussion here by A330 pilots that 5 degrees might have been appropriate, she'd be climbing with that, so why does climb convey a problem to PNF?

2. POWER? The belief is N1 was set at 85%. Evidently, it satisfied the PF.
She had been cruising at .8M, why change? He then neglected to move the levers, why?

3. Captain D left the RHS in command, "He's taking my place"......

Admiralty Law? Splendid.

Mostly, Sir, I take exception to your "closed book" attitude.

BEA have not made conclusions. Every syllable of your post is conjecture. Well founded? I'll grant you that it is.

When Captain returned, he was not treated to STALL WARN, the two pilots were at odds, and he had trouble assessing the situation, apparently. RHS had no restraints latched; it is not impossible the PF was prepping for an egress from the cockpit after water "landing". LHS had lap only, perhaps he too, was starting to prepare for exit. If the Ocean was visible, the attitude and airspeed would not have been remarkably different from a vanilla short final. Nose up, velocity ~ 150 mph, etc. The sink would have stopped a faint heart, but...........

CPL, retired.

[simflea404]

Having a good idea of the workload following a discrepency in instruments and confusion that happens when you are not "at the wheel" at the time...I can imagine how things went from bad to worse without understanding why...To me this is the most important issue...how to stop having professionals put in such a situation. Forget the final CVR...as many have said...and think of why the problem was not diagnosed expediently...I have heard of many checklists that ask for something to be done on the third page that should have been done ASAP....Boeing and AB alike (before someone insinuates either is better).
To blame the pilots is an easy way out...and a way to have the mistake occur again,,,,
Oh Bol..cks...I'm not a pilot...only someone in the aviation business for the last 35 years...so I guess I know nothing....

[iceman50]

LYMAN

1. Pilot initiated roll left, and Nose up. There's PITCH. Don't confuse aft stick with anything but an adjustment in PITCH. You know different?

My highlighting in red, but that is utter rubbish. Having tried to "simulate" the input in an A330 simulator the pitch required to initiate and maintain the "zoom" was significant and took great effort and had to be HELD! The PF appears to have had no idea what he was trying to do. You do NOT pitch a widebody at 35,000' to 15 degrees nose up. The A/C was zoomed to a stall well above REC MAX Altitude.

(ATPL and still flying 40+ years)

[Lyman]

Why are you conflating the zoom with the PF's initial input? They are not connected, at least not initially. You in the sim needed what to intitiate the "ZOOM"? There's the rubbish, being unable to see the LOC as a development, not an instantaneous artifact.

You are way ahead of yourself, and the climb. Once input, the PF had no reference (back) to his attitude at handoff, it became a guessing game.

His panel displays are unknown. It was NOT his goal, as was yours, to establish a wicked climb of 3000 feet. His attitude increased NU incrementally, yet here's you saying he slammed full aft stick and Held it!

He did NOT.

[iceman50]

LYMAN

You are way ahead of yourself, and the climb. Once input, the PF had no reference (back) to his attitude at handoff, it became a guessing game.


Clutching at straws again and with your argument damning the pilot even more as if he had NO reference i.e. PFD what was he doing "flying" the A/C?? He "held" aft sidestick he did not do it incrementally as you are suggesting.

[Lyman]

His displays were not recorded. No one has said they were non-existent.

The climb was commanded by the FC, via g demand. Why would you expect to gain instantly 15 degrees in the sim in AL2? It took the time the computer deemed necessary.

His working theory was O-Speed, not climb. You are assuming all manner of things here, I do not have the cement thinking you do. The Stall was entered unusually, not that that would have helped them determine they were stalled. You are conflating what happened as you see it, with some need to condemn the Pilot(s) for missing something you see "clearly".

[SLFinAZ]

Lyman it's obvious you have no grasp of aviation fundamentals. You manufacture complete fantasies with no regard for facts. The released CVR as it is makes it clear the Captain never assumes actual command of the plane.

Do you have any actual understanding of what "pitch and power" actually means? From your comments again I think not.

We have no indications that his panel displays were abnormal in anyway. The PM is well aware of the planes actions and makes multiple comments that are specific to the planes attitude.

The initial climb was commanded by the pilot, there is no evidence anywhere of an uncommanded "autoclimb". Further the elevator trim wound up to it's maximum gradually in response to the pilots continued SS deflection.

Your total garbage is of no value here, the plane stalled because the PF manually flew it into a stall. It stayed stalled because he kept it that way...

[andianjul]

After forty years of flying freight around from a to b (no pun intended), I'd say he has some idea.

[TTex600]

..............................

We have no indications that his panel displays were abnormal in anyway. The PM is well aware of the planes actions and makes multiple comments that are specific to the planes attitude.

...........................

Actually, I think we do have an indication that his displays may (MAY) have been abnormal.

I'll leave it to the gents over on the Tech Log section to give minute details, but the PM switched the PF's ATT HDG and AIR DATA over to FO3. I see no reason to switch the ATT HDG input from norm to FO on 3, other than the PM seeing something on the FO screens that was apparently incorrect. If you want to research it, the info is in Interim 3.

[Lyman]

Just a popin, but when Captain returns, he is aware RHS is handling, and "assumes" the RHS data is current and correct. There is no comment to update the Captain of the discrepancy suggested by LHS monitor and switching of RHS Display.

So there are now two Pilots watching and reacting to RHS Panel? That is a tacit vote of confidence in what may be the downfall of the a/c. If reluctant before, now LHS is doubly unwilling to take over, or correct/command the ship.

imho

[DozyWannabe]

@TTex600:

It may have been a partial failure (i.e. loss of speed, as they would all have been getting), or if the RHS air data computer appeared to be getting dodgy pitot and static input then it may have dropped altimeter as well. In the sim, the closest visual approximation my colleague could get was to fail the ADC on my (RHS) side completely, which left me with attitude (artificial horizon) only. I could read the altimeter and see it winding down on the standby though, so I used that rather than make the TRE switch the source for me.

A possible theory, and I'm not saying it's true, is that manual handling was trained in terms of following the Flight Director, and the PF could have been referring to losing that.

The other question is, if the PF really was referring to losing all indications - why did he not hand over control at that point?

[Lyman]

Just a request, but can we have access to the gents who are advising you, Doze? This middleman thing is dizzymaking. I'd hate to call Bravo Sierra on actual flyers.

[DozyWannabe]

They have requested anonymity, and in light of the huge favours that they've done me on top of the fact that I gave my word, I'm obliged to say no.

Also, the difference between "flyer" and "non-flyer" is incredibly variable and can be as much as the latter having no clue whatsoever, or as little as the latter having less or no practical experience of the systems they've studied theoretically. I've been on here a while and seen the whole gamut of wise words and poor - even dangerous - suggestions coming from pilots and non-pilots alike.

[TTex600]

Dozy, if you feel the need to make a point, just please make it. No need to use one of my posts to advance your agenda. You, once again, answer questions I do not ask. You counter arguments I do not make. If you want to make a point just make it. No need to address it to me. I'm happy to defend what I think, but not what you think I was thinking. If you need clarification, I'll try and provide such.

With that, here's today's clarification.

Back to the topic, SLFinAZ mentioned that we have no indications that his displays were abnormal. I think that the PM's action to switch the PF's ATT HG and AIR DATA inputs to F/O3 is a plausible indication that the PM's screens were abnormal.


As far as your simulator experience, computer generated information doesn't much impress me if you haven't realized that already. I'd really rather look at a gyro than a EFIS, and a ASI than an EFIS, and a real peanut gyro than another computer generated mini EFIS. And, I'd rather go by my multi thousands of hours in an Airbus than by the Sim. It's just a computer after all.:ok:

[DozyWannabe]

I'm not trying to make a point at all, just taking part in the same discussion we all are. And technically with UAS DISAGREE, *all* the PFDs were "abnormal" for a certain period, the question is to what degree. We know for certain what the LHS was seeing, and right now that's all we have to go on.

You know I don't have to tell you that the modern EFIS instruments are powered by gyros and accelerometers in much the same way as the steam gauges of old - the only substantive difference is in how they are displayed.

[Lyman]

Not really interested in the names, merely in your admission that you are arrogating OPS. (Other People's Stuff), without attribution.

Thanks, then.

[DozyWannabe]

If you're referring to the upset control techniques and the like, you forgot "with their permission and encouragement". If by that you think it was someone else sitting in the seat of the sim manipulating the controls and I'm just passing their findings on, then I assure you you're mistaken. A few more weeks training and I might even be good enough to be a concierge! ;)

[alainthailande]

Sorry if this kind of article is considered as laughable by the wise crowd here, but I (SLF) have found it being an interesting reading:
What Really Happened Aboard Air France 447 (http://www.popularmechanics.com/print-this/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877)
Please don't flame me. I'm not saying that what's written in there is the true story. I don't have a clue really. It just makes sense to my uninformed mind.

Edit: link fixed - sorry and thanks for pointing it out

[DouglasFlyer]

Link doesn't work for me - this one does:

PopularMechanics (http://www.popularmechanics.com/print-this/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877)

[F111UPS767]

That Popular Mechanics account was very well written, it seems to me. Are there any faults or errors in it?

[vapilot2004]

That Popular Mechanics account was very well written, it seems to me. Are there any faults or errors in it?


Yes. It was based on incomplete data.

[DiCaprio]

'Incomplete Data'

Really? What was missed? Thousands of posts later, this struck me as a compelling and highly believable account....

[lomapaseo]

In the interim while w await the final report with a full analysis of the data by qualified experts, any number of "what-if" theories can be offered by those who watch from the sidelines (PPRune etc.)

A good writer can link selective facts together in a cohesive fashion to promote any number of theories. Apparently you found one in your referenced report. However there are numerous more theories being discussed on PPRune in these threads and any other good writer need only to cherry pick what sounds plausible into a competing conclusion with your source.

The more profesional don't rush to judgement of promoting a theory until all the facts have been vetted among the experts.

[Organfreak]

Good reply-- AND...there were many facts left out, too numerous to mention.

The situation was far too complex to be fairly summed-up in one short article.
Quite a few factors that might have been in play, some that would help explain the weird actions of the PF, have been offered here. Speculation, yes, but highly-educated speculation-- er, some of it. :hmm:

Like the man said, we are waiting for the (hopefully; <cough>) FULL report.

[F111UPS767]

One reason I found it very good was that it included in its timeline when airspeed instruments became functionable again, which greatly aided my SA on what was available in the cockpit. This may have been available in the thousands in previous posts (many of which I have not read), but here it was easily followed.

[Capt Scribble]

The article gave a succint account of the basic facts, the main point being that the aircraft was recoverable after the initial upset. Not much more needs to be said. But why 3 experienced crewmembers could not see the solution is the real question and we can only speculate on that one.

[lomapaseo]

One reason I found it very good was that it included in its timeline when airspeed instruments became functionable again, which greatly aided my SA on what was available in the cockpit. This may have been available in the thousands in previous posts (many of which I have not read), but here it was easily followed.

That is the value of a well researched and well constructed article or TV documentary. It is meant to communicate in the simplest terms.

However, it doesn't mean that it is correct or the only opinion on the subject.

The jury is still out on this subject since the investigating anaylsis is not yet complete.

[DC-ATE]

The jury is still out on this subject since the investigating anaylsis is not yet complete.

Ya...and when the final report does come out, there will still be many who will find fault with it. The only fear I have is a highly biased final report.

[Paliughi]

I think there needs to me more of a drill down on Pierre Cedric Bonin's 2900 hours of flight experience.Does anyone know what his resume of flight experience shows? 2900 hours in what? civilian or military trained?This is important detail that has been missing from all reports.The types of aircraft he previously logged times in seems very relevant at this point.2900 hours in Fouga's and Mirages or Cessna's?

[ChrisJ800]

 Private Pilot’s License issued in 2000
 ATPL theory in 2000
 Professional pilot’s license issued in 2001
 Multi-engine instrument type rating issued in 2001
 Glider pilot’s license issued in 2001
 Following his selection by Air France, pilot training course at the Amaury de la Grange
piloting school in Merville from October 2003
 A320 type rating issued in 2004 (within Air France). End of line training and pilot in
command for first time in September 2004
 ATPL License issued on 3 August 2007
 Additional A340 type rating issued in February 2008 (with Air France). End of LOFT and
pilot in command for first time in June 2008
 Additional A330 type rating and LOFT in December 2008

[jcjeant]

This is Bonin infos from the first interim report and this is a difference with the one of the third interim report
First interim report english

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e1.en/pdf/f-cp090601e1.en.pdf

Bonin infos:

Male, aged 32
 Professional pilot’s FCL license (CPL) issued on 23 April 2001
 Multi-engine instrument type rating (IR ME) issued on 16 October 2001
 ATPL theory obtained in September 2000
 Airbus A340 type rating issued on 26 February 2008
 Line oriented flight training completed 9 June 2008
 Airbus A330 type rating issued on 1st
December 2008
 Line oriented flight training completed 22 December 2008
 Other type ratings: Airbus A320 issued on 7 September 2004
 Medical certificate (class 1) issued on 24 October 2008, valid until 31 October
2009 with compulsory wearing of corrective lenses
 Flying hours:
 total: 2,936
 on type: 807(9)
 in the previous six months: 368 hours, 16 landings, 18 take-offs
 in the previous three months: 191 hours, 7 landings, 8 take-offs
 in the previous thirty days: 61 hours, 1 landing, 2 take-offs
This pilot had performed five rotations in the South America sector since
arriving in the A330/A340 division in 2008, including one to Rio de Janeiro.
His oceanic route qualification was valid until 31 May 2010.
2008/2009 ECP instruction season:
 E33 training on 2 February 2009
 C34 base check on 3 February 2009
 4S ground training on 15 January 2009
The validity of the E34, C33, CEL34, CEL33, S1 training, checks and ground
training was covered by the dates he obtained the Airbus A330 and A340 type
rating qualifications as well as by the date of the end of the line oriented flight
training.
These training courses and checks were programmed before the following
dates:
 E34 training: 31 August 2009
 C33 base check: 31 August 2009
 CEL34 line check: 31 December 2009
 CEL 33 line check: 31 December 2010
 S1 ground training: 31 March 2010

Note and polemic
Where is
 ATPL License issued on 3 August 2007
This info appear only in the third report (after the discovery of black boxes and so BEA knowing who was piloting at event time)

[Pali]

Is there any information on how many hours a pilot made autopilot/manual flying?

Or some qualified estimate?

[chrisN]

Under what licence was Bonin able to be “ . . . pilot in
command for first time in September 2004”, when his ATPL License was not issued until 3 August 2007?

Is this sequence and timing usual?

(Just trying to understand – no agenda.)

[BOAC]

A little lost in translation I suspect. Most UK airlines qualify their co-pilots at the outset as 'P1' which means in essence that they are allowed to operate as 'P1/US' (not 'PIC'), and is a licensing matter. Qualification to be a 'cruise captain' is normally delegated to an internal airline progression/training, with, of course, regulatory oversight.

[LapSap]

Is there any information on how many hours a pilot made autopilot/manual flying?


I was wondering the same thing.
How much flying experience did he have? Or is this the new breed of airline pilot?
Looking at the time-line, I don't see much opportunity for this pilot to have had any "real" hands-on/decision making/PIC time in his career.
Yes, qualifications, but where's the exposure to normal hand flying in crappy conditions as a low time pilot? Where's the flogging around in a twin at night for a few hundred hours, single-pilot IFR gaining experience?

This is a worrying trend to me.

[DC-ATE]

This is a worrying trend to me.

Better get used to it. That's all there's going to be now and in the future. Glad I'm outta aviation.

[Rockhound]

The Popular Mechanics article that Alain in Thailand helpfully posted in post #705 is essentially a synopsis of Jean-Pierre Otelli's book "Erreurs de Pilotage 5", which includes the complete CVR transcript, annotated and commented on by Otelli. Otelli has stolen the BEA's thunder - little wonder the BEA is upset.

[Lyman]

Rockhound "Stolen the BEA'S thunder". How so?

[DiCaprio]

This may have been answered before, but in a highly-automated airplane such as this, why did it not occur to PF or PM to re-activate AP when airspeed indications tallied? One assumes that 'pitch and thrust' would be one of the first things the AP would 'try', since that's been identified endlessly as the missing reaction?

Also, how come there was no warning when control input asymmetry of a certain magnitude/duration was observed by the flight management system? That would seem like a sound worth hearing.

Yeah, I'm but a punter, but one with a lot of time paying your salaries, and enough wits about me to comprehend much of this. So ne flamez-vous pas, svp.:=

[Island-Flyer]

To me that final conversation and the utter lack of CRM calls into question Air France's pilot training. This was exacerbated by the fact that the control sticks on the Airbus move independently (a feature I always believed created more problems).

At some of my past employers the practice of putting two SIC's in the cockpit on oceanic flights became a common practice for the obvious savings in cost. I had been against it for this very reason, no defined chain of command. Internal evaluation revealed that without a set chain of command CRM degrades to a point that safety of flight is compromised.

We ran into a similar problem when two cruise SIC's couldn't make a decision because one was senior to the company and the other was senior on that aircraft type. Despite this and other evidence about the dangers of not having a PIC present on the flight deck I was told that the company would fly two SIC's until the regulators force them to change that policy. The savings in payroll was too much for the bean counters to pass up.

I hope this accident prompts that change, but I doubt it will. The airline industry has lost much of its responsibility as control of operations is taken from experienced, mandated personnel like the Director of Operations and given to accounting. The regulating bodies do not back up those responsible for safety of flight operations and we get situations like this.

[Rockhound]

Lyman,
It seems to me that, by somehow gaining access to the output of both the CVR and FDR, Otelli has stolen a march on the BEA. I doubt that the BEA's final report will provide much that has not already been reported by Otelli.

[Clandestino]

Yeah, I'm but a punter, but one with a lot of time paying your salaries, and enough wits about me to comprehend much of this. So ne flamez-vous pas, svp.
Airbus A/P doesn't have attitude hold mode and it does not command thrust.

There is the aural warning when both sticks are out of neutral at the same time. Recorded at 2:13:03.

Consider yourself flamed.

utter lack of CRMCRM is useless when pilots lack resources of their own to manage.

calls into question Air France's pilot trainingAir France pilots have previously successfully negotiated loss of all airspeed in A330s.

This was exacerbated by the fact that the control sticks on the Airbus move independently (a feature I always believed created more problems).As long as anyone claiming independent sticks on Bus are problem does not support the claim with some verifiable research, I'll consider such utterances unreliable & irrelevant.

[jcjeant]

As long as anyone claiming independent sticks on Bus are not problem does not support the claim with some verifiable research, I'll consider such utterances unreliable & irrelevant.
All happy :ok:

[Island-Flyer]

@Clandestino

CRM is useless when pilots lack resources of their own to manage.What resources did these pilots lack? Their airspeed indication? I didn't realize you were suppose to disregard CRM when the aircraft encounters an instrumentation malfunction. My opinion based on their interactions is the only resource they lacked was adequate training.

Air France pilots have previously successfully negotiated loss of all airspeed in A330s.How many times? A good training program is not "good enough", it means that 100% of the time the crew would be able to identify a malfunction and take appropriate action to a satisfactory outcome. Obviously these pilots could not understand what should have been a relatively easy avionics error to "fly through".

As long as anyone claiming independent sticks on Bus are problem does not support the claim with some verifiable research, I'll consider such utterances unreliable & irrelevant. Defensive much? I didn't state that as a fact but rather that I believe it, as in it's my opinion. However from the information I've read on AF447 it appears that the independent movement of control sticks was a small contributor to the accident chain and removed one additional opportunity for the accident to be prevented. Had the PNF noticed that the PF had frozen his stick nose up perhaps he would have forced the proper correction. All I can tell you is that there have been times in my career when an uncommanded or unintentional control input has been noticed because the PNF control column moved and was noticed, resulting in proper correction. Mind you this applied primarily to GNE due to lateral errors and rarely pitch problems.

[Gretchenfrage]

As long as anyone claiming independent sticks on Bus are problem does not support the claim with some verifiable research, I'll consider such utterances unreliable & irrelevant.

Well, Otelli's publication, the PM article are somewhat verifiable research, in the absence of the still withheld evidence of the same by the BEA (just wonder why ....).

So it really starts being quite some evidence, if one cares to read correctly.

You can all continue to play the ostrich, which only suggests that the brain mass might be equivalent, or there must be some other reason!

But to me the lines in the PM article are horrifyingly evidence enough that independent controls are a distinct disadvantage to coupled ones. The latter would have most probably triggered a very much earlier reaction of the PNF, ......, and most probably have saved the day for those extremely poor pilots.

[wozzo]

But to me the lines in the PM article are horrifyingly evidence enough that independent controls are a distinct disadvantage to coupled ones. The latter would have most probably triggered a very much earlier reaction of the PNF, ......, and most probably have saved the day for those extremely poor pilots.
I'm curious: What kind of reaction?

PNF (as PF) had at a crucial time continuous and then repeated stall alarm in his ears and altitude, attitude and vertical speed indication before his eyes. But he, as hasn't PF, never identified the condition "stall". In my opinion so far, recognizing stall was conditional for adequate measures to "save the day".

So, considering "stall" never made it into the conscious of either member of the crew, what kind of information precisely would PNF have gathered from coupled sidesticks, and what kind of measure one would have to expect as consequence?

[Gretchenfrage]

read that paragraph taken from the PM article:

Unlike the control yokes of a Boeing jetliner, the side sticks on an Airbus are "asynchronous"—that is, they move independently. "If the person in the right seat is pulling back on the joystick, the person in the left seat doesn't feel it," says Dr. David Esser, a professor of aeronautical science at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. "Their stick doesn't move just because the other one does, unlike the old-fashioned mechanical systems like you find in small planes, where if you turn one, the [other] one turns the same way." Robert has no idea that, despite their conversation about descending, Bonin has continued to pull back on the side stick.

Maybe Bonin was so tense that he continuously pulled on the SS without realizing it, who knows, or he was just reacting wrongly. But the fact remains, that Robert did not realize it, at least for too long a time, because the ss is not visible to him and he was rightfully fixed on the PFD. With coupled controls it would have been more easily visible in front of him and furthermore tangible.

Therefore my strong opinion that with coupled controls he would have intervened earlier.

This should be a strong point in favor of coupled controls = feedback.

[Clandestino]

What resources did these pilots lack?First and foremost, ability to recognize what was happening.

I didn't realize you were suppose to disregard CRM when the aircraft encounters an instrumentation malfunction.Keep on not realizing as it is correct thing to do. I have not written it was to be disregarded, what I meant to convey is that it would be useless to use CRM when there is no knowledge or skill to manage.

My opinion based on their interactions is the only resource they lacked was adequate training.Valid if the only thing affecting the interaction were training. It is not, therefore: invalid.

How many times? At least twice. Interim2 lists only MSNs and dates. It is easy to check who was the operator at the time of the occurence using Airfleets, ATDB or similar but I didn't have the inclination to go through the whole list.

A good training program is not "good enough", it means that 100% of the time the crew would be able to identify a malfunction and take appropriate action to a satisfactory outcome.Errr... not quite. There is a thing we call Threat and Error Management that claims we humans are not 100% reliable (quite realistic view, I'd say) but that there are times when we can still work with reduced reliability and yet successfully cope with our eff-ups. Like in cruise.

Obviously these pilots could not understand what should have been a relatively easy avionics error to "fly through".Yup. WoCL, anyone?

Well, Otelli's publication, the PM article are somewhat verifiable research, in the absence of the still withheld evidence of the same by the BEA (just wonder why ....).It would be useful if you would retell the relevant part of mr Otelli's publication. Parts that got to the PPRuNe make his book look more similar to snuff porn than serious aviation safety text. Of course, such a selective quoting might lead to extremely biased view on the matter. Or not.

You can all continue to play the ostrich, which only suggests that the brain mass might be equivalent, or there must be some other reason!I don't find your ad hominem (or more precisely: ad struthiocamelum) very informative or entertaining.

But to me the lines in the PM article are horrifyingly evidence enough that independent controls are a distinct disadvantage to coupled ones. Since 1988, aeroplanes with uncoupled sticks are allowed to participate in public passenger transport, worldwide. Certifying authorities do not share your concern. What do you know that they don't?

[Gretchenfrage]

Certifying authorities do not share your concern.

Now that's comforting.
They have certified a lot of aircraft that needed redesign. Think of the DC10.
Just why couldn't they learn? Just why would Airbus be immune to redesign if deficits appear? Just because they flew since 1988? Great argument!

Anyway, I simply flew both systems and that's where my opinion and concern originates.
But then again, what does a simple pilot know ......

And by the way, I didn't want to be entertaining. Metaphors are here to underline a point of view.
Ostrich is quite suitable for some attitudes concerning the apparent deficit in Airbus controls.

Over and out.

[DC-ATE]

OK.....I'm just an "antique" pilot long ago retired, but someone fill me in please on these "uncoupled" side sticks. Just WHICH one has the authority ???

[Lyman]

DiCaprio.

No comment re: a/p not reselected, it's in here or TechLog. Post 447, Airbus issued Safety Bulletin: "Do not reconnect Autopilot too quickly post UAS, the aircraft may enter an uncommanded climb."

UAS procedures prior to, and to this day, are a "work in progress" for the Bus.


DC-ATE Sometimes the PIC, sometimes not. Sometimes Both, sometimes neither. It's a proprietary thing, Captain. If you are a BUS flyer, you are permitted to know almost always, especially when the a/c is docile, which is most the time. Rarely, when UPSET, the STICK is mysterious, and no one is permitted to know, lest someone actually have a clue. When one is busy, the other fella is to mind his bidness. It's a French thing.

[CONF iture]

Since 1988, aeroplanes with uncoupled sticks are allowed to participate in public passenger transport, worldwide. Certifying authorities do not share your concern. What do you know that they don't?
But Investigation bodies (at least one of them and this is not the BEA of course) share our concern. What do you know they don't ?

[chrisN]

DC-ATE, from answers posted previously by those who know, if the two side sticks are sending different messages, and nobody pressed the priority button, the aircraft takes the average.

If one pilot presses the button, that takes priority. If the other one then presses his/hers, it reverts to that one.

Apparently the intention was to enable one to take over if needed, not to resolve a tug of war between two pilots who refuse to agree.

At one point, PNF Robert pressed his and announced that he was taking it. Shortly after, Bonin took it back, with no such announcement, and it stayed that way.

AIUI.

Chris N

[Plectron]

ref Post #722, LapSap, surely you must be joking. With all the posts on PPRune about lack of actual hands-on flying, how can anyone ask this question? There are MAJOR players out there who hire non-pilots, train them in Cessnas for a couple hundred hours, let them languish for over a year while learning the books, and then put them on the line in big long-haul wide-body aircraft.

Once on the line, they are forbidden to land in any significant crosswind (and if you are the Captain you would know why), fly MAYBE 3-4 legs a month with the autopilot on by 1500' AGL and off at the marker inbound at which point the plane is basically ballistic.

In 10 years of this great experience they make him a "Commander". If he doesn't screw up 2 years later he is an "Instructor".

Of course, as long as the resulting incidents don't end of as flaming craters, the incidents get buried and you will only see quick blips on here. Any and all negative comments are shouted down by the cheering squad.

[rudderrudderrat]

Originally Posted by Clandestino
Since 1988, aeroplanes with uncoupled sticks are allowed to participate in public passenger transport, worldwide. Certifying authorities do not share your concern. What do you know that they don't?
See page 7 of this EASA doc. of MAY 2011.
Sounds like some timely concern to me.

http://www.easa.eu.int/rulemaking/docs/npa/2011/NPA%202011-09.pdf

"c) The use of side stick controllers together with electronic flight control systems which provide control augmentation and control deflection limiting systems could affect piloting awareness that the aircraft is approaching a control limited flight condition. It may be that return to normal flight condition and/or continuing of safe flight needs a specific crew action. In these circumstances a suitable flight control position annunciation is required to be provided to the crew, unless other existing indications are found adequate or sufficient to prompt that action.
(2) CS 25.777 Cockpit controls
Side stick controller force-deflection characteristics in pitch and roll together with displacement sensitivity and gains need to be evaluated. The intention is to show that normal inputs on one control axis will not cause significant unintentional inputs on the other. Consequently a new paragraph CS 25.777(i) is proposed requiring a suitable assessment."

[DC-ATE]

OK.....thanks for the replies, Lyman - chrisN.
Sure sounds like a STUPID system to me !!

[Mr Optimistic]

A bit surprised there isn't a drill controlling who is allowed to touch the stick: if you haven't got control, shouldn't your hand be clear and visibly so ?

[chrisN]

AIUI (perhaps ATPL’s will put me right if I have it wrong!):

A “drill” is perhaps not quite the right expression, but I’m not sure what is. Under CRM, even a junior pilot is supposed to be able to propose a change from what PIC is doing, or even take over if necessary. Ideally, it never gets to an unresolved argument. But I have seen criticism from ATPLs of a FO who knew that PIC was messing up an approach but felt unable to take over because of his rank. They all died, IIRC. (India? Short runway on top of hill? Went over the end, when FO said go around and PIC did not until too late?)

But what if FO is convinced PIC is doing it wrong, but FO is actually wrong?

In the end, the commander is paid to take decisions, although after CRM-following hearing what the other(s) say.

In AF447, commander left the junior FO as PIC, not just PF, and that seems to have inhibited the other FO in spite of his greater experience. When junior FO Bonin took back control, other FO Robert then tried harder to get commander back, and left it to him to sort it out. Which the latter did not in time.

(IMHO, at least partly because he was not properly told what had happened re stall warning, PF holding stick back, no-one pointing out NU attitude combined with low speed and high descent rate = stalled – but that is another aspect, though still a CRM issue AIUI.)

[rogerrapoport]

Pierre Sparaco, France' s top aviation writer, an Aviation Week correspondent and author of the definitive book on Airbus, has been covering the company from it's inception 40 years ago. He has just published this commentary Aeromorning.com - Pierre Sparaco Chronicles (http://aeromorning.com/en/chroniques.php?ch_id=1085).

[jcjeant]

An extract from the PM article posted some time ago .....

At 1h51m, the cockpit becomes illuminated by a strange electrical phenomenon. The co-pilot in the right-hand seat, an inexperienced 32-year-old named Pierre-Cédric Bonin, asks, "What's that?" The captain, Marc Dubois, a veteran with more than 11,000 hours of flight time, tells him it is St. Elmo's fire, a phenomenon often found with thunderstorms at these latitudes.
Amazing Bonin question about St Elmo fire :sad:
In any case from a commercial pilot
No need to have a university education or be a veteran pilot to know what is a St Helmo fire
I wonder more and more questions about the knowledge of Mr Bonin

[PA-28-180]

" Amazing Bonin question about St Elmo fire ".....
Agreed! This is something I learned about in my instrument ground school and SAW during my instrument flight training. To me, this tragedy is very much related to TRAINING.....or lack thereof.....I guess I was just 'lucky' to have a very good primary, instrument, multi and commercial instructor. I know that training is a 'cost'....but where do we draw the line between 'cost' and SAFETY? Or....DO WE?? :ugh:

[sf25]

Had they had 'conventional' controls, F/O Bonins' full nose up control input would have been a thousand times more obvious as he would have been hauling back on the yoke and probably with both hands.

can someone tell me (an interested slf) how it works with boeing´s 777 and 787 which are fbw as well but have no sidesticks? do both the yokes move the same? can one pilot feel the "force" performed by the other pilot?

[Gretchenfrage]

(slightly simplified, but along the general layout)


On the modern Boeings the two yokes are interconnected, thus move the same way. Force felt on one side is according to input force from the other. It is done by a so called drive back. This is a artificial replication of the force input to the ACEs (actuator control electronics) by the pilots.
The ACEs transmit the input to the PFCs (primary flight computers) who then process it and send it back to the ACEs who in turn actuate the hydraulics for the flight control surfaces.
If the input sensed by the PFCs exceeds the programmed parameters of the envelope or protection, the PFCs increase the necessary force up to not executing the commands. However, if the pilot then increases his own input force above a certain value, the PFCs give up and say: "You want it, you get it" and the input is routed directly to the ACEs for execution.

This latter function is the so called soft protection, as opposed to the hard protection of the Airbus that does not allow override of the protections. Only if 3 of the 5 Airbus computers (2 Prims and 1 Sec) are switched off from the overhead panel, the system goes into direct law and then allows unprocessed input.

[misd-agin]

sf25 - can someone tell me (an interested slf) how it works with boeing´s 777 and 787 which are fbw as well but have no sidesticks? do both the yokes move the same? can one pilot feel the "force" performed by the other pilot?


777 works like every other airplane. The yokes move together. It is visually obvious what inputs the flying pilot is doing.

[PEI_3721]

Shy talk, - “The issue with the sidestick is important.”
Not necessarily as you infer. An aircraft’s response to control input is the combined effects of stick and trim, with the latter providing a significant, perhaps dominant effect. You can compare this with previous accidents / incidents where conventional aircraft suffered upsets due to incorrect trim position; there are several involving go around.

A difference between conventional and sidestick is the trim force. With conventional aircraft an out of trim situation might be detected by an abnormal force, and many pilots take this as an indication of the aircraft position / motion, which is not always true – a lazy, inferred assessment of the control situation.
With a side stick (without feedback), there is no trim force, thus an alternative method of checking trim state is required – look at the trim wheel, check trim indications.

This is not an issue of one system being better than another, it’s that they are different, but the industry has grown up with a force system and this provides a general understanding of the norm.
In normal and those abnormal situations which had been considered, the sidestick system is quite adequate and may have safety and workload advantages.
With AF447 the particular situation was apparently unforeseen, the trim functioned as designed, but together with the surprise and complexity of overall situation the crew had difficulty in determining the situation.
The situation was novel; it required time, knowledge, and reasoned assessment (and reassessment). It appears that these aspects either ran out or did not occur.

Re coupled sticks; it could be incorrect to accept that stick position, coupled or not represents what the aircraft is doing. Checking, monitoring, and establishing the true situation requires looking at the output of control systems – what the aircraft is actually doing.
This requires assessment of the flight instruments, some of which were not available / accurate in AF447.

[SeenItAll]

About the sidesticks. It is my understanding that Airbus sidestick inputs are taken as requested deviations in control surface positions, and not as states for these positions. That is, when a pilot wants to adjust the attitude of the plane by some finite amount, s/he pulls the SS back/forward a specified amount, AND THEN RELEASES THE SS which then returns to a neutral position. The amount of the initial deflection in the SS is what determines the degree of attitude change. Holding the SS at a deflected position causes continually cumulative control surface inputs in that direction.

Thus, isn't it extraordinary that Bonin kept the SS in a deflected back position? Or is my understanding of how the SS works incorrect?

[Mac the Knife]

"This requires assessment of the flight instruments, some of which were not available / accurate in AF447"

As I understand it, at least the standby AI (if not the main AI) was functional.

I would have thought that the sight of a lot of blue might have been a hint that they had a rather excessive NU attitude and that consequently their rapid descent might indicate a stall.

Admittedly the main AI may have been almost obscured by alarm messages but from what I have read the standby AI was working.

But what do I know......?

[hhobbit]

With more tragic irony than flippancy, I propose a slight redesign of the AB sidesticks: a bamboo stick 12-18" long, tied onto each side with two rubber bands.

And that Airline subsidise and mandate glider and/or microlight hours, say 20/year.

My CTSW will do the pilot held stall thingy, showing 28kts IAS or less on high power, plus a dollop of neg VSI