AF 447 Thread No. 5 [Archive] - Page 5

PJ2

30th Jul 2011, 08:01

Takata;

Re your message #999:

Originally Posted by ACARS
.1/FLR/FR090601 0210 279334 06
EFCS1 X2,EFCS2X,,,,,,
FCPC2 (2CE2) /WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2,HARD
About Svarin's concerns in relation to this "wiring fault".
It seems to be simply due to PNF selection of ADR3 in place of its own ADR1 displayed. Hence, he switched to ADR3 (wrong) shortly before ADR1 returned "good" again. A while later, it seems that ADR+IR 3 was switched for ADR+IR 2 on PF display. Yes, possibly. But I wonder if the explanation is more straightforward? From the AMM:

(3) Fault detection and analysis (except for the internal FWS computer faults)
As soon as an internal or external fault is isolated, it is considered as being at DETECTED status.

The FWS computer which detected the fault must confirm it.

The fault duration affecting ARINC bus links is:

- 2 s for a label with its SSM coded FW or FT FLIGHT, for the SDACs
- 2 s + maximum of 500 ms or 5 cycles for a label not refreshed or if its parity is incorrect , for the SDACs and for the FWCs
- 2 s + 5 cycles for a label if its SSM is coded FW or FT FLIGHT, for the FWCs.

Then, the fault is at DECLARED status.

A declared fault must be sent to the CMC.

A DECLARED fault is then consolidated. This consolidation is performed by the computer which declared the fault. It consists in checking the duration of the fault or its recurrence.

If the fault is still present after 10 seconds or if it occurs 3 or more times during the flight, it is consolidated.

A fault which is declared not consolidated is transmitted to the CMC as being a TRANSIENT fault, with bit 19 of label 356 at 0 (INTERMITTENT).

A fault which is declared consolidated is transmitted to the CMC as being a PERMANENT fault with bit 19 of label 356 at 1 (HARD).

A declared fault, whether it is consolidated or not, is transmitted for correlation:
- a fault declared by a SDAC is transmitted to the FWCs,
- a fault declared by a FWC is transmitted to the opposite FWC,
- an ECAM control panel fault is transmitted to the FWCs.

The correlated message which is transmitted in any case to the CMC by the FWC 1 is stored in each FWC.

NOTE : Very few LRUs connected to the FWS, are not checked at the
BITE level but remain checked at the operational level.

(4) Correlation principle
In addition to one fault detection, each FWC starts a correlation process.

This correlation is only possible because every LRU which is acquired by the FWS is connected at least to two computers of the FWS.

This correlation is performed on the buses and on the analog data.

The correlation enables a greater precision on the origin of the fault.

- Example of a message not correlated:
If a fault is detected only by one FWS computer, the associated message will be:
FWCi(1WWi)/WRG:FMGECn BUS E GEN TO FWCi

- Example of a correlated message:
If the same fault is detected by two computers of the FWS, the associated message will be:
FMGECn(1CAn) BUS E GEN

The correlation process which is performed by the FWCs can be initiated only after the consolidation.

grity;

Yes, it means "Vertical Speed Selector", on the FCU - it also doubles as the FPA selector when the mode is in TRK-FPA.

An observation - (one of many, I suspect); Just so everyone is clear on this, the "MAX REC" on the MCDU is not displayed in red font as shown in the BEA Report. I suspect this is for emphasis only. The MAX REC is not a limitation but an advisory based upon both crew-entered TROP heights, and current weights and temperatures, (SAT). One doesn't attempt to climb above it but it wouldn't be a "limitation" in the same sense that the service ceiling of the aircraft is a certification limitation.

Thus far, in my reading of the Report, I cannot find clear comments on why the initial pitch-up occurred. The stick movement was brisk - 7deg (almost half-stick aft movement) in one second. As I posted earlier, I thought it might have been 4 to 5 degrees, which equated to about 3cm of aft stick movement or about roughly about six inches on a standard control column. This aft movement is far greater than that. We can understand a bit better why the aft stick movement during the cockpit confusion, but not the initial movement.

Still reading.

grity

30th Jul 2011, 08:16

p.s. what means "vitesse vertical selecte" also s.114)

It seems to me that On glaresheld : FPA/VS knob was selected VS 0but it has 3 values over the time, so it can not be a single knob ???

grity

30th Jul 2011, 08:22

mm43 your old calculations compares wery good with the outcoming

2 points I found:
they lost more energie in the first time, maybe du to the strong corections with ailerons

and the pitch was not constant high it moves up and down +16deg.....--8 deg
so the stall was not so stable, the stable flow must have braked down 2 or 3 times with a move to the front

Bahrd

30th Jul 2011, 08:40

They might need to be using gigabit Ethernet or even a pair of gigabit Ethernet connections to pass all the data. So four or more new cables might be needed to get the data back to the recorders. That's probably the most difficult to sell part of the concept.
I would even consider the wireless communication over a 60GHz band. It seems not to interfere with the existing standards and is expected to be widely available in the middle of this decade (IEEE Xplore - State of the Art in 60-GHz Integrated Circuits and Systems for Wireless Communications (http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=5958173)).

SaturnV

30th Jul 2011, 09:15

dozy, thanks for the translation of that section of the report.

jcgeant, the answer to your 'bizarre' question is that the wife of the PF is back in the cabin, and they both are returning from a vacation in Brazil. The PF had apparently not previously flown with the captain before this flight. That's why the captain asks if he is qualified.

(You can check the passenger list and match her name with the name of the PF.)

Now one can ask whether it was prudent for the captain to take his rest while the flight is transiting a turbulent section of the ITCZ, and turning the flight over to a junior FO with whom he has never flown before.

A33Zab

30th Jul 2011, 09:15

Quote:
p.s. what means "vitesse vertical selecte" also s.114)

It seems to me that On glaresheld : FPA/VS knob was selected VS 0
but it has 3 values over the time, so it can not be a single knob ???

FCOM
1.31.40

INDICATIONS ON PFD

VERTICAL SPEED:

The displayed vertical speed information is normally based on both inertial and barometric data.
If inertial data is not available, it is automatically replaced by barometric information.
In this case, the window around the numerical value becomes amber.
---

3 values? on page 116 only 2 (ADR or IR)

Peter H

30th Jul 2011, 09:40

Sorry everybody, meant to send this as a PM. No disrespect intended to any pilot, living or dead.

PJ2
Thus far, in my reading of the Report, I cannot find clear comments on why the initial pitch-up occurred. The stick movement was brisk - 7deg (almost half-stick aft movement) in one second. As I posted earlier, I thought it might have been 4 to 5 degrees, which equated to about 3cm of aft stick movement or about roughly about six inches on a standard control column. This aft movement is far greater than that. We can understand a bit better why the aft stick movement during the cockpit confusion, but not the initial movement.

I share your confusion about why the pilot saw the need for the initial stick movement.

However I wonder if the magnitude of the input might be be the result of [trained?] poor piloting technique. If the full "protections" are there, a huge input simply says "give me all you can".

I have no idea if such a practice exists anywhere, but can see how the available pilot interface might encourage it to develop. Or at the least, not discourage its use.

Any opinion?

HarryMann

30th Jul 2011, 09:41

Has anyone else gained the impression that PF actions, appear to assume 'Normal' law ? - despite acknowledgements of Alternate reversion soon after the AP disconnect sequence.

If so, does this indicate a stress reversion to Normal law ss inputs by PF, confused training, or lack of understanding just how sensitive the a/c is at cruise altitude to manual control...

I don't wish to criticise, but the focus on what this that or the other instrument was displaying, where this that or the other switch was set or not set, and what was being said is all but immaterial once you look at the gross insensitivity of manual flight control... and what appears to be an assumption, at least on the part of PF, that the answer to almmost everything has simply got to be stick back (and possibly more thrust)
... only when explicitly countermanded, did PF try anything else.

The meaning and dangers of MAX ALT (recommended) being exceeded were acknowledged by PNF & PF, but whereas coarse NU had been used to get there, only weak, tentative and ineffectual ND is observed as the response.

Here we have an extreme FEAR of any ND inputs (speed fear)
Here we have a seeming belief that NU inputs at the very edge of the High Alt flight envelope, in Alternate Law, are perfectly acceptable.

The 'speed fear' can perhaps be explained by the known UAS - the NU inputs as a response a serious failure by PF (and yes, its been said PNF should then & there taken firm control)

Let us also not forget that the 'silent & unobserved' Alternate Law THS movement - undoubtedly a big factor in the stability of the stalled pitch attitude, requiring large ND for long periods (many tens of seconds) to overcome...

I am glad the BEA have reported their concerns over this unfortunate oversight.

Neptunus Rex

30th Jul 2011, 10:07

HarryMann

I agree totally. The actions following the stall could suggest an "Alpha Floor" fixation. I don't think the PF understood the implications of the reversion to Alternate Law.

amos2

30th Jul 2011, 10:12

...and I don't think you lot would have a clue as to what you are talking about!! :sad:

dufc

30th Jul 2011, 10:16

I have been advised by the BEA this morning that they hope that the English version of the Interim Report #3 "will be available.....next Wednesday."

I am somewhat surprised that in a matter of such importance this should be the case.

The date for the issue of the report was chosen by the BEA and I would have thought they could have factored in the time needed for the simultaneous issue of an authoritative translation.

HarryMann

30th Jul 2011, 10:23

..and I don't think you lot would have a clue as to what you are talking about!!

I'm sure we can take some more of that sort of attitude... provided it comes with some sort of logical explanation :rolleyes:

jcjeant

30th Jul 2011, 10:34

Hi,

It's a little difference between the interim report N°1 and interim report N°3 concerning the PF .. but it's a important point.

Let see .....

Rappor intérimaire N°1

1.5.1.3 Copilote
Homme, 32 ans
ˆ Licence FCL de pilote professionnel (CPL) obtenue le 23 avril 2001
ˆ Qualification de vol aux instruments multi-moteur (IR ME) obtenue le
16 octobre 2001
ˆ ATPL théorique obtenu en septembre 2000
Void space (my edit)
ˆ Qualification de type Airbus A340 obtenue le 26 février 2008
ˆ Fin d’adaptation en ligne le 9 juin 2008
ˆ Qualification de type Airbus A330 obtenue le 1er
décembre 2008
ˆ Fin d’adaptation en ligne le 22 décembre 2008
ˆ Autre qualification de type : Airbus A320 obtenue le 7 septembre 2004
ˆ Dernière visite d’aptitude médicale de classe 1 effectuée le 24 octobre
2008, valable jusqu’au 31 octobre 2009 avec port de verres correcteurs
obligatoire.
ˆ Heures de vol :
„ totale : 2 936 heures de vol
„ sur type : 807 heures de vol
(9)
„ dans les six derniers mois : 368 heures, 16 atterrissages, 18 décollages
„ dans les trois derniers mois : 191 heures, 7 atterrissages, 8 décollages
„ dans les trente derniers jours : 61 heures, 1 atterrissage, 2 décollages
Ce pilote avait réalisé cinq rotations sur le secteur Amérique du Sud depuis
son arrivée dans la division A330/A340 en 2008, dont une vers Rio de Janeiro.
Sa reconnaissance de ligne de type océanique était valide jusqu’au 31 mai
2010.
ECP saison d’instruction 2008/2009 :
ˆ Entraînement E33 le 2 février 2009
ˆ Contrôle Hors Ligne C34 le 3 février 2009
ˆ Cours au sol 4S le 15 janvier 2009
La validité des entraînements, contrôles et cours au sol E34, C33, CEL34, CEL33,
S1 est couverte par les dates d’obtention des qualifications de types Airbus
A330 et A340 ainsi que par la date de fin d’adaptation en ligne (lâcher).
Ces entraînements et contrôles étaient à programmer avant les échéances
suivantes :
ˆ Entraînement E34 : 31 août 2009
ˆ Contrôle Hors Ligne C33 : 31 août 2009
ˆ Contrôle En Ligne CEL34 : 31 décembre 2009
ˆ Contrôle En Ligne CEL 33 : 31 décembre 2010
ˆ Cours au sol S1 : 31 mars 2010

Rapport intérimaire N°3

1.5.1.3 Copilote place droite
1.5.1.3.1 Historique détaillé de la carrière aéronautique :

 Brevet de pilote privé avion obtenu en 2000
 Pilote de ligne théorique en 2000
 Brevet de pilote professionnel avion obtenu en 2001
 Qualification de vol aux instruments sur avion bimoteur obtenue en 2001
 Brevet de pilote de planeur obtenu en 2001
 A la suite de sa sélection par Air France, stage de formation pilote à l’école de pilotage
Amaury de la Grange à Merville à partir d’octobre 2003
 QT A320 obtenue en 2004 (au sein d’Air France). Fin d’AEL et lâcher en septembre 2004
 Brevet de pilote de ligne obtenu le 3 août 2007
 QT additionnelle A340 obtenue en février 2008 (au sein d’Air France). Fin d’AEL et lâcher
en juin 2008
 QT additionnelle A330, fin d’AEL et lâcher en décembre 2008

ECP saison d’instruction 2008/2009 :
 Cours au sol 4S le 15 janvier 2009
 Entraînement E33 le 2 février 2009
 Contrôle Hors Ligne C34 le 3 février 2009
Note : la validité des entraînements, contrôles et cours au sol E34, C33, CEL34, CEL33, S1
est couverte par les dates d’obtention des qualifications de types Airbus A330 et A340 ainsi
que par la date de fin d’adaptation en ligne (lâcher)

Des entraînements et contrôles étaient à programmer avant les échéances suivantes :
 Entraînement E34 : 31 août 2009
 Contrôle Hors Ligne C33 : 31 août 2009
 Contrôle En Ligne CEL34 : 31 décembre 2009
 Contrôle En Ligne CEL 33 : 31 décembre 2010
 Cours au sol S1 : 31 mars 2010
1.5.1.3.2 Entraînements

 IAS douteuse

o Entraînement au simulateur E33 de la saison d’instruction 2008-2009.
Exercice « IAS douteuse ».

Note : le programme de la QT A320 chez Air France en 2004 ne comprenait pas d’exercice sur le vol
avec IAS douteuse.

 Décrochage

o QT A320 : séance FFS n° 4 : « pilotage en loi dégradée (effet de buffeting).
Evolutions en loi alternate ».
o QT A320 : séance FFS n° 7 : « Reconnaissance préventive et contre-mesure de
l’approche du décrochage. DEMONSTRATION STALL WARNING ». La
procédure STALL en vigueur était celle de décembre 1999.

Note globale : les QT additionnelles A330 et A340 n’abordent que les différences par rapport aux

QT
déjà obtenues sur les autres types (A320, A330, A340). Check the bold stances ......
Do you see the difference or I must explain ?

The date for the issue of the report was chosen by the BEA and I would have thought they could have factored in the time needed for the simultaneous issue of an authoritative translation.

I will be not so certain ....
Don't forget some politic pressures .....

cwatters

30th Jul 2011, 10:47

There isn't much communication in those 3 mins. One gap lasts 25 seconds which seems an age give the situation.

Hyperveloce

30th Jul 2011, 11:19

During the brieffing:

"Les deux copilotes discutent encore de la température et du REC MAX. Les turbulences augmentent légèrement et ils décident de prévenir l’équipage de cabine de l’entrée dans une zone plus turbulente. Le copilote de droite dit qu’ils sont « apparemment à la limite de la couche », avant de rajouter qu’il aurait préféré monter au FL 360. Accéder à un niveau supérieur est une préoccupation constante de l’équipage. Les pilotes désirent visiblement évoluer en dehors de la couche, probablement pour limiter les turbulences". (3rd interim report, page 75)

Could it be the reason why a reflex of the PF was to climb (violently) when the A/P and A/THR went off, and when he got the commands ? (note that it is the PNF who told the PF to reduce the VS and stabilize the altitude). When the AF 447 climbed to FL 375, no one in the cockpit seemed concerned by the RECMAX anymore.

jcjeant

30th Jul 2011, 11:35

Hi,

Another fact .. (from the interim N°3)
The PF was not belted
The PNF was partialy belted
All this when they know (and they advise the cabin personnel about) they will have some more turbulences .. and anyways they are cruising in a possible turbulent aera ..
Seem's they were very relax on the flight deck .....
How can the PF be accurate with stick if his body is free ...

Accéder à un niveau supérieur est une préoccupation constante de l’équipage. Les pilotes désirent visiblement évoluer en dehors de la couche, probablement pour limiter les turbulences"Climb for avoid turbulent zone (in CB aera) ? and possibly go more near the coffin corner ?
Seem's to me a bad solution ... the best seem's to change heading ...

SaturnV

30th Jul 2011, 11:52

hyperveloce, perhaps a pre-disposition, but then there seems to be little coordination between the two of them.

Le bruit de fond change rapidement vers 2 h 09 min 46. Ce changement de bruit de fond a été identifié comme pouvant être caractéristique de la présence de cristaux de glace mais ne donne lieu à aucun commentaire particulier de l’équipage, le phénomène étant très peu connu des pilotes à l’époque. Le PNF prend alors l’initiative de diminuer le Mach vers 0,8 et les antigivrages moteurs sont enclenchés.

No conversation about the ice crystals, and its the PNF who takes the initiative to reduce Mach and turn the anti-ice on. Not only had the PF apparently never flown with the captain before this flight, but I am thinking he hadn't flown before with the PNF. Strangers in the cockpit at a difficult time and inopportune moment.

jcjeant

30th Jul 2011, 12:13

Hi,

Strangers in the cockpit at a difficult time and inopportune moment.It's seem's that is one more stranger for those 3 strangers ... the plane ....

Yellow Pen

30th Jul 2011, 12:23

Not only had the PF apparently never flown with the captain before this flight, but I am thinking he hadn't flown before with the PNF.

This is a common occurence at any large airline.

DozyWannabe

30th Jul 2011, 12:29

It's seem's that is one more stranger for those 3 strangers ... the plane ....

Oh, *do* give it a rest with your "strange aircraft" and dark murmurings of "politic pressures", whatever that's supposed to mean. Aside from the pitots, nothing was wrong with that aircraft. It was a bad situation and mistakes were made, that was all. Now we need to know how those mistakes (in which I include the lack of expediting pitot repairs) came about.

airtren

30th Jul 2011, 13:03

I think the French Transcript is not reflecting properly the tone/intonation of the voice in that particular section, and perhaps in others as well.

"tu montes" is an acknowledgment of the situation, what the action of the PF drives the plane to do.

I am quite sure the "tu descend" should be "tu descend!!!" as an "imperative", a recommendation, an order.

It must be related to attitude. Practically, the PNF is saying "you're NOSE UP", so "GET THE NOSE DOWN"...

From what I could sense, the PNF is somewhat unpatient, with the way the PF controls the stick, while he is also trying to help, guiding him. It's clear he is not realizing the effects that this is going to have a minute or so later.

...And tellingly, the Captain says :

One question for our Gallic cousins - do I interpret "Tu montes" and "Tu descends descends" as literally climb and descend, or could the PNF be referring to attitude (nose-up/nose-down) here?

[EDIT : Corrected Captain's statement - thanks for the catch! ]

With the realization that the French only version is creating certain limitations, the new report may help, in case one didn't come to that conclusion earlier.

The "a/c to pilot information interface" - my words - is part of the "a/c category" of elements that BEA document points to among contributing factors, and recommends to be addressed.

... Aside from the pitots, nothing was wrong with that aircraft. ....

Lemurian

30th Jul 2011, 13:20

jcjean,
Do you see the difference or I must explain ?
No I don't need you to, as you're demonstrating, in the cosy comfort of your computer room that you are not able to interpret a set of informations :
The two *biographies* refer to both co-pilots and, this is news to you :
Contrarily to what everyone thought, the PF, on the RHS was the younger and the less experienced pilot on board.
( see pages 11 to 16 of the report on experience and position in the flight deck )
That's the reason for the BEA recommendation about new SOPs for cockpit task attribution when Captain is resting.
So, Mister, would you have solved , without much information the situation these pilots were facing ? in view of your performance in reading / understanding a simple text, may I be allowed to doubt it ?
Further more, wouldn't a bit of respect and humility be in order ?

HarryMann

30th Jul 2011, 13:33

How can the PF be accurate with stick if his body is free ...

Sounds like a question for someone like PJ2, to give a neutral appraisal of how difficult a task this might be, and in Alt Law too, so that basic protections are lost

airtren

30th Jul 2011, 13:34

Concur with your observations.

The "silent THS move and max position" is an important issue part of the "a/c to pilot information interface".

It's true they could have corrected the THS position manually, had they been aware of that factor being involved, which puts a light on the training of the very basic "principles, and elements of flight control".

Has anyone else gained the impression that PF actions, appear to assume 'Normal' law ? - despite acknowledgements of Alternate reversion soon after the AP disconnect sequence.

....
Let us also not forget that the 'silent & unobserved' Alternate Law THS movement - undoubtedly a big factor in the stability of the stalled pitch attitude, requiring large ND for long periods (many tens of seconds) to overcome...

I am glad the BEA have reported their concerns over this unfortunate oversight.

Mr Optimistic

30th Jul 2011, 13:36

Apologies-my reading of the French language isn't up to it- can someone advise when was the first indication that the Captain appreciated their loss of altitude and continuing descent ?

Rob21

30th Jul 2011, 13:47

Does the auto trim follow stick inputs?

Stabilizer at 13º aft can limit forward stick inputs?

BEA report says all control surfaces movement were consistent with pilot inputs. But why trim stays "locked" at 13º all the way down?

Some aircraft are almost impossible to control pitch with full aft stabilizers.

airtren

30th Jul 2011, 13:54

That may require just a whole lot of large disk space for fully readable displays from about ceiling height mid console. Decent HD width video requires about 100 megabits per second or more. Poor quality is about 13 megabits/second. Displays may be visible and gross features may be readable. ...

There could be a separation between "screens video" and "cockpit video", as the 7x7 inch screen's digital info can be collected directly from the computers, as opposed through a video camera, and the cockpit video then at lower resolution should be OK.

SaturnV

30th Jul 2011, 14:04

Yellow pen
This is a common occurence at any large airline.

Agree. But in this instance, the PF was returning from holiday in Brazil with his wife. I have no knowledge of how AF does crew scheduling, but unless split rotations for pilots low in the pecking order are fairly common, his presence on the flight deck might indicate he was pressed into service late.
______________________________________________
From Boeing,

http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/qtr_01_10/5/img/A5_fig2.jpg

This image depicts a cross-section view as an airplane is headed for a nonclassic convective system. During a typical ice crystal engine event, the airplane will be flying in convective cloud with light radar returns at flight level. However, if the pilot uses the radar tilt function to scan below the airplane, moderate to heavy radar returns will be seen. These are regions to avoid because they are associated with regions of HIWC [High Ice Water Content].

Soon after 0135,
le copilote modifie l’échelle de son ND de 320 NM à 160 NM et constate qu’« il y a un truc droit devant », qui fait sans doute référence à des échos détectés par le radar météo. Le commandant de bord confirme et l’équipage discute à nouveau du fait que la température élevée ne leur permet pas de monter au niveau 370.

The radar was left in CAL mode.

At 0208
Vers 2 h 08, le copilote de gauche, sans doute après avoir vu des échos détectés par le radar météo, propose d’« altérer un peu à gauche ». Le mode HDG est activé et le cap sélecté diminue de 12 ° par rapport à la route. Le copilote de gauche passe le réglage de gain du radar météo au maximum, après s’être aperçu qu’il était en mode calibré. La discussion est interrompue par une sensation d’augmentation de température et l’apparition d’une odeur à propos desquels les pilotes échangent pendant plus d’une minute. Le copilote de gauche identifie cette odeur comme étant celle de l’ozone.

Radar changed from CAL to MAX, but no reference to changing the tilt.

grity

30th Jul 2011, 14:07

A33Zab what means "vitesse vertical selecte" also s.114 3 values? only 2 (ADR or IR) no, I mean the green line one position higher with the unit [FT/MIN] overlaying in the beginning the VITESSE VERTICAL, than moving to +5000 and later back to zerro and --5000......

Mimpe

30th Jul 2011, 14:15

most of the matters are now self evident,however after reading all of this its clear the PF's status as impaired from early on and 'twas unrecognised.

1.... distrustfull of the Artificial Horizon at a time when it was his only reliable indication apart from altitude.
2. Degrading into spatial disorientation, under psychological pressure, whilst unfortunately retaining control of the aircraft. The saddest part was the Pf's comment that "it feels fast", which ,if one was repeatedly pulling back on the controls to slow the aircraft, sounds very somatogravic....

Eng_Icing

30th Jul 2011, 14:16

Quote:
Anti icing system is not certified for LSD larg supercooled droplets , freezing rain , freezing dreezle. LSD is probably what they encountered.

I disagree it is SLD. Due to altitude and temperture it more for a ice crystals event. SLD would occurr at much higher tempertures and low altitudes.

STICK N RUDDER

30th Jul 2011, 14:22

Well i do not blame the crew. I would say todays training is very poor from very begining of the flight training , teaching methods are bad etc..I see this every day..

Take an example of stall recovery..how do you get beyond critical AoA is by abusing the elevator so the elevator is the flight control that stalls and the flight control that unstalls AC. It s your AoA control and or speed control so you MUST push that stick fwd BUT some teach just add power keep the same pitch as we can see today.

Now flight schools or airlines teach something new the ,,new way'' to recover from the stall and even they don t teach full stall recovery.I see this with EU students who never heard of elevator trim stall,turning stall,cross control stall etc.Just not too long ago a student who finished the training did t know pitot static system failures and instrument errors.

Today we train OPERATORS not pilots..think of it you have pilots flying who never been upside down in an airplane and they are supose to recover from any attitude???? Blame flight training and my friend it will get worse...

BOAC

30th Jul 2011, 14:39

So many contradictions and disagreements on translation - we will have to wait for Wednesday to see how BEA do at it, and to see the FDR traces annotated in English.

So far, what I see of this tragic accident is:-

PF completely surprised by the loss of A/P and A/T and enters a steep climb - why? Unknown. I am not sure what he was 'seeing' on his panel.,

PNF and PF appear to disregard the pitch attitude and altitude change to above ?MAXREC? - why? Unknown, Ditto

At the apogee, at less than 6 deg of pitch and an unknown (low ) airspeed (having 'traded' KE for PE), it is probable the aircraft was not 'stalled', but was flying too slowly for the actual IAS to support its weight, hence it would start to descend.

Now, a confused PF ?sees this? and selects TOGA and raises the nose to arrest the descent, thereby 'stalling' the wing. A perhaps logical reaction since he had no idea of the IAS, and may have had some background 'trust' in the AB 'protecting' him. Add the change in AoA due to the descent and we are now well into 'stalled'. A long period now of 'STALL STALL' audio which as we know can be 'lost' in 'difficult' cockpit situations. Continuing 'disbelief' that the a/c can be going down with this pitch and power and constant nose-up to try and stop it.

From there on I suspect pandemonium was rife in the cockpit and no-one, including the Captain on arrival, was able to logically deduce that high pitch, high R of D and high thrust meant stall.

It is very rare for airline pilots to ever 'see' a full stall - in military (and civil) QFI days I used to hold the a/c in the stall to demonstrate such ('symptoms of the stall'). The BAC Lightning was particularly adept at producing a fairly stable stall with high r of d. I guess if you have never seen this demonstrated you would not recognise it?

I have made my comments on the absence of the Captain for ITCZ passage much earlier and my views on the necessary changes in training philosophy on another forum here.

I am still very puzzled by the CVR at

"2 h 10 min 39 to 2 h 10 min 46
PNF: Je te mets en en A T T
I'm putting you in in A T T"

ChristiaanJ

30th Jul 2011, 15:01

So many contradictions and disagreements on translation - we will have to wait for Wednesday to see how BEA do at it, and to see the FDR traces annotated in English.
Sorry BOAC, but it's a 117-page pdf..... not to mention a remarkable amount of alphabetti-spaghetti (abbreviations and acronyms).
It took me enough time to read the French original.
It would take me several days to translate, even using a Google translation as a starting text, and since I'm not being paid for it, I have no intention of doing so.

That doesn't mean I'm not willing to try and help out with resolving ambiguities in the translation of given paragraphs or phrases. But I have no intention of working through the entire document, comparing the English to the original French.

STICK N RUDDER

30th Jul 2011, 15:05

Go to ADDS web site there is prediction for LSD..if you do icing training and this is from NASA it s available on AOPA and FAA/ FAST TEAM / you we ll read about it..Second have you seen documentary on NOVA about AF 447 ? if not watch it on netflix under crash of flight 447..this investigators had very good idea what happened..even they mentioned something that the Franch did not and that is..Several crews responded only with pitch change and they were up to 60 sec late reacting with power by that time they put AC into stall when pitot failed.

As far as LSD i stand by that cause it s part of the training /FAA/

airtren

30th Jul 2011, 15:07

During the time slot 2:12:15 - 2:12:19

Capt says:... ca descend

and 2:12:19 - 2:12:45

Capt says: Les ailes a plat !!! (exclamation signs are my addition, as it is an "imperative", an order.... to correct the "pitch up".

Apologies-my reading of the French language isn't up to it- can someone advise when was the first indication that the Captain appreciated their loss of altitude and continuing descent ?

Mr Optimistic

30th Jul 2011, 15:07

Could understand training deficiency if there was low awareness/misunderstanding of modes and protections in degraded states. Not sure I would agree if it's about the existence of an aerodynamic condition called a stall, what causes it and what must be done, at the basic level, to get the wing flying again.

Yankee Whisky

30th Jul 2011, 15:20

Air France crash blamed on pilot error | World news | The Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/29/air-france-crash-pilot-error)

And this is being said without detailed technical evidence. I have heard and seen too many questions as to accept such a simplistic statement.

What is the reaction by this forum?

takata

30th Jul 2011, 15:22

So many contradictions and disagreements on translation - we will have to wait for Wednesday to see how BEA do at it, and to see the FDR traces annotated in English.
Do not expect something unambiguous as such talk meanings are clearly based on interpretation of the context, the particular focus of talkers. Add to it translations issues for few typical expressions, and one can get it totally wrong.

There is no grammar, many sentences are only suit of words, started but unfinished. The tone is the primary clue but, even hearing the record, it would be hard to figure out many interjections due to stress level: hence, there can not be a single meaning of what is said.

At one point, (0213:39) the PNF says:
- remonte remonte remonte remonte
a) he is ordering the PF: climb! climb! climb! climb!
b) he is encouraging the aircraft to go up;
c) he is talking to the altitude gauge, or at everything (everybody) at once... who could make the difference? His tone would be about the same : high stress near panic? high stress but confidence? : one would need to see his face, where he is looking at.

Yankee Whisky

30th Jul 2011, 15:43

And this is being said without detailed technical evidence. I have heard and seen too many questions as to accept such a simplistic statement.

What is the reaction by this forum?

A quick correction; I meant the technical detailed report in English so that wider audience can acquaint themselves with the report.

takata

30th Jul 2011, 15:53

I am still very puzzled by the CVR at
"2 h 10 min 39 to 2 h 10 min 46
PNF: Je te mets en en A T T
I'm putting you in in A T T"

The note is saying:
0210:39 -> 0210:46: "le selecteur AIR DATA puis le sélecteur "ATT/HDG sont positionnés sur F/O on 3"
PNF : "je te mets en ATT (*)"

0210:39 -> 0210:46: "AIR DATA then ATT/HDG are switched on F/O on 3"
PNF : "I'm switching you to ATT [word(s) missing]"

This is a PF action on ADIR switching pedestal panel; he switches F/O from ADR2 to ADR3, then switches also IR2 to IR3 (ATT/HDG).
http://takata1940.free.fr/att.jpg

vanHorck

30th Jul 2011, 15:57

JC-EE

Those tears, many have them I am sure, frustration all around especially considering AF's reply....

promani

30th Jul 2011, 16:18

takata

30th Jul 2011, 16:22

Looking at the graphs that the BEA has published in the latest report, I notice that at the time AF447 made the initial climb, the temperature had increased and the wind had not only increased, looks like off the scale, but changed direction ~180. Would this be a coincident, or am I talking the "proverbial"?
That's typical from UAS event. TAT probes are frozen also, and most of the time they are the first to be frozen (temp climb to zero C°, temp of ice inside probes). Wind speed and direction is derived from ADR data. When speed drops a lot, TAS is wrong, Wind speed is wrong (and out of boundaries) as it is derived from comparing TAS with Ground speed (GPS).
If no wind: before 490 TAS; after 150 TAS = 340 kt wind speed.
From DFDR, they have deduced a head wind of about 15 kt during the sequence.

Level100

30th Jul 2011, 16:26

jcjeant,

Check the bold stances ......
Do you see the difference or I must explain ?

Alas, I at least fail to see your point. The 3rd interim rpt gives simply more precision to the CV, but there is no contradiction to the 1st one. That this pilot did not have in its youth a straightforward career with the airlines (as so many others) is also obvios from the 1st report.

Cheers

PJ2

30th Jul 2011, 16:31

Hello, HarryMann;

Is someone making the suggestion that the cockpit crew didn't have their seatbelts on? Does the Interim Report #3 discuss this somewhere?

Under the circumstances I can't imagine how this could be true. The captain would likely have belted himself into the center seat but I haven't read that anywhere - it's the first thing I'd do though.

ChristiaanJ

30th Jul 2011, 16:38

During the time slot 2:12:15 - 2:12:19
Capt says:... ca descend

and 2:12:19 - 2:12:45

Capt says: Les ailes a plat !!! (exclamation signs are my addition, as it is an "imperative", an order.... to correct the "pitch up".
Sorry... "les ailes à plat", if an imperative, means "level off" and has nothing to do with pitch attitude.

Added:
See how easily translations can confuse ? "Level off" in English can still refer to pitch attitude, or altitude.
"Les ailes à plat" in French refers to roll attitude, not pitch.

takata

30th Jul 2011, 16:42

Hi PJ2,
Is someone making the suggestion that the cockpit crew didn't have their seatbelts on? Does the Interim Report #3 discuss this somewhere?

Under the circumstances I can't imagine how this could be true. The captain would likely have belted himself into the center seat but I haven't read that anywhere - it's the first thing I'd do though.
Yes, it is in the report. page 41.
1.12.4.2.1 3 Les sièges du cockpit
- Sur le siège situé en place gauche, les ceintures ventrales étaient attachées, la ceinture de l’entrejambe et les harnais d’épaules ne l’étaient pas.
- Sur le siège situé en place droite aucune ceinture n’était attachée.
From the recovered seats, they found that PNF had used only the belly seat belts, none were used on PF seat (and it was suggested elsewhere that Captain was standing behind them - not seated).

STICK N RUDDER

30th Jul 2011, 17:19

At the apogee, at less than 6 deg of pitch and an unknown (low ) airspeed (having 'traded' KE for PE), it is probable the aircraft was not 'stalled', but was flying too slowly for the actual IAS to support its weight, hence it would start to descend.

Agree 100%..if you demo in flight that s what happens

Now, a confused PF ?sees this? and selects TOGA and raises the nose to arrest the descent, thereby 'stalling' the wing. Aperhaps logical reaction [

Yes by natural instinct it s logical and it s logical if he thinks that pitch/elevator control altitude that s what happenes when one miss label flight controls..

Add the change in AoA due to the descent and we are now well into 'stalled'. A long period now of 'STALL STALL' audio which as we know can be 'lost' in 'difficult' cockpit situations. Continuing 'disbelief' that the a/c can be going down with this pitch and power and constant nose-up to try and stop it.

Power on stall by the book.You can stall at any pitch attitude and power setting. If you demo that s what you will observe

[/B] It is very rare for airline pilots to ever 'see' a full stall - in military (and civil) QFI days I used to hold the a/c in the stall to demonstrate such ('symptoms of the stall'). The BAC Lightning was particularly adept at producing a fairly stable stall with high r of d. I guess if you have never seen this demonstrated you would not recognise it?

Agree 100 % that s why I said poor training as far as stall/spin awareness

[/B]I have made my comments on the absence of the Captain for ITCZ passage much earlier and my views on the necessary changes in training philosophy on another forum here

AMEN brother....the question is does anyone want to listen to uspilots instructors who see the problem? Look at the training today it s production line from 0 to right seat in a year..Some one said ,,It takes one to two years to learn how to fly ..10 to 20 years to intelligently fly''..

PJ2

30th Jul 2011, 17:20

Thank you, Takata. The lower belt only for the PNF is easily explained as the shoulder harnesses are never used during cruise. The "no seat belt" for the PF requires greater explanation. At some point it went from fastened to unfastened. That requires that in the recovery from the sea bottom the buckles for the lap belt were undamaged and were not fastened. If they were not fastened as recovered, then either the PF unbuckled at some point or the belt was unbuckled in the impact. Without closer examination one cannot judge which is more likely.

Understand the captain was standing...I now recall that his body was found and that he was standing made sense at the time, as it does now.

Mr Optimistic

30th Jul 2011, 17:30

Seat belts ? Was going to suggest perhaps unbuckling was in readiness to allow Capt to take place but on reflection seems odd the two seats were recovered with occupants if one was unbuckled. Hard injuries would probably show it if the autopsy looked.

Linktrained

30th Jul 2011, 17:44

It would appear that both PF and PNF may not have been scanning their instrument panels. When the Captain returned he was not briefed ( in time ) to take positive action.
A light showing that excessive trim had been selected, just might have served to prompt ONE of the three pilots that something was amiss, sooner.

The ISIS might well have been outside the visual scan of this PF. To me, it appears a wonderful piece of " Watch-making". It is all there, but too small to read in any turbulence.
Has it ever been used in anger from the right hand seat ? ( Try using it as the primary instrument ... on a Simulator, of course !)

All those years ago sometimes I would be left under the hood of a Link Trainer with instructions to make the instructor's Crab draw a picture of a hand, complete with index finger and thumb. This required accuracy of maintaining a straight course with precise turns at the right times. It was easier to do with a full panel and the rough air "off". Surely it should be possible to use this as an economical training device, if fitted with a side stick. And this SS could be arranged to have increasing sensitivity with altitude.

A few days ago we saw the required power settings for UAS. It would appear to be what the PNF had to look these up...
Just a very minor point... A whole block of figures may be easier to read if they are broken up with either a small space or a line, every four, five or six lines. The human eye is used to reading horizontal lines. A little turbulence could cause an error.

jcjeant

30th Jul 2011, 17:55

Hi,

Alas, I at least fail to see your point. The 3rd interim rpt gives simply more precision to the CV, but there is no contradiction to the 1st one. That this pilot did not have in its youth a straightforward career with the airlines (as so many others) is also obvios from the 1st report.

Cheers I'm happy that at least two people read my message ...
Unfortunately those two people don't understand why I posted this message (certainly Lemurian)
I wanted to put the light on a discripancy between the two reports.
This is about the licences of the PF (and this is a important point)
Read again ... if you had not seen the PF licenses discripancy as reported by BEA
If this is an omission by the BEA (in the first report) .. this is a serious issue .. as the BEA is not a avertissement agency who promote beans or carrots .. with those reports but instead .. a agency who analyse a accident with a result of the loss of 228 lifes
What is true about the licenses ? ... the N°1 or the N°3 report ?
The minimum duty for the BEA is to be accurate with such informations easy to collect

takata

30th Jul 2011, 18:06

but on reflection seems odd the two seats were recovered with occupants if one was unbuckled.
It was a speculation. Cockpit seats were recovered and they never gave further details about who was or wasn't seated. Hence, don't take it as a fact.

whenrealityhurts

30th Jul 2011, 18:26

Just read it was pilot error.

I am curious how long apologizing and making excuses for the pilots will continue here and elsewhere in the lack of realization and denial that keeping the rubber side down on an aircraft isn't that hard.

Reminds of the Concord crash...certainly they weren't overweight, certainly they didn't know they didn't continue with an engine fire...no way, not them...

Have a little back bone guys...people screw up. And yes, they might be your friends.

takata

30th Jul 2011, 19:21

What is true about the licenses ? ... the N°1 or the N°3 report ?
The minimum duty for the BEA is to be accurate with such informations easy to collec.
Report #1 was 30 days after the crash, Nr.#3 is 25 months later. In between, they have completed what could have been lacking (few dates) at the time of the first one. Don't you think it's quite probable?
In fact, you would like to sell us that they have fabricated this pilot's licences to cover up Air France ass?
Why don't you try to explain us how you can be such a dedicated BEA or Air France or Airbus or (whatever) hater?
Something very personnal, obviously. Did you ever get yourself (or a close friend of you) a forged licence to show up? I've heard a fairly sad story about that.

HazelNuts39

30th Jul 2011, 19:23

I'm puzzled by something. I would like to know what significance it has and would welcome any comments: -

Page 114 (Annexe 4 - Paramètres longitudinaux):
The "Vitesse verticale selectée" starts to fluctuate at 2:10:17 and from 2:10:20 to 2:10:41 it is 5000 fpm, then changes to about 1300 fpm.

Page 93 (Annexe 1)
2 h 10 min 17 -- Altitude (ft): 34 976 -- Les FD 1 et 2 redeviennent disponibles ; les modes actifs sont HDG/ALT CRZ*. (...)
2 h 10 min 42 -- La vitesse verticale est de 1 900 ft/min et la vitesse verticale sélectée est de 1 300 ft/min.

safetypee

30th Jul 2011, 19:36

whenrealityhurts (#1064) “… it was pilot error. ...people screw up.”

I aspire to more modern views of human error, even those which suggest error is a meaningless term, and particularly unhelpful in accident investigation.
The industry, your friends, and even you, might benefit from an understanding of why the crew behaved as they did.

Focussing on error looks at negative aspects and fails to look for positive human contributions, and possibly why they were not employed.
We all make errors (variations in human performance); most are identified and corrected. It’s the ones that aren’t which can hurt; we need to know why they weren’t seen.
It’s not the error itself that is important, but consequences of the error, which more often depend on the culmination of many contributing factors.
Error is always tainted by hindsight, thus always a biased view.
Error directs attention to the individual the sharp end, which may overlook a chain of events or contributions from technical and organisational sources.

Aspects from all of the above are in this accident. However, because it is impossible to know precisely what the individuals thought at the time, any views we might have as to what was seen, understood, or reasoned, can only by supposition; but at least by determining such views it enables us an opportunity to learn.

Concluding ‘pilot error’ as a cause is like closing an investigation without benefit; like closing the mind without learning, and thus preventing opportunity to help avoid similar human responses in similar demanding situations.

jcjeant

30th Jul 2011, 19:40

Hi,

takata write:

It was a speculation. Cockpit seats were recovered and they never gave further details about who was or wasn't seated. Hence, don't take it as a fact.
No further details ?

Interim report N°3 page 41

F-GZCP – 1er
juin 2009 - 41 -

1.12.4.2.1 3 Les sièges du cockpit

Sur le siège situé en place gauche, les ceintures ventrales étaient attachées, la ceinture de
l’entrejambe et les harnais d’épaules ne l’étaient pas.

Sur le siège situé en place droite aucune ceinture n’était attachée. So at least they give details about the state of the seat belts
This is not so important to know if the pilots were remaining in their seat .. as we know who was seated when airplane was flying ..
It's (speculation) almost certain that the PF was not retrieved in his seat .. (no secured seat belts)

Report #1 was 30 days after the crash, Nr.#3 is 25 months later. In between, they have completed what could have been lacking (few dates) at the time of the first one. Don't you think it's quite probable? About the CV's .. you know that BEA will collect the CV's and not parts from there or there ...
The CV is complete when collected and it was certainly not interest from Air France or other authorized agencies to give incomplete CV with a lack of mention of a important thing as a license .... !!
Nothing personnal .. I just read the reports of the BEA ...
Anyone who read it will find those differences ...

takata

a) he is ordering the PF: climb! climb! climb! climb!
b) he is encouraging the aircraft to go up;Remonte ! remonte! remonte! remonte!
If you native language is french you know certainly that is not concerning something on the panel
He tell just to climb again .. to take more altitude
or maybe he is indeed encouraging the aircraft (he speak to the aircraft - irrational) and this if true show a certain state of intense stress or panic.

takata

30th Jul 2011, 19:59

No further details ?
I was talking about the recovered bodies in relation to the recovered seats. Saying that any cockpit seat was recovered with its occupant "strapped" is a pure speculation. There was certainly no official comment about that.

About the licences, you may believe in whatever conspiracy you want. Very few people around here, me excluded, still bother about your daily rants anymore.

jcjeant

30th Jul 2011, 20:06

Hi,

About the licences, you may believe in whatever conspiracy you want. Very few people around here, me included, do not bother about your daily rants anymore.I don't bother who read or not my or your messages ... that's not important.

takata

30th Jul 2011, 20:11

I don't bother who read or not my or your messages ... that's not important.
You get me right. Note that I changed the grammar above as I thought (afterall) that this sentence didn't make a lot of sense previously.:p

Lemurian

30th Jul 2011, 20:13

jcj,
If this is an omission by the BEA (in the first report) .. this is a serious issue ..
You're way out of your league and your agenda becomes tiring.
So, you're disputing the fact that the first report didn't mention the ATPL qual of the second copilot ?
Big deal ! At Air France, all pilots pass their ALTP, plus long range nav before their first long haul aircraft type-rating.
Not mentioning that licence is an oversight.

DJ77

30th Jul 2011, 20:26

HN39, I'm puzzled by something. I would like to know what significance it has and would welcome any comments:
It appears that each time the FDs become available again and engage in HDG/VS mode the selected V/S in the FCU window resets to the instantaneous V/S.

EDIT: "Vitesse verticale sélectée" = Selected V/S = target vertical speed for AFS in HDG / VS mode, normally adjustable by a knob on the FCU.

grity

30th Jul 2011, 20:31

HN Page 114 (Annexe 4 - Paramètres longitudinaux):
The "Vitesse verticale selectée" starts to fluctuate at 2:10:17 and from 2:10:20 to 2:10:41 it is 5000 fpm, then changes to about 1300 fpm.that is the line I ask for, but sorry I dont understand what it mean .......

takata

30th Jul 2011, 20:35

If you native language is french you know certainly that is not concerning something on the panel
How would he know that the aircraft is going down beside looking at the variomètre? Everybody in the cockpit seems to have been totally focused on it and this is certainly understandable.
So yes, it may be addressed to the gauge (figurative), hence the aircraft, hence not the PF. Seriously, would you have any doubt about their stress level with such a high sinking rate with so few altitude left?
Such kind of talk to the machine is pretty common on CVRs.

There is another passage with a possible double meaning:
- 2 h 11 min 06 "(…) il vient ou pas"
a) ... is he comming or not? (the captain)
b) ... is she doing it or not? (the aircraft related to imputs applied)
I'm closer to the second sense.

takata

30th Jul 2011, 21:02

Hi HazelNuts39,
2 h 10 min 42 -- La vitesse verticale est de 1 900 ft/min et la vitesse verticale sélectée est de 1 300 ft/min.
It might be related to ISIS, "barometric pressure selected" (see #2 below, 1.34.25) but I'll look at other possibilities.
About your previous "pseudo-flight curves" k-energy study, no matter what BOAC could think about it, it looks that you were very very close to the real data. Very good job indeed.

ISIS Altitude:
http://takata1940.free.fr/isis_alt.jpg

HazelNuts39

30th Jul 2011, 21:26

Hi Takata,

Txs for yr kind reply. Do I note correctly from the picture of the ISIS that it doesn't show a 'variom`etre'?

takata

30th Jul 2011, 21:52

Txs for yr kind reply. Do I note correctly from the picture of the ISIS that it doesn't show a 'variom`etre'?
Right, lol. It is a target fixation about ISIS recordings because I thought that V/S could be derived from it. Forget it.
"V/S selected" p.114, right? It looks to be related with Flight Guidance. I'm looking at it.

PJ2

30th Jul 2011, 21:53

HN39;
Originally Posted by HazelNuts39
2 h 10 min 42 -- La vitesse verticale est de 1 900 ft/min et la vitesse verticale sélectée est de 1 300 ft/min.

La vitesse verticale refers to the Vertical Speed indicator on the PFD. The IVSI, (Inertial Vertical Speed Indicator) on the right indicates climbing at a rate of 800fpm.

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-QxQTz3m/0/L/i-QxQTz3m-L.jpg

The la vitesse verticale sélectée refers to the Vertical Speed Selector knob located on the FCU, (Flight Control Unit), shown below. The VS shows a selected rate of "2500"fpm.

This knob also sets the FPA, (Flight Path Angle), when the HDG-VS/TRK-FPA button is toggled to "TRK/FPA".

For these FCU controls to have any effect on the aircraft, the autopilot must be engaged.

Just to acknowledge, DJ77 describes the function in his post above, and mentioned correctly that the VS resets instantaneously if the FDs become available.

The difference referred to here (1900fpm, vice 1300fpm) merely refers to the difference between the indication on the PFD, and the VS setting in the FCU window. I'm unsure why it is mentioned in the report except perhaps to indicate that the FDs were at that moment, functioning.

ADD EDIT after examing page 114:

There is an "ADR" and "IR" vertical speed selection I see. The Vertical Speed has two components which work together to provide the most accurate VSI - a barometric component and an inertial component. The parameter is showing the switching between the two.

I made a cursory examination of what was occurring in the data at the time the Vertical Speed indication switched from IR to ADR and it appears to be the point at which the stall had fully developed, at 02:11:47 or so; a number of other parameters change significantly at this point as well. The THS had reached its maximum setting, the thrust levers were momentarily closed to idle and the engine N1s reduced, (but not to Idle), and the stall warning was inhibited for reasons with which we are now familiar.

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-rqxZkbz/0/M/i-rqxZkbz-M.jpg

takata

30th Jul 2011, 22:01

I'm unsure why it is mentioned in the report except perhaps to indicate that the FDs were at that moment, functioning.
It seems to be a BEA concern that FDs were not set OFF as per UAS procedure as they were comming back many times for a while (They are not sure about the effect or indications given to PF). It is still a work in progress at this point.

HarryMann

30th Jul 2011, 22:25

Fact is.let's say PF was only strapped waist belt..
Would that prevent accurate SS in moderate to strong turbulence ?

PJ2

30th Jul 2011, 22:36

Takata;
It seems to be a BEA concern that FDs were not set OFF as per UAS procedure as they were comming back many times for a while (They are not sure about the effect or indications given to PF). It is still a work in progress at this point. My understanding of the FDs is that they reflect data being sent to the FCPCs by the FMGECs. At this point, the raw data on the PFD would be the most important thing to look at - the FD's would not be presenting useful information. However, as we know, they may have tried to use the FPV to confirm what the VSI was telling them, and we know it didn't work because the FPV was not available at the time.

The simulator sessions probably have helped here I would think but it is very much a work in progress which much remaining to be understood concerning Phases 2 and 3 of the three phases indicated in this report. Phase 1 stands alone as a topic of great interest, in my view anyway. At some point, a formal calculation needs to be made, (I know that some calculations have been done by some experienced engineers), as to whether the aircraft was recoverable after the stall had fully developed moments after the apogee with AoA >16deg, (meaning stick held fully forward, engines at idle thrust, until very clear indications of rapidly increasing speed were obtained), and whether this would be moreso if the THS were rolled forward, and if so, to what setting.

PJ2

30th Jul 2011, 22:39

HarryMan;

My sense of it is, the arm and hand "unit" has sufficient mass to be moved about on its own but that would be turbulence very much in the moderate to moderate + territory. Anything lighter than that would be controllable, but one must not grip the stick firmly but "ride it at the top" while making corrections. Unless the inertial reels fastening the shoulder harnesses are locked tight around the upper body, they won't prevent movement, especially sideways.

That's one view...there will be several thousand others. ;-)

HazelNuts39

30th Jul 2011, 22:56

For these FCU controls to have any effect on the aircraft, the autopilot must be engaged.

Just to acknowledge, DJ77 describes the function in his post above, and mentioned correctly that the VS resets instantaneously if the FDs become available.PJ2 and DJ77, my thanks to you both. I understand that the recorded changes of selected V/S do not indicate a pilot action, and have no effect on the aircraft with AP OFF. Would they affect the FD and thereby influence the PF's actions?

Regarding the indicated V/S, I note that the source switched several times between IR and ADR. Would that be automatic too?

Shadoko

30th Jul 2011, 23:05

From a "tourist" PoW (me), the BEA report is not as harsh against pilots than it could be. But, if you "read between the lines", it seems (to me, imho), to reflect some kind of sideration at what BEA people discovered by reading CVR and flight data. Is the final wording more politically correct than it may have been? Have the Air France "leaks" they will buy Boeings, just few days after the black boxes been read (see for example: Air France urged to back Airbus in plane order: Thomson Reuters Business News - MSN Money (http://money.msn.com/business-news/article.aspx?feed=OBR&date=20110612&id=13759478)), something to do with this too kind wording? Some extracts gave my attention (non professional, non pilot, just interested):
One of the co-pilots (the PF) seems to have an altitude "obsession":

- Around 1H45 (p.74): "le copilote propose de demander à monter au niveau 360 non standard" (the co-pilot suggested asking for a climb at non-standard level 360).
- Just after 1H52 (p.75): "Le copilote attire de nouveau l’attention du commandant de bord sur la valeur du REC MAX, qui atteint alors le FL 375." (The first officer again draws the attention of the captain on the MAX REC value, which then reaches the FL 375.). Is this not a remark to obtain a climb permission? The captain didn't comment.
- Around 2H00 (p.9, p.51 et p.75): "malheureusement on ne peut pas trop monter pour l’instant" (unfortunately we can not climb for now): briefing between two co-pilots
- Just after the Captain left (p.75): "Les deux copilotes discutent encore de la température et du REC MAX." (The two co-pilots are discussing again about the temperature and REC MAX.).

In one of the occurences (p.75), the BEA wrote a guess about this "préoccupation constante de l’équipage" (constant concern of the crew): "probablement pour limiter les turbulences." (likely to limit turbulence.). OK. Perhaps.
But there is something strange: at 2 h 06 min 54, the PF said (p.91) "Moins quarante deux on utilisera pas les anti ice c’est toujours ça de pris " (litteral translation: minus forty two we don't have to use anti icing it is always something taken. Blue sentence probably translates: better than nothing).
Why he said this?
Concern about fuel consumption? Same for higher altitude? Same for straight road through ITCZ?
Something to do with salary "add-on"? The salaries of Air France pilots are a non readable black box for people outside the company (and even for many inside).
But it has also been said the company encouraged fuel economy, so it all could be a "good practice" learned by pilots, and very difficult for them to make balance with flight security.

Hope I am not too harsh.

Two questions: did you think the transcription is complete? Seems to me very few is said after Captain came back. And what about (apparently) total ignorance of alarms and synthetic voice?

@ jcjeant: did your post #1028 (It's seem's that is one more stranger for those 3 strangers ... the plane .... ) means you think the plane was a stranger to the crew (and not a strange plane as suggested)? If true, it is the same for me. Who might have suspected such a story if the black boxes had not been retrieved?

Sorry for my Frenchie English. Sorry for this too long and probably stupid post, but the reading of the CVR transcription is so appalling I can't tell nothing. Peace to all these souls.

HarryMann

30th Jul 2011, 23:33

PJ2

That clarifies it fine, thanks

L337

31st Jul 2011, 00:02

(litteral translation: minus forty two we don't have to use anti icing it is always something taken. Blue sentence probably translates: better than nothing).

Below minus 40 all water is assumed to be ice. So below minus 40 engine anti-ice is not selected on.

I think that explains the quote.

SaturnV

31st Jul 2011, 00:35

Cockpit seats 1, 2, and 4 were retrieved, along the bodies of PF and PNF. We do not know whether both bodies were retrieved simultaneous with the seat they were sitting in. My guess is that they were, for that would facilitate recovery. Retrieval of other bodies was deferred until after the DNA testing was completed on these two bodies.

This third interim report says very little about the bodies recovered in the last phase, where they were seated in the airplane, and whether the recovered bodies were all seated and belted. The report does say that the autopsy results for the bodies recovered by Ile de Sein were consistent with the autopsy results for the bodies recovered floating.
_______________________

Rather strange that none of the pilots comments on the change in heading as the plane circles back.

JD-EE

31st Jul 2011, 00:42

whenitreallyhurts must have a problem thinking. Yes, the crash was caused by inappropriate behavior in the cockpit. Now, what does that have to do with the price of airline safety?

Perhaps we should ask WHY? That's a simple three letter word that eludes those anxious to have somebody, that is SOME BODY, to BLAME and be our Judas goat so that "the bad is cast out."

That simple question raises interesting specters that BEA has pretty much confirmed and AF's rant (despite it's one good point) rather confirms. Those pilots were basically untrained for the kind of situation in which they found themselves. There also seems to be a pattern of similar failures. So given a pattern one can deduce the reason for the pattern. AF and ABI positively screwed up the training. And ABI's stall warning system (cough) "Needs work."

JD-EE

31st Jul 2011, 00:45

Lemurian - jcjeant appears to not recognize the meaning of "preliminary" or "interim."

jcjeant

31st Jul 2011, 00:53

Hi,

@ jcjeant: did your post #1028 (It's seem's that is one more stranger for those 3 strangers ... the plane .... ) means you think the plane was a stranger to the crew (and not a strange plane as suggested)? If true, it is the same for me. Who might have suspected such a story if the black boxes had not been retrieved?Exactly :ok:

Fact is.let's say PF was only strapped waist belt..If we want take a look at facts .. BEA report N°3 indicate that the waist belt of PNF was secured and no belts were secured for PF on the seats recovered
But as JD_EE remark .. it's only preliminary report
Maybe in the next report (maybe final) .. they will write that all belts were secured .. I never know .. with BEA ...

Ian W

31st Jul 2011, 01:16

Just read it was pilot error.

I am curious how long apologizing and making excuses for the pilots will continue here and elsewhere in the lack of realization and denial that keeping the rubber side down on an aircraft isn't that hard.

'Keeping the rubber side down isn't that hard?

Really? You have experience of flying an A330 close to its ceiling in turbulence at night in alternate law with instruments that are failing? If so you must be one of the few A330 pilots in the _world_ with that experience.

There is a lot of difference between being given a situation that you have been trained for and making errors, and being given a situation that you have never trained for and being expected to ace it from no experience.

It would appear that 'bus drivers are all conditioned that its just going to motor on and you can forget all that 'fly the aircraft stuff' that you might have been taught. All that is needed is a knowledge of the laws and a list of mental exercises to recite at the periodic check and if in doubt pitch and power.

Well in this case that was not true and people died.

This is not so much 'pilot error' as pilots being put in a situation that they had no chance of recovering as they'd never been trained to do so. What reactions they did have were in line with the by rote training they had received.
Indeed it may be that even an ace manual pilot may have had difficulty, given that it was night time in turbulent weather conditions, the lack of reliable instruments and squirrely behavior of an aircraft close to its ceiling with some protections but not others.

But I am sure you would have had no problem with your high skill and infallibility you would have needed no training and just have another story over pastis the next day. :rolleyes:

Loerie

31st Jul 2011, 01:53

Which argument puts it right back in AF s`court.......why were they not trained to see what they were seeing and take corrective action?After reading this for two years it does seem that every opportunity has been given the PF and others that they were finding themselves in a very difficult corner for which they were untrained......shame on AF and ,probably,AB.

Lonewolf_50

31st Jul 2011, 02:07

Dozy:

Aside from the pitots, nothing was wrong with that aircraft.
Not quite so. There was the matter of a few pitot tubes going AWOL for a bit that was trigger to this event. Absent that, no UAS, and no issues with hand flying way up there where the air is thin, and a bit bumpy. Granted, that is a malfunction, and there are procedures for it, but there was something wrong with the aircraft. Something fundamental.

Ian, please don't hate me for what follows:

First note: if the two pilots were both aware of them being in condition UAS, what is the likelihood that they were skeptical of stall warning, knowing that airspeed is a component of stall AoA calculations? That might explain in part the apparent "ignore" of the stall warning.

Second note:

From the latest release, the aircraft went into a condition of unreliable airspeed. What leaped out at BEA was that (if I read this rightly) the crew didn't progress to the unreliable airspeed checklist/procedure as was standard practice at the time. (If I misunderstand that, my apologies).

The information released shows me a PNF who had to focus on flying problems rather abruptly. His requirement to assist (rather than take over from??) the PF, to include the switch to (F/O 3 on the ATT select?? takata's illustration informs this) indicates to me that he felt that the PF was having difficulty with his PFD. Given the number of things going wrong on displays, and the PF being unclear on what he was seeing (from PNF perspective) giving the PF a better inertial unit to run his would be a helpful copilot (role) assisting PF. (If this guess is off, apologies).

In the meantime, hand flying at altitude with UAS in Alt 2: is this trained for?

If not, the PF was playing catch up.

A human factors question arises that may be answered by AF SOPs or habits, or it may not have an answer.

With what appears to be the senior pilot between the two recognizing a pilot who was fighting the aircraft a bit, or chasing it, his initial "talk him back into the scan/situation" is what most of us would do as good copilots ( in terms of our role at the time.)

At what point should/would it have been "I have the controls" when the PF kept chasing the attitude and the PNF kept having to prompt him to go in a different direction? (Aside: Isn't that the question every Captain must have a clear answer to before takeoff, or an instinct for, in terms of his threshold of "that's enough, I have controls" when his copilot is flying?) If the PNF made a number of inputs on the SS but didn't take controls, I know a few CRM people who'd be aghast, as the preference is that one pilot is on controls, the other isn't. (We could probably spend all day debating the intricacies of what's behind that.) WIth a SS, his inputs won't be felt by the PF, so the "summing" function may have less than the desired effect, as opposed to conventional controls where the PF would have felt what PNF was doing. <== Is this a shortcoming of SS, or an advantage? I can see it both ways. (Anyone whose instructor "rode the controls" while you were learning probably sees the issue here).

The SOS call to the Captain was a good idea. I am unclear on the problem that seems to have delayed the Captain's return ... maybe it wasn't delayed, but PNF was in a mild case of temporal distortion -- time was slowing down or speeding up for him.

If the PF was unable to get level, you can argue that PNF can't get to the next logical task: procedure for airspeed indications being unreliable, and announced in the cockpit, acknowledged, and subsequently they follow the step by step UAS procedure.

The PF's flying occupied most of his attention.

Why PF couldn't get to straight and level is a question AF has to answer.

If the aircraft can enter a given mode, (degrade into ALT Law 1 or 2 or direct) then the pilot must be trained to fly it in that mode. Likewise direct law. Not just initial training, but proficiency, and/or refresher.

You never know when you'll need it.

t54

31st Jul 2011, 02:39

Shadoko
One of the co-pilots (the PF) seems to have an altitude "obsession":Wife in the back?

PJ2

31st Jul 2011, 05:07

HN39;

The switch-over would be automatic. The FDs would not have any influence on the crew's behaviour. Raw data's the thing in circumtances like this. They had attitude, vertical speed, altitude all engine instruments and everything else required for stable flight. All that was missing was airspeed information, and that for less than a minute.

jcjeant

31st Jul 2011, 05:13

Hi,

The switch-over would be automatic. The FDs would not have any influence on the crew's behaviour. Raw data's the thing in circumtances like this. They had attitude, vertical speed, altitude all engine instruments and everything else required for stable flight. All that was missing was airspeed information, and that for less than a minute.Maybe we can add to the missing items list a reliable stall alarm

Heathrow Flyer

31st Jul 2011, 06:03

I agree that it is not an issue of whether the pilots made an error, but to understand why they made an error.

So I was pleased to see it reported that:

The French aviation investigation agency (BEA) is forming a special group, including aviation experts and physiologists and psychologists, to study the pilots' possible responses in the last few moments of the flight to help determine why they did what they did.

Old Carthusian

31st Jul 2011, 06:32

If those of us who follow the news remember the Toyota brake pedal scandal in the US we actually have a possible explanation. The people drving the cars swore blind that they pressed the brake pedals but that the cars accelerated. In fact as detailed examination of several incidents showed they pressed the accelarator pedals. When faced by unexpected circumstances people do not do what they think they do. This accident is a prima facia case of such a reaction and no Lonewolf 50, it is not the aircraft. It is inadequate training and a culture which encourages a disregard of SOPs. If there is any blame to be apportioned it is to AF who allowed these circumstances to develop. Both the more experienced pilots could have taken over from the PF and to my mind this is the biggest mystery. Why did neither do so?

vanHorck

31st Jul 2011, 06:33

In my post #952 I wrote:

this in my view should be read as 2 separate statements made by the captain

CAP: Là je sais pas
That one I have no idea of

CAP: là ça descends
That one indicates a descent

Subsequently a consensus seems to emerge (#966 #968) that my analysis may be wrong and it is more likely the "Là je said pas" is intended to suggest that the CDB does not know what is going on as a reply to the question of the PF asking what is going on.

One needs the original recordings for the intonations to decide the intention of the wording. Perhaps there is a French native captain who can answer this:

If one wanted in French to reply to an urgent question (from a junior) of what is going on, I believe the proper answer would be: "je ne said pas" or " je ne said pas encore" (I do not (yet) know).

By adding "Là" if taken on it's own it is almost an expression of non-responsability in the sense of "don't ask me" (!!) or at the very least a form of very casual talk, not likely in this situation.

Is this explanation correct?

In French "Là ... et Là ..." is often used to point at different subsequent things.

I am not accusing any pilot just trying to get to the cockpit management issues at hand

blind pew

31st Jul 2011, 06:42

Gentlemen I think you are failing to see the wood from the trees.

The aircraft was equipped with substandard parts which were inadequately tested, when this was realised there should have been a mandatory replacement program within a definite time scale.
Down to manufacturers and the authorities.

Air France were also negligent and it took not only the accident but pilot strike action to get them replaced.

Air France carried out a series of simulator tests with similar conditions to the RIO flight, most of the crews crashed.
Those that didn't had a member who flew small aircraft in his spare time.

To AF credit they recruited a committee to look at their operation that included two Anglo-Saxons.
One ex military and the second one whose initial flying course was of two years duration, including an aerobatics test and whose employee gave instructors courses to young first officers to augment their handling abilities.

Whilst there were definite errors on the part of the crew notably the captain leaving the flight deck during ITCZ transit - they were not sufficiently trained to deal with a situation which, before the advent of glass cockpits, was extremely rare.
They were not taught correct pitch power flying - PNF should not have had to delve into a checklist - it should be known by heart.

Which poses a question about the BEA, DGAC and EADS;
Since the inauguration of the airbus we have had a series of accidents involving top Air France and Airbus personnel. Halbesheim, Strasburg, Gulf de Lion, Etihad at Toulouse as well as 447 to name a few (plus the construction software design fiasco between the french and the germans), If EADS can get the design philosophy / human interface so wrong that the one group of pilots that should not be crashing them does then what chance do mere mortals in the third world have????
(this was also demonstrated by a Russian pilot's son!)

As we all know EADS are responsible for the checklists, as are the DGAC in overseeing the AOC holder - so to purely blame Air France and it's pilots is a mistake.

I have known collusion in four western aviation authorities, all carried out in THE NATIONAL INTEREST - it is about time that they exercised their powers in the interest of the passengers and crews.

The industry has had two crew operation forced upon them - I believe it is intrinsically unsafe.( as demonstrated here when PNF was in the checklists and not monitoring PF).

Training has continually evolved along with sophisticated electronics to the detriment of handling skills - this needs to be addressed.

In the good old days most pilots could cope with multiple failures and fly the aeroplane - is the cost of ensuring adequate flying currency too expensive with respect to the cost of a hull loss?

vanHorck

31st Jul 2011, 07:01

Blind Pew,

Whilst you are essentially correct, you are at risk of being side-lined as an old-school pilot who refuses to see the advantages of modern technology....

To further enhance your argument: There are now automatic messages for pilots exceeding the narrowest of tolerances during hand flying, resulting in gentle phone calls from ops to the PF and/or the captain urging them at the very lest caution if not nudging them to use the automation rather than flying by hand. This clearly results in less hand flying than would otherwise be the case.

One could debate that automated flying is excellent "systems training" but should not count towards flying hours for more than say 10% of the time...

Perhaps some GA flight time (without AP) should be made mandatory, just a block of 2 hours per month of which one hour upper air work and one hour circuits would do the trick.

But life is not like that, unfortunately...
Companies (manufacturers as well as airlines) will always strive for more automation to "cut out the middle man" (less strikes or illness is less money lost) and to compensate for human deficiencies (fatigue, spacial disorientation etc).

Whilst I agree some crashes are the result of the automation, how do we decide the crashes which have been prevented by the same automation? Because that is the side the companies are on.

BOAC

31st Jul 2011, 07:47

Note for PJ2 - trying to follow your link to 'P114', but please be aware that page numbers here are meaningless since they depend on individual settings of posts per page. If you can link to post numbers that helps.

Re VS - is the AB system like the Boeing? Initial Inertial reading with time related barometric damping? Are you referring to some sort of pilot selectable 'selector' between IR and baro in your post #1080? "There is an "ADR" and "IR" vertical speed selection I see." or is this software driven?

Why would PNF feel the need to change PF to 'IR3'? Does this indicate that IR3 was giving erroneous info?

Why all the queries about SS inputs left and right? Surely the FDR trace will show who was doing what?

Old Carthusian

31st Jul 2011, 08:01

vanHorck, blind pew

Go away and read up on historical accidents caused by pilot error. Read about the psychological aspects of accidents. Then come back and comment when you actually know what you're talking about. (Clipper Skippers anyone?). Flying is immesurably safer now than it was in the past precisely because of the increase in computerisation and automation.

Hand Solo

31st Jul 2011, 08:45

The aircraft was equipped with substandard parts which were inadequately tested, when this was realised there should have been a mandatory replacement program within a definite time scale.
Down to manufacturers and the authorities.

Agreed, but all major manufacturers have been guilty of this.

Air France carried out a series of simulator tests with similar conditions to the RIO flight, most of the crews crashed.
Those that didn't had a member who flew small aircraft in his spare time.

Do you have a reliable source for this? The FDR/CVR were found only a matter of months ago. Prior to that the conditions of flight were largely unknown. If most Air France crews crashed in these conditions then that is a matter of grave concern. I have flown unreliable IAS at altitude in an Airbus simulator numerous times and haven't crashed once, nor do I know anyone who has. I do not fly light aircraft and consider myself averagely skilled. If I can do it why can't they?

Whilst there were definite errors on the part of the crew notably the captain leaving the flight deck during ITCZ transit - they were not sufficiently trained to deal with a situation which, before the advent of glass cockpits, was extremely rare.

Train your crews right and the captain should have no problem leaving the cockpit during ITCZ transit. I don't know of any European major where this is considered a factor during augmented crew ops.

They were not taught correct pitch power flying - PNF should not have had to delve into a checklist - it should be known by heart.

Unreliable IAS is a memory drill and the attitudes and power settings should be known by heart. Why did they not recognise the situation and call for the drill? If you know the pitch and power settings but don't use them what does that say?

The industry has had two crew operation forced upon them - I believe it is intrinsically unsafe.( as demonstrated here when PNF was in the checklists and not monitoring PF).

Was a checklist ever called for, let alone commenced?

In the good old days most pilots could cope with multiple failures and fly the aeroplane - is the cost of ensuring adequate flying currency too expensive with respect to the cost of a hull loss?

There were a lot more crashes in the good old days. Nostaligia is great fun but you're shooting yourself in the foot with this one.

gonebutnotforgotten

31st Jul 2011, 09:04

BOAC

I assume 'p114' refers to BEA's Etape 3 report page, not this thread. It shows the Paramètres longitudinaux traces including the all-important positions of the Side Sticks.

blind pew

31st Jul 2011, 09:26

Yes I agree I am an old fuddy duddy and automation has saved many lives but we have had far too many replies on several threads asking as to what the automatics were doing!
If it is so wonderful then why do so many people get it wrong?

CRM has changed things as has the information highway but this is a major western carrier where the aircraft is built and the systems designed.
It is wrong of the press to put the blame on the pilots and airbus to issue a statement that they could have recovered the situation when they obviously didn't understand what was happening.

My source was a senior AF training captain and I believe the exercise was based upon the original acars data. I have no reason to disbelieve him but he is old school as well and amuses himself with aeroplanes outside of work.

I still believe that if one major long haul carrier decided in the 1960s that they needed two years of basic training for their cadets and a further two years or more before they were fully fledged to operate P2 then perhaps the modern system of under a third of that time is a mistake.

Yes I know it is cost orientated but the demise of a major carrier also carries a cost let alone the needless deaths.

Air France is lucky in that it has a captive customer base - the French wouldn't dream of flying with Johnny Foreigner.

Re power attitude - there was a post stating that PNF was reading from a checklist.

I still go 100% behind my comment that it was a lack of airmanship from the captain to leave the flight deck during the transit of the ITCZ. Having crossed it many times over a period of 7 years as a first officer there was NEVER an occasion when the captain was out of the flight deck. It was, especially in the middle of the night and over the South Atlantic, the most demanding cruise phase of a modern airliner -(poss exception CAT over Andes).

If modern training is sufficient to allow relatively low time first officers to man the flight deck during critical phases of flight that why did they crash and why did my last company who pioneered the direct route fly with two full three man crews?

I still believe the regulatory authorities need to get their A@@@ in gear.

grity

31st Jul 2011, 09:40

thanks to HN and PJ2 and others to clear up the vertical speed settings...

and a question to the calculators abaut the inizial of the first pitchup between 2:10:07 and 2:10:17 detailed on s.44 of the french 3.interim pdf

the AP disengaged at 2:10:05 and before he hold the bird with pitch 3deg through the turbulencen with elevator movments in the range +/- 0.5 deg

PF moved the elevator for 10 sec just up to -1.0 deg (pulling) and the reaction was the beginning of the climb at 2:10:17 with pitch up 12 deg; vertical speed 6000FT/min; acceleration normal 1.3 G after 10 sec

is the system in this high at this speed so sensible that 1.0 deg wrong elevator lets move (pitchup) the heavy bird so fast so strong?

HazelNuts39

31st Jul 2011, 10:04

With the DFDR data released in Interim Report no.3, it is now time to add a few observations to my july 10 post #30 on page 2 of this thread. While the earlier post was for still air, the new element is the role that movements of the air masses traversed by the airplane played around 02:10.

In the preceding minute the level of turbulence had been increasing from an amplitude peak-to-peak of about 0.2 g at 02:09:30 to about 0.5 g when the AP disengaged at 02:10:05. At that time the vertical speed was passing through zero, decreasing at the rate of 400 fpm per second, or 0.2 g. The normal acceleration was thus 0.8 g at that point. The airplane’s pitch attitude was then increasing through about zero, i.e. much less than the 2.5 degrees it would have been in steady, unbanked level flight. In the two seconds after AP disconnect until the first movement of the side stick, pitch increased to about 1.3 degrees. The pitch attitude continued to increase progressively from 2:10:08.4 and the vertical speed became positive at about 02:10:10. The engine N1’s which were close to 100% up to 02:10:00, then dropped to about 83% 6 seconds later (the commanded N1 dropped to 75% in about 3 seconds). When the pilot grabbed the SS, he was looking at pitch 1.3 degrees NU, 7 degrees right bank, and –400 fpm vertical speed.

My tentative explanation of these events is that the airplane was traversing the fringe of an area with significant updraft velocity (1024 fpm fits the data). The AP pitched the nose down to maintain altitude, and the A/THR reduced engine thrust to maintain airspeed. After disconnect of AP and A/THR, the FCS increased pitch to regain 1 g normal acceleration, and thrust was locked at significantly less than required to maintain airspeed in level flight in still air.

More analysis to be done by BEA (and perhaps me). Why did AP and A/THR disconnect 2 seconds before the speeds dropped?

BOAC

31st Jul 2011, 10:20

I assume 'p114' refers to BEA's Etape 3 report page, not this thread. - ah - thanks for that. I am waiting for Wednesday to download that.

Train your crews right and the captain should have no problem leaving the cockpit during ITCZ transit - and therein, as I'm sure you ?realise?, lies the problem.

takata

31st Jul 2011, 10:29

Hi vanHorck,

By adding "Là" if taken on it's own it is almost an expression of non-responsability in the sense of "don't ask me" (!!) or at the very least a form of very casual talk, not likely in this situation.

Is this explanation correct?

In French "Là ... et Là ..." is often used to point at different subsequent things.
It could, but this is not correct in this context, as you seems obviously not used to hear this kind of talk which is completely informal. "Là" is used in such talk as a pointer meaning "now, at this point". It is very common talk and everybody I know speaks like that in real life, including the PF:

- "Là c’est bon là, on serait revenu les ailes à plat [là]..." => now (at this point) it is good, now we are back to wings level...
- "je suis entrain de descendre là?" ) => Am I descending now?
- "là je monte okay alors on descend [là]..." => Now I'm climbing... okay then now we'll go down...

If one want to point at something (an instrument), he will very likely use "çuilà" (celui-là) or "çuici" (celui-ci):
- çuilà (celui-là) monte = this one is rising
- çuici (celui-ci) descend = that one is falling

or even more undefined, "ça":
- ça monte, ça descend...
but you could find also "là ça" as an attention getter:
- là ça monte, là ça descend

It is obvious from the conversation that the crew is talking freely and that there is no formality between each others, including the captain.

grity

31st Jul 2011, 12:50

at the start of the event 2:10:07 the ship was rolling 8 deg left 8 deg right and so on every 2 sec to the other side......the acceleration lateral was also left-right-left with around 0.1G

PF put his hand to the stick and was moving the stick from left to right and so on...... nearly counter-syncron with the rolling (s.31)

question: is this the perfekt movment (and he just overreacted a little bit) or will be the dumping effect better if he moves phase-shifted?

hetfield

31st Jul 2011, 13:23

I'm asking myself, would this accident also have happened with

- an artificial feel (yoke) instead of a constant bungee force in the stick
- a conventional stall warning

?????

airtren

31st Jul 2011, 14:07

The adverbs:

La (French) - there (English)
Ici (French) - here (English)

are included/embeded when composing "demonstratives" words, which include an indication/meaning of proximity/distance. For instance:

"ce-la" - "that" (English) - there is an implying of "there"
"ce-ci" - "this" - there is an implying of "here"

The use of the addition of "la" in slang/colloquial French sentences, with a meaning/implying of locality (in space or time) relative to the speaker, is quite similar if not identical to the use of proximity/distance qualifiers in other languages, particularly those deriving from, or having a strong Latin influence.

For instance, I would put in that category in the CVR, the

PF's: j'ai plus the vario la
Captain's: doucement avec le pallonier la

But, in the case you pointed to, as that particular use of "la" is IMO, a "shorter "ce-la", which translates into "that", which makes the English translation into "that one" IMO quite correct.

Even, if his response is relative to someone pointing to the screen to to two items, to which he refers to by their location on the screen, in which case, it would be "there, that one", and "there, that one", the meaning of the translation is still correct.

Lastly, it is reflecting "casual talk", but I would definitely NOT add any association of meaning a degree of responsibility to it...

In my post #952 I wrote:

this in my view should be read as 2 separate statements made by the captain

CAP: Là je sais pas
That one I have no idea of

CAP: là ça descends
That one indicates a descent
....

By adding "Là" if taken on it's own it is almost an expression of non-responsability in the sense of "don't ask me" (!!) or at the very least a form of very casual talk, not likely in this situation.

Is this explanation correct?

In French "Là ... et Là ..." is often used to point at different subsequent things.

I am not accusing any pilot just trying to get to the cockpit management issues at hand

bearfoil

31st Jul 2011, 14:21

Hazelnuts39 re: #1110

Virtually from the outset, I have been trying to engage others in a discussion of the possibility of Autopilot loss due to other than UAS, or ICE. It was the fulcrum upon which I placed a snarky insult to PJ2, for which I am eternally regretful.

So thanks. The A/P is programmed to disconnect by itself when it cannot "keep up". The Definition of "Keeping Up" is what got me on PJ2's dark side, I fear. Also, what remains of LAW at this type of disconnect is NORMAL LAW. So, did the dropout cause the UAS instead of ICE? Via airflow disruption due manouvering in turbulent air? Were the first perhaps clumsy inputs of PF the cause of unreliable IAS?

Aside from that interesting discussion is the trail of Flight Path post a/p loss, imho. In ALTERNATE LAW, the a/c is "sensitive". Not in the way of a small fighter, way different. A wide Body is massive, and must be flown gently, when inputting a control if you can sense it at all quickly, it is probably too much? Driving heavy equipment requires a separate set of "Buns".

After A/P drop, the a/c was commanded NU. As his (PF's) first input, can we opine that it was "too much"? Likely without a quick response, the PF may have put in "more"?

HN, you assume a turbulence in cruise that is a given from the beginning (yes?) I believe. The autopilot manages such that the ride is "comfortable", but both pilots obviously were cognizant of airframe movement about the "best" Flightpath? So, as a surprise hand back, the PF must begin his manual flight without a current "feel" for response?

The first step in "correcting" is to stop the trend, not go the other way?

His first input was too much, he forgot to "wait"? With the rolling, is this an evidence of overcontrol?

However the a/p dropped out, isn't allowing the a/c to exhibit "sensitivity" a NO NO?

Somewhere between "Do Nothing" and ACM, isn't there a better transition avaliable?

takata. Bonjour! Thank you for the Pic. Note the damage at the lower collet, evidence of the jackscrew "pulling through" whilst trying to lessen the NU? Jammo?

grity. #1113. A Pilot Induced Roll Oscillation? (PIRO)? Is the SS damped to prevent "Coffee Stirring"? One surprise with all the calcs re: climb and KE is the absence of the rolling factor, a draggy circumstance, and without it, could the a/c have survived?

airtren

31st Jul 2011, 14:29

For what is worth,

In your post #1112

- çuilà (celui-là) monte = this one is rising

Correct is "that" instead of "this"

I would translate "that one is ascending"

- çuici (celui-ci) descend = that one is falling

Correct is "this" instead of "that"

I would translate "that one is descending"

If one want to point at something (an instrument), he will very likely use "çuilà" (celui-là) or "çuici" (celui-ci):
- çuilà (celui-là) monte = this one is rising
- çuici (celui-ci) descend = that one is falling

.

airtren

31st Jul 2011, 14:46

Hazelnut39,

It's a direction of thought, and question that I am certainly interested in...

I've posted at one point, the opinion that the "nose-up" along with the "roll" SS command applied by the PF when taking control from the AP, was because the AP has disconnected during a time interval, in which due to turbulence, it was controlling the A/C in an attempt to return it to level, and thus the A/C was not level yet. So the PF attempted to complete that "return to level" "started but not completed" by the AP.

airtren

.... When the pilot grabbed the SS, he was looking at pitch 1.3 degrees NU, 7 degrees right bank, and –400 fpm vertical speed.

More analysis to be done by BEA (and perhaps me). Why did AP and A/THR disconnect 2 seconds before the speeds dropped?

whenrealityhurts

31st Jul 2011, 14:51

Let's assume the pilots were good...let's assume the aircraft was decent....looking at the cockpit of your typical google search Airbus panel, I am struck with this idea.

Your in a very strong tropical thunderstorm. Lightning hits the cockpit, avionics bay, multiple times. Tubes go dead, avionics take a pretty hard hit.

I get the impression that pilots on a dark and rainy night, getting 10k up and down drafts in a cell, have no engine, A/S, or AI reference from non tube instruments.

So your trying to maintain attitude control in what is probably a dark cockpit under IMC conditions and your getting slammed.

If there is an iron gyro back up AI, etc...ok disregard, but I couldn't find one in the pics that I saw.

bearfoil

31st Jul 2011, 15:04

airtren

Would you consider other than Pitot issues as cause? That would involve other than a "time interval" approach? The A/P is 'dynamic' (constant) in its inputs, No? So the disconnect is "instant", not sequential? The important vector is the 'logic' of its loss? Not the "cause"?

So also the discussion involves a possible "remnant" of NORMAL LAW? Unfortunately, this introduces "mode Confusion".

grity

31st Jul 2011, 15:12

the stick move of first 10 sec. after AP disconect 2:10:07 --- 2:10:18
the moves are more or less horizontal so I think he did not realise that he pulled, just fight with the rolling ship....left right left right left right.... realising that he had no longer correct speed at this time
http://s7.directupload.net/images/110731/temp/osapfdgy.jpg (http://s7.directupload.net/file/d/2602/osapfdgy_jpg.htm)

ChristiaanJ

31st Jul 2011, 15:13

- ah - thanks for that. I am waiting for Wednesday to download that.Re 'p114', be careful...
From personal experience, with a typical French-to-English translation, the wordcount and pagecount of the English text tend to be in the order of 20% less than those of the French text.
So p'114' in the French report is unlikely to be the same page as in the English translation......

bearfoil

31st Jul 2011, 15:17

grity

If he didn't know he pulled, and the a/c had been in Normal Law at that point, would the FCS know that he didn't know? Otherwise occupied with his Roll problems, what was his PITCH 'up to' ?

SaturnV

31st Jul 2011, 15:22

whenrealityhurts,

No lightning. No lightning strikes.

Dark night, in the clouds, flying through ice crystals, moderate+ turbulence, on the periphery of a Cb cell, that's the environment outside.
_________________________
An A-320 flying between Paris and Geneva at FL 270 in and out of the clouds in daylight when the crew suddenly spotted a Cb ahead (unanticipated), couldn't quite get around it. The turbulence knocked a generator off-line, and the captain's panels went dark. Stuff happens. But there is no indication of something similar happening to AF 447.

Interesting that, in the Geneva flight, the turbulence was sufficient to send loose material in the cockpit flying about, one item cracking the co-pilot's headset.

The BEA 'lessons learned' report didn't identify the airline or give the incident date, but that crew also was inattentive to its radar.

3holelover

31st Jul 2011, 15:52

At the risk of making myself appear more foolish than I already have, I feel compelled to offer an observation;

Some time back, in one of these threads, someone posted a link to some utubes of some Airbus simulator training in progress. At the time, probably because I've had very little experience in the pointy end during flight, I was struck by the "automaton" nature of the behaviours I saw. I thought it truly looked as though pilots had become mere accessories to the computers, with little room for thought and/or any sense of actually "piloting" their machines.

It looked to me, as I watched the gents twiddling knobs and going through checklists and pecking away at keys, that these sorts of pilots had been programmed to deal with their jobs as a computer tech might with his network administration tasks.

It struck me that these were not at all like the pilots of old who could fly any big old bird with several broken bits and malfunctioning whatnots, because they knew the basics of keeping their machine in it's element.

"Two kinds of pilot" I thought. "Old" and "New". "Old" could fly almost anything with wings, but not a newer, glass and computer machine. "New" could fly the computer generation "smart" birds, but probably not an old DC3.

I'm still mulling over those distinctions, but it has occurred to me more recently that this particular airplane needed both kinds of pilot, and the two "New" types that were in the seats just had none of the abilities of that "Old" type. I simply cannot fathom any of the type "Old" failing to recognize a stall. ... at any point during a 35000ft descent.

These poor blighters were more computer programmers than pilots. They needed an old geezer.... and when their best shot at that re-entered the cockpit, he'd missed the beginning of it all, and in any case his AF training had probably left a whole quilt of cobwebs on any "Old" pilot within him.

Smilin_Ed

31st Jul 2011, 16:06

You have it right 3holelover. As Old Carthusian pointed out a couple of pages back, the overall AirBus safety record is splendid, but clearly when things go wrong, the Bus needs someone who can fly an airplane.

airtren

31st Jul 2011, 16:09

Bearfoil,

I am going to do my best to answer, as I can't fully parse your post, and am guessing that my post have have been unclear, and thus difficult to understood.

My post was only referring to the fact that the PF's action on the SS could have had a good reason to have a NU component, due to the context of the pitch/roll/power state of the plane left to him immediately after the AP disconnect.

That as opposed to those that are the opinion that there was no reason for a NU action..

As far as the AF 447 accident, I mentioned several times that IMO, there are multiple confluent causes, which the "pitot tubes" are only a part of, in one category, and part of multiple classes in that category. The category is "a/c components failure".

airtren

Would you consider other than Pitot issues as cause? That would involve other than a "time interval" approach? The A/P is 'dynamic' (constant) in its inputs, No? So the disconnect is "instant", not sequential? The important vector is the 'logic' of its loss? Not the "cause"?

So also the discussion involves a possible "remnant" of NORMAL LAW? Unfortunately, this introduces "mode Confusion".

bearfoil

31st Jul 2011, 16:13

It may be out of character for me to say, but AirBus had 32 episodes of some hairy UAS that ended "well".

Neither Black, nor White, the upshot of 447 is that the Pilots may not have been ready, the a/c was, and neither could save the flight from destruction. Isolating any one 'format' is not helpful, there is a SYSTEMIC problem.

That said, 3hl and :)Ed are also exactly correct.

airtren. I get your post perfectly. Isolation of events is proper, as is a "global View". Neither is helpful, if all things as a whole are not considered together.

"Somewhere between "Do Nothing" and ACM".... is the 'moving' target?
(relative to a/p loss/handover)........

airtren

31st Jul 2011, 16:17

Thanks for posting Grity,

I think there is a possibility that with no training/practical experience in using the SS in Alternate 2, with no pitch/roll protections, he not only didn't realize that his amplitude of commands is excessive.

Based on the graphs, I also think that he didn't realize that his perceived Neutral Position of the SS, was in fact "off-neutral", on the NU side, and thus what he thought that it's a return of the SS to Neutral, was in fact a SS NU command.

the stick move of first 10 sec. after AP disconect 2:10:07 --- 2:10:18
the moves are more or less horizontal so I think he did not realise that he pulled, just fight with the rolling ship....left right left right left right.... realising that he had no longer correct speed at this time
http://s7.directupload.net/images/110731/temp/osapfdgy.jpg (http://s7.directupload.net/file/d/2602/osapfdgy_jpg.htm)

PA 18 151

31st Jul 2011, 16:28

These poor blighters were more computer programmers than pilots. They needed an old geezer.... and when their best shot at that re-entered the cockpit, he'd missed the beginning of it all, and in any case his AF training had probably left a whole quilt of cobwebs on any "Old" pilot within him.Don't agree on that single point.

The PF said he didn't have control of the plane. In fact he had full control of the plane, he was just a muppet.

Captain turns up, PF says aircraft out of control, what's the captain supposed to think? He has to believe the PF, that the aircraft is out of control, and he (and PNF who should have caught this sooner) simply ran out of time to work out it wasn't.

Reading that CVR transcript, words fail me.

The PF fooled them both and a couple of hundred people died.

ChristiaanJ

31st Jul 2011, 16:30

3hl,
Not a bad write-up... thanks.
Somebody in a much earlier post referred to the 'video game generation'.
That may be a bit excessive, but there is some underlying truth in it.

There were autopilots in the 'olden' days (even the pre-WWII 'very olden days'), but they only did the simple jobs, like ATT HOLD, ALT HOLD, HDG HOLD, and suchlike, relieving the human pilots from the mind-numbing (on long flights) task of simply maintaining altitude or heading, without letting them lose 'situational awareness'.

'George' was a much-appreciated crew-member in those days. Nowadays, 'HAL' is no longer looked at in the same way.....

bearfoil

31st Jul 2011, 16:33

Something like a wing leveler was in there at the start?

Welsh Wingman

31st Jul 2011, 16:46

Good post. You have to embrace new technology, but build on the basics of the past. Buying a satnav for your car doesn't justify no longer being able to read a road atlas, just in case, if we are talking analogies. Old drivers should learn to use their satnav, and new drivers should still learn how to read a road atlas. It's not old ways v new ways. There were enough clues for most old school flyers to have recognised an aerodynamic stall, and there are enough references from the BEA to the effect that there was insufficient high altitude crew manual flight training (AF and generally). Something has gone awry in training and the human/aircraft interface, probably due to commercial pressures that have sadly prevailed, so it needs to be remedied. There is no IAS event without the substandard pitots, but pilots are there to deal with such problems.

Level100

31st Jul 2011, 16:46

jcjeant,
referring to your post,

I'm happy that at least two people read my message ...
Unfortunately those two people don't understand why I posted this message (certainly Lemurian)
I wanted to put the light on a discripancy between the two reports.
This is about the licences of the PF (and this is a important point)
Read again ... if you had not seen the PF licenses discripancy as reported by........ BEA

I always read your posts (:ok:), but I still fail to see your fine point in this particular
one, notwithstanding your appeal to participate in a boy-scout like scavenger hunt (I think that's about what the French "jeu de piste" means, or, since your German is probably fine: "Schnitzeljagd":rolleyes:).
Surely you do not want to infer in a definite manner that the terms used (remember also, we speak of the years 2000/1) in the 1st report mean a JAR licence (e.g. the word JAR does not appear) whereas the present one rather would hint a national professional pilot (but with out using the abreviation PP actually!)?
So what exactely do you think is of any significance here for the genesis of the accident?
Cheers

CONF iture

31st Jul 2011, 17:58

More analysis to be done by BEA (and perhaps me). Why did AP and A/THR disconnect 2 seconds before the speeds dropped?
The trace on page 110 shows a Mach drop at the time of the AP disconnect.
Q. Is there only one Mach source to be registered ?

AoA 1 seems to be almost locked to 2.1 deg for the initial climb, up to the time 2 10 51.
Q. What's the consequence on the Flight Control System ?

THS never moved during the initial climb ... Why is that ?
Is it G related ?
Is it Protection related ?
THS trace is absent from page 31 and 32 graphics ... Why is that ?
ELEVATORS traces are also absent from those graphics ... Why is that ?

Ainsi, il apparaît à ce stade des travaux que l’essentiel des mouvements de l’avion dans l’axe longitudinal (assiette, vitesse verticale, altitude) est le résultat des actions du PF, à l’exception de faibles variations vraisemblablement dues à l’aérologie.
... not too impressed by that one.

L’exploitation des 5 fichiers audio déchargés a permis de mettre en évidence que l’événement ne se trouvait pas à la fin de l’enregistrement des 5 pistes et que leur durée était inférieure de plusieurs dizaines de secondes aux valeurs attendues.
La synchronisation des différentes voies a montré qu’une partie des données était manquante. Par ailleurs, l’exploitation du contenu binaire de la mémoire EEPROM confirme l’incohérence des pointeurs utilisés par le moyen de lecture du constructeur pour débuter et terminer le déchargement des données.
And of course so not impressed by those comments on the CVR ...

No reason for the victim's families (especially pilot's families) to not obtain the numeric data.

Has anyone seen further comment on the WRG ACARS message ?

mosteo

31st Jul 2011, 18:32

My apologies if this has been pointed before, I've read all the posts but for the ones from a couple posters that I skip over some of the time.

Just to settle a minor point that has sometimes in the past been discussed, this report clearly identifies the reason for the uncommanded initial roll to right:

p.76:

La présence de turbulences, mise en évidence par l’activité du PA pour contrôler le roulis dans les secondes qui ont précédé, a provoqué à sa déconnexion un départ de l’avion en roulis à droite jusqu’à environ 8°.

My translation (caveat: I'm not French nor English native speaker):

The presence of turbulence, evidenced by AP activity in order to control roll in the preceding seconds, caused upon its disconnection a departure of the plane in roll to the right, to around 8º.

It was presumed by most posters that this was the case but I like to see any loose ends closed, so this is my 0,02€ contribution until the official translation is given.

BOAC

31st Jul 2011, 18:39

Re 'p114', be careful.. - thanks for the warning, but now I know where it is I'll find it.

Re: This 'neutral' position for the SS (#1128)- is it not spring centred?

If that strange pic by 'grity' represents the Right SS, is 'below the line' nose up?

bearfoil

31st Jul 2011, 18:39

Would an entry into a robust updraft cause the reduction in IAS? Would it cause the a/p to lower the nose to hold altitude? Was the a/p handling Roll excursions that were rapid enough to challenge its remaining performance?

Loss of THS response with repeated ND inputs is apparent on the traces. It remains full UP. the elevators show PF commanding ND.

Is anyone interested in looking closely at the 30 seconds prior/post a/p loss?

airtren: Would those lateral excursions of the ss possibily be related to the Human body's reaction to changes in posture due ROLL? Might they have been reactions to, rather than attempts to control, ROLL? PF: Loose restraints?

CONFiture: Are you aware of "missing traces" on other investigations by BEA re: Airbus? Because, at some point, after repetition, malicious becomes insulting.......

Ian W

31st Jul 2011, 19:02

Lonewolf_50
Ian, please don't hate me for what follows:

First note: if the two pilots were both aware of them being in condition UAS, what is the likelihood that they were skeptical of stall warning, knowing that airspeed is a component of stall AoA calculations? That might explain in part the apparent "ignore" of the stall warning.

But I think that you are correct.
The first reaction to everything falling apart is disbelief that it is happening. So being sceptical of the stall warning is a 'normal' reaction. Like many other things when flying you have to believe the instruments - and - in this case when that was tried the normal instruments in the scan were either obviously invalid or flagged as in error. So it can't be true.

Then the PF appears to have followed 'normal law' control procedures when the aircraft was in alternate - and he had accepted that. But under pressure one reverts to ingrained behaviors. So his 'learned' response was inappropriate for the aircraft state. The only way to prevent this happening is continual training in reversions to manual control and upsets at cruise level. How many line pilots here have that? How many can say that they have more than a few minutes actual manual piloting in alternate law at cruise level?
So when everything goes pear shaped - the crew are dropped into a situation that they have NO consistent experience of even in straight and level flight - but here they are in an upset that possibly gave one chance at recovery.

Second note:

From the latest release, the aircraft went into a condition of unreliable airspeed. What leaped out at BEA was that (if I read this rightly) the crew didn't progress to the unreliable airspeed checklist/procedure as was standard practice at the time. (If I misunderstand that, my apologies).

The information released shows me a PNF who had to focus on flying problems rather abruptly. His requirement to assist (rather than take over from??) the PF, to include the switch to (F/O 3 on the ATT select?? takata's illustration informs this) indicates to me that he felt that the PF was having difficulty with his PFD. Given the number of things going wrong on displays, and the PF being unclear on what he was seeing (from PNF perspective) giving the PF a better inertial unit to run his would be a helpful copilot (role) assisting PF. (If this guess is off, apologies).

In the meantime, hand flying at altitude with UAS in Alt 2: is this trained for?

If not, the PF was playing catch up.

This raises another issue that I have not seem mentioned much here. A 'constituted crew' where the Captain and FOs have flown together for some time and know each other and how they work will almost ALWAYS be better in an emergency than a random selection by roster. It may suit the bean-counters to have freedom to vary crew composition but it fails to engender team spirit. More importantly, when you have flown with someone for sometime you can both react and work-together almost intuitively. Someone should really quantify this teamwork effect in monetary terms as the accountants do not understand anything else.

A human factors question arises that may be answered by AF SOPs or habits, or it may not have an answer.

With what appears to be the senior pilot between the two recognizing a pilot who was fighting the aircraft a bit, or chasing it, his initial "talk him back into the scan/situation" is what most of us would do as good copilots ( in terms of our role at the time.)

At what point should/would it have been "I have the controls" when the PF kept chasing the attitude and the PNF kept having to prompt him to go in a different direction? (Aside: Isn't that the question every Captain must have a clear answer to before takeoff, or an instinct for, in terms of his threshold of "that's enough, I have controls" when his copilot is flying?) If the PNF made a number of inputs on the SS but didn't take controls, I know a few CRM people who'd be aghast, as the preference is that one pilot is on controls, the other isn't. (We could probably spend all day debating the intricacies of what's behind that.) WIth a SS, his inputs won't be felt by the PF, so the "summing" function may have less than the desired effect, as opposed to conventional controls where the PF would have felt what PNF was doing. <== Is this a shortcoming of SS, or an advantage? I can see it both ways. (Anyone whose instructor "rode the controls" while you were learning probably sees the issue here).

This dual attempt at controlling the aircraft is probably again a symptom of not having a constituted crew who all know each other well, rather than an administrative 'pecking order' or 'authority gradient' in the cockpit.

The problem of sidesticks and the visibility of what a pilot is doing both for the PNF and perhaps for the pilot himself. is a subject of debate among cockpit designers and pilots. Personally, I would think that for single seat aircraft and for 'flying the computer' a sidestick is probably good. For instances where a dual crew have to fly an aircraft manually (even if through some computer assistance) then the larger central yoke or joystick rapidly shows others what the PF is doing without the need for verbal or instrument clues that may not be easily available due to noise or vibration.

There are a HUGE number of human factors issues that will need to be investigated

Multiple Alarms on multiple failures causing cognitive overload
(In)Consistency of alarms (the stall warning) poor alarms reinforcing disbelief in instruments
Belief in alarms - the crews MUST know which alarms to ALWAYS believe and the system needs to ensure that there are NO false alarms
Display of reliable data/information during failures - it is sometimes better to have NO data than BAD data
Manual flying of a squirelly aircraft at cruise in bad weather in alternate law (is it possible at all without constant practice?) with limited instrument information. The crew did not have this training. (Does ANY crew?)
CRM and crew performance in upsets with constituted crews compared to random selections of front crews.

I am sure that there are more but this crew had EVERY one of those issues and probably 30 seconds at the beginning of the incident to get everything right or it would be too late. It proved too difficult for this crew to manage.

Is everyone sure that the crew they are next flying with would do any better in similar circumstance?

bearfoil

31st Jul 2011, 19:08

Ian W?

SS v Yoke? (at the very end)

CAPTAIN: "PULL UP"

PF: "But I have been pulling for quite awhile"........

something like that?

RetiredF4

31st Jul 2011, 19:15

Originally Posted by grity
the stick move of first 10 sec. after AP disconect 2:10:07 --- 2:10:18
the moves are more or less horizontal so I think he did not realise that he pulled, just fight with the rolling ship....left right left right left right.... realising that he had no longer correct speed at this time

Graph by grity (http://s7.directupload.net/file/d/2602/osapfdgy_jpg.htm)

Initial grip to the SS was with the intention to counter the roll to the right. Thereby he overcontrolled or he chased the roll like in an PIO. During each reversal from left to right or vv PF induced a pitch change as well.

The initial grip had also a big NU input, which brought the plane of the later left / right movements considerably in the NU region, with only two considerable ND inputs but only enough to reach the neutral SS pitch position.

The assumption, that those NU inputs where associated with the aim to climb to a higher FL is IMHO obsolete (i didn´t believe in it anyway). PF might have intended to counter a sinking tendency as described by hazelnuts39 (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-56.html#post6609124), but i meanwhile doubt that.

The whole mess might as well have started with
- not being prepared for the situation
- being surprised by the dropout of AP + ATHR,
- PF gripping SS in a hastily and unsuitable mannor
- and thereby implementing unwanted and anneccessary steering inputs
- chasing the roll and missing the pitch (PNF might have noticed it)
- and loosing instrument cross check and SA all together
- and PNF on the LH seat not seeing the need to take over
- or not willing due to expierience in LH seat LH SS
- stall warning triggered the TOGA initiation in PF´s intinctive reaction
- and pitch control stayed as bad as before.

Was the seat position not suitable for the correct operation of SS?
Training issues had been mentioned month before already.

Unfortunately the graphs in the report are not good quality, i hope they show up some time in a higher resolution. There i a lot of info in them, and we will have lots of discussions about them.

In Phase 3, there are a few points where vertical speed goes close to zero, in one time at 02:14:15 (page 113 of the report) and also some 17 sec. before that it even shows positive climb.
Other times descent rate is more than 15.000 fpm.

Do we know, that those values are valid indications or are those values wrong?

It will be much enlighting to understand the behaviour of the crew in phase 3, because most probably their reactions based on things they saw. If those above mentioned VV values are correct, then they saw a drastic increase of descent rate when pitching down and a reduction of descent rate when pitching up with TOGA, with the expectation to get the ship flying again. We know that they had been stalled completely and that this increase in descent rate was a necessary tradeoff to achieve recovery, they probably didn´t.

DozyWannabe

31st Jul 2011, 19:25

THS trace is absent from page 31 and 32 graphics ... Why is that ?
ELEVATORS traces are also absent from those graphics ... Why is that ?

Because that part of the document is dealing with control responses to instrument displays as opposed to flight surface responses to commands, it would appear.

I'm therefore presuming it can be inferred from the statement that the aircraft performed as designed that the control surfaces responded to the commands given in the correct manner, for which you'd need to get your Airbus manuals out to correlate. Remember that this is an interim rather than a final report, and that hopefully the FDR traces you would like to see will be included in that document.

Ian W

31st Jul 2011, 19:36

vanHorck

Whilst you are essentially correct, you are at risk of being side-lined as an old-school pilot who refuses to see the advantages of modern technology....

To further enhance your argument: There are now automatic messages for pilots exceeding the narrowest of tolerances during hand flying, resulting in gentle phone calls from ops to the PF and/or the captain urging them at the very lest caution if not nudging them to use the automation rather than flying by hand. This clearly results in less hand flying than would otherwise be the case.

If anyone from Ops has made such a call then they should consider themselves a causal factor in this type of incident.

If they are so insistent that automation should always be used then perhaps the airlines should order fully automated aircraft. Then they can dispense with the expensive instrument monitors that they appear to want in the cockpit.

wozzo

31st Jul 2011, 19:57

Longitudinal sidestick deflection (left/right), elevators, THS 2:09:00 - 2:14:30 (page 114).

http://img846.imageshack.us/img846/4897/screen01v.png (http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/846/screen01v.png/)

vanHorck

31st Jul 2011, 20:02

Old Carthusian,

Let's not fight, read my last sentence.

Many lives have been saved through automation so I am all for it and a bus fan as well, but I dislike the (in my view insufficient hand-fly) training and I dislike even more the reluctance of (some) carriers to allow their pilots to hand fly both in the cruise as well as in the approach in varying circumstances.

Ian W

It's easily checked.... Ask the FO's in your fleet what percentage of captains allows them to hand fly in anything but the smoothest CAVOK weather (better even is a captain who asks his FO to hand fly), although I suspect it varies from airline to airline
(and I am certainly not implying AF have such a policy as I don't know)

bearfoil

31st Jul 2011, 20:06

What's that smell?

Evidently OZONE. Noted by the crew, one is allowed to associate OZONE with WRG.....? That would explain the dire need to recover the avionics bay.

Can anyone devise a way to recover an a/c via Inertial Cues? Those boys from the Segway scooter should give it a go.

ChristiaanJ

31st Jul 2011, 20:22

What's that smell?
Evidently OZONE. Noted by the crew, one is allowed to associate OZONE with WRG.....?You can associate anything with anything to demonstrate your ignorance.
Real avionics faults stink, but not of ozone.....
Since ther was a mention of St.Elmo's fire, that sounds as a more plausible explanation.....

T56

31st Jul 2011, 20:29

Going back to link 959 and subsequent discussions:

Now, I understand also why the BEA would like to have the whole scene with all pannels filmed as many things said all along are related to instruments and very hard to guess what it was exactly.

The desire to capture cockpit video has been around for a long time. Now that we have glass cockpits, the ability to capture these now exists as well. One point missed in discussing all of this is that it does not need to be captured in "real time," which would in fact require large amounts of memory. If there were two image streams, one of the cockpit, and one composite of all of the glass displays (direct content), these could be captured with quite high resolution, but only at a rate of one capture per second. Nothing will change so rapidly that 1PPS will miss much of significance, and with a modest (in today's terms) amount of memory, one or two hours (or perhaps even an entire flight) could be captured for future reference if needed. The technology now exists. It should be done.

Thoughts.

bearfoil

31st Jul 2011, 20:38

Citing a "more plausible" explanation than another somehow gives one the right to be insulting?

Electric motors produce OZONE, as does welding, Heating, Lightning, etc.

Sparking of any kind produces OZONE. Dismissing causes other than Saint Elmo's Fire strikes me as more consistent with, erm.....ignorance.

Can you please refrain from personal insult?

DozyWannabe

31st Jul 2011, 20:43

Bear, I don't think CJ was trying to be insulting, but I can understand his frustration. Hanging on to every last thing you can trying to prove a hardware/software fault is one thing, but spamming two threads with the same post smacks of desperation.

vanHorck

31st Jul 2011, 20:46

What is it with this thread?

The whole series on the search for the truth about AF447 was one of the highest standing ones EVER with magnificent contributions from many mm43 just to name one.

So please let's have respect, and continue the good work with debate not insults.

I am sure I speak on behalf of many.

bearfoil

31st Jul 2011, 20:50

I tried to accommodate the different fora with a question I thought more consistent with the foundation.

I am not desperate to prove anything. On the contrary, I am trying to unstick some narrow thinking that seems to be herding itself into the corral being built by partisans.

The BOEING 787 recently had a serious inflight electrical Malfunction/Fire.
The a/c was nearly lost.

Do you know what those on board were breathing? You talk of frustration? Tedium is listening to the same old suspects gather around the 'B'anner and sing the 'A'nthem.

take care friend

KBPsen

31st Jul 2011, 20:53

The whole series on the search for the truth about AF447 was one of the highest standing ones EVER Sure, if you ignore the 90% of it that wasn't.

ChristiaanJ

31st Jul 2011, 20:54

Can you please refrain from personal insult?By all means, on condition you refrain from polluting what is supposed to be a serious discussion about a real aircraft accident with fatuous nonsense and 'theories' without any factual and argued base.

bearfoil

31st Jul 2011, 20:59

Christiaan

You are not moderator, and have no business 'judging' the relative 'purity' of anyone's input.

You have control issues, my friend. 'I' is for ignore.......

DozyWannabe

31st Jul 2011, 21:01

The BOEING 787 recently had a serious inflight electrical Malfunction/Fire.

So if you can explain to me what the correlation between an early production B787 on flight tests experiencing a fire in the electronics bay that was clearly visible and a production A330 that suffered a crash due to excursion from controlled flight following a UAS that has shown no evidence whatsoever of in-flight fire actually *is*, then I'm sure we'd see the relevance.

PS. CJ is a former Concorde engineer, so I'd think *very* carefully before tangling with him.

[EDIT : Misunderstood KBPsen's post - my apologies, sir.]

ChristiaanJ

31st Jul 2011, 21:15

Thanks, DW !

Oh, and, bearfoil, if it wasn't for your pollution showing up in other peoples posts, I'd have pushed the "I" button long ago.

bearfoil

31st Jul 2011, 21:24

CJ

Now it's alliances and feudal warfare?

Again, it is not for you to 'judge'. How about principles, rather than personalities?

You are indeed a valued resource here, and my goal is not to annoy.

Doze, B787 has neglected a serious flaw in their certification program, and no one notices. Airbus clearly has ignored some critical flaws in their product's performance relative to operator proficiency.

That's called an opinion, and is neither desperate, not personal.

gpc62

31st Jul 2011, 21:27

Based on Lemurian's post #958 (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-48.html#post6605209), in turn based on spagiola's #940:

I've added the synthetic voice (VS) announcements and stall warnings, from pages 91-104 of the report in French (http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3/pdf/f-cp090601e3.pdf).

I wanted to see where the stall warnings occurred in relation to the pilots' conversation, but it adds some other info as well -- eg, warnings about dual inputs toward the end, and the final "pull up"s.

And there's a puzzling (to me anyway) VS announcement at 2 h 12 min 17: « Priority right »
Just before that, the column of notes about FDR parameters has:

2 h 12 min 16
Le pilote en place OPL prend la priorité.
The pilot in place OPL takes precedence.

According to the key on page 89, "OPL" is the PF:
Copilote en place droite (PF) pilotant avec le manche OPL

Was the "PF" (sitting in place OPL) not actually the one with "la priorité" up until that moment??

Anyway, on with the unofficial transcript translation:

=====

gpc62: Added synthetic voice (VS) announcements. A few other minor additions/trivial corrections.

Lemurian: To spagiola
I took the liberty to proof-read your very good translation and this is how it is :

spagiola:
I'm a native French speaker and have a PPL, but have no further relevant qualifications, so caveat emptor.

=====

2 h 10 min 05
Cavalry charge (Alarme de déconnexion du pilote automatique)
Cavalry charge (Autopilot disconnect alarm)

2 h 10 min 06
PF: J’ai les commandes
I have control

2 h 10 min 09
PF: Ignition start
Ignition start

02 h 10 min 10.4 :
VS : « Stall, stall » (sans cricket)
VS: "Stall, stall" (without cricket)

2 h 10 min 11
PNF: Qu’est ce que c’est que ça ?
What's that ?

2 h 10 min 13
VS : « Stall, S »
VS: "Stall, S"

2 h 10 min 14
PF: On n’a pas une bonne… On n’a pas une bonne annonce de…
We don't have a good... we don't have a good indication of ...

2 h 10 min 17
PNF: On a perdu les les les vitesses alors… engine thrust A T H R engine lever thrust
We've lost the the the speeds so ... engine thrust A T H R (off) engine lever thrust

2 h 10 min 18
PF: … de vitesse
... of speed

2 h 10 min 22
PNF: Alternate law protections
Alternate law protections

2 h 10 min 24
PNF: Attends on est en train de perdre…
Wait we're losing...

2 h 10 min 25
PNF: Wing anti-ice
Wing anti-ice

2 h 10 min 27 to 2 h 10 min 31
PNF: Fais attention à ta vitesse Fais attention à ta vitesse
Watch your speed Watch your speed

PF: Okay, okay okay je redescends
ok ok ok I'm going back down

PNF: Tu stabilises
stabilize (“stay there”)

PF: Ouais
Yeah

PNF: Tu redescends
You're going back down

2 h 10 min 33
PNF: Selon les trois tu montes donc tu redescends
According to the three you're going up, so you go back down (meaning the three vertical speed indicators... )

2 h 10 min 35
PF: D’accord
Agreed

2 h 10 min 36
PNF: T’es à ... Redescends
You're at ... go back down !

PF: C’est parti on (re)descend
On our way we're going (back) down

2 h 10 min 39 to 2 h 10 min 46
PNF: Je te mets en en A T T
I'm putting you in in A T T

2 h 10 min 42
PF: On est en ouais on est en climb
We're in yeah we're in climb

2 h 10 min 49
PNF: (…) il est où euh ?
Uh, where is he?

2 h 10 min 51
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu
Stall alarm starts [continues until 2 h 11 min 45]

2 h 10 min 56
PF: (TOGA)
(TOGA)

2 h 11
PNF: Surtout essaie de toucher le moins possible les commandes en en latéral hein
Above all, try to touch the controls as little as possible in in lateral, hey ?!

2 h 11 min 03
PF: Je suis en TOGA hein ?
I'm in TOGA, no ?

2 h 11 min 06
PNF: (…) il vient ou pas
Is he coming or not ?

2 h 11 min 21
PF: On a pourtant les moteurs qu’est-ce qui se passe (…) ?
We've got the engines yet (nothing is happening...),. what's going on (...)?

2 h 11 min 32
PF: (…) je n’ai plus le contrôle de l’avion là J’ai plus du tout le contrôle de l’avion
I no longer have control of the plane; I no longer have any control at all of the plane

2 h 11 min 38
PNF: Commande à gauche
Controls to the left

2 h 11 min 41
PF: J’ai l’impression (qu’on a de) la vitesse
I have the impression (that we have) some speed

2 h 11 min 43
[Bruit d’ouverture de la porte du cockpit]
[Sound of the cockpit door opening]

CAP: Eh qu’est-ce que vous (faites) ?
Hey what are you doing?

PNF: Qu’est-ce qui se passe ? Je ne sais pas je sais pas ce qui se passe
What's happening? I don't know I don't know what's happening

2 h 11 min 45
Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket
Stall alarm stops

2 h 11 min 52
CAP: Alors tiens prends prends ça
So here take take that

2 h 11 min 53
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet
VS: "Stall, stall" + cricket, incomplete

2 h 11 min 55
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet
VS: "Stall, stall" + cricket, incomplete

2 h 11 min 58
PF: J’ai un problème c’est que j’ai plus de vario là
I have a problem it's that I no longer have vertical speed
CAP: D’accord
OK

PF: J’ai plus aucune indication
I no longer have any indication

2 h 12 min 04 to 2 h 12 min 07
PF: J’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou non qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ?
I have the impression that we have some crazy speed, don’t we ?.. what do you think ?

2 h 12 min 07
PNF: Non surtout ne ne (les) sors pas
No, in any case, don't don't extend them

VS : « Stall, stall »

2 h 12 min 10
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet

2 h 12 min 13
PNF: Qu’est-ce que tu en penses qu’est-ce que tu en penses, qu’est-ce qu’il faut faire ?
What do you think ?what do you think ? what do we have to do?

2 h 12 min 15 to 2 h 12 min 19
CAP: Là je sais pas là ça descend
I don't know we're going down

2 h 12 min 17
VS : « Priority right »

2 h 12 min 19 to 2 h 12 min 45
PF: Là c’est bon là on serait revenu les ailes à plat, non il veut (pas)
there ! that's good ! we'd be back to wings level, no he (doesn't) wan't to

CAP: Les ailes à plat ... l’horizon l’horizon de secours
Wings level ... the horizon the backup horizon

PNF: L’horizon
The horizon

2 h 12 min 26
PNF: La vitesse ?
The speed?

2 h 12 min 27
PNF: Tu montes ...
You're going up ...

VS : « Stall, stall »

PNF: Tu descends descends descends descends
go down go down go down go down

2 h 12 min 30
PF: Je suis en train de descendre là ?
Am I going down?

PNF: Descend !
Go down

2 h 12 min 32
CAP: Non tu montes là
No you're going up, now

2 h 12 min 33
PF: Là je monte okay alors on descend
There I'm going up ok so let's go down

2 h 12 min 34
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet

2 h 12 min 39
PF: Okay on est en TOGA
ok, we're in TOGA

2 h 12 min 40
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu
Stall alarm starts [continues until 2 h 12 min 46]

2 h 12 min 42
PF: En alti on a quoi là ?
In alti[tude] we're at what, here?

2 h 12 min 44
CAP: (…) C’est pas possible
It's not possible

2 h 12 min 45
PF: En alti on a quoi ?
In alti[tude] we're at what ?

[*** during the following 19 seconds of speech, the stall alarm stops for 3 seconds, and then restarts for another 8 seconds. The transcript does not indicate the exact times for the pilots' speech, or where these stops and starts occur in relation to the speech: ***]

2 h 12 min 46
Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket
Stall alarm stops

2 h 12 min 49
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu
Stall alarm starts

2 h 12 min 57
Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket
Stall alarm stops

[*** now here's the pilots' speech for that time interval: ***]

2 h 12 min 45 to 2 h 13 min 04
PNF: Comment ça en altitude ?
What do you mean in altitude?

PF: Ouais ouais ouais j’descends là non ?
yeah yeah yeah i'm going down now, no?

PNF: Là tu descends oui
You're going down now, yes

CAP: Hé tu ... tu es en… Mets mets les ailes horizontales
hey you ... you're in ... put put the wings level

PNF: Mets les ailes horizontales
Put the wings level

C’est ce que je cherche à faire
That's what I'm trying to do

CAP: Mets les ailes horizontales
Put the wings level

2 h 12 min 59
PF: Je suis à fond à… avec du gauchissement
I'm at the limit of the stick... to the left

CAP: Le palonnier
Rudder pedals

2 h 13 min 23 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 25
PF: Qu’est-ce qu’y… comment ça se fait qu’on continue à descendre à fond là?
What is... how come we're continuing to descend so fast?

2 h 13 min 28
PNF: Essaye de trouver ce que tu peux faire avec tes commandes là-haut Les primaires et cetera
Try to see what you can do with your controls up there. The primaries etc

2 h 13 min 32
PF: au niveau cent
At level 100

2 h 13 min 36
PF: Neuf mille pieds
9000 feet

2 h 13 min 38
CAP: Doucement avec le palonnier là
Easy with the rudder

2 h 13 min 39
PNF: Remonte remonte remonte remonte
Climb climb climb climb (literally, "remonte" is "climb back up")

[*** another sequence where the transcript does not splice the VS and the pilots' speech together: ***]

2 h 13 min 41 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 43 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 45 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 47 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 40
PF: Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure
But I've been pulling to the back stop for a good while

CAP: Non non non ne remonte pas
No no no don't climb back up

PNF: Alors descend
Go down, then

2 h 13 min 45
PNF: Alors donne-moi les commandes à moi les commandes
So give the me controls. I have control

PF: Vas-y tu as les commandes on est en TOGA toujours hein
Go on, you have control. We're still in TOGA, right ?

2 h 13 min 55
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu
Stall alarm starts

2 h 14 min 03
Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket
Stall alarm stops

2 h 14 min 05
CAP: Attention tu cabres là
Watch it, you're pitching up

PNF: Je cabre ?
I'm pitching up?

PF: Ben il faudrait on est à quatre mille pieds
Well, we should, we're at 4000 feet

2 h 14 min 17
VS : « Sink rate »
VS : « Pull up » (3x)

2 h 14 min 18
CAP: Allez tire
Go on, pull

PF: Allez on tire on tire on tire on tire
Go on, we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling !

2 h 14 min 21 to end
VS : « Pull up » (4x)

2 h 14 min 26 to end
CAP: (Dix) degrés d’assiette
(Ten) degrees of trim

2 h 14 min 28.4
[Fin des enregistrements]
[End of data]

=====

DozyWannabe

31st Jul 2011, 21:41

Now it's alliances and feudal warfare?

May I answer? I assure you it's nothing of the sort, but this is the most recent of many times where you've said you were going to go away, have a break and regroup only to come bouncing back on within 24 hours with a new "lead" to throw into the mix.

You are indeed a valued resource here, and my goal is not to annoy.

You might want to think about that then.

Doze, B787 has neglected a serious flaw in their certification program, and no one notices.

I'm sure Boeing are taking it *very* seriously, which is why the 787 program has been somewhat slower than anticipated since the incident.

Airbus clearly has ignored some critical flaws in their product's performance relative to operator proficiency.

That's called an opinion, and is neither desperate, not personal.

So let me get this straight, you're trying to say that *Airbus* is responsible for the airlines' policies on training and any deficiencies within?

A note to anyone who wants to bring up Ziegler and concierges again - that was a *very long time ago* - please don't! The "race to the bottom" is a corporate disease that affects many more industries than aviation, and automation (and Airbus's role in the advances made within) is a factor, not a culprit.

Ranger One

31st Jul 2011, 21:41

"....it would be like entering an arse-kicking contest with a monstrous entity that has a thousand legs - and no arse"

DW, thanks for that. Saved for future use.

Owain Glyndwr

31st Jul 2011, 21:41

Back to impersonal mattershttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/wink2.gif

There has been a lot of debate on whether the aircraft could have been recovered from the stall and if so how much height would have been needed. I think what has been missing is not so much a question whether it could have been brought back inside the flight envelope but a recognition that it was actually held in the stall by pilot action and that the first stage of recovery would have been simply to remove the up elevator by relaxing on the sidestick. This would not have been sufficient by itself, but would have removed any doubts about the efficacy of down elevator, application of which would have further reduced the AoA and brought the THS back towards 3 deg NU rather than 13 deg.
I hope what follows is not too confusing, but the graph, which is taken from the AIAA/NASA/Boeing report on upset recovery is as near as Gums is going to get to pitching moment curves for the A330. Looking at the model test geometry it is difficult to see anything that would make these curves substantially different from the A330. Even so, treat them as qualitative not quantitative.
>http://i1080.photobucket.com/albums/j326/clivel1/testaircraftGA-1.jpg (http://s1080.photobucket.com/albums/j326/clivel1/?action=view&current=testaircraftGA-1.jpg)

http://i1080.photobucket.com/albums/j326/clivel1/basiccmalpha2-1.jpg (http://www.pprune.org/%3Ca%20href=)">
On the zero elevator line you can see the typical mild pitch up near the stall that I mentioned in an earlier posting.
For the tail geometries typical of modern civil designs, the relative pitching power of THS and elevator would be about 1deg THS equivalent to 1.5 deg elevator. So for a THS set at -13 deg we can read these curves at about 20 deg up elevator to get a feel for things. This would take us up to a trimmed AoA (Cm = 0) of just over 20 deg. However, if you add 30 deg up elevator, you would end up at just over 40 deg AoA, which is pretty similar to AF447 in the same state. So to get to the high AoAs we see from the DFDR data, it looks like you have to be holding full back stick as well as having the THS at -13 deg.
If you now return the stick to neutral at this elevated AoA you get a substantial nose down pitching moment which will take the aircraft back towards sanity. But it will not take it the whole way – just back to the AoA set by the THS angle.
To get back inside the flight envelope you MUST apply some down elevator, which will give another substantial recovery pitching moment but also will, with the A330 logic, start to return the THS back to its cruise setting of -3 deg.
To get an idea how much height loss is involved, you can approximate by a simple energy height trade and a pull-up. Simple geometry says that this latter is surprisingly small. Obviously it depends on the steepness of the descent, the airspeed and the amount of ‘g’ one can pull. This last item also depends on the airspeed. It isn’t any good accelerating to Vs1g because there is no spare lift for the pull-up. To get a reasonable ‘g’, say a 0.5g increment, you need to accelerate to 1.23Vs. Starting from a 20 deg dive the pull-up with that ‘g’ will take about 500 ft altitude.
Starting from 100 kts CAS at 34000 ft and accelerating to say 240 kts CAS at about 28000 ft you need to accelerate from around 300 ft/sec TAS to about 650 ft/sec TAS, which equates to a height loss of just over 5000 ft. Add the 500 ft for a pull-up and in round figures you should be able to recover in 6000 ft altitude.
On that analysis the aircraft WAS recoverable from the stall, but it would have required a definite and sustained nose down elevator application that never materialised – in fact, despite Bear’s latest remarks, DOWN elevator was never applied, just a relaxation of the up elevator

As I said, treat this as a qualitative explanation of what the aerodynamics are likely to have been. Looks quite reasonable to me thoughhttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/wink2.gif

DB64

31st Jul 2011, 21:45

Quote 3holelover
"Two kinds of pilot" I thought. "Old" and "New". "Old" could fly almost anything with wings, but not a newer, glass and computer machine. "New" could fly the computer generation "smart" birds, but probably not an old DC3.

I'm still mulling over those distinctions, but it has occurred to me more recently that this particular airplane needed both kinds of pilot, and the two "New" types that were in the seats just had none of the abilities of that "Old" type. I simply cannot fathom any of the type "Old" failing to recognize a stall. ... at any point during a 35000ft descent.

These poor blighters were more computer programmers than pilots. They needed an old geezer.... and when their best shot at that re-entered the cockpit, he'd missed the beginning of it all, and in any case his AF training had probably left a whole quilt of cobwebs on any "Old" pilot within him.

I'm not sure the distinction should be between old and new but rather those with a passion for the work they do and those for whom it is a job; alas the reality is often the latter in all walks of life but where lives are at risk such as in aviation or medicine I think we would all prefer to be in the hands of those for whom it is a true vocation and are passionate about it.

Whilst it seems clear that there was a serious lack of training, even I, who am not a pilot, would hope that understanding, avoiding and dealing with a stall were first principles of flying.

I do understand the issues are both complex and emotive and have followed the thread since the accident, personally I am horrified at the apparent lack of training and concerned about the recruitment criteria.

t54

31st Jul 2011, 22:01

It's all about psychology, not technology.

The PF couldn't fly the plane without computer help but he thought (hoped) he could (Dunning-Kruger effect, alias "innocence of youth").
The PNF didn't want to offend him and damage the PF's self-esteem, especially as the PF's wife was in the back.
The PF wanted to get above the turbulence, anyway.
The captain would have marked him down (promotion prospects?) if he'd disturbed him for nothing.
The normal-law disconnection represented an OPPORTUNITY for the PF!

Result -
total disaster - reminiscent of crashes before anybody knew anything about how wings work. The PF didn't know anything (worthwhile) about how the most important machine on the aeroplane (the wings) work. Not surprising, really, when this simple device is shrouded in pseudo-mystery by mathematical nonsense spouted from so many sources.
Perhaps he had never swapped yarns with old-timers over a beer or two. Perhaps he had never heard of "coffin corner". Perhaps he thought that when you said "Up!" the plane always went up, When you said "Down!" the plane always went down. Just like on the computer.
But if you enter a skid, due to too vigorous actions...what then.....
Turn into the skid, of course - if you can do it in time.

What OUGHT to have happened was that the PF said immediately "I'm totally out of my depth here. For God's sake, you take over. I'll get the captain".
"Ce situation est trop difficile pour moi. Prennez-vous les controles, tout de suite. Je vais reculer le capitaine." (apologies for the French)

But that would NOT have gained him any Brownie points. The guy was between a rock and a hard place.

SaturnV

31st Jul 2011, 22:25

Ozone concentrations as a function of altitude:

http://www.asr.ucar.edu/2004/ACD/Narrative/ASR04.final.narrative.noSI_files/image086.gif

^^^^ B and C reflect stratospheric air intruding into the upper troposphere.

AF 447 at FL 350 is 15000 feet below the tropopause boundary. The overshooting top of the Cb near their track is between 52000 and 56000 feet.

http://www.stormchase-wa.com/gallery/albums/userpics/10001/normal_img004.jpg

^^^ An overshooting top.

mm43

31st Jul 2011, 22:27

For those struggling with interpreting some of the BEA's FDR traces, the following shows the longitudinal data from prior to AP/ATHR disconnect through to shortly after the aircraft entered the stalling regime.

A few English words have been added, and the AP and ATHR disconnects plus the Stall Warnings are also marked.

http://oi56.tinypic.com/2mx35ua.jpg

Linktrained

31st Jul 2011, 22:35

Some pages back I had asked abut the effect of thrust from under-slung engines. I was informed that an increase in thrust tended to pitch the aircraft's nose up.
Would I be correct, then, in assuming that reducing thrust to Flight Idle would therefore tend to lower the nose ?
This should help to get the aircraft's wings unstalled sooner. Power could be resumed gently, to reconvert a not too bad glider ( see Sully) to a powered aeroplane again.

HarryMann

31st Jul 2011, 22:36

Buying a satnav for your car doesn't justify no longer being able to read a road atlas, just in case, if we are talking analogies. But I know a youngster or two today that refuse to have a map in the car (for when their satnav gets them lost)

I can only conclude they don't want to show their ignorance to their girlfriends by holding it the wrong way up and takinga left turn when it should be right :)

etudiant

31st Jul 2011, 22:36

Re T54

With due respect, that seems an unreasonable assessment of the PF.
He was a qualified glider pilot, so he had a practical basis for how the aerodynamics work.
He went from a happy situation where the Captain gives him the responsibility in a dark and stormy passage to a nightmare where the instruments play false, including the stall warnings, while the plane bucks and rolls and plunges, despite his best efforts.
With no visual cues and the stall warning turning off when he went slow, while turning back on when he went faster, his despairing comment that 'I don't understand' is entirely reasonable.
There is lots to improve in the training, which clearly should bear the blame, rather than the PF, who was just one of the victims.

jcjeant

31st Jul 2011, 23:01

Hi,

Level100
So what exactely do you think is of any significance here for the genesis of the accident?
Cheers

I send you a PM .. more easy for understand what I mean (en français of course)

gonebutnotforgotten

31st Jul 2011, 23:21

The 3rd Rapport d'etape adds a lot of detail, and clarifies a lot of what was previously just speculation, and it still tells me that the most interesting part of the event was that extraordinary climb from FL350. Not only did it put the aircraft in a hopeless energy state from which a stall was inevitable, but it also tells us a lot about the instrument flying skills of the PF. In fact it is so bizarre that I am still looking for an 'AHAH' moment that reveals just what it was he was trying to do and how he was doing it. I don't buy the argument that because he had previously thought about climbing out of the turbulence, this was now his way of doing it; no one in their right mind would have done it at that rate, nor deliberately pitched to 10 deg nose up at that level. Nor do I believe that these pitch inputs were inadvertent side effects of lateral inputs - at one point he was achieving 1.6g, and even if some of that was due to turbulence (and there isn't much sign that it was really particularly rough in the 20 sec or so before disconnect), there is still a lot to explain away. The stick force needed to do that isn't zero, some one posted the calibration some time back and I think you need around 5kg pull to do that, hardly inadvertent.

So what was he reacting to? I suggested a month ago that when the speed and Mach became invalid the altitude corrections would have been wrong causing a sudden change in indicated altitude, as happened in the Air Caraibes incident. In that case the change was -300ft, not a huge amount but just possibly enough to prompt the PF to want to pull up. the current BEA report's graphs don't show any such jump, though, intriguingly, the table on pages 92/93 shows that at the start at 2:10:05 the altitude (on the left PFD?) was 35 024ft, while 4 seconds later at 2:10:09 it is shown as 34 664ft, so I guess there was a jump. Nothing other than a complete disregard of attitude explains PF's later insistence 'Okay, okay okay je redescends', and similar phrases, when he plainly achieved no such thing. It seems the BEA are wondering whether reappearances of the FD bars might have had an influence, but if they did, this merely shows how the poor fellow seemed unable to 'look through the bars' to see and assess the underlying attitude. There may be good explanations for this behaviour, but I am struggling to find them. On the face of it, the question for Air France is whether this skill level is typical (in which case they have a humongous training problem to resolve) or unique to this co-pilot (in which case checking and evaluation needs attention).

One other puzzle, why (as had been noted) does the AP disconnect occur a few secs before the indicated speed loss?

I note Owen Glyndwr's Cm - alpha curves, which suggest that return to normal flight should have been possible. but is it enough just to correct the pitching moment? Don't you have to pitch down to within a few degrees of the actual flight path angle, which in this case, once the full stall (I also don't like calling it a deep stall because that's different) is developed, would mean pushing the nose down about 45 deg? I can't see them having the insight to do that

DozyWannabe

31st Jul 2011, 23:23

I send you a PM .. more easy for understand what I mean (en français of course)

Would you be able to give us poor old Anglophones a quick summary? I don't like all this secrecy and dancing around the point...

takata

31st Jul 2011, 23:34

Hi Owain,
Very interesting post, but what about engine thrust maintaining high pitch up with barely no airspeed?
So to get to the high AoAs we see from the DFDR data, it looks like you have to be holding full back stick as well as having the THS at -13 deg.
I noticed, from the tracks, that the first nose-down attitude recorded during the stall sequence was achieved between 0211:45 and 0212:00.

During the sequence, the PF was maintaining full elevators deflection (-30°) and, in addition, the THS was reaching -13°. He was also maintaining a full left stick order, but the aircraft rotated to the right in high bank. When it started, the airspeed was for the first time recorded under 30 kt (sensed).

Nonetheless, the pitch came down from about 16°NU to 12°ND!
Vertical Speed increased from -10,000 to above -15,000 ft/mn.

The only other parameter changing (beside the right turn) was that N1 was reduced, at the start of this sequence. N1 decreased in 20 seconds from about 105% (CLB) to IDLE (about 55-60%).

PF had "a very high speed" feeling, released SPEED BRAKE, applied CLB again (105°) and 15 seconds later, the aircraft attitude was nose up again without having gathered that much speed (below 100 kt).

jcjeant

31st Jul 2011, 23:43

Hi,

Would you be able to give us poor old Anglophones a quick summary? I don't like all this secrecy and dancing around the point...

Well I have posted before in english .. and it's crystal clear.
Seem's a french man don't understand .. so "par courtoisie" I send him a PM in french
It's not secrecy
I exercise my right to just send a PM to another member
I do not see where there is a problem or some secrets ...
Is there an atmosphere of paranoia on this board ? :)

DozyWannabe

31st Jul 2011, 23:55

Not a problem - could you provide a link to where you explained your position?

Not paranoia at all, just slightly confused.

[EDIT : Got it :

Hi,

takata whrote
So .. when read all this .. my feeling is:
The pilots were rated on type ... but nevertheless were not qualified for the situation of AF447 was
They had not knowledge of basic flying skills
They don't know how the Airbus systems work
So we can conclude that:
The formation and training of those pilots is very low
So Air France bear all the responsibility for this accident by not providing adequate training to their pilots or not detecting by exams (simulator) that those pilots were not qualified for fly a Airbus A330
At least and even if this above is not entirely true .. Air France stay bear the responsibility of this accident as the contract between Air France and their passengers was to transport them from A to B and they failed....
Are my feelings good ?

I take it your position remains the same?]

bubbers44

1st Aug 2011, 00:09

Bear, continuous left and right controls and pitch up control tells me he was probably not aviating properly. Most of us believe if he had held pitch and power we wouldn't be talking about this now.

The wild pull up to a nonflyable attitude put it in a deep stall, then they had no clue how to recover from a deep stall so spent several minutes with full nose up SS before impact with the Atlantic.

My students in a J3 cub with three hours knew you couldn't get out of a stall by holding the stick back.

Mike X

1st Aug 2011, 00:09

Excuse my intrusion.

As a lifelong dedicated enthusiast (much reading), beside the facts stated, surely one will feel the "fall" (rate of descent, albeit relatively level, in one's belly.)

Was on a 738 in 2007. Felt my guts responding upon descent. Last off and chatted with pilots. Asked about descent and was told it was rapid so as to make up time for the late departure.

Losing altitude at that rate must certainly induce a bodily reaction, which would then inform the brain.

Maybe, under turbulent conditions, one does not pick it up.

Linktrained

1st Aug 2011, 00:27

....So IF PF had not "felt very high speed..." and could have left his power off for a bit longer (30 seconds, say ?)... Who knows ...

HarryMann

1st Aug 2011, 00:32

Mike X, no you wouldn't. You could be falling at 20,000 fpm and not know it, you only pick up accelerations - and never believe your senses blind - that's what the instruments are for, and attitude was there...

==============

During the sequence, the PF was maintaining full elevators deflection (-30°) and, in addition, the THS was reaching -13°. He was also maintaining a full left stick order, but the aircraft rotated to the right in high bank. When it started, the airspeed was for the first time recorded under 30 kt (sensed).Of course, when fully stalled, the roll control via ailerons, and even spoilerons, would be weak at best, and possibly even have some reversal effects. The wallowing in roll and lack of definite corrective lateral stick control, should have been a big signal that he was heavily stalled. A glance at the Attitude, at the Trimwheel and...

..but not even once, was the question asked of PNF, even colloquially, 'Hey! D'ya think we're stalled' - or 'Please check, are there indications that we may be stalled' - and all this despite the Stall Warnings.

As with the Buffalo accident, one does wonder whether recent briefings or reading material were foremost in the pilot's minds - that is, tail icing with the former and false stall warnings with UAS in this case, there is a psychology there perhaps, last meaningful imprint takes precedence.

Nonetheless, the pitch came down from about 16°NU to 12°ND!
Vertical Speed increased from -10,000 to above -15,000 ft/mn.The Airbus was displaying some natural stability tendences maybe, whilst rocking in roll, it was from time to time, dipping its nose... nodding. Either that, or this coincided with PF releasing some of that NU, NU stick pressure. Commensurate, an increase in vertical speed would be expected.

Mike X

1st Aug 2011, 00:37

As has been stated so many times before, pitch and power, the basics. Bearfoil's interesting point re waiting to see how the aircraft reacts after auto dropout is worth considering.

HarryMann

1st Aug 2011, 00:41

Pilot felt high speed...

More like... PF heard a 'different' airflow sound, due to grossly high incidence, never heard it before , incorrectly associated it with high airspeed sound ?

HarryMann

1st Aug 2011, 00:42

What is 'auto dropout' ?

Mike X

1st Aug 2011, 00:48

What is 'auto dropout' ?

Sorry for any assumption.

'When the automatics leave the party'. :)

jcjeant

1st Aug 2011, 00:53

Hi,

I take it your position remains the same?It was not about this message but about the message with discrypancies about CV's in report 1 and 3
BTW yes my position remain the same about Air France .. suffice to read Vienna and Montreal conventions rules for know who bear the responsibility in such event

HarryMann

1st Aug 2011, 01:23

Mike,

Lots of peeps have mentioned the initial response to A/P disconnect, and PJ2 having direct experience of the type, went to some trouble a while back explaining his approach, and the whys and wherefores of leaving alone as far as possible as there may be better things to be doing, although establishing wings level may indeed feature

takata

1st Aug 2011, 01:30

The Airbus was displaying some natural stability tendences maybe, whilst rocking in roll, it was from time to time, dipping its nose... nodding.
Sure, a brutal right bank increasing to 40° while full left stick was maintained continuously for 50 seconds, and a sharp pitch change of -28° nose down while full aft stick was maintained continuously for 40 seconds, is certainly related to aircraft stability when stalling with no speed worth to be mentioned.
But what changed the previous equilibrum (16° NU, TOGA, continuous oscillations in roll) seems to be the sharp reduction of thrust.

Either that, or this coincided with PF releasing some of that NU, NU stick pressure. Commensurate, an increase in vertical speed would be expected.
No no. PF stick did not move from full left and full aft from ~0211:40 to 0212:15, while aircraft started to pitch down from 16° nose up after 0211:45 and reached 12° nose down in about 10 seconds (0211:55).
PF declared feeling a "very high speed" at 0212:02, and in fact, the aircraft accelerated by ~50 kt but from an airspeed close to zero.

It happened right after the captain came back on the FD. He should have been quite puzzled to see the horizon moving down and up again to zero, while V/S increased from 150%, with airspeeds/Stall Warnings disappearing (NCD) and reappearing (valid)...
TOGA put the aircraft back in stable attitude, close to zero pitch for a while and wings could be put barely level again.

bearfoil

1st Aug 2011, 01:37

As flattering as it is to be confused with PJ2, My remark had to do with PF's first input after a/p loss.

With NOSE UP, (and LEFT ROLL), if PF was impatient for NU response after initial pull, he may have accentuated it with more pull. The a/c is heavy, and having taken manual control in these conditions w/o alot of experience (did anyone?), his exaggerated pull may have caught the airframe responding, and been responsible for the 1.6 gee rotation?

The traces tell this?

Indarra

1st Aug 2011, 02:30

Long time lurker, retired intelligence analyst. Not a pilot but I am trained to think out of the box and approach issues laterally.

I would like to take up more explicitly the suggestions that a few others have made about the visibility of PF actions with the sidestick. I do think care needs to be taken in considering this factor. Unfortunately, it perhaps has become a taboo or “jump over” issue because of unproductive AB vs Boeing arguments, and it has tended to be quickly dismissed in this forum. Similarly I do not see it picked up in explicitly in the BEA reports.

But it seems to have been a significant factor in this accident at two points, both the incident start and subsequently in the cockpit in finding a resolution

My understanding of the operation of a two person crew in aviation is that the PNF should monitor the actions of the PF and express views and act when appropriate. In this case we had a relatively inexperienced crewmember as FP and the most experienced person on type as PNF. However the PNF does not seem to have been privy to the sidestick actions of the PF, so that his checking role was stymied. Similarly the Captain when he arrived at 2:11:43 could not see the sidestick actions.

2:13:40
PF: Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure
Capt: Non non non ne remonte pas

The BEA is undertaking a study with psychologists and psychiatrists but I hope it gives consideration to the reactions of the PNF and Captain given the incompleteness of the information that they had regarding sidestick operation. Did they automatically tend to assume the sidestick was being handled in the way that THEY would have handled it, or did they tend to omit a focus on sidestick operation because it was not visible?

What I am getting to a need for a simple panel display so that both pilots can easily view the sidestick operation. For example, a simple color display showing one or two of the following colors as appropriate: blue (up), orange (down), red (left), green (right), white (neutral). This should inform and hopefully empower the PNF (and anyone in the 3rd seat) to the necessary degree.

A number of incidents come to mind in this connection. Of course, the availability of a yoke didn’t ultimately save EgyptAir 990 or Silkair 185. There was an earlier suicide attempt with JAL 350 (DC8) in 1982 on landing approach. I understand that in that case PNF grabbed the yoke and forced it back, reducing the crash impact and allowing the majority on board to survive. I also wonder with AirBlue 202 whether a sidestick display could have given PNF a few more seconds to realize what was happening. Visibility of sidestick actions will surely be an issue from time to time in the decades ahead.

takata

1st Aug 2011, 02:34

The traces tell this?
It seems that autothrust reduced N1 from ~100% down to 85% just before disconnection (reduction caused by turbulences or Mach selected, diconnection by UAS) and it stayed there until it was unlocked by the pilots (~0210:25 -> CLB).
This caused at first a pitch down of about 3°, down to zero or slightly below (~0210:00 - 0210:05)... which could have delayed the aircraft response to PF NU orders.
Thrust increased to CLB between 0210:25 and 0210:35, from 85% to 100+, it would have added some pitch up before the PF tried to reduce aircraft V/S.
N1 was reduced again to 85% at 0210:45, quickly followed by TOGA after 0210:51 (at second stall warnings sequence).

At AP disconnection (0210:05), she started wings level and she rolled to the right at 4° per second, before first PF imputs two seconds later.

Lazerdog

1st Aug 2011, 03:33

I wonder if there is a software routine that could have detected the stall that the pilots were unable to? High AOA, sufficient thrust, yet altitude is decreasing steadily for a long period. (Have the computer do the instrument scan and suggest action.) I still think training and new procedures are required to get crew back to being active pilots. If I am on a passenger flight, I sure hope the folks up front have had a crusty instructor pilot throwing everything at them so that the right scans, observations, and responses are learned and quickly applied when things go awry.

STICK N RUDDER

1st Aug 2011, 03:57

"My students in a J3 cub with three hours knew you couldn't get out of a stall by holding the stick back''

If you ever did fly with this kids some of training programs only wants you to teach them how to recover on the first sign of stall then you got to teach them how to fly jets in pistons...

grity

1st Aug 2011, 04:13

mm43 I read the ATHR disconect 2 sec later 2:10:07

in the acceleration we can seperate two different parts IMO, the average value and the short peaks

the average value will corespond to the main movements of the heavy airbus, the shorter peaks shows the turbulent influence

between 2:10:07 and 2:10:17 the average acceleration get up from 1.0 g to 1.3 g (and fall back to 1.0 g in the following 10 sec) I think this is caused to the elevator move to -1.0 deg (the pull by the PF) also the g-protection can play a rule here

but the acceleration peaks in this time ( 0.8 ...1.6.....0.85 .......1.5 g) indices strong up and down drafts

this are followed by changes in AoA ( 4....2.....5....2....6) and the stall-approach-warning worked perfekt ("stall" if AoA>5.8 deg)

but I think that the air flow over a wing even with this higher AoA will not break down so fast, (flow-seperation needs his time)

so the wing with AoA=6 is still not in a stall, but with this speed he create a very strong lift and can create strong momentes

my read is that the turbulences can caused a lot of this first pitch up......

mm43

1st Aug 2011, 04:34

Originally posted by grity...
mm43 I read the ATHR disconect 2 sec later 2:10:07Yes, no doubt about that, and I'll fix the graphic. Thanks.

PJ2

1st Aug 2011, 06:20

Hello, HN39;
My tentative explanation of these events is that the airplane was traversing the fringe of an area with significant updraft velocity (1000 fpm?). The AP pitched the nose down to maintain altitude, and the A/THR reduced engine thrust to maintain airspeed. After disconnect of AP and A/THR, the FCS increased pitch to regain 1 g normal acceleration, and thrust was locked at significantly less than required to maintain airspeed in level flight in still air.

More analysis to be done by BEA (and perhaps me). Why did AP and A/THR disconnect 2 seconds before the speeds dropped?
Yes, I agree with your assessments concerning conditions just prior to AP-A/THR disengagement.

On your question regarding disengagement of the AFS, I suspect that the AP - A/THR disengagement occurred two seconds before the loss of airspeed because the Mach parameter dropped to M0.30 for one sample, two seconds prior to the CAS dropping and the engagement conditions for the AP-A/THR-FD systems were temporarily not met.

On the flight conditions, aircraft response etc, in my view the variations in roll, pitch and engine thrust would be considered minor and common in light to more than light turbulence. Even in moderate turbulence at altitude, manual flight in Normal Law is not a problem. I haven't done it in anger in Alternate Law but in the simulator it is a non-issue but as I've mentioned, one has to be gentle. I think the control inputs by the PF were exceedingly brisk and resulted in the 1.5g initial vertical accelerations. But eight-degrees of roll in two seconds, (as noted in the BEA Report's graphs near the beginning of the Report), is not in itself a "control" issue, nor is the slight pitch down then recovery by the autoflight system just prior to disconnection.

What I wish to convey here is, with a loss of auto-flight capability, one simply flies the airplane, maintaining stable flight while sorting out why the system disconnected, then reconnecting when re-engagement conditions are met.

On why the PF's seatbelt may not have been fastened at impact, I believe Mr. Optimistic commented earlier that the PF may have been preparing to get out of his seat to let the captain in. I think this is a reasonable conclusion to draw at the moment - I can see something like that occurring, but of course there is no evidence thus far to support this suggestion.

jcjeant

1st Aug 2011, 06:54

Hi,

On why the PF's seatbelt may not have been fastened at impact, I believe Mr. Optimistic commented earlier that the PF may have been preparing to get out of his seat to let the captain in. I think this is a reasonable conclusion to draw at the moment - I can see something like that occurring, but of course there is no evidence thus far to support this suggestion.I don't think this is a reasonable conclusion ....
The reasonable (and logic conclusion) was that the captain take place in the left seat (due to his qualifications and common usage)
It's certainly the first place to go who come to his mind if he want to take command
In the CVR report .. nothing (not a word) about captain to take command.
If this was the case .. sure the BEA had reporting the wordings .. as it is a important event ...

AlphaZuluRomeo

1st Aug 2011, 07:15

More analysis to be done by BEA (and perhaps me). Why did AP and A/THR disconnect 2 seconds before the speeds dropped?
Thanks for enlighting / correlating the facts, HN39, much easier to read (for me) :)
About the AP discon : AP2 was engaged, it's based on the right side "chain" (pitot 2, ADR 2, IR 2, EFCS 2...) unless I'm mistaken. My guess is that the pitot #2 was the first to freeze, the first to give an value dropping, unmatched with the 2 other speeds (ADR1, ADR3).

@ bear (post 1115) : I'm ready to accept other causes than UAS/icing... providen an alternative theory shows itself either probable/logical or demonstrated (facts, recordings...)

@ grity (post 1120) : Thanks for the pic with the stick moves, very valuable.

xcitation

1st Aug 2011, 07:22

Having lost the IAS due to pitot they then did a zoom climb. This traded their velocity for altitude gain and resulted in the slower speed and stall problem. We can presume that the initial zoom climb was accidental as no additional thrust was applied, no announcement given.
For me this is the most puzzling part of the incident. Perhaps an accidental climb whilst trying to level wings in the chop. But +2500 feet? When instrument scanning you do your utmost to maintain them at the desired position. Corrections are done frequently and in very minor stick adjustments.
When they lost the IAS why did one of them not glance at the ground speed for a sanity check? You have it right there so why not.
They would have seen it change from >400kts to <50kts. C'est une grand problem, non? Perhaps the PAX seat back display would show ground speed change and they could even deduce a stall.
I say this not in cricticism of the pilots, but more as a question of what would I do if I lost my speed. Maintain attitude and power and treat her gentle as egg shells to buy time so my buddy can figure it out and call it in. Keep my scan going because that's all I have. No doubt it is more difficult because of the chop and warnings.
My gut say there is more to the puzzle. However I have a feeling we will never know. How do the more knowledgeable ones here feel about the PFD switch by the PNF and BEA want to record the instrument panel?
I was hoping to get an answer why the PF nosed up so radically. Reading the report 3 it looks like not yet, perhaps not ever.

Owain Glyndwr

1st Aug 2011, 07:22

I note Owen Glyndwr's Cm - alpha curves, which suggest that return to normal flight should have been possible. but is it enough just to correct the pitching moment? Don't you have to pitch down to within a few degrees of the actual flight path angle, which in this case, once the full stall (I also don't like calling it a deep stall because that's different) is developed, would mean pushing the nose down about 45 deg? I can't see them having the insight to do that

I agree you have to pitch down enough that the aircraft accelerates. The curves of course only relate to AoA and aircraft trim, but in practice, until the dynamics have sorted themselves out and a new flight path angle stabilised, AoA and pitch move together. I think that when you have pitch down from some steady (stalled) state, the first thing that happens is that the flight path angle becomes more negative at more or less constant AoA, and the aircraft starts to accelerate. This would be a steadily escalating effect I think, so it would not be necessary to pitch all the way down to 45 deg nose down in the first instance. But then I am not a pilot, so perhaps someone else could comment?
Hi Owain,
Very interesting post, but what about engine thrust maintaining high pitch up with barely no airspeed?
The AIAA curves were just tunnel data, so no thrust effects were included. There certainly would be an effect such as you describe, which would depend on altitude as well as airspeed. (Thrust increases with decreasing altitude and decreasing airspeed; the overall aerodynamic moments other than thrust decrease also with airspeed, so the pitch effect from the engines is biggest at SL and low airspeed.
I don't think I agree with the "barely no airspeed" bit. To me it seems that the credibility of the measured CAS is going steadily south as AoA increases and above about 35 deg AoA you cannot believe a number of it. I say this because it seems to me that the position errors are wholly unknown for any AoA above the flight tested stalling value and that when you are looking at AoAs of 30 deg or more coupled with roll and sideslip excursions the 'measurements' are completely unreliable. Where the measured CAS can be relied upon the recorded ground speed converted from TAS to CAS is in pretty good agreement with the measured value (and yes, I am aware of wind effects, but the AI analysis needed only a 15 kt wind correction and this, I assume, would have been 15 kt TAS, so much less as a CAS). If you carry that process forward to the regions where the recorded CAS is crazy you find that the aircraft was fairly close to 110 kts CAS all the way down.
A back-of-an-envelope sum for 110 kts and FL350 suggests that going from Flight Idle (essentially zero thrust) to TO power would add 8 degrees to the AoA. In the only sequence where power was reduced to idle the pitch changed from +15 to -10 but unfortunately one cannot say what effect that had on AoA because the AoA recording has hit the stops, as has the flight path angle recording. If you were VERY imaginative and believed the AoA out of the IRS, you might persuade yourself that the AoA was reduced from about 46 deg down to about 39 deghttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/wink2.gif

jcjeant

1st Aug 2011, 08:09

Hi,

Can gurus explain to a graphics dumb reader ......

http://i.imgur.com/GEJ0Y.jpg

What about the movements of elevator and movements of stick ..
Do you see the elevator mimic the stick commands in the 20 - 30 first seconds after AP tell goodbye ?

paull

1st Aug 2011, 08:28

Since in Normal law it goes where you point it, I guess in the vast majority of cases pitch up equates to going up so I can understand the lack of precision most of the time, but surely if the PNF or Captain did know what was happening (stall)they would have said "push the nose down (or forward)" rather than "Go Down".

1- Can we read anything into PF and Capt's use of Up/Down rather than nose Up/Down that would let us know what they understood the situation to be and when?

2- In a similar situation would explicit references to pitch be more helpful to the PF than saying Up or Down? After all, if I were frightened and could see from the rate of descent that I was going down fast, someone telling me to go down would not be something I would want to hear. A statement of "Get the nose down" might get through to me. (There again "The wing is stalled, get the nose down" would have probably been better still!)

I think of stall recovery as being like turning across the slope on skis, you know the theory, but the first time you turn back towards the fall line and it gets worse before it gets better, most of us fall on our backsides.

HazelNuts39

1st Aug 2011, 08:31

On your question regarding disengagement of the AFS, I suspect that the AP - A/THR disengagement occurred two seconds before the loss of airspeed because the Mach parameter dropped to M0.30 for one sample, two seconds prior to the CAS dropping and the engagement conditions for the AP-A/THR-FD systems were temporarily not met.That's another intriguing thing. The ADR's calculate Mach and CAS quasi-simultaneously from the same pitot and static pressures. Why would there be a delay of two seconds between Mach and CAS?

From Interim Report no.2:
1.6.11.6 Consequences of a drop in the measured total pressure
The static pressure (Ps), total pressure (Pt) and total air temperature (TAT) allow the ADR to calculate the following parameters in particular:
 Standard altitude
 Mach
 Calibrated Air Speed (CAS)
 True Air Speed (TAS)
The order in which these different parameters are calculated is not immaterial because the value of the measured static pressure must be corrected to take into account the measurement error due to the air flow disturbances in the vicinity of the sensor. This correction depends in particular on the Mach and has a direct influence on the standard altitude which only depends on the static pressure. On an A330-200 in cruise flight, the measured static pressure overestimates the real static pressure. If Pt and Ps are known, it is possible to calculate a Mach value that provides access to the correction of Ps. The Ps thus corrected is then used to calculate the CAS and the altitude.

DozyWannabe

1st Aug 2011, 08:40

What about the movements of elevator and movements of stick ..
Do you see the elevator mimic the stick commands in the 20 - 30 first seconds after AP tell goodbye ?

Yes - quite clearly, although the deflection is clearly less in the earlier part of the graph - the question is, what was their altitude and airspeed in the two phases you highlight - it looks like the system was deflecting the elevators relevant to cruise speed in the first part, and lower airspeed in the second.

@pax2908 below - there'll always be debate over that one. The only difference is that the THS trim would have had to be wound on manually rather than happening automatically, which a lot of people were using as an argument in favour of Direct Law until the report came out, reasoning that the PF would not have wanted that much nose-up deflection. However the CVR now indicates that is precisely what the PF was trying to achieve - the big question now is why.

pax2908

1st Aug 2011, 08:59

Re. jcj (elevator vs sidestick) because the control loop is not 'direct law' so as long as the a/c is responsive in pitch, the g demands can be achieved with relatively small deflections? One question is, whether direct law might have been more appropriate?

Microburst2002

1st Aug 2011, 09:22

this is too long a thread.

Can anyone tell me what was the pitch attitude and the thrust at the time of the AP/ATHR disconnection?
I believe that, if they were normal (about 2.5º) but the atmosphere was somewhat turbulent and at night, somatogravic illusions could have played a very important rol, along with lack of hand flying in skills.

I can't see why else he would pull up in the first place, unless attitude was too low, or thrust was in idle and altitude decreasing or something like that.

There must be a reason, other than total inability to fly straight and level.

A33Zab

1st Aug 2011, 09:34

I did have the same observations,

It seems that autothrust reduced N1 from ~100% down to 85% just before disconnection (reduction caused by turbulences or Mach selected, diconnection by UAS) and it stayed there until it was unlocked by the pilots (~0210:25 -> CLB).

Few seconds before AP disconnect (Line 1B)

This caused at first a pitch down of about 3°, down to zero or slightly below (~0210:00 - 0210:05)... which could have delayed the aircraft response to PF NU orders.

Thrust increased to CLB between 0210:25 and 0210:35, from 85% to 100+, it would have added some pitch up before the PF tried to reduce aircraft V/S.

Note: Thrust Lever was taken out of CLB detent (THR lock Ulocked) but not moved to intercept N1 T/L target or the instinctive disconnect was used. Line C2

[Engine Control Unit ECU: The autothrust is in Memo Mode. The power level is latched to its prior state provided that the throttle has been in the
Max. Continuous or Max. Climb detents for at least 2 seconds.
The throttle must stay in one of these detents in order to hold Memo Mode]

N1 was reduced again to 85% at 0210:45,
T/L retarded to below CLB detent. few seconds before Line 3C.

quickly followed by TOGA after 0210:51 (at second stall warnings sequence). Line 4C and at the same time THS (-3.8°) starts to move NU.
Did T/L movement below CLB detend resets a logic(FMGEC)? and did thereafter the TOGA initiate this THS movement? (Normal TO~15° pitch/TO thrust) Line 4C/4E
After the TOGA T/L was few seconds into MCT/FLX detent(N1 continued at 100%+) Line 5C before T/L was positioned in IDLE and THS movement seemed to stop at -13.5° (Line 5E)
At that time there was a full elevator command on the SS. Line 5D

http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/rr101/Zab999/Remarkable1.jpg

jcjeant

1st Aug 2011, 09:34

Hi,

Yes - quite clearly, although the deflection is clearly less in the earlier part of the graph - the question is, what was their altitude and airspeed in the two phases you highlight - it looks like the system was deflecting the elevators relevant to cruise speed in the first part, and lower airspeed in the second.

Pitch protection in alternate law ? or .. ?

BOAC

1st Aug 2011, 09:46

I fear it is time to delve a little deeper into the 'management' side of this.

Those of us with a little experience know that when (a less experienced) PF gets confused, it is pointless shouting rapid commands at him/her since, like a stall warning, they either will not register or will further confuse.

So, I ask, why did PNF ('Duty Captain') NOT take control much earlier? It is either a further indictment of AF training of their co-pilots for LHS relief (or simply for being a pilot) OR was there an extra person or persons in the flight deck that may have inhibited PNF from the firm take-over of control that was necessary? Do we know from the CVR?

grity

1st Aug 2011, 10:07

jcjeant the elevator and THS is very detailed here:
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-59.html#post6610567
or s.44

the stick movements are detailed on the 3.report s 31 and s 32

s.31 was also my databasis for the stick-movment of the first 10 sec after 2:10:07
(what you call making mayonaise)

if PF was never before flying in altlaw at this altitude in his live, than he was a very fast lerning pilot: he need just 20 sec to learn how to hold the wings level and no longer to overreact....learning by doing but he really should have learnd this not in this situation

and I think the PNF had (maby partiell) realised the movements of the PF stick, he made one comment abaut it:
2 h 11
PNF: Surtout essaie de toucher le moins possible les commandes en en latéral hein
Above all, try to touch the controls as little as possible in in lateral, huh

DozyWannabe

1st Aug 2011, 10:13

@jcjeant - Nothing to do with any "protections" as such, travel limiters on hydraulic surfaces have been around for donkey's years (you don't want the same input:deflection ratio at cruise as you do at takeoff or on approach!). It looks to me like the limiters were functioning as they should have been - restricting surface travel while apparently in stable cruise phase and giving maximum authority when things started to go pear-shaped.

@BOAC - Indeed, and this is the similarity to the Birgenair case that I feared - in the Birgenair case it was put down to the command gradient because the Captain (ex-military jock, very senior) was PF, and the F/O (PNF) was relatively junior, despite the fact that the PNF clearly had a better handle on the situation. Why the more experienced F/O (PNF) felt he could not take command from the junior F/O (PF) I cannot fathom. In fact there was an intriguing exchange at one point where the PNF calls for "controls on the left" and starts making inputs, but shortly thereafter the PF regains control and continues handling as before (alas incorrectly). To our French cousins - would you expect "controls on the left" to be a demand for both pilots to make left bank inputs or was he in fact calling for control and overruled by his junior?

@grity (and others) - I've started noticing a reference to "squirrelly" behaviour (very sensitive controls) in Alt Law, which was earlier refuted by PJ2 - who said that the controls in Alternate were slightly more sensitive, but that the difference was barely noticeable in practice. Can we stick to what we *know*, please? The point the BEA were making was that there seemed to be insufficient hand-flying training *at altitude* in AF - the FL was the main factor, not the control law.

SaturnV

1st Aug 2011, 10:43

BOAC, are you suggesting the wife was or had been in the fourth seat?

---And that's why the fourth seat was retrieved, if only to check the straps?

This was a flight crew that after the SELCAL check with ATLANTICO, apparently switched immediately to the DAKAR frequency. And a flight crew that left the radar in CAL mode until 0208.

The Captain had asked the PF whether he wanted to take his rest and the PF said he wasn't sleepy. The Captain apparently then took his rest during the period that the PF would have been resting.

Is the PF unbelted because that facilitates his turning around if he wants to talk to someone behind him?

All that said, its hard to believe the presence of a fourth person on the flight deck would not have been hinted at by now, through some leak to the media.

hetfield

1st Aug 2011, 10:55

IF there was a fourth person on the flight deck it should have been mentioned already by the BEA reports........................:confused:

BOAC

1st Aug 2011, 11:00

Saturn - no, not suggesting, just asking. It is known that some European airlines are not as correct in resticting access to the flight deck as most UK ones (DB and SR of Virgin excepted, of course) so I felt it a valid question.

SaturnV

1st Aug 2011, 11:29

BOAC, without the complete transcript, we don't know the extent of any extraneous conversation.

The CVR record begins shortly after midnight, and the only apparent observation with respect to external weather that's noted from the start of the CVR until after 0200 is when overflying the coast at Natal, where the captain remarks that the weather has been good.

There apparently is no discussion by the flight crew of the message from dispatch received at 0030 alerting them of Cbs between SALPU and TASIL. (The third interim report again specifically notes this message.) The range of the radar is reset after the SELCAL check at 0135, but it is left in CAL mode.

GarageYears

1st Aug 2011, 11:50

2 h 12 min 04 to 2 h 12 min 07
PF: J’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou non qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ?
I have the impression that we have some crazy speed, don’t we ?.. what do you think ?

There was a comment by HarryMann (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-59.html#post6610754) that perhaps the PF was hearing a different airflow sound and wrongly associated this with high speed - absolutely that is possible!

As I noted previously, I have been involved in Level D sound simulations for over 20 years now and would certainly find it likely that the aerohiss heard at an abnormal attitude such as that experienced by AF447 on the way down would likely be similar to the noise normally associated with high Mach.

This would be somewhat similar to the sound when an aircraft achieves some level of sideslip, which is particularly noticeable due to the asymmetric flow of air over the cockpit.

In a stall such as that experienced by AF447, with a significant and unusual AoA, the airflow breaking over the nose and windshield would be turbulent and certainly sound "different". I doubt it would be identical to that of high Mach cruise (which just tends to significantly louder than normal - the change from 0.82M to 0.85M for example is significant in dB terms), but for any pilot I suspect it would be noticeable.

In my comfy office, it is easy to say that the clues were all there - attitude and altitude (or more explicitly rate-of-descent), but I will add this - most simulators would do a very poor job of representing this sound condition - in fact I would so bold as to say they would do a crappy job and would likely generate little, if any sound, since forward airspeed is the driving parameter for the aeronoise sound cues (a combination of Mach and CAS).

As I write this post, I am now attempting to think through what would be needed to drive this abnormal descent sound cue - probably a function of AoA and vertical speed...

Golf-Sierra

1st Aug 2011, 13:01

Hello,

BEA report, page 109, Annexe 4, vitesse verticale[FT/Min] (bright red)

Up to 02:12 it was consistently negative, but then it jumped up to 0, stayed for a while and then oscilated. Just before impact it went positive to about 2500 ft/min a couple of times.

Why?

At an extreme rate of descent (-16'000 ft/min) what would the altitude tape look like? Would it be clear they are falling, or would it simply be a blur?

Could this strange fluctuation in the v/s indication be the 'straw that broke the camel's back' which completely confused the crew. Did the PF completely disregard the loss in altitude as he was convinced that the altitude indication was also unreliable?

Shadoko

1st Aug 2011, 13:15

Sure, a brutal right bank increasing to 40° while full left stick was maintained continuously for 50 seconds, and a sharp pitch change of -28° nose down while full aft stick was maintained continuously for 40 seconds, is certainly related to aircraft stability when stalling with no speed worth to be mentioned.
But what changed the previous equilibrum (16° NU, TOGA, continuous oscillations in roll) seems to be the sharp reduction of thrust.
.../...
TOGA put the aircraft back in stable attitude, close to zero pitch for a while and wings could be put barely level again.
Could the airflow created by the thrust alter the direction of "natural" airflow due to the flight path? And the resulting AoA of the rear surfaces would be very different of the one of the wing?
Another question: at the same moment (when a/c right banked until 40°), what stopped this right wing plunge? The low wings configuration vs fuselage (so the entire fuselage has a "lateral drag" in this attitude) or the "lateral drag" of the vertical stabiliser (and then initiated the right turn: begining of a spin dive?)?

DozyWannabe

1st Aug 2011, 13:16

There was a comment by HarryMann (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-59.html#post6610754) that perhaps the PF was hearing a different airflow sound and wrongly associated this with high speed - absolutely that is possible!

But at the same time would it not be prudent to check the altimeter (which would have been significantly unwinding at this point)? If AF had passed on the bulletin sent by Airbus regarding the problems with the Thales pitots and subsequent UAS incidents, then surely this knowledge should have been - if not at the front of their minds - at least easily accessible?

Don't get me wrong, I have long argued that the situation these guys found themselves in would have required the best of their abilities (a tall order at 2am) and more than a spoonful of luck to diagnose and correct, but if they *had* been able to bring their "A" game, a glance at the power settings and the ADI should have given them a clue as to their predicament. Admittedly this is 20/20 hindsight, but given the Birgenair and Aeroperu incidents 14 years previously - has it not percolated through the piloting fraternity that when you have a UAS situation (and ice is the likely culprit) that the only readings you should rely on are your attitude indicators, thrust settings and altimeter?

Looking at the DFDR sidestick traces, it seems that a nose-up attitude was commanded almost throughout the sequence - why? Did he "tense up" and not realise he was ordering back-stick? I ask this because from my Air Cadet days I remember that stall and back-stick was a no-no.

hulotte

1st Aug 2011, 13:16

To our French cousins - would you expect "controls on the left" to be a demand for both pilots to make left bank inputs or was he in fact calling for control and overruled by his junior?

Le pilote en place CdB prend la priorité. Le manche CdB est positionné à gauche en butée.

Commande à gauche:
Meaning : LHS (PNF , FO) had asked for taking over flight control !!! and act as PF

Then RHS (junior) take over control using priority knob

DozyWannabe

1st Aug 2011, 13:26

Commande à gauche:
Meaning : LHS (PNF , FO) had asked for taking over flight control !!! and act as PF

Then RHS (junior) take over control using prioity knowb

Bloody hell - what was going on in that flight deck? Surely "I have control" means just that, but if what you're saying is true, PNF said "I have control", the PF ignored him and he didn't say a word!

GarageYears

1st Aug 2011, 13:30

Quote:
Originally Posted by GarageYears http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-61.html#post6611632)
There was a comment by HarryMann (AF 447 Thread No. 5 (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-59.html#post6610754)) that perhaps the PF was hearing a different airflow sound and wrongly associated this with high speed - absolutely that is possible!

But at the same time would it not be prudent to check the altimeter (which would have been significantly unwinding at this point)? If AF had passed on the bulletin sent by Airbus regarding the problems with the Thales pitots and subsequent UAS incidents, then surely this knowledge should have been - if not at the front of their minds - at least easily accessible?The very first explicit reference to ALTITUDE occurs here:

2 h 12 min 42
PF: En alti on a quoi là ?
In alti[tude] we're at what, here?

2 h 12 min 44
CAP: (…) C’est pas possible
It's not possible
It would seem that Altitude was not high on the list of concerns until nearly 60 seconds AFTER the Capt returned to the cockpit, at least from the words spoken.

The point of my post and the original mention by HarryMann was an attempt to understand the PF's comment regarding "crazy speed"... I do have some concerns that he may have thought the opposite - i.e. crazy LOW, but that would not agree with the use of the Speedbrakes.... so it has to be crazy as in 'fast'? But then you wouldn't select TO/GA in that case.

A lot of confusion basically, which I think sums it up.

CONF iture

1st Aug 2011, 13:53

I would like to take up more explicitly the suggestions that a few others have made about the visibility of PF actions with the sidestick. I do think care needs to be taken in considering this factor. Unfortunately, it perhaps has become a taboo or “jump over” issue because of unproductive AB vs Boeing arguments, and it has tended to be quickly dismissed in this forum. Similarly I do not see it picked up in explicitly in the BEA reports.

From 318 to 380, Airbus is doomed to the technology it has imposed to all - Very early on, common sense complains were formulated though.

Never, ever, BEA would address such topic.
Only AAIB has openly commented on it.

takata

1st Aug 2011, 14:10

Hi GarageYears,
The point of my post and the original mention by HarryMann was an attempt to understand the PF's comment regarding "crazy speed"... I do have some concerns that he may have thought the opposite - i.e. crazy LOW, but that would not agree with the use of the Speedbrakes.... so it has to be crazy as in 'fast'? But then you wouldn't select TO/GA in that case.

This expression "une vitesse de fou" is crystal clear. It always means, related to speed, "extremely high". A more correct grammaticale expression would be "une vitesse folle", exact same meaning, but here, "fou" is related to somebody: it is a metaphore meaning that only a crazy man (le fou) would go that fast.

tmadam

1st Aug 2011, 14:10

Back to basics here if you don't mind... a conventional a/c pitches ND at stall because the horizontal stabiliser is still flying.

Some have referred to PF's glider training. In a glider stall even if you hold full back stick, the nose drops and a/c recovers (before stalling again if you continue) because the HS is flying and there is not enough elevator authority (at ~30 kt) to keep the nose up.

Of course the situation under discussion here is vastly different, but can elevator and power together really maintain a NU attitude in the A330 with a stalled wing and a flying HS?

At the extreme AoA eventually reached, wouldn't the HS have also then been stalled?

Lonewolf_50

1st Aug 2011, 14:11

Old Carthusian
With respect, your resort to a false dichotomy in your response to me is an error. There was indeed something wrong with the aircraft, AND there looks to be something wrong in the handling of that malfunction, which falls in the realm of human factors.

Hand Solo's later point affirms that the hand flying issue need not lead to loss of control, certainly.

Others have likewise commented, which is why a point I also raised was training in Air France. See also Hand Solo's follow on comment:
"Train your crews right and the captain should have no problem leaving the cockpit during ITCZ transit."

My point in response to Dozy had to do with his FALSE statement that there was nothing wrong with the aircraft. YES, there was, the pitot tubes iced up, and that is a fundamental system for any aircraft in flight.

As has been noted for two years on these forums, that by itself need not result in a crash, but it was the triggering event that was the first in the sequence of things going awry until impact with the surface. It is also a contributing cause (from a human factors standpoint) or what looks to be at least one pilot not trusting instruments related to air mass inputs:
Airspeed (which was unreliable at various points)
Stall Warning
VErtical speed

Note, these aren't pure pitot tube inputs, but with AoA not readable, you have to infer something about AoA from your airspeed and attitude, as that's what you've got. Stall speed is what it is for various conditions, thus, if speed is unreliable, might one of the crew think that Stall Warning is spurious? (Then again, the pitch and power chorus will once again sing their usual in three part harmony ... )

There is a known remedy for the sub standard pitot tubes that hadn't been undertaken for that particular hull. To repeat for clarity: not a matter of either or, it's BOTH.

Insofar as the manufacturer is concerned, I am not sure they are clear from related fault (AF looks to get hit with a lot of fault here for the above) since manufacturer's input on training, airworthiness, and documentation is non trivial.
-----
HazelNuts: many thanks for post 1110. http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-56.html#post6609124
From this I understand that turbulence did increase the challenge for hand flying, somewhat, if your analysis is correct.
-------
For anyone: (from the CVR) Does this mean the PNF is taking controls in the left seat, or he wants the PF to roll left?

2 h 11 min 38
PNF: Commande à gauche ("Controls to the left")

BOAC: it appears we are thinking similarly here.
------
Caveat: what follows involving CVR excerpts is based on partial translation a few pages back, and edited to shorten this long post. Do not take this as gospel, please, gentle readers.

This just struck me:

PF: "I have a problem it's that I no longer have vertical speed"

Does this mean ... VSI (source, static and inertial) on PF display is gone wrong, he doesn't trust it, the value makes no sense to him, or his scan has broken down?
---------------------------
When I read from the Captain "it's not possible" I had a chill go down my spine.

2 h 12 min 33 There I'm going up ok so let's go down
2 h 12 min 34 VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet
2 h 12 min 39 ok, we're in TOGA
2 h 12 min 40 VS : « Stall, stall Stall alarm starts [continues until 2 h 12 min 46]
2 h 12 min 42 PF: In alti[tude] we're at what, here?
2 h 12 min 44 CAP: It's not possible
{Was "how far below the assigned altitude" or "we are stalled" not possible ... }
Two minutes before impact, the Captain appears to have to overcome the denial stage of dealing with an inflight malfunction. (Human factors issue, how people respond to malfunctions and emergencies. Granted, he was trying to catch up to a situation in progress ...)
---
PNF: Là tu descends oui You're going down now, yes
CAP: hey you ... you're in ... put put the wings level
PNF: Mets les ailes horizontales Put the wings level
PF: That's what I'm trying to do
**** Question on crew training is: why doesn't PNF take the stick now?*****
Thought, not fact, follows:

At this point in the event, (two minutes before impact) the aircraft may have been saveable with wings level, nose down, and fly out of the stall and then pull up to break descent. Does not look as though PNF's scan was working in the direction that would have led to this course of action. I don't think he realized that the stall warning was not spurious.)

CAP: Put the wings level
2 h 12 min 59 PF: I'm at the limit of the stick... to the left
CAP: Rudder pedals
2 h 13 min 23 : VS : « Dual input »
(PNF is on the controls, but doesn't take over the controls. ???)

A minute and a half previously he said
2 h 11 min 38 PNF:
Commande à gauche ("Controls to the left")
2 h 13 min 25
PF: What is... how come we're continuing to descend so fast?
***From CVR, it seems that neither the PNF nor Captain responds with "we are stalled." Ouch. :(
2 h 13 min 28
PMF: Try to see what you can do with your controls up there. The primaries etc
2 h 13 min 32
PF: At level 100
2 h 13 min 36
PF: 9000 feet
2 h 13 min 38
CAP: Easy with the rudder {PF Still trying to get the wings level?}
2 h 13 min 39
PNF: Climb climb climb climb (remonte / "climb back up")
2 h 13 min 41 :
VS : « Dual input »
2 h 13 min 43 :
VS : « Dual input »
2 h 13 min 45 :
VS : « Dual input »
2 h 13 min 47 :
VS : « Dual input »
2 h 13 min 40
PF: But I've been pulling to the back stop for a good while
CAP: No no no don't climb back up
PNF: Alors descend
2 h 13 min 45
PNF: So give the me controls. I have control

About two minutes and 20,000 feet (lost) after.. 2 h 11 min 38 PNF: Commande à gauche ("Controls to the left")
(assumes ~ 10,000 fpm decsent average rate ...)

NOTE: If "controls to the left" means at this point in his talking to PF "roll left" then some of my analysis is bogus.
---------------------------------------------------------
@ Owain: Post # 1161, thanks. :)

@T54: I fear you are too close to right, in re psychology. :(

@Gonebutnotforgotten: It seems the BEA are wondering whether reappearances of the FD bars might have had an influence, but if they did, this merely shows how the poor fellow seemed unable to 'look through the bars' to see and assess the underlying attitude.

There may be good explanations for this behaviour, but I am struggling to find them. On the face of it, the question for Air France is whether this skill level is typical (in which case they have a humongous training problem to resolve) or unique to this co-pilot (in which case checking and evaluation needs attention).
I used to hear something about "HUD cripples" who were forced to fly on regular instrument scans ... but won't digress. ;)

@ HarryMann: posts #11778. Thanks, clears up a few things.

takata

1st Aug 2011, 14:27

For anyone: (from the CVR) Does this mean the PNF is taking controls in the left seat, or he wants the PF to roll left?
2 h 11 min 38
PNF: Commande à gauche ("Controls to the left")

The PNF announced to the PF that he was making himself an imput to the left (which can be seen at the same time on the track recorded).
This happened when aircraft departed to the right, despite the PF already applying full stick deflection to the left.

Mimpe

1st Aug 2011, 14:34

PF lost his scan, panicked,overcontrolled and zoom climbed whilst experiencing somatogravic disequilibrium, and it took them more 20,000 feet of confused high AoA stall at massive ROD to get anwhere near "I have the aircraft".

From reading the transcripts, i'd say PNF was their best chance.

Lonewolf_50

1st Aug 2011, 14:40

takata, thanks for that. If the PNF was on the controls at that point, this has me very puzzled.

(IIRC, PNF was senior man in the cockpit before captain returned).

If you have to come onto the controls, to correct a flying issue by the other pilot, the standard CRM I am familiar with is that you make a control change (you take controls) and you fly until it's right.

Not sure what one would find in Air France SOP in that situation.

I just had a weird thought:

The PNF was wondering "why is captain not back in the cockpit?" at some point. Perhaps, on his way back to his rest station, he had to visit the lavatory, and when the recall came he was finishing up the business, or in the middle of it. This might explain "delay in response" that had the PNF concerned ...

takata

1st Aug 2011, 14:52

Hi Lonewolf,
IIRC, PNF was senior man in the cockpit before captain returned.
Well... no!
That's the part missed by almost everybody about "command of the flight" and it is also part of BEA comments (and concerns) about the flight deck management.
In fact, the captain left his command to the PF -the younger F/O. It is the sense of captain question about jr. F/O licence; he is checking if the jr. F/O can take "command" during his rest.
Air France doesn't make any distinction between F/Os seniority (both are presumed competent).
SOP is that the F/O "in command", when captain leaves the FD, should be the one flying: hence here, it is the PF who is in "command", not the PNF. This should be formalized by a captain annoucement about who is taking the command until his return, but there was no such a formal "passassion of command".
Air France changed that after AF 447. Today, the pilot "in command of the flight" would be the F/O PNF in left seat.
But it was not the case at this time.

gpc62

1st Aug 2011, 15:09

To repeat my dumb question (possibly overlooked because of the delay before my post with the CVR + VS (http://www.pprune.org/6610403-post1158.html) appeared)...

From page 99 of the report in French (http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3/pdf/f-cp090601e3.pdf),

2 h 12 min 16
Le pilote en place OPL prend la priorité.

2 h 12 min 17
VS: « Priority right »

According to the key on page 89, "OPL" is the PF:
Copilote en place droite (PF) pilotant avec le manche OPL

Was the "PF" (sitting in place OPL) not actually the one with "la priorité" up until that moment??

takata

1st Aug 2011, 15:18

I just had a weird thought:

The PNF was wondering "why is captain not back in the cockpit?" at some point. Perhaps, on his way back to his rest station, he had to visit the lavatory, and when the recall came he was finishing up the business, or in the middle of it. This might explain "delay in response" that had the PNF concerned ...
This is based on something said by the PNF, I presume. But it is not the meaning I understood myself from the context:
- 2 h 11 min 06 : (…) il vient ou pas
The French pronom "il" is undefined, it may be related to something or someone. But all the discussion between pilots is about aircraft control up to this point and after this point. PNF wanted the PF to control his pitch during the climb. It is obvious that he is irritated by PF way of flying and slow corrections. PNF is very authoritative and PF seems quite stubborn.

So, I would interpret this sentence related to aircraft control, not to the captain: it sounds like an exprimed PNF concern about aircraft response time to imputs from the PF:
- have you got a response or not? (implying: I'm asking you to correct your pitch for a while but I can't see that we are going down)

Diversification

1st Aug 2011, 15:23

I have now read many statements that the correct action should have been "pitch and power" at cruise level. If this is really true can any of the knowledgeable posters explain to me why autopilot disconnect was so urgent when speeds started to become strange. Could it not have continued on by simply keeping pitch and power with some noisy kind of alarm to the pilots. They could then have chosen to keep it on or disconnect it at once. The same might be valid for the flight law change.
I am not a pilot so I am looking forward to good arguments from some of you

Mr Optimistic

1st Aug 2011, 15:39

CAP: Là je sais pas là ça descend
I don't know we're going down

This was in reply to a question as to what should be done. Is the Captain's reply to be taken as 'I don't know why we are descending' ie that he accepted they were but couldn't figure out why - if so, not very encouraging to the PF, or that he didn't believe that they were descending ?

Lonewolf_50

1st Aug 2011, 15:43

takata, thanks, to put it in words that make sense to me:

Even though in the "Captain's seat" (left), the PNF (who also has more time in this model of aircraft) is not the acting Captain (aircraft commander) for that leg. He is by role definition the co-pilot. This goes a long way to explain some of why he was trying to talk the PF back into level flight.

Does that fit what you said, or have I misunderstood you again?

This whole time, since the first discussion of CVR release, I have been under the impression that the PF (at A/P disconnect) was in the Right Hand Seat.

Is that incorrect?

Secondly, since this crash, AF has since changed policy so that the senior man on the flight deck is indeed the senior man on the flight deck.

Right?

RetiredF4

1st Aug 2011, 16:05

DozyWannabe
@jcjeant - Nothing to do with any "protections" as such, travel limiters on hydraulic surfaces have been around for donkey's years (you don't want the same input:deflection ratio at cruise as you do at takeoff or on approach!). It looks to me like the limiters were functioning as they should have been - restricting surface travel while apparently in stable cruise phase and giving maximum authority when things started to go pear-shaped.

i had asked that question at least two times before, and your answer motivates me to try it a third time:

If the SS input to the flightcontrols, in this case to the elevators (and the THS???) is modulated according to speed, what speed source is used and is that a gradual change or a change of lets say 2 or three different datum values?

I think this question is very important, as we see a drastic drop of IAS after AP dropout while PF was (mis)handling the SS. If this new "false speed" changed the modulation of the SS input to the extreme low speed regime (wich at that time was not cosistant with the real speed), then the SS inputs of the PF would suddenly cause much greater flightcontrol deflections than moments before. It would explain part of the initial SS control problems and if THS travel is speed dependent as well we should look into THS travel to NU in relation to later (when speeds where valid again)THS travel ND also.

GarageYears

1st Aug 2011, 16:07

Bear:

PF was in the RHS.

As for law:

2 h 10 min 22
PNF: Alternate law protections
Alternate law protections

Is clearly stated.

Where do you get the idea that the FCS will "sort out" stick commands for best Flight Path? (NORMAL?)

That hardly includes waving the SS around in more or less the direction thought to be about right and have the "magic" figure out how to fly the airplane. You can go and read how Normal Law works.

Yet again I feel you are just throwing poop out there. The difference between considered opinion, extrapolated from the facts we have, and some of the imaginings you have blessed us with over the weeks is a large void. I am all for free thinking, but ever since you pestered all and sundry with your assertions of V/S loss in-flight things really haven't panned out for all your musings...

hetfield

1st Aug 2011, 16:11

From 318 to 380, Airbus is doomed to the technology it has imposed to all - Very early on, common sense complains were formulated though.

Never, ever, BEA would address such topic.
Only AAIB has openly commented on it. Sad but true.
:ok:

takata

1st Aug 2011, 16:17

Even though in the "Captain's seat" (left), the PNF (who also has more time in this model of aircraft) is not the acting Captain (aircraft commander) for that leg. He is by role definition the co-pilot. This goes a long way to explain some of why he was trying to talk the PF back into level flight.
Does that fit what you said, or have I misunderstood you again?
Well, concerning F/Os, they were both "co-pilots" for this leg. The one really acting as "co-pilot" during this leg was in fact the junior F/O, simply because he was the PF all along from take-off under captain command. At one point, captain ask him if he wants to take a rest, as he seems to be concerned by F/O long duty time. His answer was : "No, I don't feel tired".
When captain leaves, he could have picked the other F/O as "aircraft commander", but he didn't. He implicitely confirmed that "aircraft command" was on the hand of the PF.
I don't know the history of this crew. Was it usually composed of Captain + senior F/O? All we know is that the junior one was comming back from holiday. He certainly did not fly the previous leg with the same captain, but nothing says that the other F/O was also part of his usual crew.

This whole time, since the first discussion of CVR release, I have been under the impression that the PF (at A/P disconnect) was in the Right Hand Seat.
Is that incorrect?
Right, that's the only thing we knew for sure (we were guessing about who was flying, not from where). Now, we know also who was the PF, on the right hand seat.

Secondly, since this crash, AF has since changed policy so that the senior man on the flight deck is indeed the senior man on the flight deck.
Right?
It's not about seniority. Any F/O is still considered to be a possible choice for captain to pick for his replacement (should be determined pre-flight). It's about training for F/Os to perform the task as newly defined:
- Acting aircraft commander, PNF, left hand seat.
- PF, right hand seat.

TyroPicard

1st Aug 2011, 16:23

I think readers may find this significant...assuming my translation is correct from Page 78 of the report.

L’altitude maximale d’environ 38 000 ft a été atteinte à 2 h 11 min 10.
The maximum altitude of about 38,000ft was reached at 2 h 11 min 10.

Peu après 2 h 11 min 30, le PF dit deux fois qu’il a perdu le contrôle de l’avion.
Shortly after 2 h 11 min 30, the PF stated twice that he had lost control of the aircraft.

A 2 h 11 min 37, le PNF dit « commandes à gauche », prend la priorité et donne une action
brève en butée à gauche ; le PF reprend presque immédiatement la priorité sans aucune
annonce et continue à piloter.
At 2 h 11 min 37, the PNF said "controls to the left", took Priority, and give a brief control input left (?to the stop?)(en butee); almost immediately the PF took Priority back without any announcement and continued flying the a/c.

Technical note.. Airbus sidesticks have a "Takeover button" which when pressed disables the other sidestick. This is known as "Priority Left or Right". There are technical complexities but the important message is ...

RHS: I have lost control
LHS: OK I'll fly it
RHS: No I'll fly it anyway.......

vanHorck

1st Aug 2011, 16:28

CAP: "Là je sais pas là ça descend"

in no way is this one single sentence. I was raised partly in French, the second "là" is out of place within one sentence. It suggests a second sentence, therefore:

Là je sais pas. Là ça descend

or to put it differently:

Là je sais pas .............. Là ça descend

Whatever the conclusion is, this sentence is crucial alongside the decisions or not of the PNF or the CDB (not) to take control

Mr Optimistic

1st Aug 2011, 16:28

Any particular significance to AoA sensor #1 consistently reading low ?

bearfoil

1st Aug 2011, 16:36

Garage Years

Do you have access to the traces of the autopilot's inputs prior to its loss to the crew? Just a question. (A comparison, an overlay, might help give some scale to PF's inputs?)

Is there a slight possibility that the PF may have been reacting to airframe positions, including ones he had created?

Mr. Optimistic

Could the Pitot #1 (Captain's) have been inop for the duration? If so, why?

TyroPicard

If so, then there is friction, perhaps fatal friction, in the cockpit? PNF's call for Captain's return, was that a call for his Authority as well as his skill? Was PNF too timid to overrule the PF? (perhaps?).......

jcjeant

1st Aug 2011, 16:51

Hi,

takata
It is obvious that he is irritated by PF way of flying and slow corrections. PNF is very authoritative and PF seems quite stubborn.
So, I would interpret this sentence related to aircraft control, not to the captain: it sounds like an exprimed PNF concern about aircraft response time to imputs from the PF:
- have you got a response or not? (implying: I'm asking you to correct your pitch for a while but I can't see that we are going down) And why he can't be irritated cause the captain not come more quickly on the flight deck ?
He make not one .. but some calls .. so this show his impatience for see the captain on the flight deck
We can argue for years only on those words .. but I think it's not significant words for the main event ...

jcjeant

1st Aug 2011, 16:54

Hi,

Garage Years

Do you have access to the traces of the autopilot's inputs prior to its loss to the crew? Just a question. (A comparison, an overlay, might help give some scale to PF's inputs?)AFAIK .. you can see the AP commands in the graphics in the report N°3 (longitudinal and lateral axis commands and surfaces controls responses are shown)
The graphics timeline begin before the AP tell goodbye

ChristiaanJ

1st Aug 2011, 16:56

CAP: Là je sais pas là ça descend
I don't know we're going downA bit of punctuation in the BEA report would have helped, but I'm aware that's difficult to clearly define from a colloquial discussion on a CVR tape...

"Là je sais pas. Là, ça descend"
Expanded and interpreted: "From what I see, I don't know. As far as I can see, we're going down."

"Là je sais pas là. Ça descend"
Expanded and interpreted: "There I haven't got a clue" (repeating the first "là" to stress it). "But we're going down".

Just putting a comma or caps would have made the intonation and meaning clearer.

And literally of course "ça descend" = "it's going down", which can refer to a lot of things, even instrument indications.

This was in reply to a question as to what should be done. Is the Captain's reply to be taken as 'I don't know why we are descending' ie that he accepted they were but couldn't figure out why - if so, not very encouraging to the PF, or that he didn't believe that they were descending ?I doubt we, as outsiders, will ever get to hear the original tape.

And I would expect even the BEA is still battling today to match up the real meaning of those CVR 'cockpit voice messages' with what they think the pilots were seeing.

Only a detail, but IMHO maybe in a full transcript, expletives should not be deleted..... They often indicate a state of mind, or fury, or bafflement, or a first reaction to a totally unexpected event. And the exact intonation often speaks volumes....

For the francophones among here, I'm just thinking of the difference between the short-and-sharp "merde" (as when burning your fingers on the stove) and the long-and-slow "ohhh meeerrrddde" (when the soufflé coming out of the oven has totally collapsed).
I expect my anglophone friends can come up with exactly similar examples.

I gather in the current BEA CVR transcript, expletives have already been deleted. Too bad.

DozyWannabe

1st Aug 2011, 16:56

My point in response to Dozy had to do with his FALSE statement that there was nothing wrong with the aircraft. YES, there was, the pitot tubes iced up, and that is a fundamental system for any aircraft in flight.

Hi LW_50,

I'd been meaning to ask you about that as it happens, because that's exactly what I said!

Aside from the pitots, nothing was wrong with that aircraft.

Did you read 'pitots' as 'pilots'? (In any case it's my fault for using 'pitots' as a contraction of 'pitot tubes')

airtren

1st Aug 2011, 17:03

First, for what is worth: the French pronouns ("prenomes"), like the nouns they replace, have in French two genres: masculine, or feminine. "il' is the masculine form, so it would translate into the English "he" for a person, or "it" for an object or animal.

In this case, I have NO doubts, that the PNF's ""il vient ou pas" - "is he coming or not?" is "Lonewoolf_50's" interpretation, in terms of referring to the Captain.

Indeed, it seem to show the frustration in regards to the PFs actions, but also with his limitations as well in changing the situation, without the Captain's presence

But, it's quite a long stretch to say that he refers to the "a/c controls response", instead of the Captain. That's something a non fluent French speaker would not know.

The "il descend ou non?" would be first on the list, with others as well, while, "il viens ou non?" would not even be on the list, not only in terms of meaning, but also in the context of an emergency call placed shortly before with the Captain, and in the context of using "descend/monte" relative to the "a/c" and PF actions shortly before.

airtren

I just had a weird thought:

The PNF was wondering "why is captain not back in the cockpit?" at some point. Perhaps, on his way back to his rest station, he had to visit the lavatory, ...

This is based on something said by the PNF, I presume. But it is not the meaning I understood myself from the context:
- 2 h 11 min 06 : (…) il vient ou pas
The French pronom "il" is undefined, it may be related to something or someone. But all the discussion between pilots is about aircraft control up to this point and after this point. PNF wanted the PF to control his pitch during the climb. It is obvious that he is irritated by PF way of flying and slow corrections. PNF is very authoritative and PF seems quite stubborn.

So, I would interpret this sentence related to aircraft control, not to the captain: it sounds like an exprimed PNF concern about aircraft response time to imputs from the PF:
- have you got a response or not? (implying: I'm asking you to correct your pitch for a while but I can't see that we are going down)