AF 447 Thread No. 5

[CONF iture]

Second, why the pitch-up? I think the answer will be straightforward, not complex at all.
Maybe the PF just applied a bit generously the Airbus recommended procedure for UAS ...
But I think svarin is really on something ... Of course I don't expect the BEA to 'study' in that direction.

Full data to the victim's families - Make sure no data are left behind.

[airtren]

Hello jd_ee

You've been quite a prolific poster today.

Your reply has triggered more thoughts, and comments here:

Airtren, IMAO the plane's software declares stalls inappropriately.

The problem with the Stall Warning, which I've already mentioned, can be split, IMO, in two parts, each part being a problem on its own.

These may not look as problems to those people that are inside the box, engineers or pilots that were educated/trained to accept the SW, think of it, use/operate with it, as it is.

From outside of the box though, the Stall Warning looks unreliable, and incomplete, to say the least.

First it is the limited number of parameters used for calculation and triggering the Stall Warning, and the high risk of having major parameters, and thus the calculations invalided by adverse weather, inducing a total failure of the Stall Warning.

Second is the single Stall Warning message in itself.

There seem to be 3 types of distinct Stall related situations.

1. Entry/approach to Stall (transition from NON STALL to STALL, or entering the Stall ZONE)
2. Stall per see (Stall, or Stable STALL, or in the middle of Stall Zone)
3. Exit Stall. (transition from STALL to NON STALL, or exiting the Stall Zone)

The current one Stall Warning message seem to be designed to apply for both situation #1 and #2, but not for situation #3.

In the case of AF 447, the Stall Warning didn't work for any of the situations it was designed for, which is #1, and #2, but it was triggered for situation #3, in which case its interpretation as #1, or #2 was misleading, making the PF think that his actions were wrong, inducing a Stall, when in fact, his actions were in the right direction.

So:

The first problem can be addressed, by extending the number of parameters/sensors, with parameters/sensors that cannot fail, and become invalid at the same time with the others, under the same conditions, so to reduce the risk of failure, and increase redundancy. This also implies a change of the algorithms, and perhaps have several parallel ones, for calculating the Stall conditions.

The second problem, is ideally resolved by adding two more Stall messages, and creating a distinction, so there would be one message for each of the 3 situations, which would make each of them clear, and unambiguous.

1. Warning!!! A/C Entering Stall
2. Emergency!!! A/C is in Stall
3. Information!!! A/C Exiting Stall


What I really want to know is WHY the PF might have might have made this apparently inappropriate action.

….Once PF had the plane at 16 degrees pitch and an AoA of 60 degrees I am reasonably convinced it was all over. There was not enough altitude to get the plane back into a flight configuration based on the NASA curves posted here in the past.

… PF needed something to beat into his brain (a physical slap in the face?) to convince him he was stalled.



Based on the division of the time from the AF 447 A/P and A/THR disconnect to the final impact to the Ocean, in two major steps:

1. Transition from Normal to STALL.
2. Attempts to exit Stall, and return to Normal.

On Step 1, based on the current BEA report, I perceive a confluence of causes.

IMO, a PF/PNF failure alone cannot stand, as it has immediately great, and grave implications on Air France, as well as the industry. The Captain and two pilots were employed, were trained, were accredited, and they were tasked to fly the plane by Air France according to its standards, Airbus, and the industry's international standards.


The second step, is not easier to judge. But among all of the failures, one of its contributors is the Stall Warning, i.e. not having it when it was needed, and then having it at the wrong time, with the wrong meaning for the actions of the PF at the time.



Would have been possible to get out of the Stall?

I think there was a chance.

There are two cases of Stalls and successful recovery that come to mind, with no passenger injury, or plane damage, albeit not A330, but rather A310 – Interflug, approaching Sheremetievo, Moscow, in 1991, and Tarom approaching Orly, Paris in 1994.

I consider them relevant, as 310 is still part of the 300 family, and would expect a number of similarities in their aerodynamic attributes.



The captain and pilots on the Tarom Airbus 310 approaching Orly, Paris, France in 1994, realized the problem they were getting into very early, before the stall, and worked very hard, and were very quick to bring the plane out at 800ft above ground, from the Stall at 4100 ft, 30 knots airspeed, and 60 degree pitch attitude. So, it was possible within 3300ft.



Considering that the AF 447 had its highest stall point at 38000 ft (33000ft more than 4100ft, which is also about 9 times more) , somewhere around 185 knots airspeed (155knots more than the 30knost), and 16 degree pitch (a lot more than the 60), I think that with appropriate awareness – which a correct Stall Warning would have helped - and quick, aggressive actions, the plane would have had hope and chance to recover.

[gums]

There is no big deal using the side stick.

A few thousand, well maybe hundreds, of pilots have flown the Viper since the mid 70's. Our ops chief demanded we all have one ride in the back seat of the family model to check out the stick. That requirement went away after about 6 months or less. I flew an old pilot ( hadn't flown in ten years or so) one day, and it took him all of ten seconds to get the "feel" of it.

The 'bus stick moves, and ours didn't/doesn't. Personally, and having flown PC sims and real aircraft sims, I prefer a stick that uses pressure more than actual movement.

As with the 'bus, the Viper stick is "canted" to help minimize roll inputs with pitch inputs and vice versa. Both jets' computers revert to trimmed gee and zero roll rate if you just let go of the stick. That's gear up, for the most part. Ours had a healthy AoA and pitch rate input with gear down, making the thing seem more like the "old" jets.

So I am not gonna blame the side stick for any contribution to this accident.

[Machinbird]

So I am not gonna blame the side stick for any contribution to this accident.Hi Gums, I plan on looking at the control input traces, looking for synchronization between lateral inputs and nose up inputs. If so, wouldn't that infer cross channel inputs?

My understanding of the Friday BEA report is that it will be an interim report that will provide (almost) full presentation of the raw data, and early factual conclusions.
I expect they will then kick the can around for a year or so in the process of writing the final report and trying to make sense of that which is presently illogical data from their analysis. Is this a realistic assessment?:confused: If so, there will be plenty to chat about and analyze for the next year.

[DozyWannabe]

But I think svarin is really on something ...

Be honest CONF, is it that you *think* he's on to something, or is it that you *want* him to be on to something, given a track record of wanting a smoking gun to stick it to Airbus for over two decades?

Of course I don't expect the BEA to 'study' in that direction.

Why not? Accident and incident investigations have discovered problems with Airbus software which Airbus have gone on to fix several times in the past.

IMO, a PF/PNF failure alone cannot stand, as it has immediately great, and grave implications on Air France, as well as the industry. The Captain and two pilots were employed, were trained, were accredited, and they were tasked to fly the plane by Air France according to its standards, Airbus, and the industry's international standards.

The Dutch investigators thought very much the same way after the Tenerife disaster in 1977. It was a painful thing to accept, but by and large it is accepted today. That said, AF447 can never be put down to human factors alone because of the known pre-existing issue with the Thales AA pitot tubes fitted to that particular airframe.

[rudderrudderrat]

What I really want to know is WHY the PF might have might have made this apparently inappropriate action. If he was still thinking he clearly thought it was the right thing to do. Once PF had the plane at 16 degrees pitch and.....
I don't think the pilot was able to think clearly, being overloaded with unreliable airspeed, ECAM Dings, ALT LAW, etc. I suspect that once he selected TOGA power, he simply went for an inappropriate combination of power and attitude with which he was familiar:
UAS: TOGA/15 degs pitch. ...................Cl/5 degs above FL 100
Wind Shear: TOGA/17.5 degs pitch.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

My understanding of the Friday BEA report is that it will be an interim report that will provide (almost) full presentation of the raw data, and early factual conclusions.
I expect they will then kick the can around for a year or so in the process of writing the final report and trying to make sense of that which is presently illogical data from their analysis. Is this a realistic assessment? If so, there will be plenty to chat about and analyze for the next year. Indeed .. there will certainly be a matter for debate that I hope it will be contradictory and impartial.
For my part I'm not expecting much more of this new interim report ...
Nothing more than we already know .. according to the 2 other reports and the last note of the BEA
More .. I'm not 100% sure of the integrity and independence of BEA from the other actors implicated ...
How to be confident in an organization whose members are at the origin of repeated leaks to the benefit of the press
How can you trust when you know that the parent organization of BEA (the French state) gives the findings of an investigation not even finished (Secretary Ministry of Transport Mariani which states that pilots are responsible for 95%)

[DJ77]

I concur with Gums that it would be easy to duplicate this scenario.
I understand Gums' proposed scenario was to try to confuse the confusers, specifically the AoA protection (normal law, correct speed data) as he did with the Viper. Apparently not directly related to AF447 but there may be a subtle link.

[grity]

gums As with the 'bus, the Viper stick is "canted" to help minimize roll inputs with pitch inputs and vice versahi gums, exist a stick for left-handet pilots in the viper?

i trying to creat this post with my left hand........ it is horrible for the brain using the mouse with lefthand push the button with the third finger

how fast can an airbuspilot chang his hand-skills for the stick if he change the seat from right to leftside?

[JD-EE]

EMIT, I'd call the two modes of thought for joysticks as "attitude" and "motion".

Traditional sticks in aircraft control attitude. The image in your head could be a model of the aircraft on top of the stick handle. Push is nose down.

Computer "mouse" joysticks think position and translate that diddle stick I mentioned down to a horizontal platform. Push is "go up" as opposed to "pitch down".

I'm still vaguely wondering what it would take to get an even moderately experienced pilot to mentally switch modes of thought from "change the attitude this way" to "Dangitall I'm telling you to go up! Please go up!" I can't see what would do it. It'd be an interesting thing for some college psychology type to study for his thesis, I suspect. I can't shake that image in my head of the pilot pulling the stick to go down rather than pushing it to pitch nose down and being confused further when the plane did the wrong thing. And once a simple mistake is made it's quite natural for people under stress to keep repeating the same mistake over and over thinking they just didn't do it hard enough. ("This time, Rocky, for sure!")

[RetiredF4]

A mixup (PF wants to push and pulls instead) is out of the world.

During my instructing air combat maneuvers in the F4 it never was very difficult to get the students to pull on the stick hard enough, but it was work to prevent him to exceed the allowed g-limit.
On the other hand it was hard work to train the students an effective extension maneuver with close to zero G. At the beginning most just relaxed back stick somewhat and felt unloaded with still 1.5 G on the frame or thaught they had a good unloading maneuver going with 3/4 G.

Same for the duration of the maneuver. Whilst students pulled all the way into the buffet and staying there all day until speed was gone, i never ever had to tell one to terminate his unloading maneuver. Those where most times too short and therefore not effective enough. We taught to unload for 5 seconds, most ended after 2 seconds.

Situation as described above where agrevated by a nose high position, where a hard pull disipated more speed rapidly and the unload had to be way longer until the nose was below the horizon.

It is natural behaviour to pull more and longer than needed and not to push hard and long enough to get a desired unload of the AC, at least in fast flying jets.

How often does an air transport pilot push (not relax) on the SS and feel less than 1 G? And how often in an unplanned situation under stress?

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi franzl,

Thanks. Very interesting comments regarding pilot sensed g's.
How often does an air transport pilot push (not relax) on the SS and feel less than 1 G? - Never in the simulator, where he did his approach to the stall training.

In the simulator, apart from mild turbulence, there is no sensation of vertical acceleration (motion legs only have about 3 m of travel). I have witnessed over controlling during TCAS events due to the lack of the sensation of delta g. The "sinking feeling" on entry to the stall would be something the pilot had never experienced on type or in the sim.

[andianjul]

Hi JD-EE
I was fortunate to spend a year working in a college near Buffalo, NY. One of the professors there was a proficient touch-typist in both QWERTY (his laptop PC) and DVORAK (his desktop PC). All he had to do was to hit an 'alt+key' sequence to switch between the two modes and start typing. Hence, I don't think a pilot is going to confuse his side stick with his track point. That said, however, I am concerned about the switch from the LHS seat to the RHS seat. What amount of 'hand flying' experience are the pilots given in each seat?

[Mr Optimistic]

Sensed motion. Presumably the initial falling sensation could have been misinterpreted as turbulence, after that once at terminal velocity they would sense near enough 1 g wouldn't they ?

[HarryMann]

JD-EE
The same way a tacking sailboat can go faster than the wind. If you hit the wind at the right angle with an airfoil you can acquire energy from the wind. Of course, the sailboat has its keel to make this effect more pronounced. That allows its crumby airfoil called a sail to work. The sailplane has only its mass to provide the effect.This is nothing to do with circling (thermalling) in a steady moving air mass (which was the question).

It seems to approximate a description of dynamic soaring through an altitude range with a wind gradient i.e. the flight of the Albatross (which wasn't the question)

=== Retired F4 ===

A useful observation (about low to zero 'g' sensations) I think. I also think there is no chance the pilot got his 'ups & downs' & 'push & pulls' wrong - if he did there is one massive question to be raised over the whole airline industry for years to come :ugh:

This is exactly the situation with weight control Vs aerod control (bar Vs stick) aircraft.. one pushes, the other pulls for the same effect.
I found when teaching some stick-centric pilots would get it wrong... whereas I never could imagine a situaton, in an aircraft or on a computer sim of getting it wrong, despite flying h/gs and powered h/gs lot, despite initially flying with a stick (from age 16) how could one not make that switch immeditaely and correctly... ? Proviso, as long as one kept a picture in your minds eye.. so are we saying there may be people flying by rote, like learning things parrot fashion instead of understanding the basics and working up from there, the exam tick box generation OMG

No, that has to be ruled out, PF meant NU, UP, CLB, SLOWER or he had already given up focusing on the task of speed & pitch stabilisation by then.


As RetiredF4 suggests between the lines, unless you have been in a stall and been taken through the ND inputs, wait for pitch and speed to come back, steady (constant 'g' if poss) recovery and pullout etc THEN I suppose, how would you know what was required, or indeed, how long it might take.. :hmm:
IMHO - It is unonscionable that pilots have not acquired high manual handling skills in conventionally controlled aircraft before being accepted for Commercial Flying of almost any nature.
Fiddling with the stick for a few seconds to see what happens with the stall warning, if that is what we think may have happened, is the sign of trainee, not an experienced airline pilot

I am not suggesting PF nor PNF had or hadn't those skills

[Linktrained]

andianjul

From the responses that I have had, so far, " not if I can avoid it."
Some earlier generation training aircraft had the throttle in the left and stick in the right hand - others had their hands and controls the opposite way round. I do not recall that it was a problem. Some of the transport aircraft had nose wheel steering from the Left seat, others had auto-pilot controls out-board of the Left seat. Whichever pilot whose " leg" this was, would sit in the left seat. Until, in the UK in the mid sixties, we became "seat-rated". Training Captains and few Senior F/Os, who could act as Second Captains were allowed to sit in either seat, checked on alternate Base Checks. Flying with a very Senior Captain ( non Training) who was operating from the Right hand seat, I asked him if he was Right hand seat qualified. I knew that he was not.
He told me to B#### - Off. ( Should I take offence, NOW ?)

Having had to do my hour at a time hand flying, because the A/P seldom worked on some of the aircraft that I flew in the fifties, I still tended to hand fly to F/L10.0 when not too busy. Approaches were all manual, except for just two in very clear conditions - the aircraft only had a single channel. ( A " Practice Emergency G.C.A.", down to touch-down, whenever practicable would be good for all of us.)

[PJ2]

JD-EE;

The sidestick position symbol is only displayed on the PFD during takeoff.

I know about the small "stick" in the middle of a laptop keyboard - I think the HP has the same arrangement.

I think there is no connection between the way another control device might work and either the yoke or a sidestick in terms of muscular or cognitive habit which would confuse or alter a psychomotor response, even under stress.

If anything, the response would more likely be exaggerated, but in the correct direction. In fact I have always thought that that's where the initial two stall warnings came from right after the AP disconnect...a strong, quick pull on the stick, followed by a relaxation, (unloading, to use Retired F4's term). The continued aft stick after the stall entry is another matter I think. One considers the Airborne Express DC8 accident when thinking about this. (That said, we will never know why the Colgan captain pulled instead of pushed the stick; the explanation has usually been the notion that on that particular design, the T-tail can stall in icing, (several (NASA?) videos were referenced) and the unloading of the tail (stalled tail) would pitch the nose down. The response was to pull back, (not sure why, if the tail was "stalled" but there it was)).

I've flown in both seats while teaching and there is a difference when switching sides if one doesn't do it often. We've had the discussion about who was sitting where and why, (who replaces captain, licensing issues, First BEA Report, etc).

While possible, I don't think that played a decisive (primary) role here. But because sitting in one's familiar physical place does have a psychological and even physiological effect, (IOW, it does make a difference), I think the question of who was sitting where is still important for secondary, cognitive reasons. When one is not in one's normal seat, one needs to intellectualize responses somewhat, (think about the hand's position when reaching for a switch on the overhead panel, etc etc), rather than operating out of pure habit.

The poster who worked the mouse and typed with opposite hands makes an interesting point. There may be some minor similarities between this example and cockpit psychomotor skill but I think that that example doesn't fully translate in terms of analyzing or fully explaining cockpit behaviours. It doesn't take into account thorough training and the establishing of behaviour through long and frequent repetition both of which greatly reduce the effects of high stress and not being in one's familiar place.

That isn't meant to dismiss the effect; there is the need to examine it. My view has always been, the loss of airspeed information wasn't itself an emergency but it quickly turned into one due to the pitch up and we need to know why that happened. Large physiological responses are natural when under stress; is that what happened here? Perhaps the next BEA Report will address this, if so.

Part of the reason training is so thorough and realistic (up to a point, as sims can't reproduce 'g' or aircraft behaviour in unusual attitudes), is to reduce the effect of the sympathetic nervous system "fight or flight" response and provide ways built through habit, of controlling the stress response.

It is known that the stress response has a natural "pace" or curve where heightened senses and acute physiological responses quickly diminish under high, continuous stress. IIRC, the report on the Alaska Airlines MD80 stabilizer jackscrew accident off the California coast near LAX mentioned this. Whether this is a factor here would be something for the final report to comment upon.

To your question, I think an instinctual response which "confused" push and pull is not likely, given the complete/total absence of such a control movement/requirement in all aircraft. In other words, there are no QWERTY and DVORAK aircraft! ;)

kind regards.

[Lonewolf_50]

grity, about that right hand left hand thing you mentioned ...

Ten years ago, I was made aware of the risks of carpal tunnel syndrome.

I use computers a lot.
I am right handed.
I chose to begin to use my mouse left handed. (Still do)

It took very little time to adapt to left hand.

I had decided to play a favorite computer game (about eleven years ago) that I used to play right handed, left handed. It was very mouse intensive. (For those interested, it was a dungeon crawl called Diablo, not a flight sim) I found that while I initially was a bit clumsy, it wasn't long before I was able to run the little computer animation around the screen and activate mouse button commands with little problem.

Due to the set up of power and stick on most planes I flew, I was never able to try and teach my left hand how to fly that way. I did however, get to be good at gently flying with my left hand while writing things down on my knee board (right handed) very early in my flying career.

Put another way, with enough practice, left handed flying seems to be a teachable skill ... but you need to practice it. How much time does one get to do that? I've yet to see any of the SS pilots complain about having to fly left handed on the stick. Is this really a problem? (I taught a number of left handed people how to fly, in the RH stick LH power set up, and they seemed to do just fine). I doubt very much that PNF not taking the controls sooner had anything to do with "I don't fly very well with my left hand" concerns.

PS: I broke my right hand in 2004, punching something (no, not someone). I still had to go to work and type reports. So, I did, with just my left hand, for a few weeks. It didn't take that long to adapt, but it was slower.

Conlcusion? Adaptability seems to me the rule, not the exception.

PS#2: JD-EE.

Helicopter pilots who initially flew the V-22 reported some non-intuitive monkey skill issues with the flight controls of that aircraft. Had a long talk on that score some years ago with a test pilot who had flown with me in another squadron. Bottom line, took a bit of getting used to, but adaptation wasn't major. You can probably do a search for the V-22's teething problems, and maybe using "ergonimics" or "flight control differences" search terms to find some of the articles written about this a couple of decades ago. Might answer your question.

The test pilots at Patuxent River and the Marines in New River did revise twice, at least, the proposed training pipeline mix of rotary wing and fixed wing (from initial training) for their prospective Osprey pilots. The multi-engine training balance was increased on one of those reviews, as they felt the helicopter bit was over emphasized.

I am not sure what they have done since, been some years since I was (tangentially) involved with such programs.

Also worth noting:

The initial flying in a helicopter, if one began in fixed wing, could be confusing since power forward, push with left hand, in a plane is the same as power reduction, push with left hand, in a helicopter.

Howerver, you usually translate into helicopters in a VFR training environment where pull is up and push is down with the left hand. That, and being taught a collective isn't a throttle, doesn't take long to adapt to.

By the time you are in flight above translational lift, or in instrument flight regimes, you have already learned what the push or pull does, and the confusion does not arise. If it had ever been present,,and remained, the instructor would probably suggest you go back to flying fixed wing. :)

[gums]

- We never had a left-handed side stick.
- We never had problems with lefties using a stick mounted just above and to the right of one's right knee

Many of us were worried about our newbies ( Ell Tees right outta pilot training) forgetting how to fly a "real" plane. It didn't happen, and many went to other jets and commercial airliners. The Reserve unit I helped check out had many commercial airline pilots, and they flew the Viper and a host of heavies every week. We always thot the Viper would be the easiest plane for someone to hijack, as the average pinball wizard could simply "point" the thing. I have a feeling that the 'bus is harder to fly than the Viper due to momentum.....

I know my assertion of duplicating the stall entry is brash. However, JD and others have done energy calculations and such that seem to support my assertion of entering a stall before the confusers can react. Unlike the Viper, the 'bus appears to command less than one gee according to pitch. e.g. 30 degree nose up would be a 0.87 gee command ( also commands more than one gee if in a bank). Our little jet used a pilot-commanded gee. So Retired's example of unloading is a good one. Several of our pilots would trim for zero gee before entering a fight. Letting go of the stick resulted in a 'perfect' zero gee "extension" to gain energy. Conversely, at extreme pitch attitudes and a one gee trim, the jet would slowly raise the nose to achieve one gee.

The point of "feeling" the reduced gee may play a role here with the pilot back stick input. All the pilots here KNOW, they KNOW that you cannot trust your senses in IFR or even a dark night. So the old saw about pitch and power procedure has legs.

Lastly, most of us with lottsa hours have prolly had a static or pitot failure due to freezing. Easy to recognize and to apply the "power/pitch" law. Some of the new jets don't have pneumatic tubing directly connected to the displays or "meters" - the displays are electronic so the raw air data is converted to electrons along the way. So is it an electronics problem or a real lack of pressure in the tubing? Worse, the confusers use the electronic signals in any FBW system. Our system had separate pneumatic sensor systems - one for the FBW system and the other for navigation and weapon delivery purposes. Our basic airspeed indicator was a steam gauge!!! The HUD and other displays were electronic conversions.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

A useful observation (about low to zero 'g' sensations) I think. I also think there is no chance the pilot got his 'ups & downs' & 'push & pulls' wrong - if he did there is one massive question to be raised over the whole airline industry for years to come

Can the pilot think he was in a inverted flight ? :)

[ChristiaanJ]

Hi,
Can the pilot think he was in a inverted flight ? :)
I haven't been impressed by your earlier posts, but this one takes the biscuit.....
Quite apart from the fact that everything indicates so far that the attitude displays were functional.
"Weird and wonderful" remarks such as yours only "pollute" the discussions.


PS.... in (roughly) -1g inverted flight, he could have been blinded by the sandwich crumbs, dried Brazilian mud, a few pencils and pens, and other extraneous matter, all "rising" from the cockpit floor.
Nice theory, but no sigar.....

[Lonewolf_50]

Not to mention the coffee splashing about, and perhaps even some old cigar butts that had been stashed in some corners ...

[takata]

ADR Single and ADR Dual faults are detected by ADR itself.
A Triple ADR Failure message (ADR 1+2+3 FAULT) only exist if the BUSS option is installed, this is a level 3 (Red & Master Warning).
This Triple ADR monitoring was NOT installed on the A/C.
A local ADR fault without ECAM message doesn't seem logical to ECAM protocol.

1) PROBE-PITOT fault is not the result of this ADRs self-testing (two by two), it is the result of EFCS and AFS functions monitoring their respective CAS imputs. They are working with imputs from all 3 ADRs. CAS was rejected by those functions, triggering the following ACARs sequence by pointing to this PROBE-PITOT fault (total pressure imput).

2) My concern about ADR self-monitoring is to explain why ADR DISAGREE wasn't triggered following the PROBE-PITOT fault even if the three CAS were rejected by those monitoring functions. My explanation is that it was a "triple ADR fault"; hence, it was not detected at internal level. No "outlier" ADR could be rejected, being all erroneous while passing (or failing) the comparative test two-by-two.

This test condition required to reject the first ADR (CAS) is: 16 kt difference during 10 seconds.
It means that ADR 1+2 / ADR 1+3 / ADR 2+3 all passed or failed this test when CAS dropped. Hence, ADR2 was also affected like the two other recored CAS from ADR1 and ADR3; all 3 speeds went down from coherent and valid values to erroneous values:
- passing succesfully the test, hence staying consistent (c)
- failing the test, hence being inconsistent (d).

Example (CAS_1, CAS_2, CAS_3); T_1 = T_0 + 10 seconds:
.... T_0 -> (274, 275, 275) => all valid and coherent values
a).. T_1 -> (61, 275, 275) => ADR_1 ("bad") would be rejected due to ADR 1+2 and ADR 1+3 test.
b).. T_1 -> (61, 275, 77) => ADR_2 ("good") would be rejected due to ADR 1+2 and ADR 2+3 test.
c).. T_1 -> (61, 70, 77) => all values consistents (no fault) but 3 ADR erroneous.
d).. T_1 -> (61, 99, 150) => all values inconsistents (triple fault) and 3 ADR erroneous.

In case of (d), ECAM messages (FLR) are compiled into Current Flight Report (CFR) sent by ACARS when they are linked to the same fault (having the same ATA). The priority would simply be PROBE-PITOT fault over ADR fault during the correlation window.
In this case, ADR 1+2+3, being not displayed (no BUSS), it would nonetheless trigger three ECAMs:
- ADR 1+2
- ADR 1+3
- ADR 2+3


3) FCOM:
"If one ADR is correct but the other two ADRs provide the same erroneous output
or if all three ADRs provide consistent and erroneous data:
The systems will reject the “good” ADR and will continue to operate using the two “bad” ADRs."
Like I said before about this quote, something is obviously missing here:
The system could only reject the "good" ADR in the first case (one is "good", two "bad").
In the second case, the system will continue to operate using the three "bad" ADRs. This should have been added to this sentence. The consequences are the same in both case (erroneous output could be used), but the logic would be restablished.

It should be our case to be considered excepted that CAS was rejected by external monitoring functions => CAS monitoring (EFCS) and ADR monitoring (AFS).

[airtren]

A mixup (PF wants to push and pulls instead) is out of the world.
...
Situation.... agrevated by a nose high position,....

It is natural behaviour to pull more and longer than needed and not to push hard and long enough to get a desired unload of the AC, at least in fast flying jets.

How often does an air transport pilot push (not relax) on the SS and feel less than 1 G? And how often in an unplanned situation under stress?
The combination of Alternate 2, turbulence and ice crystals - likely present - were IMO considerable factors.

The way human (and animal) mechanical and control mechanisms work is that the control is conditioned by feedback coming from the object of the action, from the motion, and the result of the motion.

A simple experiment/example is the opening of an umbrella. If there is no wind, I can open the umbrella with a quick, short action. In wind, I need a stronger, and prolonged opening action, until I defeat the wind's reaction, and see the umbrella opened.

A similar behavior is shown by an experiment with a dog, or cat,, for instance an attempt to pull a toy from my hand. There will be a stronger, and prolonged action of the dog, or cat, if I don't release the toy immediately.

It's clearly a reflex built deeply in our motion control systems.

Back to the A/C, the A/C was in turbulent air, and thus the A/C's response to a certain control, could be delayed by the countering effect of the random direction and force of the turbulent air motion.

Additionally, it was instrument based flying, and the perception of the A/C response was through the instruments. Was that as fast as normal visual perception reflex?

If the PF's first action on the stick encountered such a delayed perception of the A/C response, the natural reflex - referred above - is that the action will be stronger, and prolonged, until the A/C is responding to the stick action.

An additional element, which could amplify the effect of the reflex is how the duration of the action on the stick is translated into the actuating of the control surface action.

Is the excursion/amplitude of the actuating of a control surface proportional to the duration of a certain stick action?

If that's the case, it's clear, that the longer duration, is equivalent to a stronger action on the stick, which adds to the already stronger stick action driven by the reflex.

Deprogramming the reflex mentioned above, and reprogramming the pilot's hand control reflex mechanisms when is at the A/C controls only, requires training, and practice, which may be different from one individual to another.... How stress worked in blurring the new reflex, with the old/natural reflex?

An additional perception factor was the angle of the ice crystals - likely present - hitting the windshield. Where they in an angle giving the perception that the A/C is nose down?

I hope that a transcript of the full cockpit sound recordings will be made available with the next BEA report, along with data from data recordings.

[infrequentflyer789]

Hi,

Can the pilot think he was in a inverted flight ? :)

We'll never know what they thought. Question is could the aircraft, through failure or some human interface factor in design, have convinced them they were inverted.

Very unlikely. As someone kindly pointed out to me a while back when I conjectured that they lost attitude: in the roll axis, control was maintained (albeit with some large excursions possibly due to stall). Without attitude indication at night / in IMC, I don't think they would have have kept wings anywhere near level.

[Annex14]

Just found that attached (link) report on "FlighGlobal" in "Safety" and "Recent Accidents" on the page that opens it says on the right column - "Last AF447 News from the web"
An Airbus Captain’s Take on the Air France Disaster | Autopia | Wired.com (http://www.wired.com/autopia/2011/07/an-airbus-captains-take-on-the-air-france-disaster/)

I think rather interesting to have a statement like this.
Looking foreward to Friday

[takata]

Hi Annex14,
I think rather interesting to have a statement like this.
Until today, there was not a single press article quoting a "real" A330 captain (one being not an anonymous). This one (article) is no exception as I can't believe that a real captain would really know so few about his aircraft.
Hence, interest is very limited.

[Annex14]

takata

correct what you say and I too agree that if someone has to say anything about that accident before the facts become public, he/ she should stand it by name !
Seen al the mess that was published in the past by the media I understand the reluctance to any report that even looks like that "Quality Journalism"

Nevertheless I thought it worth to mention and show the link, but also that - hopefully - the puzzle is layed to a picture on Friday.

[bearfoil]

jcjeant

No. There was no inverted flight. Nor backwards flight, nor spin.

A different look at the descent?

"Mainly Nose UP". Did they know they were Stalled? They did.

Then why the "Mainly Nose UP"? Especially with that rod? 10,000fpm?

The nose never fell below 30degrees NU? YES. BEA say so, and I believe it.

Wait. "Mainly Nose UP" means there were other inputs to the Stick?

Yes, of course. Mainly Nose DOWN. But the Nose? Yes, unable to drop below 30 degrees; less Pitch was UNAVAILABLE.

PITCH was at its lowest with stick back, or stick forward? Stick back.
Every pilot will push the stick to get the Nose down, and if 30 degrees had been the 'lowest' result of stick forward, PF would maintain ND input. Instead, it looks like Stick back was the default (preferred) position. What did the a/c do with ND? Probably go NU? Buffet like she was coming apart? Increase descent?

Guess? Something BAD.

Some possibilities show these guys did everything by the Book. Even the procedure at the STALL Warning. Both of them.

Alarming to me that when presented with a possibility that mitigates the 'PE', or is critical of the 'platform', the popular drift tends to migrate toward the PE.

I predict that with new data, these pilots will be seen in a new light.

[henra]

In case of (d), ECAM messages (FLR) are compiled into Current Flight Report (CFR) sent by ACARS when they are linked to the same fault (having the same ATA). The priority would simply be PROBE-PITOT fault over ADR fault during the correlation window.
In this case, ADR 1+2+3, being not displayed (no BUSS), it would nonetheless trigger three ECAMs:
- ADR 1+2
- ADR 1+3
- ADR 2+3


Wouldn't there have been also ECAM messages in case b) or c) if during the correlation window of 10s the speeds would have fallen more than 30kts (which was very likely the case) ?

[jcjeant]

Hi,

jcjeant,
I haven't been impressed by your earlier posts, but this one takes the biscuit.....
Quite apart from the fact that everything indicates so far that the attitude displays were functional.
"Weird and wonderful" remarks such as yours only "pollute" the discussions.It was just to emphasize that all this discussion about confuse push or pull or the inverse (choice yours) is useless ... as we know (for 99,9999999 % sure) that is not this possible type of error involved in this crash ...
Maybe no "good sens" .. but certainly "humor sens" .
Some seem's to had lost this particular sens :) or the skill to detect it :)

[Neptunus Rex]

Bearfoil

Your input on this subject has been prodigious, however, on your last, I have to disagree. They did very little 'by the book.' Inter alia:

On seeing the UAS prompt, the SOP is to set the pitch attitude to 5 degrees nose up, then consult the QRH for the appropriate pitch and N1 settings for weight and Flight Level. Why the much larger pitch-up and subsequent climb, with its associated loss of energy?

Had they recognised that the aircraft was stalled, the PF should have maintained nose down input on the sidestick, augmented by manual pitch trim.

There was at least one simultaneous sidestick input, which gives the algebraic sum of both inputs, and is completely forbidden. The correct procedure is to announce "I have control" and take control by pressing and holding the red pushbutton on the sidestick.

This is the most perplexing accident I can recall. There seems to have been much confusion over what information was being presented to the crew, versus what was reliable. Let us hope for more answers with the next BEA release.

[Lonewolf_50]

airtrens:

An additional perception factor was the angle of the ice crystals - likely present - hitting the windshield. Where they in an angle giving the perception that the A/C is nose down?
Given that the flight was being counducted in Night, IMC conditions at high altitude, in the clouds ... if they were looking out the window that would be an airmanship problem far more serious that if ice were hitting the windshield. That said, the most likely theory seems to be, at that temp and altitude, ice crystals forming, not ice hitting the aircraft in the form of sleet or hail. From the data so far.

Infrequent:
Without attitude indication at night in IMC, I don't think they would have have kept wings anywhere near level.
Agreed. Easy to lose it, particularly if they were in turbulent air. (Won't digress into how one could finesse a partial panel sort of scan using only heading ... that way lies madness! :eek: )

bear: Some possibilities show these guys did everything by the Book. Even the procedure at the STALL Warning. Both of them.
As Nigel pointed ou, perhaps everything except the pitch and power thing for UAS ... if more CVR info becomes available, we may see how far into that procedure they got/went.

Nigel:
There was at least one simultaneous sidestick input, which gives the algebraic sum of both inputs, and is completely forbidden. The correct procedure is to announce "I have control" and take control by pressing and holding the red pushbutton on the sidestick.
If I remember, this was in the end game, when someone took the controls, perhaps to overcome a losing situation. (Possibly they pushed buttons as the conversation of “your controls” took place.)
Wasn't this about when one pilot said they were hitting ten thousand feet ... absent more CVR info, we don't know all of the communication about controls. The second interim shows me that there was a verbal component to the last (and ultimately futile :{) passing of controls.

[bearfoil]

Neptunus

"On seeing the UAS prompt......." The first input was NU, are you saying that was not an attempt to "SET PITCH" (at 5 degrees)?

"Why the much larger (larger than 5 degrees) PITCH UP?" Beats me, you are saying the "larger PITCH UP" was PF commanded? Not known.

"At STALL, the PF should have maintained ND". Not at all. He is trained to prevent loss of altitude. Cannot do that with maintained ND. The STALL warning is not STALL, something he has never experienced in this a/c.

"augmented by manual nose down trim". NO. They were not in the correct LAW to have been prompted: "Use Manual Trim Only".

"At least one simultaneous side stick input, which is forbidden" You are saying they were not attempting to maximize ss input to be certain they were at maximum deflection (authority)?

Without CVR (further) we cannot eliminate that this dual input was not sussed as a possible remedy for PITCH authority? That it was discussed, and attempted in spite of (horrors) it was forbidden?

[Zorin_75]

"On seeing the UAS prompt......." The first input was NU, are you saying that was not an attempt to "SET PITCH" (at 5 degrees)?
The 5°/CLB thrust... memory items apply if "safe conduct of the flight is affected". Else the procedure is to "level off for troubleshooting".

"At STALL, the PF should have maintained ND". Not at all. He is trained to prevent loss of altitude. Cannot do that with maintained ND. The STALL warning is not STALL, something he has never experienced in this a/c.

I hope they weren't trained for NU inputs, as that obviously doesn't work all that well to prevent loss of altitude... Procedure at that time called for pitch reduction to 5°.

"augmented by manual nose down trim". NO. They were not in the correct LAW to have been prompted: "Use Manual Trim Only".
No, they just were not in a law that left them only manual trim, the wheel was still there to use. But why trim for nose down while pulling up?

[bearfoil]

Zorin

The first input was nose up. You are certain the a/c was not pointed down at this point? A NU input would be an attempt to level, if the a/c was PITCHED NOSE LOW. You also do not know the decision was not made that the safe conduct of the flight was in jeopardy?

This also ennables a further explanation of what occurred next, a lag in a/c response to the NU.

(at STALL)

"PITCH reduction to 5 degrees" . PF may have reduced his back pressure, but been unsuccessful at reducing PITCH. The a/c at STALL WARNING was at 6 degrees PITCH UP, so holding altitude at that attitude would be read by the Computer as a "stick back". Remember, up to this point, He WAS holding NOSE DOWN inputs. (Until STALL WARN).

Lastly "Why trim for NOSE DOWN when inputting NOSE UP"? He was NOT necessarily inputting NOSE UP, he may have been attempting a hold on to the altitude.

Also, he was not looking for TRIM, he was looking for AUTHORITY. He did not know the THS was full UP, and that he desperately needed to move it DOWN.

This is a gripe of mine. At unusual Attitudes (sic), why is the THS allowed to (commanded to?) migrate into a position where, if setting is unknown, it may be causing the problem PF is trying to solve?

[PJ2]

Neptunus Rex;
On seeing the UAS prompt, the SOP is to set the pitch attitude to 5 degrees nose up, then consult the QRH for the appropriate pitch and N1 settings for weight and Flight Level.
We'll soon know more about the pitch-up. I don't think a ND pitch attitude is plausible but given the loss of data there may be a possibility of a small indicated height loss to which the PF may have then responded - we just don't know yet.

However, I don't think any pitch-up is indicated in the memorized items under these conditions, (level cruise flight, aircraft not at risk). Loss of airspeed information is not an emergency nor is the safe conduct of flight impacted so one would go to the next main memory item, "Level off for troubleshooting". As I have said from the start, the first response is to "do nothing" (except ensure the aircraft is under control, then get the QRH out, then communicate with ATC/FA's etc), because both speed and thrust were fine just before the event and, within controllable variations (using attitude information and setting thrust to what it was before the AT disconnected),

From the First BEA Interim Report:

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-GnmPntp/0/M/i-GnmPntp-M.jpg

From an A330 flight crew training manual, (2007):

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-hvNcXRD/0/L/i-hvNcXRD-L.jpg

Because the displayed information may be erroneous, the flying accuracy cannot be assumed. Incorrect transponder altitude reporting could cause confusion. Therefore, a MAYDAY should be declared to advise ATC and other aircraft of the situation.

PART 1: MEMORY ITEMS
If the safe conduct of the flight is affected, the flight crew applies the memory items. They allow "safe flight conditions" to be rapidly established in all flight phases (takeoff, climb, cruise) and aircraft configurations (weight and slats/flaps).The memory items apply more particularly when a failure appears just after takeoff. Once the target pitch attitude and thrust values have been stabilized, as soon as above safe altitude, the flight crew will enter the 2nd part of the QRH procedure, to level off the aircraft and perform trouble shooting. This should not be delayed, since using the memory item parameters for a prolonged period may lead to speed limit exceedance.

PART 2: TROUBLE SHOOTING AND ISOLATION
GENERAL
If the wrong speed or altitude information does not affect the safe conduct of the flight, the crew will not apply the memory items, and will directly enter the part2 of the QRH procedure.

Depending of the cause of the failure, the altitude indication may also be unreliable. There are however, a number of correct indications available to the crew. GPS altitude and ground speed are available on MCDU GPS monitor page and RA may be used at low level.

For faulty ADR(s) identification, the flight crew may, either level off and stabilize the flight using the dedicated table in PART 2, or, if for instance already stabilized in climb, use the CLIMB table given in part 3. The trouble shooting will be more accurate, using the level off table.

LEVEL OFF AND STABILIZATION (IF REQUIRED)
The table gives the proper pitch and thrust values for stabilization in level off according to weight, configuration and altitude.

It must be noticed that, if the altitude information is unreliable, FPV and V/S are also affected. In this case, the GPS altitude, if available, is the only means to confirm when the aircraft is maintaining a level. When reliable, the FPV should be used.

If the memory items have been maintained for a significant period of time, the current speed may be quite above the target

If FPV is reliable, or if GPS altitude information is available:
--Maintain level flight (FPV on the horizon or constant GPS altitude)
--Adjust thrust according to the table
--Observe the resulting pitch attitude, and compare it with the recommended table pitch target.

• If the aircraft pitch to maintain level flight is above the table pitch target, the aircraft is slow, then increase thrust

• If the aircraft pitch to maintain level flight is below the table pitch target, the aircraft is fast, then decrease thrust

When the pitch required to maintain level off gets close to the table pitch target, re-adjust thrust according to table thrust target.

This technique permits to stabilize the speed quickly, without inducing altitude changes. If FPV is not reliable and GPS altitude information is not available (no means to ensure level flight):

Adjust pitch and thrust according to table, and wait for speed stabilization. Expect a significant stabilization time and important altitude variations.

[Lonewolf_50]

... he was not looking for TRIM, he was looking for AUTHORITY. He did not know the THS was full UP, and that he desperately needed to move it DOWN.
We don't know what he knew. Nor what he saw in his field of view.
At unusual Attitudes (sic), why is the THS allowed to (commanded to?) migrate into a position where, if setting is unknown, it may be causing the problem PF is trying to solve?
That's a good question, bear. Here's an idea for you.

The unusual attitudes (UA) law looks to be a form of graceful degradation that is intended to ensure that automatic (robot) inputs no longer contradict a pilot trying to recover from an unusual attitude. (Note, current hints suggest this law state was not active in 447). Mikelour posted a few pages back on some UA scenarios he used to teach in the sim, some of which demonstrated that you needed to remember to get that trim wheel working to get the plane back under your control. (He also caveats that he wasn't sure if it was a "simism" or not).

The design thus (it seem to me) includes the possibility that a haywire robot may contribute to UA. If those out of normal parameters boundaries are reached, robot is told "sit on yer hands, you naughty boy" and the pilot flies as manually as can be in this aircraft, to include trimming the nose with his trim wheel -- he has to, as the robot has been put into the penalty box for a two minute minor. Don't know if there is a flag or alert for UA law that lets the crew know "robot is in the penalty box, you are flying a man down" or not.

I'll hope that Svarin, if he'd like, can pursue further his concerns on unexpected logic failures or failure modes.

Can't wait for the Friday report. Hopefully some of the fog will be burned off.

[infrequentflyer789]

I hope they weren't trained for NU inputs, as that obviously doesn't work all that well to prevent loss of altitude... Procedure at that time called for pitch reduction to 5°.


I think your hope on training is sadly misplaced. See Stop Stalling | Flight Safety Foundation (http://flightsafety.org/aerosafety-world-magazine/april-2011/stop-stalling) [reference posted earlier by others]

It seems approach to stall training (and possibly all stall training) has become "lose altitude and fail check", leading to NU inputs, resulting in stall.

I suspect we will add 447 to the list of crashes quoted by the boeing guy. At least the problem has been recognised and will hopefully now get fixed.

[I'm still interested in what caused the initial climb into the stall though - like Bear says, the seconds either side of A/P disconnect are the key].

[bearfoil]

While I'm waiting for Zorin, I'd like to suggest a possible (sic) explanation for what we know.

I trust the Pilots were doing all they could. I trust they were highly qualified. I trust them easily as much or more than I do an a/c whose bread and butter is autoflight, and not UAS.

After the STALL, and what I take to be a proper and trained PF response, we find that the THS is 'held' in almost maximum NU. For this, the Pilot holds NU, well after his 'recovery' from STALL WARNING. What on Earth causes a Horizontal Stabiliser to be planted almost to the stops NUP, and in a STALL, with an extreme r/o/d?

Let alone a Pilot with full back stick? As I mentioned above, my opinion is NU stick is what gave the PF the best ND response.

Pardon? There is no other explanation except 'He didn't know about the Stall'. What else could this attitude be? Nose in the sky, tail first descent in average 10k fpm? No other attitude explains the basic environment, Panel or NO, Viz or NO, QRH or NO.

ACARS be damned, the trickle of 'data' from BEA aside, I think I know what explains this, if not the climb.

Also the "Duet" on ss at 10k.

[Neptunus Rex]

Bearfoil

"On seeing the UAS prompt......." The first input was NU, are you saying that was not an attempt to "SET PITCH" (at 5 degrees)?No. There could have been significant, and changing, vertical currents affecting the flight.

"Why the much larger (larger than 5 degrees) PITCH UP?" Beats me, you are saying the "larger PITCH UP" was PF commanded? Not known.Same answer as above.

"augmented by manual nose down trim". NO. They were not in the correct LAW to have been prompted: "Use Manual Trim Only".Direct Law will display the Manual Pitch Trim prompt, because that is all that is available. They were in Alternate Law, so both automatic and manual pitch trim were available. Manual pitch trim has priority, and is faster. The system follows up and reverts to automatic when manual is relinquished.

"At least one simultaneous side stick input, which is forbidden" You are saying they were not attempting to maximize ss input to be certain they were at maximum deflection (authority)?The CVR should tell us the answer. However, the commanded inputs were predominantly nose up, which is anomalous, to say the least.

"At STALL, the PF should have maintained ND". Not at all. He is trained to prevent loss of altitude. Cannot do that with maintained ND. The STALL warning is not STALL, something he has never experienced in this a/c.Not so. At "Approach to Stall" the training was to prevent loss of altitude. At "Stall" the technique is to lower the pitch attitude and accept a loss of altitude. Most A330 flights take place in Normal Law, where α Floor will prevent the stall. α Floor is only available in Normal Law, and is triggered when full back stick causes the pitch angle to reach α Prot.

]...something he has never experienced in this a/c.[/B]

Captain Moody (nor anyone else) had never experienced volcanic ash causing all four engines on his B747 to flame out. Captin Sully had never experienced a double engine failure on his A320 at low level; nor had he previous experience of ditching a jet transport. Captain de Crespigny had never experienced an uncontained engine failure causing power loss, substantial airframe damage as well as collateral damage to multiple systems on his A380. Every once in a while, valiant members of our profession become involuntary test pilots. Mercifully, it is very rarely: thankfully, most of them rise to the occasion and become our heroes.

[takata]

In case of (d), ECAM messages (FLR) are compiled into Current Flight Report (CFR) sent by ACARS when they are linked to the same fault (having the same ATA). The priority would simply be PROBE-PITOT fault over ADR fault during the correlation window.
In this case, ADR 1+2+3, being not displayed (no BUSS), it would nonetheless trigger three ECAMs:
- ADR 1+2
- ADR 1+3
- ADR 2+3


Wouldn't there have been also ECAM messages in case b) or c) if during the correlation window of 10s the speeds would have fallen more than 30kts (which was very likely the case) ?

The correlation window that I was talking about is the one lasting 1 minute for PROBE-PITOT 1X2/1X3/2X3 and the four other "FLR" ACARS that were reported during the flight. When a failure (FLR) is detected, independently of what the ECAM is displaying in real time in the cockpit, the Central Maintenance System (CMS) opens a 1 minute window during which all the correlated failures (same ATA) are compiled into the same CFR (Curent Flight Report) and a single ACARS is queued for sending when it is closed - in between, each message header could change during this compilation following a particular logic. The full details about such a failure message are only available by accessing the PFR (post flight report).

This system is for maintenance, not investigation. What really matter is that, at arrival, the maintenance must look at the PITOTs and not waste its time for troubleshooting ADRs or the flight Computers which reported in fact this pitot's failure.

This particular "FLR" ACARS was sourced/correlated with:
- EFCS2 & EFCS1 = Electronic Flight Control System 1 & 2 = Flight Control Data Concentrator (FCDC) 1 & 2
- AFS = Auto Flight System = Fault Isolation and Detection System (FIDS).
Hence, during this minute, those systems could have reported other "FLR" with the same ATA that could have been compiled within this reported ACARS.

The CAS falling suddenly triggered two other CAS monitoring functions different from this ADR self-monitoring discussed here. Beside PROBE-PITOT ECAM, the other Flags and Warnings time stamped 0210 were correlated with this sudden fall of speed, whatever ADR (external) fault was or wasn't reported. The second class 2 "FLR" at 0210 (27-93-34) points at FCPC#2 (PRIM2) OR a connection between FCPC2 and ADR1; BEA correlated also the two Maintenance messages (FCDC1 & FCDC2) to this fault. Maybe we'll got more details from their last findings about system fault logic and cockpit ECAM.

[mm43]

With the ongoing discussion over the what the crew may have heard, seen or felt in the stalled environment, I believe the following should be noted:-


Once stalled the AoA was never less than 35° and finished at 61°
Pitch attitude was 16°NU at stall and at end of flight, though occasionally less
Aerodynamic flow was abnormal/turbulent
Likelihood of rain/hail striking cockpit windows was low
Buffet vibration generated around wings and engine pods complete with noise

http://oi56.tinypic.com/ebeip1.jpg

The overall effect may have been perceived as a Vmo/Mmo event. That of course doesn't explain exactly how the aircraft was delivered into that situation in the first place.

Taking a step back from the UAS upset, it is worthwhile noting that the flight plan provided for a climb to FL370 at SALPU. The forecast OAT at FL350 between ORARO and TASIL was -46°C, but with their weight of 205 tonnes and high OAT, that higher level request wasn't made to ATLANTICO.

"the little bit of turbulence that you just saw
[…] we should find the same ahead […] we’re in the cloud layer unfortunately we can’t climb much
for the moment because the temperature is falling more slowly than forecast"Add ITCZ to the bolded comments above, plus an OAT value probably warmer than forecast, and you have a receipe that should have "rung a few bells" - but it didn't.

In the AF447 Thread on 27 September 2009 I wrote, "Icing that took place was probably 'rapid' as opposed to 'gradual'".

Following the AP/ATHR disconnect, the aircraft entered a "zoom climb". The Stall Warning sounded briefly during the pitch up manuever and some ND inputs were made and attitude was reduced to 7°NU but the AoA was still rising and the SW sounded again. Further NU inputs prevented any normal stall recovery and once the CAS became less than 60KTS the SW stopped.

http://oi52.tinypic.com/2lwap0l.jpg

As I stated over 2000 posts ago, the software needs to be changed to sense both the CAS and AoA direction of change and the effect of NCD values to provide an unambiguous "STALLED!" warning on the PFDs. There should be no need for the "big red button" marked "SOS", because if there is, it is only a cover-up for lack of training and/or understanding by those charged with the safe flight of the aircraft and all those souls onboard.

Also posted many moons ago was a suggestion that once a UAS event at cruise altitude is detected, that the AP/ATHR combo continue in a NORMAL 2 LAW where pitot dynamic/static related inputs are replaced by IRU data and a pseudo CAS is provided to the AP. This will also cover the 300 foot static baro loss often noted in these events, and with due warning to the crew enable them to monitor the situation and oversee that NORMAL 1 LAW is resumed when ADRs are in agreement.

You can, "Lead a horse to water, but you can't ....... "

Notwithstanding, there may also be some underlying physiological related events which will no doubt surface in the Final Report.

[bubbers44]

While we make our final comments before the interim report Friday the 5 degrees nose up and climb power will only work prestall. Once stalled and had a 61 degree angle of attack in the descent at 10,000 fpm descent rate they need at least 30 degrees nose down pitch to recover. The 5 degrees pitch up and climb power wasn't applied when it should before the stall and they went way above that causing a full stall. Hopefully they will tell us Friday how they did this.

[takata]

Hi mm43,
With the ongoing discussion over the what the crew may have heard, seen or felt in the stalled environment, I believe the following should be noted...
I'll add also few additional notes for those who are following this discussion:
When the second stall warnings sounded, at 0210:51 (see mm43 graph):

- @ FL375, aircraft was NOT in "abnormal attitude": pitch (~7°), Alpha (6°) and roll (10/12°) were NOT excessive, airspeed (215 kt) was NOT totally lost.... and THS (3NU) was NOT at maximum (14NU)... and of course, the aircraft was NOT stalled.

Everything seriously wrong started at this point and during the following 10 seconds:
- TOGA was applied (NU limited effect);
- Sustained NU sidestick orders;
- Pitch increasing from 7 to 16°;
- Alpha increasing from 6 to 16°;
- another 500 ft were added, reaching FL380;
- Speed falling from 215 to 185 kt;
- THS starting moving UP, (but reaching 13°NU only one minute LATER = close to the end of mm43 graph)
- The aircraft stalled at the apogee.... while the STALL, STALL warnings sounded at least 40 seconds more during the stall.

[Neptunus Rex]

bubbers 44

Absolutely right. As I said, 5 degrees nose up pitch was the correct response to UAS. Once in the stall, corrective nose down pitch must be applied.

Let's see what Friday brings to help us understand this enigma.

[PJ2]

Neptunus Rex;

According to the A330 flight crew training manual and the UAS drill, a 5° pitch up at cruise altitude is not the correct response to the UAS memory items. The correct response is to maintain level flight and troubleshoot.

PJ2

[bearfoil]

Neptunus Rex

"5 degrees NOSE UP PITCH was the correct response". (To UAS).

Both Zorin and I disagree. Zorin claims it was "LEVEL OFF and troubleshoot". My claim is that with NOSE UP per PF, he could have been trying to do either five degrees NU OR LEVEL OFF, as the siituation demanded.

In Turbulent air (an accepted factor), AutoPilot could have trimmed NOSE DOWN to keep the a/c on altitude (UPDRAFT). We don't know yet the PITCH @ a/p drop. With UPDRAFT, the AoA is increased independent of SA, and depending on energy therein, the NOSE UP would have an additional bias NOSE UP, perhaps adding to the unexpectedly ambitious PITCH UP when the a/c responded?

"Once in the STALL, corrective NOSE DOWN PITCH must be applied."

PF had been applying NOSE DOWN PITCH. At 6 degrees NOSE UP, he heard the STALLSTALL, selected TOGA, and apparently, with back pressure, attempted an escape from the STALLWARNING, as he had been trained.

At this POINT, the STALL WARNING is important, in the sense that had it continued, it is likely the PF may not have sensed the NOSE FALLING, felt or heard buffet, or had other STALLED cues. We don't know except the BEA said the PITCH kept increasing. From here, BEA have no applicable statements except to say the PITCH did not decrease below 16 degrees.

There is no 'STALLED' prompt inSTALLED. :ok:

As before, I am offering possibilities to keep my mind open; if others have witheld judgment, so much the better.

regds

bear

[bubbers44]

I'm waiting patiently. If all it takes is UAS training to keep this from happening again then do the UAS training so even the automatic airplanes can be flown with automation inop with a qualified pilot. I never flew one that the throttles didn't move and you just monitored so feel fortunate.

My J3's and Twin Beeches, Lears, biplanes and Boeings didn't have much of that magic stuff. Had autoland at the end but never did one outside the sim.

I prefer yokes and sticks because you can see what everybody is doing and it feels really good when you hit a bump and if your hand moves an inch or two you are still stable. You don't have to worry about potentiometers and all that electronic magic.

[Shadoko]

Some news?
On a reconstitué l'accident de l'AF447 au simulateur - Le Point (http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/on-a-reconstitue-l-accident-de-l-af447-au-simulateur-27-07-2011-1356922_23.php)
Had they accessed some leaks, or pure journalist assumption?
The time data are strange: Publié le 27/07/2011 à 23:59 - Modifié le 27/07/2011 à 21:15 (French time: UTC+2).
Is it credible one can hear ice coming out Pitots bouncing on cockpit? ("Dans le cockpit, s'ajoute le bruit de la glace se détachant des sondes.": ~ In the cockpit, you have to add the noise of the ice coming apart from Pitots)?

[airtren]

Hello Shadoko,

Thanks for posting.

The article shows a simulation aligned very much with the BEA report we already know well - no new, surprise elements. Which perhaps is an indirect indication of what's coming on Friday....

Turbulence is at a level, where the PNF needs to keep his pointer on the lines of the check-lists he is reading.


Some news?
On a reconstitué l'accident de l'AF447 au simulateur - Le Point (http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/on-a-reconstitue-l-accident-de-l-af447-au-simulateur-27-07-2011-1356922_23.php)
Had they accessed some leaks, or pure journalist assumption?
The time data are strange: Publié le 27/07/2011 à 23:59 - Modifié le 27/07/2011 à 21:15 (French time: UTC+2).
Is it credible one can hear ice coming out Pitots bouncing on cockpit? ("Dans le cockpit, s'ajoute le bruit de la glace se détachant des sondes.": ~ In the cockpit, you have to add the noise of the ice coming apart from Pitots)?

[CONF iture]

According to the A330 flight crew training manual and the UAS drill, a 5° pitch up at cruise altitude is not the correct response to the UAS memory items. The correct response is to maintain level flight and troubleshoot.
PJ2,
The FCTM you quote must be an Airline's customized version ... ?
If so, that Airline did a very good job by stating things clearly, which Airbus has not done yet.
For Airbus, as quoted earlier (http://www.pprune.org/6597470-post730.html) by A33Zab, the correct procedure is to take initially 5 degrees NU + CLB thrust :
The initial pitch attitude and thrust values given in the QRH should be considered as "Memory Items", since they allow "safe flight conditions" to be rapidly established in all flight phases (takeoff, climb, cruise) and aircraft configurations (Weight and slat/flaps).

[CONF iture]

As the messenger for Airbus or BEA as you wish, Le Point (http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/on-a-reconstitue-l-accident-de-l-af447-au-simulateur-27-07-2011-1356922_23.php) a parlé :

L'action du PF à cabrer sur le manche continue, et aura été majoritaire pendant 95 % des quatre minutes.
Les données contenues dans les enregistreurs de vol montrent très précisément comment s'est déroulé le crash de l'AF447, et permettent d'identifier les conséquences de l'action à cabrer du PF.


I prefer yokes and sticks because you can see what everybody is doing
Amen !

Do we have to consider both the PNF could not see what the PF was doing ...

[grity]

mm43 Taking a step back from the UAS upset, it is worthwhile noting that the flight plan provided for a climb to FL370 at SALPU. The forecast OAT at FL350 between ORARO and TASIL was -46°C, but with their weight of 205 tonnes and high OAT, that higher level request wasn't made to ATLANTICO. THX for the THS position in your analysis. at which time did they passed SALUP?

the climb to F370 (without trust correcting) has finished 02:10:40
the following correctionTOGA was also not corrected in his pitchup momentum....

and then a stray purring cat was laying on the stick.......

[PJ2]

CONF iture;

Thanks for responding.

I don't want to put too fine a point on this as it is just one of a number of notions which have been put forward to come to terms with the pitch-up. The drill and checklist are a problem.

The very fact that there is primary disagreement about how to do this checklist is itself, interesting and revealing.

I do see your point of course, but think about it: What pilot is going to pitch an A330 up at 5 degrees at FL350, expecting that the aircraft is not going to climb? The pitch and power settings for an A332 at FL350 at 205T for 260kts is 3.5deg and 70.9% N1. Five degrees is not going to be a runaway climb but it is going to climb.

The early drills and checklist, (2002, 2003) do indeed state that the "Immediate Pitch Attitude and Thrust Guidance" above FL100 is 5deg of pitch and CLB thrust.

The drill and checklist in force at the time of the accident is confusing because it's flow is not clear nor are the priorities for the pilot. I have made the points before that there are several "bifurcations" in the checklist which are difficult and problemmatic to memorize. The FCTM statements, (2007) which I reference state quite clearly that if the flight is not in immediate danger, then the procedure is to level off and troubleshoot.

The rest of the statement which you quoted from A33Zab's original posting reads as follows, (my bolding in the first sentence and after):

"PART 1: MEMORY ITEMS
If the safe conduct of the flight is affected, the flight crew applies the memory items. They allow "safe flight conditions" to be rapidly established in all flight phases (takeoff, climb, cruise) and aircraft configurations (weight and slats/flaps).The memory items apply more particularly when a failure appears just after takeoff. Once the target pitch attitude and thrust values have been stabilized, as soon as above safe altitude, the flight crew will enter the 2nd part of the QRH procedure, to level off the aircraft and perform trouble shooting. This should not be delayed, since using the memory item parameters for a prolonged period may lead to speed limit exceedance.

PART 2: TROUBLE SHOOTING AND ISOLATION
GENERAL
If the wrong speed or altitude information does not affect the safe conduct of the flight, the crew will not apply the memory items, and will directly enter the part2 of the QRH procedure."

Regardless of what Friday's release has to say, this drill and checklist is a problem.

[Zorin_75]

bear,

sorry, us humans need to sleep from time to time.
To cut it short, no, of course I don't know what happened. Still we can assign different levels of probability to the various suggested scenarios. I'm absolutely with you in firmly believing they were trying to do what from their perspective looked like the best chance to get home.

[GarageYears]

Sadoko:
Is it credible one can hear ice coming out Pitots bouncing on cockpit? ("Dans le cockpit, s'ajoute le bruit de la glace se détachant des sondes.": ~ In the cockpit, you have to add the noise of the ice coming apart from Pitots)?

As one who spends his life creating sound simulations for all classes of aircraft (at the highest fidelity Level D for commercial aircraft and equivalently for military sims), I find it almost impossible to believe that anyone could believe such ice shedding would be audible - the location of the pitot tubes themselves and, above all else, the small quantity of ice involved (due to the physical size of the tube) makes this claim extremely unlikely.

As it stands, for the many simulators I have been involved in, ice shedding from propellers, with the ice being flung from the blades and hitting the cabin sides, is about the only sound cue related to icing that I believe might be audible to any cockpit crew.

Given the altitude, true airspeed and the factors mentioned above, I do not believe that ice leaving the pitot tubes would cause any noticeable audible cue for the crew AT ALL. :=

[takata]

Hi Neptunus Rex,
post #791
I'm sharing all your comments, only one tid bit should be added.
Most A330 flights take place in Normal Law, where α Floor will prevent the stall. α Floor is only available in Normal Law, and is triggered when full back stick causes the pitch angle to reach α Prot.
α Floor is only available in Normal Law, but it is inhibited above Mach 0.53. Below this speed, high AOA protection would reduce pitch while applying α Floor. It is obvious that high AOA protected mode is aimed at low altitude, high pitch and low speed situations which are, by very far, what is frequently needed.

At first sight, stalling at cruise level seems so unlikely, in protected mode or not, that most of the documentation/procedure is not even talking about the case.

At cruise, if one hear the stall warnings, this FCOM sentence "release back pressure on the sidestick" is also inherently implying that the PF is pulling gee's during manoeuver, hence triggering SW, not that he is flying level at the onset for buffet.

If one look at the UAS/Turbulence penetration procedure tables, in clean configuration, safe pitch/thrust settings (=> Mach 0.80):
@ FL370, over 190 t:
- Pitch: 3°
- N1: 94.3%

Hence, at FL375, TOGA would not make that much difference as the aircraft would be very close to its maximum cielling anyway. Also, applying a 5° pitch "above FL100" is in reality aimed for above FL100 and below FL250. It is 3.5° from FL250 to FL370 (90% N1) and 3° above FL370. Also, those settings should be memory items for turbulence penetration speeds.

TOGA + pull up is the Windshear normal procedure. In no way it is related to STALL or UAS procedures at cruise altitude.

Also, while the situation was deteriorating seriously, from 0210:51, the aircraft took another 10 seconds to enter this full stall with all Alarms soundings. Even so, the PF still had its Flight Path Vector (FPV) working. In fact, it was flagged much later when alpha/speeds became again invalid when the stall was much more advanced.

This is another puzzling fact as the FPV (which seems to have been selected) would provide a visual increasing Alpha for the pilots. Moreover, during this early stall sequence, it is also probable that the Flight Directors came back on PFDs and that all speeds/baro altitude were valid and coherent again (but without any characteristic speeds -VLS, VSw, VMax- displayed).

Consequently, my opinion is that the PF should have distrusted all its instruments as everything seems to be working fine in the cockpit displays at this crucial point... but also, during the following 30-40 seconds, in addition to this Stall Alarm which never stopped its warnings.

[airtren]

For those that are more comfortable with an English version, here are some excerpts from the article. I've selected based on elements discussed on the AF 447 threads:

- the thrust at FL 350 was at %85 - article comment: "at this altitude Thrust level changes other than Idle don't bring a very significant power variation."

- "for changing altitude, the procedure requires a pitch no less than 0 degrees for descent, or 4 degrees for ascent."

- "the altitude change caused a buzzer to sound at 200 ft above FL350."

- "95% of 4 minutes, the NU action was present. However, there were a total of 6 short ND commands."

- "at FL 375 the climb is at 700ft/min, and the plane still flies at 4 degrees attitude and 215knots, certainly slow"

- "when the Captain rejoins, the speeds are invalid, the Stall Warning stops, quite a confusion in the cockpit"

- "while the plane was at 10000ft/min descent, and 40 degree attitude (AoA), the actions of thrust to Idle, and ND don't bring a significant change, AoA remaining above 35 degrees."

[airtren]

GarageYears,

It seems that they've created sounds for the simulation, that replicate the AF 447 cockpit surrounding recorded sounds. Do you doubt that as well?

The article's author interpretation of the "ice cracking" sound which you point to, may be very well wrong.

With your experience of generating sounds from difference sources, for simulation, what's your interpretation, what is that "ice cracking" sound coming from?



As one who spends his life creating sound simulations for all classes of aircraft (sims), I find it almost impossible to believe that anyone could believe such ice shedding would be audible -....

[bearfoil]

Garage Years

Just the man for this. In the manual re: UAS one of the potential causes for loss of airspeeds is a shed radome. Whether 447 lost her fiber nose or not, would the radome contacting the fuselage area near the probes be audible to a crew?

[takata]

Hi airtren,
Some excerpts from the article, which have elements discussed on the AF 447 threads:
This article seems to be a mix between BEA and Presslike-fantasy (simulation). What could be trully learned from it at one day from an official interim report release?
The only interesting information out the whole content is this one:
Retrouvez notre dossier "Rio-Paris, révélations sur une catastrophe", dans Le Point n° 2028, en kiosque dès jeudi.
They are just selling their "Rio-Paris dossier" in today paper issue, as tomorrow, it will be certainly outdated.

[roulishollandais]

It appears that the french radio "FRANCE-INFO" (MM. FELDZER, POLACKO, aso):ooh: received not only the BEA report, but all informations from the both CVR and DFDR, when it is refused to public use !?
Are OACI procedures no more in use in FRANCE ?

[lomapaseo]

I have seroius doubts about the interpretation that they heard ice cracking sounds on the CVR

Lots of CVR recording over the years and the only ice sounds documented to my knowledge have been impact sounds from hail hitting the frontal faces. The relative velocity of a shed off an aircraft surface pitot would be too low and this "Ice crack sounds" defies imagination. Even the ice sheds off the MD80 incidents could not be heard.

[DozyWannabe]

It appears that the french radio "FRANCE-INFO" (MM. FELDZER, POLACKO, aso):ooh: received not only the BEA report, but all informations from the both CVR and DFDR, when it is refused to public use !?
Are OACI procedures no more in use in FRANCE ?

Really? The only thing up on their website is an interview with two of the people involved in the simulator reconstruction sessions - they don't say anything about having a leaked report...

[bearfoil]

takata

I have not been persuaded by the ICE theory. It is not at all unusual for a radome to come off the nose. After all, it bears mention in the FCOM.

Whether 447 lost her fiber/resin nose or not, the "Sound" in the CVR will be interesting.

I am keeping an open mind.

lomapaseo, your thoughts re: Radome loss?

[airtren]

Hello PJ2,


... As I have said from the start, the first response is to "do nothing" (except ensure the aircraft is under control,...

Indeed, from the start, you've said this consistently, many times....Your confidence and calm which I wish in every pilot of an airplane I am a passenger of, make it sound very simple, very safe....:ok:

Would you consider qualifying a bit the very succinct "do nothing ... ensure the a/c is under control", in regards to the flight law, and turbulence?

Is there anything you would add, is there a need to differentiate the needed actions between the A/C being in "Normal Law, No Turbulence", "Alternate 2, and NO Turbulence", and "Normal Law, with 3 degrees of turbulence: mild, medium, heavy", and "Alternate 2 and mild, medium, heavy turbulence"?.

[bearfoil]

02:09:45~02:10:25 It's in here.

[3holelover]

it is not at all unusual for a radome to come off the nose.I don't think that's an accurate statement at all Bear. I think it's extremely unusual. ...and extremely unlikely.

[airtren]

Hello Takata,

The picture is informative.

Would you have a clue, what training center is that?

Hi airtren,

This article seems to be a mix between BEA and Presslike-fantasy (simulation). What could be trully learned from it at one day from an official interim report release? .

[EMIT]

Hello Bearfoil,

Yeah, we loose radomes by the dozen, they come cheap these days.

Icing of probes, however, does not happen that often, or does it.
The following quote from BEA interim report does not describe a large number of radome loss events.

Quote;
As of 3 November 2009, Airbus had identified thirty-two events that had
occurred between 12 November 2003 and 1st June 2009(18). According to Airbus
these events are attributable to the possible destruction of at least two Pitot
probes by ice. Eleven of these events occurred in 2008 and ten during the first
five months of 2009. (Note by EMIT: destruction should be read as obstruction)
Twenty-six of these incidents occurred on aircraft fitted with Thales C16195AA
probes, two on aircraft with Thales C16195BA probes and one on an airplane
equipped with Goodrich 0851HL probes.
As of 1st June 2009 Air France had identified nine events that might meet
the above-mentioned criteria. After the F-GZCP accident the airline started a
targeted analysis of recorded parameters and identified six additional events
that occurred in 2008.
In addition, a foreign operator began a targeted analysis of recorded flight
parameters recorded after June 2006 on its A330 fleet. As of 18 November
2009 it had identified fourteen events. Only four of them had been detected
and reported by the crews to their airline.
Further, Airbus identified four events that have occurred since 1st June 2009.

[bearfoil]

Less rare than simultaneous (including rate) obstruction of three Pitot Heads?

Fair question. However, I am basing my question on the FCOM. It's in there.

We are dealing here with most likely an extremely rare confluence of bad things. Yet I witness an unusual presence of "stuckness" and "dismissiveness". I'm not actually taking sides 3hl. What I seek to do is express my thoughts regarding possibilities.

Here, your statement is best directed at Airbus/AirFrance. Again, it's in the FCOM as a cause of duff speeds.

[bearfoil]

EMIT

Until the data is in, what needs to be acknowledged are all the possibilities, regardless of probability. I am having a hard time trying to convince people that the time to defend a particular opinion is after all of them have been entertained, and the data is available.

If it is too soon to state cause, it is definitely too soon to reject even one, at least conclusively :ugh:

[takata]

The picture is informative. Would you have a clue, what training center is that?
A picture is informative, or will illustrate an article, because it is showing something related (like a flight simulator) not because it was taken specifically for the relevant press article. This one is from news archives or possibly related. It is more likely from news picture archives as it seems taken during an aeronautical convention.
Consequently, I'm pretty sure that this picture was not related to any official (informed) replays of the recorders (Airbus, Air France or BEA).
Now, you may wish it was.

[Peter H]

GarageYears (http://www.pprune.org/members/304162-garageyears)
As one who spends his life creating sound simulations for all classes of aircraft (at the highest fidelity Level D for commercial aircraft and equivalently for military sims), I find it almost impossible to believe that anyone could believe such ice shedding would be audible - the location of the pitot tubes themselves and, above all else, the small quantity of ice involved (due to the physical size of the tube) makes this claim extremely unlikely.

As it stands, for the many simulators I have been involved in, ice shedding from propellers, with the ice being flung from the blades and hitting the cabin sides, is about the only sound cue related to icing that I believe might be audible to any cockpit crew.

Totally accept the thrust of your point, but think that there is another source of ice-related sounds.

I dimly remember claims made in the original AF447 thread of hearing ice on the windscreen. Cannot find those posts, but this later one captures the idea.
http://www.pprune.org/6538743-post1871.html
EMIT
I have seen the TAT anomaly (TAT probe icing due to high ice crystal content) when flying through "light green" radar returns in the neighbourhood of CB's, in other words, while avoiding CB's. Turbulence then was only light, occasionally moderate, nothing out of the ordinary. Saint Elmo's and a sound like rain on the windscreen were also present.

To summarise:
a) The claim about hearing ice shedding from the pitots sounds like b/s. [Or a journalistic misunderstanding.]
b) Hearing ice shedding from elsewhere is highly unlikely. [You are the expert.]
c) In de-briefings several pilots have reported hearing something (later identified as ice-crystals) hitting the windscreen prior to a high-altitude "anomaly". So it may well have happened on AF447. [IIRC it is often reported as quite a distinctive sound.]

[BOAC]

Following the AP/ATHR disconnect, the aircraft entered a "zoom climb". The Stall Warning sounded briefly during the pitch up manuever and some ND inputs were made and attitude was reduced to 7°NU but the AoA was still rising and the SW sounded again. Further NU inputs prevented any normal stall recovery and once the CAS became less than 60KTS the SW stopped. - this is NOT what the May BEA report said - perhaps you are 'clairvoyant' regarding the 28 July report? The stall warnings sounded BEFORE the climb.

[bearfoil]

BOAC

airc, THe "STALLWARNING" sounded briefly at PF first input, NURL.


Could that be consistent with a cruise speed input of NOSE UP? If so, would the PF immediately reduce PITCH? If so, it may not be associated with the climb at all?

[BOAC]

No idea. The way the (English) report is written (for what it is worth :mad:) there were at least 11 seconds before the a/c began its climb. I was going to sit quietly and await a better report tomorrow but I got woken up by people inventing stuff again:ugh:

[CONF iture]

france info (http://www.france-info.com/monde-ameriques-2011-07-28-vol-rio-paris-la-catastrophe-reconstituee-dans-un-simulateur-de-vol-553146-14-16.html)
They won't tell if they got access to the data, but listening to the interview, it is possible they actually did :

"The pilots didn't understand what was going on, we clearly hear it in the registered conversations in the flight deck, there is no panic."


Also a desire to 'protect' the Airbus technology to the public eyes ... ?

"The airplane did not stall, il s'est enfoncé (it has gone deep ?), thanks to the protections."
"The protections have been effective but not understood by the pilots."

[bearfoil]

From BEA. At 02:10:16: "So, we've lost the speeds.......ALTERNATE LAW". (PNF). In between the STALL WARNING, and the (PNF) voice recording, there is no official mention of "CLIMB" (or STALLWARNING). Likewise, it would seem a blatant omission by BEA, had the a/c begun the climb, or had experienced notable problems. (Other than UAS).

We may know soon, or not. I expect somewhat less than full disclosure.

[takata]

Some people are still entertaining the idea that those flight data, CV recorders, are hiding critical informations in order to state the truth, informations that will point to the only one cause of this crash, the only relevant thing they could ever be able to believe as being not a cover up for the manufacturer's wrong doings.

My own feelings is that we won't get more clues tomorrow about this single cause than what is already known fairly exactly today (of course, if one bother to put all the facts together by stopping to make up what he wishes), because nothing more than that was recorded, nothing that could direclty explain PF's actions.

One could replay the scenario many thousands times, it won't help to understand the cause without discarding this way of thinking. Pilot's brain is not recorded. All we are going to learn is more details about their confusion concerning the situation they were facing. It is quite obvious that they never acknowledged the stall situation, neither that they would have tried to recover from it if the stall was not acknowledged at the first place.

That's, in my opinion, the issue the industry would have to deal with in the future. As there will be no single and very easy answer to: what to do then? because it is a very complex one, it's not going to be fixed any time soon.

[bearfoil]

What is it about "the Pilot's Brain" that is of interest to the a/c? This a/c is protected, flies safely, won't STALL, (at least on its own....)

A thinking Pilot, one 'thinks', is not necessary to the Airbus. One who can memorize, and leave things alone? Now you're talking! Thinking is optional, and more expensive!

[MountainWest]

According to the 27 May 2011 BEA update:

"At 2 h 13 min 32, the PF said "we’re going to arrive at level one hundred". About fifteen seconds later, simultaneous inputs by both pilots on the sidesticks were recorded and the PF said "go ahead you have the controls"."

I am interested in the "simultaneous" inputs. Were these consistent, or were they conflicting NU and ND commands?

[GarageYears]

Firstly - if the assertion was the sound was replicated from the CVR mic recording it must be recognized that the mic is optimized for voice bandwidth. I commented on this previously, but don't have time to search for the post. But the CVR cockpit mic frequency range is limited - I want to say to around 6kHz....?

Secondly transient noises of short duration are very hard to isolate and make any sense of unless very loud. Ice shedding from the pitots would not do this.

Ice crystals hitting the windshield - yes, I can see that being audible, certainly.

Radome damage/departure/etc - something of this nature would certainly lead to a noticeable change in the aerodynamic impact noise footprint.

Both ice crystal noise and radome damage would be heard over the CVR. Ice-shedding not so, in my professional opinion.

[PJ2]

Takata, I fully concur with your remarks; tomorrow is not going to "solve" this. Expectations that it will are bound to be disappointed because that isn't the way accident investigation works. Reification of this or that pet theory will not be found in this update.

airtren;

Thanks for your comments and question.

Machinbird made a good point a while back in pointing out to me that "doing nothing" isn't the exact response and of course he was right. By the phrase, I was assuming a great deal on the part of the reader. What I meant was, other than maintaining level flight as best one can using pitch and manual thrust settings, (which would be those which existed just prior to the failure), one "does nothing" in terms of climbing/turning/descending etc. Above all else, one stabilizes the aircraft in level flight. There is absolutely NO reason to change anything during a UAS event.

Now, your question is a good one, made even more important by the extensive and wonderfully-intelligent discussions by many here who do know their stuff, concerning the behaviour of the A330 in Normal, Alternates 1 & 2 and Direct Laws, including simulation of same. I have learned both here and in private communications more about the airplane I flew for many years than I ever knew during my time on the airplane. (There is a notion there that I would like to explore, but time, space and a low desire to do so all call for a break at the moment). The airplane flies and works brilliantly; what is being explored here, as takata notes, are the extreme boundaries of flight in a heavy transport, and at the boundaries, (note: not the limits, but the boundaries), of design and engineering. That is why this accident is extremely complex, involving the above and a healthy dose of human factors, ergonomics, warning systems, and so on.

I assumed the airplane was just about as easy to fly in Alternate 1 and 2 and Direct Laws as it was in Normal. I have done this in the simulator many times and I think it is safe to assume that simulator fidelity is high in these regimes, (vice low fidelity in the stall or upset). It was never a problem flying the airplane thus, nor was it like "balancing oneself on the top of a greased flagpole". I understand the roll direct is brisk, but at altitude, one is always gentle and smooth with a heavy machine in thin air.

In direct response to your question, I think one can manually fly this aircraft at high altitude providing one handles it thus. I have learned through discussions on the reduced damping effects of high altitude flight and the physics of mass and trajectory of a heavy machine as well as the notions underpinning an understanding of PIO, that maintaining level pitch and bank attitudes in the circumstances you describe, would be challenging and perhaps even very demanding depending upon the second-by-second series of sidestick inputs over a short period of time. I think one can lose one's SA if one induces PIO, especially in Roll Direct, a factor which I had not truly been aware of until recently. It will be interesting to see how the BEA deals with this notion and phenomenon, if at all.

These points are why this accident will not be close to resolution and understanding in tomorrow's release by the BEA.

Marshal McLuhan once observed, "In the vortex of process, there are no fixed points of view; understanding is never a point of view." I think that may describe an approach to this report and the final report which will yield the best comprehension of what occurred. If one as a point of view, the report will be disappointing and unfulfilling.

I hope this helps airtren; I am enjoying your contributions and am pleased you entered the conversation.

[airtren]

Thanks for the pointer CONF_iture

From listening to the interview, among the two interviewed pilots comments that I would mention, are references to the shortcomings of the "a/c to pilot information interface", the reviewing of procedures for such situations, and a dialog between Air France and other airline companies, on one side, and Airbus on the other, in that regard which is just at the beginning..

france info (http://www.france-info.com/monde-ameriques-2011-07-28-vol-rio-paris-la-catastrophe-reconstituee-dans-un-simulateur-de-vol-553146-14-16.html)
...

[EMIT]

Bearfoil, for once I'll inject an icon: :ugh:

Of course, the FCOM mentions the possibility of a radome getting damaged or lost. Such an event would greatly influence airflow around the nose of the aircraft and would thus adversely influence the pressure measurements as taken by the various pressure sensors mounted around the nose. But FCOM mentions a zillion possible failures.
The BEA Interim Report number 1 mentioned an estimate of aircraft state at impact, based exclusively on damage patterns found on floating debris - almost 2 years later, the recorders proved that the original estimate was remarkably accurate.
Part of the original estimate, was parts of the radome found at sea.

Quote from Interim report 1:
Observations of the tail fin and on the parts from the passenger (galley, toilet door, crew rest module) showed that the airplane had likely struck the surface of the water in a straight line, with a high rate vertical acceleration.

Quote from Interim report 2:
From these observations it can be deduced that:
* The aircraft was probably intact on impact.
* The aircraft struck the surface of the water with a positive attitude, a low
bank and a high rate of descent.
* There was no depressurisation.

I think you can TRUST the BEA that, had there been grounds to suspect that the radome was lost, they would have mentioned it in their reports so far.


To the rest:
Whether it is conceivable that pilots somehow make an error with regards to stall reactions? Yes, it happens, even in good old fashioned Boeings!
Heavy take-off, during flap retraction an upgust underneath a big Cu (note: I do not state Cb), as margin at that moment is very small, it triggers a stick shaker.
PF reaction? Pull up the nose slightly. PNF intervenes, so nose is lowered, a/c continues flight uneventfully.
Query by the PNF (the commander) about the reaction of the PF - well, it pointed to a sort of mix up of the text from GPWS/Windshear procedures, that speak of pulling up, with the stick shaker as upper limit of that action. So, somehow, in the PF's mind, there had formed a connention of "stick shaker, pull up".
More strange reactions in pilots minds: read up in an old Boeing magazine about the 767 that took off from Isla Margarita (1994 or 1995) and turned directly towards the 3.300 ft high mountain on the island. The GPWS calls caused a PF reaction of increasing pitch by 1 degree. Only after the audible impact with a TV antenna on the mountain top, did he progress into a proper GPWS reaction.

Once again: 15 degrees nose up, clearly visible on those beautiful PFD's, is very, very unusual attitude in a transport aircraft around FL350. All recorded pilot actions should have been very much nose down. All sorts of failure flags on the PFD and messages on ECAM should not have distracted the crew from the still perfect attitude indications.
And, as said by many before, the mighty "push" of TOGA at FL350 is nothing more than CLB thrust at that altitude, and as such a disappointingly small amount above normal cruise thrust. Certainly not a big handful of pitch up moment.

[bearfoil]

Have a look at the fractures evident on the radome after surface retrieval.

Note the linear fracture from the outer perimeter in toward the center of the piece. Can you describe the likely mode of failure of this two phase material with any linearity remaining? I can. Are you at all interested?

[EMIT]

Bear,

Behind the radome is the WX Radar. If the radome gets lost, that radar is not gonna be able to sweep its antenna back and forth any more, exposed to a 480 kts airflow. That is certainly gonna trigger a couple of messages that would have been in the ACARS data stream.

[lomapaseo]

CVR should go from relatively quiet to noisy as hell.

I doubt that we will hear the CVR for our confirmation, So I will just wait for the BEA to tells us what's significant on the CVR

[bearfoil]

Yes, I get that, and thanks. You are a man of Faith, then?

[EMIT]

Bear,

I wrote about ACARS messages that would have been in the list as of day 1 of the reporting about this accident.
Or do you think that they had it all figured out by then already: - let's not tell about the ACARS messages that have to do with radar loss, cause you'll see, in about 2 years time we will have to cover up about bad quality radomes?
Facts, my friend, not faith.
We will not need to have the CVR available on Youtube to check for ourselves that the radome did not get blown away.

Whether ice crystals impacting on the windscreen will be audible on the CVR - who knows, the Cockpit Area Mike is not a marvel of audio quality, but processing logic can sometimes provide pleasant surprises.

[Peter H]

PJ2 (http://www.pprune.org/members/67532-pj2)
By the phrase, I was assuming a great deal on the part of the reader. What I meant was, other than maintaining level flight as best one can using pitch and manual thrust settings, (which would be those which existed just prior to the failure), one "does nothing" in terms of climbing/turning/descending etc. Above all else, one stabilizes the aircraft in level flight. There is absolutely NO reason to change anything during a UAS event.

Can I -- a non-pilot -- tentatively challenge this wording.

There seem to be at least two situations where the current settings would not be "those which existed just prior to the failure":
a) The s/w "correctly" changed something. [e.g. IIRC the thrust changes on a/p drop-out].
b) The s/w has "inappropriately" (in 20:20 hindsight) modified the previous status-quo prior to the fully-recognised UAS event. [e.g. as a "correct" response to erroneous airspeed values.]

In either case the pilot needs to revert to something like the settings in effect before the s/w acted. In this situation "one stabilizes the aircraft in level flight" and "there is absolutely NO reason to change anything during a UAS event" would seem to be mutually inconsistent.

BTW I suspect that our positions could be reconciled by some sort of differentiation between "simple" and "complex/compound" UAS events.

As a retired s/w engineer, and assuming dual pitot failure:
If the 2nd pitot failure occurring while the 1st pitot failure was being analysed the s/w developers can be forgiven for failing to handle it "well". Especially as the s/w development team probably believed/were-told that double in-flight pitot failures were vanishingly improbable.

This could easily cause a brief period of erroneous airspeed, leading to: thrust changes, trim changes and a/p drop-out. Leaving the plane some way from steady-state-cruise settings.

[bearfoil]

Peter H.

Where have you been? You are so welcome here, at least by the bear.

The time to trim back on theory is after the data, not prior.

:ok:


What was a/c doing for the last fifteen seconds prior to a/p loss?

What did the PF do for fifteen seconds after a/p loss?


Everything has been done to Death, except..........

[airtren]

Thanks for your answer PJ2. As usual reading another post of yours is delightful.


..."doing nothing".... By the phrase, I was assuming a great deal on the part of the reader. What I meant was, one "does nothing" in terms of climbing/turning/descending etc....

The "great deal" assumption that the reader does not need explanations, may imply straight forward that he does not need the summarized "doing nothing" either, as if he knows the first, he knows the latter as well.....
...

I assumed the airplane was just about as easy to fly in Alternate 1 and 2 and Direct Laws as it was in Normal. I have done this in the simulator many times...
Perhaps at a high experience/professional level the protections of Normal, versus Alternate 1, versus Alternate 2, versus Direct, don't bring or mean much, particularly in smooth non-adverse weather....

But we know their purpose, and that their degree of absence and importance becomes even more obvious when the flying conditions are no longer friendly and/or simple. And the short 4 minutes or less between life and death on the AF 447 exacerbates that like nothing else would....

As I mentioned before a recent cross continental flight with heavy turbulence almost out of nowhere, made me think a lot more...


I have learned through discussions.... that maintaining level pitch and bank attitudes in the circumstances you describe, would be challenging and perhaps even very demanding depending upon the second-by-second series of sidestick inputs over a short period of time.

Between a 200 tone airplane, at M0.8, and a 5 grams paper made plane at a hand throw speed, there may be a huge difference in mass, inertia, size of wings, and power behind the motion, but they are paradoxically similar, if not identical, in the proportionality of the air lift to their mass/weight.

That being said, the challenge in maintaining the level flight is the turbulent air in large masses, at random speeds, and random change of directions, which creates the demanding situation, to which the second-by-second inputs of the side stick are only the pilot's plane control responses/reactions.

Among many others, it is these very situations that elevate one having the control of the stick in the cockpit, to the title of true airline pilot, as much as many years ago, just flying an airplane would, and therefore I strongly believe they're worth mentioning.

In light of this,you may agree that the use of "do nothing" calls for an update, as it may present the risk of telling selectively only part of the story, which means the risk of over simplifying - (edited: trivializing)....
....
As much as the tremendous progress in the science of making and controlling flying objects after of about 100 years - although more, or even a lot more, if we go back to daVinci, or Icarus.... - with each step, and each gain, the pushing forward of the boundaries of knowledge brings with them inherently, also the boundaries of the unkown. The AF 447 seem to be an apogee, or a burst of a collection of unknowns, of the current stage in technology, and industry, which like many of the past, came with a tremendous, undesired, and sad sacrifice. When resolved - and one has to recognize the resources allocated by the French Government, BEA, Airbus, and Air France, the Industry at large, the International community for the resolution - the solutions will be, along with many other elements another step forward in the knowledge and advancing of man.

And hey... , even this Forum, and these threads are somewhat a contribution, and part of that step forward, as meager as it may be, ....

[john_tullamarine]

I note a little angst arising between some of the posters.

Rest assured that, if I observe an excessively inappropriate post, I'll edit/remove it.

This doesn't extend to heavy handed moderating along any given party line eg I might not particularly like a particular style of post - however, so long as it generally complies with our requirements, my like/dislike is not a reason to censor it. Non-nasty banter and a bit of give and take is quite acceptable and the place would be boring without it.

If you, as an individual, take exception to a particular line of post, please either ignore the post and move on or, if you see the need, PM me and I'll review the complaint circumstances.

[PJ2]

Peter;

Thank you for your thoughtful post.

Yes, I not only agree with your "notwithstanding", but know of at least one reasonable explanation for the immediate aft-stick movement.

Still, the key here is in the notion of "stabilizing the aircraft". One must absolutely establish control of the aircraft and one does what one must to maintain control, which also means avoiding those actions and changes which will de-stabilize the aircraft. So, for example, if there is a momentary apparent "loss of altitude", say 300ft (I am not citing a known example, I'm positing, here), the reaction could, (not 'would'), be to pull back and "regain" the altitude, from which one then levels off, sets power and gets out the QRH. I'm using quotation marks in this example because any such loss would almost certainly be an indication issue and not an actual loss of height, and in any case, such loss, real or merely indicated, is not serious and does not require instant response or correction when one is wrestling with another abnormality. Sure is easy to say and type, isn't it? My golly. We have to be so careful of hindsight bias when reading what is coming.

Of course, I, we, don't know if any of this occurred, but the notion does lie within what I would consider the "plausible" arena vice some of the theories placed out in the open for consideration by other contributors.

[bearfoil]

PJ2

I knew what you meant, from the git. However, lacking some explanatory, it is (perhaps), red meat for those ready to pounce. So you know, I am most grateful for your input. You and others have multiplied my meager knowledge manifold.

I come from a professional standpoint where it is not necessary to comfort the afflicted. More like afflicting the comfortable.

At no time do I believe it is appropriate to get personal. I hope my presence is not annoying to anyone, except to make my points, which I believe in.......

with great respect, Bear

(erm.....what was that back ss, then?) :ok:

[PJ2]

airtren;

Yes, the phrase "do nothing" doesn't really describe what one really does and should do when a UAS event occurs. One does something, but the goal is level, stable flight or a return to same with an establishing of the former cruise attitude and power - the goal isn't "5 degrees up, then sort it out" because that destabilizes the aircraft making it difficult to "find home" again.

Control in moderate to heavy turbulence is an issue dealt with in the FCOM - the SOP is clear: in addition to reducing Mach and disconnecting the auto-thrust, one also lets the speed and altitude wander slightly. How much is up to the pilot because the manuals cannot provide rules for everything. I've seen excursions between green dot and VMO, and +/- 300ft - the airplane "rides downhill or uphill" - it doesn't "fall"...(getting rid of the notion of the "air pocket" has been one of the toughest nuts to crack!) Temperature (SAT), wind shears of 60 to 80kts in short time periods, will result in all kinds of local instability which make control of the aircraft difficult, if only because it is tough to hang onto the stick in such conditions. So it's a factor, given all. My sense of it being a factor here is that it wasn't, or that it was light, possibly moderate but nothing more, but that's just me.

[mm43]

Originally posted by BOAC ...
- this is NOT what the May BEA report said - perhaps you are 'clairvoyant' regarding the 28 July report? The stall warnings sounded BEFORE the climb.We seem to have a difference of opinion over what happened following the AP/ATHR disconnect.

Ex BEA Note - From 2 h 10 min 05, the autopilot then auto-thrust disengaged and the PF said "I have the controls". The airplane began to roll to the right and the PF made a left nose-up input. The stall warning sounded twice in a row.The graphic included with my post clearly indicates what is believed to have happened. The initial nose-up input was responsible for the double stall warning per the above quote, and if the attitude didn't change, then why did the AoA trigger the SW? The graphic(s) may be close to the truth or completely wrong, and remember you said, " [they] will pass rapidly into the 'factual' world - as pseudo FDR traces - when in fact they are supposition - guess-work - based on extremely limited information".:ok:

Nothings changed, and the 'facts' will supercede everything that this forum has promoted at each successive release of information by the BEA. Until then, I'm quite happy to be classed as 'clairvoyant'.:p

[A33Zab]

The reason why ADR 1(2)(3) or ADR 1+2, 2+3 or 1+3 FAIL messages were absent is because the ADRs didn't fail.
They did send (CAS < 30Kts) a SSM(System Status Matrix) signal NCD and a value output of 0 Kts.

The SSM for digital on bus signals (Bit 31,30) of the ARINC word can have 4 states:
- NO (Normal Operation)
- FT (Functional Test)
- NCD (No Computed Data)
- FW (Failure Warning)

If a ADR failed (as detected by its own fault detection logic) the SSM is set to FW.
The FWC composes the exact ECAM warning, e.g. when ADR 1 and ADR 2 outputs a FW SSM then the FWC will send the warning NAV ADR 1 + 2 FAIL.

Since there is no crosstalk between ADRs, an ADR DISAGREE; ADR IAS DISCREPANCY or any other air data discrepancy can only be detected by a system which receives all 3 ADR ouputs, e.g. EFCS/AFS.

When all 3 ADRs signals are in NCD SSM state the value output is 0; so no difference between ADRs but also NO failure.
The logic I did post before did already show why the IAS discrepancy message was inhibited. (any ADR in NCD, dual ADR in NCD for 'frozen 'pitot)

Question is what will the FCPC do with the received NCD state of ADR?
Will it take the value of 0 Kts in account or ignore this ADR?
Maybe later today an answer?

[CONF iture]

A33Zab,
Could we then think, as long as ADR DISAGREE was not present, that High and Low Speed Stabilities were at least available ?

[CONF iture]

From listening to the interview, among the two interviewed pilots comments that I would mention, are references to the shortcomings of the "a/c to pilot information interface", the reviewing of procedures for such situations, and a dialog between Air France and other airline companies, on one side, and Airbus on the other, in that regard which is just at the beginning..
And some other comments made (I don't comment myself, just try to translate):


Pilots were fully aware of the weather situation. Weather situation had nothing of extreme, only relatively moderate turbulence.
Like a Boeing, the Airbus is a complex system, there are many computers, bugs and false indications are possible, and the user manual for the man-machine interface is not always understood.
The man-machine interface didn't work, it is the whole challenge, and the object of the coming legal battle.
Inappropriate maneuver has been applied, but we understand why such wrongly doing could take place.
It will be necessary to review the user manual.
It will be necessary to review the procedures to be applied in extreme situations.
The Airbus is different from any conventional aircraft in a way that it will maintain the last flight control order.
I've made hundreds of simulator sessions on this type, some with similar malfunctions.

Just one personal note : The last comment is from Gérard Feldzer. I have a doubt he has practiced UAS at cruise flight level, and exit from a full stall situation.
For the record, Feldzer is also the guy who, two years ago, was talking about Global Warming and Monster CB.

[airtren]

Hello PJ2,

Thanks for your thoughtful reply.

The more I think about the "do nothing", the more I conclude that you were right when you wrote that Machinbrid was right that it is not the exact answer.


Machinbird made a good point a while back in pointing out to me that "doing nothing" isn't the exact response and of course he was right.


airtren;
Yes, the phrase "do nothing" doesn't really describe what one really does and should do when a UAS event occurs. One does something, but the goal is level, stable flight


Knowing many of your posts, I know what you mean. But that is not the point.

Readers may come to this forum after a search hit, for a quick answer, and after a quick read, they don't come back to better understand, what is behind a certain statement.

I know well you didn't mean that, but the danger of the "do nothing" is that it gives the wrong message, that a pilot really does not have to do much, or know much, even when he gets the controls, as the A/C does everything by itself.

The "do nothing" resonates with a certain philosophy I disagree with, which is that modern airplanes don't require highly qualified and knowledgeable pilots. This is one of the reasons why a pilot when put in front of the controls, can loose it.

To me it's clear, that pilots of modern planes, need to be as good as the old days, old school pilots, PLUS also be technically so good as to understand well the various aspects of the new technologies used by the plane, so that any time can take best decisions.

A pilot in the cockpit needs to be like a Master/Champion chess player - understand well the situation on the chess board, and anticipate, see ahead, as many moves and combinations as possible.

A pilot, while the AP and A/THR are ON, and flight is in Normal Law, should follow closely the flight, particularly when the weather is problematic. He has to understand and anticipate all the possible scenarios that may develop, at any given point of time, based on a good knowledge of the A/C. and specifically the weaker points of the A/C. He needs be ahead of the game, ahead of all the other players, outside and inside the A/C, so that his reaction to anything that happens outside, or inside, is quick, to the point, very effective, and with immediate positive results.

When given the controls, he should be already aware of all of the conditions of the flight, before the control transition, and a quick assessment immediately after the transition, is only to confirm that all checks out. His subsequent actions should not be a guess, but rather a well known series of moves with a known ahead result, and driving to a known result.

Just an opinion,
airtren

[A33Zab]

NO,

From 02:10:06 it was in Alternate 2 Law, after 02:10:16 this ALT 2 was latched.

http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/rr101/Zab999/Dia13.jpg

[jcjeant]

Hi,

A pilot, while the AP and A/THR are ON, and flight is in Normal Law, should follow closely the flight, particularly when the weather is problematic. It has to understand and anticipate all the possible scenarios that may develop, at any given point of time, based on a good knowledge of the A/C. and specifically the weaker points of the A/C. He needs be ahead of the game, ahead of all the other players, outside and inside the A/C, so that his reaction to anything that happens outside, or inside, is quick, to the point, very effective, and with immediate positive results.

When given the controls, he should be already aware of all of the conditions of the flight, before the control transition, and a quick assessment immediately after the transition, is only to confirm that all checks out. His subsequent actions should not be a guess, but rather a well known series of moves with a known ahead result, and driving to a known result.

Just an opinion,
airtren Indeed ...
And in the case of the AF447 ... it's not really a surprise as it's many events of same nature on the same type of plane that happened in the years and months before the AF447 event .. well reported and published in many reports and testimonies of those concerned
So .. it must be normal that because the backup of experience and the care of Air France about the safety they have formed and warned their pilots about the scenario encountered by the AF447 .....
At least ... this is how it must be ..
Maybe the 3 interim BEA report will not show a so good picture ....

[grity]

airtren A pilot in the cockpit needs to be like a Master/Champion chess player - understand well the situation on the chess board, and anticipate, see ahead, as many moves and combinations as possible.
no chess master can look all day with all his skills to an automatic chess game/turnament to wait for the moment of a s/w bug

it was one of the fruits of this treat, to realize that even a champion needs training to hold his level (onbord training),

fly 10% of the time with your hands...

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi grity,

fly 10% of the time with your hands...
In over 7 years of AB FBW, I've never had any real time experience in ALT LAW. Plenty of "Direct Law" handling on previous Boeing & Lockheed types though. I bet it feels completely different to anything else I've tried.

How long did the PF have in order to practice that night before they stalled?

[wallybird7]

Light, Moderate, or extreme -- doesn't really matter. What really matters is how prepared the pilot was to handle this unique situation. Hand flying in turbulence when everything goes out.
I am disturbed that it is not permissable to "hand fly" the aircraft in real life let alone the simulator/and or duplicate the "emergency" that they encountered in training.
I can't imagine a new guy, or inexperienced guy, being able to keep this thing under control under these conditions. Even if it was benign.

That's what training and testing is for. So far I see no evidence of it.

[BOAC]

We seem to have a difference of opinion over what happened following the AP/ATHR disconnect. - yes, from the report of May, the 'difference' is that I am unable to ascertain exactly what sequence happened, while you appear to be able to! Anyway, 1230GMT today and hopefully we will know a lot more.

To summarise where I sit on AM 29 July:

The SW's following A/P disconnect are unexplained and a 'puzzle' - possibly due turbulence, possibly due to a low faulty IAS, possibly due to over-controlling in pitch or ???. It does not take a big pitch change at FL350 at that weight to push past the stall warning alpha - perhaps 'recovering' from a perceived drop in altitude?

The zoom climb, apparently 'unremarked' by either pilot, is a puzzle.

After the a/c 'flopped over' at FL380 and began to sink in a (possibly unrecognised) stalled condition - this is far less of a puzzle, due to their lack of experience of the 'impossible' full stall - as in PGF. My gut feeling is that from somewhere between 15 and 20k, they had insufficient altitude to recover anyway.

Why the AB software stops the stall warning when the a/c is deeply stalled defeats my logic.

My sincere hope, however, is that most FBW/software (particularly AB) pilots (and the training system) have had some quiet, contemplative and sobering thoughts over the last few months about what they need to think about and what the system might NOT do for them.

[hetfield]

"Crew disregarded flight-procedures!

Airbus Test Pilot Fernando Alonso in the German WELT of today...

Air-France-Absturz: Crew von Todesflug AF 447 missachtete Flugregeln - Nachrichten Panorama - Weltgeschehen - WELT ONLINE (http://www.welt.de/vermischtes/weltgeschehen/article13513846/Crew-von-Todesflug-AF-447-missachtete-Flugregeln.html)

[RetiredF4]

@airtren

An excellent statement, and @grity

an excellent ammendment to this statement.

Thank you both.


How was that old tale (at least how i was used to it):

Flying will be be hours of joy and boredom, interspersed with moments of sheer terror.

Be always prepared for the latter.

franzl

[HappyPass]

Fresh info has just been released

Vol AF 447 (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/vol.af.447.php)

Best regards,
HP

[GarageYears]

The "report" is simply the SAME information as released in the previous "note", now labeled a "report"....? Seriously: WTF?

- GY :ugh:

P.S. Admittedly I did NOT do a line by line comparison, but from what I see it is the same!

[RetiredF4]

And for that statement they needed more than 2 month?

It´s not clarifying anything at all.


Only one example:

• Throughout the flight, the movements of the elevator and the THS were consistent with the pilot’s inputs

It would be more interesting to know, wether the aircraft behaviour followed those inputs.

franzl

[BOAC]

Try this (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/note29juillet2011.en.pdf) link for the English version. Work to do at AF.

Safety recs summarised at http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/reco29juillet2011.en.pdf

[DozyWannabe]

Actually, it looks like the safety recommendations are pretty specific, and there are clear references to AoA in both the new note and the recommendations. AF come in for implied criticism due to there being no established procedure for a flightdeck when the captain is not present as well as training in general (it appears that neither PF nor PNF called the "Unreliable IAS" procedure), and there is a recommendation for an AoA display, which will be down to Airbus and Boeing to implement - if the regulators take the recommendations up, as well as for flight recorders to record extra parameters (including all visible instruments).

So no, it's not anything like a final report, but steps forward have been made and it appears that any fears that AF or Airbus would be "protected" from criticism or requests for change were unfounded.

[Zeroninesevenone]

Air France - Corporate : Air France?s reaction to the publication of the BEA?s third intermediate report (http://corporate.airfrance.com/en/press/press-releases/article/item/reaction-dair-france-a-la-publication-du-troisieme-rapport-detape-du-bea/back/61/)

[grity]

And for that statement they needed more than 2 month?and? at which place was sitting the so called PF? left the new one with the reportet instruments ahead his nose, or right as in the hours before mayby?

[SaturnV]

It looks as if two of the three pilots had been napping up until about 0200, and the alert pilot, the captain, leaves the cockpit.

From both the English and French versions.

A 1 h 55 min 57, le commandant de bord réveille le second copilote et annonce « […] il va prendre ma place ».

A 1 h 55, the Captain woke the second copilot and announced "[…] he’s going to take my place".

It would seem there was no playing with the radar with respect to tilt or gain, and they flew on expecting little more than some light to moderate chop.
_____________________

Is the second co-pilot the junior co-pilot, and is he the PF?
Both versions omit what appears to be a name reference in the captain's announcement.

[takata]

Hi,
So no, it's not anything like a final report, but steps forward have been made and it appears that any fears that AF or Airbus would be "protected" from criticism or requests for change were unfounded.
This is a "Synthetis Note", not the 3rd Interim Report which would be posted later (likely, following the Press Conf .)

[SaturnV]

takata, that would be the press conference at 14:30. Do you know, is it being televised?

[GarageYears]

Well you can be a generous as you like, but if it took me 2 months to produce this level of work output where I work... I wouldn't be working there any more.

If there is one tiny shred of additional information it is this:

At 2 h 11 min 42, the Captain came back into the cockpit.

<snip>

• Each time the stall warning was triggered, the angle of attack exceeded its theoretical trigger value
• The stall warning was triggered continuously for 54seconds

The rest we had before.

All this confirms is:

- The crew never mentioned UAS
- The crew never mentioned Stall

Again I may be missing something the more rigorous reader may spot.

- GY

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi,

I would appear that neither pilot "heard" the stall warning "Stall Stall".
Does it only come from the speakers in the cockpit or does it come through their headsets. Do AF use ANR?

• Neither of the pilots made any reference to the stall warning
• Neither of the pilots formally identified the stall situation

It is not uncommon to observe crews (with a high work load) shut down their audio senses - like this crew did:
&#x202a;Whats that beeping sound?&#x202c;&rlm; - YouTube

[GarageYears]

rudderrudderrat asked:

I would appear that neither pilot "heard" the stall warning "Stall Stall".
Does it only come from the speakers in the cockpit or does it come through their headsets. Do AF use ANR?The FWC generates the Stall warning and it is sent to the speaker outputs irrespective of pilot ACP control setting or speaker volume (i.e. it cannot be defeated).

Warnings are ALSO sent to the crew headsets directly.

- GY

[takata]

- CAS1 (ADR1, Captain probes) was erroneous during 29 seconds, starting @ 0210:05.
- CAS3 (ADR3, ISIS) was erroneous during 54 seconds, starting "after" 0210:05 but "before" 0210:16.
So (at least) during 19-29 seconds, two (or three) airspeeds were wrong, meaning that all speeds were rejected by the EFCS and AFS.

[DozyWannabe]

I would appear that neither pilot "heard" the stall warning "Stall Stall".
Does it only come from the speakers in the cockpit or does it come through their headsets. Do AF use ANR?

I'm not sure, but IIRC the ADI section of the PFD flashes "STALL" in large capital letters as the audible warning sounds.

It is not uncommon to observe crews (with a high work load) shut down their audio senses - like this crew did:

What can one say but "D'oh!"?

[infrequentflyer789]

BEA website seems to be struggling, but links direct to the pdf documents are still working (although takes a couple of tries for me):

The "note":

English: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/note29juillet2011.en.pdf
French: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/note29juillet2011.fr.pdf

The recommendations (actually more a note about them):

English: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/reco29juillet2011.en.pdf
French: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/reco29juillet2011.fr.pdf (http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/reco29juillet2011.en.pdf)


Looking at these, I think (hope) they are more press summaries / extracts released in advance of the complete interim report.


A few things do grab attention:


Recommendation for video recording of cockpit displays - perhaps implying there is still significant uncertainty about what the pilots actually saw ?
No training (not just "not a lot" - none!!!) for manual flight or UAS at altitude (let alone alt or direct law)
No CRM training for capt. off duty [edit: intended meaning no CRM training for the situation of capt. off duty, not that capt. was not trained - too few words used first time!]
no UAS procedure called, and no mention of stall despite continuous warning for almost a minute at one point :confused:

And what might turn out to be a biggie (or two):


Control surfaces moved according to pilot inputs (BUT: only pitch axis mentioned, what happened in roll ?)
Plane moved according to contol inputs "Until the airplane was outside its flight envelope". Why qualify with that ? Maybe there is a nasty deep stall behaviour in there ?

Waiting for the real report now...

[fizz57]

@RetiredF4

You might care to read the orange bits in the report a little less selectively:

" Until the airplane was outside its flight envelope, the airplane's longitudinal movements were consistent with the position of the flight control surfaces"

Almost certainly by implication, once the airplane was "outside its flight envelope" this was no longer the case.

[sensor_validation]

From the recommendations re image recording of the instrument displays:-

Are they suggesting a possible explanation is that the displays were not showing the same information as that recorded?

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

This is a "Synthetis Note", not the 3rd Interim Report which would be posted later (likely, following the Press Conf .)

Hi Takata :)
I was wondering about that. Are U sure or is or a guess ?
Regards.

[infrequentflyer789]

@RetiredF4

You might care to read the orange bits in the report a little less selectively:

" Until the airplane was outside its flight envelope, the airplane's longitudinal movements were consistent with the position of the flight control surfaces"

.

Whoa. two different things:

1. control surfaces followed pilot control input. Always (as RetiredF4 said)
- control systems not at fault
2. plane follows control surface input. until flight envelope exceeded.
- plane behaved aerodynamically (and ergo probably didn't lose any bits)
... until outside envelope, where you are into test-pilot territory or even beyond.

[takata]

Plane moved according to contol inputs "Until the airplane was outside its flight envelope". Why qualify with that ? Maybe there is a nasty deep stall behaviour in there ?
That meant that, outside the flight envelope, simulators can't tell the BEA (for sure) that an imput is actually valid in relation with aircraft control surfaces position: as simulators are not supposed to derive anything accurately out of envelope's flight domain.
Hence, this part could only be verified by test flight (if one want to risk an A330 to verify that) which the BEA did not do up to this point (understandable).

[takata]

Hi AlphaZuluRomeo,

I was wondering about that. Are U sure or is or a guess ?
Yes, I'm sure. It is also written: Synthesis note, 29 July 2011

[grity]

infrequentflyer78 No CRM training for capt. off dutythey do not say that the captain was without a CRM training..... I understand that in this training this situation is not part of the rules

• There is no CRM tr aining for a crew made up of two copilots in a situation with a relief Captain



p.s. is it coincidence that JAA four weaks after the AF447 chrash became dissolved.....

[PJ2]

airtren;

If I may, I've clarified the meaning of "do nothing" and I think you're turning it into something I never meant and that no airman would mis-interpret.

I would have thought that all pilots who fly transports would have understood what I meant and wouldn't think of it as "advice", or take it literally - no pilot would actually "do nothing" and just sit there waiting for the automatics.

As for the BEA effort, it's disappointing, but there it is. Some interesting points regarding SOPs and some obvious safety recommendations. I guess we'll have to wait til October.

PJ2

[DozyWannabe]

Are they suggesting a possible explanation is that the displays were not showing the same information as that recorded?

Not really, but "sort of". I read this as a criticism of the fact that only the LHS instrument displays were recorded, which means that the PF's side (RHS) was not. I think this is the BEA saying that it's impossible to know what the PF was actually seeing, and they don't like having to take it as read that he was seeing the same as the PNF, whose instrument displays were recorded. This doesn't alter the fact that the PNF was supposed to be monitoring his instruments, and both pilots should have been checking for discrepancies the moment the ASI data became unreliable.

[FE Hoppy]

• Throughout the flight, the movements of the elevator and the THS were consistent with the pilot’s inputs.

[infrequentflyer789]

That meant that, outside the flight envelope, simulators can't tell the BEA (for sure) that an imput is actually valid in relation with aircraft control surfaces position: as simulators are not supposed to derive anything accurately out of envelope's flight domain.
Hence, this part could only be verified by test flight (if one want to risk an A330 to verify that) which the BEA did not do up to this point (understandable).

I assumed that they would determine from fdr whether or not the plane responded (at all) to contorl surfaces and if it did so in the right direction. Less concerned about whether the response was exactly as predicted (agree with you on that), more with did it cease responding completely or do strange things.

BEA qualification could indicate either case I suppose, or nothing at all.

[takata]

I think this is the BEA saying that it's impossible to know what the PF was actually seeing, and they don't like having to take it as read that he was seeing the same as the PNF, whose instrument displays were recorded.
Too much reading here. Having a camera showing all the displays and crew actions (postions/attitudes) would be very helpful rather than having to derive something from recorded data which doesn't give any hint about what can NOT be derived. (e.g. was the PNF reading silently the documentation? was he scanning the displays? looking at the PF actions? did they exchange meaningful regards?)
A lot of things needed to understand their actions are lying in cockpit ergonomics and pilot's way to deal with the interface. Most of what would be very helpful to investigation, in this case, is lost without a camera record. About the flight data missing, it seems that it would be better/easier to have them directly recorded rather than filmed.

[infrequentflyer789]

they do not say that the captain was without a CRM training..... I understand that in this training this situation is not part of the rules


Which is what I meant - previous post edited to clarify.

Seeing as captain off duty happens rather frequently on long haul, it's slightly suprising (well, to me...) that there is no CRM training for the rest of the crew in that situation. Poor CRM is then unsuprising.

[GarageYears]

Agree with takata: Interim report 3 is still the meat that is due today. Still scanning the BEA website. The PR issued on July 25th clearly states the 3rd interim report is due today - the 'synthesis note' does not seem to meet that criteria.

- GY

[DozyWannabe]

@takata - Good point.

However, I can see the concept of a cockpit-area-camera going down like the proverbial lead balloon with pilots' unions...

[Ian W]

Takata
Having a camera showing all the displays and crew actions (postions/attitudes) would be very helpful rather than having to derive something from recorded data which doesn't give any hint about what can NOT be derived. (e.g. was the PNF reading silently the documentation? was he scanning the displays? looking at the PF actions? did they exchange meaningful regards?)
A lot of things needed to understand their actions are lying in cockpit ergonomics and pilot's way to deal with the interface. Most of what would be very helpful to investigation, in this case, is lost without a camera record. About the flight data missing, it seems that it would be better/easier to have them directly recorded rather than filmed.

I could not agree more. Many investigations comprise a group of 'subject matter experts' listening to noises on the CVR and trying to work out what it was - who was in the cockpit, what was the FO doing etc etc. Or trying to infer from the FDR what was on displays. But every time cockpit video recordings are proposed the 'professional pilots' rise up against the idea. They would rather have investigations fail and others of their number die due to repeating the same error, than have their actions recorded in the way the cashier at a 7/11 gas station is recorded. :confused:

I doubt if recommendations from this accident will change their minds.

[HarryMann]

... until outside envelope, where you are into test-pilot territory or even beyond. Not necessarily, esp. if only in pitch... (gawd :rolleyes:, many were stalling and recovering gliders and even powered aircraft before they had a full driving licence. I'm sure some were recovering from spins even).

====

I find it quite incredible that so many are suggesting (albeit frequently doing it between the lines), that the aircraft may have been irrecoverable once fully stalled soon after reaching the apogee.

It's a fairly conventional aerod. design, and I see no reason we should start comparing it to a 'T' tailed a/c operating with an aft c.g.

The fact it stayed at a stable AoA (probably determined by the THS setting) and just rocked its wings (+/- 20° max), maintained a reasonable airflow and forward speed component, make me think all was definitely not lost until say, at a guess, 25 > 20,000 ft.

It's for this reason that I banged on loudly earlier about an well positioned AoA instrument, with green and red areas a bit like the revcounter in many cars, and about insistance on above average manual flying skills, for any aircrew going for a commercial license.

One other thing, and I know this will not be accepted immediately by all Airbus cockpit crew .. I am not convinced that the airbus sidestick design is optimum for all situations (I'll leave it at that for now!).

[HazelNuts39]

an well positioned AoA instrument, with green and red areasOf course you need to have valid airspeed to set the green/red correctly.

[BOAC]

I find it quite incredible that so many are suggesting (albeit frequently doing it between the lines), that the aircraft may have been irrecoverable once fully stalled soon after reaching the apogee. - where do you get this impression? We were told (in May, certainly) that it was recovering at one point. Who says
'irrecoverable'?

[takata]

- where do you get this impression? We were told (in May, certainly) that it was recovering at one point. Who says 'irrecoverable'?
Some says that it was irrecoverable, even before stalling... that PF pitch imputs and climb were not even correlated... go figure!

[FE Hoppy]

Air France’s reaction to the publication of the BEA’s third intermediate report
Friday 29 July 2011
In its third intermediate report, the French Accident Investigation Bureau (BEA) has just presented the exact circumstances of the AF 447 Rio/Paris accident on 1 June 2009.
It sheds further light on this tragedy that has deeply affected Air France and the entire air transport community. Air France wishes to pay tribute to the memory of the passengers and crew who lost their lives and extends its most sincere thoughts to their families.
From the flight recorder data, it has been established that the combination of multiple improbable factors led to the disaster in less than four minutes: the icing of the Pitot probes was the initial event that led to the disconnection of the autopilot, the loss of associated piloting control protections and considerable roll movements. After the manoeuvres carried out by the crew in deteriorated and destabilizing piloting conditions, the aircraft stalled at high altitude, could not be recovered and struck the surface of the Atlantic Ocean at high speed. It should be noted that the misleading stopping and starting of the stall warning alarm, contradicting the actual state of the aircraft, greatly contributed to the crew’s difficulty in analyzing the situation.
During this time, the crew, comprising both First Officers and the Captain, showed an unfailing professional attitude, remaining committed to their task to the very end. Air France pays tribute to the courage and determination they showed in such extreme conditions.
At this stage, there is no reason to question the crew’s technical skills.
Work will now continue to understand the causes and the various technical and human factors that contributed to the events leading to this disaster. It is important to understand whether the technical environment, systems and alarms hindered the crew’s understanding of the situation.
The BEA has also issued various recommendations for the European authorities in charge of air safety that Air France has already implemented or will implement as soon as possible. In addition to the elements that will be brought to light by the BEA’s final report and the work of the legal inquiry, we know that the measures already taken have considerably improved the safety of air transport, which is the most important aspect for the air transport industry. These measures prevent such an accident happening again.

Could not be? Wasn't would be more accurate wouldn't it?

[DozyWannabe]

One other thing, and I know this will not be accepted immediately by all Airbus cockpit crew .. I am not convinced that the airbus sidestick design is optimum for all situations (I'll leave it at that for now!).

Well neither is the yoke, to be honest - it gets in the way, seriously limits freedom of movement, accumulates crud around the base (when floor-mounted) and it's easy to bump when you turn around, which can have unintended consequences (ref: EAL401). As many others have said, there are positives and negatives to both major civil airliner control philosophies applied to the airframes currently in manufacture.

[GarageYears]

AF statement:

At this stage, there is no reason to question the crew’s technical skillsFrom the BBC:

A statement from Air France rejected the BEA's findings, saying that "nothing at this stage can allow the crew's technical competence to be blamed" for the crash.Personally I find it hard to agree with either statement.

The BEA recommendations don't seem to support these statements either....

- GY

[jcjeant]

Hi,

From the flight recorder data, it has been established that the combination of multiple improbable factors led to the disaster in less than four minutes: the icing of the Pitot probesAre they serious ?
Improbable factors ?
The icing of pitot tubes is not a improbable factor
This icing was well know .. cause many anterior accidends before the AF447 event
Anyways I hope a more complete interim report will be posted on BEA site.
Weird behaviour that posting the synthesis before the 3 interim report if it's any one ........

[infrequentflyer789]

- regarding AF statement

Could not be? Wasn't would be more accurate wouldn't it?

I would agree - bear in mind it's probably gone through translation though.

The statement (at least in english) then goes on to contradict itself by saying that the stop-start stall alarm contributed to failure to analyse situation. Why would that have any relevance if the situation "could not be" recovered !?

It also states that pitot icing "led to" the roll excursions - new one on me, how :confused:

Personally I think AF are grasping at straws, particularly given the comments on training. Also, AF blames the pitots, but they were advised (in plenty of time to prevent this) to change them by AB, and they delayed/refused. I think AF are in trouble on this one.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

As usual the french press articles are very interesting ...
Vol Rio-Paris : le BEA pointe une série de défaillances des pilotes - Société - Nouvelobs.com (http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/actualite/societe/20110729.OBS7816/vol-rio-paris-le-pilotage-mis-en-cause-dans-un-nouveau-rapport.html)
Le Figaro - Flash Actu : Af447:''enjeux conomiques'' (familles) (http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2011/07/29/97001-20110729FILWWW00283-af447enjeux-economiques-familles.php)
AF447 : "suspicieux d'accuser les pilotes si vite" - Europe1.fr - International (http://www.europe1.fr/International/AF447-suspicieux-d-accuser-les-pilotes-si-vite-648059/)
AF447: le BEA émet des recommandations vis à vis des compagnies aériennes et des autorités (http://www.businesstravel.fr/201107299851/newsflashes/newsflash/af447-le-bea-emet-des-recommandations-vis-a-vis-des-compagnies-aeriennes-et-des-autorites.html)
Crash du vol AF447: Air France dfend ses pilotes et met en cause l'alarme - 20minutes.fr (http://www.20minutes.fr/article/763970/crash-vol-af447-air-france-defend-pilotes-met-cause-alarme)
29 juillet 2011 - Culture (http://www.france-info.com/chroniques-hyper-revue-de-presse-2011-07-29-29-juillet-2011-553365-36-41.html)
Les familles de victimes allemandes jugent l'enquête du BEA "orientée" - Le Point - commentaires (http://www.lepoint.fr/reactions/monde.php?article=les-familles-de-victimes-allemandes-jugent-l-enquete-du-bea-orientee-29-07-2011-1357586_24)

[jcjeant]

Hi,
Warning: crude statement
So with this synthesis report .. we know the technical event starting the tragedy
The icing of the pitots tubes
And we know the human factor
Incompetent pilots in the situation cause lack of training (not training at all !!)
Methink AF is in BIG trouble cause this report.
And me think the BEA and DGAC are also in BIG trouble for the reasons above !

[ZeeDoktor]

Is it just me, or is this report really useless? I would have expected plots of the DFDR data and a CVR transcript! Bloody hell, there's nothing new of relevance in there!

Very disappointing. BEA should just dish out the facts!

[airtren]

Hello HarryMann

There is at least one instance that shows that a member of the A300 family has been recovered from a stall, from a lot lower altitude, 4100ft.

A A310, Tarom, approaching Orly, France, 1994 has been recovered at 800 ft, and landed safely, with no injuries or damage, from an uncontrolled climb and stall at 4100ft, pitch of 60 degrees, and airspeed of 30knots.
But it was a very well understood stall situation though, with very quick, proper ND, and roll, aggressive reactions from the pilots.

So, based on that one could even say that at 10000ft there was hope.



...I find it quite incredible that so many are suggesting (albeit frequently doing it between the lines), that the aircraft may have been irrecoverable once fully stalled soon after reaching the apogee.

It's a fairly conventional aerod. design, and I see no reason we should start comparing it to a 'T' tailed a/c operating with an aft c.g.

The fact it stayed at a stable AoA (probably determined by the THS setting) and just rocked its wings (+/- 20° max), maintained a reasonable airflow and forward speed component, make me think all was definitely not lost until say, at a guess, 25 > 20,000 ft.


One element I don't have an answer yet about the Stick, is what is the effect of "duration" in a certain position of the stick.

a. Is the actuating of a control surface proportional with the duration of the stick in a certain position?

or,

b. Is the actuating of a control surface, proportional only with the position of the stick, regardless of its duration?


One other thing, and I know this will not be accepted immediately by all Airbus cockpit crew .. I am not convinced that the airbus sidestick design is optimum for all situations (I'll leave it at that for now!).

[airtren]

Could not be? Wasn't would be more accurate wouldn't it?
No.
Based on the pilots actions, it was not possible to recover the plane.
The verb and sentence conveys what it is meant: airplane COULD not be recovered.

[badgerh]

Airtren,

I agree with your semantics but I think that Af are obfuscating. A clearer statement would be "the pilots were unable to recover from the stall" for whatever reason whether it be lack of training, not realisung they were fully stalled, simple panic or a combination of these and other factors.

"Could not" might imply what I wrote or that given the situation nobody could recover the plane, something that has not even been suggested yet.

[vanHorck]

I am tempted to say the report contains a lot more valuable information than the AF statement does.

What a shame AF is only thinking of keeping her slate clean rather than to enhance flight safety.

I find AF's comments shameful.

[glenbrook]

Air France défend ses pilotes (from Le Nouvel Observateur)
Air France, a répondu à ces résultats dans un communiqué en défendant le &quot;professionnalisme&quot; des pilotes, mettant en cause de leur côté la fiabilité de l'alarme de décrochage de l'avion, dont &quot;les multiples activations et arrêts&quot; ont &quot;fortement contribué à la difficulté pour l'équipage d'analyser la situation&quot;.
Air France responded to these results in a press release defending the &quot;professionalism&quot; of the pilots,for its part blaming the reliability of the stall warning with &quot;multiple stops and starts&quot; which strongly contributed to the difficulties the flight team had in analysing the situation.

Personally, although AF is not impartial I think this point is very important. I think the pilots disbelieved the stall warning from the start. In fact I think the very first stall warning, which came only a few seconds after AP disconnect, was a bogus warning caused by UAS.

[airtren]

Airtren,

I agree with your semantics but I think that Af are obfuscating. A clearer statement would be "the pilots were unable to recover from the stall" for whatever reason whether it be lack of training, not realisung they were fully stalled, simple panic or a combination of these and other factors.

"Could not" might imply what I wrote or that given the situation nobody could recover the plane, something that has not even been suggested yet.

Andrew from Addis
It's a "press release", and the number of words used is an important consideration. Sentences are crafted, so that they're short, while they convey the information, which you've noted. Excluding misinterpretations is a lesser consideration, and it is left to the reader.

[sensor_validation]

What about this document?

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3/pdf/f-cp090601e3.pdf

[takata]

Interim Report #3, 117 pages (French) , mirror site link:
http://media.webcastor.fr/web/bea/f-cp090601e3.pdf

[jcjeant]

Hi,

What about this document?

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...cp090601e3.pdf (http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3/pdf/f-cp090601e3.pdf)

Thank you ... downloading as I write ... :)

[wes_wall]

Thanks, assume it will also be in English. Hopefully it appears that this report will be more telling.

[HazelNuts39]

In fact I think the very first stall warning, which came only a few seconds after AP disconnect, was a bogus warning caused by UAS.
From the BEA press release: Each time the stall w arning was triggered, the angle of attack exceeded its theoretical trigger valueTo achieve a rate of climb of 7000 ft/min, then reduce it to 700 ft/min in the time allocated in BEA's note, requires a level of "gee" that brought the AoA very close to the "theoretical trigger value". A little bit of turbulence could have done the rest, which explains the intermittent nature of the first two s/w occurrences. Nothing 'bogus' about that.

[airtren]

Hello PJ2,

I am sorry if there is any perception in a negative sense. I am not the good writer that you are.

Nevertheless, please take my post, as a long thought out positive feedback, and an additional clarification to the ones you've already posted recently in your replies. As I've noticed the possible misinterpretation along time ago, in the repeated instances of that text, I think such clarifications were long due. I hope will help for future posts.

The Forum, and these threads are a learning and information source for many. The audience is a lot wider than just airmen.


airtren;

If I may, I've clarified the meaning of "do nothing" and I think you're turning it into something I never meant and that no airman would mis-interpret.

I would have thought that all pilots who fly transports would have understood what I meant and wouldn't think of it as "advice", or take it literally - no pilot would actually "do nothing" and just sit there waiting for the automatics.


As I posted earlier, I've expected the BEA recommendations to target both manufacturers and operators. They are in the right direction. What we see is just a summary.

I am looking forward though to the transcript of the CVR, and an accurate/precise time line of A/C states, and state changes, and pilot actions.

Edit: >>> Finally, got the report...... Yes, the transcript of the CVR speaks: the PNF calls the attention of the PF several times to do a ND, during the ascent. Furthermore, it calls the attention of the PF to use very fine stick controls. That's what you've recommended, isn't it?

Finally the CVR shows that Captain does not make too much of a difference.....

The problem with the Stall Warning is brought forward strongly, which was one of my major issues with the A/C.

The graph of the PF stick almost shows that the PF kept the stick in NU, instead of Neutral.

Training, training, training is an issue.

The PF had a "Glider Pilot License" from 2001, and the AF330 license from December 2008....
>>>>
End Edit


As for the BEA effort, it's disappointing, but there it is. Some interesting points regarding SOPs and some obvious safety recommendations. I guess we'll have to wait til October.

[Lonewolf_50]

and there is a recommendation for an AoA display, which will be down to Airbus and Boeing to implement
IIRC from our discussions a few threads ago, AoA can be called up already on one of the pages (maintenance?). Perhaps a short term fix is to use the software to add AoA to the opening of the F/CTL page which shows position of the THS and Rudder, etc. Granted, that puts the PNF in the role of advising PF of AoA, rather than putting it into scan. While that's not how I would do it, might be a decent short term fix. (Opinions?)

Second: where on the vertical display real estate is a good place for an AoA gauge? Opinions will differ.

Gratifying to see the BEA seems to agree with something that had me scratching my head.

Note: the training issue leaps to the fore.

PostScipt:
Seeing as captain off duty happens rather frequently on long haul, it's slightly suprising (well, to me...) that there is no CRM training for the rest of the crew in that situation. Poor CRM is then unsuprising.

CRM shortfall in terms of "Captain's at rest, how do we coordinate our efforts when we need him" an interesting point I had not thought about. I would have assumed that AF has a drill for that case. Good for the analysis effort to consider that area.
It should be noted that the misleading stopping and starting of the stall warning alarm, contradicting the actual state of the aircraft, greatly contributed to the crew’s difficulty in analyzing the situation.
Begins to look like the compound emergency/malfunction scenario, perhaps, in the eye of the crew.
"Crap, the AS is going squirrely, look, SW is sounding, must be from bad AS, look, x is wrong ... "
A A310, Tarom, ... recovered at 800 ft, ... from an uncontrolled climb and stall at 4100ft, pitch of 60 degrees, and airspeed of 30knots ... very quick, proper ND, and roll, aggressive reactions from the pilots ... one could even say that at 10000ft there was hope.

I doubt that aircraft developed a 10,000 fpm rate of descent. (And good thing, the pilots reacted promptly! :) Overcoming that 10,000 fpm from first unstalling, then getting knots on, then recovering with a nice firm pull without heading toward accelerated stall, since you are not in Normal Law ... how much altitude that takes is a question worth thinking through.
A clearer statement would be "the pilots were unable to recover from the stall" for whatever reason whether it be lack of training, not realisung they were fully stalled, simple panic or a combination of these and other factors.
That's a clue to what the crew were seeing and understanding from what they saw. (Was PNF head down in ECAMS pages or was his scan on flight instruments? We will probably never know. Is that how PNF's roles are trained? )
Personally, although AF is not impartial I think this point is very important. I think the pilots disbelieved the stall warning from the start. In fact I think the very first stall warning, which came only a few seconds after AP disconnect, was a bogus warning caused by UAS.
How well does this sort of malfunction get covered in the sim training?

When interrelated elements of a system both go bad, what logic tree or symptom troubleshooting is taught?

[glenbrook]

OK, this is the real report. It is very clear that PF was confused from the start and disbelieved airspeed. PNF kept telling him to descend, at one point saying "all three say you are climbing so descend";.
At one point PNF says ";we still have engines so whats happening"; presumably referring to the low airspeed.
2:12:27 PNF You're climbing (Stall warning), Descend descend descend descend
PF I was descending then?
PNF, Descend
Captain: No, you're climbing
PF: There I am climbing, ok now descend

The focus herein should be why the PF & PNF got so confused, although I am wondering how the PNF and Captain could not notice the PF's input. They realised they were climbing and knew they shouldn't be.

[Lord Bracken]

The CVR (assuming, complete) is at the end of the 3rd report published in French now on the BEA.aero site. My French isn't great, but it looks like complete confusion all the way down.

[grity]

2:12:44 C’est pas possible

[STICK N RUDDER]

Anti icing system is not certified for LSD larg supercooled droplets , freezing rain , freezing dreezle. LSD is probably what they encountered.

Blocked pitot tube including moisture drain hole if the AC was put in climb will read high erroneously and if you fixate on IAS and not flying pitch/power the reaction would be NU input and going into stall.

Here is what happened to North West B 727 in 1975

,,Investigators found that the pitot (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pitot_tube) heads had ce (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ice) damage which caused the crew to receive the wrong readings. The crew, believing the readings where true, raised their nose and pulled back on the control column (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_column), which caused the plane to stall,,

,,The aircraft had descended from 24000 feet to 1090 feet in 83 seconds,,

Full NTSB report

http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR75-13.pdf

[DozyWannabe]

OK, this is the real report. It is very clear that PF was confused from the start and disbelieved airspeed. PNF kept telling him to descend, at one point saying "all three say you are climbing so descend";.
At one point PNF says ";we still have engines so whats happening"; presumably referring to the low airspeed.
2:12:27 PNF You're climbing (Stall warning), Descend descend descend descend
PF I was descending then?
PNF, Descend
Captain: No, you're climbing
PF: There I am climbing, ok now descend


...And tellingly, the Captain says :

2 h 12 min 19 -> 2 h 12 min 45 : Horizon Horizon - Standby Horizon

Shades of Birgenair indeed:

0346:00 (46:22) CAM-3 *ADI
...
0346:31 (46:53) CAM-3 *ADI*

Admittedly this is from a Google Translate of that particular section of the document, but the question in my mind is the same as in Birgenair - why did the PNF (who appeared to have a better understanding of the situation) not take control earlier?

One question for our Gallic cousins - do I interpret "Tu montes" and "Tu descends descends" as literally climb and descend, or could the PNF be referring to attitude (nose-up/nose-down) here?

[EDIT : Corrected Captain's statement - thanks for the catch! ]

[levelvibes]

Who can please shed some light on the copilot´s deficient training the BEA report states.

"The copilots had received no high altitude tr aining for the "Unreliable IAS" procedure and manual air craft handling".

I find it hard to believe this. Isn´t this training absolute standard in any simulator training of any serious airline?
Am I missing anything?

Thanks

[jcjeant]

Hi;

One question for our Gallic cousins - do I interpret "Tu montes" and "Tu descends descends" as literally climb and descend, or could the PNF be referring to attitude (nose-up/nose-down) here?

Methink it means
literally climb and descend

[GarageYears]

2 h 11 min 32

je n’ai plus le
contrôle de l’avion là
J’ai plus du tout le
contrôle de l’avionGoogle Translate gives me:

"I have no control of the plane there
I am over the whole control of the plane"

I'm pretty sure there is a more accurate translation, but so far the story from the CVR is one of confusion and disbelief at what the instruments were telling them, rather than a systematic approach to understanding the situation and appropriate recovery. I have been through the entire CVR transcript, but since my French is iffy and my clumsy attempts using Google translate (particularly since the document is columnized) are hard to follow, I'll leave it at that.

[Lonewolf_50]

It is very clear that PF was confused from the start and disbelieved airspeed.
What did he see on his attitude indicator?
PNF kept telling him to descend, at one point saying "all three say you are climbing so descend";.

Note: when talking a pilot out of vertigo or scan breakdown, I learned the hard way that an effective technique is to do what I think the Captain was trying to do. The Captain appeared to be trying to get the PF to use his attitude reference, or was pointing out a problem in the attitude.

What I found works is to make recommendations or commands based on the monkey skills required to remedy the siuation.
Examples.

"Lower nose to horizon." "Raise nose to five degrees nose up. Lower nose to three degrees nose down.

Roll right. Stop roll. Wings level.
Left wing is down, roll right. Stop roll.
Add power. reduce power.

What that does is help the other pilot make corrective actions and re-establish his scan. Not sure what others have experienced in this regard.

My aircraft commander once talked me out of a horrific case of the leans doing just that. I used the technique more than once later on in life.
At one point PNF says ";we still have engines so whats happening"; presumably referring to the low airspeed.
2:12:27 PNF You're climbing (Stall warning), Descend descend descend descend
PF I was descending then?
PNF, Descend
Captain: No, you're climbing
PF: There I am climbing, ok now descend

Looks like someone got behind the aircraft. :(

I was descending?
No, you are climbing.
Chills up my spine.

[SaturnV]

The turbulence recorded between 0207 and 0210 was near but did not exceed 0.5G

There are several pages of presentation on the on-board radar, its limitations, etc.

Le radar de bord ne détecte donc pas directement les dangers à éviter et présente certaines limitations qui nécessitent de la part des pilotes une surveillance active et une interprétation permanentes des images présentées pour limiter le risque de sous-estimation du danger de la situation. Il est à noter que, au moment de l’accident, la présence de cristaux de glace à haute altitude n’était pas considérée comme un danger objectif et que les équipages n’y étaient pas sensibilisés.

Just before the captain leaves to go on his rest, there is four minutes (0148 -0152) of turbulence at 0.3-0.4G. Moderate turbulence but nothing to indicate there was any conversation about adjusting the radar. And as the captain takes his leave, no discussion about the weather at all.

BEA comment on an AF A-320 flight that ran into a Cb enroute Geneva.

The top of the cumulonimbus being mainly made up of ice crystals, their detection by the onboard weather radar required an active search with changes to the gain, tilt and range, to be able to detect humid zones. This must be done in sufficient time to allow avoidance. In addition, the rapid formation of these clouds requires frequent repetition of the search. During this flight, the radar [2] was in WX mode, gain on AUTO, the tilt set at -2° and the distance selected on the ND at 160 NM on the Captain’s side and 80 NM on the co-pilot’s side. The Captain expected to encounter storm activity on arrival at Geneva, but not in cruise. The copilot focused his attention on programming the FMGS for the arrival. The crew did not carry out any particular search for storms with the aid of the radar.

Turbulence at the top of cumulonimbus (http://www.bea.aero/ita.articles/turbulence.at.the.top.of.cumulonimbus/turbulence.at.the.top.of.cumulonimbus.html)

[HarryMann]

Originally Posted by HarryMann
an well positioned AoA instrument, with green and red areas
Of course you need to have valid airspeed to set the green/red correctly. Not at the -ve and +ve extremes, as with a revcounter, we have an Orange area

But yes, its not all so simple... but nothing is, What is simple and the Captain could have pointed straight at it.. would be a large simply calibrated AoA instrument -

We are supposed to be cruising at about 3.5 ° So WIHIHi.e. What in Hell Is Happening, that looks like 15°

[infrequentflyer789]

2 h 11 min 32

Google Translate gives me:

"I have no control of the plane there
I am over the whole control of the plane"

I'm pretty sure there is a more accurate translation, but so far the story from the CVR is one of confusion and disbelief at what the instruments were telling them, rather than a systematic approach to understanding the situation and appropriate recovery. I have been through the entire CVR transcript, but since my French is iffy and my clumsy attempts using Google translate (particularly since the document is columnized) are hard to follow, I'll leave it at that.

- GY

I read it as "I no longer have control of the plane". My french isn't that good either though. Hopefully english translation will be along soon.

I believe they definitely had _some_ pitch info, but what:


Les ailes à plat
l’horizon l’horizon de
secours

- that is capt. at 2.12.19

Shouting for wings flat I think (too late - wings needed to be a lot below flat by then ?). But "l’horizon de secours" - is that the standby (ISIS) ? If so, was PF/PNF seeing something else on main attitude display ?

Mostly, like you say, it looks like complete confusion. No verbal acknowledgement of stall or recovery from. Unless "Im in TOGA eh?" is indicating "I'm in TOGA so can't be stalled can I ?". Previous stall training emphasised TOGA, not nose down, didn't it... :(

Still, at least we got data to look at now.

[GarageYears]

The amplitude of the SS inputs are also pretty disturbing...

Here's the beginning;

2 h 10 min 05 Altitude=35024
The P/A2 disengages.
The roll angle from 0 to 8.4 ° in 2 seconds while the handle is in neutral.
The pitch is 0 degrees.
Cavalry charge (Alarm: disconnection autopilot)
2 h 10 min 06
The flight control law passes from normal to alternate. PF: "I have control"
During the period 2 h 10 min 07-2 h 10 min 18
The SS is positioned:
- To pitch between neutral and ¾ stop
- Left half and then stop right half-stop, 2 times, alternating left until it stops then right to the half-stop (period 4 seconds).
The pitch increases to 11 °.
The vertical acceleration varies between 0.9 g and 1.6 g.
The roll angle is between 11 ° right and 6 left.
The vertical velocity increases up to 5200 ft / min.

So the first SS input at 0.8M/FL350 is 3/4 of the SS travel NU, with an equally significant full-left and then 1/2-right alternating inputs over a period of 4 seconds... pitch started at 0 degrees at 2h10m05 and is 11 degrees at 2h10m18

<snip>

2 h 11 min 32:

OPL is the handle:
- Set to pitch, reached the
stop after 6 seconds and there
remains up to 2 h 12 min 15etc...

Apologies for the Google Translate.

- GY

[grity]

jcjeant, send you a PM

[Lonewolf_50]

Garage years:

A couple of threads back, either Chris Scott or Confiture posted a link to a small video of a pilot flying a sidestick (in turbulent weather? at low altitude?) that he opined as being in the realm of over controlling. Is what you described in the same ball park, or do you think it's larger control deflections?

If the plane can be in Alt 2 at altitude, and thus need to be hand flown in tha tmode, should not the training syllabus include such tasks and skills be mastered, or at least demonstrated?

[bearfoil]

Lonewolf

I see your quoted exchange differently. Rather than being behind, I see a PF asking for help from someone who (he thinks may) have accurate reads, his being 'duff'.

If so, it is absurd, and calls for an exchange of ss? PF should not even think of asking his question "I was descending then?" If going on feel, he's barking up the wrong tree, and if he is unaware, his question should have been a statement, "your aircraft".

bear

[airtren]

....

.Tarom, Orly 1994, ..

I doubt that aircraft developed a 10,000 fpm rate of descent. (And good thing, the pilots reacted promptly! :) Overcoming that 10,000 fpm from first unstalling, then getting knots on, then recovering with a nice firm pull without heading toward accelerated stall, since you are not in Normal Law ... how much altitude that takes is a question worth thinking through.

The Tarom guys were with their sticks full ND, during the ascent already, before the Stall, at 60 pitch, as they understood what they need to do, long before the Stall, they just could not stop the ascent. The problem was that the THS was full UP, in spite of elevators full DOWN. They were able to get the A/C back from a 60 degree pitch,....

All was needed was to change the pitch.... take that 10000ft/min descent rate from a NU, to a ND....

Easy to say....

Interestingly, the PF had a Glider Pilot License, since 2001.

[Lonewolf_50]

bear, one way to resolve a pilot who is confused by his displays, in a multi crew aircraft, is to pass the controls to the pilot who isn't. Yes. That is a technique. Would that have helped in this instance? If done early enough, likely so.

Don't know what AF SOP is for such things, nor the corporate culture, nor the norms in its pilot community.

I thus won't comment on what should, or should not have been done, or what is or isn't absurd.

I learned the "helpful copilot" role in CRM and via experience. It sometimes precedes "I have controls" as the order of actions. Depends on the situation.

[GarageYears]

Lonewolf_50:

My take is the reported stick inputs of the magnitude stated are wholly excessive for the altitude/speed, turbulence or otherwise. At the start of the sequence small corrective inputs would have been expected (what I read in the report was entirely different, almost as if the PF was behaving as if they were low and slow).

- GY

[Lonewolf_50]

GY, your comment on "reacted as though he were low and slow" puts the "recency of training" issue back on my screen as a significant training issue among other training issues.

[bearfoil]

lonewolf

With your emphasis on scan (kudos), and your teaching experience, the question asked by PF can mean only a couple things. With a nod to possible translation and linguistic issues, "Was I descending then?"

1. From your PFD, can you tell? (poor technique?)

2. Did you feel a descent? (not the proper time for flight by butt cheek?)

3. A student asking for direction, rather than a PIC?

All are unacceptable?

[spagiola]

A quick, informal translation, that may help some of the non-French speakers here.

I'm a native French speaker and have a PPL, but have no further relevant qualifications, so caveat emptor.

2 h 10 min 06
PF: J’ai les commandes
I have the controls

2 h 10 min
PF: Ignition start
Ignition start

2 h 10 min 11
PNF: Qu’est ce que c’est que ça ?
What's that

2 h 10 min 14
PF: On n’a pas une bonne… On n’a pas une bonne annonce de…
We don't have a good... we don't have a good indication of ...

2 h 10 min 17
PNF: On a perdu les les les vitesses alors… engine thrust A T H R engine lever thrust
We've lost the the the speeds so ... engine thrust A T H R engine lever thrust

2 h 10 min 18
PF: … de vitesse
... of speed

2 h 10 min 22
PNF: Alternate law protections (law/low/lo)
Alternate law protections (law/low/lo)

2 h 10 min 24
PNF: Attends on est en train de perdre…
Wait we're losing...

2 h 10 min 25
PNF: Wing anti-ice
Wing anti-ice

2 h 10 min 27 to 2 h 10 min 31
PNF: Fais attention à ta vitesse Fais attention à ta vitesse
Watch your speed Watch your speed

PF: Okay, okay okay je redescends
ok ok ok I'm going back down

PNF: Tu stabilises
stabilize (could also be, you're stabilizing)

PF: Ouais
Yeaf

PNF: Tu redescends
You're going back down

2 h 10 min 33
PNF: Selon les trois tu montes donc tu redescends
According to the three you're going up, so you go back down

2 h 10 min 35
PF: D’accord
Agreed

2 h 10 min 36
PNF: T’es à ... Redescends
You're at ... go back down

PF: C’est parti on (re)descend
On our way we're going (back) down

2 h 10 min 39 to 2 h 10 min 46
PNF: Je te mets en en A T T
I'm putting you in in A T T

2 h 10 min 42
PF: On est en ouais on est en climb
We're in yeah we're in climb

2 h 10 min 49
PNF: (…) il est où euh ?
Uh, where is he?

2 h 10 min 56
PF: (TOGA)
(TOGA)

2 h 11
PNF: Surtout essaie de toucher le moins possible les commandes en en latéral hein
Above all, try to touch the controls as little as possible in in lateral, huh

2 h 11 min 03
PF: Je suis en TOGA hein
I'm in TOGA, huh

2 h 11 min 06
PNF: (…) il vient ou pas
Is he coming or not

2 h 11 min 21
PF: On a pourtant les moteurs qu’est-ce qui se passe (…) ?
We've got the engines after all. what's going on (...)?

2 h 11 min 32
PF: (…) je n’ai plus le contrôle de l’avion là J’ai plus du tout le contrôle de l’avion
I no longer have control of the plane; I no longer have any control at all of the plane

2 h 11 min 38
PNF: Commande à gauche
Controls to the left

2 h 11 min 41
PF: J’ai l’impression (qu’on a de) la vitesse
I have the impression (that we have) the speed

2 h 11 min 43
CAP: Eh qu’est-ce que vous (faites) ?
Hey what are you doing?

PNF: Qu’est-ce qui se passe ? Je ne sais pas je sais pas ce qui se passe
What's happening? I don't know I don't know what's happening

2 h 11 min 52
Alors tiens prends prends ça
So here take take that

2 h 11 min 58
PF: J’ai un problème c’est que j’ai plus de vario là
I have a problem it's that I no longer have the [vario] there
(not sure that "vario" is, here)

CAP: D’accord
OK

PF: J’ai plus aucune indication
I no longer have any indication

2 h 12 min 04 to 2 h 12 min 07
PF: J’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou non qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ?
I have the impression that we have a crazy speed, no, what do you think of it?
(in this context, I believe "vitesse de fou" means "very high speed")

2 h 12 min 07
PNF: Non surtout ne ne (les) sors pas
No, definitely don't don't extend them
(literally, "don't take them out")

2 h 12 min 13
PNF: Qu’est-ce que tu en penses qu’est-ce que tu en penses, qu’est-ce qu’il faut faire ?
What do you think of it what do you think of it what do we have to do?

2 h 12 min 15 to 2 h 12 min 19
CAP: Là je sais pas là ça descends
I don't know we're going down

2 h 12 min 19 to 2 h 12 min 45
PF: Là c’est bon là on serait revenu les ailes à plat, non il veut (pas)
there that's good we'd be back to wings level, no he (doesn't) wan't to

CAP: Les ailes à plat ... l’horizon l’horizon de secours
Wings level ... the horizon the backup horizon

PNF: L’horizon (segonde)
The horizon

2 h 12 min 26
PNF: La vitesse ?
The speed?

2 h 12 min 27
PNF: Tu montes ... Tu descends descends descends descends
You're going up ... you're going down go down go down go down

2 h 12 min 30
PF: Je suis en train de descendre là ?
Am I going down?

PNF: Descends
Go down

2 h 12 min 32
CAP: Non tu montes là
No you're going up, there

2 h 12 min 33
PF: Là je monte okay alors on descend
There I'm going up ok so we're going down (or could be "let's go down")

2 h 12 min 39
PF: Okay on est en TOGA
ok, we're in TOGA

2 h 12 min 42
PF: En alti on a quoi là ?
In alti[tude] we're at what, here?

2 h 12 min 44
CAP: (…) C’est pas possible
It's not possible

2 h 12 min 45
PF: En alti on a quoi ?
In alti[tude] we're at what ?

2 h 12 min 45 to 2 h 13 min 04
PNF: Comment ça en altitude ?
What do you mean in altitude?

PF: Ouais ouais ouais j’descends là non ?
yeah yeah yeah i'm going down here, no?

PNF: Là tu descends oui
You're going down here, yes

CAP: Hé tu ... tu es en… Mets mets les ailes horizontales
hey you ... you're in ... put put the wings level

PNF: Mets les ailes horizontales
Put the wings level

C’est ce que je cherche à faire
That's what I'm trying to do

CAP: Mets les ailes horizontales
Put the wings level

2 h 12 min 59
PF: Je suis à fond à… avec du gauchissement
I'm at the limit ... to the left

CAP: Le palonnier
Rudder pedals

2 h 13 min 25
PF: Qu’est-ce qu’y… comment ça se fait qu’on continue à descendre à fond là?
What is... how come we're continuing to descend so fast?

2 h 13 min 28
PNF: Essaye de trouver ce que tu peux faire avec tes commandes là-haut Les primaires et cetera
Try to see what you can do with your controls up there. The primaries etc

2 h 13 min 32
PF: au niveau cent
At level 100

2 h 13 min 36
PF: Neuf mille pieds
9000 feet

2 h 13 min 38
CAP: Doucement avec le palonnier là
Easy with the rudder

2 h 13 min 39
PNF: Remonte remonte remonte remonte
Climb climb climb climb (literally, "remonte" is "climb back up")

2 h 13 min 40
PF: Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure
But I'm nose up to the limit since earlier

CAP: Non non non ne remonte pas
No no no don't climb back up

PNF: Alors descends
Go down, then

2 h 13 min 45
PNF: Alors donne-moi les commandes à moi les commandes
So give the me controls. The controls to me.

PF: Vas-y tu as les commandes on est en TOGA toujours hein
Go on, you have the controls. We're still in TOGA, ok

2 h 14 min 05
CAP: Attention tu cabres là
Watch it, you're pitching up

PNF: Je cabre ?
I'm pitching up?

PF: Ben il faudrait on est à quatre mille pieds
Well, we should, we're at 4000 feet

2 h 14 min 18
CAP: Allez tire
Go on, pull

PF: Allez on tire on tire on tire on tire
Go on, we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling

[GarageYears]

spagolia:

Painful reading..... :ooh:

Thanks for the translation.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

Can someone with technical knowledge put some comment on the graphic from page 111 of the N°3 interim report
Comment about the differences of stick-and surfaces positions (elevators and trim)
Thank you.

[Alber Ratman]

I mentioned the lack of AOA indication a long time ago, seems the experts at the BEA agree.

[glad rag]

I mentioned the lack of AOA indication a long time ago, seems the experts at the BEA agree. Yes, and I suggested some stand alone examples of the types that could be retrofitted and engineered only to illuminate/indicate when the control laws degraded downwards.......:ouch:

Tragic reading the transcript on post 939, tragic.

[rudderrudderrat]

H jcjeant.


From 02 10 15 the roll input is L & R (-8 to + 8) with little back stick.
From 02 10 45 to 02 11 30 the back stick varies between 0 and -10, at the same time the stab trim runs from -3 to -10.
From 02 11 30 onwards the back stick is held between full back (-30) to about half back but mostly full back; from 02 11 30 to 02 11 45 the stab trim runs to the limit -13 and remains there.

[FullWings]

What's happening? I don't know I don't know what's happening
...
Am I going down?
...
No you're going up, there
...
yeah yeah yeah i'm going down here, no?
...
What is... how come we're continuing to descend so fast?
...
9000 feet
...
Climb climb climb climb
...
But I'm nose up to the limit since earlier
...
Watch it, you're pitching up
...
Well, we should, we're at 4000 feet
....
Go on, we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling
...


Horrible, horrible reading. They had most of the clues between them but the committee decision didn't work out. :ouch:

[RealQuax]

Ref #939 2 h 10 min 39 to 2 h 10 min 46
PNF: Je te mets en en A T T
I'm putting you in in A T T

I am putting you in ATT: That doesn't mean he switched the IRS to ATT, does it?

[jcjeant]

Hi,

H jcjeant.


From 02 10 15 the roll input is L & R (-8 to + 8) with little back stick.
From 02 10 45 to 02 11 30 the back stick varies between 0 and -10, at the same time the stab trim runs from -3 to -10.
From 02 11 30 onwards the back stick is held between full back (-30) to about half back but mostly full back; from 02 11 30 to 02 11 45 the stab trim runs to the limit -13 and remains there. Maybe I'm not enough smart for read a graphic .. :)
But I was requesting advise cause I see differences between the stick position and surfaces position in a corresponding time (discripancies) and I don't think it's can be caused by some hysteresis ...
I read some big movements of the stick .. and not corresponding movement of elevator (at same time)
Why this gap ? (at least is what I see in the graphic)

[Lonewolf_50]

bear, what it means to me is that what he's seeing doesn't make sense. You have instruments doing something unexpected or wrong, a scan breakdown, or both, or multiples of them.

What was he seeing? Apparently, not the same thing the PNF was seeing.

EDIT:

I just read the released (thanks for the translation) trail of discussion, spagiola.

My eyes are wet.

Oh, sweet Jesus. :{

EDIT 2:
Don't understand this
2 h 10 min 39 to 2 h 10 min 46
PNF: Je te mets en en A T T
I'm putting you in in A T T

I think I understand this
2 h 10 min 42
PF: On est en ouais on est en climb
We're in yeah we're in climb

2 h 10 min 49
PNF: (…) il est où euh ?
Uh, where is he?

PNF had already called for the captain.
He seems to have noticed things going pear shaped early, and called for help.

[paull]

Brevet de pilote de planeur obtenu en 2001

So, I guess the "They should make Gliding/PPL/Aerobatics... a requirement" is not the solution, people can still freeze or get it wrong without training/practice.
Such a pity, fear brings with it terrible tunnel vision, compared to the high you get when you get to do what you have trained to do.

I have to believe that the AoA indicator would have made the difference, particularly if it was part of the 'primitive' panel, i.e., these are real, WYSIWYG, no translation, no airspeed indication just a piece of tin that says "this is the way the wind blows" . Sad

[takata]

Hi Alber Ratman,
I mentioned the lack of AOA indication a long time ago, seems the experts at the BEA agree.
Right, but one need to know how to use it. Nonetheless, it should not be so difficult to add them... but most companies don't want (need) them (this documentation below is from 1995).

http://takata1940.free.fr/aoa1.jpg
http://takata1940.free.fr/aoa2.jpg
http://takata1940.free.fr/aoa3.jpg

[vanHorck]

Excellent translation except:

2 h 12 min 15 to 2 h 12 min 19
CAP: Là je sais pas là ça descends
I don't know we're going down

this in my view should be read as 2 separate statements made by the captain

CAP: Là je sais pas
That one I have no idea of

CAP: là ça descends
That one indicates a descent

Further on I keep seeing that the captain is trying to make sense of what are apparently continuously divergent readings.
He seems to be getting it right initially when he points to the emergency artificial horizon indicator but then starts doubting when apparently directed towards other attitude information which is in disagreement with that emergency artificial horizon:


The only stable reading not in dispute is the altitude (9000 feet not disputed), but other attitude readings seem to be in total disagreement

[papapapahotel]

Yes, painful.
It's been enlightening to read this thread, technicaly, and now, humanly.
Thanks to all of you.

[Alber Ratman]

Takata, thanks for the enlighting insight. Most companies might not feel the need for them. Do you believe that the regulators might think overwise now and with the functionallity of raw data if the main ADIRU's fall down?

PS Those instruments would have been showing +25 all the way down.

[DozyWannabe]

Birgenair transcript (English translation) - compare and contrast:

BirgenAir Accident - CVR Transcript (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/ComAndRep/PuertoPlata/CVR-birgenair.html)

[paull]

I am reminded that some said that the BEA would never
1-seriously look for
2- Find
3- Read
the recorders, but actually after I put those folk on my ignore list I found the quality of the thread improved:)

[DozyWannabe]

CAP: Là je sais pas
That one I have no idea of


Could be airspeed.

CAP: là ça descends
That one indicates a descent


Could be altimeter.

Further on I keep seeing that the captain is trying to make sense of what are apparently continuously divergent readings.
He seems to be getting it right initially when he points to the emergency artificial horizon indicator but then starts doubting when apparently directed towards other attitude information which is in disagreement with that emergency artificial horizon:

The only stable reading not in dispute is the altitude (9000 feet not disputed), but other attitude readings seem to be in total disagreement

I read it slightly differently - remember he's come in having been woken up from trying to sleep. Unfortunately he never names the instruments he's describing (except when he tries to draw their attention to the horizon and standby horizon). I read it as him seeing them nose-high with TOGA power, trying to work out why the altitude is falling away, and then - sadly too late, he seems to realise, and tells his crew to put the nose down:

2 h 13 min 39
PNF: Remonte remonte remonte remonte
Climb climb climb climb (literally, "remonte" is "climb back up")

2 h 13 min 40
PF: Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure
But I'm nose up to the limit since earlier

CAP: Non non non ne remonte pas
No no no don't climb back up

PNF: Alors descends
Go down, then

At this point it's too late to do anything, but it appears that the Captain and PNF are finally aware of what's happened, unfortunately the PF doesn't seem to have been as quick on the uptake (understandably, as he'd been fighting the thing most of the way down) - and bizarrely, the Captain and PNF seem to agree...

2 h 13 min 45
PNF: Alors donne-moi les commandes à moi les commandes
So give the me controls. The controls to me.

PF: Vas-y tu as les commandes on est en TOGA toujours hein
Go on, you have the controls. We're still in TOGA, ok

2 h 14 min 05
CAP: Attention tu cabres là
Watch it, you're pitching up

PNF: Je cabre ?
I'm pitching up?

PF: Ben il faudrait on est à quatre mille pieds
Well, we should, we're at 4000 feet

2 h 14 min 18
CAP: Allez tire
Go on, pull

PF: Allez on tire on tire on tire on tire
Go on, we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling

Painful reading.

[Lemurian]

To spagiola
I took the liberty to proof-read your very good translation and this is how it is :



I'm a native French speaker and have a PPL, but have no further relevant qualifications, so caveat emptor.

2 h 10 min 06
PF: J’ai les commandes
I have control

2 h 10 min
PF: Ignition start
Ignition start

2 h 10 min 11
PNF: Qu’est ce que c’est que ça ?
What's that ?

2 h 10 min 14
PF: On n’a pas une bonne… On n’a pas une bonne annonce de…
We don't have a good... we don't have a good indication of ...

2 h 10 min 17
PNF: On a perdu les les les vitesses alors… engine thrust A T H R engine lever thrust
We've lost the the the speeds so ... engine thrust A T H R (off) engine lever thrust

2 h 10 min 18
PF: … de vitesse
... of speed

2 h 10 min 22
PNF: Alternate law protections
Alternate law protections

2 h 10 min 24
PNF: Attends on est en train de perdre…
Wait we're losing...

2 h 10 min 25
PNF: Wing anti-ice
Wing anti-ice

2 h 10 min 27 to 2 h 10 min 31
PNF: Fais attention à ta vitesse Fais attention à ta vitesse
Watch your speed Watch your speed

PF: Okay, okay okay je redescends
ok ok ok I'm going back down

PNF: Tu stabilises
stabilize (“stay there”)

PF: Ouais
Yeah

PNF: Tu redescends
You're going back down

2 h 10 min 33
PNF: Selon les trois tu montes donc tu redescends
According to the three you're going up, so you go back down (meaning the three vertical speed indicators... )

2 h 10 min 35
PF: D’accord
Agreed

2 h 10 min 36
PNF: T’es à ... Redescends
You're at ... go back down !

PF: C’est parti on (re)descend
On our way we're going (back) down

2 h 10 min 39 to 2 h 10 min 46
PNF: Je te mets en en A T T
I'm putting you in in A T T

2 h 10 min 42
PF: On est en ouais on est en climb
We're in yeah we're in climb

2 h 10 min 49
PNF: (…) il est où euh ?
Uh, where is he?

2 h 10 min 56
PF: (TOGA)
(TOGA)

2 h 11
PNF: Surtout essaie de toucher le moins possible les commandes en en latéral hein
Above all, try to touch the controls as little as possible in in lateral, hey ?!

2 h 11 min 03
PF: Je suis en TOGA hein ?
I'm in TOGA, no ?

2 h 11 min 06
PNF: (…) il vient ou pas
Is he coming or not ?

2 h 11 min 21
PF: On a pourtant les moteurs qu’est-ce qui se passe (…) ?
We've got the engines yet (nothing is happening...),. what's going on (...)?

2 h 11 min 32
PF: (…) je n’ai plus le contrôle de l’avion là J’ai plus du tout le contrôle de l’avion
I no longer have control of the plane; I no longer have any control at all of the plane

2 h 11 min 38
PNF: Commande à gauche
Controls to the left

2 h 11 min 41
PF: J’ai l’impression (qu’on a de) la vitesse
I have the impression (that we have) some speed

2 h 11 min 43
CAP: Eh qu’est-ce que vous (faites) ?
Hey what are you doing?

PNF: Qu’est-ce qui se passe ? Je ne sais pas je sais pas ce qui se passe
What's happening? I don't know I don't know what's happening

2 h 11 min 52
Alors tiens prends prends ça
So here take take that

2 h 11 min 58
PF: J’ai un problème c’est que j’ai plus de vario là
I have a problem it's that I no longer have vertical speed
CAP: D’accord
OK

PF: J’ai plus aucune indication
I no longer have any indication

2 h 12 min 04 to 2 h 12 min 07
PF: J’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou non qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ?
I have the impression that we have some crazy speed, don’t we ?.. what do you think ?


2 h 12 min 07
PNF: Non surtout ne ne (les) sors pas
No, in any case, don't don't extend them


2 h 12 min 13
PNF: Qu’est-ce que tu en penses qu’est-ce que tu en penses, qu’est-ce qu’il faut faire ?
What do you think ?what do you think ? what do we have to do?

2 h 12 min 15 to 2 h 12 min 19
CAP: Là je sais pas là ça descend
I don't know we're going down

2 h 12 min 19 to 2 h 12 min 45
PF: Là c’est bon là on serait revenu les ailes à plat, non il veut (pas)
there ! that's good ! we'd be back to wings level, no he (doesn't) wan't to

CAP: Les ailes à plat ... l’horizon l’horizon de secours
Wings level ... the horizon the backup horizon

PNF: L’horizon
The horizon

2 h 12 min 26
PNF: La vitesse ?
The speed?

2 h 12 min 27
PNF: Tu montes ... Tu descends descends descends descends
You're going up ... go down go down go down go down

2 h 12 min 30
PF: Je suis en train de descendre là ?
Am I going down?

PNF: Descend !
Go down

2 h 12 min 32
CAP: Non tu montes là
No you're going up, now

2 h 12 min 33
PF: Là je monte okay alors on descend
There I'm going up ok so let's go down

2 h 12 min 39
PF: Okay on est en TOGA
ok, we're in TOGA

2 h 12 min 42
PF: En alti on a quoi là ?
In alti[tude] we're at what, here?

2 h 12 min 44
CAP: (…) C’est pas possible
It's not possible

2 h 12 min 45
PF: En alti on a quoi ?
In alti[tude] we're at what ?

2 h 12 min 45 to 2 h 13 min 04
PNF: Comment ça en altitude ?
What do you mean in altitude?

PF: Ouais ouais ouais j’descends là non ?
yeah yeah yeah i'm going down now, no?

PNF: Là tu descends oui
You're going down now, yes

CAP: Hé tu ... tu es en… Mets mets les ailes horizontales
hey you ... you're in ... put put the wings level

PNF: Mets les ailes horizontales
Put the wings level

C’est ce que je cherche à faire
That's what I'm trying to do

CAP: Mets les ailes horizontales
Put the wings level

2 h 12 min 59
PF: Je suis à fond à… avec du gauchissement
I'm at the limit of the stick... to the left

CAP: Le palonnier
Rudder pedals

2 h 13 min 25
PF: Qu’est-ce qu’y… comment ça se fait qu’on continue à descendre à fond là?
What is... how come we're continuing to descend so fast?

2 h 13 min 28
PNF: Essaye de trouver ce que tu peux faire avec tes commandes là-haut Les primaires et cetera
Try to see what you can do with your controls up there. The primaries etc

2 h 13 min 32
PF: au niveau cent
At level 100

2 h 13 min 36
PF: Neuf mille pieds
9000 feet

2 h 13 min 38
CAP: Doucement avec le palonnier là
Easy with the rudder

2 h 13 min 39
PNF: Remonte remonte remonte remonte
Climb climb climb climb (literally, "remonte" is "climb back up")

2 h 13 min 40
PF: Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure
But I've been pulling to the back stop for a good while

CAP: Non non non ne remonte pas
No no no don't climb back up

PNF: Alors descend
Go down, then

2 h 13 min 45
PNF: Alors donne-moi les commandes à moi les commandes
So give the me controls. I have control

PF: Vas-y tu as les commandes on est en TOGA toujours hein
Go on, you have control. We're still in TOGA, right ?

2 h 14 min 05
CAP: Attention tu cabres là
Watch it, you're pitching up

PNF: Je cabre ?
I'm pitching up?

PF: Ben il faudrait on est à quatre mille pieds
Well, we should, we're at 4000 feet

2 h 14 min 18
CAP: Allez tire
Go on, pull

PF: Allez on tire on tire on tire on tire
Go on, we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling !


For some reason, I lost the colors but you've cited the speakers.

[takata]

Hi Lonewolf,
2 h 10 min 49
PNF: (…) il est où euh ?
Uh, where is he?

PNF had already called for the captain.
He seems to have noticed things going pear shaped early, and called for help.
Be carefull (everybody) about the transcript meaning. It is better to wait for the English translation which will be painful to do (I guess it is the reason why they are late on it).
French talk (especially in high stress context) is using a lot of undefined terms; here, "il est où" could mean "where it is?" or "where he is?". In context, I understand that something is missing on his pannel (like Flight Director, or another indication he was looking at that disapeared) rather than "someone" -the captain.
A lot of these sentences are completely meaningless without the tone -might be interrogative, or talking to one or to the other or to himself or even to the aircraft.
Following the conversation with notes about the context in other columns add a lot to the understanding.

Now, I understand also why the BEA would like to have the whole scene with all pannels filmed as many things said all along are related to instruments and very hard to guess what it was exactly.
Vario = variomètre = V/S indicator. The PF lost it at one point.

It is a work in progress. Much more will be added but we'll have to wait for the first quarter of 2012, when they will finish their job.

[PJ2]

Lonewolf_50;
IIRC from our discussions a few threads ago, AoA can be called up already on one of the pages (maintenance?).
The AoA parameter, along with thousands of other parameters, may be brought up on the 3rd ACARS unit on the pedestal, using the ACMS > Alpha LBL settings. I used to watch the AoA, FPA, VRTG, LATG, CAS, TAS all the time. It takes about 3 minutes to go through the menu call-up process so it wouldn't have been available here.

Further, regarding the safety recommendations, I doubt if the recommendation to include the AoA in the available displays for crews is a realistic, or even helpful idea. Airline pilots don't fly "AoA" and it would be a significant transition from pitch, power and speed to train crews to fly primarily AoA. I don't think it would have helped or saved this situation because AoA wasn't being taught/trained. Besides, this is the only accident we know of which could have made use of an AoA display to save the aircraft. The Turkish B737 could not have been saved as there wasn't sufficent altitude by the time the aircraft stalled, and they weren't paying attention to the airspeed, so an AoA indication may not have helped.

airtren, thanks for your very kind response.

[Lonewolf_50]

Going over this twice, the following passage looks somewhat like the PF has an attitude indication that's gone wrong.

Yes, I know there's no ACARS hit, but he does not seem to be seeing what the PNF is seeing.

I am not sure what he was looking at, but I have a suspicion that he was on a performance instrument scan rather than an attitude scan during part of this, and it may have been due to his attitude not matching what he was seeing ... but I think that if PNF had seen PF's display as being different from his, he might have done something ... what was "putting you on ATT" mean?
Was he switching attitude indicator reference?

2 h 10 min 27 to 2 h 10 min 31
PNF: Fais attention à ta vitesse Fais attention à ta vitesse
Watch your speed Watch your speed

PF: Okay, okay okay je redescends
ok ok ok I'm going back down

PNF: Tu stabilises
stabilize (“stay there”)

PF: Ouais
Yeah

PNF: Tu redescends
You're going back down

2 h 10 min 33
PNF: Selon les trois tu montes donc tu redescends
According to the three you're going up, so you go back down (meaning the three vertical speed indicators... )

2 h 10 min 35
PF: D’accord
Agreed

2 h 10 min 36
PNF: T’es à ... Redescends
You're at ... go back down !

PF: C’est parti on (re)descend
On our way we're going (back) down

2 h 10 min 39 to 2 h 10 min 46
PNF: Je te mets en en A T T
I'm putting you in in A T T

2 h 10 min 42
PF: On est en ouais on est en climb
We're in yeah we're in climb

[ChristiaanJ]

spagiola,
Great job!
I might disagree with a couple of translations, but they would depend on intonation, etc. so I've no intention to argue about them.
Yours is probably better than the "official" BEA English translation, which I haven't bothered to read yet.

[Lonewolf_50]

PJ, what I was getting to is that the AoA data is already fed into the system anyway, as you describe: it's there for the taking. My thought was to allow it to be direct fed to a different page rather than having to page down to dig it out.

If I am reading correctly, the F/CTL page comes up with one or two movements or touches, or comes up on its own if a given malfunction circuit completes. (If I misunderstand, sorry).

Put another way, have it on the first floor rather or the lobby of the hotel, not the seventh level of the underground parking garage.

No need to change anything else.

Buuuuuuuuuuut,

that means you'd need to believe you needed to look at AoA to summon F/CTL and see what it is. Different scan and Cockpit coordination drill, certainly.

I also appreciate your point on the AoA in the scan: what scans do you teach for which aggregate tasks or task sequences? It's a cross check, not a primary, as I see it.

[Gerard13]

"J'ai plus du tout controle de l'avion" means "I have no control at all of the plane".
Good French would read: "Je n'ai plus du tout controle de l'avion", but of course most people in France and elsewhere do not speak their own language properly, creating ambiguities and confusion for any kind of automated software translation.

[DozyWannabe]

Going over this twice, the following passage looks somewhat like the PF has an attitude indication that's gone wrong.

I'm not sure - to me it seems like he thinks he knows exactly what he's doing and does not understand why despite full back stick and full power he is still losing altitude (this despite the stall warning going off - possibly "tuned out" by the stress of the situation)...


2 h 13 min 25
PF: Qu’est-ce qu’y… comment ça se fait qu’on continue à descendre à fond là?
What is... how come we're continuing to descend so fast?

2 h 13 min 28
PNF: Essaye de trouver ce que tu peux faire avec tes commandes là-haut Les primaires et cetera
Try to see what you can do with your controls up there. The primaries etc

2 h 13 min 32
PF: au niveau cent
At level 100

2 h 13 min 36
PF: Neuf mille pieds
9000 feet

2 h 13 min 38
CAP: Doucement avec le palonnier là
Easy with the rudder

2 h 13 min 39
PNF: Remonte remonte remonte remonte
Climb climb climb climb (literally, "remonte" is "climb back up")

2 h 13 min 40
PF: Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure
But I'm nose up to the limit since earlier

Followed by the Captain realising what's happened and telling him to get the nose down

CAP: Non non non ne remonte pas
No no no don't climb back up

PNF: Alors descends
Go down, then

[takata]

CAP: Là je sais pas
That one I have no idea of

Could be airspeed.

Not at all. The Captain is answering the previous question from the PNF addressed to him:
PNF: what do we have to do?
CAP: No idea (basically, it is the meaning = here, I don't know.), we are going down (constat ; statement).

See:
2 h 12 min 13
PNF: Qu’est-ce que tu en penses qu’est-ce que tu en penses, qu’est-ce qu’il faut faire ?
What do you think ?what do you think ? what do we have to do?

2 h 12 min 15 to 2 h 12 min 19
CAP: Là je sais pas là ça descend
I don't know we're going down

[A33Zab]

You mean this period? I did draw some lines and added text.

Indeed most peculiar, TOGA?
sorry no answer yet, I have to wait for full translation.

http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/rr101/Zab999/GRAPH.jpg

[DozyWannabe]

Not at all. The Captain is answering the previous question from the PNF addressed to him:

OK, I got you - so you're disagreeing with vanHorck's theory (which in retrospect, having reread I'm inclined to agree with you).

That doesn't change my reading of what the captain was getting at though, which must have been an awful realisation when it hit him.

[Lonewolf_50]

Dozy, you and I are quoting different parts of the discussion.

Can we try and discuss the same parts?

Early on, we seem to have a disagreement in what the two of them are seeing, as the PNF keeps telling him about what he's doing and what's going on. It may be that they were seeing something different. It is also possible they were seeing the same thing and interpreting it differently. It is also possible that PF's scan began to break down about the time he took controls in Alt 2 ...

[airtren]

Good points!

A further departure from the original recorded voices seems to be also the French notation, which is not capturing the use of the "imperative", as in to giving directions of what to do: do that !, don't do that!, sort of giving orders...

Like the first instances of "redescend", should have been "redescend ! "., as an imperative, as an order - the PNF tells PF what he should do to correct the altitude gain.

airtren

Hi Lonewolf,

Be carefull (everybody) about the transcript meaning. It is better to wait for the English translation which will be painful to do (I guess it is the reason why they are late on it).
French talk (especially in high stress context) is using a lot of undefined terms; here, "il est où" could mean "where it is?" or "where he is?". In context, I understand that something is missing on his pannel (like Flight Director, or another indication he was looking at that disapeared) rather than "someone" -the captain.
A lot of these sentences are completely meaningless without the tone -might be interrogative, or talking to one or to the other or to himself or even to the aircraft.
....

[IcedandHeavy]

A first post from a non aviation-professional who has lurked here for 3 years:

Is there a detailed time-stamped control input graphic available somewhere? If already posted, would appreciate the post #.

Specifically, I am interested in the seconds after the nose down input at around 2:17:17. Was the limited amplitude of this input the reason why the TLS stayed fully up? Or was the limited duration of this input the reason why the THS did not change position from fully up? Bear with me please, I appreciate I have no understanding of the autotrim algorithms in any mode.

Also, how many seconds elapsed between the stall warning following the nose-down input around 2:12:17, and the subsequent nose-up input? Did the PF immediately move the stick nose-down after the stall warning sounded?

What I am trying to get an estimate for is, how much time would have been needed before the aircraft regained enough speed to turn off the stall warning (i.e. because of adequate airspeed and not because of the warning being disabled by illegal angle of attack), in 2 hypothetical situations:


the nose-down input at around 2:12:17 had been maintained?
the nose-down input at around 2:12:17 had been maintained and the THS had been at 0

and then compare the estimated times in with the time between the stall warning a few seconds after 2:17:17 and the PF's subsequent nose-up input (reaction?)?

Informed estimates, anyone?

[overthewing]

Dumb non-pilot SLF question here, and I apologise for posting in the Tech forum - but this has been nagging at me.

The a/c described almost a complete circle, anti-clockwise, before it hit the sea. Is this typical of what happens in a stall, or does it suggest the plane was wing-down all the way?

The Captain sounded concerned about getting the wings level before anything else, and the whole mess kicked off with the PF trying to correct a roll to the right. Is there something in this that might have confused / distracted them? Would a persistent tilt to the right, or a roll from one side to the other, have confused the sensation of being light in the seat, or made it harder to distinguish dive from stall?

Apologies again. Please ignore if stupid.

[airtren]

Hi A33Zab, jcjeant, (post #966)

I think the portion to the right which is cut out from your chart, which shows that the elevators positions corresponding to the ND stick commands, go from -30 to -15, which is still on the same side of the Y-axle as the HTS, which is steady at -13.

You mean this period? I did draw some lines and added text.

Indeed most peculiar, TOGA?
sorry no answer yet, I have to wait for full translation.

[airtren]

Hi Lonewoolf_50 (post #918)

The Tarom pilots were on "the top of it", from the start of the ascent, before the stall, and during the undesired ascent, trying to bring the nose down. The A/THR pushed the HTS all the way UP. According to the BEA report, at some point the HTS was full UP, the Elevators full DOWN. Remember this guys were at 60 degree pitch up, and 30knots, at stall, and they still managed to turn the nose downwards, get enough speed and lift, to level at 800ft (within 3300ft)....

Now the AF 447's 10000ft/min could have worked to their advantage, of having an initial speed, had they been able to just pitch it down enough, from the nose up pitch, so that the falling speed would have started putting lift into the wings.
airtren


I doubt that aircraft developed a 10,000 fpm rate of descent. (And good thing, the pilots reacted promptly! :) Overcoming that 10,000 fpm from first unstalling, then getting knots on, then recovering with a nice firm pull without heading toward accelerated stall, since you are not in Normal Law ... how much altitude that takes is a question worth thinking through.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

Is there a detailed time-stamped control input graphic available somewhere? If already posted, would appreciate the post #.

Page 111 of the french report it's a graphic ... and some other below ...

[t54]

Lonewolf_50
"PJ, what I was getting to is that the AoA data is already fed into the system anyway, as you describe: it's there for the taking. My thought was to allow it to be direct fed to a different page rather than having to page down to dig it out."

If you are going down at 10,000 f/min in a more-or-less horizontal attitude you must have a very large AOA. You are either stalled or the fuselage has come off.

[sensor_validation]

p110 - the 'TEMPERATURE STATIQUE' is also clearly affected by ice at same time as the speeds - temp rises to 0 as ice melting - so what about the super-cooled ice theory again - and could it have also frozen the PF's static pressure and altitude readings?

[DozyWannabe]

Dozy, you and I are quoting different parts of the discussion.

Can we try and discuss the same parts?

Sure, although the truth is that I haven't a clue what that exchange signifies and this is probably key to the BEA's recommendation to get more parameters onto the DFDR (like the instrument displays on both sides). If the PF's attitude display was faulty (or not making sense), then logically the first thing to do would be to hand control to the PNF, who seemed to have a better handle on things.

Unfortunately because we can't know that, there will always be a question mark about what caused the PF to make those inputs. Sadly this is a thread that has run through accident investigation for some time, examples being BEA548 - where the FDR explained what happened but there was no CVR to give definitive clues as to why, UA535 - where the FDR was a primitive model that didn't record enough parameters to give a full picture, and Tenerife, where full CVR, FDR and ATC recordings were available but the error was so basic and yet so gargantuan that one of the investigating teams had a tough time believing what they were hearing and seeing. "If we only had that parameter recorded" is a sad lament in an age where we can store hours of nonvolatile audio-visual information on a sliver of metal about the size of a child's little fingernail.

I think ultimately what needs to come out of this is an understanding of the psychology of pressure situations - how one pilot can lose both engines and yet rely on his training to ditch the aircraft in a river and save everyone on board, yet at least two others have lost airspeed indications and been so confused by what their instruments were presenting them with that they stalled an otherwise serviceable airliner into the sea. It's not really a fair comparison, because in the former case all the instruments were working - but it's the level of pressure and knowing that this situation is for real that really interests me. China 006 (The 747SP that went aerobatic over northern California) is another example of instrument perception being clouded by pressure and stress. All three of the flight crew swore that their horizons had tumbled when in fact they had not.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

then logically the first thing to do would be to hand control to the PNF, who seemed to have a better handle on things.

You make me remember that "Der Spiegel" had used "baby pilot" for the PF
Seem's they had good informants as the BEA report show now that it was the youngest pilot as PF during the event

[takata]

Unfortunately because we can't know that, there will always be a question mark about what caused the PF to make those inputs.
There is a very good clue about what the PF thought, but he is not sure. He said it twice and all his imputs seems to reflect that:

0211:41 - PF: J’ai l’impression (qu’on a de) la vitesse...
~ I've got the feeling of speed [of flying fast]
0212:04 - PF: J’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou ! Non ? Qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ?
~ I've got the feeling that we are flying extremely fast! Don't you think? What do you think? [=> He orders and releases SPEEDBRAKES]
0212:07 - PNF: Non! Surtout ne ne (les) sors pas! [VS : « Stall, stall »]
~ NO! Don't use them! [Speedbrakes] - [Stall Alarm sounding]

[wozzo]

You make me remember that "Der Spiegel" had used "baby pilot" for the PF
Seem's they had good informants as the BEA report show now that it was the youngest pilot as PF during the event

RHS/PF was first Co-pilot, age 37. 2nd Co-pilot (LHS/PNF) was 32.

3rd Interim Report, page 75:
A son retour dans le poste de pilotage, le second copilote dit qu’il a somnolé. Il s’assied sur le siège de gauche et le copilote en place droite lui fait un briefing (...) , après le départ du commandant de bord, le copilote de droite reste PF et le copilote de gauche est PNF.

[takata]

Hi wozzo,
RHS/PF was first Co-pilot, age 37. 2nd Co-pilot (LHS/PNF) was 32.
It is what I also believed but I was wrong and the press seems to have been better informed. This report is mentioning the curriculum of each pilot and their seat occupied (pp.11-17). The younger F/O was the PF.

[GarageYears]

After reflecting on what I've read from the report (and thanks to the various posters who translated and then refined the CVR transcript over the course of the last few hours), here's what I think happened taking a big picture look:

- AP disconnect took the crew by surprise with immediate confusion related to speed
- At no point was UAS identified or the appropriate procedure/SOP
- The PF input was significant in terms of SS deflection resulting in the over-correction of the initial mild roll, coupled with a 3/4-travel deflection NU input leading to a climb
- Despite the climb, the focus appears to have been on the lost speed indications
- Since speed was the focus (and was unavailable), the true loss of speed due to the zoom-climb was masked
- When the speeds did return the aircraft was truly slow and correspondingly trimmed nose high with negative AoA (the stall warnings and attitude of the aircraft were not acknowledged)
- The aircraft was descending NU in the stall when the Capt returned to the cockpit
- Since he was not in the cockpit at the beginning of the event, he arrives to find the aircraft altitude unwinding, the attitude indicators showing pitch up, with the power in TO/GA
- At no point was the initial climb discussed to allow the Capt to understand where all the airspeed went
- Speed continues to be a focus, but distractions due to roll seem to predominate
- Altitude was not commented until very late in the sequence and seems to be identified with surprise (as if the loss of altitude was not noticed prior)
- Once the altitude loss was identified, the confusion at this point led to continued NU and TO/GA, seemingly in an attempt to power out of the condition, but with no diagnosis of the AoA or trim
- Since NU (climb) did not seem to be working, ND was tried, but this occurred way late and was not sustained
- At FL100 control was passed to the PNF, but NU/climb commands continue basically until impact

I have purposefully not added details in the sequencing above, since it is too easy to get lost in the fine print and ignore the bigger picture.

Above all, the initial loss of the speeds and the transition from "loss of speed indications" to "we've no speed due to stall" seems to have been the root here.

[wozzo]

It is what I also believed but I was wrong and the press seems to have been better informed. This report is mentioning the curriculum of each pilot and their seat occupied (pp.11-17). The younger F/O was the PF.

takata,

thanks, I get it now: "Le second copilote" from Interim Report 3 ist the "first" co-pilot from the Interim Report 1. Confusing!

[gums]

Salute!

I still cannot find any official BEA report in English.

I realize that I am a primitive Anglo from the Colonies, but PLZ.

Would be nice to see what the other few dozen folks here are talking about with quotes and such.

I found a partial English version courtesy of the main Pprune AF447 thread, but no CVR, no ADR, just basic B.S.

respectfully,

[DozyWannabe]

You make me remember that "Der Spiegel" had used "baby pilot" for the PF Seem's they had good informants as the BEA report show now that it was the youngest pilot as PF during the event

You say that, but that "baby pilot" was the same age in 2009 as I am now, so in fact was 2 years older than me.

In a lot of cases, age and experience help, but in pressure situations sometimes the reaction can be almost random. As I said in the R&N thread, the Birgenair PF, a senior captain and ex-military pilot, was also unable to read the situation he was put in, with the same result.

Gums, that link was to the earlier report. As yet there is no English version of the 3rd (current) report, which is why we're lucky to have people on here who can help translate for us.

[GarageYears]

Hi Gums,

This post > http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-48.html#post6605209 is the most refined CVR translation so far. The report has more what you are expecting with timeline, altitude, control inputs/comments and voice remarks in columns, but is all in French - I worked my way through using Google translate page by page, but it is hard work. As for the rest of the full report, I'm in the same boat as you - meaning I'm language impaired. :{

[mm43]

Originally posted by gums ...
I still cannot find any official BEA report in English.Hi gums,

One can only assume that pressure has been placed on the BEA to produce their Interim Report No.3 by Friday, and the work required to validate the other language versions has not been completed. There are currently no English, German or Brazilian language reports available.

The English one (when posted) should be found at:-

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3.en/pdf/f-cp090601e3.en.pdf
or
http://media.webcastor.fr/web/bea/f-cp090601e3.en.pdf

Meanwhile the French version is at:-

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3/pdf/f-cp090601e3.pdf
(http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3.en/pdf/f-cp090601e3.en.pdf)

[HarryMann]

2 h 13 min 40
PF: Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure
But I've been pulling to the back stop for a good whileAlmost the last PF statement was that he'd been full NU for pretty well the whole episode...
This seems to be what the Captain picked up on, and reversed his advice
He probably then realised this had been a full stall sometime before he'd entered the cockpit

Indeed was it then that the CAPN glanced at the THS trimwheel position to confirm his worst fears

And was the PF also trying to communicate that he knew the THS trim was (or must be) very NU too ?

================================

AoA gauge or not, the constant and rather crude sounding references to simply Nose Up (or even just Go up) and Nose Down (or even just, Going Down)

surely bear many of the hallmarks, even accepting the stress, incomprehension and tunnel vision of rather one dimensional training alongside a very hands-off cockpit experience.

Any reasonable CRM does seem to have broken down. As noticed, PNF's main contribution was to recall the Captain promptly. It is painful to contemplate they were effectively passengers until a late and saddening eureka moment.

=======================

That said, if what we mostly all believe to be true, in the way this ocurred, many questions need to be answered of the aircraft systems and controls and cockpit & flight ergonomics.

This is not about icing pitots... the crew are there for just that reason, and potentially many other unforseen situations. There also seems to be a significant gap developing between flight crew capabilities - and those required for safe flight under emergency and/or exceptional conditions.

The CAPN, FO 1 and FO 2 crewing that replaced the Flight Engineer system so many years ago, this crew complement itself... was it even functioning in any way as originally promised and intended?

[DozyWannabe]

OK, so this is largely Google Translate, with a bit of what I've picked up from here, but this seems to be the meat of it:

Translated version of cvr.doc

2 - HISTORY OF FLIGHT: ANALYSIS POINTS

The flight was divided into three phases:

Phase 1: the beginning of the CVR recording to the autopilot disconnect.

Phase 2: disconnecting the autopilot until the outbreak of the stall alarm.

Phase 3: the onset of stall warning until the end of the flight.

• Phase 1

At the beginning of the CVR recording shortly after midnight, the aircraft was cruising at flight level 350. 2 The autopilot and auto-thrust incurred. Automatic transfer of fuel in the "trim tank" was performed during the climb, and the center of gravity is then 27.5%, to a mass of 218 tonnes. The flight is calm. The crew, consisting of the captain and co-pilot, VHF is in contact with the control center of Recife.

The crew discusses the high temperature (standard plus eleven) and reported the estimated amount of fuel remaining on arrival, which is evolving. The crew sees the city of Natal and finds that the weather has not been a problem. He is concerned about the closure of a land support ETOPS, Sal-Cape Verde Amilcar. It requires a change to the CCO, who said that the field is open in an emergency.

The captain offers the first officer to take a rest because of the length of his vacation. The latter replied that he did not want to sleep.

35 to 1 pm, the plane gets to the point INTOL and crew leave the frequency of Recife to switch HF communication with the control center Oceanic Atlantico. A trial is SELCAL effectué5 successfully, but attempts to connect with ADS ocean Dakar fail.

Soon after, the first officer change the scale of the ND 320 NM 160 NM and found that "there is something ahead," which presumably refers to echoes detected by weather radar. The captain and the crew discusses confirms again that the high temperature does not allow them to ride at 370.

A 1: 45 pm, the aircraft enters a turbulent zone slightly, just before the point SALPU.

Note: the crew had received a 30 to 0 h information from the OCC on the presence of a convective zone associated with the ITCZ between SALPU and TASIL.

The crew reduced the lighting in flight deck and turns on the headlights "to see outside." The first officer noted that they will "return to the layer" and it would have been nice to ride. A few minutes later, the turbulence slightly and reinforce the co-pilot suggested asking up in 360 non-standard as it thinks is "really on the edge" of the layer. The captain says they will wait. It reduces the scale of the ND 40 NM, the weather radar will go into mode + weather turbulence. Soon after, he reported the appearance of St. Elmo's fire and said that "rotor as it goes" when he goes to rest.

Shortly after 1 h 52, the turbulence ceases. The first officer again draws the attention of the captain on the value MAX REC, which then reaches the FL 375. The captain did not comment and a few moments later, he wakes up in the second co-pilot, said he will take his place, and asks the copilot in the right seat if it has a pilot license online. Thus it ensures that it is entitled to the supplement and refers implicitly as reserve driver. This question probably means that the first officer issues the driver alternate the captain had not been addressed during the briefing before the flight.

On his return to the cockpit, the second co-pilot said he dozed. He sits on the left seat and the copilot in the right seat makes it a briefing, pointing out that "little bit of turbulence that you come to see you go ... we should find the same before it is actually in the layer Unfortunately we can not get over for now because the temperature decreases more slowly than expected. " Before leaving the cockpit, the captain recalled the HF frequencies to contact Atlantico and Dakar ocean. In fact, after the departure of captain, first officer on the left is PNF and co-pilot on the right is PF.

The two co-pilots are still discussing the temperature and REC MAX. The turbulence increases slightly and they decide to prevent cabin crew from entering an area more turbulent. The first officer on the right says they are "apparently in the boundary layer," before adding that he would have preferred to climb to FL 360. Go to the next level is a constant concern of the crew. The drivers clearly want change outside of the layer, presumably to minimize turbulence.

08 to 2 pm, the first officer on the left, probably after seeing the echoes detected by radar weather, proposes to "alter a little to the left." The HDG mode is activated and select the course dropped 12 degrees to the road. The first officer left pass the gain setting up the weather radar, after observing that it was calibrated mode. The discussion is interrupted by a sensation of temperature increase and the appearance of an odor about which drivers exchange for more than a minute. The first officer on the left identifies this as the smell of ozone.

Conversations in the cockpit did not reveal any malfunction of the weather radar and show that it has submitted a usable image.

The background noise changes rapidly to 2 h 09 min 46. This change in background noise has been identified as being characteristic of the presence of ice crystals but does not give rise to any particular crew, the phenomenon was little known drivers at the time. The PNF then takes the initiative to reduce the Mach 0.8 and anti-icing engines are engaged.

The departure of captain has been without a clear operational guidelines, particularly on the role of each of the two co-pilots. The absence of a formal framework of operation of a crew consisting of two co-pilots have led to the division of labor is not optimal seen them.

• Phase 2

A 2 h 10 min 05, the sharp drop in measured velocities, presumably due to blockage of the Pitot probes by ice crystals, causing the disengagement of the autopilot and auto-thrust (thrust is then fixed) and the change of control law of flying to alternate normal. The presence of turbulence, as evidenced by the activity of the PA to control body roll in the seconds before, led to a disconnection from the plane to roll right up to about 8 °.

The co-pilot PF says "I have control" and has fast action and high amplitude side, almost lock to lock. He was also an action that increases the pitch attitude of the aircraft to 11 ° in ten seconds. Flight directors are not disengaged by the crew, but the trend bars disappear.

A 2 h 10 min 10, the PF are increasing the incidence and the stall warning activated twice unexpectedly. Probably in response to this alarm, the PNF exclaims, "What's that?". The PF then said "there was not a good one ... you do not speed ... good news" and the PNF "we lost the speed." The reported incidence is about 5 °, a value theoretical threshold for triggering the alarm just over 4 °.

The crew identifies the loss anemometer indications but none of the two co-pilots then calls the associated procedure. The emergency maneuver "IAS dubious" requires first to disconnect and disengage the automatic flight directors. The two co-pilots had been trained at the emergency maneuver in low layer, at which the plate to adopt is 10 ° or 15 °.

However, a note describing the problem OSV loss anemometer indications previously encountered on the cruise and A330/A340 fleet reminiscent of the procedures to be applied. The note had been circulated to all NTP division A330/A340.

Between 2 and 18 h 10 min 2 h 10 min 25, the PNF read the ECAM messages in a disorderly manner, but mention the loss of self-driven and alternate passage into law. Thrust lock function is disabled. PNF calls and triggers anti-icing of the wings.

The PNF then attracts the attention of the PF on speed. At that time, the two speeds recorded (the one displayed on the PFD of the left and ISIS) are less than 100 knots and vertical speed reaches a maximum of 7000 ft / min. Longitudinal movements of the aircraft are the result of the actions of PF, which also continues to perform actions of high amplitude side to control the roll, less than 10 ° right and left.

A reading of the three instruments (both PFD and ISIS), the SOP notes that the aircraft climbs and asked repeatedly to go back down to the PF. The latter then makes a number of actions that have to bite the effect of reducing the tax base and the vertical velocity, whose values ??are nevertheless still excessive and the aircraft is about 37,000 ft and continues to rise, without the intervention of PNF. Although the REC MAX was a constant concern before disconnecting the PA, none of the two co-pilots there refers.

To 2 h 10 min 34, the speed displayed on the left side becomes valid and then to 215 kt, the speed of the ISIS is always wrong. The aircraft then lost about 60 kt from disconnecting the autopilot and the start of the climb, which is consistent with increasing altitude of about 2000 ft.

A 2 h 10 min 47, the thrust levers are slightly remote to 2 / 3 of the beach IDLE / CLB (85% N1). Two seconds later, the plate came back a little below 6 degrees, roll is controlled, the impact is slightly less than 5 ° and the PHR is 3 ° nose. The vertical velocity is always high at a 100 ft / min. From a few seconds, the PNF tries to recall the captain.

In this phase, at any time one of the two co-pilots has announced value of speed, attitude, vertical speed and altitude. The flight directors were not disengaged, the bars tend to have disappeared and reappeared several times it is not possible at this stage of the investigation to know what orders they were able to identify or determine whether these orders may have influenced the actions of the PF.

At this point, after a quick trim and altitude, which is the consequence of the actions of PF, the trajectory of the aircraft appears to be controlled. The increased pitch angle and the initial vertical velocity resulting were excessive for the altitude and should have been advertised immediate difference from the PNF. The lack of specific training manual flying at high altitudes likely contributed to the actions of steering and monitoring inadequate.

The low synergy observed between the two co-pilots can originate on one hand the lack of clear division of roles by the captain, and also the lack of CRM training between two co-pilots in a situation substitute the captain.

Note: no regulation requiring such training or criteria such as experience or ability in the decision to designate an alternate captain during flights by crews strengthened.

• Phase 3

A 2 h 10 min 51, the stall alarm is activated again, with an incidence of approximately 6 °, which corresponds to the theoretical threshold for triggering the alarm for the Mach 0.68 worth while. PF continues to hold considerable nose-up input: the plate increases by 6 to 13 and the incidence of 6 ° to 10 °. The vertical acceleration recorded reflects the rapid onset of vibration can be the buffet. Five seconds later, probably in response to the stall warning, the PF advance thrust levers to the notch TO / GA and the announcement. That's about at that moment that the plane out of its flight.

Despite some actions to sting, the PF maintains a global action to pitch up. The plate is between 11 ° and 18 ° and the incidence between 11 ° and 23 °. The THS begins a movement consistent with the actions of PF and will reach the value of 13 ° nose about a minute later. It should be recalled that in alternate law, auto trim is still active. By cons, it is difficult for the crew to know the position of the trim and no alarm does not notify the crew that place.

A 2 h 11 min 06, after several attempts to call, the PNF is concerned about the lack of new captain. This concern probably increases the stress of the PNF in front of a situation he does not understand.

A second later, the speed of the ISIS becomes valid. ADR 3 is selected on the right side PFD, the speed of the PF becomes equally valid. It is 183 kt and then the three speeds shown are consistent. This requires no comment from the crew.

Within 30 seconds after the start of the stall warning, the airspeed decreased from 205 to about 160 kt. The vertical velocity is zero and then gradually became strongly negative (4000 ft / min). The maximum altitude of about 38,000 ft was reached at 2 h 11 min 10.

Shortly after 2 h 11 min 30, the OP said twice that he lost control of the aircraft. This may reflect the difficulty of controlling a roll, the airplane banked to the right when he maintains his grip on the left stop. However, his few actions to sting every time cause a reduction of assessment.

A 2 h 11 min 37, the PNF called "controls on the left," takes precedence and gives a short-acting to a stop on the left, the PF takes priority almost immediately without any announcement and continue to drive.

To 2 h 11 min 42, the captain enters the cockpit shortly before the stall warning stops. The parameters of the plane are then: altitude of about 35,800 ft, vertical speed of 9100 ft / min, calibrated airspeed of 100 kt down, base 12 ° and N1 engine 102%. Neither of the two co-pilots will not result in a detailed account of problems or actions taken, except that they have lost control of the aircraft and they have tried everything. In response, the CDB said many times "take it", probably referring to the FPV. The parameters show that the stall warning stopped because the three values ??of incidence have become invalid.

Note: from 2 h 11 min 45, the speeds are no longer displayed continuously on the PFD.

A 2 h 12 min 04, the OP said he thinks they are overspeed condition, perhaps because of high aerodynamic noise prevailing in the cockpit. None of the other two drivers parse this hypothesis when it is inconsistent with the pitch attitude and vertical speed high descent.

Until the end of the flight, the values ??revert incidence successively valid and invalid. Every time that at least one value becomes valid, the stall alarm is reactivated, and each time that the effects are disabled, the alarm stops. Several actions to sting causes a decrease in the impact assessment and whose values ??revert while valid, so that a free action to sting results in the activation of stall warning. It seems that the drivers then react with a nose-up action, the consequences are an increased incidence, a decrease in measured velocities and therefore stopping the stall alarm. Until the end of the flight, no value will be valid incidence below 35 °.

Neither of the two co-pilots has formally identified the dropout situation in which was the plane or through the alarm either by recognition of the buffet, or by the interpretation of high values ??of vertical velocity and the base. It should be noted that the buffet is the only indication of approaching the stall at high altitude on other airplanes of the alarm threshold stall does not vary with the Mach.

In the absence of relevant information from the co-pilots, the only reading of information available on the screens (plate, roll, push, vertical speed, altitude, etc ...) did not allow the CBD to quickly realize the situation of the aircraft. He did not then ask questions that might help them understand the sequence of events.

The stall warning lasted 54 seconds continuously, during which none of the co-pilots are referred to. It is likely that the CBD has heard the alarm a few moments before entering the office, but it is also likely that its many stops and reactivations were added to the confusion and disrupted his diagnosis of the situation.

Despite several references to the altitude, which decreased, none of the three crew members did not seem able to determine what information to trust: the values of trim, roll and thrust might have seemed inconsistent with the values vertical speed and altitude.

3 - CONCLUSIONS

3.1 New Findings

the composition of the crew was in accordance with the procedures of the operator,
the weight and center of gravity were within operational limits,
at the time of autopilot disconnect, the captain was at rest,
the departure of captain has been without a clear operational guidelines, particularly on the role of each co-pilots,
the crew had identified the echoes on radar weather,
the crew made ??a change in direction of 12 ° to the left of the road
The PA has withdrawn while the aircraft was operating in an upper cloud layer of slightly turbulent
co-pilots had not received training at high altitude, the procedure "IAS questionable" and flight manual
there was inconsistency between the measured velocities, presumably as a result of obstruction of Pitot probes in environment of ice crystals,
although identified and announced the loss of airspeed indications, none of the two co-pilots has called the procedure "IAS questionable"
the invalidity of the speed displayed on the PFD lasted 29 seconds left, the speed of the ISIS 54 seconds,
in less than a minute after the disengagement of the autopilot, the plane went out of its flight as a result of manual control actions predominantly to pitch,
The captain returned to the cockpit about 30 minutes after a disengagement of the autopilot,
throughout the flight, movements of the elevators and PHR were consistent with the actions of the pilot
to the exit of the flight, the longitudinal movements of the aircraft were consistent with the position of the control,
there was no explicit allocation of tasks between the two co-pilots,
there is no CRM training for crew consists of two co-pilots in a position of substitution of the captain,
no announcement regarding the standard deviations of attitude and vertical speed has been made,
the impact of the plane is not directly presented to pilots,
approaching the stall was characterized by the activation of the alarm and the onset of buffet,
neither pilot refers to the stall warning,
neither pilot formally identified the situation stall
the stall warning was triggered continuously for 54 seconds,
shortly after activation of stall warning, the PF applied thrust TO / GA and had a nose-up action,
the incidence is the parameter to activate the stall warning and if the values of angle-of-attack become disabled, the alarm stops, by design, when the speed values were measured below 60 kt, the three values of incidence/AoA have become invalid
whenever the stall warning was activated, the incidence exceeded the value of the theoretical threshold of activation,
engines worked and always responded to the commands of the crew,
no announcement has been made to passengers.

4 - SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

Reminder: in accordance with Article 17.3 of Regulation No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation, a safety recommendation does by no means a presumption of fault or liability in an accident, serious incident or incident. The recipients of safety recommendations report to the authority responsible for security investigations that issued the actions taken or planned to ensure their implementation, as provided by Article 18 of the Regulation.

4.1 Recommendations on operation

Flight Training Manual

The survey has highlighted the weaknesses of the two co-drivers: the inappropriate actions of PF on the flight controls at high altitude have not been identified by the PNF by lack of effective monitoring of the trajectory. The stall warning buffet and have not been identified. This is probably due to a lack of specific training despite compliance with regulatory programs. Manual control can not be improvised and requires precision and measured actions on the controls. There are other opportunities for disengagement of the autopilot for which only a specific and regular training can provide the necessary expertise to ensure flight safety. A reading of their latest training and checking, it was shown that co-pilots were not trained in manual control, approach and recovery stall at high altitude.

Consequently, the BEA recommends:

• that the EFSA review the content of training programs and to impose such control and the introduction of specific exercises and regular dedicated to manual control, the approach and stall recovery, including high altitude.

Replacement of the command

The survey revealed that lack of education and training a crew of two co-pilots do not guarantee a performance level equivalent to that of a crew of one captain and a co-pilot in a situation worse. The lack of hierarchy and efficient allocation of tasks in the cockpit have greatly contributed to the low synergy. The concern arose from the absence of captain in the cockpit shows that the two co-pilots lacked the capacity to address this emergency. This can be explained both by the lack of adequate training and lack of decision-making practice of the two co-pilots. Many events have had a favorable outcome due to the presence of the captain whose training and experience have enabled a more robust and more serene reactions to the situation.

Consequently, the BEA recommends:

• that the EFSA defines additional criteria for access to the function

Deputy of the captain to ensure a better distribution of

work crews in case of reinforced

and

• that, temporarily, the DGAC defines additional criteria for

access to the function of deputy commander to ensure

better division of labor in cases of crews strengthened.

4.2. Recommendation for certification

Measuring impact

The crew was never formally identified the dropout situation. The angle-of-attack information is not directly accessible to the pilots. The angle-of-attack of cruise flight is close to the angle-of-attack of the onset of stall warning in a law other than the normal. Under these conditions, manual control can cause the aircraft to high incidences such as those encountered during the event. It is essential to ensure the safety of the flight to reduce the angle-of-attack when the stall is imminent. Only a direct reading of the impact could allow crews to quickly identify the location of the aircraft aerodynamic and have any necessary actions.

Consequently, the BEA recommends:

• that the EASA and the FAA evaluate the merits of integrating the presence of an impact indicator directly accessible by the pilots on board aircraft.

4.3. Recommendations for flight recorders

The operating parameters of the FDR and CVR listening to provide information essential to understanding the event. However it is difficult to reconstruct the information available to the crew on their flight instruments, including the orders given by the bars in the trend of flight directors when they reappear. We can not see if there have been attempts to re-engagement of the autopilot. A view of the dashboard complement the information given by the FDR and CVR and would confirm the information available to the crew and the actions it has taken. Many recommendations have already been issued on the subject over the last ten years without a breakthrough has occurred.

Consequently, the BEA recommends that again:

• that ICAO imposes on aircraft performing public transport passengers an image recording for viewing the entire panel,

and

That, at the same time, ICAO establish very strict rules of operation of such records to ensure confidentiality of stored data.

Today, regulations require the registration of conduct of the flight parameters displayed on the left. Some key parameters for the analysis of flight control are lacking, particularly those presented in the right seat driver: speed, altitude, attitude, position bars tend flight director, etc.. In addition, aircraft are equipped with complex systems whose analysis of the operation is limited and hampered by the lack of registration of the parameters of all the data sources they use.

Consequently, the BEA recommends:

• that the EASA and the FAA mandate the recording:

o the position of the bars tend flight directors,
o the conduct of the flight parameters displayed in the right seat, in addition to those shown on the left,

and

• that the EASA and the FAA are studying the merits of mandatory recording anemometer and inertial parameters of all sources used by the systems.

4.4 Recommendations on the transmission of flight data

In the Progress Report No. 2, BEA has issued safety recommendations regarding the increase in the duration and scope of the ULB, sending regular data recorders and carriage of ejection. These recommendations are based on the findings of an international working group led by government-industrie12 the BEA as part of the safety investigation into the crash of flight AF-447, which has since studied the feasibility of transmission triggered flight data. The concept is to analyze real-time flight data on aircraft to detect emergency situations. In these cases, the transmission of flight data is triggered to facilitate the location of an aircraft in emergency situations. The working group's results show that it is technically feasible to define reliable criteria based on flight parameters to detect emergency situations, while limiting the false detection. The group also concluded that it is technically feasible to obtain an impact position.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

This is not about icing pitots... the crew are there for just that reason

I want to disagree ...
The pilots are not "there" to correct a instrument fitted and designed for other purpose
By other purpose i mean .. not designed for work in the domain where was the plane
It's not to the pilots to correct bad design .. but it's the duty of the designers and the duty of the certification bodies ...
The problem was know .. and despite this .. planes (passengers and pilots) were send in a aera (altitude - region) when the problem can arise ...
If they had not icing .. never this tragedy had happened ... period
End of rant about pitot tubes ...

[gums]

Thanks to all for potential links and such.

Reading Spag's translation makes me cry.

Remember, the plane "protects" you.

Makes me cry again.

Over 3 minutes to see what's happening and decide to do something besides debate why the plane is going down so fast but "we're" "commanding" it to go up. Sheesh.

[HarryMann]

I want to disagree ...Mmm, wrong...:=

I really thought you'd analyse that differently.. This accident throws up much more important things than those already known (pitot icing propensity)

[jcjeant]

Hi,

Shortly after 1 h 52, the turbulence ceases. The first officer again draws the attention of the captain on the value MAX REC, which then reaches the FL 375. The captain did not comment and a few moments later, he wakes up in the second co-pilot, said he will take his place, and asks the copilot in the right seat if it has a pilot license online. Thus it ensures that it is entitled to the supplement and refers implicitly as reserve driver. This question probably means that the first officer issues the driver alternate the captain had not been addressed during the briefing before the flight.


Bizarre question ...
Why ask this in flight ?? seem's to be late ...
Is this a usual thing to the captain to not know the qualifications of his crew or a usual thing from a airline to not inform the captain of the crew composition ?
From the 3 interim report it's unfortunately no informations about the crew who made the prior flight Paris - Rio
I wonder if it is the same crew or another ...

[airtren]

After the stall, and start of the fall, the pitch (assiette) went several times from positive (nose up) to negative values (nose down) - it is explicitly mentioned on the CVR/FDR sync recording transcript (3rd column).

On the graphs, the Pitch (Assiette) Curve going negative (Nose Down) coincides with Elevator ( Governe de Profondeur) Curve going from -30 to -15, and with Vertical Speed (Vitesse) Curve slowing down significantly close to 0 (zero), or even going positive.

The Vertical Speed Curve shows continuous variations during the fall, indicating that the fall was very bumpy, and not at constant speed.

Close to the end of the Vertical Speed Curve (right side), there are two spikes significantly above Zero. If they reflect the reality, the plane had two moments in which not only it stopped falling, but it climbed.

I could not access Page 47 for quite sometime, while I can access 46, and 48. It seems there is a problem with it. I wonder if that behavior is seen by others too.

[auraflyer]

Gums, hope this helps.

Some points from my reading of the French (not a native speaker). The first two are my thoughts, the rest is my best attempt to translate the salient parts of the report; thoughts are theirs, not mine.

I'm sure I've made mistakes, will correct them as people point them out to me.


1. The pitots seemed to fail at 3 different points and differently. See p 31. The ISIS speed dropped, rose then dropped again. Not certain about this, but given the statement at 2:10:17 "we've lost the the the speeds", the third (unrecorded) speed might not to have fallen as far at that moment, so there was one high(er) (unrecorded speed) and two that had dropped to 73kt and coincided at that value.

2. The aircraft apparently left its known flight envelope at 2:10:54:

p43: "La validité du modèle se limite au domaine de vol connu d’après les essais en soufflerie et les essais en vol. Ainsi, la simulation a pu être menée sur la période de 2 h 10 min 00 jusqu’à 2 h 10 min 54."

As I read it, Airbus conducted a simulation limited to the flight envelope as known from wind tunnel/test flights. The ending of the simulation at 2:10:54 suggests that that was the limit of the envelope.

"Phase 1"

3. Background noise changed, sounds characteristic of ice crystals encountered at 2:09:46 (p75)

"Phase 2"

4. Indicated airspeeds first dropped at 2:10:05 (p76). The sharp ("brutale") drop caused disconnection of AP and autothrust. Turbulence caused a right roll of up to 8 degrees (p76)

5. PF's sidestick inputs were quick and large, almost from stop to stop (native speaker pilot might assist - "butee" (Lemurian?)). They caused a pitch increase of 11 degree in 10 seconds, and increased the AoA. The stall warning activated twice. [As I read it, activated briefly or intermittently - not certain about "de manière furtive", as I understand it to mean "almost silent/hidden"] This is probably what caused PNF to say "what's that?" (qu’est-ce que c’est que ça?). [2:10:10]

6. Although they identified unreliable airspeeds, neither of the two performed the associated procedure. They had only been trained in emergency procedures at low altitude. (There is a passage observing that a note had been circulated following earlier UAS encounters in the A330/340 fleet.)

7. Between 2:10:18 and 2:10:25 the PNF read the ECAM messages out of order (I read it as uncoordinated, ie not usual). He notes loss of auto thrust and alt law, and calls for wing anti icing.

8. PNF draws the PF's attention to speed. The two known (ie in the data recorders) speeds are less than 100 kts. Vertical speed has reached a maximum of 7000 ft/min. PNF notes the climb, tells PF several times to descend. PF does take action but the rate of climb is nonetheless still excessive. (p76)

9. Near 2:10:34, the left displayed speed becomes valid and increases to 215kt. The ISIS speed is still wrong. The aircraft has already lost about 60kt from the time the AP disconnected, which is consistent with climbing about 2000ft.

10. At 2:10:47, thrust is moved back to about 2/3 (N1 85%). 2 seconds later, pitch returns to a little under 6 degrees, roll is controlled, AoA is under 5 degrees, THS is 3 degrees up. Vertical speeds is still above 1100 ft min. The PNF calls for the captain.

11. Up to this point, neither of the two pilots has mentioned the values of speed, pitch, vertical speed or altitude. The flight directors had not disengaged but the "bars" have disappeared and reappeared several times. They can't say at this stage how this might have affected what the PF was doing.

12. At this point, the PF seems to have controlled the aircraft's trajectory. The initial increase in pitch and the resulting vertical speed were excessive for that altitude and should have been mentioned to the PNF. There is a passage about the lack of CRM and the lack of clear division of resposibilities by the captain. (p77)

"Phase 3"

13. At 2:10:51, the stall warning sounded again. AoA is aobut 6 degrees, which is the theoretical threshold for stall warning activation at M0.68. PF mostly continues to apply nose-up: pitch increases from 6 to 13 degrees, AoA from 6 to 10 degrees. The recorded values for vertical acceleration reflect a rapid onset of vibrations that could be buffet. Five seconds later, probably as a result of the stall warning, PF applies TOGA. "That is about the moment the aircraft left its flight envelope."

14. Despite some small contrary actions [I think this is what they mean by "piquer"] the PF generally maintains nose up inputs. Pitch is between 11 and 13 degrees and AoA between 11 and 23. The THS starts moving consistently with the PF's inputs and reaches a value of about 13 degrees about a minute later. Note that in alt law, auto trim is still active. On the other hand ,it is difficult for the crew to know the trim position and there is no alarm that it is moving [check: "deroule" - I usually understand as "unroll"].

15. At 2:11:06, after several attempts to call the captain, the PNF again notes his absence. "This concern probably increases the PNF's stress, who has found himself in a situation he does not understand."

16. A second later, the ISIS speed becomes valid again. ADR 3 is selected on the right hand PFD, and the PF's speed also becomes valid. It is then 183 kt and the three speeds are consistent. This is not the subject of any comment by the crew.

17. In the 30 seconds after the stall warning started, airspeed fell from 205 to about 160 kts. Vertical velocity fell to zero, then strongly negative (-4000 ft/min). Maximum altitude of 38,000 ft was at 2:11:10

18. A little after 2:11:30, PF announced that he had lost control of the plane. This might be explained by difficulty in maintaining roll control: it was rolling to the right even though he had the stick at full left stop (again, "butee").

19. At 2:11:37, PNF said "command to the left" [I read it potentially as "I have control"?], and made a short input to the left stop. PF took control again almost immediately without saying anything and continued to fly ("piloter").

20. About 2:11:42, the captain re-entered the cockpit, not long before the stall warning stopped. Altitude was 35,800 ft, vertical speed was -9,100 ft/min, IAS [I think - "vitesse conventionnelle"] was 100kts and dropping, pitch at 12 degrees and N1 at 102%. Neither of the pilots knew exactly what was going on ("what problems they had encountered or the actions undertaken"), other than that they had lost control of the aircraft and they had tried everything. In response, the Capt several times said "look at that"; he was undoubtedly pointing to the FPV. The recorders show the stall warning had stopped because the 3 AoA values had become invalid.

After 2:11:45, the speeds were no longer continuously displayed on the PFD.

21. At 2:12:04, PF said he thought they were in an overspeed situation, possibly because of the high aerodynamic noise inside the cockpit. Neither of the other two pilots analysed this hypothesis even though it was inconsistent with the pitch and the high negative vertical speed.

22. Until the end of the flight, the AoA values became successively valid and invalid. Each time that at least one value becomes valid, the stall alarm starts; when the values become invalid again, the alarm stops. Several small inputs are made that reduce pitch, and each time they make the AoA values valid again and cause the stall alarm to sound. It seems that the pilots react by making nose up inputs, which cause the AoA to increase, the measured speeds to decrease and hence cause the stall warning to stop. Until the end of hte flight, the AoA never drops below 35 degrees.

23. Neither of the two copilots formally identified the stall. They did not recognise it from the stall warning, by recognition of the buffet, or by the high value of the vertical speed and the pitch. Not quite certain of this: "It is notable that the buffet is the only indication of the onset [or approach] to stall at high altitude on other aircraft where the stall warning does not depend on Mach".

24. Not having been given relevant information by the copilots, the only information the Capt had, from the screens, was not enough to give him rapid situational awareness. He did not then ask questions that could have helped him understand the sequence of events.

25. The stall alarm sounded continuously for 54 seconds but neither of the copilots referred to it. It is likely that the Capt heard it briefly before he returned to the cockpit but it is equally probably that the multiple start/stops added to the confusion and affected his understanding of the situation.

Despite several references to the decreasing altitude, none of the three pilots seemed to know which information to trust: the pitch, roll and thrust values could have seemed inconsistent to them with the vertical speed values.

[DozyWannabe]

19. At 2:11:17, PNF said "command to the left" [I read it potentially as "I have control"?], and made a short input to the left stop. PF took control again immediately without saying anything and continued to fly ("piloter").

Yes- what the hell was that about?

[airtren]

There are several instances in which the left side stick - manche CDB (Commandant de Bord) - has participated to the controls. Dual input took place towards the end of the recordings.

The graphs show the controls applied to the left side stick, and right side stick - page 114.

Yes- what the hell was that about?

[takata]

.1/FLR/FR090601 0210 279334 06
EFCS1 X2,EFCS2X,,,,,,
FCPC2 (2CE2) /WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2,HARD
About Svarin's concerns in relation to this "wiring fault".
It seems to be simply due to PNF selection of ADR3 in place of its own ADR1 displayed. Hence, he switched to ADR3 (wrong) shortly before ADR1 returned "good" again. A while later, it seems that ADR+IR 3 was switched for ADR+IR 2 on PF display.