Data Guy
30th Mar 2011, 07:03
HISTORIES OF OXYGEN GENERATORS - Incidents and Tests.
Source; NTSB report and FAA Tech Center Tests -- Aug 1986 to April 2003.
NTSB ValuJet Report NTSB/AAR-97-06 adopted Aug 19, 1997 regarding the loss of Valujet flight 592 on May 11,1996. Briefs Only; see full NTSB report, at Link > http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1997/aar9706.pdf
7 Incidents Involving Chemical Oxygen Generators. Ref pgs 93-96 (Ed. Note; Only 1and 2 were fires).
Incident 1. 8/10/86. Aircraft destroyed at the gate. NTSB cause; the fire was initiated by improper handling and that the generator had not been packaged properly. Generator was a Scott P/N 801836-06C - ref Appendix P, Hazardous Material Factual Report, Exhibit # 15-Q, pg 000444. (Ed. Note; the same model shipped on ValuJet 592 (ref NTSB Final Report-ValuJet; page 14, “Scott P/N 801386-06, three mask”.
Incident 2. 2/19/88. In-flight fire by a rupture (3 inch hole) of a Duo-Pac Avoix generator caused by blockage of the output tube. NTSB recommended relocation of the relief valve directly to the generator body. Ref to NTSB Safety Letter and Link > http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/1989/a89_106_107.pdf
Incident 3. 11/7/92.Cargo facility fire. Improper labeling. No claim generator initiated fire.
Incident 4. 9/24/93. Cargo facility fire. Improper labeling. No claim generator initiated fire.
Incident 5. 10/21/94. Cargo facility fire. Improper labeling. No claim generator initiated fire.
Incident 6. 1/26/96. Cargo facility. Improper labeling. No claim to a fire.
Incident 7. 4/25/96. Repair station. Improper labeling. No claim to a fire.
ALSO
> Ref pg 54, Five Fire Tests, “Test Conditions and Results”. No fire with tests 1 and 3. Fire with tests 2, 4 and 5 on the fourth try.. (Ed. Note; not known if outlets were plugged as in the May 1999 DOT/FAA Tech Center tests below.
> Ref pg 133, “Conclusions; # 6, The activation of one or more chemical oxygen generators in the forward cargo compartment of the airplane initiated the fire on ValuJet flight 592. Conclusion # 21; Because of the rapid propagation of the oxygen fed fire …..”.
> Ref Appendix P, Hazardous Material Factual Report, Exhibit # 15-Q, pg 000446; “test data indicate that the outside surface of Scott oxygen generator canisters may reach 420 to 443 degrees F during production of oxygen”.
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May 1999. DOT/FAA/AR-TN99/9. By O’Connor and Hagen. Activation of Oxygen Generators in Proximity to Combustible Materials. Link > http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/tn99-9.pdf
Abstract; This report presents the results of a series of tests performed on oxygen generators contained in cardboard shipping containers and packing materials to witness the probability of ignition in the event one of the generators was activated. Test results indicated that in the presence of an activated generator, combustible materials will produce a fire. Since it is conceivable that the sodium chlorate in a inactivated generator could melt and plug all outlets, the outlet and pressure relief valves were plugged before activating the generator to simulate this melting situation. The activation of an aircraft oxygen generator canister produced temperatures of 410 F). No fire in 3 of 7 tests.
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April 2003. DOT/FAA/AR-TN03/35. By David Blake. The Response of Aircraft Oxygen Generators Exposed to Elevated Temperatures. Link > http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/TN03-35.pdf
Abstract; The purpose of this testing was to determine the temperatures that would cause self-activation of sodium chlorate oxygen generators. The data will be used to establish the degree of thermal protection that would be required to prevent the activation of chemical oxygen generators should they be exposed to heat from a cargo compartment fire involving other materials. The minimum temperature that caused the activation of one of the generators was 600°F. Due to uncertainties with other designs not tested and the physical properties of sodium chlorate, it is recommended that the generators not be exposed to temperatures above 400°F.
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Source; NTSB report and FAA Tech Center Tests -- Aug 1986 to April 2003.
NTSB ValuJet Report NTSB/AAR-97-06 adopted Aug 19, 1997 regarding the loss of Valujet flight 592 on May 11,1996. Briefs Only; see full NTSB report, at Link > http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1997/aar9706.pdf
7 Incidents Involving Chemical Oxygen Generators. Ref pgs 93-96 (Ed. Note; Only 1and 2 were fires).
Incident 1. 8/10/86. Aircraft destroyed at the gate. NTSB cause; the fire was initiated by improper handling and that the generator had not been packaged properly. Generator was a Scott P/N 801836-06C - ref Appendix P, Hazardous Material Factual Report, Exhibit # 15-Q, pg 000444. (Ed. Note; the same model shipped on ValuJet 592 (ref NTSB Final Report-ValuJet; page 14, “Scott P/N 801386-06, three mask”.
Incident 2. 2/19/88. In-flight fire by a rupture (3 inch hole) of a Duo-Pac Avoix generator caused by blockage of the output tube. NTSB recommended relocation of the relief valve directly to the generator body. Ref to NTSB Safety Letter and Link > http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/1989/a89_106_107.pdf
Incident 3. 11/7/92.Cargo facility fire. Improper labeling. No claim generator initiated fire.
Incident 4. 9/24/93. Cargo facility fire. Improper labeling. No claim generator initiated fire.
Incident 5. 10/21/94. Cargo facility fire. Improper labeling. No claim generator initiated fire.
Incident 6. 1/26/96. Cargo facility. Improper labeling. No claim to a fire.
Incident 7. 4/25/96. Repair station. Improper labeling. No claim to a fire.
ALSO
> Ref pg 54, Five Fire Tests, “Test Conditions and Results”. No fire with tests 1 and 3. Fire with tests 2, 4 and 5 on the fourth try.. (Ed. Note; not known if outlets were plugged as in the May 1999 DOT/FAA Tech Center tests below.
> Ref pg 133, “Conclusions; # 6, The activation of one or more chemical oxygen generators in the forward cargo compartment of the airplane initiated the fire on ValuJet flight 592. Conclusion # 21; Because of the rapid propagation of the oxygen fed fire …..”.
> Ref Appendix P, Hazardous Material Factual Report, Exhibit # 15-Q, pg 000446; “test data indicate that the outside surface of Scott oxygen generator canisters may reach 420 to 443 degrees F during production of oxygen”.
-----------------
May 1999. DOT/FAA/AR-TN99/9. By O’Connor and Hagen. Activation of Oxygen Generators in Proximity to Combustible Materials. Link > http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/tn99-9.pdf
Abstract; This report presents the results of a series of tests performed on oxygen generators contained in cardboard shipping containers and packing materials to witness the probability of ignition in the event one of the generators was activated. Test results indicated that in the presence of an activated generator, combustible materials will produce a fire. Since it is conceivable that the sodium chlorate in a inactivated generator could melt and plug all outlets, the outlet and pressure relief valves were plugged before activating the generator to simulate this melting situation. The activation of an aircraft oxygen generator canister produced temperatures of 410 F). No fire in 3 of 7 tests.
-----------------
April 2003. DOT/FAA/AR-TN03/35. By David Blake. The Response of Aircraft Oxygen Generators Exposed to Elevated Temperatures. Link > http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/TN03-35.pdf
Abstract; The purpose of this testing was to determine the temperatures that would cause self-activation of sodium chlorate oxygen generators. The data will be used to establish the degree of thermal protection that would be required to prevent the activation of chemical oxygen generators should they be exposed to heat from a cargo compartment fire involving other materials. The minimum temperature that caused the activation of one of the generators was 600°F. Due to uncertainties with other designs not tested and the physical properties of sodium chlorate, it is recommended that the generators not be exposed to temperatures above 400°F.
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