Merged: Senate Inquiry

[Sarcs]

Addendum to my last from Phearless Phelan (Pro Aviation) :ok::
Crash investigation response now due next month (http://proaviation.com.au/?p=2130)

Delays in the government’s response to a senate committee report that have dumfounded senators, the aviation industry and the general public are now expected to be resolved within five weeks. Transport Minister Warren Truss anticipates tabling the government’s response to the committee’s recommendations before the Parliament’s current autumn sittings close on Thursday March 27.

A spokesman for Minister Truss has told ProAviation the Government’s “detailed and considered response” was now being finalised for its tabling in Parliament.

The ATSB’s report on its investigation of the Pel-Air ditching at Norfolk Island in November 2009 was published in August 2012, generating furious debate and the perception that investigators had ignored critical systemic issues surrounding the carrier’s flight operations and operational support systems, as well as questions over CASA’s regulatory oversight of Pel-Air.

The Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee conducted its “Aviation Accident Investigations Inquiry” between Sept 2012 and May 2013, but the task kept expanding and the committee’s report was finally tabled on June 19, 2013.

The government’s response is now expected to address the 26 detailed safety-critical recommendations.

Among these were the reopening of the ATSB investigation, the recovery of the ditched medevac Westwind jet’s cockpit voice and flight data recorders, and the question of whether the Australian Federal Police should investigate whether breaches under S42 of the Transport Safety Investigations Act had occurred.

The Pel-Air ditching has now generated endless inter-related reports but the government’s response to the senate committee’s recommendations was delayed firstly by the pre-election caretaker period, the election on 7 Sep 2013, and since by inter-departmental manoeuvering that has been closely followed by the increasingly frustrated multi-party Senate committee whose findings were unanimous.

Mr. Truss’s spokesman says: “It is however noted that the Government and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) have already taken actions relevant to the Committee’s report through the establishment of the independent aviation safety regulation review [ASRR] Panel and the independent peer review of the ATSB by its Canadian counterpart the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB).

The peer-review, announced last August by TSB Chair Wendy Tadros and ATSB Chief Commissioner Martin Dolan is “examining the application of investigation processes and methodologies in selected Australian aviation investigations.”

Over four years after the ditching and the dramatic night rescue of its four passengers and two crew, and against the background of the current ASRR Panel’s deep probe into related regulatory issues, there is close industry interest in what solutions the government’s response will identify.
Well that'll take some of the heat out of the questioning in Senate Estimates next Monday (http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/02%20Parliamentary%20Business/25%20Senate%20Estimates/add1314/schedule.ashx)...still think that the Beaker lame duck is ripe for the Ferryman's spit roast..??:E

Either way it would appear that we're heading for a..."MAYDAY..MAYDAY..MAYDAY"..:=..as it just so happens that May also coincides with the 2014-15 budgetary estimates (on the 26 May for the RRAT committee).

One would assume..:confused:..that all the ducks will need to be well and truly found & lined up by then...:ok:

[Kharon]

Sarcs # -'Well that'll take some of the heat out of the questioning in Senate Estimates (http://api.viglink.com/api/click?format=go&jsonp=vglnk_jsonp_13929550304146&key=1e857e7500cdd32403f752206c297a3d&loc=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Faustralia-new-zealand-pacific%2F429828-merged-senate-inquiry-87.html&v=1&ref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Fnewreply.php%3Fdo%3Dnewrep ly%26noquote%3D1%26p%3D8325137&libId=36158d25-7bb4-432b-abec-0c9624d95466&out=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aph.gov.au%2F~%2Fmedia%2F02%2520Parliam entary%2520Business%2F25%2520Senate%2520Estimates%2Fadd1314% 2Fschedule.ashx&title=Merged%3A%20Senate%20Inquiry%20-%20Page%2087%20-%20PPRuNe%20Forums&txt=Senate%20Estimates%20next%20Monday) next Monday...still think that the Beaker lame duck is ripe for the Ferryman's spit roast..??

I just wonder about the heat emanating from the Senate kitchen. The Bar Room Barristers (BRB) had dinner and a quiet little drink (or two) for P 49ers birthday last evening, only a round dozen at the table (much dark muttering about closet MKR fans was heard), topics were, in no particular order:-

1) Have the Senators discovered who in the PMC provides Mrdak top cover?
2) Have the Senators discovered who in the PMC provides Dolan top cover?
3) If they know, can they neutralise or redirect?

The table was split 6/6 on these questions; Dr. Wall being deemed too academic to soil his hands directing traffic on matters aeronautical; there was some support for Hazelhurst but with so many female mandarins in position and without knowing all the local scandal, it was judged a bit too hard to call. The only line of inquiry that made sense was a time line and associated tasking schedule which makes for very interesting reading (cheers P7) but couldn't, not with any certainty throw a dart at the right answer. All the same, but it's fascinating to see how the buttons are pushed, the levers are pulled, the grease is applied and the coal gets shovelled into the boiler. Sir Humphrey was a pussy cat.

4) Is there enough steam left in the boiler to finalise the Pel Air fiasco and progress to the next logical step i.e. publicly (or privately, don't care) giving CASA it's comeuppance?

Ayes 8 : Nays 4. With McComic waiting for Beaker before sharing a cab to the ferry dock, consensus was that the bad boys will all be so busy queuing up for his job they won't see the truck coming. The Ayes feel that after all the buggering about, shuffling and sliding around the issues, the miniscule may well believe that throwing the McComic arse to the wolves will do the job, we beg to differ. The notion that this united, bi-partisan, angry, very aware Senate committee will accept this cynical, token gesture is risible. Acceptance is problematic, a poison chalice. The world and it's wife know that this committee is very properly briefed and therefore very, very aware of the ailments, who the villains are and where they live. Must they now stand and be judged as being either complicit or negligent if changes are not made. Never fear, the BRB has faith; lots of, in spades, redoubled, that the Senate crew will see the job through to a 'fit and proper' conclusion.

5) Is there enough political clout and courage to involve Abbott on a meaningful level; to where he appoints a junior minister, even if it's only an interim measure to oversight the changes?

Ayes 2 : Nays 10. Less faith in the PM, mostly due to past advice to PM's to do nothing. Apart from the one low life, we could not remember one PM who actually mentioned, let alone voiced concern or caring for the aviation industry per se (apart from Big Q matters, which don't count). Maybe if D. Fawcett Esq. could get 10 minutes; or, one or two of the 200+ WLR submissions was glanced at; or, even if just the Senate Pel Air report was smuggled into the PM briefcase, perhaps, just maybe, something may be achieved. We are, after all an Australian industry and boy, do we ever qualify for red tape relief. Endit.

6) Will Truss back up his pugnacious, pre election rhetoric with positive action or will he just wave a wet lettuce leaf and dive behind the barricades – yet again, to look after his old mates until they escort him off the premises on his Zimmer frame??

No brainer 12 :0 the Nays. In opposition with Albo running scared, let down by his 'trusty' CASA allies, ol' Trusty was on the podium like a rocket, flapping his gums and making fearful, ferocious noises, not too many promises though. Consensus was that the Wet Lettuce Review was deemed a suitable bone, sufficient to placate the plebs; anyway as Creampuff said, so many friends, so little time.

The signpost to where the action is and where the industry is headed may be revealed on Monday, then again, it may not be. But I reckon those that can will watch the CASA /ATSB sessions with some interest. Do hope it's not a fizzer, got snags for BBQ, beer fridge heaving and everything. The BRB have sanctioned the Gobbledocks attendance, provided he agrees not to pelt snags at the wide screen and that bloody elephant stay on the dockside; the mess last time was unbelievable.

Toot toot.

[Sarcs]

Kharon: The signpost to where the action is and where the industry is headed may be revealed on Monday, then again, it may not be. But I reckon those that can will watch the CASA /ATSB sessions with some interest. Do hope it's not a fizzer, got snags for BBQ, beer fridge heaving and everything. The BRB have sanctioned the Gobbledocks attendance, provided he agrees not to pelt snags at the wide screen and that bloody elephant stay on the dockside; the mess last time was unbelievable.
If the non-aligned Senators (now and into the future) require further incentive to 'maintain the rage' they should look no further than my post #471 (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/527815-truss-aviation-safety-regulation-review-24.html#post8332679) of the Truss WLR thread..:*

On Monday's Estimates' Agenda it looks like the prime viewing time will be from 1400 EDST (0300 UTC)..:ok::

DoIRD Estimates 24 February (http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/02%20Parliamentary%20Business/25%20Senate%20Estimates/add1314/rrat.ashx).

"Que Sera Sera... Whatever Will Be, Will Be...":ok:

[Sarcs]

Or if you want to go further back in time, to say 15/02/13 to put it all in perspective you can go HERE (http://parlview.aph.gov.au/mediaPlayer.php?videoID=91095)..:E

Hmm..looks like I might have to dust off the cobwebs of my old poohtube account...:ok:

[Up-into-the-air]

This is happening today and sith mrdak has protected Beaker on a number of occasions.

Interesting read from Hansard when it comes out.

The following current post has come out (http://vocasupport.com/atsb-senate-in…-february-2014/ ‎)

Senator Fawcett:


TSB Canada investigation asks Dolan on progress, with final report in May 2014.


Review Dolan says will occur on standard process.

[B]TSB Canada - open to give a briefing to the ASRR panel and Mr. David Forsyth

[Frank Arouet]

Dolan was glib about the terms of reference to TSB Canada. Who would have written them? I like the term 'peer review' as if there is anything like CASA or ATSB anywhere in the world. They have no 'Peers' to be on Par with except somewhere in a parallel universe. I think Fawcett is onto Mrdak. But... I was wrong once before.

[Creampuff]

Short summary of today’s evidence from CASA and ATSB: Everything’s fine. Nothing to see here. Move on. :ok:

[Up-into-the-air]

Script [written large] by mrdackio.

Thumb your noses at the Senator's!!

Refer to the TSB Canada [far enough away]

Looks like you did something Beaker - even change your looks

Throw a piece of meat to the lions - skull

[B]CONFUSE THE TROOPS

That how it works??

Oh by the way, where did the old ICC of casa go - was that amsa I heard??

[aroa]

ICC Hart the Decent fiqured that herding cattle was more relaxing and worthwhile than herding (fat)cats...:ok:

Last lady ICC left the stage of "CAsA the Musical" by exiting ? falling stage left into the foot lights. Or was she pushed?. Or shouted at?

At AMSA ???...that fiqures, got the word "safety" in it , and as we know anything, and I mean ANYTHING, can be done in the name of "safety".
Hope she has something more to do there for value of the taxpayers dollars.:ok:

Latest lady ICC ex LSD (sic) Probably still learning the chorus lines for "CAsA the Musical"....

pretty easy really.... "Safety safety safety !!
Empty skies for all...." etc :mad:

WARNING : THIS is NOT a comedy. Its a McComedy R 18+ :mad::mad::mad:

[Creampuff]

CASA and ATSB have called the Committee’s bluff, and the Laborial Senators have been exposed as having insufficient moral fibre to put their Senate power where their mouths are. Political expedience wins every time.

Embarrassing questions aren’t even wet lettuce: They are just hot air.

[Up-into-the-air]

And where oh where is the ICC gone??

Oh where oh where indeed??

Like to tell us creamie??

[Creampuff]

I used to wish I had a clue what you are on about UITA.

The only ICC whose name I recall is ‘Hart’, and that’s only because of threads on PPRUNE. I have no clue or interest in where s/he went, I have no clue or interest in how many successors s/he’s had, I have no clue or interest in who the successor/s is/are and I have no clue or interest in where they’ve gone, if they’ve left.

I can understand why lots of people leave CASA. Only people with extraordinarily low self-esteem or weak moral fibre could be prepared to continue to work for an organisation for which they have no respect or, in some cases, open contempt.

[Sarcs]

Beaker's performance today..:rolleyes:..well you make up your own mind..:E

[YOUTUBE]RRAT Estimates 24/02/14 - ATSB Part 1 - YouTube (http://youtu.be/WjWYG2n7DMU)

At about 06:00 classic Heff statement!:D:D "Would the man at the back of the room believe anything that comes out of Beaker's mouth these days..??":ugh::yuk::yuk:

"Caesar judging Caesar"..::E

[YOUTUBE]RRAT Estimates 24/02/14 - ATSB Part 2 - YouTube (http://youtu.be/8L7iqrXDSjw)

Additional vs Significant vs New..:rolleyes:

[YOUTUBE]RRAT Estimates 24/02/14 - ATSB Part 3 - YouTube (http://youtu.be/WBDL-eYm2rw)

Ps Love the gotcha moment towards the end from DF (at about 06:45)...hmm fair payback I reckon..:E

Pps Kingcrat was certainly squirming towards the end..:confused:

Addendum - 'The Battle of the two Big Macks'
Not wishing to detract from yesterday's episode of the RRAT Estimates, but I thought a flashback in time to a past, somewhat amusing, episode could help while away the time till Hansard & certain Tabled docs are released. Also features one of the former FF ICC Commissioners..:E

[YOUTUBE]RRAT Estimates 29/05/2013 - Battle of the two Big Macks - YouTube (http://youtu.be/K0pJv6DNzuo)

[Kharon]

I've now watched the afternoon estimates session twice, with many pauses and much backtracking; although without the Hansard it's tough to get to the actual critical words, but it's pretty clear from the tapes. Truss needs to take a break.

The McComic attempted filibuster was so full of bollocks, threats, smoke, threats, mirrors, threats, contradictions, threats, bollocks and rubbish, it was a relief when Bill H pulled him up, "that's your lot, now STFU". For that alone, I will always hold Heffernan in high regard. It is unbelievable that the board would allow such a 'speech' (for wont of better) to be made by that director to an educated, cynical audience of Senators, harder to believe that Truss is prepared to be shamed and humiliated in that manner, publicly and on the record. I almost felt a twinge of sympathy for MM, who, like a patient, alert work dog, carefully tended his wayward charges lest a foot was placed so far into a mouth it was unrecoverable. Fielding in the slips is a tough gig and it was a long session for him, pity he's in so much hot water over airports.

Anyway, the CASA first XI were dismissed quickly, despatched to the change rooms to prepare for the next innings when the long awaited response to the Senate inquiry is finally released, to meet it's dreary anti climax. Nice to see that plagiarised crock, the Chambers report used as a club, again; it's to be hoped that the cynical attack of his own troops will haunt what's left of a less than salubrious career. There's a natural justice for you, if you like it Senator.

Next we had the Beaker outfit; that wriggled, squirmed and shuffled like a crew of schoolboys caught with their Willy's out in the bike sheds, but knowing all the while, that one of their Dad's owns the school and there is no way in hell they will get clobbered. The unashamed, belligerent arrogance, the endless round and round of shapeless answers is embarrassing. Even when MM admitted that there was new and significant evidence, they persisted, even when MM went to their rescue, again they stonewalled, even when Beaker was very neatly hoist on his own petard (Bravo DF) still they persisted. You need miniscule support to be that confidently dismissive of quality Senators like Xenophon and Fawcett, who will, with intelligence and commitment persist until the truth, no matter how unpleasant is admitted.

So here we sit, now anticipating the minuscule's response to Senate to be a dud; the TSB report on 'paperwork' protocols to be done only according to the restricted ToR, Canely Vale to be accepted as 'nice' paperwork, despite Senators best efforts. Truss could, in a heartbeat, change all that; but he won't. The simple fact that we must, yet again, listen to the now Beardless Beaker (BB) circular arguments, his off siders belligerence and distractions says nothing here will be used as a lesson for change. Beaker and his bully boy mate stand in the rubble of Australian credibility. Truss didn't do squat last time and history do repeat. The miniscule 's WLR will, in all probability meet the same fate at the stone wall.

Perhaps an appeal to Abbott, 'Dear Sir, please, while we still have an industry give us a Proper Minister; or, appoint DF Junior Minister; or, promote Barnaby Joyce to the post; then at least something positive may happen. The best we can hope for now is that being sufficiently humiliated yesterday is enough excuse for the miniscule to fold his tent and slip quietly away into the night'. L&K the IOS.

Truss seems to be a man stuck in a time warp, unable to deal yet again with the problems he failed to deal with 8 years ago. The same problems are resurfacing, dealing with them in the same way as last time is not an option. Look at the cock up you left behind. Man up or march seem to be reasonable options.

Man of the Match – Mrdak for sheer dogged determination and dedication.

Sponsored by the Ills of Society Barnaby support group. Funding exploratory research into providing Jelly fish with a backbone – like it or not.

[Up-into-the-air]

Phillip Reiss seems to know the ICC [APOA 2013 Presidents reply] : (http://www.aopa.com.au/magazine/2013/12/columns/from-the-president/)

AVMED recognise that delays and the costs of additional medical testing have caused considerable angst in the pilot community; they are working to try and eliminate many of the problems. Assoc. Prof. Pooshan Navathe and Mr. Peter Fereday called this meeting and working through the process is a positive step forward.


This follows on from our AOPA initiated meeting in Sydney back in August with Assoc. Prof. Pooshan Navathe and Ms. Elizabeth Hampton, CASA Complaints Commissioner, and demonstrates the value of sensible engagement rather than confrontation. We will keep you posted on the outcome. This will not be resolved over one meeting but I am optimistic of an improved outcome for issuance of Class 11 medicals.
Now you have a name - maybe you can answer the question.

[Creampuff]

Let me google that for you: https://www.google.com.au/search?hl=en&q=elizabeth+hampton&meta=

I have NFI what you're on about (or on). :*

[Sarcs]

Kharon:So here we sit, now anticipating the minuscule's response to Senate to be a dud; the TSB report on 'paperwork' protocols to be done only according to the restricted ToR, Canely Vale to be accepted as 'nice' paperwork, despite Senators best efforts. Truss could, in a heartbeat, change all that; but he won't. The simple fact that we must, yet again, listen to the now Beardless Beaker (BB) circular arguments, his off siders belligerence and distractions says nothing here will be used as a lesson for change. Beaker and his bully boy mate stand in the rubble of Australian credibility. Truss didn't do squat last time and history do repeat. The miniscule 's WLR will, in all probability meet the same fate at the stone wall.
Perfectly summarised there Mr “K” (& I totally agree with Creamy’s commentary on the M&M team's batting technique) :D, plus I wholeheartedly agree with the sentiment that the current miniscule has to be dropped (preferably before the next TEST).

Comment: The miniscule sits on the selection committee & had the perfect opportunity back in September last year for a dawn dropping of the Beaker & DAS and he didn’t take it!

MOM selection was, to my mind, line ball between Senator’s X, DF & Mr M&M (hmm..kind of looks like the red bugger in the ad…:E)

Couple of things that should not go unnoticed with the individual performances..

DF – That googly at the end went within a whisker of taking out the off stump of M&M. The look on M&M’s face was priceless, you could almost see M&M thinking.. “But..but the miniscule secretly briefed me on the DF’s spin bag of tricks and he never mentioned that he bowls the perfect googly and said he would adhere to the party politic and bowl a on-side line..??:D

NX – What can I say, as usual, almost faultless line & length and kept his cool even while seething at Beaker being dropped on the fence while on nought. Those sharp in-swingers at the end are what sway me towards the MOtM selection.:D:D

M&M- Batted with the superfluous ease of a consummate professional No 3. Has this uncanny knack of knowing when to just play the ball with no more than a straight bat and when to sweep down the legside. Almost come unstuck in the second last over to a DF googly but held his composure till stumps.:D:D:D

So “K” have to agree on your selection for MOM..:ok:

Hmm..at 2 all and a draw..the next test will be fascinating..:rolleyes:


ps WOW (word of warning) from the IOS: Dear miniscule…shuffle on please while you can, with at least some modicum of dignity…:rolleyes:..otherwise it could get very ugly.:{.very quickly…:*

[Kharon]

It occurred to me that it would be nice to post some refreshing candour and a proactive approach to some of the problems. Greg Hood (ASA) just grasps the nettle, no bluff, no bull, just straight answers and an open forum on how he and his group have set about the tasks in hand. Have a read or a listen, compare the consummate professional on top of his game to mindless double talk Beaker trots out;

Mr Hood: I think it is fair to say that the incident was of significant concern to us in relation to the fact that there were some procedural issues in relation to the display, for example, on the air traffic controller's screen. She did not have the appropriate map as a visual cue. We have addressed that issue nationally, across the country. Basically, the 737 aircraft started to head towards the active parachuting area and a fellow controller alerted the controller to the fact that that area was active. We took some action for the aircraft to be vectored clear of that area, but it came close to an area in which active parachuting was taking place.

CHAIR: 'Close' being?

Mr Hood: I believe it was 0.2 nautical miles, but I would have to take that on notice.
CHAIR: That is pretty close, is it not?

Mr Hood: Yes.

CHAIR: It would be a bit of a thrill if you were hanging in the air there. Are there sufficient procedures at the other airports? Obviously you have taken some procedural action.

Mr Hood: We have looked nationally at about 38 sites now at which the parachuting takes place. We have standardised the letters of agreement and the procedures that we utilise to separate jet traffic with parachuting airspace.

Mr Hood: That is correct. I think within about 30 minutes of the Virgin aircraft diverting from inbound to Adelaide to Mildura the aircraft requested the weather for Mildura from an area traffic controller and was advised that the weather was broken at 3,400 feet. That may have formed the basis for the aircraft's decision to divert to Mildura. The TAF at the time, the terminal area forecast, had a tempo period, which indicated you required 60 holding for Mildura, but the conditions when requested of ATC were still broken cloud at 3,400 feet.

As we know, the Mildura AWIS, the Aerodrome Weather Information Service, which is jointly owned by the airport, by Airservices Australia and by the Bureau of Meteorology, was unserviceable. The way in which aircraft could have derived updated information about the weather at Mildura could have been via request to ATC through the AERIS, which is the Automatic En Route Information Service. There is one available at Mount William where you dial up the VHF and it provides you with that information. Or in fact through ACARS, which is the airline system. They have their own system where they can request the information from their respective operation centres in Qantas and Virgin to be provided with the latest information.

Cash and no bull**** – Bravo, thank you Mr. Hood; there is hope yet.

I was wondering who was sat next to Dolan, because Dolan kept looking at him before beginning every statement – in Hansard representing the Government was Senator the Honourable David Albert Lloyd Johnston, if you can find the segment below on the U-chewed clips a student of body language and lip reading may, perhaps gain some insight.

Senator XENOPHON: Can you indicate whether you provided advice to the government as to why you thought there was nothing new and significant arising out of the Senate inquiry report, with a view to reopening the investigation or reconsidering your findings?

Mr Dolan: The advice that we provided through the department to the government is decision-making advice for the government, and I am not sure I am in a position to comment on that.

Senator XENOPHON: I am not asking you for the content of that advice. I am asking whether, in fact, you provided advice as to whether you ought to reconsider reopening in any way the ATSB's report into the Pel-Air incident.

Senator Johnston: I do not think you can discuss the content or the inference.

Senator XENOPHON: I am not asking for the content.
Senator Johnston: Well, the inference to be drawn as to what the advice was about. If there was advice, there was advice.

Senator XENOPHON: I am just trying to establish whether there was advice on this particular issue. I am not asking for an inference as to whether there was advice one way or the other. It is as to whether there was any.

Senator Johnston: I think departments provide advice on all manner of issues. I think you can assume that they did.

Senator XENOPHON: I was just trying to establish that from Mr Dolan.


Absolutely awful, but lawful. Stone walls, a hanging ceiling and one tiny window to wriggle though, perhaps the ToR the Canadians are working with may put a light on; but I doubt it. Today I filed with the BRB my version of the Beaker school report from the Canadian cousins, there a bottle on it, for who gets the closest – more later (if the report ever turns up and Commissioner Dolan ever gets done tweeking it).

[Sarcs]

Kharon:It occurred to me that it would be nice to post some refreshing candour and a proactive approach to some of the problems. Greg Hood (ASA) just grasps the nettle, no bluff, no bull, just straight answers and an open forum on how he and his group have set about the tasks in hand. Have a read or a listen, compare the consummate professional on top of his game to mindless double talk Beaker trots out;
Well picked up "K"...:ok: But wait there was more from the consummate professional Mr Hood in regards to the YMIA fog debacle :D: Senator FAWCETT: Thank you. My only question of substance goes to the incident at Mildura with the two 737s that had the met forecasting issue and then ran short on fuel. We have spoken to ATSB about their internal inquiries. I would be interested to know from Airservices's perspective, as the provider of that information, what you are doing internally to learn from that incident to prevent it occurring.

Mr Hood : I will clarify the last point first. The lateral proximity of the 737 to the parachuting area reduced to 2,100 metres. With regard to the Mildura incident, I think I answered a question last estimates from Senator Xenophon in relation to the fact that our inquiries were continuing into the diversion of two aircraft, a Qantas and a Virgin aircraft, from being inbound to Adelaide, where unforecast fog eventuated, to Mildura. We have undertaken our own internal investigation and we are also an active participant in the ATSB's investigation into that incident.

Senator FAWCETT: So, not only was there the unforecast fog; the conditions at Mildura also deteriorated below landing minima unforecast.

Mr Hood : That is correct. I think within about 30 minutes of the Virgin aircraft diverting from inbound to Adelaide to Mildura the aircraft requested the weather for Mildura from an area traffic controller and was advised that the weather was broken at 3,400 feet. That may have formed the basis for the aircraft's decision to divert to Mildura. The TAF at the time, the terminal area forecast, had a tempo period, which indicated you required 60 holding for Mildura, but the conditions when requested of ATC were still broken cloud at 3,400 feet.

As we know, the Mildura AWIS, the Aerodrome Weather Information Service, which is jointly owned by the airport, by Airservices Australia and by the Bureau of Meteorology, was unserviceable. The way in which aircraft could have derived updated information about the weather at Mildura could have been via request to ATC through the AERIS, which is the Automatic En Route Information Service. There is one available at Mount William where you dial up the VHF and it provides you with that information. Or in fact through ACARS, which is the airline system. They have their own system where they can request the information from their respective operation centres in Qantas and Virgin to be provided with the latest information.
Hoody is all over this incident..:D..line of questioning continues: CHAIR: So, was the Qantas aircraft landing legal? Did it have sight?

Mr Hood : I am not familiar with precisely what the cloud base and the visibility criteria were. The ATSB investigation will come out with that. In respect of your question, I suppose the point of clarification from the Airservices perspective is: do we continue to provide continuous weather updates to aircraft? In sectors like Mildura you have Mildura, Broken Hill and Swan Hill, for example, all of which you may have aircraft inbound to. As you know, those sites that have a Bureau of Meteorology officer on the ground may be originating multiple special climate statements. Every 5 or 10 minutes you might have the weather changing. That tends to happen a lot with thunderstorm activity and also with changing visibility and fog. What you are likely to be faced with as the air traffic controller is several changing weather scenarios on your particular sector. So, the passing of updated weather information to every aircraft or every destination becomes impractical. At all times it was available to the pilot to request that information of ATC, but specifically we did not provide an update on the weather at Mildura to the two 737s.

In our investigation we had 10 findings and two recommendations {Comment: God forbid not SRs..:ugh:} . We are certainly acting on the two recommendations, and we are also participating with the ATSB, next month I believe, in the meeting with CASA, the airlines and the ATSB in relation to the clarification of who was responsible. The other thing that we do not have access to is what they received from their own company in terms of ACARS messages from Qantas and/or Virgin.

Senator FAWCETT: Are you able to table those findings and recommendations for the committee?


Mr Hood: Certainly, but not today. I am happy to provide the Senate a copy with our internal investigation.

Senator FAWCETT: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2FDYU%22;queryty pe=;rec=0) Thank you.{Comment: See how easy it is when your armed with the known facts, have nothing to hide and are proactively seeking to address the highlighted significant safety issues...:D}

But wait there is still more...Senator XENOPHON: I have some supplementary questions directly on the Mildura incident. The ATSB, in its interim report into this incident, state in part that information about the actual weather conditions at Mildura was not available to the crew from the Automated Weather Information Service, AWIS, as the aircraft approached Mildura'. It goes on to say that the AWIS link from the automated weather station is a very high frequency omnidirectional radio range, which was operated by Airservices Australia, was unserviceable. Does Airservices agree with this statement by the ATSB?

Mr Hood : As I said, the ownership of the AWIS sits with three parties. The Weather Information Service itself sits with the Bureau of Meteorology. The line that takes it from the bureau to the navigation aid belongs to the airport and we own the navigation aid which broadcasts the information. The navigation aid, the NDB, was out of service and had been NOTAMed five days prior.

Senator XENOPHON: What was unserviceable? Was it the automatic weather station or the omnidirectional radio range link?

Mr Hood : My understanding is that the non-directional beacon, the navigation aid which broadcasts the weather, was out of service.

Senator XENOPHON: That is the responsibility of Airservices?

Mr Hood : That is correct.

Senator XENOPHON: How long had that link at Mildura been non-operational?

Mr Hood : My understanding is that it was NOTAMed five days prior to the incident. Whether it was previously NOTAMed I would have to take on notice.

Senator XENOPHON: If you could. Is it operating now?

Mr Hood : That navigation aid has been decommissioned. The AWIS at Mildura is now owned by the airport and was commissioned, broadcasting on a VHF frequency, in mid-November. My understanding is that it is operating.

Senator XENOPHON: You do not have responsibility for it anymore?

Mr Hood : That is correct.

Senator XENOPHON: You used to but not now?

Mr Hood : It used to be a joint responsibility. Now the airport owns and operates the facility in conjunction with the Bureau of Meteorology.

Senator XENOPHON: Finally, is there any oversight or regulatory framework to ensure that weather information can be accurately transmitted to crews considering the many parties that seem to be responsible?

Mr Hood : The Aeronautical Information Publication, the pilot's bible in relation to how information is disseminated, is basically an interpretation of the rules for laymen. One of the recommendations made in our investigation is that it needed some clarification, specifically in relation to the unavailability of an AWIS and what the air traffic controller and the pilot's responsibilities are if the AWIS is unserviceable.

Senator XENOPHON: Thank you.
Here's a thought?? Perhaps Beaker should consider transposing, with additional info, the ASA investigation report for the bureau's report, could save a mountain of taxpayers green?? Oh that's right it has been done before and look where that ended up...:ugh: And we have the small problem that ASA is a DIP to the incident so their ultimate objectivity would come under question...:}

Still top job by Hoody, it is good to see that he is not relying on the proposed Beaker love in to find out all the, politically correct, obfuscated facts/findings..:E

Maybe the miniscule should consider offering Beaker's position to Hoody, he'd certainly go a long way to restoring some credibility to the ATsB (make that s a big S again..;))...:ok:

[scrubba]

Sarcs said:

Maybe the miniscule should consider offering Beaker's position to Hoody...

Hoody is right where he needs to be right now - changing the management culture of AsA. :ok: Just let him get on with it, since AsA as an operational service provider is a much greater risk than Beakersville :mad:

Beakersville needs its own solution, starting with abandoning it as a sinecure for public servants needing lateral arabesques from their last post of stardom :ugh:

[Kharon]

Scrubba # above "Hoody is right where he needs to be right now –etc.

Good point, agreed. Hood was mentioned only to highlight the stark differences between department attitudes. It's timely and 'proper' that ASA have someone to straighten out the mess left behind. The only cloud I can see is that of fiscal embuggerance; ASA need to spend some dollars. There is an example of some of the problems Mrdak, Staib and Hood have to deal with. See – Hansard (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22committees%2Festimate%2Ff3681c2b-ec9a-4fe5-9b53-730b8f34fcff%2F0000%22)- Turn 60 - pages 74 to 76. This Edwards joker is banging on about a department not making as much profit, not about how ASA can recover. Not about how can we sort out the situation where an event like this– Airservices loose two A330 (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/02/28/how-airservices-australia-lost-two-garuda-a330s-over-wa/) – (Ben Sandilands), can occur while not only does the Senator expect ASA to fix that up and still make 'more' profit. Makes you wonder, don't it?

Senator EDWARDS: Being a good business operator, when I heard that the division had made $62 million last year I said, 'How do we get into that business?' I found out we could not, because it is a monopoly. So, what we have now is a forecast of a 30 per cent drop in net profit to that division. I am sure the Treasurer will be very interested to know that and the reasons why. So, let's pre-empt him and see if we can find out why.

Read that one again, carefully. What is this man saying about himself?

Senator EDWARDS: With all due respect to what I thought was going to be a short answer for Senator Sterle so that he could get on with his questions, could you actually flesh out—you just have short notes there—what changes in accounting principles have led you to this on all of those? Can you provide a reasonably fulsome explanation as to those points which you have made with me as to why you are going to be short on last year's result? Since you have given me increased revenues, you may quite rightly be trying to draw a correlation between increased revenues meaning that more people on the ground had to do more work. As a proportion of wages spent to profit earned from last year, are we going to be in an appropriate performance quartile or area that you are happy or not happy with? As chief executive officer you are accountable for profitability.

Senator EDWARDS: I am not trying to jump in on this one, but we do need an explanation. If you could provide a fulsome report in a timely manner and not just prior to the next estimates as to what it is, we will have a discussion. It will be very evident to you if there is some line item in there that is going to create a problem, and I am sure you will be able to address it. But obviously now that we have tackled the issue, let us get the answers as to why that is showing up the way it is. A 30 per cent fall in profit without an explanation out there in private land would be a significant event.

Nope, Hoody can have that job. How would you like to deal with the arrogance and greed on display in the quoted paragraphs. The same idiot would be howling the bloody roof down if 'his' aircraft had a close call one dark and stormy. Air Traffic Control is not a cash cow for politicians to milk, it's an essential service, the management of which has become a hell of a mess. So perhaps the gummint will just have to bite the bullet and withstand a loss of 10 million or so, just in case we bump a couple of aircraft together; saving a few pennies here and few pennies there. Why should the ASA be driven to make a profit and why should they be browbeaten about a profit loss? Shee-it, an inquiry into a mid air will cost a lot more than the loss of a profit percentage for a couple of years; just while the boys and girls sort it all out.

“For the want of a nail the shoe was lost,
For the want of a shoe the horse was lost,
For the want of a horse the rider was lost,
For the want of a rider the battle was lost,
For the want of a battle the kingdom was lost,
And all for the want of a horseshoe-nail.”
(Benjamin Franklin).

[thorn bird]

"Why should the ASA be driven to make a profit and why should they be browbeaten about a profit loss? Shee-it, an inquiry into a mid air will cost a lot more than the loss of a profit percentage for a couple of years; just while the boys and girls sort it all out."

Kharon, "never a truer word was spoken", forgot who said that.
But then why does CAsA have to make a profit? They can write rules that nobody understands, then manipulate those rules to develop an income stream from services that provide nothing useful to the "client"except grief and wasted time and does nothing that improves "Safety",
Why was essential public infrastructure like our airports gifted to a "colourful" bank to manipulate into a billion dollar turnover a year business that pays absolutely no tax and spends as little as possible to improve the infrastructure for those that use it? other than those who wish to park their cars of course.

[Sarcs]

TB: Why was essential public infrastructure like our airports gifted to a "colourful" bank to manipulate into a billion dollar turnover a year business that pays absolutely no tax and spends as little as possible to improve the infrastructure for those that use it? other than those who wish to park their cars of course. Other than the 2nd Sydney Airport 30 year debate, that Thorny briefly touches on (above), the subject of airports is quite often the forgotten third cousins in the yin and yang of aviation safety regulation in this country. However it is an area that does cause considerable public debate and interest in local and regional communities, especially when the local airport quite often provides the umbilical cord connection, to the outside world, that is essential for the economic growth and prosperity of these communities.

In recent times organisations such as the AAA, ALGA and RAAA are starting to become more and more vocal about concerns for the financial impost of, what they essentially feel, is over regulation (red tape) governing how these local/regional airports can be legally used. Perhaps a recent article from Australian Aviation best describes these issues: Regional airports under pressure – AAA (http://australianaviation.com.au/2014/02/regional-airports-under-pressure-aaa/)

There is also the other impost on regional airport (& operators) due to security screening imposed when a local airport wishes to expand/improve their airport to introduce or expand RPT operations, quote from AAA CEO Caroline Wilkie in the Aviation Business article: Australia's regional aviation sector cries out for help (http://www.aviationbusiness.com.au/news/australia-s-regional-aviation-sector-cries-out-for-help)

“…There are areas such as Commonwealth-mandated airport security screening requirements that should be looked at more closely (for) cost efficiencies while supporting a sensible risk-based approach to aviation security,..”

Then there is the issue (that has been the bugbear of Senator Fawcett’s ever since his first foray into Senate Estimates back in 2011) of the government leasing arrangements (of what used to be government owned & administered airports) and the possible aviation safety implications of current/future developments of these airports. It should therefore be encouraging for organisations such as the Archerfield & Moorabbin tenancy groups that Senator Fawcett, despite being now part of the government, has not lost any of his passion on the subject of preserving airports (& operators) and keeping safe the operating environment around these airports: Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee 24/02/2014 Estimates - Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=COMMITTEES;id=committees%2Festimate%2Ff3681c2 b-ec9a-4fe5-9b53-730b8f34fcff%2F0006;query=Id%3A%22committees%2Festimate%2Ff3 681c2b-ec9a-4fe5-9b53-730b8f34fcff%2F0000%22)

"...Senator FAWCETT: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2FDYU%22;queryty pe=;rec=0)There is another element to the very fine comments Mr Doherty made about preserving airports and it goes back to the lease that the Commonwealth signed either with local governments or with people who purchased the lease, and there are a number of different bodies around Australia. That goes to the intent of maintaining the airport basically with, as a minimum, its existing infrastructure, functions and capabilities and the potential to grow. Have I characterised that correctly in terms of the intent of that lease?

Mr Doherty: In broad terms, there are provisions relating to the contingent operation of airports. Of the examples you gave, there are actually two broad categories. One was the airports which were transferred into local ownership under the ALOP where there is a deed which provides for the continued operation of those sites as airports. For the more limited group of federal leased airports, there are provisions to require continued operation.

Senator FAWCETT: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2FDYU%22;queryty pe=;rec=0)My question goes to the treatment of tenants, whether they be at the Archerfield, Bankstown type airfields or whether they be at ones that are now owned by local government, or in some cases local government has actually sold those on to other parties. You are aware of the AAT case with Archerfield and the longstanding complaints of tenants at Bankstown; we are now starting to get some substantiated evidence coming from tenants in airfields that are owned by third parties, so they have been in local government ownership and have passed on. I am just wondering, given your comments here about preserving airfields and not allowing a degradation of capability, what protections is the Commonwealth looking to try and enforce in those heads of power represented by either the deed or the lease, because at the moment we are seeing GA operators, particularly, being squeezed out of a number of airports?

Mr Doherty: Yes, the future development of the secondary airports under the federal leased airports group is an area that we are looking at and are very conscious of. There is a provision in the lease which requires the continued maintenance of the airport at operating standard. There is a provision in the lease which talks about the development of the airport and has a range of factors involved, including commercial operation, but also the hope for continued development of the site. We take those into account in two main ways, one is in relation to the regulatory decisions under the Airports Act, be that master plan decisions or major development proposals, which come through for agreement. Historically, the challenge there has been around the balance between non-aeronautical development of land not currently required for aeronautical uses on those sites and preserving the capacity for aeronautical use.

The other major avenue is through the monitoring of the lease arrangements, and we have an annual lease review which goes through in a systematic way the compliance with the lease provisions, so the issue would be addressed at that stage as well.

Senator FAWCETT: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2FDYU%22;queryty pe=;rec=0)So, for a leaseholder on an airport that was in local government ownership under the deed and has now transferred to a third party, if a GA operator who has signed a lease for—I think it was 258 square metres of land—is told by the owner that they cannot renew it unless they now include unusable land around them to increase it to nearly 800 metres, and hence a significant increase in their cost because they are paying per square metre, or they will be evicted, is that kind of conduct something that the department is comfortable with or is that something that, as the holder of the original head of power of that deed, you would be seeking to protect those leaseholders given that they have no other option to go and run an aviation business.

Mr Doherty: The example you are talking about is not within the Airports Act structure, but under the ALOP deeds. In that case, our area of intervention has been much more limited and has been preserved at maintaining the operation of the site as an airport. In relation to behaviour by the airport operator, which could be abuse of its position of power as the operator about the terms of commercial arrangements on the lease, we would see that more as a matter for the ACCC to operate and not something that we would regularly be involved in under the deed arrangements.

Senator FAWCETT: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2FDYU%22;queryty pe=;rec=0)My understanding is that the deed required owners to continue to provide fair and equitable access to the business and their operations as long as they met their payments and they complied with all regulations. If an airport owner said that somebody who wanted to start up a flying school in a region where there was no ability to learn to fly, is it your expectation that the company should be able to do that or is it your expectation that the owner could say, 'No, we do not want a flying school at the airport.'

Mr Doherty: I am not sure that that is an area that we could get into under the provisions of the deed, to that level of detail.

Senator FAWCETT: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2FDYU%22;queryty pe=;rec=0)Could you take that on notice? Because my reading of the deed indicates that if they are compliant with the aviation regulations and they are meeting the terms of payment for their lease that they should be able to run a bona fide aviation operation at an airfield.

Mr Wilson: We will take on notice the issue associated with our powers associated with the deed in a specific case as you have indicated. I would not like to answer it without actually going back and looking at the deed.

Senator FAWCETT: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2FDYU%22;queryty pe=;rec=0)I am happy to take that on notice. What I am also putting on notice is that I am concerned about the future viability of the GA sector at a number of airports where, for commercial reasons, they are being squeezed by the owners and, given that, unlike any other business where you cannot just relocate down the block, the airport is the only place you can run your business, that appears to be unconscionable conduct in flying against the head lease or deed under which those airports were actually devolved from Commonwealth ownership..." :D:D

Remember that the Senate sits tomorrow, so will monitor to see if & when the AAI report gets a miniscule (govt) response...more to follow K2 :ok:

[Sarcs]

While we wait for the AAI report response to be tabled, the WLR panel to brief the miniscule, the TSBC tick-a-box review report and eventually Mr FAA’s knock on the door (re Ben’s piece: Australia suppresses criticism of its aviation safety body (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/03/02/australia-suppresses-criticism-of-its-aviation-safety-body/))…..:=

Kharon: Stone walls, a hanging ceiling and one tiny window to wriggle though, perhaps the ToR the Canadians are working with may put a light on; but I doubt it. Today I filed with the BRB my version of the Beaker school report from the Canadian cousins, there a bottle on it, for who gets the closest – more later (if the report ever turns up and Commissioner Dolan ever gets done tweeking it). Perhaps an option for the miniscule, which may temporarily appease Mr FAA, could be to bring in the ICAO audit team from 2004 for a revisit (audit review) of the ATsB. There would certainly be no manipulated ToRs as the procedure for audit is all laid out in the previous 2004 report…

“….2. OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE MISSION
2.1 The audit was carried out following the standard auditing procedures provided for in ICAO Doc 9735 — Safety Oversight Audit Manual with the objective of reviewing the relevant activities conducted by the ATSB to determine whether the SARPs of Annex 13 and associated guidance material were being followed. The objective was also to offer advice, as applicable, to the ATSB in implementing these provisions.
2.2 The ICAO audit team reviewed the ATSB compliance with the SARPs set out in Annex 13 and other relevant procedures, and adherence to guidance material and relevant safety-related practices in general use in the aviation industry, as referred to in such material. The ICAO audit team also reviewed whether the ATSB had the organizational structure and the legal status necessary to carry out its obligations.
2.3 The ICAO audit team also reviewed the ATSB’s regulatory provisions, examined records and documentation and conducted interviews, in order to make its findings and recommendations, on the basis of safety oversight audit general requirements, as follows…”:D

Basically put there is no need for Beaker's ToRs and dodgy, non-transparent agreements, as it is all nicely laid out (transparent) within the ToRs (attachment A) of 2004 and the audit/review is guided by ICAO Doc 9735 — Safety Oversight Audit Manual (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/03/02/australia-suppresses-criticism-of-its-aviation-safety-body/).

{Comment: Hmm…I wonder why Beaker didn’t think of this, after all ICAO are the experts on such things and the original team would only require a small refresher to come up to speed on the last decade’s err…shenanigans??}

Refresher and ICAO team CV for the miniscule; here is the report from the ICAO team of 2004: ICAO AUDIT REPORT OF THE ATSB (Canberra, 31 May to 4 June 2004) (https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/36732/ICAO_audit.pdf)

It is interesting to note, in that report, that some of the recommendations/NCNs are still apparently outstanding or response actions have only fairly recently been updated, example (reference: pg 33 Appendix 4-3): FINDING:

The ATSB’s policy is to place the primary focus on fare-paying passengers and to investigate all fatal accidents (unless they involve sport aviation). However, accidents that are considered to have little potential benefit for prevention may not be investigated in detail. In such cases, the ATSB would not necessarily attend the scene, conduct an in-depth investigation or produce an extensive report.

RECOMMENDATION:

The ATSB should investigate all accidents as defined by Annex 13. The depth of such investigations should be at least to a level where it is evident that no further enhancement of aviation safety can be achieved.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROPOSED BY THE ATSB:

This recommendation is related to the earlier recommendation at Appendix 2-2 and the ATSB response at 2-2 is also relevant. The ICAO audit recommendation that all accidents should be investigated at least to a level where it is evident that no further enhancement of aviation safety can be achieved has significant budgetary implications that are outside of the control of the ATSB. While many accidents are essentially repetitive and involve little new safety learning and diminishing returns in their investigation, it is rarely possible to be so absolute as to assess that no further enhancement of aviation safety can be achieved by further investigation.

The ATSB will, before the end of August 2004, advise the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the Departmental Secretary and the Department of Finance and Administration of the audit recommendation and its budgetary implications.

ACTION TAKEN BY THE ATSB:

The ATSB formally briefed the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services on the final ICAO Audit and its recommendations by Minute dated 22 October 2004. This Minute was also the formal mechanism for briefing the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) Secretary and Deputy Secretaries. The ATSB briefed the Department of Finance and Administration (DOFA) at Division Head level on the ICAO Audit with a focus on recommendations CE-3/02 and CE-5/03 on 23 November 2004 via the Department of Transport and Regional Services’s Chief Financial Officer. On 21 December 2004 the Department of Finance and Administration responded that any additional funding was a matter in the first instance for the Minister's consideration against other priorities in his portfolio. DOFA stated also that only proposals with specific authority from the Cabinet or the Prime Minister were eligible for budget consideration.

In 2007-08 the ATSB was funded to undertake approximately 80 new aviation safety investigations of which about 30 are of the more comprehensive variety. Choice of the 80 from approximately 8000 accidents and incidents reported was based on published selection criteria. In addition, for the financial years 2007-08 to 2009-10 the ATSB was provided with additional budget funding to assist Indonesia with its transport safety improvement program.

STATUS: Completed (monitoring).
Well this is helpful miniscule…:E..(from above) it would appear that the audit report ATSB actions etc would have had to come across your desk from time to time, not to mention that the former miniscule (JA) surely would have briefed you on where it was at in ’05??

So it is a good fit (miniscule) for the Beaker TSBC review charade conundrum, perhaps you’ve already considered it?? :rolleyes:

I suppose the other way you could go (miniscule) is to personally request the TSBC consider using the 2004 ICAO audit team’s ToRs for their review and plead that they may also consider carrying out the review in reference to ICAO Doc 9735 — Safety Oversight Audit Manual (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/03/02/australia-suppresses-criticism-of-its-aviation-safety-body/) , might help you save face and bring some veracity to the subject…forever helpful L&K K2 (Sarcs):ok:

[Kharon]

Sarcs# 1786 –" So it is a good fit (miniscule) for the Beaker TSBC review charade conundrum, perhaps you’ve already considered it??

TSBC review, like the 2004 audit is a non starter; but it would be unfair to accuse the Canucks of being part of the charade though. The TSBC have been given a brief which, no doubt they will scrupulously adhere to. The Senate are onto the game and the narrow ToR are exposed to reveal, once again, the depths to which our safety agencies are prepared to sink, to ensure their pre determined outcomes. Two options; we could save the dollars and let Beaker write his own report, because if he or MM are writing the ToR the result is a foregone conclusion. Option two would be the honest approach and have an independent audit of the Pel Air fracas; no holds barred and no homemade ToR; that may get closer to a true picture. But I think the Senate know this, their job is to reveal the cunning plan. The only slightly pregnant question is of course; what will/can the Senators do, now they have the knowledge? Complicit, negligent or proactive, that is the question the Senate must publicly answer.

The answer is pure easiology, lets have a 2014 ICAO audit of ATSB done by the heavy mob; only this time, lets act on it – value for money etc.

Mr Dolan: The three commissioners determined that it was their responsibility to make that assessment and we did not see any need or possibility to defer that decision to someone else.

What we did do, quite deliberately, was ask a counterpart organisation, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, to benchmark our investigation methodology against their investigation methodology and to review three of our investigations in light of that, essentially against what the TSB would have done as against what we did, and to give us an independent report on the results.

It is entirely possible that as a result of that there will be new and significant information. If there is, the commission will reopen the investigation. (My bold)

Mr Mrdak: I think going back to my earlier answer about the integrity of the process, the terms of reference that have been given to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, the way in which they are looking at that and the advice to government from the ATSB on that process will underpin the government's response when that is tabled in terms of the very questions you are asking. (My bold)

Senator XENOPHON: You would understand the disquiet in the aviation community that the ATSB was effectively Caesar judging Caesar. The commissioners had to make a determination as to whether they did a good job or not in terms of their previous report that was the subject of scathing criticism by a Senate inquiry. But you acknowledge that? (My bold)

Senator FAWCETT: One of the things Mr Dolan said to us earlier was that the TSB was going to give them a draft so that they could look at issues of fact. We have just had a prolonged discussion between Senator Xenophon and Mr Dolan around 'new and significant'. The facts, as came out on paper very clearly before the Senate committee was that there was new information—and I particularly refer to the Chambers report. It was significant, because the ATSB report said that the regulatory system that was in place did not need investigation and yet the new information highlighted that CASA itself knew that there were significant deficiencies in that which had not been highlighted. So, the evidence in black and white said that it was new and significant. Our concern is that if ATSB is given the role of deciding what is factual and if there are factual errors in the TSB report, if TSB say that this is new and significant and it should have been investigated. What we have just heard from Mr Dolan yet again is that the ATSB considers it completely within their remit to say, 'We are the ones legally charged with deciding if it is new and significant. We decide that is factually incorrect. Send it back to the TSB with an amendment.' That hardly inspires confidence in the aviation community in Australia. (My bold)

Mr Mrdak: I did read the way you have taken that from what Mr Dolan has said here today or previously in relation to the nature of the Canadian draft report. I would not lead you to the conclusion that you have reached, I do not think. Knowing the way in which these processes are undertaken and the integrity of the agency involved, I do not think you could lead to the conclusion you are reaching from the ATSB being asked to fact check a document. I do not think that is the way the Canadian authorities would ever see that taking place.

Senator XENOPHON: I understand that, but is that also the subject of review by the TSB?

Mr Dolan: The TSB is looking at the process by which the ATSB undertook this investigation, and that material is relevant to their consideration. I would not expect to be taken chapter and verse through the process that the TSB is using to meet their terms of reference. I am happy—and I am not sure whether it has been done previously—to supply the terms of reference to the committee to give some context as to what is actually being undertaken by the Canadians.(My bold)

You can fool some of the people, some of the time. To paraphrase WC Fields; Muppets are like elephants. I like to look at 'em, but I wouldn't want to own one.

[Sarcs]

Kharon: TSBC review, like the 2004 audit is a non starter; but it would be unfair to accuse the Canucks of being part of the charade though. My mistake "K" I wasn't accusing the Canucks of being part of the charade, perhaps I should have said the 'Beaker TSBC charade'..:uhoh:

Yesterday in the Senate Senator X made a speech which surprisingly kind of flows from Kharon's last post..:D

Nick's take on Beaker...

"...I do not understand how Mr Dolan's position in the ATSB is tenable..."??:ugh:

On the Beaker..:E...TSBC charade...

"....It is hard to understand how the Canadian TSB can produce a useful or meaningful view without digging further than the surface documents. This should not be a tick and flick exercise. The people involved in this incident—the pilot, Dominic James; the co-pilot; the patient and her husband on the aeromedical flight, Mr and Mrs Currall; the doctor; and the nurse, Karen Casey—have had their lives permanently affected. Their suffering has been significant—in particular, Ms Casey, who cannot go back to her work as a nurse. They all deserve better. The Canadian TSB needs to be given carte blanche to examine papers, to interview witnesses and interested parties, and to release its report to the public. The fact that it has not done so to date concerns me greatly. There has been more than enough pushed under the carpet in this case. My fear is that the Canadian TSB may unwittingly be involved in what could end up being a whitewash on behalf of the ATSB...":D:D

And finally Nick on missed opportunities if this debacle is allowed to be..."pushed under the carpet"...

"...It is time to accept the mistakes that have been made, because without accepting those mistakes we cannot learn; and, if we cannot learn, then we cannot change, and that would be a tragedy in every sense of the word. No lives were lost in the Pel-Air incident due to the great skill of the pilot and some good luck. But unless these systemic issues—a lack of transparency, a lack of regulatory oversight, a desire to protect instead of expose—are addressed we cannot guarantee that no lives will be lost in the future, and that would be the greatest tragedy of all...":ugh:

[YOUTUBE]Senator Xenophon adjournment speech 04/03/2014 - YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gm1SXkIyl0I&feature=youtu.be)

Hansard link
(http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=CHAMBER;id=chamber%2Fhansards%2F67c4776b-ef74-4a80-9fa9-064fa0f9d851%2F0189;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansards%2F67c47 76b-ef74-4a80-9fa9-064fa0f9d851%2F0000%22)
No comment required...:ok:


Addendum: DF votes against NX's DM CAO 48.1...:{

Shock horror you say.:(..read on where he explains why?Senator FAWCETT (South Australia) (13:08): I rise to speak on Senator Xenophon's disallowance motion against the Civil Aviation Order 48.1 Instrument 2013. I will first correct the record. There was dialogue in the previous government, and I commend Minister Albanese, as he was then, for his willingness to engage. In fact, I remember attending a meeting with Senator Xenophon, with then Minister Albanese's staff, with Minister Truss's staff, with representatives of the Australian International Pilots Association and with CASA where we talked through this issue at length. At the end of that meeting, the position that was adopted—certainly by me—was that the disallowance should not be supported. Minister Truss's position was the same. So the comment by the opposition that we have now changed our position is not correct, and I make that point before addressing the issue at hand in any more substance.

I commend Senator Xenophon for his interest in and commitment to the aviation industry in Australia. We have worked very collaboratively on a number of aspects around regulation and other things that affect the viability and safety of aviation. I again put on record my appreciation for the engagement of both the then minister and the current minister around this issue. I have not personally changed my position from when we were dealing with this in opposition for the reason that where this brings us to is safer then where we were. I acknowledge that there are still outstanding issues, as Senator Xenophon has highlighted. But, as he has also highlighted, some of those issues leave us in much the same position as we were in previously. The previous position may not have been ideal, but we are in no worse a position now. Given that in net terms there is an improvement, I think it is appropriate to adopt those changes. I will go through why I take that position in a little more detail.

I will talk firstly about the broad context of regulatory reform and then come in a little more detail to 48.1. The regulatory reform process, as anyone engaged with the aviation industry in Australia knows, has been long and drawn out to the point of being dysfunctional because of the length of time and the different strategic approaches that CASA has taken to the reform process, particularly when it comes to the engagement of industry. I have long been an advocate of the approach taken by the former director, Mr Byron. He argued that industry, as the current subject matter experts in a particular area of operation, are probably best placed to know what will work for them and their sector.

Despite the fact that there are some rogue operators in the aviation industry, whether they be people in workshops or people operating airlines or charter companies, the vast majority of operators have invested hugely, in personal terms and in terms of their shareholders. They have a huge incentive to make sure their operations are safe because, if they have an accident, gaining insurance or contracts—particularly if they are operating in a contract environment within the resources sector—becomes almost impossible. Once an airline has an accident, re-attracting customers is difficult. So people have a huge incentive to get it right. I am a great believer that industry should be leading in the development of both regulations and standards, in conjunction with the regulator, and that only if there is a safety case that the regulator can prove should the regulator discard the industry's position.

I am aware that CASA's point of view is that the drafting of 48.1 involved working groups with industry and scientific experts, but I would have to say that CASA's track record of engagement with industry has not been wholesome. On many occasions it appears to have been a one-way process where they might have listened but did not take due regard or, in some cases, they just transmitted what they were planning to do and called it consultation. There are examples where it has worked well, but there are many where it has not. This is one area where we need to fundamentally reform the process, not only at the drafting stage but also, importantly—as Senator Xenophon has highlighted—once a regulation comes into force, because there is often very little appetite to revisit it for an extended period.

As we look at our regulatory reform process we see that not only does industry need to have a stronger voice up front in setting the regulations and the manual of standards that goes with them but also there needs to be a review mechanism where, if there are outstanding issues, there is an opportunity—a framework—for industry to have quick and effective remedy to them. Senator Xenophon mentioned the expert panel that was discussed at the meetings we had last year with then Minister Albanese's staff, Minister Truss's staff, CASA and the industry body. This concept, situated in a more structured framework, is something that I am very much pushing for as part of the review of aviation safety and regulation. I am also in discussions with the current minister's office about this concept in regard to CAO 48.1. I think the review that is being conducted by David Forsyth has terrific potential to reform how industry and the regulator engage. A key part of that—and we have seen that legislation has just been introduced in the parliament by the government—is reforming the role of the board so that we have people on the board with aviation experience.

That board's role really needs to be one of governance, as opposed to hands-off oversight, so that they are setting the strategic direction for the regulator. That strategy would go to the culture of the regulator, whether it is a big 'r' regulator—a policeman with a big stick—or further along the spectrum towards an educator and supporter. That balance in the middle needs to come through a strategic decision. So, regardless of who is the director of the regulator, we should see a consistent approach that industry can plan for and engage with—an approach that will keep the industry not only safe but viable in terms of the cost bases they have to meet. And there are many costs associated with changing or rejecting regulation.

That brings me to CAO 48.1 and this disallowance motion. As I have stated, overall it is safer, and in the areas where there are points of contention we are no worse off than we were. If we were worse off in significant areas then clearly there would be a case to reject the regulation. But, if we are no worse off and in other areas we are better off, then the travelling public and the industry are better served in finding a way to effectively and quickly review the regulation and modify those areas of concern.

Senator Xenophon mentioned the window of circadian low. Whilst I have never been a long-haul pilot, I have had many years of flying what we call reverse-cycle operations, where we fly by night—in the military's case, often using night-vision equipment, which brings fatigue issues of its own—so I am well aware of, and I am concerned by, the fact that we have had a grandfathering of that 5 am start point in these regulations. But if we are no worse off than we were before we should review that, as opposed to rejecting the whole package out of hand.

The position that I am taking on this—it is the government's position—is not to support the disallowance, but I am working with the minister's office. That is partly because many industry players, since the order was introduced in April 2013—with a transitional window to 2016—have already invested in changing how they work to meet the new regulations. And, as I have said, change does not come cheaply to industry players. Not only are we going a step backwards in safety if we adopt this disallowance but we are disadvantaging those industry players who have invested in adopting the new regulations. I am seeking to make sure that we have, in a very timely manner, the opportunity for the concerned parties in the industry—I know the Virgin Independent Pilots Association and the Qantas group have raised the concerns of, predominantly, long-haul pilots—to help select subject-matter experts who can form this independent panel to review the specific areas of concern. We would then have an independent umpire to bring a recommendation back to the minister so that he can work with the regulator to address those concerns in a timely manner.

Obviously, I cannot speak for the review being led by David Forsyth, nor the recommendations that they will bring forward, but, having met with many players from the maintenance, manufacturing, engineering and operations areas of the industry, I am aware that one of the critical things that we need is a system whereby industry can have a timely remedy to decisions of the regulator that have a material impact on their business and where the safety case is disputed by industry. Whilst, hopefully, the remedy for this will not necessarily be part of the broader regulatory reform and a change of structure, it may well be a test case of how that could work. That may then lead to ideas around how we adopt the broader regulatory system and provide an opportunity for industry to have that timely remedy.

The government will not be supporting the disallowance. I maintain the same position I have had since I was in opposition: in net terms we would do better to adopt the new 48.1. But there is a need to have that independent panel to work with industry and the regulator to review the points of concern and come up with an agreed position so that we can quickly amend that part of the regulation that needs changing.
The dynamic duo , I believe, are not going anywhere just yet..:ok:

[Kharon]

IOS super star – Sandilands (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/03/06/labors-sorry-record-on-air-safety-will-bite-it-over-qantas/) – on Plane talking makes a couple of very notable points. It's worth the reading time. Steve (ALAEA Fed Sec) AOC protection and public safety are face cards and priceless.

Which raises the problem of Anthony Albanese as the Minister responsible for CASA, the safety regulator, and the ATSB, the supposedly independent safety investigator. Albanese is an embarrassment in relation to the on going scandal of the Pel-Air crash investigation, in which he failed to respond, as he had promised, to the detective work done by a Senate committee which found that CASA had withheld from the ATSB an internal document showing it had been so deficient in its oversight of the operator that a preventable accident had occurred.

It further found evidence that implied that the ATSB had complied with pressure from CASA to frame the pilot of the crashed jet with all the responsibility, and failed to consider all of the safety factors, nor even report on them in the form and detail required under international ICAO rules.

The entire Pel-Air scandal shows that CASA was not just incompetent but quite possibly in breach of Commonwealth law in suppressing information relevant to an air crash investigation.

[Sarcs]

Ben also puts the miniscule on notice..:D
The scandal is also a test for the Coalition’s deputy PM and Transport Minister, Warren Truss, who is understood to be making a response to the Senate committee findings before the current parliamentary session ends later this month.

Ominously, Truss has allowed his own initiative, the Aviation Safety Regulation Review, which is now underway, to suppress public submissions which are highly critical of CASA by not publishing them at a single accessible reference point.
But to the QWON that Shorty asked..:rolleyes::Qantas

Mr SHORTEN (Maribyrnong—Leader of the Opposition) (14:05): My question is to the Prime Minister of Australia, who I am sure is proud of the enviable safety record of Qantas, the world's safest airline. Does the Prime Minister accept that the enviable safety record of Qantas is in no small part due to the professionalism, the hard work, the commitment and the expertise of its Australian based maintenance crews?

Mr ABBOTT (Warringah—Prime Minister) (14:06): I absolutely accept that Qantas has a fine safety record, perhaps the best safety record in the world. Obviously I am very grateful to the workers who are responsible for that. I am proud of them, as I am proud of Qantas. But Virgin is a safe airline as well. Is the Leader of the Opposition suggesting to this House that Qantas is safe and other airlines are not? What is the Leader of the Opposition suggesting here? Is he suggesting that the Qantas Sale Act is somehow responsible for Qantas's safety? Is that what the Leader of the Opposition is suggesting?

Honourable members interjecting—

The SPEAKER: There will be silence while we hear the Prime Minister's answer. The question has been asked. The answer is being given.

Mr Shorten: Madam Speaker, I seek your guidance: on a number of occasions, the Prime Minister keeps asking questions and I am happy to answer them.

The SPEAKER: There is no point of order. The member will resume his seat. There is only one relevance allowed on each question.

Mr ABBOTT: The Leader of the Opposition is trying to suggest that it is the Qantas Sale Act that is responsible for the Qantas safety record. The Leader of the Opposition is trying to suggest that without the restrictions that exist under the Qantas Sale Act an airline cannot be safe. This is a most reckless and irresponsible suggestion from the Leader of the Opposition. Qantas is safe. I am proud of Qantas. I am proud of the workers. Virgin is safe. I am equally—

Mr Danby: What about China Southern?

The SPEAKER: The member for Melbourne Ports will withdraw.

Mr Danby: Madam Speaker, my comments were about the safety record of China Southern compared to Qantas. I see no need to withdraw.

The SPEAKER: In that case, he can remove himself under 94(a).

The member for Melbourne Ports then left the chamber.

Mr Albanese: Madam Speaker, on relevance: the question went to whether Qantas's safety record was related to its workforce—

The SPEAKER: The member will resume his seat. Has the Prime Minister finished his answer? We had the Leader of the Opposition attempting a point of relevance. We can only have a question.

Mr Shorten interjecting—

The SPEAKER: We do not have guidance under standing orders. It was a good intervention. It was a good try. The Prime Minister has indicated he wishes to continue his answer. He will direct his remarks to the question.

Mr ABBOTT: In this country we are blessed with two outstanding airlines: Qantas and Virgin. They both have outstanding safety records—and Rex, also a great airline with a great safety record. The point I wish to make is that Qantas's safety record does not depend upon the Qantas Sale Act, and it is reckless of the Leader of the Opposition to suggest that it does.
The Albo interjection is interesting..:ugh: I find it somewhat ironic that after nearly seven years of almost totally ignoring aviation issues, that finally Albo (and Labor) is fast developing a fixation on aviation matters. Not long after asking a couple more questions himself, Albo was ejected from the chamber...the Labor mob are a rabble..:E

[mcgrath50]

Albo was ejected from the chamber...the Labor mob are a rabble.

Or being set upon by one of the most partisan speakers we have had in a long time. Having said that being ejected is just all part of the game in parliament.

[Frank Arouet]

Dear 'Bronny' is the most kicked out parliamentarian in history.


Payback is a bitch!

[Sarcs]

It has been 1577 days since the ditching of VH-NGA; 546 days since Senator X first moved..

“…Senator XENOPHON (South Australia) (11:55): I move:
That the following matters be referred to the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee for inquiry and report by 29 November 2012:
(a) the findings of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau into the ditching of VH-NGA Westwind II, operated by Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd, in the ocean near Norfolk Island airport on 18 November 2009;
(b) the nature of, and protocols involved in, communications between agencies and directly interested parties in an aviation accident investigation and the reporting process;
(c) the mechanisms in place to ensure recommendations from aviation accident investigations are implemented in a timely manner; and
(d) any related matters.

Question agreed to….”
...and 294 days (& counting) that we have waited for two successive governments to respond to…“a damning, a damning report into the Aviation Transport Safety Bureau's investigation of Pel-Air flight VH-NGA off Norfolk Island in 2009…”:=

Now finally, it would appear that, the tabling of the government response is imminent (within next fortnight), so in the last days of miniscule anxiety (or not) I thought some flashback moments may help to fill in the time…:hmm:

The Senate Estimates on the 29 May ’13 (besides the battle of the two Big Macks (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/429828-merged-senate-inquiry-89.html#post8337794)) was a significant event. It began with the Heff setting the serious non-partisan concern of the RRAT committee…“Bugger it—the questions and the answers are the questions and the answers”:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_gzfBJVTJzI
Besides the numerous references (throughout the day) by the Senators for an urgent government response to the PelAir report; the start of the NX CAO 48.1 DM journey (post#548 (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/527815-truss-aviation-safety-regulation-review-28.html#post8362860)) and the battle of the two Big Macks, there was also some other (no less) significant moments that may have passed scrutiny from the IOS..:cool:

First there was Nick’s further inquisition on the now infamous Chambers Report (https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=b2509175-b1eb-4ae1-b9c3-b3897323df48): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OtaPX4V2o8Y
In which Senator Xenophon’s QONs were answered like this:

Senator XENOPHON: I have got two more questions. What prompted you to focus on the Bankstown office?

Mr McCormick: I will take this on notice, but from memory there were over 77 certificates being managed from a very small office. In other words, an enormous amount of surveillance was being done at Bankstown.

Answer:
As advised during the hearing, the CASA Bankstown Office was managing a large number of certificates at the time and they were also the office responsible for the oversight of Pel-Air.

Senator XENOPHON: My understanding is that there was not a covering note or any associated note with the report, but I would like to know whether there was one.

Mr McCormick: To my knowledge there was not, but we will take it on notice.

Answer:
CASA provided a copy of a covering Minute to the Director of Aviation Safety (advising that the “Chambers Report” was attached) to the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport during the Aviation Accident Investigations Inquiry, which is available on the Inquiry website. CASA was not able to find any other covering or associated notes to this report in its records.

Q/ Will the DAS (soon to be retired) ever escape the all pervading stench of “Wodger’s Weport”??:E

At the tailend of the FF inquisition there was a scene that encompassed Senators Heff & Edwards that we also may have missed in amongst all of the other shenanigans of the day…:{
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3_tguIfGCds
Comment 1: Heff’s concerns, in regards to the RFS firebombing ops, is quite disturbing in light of the Dromader firebombing tragedy on the 24 October 2013. Wonder if there were any minutes taken of that meeting??

Comment 2: Senator ("Mea culpa after mea culpa) Edward’s question, on reflection, in regards to the Monarch ATSB investigation findings is interesting..:ooh:
Perhaps a case of 21 years of FF/Dept/Govt obfuscation, procrastination and mea culpa after mea culpa??:rolleyes: . Wonder if it was wise for Kingcrat to draw attention to the fact that he has apparently been a silent witness, in the shadows, for that 21 years??:ugh:

All in all it would seem that after the 29 May ’13 Estimates hearing there was a lot of behind closed doors meeting going on, oh to be a fly on the wall…:cool:

Dear miniscule…TICK..TOCK :ok:!

[Sarcs]

Again to while away the time until the miniscule's response (and for IOS amusement {upon reflection}..:rolleyes:), a golden moment and a significant turning point in the PelAir inquiry...:D..please enjoy..:ok:


Chambers report & FRMS SAR 150213 Part 1 - YouTube

[gaunty]

I might have missed it but on the recommendation of the Senate Enqiry two simple questions.

Have the recorders been raised yet?? It is still possible they can provide some useful answers. Or is it in someone interests for this not to be so. I was, at around that time, in the throes of spending well over $600k to make an aircraft compliant. It did not make the aircraft any safer, just provided the obvious opportunity to learn if it did go upside down.
So why bother if you are not going to raise them. :confused:

And, shortly after the accident was there a vessel capable of doing so nearby and if so why was it not tasked to do so and who ordered it not to. I have seen the underwater video and from my limited knowledge of things underwater It seemed hardly challenging.

[halfmanhalfbiscuit]

Gaunty,

I'm pretty sure it is still a no.

there were offers to help raise them I seem to recall


http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2013/05/29/atsb-a-bulletin-from-a-rotten-organisation/?wpmp_switcher=mobile


Sure the senators report covers this.

[Creampuff]

At Senate Estimates last week Mr Dolan reiterated ATSB's earlier decision not to retrieve the OBR devices.

ATSB has no interest in the content. It might confirm that the timing of and errors in the weather information transmitted to NGA misled the crew.

Why someone else hasn't already retrieved them is beyond me. If I'd been the PIC, I would have had them out a long time ago (after consulting with the insurance company).

[Sunfish]

The recorders are at 50m. THe wreck has been dived on by the local professionals. It is just outside the sport diving limit (42m) but easily withing any professionals range using decompression technique and maybe heliox mixture.

It should have been an afternoons work to retrieve them. One can only conclude that the ATSB deliberately did NOT want their contents revealed because it would have given the lie to the story and subsequent fitting up of Dominic James.

If the wreck has not broken up, they are probably intact and readable, assuming they are solid state devices. A private expedition could get them, but my guess would be that ATSB would attempt a legal move to sieze them and suppress the contents if they were retrieved.

I've dived on "Blackjack", a B17, in New Guinea and its still intact at 42m after all this time.

[dubbleyew eight]

official obdurance is all the more reason to privately retrieve them and ask the FAA to do the decoding.

[Sarcs]

The question has been put, numerous times, on why it is that Beaker has repeatedly refused (including just recently in Senate Estimates & QONs) to grab the lifelines thrown by the Senators, the revelation of the Chambers report and FRMS SAR was one such lifeline:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RCUtlfC4tlc

Senator Fawcett’s QONs were answered like this:1. ATSB Response:
The ATSB has reviewed the Chambers Report to see whether it contained evidence that might support substantive changes to the report of the investigation into the Norfolk Island ditching. In this context, it should be noted that the ATSB had already, as part of its investigation, assessed the content of CASA’s special audit of Pel-Air and had regard to that audit in finalising its report.

It should also be noted that the primary (but not sole) purpose of an ATSB investigation is to establish the factors that contributed to an accident, and that the Chambers Report does not contain any new evidence that organisational factors were likely to have contributed to the accident.

In the view of the ATSB, there is insufficient additional material within the Chambers Report to support changes to the existing findings of the ATSB report or to require new findings. As regards the accident flight, the Chambers Report reflected what was separately reported (and available to the ATSB) in the reports of CASA’s accident investigation and of its special audit of Pel-Air.

The Chambers Report could have been an indicator to the ATSB of potentially relevant organisational issues within Pel-Air and CASA. The report’s availability to the ATSB investigation would likely have led to a review of the scope of the investigation to determine whether there needed to be further examination of possible organisational factors in the accident.

That said, it is unlikely that the Chambers report would have led to substantive re-scoping of the investigation, since the CASA accident investigation report already indicated the existence of organisational deficiencies and the ATSB safety factor identification processes include the consideration of organisational factors as part of the scope of an investigation.

The ATSB does not consider that lack of access to the Chambers Report was a constraint or limitation to the ATSB investigation and its assessment of factors contributing to the accident.

The ATSB has also reviewed the CASA fatigue audit. The ATSB notes that it provides more detailed information and evidence to support the FRMS findings listed in CASA’s Special Audit (which were briefly summarised in the CASA Accident Investigation Report). The CASA FRMS audit identified several important safety issues associated with Pel Air’s FRMS. However, the audit report does not provide any new information that would assist with determining the level of fatigue associated with the accident flight, and the main themes of the report do not appear to be associated with the circumstances of the occurrence.

As the ATSB has previously advised the Committee, any judgement about whether to include, within the scope of a safety investigation, matters that are not contributory to the occurrence involves considering a range of factors. In this case, the ATSB was aware that CASA was conducting a review of the operator’s FRMS. Accordingly, the ATSB judged that the safety enhancement value of considering this non-contributory issue in its investigation was limited.Beaker maintaining his obstinate stand on the PelAir investigation, besides decimating the reputation of the ATsB, is akin to committing public servant suicide.
Senator X take on Beaker’s position…NX media release 19 June 2013 (http://www.nickxenophon.com.au/media/releases/show/atsb-chief-should-go/) and in his 04 March adjournment speech, where he said..“ I do not understand how Mr Dolan's position in the ATSB is tenable”.

So what is it that is so terribly damning in all these shenanigans that would cause an essentially rational (muppet:O) like Beaker to commit harakiri?? Could it be that someone has got leverage on Beaker; or maybe Beaker is just a loyal bureaucrat prepared to fall on his own sword for his miniscule; or maybe he just believes he is right and the rest of us are wrong???:( Either way when he goes the rest of the bureau commissioners must also go because they are obviously complicit in the Beaker hardline view on the PelAir report…:=

Rumour has it that the AFP investigation is still very much active so maybe, for the benefit of the AFP investigators, we should re-examine the key moment where Beaker apparently did a complete 180 back in February 2010, mentioned here by Senator Heffernan..:rolleyes::
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=00G9Wfzv5cg
Link for ATSB email:Internal ATSB email regarding the ATSB and CASA's approach to the Pel-Air investigation (dated 9 February 2010), received 10 October 2012;(PDF 1093KB) (https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=e2ae91cd-8a14-4f9c-ab41-b9370c2b1a69)

As mentioned in the last couple of posts, there is also the outstanding issue of the unrecovered CVR/FDR…:ugh:

Sunny: "...One can only conclude that the ATSB deliberately did NOT want their contents revealed because it would have given the lie to the story and subsequent fitting up of Dominic James..."

And from Nick’s adjournment speech:

The committee also raised concerns about the ATSB's decision not to retrieve flight data recorders from the ditched plane despite the ATSB's responsibilities under the International Civil Aviation Organization's annexe 13 ruling. The committee was so concerned with Mr Dolan's comments on this front that it stated in its report:

Mr Dolan's evidence in this regard is questionable and has seriously eroded his standing as a witness before the committee.

This is an incredibly strong statement in regard to a senior public servant. I do not understand how Mr Dolan's position in the ATSB is tenable. And yet, neither the previous government nor the current government has formally responded to the committee's report—but I understand it is coming shortly.It should be remembered that the ATSB decision not to retrieve the CVR/FDR was not always the case, well at least up until the release of the Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2009-072 Preliminary report (http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1345477/ao-2009-072-prelim.pdf) : The ATSB has interviewed a number of witnesses and people who were associated with the occurrence, and is assessing the feasibility of recovering the aircraft Cockpit Voice and Flight Data recorders from the seabed.

The investigation is continuing and will include further examination and analysis of the:
•meteorological information and its effect on the decision making and actions of the crew during the flight
•fuel planning relevant to the flight
•operational requirements that were relevant to the conduct of the flight
•crew resource management
•aeromedical flight classification and dispatch.

The remainder of the investigation is likely to take some months. However, should any critical safety issues emerge that require urgent attention, the ATSB will immediately bring such issues to the attention of the relevant authorities who are best placed to take prompt action to address those issues.



Hmm it would appear that from January through to August 2010 was where it all went south for Beaker (& the ATsB), if I was the AFP investigator (IIC) I’d be asking some serious questions about that point in time..(hint?):E

Dear Miniscule, 6 more sitting days to go TICK TOCK!:ok:

[Up-into-the-air]

Question sarcs - What were the TOR issued to TSB of Canada and why have these not been made public.

That the victims have not been interviewed probably gives the answer to this question!!

Love to be "The Man at the Back of the Room" with beaker!! and get the answer.

[gaunty]

Incomprehensible. That they were not recovered when we all know there was little or no technical difficulty and relatively low cost.

CAO 20.18 Sect 6 Is very specific about carriage of recorders including maintenance and so on. I have written the cheques and even cancelled flights to remain compliant,

So if it is a legal REQUIREMENT, and in this particular case there is no relief for unserviceability on dispatch, neither were they recorded as an MEL item, what possible justification can there be for their not being recovered.

It is a significant cost of operation for the operator, for the ATSB or CASA to suggest they don't have the budget nor justification for their recovery is not just incomprehensible its just plain old fashioned bull****.

And it smells even worse. To high heaven in fact.

In the scheme of things I might have even been moved to fund the recovery if I had been made aware.

I am remain open to be educated on this matter.

[halfmanhalfbiscuit]

Question sarcs - What were the TOR issued to TSB of Canada and why have these not been made public.


https://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/news-items/2013/canadian-investigators-to-review-atsb.aspx


Canadian safety investigators to review and compare ATSB processes
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) will conduct an independent external review of the ATSB’s investigation processes and publish the results. The review was announced today by TSB Chair, Wendy A. Tadros and ATSB Chief Commissioner, Martin Dolan.
The review, to begin with an initial visit by the TSB team this month, will provide an independent and objective assessment of the ATSB’s investigation methodology and processes.
The review team will benchmark TSB investigation methodologies with the ATSB’s and compare them with international standards. The review will also examine how ATSB methodologies and processes have been applied to ATSB investigations and compare them with TSB approaches.
Mr Dolan said the review is a new step in the ATSB’s continuing close cooperation with other international investigation agencies. It will provide both organisations with a significant learning opportunity.
“I invited the TSB to conduct the review because we are always looking to improve our investigation systems and approaches,” Mr Dolan said. “I’m grateful that our Canadian colleagues have agreed”.
“The review will identify best practices from both organisations that we can adopt to improve how we investigate accidents and occurrences and improve transport safety.
“The TSB is well placed to conduct this review as they have a similar legislative framework to the ATSB and a long-standing commitment to systemic investigation to improve safety.”
It is anticipated that the TSB will produce a final report early in the northern spring of 2014. The report will be published by the TSB and available on the TSB website.
Any questions about the TSB review should be directed to the ATSB on 1800 020 616.



Looking at methodologies and processes. NOT a specific accident like Pel Air. But I bet they claim more than the limited TOR allowed.

[Sarcs]

Only made a quick scan..:cool:..basically put, the miniscule has squibbed on overruling Beaker on both reopening the investigation & retrieving the CVR/FDR...:{

Here is the link for what appears to be a typical Laborial wet lettuce response..:ugh:: Government Response (http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/completed_inquiries/2010-13/pel_air_2012/gov_response/Government_Response.pdf)

Senator X - "Not happy Jan!":=:=


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zq3u_QKFEbE

Ps CAA (CAsA Board) amendment bill has been tabled in the Senate! Tick Tock..:rolleyes:

[Sarcs]

Nick..:D:D:Government soft on Pel-Air findings - 20th March 2014

The Commonwealth Government has let down the travelling public by failing to fully implement the findings of a highly critical Senate inquiry into aviation safety, Independent Senator for South Australia, Nick Xenophon, said today.

The Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee’s report into aviation accident investigations (the Pel-Air Report) found serious failures on the part of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) regarding the investigation of the ditching of Pel-Air VH-NGA off Norfolk Island in 2009.

“There are very serious matters raised in this report, including how effectively aviation operators are regulated,” Nick said. “CASA and the ATSB seem more interested in protecting themselves than protecting the Australian public.”

Senator Xenophon said the Government had failed to look at the bigger picture in the report, which shows serious systemic failures in both the ATSB and CASA.

“For the most part, the Government seems to accept that the current processes and systems are enough to make sure the ATSB and CASA are working properly,” Nick said. “But the evidence in this report clearly shows that’s not happening.”

“The Government shouldn’t take assurances from the ATSB or CASA at face value.”

Senator Xenophon said he hoped the Aviation Safety Regulation Review, established by Transport Minister Warren Truss, would back up the findings of the committee. The ATSB’s investigative processes, including its report into the Pel-Air ditching, are also being reviewed by the Canadian Transport Safety Board (TSB). However, Senator Xenophon fears the TSB review could be a whitewash because of its limited terms of reference.

“I hope the committee’s report has opened the door for serious change,” Nick said. “I believe the independent review will vindicate its findings, and I hope the Government will have the courage to act on them.” miniscule wet lettuce MR..:oh: :{:Media Statement
20 March 2014


Response to Airline Accident Investigations Report
TODAY Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development Warren Truss announced the Australian Government’s response to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee’s Report into Aviation Accident Investigations.

Mr Truss welcomed the Committee’s report as an important contribution to further improving Australia’s aviation safety framework and commended the Committee on its careful deliberations.

"The Government has agreed to 20 of the 26 recommendations in the report, with a further four of the recommendations being matters for consideration by the independent safety agencies concerned," Mr Truss said.

"Key recommendations that the Government has agreed to include improvements to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s (ATSB) investigative and reporting policies and procedures, and the establishment of better and more transparent information sharing and governance arrangements between the ATSB and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).

"A number of initiatives have already been implemented to address many of the recommendations in the report.

"In November last year we established an independent Aviation Safety Regulation Review, which is expected to bring forward a number of options for the Government’s consideration on further improvements to Australia’s aviation safety regulation framework.

"The Review, being undertaken by a panel of leading international aviation safety experts, is also examining options for reducing the cost of regulation on industry."

The Aviation Safety Regulation Review Panel is expected to deliver its report to the Government by the end of May 2014.

Mr Truss said since receiving the Senate Committee’s report, an independent peer review of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau had also commenced which is examining the Bureau’s methodologies and processes, concerns about which were raised in the Committee’s report.

The peer review of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau is being carried out by the Canadian Transportation Safety Board, which is also expected to finalise its report in May 2014.

Mr Truss added that the government has also recently introduced legislative amendments to strengthen the CASA Board by providing for an additional two members.

"These amendments will allow the Government to increase the level of aviation experience on the Board and allow an expanded Board to oversee CASA’s new strategic direction, which the Government will issue to CASA after it has considered the Aviation Safety Regulation Review Panel’s report," he said.

A copy of the Australian Government’s full response to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee’s Report into Aviation Accident Investigations is available online at: www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/safety (http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/safety)
Hansard link for NX & DF on the Govt Response tabling HERE (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=CHAMBER;id=chamber%2Fhansards%2Fd47ae92e-9074-402f-8aed-5703602e0133%2F0158;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansards%2Fd47ae 92e-9074-402f-8aed-5703602e0133%2F0000%22)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zq3u_QKFEbE

[Up-into-the-air]

A summary of the response is at:

Summary of PelAir Government response (http://vocasupport.com/summary-of-pelair-government-response/)


http://i774.photobucket.com/albums/yy27/flyingoz/pelairsenate_zps0a9ed5f5.png

The summary above details the extent to which casa and atsb are just using the process of "Government Reply", which is really just the Departments [via Mrdak] directing traffic.

Nothing new here creamie, but the IOS are onto them, as is Senator Xenophon and the Committee.

There is a real need now for the Aviation Committee [ASRR] to hold the line against casa and atsb and get the change that the aviation community really requires.


Assistance to the Aviation Industry (http://vocasupport.com/summary-of-pelair-government-response/)

[Sarcs]

I agree with UITA's sentiments that the Govt response is typewritten bureaucratic spin authored by the Kingcrat i.e. the fix is well and truly in place..:ugh::ugh: The miniscule's complicity in the signing off of this spin and bulldust, is a typical Laborial soft c#cked approach to potentially politically embarrassing unknowns...:=:yuk:. I'd be interested to see if the Truss bandaid response was pretty much the same as the Albo draft response..??:rolleyes:

However there is a number of positives in this reply as 77% of the recommendations were actually agreed to in principle and weren't white washed like the last inquiry by the Great White Elephant Paper...:{

It's unfortunate that the two most critical recommendations (reopening the investigation & retrieving CVR/FDR) were dismissed, however we all knew that this miniscule would, from past form, always back the ATsBeaker opinion on this...:=

So to the Govt response..

To begin with here is a basic summary from Australian Flying, with comments from DJ included:Minister Responds to Senate Inquiry Recommendations (http://www.australianflying.com.au/news/minister-responds-to-senate-inquiry-recommendations) 21 Mar 2014

The Federal Government has responded to the recommendations made by the Senate inquiry into the Pel-Air Norfolk island ditching investigation. (http://www.australianflying.com.au/news/pel-air-report-the-major-findings)

In a statement released by Minister for Infrastructure and Transport Warren Truss yesterday, the government said it accepted 20 of the 26 recommendations made by the Senate.

“The Government has agreed to 20 of the 26 recommendations in the report, with a further four of the recommendations being matters for consideration by the independent safety agencies concerned,” Truss said.

“Key recommendations that the Government has agreed to include improvements to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau's (ATSB) investigative and reporting policies and procedures, and the establishment of better and more transparent information sharing and governance arrangements between the ATSB and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).

“A number of initiatives have already been implemented to address many of the recommendations in the report."

However, the government has rejected calls to recover the flight data recorders and to re-open the ATSB investigation, two key aims of holding the Senate inquiry in the first place.

According to the response, recovering the data recorders would be costly and reveal no data that was not available through other sources, and whether or not the investigation should be re-opened was left up to the ATSB.

Dominic James, the pilot fingered by the ATSB report as being responsible for the November 2009 ditching, says the government's response falls short of what is required to make significant change.

"I am concerned this response doesn't go far enough," he told Australian Flying. "My aim was that the truth behind how the ATSB report was compiled be found, and I believe the Senate inquiry did that. Questions over the conduct of CASA and the ATSB have been answered.

"But finding answers and making concrete changes aren't the same thing.
"There are some positives, but the fundamental recommendations have been let go, chiefly the one that called for the ATSB report to be rewritten.
"The government should have embraced all the recommendations. This was a landmark Senate inquiry in terms of its scope and the expertise, and I think the government should have listened more."

For James, who has long maintained the stance that the ATSB report overlooks the significance of deficiencies at Pel-Air, Truss' response yesterday is not the end of his campaign.

"I'm going to keep pushing until the ATSB report is rewritten. How can you have a reports that says Pel-Air was compliant when they were in fact responsible for regulatory breaches.

"You can't have one government document [the ATSB report] saying one thing and another [a CASA audit of Pel-Air] saying the opposite. How did Pel-Air escape any meaningful action being taken against them?"

Truss's statement (http://www.minister.infrastructure.gov.au/wt/releases/2014/March/wt042_2014.aspx)and the full government response (http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/safety/report/index.aspx)to the RRAT recommendations are available from the Department of Infrastructre and Transport website. Okay and the Govt response to recommendation 1: Recommendation 1

The Committee recommends that the ATSB retrieve VH-NGA flight data recorders without further delay.

Response

The Government notes this recommendation.

However advice from our independent aviation safety agencies, the ATSB and CASA, does not support retrieval of the recorders.

The ATSB has given detailed consideration to the Committee’s recommendation.

The ATSB has reached its position on the basis that:




the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) covered communication between the crew for the last two hours of the flight which is after the critical instances and decision points of the flight i.e. receipt and assimilation of the various weather updates and decisions on flight planning and fuel management; and
the flight data recorder (FDR) only recorded five basic parameters and would provide limited benefit to the understanding of the accident.

Therefore with respect to the ditching of aircraft VH-NGA, the ATSB advises that data to be obtained from the CVR and FDR would offer little information directly relevant to the key safety issues in the investigation not already available from other sources.

The ATSB has also advised that any information obtained would not likely lead to any commensurately significant safety learning or improvement to transport safety. Retrieval of the recorders would also not represent a proper use of limited public resources, consistent with the provisions of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 and the Public Service Act 1999, with which the Chief Commissioner is obliged to comply. It is considered unlikely to lead to a better understanding of any significant lessons learned for the aviation industry.

The current international position, which is what applies to the Committee’s recommendation, is that the relevant International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annexe 13 provides that effective use shall be made of flight recorders in accident or incident investigations.

Determining effective use involves weighing up the likely safety benefits to be derived from the information obtained, alongside the cost of the recovery action and having regard to where a crash site is difficult to access.

The Government is however cognisant of the Committee’s concerns over the carrying out of the investigation and therefore supports the current Canadian Transportation Safety Board peer review of the ATSB investigation methodologies and processes having regard to Australia’s obligations under ICAO Annex 13. The peer review report is scheduled to be completed by May 2014 Given recent (and past) comments on here about the logistics of recovery of the CVR/FDR, make this response an absolute joke and a shocking slap in the face to the intellect of all IOS members plus 'the man at the back of the room!'

It is a pointless exercise (& vomitous in parts) to rehash all of the Govt response to the recommendations but one constant theme throughout the response is that the ATsB & FF are..."independent statutory authorities"..:yuk: That would certainly be true with FF (dictatorial, unaccountable, Judge Jury Executioner & trough dwellers might be more appropriate..:E), however one thing the PelAir inquiry more than adequately highlighted is that the ATsB claim of independence, under Beaker, is a laughable myth..:ugh:. The ATsB is no more than a hand puppet for both the Dept & FF to play around with...:rolleyes:

Senator X:..."What is vitally important about the recommendations from this report is that they do not stand alone. They were made in the context of evidence that showed a serious and systemic lack of rigour from both the ATSB and CASA. Any responses from the government that claim that existing policy or procedure addresses the committee's concerns cannot be accepted, because this report clearly shows that existing policies and procedures do not work. Instead, the flight crew of VH-NGA were made scapegoats for regulatory failures...

...This report also called into question the relationship between the ATSB and CASA, and whether the intention of the memorandum of understanding between them is being met. The purpose of CASA is to ensure Australia's aviation safety regulations are being met and are serving their purpose. Therefore, if an incident investigated by the ATSB reveals a gap in that oversight, it is the ATSB's duty to report it..."

And the TSBC review..well let us again refer to Senator Nick on that one..

"....I note that the government has already established its review into aviation safety, and that the ATSB has already invited the Canadian transport safety board to consider its investigative and reporting processes in relation to the Pel-Air incident and other matters. But I do have serious concerns about the Canadian process. Those concerns are not about the integrity of the Canadian transport safety board, but about the fact that it seems that their terms of reference are so circumscribed. They have yet to interview or obtain information from the Senate committee, from the pilot involved in that incident or from experts who gave evidence to that committee..." :=

So the battlelines are well and truly drawn, again best summed up by Senator Nick: The government should take a similar approach to considering this report. Sadly, it has not. In what environment is the ATSB and CASA operating? What are their cultures like? Are they likely to enforce the systems and procedures already in place, or do changes need to happen? This report gives us the answer to many of those questions. The next question is whether the government will take them into account and act appropriately. I seek leave to complete my remarks later. More to follow..:ok:

[Creampuff]

The increase in the size of the CASA Board is the only action the Laborials will take in response to all this. Anyone who believes otherwise is deluded.

A few people will wait for, and greet with credulous enthusiasm, the ASSR Panel Report. But the outcome will be the same as all the other Reports.

I see in another thread some people doing their level best to insult the intelligence and alienate one of the incoming non-major party aligned Senators.

And pilots and the little end of aviation industry in Australia wonder why they remain the playthings of the powerful. :*

[SIUYA]

Sarcs...

You are 1,000% correct regarding the Government's ridiculous response about the refusal by ATSB management to recover the recorders.

I cannot believe Truss and Co have been so fkucing rock-hard STUPID that they to accepted the reasons provided by Dolan and Co. to justify the ATSB's failure to recover the recorders.

Look carefully at the timeframes - the decision NOT to recover the recorders was made at an early stage of the investigation as far as I can understand, so how come, at that EARLY stage, was the ATSB so confident that the recorders wouldn't reveal data that wasn't available from other sources.

It's totally implausible to think that was seriously entertained by Dolan and Co.

I can think of some REALLY, REALLY important data that might have been revealed from the CVR - and it concerns information that wasn't really covered properly by the investigation - THE ROLE OF THE CO-PILOT.

Also, it would have revealed what was discussed by the crew regarding the decision to ditch, and in particular, what instructions were provided to the occupants.

The Minister's response to Recommendation 1 defies belief, and provides a stark indication that the Minister, like his predecessor, really doesn't have a clue what it's all about, and that he seems to believe, like the idiot running the ATSB, that bulsh1t baffles brains.

There is NO hope while this nonsense continues.

Creampuff's right, time to lobby the marginals.

:mad:

[gaunty]

SIUYA

There are many more questions that could be answered by the recorders.

Particularly the CVR. What's to lose. Hmmmm?

It actually begs the question. Are we to base investigation results on basically uncoroborated evidence and "views"!
It wouldn't be the first time that "evidence" offered on recollection was not supported by other facts. The only way that can become incontrovertible is why CVRs are installed in the first place.


I for one wont rest until they are!

And, otherwise what's the point in mandating them?

[Creampuff]

These days the ATSB merely jumps to a convenient conclusion and doesn't bother pursuing anything that might cast doubt on that conclusion. Here's what the AAAA submission to the ASRR Panel says on this issue:AAAA expressed strong concerns to ATSB management with previous attempts during investigations to attempt to mould evidence to fit a theory, rather than objectively analysing and presenting the evidence available.That the Laborials are prepared to acquiesce in the ATSB's refusal to retrieve NGA's OBRs is a very sad indictment on the weakness of the fabric of government in Australia.

[Up-into-the-air]

The following, from a speech in Parliament in 31 October 2006 by Senator McLucas:

Shadow Minister for Transport Kerry O’Brien and Queensland Labor Senator Jan McLucas have renewed Labor’s demand for a full Senate inquiry into the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).

Today’s call was prompted by the latest revelation of how much CASA knew about the unsafe practices of Transair prior to the tragic accident in July 2005 at Lockhart River. This accident cost 15 lives and was the worst air crash in Australia for nearly 40 years.

“Under intense questioning last night in Senate Estimates, CASA revealed that they were aware of a history of non-compliance with the Civil Aviation Act and Regulations by Transair as far back as 2001.

“Today, as part of the Estimates Committee process, Senator O’Brien has done what CASA has failed to do and that is to table details of CASA’s own findings where Transair has failed to comply with safety standards,” said Senator McLucas.
Goes further to the "fabric of government" and the failure to get proper management by casa and atsb and the lengthy time that this has been out of control.

[Sarcs]

Creamy: These days the ATSB merely jumps to a convenient conclusion and doesn't bother pursuing anything that might cast doubt on that conclusion. Here's what the AAAA submission to the ASRR Panel says on this issue:

AAAA expressed strong concerns to ATSB management with previous attempts during investigations to attempt to mould evidence to fit a theory, rather than objectively analysing and presenting the evidence available.

That the Laborials are prepared to acquiesce in the ATSB's refusal to retrieve NGA's OBRs is a very sad indictment on the weakness of the fabric of government in Australia. {Comment: Spot on Creamy!:D}

gaunty:It actually begs the question. Are we to base investigation results on basically uncoroborated evidence and "views"!

It wouldn't be the first time that "evidence" offered on recollection was not supported by other facts. The only way that can become incontrovertible is why CVRs are installed in the first place.

I for one wont rest until they are!

And, otherwise what's the point in mandating them? {Comment: It would seem that the blackbox maybe now be fairgame so how about it gaunty or Sunny?? :E}

SIUYA:Look carefully at the timeframes - the decision NOT to recover the recorders was made at an early stage of the investigation as far as I can understand, so how come, at that EARLY stage, was the ATSB so confident that the recorders wouldn't reveal data that wasn't available from other sources...
...The Minister's response to Recommendation 1 defies belief, and provides a stark indication that the Minister, like his predecessor, really doesn't have a clue what it's all about, and that he seems to believe, like the idiot running the ATSB, that bulsh1t baffles brains. Not to labor(ial) over the Govt response to R1, however it is worth reflecting on the now infamous previous Senate Inquiry thread on the subject of the non-recovery of the OBRs...

Kharon post #953: (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/468048-senate-inquiry-hearing-program-4th-nov-2011-a-48.html#post7641845)"...I still wonder why the "Black box" was not recovered, the combined unit would have provided an independent eye witness to the events. We are obliged by law to install and keep serviceable the "boxes": not recovering the thing makes it pointless to do so. The report is happy with 'edited' transcript and 'expert' opinion. I guess expecting the facts and evidence to support assumption are not required in the modern era of investigations. CASA and the ATSB have dreamed up some bull about there being 'enough' evidence without the CVR/FDR; and yet questions are stll being asked against spin, speculation and assumption.

We have three independent witnesses to the event ignored, unheard and buried under a mountain of paperwork; the CVR, the FDR and the co pilot. It would be a brave judge who made a ruling without hearing all the witnesses..."
Closely followed by my post at #954:post “K” :ok: and highlights yet another unexplained and unresolved, tainted area within the remit of the Pel-Air enquiry that hopefully hasn’t got past the attention of the good Senators.

A quick Sunday afternoon google search for unrecovered blackboxes turns up a list total of twelve (I guess soon to be 13) from 1965. Some of those cases it wasn’t from a lack of trying to retrieve them. And sometimes they were totally or partially destroyed or lost.

The irony of the Pel-Air Norfolk ditching is that if the crew and pax had of perished then the bureau and FF would have been obligated to recover the blackbox!

Besides being a rather embarrassing retraction by the DAS and points to the question whether the DAS is indeed the puppetmaster or the puppet, the following is interesting in the context of the unrecovered blackbox:


At page 41 of the Hansard from Monday 22 October it was stated:

CHAIR: So your department had no part, no conversations, in the recovery of the black box?
Mr McCormick: No, Senator, we did not.
CHAIR: No input at all?
Mr McCormick: No, Senator.

I have since been advised that this statement is not correct. On 8 December 2009
the ATSB raised with CASA by email the possibility of contributing to a joint fund
sharing arrangement to recover the black box and was advised that CASA did not have the funds to contribute to that exercise. I was not aware of this email at the time of my advice to the Committee.

I apologise if my comments have been in any way misleading.

Besides the fact that the Hansard reference to which he refers is actually located on page 53 this revelation may call into question some of the issues that Kharon raises in post #953.

§ How can it be that FF doesn’t have the necessary funds and where’s the cost/benefit/analysis?
§ As “K” infers could it be that FF legal considered the CVR information could be detrimental to their case of trying (initially) to prosecute the pilot under S20A of the Act and given the protections section 32 AO-AU afford the flight crew?
§ Could it also be that FF were aware that had the blackbox been retrieved then the bureau would have full and privileged control over the CVR/FDR information as per the TSI Act?

The DAS revelation would have been a contributing factor to bean-counter Beaker’s ultimate decision not to recover the black box, which
he explained to the committee on page 67 of the Hansard:

Mr Dolan: At the initial stages, we understood the aircraft was in comparatively shallow water and that access to the recorders would be reasonably achievable by a diver or other mechanisms without too much difficulty. That brief was to convince me to make the necessary allocation of resources to retrieve the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder. Upon investigation, it became clear that the depth at which the aircraft was in the water, its location at a remote island, Norfolk Island, and the work health and safety standards applying to diving to those depths meant that there would have been a substantial cost of recovery.

The requirement was effectively that there be a decompression chamber, none of which was available on Norfolk Island, for the full time of the retrieval because of the depth at which the divers would be operating. When we got a reasonable and first approximation assessment of that, in the knowledge that, from our point of view, the key information we had about flight decision making would not have been recorded on the cockpit voice recorder which only had a two-hour time on it—

You got to say what a load of bollocks! And what about the FDR, surely the invaluable information that it holds over a 100hrs of ‘power on’ was worth the cost of retrieval alone??:ugh:

Not sure about the FA2100 combined CVR/FDR but a lot of FDR’s these days have so many more flight system parameters measured/recorded.

Whose to say if fuel flows, fuel burn etc wasn’t recorded not to mention (as “K” said) actual winds aloft, ground speed etc..etc. Even PTT actuations, which could have possibly shown transmissions that weren’t received or recorded by ATC. The list isn’t endless but there is a 100hrs of possibly relevant information that is still sitting on the ocean floor.:{

Hopefully the good Senators are all over this because it certainly is an area that raises the stench of this whole Pel-Air debacle to an extreme level! :yuk: And it goes on over numerous posts/pages thereafter..:ugh:

Creamy etc are right, this response to R1 is a huge indictment of the agencies involved and the political system under which we are governed...:{

Conspiracy theory: Here's a thought..:cool:?? Maybe at the time (like in the LHR case) and unbeknownst to the ATsB, PIC/FO the CVR/FDR on VH-NGA was in fact U/S??:E


Addendum:


Non-retrieval of CVR/FDR - Dolan obfuscation 22/10/12 hearing - YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0mx4iBNftHY&feature=youtu.be)

[Frank Arouet]

CASA in particular have a history of loosing 'evidence' when it comes to protecting their CRONY's, I am a victim of that, and one Deputy PM accused the CASA Board of 'destroying' that evidence.


Given, if there is no will, by anyone, to recover the FDR/CVR, that 'evidence' is effectively 'lost', who is the 'CRONY' being protected, (by both political Party's and statutory bureaucracy's)?


Unlike my 'evidence', the Pel-Air 'evidence' can still be 'un-lost' and recovered as it still exists, (I'm assuming). There is possibly some legal injunction available to prevent its continued inability to be entered into evidence.


What prevents a salvage by private party's and who 'owns' the savaged hull and its contents?


Lawyers, Insurance assessors, and dive experts welcome to comment on this one.

[SIUYA]

Frank...

...the Pel-Air 'evidence' can still be 'un-lost' and recovered [if] it still exists...

:ok: Very good point.

See TSI Act S.49, as follows:

49 OBR ceasing to be an OBR under declaration of ATSB

...

(3) If:

(a) the ATSB decides to investigate the transport safety matter to which an OBR relates; and

(b) the ATSB is satisfied that any part of the OBR is not relevant to the investigation;

the ATSB must, by published notice, identify that part and declare that part is not to be treated as an OBR on and after a date specified in the notice.

(4) The ATSB cannot revoke or vary a notice published under this section.

(5) When an OBR, or part of an OBR, ceases to be an OBR because of a notice published under this section, then any related OBR information also ceases to be OBR information.

The $64K question therefore is:

"Did TweedleDUMB (Dolan) publish a notice pursuant to S.49(3)(b) when the ATSB decided not to recover the recorders at the EARLY stage in the investigation when he (TweedleDUMB) became so confident that the recorders wouldn't reveal data that wasn't available from other sources?"

And if, TweedleDUMB didn't publish that notice, then WHY wasn't it published?

However, if TweedleDUMB DID publish the notice, then the recorders are open slather I reckon to be 'un-lost' as Frank is suggesting, if it's at all possible to do that, and then the information that they may provide could be made public as/where/when necessary, and as SHOULD have been published in the first place. :E

And as far as I can see, there's absolutely fcuk-all that TweedleDUMB could do to stop that if he published the requisite notice under S.49 of the TSI Act, because S.53 would seem to not apply if that were the case.

I'm no lawyer - so I'll defer to Creampuff's opinion here.

Notwithstanding, you better get your scuba gear dusted off gaunty - looks like you might be going for a diving trip to Norfolk Is. :}

[Creampuff]

I'm no lawyer either, but I'd put it this way: If I'd been PIC, the recorders would have been out and taken to a trusted organisation a long time ago.

Bear in mind what the prohibitions on the use and disclosure of OBR information are (supposedly) about: The protection of the crew!

It would be a complete perversion of the policy of the legislation, and would expose the ATSB as pursuing an agenda entirely contrary to the interests of air safety, if ATSB tried to prevent someone from recovering the recorders and the disclosing of the information on them for the purposes of finding out the facts and vindicating the crew.

[SIUYA]

Thanks Creampuff...

We are obviously in violent agreement here! :D:D

So, does anyone have any idea if TweedleDUMB ever published a notice pursuant to S.49(3)(b) at the time that the ATSB decided not to recover the recorders at the EARLY stage in the investigation?

Because if he didn't, then it seems to vindicate the assertion that TweedleDUMBER (the Minister) has demonstrated rock-hard STUPIDITY in accepting the reasons provided by TweedleDUMB to justify the ATSB's failure to recover the recorders.

If no notice was issued by TweedleDUMB (Dolan) pursuant to S.49, then I'd say TweedleDUMBER (Truss) might need to not pass GO, not collect $200, and go back to the drawing board and rethink the whole matter and either get TweedleDUMB to issue a notice pursuant to S.49, or to bite the bullet and spend some $$$s to recover the recorders RFN (Right Fcuking Now) without any more procrastination and obfuscation.

It's not rocket science FFS.

Why is this all so bloody hard? :ugh:

[FlexibleResponse]

I wonder if anyone has seen a reasonable estimate on chartering a proficient salvage company to retrieve the FDR/CDR?

If so, could that be funded by a privately led funds drive?

[Sarcs]

Ben (& his nearly fried server) have taken taken some time out from the mystery of the disappearance of MH370 to pass comment on the Govt wet lettuce response..:D:D:Pel-Air crash report failings flick passed by Govt (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/03/23/pel-air-crash-report-failings-flick-passed-by-govt/)

Last week the Warren Truss, the deputy PM and transport and infrastructure minister, did what his predecessor Labor’s Anthony Albanese, failed to do last year when he promised but never delivered a timely response to the Senate committee inquiry into the ATSB’s report into the Pel-Air crash.

For the many new readers who are visiting Plane Talking, a Pel-Air Westwind corporate jet was performing an air ambulance contract to transfer a patient from Apia to Melbourne via a refueling stop at Norfolk Island in November 2009 when it was ditched in the sea , from which all six people on board were rescued against all the odds.

The quality of that report, and the suppression of documents that cast a very bad light on Australia’s air safety regulator, CASA, and its safety investigator, the ATSB, has become something of a cause in Australia’s aviation sector where both bodies are distrusted and held in contempt.
The Senate all party committee was unanimous in its criticism of both bodies but all of its substantive recommendations for strong corrective action were in effected ruled out by the new minister, who appears to be channeling his discredited predecessor, when he tabled the much delayed government response to the committee’s findings.

The committee’s report and the new government’s response, can be found on this page (http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/safety/report/index.aspx).

The are some matters arising from the Pel-Air crash that require the Minister’s attention.

The Senate committee devoted a chapter of its report to its rejection of the integrity of the testimony given by the chief commissioner of the ASTSB, Martin Dolan, something that may be without precedent in the history of parliamentary scrutiny of the affairs and performance of a government agency.

Why is Mr Dolan trusted to head the ATSB when his word is not trusted by an all party committee of the Parliament of Australia?

Why is it the Coalition way to endorse what was the Labor way in the Pel-Air crash, and permit two statutory authorities to rig an air crash investigation so that evidence that showed CASA was incompetent was disregarded and evidence that implicated the regulator and the operator subordinated to the purpose of apportioning all of the blame on the captain of the flight.

It’s one thing for Labor to treat individual rights with contempt when it comes to the misconduct of powerful public authorities. But does this make it right for the Coalition to do the same thing?

Why is it that the Coalition position that the ATSB report, which failed to deal with the lack of regulatory oversight of the operator, or the suitability of the aircraft for the purpose, or the lack of appropriate regulations concerning to conduct and fueling of such operations, should nevertheless be allowed to stand.

Why is the government tolerating a so called independent review of the ATSB’s investigative processes by its Canadian counterpart that is so restrictive in its terms that not all the parties to that inquiry are being asked to participate in what seems to be a desk audit?

Is the government a party to suppressing documents highly critical of CASA (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/03/02/australia-suppresses-criticism-of-its-aviation-safety-body/) that have been submitted to its Aviation Safety Regulation Review?
When a government that models itself on the Westminster system invites submissions to a statutory inquiry and publishes them they are protected by legal privileges.

Can the Minister assure the aviation industry that their ‘suppressed’ submissions are also privileged in the event that these detailed allegations and observations made about CASA are independently made public?
These are important questions. For the public accountability of Government and Public Administration as well as the safety of aviation. Scary thought that if the MH370 wreckage is found in the southern search area then the accident investigation, under the terms of Annex 13 section 5.3 'State of Registry', could be delegated by the Malaysians to our ATsB to conduct. Would you want the current regime under Beaker to be carrying out what would be such a heavily internationally scrutinised investigation??:(

Here is a refresher (CV if you like) on Beaker..:ugh:

Non-retrieval of CVR/FDR - Dolan obfuscation 22/10/12 hearing - YouTube (http://youtu.be/0mx4iBNftHY)

Ps Corrected for you SIUYA, good to see that someone is awake! :ok:

[Man the lifejackets]

I'm happy to defer to the significant experience of the posters on this site (gaunty) but I remain to be educated as to the benefits of recovering the cvr etc. Without recourse to this data the powers that be have already demonstrated their complete incompetence. (ie withholding the Chambers report - and then ignoring it)

Surely the issue has moved beyond the technical issues (which I suspect may prove they're f..kw.ts) to making them accountable for the facts that have already been uncovered by the senate. ie the senate knows they're f..kw.ts.; the available facts demonstrate they're f..kw.ts, so how do we stop them being f..kw.ts? The senate has already made a prima facie case which both governments and the AFP appear to have ignored - what else can the truth add?

Imagine if the recovery of the black boxes revealed nothing other than what was already "known" - perhaps the only other benefit might simply be to demonstrate that recovery could be achieved relatively simply and cheaply compared to, say, some other cost centres of the ATSB budget. Even then, with the commissioner immune to embarrassment, what would this add? The lunatics are still in charge.

Of course. it would be worthwhile having the data (the truth is important) and apportioning blame appropriately but what would change if the agencies continue to operate as before? Self serving bureaucrats reporting to self serving politicians. Viva democracy. (note to self - must stop thinking negatively):)

[SIUYA]

Sarcs...

Scary thought that if the MH370 wreckage is found in the southern search area then the accident investigation should, by rights, fall to our ATsB to conduct..

Nice try, but you need to look at ICAO Annex 13 here:

State of Registry

5.3 When the location of the accident or the serious incident cannot definitely be established as being in the territory of any State, the State of Registry shall institute and conduct any necessary investigation of the accident or serious incident.

However, it may delegate the whole or any part of the investigation to another State by mutual arrangement and consent.

So it's Malaysia's 'gig' Sarcs until/if it (Malaysia) delegates the investigation to someone else.

Note that Australia is properly performing its responsibilities:

5.3.1 States nearest the scene of an accident in international waters shall provide such assistance as they are able and shall, likewise, respond to requests by the State of Registry.

This would be without any kudos to TweedleDUMB and the ATSB - hat's off to the RAAF with the excellent job that they are doing! :D:D

But be VERY CONCERNED if Malaysia (State of Registry) in a moment of sheer lunacy decides to devolve the investigation to ATSB per Annex 13 para 5.3 Sarcs, because in all certainty it would become $$$-driven exercise under TweedleDUMB's 'Commissionorship', and going by the quality of ATSB reports under the idiot's so-called management, we would almost certainly end up knowing a good deal less than we presently know when the investigation was, hopefully, concluded in about 50 years time.

:mad:

[SIUYA]

Man the lifejackets...

You make good points, but you probably need to understand Annex 13 a little bit here with respect to OBRs.

It's not that the OBRs may not reveal information about data/information that's known. It's the fact that effort WAS made to recover the information which may substantiate other information that's already known.

You also need to look at what gaunty said:

It actually begs the question. Are we to base investigation results on basically uncorroborated evidence and "views"!

It wouldn't be the first time that "evidence" offered on recollection was not supported by other facts. The only way that can become incontrovertible is why CVRs are installed in the first place.

In other words, the OBR information really is invaluable to 'corroborate' other information, and also to validate other information that's gained during an investigation.

There are many 'landmark' investigations where OBR data really DID provide the 'key' to what happened MTL, and to disregard the effort to retrieve that data based solely on $$$-considerations, as was seemingly done with the PEL-AIR investigation reveals a very 'flawed' philosophy and understanding of basic investigation methodology by the investigation body conducting the investigation.

Remember too MTL, the purpose of the investigation is NOT to apportion BLAME, but the way CASA approached things with the investigation under consideration might perhaps make you think otherwise. :{

But nothing I or any other PPRuNERs say/write is going to make the slightest bit of difference to TweedleDUMB and TweedleDUMBER I'm afraid, and unfortunately all we're doing is pissing into the wind.

Time to canvass the independents I think.

[Creampuff]

Just to re-focus everyone on why the content of NGA’s CVR is so important: There were patent errors in the information transmitted to NGA, and there are patent errors in the transcript of the recordings of the information transmitted to NGA, parts of which transcript appear in the ATSB’s report.

The patent errors are not matters of debate. They are fact.

An analysis of NGA’s CVR would, among other important outcomes, help to determine the extent of the errors.

(PS: Ben S has NFI with responsibility for investigation of the MH370 tragedy. Fortunately, for aviation safety, the investigation will have nothing to do with ATSB.)

[Sarcs]

Creamy thanks for the refocus..:D Although I don't believe Ben has said anywhere in his MH370 articles that the ATsBeaker will now be conducting the accident investigation, that was just me stirring the pot..:E (SIUYA have now corrected my post :D).

Out of interest here are the comments (including from Ben himself) from the Planetalking article Pel-Air crash report failings flick passed by Govt (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/03/23/pel-air-crash-report-failings-flick-passed-by-govt/#comments): Dan Dair
Posted March 23, 2014 at 8:01 pm | Permalink

I know this is an issue very close to your heart, Ben.
So my question to you (& others) is:

Aside from covering-up for their own mistakes &/or institutional deficiencies,

What are the consequences for CASA & the ATSB (& maybe the government) if they come out & admit to all their failings on this issue.?
(aside from the likelihood that the two heads of departments would be asked to resign)

(I’m thinking about them hiding from law-suits, as much as anything.?)

Ben Sandilands
Posted March 23, 2014 at 8:31 pm | Permalink

The only approriate course of action is for the ATSB report to be withdrawn and re-done to the standards expected of a first world state in relation to air accident investigations.

The remedial process should involve the replacement of both bodies with well resourced, effectively run independent bodies like the FAA and NTSB, with appropriate powers of enforcement, and which conduct their affairs transparently and in public.

And Yes, I’m aware of criticisms of the FAA, and some major stuff ups such as its botched investigation of rudder hard overs in older model 737s and a cargo door fault in older 747s. But the structure, scaled to Australia’s needs, would make sense.

comet
Posted March 23, 2014 at 9:56 pm | Permalink

I hope the many new readers of Plane Talking absorb the gist of this:
Australian government authorities rig an air crash investigation.
Hopefully some FAA officials read this too. India got classified as having sub standard aviation regulation. But at least India is doing something about it and making improvements. Australia is not.

[email protected]
Posted March 23, 2014 at 11:11 pm | Permalink

Yes, it is so easy to criticise the way Malaysian politics works.
Yet here in supposedly non corrupt Australia, we have an airline that has an ex politician on the Board of Directors and two Government bodies charged with maintaining safety standards and inquiring in to incidents, both of whom seem to be unwilling to find against the airline with the ex politician, in a serious near fatal incident.
Not a good look, is it?

comet
Posted March 24, 2014 at 5:53 am | Permalink

It’s not a good look.

The problem is that the mainstream media are not looking. They’re not covering this story. Only Plane Talking is.
It’s strange they’re not interested in this story.

And so the mainstream political parties are not interested in doing anything about it. It’s a chicken vs egg situation, and proves the media follow the agenda of the political parties. It stinks, really.

And many people working in the government statuary authorities dealing with aviation safety hope to one day gain employment in the airlines they are investigating. So nobody wants to rock the boat.

So in the end, people who should be acting on behalf of the people end up acting in self interest on behalf of their own careers.

With lax aviation regulation it’s inevitable that mistakes of the past are repeated, costing lives.

It’s actually extraordinary that a report detailing the incompetence and operational failures of another government authority can be swept under the carpet like this.

[Kharon]

The look of gob smacked on horror on the Fawcett visage was a sight to long remember as the miniscule and his merry band of 'advisors' delivered the pineapples to the Senate committee. The miniscule response a calculated insult, designed to inform the 'IOS Senators' that the trusted experts are in charge of all matters aeronautical and extraneous fumbling and groping will not; not in any circumstances, be tolerated. This response from the 'department' insults industry, the Senate committee, the tame overseas experts, the Reverent Forsyth's panel and the general public, who, one way or another pay for the pineapples.

The question now is, do the BRB order another dozen of the specially designed, pineapple accommodating bar stools, or will there be a dust up???. As brother Creampuff rightly points out, actions speak louder than words, now more than ever.

It must be quite an experience for the Senators; to be so publicly humiliated, treated as irrelevant in such a fashion. They have discovered for themselves just how foul the air safety miasma is; the depth of depravity and possibly, based on their own evidence just how deep the suppurating sores on the arse of industry are. They may have discovered just how impotent, how disgusted and how furious, these ridiculous departments make industry feel. Welcome to the club boys and girls, your trump beaten in crooked game where those without an ace or two up their sleeves are doomed to be shown the back door, exiting with a complimentary pineapple; thanks for participating.

Now what can be done is the question; I am a bottle of excellent Claret ahead at the moment in the pre release stakes on the miniscule response to Pel Air; word count 89% correct, paragraph by phrase count 92%; overall accuracy 99% (they left a very exploitable loop hole in one paragraph, which, I confess surprised me). Well, it's the WLR review next, the bottle on offer is a cracker; however, I would happily pay for a case of the same to be cataclysmically wrong and be delighted to share it with those in the Senate who made a fight against the gross obscenity, this travesty the miniscule for transport has seen fit to release. Did you see the smug, treacherous, cynical bugger actually daring to shake hands with a P3 crew going out to search for the missing 777. Rubbish like that daring to shake hands with hard working, honest aircrew after signing the Pel Air response. I'd rather chew my leg off.

We can thank the heavens for small mercies, at least it's the AMSA and RAAF searching, not ATSB and CASA; could you imagine it; I can.

Now then where's that bottle?

[Fantome]

listen cobber . . . . it do your gastric mucosa no good exposing your self to this heartache and agony.

you need to take a break and join us up here for week or two's total media blackout.

catch some fish . .. pop the corks on the choice vintage . . . . . tell us again the maker's name on the clock . . .

but if you do get off on corruption, there's always the stuff about Premier Joh, his police minister Terry Lewis and revelations just coming to light by a researcher and author on the subject who was on with Fran Kelly this morning on the wireless.

(her dad flew B24s . .. RAAF .. . . by the way , which may in part account for her feeling at times for aviation's complexities.)

[SIUYA]

Creampuff said...

there are patent errors in the transcript of the recordings of the information transmitted to NGA, parts of which transcript appear in the ATSB’s report.

The patent errors are not matters of debate. They are fact.

An analysis of NGA’s CVR would, among other important outcomes, help to determine the extent of the errors.

THIS IS IMPORTANT!


As I previously supposed:

The $64K question therefore is:

"Did TweedleDUMB (Dolan) publish a notice pursuant to S.49(3)(b) when the ATSB decided not to recover the recorders at the EARLY stage in the investigation when he (TweedleDUMB) became so confident that the recorders wouldn't reveal data that wasn't available from other sources?"

And if, TweedleDUMB didn't publish that notice, then WHY wasn't it published?

However, if TweedleDUMB DID publish the notice, then the recorders are open slather I reckon to be 'un-lost' as Frank is suggesting.


What I'm suggesting is that IF the recorders were of no interest (for whatever reasons) to the ATSB, and if there was a Notice pursuant to S.49(3)(b), then as far as I can see it's 'open season' for a recovery effort, and that if successful, MAY provide recorded data that would, among other important outcomes, help to determine the extent of the errors in the ATSB report.

That would then open the door for a re-opening of the investigation pursuant to para. 5.13 of Annex 13, because it would provide new and significant evidence.

So, does ANYONE know if Dolan published the notice under S.49(3)(b)?

[Sarcs]

SIUYA maybe the better question is if the blackbox hasn't been 49'erd by Beaker why not??:=:=

On the subject of pineapples...:rolleyes:

4:04pm: In tropical fruit news, Parliament House has been inundated with hundreds of pineapples.

Coalition MP Michelle Landry is delivering the fruits to all MPs and senators to showcase the "diversity of the local industry" in her Queensland electorate of Capricornia.

"We are world leaders in coal and beef production, crocodile farming and intellectual research through CQUniversity," Landry says.

"But you may not realise that Capricornia is a key player in Australia's pineapple industry."

The pineapples in question come from a company in Yeppoon.
The Pulse has taken custody of one of the pines in question. We can report it is a sturdy fruit. That is not too prickly and has a flamboyant coiff.
http://images.theage.com.au/2014/03/24/5289940/art-Landry_pineapples-620x349.jpg

Read more: Politics Live: March 24, 2014 (http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/the-pulse-live/politics-live-march-24-2014-20140324-35cgw.html#ixzz2wruazGmD)

All ready for "Mayday Mayday Mayday" insertion time...:E

[Frank Arouet]

QUOTE does ANYONE know if Dolan published the notice under S.49(3)(b)? QUOTE


I feel an FOI request coming on. Perhaps the notice was 'lost' and if so can it also be un-lost?

[Kharon]

Fantome – very little heart ache and absolutely no agony; all just bloody good sport to me and the BRB, both relaxing and refreshing. For example, there is a notion floating about to prepare a brief for Albo (remember him); now in opposition. Truss has been horribly exposed by the response to Pel Air. Perhaps, with the right information and the moral high ground Albo could attack Truss in the parliament, there's plenty of ammunition. Remember no one has, as yet, heard his response. Cleverly played, this recent Truss exhibition could create havoc for Abbott, particularly when the Oh so predictable WLR is published. Truss is on bloody thin political ice anyway and Barnaby is enticing him further out into the centre. Quite a coup if Albo could do a Lazarus. Come back from the dead on matters aeronautical; rattle the Shorten cage and force Abbott to dump Truss. All to play for, the aligned Senators have provided a wealth of valid, factual information, all the opposition have to do, is use it.

As the Malaysians are about to discover, death by aviation is not small potatoes. Not when folk are hurt and questions which responsible government should have answered are not responded to; at least not in any meaningful way. There have been enough incidents and accidents recently to make even the most thick skinned politico pay attention. Our mob failed to learn the right lessons from Lockhart, have chosen to white wash Pel Air and expect to continue deluding the travelling public into the foreseeable future. Statistically, (pure math) we are due for a big one, imagine the headlines then.

The problem for the Pollies is they now categorically know how bad things really are; it's a risky business to continue in denial. They become part of the problem, guilty by association, complicit in deceit and derelict in duty by ignoring the obvious risks.

So, thanks, but no thanks mate; having far too much fun to be sat in the sunshine, boozing and murdering innocent fish, just for fun. There are windmills to tilt, dragons to slay, monsters to wrestle and a busy ferry service to run. What, leave all this, just when it's getting interesting - not on your Nellie.

Toot toot.

[Creampuff]

Section 49 of the TSI Act has nothing to do with the physical thing that is the CVR box and its electronic component innards.

Section 49 of the TSI Act is about the sounds that are recorded and stored in the CVR box.

The prohibition in section 53 of the TSI Act is about the unauthorised copying of the recording and unauthorised disclosure of the information contained in the recording to someone else.

If I remove the CVR box and listen to its contents, and I don’t tell anyone what I heard, what offence do I commit? If I remove the CVR box and listen to its contents, and make a public statement to the effect that it contains information that in my opinion is directly relevant to the investigation of the ditching of NGA, what offence to I commit? It’s merely a statement of the bleeding obvious.

Unless the Chief Commissioner has given a direction under s 43 to the effect that the CVR not be removed from NGA, where is the impediment to someone recovering the CVR to use it precisely for its one and only intended purpose? (A direction to that effect under s 43 would probably be unlawful, because it would be completely contrary to and a complete perversion of the policy of the legislation.)

Any objection by ATSB to the recovery of the CVR by a third party and delivery of a copy of the contents to ATSB would simply expose ATSB’s motivation as craven self-interest.

[Sarcs]

Kharon:Truss has been horribly exposed by the response to Pel Air. Perhaps, with the right information and the moral high ground Albo could attack Truss in the parliament, there's plenty of ammunition. Remember no one has, as yet, heard his response. Cleverly played, this recent Truss exhibition could create havoc for Abbott, particularly when the Oh so predictable WLR is published. Truss is on bloody thin political ice anyway and Barnaby is enticing him further out into the centre. Quite a coup if Albo could do a Lazarus. Come back from the dead on matters aeronautical; rattle the Shorten cage and force Abbott to dump Truss. Interesting concept “K” especially when you consider that Albo in parliament just last week had this to say on the subject of the ATsB...

“…However, there is a role for an opposition to raise concerns about the direction of some government policy, and earlier this month there were reports that the government was considering staff cuts of up to 20 per cent in the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. The ATSB employs 110 people. They investigate accidents, safety concerns and near misses in air, sea and rail transport.

These cuts should not be considered by government. There is a need to quarantine ATSB...

...Their task is simply too important to cut corners by cutting costs and cutting staff, and I would hope that the government maintains at least the support that is there for these agencies…

….I would urge the minister for transport, who is also the Deputy Prime Minister, to make sure that these agencies are not subject to budget cuts…
…when it comes to the potential for cuts in this area, there is a very simple, old-fashioned saying: it is better to be safe than sorry. And when considering the aviation sector, you cannot afford to be in the situation whereby you look back with regret at decisions made that may have been short-sighted. So I am confident that the government will reject the suggestion of making cuts to the agency's staff….”

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UsRNFXUXK_g

Albo also infamously stated at the opening of Fort Fumble’s new Brisvegas office in 2008 (http://www.aacci.org.au/pdf/Address_at_opening_of_CASAs_NewBrisbaneOffice.pdf)…

“..And, nothing, I repeat nothing, is as important in aviation as safety. Safety must underpin everything the industry does…”

So interesting concept “K”, however there are some rather large credibility issues on the subject of Albo's (as the former miniscule) past statements on aviation safety being sacrosanct. One example HERE..:{ (http://www.senator.fawcett.net.au/ATSB%20budget%20cuts%2029%20May.pdf)


Not to mention that he was miniscule responsible for hiring bean counter Beaker in the first place…:ugh:

One thing the MH370 tragedy has highlighted is that there is no place in aviation safety for political obfuscation and playing the ‘blame game’, too many lives can be affected now and into the future for authorities to be either complacent or non-transparent in their delegated actions in the aftermath of aircraft accidents.

For Truss to effectively condone the actions of Beaker and Skull in the PelAir attempted cover up, while thumbing his nose at the Senators, has done further damage to our already tarnished aviation safety record. His inaction on recommendation 1 alone supports the argument that the ATsB should no longer be funded or overseen by his department.:=

As Albo states above, the ATsB’s role is far too important to be governed by budgetary constraints. Regardless that everyone survived the Norfolk ditching, the issue of whether to salvage VH-NGA’s black box should never, ever have been subject to such constraints…:mad:..FFS!:ugh:

IMHO for the ATsB to be a truly effective independent statutory authority it needs to be modelled on the NTSB or TSBC and be directly reportable/funded by the Parliament (& far from the thieving, politically inspired hands of miniscules & bureaucrat mandarins).

Otherwise, from what we’ve all observed with PelAir, why have the ATsB??:rolleyes:

And miniscule your head should be on a platter for even contemplating putting out such a ****e Govt response…TICK TOCK!:yuk::yuk:

[gaunty]

Someone around here was suggesting that the very clever PM & C persons could sort the whole CASA thing out in a trice.

If it wasn't them who prepared the response, who did. :sad: Either way brickbats.

re: the CVR I'm still getting my head around the timelines but if it does have 120 minutes, then those 120 minutes preceding its stopping, which I imagine must have been on impact, will or should contain some interesting answers to some questions I still and I suppose a few others may have.

Time of impact 1026:02.UTC?? so we should be able to go back to at least 0826:02UTC?? which at the least includes 0940 top of the drop and period of activity prior. As well as the pre-ditching and pre-impact info, maybe some post impact who knows until we drag it up.

The other question/answer I may have missed, is did the aircraft have the capacity to carry the additional CPDP fuel, if indeed it had been computed? And, what on the day should it have been. The answer begs some questions.

Just sayin?

[Creampuff]

I think Sunfish gave up his 'kid geniuses in PM&C fixing this' idea a while ago.

Mugged by reality ....

[Kharon]

Steam On - Checked.

Credibility eh? – I wonder if our miniscule has considered that. In a less than stellar career our remittance man from Qld has not assisted himself by relying on and blindly supporting 'institutions'. He cannot seem to believe, despite clear evidence that CASA is an asylum; cannot possibly consider ATSB as a right royal cock up. His response to Senate amply reflects this. Was Beaker publicly terminated with extreme prejudice?; was McComic sent for analysis before ever being allowed out in society again; alas, no. There they sit, smug, well paid and happy within their isolated, protected orbit. A cartoonist could portray Truss as a monkey at the end of the organ grinders chain, capering, scampering about picking up pennies and hoping for a pat.

There is a mountain of fact, evidence provided by a very credible Senate investigation, supported by over 20 previous 'investigations' /inquiries etc; industry comment, analyst comment, expert advice and international censure, all available to the miniscule, being steadfastly ignored.

For example; at the hub of the Pel Air investigation we find a manager (acting) madly signing off NCN as fast as they are written. In some instances, even signing them on behalf of the 'investigator' before signing them off as acquitted. A manager who was at the same time copying and pasting plagiarised wisdom to complete a secret 'report' as damning of the CASA methodology as it was of his own investigating team. All of this while Humpty Dumpty of Pel Air was put back together again, in record time. Hansard provides all of this as fact and tested evidence not supposition. The contradictory, capricious actions of this one manager, standing alone are worthy of very serious consideration by honest folk as they so clearly represent and identify much of where CASA has failed industry under McComic.

The Senators have witnessed a small portion of this aberration, been presented with solid facts and have made some righteous determinations. Miniscule Truss has consciously, (IMO with malice and aforethought) agreed to support an institutional response, which not only flies in the face of fact and logic, but insults the hard working conscientious Senators who provided the information to the miniscule. Industry is inured to such blatant insults; but men the calibre of Fawcett, Heffernan, Sterle and Xenophon are not. That committee does have the horsepower to call for an inquiry, I believe only a committee majority is needed to turn the trick (?). Perhaps the next one will include the miniscule response to their inquiry into Pel Air.

Must we now ask why even a simple Navy exercise to retrieve the OBR device from NGA cannot be contemplated? Hells bells, the miniscule will spend more on lunch and airfares the next 12 month than the exercise would cost. So, if not, please explain why not. Only this time, please try to present a believable, logical explanation; at the least one we could reasonably expect to be fooled by.

You see the miniscule, ridiculous capering at the end of the departmental chain is shameful. After the pathetic, humiliating 2008 effort an honourable man would have at least ordered a new ATSB investigation and opened an inquiry based against the evidence provided by the Senators. By supporting the institutional stance, denying the problems exist, burying the injustice and generally dancing to a flawed tune, Australia is shamed, parliamentarians humiliated and a mockery made of a once proud industry.

By the way miniscule, the hysterically barking, part blind, part mad dog tied to the back fence is yours. Please; put it out of it's misery or take it away. Because when it bites someone, and it will, the blame belong you and the blood will be on your hands.

Steam Off – Checked.

Selah.

[majorca]

Come on, Sarcs
That drongo Albo has done nothing, if not did nothing, to enhance aviation safety in Australia. Bravo for him coming out and denouncing Truss, who has been in the job "5mins", he needs to look back to what he presided over! AsA is a shambles! From CASA to ATC. AsA needs a shakeup and all the politicians want to do is shift the blame.

[Sarcs]

The following poohtube vid shows when Beaker thought he had a “gotcha” moment of the IOS Senators, in particular Senator Fawcett :rolleyes::
CVR/FDR 28/02/13 - 'Shall or should' & ATsB Chief Commissioner. - YouTube (http://youtu.be/4r8nxCwY7rg)

Certainly an uncomfortable point in the inquiry for Senator Fawcett and the smug look on the Beaker’s face almost makes you want to vomit..:yuk::yuk: However it was also a pivotal PNR moment for Beaker that shredded any remnant of credibility he may have once had in the eyes of the Senators & IOS members…:=

…Senator Xenophon on AAI Govt response (20/03/14):I note, in particular, the comments from ATSB Chief Commissioner Mr Dolan, who admitted during questioning that he was 'not proud' of the ATSB's report into the Pel-Air incident. The committee even went so far as to state that Mr Dolan's standing as a witness before the committee had been eroded by his evidence relating to the ATSB's failure to retrieve the flight data and cockpit voice recorders. Mr Dolan justified this position by quoting a version of the statement that sets out the ATSB's international responsibilities in this regard—ICAO Annex 13—that was not in force at the time of the accident or investigation. I pay tribute to Senator David Fawcett's cross-examination of Mr Dolan in this regard, which elicited very valuable information. A reading of the current Annex 13 may leave some room for discretion as to whether the recorders are to be retrieved. A reading of the annex that was in force at the time of the incident and subsequent investigation—and therefore should have been the one used by the ATSB to reach a decision—does not provide for this discretion. The committee report states:

The committee does not accept this argument— that is, the argument of Mr Dolan.

At the time the decision against retrieving the FDR was made the imperative existed for the ATSB to do so. To ignore this imperative by arguing that the benefit did not justify the cost appears disingenuous. To imply that the revised wording in the current version of Annex 13 was the basis for the ATSB's decision in 2009/2010, before this version was in force, is even more disingenuous.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zq3u_QKFEbE
And yet this miniscule refuses to accept the factually correct, extremely damning Senate PelAir report against a discredited and severely flawed witness like Beaker…:ugh:

Kharon:By supporting the institutional stance, denying the problems exist, burying the injustice and generally dancing to a flawed tune, Australia is shamed, parliamentarians humiliated and a mockery made of a once proud industry “God save the Queen because nothing will save the Governor-General…err miniscule!”:E

[Kharon]

Paraphrase W.C. Fields Elephants - I like to look at 'em, but I wouldn't want to own one. Now that the miniscule has had a chance to get his seat warm (for how long is anyone's guess) I wonder how he's getting along with Albo's white paper elephant. Takes a bit of adjustment to get used to having one about the place, especially a large, old cranky one.

I see his boy Beaker has some competition though. Centaurus has kindly put a link on Pprune (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/536754-new-report-canadian-boeing-737-accident-must-read-first-officers.html#post8402123) – which allows access to the Canadian TSB investigation and report into a CFIT. It is a fine example of what an accident report should be. There really is something for everyone and although it is long (215 pages), it's worth the time taken; if for no other reason than it is an example of how it should be done.

I just love the opening statement; I hope the Canucks maintain the high standard when they 'do' our report card. You just never know in this world, do you?
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 13, Footnote1 requires States conducting accident investigations to protect cockpit voice recordings. Canada complies with this requirement by making cockpit voice recordings privileged in the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act. While the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) may make use of any on-board recording in the interests of transportation safety, it is not permitted to knowingly communicate any portion of an on-board recording that is unrelated to the causes or contributing factors of an accident or to the identification of safety deficiencies.

The reason for protecting cockpit voice recorder (CVR) material lies in the premise that these protections help ensure that this essential material is available for the benefit of safety investigations. The TSB has always met its obligations in this area and has restricted the use of CVR data in its reports. Unless the CVR material is required to both support a finding and identify a substantive safety deficiency, it will not be included in the TSB's report.

In this report, the TSB has made extensive use of the CVR recording. In each instance, the material has been carefully examined to ensure that the extracts used are related to the causes or contributing factors of this accident or to the identification of safety deficiencies. My bold.

Toot toot.

[Sarcs]

To take our mind (and disgust) off the insipid smarmy images of mi..mi..mi..Beaker the (STBR) Das has provided a bit of light relief for a Thank God it's Friday...;)

Dear Heff...

http://i1238.photobucket.com/albums/ff498/004wercras/McOmickrelief.jpg

..L&Ks

PMO diagnosis: First thought rabies but after that (above) definitely FIMD.

PMO prognosis: Retiring should see the condition exacerbate but should consider earlier retirement as the more frequent occurrences and the high blood pressure are ominous signs of a worsening condition..TICK TOCK!:E

[Frank Arouet]

28th March 2014. The Honourable Michael McCormack MP. Member for Riverina.
11-15 Fitzmaurice Street Wagga Wagga NSW 2650.
I write this letter addressed to you as my local member and in your capacity as Parliamentary Secretary to The Minister for Finance, plus as a conduit to Minister Truss, Deputy Prime Minister and in this case Minister for Transport, to put on record my deep concern at the series of recent events that culminated in Minister Truss’ response to Senate inquiries into The Civil Aviation Safety Authority. I am also concerned that the Review he instigated into CASA appears to have a pre-ordained outcome supportive of CASA and dismissive of the plethora of concerns raised by industry. It appears to me that he is captive to, and blindly supportive of both CASA and The ATSB despite clear evidence in submissions to both Senators and his Review Board that at best, (in my opinion), are both incompetent, and at worst, a visual and credible account of abuse of their mandates.
Without laboring individual points which I’m sure Senators Heffernan, Fawcett and Xenaphon would gladly elaborate on for you, and with a full understanding of what is expected of you along Party lines, I advise I can no longer support you or your Party with my vote in the future and, in protest, will vote for The Labor Party at the next Federal elections unless there is a quantum shift in attitudes toward what, (in my opinion), are out of control regulatory authority’s that constitute a real and present danger to the traveling public and aviation industry.
It gives me no pleasure in telling you this, and as a long time Conservative Voter you will understand such an action is not taken lightly although it appears to be of no consequence in the big scheme of things. It will similarly give me no pleasure in saying ‘I told you so’, when Minister Truss is found out of his depth when the inevitable, and over due tragedy takes place in our skies that prompts people to ask why so many inquiries over so many years have led to nothing but lip service emphasizing a ‘safety’ mantra but no action, absent since Seaview, Monarch, Lockhart River and more recently Cabramatta and Pel-Air. You may like to start with ‘The Morris’ inquiry which I believe was the longest running in Australian history and compare it with subsequent findings to see what I’m on about. You may also like to ask The Minister for Finance why $150+ million has been spent over some 23 + years for a ‘regulatory review process’ that is still incomplete and will never be acceptable to industry while templates along the lines of US FAR’s, New Zealand and New Guinea are immediately workable and acceptable by ICAO and other signatories to the Chicago Convention.
Perhaps a plausible explanation as to why the flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders have not been recovered to date from VH-NGA still in shallow water may ameliorate further damage to LNP election prospects. I’ll willingly circulate this. Be in no doubt, the last Minister gave me no reason for optimism, but at least he was a known quantity and nobody expected anything from him. The industry expected better from this new government. CASA, (in my opinion), and in particular are an impediment to productive industry growth and $millions are being wasted to further handicap it.
Your Constituent. cc to industry.

[Kharon]

While we wait for an earth shaking response to Franks humble missive, a scary thought. What if we get a safe, sanguine, competent DAS, what then?. The BRB and IOS would be bereft of a solid, constant supply of ribald humour. If comic relief disappears overnight what then?; I mean there are other bit players, some even mildly amusing but none in the class we have come to know and enjoy. Aye, tough times ahead kids; but never mind, looks like we'll always have Beaker. Now, I wonder, should we not contemplate a new name. I mean the real Beaker is not a bad sort of chap; the more I watch, read and listen to Hansard, the more the Dickensian character Uriah Heep creeps into my imagination; any other offers?

Uriah Heep (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uriah_Heep)

It fits, very neatly into the dichotomy, does it not?

[Kharon]

CP # 1829 - "Unless the Chief Commissioner has given a direction under s 43 to the effect that the CVR not be removed from NGA, where is the impediment to someone recovering the CVR to use it precisely for its one and only intended purpose? (A direction to that effect under s 43 would probably be unlawful, because it would be completely contrary to and a complete perversion of the policy of the legislation.)"

Curse you Creamy; (with smile) there I was happily reading through the Canadian CFIT report, contemplating the much anticipated second coffee, then, looking for a reference I re read your post. Now the curiosity bump is itching, again, the old familiar itch – If not, why not recover the OBR. Even of it's only for the sake of ticking the ICAO 13 box. It's not a good look and it's hard to justify. Too deep; too risky; too cold; too little money; puerile bollocks. Then we get the very thin argument ~ we had all the information we needed. Again pure, unmitigated Bollocks.

Since the beginning, there has been a strange 'smell' about the OBR matter, a queer, indefinable aroma. I could easily be persuaded that there never was any intention, from minute one, to recover the box. It's not Dolan's money, it's 'our' money and 'our' elected Senators, representing 'our' interests want the box recovered. Who is Dolan to gainsay them? Why is he being so obdurate? Hell, he may even be right and there is little of interest there, but I feel that now, after all that has transpired, he must prove that statement. Why not, what's to loose?, the Senate wants it, we all want it, so what's the hold up?

I believe we can safely rule out dogged determination to protect the ministry or department from adverse comment, (a) they can spin that away at the drop of a hat, (b) Dolan has had many 'chances' to legitimately do so, and have some semblance of credibility remaining. Again I reach the Gordian knot, why not take the easy, honest way out? Why defy a fully armed, hostile Senate committee? Aye, it's a puzzle.

Not – repeat not – pushing conspiracy; but I always end up wondering, what in the seven hells can be so bad that it warrants this level of abstruseness. The incident was, after all said and done, a fairly straight forward event; which, honestly managed would have had very little, if any, notice taken (well not for too long anyway). There were some good safety 'holes' identified, which may assist in preventing a reoccurrence. Had we been less focussed on persecution, prosecution and just followed the investigation script, the industry could have learned some valuable lessons. Perhaps how to improve life raft deployment, life jacket selection, weather advisory, TAF and METAR forecasting, perhaps even taken a fresh look at alternates, the pit falls of bad fuel planning, ATC and airspace management; etc. etc.

So, once again, I just don't get it (shakes old wooden head). What's the driver behind the now public actions, akin to the defence of Stalingrad, of CASA and ATSB that is worth this much aggravation, suspicion and credibility loss. This is the Australian aviation safety system on display to the world and it's wife, WTF are they thinking. Why not just say, OK Senator, if you'll foot the bill, ex budget, we will re examine the matter, retrieve the OBR and provide a report of value to industry. It's all gone well beyond the incident now, which has morphed into history and no longer the subject of serious discussion.

We can, I believe, reasonably rule out sex as a motive, that only leaves us with either money or power, even then, cui bono?. Neither IMO justify the performances we have witnessed. I am tempted to consider a pre ordained verdict needing to be 'justified' and the resources of a department being 'utilised' to support the desired end result; perhaps all was well until the inescapable, inconvenient facts started to pop up like mushrooms.

Dunno, but you'll own; it's all passing strange and getting stranger by the day. Just happy it's not me who has attracted the wrath of that Senate committee. I'll just toddle off now for coffee #2 and perhaps, steal one of Min's fresh baked blueberry muffins, that's enough risk for one Sunday morning. Then back to the excellent TSBC CFIT report, now that report is worth the time.

Toot toot.

[Creampuff]

The only reasonable explanation that I can come up with is that the CVR may contain information that supports the conclusion that the timing and content of weather information transmitted to NGA gave the crew a misleading picture of the actual and forecast conditions at NFI. That outcome would be inconvenient and embarrassing for ATSB and others.

The truly inspiring aspect of all this is the way in which the professional pilot community has united to take decisive action to protect its interests, by arranging the recovery of the OBR equipment despite ATSB's obfuscation. :rolleyes:

[004wercras]

Since the beginning, there has been a strange 'smell' about the OBR matter, a queer, indefinable aroma. I could easily be persuaded that there never was any intention, from minute one, to recover the box. It's not Dolan's money, it's 'our' money and 'our' elected Senators, representing 'our' interests want the box recovered. Who is Dolan to gainsay them? Why is he being so obdurate? Hell, he may even be right and there is little of interest there, but I feel that now, after all that has transpired, he must prove that statement. Why not, what's to loose?, the Senate wants it, we all want it, so what's the hold up?
The hold up has been for several reasons. The first reason was that the abysmal Beaker didn't want to dip into his pot of money. Being a career bureaucrat and Comcare 'accountant' will dull the senses and fry ones brain cells. Hence his bulging eyes. The second reason which would have hit home early in the peace was that the ATsB stuffed up, and they realised the CVR could contain something that makes them look rather silly (even though Beaker himself makes them look rather silly anyway)

I think the Senators did the best they could do with limited powers. The bigger issue is why that fool Truss hasn't given Beaker, McComick and MrDak an instant DCM? Skull is the only scalp to be skinned thus far, and even that is a weak, wet lettuce dismissal by any standard. But then again, this has never been about safety has it? It's all about politics. Dirty, devious, dishonest politics. One day those in power will reap Karma for all the deaths that have occurred due to their malfeasance and when that day comes I am confident that the River Styx Houseboat Captain will joyfully pick up his passengers while those who have been victims to Australia's aviation farce and died as a result will be lining the river bank, placards in hand and waving farewell to these parasites.

Toot Toot indeed!

TOOT TOOT

[Kharon]

Naughty Creampuff; I'd say most pilots (of all castes) their families and insurance companies would like to be able to believe that should an unfortunate event occur, every effort would be made by the responsible authority to recover all data pertaining to the event and would make a honest attempt to determine the cause and circumstances. If only to prevent a repeat. The prevention of recurring events should be a yardstick used to measure the effectiveness of not only the performance of the national safety agency' but the effectiveness of supporting regulation. I might add, we already spend significant sums attempting to do this. The disappointing results of the Pel Air incident reflect an abject failure to meet any of the mandated criteria, let alone contribute to improved safety standards. This from what should have been a straightforward investigation.

Although it seems like great fun, the notion of a privately funded venture, even for a team of the Norfolk pro's would be 'legally' problematic; or else they would have had the whole shooting match up on the beach by now. There are some 'serious' matters which need to be sorted, like jurisdiction, ownership, insurance, custody, provenance, chain of evidence. All those 'minor' irritations of the law (rules of evidence) which, despite the best efforts of CASA to ignore, could, I suspect become problematic. I don't know, but I imagine recovery would have to be Navy or police supervised. Anyway, something more than just a bunch of well meaning, non accredited, non aligned 'private' crew; just to ensure that there was no call of 'monkey business' from interested parties. We may even want to know if the box was serviceable, or even plugged in during the flight.

We would need to know and be able to prove that there had been no tinkering, before, during and after any data recovered was used in anger. The real expense is going to be analysis. We certainly cannot allow ATSB to do it; look at the R/T transcript again, we don't want bits and pieces of data being accidentally 'overlooked' do we?.

But, the physical act of recovery is not a problem. I expect that happy bunch of pirates on No-poke Island know, to the inch, where the wreckage is and have been keeping a watchful eye. Good crew out there.

[Creampuff]

So everyone will sit around, whinging and whining and waiting for ‘the government’ to ‘do something’? Ain’t gonna happen, because it could be inconvenient and embarrassing.

If the ATSB did retrieve the OBR equipment and announced: “The OBR information does not provide a substantial basis on which to change the conclusions of our Report”, what then? Who’d believe it?

As I’ve said, if I’d been the PIC I’d have had the boxes out long ago.

Nobody’s actually identified the legal impediment to retrieval, or why that impediment is insurmountable.

If there’s an allegation of ‘tampering’ by a ‘private’ recovery team, so what? If the raw CVR recording were published and reviewed against the estimated timings of events like ground radio transmissions and ditching, I reckon a bunch of professional pilots would be able to judge whether bits were missing or added ex post facto.

I’d like to see someone convince the CDPP that it’s in the public interest to prosecute someone for doing the ATSB’s job for it, by retrieving the OBR equipment and using the information on it for the purpose for which it is fitted.

The only outcomes could be:

1. No information retrievable from the OBR equipment. Status quo re the Report's conclusions, but lingering criticism of ATSB for not retrieving the equipment sooner.

2. Information retrievable from the OBR equipment supports the conclusions of the Report, or does not cast doubt on the validity of the conclusions. Status quo re the Report's conclusions, but ATSB looks better.

3. Information retrievable from the OBR equipment suggests or shows that the timing and content of weather forecasts and reports provided to NGA provided a misleading view of the prevailing and likely weather conditions on arrival at NFI. ATSB looks worse, but the OBRs have served their one and only purpose.

[No Hoper]

Friends dive on wrecks around the pacific. They tell me that unless it has been designated off limits you should be able to dive on it.

[Frank Arouet]

At least, by leaving everything where it is, no chains of evidence have been broken. The real test is who recovers that evidence and what they do with it thereafter. Oh, and who would believe them to not abuse it whilst in their care. Seeing as Beaker has taken an active interest in the Malaysian Airline affair we should ask the Malaysians to do the recovery and hand the evidence to someone like NTSB. That should square us all up.

[004wercras]

Sunfish has the skills to retrieve the box, all he needs is the financial backing.
It could be retrieved covertly, then hidden. On the day that Beaker finally gets pushed it could be brought out, wrapped in barnacles and a ribbon, and presented to him as a farewell gift from the IOS.

[gaunty]

Creampuff.

Why isn't it possible:
The only reasonable explanation that I can come up with is that the CVR may contain information that supports the conclusion that the timing and content of weather information transmitted to NGA gave the crew a misleading picture of the actual and forecast conditions at NFI. That outcome would be inconvenient and embarrassing for ATSB and others.
that the exact opposite is shown to be true, or am I missing something.

just saying!

[Kharon]

Gaunty - [that] the exact opposite is shown to be true," etc.

Furry muff. But, does it matter either way though? really. Thankfully, this one 'lucky' time the coroner is not involved (always a plus) but there must be insurance and compensation issues to deal with which are probably in need some sort of 'independent' umpires decision, if only to decide how many cuts of the cane James deserves. The point I am labouring to make, is simple. No one has yet been provided 'all' the available evidence and information on which to make a decision. Access is being denied for all kinds of fanciful reasons. I'm not claiming expertise in this field, however, I doubt a judge or coroner would be prepared to entertain hearing a case without 'all' the available evidence being offered; particularly if that evidence was obtainable. Even the least aviation aware member of the public (include journalists) knows that the 'black box' is essential; if they know nothing else.

M'lud - "So, where's the orange thing-gummy; this black box whatsit then?, temperature, TAS, effective TAS, groundspeed and SGR would be really nice". "Just so we can establish the flight data exactly, beyond speculation and reasonable doubt".

ATSB – "Oh, it was far too much trouble to recover M'lud; we had a rope around wreck engines, used an expensive robot to do all that; but to spend the extra few pennies for a cable and crane seemed a bit over the top". "In short, we left the wreck where it was and cut the rope; anyway, we were told that we had all the answers we needed".

M'lud – "So, do we have a co-pilot statement".

ATSB – "Oh no M'lud, can't have anything like that".

I'll leave M'lud's response to your foetid imaginations. But, trying to sell the same fairy story to a Senator like Fawcett is, of it's self, stupid, suspicious, not to mention incredibly arrogant. You have to ask why a potentially career ending gamble, which Dolan freely took, was attempted. He was never going to get away with the - Annexe 13 - version ploy; not ever. The bait was offered and he snapped it up, thinking the hook was avoided. Sarcs posted the - Annexe 13 - Hansard recording; have a careful look, it's all there in glorious Technicolor.

Yup, the box would be nice to have; but the truth would be better.

I believe I'll end there; I can hear the peals of laughter, guffaws and bellows of delight from the legal eagles at my naiveté. But that's OK.

This above all: to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.
Farewell. My blessing season this in thee.

[Creampuff]

Gaunty

You are confusing the possible outcomes with the possible explanations for inaction by ATSB.

The 'exact opposite' to the outcome in the passage you quoted is envisaged in my list of 3 possible outcomes above. (See outcome 2).

The only reasonable explanation I can see for inaction by ATSB ain't that outcome.

Any refusal by any aviation accident investigatory body to retrieve OBR equipment is always going to look absurd.

If the equipment were in the Mariana Trench and there were no controversy surrounding the incident, there'd be a reasonable excuse.

[Sarcs]

What posters’ seem to be forgetting is the two tonne elephant in the room that refused to contribute to the VH-NGA black box recovery slush fund…:=
Basic chronology of relevant period (my bold):

8 December 2009: E-mail from ATSB to CASA raising the possibility of contributing to a joint fund sharing arrangement to recover the black box and CASA advised they didn’t have the necessary funds.

16 December 2009: CASA accept the Pel-Air ‘Management Action Plan’ which consisted of three phases.

18 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 1 items and were able to recommence domestic operations.

21 December 2009: ATSB, with the assistance of the Victoria Water Police, use a remotely-operated vehicle (Rover) with an underwater video camera was to assess the wreckage.

23-24 December 2009: CASA overseeing FOI of Pel-Air Eric Demarco issues 14 RCA and a number of AOs. The RCAs needed to be acquitted by 28/01/2010.

24th December 2009: Dominic James notice of suspension of CPL, ATPL, CIR pursuant to CAR 265(1)(a). Also given notice to undertake examinations under CAR 5.38.

24 December 2009: Pel-Air successfully completed Phase 2 items and were able to recommence international operations.

8 January 2010: CASA issue 7 more RCAs and several more AOs, all of which Roger Chambers the Audit Coordinator signed on behalf of several SAR team members.

8 January 2010: Audit Report completed.

13 January 2010: ATSB issue preliminary report AO-2009-072.

3 February 2010: Video conference meeting between the ATSB and CASA to discuss critical safety issue.

So FF shirked the slush fund..:ugh:..but even then the ATsB (up till at least the 13 January 2010) were still determined to recover the black box. Apparently they carried out a feasibility review that was then forwarded to bean counter Beaker as a brief for assessment:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0mx4iBNftHY

{Comment: Sure would like to get a copy of the Beaker brief…FOI anyone?? :ooh:}

Kharon: …“Was the wreck ever raised ? - truth or dare…”
Interesting question put…:confused: Heard a rumour that the Rover (21 December 2009) had actually managed to get a rope around the tail section of VH-NGA…:(

Hmm so curious I took a look at the S25 released Rover footage…:cool:



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ceEdTsAKAZY



Although not very long the time stamp is interesting to follow i.e. it has been significantly edited. The footage starts at 08:38 then jumps back to 08:28, then jumps forward again 08:33, then 08:36, then finally back again to 08:29.

The footage does match the findings as stated in the report…
“….The wreckage came to rest on a sandy seabed. Video footage showed that the two parts of the fuselage remained connected by the strong underfloor cables that normally controlled the aircraft’s control surfaces.

The landing gear was extended, likely in consequence of the impact forces and the weight of the landing gear. The flaps appeared to have been forced upwards from the pre-impact fully extended selection reported by the PIC.

The underwater video showed a lack of visible damage to the turbine compressor blades at the front of the engines. That was consistent with low engine thrust at the time of the first contact with the sea.
Consistent with the aircraft occupants’ recollections, the video footage indicated that aircraft’s configuration resulted in the bottom of the fuselage below the wing making the first contact with the water.

On contact with the water, the fuselage fractured at a point immediately forward of the main wing spar. The flight nurse was seated nearest to that location and reported the smell of sea water and feeling water passing her feet immediately after the impact. All of the aircraft occupants recalled that the fuselage parts remained aligned for a few seconds after the aircraft stopped moving, before the aircraft’s nose and tail partially sank, leaving the centre section above the surface of the sea. The passenger cabin/cockpit section adopted a nose-down attitude, leaving the wings partially afloat and the engines below the surface…”

So no smoking gun but it would be interesting to get a copy of the full rover video footage, especially with a pan out that takes in the tail after about 08:39…:rolleyes:

{Fascinating rumour: Talk around the Norfolk Island traps (BRB ;)) is that there is a photo floating around of an open access panel to the black box??..:E}

Addendum: Ben's latest kind of fits..:DMH370 PR stunt sees ATSB try to avoid its dismal black box record

The ATSB has sought to leverage a bit of reflected glory out of the MH370 black box search today with an illustrated and indeed useful primer (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2014/black-box-flight-recorders.aspx#.UzoX2TXd8Ug.twitter) on their uses in air accident investigations.

But for those that have followed its disgraceful mishandling of the Pel-Air crash, this PR exercise will do nothing to restore its damaged integrity, and in particular, its cavalier refusal to retrieve the data recorder from the sea floor near Norfolk Island where the small corporate jet was ditched in November 2009 shortly before it ran out of fuel.

The ATSB was a party to a botched and grievously inadequate investigation of that crash, in which in consultation with CASA, the Australian air safety regulator, an internal document related to CASA’s failures to conduct proper oversight of the Pel-Air Westwind operation was withheld from inclusion in the accident report.

A Senate inquiry into the investigation process which lead to the flawed and embarrassingly inadequate ATSB report being released included an entire section dealing with the unsatisfactory nature of the testimony given to its hearings by the chief commissioner of the ATSB, Martin Dolan.
The black box that the ATSB refused to retrieve from the wreckage of the Pel-Air jet could have provided vital information from the two pilots as to what they had been told about weather conditions at Norfolk Island before they found that they were unable to land and no longer had sufficient fuel to fly to an alternative airfield in Noumea, Fiji or New Zealand.

With such a shabby record in relation to Pel-Air and its flight data records , the ATSB lacks the credibility to add very much if anything to the high powered international task force now focused on seeking every possible piece of evidence that could cast light on the MH370 tragedy.

If it resolutely refused to pursue all the evidence available to it in relation to a small jet crash in Australia, what possible relevance could the ATSB have to determining all of the factors involved in the loss of the Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-200ER that vanished from air traffic control radars on 8 March, on its way from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing?

Dozens of previous articles on the Pel-Air controversy, the Senate inquiries, and links to the full reports and documents that Australia’s aviation regulator and safety investigator sought to hide from the public can be retrieved from this catalogue (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/?s=pel-air).

[Frank Arouet]

If the aircraft FDR has been tampered with or removed from the water for any reason and replaced, the evidence is compromised without independent evaluation.

With this break in the evidence chain, one needs to ask if it was intentional, in which case it is a criminal matter, or, if by negligence or incompetence, it is cause to dismiss the public perception of safety in aviation matters attended to by any regulatory body in its current guise.


Read this slowly: Lack of, or feigned lack of knowledge, or awareness of credible, and available evidence, is as culpable as having intentionally destroyed that evidence. If more than one person is involved it is tantamount to a conspiracy.

[aroa]

Above title sounds a bit mutually exclusive ie keep well apart !!:mad:

Perhaps B B B Beaker does have a sense of humour. It is April 1 after all :ok:

[004wercras]

Sarcs, succinct timeline of events, nice post. Makes the ATsB and CAsA truly look like the shonks that they are. But don't worry, all is good according to The Skulls tendentious industry letters! And heck, Terry has an A380 endo, they have a magic practising Priest on the payroll and Sky Sentinel is the Holy Grail of I.T software, so we must all be safe?

[Kharon]

CP # 1844 – "[I] reckon a bunch of professional pilots would be able to judge whether bits were missing or added ex post facto. etc.

Quite often in the CP offerings, there is a little thought provoking gem, like the one above. Think about it; the Canadian report into a CFIT is getting a lot of attention; solid discussion and the considered opinion of a 'bunch of pilots'; a report like that is bound to. The report is 'rock solid' and may be relied on to assist in formulating revised SOP, CRM, training and a whole range of 'safety' related elements. No one doubts the report's probity, no one questions the transcript, the 'pilot' body may examine and glean what lessons may be learned, with absolute confidence that the base information is almost irrefutable. Australian aircrew cannot do this against the current ATSB standard. One purpose of an investigation is to prevent or assist in the prevention of a repeat occurrence. If operators, chief pilots, training and safety departments cannot rely on the report provided to formulate 'policy', it's a sad indictment of the system. If the system can produce one seriously flawed, compromised report into a relatively 'simple' matter, how may it be relied on not to have done this with past reports; and, not to continue to do so with future events. Now it's been proven they can; Truss trusts Beaker – he must be barking.

Great work (again) Sarcs, that time line really spells it out. It really was a 'miraculous' recovery, seems the 'laying on of hands' and the magic healing cupboard work just fine. What a pity Polar and Barrier did not make it to repair station in time; bet they'd have enjoyed the benefits of the fast turn around process.

Yup, there is lots to recommend the great Australian safety myth to the international aviation communities; I expect there's a quite a queue and crowd control measures at HQ; all clamouring for that unique Australian brand of service.

Aye well, at least for time being, the water is drinkable.

Sponsored by the IOS, Lazarus fraternity. (Raising the dead and muff diving).

[Sarcs]

Here 'tis...the rope that is..:E

Pel-Air ditched off Norfolk Island - YouTube

From the PBRP (Pirates Bar Room Plunderers..;)) the story goes that the rover had roped the tail and the locals were all geared up to retrieve the black box. However then mi..mi..mi beancounter Beaker got the trembles and put the khybosh on it citing OHS issues, decompression chambers and of course limited funds...

...then the locals offered (for next to nothing) to drag the wreck towards the shore where the ocean bed rises up to a depth of 30m, thus allowing recovery of the box through a normal freedive. They again were all set to go and had lined up the local freighter to snag the mooring rope with it's anchor, but again Beaker got all squeamish and refused to give the green light...so..so close but no cigar!:ugh::ugh:

..rumour amongst the PBRP is that the box is now proudly sitting on someone's mantelpiece in yonder Norfolk Isle..:E

Now you can see why this tale has shades of Hempel, in both cases the necessary crew was ready and eager but the powers to be got cold feet right on the vinegar stroke..:{

[Creampuff]

I’m not sure why you’re worried about all this ‘chain of evidence’ stuff, Frank. :confused: Who wants to bring what court action against whom, on the basis of the OBR information? The TSI Act has some very hairy-chested prohibitions on the use of OBR information for the purposes of prosecution, civil action or administrative action against the crew of NGA.

All that everyone (other than someone who stands to be vindicated or embarrassed) wants to know is: WTF HAPPENED. The CVR might help to answer that question. That’s the CVR’s job…

If the CVR is indeed sitting on someone’s mantelpiece on NFI, that 'someone' should send it to another 'someone' with the equipment and expertise to extract any available record. If it were on my mantelpiece, I wouldn’t be sending it to ATSB…

[gaunty]

Creampuff

You seem to have missed my point.

Until the OBR's are raised, or revealed however that my be accomplished, and compared to the "evidence" relied on for the report, there are more still more questions than answers.

The OBR's were always meant to expose, post facto, what was actually "said" and what was actually "done" against the perhaps convenient interpretation by the participants of the drama.

Just sayin!

[Frank Arouet]

Creampuff;


I can think of numerous persons who have potential claims to be aired in court and that data that could help, but is suppressed because it is conveniently 'lost'.


It can be 'un-lost' via a 'subpoena duces tecum' by one or all of the following through an ordering authority with their interests at heart, not CASA or ATSB's.


One is a flight nurse who I understand has received nothing by way of compensation for ongoing problems. The pilot could be vindicated and have a claim against everyone tainted with this debacle. The flying public could be given ease for safety concerns and the whole lot could help teach pilots from the lead up to the final part of the flight. Weather providers could be helped by lessons learnt. Otherwise why carry the load in the first place when a carton of XXXX would fit.


I would like to know WTF happened and the CVR would more than likely help. Or maybe I'm just not important?

[thorn bird]

Ah, but Frank was there an FDR/CVR fitted to said aircraft?? supposed to be, but was it actually working???serviceable??? given the operator's other transgressions......................hmmm?? given the unseemly haste to get the operator back in the air, unlike them with no political pull, like the poor pilot who received the infamous CAsA Xmas eve 1659pm Fax, or the Barriers et al, where the dragging chain chokes the life blood out of them. Would have been a tad embarrassing for CAsA, having moved heaven and earth
to redeem the miscreants got a Friday arvo email " Mate the bloody black box war'nt there!!"

[004wercras]

Sarcs, nice work with the timeline in post #1851. Perhaps a transfer of that information into a Dichotomous key would impress upon the avid reader how 'unrealistic' that timeline of events really is :=
For an organisation with that level of issues, an organisation that just ditched an aircraft, an organisation that had received previous woeful audit results prior to the accident and also after the accident, one finds it almost miraculous that such a rapid turnaround in culture and processes, in some cases in just a matter of days or weeks, could be achieved and be 'realistic'. And then you have the incredible speed, the almost Superman like speed in which CAsA closed off those findings, which ultimately meant the operator could continue as normal, no problems here officer, back to the business of 'safety'.
I mean hell, it takes those bumbling ninnies 3 months just to approve the inclusion of an additional sentence in an Ops manual! Oh my, how i wish my organisation was fortunate enough to receive such speedy, robust service. I wonder what the 'secret', dare I say 'mystique' is in all of this??

I bet Sky Sentinel has Pel Air ranked very low in its risk matrix, no more audits for Pel Air for 3 years????

Honestly, safe skies for all?

[Kharon]

Sarcs post - 1852 (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/429828-merged-senate-inquiry-93.html#post8412547)– provides a recording where NX is questioning Dolan with regard to OBR recovery. Interesting passage of play for not only what's mentioned, but what is not. This is purely in the realms of weekend speculation, normally I wouldn't bother; but something, somewhere is 'off'. So I'll risk a brickbat or two and throw the questions out there to the learned colleagues, then perhaps I can assuage the itch.

Smoke and mirrors 1. The Dolan response blatantly ignores the easy, pre-arranged tow from 50 meters to 30 meters and presents his argument intimating that the 'dive' is to be conducted in 50 not 30 meters.

Smoke and mirrors 2. Why abandon the project at such a late stage ? the initial funding allocation by made Sangston would more than adequately have covered the cable tow to a 30 meter location and the modest fees charged by the diver; done and dusted.

Why does Xenophon not give the date of the 'yellow pages' report? This is an interesting, but IMO crucial, 'omission', whether by accident or design we can't know. He did however, despite being advised to 'get a move on' spend a lot of panel time reading the 'part headings' out to Dolan, who probably has them tattooed on his arse. Yet the initials JH are mentioned; while who wrote it is an important part of the overview, the chronology is essential. You get a picture forming; a senior, experienced, proficient investigator armed with a Rover, a couple of very experienced 'local' boys, a handy derrick and an easy tow to where a diver could easily and safely recover 'the box'. The yellow pages are transmitted to HQ when?, the decision made when ?, the advice to knock off was received when? and the Rover was sent home when?. Another critical element is why was there a caveat, making it a step by step approval for the recovery? It was 90% done, the expensive bit was done, the cost of a ship and a cable were not only insignificant, but allocated. So why was the next, logical step not 'approved'.

It's reasonable to assume that JH would be anticipating a go response, it's the logical conclusion to a 'honest' report. You can easily see the 'picture', it's all ready to go, so why not crack on while the weather is good, the sea calm and the last stage set; I know I would. Is it feasible then, that JH anticipating a GO message, would do the same? It does support the persistent rumour that the tail end of the aircraft was indeed raised, albeit briefly. I'd like to know if Dolan and the ATSB crew are all prepared to make a statutory declaration that it was not

Perhaps the Senate could shout NX a ticket and a weekend on Norfolk to have a couple of beers (it's never just one) at the RSL, let's call it a fact finding mission.

I know, let it go, right. Some mystery's intrigue, some conundrums are food for thought on long journeys, even for idle pub conversation; but this puzzles vexes me. Like the tail of NGA, so close, but oh so far away.

[Sarcs]

004: I wonder what the 'secret', dare I say 'mystique' is in all of this?? Kharon: The yellow pages are transmitted to HQ when?, the decision made when ?, the advice to knock off was received when? and the Rover was sent home when?. Another critical element is why was there a caveat, making it a step by step approval for the recovery? It was 90% done, the expensive bit was done, the cost of a ship and a cable were not only insignificant, but allocated. So why was the next, logical step not 'approved' Yes it is an interesting puzzle to spend some weekend time mulling over...:rolleyes: My basic chronology has some serious holes that need filling…:ugh:
Timeline entries…

“…8 December 2009: E-mail from ATSB to CASA raising the possibility of contributing to a joint fund sharing arrangement to recover the black box and CASA advised they didn’t have the necessary funds…

...21 December 2009: ATSB, with the assistance of the Victoria Water Police, use a remotely-operated vehicle (Rover) with an underwater video camera was to assess the wreckage.

13 January 2010: ATSB issue preliminary report AO-2009-072…”

It is interesting that the 8 December entry was only discovered because the DAS (STBR :D) made a (what was to become commonplace for the DAS) correction to the Senate record, see here (https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=77cfd155-ecc3-48a7-bf00-2bfadec357a1). {Note: Even then the DAS research minions got the facts wrong as the Hansard quote was not on page 41 but on page 53}

It is also interesting that such a decision was made (i.e. not to contribute to the black box slush fund) without the DAS either signing off on; or apparently being aware that such a decision had been made...:ooh:

Sometimes body language speaks louder than words, so let us have a look at when the Hansard pg 53 question was asked, starting with Senator Nash questioning the DAS on black boxes, wx reports and Mr Wickham..:= :[YOUTUBE]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzqesCxyC2U{Comment: Senator Nash’s questions certainly reflect the significance of Creamy’s post #1821 (http://www.pprune.org/8395704-post1821.html)}

So many gaps still to be filled on the timeline of embuggerance but for now back to rovers, black boxes and the strange decision making of mi..mi..mi..Beaker..:ok:

Much more to follow.. TICK TOCK!:E

004 for real squirm factor the following poohtube vid is even better...:rolleyes:

[YOUTUBE]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MxE892HVzUA

...amazing how the more you tie yourself up in knots the redder your ears go...:E

[004wercras]

Thanks Sarcs, there were some nice nuggets in that Poohtube clip. I particularly enjoyed the following:

Hoody - I don't think Senators Nash and Heff could believe that CAsA would refer to anybody's appointment as delightful! Even though the tanned and chiselled Hoody wore a dapper suit and his CAsA issued tie the Senators didn't buy the 'delighted' statement.
This is for you Hoody:
http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Fz1ex78QeQI

The Skull - Oh my, didn't Herr Skull look like he had a swallowed a handful of chillies when in the background Sen Heff could be heard saying 'save him Mr Hood'! Absolutely priceless. 10/10. Indeed body language is a wonderful thing.
This one is for you Mr bald headed angry stud muffin:
http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=5oSjZh2D7CE

Terry - Oh dear, Terry Terry Terry, did a wonderful job imitating a cardboard cutout! Was it past his bedtime of 1830? Was he tired from the A380 SIM session the previous night? Or was he just smiling along because he is completely deaf? Who knows, who cares really.
For those who enjoy watching paint dry here is how to make your very own Deputy DAS:
http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Jw5cggshDdo

[thorn bird]

One thing I find passing strange?? Why would they go to all the expense of shipping a rover & police operators all the way from Melbourne to Norfolk to look at a wreck?...What could the wreck tell them?? other that its a wreck.
I think they fully intended to recover the boxes, thats why the rover was sent,
so what happened to shoo them off? orders from on high?? and if so Why?.
Conspiracy theory...Pel Air were smuggling jars of NUTELLA into the country on behalf of a terrorist cell that ASIO didn't want exposed.....well its plausible...... NUTELLA is now classified as a dangerous substance, according to the foreign gentleman at the Mascot sheep pens.

[Frank Arouet]

Men in black coats I'm guessing.

[004wercras]

Thorny, the answer to your question could be multi faceted. I hypothesise as follows;

Perhaps initially the ATSB wanted to conduct an investigation in line with its internal processes and ICAO annexe. However, possibly once the process commenced and after consultation with CASA they realised there may be a problem with one or two government departments looking like knobs as a result of some of the likely causal factors behind the accident.

Perhaps under the leadership of Beaker he quite stupidly decided to stop the retrieval so as to save a couple of pennies. It would not surprise me because he was relatively new to ATSB and had no idea about aviation accident investigations etc.

CASA the 'alpha male'. Perhaps the dominating partner in the marriage of CASA and ATSB is CASA? Normally there would be no marriage at all, but CASA saw a weakness in 'the new world according to Beaker' and CASA went where it had never been able to go before and have the ATSB become its bitch. Either way you have Doc Voodoo to mostly blame for this unholy agency conjugal relationship.

Good ol incompetence. Perhaps this whole sordid untidy affair can be pinpointed to plain old incompetence. You know, when egotistical nupties think they know everything when in fact they know ****. That's why companies are sold off by governments and the private sector takes over, governments are a totally useless waste of air.

Now all said and done, perhaps Nutella is the smoking gun? I've seen things that Nigella Lawson has done with Nutella which proves it is most certainly an underestimated foe, an unmitigated risk, a latent condition indeed :ok:

[thorn bird]

Good Grief!! Frank...Wercras..now guys??
We have men in black coats....screaming skulls...Voodo doctors....Mi MI Beakers..Alpha Males and Bitches!!!
Card board cutouts...and Hooded villains!!!

Na, sorry the Nutella sounds a much more plausible scenario.

[Sarcs]

There was many moments throughout the PelAir inquiry where Beaker & McComic displayed open contempt for the RRAT committee Senators and their questioning. However IMO there was two particular (gotcha) moments that more than adequately highlighted the levels of complicity and obfuscation the two agency heads were prepared to go to in perpetuating the PelAir coverup i.e. PelAir Gate.

Moment one: As referred to in Kharon’s post #1849 (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/429828-merged-senate-inquiry-93.html#post8412229)…

“….trying to sell the same fairy story to a Senator like Fawcett is, of it's self, stupid, suspicious, not to mention incredibly arrogant. You have to ask why a potentially career ending gamble, which Dolan freely took, was attempted. He was never going to get away with the version ploy; not ever. The bait was offered and he snapped it up, thinking the hook was avoided. Sarcs posted the - Annexe 13 - Hansard recording; have a careful look, it's all there in glorious Technicolor.

Yup, the box would be nice to have; but the truth would be better…”

CVR/FDR 28/02/13 - 'Shall or should' & ATsB Chief Commissioner. - YouTube

Subsequently when Senator Fawcett realised he’d been duped by the lint flicking Beaker he fired off two written QONs which were answered by (tail between the legs) ATsBeaker like this:SENATE RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT
REFERENCES COMMITTEE

Inquiry into aviation accident investigations

Written Questions Taken on Notice – Australian Transport Safety Bureau from Public Hearing – Thursday, 28 February 2013

Written Questions on Notice- Senator Fawcett

1. Could the ATSB confirm which edition of the Annex 13 document was current at the time Mr Dolan made his decision regarding not recovering the FDR.

ATSB response: The version of Annex 13 current at the time was the 9th Edition as amended by Amendments 11, 12-A and 12-B.

2. Explain the discrepancy between the answer he provided today (explaining their decision to not recover the FDR which inferred that the "reasonable" clause in the current document was the basis) given the standard which was in force at the time of the accident, which, if it did not provide that modification would have mandated recovery of the FDR.

ATSB response: The ATSB considers that the general provisions of paragraph 5.4 of the Annex as it stood at the time provided the necessary discretion to the ATSB in its conduct of the investigation.
IMO this is clear evidence that Beaker never even considered the implications his (money pinching) decision to not recover the black box could ultimately have on the ATsB obligations to comply with ICAO Annex 13…:=

Moment two McComic (at 04:25):

CASA 22/10/12 - Senator Nash & Chair on blackbox & Wickham - YouTube

Boy those McComic minions in the background had a busy couple of minutes finding the necessary reference for their boss, however it was to be a short lived triumph (with the Cheshire grin) McComic, as the good Senator Nash’s :D question still stood and was eventually answered like this:Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON NOTICE

Inquiry into Aviation Accident Investigations (Pel-Air) 22 October 2012

Civil Aviation Safety Authority
CASA07: Receipt of weather information by Dominic James

Hansard: p.52

Senator NASH: There are two to take on notice. In terms of the information regarding the weather, the initial weather report you referred to earlier was 6,000 feet in terms of the cloud, but then a second one was issued very shortly after with different information. How do you know it was received? Given some of the issues around the radio frequency—and of course I understand that you know it was sent—how do you know it was received?

Mr McCormick: I can look to the ATSB report.

Senator NASH: Can I ask you to take on notice, given the evidence around, how do you and CASA know that information was received by the pilot?

Answer:
The transcripts of the contacts with air traffic services by the crew of the aircraft VH-NGA do not reveal any apparent communications difficulty. In interviews with CASA, Mr James did not express any views that there were any high frequency communications irregularities. The first CASA became aware of Mr James’s views on HF communications difficulties was when he raised it on the recent 4 Corners television program.

The transcript of the pilot’s conversation with Fiji air traffic control reveals that the pilot acknowledged the second report on weather information indicating it was received.

0802:32 from Nadi to VH-NGA. Roger this is the latest weather for Norfolk...SPECI... I say again special weather Norfolk at 0800 Zulu... auto I say again auto, alpha uniform tango oscar, wind 290 08 knots, 999 november delta victor, overcast one thousand one hundred, temperature 21, dew point 19, QNH Norfolk 1012...remarks... romeo foxtrot zero zero
decimal zero oblique zero zero zero decimal zero go ahead.

0803:21 from VH-NGA to Nadi. Thank you Nadi... much appreciated NGA .

A different response could be expected if the pilot experienced difficulty hearing the radio transmission. The ATSB accident report on page 17 also advised that no difficulties were identified by the flight crew with their radio communications during the flight.

Comment: Notice that (much like the CAIR 09/3 record of the transcript) the above AQON’s transcript copy fails to include the erroneous (infamous) 0801 Nadi transmission of the O630 METAR for Norfolk (reference page 1 - Attachment 9 Aherne submission) (https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=781322a9-1d6b-4821-b857-b02ffa885397):

So no harm done and back on script for what FF & ATsBeaker wanted us all (including the man at the back of the room) to believe, yeah right…:ugh:

IMO these two recorded moments in the PelAir inquiry more than adequately highlight why both Fort Fumble & ATsBeaker should have been excluded from contributing advice & recommendations for the miniscule (Albo & then Truss) DRAFT response to the PelAir report. The conflict of interest is obvious, even to the man at the back of the room, and Truss has by association, with these two numbnuts, potentially put his foot on a claymore that will blow if he doesn’t heed the advice of the IOS bomb disposal experts…:E

[004wercras]

"Email trails are a great thing"! Indeed they are Senator Heff. But so are fax machines, especially the fax/printer machines on Levels 1 and 2 Brisbane where often the faxes meant for the third (turd) floor end up on L1 and L2! Gobbledock tells us that these are great places to hang around Monday mornings and particularly at times when CAsA are 'under the pump'! They really are a stupid mob aren't they?

I hadn't viewed the ATSBeaker clip for a few months, and certainly forgot how much the Beaker looks like......Beaker! Those hand movements, head bobbles, wide eyes....better stop there. But on a serious note it was interesting to see his passion for linguistics, arguing the point over 'should' and 'shall' in a manner that would make any bureaucrat proud (including the Spook at the back of the room!). But it was Beakers continued emphasis on 'feasibility' that is very very concerning. Forget SAFETY, forget they are the Australian Transportation SAFETY Bureau, forget that CVR/FDR's are probably the single most important piece of evidence in the majority or air crashes! No, we have a 'cost analysis' instead. Some figure crunching, some spreadsheet stimulation, some number juggling, some penny counting that was more important, took the most precedence, was the driving factor behind his decision making process! What a disgrace. Might as well call it the Australian Transportation Feasability Bureau (what do you reckon Kharon, the ATFB?? :E) Without straying to far from the herd I am still disgusted that someone so disconnected, out of tune with and unqualified to run the ATFB is still sitting in that chair??

[Sarcs]

From a bemused PMer- In case I lost people..:{..with this part of my last post : Answer:
The transcripts of the contacts with air traffic services by the crew of the aircraft VH-NGA do not reveal any apparent communications difficulty. In interviews with CASA, Mr James did not express any views that there were any high frequency communications irregularities. The first CASA became aware of Mr James’s views on HF communications difficulties was when he raised it on the recent 4 Corners television program.

The transcript of the pilot’s conversation with Fiji air traffic control reveals that the pilot acknowledged the second report on weather information indicating it was received.

0802:32 from Nadi to VH-NGA. Roger this is the latest weather for Norfolk...SPECI... Isay again special weather Norfolk at 0800 Zulu... auto I say again auto, alpha uniform tangooscar, wind 290 08 knots, 999 november delta victor, overcast one thousand one hundred,temperature 21, dew point 19, QNH Norfolk 1012...remarks... romeo foxtrot zero zero
decimal zero oblique zero zero zero decimal zero go ahead.

0803:21 from VH-NGA to Nadi. Thank you Nadi... much appreciated NGA .

A different response could be expected if the pilot experienced difficulty hearing the radio transmission. The ATSB accident report on page 17 also advised that no difficulties were identified by the flight crew with their radio communications during the flight.
& "...Notice that (much like the CAIR 09/3 record of the transcript) the above AQON’s transcript copy fails to include the erroneous (infamous) 0801 Nadi transmission of the O630 METAR for Norfolk (reference page 1 - Attachment 9 Aherne submission) (https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=781322a9-1d6b-4821-b857-b02ffa885397)..."

Here is the relevant reference from CAIR 09/3…


http://i1238.photobucket.com/albums/ff498/004wercras/CASACAIR09-3Pg7.jpg

{Note: CAIR 09/3 can be viewed at the rear of attachment 5 of FF PelAir submission, see link HERE (https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=413251f8-d4e2-4cb1-a4c0-3d61087ba291)}

…you can see that much like the AQON (above) that the 0801 NADI relay of the 0630 METAR has been glossed over and the contents conveniently airbrushed out. Remembering that CAIR 09/3 was signed off by the Manager of the ALIU on the 21 July 2010, some 2 and a bit years before Fort Fumble were to sight the ATsB Final report.

Clear as mud now?? ;)

OK moving on...

004: But it was Beakers continued emphasis on 'feasibility' that is very very concerning. Forget SAFETY, forget they are the Australian Transportation SAFETY Bureau, forget that CVR/FDR's are probably the single most important piece of evidence in the majority or air crashes! No, we have a 'cost analysis' instead. Some figure crunching, some spreadsheet stimulation, some number juggling, some penny counting that was more important, took the most precedence, was the driving factor behind his decision making process! What a disgrace.Well said 004 and a disgrace indeed, perhaps it is worth reflecting on a small passage from the Aherne evidence that highlights the significance of the black box in regards to AAI (my bold):Senator XENOPHON: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2F8IV%22;queryty pe=;rec=0)Okay. Let's not dwell on that. The cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder are in approximately 47 metres of ocean off Norfolk Island. In your view as an independent safety expert, do you find it unusual that the CVR and FDR were not retrieved in this case?
Mr Aherne: I am. There are a couple of things I will go to quickly. First, I cannot find where a turbofan aircraft is ditched at night and everyone has lived, and I think we could learn a lot from what the crew did that night. The second thing is that there are so many assumptions in the fuel calculations of this particular flight. I have had six air transport pilots of high experience, and all of them came out with slightly different answers. It is not an exact science sometimes, but I think the only way we would really know is from the flight data recorder we could get from the accident. I know the ATSB justified that by saying that the crew were alive and they did not need to get it, but I cannot believe that the crew's input into this report is largely not there.
Senator XENOPHON: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2F8IV%22;queryty pe=;rec=0)But also, if there is a conflict in terms of information that was supposedly given to the crew then the cockpit voice recorder might be of some assistance.
Mr Aherne: Definitely. The cockpit voice recorder in this case would fill in the gaps that Senator Fawcett was talking about in terms of the human factors: the relationship between the pilot and the co-pilot, their reaction to the ATC's requests or instructions, their lines of thinking, the verbalisations they were doing on the flight deck. We can learn a lot from all of these things, and it is a pity it is sitting on the bottom of the ocean. [YOUTUBE]Senate AAI inquiry hearing 22/10/12 - Bryan Aherne Part 3 - YouTube
The word PITY is an understatement…:ugh: Bryan's BIZARRE comment was much more descriptive for the PelAir Gate charade..:D

TICK TOCK!:ok:

[gaunty]

Thank you gentlemen.

Monarch, Seaview, Whyalla, Lockhart River, Ghost Flight, Pelair, when will it end?

I've lost count of the dozens of others and we still haven"t got even remotely close to regulatory reform. Its like Agatha Christies "Mousetrap", been playing since 1952, 25,000 performances, same story, same lines, just different actors.

And as the Senator at the end of the Aherne You Tube Pt 3 asks, what about the fuel and the capacity of the aircraft to perform the task "legally" in the first place? It may have been "legal" but was it smart, and were the medical crew, patients or even the flight crew for that matter "informed" that it is was being operated on a degraded standard from that required for "fare paying passengers". The medics and patients may not have paid a "fare" but they sure as hell were entitled to the same standard as if they had.

We can learn a lot from all of these things, and it is a pity it is sitting on the bottom of the ocean.

Too many questions too many cooks and too many agendas, it stinks to high heaven.

And why is the co-pilot MIA, I have no doubt she is traumatised, no criticism, but did she corroborate the evidence or did she not or did she choose as is her absolute right to remain silent. I was shocked to hear Ahernes comments on her injury, bravery and fortitude with just half a lifejacket. And that they did not crack a mention nor did there appear to be any regulatory concern about their unserviceability. I know of at least one operator who wisely, in this knowledge, does not now recertify but replaces lifejackets when they expire. Significantly higher cost but smart given that they need to work in anger.

I can personally testify that recertified life-rafts carry the same risks of failure.

The OBR's were always meant to expose, post facto, what was actually "said" and what was actually "done" against the perhaps convenient interpretation by the participants of the drama.

[Up-into-the-air]

Don't forget, the Senate inquiry was the one that ...discovered... the following:

1. Failure by PelAir to 20.11 the crew;

2. That the life-jackets mal-functioned;

3. That the PelAir fuel management strategy was flawed;

4. atsb and casa's refusal to raise the CVR and FDR

AND:

4. casa covered up it's failings through the non-declared "chambers report" [aka chamberpot report];

THEN:

The Senate, among it's 26 reccomendations, and other findings, went to a likely breach by casa ["The Skull"] of the TSI [Transport Safety Investigation Act, by not passing information to beaker's atsb.

This is a serious matter, that mrdak [Minister's response to PelAir Inquiry] advised the Minister to "brush-off", thinking it was all "....going to go away...".

I am sure that the Senators have quite a different idea and will ensure that the matter goes to it's proper finality and in a short time-frame:



A proper re-work and re-structure of the Aviation Acts;
Introduction of the US-FAR's

[Sarcs]

gaunty:The OBR's were always meant to expose, post facto, what was actually "said" and what was actually "done" against the perhaps convenient interpretation by the participants of the drama.That may be so Mr G, however much like this statement in a SMH article on who will take custody (if able to be found and recovered) of the MH370 CVR/FDR…

“….Experts say finding the recording devices will be crucial to unravelling the mystery of what happened aboard the flight that was scheduled to fly from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. But they say the cockpit voice recorder inside them may not be helpful because they store only about two hours of sound and probably have not preserved what was being recorded around the time the plane was diverted thousands of kilometres off course while over the South China Sea….”

SMH article link: Flight MH370: who will get custody of black boxes? (http://www.smh.com.au/world/flight-mh370-who-will-get-custody-of-black-boxes-20140414-zqui9.html#ixzz2yuNoIRBp)

As it has been stated numerous times (and was the basis for Beaker ultimately justifying his decision to not recover the black box) the two hour timeframe wouldn’t cover the 0801 UTC RT from NADI to VH-NGA. However it could have covered the crew byplay as to their understanding of the relayed WX updates from NADI & Auckland. As Bryan Aherne highlighted...

“…The second thing is that there are so many assumptions in the fuel calculations of this particular flight. I have had six air transport pilots of high experience, and all of them came out with slightly different answers. It is not an exact science sometimes, but I think the only way we would really know is from the flight data recorder we could get from the accident…”

...perhaps of more importance is the up to 100 hrs of recorded information off the FDR.

Presumably one of the five parameters that NGA’s FDR recorded was fuel quantity/burn. So given that the ATsB investigators initially notified a CRITICAL safety issue that highlighted deficiencies within the interpretation of the regs and pilot guidance in regards to ALT requirements for remote islands etc, then it would be natural to assume that the FDR recording would have been invaluable to the ATsB reinforcing their originally intended CSI.

As a State sanctioned AAI the old (pre-Beaker) ATsB (and still practiced throughout the rest of the world) on recognising a critical or significant safety issue would then have been obligated to issue a safety recommendation to CAsA, who in turn would have been obligated to address the SR within a set timeframe.

As history will now show, the original intended CSI was downgraded to MINOR and no SR was issued, instead we are left with the following intended actions from CAsA for the MINOR SI (take note of the notified dates for intended proactive actions and the several CAsA caveats):Fuel planning and en route decision-making - AO-2009-072-SI-01 (http://atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2009/aair/ao-2009-072/si-01.aspx)
Safety issue description

The available guidance on fuel planning and on seeking and applying en route weather updates was too general and increased the risk of inconsistent in-flight fuel management and decisions to divert.

Proactive Action

Action organisation: Civil Aviation Safety Authority

Action number: AO-2009-072-NSA-094
Date: 30 August 2012

Action status: Closed

During this investigation, the ATSB and Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) have had a number of meetings in respect of the general nature of the available guidance and its possible influence on the development of this accident. In response, in July 2010 CASA issued Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) 1003OS, section 3.3.4 of which stated:

CASA also intends to review Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 234-1 relating to fuel requirements. This review is being undertaken in two phases: the first to enhance the guidance for fuel planning and in-flight fuel-related decision making on flights to remote destinations (including remote islands); and secondly a holistic review of guidelines for fuel and alternate planning.

In addition, NPRM 1003OS proposed changes to the requirements for the carriage of fuel on flights to remote islands. The proposed changes affected Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 82.0 and included:



Designating Cocos (Keeling) Island as a ‘remote island’.
Removing the provision that allowed an operator not to carry fuel for diversion to an alternate aerodrome if the operator’s operations manual allowed such a procedure.
Amending the definition of ‘minimum safe fuel’ to require the calculation of fuel for diversion to an alternate aerodrome in the event of a loss of pressurisation coupled with the failure of an engine, in addition to either of the individual failures.
A requirement that a pilot in command who is subject to a condition to carry fuel for diversion to an alternate aerodrome on a flight to a remote island must nominate an alternate aerodrome
Extending the condition to carry fuel for diversion to an alternate aerodrome on a flight to a remote island to passenger-carrying aerial work and regular public transport flights.
Providing for CASA to be able to approve an operator not to comply with a condition to carry fuel for diversion to an alternate aerodrome on a flight to a remote island, subject to conditions that would not adversely affect safety.

On 25 June 2012, CASA advised that amendment 36 to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 6, State Letter AN 11/1.32-12/10 detailed a number of new Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP) in regard to fuel planning, in-flight fuel management, the selection of alternates and extended diversion time operations (EDTO). In this respect, CASA provided the following update:




CASA intends to review Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 234-1 relating to fuel requirements. The ICAO fuel and alternate Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) are the basis of these changes and will be coordinated by CASA project OS09/13. While this project will focus specifically on passenger-carrying commercial flights the project will also be reviewing fuel requirements generally. The project will now be conducted in four phases. The first three phases will involve amendments to the relevant Civil Aviation Order (CAO) applicable Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 234-1 and Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 234. The project objectives are as follows:

Phase 1 will involve amendments to the relevant CAOs and a review of CAAP 234-1 for flights to isolated aerodromes in light of the ICAO amendments. This phase will encompass fuel and operational requirements for flights to isolated aerodromes and will also consider the provision for flight to an alternate aerodrome from a destination that is a designated isolated aerodrome. The CAAP 234-1 will also be expanded to provide guidance and considerations necessary for flights to any isolated aerodrome, in particular when, and under what circumstances, a pilot should consider a diversion.
Phase 2 will involve amendments to the relevant CAOs and further review of CAAP 234 in light of the ICAO amendments. This phase will encompass regulatory changes related to the implementation of general fuel planning, in-flight fuel management and the selection of alternate aerodromes. This review will include the methods by which pilots and operators calculate fuel required and fuel on-board.
Phase 3 will involve amendment to CAR 234 to specify that the pilot in command, or the operator, must take reasonable steps to ensure sufficient fuel and oil shall be carried to undertake and continue the flight in safety. In addition, for flights conducted in accordance with Extended Diversion Time Operations (EDTO), CAO 82 and CAR 234 shall be amended to require consideration of a "critical fuel scenario" taking into account an aeroplane system failure or malfunction which could adversely affect safety of flight. It is anticipated that the methods chosen by the pilot-in-command and operator will therefore be sufficient to meet the requirements of CAR 234 to enable a flight to be undertaken and continue in safety.
Phase 4 will involve the publication of internal and external educational material along with conducting briefings where necessary.



and that:

The amendment to the ICAO Annex 6 standards will be considered, and where appropriate, incorporated into the relevant legislation/advisory publication. In addition it is anticipated that there will be guidance material for operators who can demonstrate a particular level of performance-based compliance. The intent is to provide a bridge from the conventional approach to safety to the contemporary approach that uses process- based methods and Safety Risk Management (SRM) principles.

The ICAO Fuel and Flight Planning Manual are reflected in the SARP to Annex 6. Inclusion of the provisions of the Amendment 36 SARPs will be captured throughout this project. The ICAO SARP becomes effective from November 2012.

CASA will endeavour to make the changes as soon as possible - subject to third party arrangements such as drafting and resource availability. However the timing of the CAR changes will be subject to a timetable that is not necessarily able to be controlled by CASA.

Finally, CASA also advised of their intent to regulate Air Ambulance / Patient transfer operators as follows:


Air Ambulance/Patient transfer operations in the proposed operational Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASRs) will be regulated to safety standards that are similar to those for passenger operations.
While CASR Parts 138/136 will be limited to domestic operations and, if CASA decides to retain Air Ambulance/Patient transfer operations in these rule suites, any such operation wishing to operate internationally will also be required to comply with CASR Part 119. If, however, CASA decides to move these operations into CASR Parts 121/135/133 they will already be required to comply with CASR Part 119. Either way, Air Ambulance/Patient transfer operations will be regulated to the same standard as Air Transport Operations (ATO). In relation to Norfolk and Lord Howe Islands, all ATO which include Air Ambulance/Patient transfer, will be required to carry mainland alternate fuel.CASR Parts 119/121/135/133 are expected to be finalised by the end of 2012 and are currently proposed to commence in June 2014. CASR Parts 138/136 are expected to be made by June 2013 and are proposed to commence in June 2014. Given that the drafting of these CASR Parts are subject to third party arrangements (Attorney-General’s Department) and CASA and the industry’s ability to effectively implement the new rule suite, these timelines are subject to change.

So everything is sweet, lessons learnt and future potential accidents averted..:D, therefore MINOR SI closed and there will be proactive action sometime (hopefully) in the next decade?? :ugh: TICK TOCK!

[scrubba]

Given the emerging story of the VARA ATR at Albury, what are the chances that the ATSB and CASA have found a deep enough part of Lake Hume to hide the CVR and FDR, given that everyone survived... :uhoh:

[Sarcs]

scrubba: Given the emerging story of the VARA ATR at Albury, what are the chances that the ATSB and CASA have found a deep enough part of Lake Hume to hide the CVR and FDR, given that everyone survived... Classic scrubba...:E If part of the somewhat disjointed thread rumours are indeed true it certainly paints for some disturbing parallels with PelAir: Virgin plane suffers two mid-air incidents, one resulting in woman breaking leg (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-07/virgin-plane-investigated-after-two-mid-air-incidents/5304732)

Updated Fri 7 Mar 2014, 8:12am AEDT
Map: Australia (http://maps.google.com/?q=-26.000,134.500(Australia)&z=5)

An investigation is underway into a flight that left a Virgin Australia crew member with a broken leg, and another incident involving the same plane a few days later.

The female crew member was injured when the ATR-72 turbo prop encountered severe turbulence on a flight from Canberra to Sydney last month.

Virgin says the plane was inspected by an engineer and cleared to fly.
Five days later, during a flight to Albury in New South Wales, the pilot reported a possible bird strike.

He later found the aircraft had been damaged.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau says the plane remains on the ground at Albury.

The bureau is interviewing crew and maintenance personnel and examining the flight recorder. Passing strange that the first incident (actually listed as an accident) is duly recorded (see here (http://atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ao-2014-032.aspx) & page 15 of weekly summary here (http://atsb.gov.au/media/4723912/AWS_28Feb2014.pdf)) and yet the ABC article listing a possible bird strike incident 5 days later is not recorded as such, rather it is listed pg 16 here (http://atsb.gov.au/media/4723918/AWS_7Mar2014.pdf) as: 25/02/2014 * 201400985 *Accident-Yes - AO-2014-032* near Albury Aerodrome NSW*
ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Regional* ATR72-212A*Air Transport High Capacity*Passenger* D CTR
During a post flight inspection, substantial damage
to the aircraft's tail assembly was detected. The
investigation is continuing.
So the ATsB has tied the two incidents (accidents) together, yet there is no big media statements from the bureau/Fort Fumble, no pending show cause notices and no voluntary grounding murmurs from VARA...:rolleyes: Oh that's right SOP 101 i.e. "nothing to see here...move along!":=

One thing is for sure JB cannot be happy...:ugh:

[Sarcs]

Slight diversion but there is a point...:cool:

The ATsB investigation number AE-2014-054 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ae-2014-054.aspx) summarises the bureau's requested involvement with the MH370 search and investigation:At 1722 Coordinated Universal Time on 7 March 2014, Boeing 777-200ER aircraft, registered 9M-MRO and operating as Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370, disappeared from air traffic control radar and a search was commenced by Malaysian authorities. The aircraft had taken off from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on a scheduled passenger service to Beijing, China with 227 passengers and 12 crew on board.

Under Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (Annex 13) Malaysia, as the country of registration, has investigative responsibility for the accident.

On 31 March 2014, the Malaysian Government accepted the Government of Australia’s offer to take the lead in the search and recovery operation in the southern Indian Ocean in support of the Malaysian accident investigation. This assistance and expertise will be provided through the accredited representative mechanism of Annex 13.

In accordance with paragraphs 5.23 and 5.24 of Annex 13, on 3 April 2014 the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) appointed an accredited representative and a number of advisors to the accredited representative (ATSB investigators). These investigators’ work will be undertaken as part of an External Investigation under the provisions of the Australian Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

The Malaysian Department of Civil Aviation is responsible for and will administer the release of the final investigation report into this accident. Any enquiries in respect of the ongoing investigation should, in the first instance, be directed to:

Department of Civil Aviation/Jabatan Penerbangan Awam Malaysia
No. 27 Persiaran Perdana
Aras 1-4 Blok Podium
62618 Putrajaya
Malaysia
Telephone: +60 3 8871 4000
Email: [email protected] The following is a truly excellent article from Joseph Wheeler (Shine Lawyers) on how our obligations to ICAO Annex 12&13 are supposed to work and possible solutions to the highlighted shortcomings of the Annexes in the case of MH370:MH370 investigation: roles, responsibilities and rule changes
April 17, 2014 by Joseph Wheeler

The investigation of an international air accident follows clearly defined and regulated pathways. Roles and responsibilities are given to different countries (States) and different entities within States who have specific expertise or knowledge to share, under Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention 1944 (the Convention).


The announcement by the Prime Minister of Malaysia Najib Razak on 24 March 2014 that the flight “ended in the Southern Indian Ocean” could be characterised as a trigger for the official air accident investigation under Annex 13 and the designation of official roles in the investigation thereafter.


This article will look at typical air accident investigations, describing what they are aimed at achieving, as well as suggesting some potential avenues for consideration of regulatory changes at international level to prevent initial search operations, such as those needed to find MH370, from being so reliant on individuals rather than proposed clear plans to activate appropriate State and commercial international cooperation.


Who are the players in an investigation?
When accidents occur outside the territory of any State which is a party to the Convention or otherwise, it is the State of Registry of the aircraft (for MH370, Malaysia) which must take responsibility for the investigation (para 5.3, Annex 13). It has a discretion, and on 31 March 2014 Malaysia formally exercised that discretion in favour of Australia, to delegate that responsibility in part to other States. Under that delegation the Australian official investigative body (the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, ATSB) accepted taking the lead in the search and recovery operation in the southern Indian Ocean, in support of the Malaysian accident investigation.


The ATSB investigation number for this role is AE-2014-054.


The style of appointment is an interesting one. It was open for Malaysia to ask that this role be undertaken by Australia given its proximity to the search area and regional expertise however, the appointment of Australia to take the role comes by way of a procedure in Annex 13 in relation to the appointment of accredited representatives of States to an investigation if they provide information, facilities or experts. Thus, in essence Australia has asked Malaysia to be involved in the investigation by virtue of the fact that it already assisted in the search operation and Malaysia has accepted that offer. In addition to having a representative on the investigation, the same procedure entitles Australia to have advisers in the investigation.
Pursuant to para 5.25, Annex 13, specific powers to participate in the investigation as a result of the operation of Annex 13 are broad. Thus, the Australian representative and advisers may:



Visit the scene of the accident;
Examine the wreckage;
Obtain witness information and suggest areas of questioning;
Have full access to all relevant evidence as soon as possible;
Receive copies of all pertinent documents;
Participate in read-outs of recorded media;
Participate in off-scene investigative activities such as component examinations, technical briefings, tests and simulations;
Participate in investigation progress meeting, including deliberations related to analysis, findings, causes, contributing factors and safety recommendations; and
Make submissions in respect of the various elements of the investigation.

The standards and recommended practices in the Annex are the bare minimum the lead investigation State may permit another participating State.


In addition, the other States who may participate in the investigation are the State of the Operator, the State of Design and the State of Manufacture (for MH370, Malaysia and USA). A feature of the Annex is that there is broad discretion of the lead State to include any other State who may be able to assist and a mandate for States which are asked for information to provide it to the investigating authority which seeks it out.


States which have lost citizens
States which have suffered fatalities to their citizens as a result of the accident are entitled to appoint an expert to the investigation who may:


Visit the scene of the accident;
Have access to the relevant factual information which is approved for public release by the State conducting the investigation and information on the progress of the investigation; and
Receive a copy of the final report.

Recommendation to release preliminary report within one year
In para 5.28 of Annex 13 there is a recommendation that:
the State conducting the investigation should release, at least during the first year of the investigation, established factual information and indicate the progress of the investigation in a timely manner.


The ATSB, in its online description of its role in the investigation, confirms that the Malaysian Department of Civil Aviation is ultimately responsible for administering the release of the final investigation report for this incident.


Likelihood of release of preliminary report
The recommendation in relation to a release of established factual information within the first year looks exceedingly unlikely given the unprecedented circumstances surrounding MH370’s disappearance and lack of clues as to its actual location.


By way of comparison with the “usual” time needed to release accident investigation reports, consider the MASwings Twin Otter crash (http://www.shine.com.au/maswings-airline-crash-sabah/) at Kudat Airport on 10 October 2013. In that case, investigation reports were expected from the Malaysian Department of Civil Aviation within 6 months of the event, but none have yet been publicly released. That was an accident in which all the relevant evidence was available. It is clear that where next to no evidence is available, the official investigation cannot help but take significantly longer than the normal course of events which usually dictates a necessarily measured release of information in line with resourcing and other priorities on accident investigation efforts.

Official aviation accident investigations

The Australian approach to safety factor determination
An accident investigation in Australia by the ATSB involves a no blame investigation approach in line with international practice. The following is largely adapted from discussion in “Expert Evidence” by Ian Freckelton and High Selby, Chapter 141 “Transport accident investigation” by Patrick Hornby.

The purpose of air accident investigations, and in fact all transport accident or incident investigations by the ATSB, is to search for safety factors which contributed to the incident. In practice, while many think it is the case, there is never one “cause” for an accident. Events such as airline accidents and incidents are the result of multiple contributing factors, some technical, some human factors, some organisational or regulatory influences, some relating to particular local conditions.

The ATSB examines the evidence and evaluates how each potential safety factor (i.e., potential condition or element that increases risk) could have been a contributing safety factor which affected the actual outcome or outcomes in a particular case. A contributing safety factor is one which, had it not occurred or existed at the time of the event/occurrence/accident/incident, then the occurrence probably would not have occurred, adverse consequences associated with the occurrence probably would not have occurred, or been as serious, or another contributing safety factor would probably not have occurred or existed.
This evaluation is a process which often is confused by some as involving the attribution of “guilt” or “blame”. It is not the same. The search for answers involves a “link-by-link” approach in forming judgments about whether each element or contributing safety factor related to other contributing safety factors, rather than considering each factor relative to the occurrence (accident or incident) itself. This permits the identification of higher level safety factors or issues in the conditions which developed to result in an accident. It is those higher level factors which are of most utility to organisations following the conclusion of an official investigation and aligns with the purpose of producing a report which lends itself to the prevention of future accidents.

An example may clarify. Consider a crash which has arisen due to a wing breaking off in flight. The evidence has been gathered and the ATSB notes it has been proximately “caused” (i.e., the occurrence event) by a hairline fracture in a metal join breaking up in flight on an aircraft due to normal flight stresses. However, that is not enough information for preventing that type of accident from happening in future. Only an examination of why that hairline fracture was unnoticed during routine inspections, and an examination of the rules in relation to the regularity and types of inspections of such metal joins, as well as analyses of the maintenance on the aircraft, and other factors would result in the kinds of information needed to identify the contributing safety factors in the particular occurrence.

The safety message coming out of such a hypothetical investigation may well be something along the lines of “[X] type aircraft require 500 hourly inspections of their wing spar joins, rather than the presently required 1,000 hourly inspections”. That is very different to legal blame being apportioned.

What is the ATSB’s standard of proof?
How does the ATSB determine that one factor was related to another factor and how does that link up with the actual occurrence event itself? The ATSB standard is there to be a “probable” or “likely” link between a contributing safety factor and another factor. In the ATSB’s view this must be a high probability – that is, a 66% probability that one factor impacted upon another safety factor.

This approach leads to a strong probability of relationship between the occurrence event itself (e.g., the wing break up above) and the proximal factors which may have contributed to that event (such as rules on inspections which were insufficient or maintenance practices which fell short of sufficient rules).

In the end, this approach suits the purpose of the investigation – prevention of future incidents.

What changes might be needed following the disappearance of MH370?
Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, Annex 12 on Search and Rescue, and standard practice can be seen to assume certain factors in relation to the normal, “routine” progress of air accident investigations. The rules themselves are limited in their ability to assist in instances such as the unprecedented case of MH370, where the search and rescue stage has far exceeded the length of any prior SAR operation.

The present standards and recommended practices are geared towards providing guidance on how States and entities should work together to determine the causes of an occurrence, for aircraft whose location is known, and where the main task of determining what has caused the accident is essentially all that remains to be done for the purposes of preventing it happening again in future.

In the present situation Malaysia, as the State responsible for the search operation, had relatively little guidance on the (other than purely diplomatic) ability to recruit technical and other State assistance to determine the whereabouts of a lost aircraft. This is because the rules are written with an implied assumption that the aircraft would typically have been found within a short time (i.e., days) of the SAR operation being triggered.

What is needed and what will be addressed at ICAO in due course are procedures and strategies to ensure that a situation of uncertainty in relation to the location of an aircraft is addressed with the same rigour as are “typical” air accident investigations under Annex 13. That is, where Annex 13 sets out the roles and responsibilities of States and entities in relation to gathering, recording, and analysing evidence following a crash, and Annex 12 demands a search operation continue until “all reasonable hope of rescuing survivors has passed”, both Annexes evince a leaning or presumption that the aircraft is at least reasonably “findable” or accessible, and also that that is possible within a reasonably short period of time (i.e., during which it would be possible to reach, attend to, and rescue survivors for example). Annex 12 is arguably more geared around coordinating responses to known emergency situations, than determining whether there is one in the case where an aircraft has missed all the normal indicators of communicating to the world that it is in distress.
There is no concrete guidance to States in situations where the aircraft is somehow “lost”.

There needs to be specific high level guidance or standards and recommended practices, on how States should cooperate to “find” a lost aircraft. The search operation led by Malaysia for MH370, criticised as it was for its sluggish start, has to a large extent been hampered by a lack of appropriate international regulatory guidance. The relative “success” of the search operation (in that States have cooperated and lent support and resources) has been the result of diplomatic efforts to recruit foreign assistance, but this is not the most efficient way to handle such situations.

What is needed next?
Ideally ICAO States should consider the creation of an Annex to the Convention which bridges the gap between Annex 12 and Annex 13 – focussed specifically on international cooperation to recruit and deploy all relevant State-owned and commercial resources of member States to find lost aircraft. Of course there would be major privacy and other diplomatic challenges with such an effort, but these have been shown to be surmountable in the MH370 search situation, given time. The time devoted to meeting those diplomatic challenges should be now, before another MH370-type event happens.

It is not suggested that such a regulatory response from the international aviation community would be enough to move forward from MH370. ICAO has quite rightly looked first at the simpler, technical responses which would be needed to ensure aircraft are properly traceable especially over the high seas. This is the subject of a special meeting to be held in Montreal from 12-13 May 2014 as described elsewhere on our website (http://www.shine.com.au/one-month-since-mh370-disappears-questions-answers/).

However, it certainly is an area in need of consideration, especially when one considers the explication of air accident investigation described above.
The families affected by MH370 and the world are desperate to know what happened to that otherwise seemingly routine Kuala Lumpur to Beijing flight. However, every air traveller and air transport stakeholder in the world has a stake in the prevention of such incidents again in future and as a result any higher level regulatory contributing safety factor which might need to be addressed should be.

In my mind at least, the dearth of relevant international guidance and regulation on cooperation to locate aircraft is one factor worthy of detailed attention at the international level.

- See more at: MH370 investigation - Expert aviation law insights - Shine Lawyers (http://www.shine.com.au/mh370-investigation-roles-responsibilities-rule-changes/#sthash.1IDyHQbK.dpuf)
Hmm...can anyone else see the irony of a law firm (that has strong associations with several LHR victims' families) basically pointing out the ATsB's international legal obligations to ICAO, under Annex 12 and in particular 13, when we have the spectre of PelAir Gate hovering in the background??:E

Addendum for post #1874: Planetalking article :rolleyes: - Virgin Australia’s leg breaker ATR now ATSB double header (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/04/18/virgin-australias-leg-breaker-atr-now-atsb-double-header/)

[Sarcs]

Further to my last...:rolleyes:

Malaysia Airlines MH370: Australia, Malaysia work on deal over recovery of missing plane (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-18/australia-malaysia-work-on-deal-over-mh370-recovery/5399466)

Malaysia and Australia will sign a deal that specifies who will handle any wreckage from missing flight MH370 that may be recovered, including the crucial black box flight data recorders, according to Malaysian media reports.

Officials in Malaysia are drafting the agreement "to safeguard both nations from any legal pitfalls that may surface during that (recovery) phase," the government-controlled New Straits Times says.

The Malaysian government hopes the deal can be finalised soon and endorsed in a cabinet meeting next week.

Australian officials are studying the memorandum of understanding (MoU), the newspaper says.

"The MoU spells out exactly who does what and the areas of responsibility," civil aviation chief Azharuddin Abdul Rahman was quoted as saying.

8 things about black boxes (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-26/black-box-flight-recorders/5343456)

http://www.abc.net.au/news/linkableblob/5347330/data/custom-image-of-flight-recorder-data.jpg (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-26/black-box-flight-recorders/5343456)

Mr Azharuddin said Malaysia would lead most of the investigation, with Australia and others helping. Details of the memorandum will not be made public, the report said.

Mr Azharuddin and other officials could not immediately be reached by news agency AFP.

The Malaysia Airlines flight carrying 239 people, including six Australians, inexplicably veered off course en route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing on March 8 and is believed to have crashed into the southern Indian Ocean, off the West Australian coast.

But a massive international search - led by Australian authorities - has failed to turn up any wreckage.

A Bluefin-21 unmanned submarine is being deployed in the search for the missing plane but data from its dives has failed to reveal any trace of the aircraft.

Procedures for passenger remains to be governed by deal

The New Straits Times quoted a source with "intimate knowledge" of the deal saying it also specified where any passenger remains would be brought and who would carry out autopsies.

The crisis has brought intense international scrutiny on the Malaysian government, which has been accused by anguished Chinese families and other critics of hiding information and possibly trying to cover up its handling of the situation.

It is hoped any data contained within will indicate what caused the plane to divert.

"Malaysia's scandal-prone regime, which has a poor record on transparency, has pledged to reveal the contents of the data recorders if they are found."

A range of theories including hijacking, rogue pilot activity and aircraft malfunctions have been speculated upon.

Malaysia's government has rejected such claims, saying it is passing on all it knows promptly. Two-thirds of the passengers were Chinese.

A survey by Malaysia's leading independent polling firm released earlier this week found that only 26 per cent of Malaysians believed the government was being transparent about MH370.
Given our aviation safety agencies track record in obfuscation on matters to do with black boxes, MoUs and 'other safety related matters', my money is on Beaker, Skull, Kingcrat and the FF iron ring giving the Malaysians a run for their money in the hoodoo voodoo smoke'n'mirrors stakes...:E

[Sarcs]

Not sure about anyone else but I cringe anytime that Beaker is referred to in regards to the MH370 search & investigation...:ugh: Fortunately in the following SMH post we are spared any vid or mi.mi.mi.mugshots but of interest is that it would appear that Beaker has been demoted..:E:Debris on beach not from missing MH370: ATSB
(http://www.smh.com.au/national/debris-on-beach-not-from-missing-mh370-atsb-20140424-3754x.html#ixzz2zlKHMBWA)
The debris found on a beach in Western Australia is not connected to missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau says.

ATSB spokesman Martin Dolan told ABC radio on Thursday he was satisfied it was not from the plane.

The item was found washed up on a beach 10 kilometres east of Augusta, near Margaret River, on the south-west coast of Western Australia.
"We've carefully examined detailed photographs that were taken for us by the police and we're satisfied that it's not a lead in the search for MH370," Mr Dolan said.

"From our point of view, we're ruling it out. We'll get some further details just to be sure but at this stage we're not seeing anything in this that would lead us to believe that it comes from a Boeing aircraft."

On Wednesday, Mr Dolan told CNN: "It's sufficiently interesting for us to take a look at the photographs.

"The more we look at it, the less excited we get."

He said the debris appeared to be sheet metal with rivets.

The Joint Agency Coordination Centre (JACC), which is overseeing the search for the plane that disappeared on March 8, said on Wednesday that Western Australian police had taken possession of the debris.
It was reported that the person who found the object initially kept it for a day or two before taking it to the Busselton Regional Airport for inspection.

The object was taken to Busselton Police Station on Wednesday.

Senior Sergeant Steve Principe at Busselton Police Station told The Busselton-Dunsborough Mail the object was about 2.4 metres high, half a metre wide and was of an alloy type of metal.

The object did not have any identifiable writing on it, Senior Sergeant Principe told the news outlet.

"The Australian Transport Safety Bureau is examining the photographs of the material to determine whether further physical analysis is required and if there is any relevance to the search of missing flight MH370," the JACC said in a statement on Wednesday.

"The ATSB has also provided the photographs to the Malaysian investigation team."

Malaysian authorities said on Wednesday that a report on the items found near Augusta had been received, but there had been no verification of whether they were part of the missing flight.

Acting Transport Minister Hishammuddin Hussein said insights from Jean Paul Troadec, a key expert in the two-year search for wreckage from the 2009 Air France crash, and experience from the 1997 Silk Air crash, would be considered in determining the approach to the next phase of the search.

''When we have to regroup and restrategise, it's a matter of looking at all the data, whether it is satellite, whether it is radar, and that is very important as we chart our next course,'' he told reporters in Kuala Lumpur on Wednesday.

''Those are the sort of things we will be looking at in identifying the possibility of other locations, but that will be part and parcel of the whole work in progress.''

Up to 11 military aircraft and 11 ships are planned to assist in the continued search effort on Thursday.

Rough seas and poor visibility may hamper the search.

Before any of the aircraft take off, an assessment of current weather conditions will be made as ex-tropical cyclone Jack moves south.

The day's visual search area totals approximately 49,567 square kilometres.

The centre of the search area lies approximately 1584 kilometres north-west of Perth.

The autonomous under water vehicle, Bluefin-21 AUV, is completing mission 12 in the underwater search area.

It has now completed more than 90 per cent of the focused underwater search area and no contacts of interest have been found.
While on Beaker apparently there was a muppet (matching the description of Beaker) seen passing through KL airport. Which would seem to support the rumour that Beaker has personally fronted the Malaysians to beg for the ATsB to head up the MH370 investigation. Hmm trying to claw back some credibility perhaps??:E

Speaking of credibility I noted that the DAS (STBR) is still trying to defend his legacy while rubbishing those IOS members suggestions for adopting the NZ regs:CASA says NZ regulations not suited to Australia (http://www.aviationbusiness.com.au/news/casa-says-nz-regulations-not-suited-to-australia)


CASA Director of Safety John McCormick has dismissed calls for Australia to copy the New Zealand aviation safety regulations, saying that the Kiwi rules could not simply be adopted and enforced in their current form as Australian regulations, because many provisions in the New Zealand rules are not written in a manner consistent with Australian legislative drafting standards.

In addition, he says, some content is not consistent with the definitions, terminology and requirements set out in our Civil Aviation Act and regulations, which could mean a broad reconsideration and revision of the Australian aviation safety legislation in its entirety.

“If we went in this direction we may need to amend the Civil Aviation Act and rework the new Civil Aviation Safety Regulations that have already been made (and) this would be a long-term undertaking, involving several additional years of legislative redrafting and industry consultation.”

The New Zealand rules often provide for considerable discretion to be exercised by the New Zealand Director of Civil Aviation in regard to the intent of the regulations and what is acceptable in terms of compliance, which could significantly hinder CASA's efforts to achieve a high level of standardisation in applying and enforcing the aviation safety legislation of Australia.

Also, the contravention of any New Zealand civil aviation rule is a criminal offence for which a person may be prosecuted.

In addition, the New Zealand rules for aircraft operations contain more differences to ICAO standards than Australia currently registers and their rules in some areas are not as up to date as the new Australian regulations.

“We believe some rules may not offer adequate levels of safety and do not take into account Australian conditions and considerations,” McCormick added. The thing is do we, the IOS, really care anymore what the, soon to be former, DAS has to say...:rolleyes:

[004wercras]

The thing is do we, the IOS, really care anymore what the, soon to be former, DAS has to say...
Of course we don't care what McSkull has to say. His 5 years as DAS speaks for itself. He may as well just speak (scream) at a brick wall because pretty well none of us have confidence in him (except of course Chairman Hawke).

ATSB spokesman Martin Dolan told ABC radio on Thursday he was satisfied it was not from the plane.
As for ATsB Spokesman Beaker, I can confirm that the budget conscious aviation accountant did indeed go for a little business class trip to KL. Unfortunately I wasn't a fly (or a Muppet) on the wall and the contents of any meetings are unknown. Perhaps he was there for a special screening of 'Muppets Most Wanted'? There are some funny scenes in the movie which members of the IOS will enjoy, especially when Dr Bunsen HoneyMrDak pineapples the poor googley eyed mi mi mi Beaker mercilessly! A sign of things to come? Art reflecting life?

[004wercras]

Beakers activities in KL at 0:40

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=WsRKZLDOXWc

And

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=jXKUb5A1auM

[Sarcs]

004 love it...:ok:...still laughing...:}

While on the subject of mi..mi..mi..beancounter Beaker noted some interesting parallels with the PT article this morning..MH370 Malaysia agrees to release interim report, after final review (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/04/25/mh370-malaysia-agrees-to-release-interim-report-after-final-review/)...and the winged ATR at Albury...:confused: {Perhaps best described in my post here (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/538156-virgin-atr-grounded-albury-2.html#post8444786)}

The ATR (apparent cover up..:=) mystery also gets a passing mention by Ben in his other article from this AM: Australian ATC sends Jetstar A320 through path of Singapore A330 (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/04/25/australian-atc-sends-jetstar-a320-across-path-of-sq-a330/)Keep in mind, the ATSB isn’t investigating the incident for fun. And unlike its recent attempts to hide the very serious implications of the Virgin Australia ATR grounding at Albury (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/04/23/was-it-a-bird-or-a-stuff-up-the-virgin-atr-questions/), it has made only a half hearted effort to be obscure on this occasion. Hmm...TICK TOCK miniscule!:hmm:

[Kharon]

"McComic – "Also, the contravention of any New Zealand civil aviation rule is a criminal offence for which a person may be prosecuted".

The point, dearest John, is that NZ will ruthlessly prosecute, under the LAW. Bull****, hearsay and technical breaches of administrative policy will not and cannot be made to work under NZ aviation law; i.e. proof must be provided. It's called facts and is presented as EVIDENCE for impartial assessment. This is different stuff to innuendo, hearsay, hay stacked reports of minor transgressions made up by willing accomplices to make much out of sod all. The bull**** we have come to expect, Barrier for one example. The supposition and artful manipulation of "facts and circumstances" to suit; the Airtex /Pelair treatments for example, which adequately and eloquently define the two faces of diametrically opposed non sequiturs. Cowardly scampering to tribunal which only "stands in the shoes of the regulator" and has no use for balls, brains and gods forbid, testable 'evidence'.

By using the AAT as a foil; the 'company lawyers' have cleverly manipulated, through the rules (always legal) a situation where the myth of CASA righteousness is used to hoodoo some 'arbiters' into believing that the CASA official, legal case is impeccably researched, totally impartial and; (saddest of all), righteous. Why are CASA so a-feared of prosecuting? Is it that the presenting of facts and circumstances, to a court of law and having to prove a case is just too hard? Or is just the potential humiliation of having your collective arses trounced on a trumped up brief too scary for the amassed ego's. Perjury and accountability do not make for easy minds, one element has to go.

Of course, there always is always the ICC; if we can ever find one who is not someone's "drinking mate", current squeeze or, a newly borne from the home stable. ICC? - it's been an industry standing joke ever since we lost Hart. What price to see/hear or read the Hansard testimony of that man eh?.

No, in NZ (and most civilised cultures) there would be both a desire and a need to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the case for the prosecution, not to simply bamboozle or frighten administrative fossils and Muppets masquerading as 'arbitrator' to the 'authority'. You see in NZ system, the rules may easily be followed and are clearly defined, which takes away many of CASA's weapons. No rule broken= no case to answer.

If the CDPP cannot make a case for prosecution, then scampering off to the AAT should not be the primary or a secondary option except, perhaps for administrative misdemeanour. Who needs double jeopardy fenced by non accountability, guarded by 'the mystique'. Imagine the chaos if the coppers tried that on;– no case to answer, dismissed: OK, no problem, we'll get you at the AAT next week. Look closely at the Quadrio case (and that ain't over yet; not by a long shot).

But you could do us all a final favour; take some of your bloody 'mates' with you. There is nowhere for them to hide, not in the real world anyway. Because, it's as sure as eggs, soon as you leave the buildings' protection, someone will peach or squeal (hell they're queuing up even now); self protection, advancement and disloyalty is a prerequisite; but you know that. What then?, without the trappings of power and your small band of willing accomplices to protect and dissemble.

And you dare to call Butson disillusioned; what a hoot.

Toot toot.

[Prince Niccolo M]

Ah Kharon,

and I thought you were going to ask:

"McComic – "Also, the contravention of any New Zealand civil aviation rule is a criminal offence for which a person may be prosecuted".


if that is somehow different from Oz? :confused: :confused: :confused:

[Kharon]

Morning Niccolo. Ah-yup; I did play with that most sensible line of reasoning and argument. But, for some reason that one fatuous, arrogant, condescending, irrelevant line of manure made me cranky. No excuses, emotion, (read anger if you will) plain, pure and simple got the better of me and the construct, like Topsy, just grew. The condition of Australian aviation law is ludicrous, dangerous, dishonest and embarrassing enough without it being forced to endure further humiliation by the antics - etc. etc. Next paragraphs consigned to the tidy bin by act of sheer willpower. (Big smile).

[004wercras]

Kharon, twas a robust post that one of yours :ok:
Imagine if it had been the Gobbledock posting instead?? Then the complaints would have really rolled in.

[Sarcs]

In another robust, although rather less inflammatory..;), response to the DAS (STBR) spin & bulldust monthly rant, I note that AMROBA have put out a Breaking News (http://amroba.org.au/adapting-foreign-regulations-can-do.html) article:Adapting Foreign Regulations - Can Do

Adopting International Aviation Standards

ICAO: Adapting or adopting regulations from other States
“To meet their requirements for regulations, Contracting States always have the option of adopting another Contracting State’s regulations. Even though the unilateral adoption of another Contracting State’s regulations may have some advantages, such as enhanced exchange of operating crew and aircraft, it should be done only after ensuring that the regulations have been updated to include all ICAO Standards.”

Why doesn’t government adapt the New Zealand system & then work towards a common Pacific Region aviation regulatory system? Shouldn’t be that hard, most Pacific Region countries have already adapted & implemented the NZ aviation rules.

However, our bureaucrats still say that it is not easy to adapt/adopt another country’s ‘rules’ because of our legal structure. Very misleading, only to a minor extent this is correct and it should never be used as the reason to over regulate this industry. The same excuse was made when CASR Part 21 was being developed but the Minister of the day overruled the regulator’s objection and CASR Part 21 was made based on FAR Part 21 with minor changes. It can be done if the attitude is right.

Australian Legal System
The Australian legal system is based on a fundamental belief in the rule of law, justice and the independence of the judiciary. Principles such as procedural fairness, judicial precedent and the separation of powers are fundamental to Australia’s legal system. The common law system, as developed in the United Kingdom, forms the basis of Australian jurisprudence.
Other countries that employ variations of the common law system are the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Malaysia and India.

Aviation Regulatory Development
For too long, Australia has had “unique” aviation requirements that have impeded safe growth of aviation in Australia. The consequence, we now have quiet skies, e.g. last Canberra flying school closed four years ago. Fuel companies pulling out GA fuelling facilities all over the country. Huge loss of flying schools and charter operators. It is a very sorry state of affairs.

The aviation regulatory change that commenced back in the late 1980s started the slowdown and all because the Civil Aviation Act does not require a regulatory system that ensures a sustainable and safe aviation industry. The changes since 2000 have added to the loss of charter and private operations. Changes and proposed changes since 2010 have also impeded growth in charter, small airlines and private aviation. The direction of regulatory development is, to some degree, dictated by the Civil Aviation Act.

The Minister’s Aviation Safety Regulation Review must be aware by all the submissions that the regulatory development over the last two decades has failed to provide a cost-effective, safe and sustainable system – the main reason is that we are made to use an unsuitable regulatory structure or government has applied an inappropriate structure.

Because of sec 98 of the Civil Aviation Act, Australia will always have a problem because “regulations” (standards) that are made by National Aviation Authorities in other countries are required to be made by the Governor-General – a totally flawed regulatory structure. New Zealand have rules made by the Minister, whereas the FAA and EASA make regulations just like CASA’s predecessors developed and promulgated Civil Aviation Orders.

This was a three tier system where there is an ‘enabling’ Act, Government regulations and CASA promulgated Civil Aviation Orders – it works. Canada also has a three tier system that is acceptable to both the FAA and EASA enabling Canada to have agreements in Europe, North America, etc.
Instead of following EASA or FAA, the structure should at least mirror image the Canadian model. The Canadian aviation model can fit under the current Act. It would reduce regulatory burden whilst encouraging growth and private aviation.

Even under the current Act provisions, regulatory development could be modelled on the Canadian regulatory system where the Regulation provides a “head-of-power” for the “standards” promulgated by Transport Canada Aviation.

Australian Regulatory Structure
Act: sec. 98 Regulations etc.
(1) The Governor-General may make regulations, not inconsistent with this Act:
Sec. 9 CASA’s functions
(1) CASA has the function of conducting the safety regulation of the following, in accordance with this Act and the regulations:
by means that include the following:
(c) developing and promulgating appropriate, clear and concise aviation safety standards;

[CIVIL] AVIATION SAFETY STANDARDS ≥ ICAO STANDARDS
International Treaty Regulations/Rules Standards (ICAO SARPs)
Civil Aviation Act (CAA)
Sec. 98 CAA
Sec. 9(1)(c ) CAA
Enabling Act Regulatory “head-of-power” Requirements

ICAO:
“Note. — The term “regulations” is used in a generic sense to include but is not limited to instructions, rules, edits, directives, sets of laws, requirements, policies, and orders.”

“Each contracting State undertakes to adopt measures to insure that every aircraft flying or manoeuvring within its territory and that every aircraft carrying its registration mark, wherever such aircraft may be, shall comply with the rules and regulations relating to the flight and manoeuver of aircraft there in force. Each contracting State undertakes to keep its own regulations in these respect uniform, to the greatest possible extent, with those established from time to time under this Convention.”

Further, the Article states that: “Each contracting State undertakes to insure the prosecution of all persons violating the regulations applicable.” &
“A better alternative would be to adapt the regulations to meet the aviation environment while still maintaining harmony with other States.”

The biggest singular problem confronting aviation regulatory development is the Civil Aviation Act. Though a “limited” regulatory development program can be initiated under the Act, the predilection with two tier regulatory system is totally flawed. A three tier system can be developed and implemented within two years with an extended compliance uptake.

The real test of being compliant with ICAO and harmonised with international aviation standards is by comparing the applied practices of operators, organisations and individuals in this country with their counterparts working under other aviation systems. The legislative structure adopted in different countries can be different but achieve the same outcome. IMO this article, rather eloquently, meets the Skull ToR for robust debate...

“Do not be dismayed by our vocal but largely uninformed minority of critics; they are symptomatic of other ills in society. I prefer ‘facts’ when engaged in discussions; not hearsay and tautological rubbish that some others seem to regard as promising material.”

...and if you combine the AMROBA right of reply with this Proaviation article (http://proaviation.com.au/), you begin to see an IOS appetite for the fight (with historical facts included)...:D:McCormick rebuffs Kiwi rules – Opinion (http://proaviation.com.au/2014/04/29/mccormick-rebuffs-kiwi-rules-opinion/)

In his April “CASA Briefing” Director John McCormick has expounded on several points that have also been raised by numerous respondents to Australia’s Aviation Safety Regulation Review (ASRR), and which are currently under consideration by the Panel.

The Director’s opening shots are aimed at the popular belief that Australia would be (or would have been) better off adopting and adapting New Zealand’s aviation regulatory rule set from the start.
The language and subject matter of the briefing appear to reflect the style of CASA’s Office of Legal Services.

A widely experienced industry observer comments: “For a start I think it’s totally inappropriate that a government agency should be publicly arguing its position on the New Zealand rules issue while an enquiry commissioned by the Minister and covering that specific issue among others is still running. What he actually appears to be saying is, ‘we know there’s an enquiry going on, but we’ll go ahead and do it our way anyway,’ which is pretty well what happened with the department’s response to the senate committee’s unanimous recommendations in its Pel-Air/CASA/ATSB report.”

Clearly the Director disagrees with the NZ proposition:
There has been some comment in recent months suggesting a simple solution to updating the aviation safety regulations would be for Australia to adopt the current New Zealand rules. While this may sound attractive to some people there are real issues to be considered. Right now the New Zealand rules could not simply be adopted and enforced in their current form as Australian regulations. Many provisions in the New Zealand rules are not written in a manner consistent with Australian legislative drafting standards.

ProAviation has studied examples of the aviation regulations of several ICAO contracting states, and we have been unable to identify any rules that are written in “a manner consistent with Australian legislative drafting standards.”

In addition, some content is not consistent with the definitions, terminology and requirements set out in our Civil Aviation Act and Regulations. This means adopting the New Zealand rules could well require a broad reconsideration and revision of the Australian aviation safety legislation in its entirety. If we went in this direction we may need to amend the Civil Aviation Act and rework the new Civil Aviation Safety Regulations that have already been made. This would be a long-term undertaking, involving several additional years of legislative redrafting and industry consultation.

Mr McCormick appears to overlook the fact that amending the Civil Aviation Act and reworking the CASRs was exactly what the whole project was about when it was first launched with clear, unambiguous guidelines and precise directives that complied with the founding principles established by (then) Minister John Anderson. However the assertion that sorting it out would take “several additional years of legislative redrafting and industry consultation” appears to assume the task would be assigned to those who spent all those years steering the program into its present botched state.

ProAviation has spoken to several people who were involved in the Program Advisory Panel processes over a lengthy period, and the following direct quotes from various PAP participants during the process, throw an entirely different light on the management of the regulatory reform program (RRP) from what is being put forward by CASA:




“Regarding the current status of the regulatory reform program, the best illustration I’m aware of is the truly hopeless flow of trashed maintenance regulations now being returned from the Attorney-General’s Department, which frankly might just as well have acknowledged (a named lawyer’s) authorship.”
“The PAP [I]never “consulted interminably” as John McCormick and others seem to imply. While Leroy Keith was a member of the PAP, and to the extent that PAP decisions were usually unanimous, this meant that he, or anyone else for that matter, rarely (if ever,) exercised a veto. We did say, via the PAP Chair, that CASA needed to explain its decisions so well that they were accepted, and generally Leroy rose to this challenge.”
“As far back as the end of 1998 we had Parts 21 through 35 in place, in law, and we had Part 91 (General Operating and Flight Rules); Part 61 – licensing for pilots, Part 66 – licensing for engineers; and a lot of other rules more or less ready to go. However with a change in Director shortly thereafter (from Leroy Keith to Mick Toller), the departure of some of Leroy’s people and the appointment of a new RRP manager, all that went on the back burner because within CASA all knowledge and acknowledgement of the PAP era was extinguished – it just wasn’t referred to – it was like it never happened.”
“By about 2004 -2005, Part 91 was ready to go (to the attorney-General’s satisfaction and to the DOTARS’ satisfaction.) It was substantially the same as the one that we left in 1998. Just bear in mind that in 2005 Part 91 was ready to go into law at that point.”
“All these years later, the state of the maintenance regulations is that they are unusable and they will demolish all the remaining small maintenance organisations that haven’t already disappeared.”
“CASA’s ‘blame game’ variously attributes the 20-plus year fiasco to changes of management with each new director, and to “endless consultation.” While management changes certainly played a role, its claims regarding consultation are untrue. The Program Advisory Panel (PAP) was wound up by CASA in the late 1990s because the Minister didn’t extend it. It was only intended to be for two years anyway, because it was expected that by the end of two years the PAP would have had the job completed.”

It is also disturbing that Mr McCormick continues to imply that the rewrite of various rule sets is meant to give industry more time to understand them and prepare for their implementation. In our view this is an insult to the intelligence of an intelligent industry, of the general public, and of the parliamentarians.

The perception of industry in all affected sectors we have consulted is that the failure of the regulatory review program is due to the influence of various underqualified individuals and groups with their own motivations, personal or industrial, seeking to embed their philosophies in the regulations under which aviation must operate.

Another issue that needs to be resolved is the “criminalisation” of aviation law that is proposed, which has been likened to having the police write the motor traffic regulations. CASA has always insisted that this was “government policy.” A lengthy Freedom of Information process with CASA has failed to help us identify the person who made that decision.
However a response from the Attorney General’s Department as to the source of this philosophy makes it quite plain that despite the protestations of the (then) head CASA lawyer, that initiative was solely a CASA decision:
“The Attorney-General’s Department would like to provide the following points of clarification:
“The new draft maintenance suite of Civil Aviation Safety Regulations were drafted by the Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing on instruction from CASA.
“The document ‘A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers’ is a guide only. The decision as to whether conduct needs to be proscribed through the application of criminal penalties is a decision for CASA having regard to the principles in the Guide.”

It is arguable that the most expeditious and effective way out of the chaos would be to trace back in the history of regulatory development to the point where it all started to go wrong, re-adopt the guiding principles under which the RRP and the PAP were launched, enshrine those principles in the program’s marching orders, re-engage with the industry in a PAP format, and identify and eliminate enemies of the concept of genuine consultation.

That process might well demonstrate that a lot of the necessary work has already been done. All the above two articles are missing is the Dear John, :D:D:ok:

[Kharon]

004 # 1884 – "Imagine if it had been the Gobbledock posting instead??"

Don't fret. The Gobbledock (GD) only exists to serve the cause. Now, safely returned from his sojourn as 'secret agent' (the IOS secret weapon) in Montreal and other 'interesting' places he is quite happy, taking a break at house boat park. Currently; pandering to the needs of his beloved elephant. He did however manage to track the WLR Secretariat on their mind boggling tour of foreign parts. To say their surprise at the levels of 'operational' ease, communication, mutual trust, the spirit of willing cooperation and the tangible (measurable) safety outcomes, easily achieved between industry and regulator, in meetings, was 'palpable', is an understatement.

Anyway, the BBQ is hot and (thank the gods) MKR is finished so here on the houseboat, all is well. Elephants fed, dogs and horses settling in for yet another quiet-'ish' evening of beer, BBQ and looking at a booking sheet which is; I must say, looking quite healthy. But company policy firmly bars wabbits for transport – no discussion. Gas chamber and onto the rhubarb patch; that's our firm, long standing policy (it ain't legal of course, but we do have some influence).

GD and Tidy Bin (laden with angst) simply failed to communicate; it happens even in the most pedantic of cockpits. GD is smiling, waving and; at least in spirit, is very much a part of Pprune (Bless it).

So, lest we have the thread locked, on free association grounds – that's it. Selah, Toot toot and good night. Endit........Jeez, those snags smell good.

[Sarcs]

The QONs from last Senate RRAT Estimates were due to be answered by the 17th April, no surprises that date passed without any AQONs being listed...:ugh:

What was surprising was the release of the QONs index only came out yesterday...:rolleyes: However after reading some of the QONs perhaps there is a reason for the, usually efficient, committee Secretariat delaying the index...:confused: RRAT QoNs index 24/02/14 (http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Estimates/Live/rrat_ctte/estimates/add_1314/infra/Index/FINAL_QoNs_Infrastructure_as_at_19March2014.pdf)

So a sampling of QONs of interest in what is going to be a pivotal month in the life & times of an ailing Oz aviation industry...:E

On John O'Brien CVD AAT matter (my bold):
Senator FAWCETT: I can give you the letter afterwards. I have it sitting right here in front of me from your organisation dated 24 January doing exactly that. I will put it to you that with due respect this is not moving forward, despite the evidence that you gave here at estimates in November that CASA had no agenda or no plans to wind back the gains of the Denison case. This is, in fact, a very deliberate effort to adopt a standard which might medically ascertain that somebody does have a colour vision deficiency, but clearly as evidenced by multiple pilots that have flown for over two decades, it is not an accurate or effective measure of their ability to safely operate an aircraft. This is going backwards and not, in fact, forwards.
Mr McCormick: As I said, what has happened between November when I was here and that letter, this is the first that I know of it. We were, of course, expecting to be in the AAT to respond to a Mr O'Brien in February 2012, however, those proceedings are currently not listed for hearing as the previous hearing to commence on 31 March was vacated at the applicant's request. So we have not had the opportunity to test these things. As I said, that is news to me. I will take it on notice and find out what we have been doing.
…
Senator FAWCETT: If you want to come back to experts, your organisation's previous experts, Ladel, Brock, Wilkins and others, were very proactive in recognising that practical tests were a viable alternative and, in fact, that many people with a CVD were able to fly. Their judgment has proven correct by virtue of the incident-free 20 years of flying. Is it the case that a personality has changed, not the science and not the safety? A personality has changed and now CASA's approach to this issue is changing?
Mr McCormick: I am not aware of any changes around our approach to this. As I said, that letter is news to me. I am not across everything that leaves the building, particularly medical matters where I normally do not involve myself. We will take it on notice and I will get you an answer about what has transpired. References:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8-uCRi7N2wQ
CASR Part 67.150 (6): (6) A person must demonstrate that he or she meets the criterion in item 1.39 of table 67.150 by: (a) in daylight, or artificial light of similar luminosity, readily identifying a series of pseudo-isochromatic plates of the Ishihara 24-plate type, making no more than 2 errors; or
(b) for somebody who makes more than 2 errors in a test mentioned in paragraph (a), readily identifying aviation coloured lights displayed by means of a Farnsworth colour-perception lantern, making:
(i) no errors on 1 run of 9 pairs of lights; or
(ii) no more than 2 errors on a sequence of 2 runs of 9 pairs of lights; or
(c) for somebody who does not satisfy paragraph (a) or (b), correctly identifying all relevant coloured lights in a test, determined by CASA, that simulates an operational situation.

Crtierion table:


Colour perception
1.39
Can readily distinguish the colours that need to be distinguished for the safe exercise of privileges, or performance of duties, under the relevant licence (http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_reg/casr1998333/s65.175.html#licence)

Note: For how to demonstrate this, see subregulation 67.150 (6).
On A380 type ratings & training buckets: Senator FAWCETT: How many people do you have endorsed on the A380?
Mr McCormick: We have at least one, but stand by. It may only be two. We will take that on notice, if we could.
Senator FAWCETT: Sure, if you could give us a list of their names that would be great.
Mr McCormick: We will.
Love this bit..:D (my bold): Mr Jordan: In response to your question, for our flight training budget for the previous financial year, we actually spent $2.3 million.
Senator XENOPHON: How many personnel within CASA was that spent for?
Mr Jordan: I do not have that information with me. I would have to take that on notice. But overall, the bucket of money we spent was $2.3 million, purely for our technical staff.
Senator XENOPHON: Does that mean that Mr Jordan's answer, that $2.3 million bucket of money for flight training for CASA, there might be some other funds available for flight training of CASA personnel?
Mr Jordan: Not necessarily flying training; there are other training monies available; for example, myself, as an accountant, to attend a training course. So there is more money than the $2.3 million.
Senator XENOPHON: I am more—
Mr McCormick: You are talking more about the flying side of things.
Senator XENOPHON: Yes.
Mr Jordan: So the $2.3 million is purely for flying.
Senator XENOPHON: So, it is not a requirement of your job to have an endorsement on an A380 or anything like that to be CFO?
Mr Jordan: No.
Senator XENOPHON: No.
Mr McCormick: We will give you a detailed breakdown on notice because I am not sure of all the facts.
Senator XENOPHON: That is fine.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UkCxbNNDcHg

Hmm...well that would be 2.3 million that presumably came out of the 89.9 million bucket...maybe come the next estimates we will have traced some more bucket money...:E

Much more to follow Sarcs...:ok:


Addendum to CVD matter

From the ICAO annex 1...6.2.4.4 An applicant obtaining a satisfactory result as prescribed by the Licensing Authority shall be assessed as fit. An applicant failing to obtain a satisfactory result in such a test shall be assessed as unfit unless able to readily distinguish the colours used in air navigation and correctly identify aviation coloured lights. Applicants who fail to meet these criteria shall be assessed as unfit except for Class 2 assessment with the following restriction: valid daytime only.

Note.— Guidance on suitable methods of assessing colour vision is contained in the Manual of Civil Aviation Medicine (Doc 8984).
...it can be seen that Part 67.150 (above) pretty well matches the ICAO medical requirements for CVD, however as we all know we have actually been operating with a difference to 6.2.4.4 for twenty odd years. So it would be natural to assume that this 'difference' should have been part of the, recently amended, mammoth list of notified differences to ICAO SARPs (i.e. AIP GEN 1.7) However if we refer to the AIP H18/14 (http://api.viglink.com/api/click?format=go&jsonp=vglnk_jsonp_13990834012276&key=1e857e7500cdd32403f752206c297a3d&libId=34b474b0-6e90-4caa-a33c-8989ce1e6a64&loc=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Faustralia-new-zealand-pacific%2F527815-truss-aviation-safety-regulation-review-37.html&v=1&out=http%3A%2F%2Fairservicesaustralia.com%2Faip%2Fcurrent%2F sup%2Fs14-h18.pdf&ref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Faustralia-new-zealand-pacific-90%2F&title=Truss%3A%20Aviation%20Safety%20Regulation%20Review%20-%20Page%2037%20-%20PPRuNe%20Forums&txt=SUP%20H18%2F14)reference for paragraph 6.2.4.4...


"...Para 6.2.4.4 Candidates for an air traffic controller licence who fail an Ishihara 24-plate test are, in practice, not employed by Australia’s ATS provider..."

...we can see that nothing has changed from the H12/11 version of the GEN 1.7...:confused:


To quote a much maligned former independent pollie..."Please explain!":E

ps There is a DJ link in all this too (i.e. Wodger's wodgering)...MTF!:ok:

[Kharon]

Sarcs # 1887 "However after reading some of the QONs perhaps there is a reason for the, usually efficient, committee Secretariat delaying the index".

The late release of the QON index, for several reasons makes it a remarkably interesting document when H18 is considered. Now I know you'll all moan and groan as each one is a bloody tedious read, but I have (yawn) ploughed my way through the pertinent sections (yawn) and saved you the reading of it (yawn) some of the potted highlights as follows:-

As H18/14 (ICAO differences) has only just been very quietly (stealthily even) released before the delayed Index; and, as Sarcs mentions the medical differences section combined with searching QON (Fawcett) particularly as related to CVD is of interest. Anyway you care to read it, the 'personality' of the driving, urgent need for ICAO compliance in this one small area; irrespective of science or safety outcomes has had a big say in the drafting of the ICAO difference. Perhaps Voodoo is de rigueur these days. The answers to the Fawcett QON will be 'interesting'.

The whole feel of the 'medical' issues is that of Rafferty's rules, of signed confessions and one mans word against that of 'expert' opinion. Lets hope the opportunity to delve deeply into exactly WTF is Avmed playing at eventuates, before confession of an afternoon nap or a pricking in your thumbs becomes lay evidence to ground a fleet.

Fawcett could do worse than have a look at the treatment AMSA received and do the same to CASA. Having a passing interest in matters nautical; I had a quick squiz at the QON to AMSA. Oh dear; someone has been monkeying with their 'Orders' and the troops are definitely not happy. Didn't count them, but looked like about 60 seriously well researched questions, asked by a very well briefed Senator, who didn't seem to think much of the changes. All the questions are written and I would hate to be the one burning the midnight oil trying to unravel the mess. Perhaps we could do the same thing with the CASA 'new' regulations; force then to justify the things, challenge every sentence and make 'em fix 'em up. Poor old AMSA legal eh?.

Sarcs –" PS. There is a DJ link in all this too (i.e. Wodger's wodgering)...MTF".

You're getting too good at this, had me going for a while, more bloody reading. Good catch though; if DJ chooses to use it; also explains the indecent haste to get that Part 61 crock up and running.

To explain; DJ (Pel Air swimming team fame) has now twice passed all the ATPL subjects and meets the qualifiers to hold and exercise a command >5700 Kgs. Loosely described, CASA are insisting on a flight test, with their special 'examiners' and offer no guidance as to where the pass/fail benchmark is. DJ has quite naturally declined the kind offer, sighting the expense of hiring an undefined but 'suitable' aircraft, covering the expenses and generally paying for a 'chop' as opposed to an un-required (by law) 'check' flight. This administrative embuggerance (cheers Sunny) is perpetrated despite the latest ICAO difference stating categorically that an ATPL flight test is not required; thus making the DJ flight test a 'unique' Australian safety milestone. Bloody amazing.

ICAO Annex 1- 2.6.1.3 Skill. Notified difference....

Para 2.6.1.3.1 There is no requirement that applicants for an ATPL(A) demonstrate their ability to perform as pilot-in-command of a multi-engine aeroplane required to be operated with a co-pilot.

Para 2.6.1.3.1.2 Australian legislation does not specify demonstrated ability

Toot toot.

[thorn bird]

Awww...ferryman U is cruel..


That poor wittle wabbit!!


Na. sorry, he dun it didn't he, no sympathy at all, he deprived a citizen of their livelihood without due process, or even a valid reason that a certified ex WAAF baggage handler was qualified to assess, so wabbit stew sounds good. Word of advice from my old Gran...needs to be cooked very slowly or it becomes as tough as old boot leather.


The medical stuff??? well mate they only did what everyone else is doing, they went offshore!!


But with a diabolical twist.............instead of offshoring the outsource they bought the offshore here and onshored the outsource thus making it an onshored outsource..brilliant!! since Australian doctors are all criminals they haven't caught yet, bringing the offshore here converting them to onshore completely bypasses having Australian doctors anywhere near what they were trying to offshore thus leaving them in a position to do whatever they like!!!..........Oh... yeah...sorry they can already do that cant they!!

[LeadSled]

Why are CASA so a-feared of prosecuting? Is it that the presenting of facts and circumstances, to a court of law and having to prove a case is just too hard? Or is just the potential humiliation of having your collective arses trounced on a trumped up brief too scary for the amassed ego's. Perjury and accountability do not make for easy minds, one element has to go. Folks,
Actually, there is a reasonably simple answer, provided by a former Director of Aviation Safety/CEO of CASA direct to his then Minister, who asked a question, substantially similar (in meaning, if not wording) to the above.
The occasion was a meeting in the Minister's office, subsequent to said DAS/CEO making a rather controversial appearance at the National Press Club, where, amongst other interesting statements, the said Director "complained" that "Courts got it wrong". We can't have the guilty bastards found innocent, can we.
Anyway, back to the Minister's office, and the answer to the Minister's question about the need for facts: "But, Minister, if we had to have facts, I would need another 100 investigators".
Administrative actions, and a naive/ compliant AAT are so much neater and tidier that courts, rules of evidence and other inconvenient restrictions on CASA.
Tootle pip!!

PS: Before any of you claim this is a second hand account, and not accurate, not so!

[dubbleyew eight]

if you set off from oodnadatta to maree by heading north it doesn't matter how well you drive or how much justification you have for each of the turns you take you are still heading in totally the wrong direction.

(maree is south south east of oodnadatta)

australian aviation law is just so like that drive it isn't funny.
you can call in all the experts you like to drive the system further but it is still headed in the wrong direction.

we've paid the DAS 3 million dollars over his tenure and all he has achieved will have to be thrown out and a start in the correct direction made.
the kiwi regs would be a good start.

[thorn bird]

Geez Leadie,
every now and then a Pearler!!!:D
Now someone out there in TV land just has to see
"Truth" mimicking "Art" and a perfect script for an OZ version of
"Yes Minister"....Hey boatman how about a chockie frog for the most
original title!!

[Kharon]

"Y'ars Minister" – perhaps.

Bugger the expense, it's Sunday. Choccy frogs all round.

[004wercras]

Thanks Sarcs, nice line of questioning by Xenophon and Fawcett :ok:

The endorsement - So CAsA, in regards to the A380 endo's, is it one or is it two people that are endorsed? John you seemed so confused? Well let me help you with the answer - I believe it is two. I know one of the endorsed individuals is a FOI based in BNE and he just so happens to be one of the few remaining good guys left, and he is more than capable of holding such an endorsement. The other A380 endo allegedly is held by Mr Farquharson. I believe that is what is of interest to the Senators as they examine exactly what the Australian taxpayers money is being spent on, the reasons behind the money being spent and whether there is any 'bang for the taxpayer buck', or whether it is being spent frivolously and fruitlessly.

Buckets of money - Another interesting point was when the bloated CFO explained that there is more than one bucket of 'training' money? So $2.3 million is used for things like endo's, currency etc for the Inspectorate, but am I correct in believing there is another bucket of moolah for the executives and/or other employees? If so, how much green is kept in that bucket? And are CAsA trying to be tricky with their answers to questions by giving the impression that only one Inspector has an A380 endo when in fact two individuals do? CAsA are cleverly playing on words and only mentioning who has a 380 endo from the inspectorates bucket of training money while they don't mention Terry's endo paid for by the 'mystery' bucket of dosh?? Makes me wonder which bucket Sky Sentinel came out of???
It may just happen to be that some of CAsA's financial wizards have been trained at "Beakers School of Finances" where buckets of taxpayer money really does make dreams come true :=

Message to Slugger - Dear Tony, being a budget conscious bureaucrat and a happy go lucky type razor wielder perhaps Fort Fumble could do with some form of financial 'readjustment'?

TICK TOCK

[Creampuff]

Gosh, 004wercras, you are obviously a CASA insider or very close to someone who is. Best you/your friend use the PID scheme to disclose this kind of information, unless you/your friend is ready to lose his/her job.

The current government isn't big on talkative drones.

[004wercras]

Gosh, 004wercras, you are obviously a CASA insider or very close to someone who is. Best you/your friend use the PID scheme to disclose this kind of information, unless you/your friend is ready to lose his/her job.
Oh Creamy, like you I am just a pimply face kid from Utah with a passing interest in those big noisy things that fly really fast dude!
However, if I were an insider I certainly wouldn't be asking the multitude of questions that I did in my previous post. I also scoped some of my questions based upon the wee video that Mr Sarcs posted, and the very words expressed by the DAS, CFO, Senators etc. No 'secrets' or 'insider trading' involved in that, nup, as any good government t agency would say - "I/we are being transparent, open and honest". Yes a number of questions were based on that. But you already knew that you naughty boy :=

Safe flying Creamy

[Sarcs]

From the thread...Stress caused by the handling by management of major changes within (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/539077-stress-caused-handling-management-major-changes-within.html) The thread primarily focuses on the one de-identified REPCON and inevitably drifts to Sky God (Red Rat) issues but there are some underlying, seemingly cynical, issues that Fedsec Steve & Kharon picked up on that needs further exploration. So reproducing the "K" post #15 (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/539077-stress-caused-handling-management-major-changes-within.html#post8463794) ....Quote: ALAEA #5 –"Just reading through the REPCONs generally. What concerns me is the way CASA seem to just fob everything off and the ATSB accept that".

If you go the Repcon link on post #1 in the left hand panel there's a black rectangle, marked Repcon, this will take you to three pages, containing 45 Repcon; most of which are aviation related. As Steve says, the responses are well rehearsed, smoothly executed excuses which make it look, through the smoke and mirrors, as though something is actually be done (disgusting).

If you can find the time have a look at the responses from the 'other' domestic transport agencies and compare them; then, if you want to get serious, have a look at the Canadian or USA authorities responses to similar 'safety reports'. I found an hour last evening to do this, not to make it a project, but to 'test' differences. I'm still shaking my head, well at least we can still drink most of the water in Australia.

If the Repcon in #1 achieves nothing else it has served well to highlight the appalling, self evident condition to which the official attitude on safety concerns has degenerated.

Quote: ALAEA "They simply never do anything".

Wrong Steve, they spend the entire day and budget making sure they cannot be held responsible or accountable for anything, while ensuring maximum control and kudos. It's an art form; deeply entrenched, fully supported and set to endure. The really 'nasty' part is they steal all the accolades for 'safe transport' from those who are at the coal face, keeping the public safe even while under the incredible pressure of work place uncertainty, mismanagement and not too much protection. Here is the link (http://www.atsb.gov.au/repcon_reports.aspx?startIndex=0) for the bureau listed REPCONs. This initiative by the bureau, appears to have been brought in at the start of 2013, & should be applauded, but I wonder if it is doing anything to dispel the severe distrust the industry now has with both the regulator and the supposed safety watchdog...:rolleyes:

Steve in his post #5 (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/539077-stress-caused-handling-management-major-changes-within.html#post8462691) gives some examples of FF responses to various REPCONs and in a further post #27 makes the comment...

"...From reading the REPCON outcomes, one could easily come to the conclusion that submitting a report is pointless because there is never any resulting fix to identified problems. I think someone needs to talk to the good Senator before he goes into the next estimates hearings..."

So to add some more fuel to the fire...:E...and to focus more on GA issues generally, here is a couple more examples of REPCONs followed by properly spun bureaucratic FF, weasel worded non-reponses...:ugh::yuk:

This one is interesting in light of a current active bureau accident investigation:Reporter's concern

The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the continuation of cabin crew service in flight while the fasten seat belt (FSB) sign is illuminated during turbulent conditions.
The reporter is concerned that the serving of hot beverages during turbulence is unsafe for both passengers and cabin crew and may result in significant injuries. The reporter has witnessed first-hand hot drinks being poured and spilt while the FSB sign was on.

Operator's response (Operator 1)

In response to REPCON AR201300053, the severity of the turbulence determines the course of action. The turbulence matrix states that during all turbulent events Cabin Crew discontinue hot drink service; there is no requirement for the discontinuation of service or to be seated, unless instructed to do so by the Captain / Cabin Supervisor in a Light turbulent event. Cabin Crew are empowered to be seated at any time they feel their safety is at risk.
During a Moderate or Severe turbulent event the Matrix states that the Cabin Crew are to discontinue Cabin Service and re-stow carts, if it is safe to do so.

Regulator's response (Regulator 1)

CASA has reviewed the content of this REPCON and advises the matter is being followed up with the operator and will take action as appropriate.

Love this bit...(my bold)

ATSB comment

REPCON received further comments from the reporter on this matter and the text below was sent to CASA for comment.
The 'matrix' seems to make a simple CAO into a complex issue.
The matrix suggests that it is safe in turbulence to have the cabin crew up and about with their trolleys, while the passengers are restrained and the Fasten Sear Belt Sign is on.
This is not applying the CAO correctly. Further, there are two potential "judgers" as to when cabin crew are to be seated. One is the Captain and the other is the cabin manager. Both will have different perceptions of when flight attendants are to be seated.
I do not believe the CAO in question is being applied correctly.

Regulator's response (Regulator 2)

I am advised that CASA has quarterly Cabin Safety review meetings with the operator. At the next meeting CASA will review the Operator's Seat Belt procedure collaboratively to ensure it meets CASA's regulatory requirements to provide an effective safety outcome.Shades of Barrier perhaps??
Reporter's concern

The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the maintenance of the two Cessna 182s operated by the operator. The reporter stated that when they were rostered to fly for the organisation, they were asked to falsify the maintenance release by significantly under-recording the hours they were actually flying.
The reporter is also concerned that the aircraft are not being maintained to the appropriate standard.
The reporter stated that the following concerns were observed:




The engine leaks an abnormal amount of oil
The pilot seat is difficult to lock in place after adjusting
The altimeter and tacho are often erroneous
The upward opening door for parachutists to exit is difficult to secure closed using the locking pin.

Operator's response (Operator 1)

We only employ Commercial Pilots to fly these aircraft and have concerns that this pilot has breached their obligations to report safety concerns to me and to act appropriately to ensure the safety of other pilots and passengers. I have investigated the claims made by this pilot and have concluded that they are baseless.

We have contacted our mechanic to investigate any oil leaks in theses aeroplanes. It was concluded that there was no evidence of any oil leaks. We have asked other pilots if there have been any issues with the seat, all of whom stated that they have had no problems locking the seat in.
The door can be difficult to use by pilots who have done limited hours on the craft, though no concerns have been voiced by my experienced pilots. We will endeavour to do more training on this aircraft for anyone that feels they need it. Also, as these aircraft are flown in controlled air space, the altimeter is checked on each flight. I believe that if the altimeter was incorrect or malfunctioning, this would be identified as we enter controlled air space. There have been no complaints by other pilot voicing concerns about the accuracy of the tacho.

Regulator's response (Regulator 1)

CASA has reviewed the matters raised in the REPCON and advises that surveillance was conducted at the airport which identified an aircraft as undergoing maintenance. The defects reported on the REPCON were not evident on that aircraft as they had been rectified during the maintenance.

CASA notes that the reporter refers to two aircraft, however only one aircraft is identified in the report.

ATSB comment

After REPCON questioned CASA as to whether they had discussed the falsification of the maintenance records with the operator, CASA conducted further enquires. They formed the preliminary view that the defects had not been endorsed on the maintenance release when they should have been and these matters were going to be examined further. And finally going back to one Steve quoted from (my bold): Reporter's concern

The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the fatigue experienced when flying either of two long distance return flights which are both back of clock duties. This fatigue is even worse on the second night if the crew is rostered on consecutive duties.

The flight time is eight hours and forty five minutes on the first return flight and nine hours and fifteen minutes for the second return flight and if the flight is diverted this generally occurs when the crew is already in a fatigued state and likely to make fatigue induced errors.

While most crews attempt to get enough sleep between consecutive duties, as they are driving home in peak hour traffic, arriving as their family is starting the day, and with body clock issues it is difficult to get more than three hours sleep during the day. This is inadequate for another back of clock duty.

While the duties may be considered below the threshold using the FAID fatigue management system, the reporter advised that they feel extremely fatigued during the latter part of the flight.

The reporter has stated that if the operator had a 'Just Culture', they may receive more reports of fatigue from flight crews rather than crews reporting unfit for duty.

Operator's response (Operator 1)

The airline takes fatigue management seriously and has a system for monitoring fatigue risk in our operations. Rosters are built to provide appropriate preparation and recovery time, meeting and often exceeding regulatory requirements. The number and frequency of consecutive back of flying operations for individuals are minimised and crew can express preferences for particular duties. The airline provides a just culture where crew can declare themselves unfit for duty if fatigued, consistent with crew individual responsibilities for fatigue management.

Regulator's response (Regulator 1)

CASA is aware of the operator's fatigue risk management policy and monitors the system in respect of fatigue risk management objectives.

Risk mitigators observed include regular monitoring of roster pattern performance by the airline, adjustment of rostering rules, the ability for a crew member to opt out of a duty when fatigue is anticipated or experienced and the provision of company transport or accommodation in order to limit the fatigue effects following duty.

Under the proposed flight and duty rules which are expected to be in force from this year, it will still be up to the individual to determine fitness for duty and to make a report via the safety management system (SMS) where this is indicated under company procedures. CASA strongly recommends airline employees report potential fatigue events through the SMS, in order to identify areas where the company should focus resources to reduce operational risk, including fatigue risk. Comment: Isn't that what the Reporter indicated was a problem i.e. lack of true "Just Culture".

If the reporter has evidence of the reporting culture being compromised by management actions they are invited to make a report to CASA detailing any concerns. Last para..."in other words if you continue to have a whinge then come to us so we can single you out for a selected tea & bikkies (pineappling) session "...yeah right like that's going to happen...:ugh:

IMO the word REPCON should be replaced with WOFTAM...:E

All this system is achieving is further discouraging (muzzling) potential (genuine) whistleblowers from coming forward when concerned with safety related matters....TICK TOCK...miniscule!:{

[Kharon]

Aaaand - Steam on.

Just reading through the Repcon, reporting the high drama of cabin service being continued during 'turbulence'. Everyone having a free whack at the safety Piñata.

The reporters version is subjective, emotive and fails to define the level of turbulence experienced at the time. It also fails to provide an accurate picture of the event; did the CA just finish dispensing the "hot drink" when the SBS came on, before docking the trolley and strapping in; or, did the CA blithely continue service during 'moderate' turbulence; or, is it that in some way the CA was 'forced' to continue in the face of 'grave and imminent danger? We are not advised, just left with a feeling that this all 'could be dangerous'. It neatly attacks the 'company' and also questions the competence of the flight crew, the CM and the CA, without a shred of evidence – other than opinionated hearsay. Bollocks.

The company comes close to reality, they define it quite clearly: passengers strapped down in 'light'; CA strapped in during moderate. Furry muff, even to the extent that the trolley must first be secured (probably why the CA seats are next to the trolley stow dock). Last thing you would want is the CA secured and the trolley floating about the cabin.

The 'regulator' has had a cuppa with the operator and maybe had a review of the COM procedures - which are probably as reasonable as could be expected without the PIC and CM being given training in the use of crystal balls. The 'regulator' quite properly agreed with the company practice, the proof being that not too many passengers, CA and most importantly 'trolleys' seldom end up damaged. QED. Regulator job done and seen to be done proper.

The 'Safety Watchdog' bit, as Sarcs points out is either loveable or risible. It's almost as hysterical as the original complaint. Of course it's complex, you bloody Muppet. (i) That turbulence can be 'predicted' with any certainty is really quite wonderful, but not an exact science; (ii) that aircrew are trained to recognise the 'potential' for turbulence and have a vague idea of where the switch for SBS is located and how to use it is a given fact; (iii) that cabin service trolleys need time to be stowed. So, here we are heading for some bumps, OK sign on, that secures the passengers, CM informed it's going to get worse, the trolleys go away and the CA are strapped in. FFS it happens 100,000 times, every day of the week. But the SWD wants to make it 'an issue', perhaps attempting to score a point over the regulator. Only a bleeding heart, rabid, pedantic OH&S guru could come up with this pathetic response.

"Both will have different perceptions of when flight attendants are to be seated". Bollocks.

"I do not believe the CAO in question is being applied correctly". Bollocks.

FCOL – what more is the regulator supposed to do?. They have been given supposition and fresh air to work with and must rely on an 'opinion'. The 'regulator' (bless 'em) have again, patiently trotted off for more tea, quite rightfully taking refuge behind the bit 'they' are responsible for – do the company procedures "comply"? – Of course they do.

This pitiful, un detailed, puling little complaint serves to show why the OH&S industry is loosing credibility; everyone is becoming a slightly hysterical, self appointed 'expert'. No wonder there is an element of cynicism when the Repcon system is used as an agenda tool, rather than part of a serious support structure for examining and improving 'real' safety issues. OBR?– "Oh, we don't do them". Silly half assed, subjective complaints from SLF – "Oh yes we do them, have expert opinion for those and everything; no, we never question motive". Spare me and bring back sanity.

- Steam off. There, I feel better now.

[Sarcs]

The ATsBeaker initiative to publish REPCONs was justified with this preamble..

"....New confidential reporting web page
(http://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/news-items/2014/repcon_news.aspx)
A new web page featuring de-identified confidential reports on aviation, maritime and rail safety concerns is now available on the ATSB website.

The ATSB’s confidential reporting scheme, REPCON, allows people with safety concerns to report them confidentially to the ATSB without fear of being identified. These confidential reports often contain valuable information that can help industry address unsafe procedures, practices or conditions.

Because many important safety concerns are reported to the ATSB through REPCON, it is vital that all of industry is aware of, and can learn from, the reported concerns. To enhance awareness of these safety issues, the ATSB will make this information available through the publication of de-identified confidential reports on its website.

The published information will include details about safety concerns, as well as responses and safety actions taken by relevant organisations or government agencies about the concern.

It’s important to remember that the information published on the new web page is de-identified to protect the identity of the reporter or any third party individual. REPCON serves to collect information about safety concerns in the aviation, marine and rail industries, to help facilitate safety action and, ultimately, improve transport safety. REPCON is not used to apportion blame or liability—the underpinning legislation specifically precludes information in a report being used for disciplinary purposes. As well, REPCON reports are inadmissible in evidence in a court, except where a person has committed an offence under the Criminal Code (False or misleading information) in making the report..."

Not one to normally question the efficacy (or veracity) of such a statement (I'll leave that to the Ferryman...:E) but going through the ICASS list of Annex 13 signatory states (duly provided here (http://www.atsb.gov.au/voluntary/repcon-icass.aspx) by ATsBeaker), I am yet to find any other State that has taken a similar initiative in publishing confidential reports on their websites. Perhaps the Kharon post highlights why this may be so...

"...This pitiful, un detailed, puling little complaint serves to show why the OH&S industry is loosing credibility; everyone is becoming a slightly hysterical, self appointed 'expert'. No wonder there is an element of cynicism when the Repcon system is used as an agenda tool, rather than part of a serious support structure for examining and improving 'real' safety issues. OBR?– "Oh, we don't do them". Silly half assed, subjective complaints from SLF – "Oh yes we do them, have expert opinion for those and everything; no, we never question motive". Spare me and bring back sanity..."


If Beaker is to continue with this, yet another apparently unique Oz initiative, could I suggest they may like to revisit their current REPCON scoping matrix...:ugh:

Sense & Sensibility??

Moving on but sticking with the theme of the FSB REPCON, I noted the following Paul B (Avweb) article...Sit the ^%$* Down! (http://www.avweb.com/blogs/insider/Sit-the-Down-221974-1.html) ...that provides a serious but somewhat amusing reminder on the dangers of unpredicted CAT...:DThe good thing is that the vast majority of passengers will never see this kind of turbulence. But the bad thing is not having seen how bad bad can be, they traipse around the cabin unsecured as if on the way from the couch to the refrigerator. Frankly, this makes me nervous as hell. When the flight attendants push the drink trolly up the aisle, that makes me nervous as hell, too. I’ve seen those things come off the deck even in mild bumps. And when I go to the lav, I use one hand for business and the other to maintain a death grip on the helper handle and I jam my head against the ceiling. Then I rush back to my seat and strap in, all the while nervous as hell. I’m not worried about crashing; I’m worried about a broken arm or a concussion. The following article (also from the US), rather more satirically, reinforces the "K" 'Nanny State' post...:ok::Right to Bear Wings (http://www.flyingmag.com/blogs/going-direct/right-bear-wings?src=SOC&dom=tw)
Is confrontation the key to success?

"Aviation" rhymes with "American." Well, even if it's not that close a rhyme, you get the idea. Aviation in many ways represents what it is to live in a free land with free skies. The same, it goes without saying, is or should be true for many of our friends worldwide. Aviation, metaphorically and literally, is a magic activity, one that takes a mere ground-bound mortal and through the power of will, ingenuity and the elegant abuse of raw physics, places us high above the world.

This might sound overly romantic; trust me, I know there's the cost of fuel and insurance, Class A-F airspace, a thousand pages of regs (okay, lots more than that) and that darned FAA medical to contend with, but the basis of it all, the reason we go to all of the other trouble is because flying is special. Apologies to kayakers, cross-stitchers, Sudoku-maniacs and Civil War re-enactors, but there's nothing remotely like flying. Even sky diving gets it wrong. Staying aloft is the point of the whole thing.

My point is simply this: I'm tired of apologizing for flying. I'm tired of telling the "not-in-my-backyard" types that we're very sorry and next time we'll try to climb on thermal energy alone so as to keep the faint and passing noise of GA down while trucks and road crews blare away unabated with hardly any notice taken. I'm tired of apologizing for our use of land, our negligible impact on the environment and our lording it up over the common folk for flying around in our airplanes as we do personal or business travel or just take in the beauty of the day. I'm tired of it.

This is not to say we shouldn't be good neighbors and try to minimize our impact, like any responsible citizen should do, but not because we're begging to stay on people's good side but instead because we choose to do it.

We need to make our message clear. You mess with aviation, you mess with freedom. You try to limit my right to fly, you're messing with not just me but with more than a half a million of my good friends, many of whom feel even more strongly than I do about the issue.

My plane is no threat to you. My plane is an emblem of the freedom to fly, a freedom that generations before us have fought valiantly to protect and one that we take the utmost pride in, for their sake, for ours and for our children.

There might not be a constitutional right directly associated with travel, let alone travel by air — the forefathers were only so prescient — but that right has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States to be so fundamental that its very omission from the Constitution is proof of its unassailably fundamental importance.

And when you travel in a plane, it is, in my non-judicial opinion, even more fundamental and more central our rights as citizens.

Think about it. Our national symbol isn't a trout. It's an eagle. Fly on.
Love it..:D:D {Comment: Hmm...maybe that's our problem we've got Skippy and a flightless bird on our national coat of arms??:rolleyes:}

MTF Sarcs :ok:

{ps Does Beaker seriously think that his REPCON examples will remain confidential & de-identified. How hard is it, for the average punter, to work out who the reporter possibly is and who the operator is in some of those published REPCONs...FFS!:ugh:}

[Sarcs]

This is even better..:ok:...from the same journo: FAA: Stop That, It's Legal!

When feds bow to public opinion over the regs, something's wrong.
By Robert Goyer / Published: Apr 22, 2014

http://www.flyingmag.com/sites/all/files/imagecache/blog_detail_image/_images/201404/GD-south-beach.jpg
Enlarge Photo (http://www.flyingmag.com/sites/all/files/imagecache/enlarged_image/_images/201404/GD-south-beach.jpg)


It must seem that I'm always complaining about the FAA, but the truth be told, the vast majority of our employees there (that's right; they're our employees) are fantastic. From controllers who bend over backwards to get us routings away from the storms to inspectors who go the extra mile to make sure we give it our best shot on our checkrides to directors who are working to bring the agency into the new millennium, there's a lot to like about the FAA.

Then there's this.

I had a photo shoot all set in South Florida with the great folks from Daher Socata to photograph one of their lovely new TBM 900s (http://www.flyingmag.com/aircraft/turboprops/new-tbm-900-features-improved-performance-comfort). Gorgeous plane, different story.

We did the shoot — two of them in fact. One was in the afternoon over the Everglades and the second one was the following morning over the Atlantic Coast near South Beach. Our flight consisted of my photo ship pilot, consummate pro Bruce Moore, our safety pilot, Cesar Eugenio, with photo subject pilot Wayman Luy, a Daher Socata Pilot, and subject plane safety pilot (and Chipmunk owner operator) Michel De Villiers, also of Daher Socata.

The shoots went off great, though we did have to hunt hard for sunlight on a few occasions. Luckily, Bruce has a great nose for good light.

The highlight of the shoots was our circuits of South Beach. We steered well clear of restricted airspace and conducted the mission within full compliance of the FARs.

Which is why what happened the next morning surprised me.

Wayman emailed me the next day saying that an FAA inspector had called him asking about the shoot. The FAA guy, Wayman said, informed him that the FAA's office had gotten phone calls about two airplanes flying close together over the beach.

Now, I am tempted to discuss how desperate for attention or ignorant of the sky above them someone who made such a call has to be. I mean, were they afraid that the two planes didn't see each other as they made turns and remained in perfect formation? Or that the formation was part of a two-light-plane leading edge of a wave of invading Pipers and Cessnas planning to descend upon South Florida? Who knows, maybe they were worried we were snowbirds coming down at exactly the wrong time of year and they wanted to warn us. In any case, every one of those calls was a call that never should have been made.

No, the thing that really got me mad was what the FAA guy asked Wayman to do next. According to Wayman, the inspector said he was fully aware that our flight was perfectly legal, but he asked us that we not do it anyways. Well, at least not over populated areas, which is also perfectly legal as long as you maintain legal altitude, which we did, and then some.

The message I got was, the FAA wanted us not just to obey the FARs but to give up some of our precious airspace and flying freedoms so they wouldn't get any more phone calls from confused citizens.

Um, sorry, but no.
Read more at FAA: Stop That, It's Legal! | Flying Magazine (http://www.flyingmag.com/blogs/going-direct/faa-stop-its-legal#RUdPrUHiJJQMkuTI.99)
Yep says it all really...:ok:

[Kharon]

Because many important safety concerns are reported to the ATSB through REPCON, it is vital that all of industry is aware of, and can learn from, the reported concerns.

Handing over – we can't get CASA to fix the issues; we no longer have a credible safety publication to place the valuable articles in, so we just cop out, right here. You kids out there can glean your own safety cures from the Repcon. Never mind the overseas folk, we have them trained to wait two years for the report. Who cares if life vests don't work properly, it's a unique domestic issue and anyway, we have registered our differences with ICAO. FFS.

See here, this is what we mean by cop out.

The published information will include details about safety concerns, as well as responses and safety actions taken by relevant organisations or government agencies about the concern.

Who'd expect the Safety Bureau to get the changes made eh? The NTSB must be reaching for a bucket; or perhaps the stop-me- laughing pills. Strewth....

REPCON serves to collect information about safety concerns in the aviation, marine and rail industries, to help facilitate safety action and, ultimately, improve transport safety.

Please show us one aviation item published recently where the ATSB recommendation has been taken on board and a tangible safety benefit has been produced; one 'real' one will do. It's all Bollocks – spin for the punters and the dopey politicians, who shake their wizened heads, nod sagely and do SFA except sign off on insulting responses to serious safety issues, raised by an educated Senate committee; smiling all the while....

What's wrong with this bloke, he has a good budget, good people, plenty of muscular law to support anything reasonable; so why all the Uriah Heep like hand wringing, obfuscation, humble PC crap and why, in the name of all the hells are CASA dictating the conclusions. The technical parts of the few reports we see are acceptable, definitely not stellar; but, the back few pages are completely beyond the pale. Bloody useless is how most describe them.

Uriah Heep

Fetch a bucket Minnie, a big one.

[SIUYA]

Kharon...

Who cares if life vests don't work properly, it's a unique domestic issue and anyway, we have registered our differences with ICAO. FFS.

Did you forget that the fact that life vests did or didn't work properly may not even be considered IAW the differences filed with respect to Annex 13, because, according to the ATSB under Dolan's (mis)management:

Decisions on whether a particular domestic accident will be investigated depend on resources, and the likely benefit to future safety, particularly in the general aviation sector.

Refer AIP Appendix 2 to SUP H18/14.

So, Kharon, if your scenario involved GA, then it looks as though you may as well assume that an investigation of the life vests probably WASN'T included, because it would have involved a cost.

FFS. :ugh:

[Kharon]

There are a couple on 'new' threads which raise some interesting questions about the new look ATSB web site and search 'philosophy'. I can't find the Sarcs post which first mentioned the 'new' system, bemoaning the loss of weekly summaries and noting how difficult it was to 'mine' the data required. I did have a whack at trying to 'navigate' through the wretched thing, only to give it up feeling slightly nauseous.

Trusting the Creampuff cock up over conspiracy system after reading the Ramble and Framer posts, I have spent some little time trying to research similar events and to generally make a honest attempt to find some 'useful' information. It's bloody hopeless – I am not one of those who can claim expertise at data mining, but can, normally, with patience (and tender words) extract the information needed; eventually. But I get the feeling that the ATSB site almost deliberately sets out to confound, the NTSB and other agencies all seem to have open, easy to navigate sites (by comparison). Some even offer to facilitate 'your research' if it's abstruse, for a modest fee (of course).

Ramble On. (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/539358-atsb-weekly-summaries.html)

It appears that the ATSB have just recently removed Aviation Weekly Summaries from their website.
Their new system is not fit for any practical purpose other than statistics.
The ATSB should take a leaf from the NTSB and list occurrences on a daily basis.

Its a valuable tool to see the nature of occurrences and what incidents are trending and at what locations.

Whomever introduced this new ATSB system demonstrates little practical knowledge of aviation operations.

The thing which prompts this post is 'Framer' doing a bit of research into the frequency with which runways are made unavailable (sudden like); probably break the data down into single runway and multiple runway airports and intersection events. It's worthwhile, even if it proves that 'statistically' the risks are low; there are those who would promote carrying an alternate and those who say it's a waste. It's tough enough to have a sensible discussion with facts, let alone without. The information sought should be readily available; it's not as though the data is not there.

Framer. (http://www.pprune.org/pacific-general-aviation-questions/539393-unforecast-airfield-closures.htm) I would like to compile a list of unforecast airfield closures in Australia since the NZAA lights went out a few years back.
Perhaps a Repcon; Oi, ya website is crap; howz about making it useful.

[Sarcs]

While the miniscule & his team of dept crats are otherwise distracted with balancing the books for 2014-15, the Ferryman’s last perhaps provides a welcome diversion from the future ‘doom & gloom’ of TA’s budgetary crisis..

Kharon: "..But I get the feeling that the ATSB site almost deliberately sets out to confound, the NTSB and other agencies all seem to have open, easy to navigate sites (by comparison). Some even offer to facilitate 'your research' if it's abstruse, for a modest fee (of course)..."

Beaker & Co should have nothing to hide so why the seemingly impenetrable website?? The ATsB’s primary function is to promote open & free dissemination of vital safety findings, lessons, research and recommendations to further enhance safety risk mitigation for the greater worldwide aviation industry. Beaker should be promoting the good work his investigators, researchers & data entry folk are doing on the coalface. So why is the ATsB (in its current form) so obtuse (almost retrograde) in how they go about their primary function??

The four year cycle
As long as we can all remember the, once beloved, bureau (BASI/ATSB) had always been the cash strapped poor cousins to the FF behemoth. Yet with limited resources they still punched above their weight and in accordance with Annex 13 were lorded as setting a benchmark for a small but effective State AAI.

It wasn’t till 2000 with the Whyalla accident investigation that the wheels started to fall off and for the first time the bureau started to cop independent, external & international flak.

Then we had the 2004 ICAO audit of the ATsB which came up with the following finding and recommendation in regards to compliance with Annex 13:
FINDING:
The ATSB’s policy is to place the primary focus on fare-paying passengers and to investigate all fatal accidents (unless they involve sport aviation). However, accidents that are considered to have little potential benefit for prevention may not be investigated in detail. In such cases, the ATSB would not necessarily attend the scene,conduct an in-depth investigation or produce an extensive report.

RECOMMENDATION:
The ATSB should investigate all accidents as defined by Annex 13. The depth of such investigations should be at least to a level where it is evident that no further enhancement of aviation safety can be achieved.

To which the ATSB responded with this:

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROPOSED BY THE ATSB:
This recommendation is related to the earlier recommendation at Appendix 2-2 and the ATSB response at 2-2 is also relevant. The ICAO audit recommendation that all accidents should be investigated at least to a level where it is evident that no further enhancement of aviation safety can be achieved has significant budgetary implications that are outside of the control of the ATSB. While many accidents are essentially repetitive and involve little new safety learning and diminishing returns in their investigation, it is rarely possible to be so absolute as to assess that no further enhancement of aviation safety can be achieved by further investigation.

The ATSB will, before the end of August 2004, advise the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the Departmental Secretary and the Department of Finance and Administration of the audit recommendation and its budgetary implications.

Which led to a rather prolonged action response:

ACTION TAKEN BY THE ATSB:
The ATSB formally briefed the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services on the final ICAO Audit and its recommendations by Minute dated 22 October 2004. This Minute was also the formal mechanism for briefing the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) Secretary and Deputy Secretaries. The ATSB briefed the Department of Finance and Administration (DOFA) at Division Head level on the ICAO Audit with a focus on recommendations CE-3/02 and CE-5/03 on 23 November 2004 via the Department of Transport and Regional Services’s Chief Financial Officer. On 21 December 2004 the Department of Finance and Administration responded that any additional funding was a matter in the first instance for the Minister's consideration against other priorities in his portfolio. DOFA stated also that only proposals with specific authority from the Cabinet or the Prime Minister were eligible for budget consideration.

In 2007-08 the ATSB was funded to undertake approximately 80 new aviation safety investigations of which about 30 are of the more comprehensive variety. Choice of the 80 from approximately 8000 accidents and incidents reported was based on published selection criteria. In addition, for the financial years 2007-08 to 2009-10 the ATSB was provided with additional budget funding to assist Indonesia with its transport safety improvement program.

But despite these initiatives, on the next four year cycle the bureau copped this finding & recommendation, again from ICAO {It is worth noting that 2008 was when Beaker first started his tenure and there was an underspend in the fiscal year 2008-09}:

AUDIT FINDING AIG/01
Funding for aviation accident investigations is provided by the Federal Government of Australia through the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government.

To make the most of the funding allocated to it, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has established guidelines to determine whether to investigate an occurrence with the level of response to a notification determined by resource availability and such factors as:
1. existence of fatalities;
2. anticipated safety value of an investigation;
3. extent of public, media or political interest;
4. timeliness of notification;
5. training benefit for ATSB investigators;
6. likely possibility of safety action arising from the investigation or the existence of supporting
evidence or requirements to conduct a special investigation based on trends;
7. safety analysis or an identified targeted programme; and
8. scope or impact of any system failures.

Under the ATSB guidelines, occurrences that may fit the ICAO Annex 13’s definition of an aircraft accident or incident may not be investigated. Although the ATSB submits a notification of these occurrences to ICAO in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 provisions, the ATSB does not submit a preliminary report and/or an accident data report identifying contributing safety factors or probable cause.

And the response & action plan:

STATE’S COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS*
Australia has considered this finding and the related recommendations from the audit team.
Australia meets its Article 26 obligations. However, Australia has also lodged a difference with ICAO in relation to standard 5.1 and recommended practice 5.1.1 of Annex 13 as Australia considers it impractical to investigate all accidents and serious incidents within resources available. In addition to targeting those accidents and incidents that are likely to yield the greatest safety value in accordance with the guidelines quoted above, Australia normally gives priority to investigations of accidents and serious incidents involving regular public transport aircraft (especially with fare-paying passengers) and accidents involving fatalities other than those involving ultralights and sport aviation.

Australia notes that the investigation of accidents and serious incidents has been included for
discussion at the ICAO Accident Investigation and Prevention (AIG) Divisional meeting in October 2008. ATSB will participate in this discussion as it relates to upgrading recommendation 5.1.1 to a standard and allocating resources to those investigations that will yield the greatest safety value.

Australia may review its investigation policy following the AIG meeting.

Which led to the notified differences (highlighted by SIUYA) recorded in the ASA AIP SUP H12/11 in 2011 {Note: More on the notified differences later because there is some rather disturbing additions in the latest H18/14 SUP}.

Then we fast forward a further 4 years to the PelAir inquiry where we had another independent external body (i.e. the Senate Committee) which was heavily critical of the ATsB using lack of resources as an excuse to not thoroughly investigate (as per Annex 13) the Norfolk VH-NGA ditching. The Committee also made this recommendation:

Recommendation 9
4.103 The committee recommends that the government develop a process by which the ATSB can request access to supplementary funding via the minister.

More to follow on bean counter Beaker’s fiscal discipline, his new notified differences to Annex 13 & the history of REPCON (WOFTAM)…:ugh::ok:

[SIUYA]

Sarcs...

According to the ATSB Annual Plan for 2013-2014, the 'weasel words' are still being used to evade the obligations under paragraph 5.1 of Annex 13 to investigate ....... accidents.

We will work to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and timeliness of investigations. The ATSB's highest priority is investigations of accidents and safety occurrences that deliver improved transport safety outcomes for the travelling public. We will also give priority to investigating serious incidents or patterns of incidents.

I find it hard to understand how the Commissioners believe that the ATSB is actually maximising its contribution to aviation safety if its priority is on the travelling public, because that inevitably will result in it not always focussing its efforts at every occasion where they will '...likely result in safety improvements.'

The PEL-AIR investigation demonstrated that quite clearly.

There is no hope for the ATSB under the current (mis)management. :ugh:

[yr right]

We'll there is a white wash being undertakeimg right at this present time with the m18 turbine dromadra. There are people in the back ground at present that are doing everything in the power to try and make this not to happen. Casa and Atsb have laid there cards on the table now. Still wiring for the final report from David's accident.
Let's hope that David's loss is not in vain and heads roll at casa and not the person they trying to pin it on now. They know for over 10 years about the proem and done nothing.

Cheers

[Jinglie]

YR right,
Get the facts on these guys and go to the Senate with solid evidence. They will back you. Vale David . RIP.

[Kharon]

Jinglie #1907 –"Get the facts on these guys and go to the Senate with solid evidence."

The Senate committee were onto the game and were all set to 'cut 'em a new one'; the WLR surfaced with a tight brief and narrow scope, even with those constraints they managed to bury the industry submissions. When the hoo-hah of the WLR is over, we can only hope that Fawcett becomes the aviation 'go-to-man' and Xenophon retains his zeal to get to the bottom of this putrid barrel we call aviation oversight and safety.

I believe Truss has been, once again, badly advised. His committee in the parliament Senate are cranky, they have had a glimpse of the truth; and, with a bit of luck after the budget brouhaha has calmed down; they will get back to work. Next estimates and probably the next few weeks will tell the tale; how much of that story will 'escape' into daylight is unknown. The hatch, match and dispatch list from Sleepy Hollow may give some clues.

As it stands, the neutered Senate committee represents a tragedy in a great waste of time, talent and money.

[Sarcs]

Stick it..:ok:..said:According to the ATSB Annual Plan for 2013-2014, the 'weasel words' are still being used to evade the obligations under paragraph 5.1 of Annex 13 to investigate ....... accidents.
Maybe the Ozfucation of Annex 13 is all about recouping the taxpayer funds spent (some would say wasted) on previous big bureau investigations, like Whyalla (over $15 million) & Lockhart ( over $20 million). To follow on...maybe the hiring of bean counter Beaker was put in place to save for the next big 'event horizon'?? :{:ugh:


But back to the Annex 13 and the bureau notified differences, from 2008 ICAO audit report...

"...Australia meets its Article 26 obligations. However, Australia has also lodged a difference with ICAO in relation to standard 5.1 and recommended practice 5.1.1 of Annex 13 as Australia considers it impractical to investigate all accidents and serious incidents within resources available..."

Which led to this, in our massively expanded :ooh: version of AIP GEN 1.7, para 5.1 ND (NB: copied from SUP H18/14 , same as for H12/11):

http://i1238.photobucket.com/albums/ff498/004wercras/Annex13ch5same.jpg



However, most disturbingly, the Annex 13 differences did not stop at para 5.1 and it would appear that the 'weasel words' have continued unabated in the latest version of GEN 1.7 (SUP H18/14)...:{

Quick compare for IOS consumption...

Chapter 5 (2014) addition:

http://i1238.photobucket.com/albums/ff498/004wercras/Annex13diffadd1.jpg

Chapter 6 (2011) deletion:

http://i1238.photobucket.com/albums/ff498/004wercras/Annex13para68deleted.jpg

Chapter 7 & 8 comparison...

SUP H12/11:

http://i1238.photobucket.com/albums/ff498/004wercras/Annex13diffch7-8H12.jpg

SUP H18/14:

http://i1238.photobucket.com/albums/ff498/004wercras/Annex13diffch7-8H18.jpg

So it can be seen that Beaker (& his minions) have got the hang of this ICAO ozfucation thingy..:ugh:..and all in the name of saving us millions??? :rolleyes:

While on the subject of NDs to Annex 13 and in light of this comment from the bureau in reply to CE-3/02 of the 2004 audit....

"...However, the ATSB is not aware of many, if any, ICAO states that do not face a budget constraint that impacts the number and extent of accident and serious incident investigations..."

...I thought it might be prudent to do a quick compare with some other ICAO states, starting with the current benchmark in our region i.e. Singapore which, surprisingly, also has a ND for para 5.1:Singapore

ANNEX 13 Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, 10th edition
Chapter 5 (Amendment 13)

5.1.2 ICAO requires States to investigate serious incident involving aircraft of a maximum certificated take-off (MCT) mass of over 2250kg. With effect from 2 August 2010, Singapore requires all serious incidents to be investigated, regardless of the aircraft’s MCT mass.
Gotta love the Singas...:D:D

And here's a couple more for comparison with a link to NZed:


Hong Kong
13. ANNEX 13 - AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION (9th edition, Amendment 13)
Nil
Canada
Annex 13, Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
Nil
NZ Annex 13 differences (http://www.caa.govt.nz/ICAO/Annex_13_Amdt_14_EFOD.pdf)



Yep SIUYA weasel words indeed...MTF Sarcs...:ok:

[SIUYA]

"...However, the ATSB is not aware of many, if any, ICAO states that do not face a budget constraint that impacts the number and extent of accident and serious incident investigations..."

Really? :suspect:

Chicago Convention - Article 38 Departures from international standards and procedures

Any State which finds it impracticable to comply in all respects with any such international standard or procedure, or to bring its own regulations or practices into full accord with any international standard or procedure after amendment of the latter, or which deems it necessary to adopt regulations or practices differing in any particular respect from those established by an international standard, shall give immediate notification to the International Civil Aviation Organization of the differences between its own practice and that established by the international standard.

The Ninth Edition of the Supplement to ICAO Annex 13 that was published in 2003 contained a list of Contracting States which had notified ICAO that no differences exist with regard to their compliance with the standards and recommended practices of ICAO Annex 13, as follows:

Austria
Bahrain
Barbados
Belgium
Botswana
Canada
Chile
China
China (Hong Kong SAR)
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Denmark
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Germany
Ghana
Guatemala
Iceland
India
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Ireland
Italy
Kuwait
Latvia
Lebanon
Lithuania
Malawi
Malaysia
Mexico
Namibia
Netherlands
Niger
Norway
Pakistan
Philippines
Qatar
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Suriname
Thailand
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Uganda
United Arab Emirates
United Republic of Tanzania
Viet Nam
Yemen
Zambia

Seems like the person who made the comment in 2004 about the ATSB not being aware of ...many, if any... ICAO states that do not face a budget constraint that impacts the number and extent of accident and serious incident investigations didn't read the Supplement before shooting from the lip, doesn't it, because it that was a case then the States in question would have needed to file a difference.

:ugh:

[Kharon]

Ever watched the kids on a slippery dip? – some who try desperately to stop; others who manage to stop and then try to run back up to the top; all ends in tears. All you can do is pray they don't get too hurt or hurt others while the hard lessons of life are learned.

That's how our impoverished ATSB seem to be to me, stuck halfway on the slippery path to perdition, led to this sorry impasse by bureaucrats, politicians and bean counters; seduced by association with some of the darkest forces ever to hold sway over matters aeronautical, ably assisted by an incompetent, parsimonious management squadron of trained buffoons and spin kings. Have a look at the calm, professional bunch running the AMSA, then decide.

Some cultures do not place very much value on a human life, never have and are not likely to change. This is not the Australian way; men and women from the armed forces, police, ambulance services, fire-fighters and many, many more daily demonstrate the value we as a nation place on life. Where someone dies or is hurt there is an inquiry of some description – even a humble coroners court will attempt to define the cause and create some form of preventative measure, where practical and possible. We have an extensive, expensive system of rule, regulation, law, protocol, practice and common sense that attempts, barring stupidity, to prevent the unnecessary wasting of life.

Cause; now there's a word to consider: in the Beaker lexicon, a life is only as valuable as his parsimonious edicts say it is. You die in an aircraft tomorrow, the ATSB may, or may not deem your incident worthy of investigation, just a GA prang, move along. It may well be that there is some 'value' to the investigation: but only so far as to shift the blame; or, to be in concert with what the 'big dogs' want. No, not bollocks; look about you, see what you are spoon fed for reports, see what is passed off as 'cause', see what is milked as blame, see what is done to prevent, see, if you dare, what impact the 'investigation' has on the 'authority' responsible. You don't need to look very far or very deep, just ask any Pel Air committee Senator.

You can read it in the H14/18 words, these are 'differences'; scripted by lawyers who know how to appear ICAO compliant, while arrogantly flipping the bird at the ICAO spirit, intent and the rest of the world. Australia's Annexe 13 is a calculated, cynical exercise designed to confound the unwashed masses and makes a cuckold of the ICAO. No other country makes a such an open mockery of accident investigation, is selective in what it will investigate and blatantly blames this on lack of 'resources'. The budget may be constrained but there's no reason not to spend it – all of it and ask for more if needed. Hells bells that 'Direct action' outfit cleans up $2.55 Billion in handouts, surely we could use some of that so as not be an international, smart arse pariah, crying poor at every (given, taken or engineered) opportunity. Shame on you.

No other country takes the Mickey out of 'confidential' reporting; read what we say in H18/14:- Chapter 8 paragraph 8.2 – read it and weep. The only thing not provided to CASA is the pilot name; same - same for Repcon – colour of socks to date time place of the alleged incident; even if you reported yourself. Signed confession; and, ATSB dare claim to be 'puzzled' by a sharp decline in the numbers of 'reports'. FFS why hide it – we tell CASA all as per the MOU, which we will call 'differences'.

Have a look at the SIUYA list of other NAA, then have a look at any of the ICAO annexe 13 protocols; almost every country bar Australia is in tune, investigates accidents 'properly', generates reports and safety recommendations. The dinosaurs departed the fix many, many moons ago. It's time now for our cynical, parsimonious, deviate system to head in that direction.

Just stop it before Australia gets hurt – or ICAO spot the deliberate, systematic rapine of what should be a world class safety outfit, reporting honestly, openly and regularly to the industry it is paid to serve.

Arrrggggh – steam off.

[yr right]

The facts are in and documented but still if the go the white wash going cost him $$$$$$$$$$$$$ to prove him self innocent while they get away with it. Watch this space
Cheers

[SIUYA]

Ummmm...

Can you run that by us again please yr right? :confused:

Not too sure I'm with you there unfortunately.

[yr right]

was in reply to this statement, they have the facts and statements but they in to deep now and cya themselves and looking to knock someone up for there own failings it seams as though they found that person sadly.


Get facts


YR right,
Get the facts on these guys and go to the Senate with solid evidence. They will back you. Vale David . RIP


cheers

[Kharon]

SIUYA -Can you run that by us again please yr right?

Yr right – "was in reply to this statement, they have the facts and statements but they in to deep now and cya themselves and looking to knock someone up for there own failings it seams as though they found that person sadly

Without meaning to offend – I have been reading the Yr-right posts in an attempt to join the dots and get a picture. To do this some assumptions were needed, no doubt YR will correct any errors or omissions.

a) "Dave" – was the pilot of the Drom involved in the fatal fire bombing accident, the one where the wing came off and was known to YR.

b) There has been a wrangle going on for many years related to concerns over the CASA ruling which allowed gross overloads; for special tasks.

c) YR is probably an 'engineering type' with much inside knowledge of the arguments, for and against, the modified weight, airframe modifications, maintenance and operations.

If that is ball park accurate, then we can join up another dot in the YR 'puzzle'. The investigation is complete and CASA are somehow implicated, by association, with the accident as the responsible authority which allowed the 'over-weight' operations. Which, from the last YR post, leads me (blindly) to the conclusion that 'someone else', probably an engineer is on the blame game chopping block for the accident. IF this is the case, then the anger and frustration in the post is understandable.

Yr right – "The facts are in and documented but still if the go the white wash going cost him $$$$$$$$$$$$$ to prove him self innocent while they get away with it.

Just saying – but I often stumble over the YR posts and the daemon curiosity whispers in my ear. No offence YR, but if this is the case.....always room for one more on the ferry.

Toot toot.

[yr right]

Look I am sorry but am limited to what I can and cant say as it has gone before the senate and is still under investigation by CASA the inquest and then possibly a trail for the person involved. But you are right on the mark 4 deaths in Australia alone. Aircraft now parked up all over the place just a sorry mess at the end of the day.
The extended hopper was for bulk not liquid and hence we have wing fitting failures this was told to CASA approx. 10 years ago, what we can hope for if the inquest can reopen the other accidents and relook at what happened and maybe place blame where it rightly should be. And yes I am a LAME. What upsets me is they going to try and lay blame at a person that in the course of there duties didn't find anything wrong with the aircraft. The day was not fit for flying a kite let alone fight a fire in thoose conditions and an RFS officer believed to have said oh the real pilots are flying . Then we loose a life.


Its sad frustrating that it had to come to this.


Cheers

[SIUYA]

yr right ...

You're right!

I initially didn't 'join the dots' from your post, but it's all coming back to me now.

From what I can recall, there was nearly a 50% increase in MTOM under the STC for the modification to that aircraft.

The NZ CAA addressed increases to MTOM with modifications in Civil Aeronautics Manual (CAM 8), as follows:


7 – Weight and Balance

7.0 General This section stressed the importance of weight to the structure, of weight control and balance, and that if approved limits are exceeded then flight tests should be made.

7.1 General Effects of Gross Weight Changes This section begins a discussion on the relationship between the design load factor and gross weight. It made the point that gross weights chosen should permit safe operation under all normal and emergency conditions. The chart that is currently reproduced in CAR Part 137 Appendix B is mentioned as a guide to determining gross weight provided the aircraft is flown in a restricted manner.

7.10 Effects of Gross Weight Changes on Aircraft Structure This section noted that the aircraft landing gear and supporting structure are particularly critical if the aircraft is landed overweight; and taxiing is very likely to be unfavourably affected by increased gross weights.

With the increase in gross weight there must be a proportionate decrease in the load factor that can be reached in flight. It again notes that caution should be exercised in all flights at overload weights whether or not they are below the possible maximum. There was some discussion on the distribution of load with respect to the structural strain on the fuselage

7.11 Effects of Gross Weight Changes on Maneuvers This section notes that to prevent excessive loading the aircraft must be maneuvered cautiously, and that the stalling speeds are increased and stalls in turns are more easily encountered. A lower allowable load factor means restricting bank angle. Another factor is gust loads; the level flight and never exceed speeds should be reduced by the ratio of specification weight to overload weight but not below maneuvering speed. Again it advised caution in all flight conditions. There was discussion about pull-up speeds and the use of full deflection of control surfaces.

Source: Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review - Agricultural Aircraft Safety Review (http://www.caa.govt.nz/GA/Ag_Aviation/Ag_Aircraft_Safety_Review.htm)

Seems to me that under the circumstances, the factors considered by the NZ CAA may have been applicable?

[Sarcs]

Good pick up SIUYA...:ok: Once again a disturbing tale of CYA (cover your ass) at all costs, seems to be filtering out in the aftermath of the RFS fire bombing tragedy. Going by yr right's last post, it would seem the standard BTP i.e. blame the pilot modus operandi (bit hard in this case) of FF has shifted to BTE (blame the engineer)...:ugh:

As YR mentions this matter has been queried in the Senate by none other than the Heff himself, who will all know by now is a Terrier and will not let the matter slide :D

[YOUTUBE]RRAT Estimates 18/11/13 - Chair concern with RFS fire bombing Ops - YouTube

Which illicited this 'weasel worded'..:rolleyes:..response from (& referred to by YR) FF to the Heff QON: Rural & Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON NOTICE Supplementary Budget Estimates November 2013 Infrastructure and Regional Development
Question no.: 131
Program: n/a
Division/Agency: (CASA) Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Topic: Relationship between CASA and the Rural Fire Service
Proof Hansard Page/s: 52 (18/11/2013)

Senator Heffernan asked:

Mr McCormick: I can give you a notice, if you like, about the relationship between us and the Rural Fire Service.

CHAIR: I think it is not between the pilot and the Rural Fire Service; it has to be between you and the Rural Fire Service. There needs to be some steadying influence in the cowboy attitude at times. I am not alleging anything, broadly, but it is an uncomfortable feeling that a lot of very learned, experienced pilots have. This guy was disgusted that a remark would be made: 'Are you a man or aren't you? Get up there!' I can give you the details.

Mr McCormick: We will look into that.

Answer: CASA provides oversight of Air Operator Certificate holders, including those who conduct aerial firefighting operations under a commercial relationship with the Rural Fire Service. CASA does not oversight Rural Fire Service organisations directly.

CASA has been advised by the NSW Rural Fire Service that it is undertaking an investigation into the matter raised by Senator Heffernan. CASA has requested a copy of that report when completed, and will consider its content in respect of any aviation safety concerns.
From that it would appear it is all in the lap of the gods but the signs are ominous that another CYA SOP action is being crafted behind closed doors...:{

[Kharon]

Seems like Heff is onto this fire bomber farce (good on 'im); it's yet another page in his ever expanding notebook of aviation atrocities. Said it before; this Senate committee is bloody furious and the arrogant handlers of the likes of McComic have over estimated the strength of the cards they hold; at the end of the day a Senate royal flush will trump a public servant bluff. Just watch NSW ICAC, one squeals, down they all go.

The 'official' attitude is summed up in the "real pilots are flying" speech. Think on that for a moment,- some ground dwelling office wallah wants to tell an Ag pilot who is fire fighting to "Man up"; Un-Furkin (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Furkin)-Believable. The only reason that fool still has teeth in his head is that he didn't say it to me. Seriously; there are limits to contractual politeness. I can only hope Heff tracks this idiot down and sends him my way: for quiet 'chat' over tea and biccy's....behind the shed.

In the video McComic tried to huff, puff and bluff his way out, once again CASA fail the industry it is paid to serve. The Ag boys will go flying, too much money to ignore; they will carry as much as (legally approved) possible; that's the nature of the beast. The RFS want them out there carrying whatever. So somewhere there must be a balance – to even dare to challenge a pilot in that fashion should have brought McComic screaming out of his kennel. But no; (anti-climax) McComic is quite happy to apply the law, just as long as he can rely on the 'expertise' of the operators (to act as CASA approved); nice little get out of jail card that one. Then there's always the trusty pilot, engineer or operator 'error' blame card to robustly apply at a later date, with 20/20 hindsight. Now – Oh, they are 'grounded'. – Excellent choice, stellar management. Crazy stuff.

[yr right]

always the trusty pilot, engineer or operator 'error' blame card to robustly apply at a later date, with 20/20 hindsight


That's if its given after the fact. They where and still being told for the last 10 years that's not 20/20 hindsight sorry. I cant say loudly enough how long ago they where told of this problem. The sad thing is they turned there heads away and closed there ears.


Now don't forget the AAAA are in this as well and they wont to self regulate how the hell can any possibly think that a great idea only one person who wants to make a name for him self and as he told me he has NO aviation knowledge.


Its such a mess where been all put into. Now somehow we got to get out of it. I don't believe aviation has been in a more dangerous place than what we find ourselves into now.

Cheers

[004wercras]

I enjoy Yr's posts - Somewhat elusive, often cryptic, occasionally bizzare often downright odd, but yet in his own way very informative! Reminds me of the night that myself, Herr Kharon and Gobbledock played Word Yahtzee after two bottles of Jack Daniels while sitting beneath a crimson sunset on the deck of the Styx River boat as we sailed up to a government department to pick up a large contingent of passengers.


But Yr makes a valid point. The regulators 'feelings' towards 'Dave' are despicable. Blame the pilot, blame the engineer, blame the one armed man with one testicle and gingivitis, blame everyone for having a hand in any accident except of course the two-bit hack outfit Regulator.
Go for it Heff, take it to these morons.


TICK TOCK

[dubbleyew eight]

I enjoy Yr's posts - Somewhat elusive, often cryptic, occasionally bizzare

I must say I have revised my opinion of yr considerably. he's a good cookie.

what you are haphazardly documenting here is what I see as the core enduring incompetence that is CAsA.
they have little or no serious aeronautical engineering competence and yet as the countries' NAA (national airworthiness authority) they are making variations to aircraft permissions that have no basis in competent engineering.

They have systematically worked to kill off manufacturing in this country to avoid having to be competent.

CAsA are a disaster. They should not be allowed to change the aviation environment to make their inadequacies in this regard in any way acceptable.

Lawyers simply cannot do what aeronautical engineers should be doing.

[halfmanhalfbiscuit]

W8 Lawyers simply cannot do what aeronautical engineers should be doing.

The technical people LAMEs, pilots, engineers etc seem marginalized by lawyers, HR, IR and a general public sector way.

CASA never have understood certification, engineering and manufacturing adequately for an NAA. Some treat the same as maintenance. Where is the approved data ? Err, that is what certification program will achieve.

There is manufacturing in Australia. But as tier 1 suppliers working under supplier approval to OEM's without any casa involvement.

[Kharon]

It's not often, these days anyway, to do anything else when CASA of ATSB are mentioned other than doubt the probity or value of anything said or written; but back in 2008, when an M18 had a wing failure, both agencies did a first rate job. It's very satisfying to be able to say that. The curiosity bump was driving me spare, so a drop or two of midnight oil was burned in an attempt to assuage the itch. Started – HERE (http://www.pprune.org/pacific-general-aviation-questions/526178-aircraft-contracted-rfs-down-nsw-south-coast.html#post8114326)– (of course) and found this:-

DFE flieger # 35 – "I think this is probably the link you are after wheatbix:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3532975/ao2008084.pdf

It makes reference (Pages 43 to 46 or thereabouts) to the original MTOW of the M18 being 4200kg, and by supplemental amendments and exemptions, increases in MTOW to 4700, then 5300kg, then finally to 6600kg for fire-fighting work. These changes involved reductions in allowable load factors, Vne, Vno and factoring of hours of service, such that 1 hour of flight time would count for more than 1 hour of service life, depending on actual takeoff weights. The report also discusses problems with recordkeeping and tracking of actual takeoff weights, among other issues that could potentially lead to structural problems, and how CASA would act to prevent the problem that occurred in the linked report from recurring."

There are almost 100 pages comprising the excellent, most refreshing ATSB report. Lately I seem to end up 'hunting' for facts and pertinent information; but not this time. The report is well worth reading; of particular interest are the following pages:-

Aircraft modifications - ATSB page 8 (p 18 pdf).
Tests and research – ATSB page 37 (p 47 pdf).
Overweight operations – ATSB page 40 (p 50 pdf).
Aircraft manufacturer-approved overweight operation. ATSB page 41 (p 51 pdf).
CASA general weight exemptions - ATSB page 44 (p 55 pdf).

The following are cherry picked paragraphs from the report:-

During the course of the investigation, it was determined that a number of operators of the aircraft type were not applying the appropriate service life factors to determine the effective hours flown when their aircraft were operated at take-off weights above 4,700 kg. The effect was to overestimate the remaining service life of those aircraft.

It was also found that operators had an interpretation of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) exemptions that, by their understanding, permitted operation at weights in excess of the maximum take-off weight and allowed them to operate at higher take-off weights without the need to account for the additional limitation imposed by the manufacturer for operation at those weights.

As a result of the accident, the following safety action has been taken or proposed:
• The operator undertook a retrospective process of applying the service life factors to its aircraft fleet during operations that had involved take-off weights above 4,700 kg and will apply them to all relevant future flights.

• CASA advised that they had contacted Certificate of Registration holders of M18 Dromader aircraft to verify that they had a procedure for recording and factoring aircraft hours that included overweight operations. Further verification would also occur as part of CASA’s routine surveillance program. CASA also advised that they will provide education to operators on the intention of the exemptions and will be revising the exemptions to ensure that the intended interpretation is clear.

The original type-certified aircraft had a 9-cylinder, supercharged, radial engine, developing 967 shaft horsepower. In more recent years, modifications have incorporated more powerful turboprop engines. One such modification, which was approved under United States (US) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) number SA09039SC, used a Garrett model TPE331 turboprop engine. As a result of the engine change, the modification increased the length of the aircraft’s forward fuselage. After the incorporation of that modification, the aircraft was designated an M18A Dromader (TPE331).

Other modifications to the aircraft included increasing the capacity of the hopper from 2,650 L to 3,028 L, the installation of servo tabs14 to the flight controls, and installation of vortex generators on the wings. The vortex generator manufacturer claimed that the installation resulted in a 7% reduction in the aircraft’s aerodynamic stall speed.
All of the modifications were carried out in accordance with FAA STCs and/or Australian Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 35-approved engineering orders.

The upshot seems to be that the modifications made were not some 'back yard bodge up'; not by a long shot. The CASA approach appears to be 'sound' and if it is in error, then it has been on the side of 'reasoned' caution; the CASA operational approval is well supported and (IMO) justified. There was little else, of a practical nature that they could have realistically done. Good job by someone. Once again, most refreshing.

Which only leaves a couple of loose ends, questions if you like. Why is there no engineering data available to support claim of a 'highly dangerous' modification?; the ATSB went to some pains to troll the world looking for similar and came up dry. The AAAA and type operators seem to be a level headed bunch, safety conscious and have a vested interest in preserving life and promoting their services; so I wonder why there are no howls of protest or internal limitations imposed?; if anyone knows and can sensibly evaluate the risks, they can. No; IMO we must look elsewhere for answers this time. Old Akro (http://www.pprune.org/pacific-general-aviation-questions/526178-aircraft-contracted-rfs-down-nsw-south-coast-2.html#post8118133) # 40 makes some sense of the problem.

I just hope the 2014 ATSB report is as good. I think we may have to cut the ATSB and CASA some slack (benefit of doubt) this time, if the 2008 effort is anything to judge by. We'll just have to wait and see; but one would hope the RFS get a sternly worded letter spelling out the authority of the PIC - if the case is proved.

Itch scratched – Endit.

[Sunfish]

Ventus,it cracked from the edge of the hole, probably started at a tiny nick in the edge or a tiny manufacturing defect.

The problem with all this life factoring is that the fatigue life is determined not just by the load the joint has carried, but by the duration of the load - in effect the "stress strain history" of the joint for its entire life. Today digital recorders give us the possibility of actually recording something like that history but mostly we have to make approximations of what the loading history would look like and then test to destruction.

[Gas Bags]

Hey Sunfish...I am unfamiliar with the digital recorders you are talking about that will record the "stress strain history" of a joint such as a wing attach point. Can you shed more light?....Cheers

[yr right]

Gas bag

Most common is a strain gauge. If you can imagine a little stamp self adhesive that has like a "S" in the centre of it with wires to each end. As the material stretches under load the "S" also stretches and they can measure the resistance across the "S" this is recorded and then they can work out the load on the part. They put 100s on when testing.
With computers they can also do modelling with program's. But still sometimes you only have to use your own eyes to know what's going to work and what's not.
White man magic

Cheers

[Sarcs]

Dromader drift but there is a point…

Perhaps one of the most insightful statements ever made on the ANZ & P thread boards…

framer (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/527672-anz-erebus-crash-28-november-1979-34-years-later-9.html#post8474521) –"That's life, now we need to look at why we haven't learnt from it."

…was eerily echoed in the title and content of a blog from the Malaysian PM: This time, we have to act on lessons learned from an air tragedy (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/wall-street-journal/this-time-we-have-to-act-on-lessons-learned-from-an-air-tragedy/story-fnay3ubk-1226917874160)

“…The global aviation industry must not only learn the lessons of MH370 but implement them. The world learned from Air France but didn’t act. The same mistake must not be made again…”

Some of the key Safety Recommendations from AF 447 relevant to MH370 and what PM Najib is referring to:On the basis of this work, the BEA recommends that EASA and ICAO:
· extend as rapidly as possible to 90 days the regulatory transmission time for ULB’s installed on flight recorders on aeroplanes performing public transport flights over maritime areas;
· make it mandatory, as rapidly as possible, for aeroplanes performing public transport flights over maritime areas to be equipped with an additional ULB capable of transmitting on a frequency (for example between 8.5 kHz and 9.5 kHz) and for a duration adapted to the prelocalisation of wreckage;
· study the possibility of making it mandatory for aeroplanes performing public transport flights to regularly transmit basic flight parameters (for example position, altitude, speed, heading).

In addition, the BEA recommends that ICAO:
· ask the FLIRECP group to establish proposals on the conditions for implementing deployable recorders of the Eurocae ED-112 type for aeroplanes performing public transport flights.
On the basis of this work, the BEA recommends:
· that EASA and ICAO make mandatory as quickly as possible, for aeroplanes making public transport flights with passengers over maritime or remote areas, triggering of data transmission to facilitate localisation as soon as an emergency situation is detected on board;
and
· that EASA and ICAO study the possibility of making mandatory, for aeroplanes making public transport flights with passengers over maritime or remote areas, the activation of the emergency locator transmitter (ELT), as soon as an emergency situation is detected on board.

4.3 New Recommendations
4.3.1 SAR coordination plans over maritime and remote areas
Those responsible for Brazilian SAR stated that they did not know what means were available in the neighbouring SAR areas and had not tried to obtain information on the subject. Contrary to ICAO standards and recommended practices, there is no SAR coordination plan between Brazil and Senegal. This lack of a plan caused a considerable delay in the start of SAR operations.
Consequently, the BEA recommends that:
· ICAO ensure the implementation of SAR coordination plans or regional protocols covering all of the maritime or remote areas for which international coordination would be required in the application of SAR procedures, including in the South Atlantic area. [Recommendation FRAN-2012-032]
Drifting back to Dromaders and ‘other safety related (ATsBeaker) matters’…

yr right: “ I cant say loudly enough how long ago they where told of this problem. The sad thing is they turned there heads away and closed there ears”

And from Kharon’s post titled…2008 M18 – ATSB report (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/429828-merged-senate-inquiry-97.html#post8478410)…that when it came to the Dromader mod there were indeed lessons learnt and safety issues diligently recorded, yet fast forward to 2013 and these lessons/warnings appear to have been unheeded.

More disturbing is that the 2008 Dromader fatality is not isolated, for inaction by relevant authorities, and has ultimately led to there being similar causal factors in recent accidents/incidents.

Example: Cape Hillsborough EMS Chopper accident 2003 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24411/aair200304282_001.pdf) v ABC Chopper accident Lake Eyre 2011 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4366706/ao-2011-102_final_1_.pdf)
The Hillsborough accident also highlighted that there were outstanding Safety Recommendations that were (and still are) to be adequately addressed.

This apparent ineffective actioning (obfuscation) of SRs was further highlighted in the PelAir inquiry in a 2000 SR (see here (https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/recommendations/2000/r20000040.aspx)) addressed to the BOM. To be fair this SR was somewhat proactively addressed by the BOM and ultimately led to changes in the regs for provision of alternates for remote islands for RPT/Charter but not airwork.

On the subject of provision of alternates, reliability/dissemination of BOM Wx reports:

If we fast forward to the PelAir inquiry we saw a 50:50 split in the CAsA Flight Ops inspectorate on whether DJ should have diverted due wx forecast below alt minima. We also saw several aberrations in what wx information was/wasn’t transferred to VH-NGA inflight and several interpretations on how DJ (as PIC) could have/should have disseminated this wx information.
{Comment: It is worth pointing out that the ATSB investigators, up till the issuance of the prelim report (Jan 2010), had deduced that there was a safety issue in all this (confused interpretation) and deemed it significant enough to fwd to FF as ‘critical’ i.e. a CSI.}

Now if we fast fwd to the bureau Mildura fog incident investigation here (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2013/aair/ao-2013-100.aspx) (I know touchy subject for some), & refer to the ‘Safety Action’ section (besides the proposed ‘love in’) we get this on the future scoping of the investigation (my bold)…

“…The investigation is continuing and will:



examine the accuracy of aviation meteorological products in Australia
examine the procedures used to provide information to flight crews from air traffic services and management of changes to those procedures
examine the provision by the operators of information to the respective flight crews
examine the relevant recorded data
review the distribution, dissemination and sharing of operational information to the aviation industry as stipulated by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, and enacted by Airservices Australia and the Bureau of Meteorology…”

Which is all good stuff in theory (despite the possible thirteen plus year lag in possible lessons learnt), but on recent observations is this just more ‘weasel words’ to appease the IOS masses?

MTF…Sarcs :ok:

Addendum

On the subject of ‘weasel words’ and following on from my post #1909 & Kharon’s post #1911 (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/429828-merged-senate-inquiry-96.html#post8474098) (& the weasel worded notified difference for Annex 13 CH 8 ACCIDENT PREVENTION MEASURES Para 8.2), the bureau recently published a REPCON that is particularly relevant to this post:Reporter's concern

The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the procedure used by Airservices Australia to alert flight crews when a Hazard Alert is issued after the flight has departed.

The crew advised that recently they departed on a Melbourne to Sydney commercial high capacity flight at 0653 UTC (due to land at 0756 UTC). During the cruise, the controller advised that their expected landing time was now 0830 UTC.

As this was well outside the NOTAM, which advised a holding time of up to 15 minutes, the crew questioned if a Hazard Alert had been issued. They were advised that one had been issued at 0655 UTC, but no advice had been passed to the crew.

As this is not the first time this has happened, the reporter advised that there appears to be a systemic failure of the system in the flow of information to flight crew of flights which have departed after the Hazard Alert has been issued.

Operator's response (Operator 1)

Airservices Australia (Airservices) appreciates the opportunity to respond to the reported concern regarding the procedure used to inform flight crews of when Hazard Alerts are issued after the flight has departed.

Due to the de-identified nature of the report, Airservices is unable to comment on the specific circumstances of the reported concern and cannot verify the reporter's statement that similar incidents have previously occurred. However in order to address the reporter's concern Airservices has investigated the matter and can provide the following commentary.

Airservices notes that the provision of Hazard Alerts and flight information service (FIS) dissemination is not based on whether an aircraft has departed, but rather on whether the aircraft is within one hour flight time of the condition (see Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) Australia GEN 3.3 sections 2.1.1 and 2.5.4).

With specific reference to AIP GEN 3.3 section 2.1.1, aircraft within one hour flight time of the condition are required to be notified by air traffic control (ATC) of the existence of new operational information. Based on the information provided in the report, the aircraft should have been provided with the relevant information. If the information was not already described in a current meteorological (MET) product or Notice to Airmen (NOT AM) then ATC is required to communicate the information using the prefixed "HAZARD ALERT".

In response to the reporter's concern Airservices will remind controllers of their obligations regarding the provision of FIS to pilots.

Operator's response (Operator 2)

The reporter’s concern was also sent to the aircraft operator and the following is their response:

Hazard Alerts are usually issued by the Tower and / or the Enroute controller.

These are not generally communicated to Flight Dispatch or other operational entities within the operator.

ATC relays these alerts directly to the aircraft when no formal NOTAM is released.

If a NOTAM reflecting changes is released (pertaining to standard traffic holding or any other operational issues) it appears in our dispatch systems and is appropriately disseminated by our Flight Following unit. With regard to aircraft in flight, this is affected by means of ACARS and / or HF, and for aircraft on the ground by contacting the crew.

This process is incorporated into our Operations Manual and is strictly adhered to.

Regulator's response (Regulator 1)

CASA has reviewed the REPCON and notes Airservices response. CASA agrees that there appears to have been a lapse on the part of Air Traffic Control to provide a Hazard Alert. As the operator only has an obligation for flight following for Extended Diversion Time Operations and therefore, in this case were not required to monitor changes after a flight departs.

CASA also notes that the nature of confidential reporting makes it difficult for the air navigation service provider and the regulator to take specific action as there is insufficient detail provided to do so.

CASA will include this information as part of its risk assessment of the certificate holder.

ATSB comment

The following further response was received from Airservices Australia:

Consistent with our response dated 28 March 2014, Airservices has published a National Information Circular (NIC 15/2014 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4892763/Airservices%20Response%20to%20REPCON%20201400023%20Brief.pdf )) to all controllers reminding them of their obligations regarding the provision of FIS to pilots including the provision of Hazard Alerts.
So 'weasel words' or good proactive response, you be the judge..:E

MTF on the history of REPCON (WOFTAM) the bureau's obfuscation of ICAO Annex 13 plus the legalities of the bureau/FF 2010 MOU...:ok:

[yr right]

We will always have accidents. We need to try and limit that to the lowest point we can.
I won't release an aircraft I won't fly in. It's that simple. But when you get awi that pings you for not having a torque wrench for a tyre valve cap you then relize how f up we are now in. And yes that's happened not to me but a mate.

[Kharon]

Good work Sarcs. Nicely done. The Framer post is solid gold;

With specific reference to AIP GEN 3.3 section 2.1.1, aircraft within one hour flight time of the condition are required to be notified by air traffic control (ATC) of the existence of new operational information. Based on the information provided in the report, the aircraft should have been provided with the relevant information. If the information was not already described in a current meteorological (MET) product or Notice to Airmen (NOT AM) then ATC is required to communicate the information using the prefixed "HAZARD ALERT".

The quote above always concerns me; I wonder, is a one hour prior notification adequate?; three hours into a four hour flight your options may be limited; one hour into a four hour flight and the odds improve. I've often wondered if a HA should be 'officially' issued to all aircraft en-route to the affected aerodrome, the moment it becomes 'live'. Can't see how that would cost a lot to do, perhaps some of the ATC could advise on the nuts and bolts.

Re the Met services wrangle, haven't read it yet, but aren't the NTSB putting their foot down about meteorological services to aviation ?.

[Sarcs]

Kharon:Re the Met services wrangle, haven't read it yet, but aren't the NTSB putting their foot down about meteorological services to aviation ?. Yes indeed the NTSB have issued a series of SRs on the same topic (SSI). Why?? Well because wx related incidents/accidents continue to rise and it is their solemn duty, in compliance with Annex 13 Ch 8, to mitigate SSI & ultimately (hopefully) prevent future accidents..:D:D:NTSB Recommends Weather Forecast Improvements AINsafety (http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/publications/ainsafety) » May 12, 2014 (http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/publications/ainsafety/may-12-2014)
by Robert P. Mark (http://www.ainonline.com/robert-p-mark)


May 12, 2014, 11:10 AM

The National Transportation Safety Board last week published nine specific recommendations to the FAA and the National Weather Service (NWS) that are intended to deliver more comprehensive pre-flight weather information to pilots. The recommendations—A-14-13 to -16 (http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2014/A-14-013-016.pdf) and A-14-17 to -21 (http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2014/A-14-017-021.pdf)—are based on the findings of NTSB accident investigations involving aircraft encountering adverse surface wind, dense fog, icing, turbulence, and low-level wind shear. While this information currently exists, it is not always provided directly to pilots by NWS preflight weather forecasts.

“What’s difficult to understand is why weather advisories from the National Weather Service to the general public, at times, provide more comprehensive information about weather conditions than the advisories they provide to pilots experiencing the same conditions,” said NTSB member Earl Weener. “Why pilots would receive less information makes no sense, and increases the risk of flying in severe weather conditions.”
While the NWS also routinely advises pilots of turbulence and mountain wave activity, there are also no specific requirements to brief pilots about these items.

Tags: National Weather Service (http://www.ainonline.com/social-tags/national-weather-service)Weather forecasting (http://www.ainonline.com/social-tags/weather-forecasting)National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (http://www.ainonline.com/social-tags/national-oceanic-and-atmospheric-administration)Weather warning (http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/tags/weather-warning)Disaster (http://www.ainonline.com/taxonomy/term/506927)Weather (http://www.ainonline.com/taxonomy/term/506929)


FILED UNDER: Accidents, Safety, Security and Training (http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/accidents-safety-security-and-training)
Maybe this is contributory to the FAA, a couple of days before the NTSB issued the SRs, putting out this: Got Weather? (http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/got_weather/) Knowledge is power. Before you fly consider your abilities and those of your aircraft. Weather briefings, forecasts, and alert apps can provide insight into how likely you are to encounter turbulence on your next flight.


FAAsafety – Aviation Weather Data: A Targeted Approach (http://faasafety.gov/files/helpcontent/courses/WX%20Data%20Briefing/player.html)
General Aviation Pilot's Guide to Preflight Weather Planning, Weather Self-Briefings, and Weather Decision Making (http://www.faa.gov/pilots/safety/media/ga_weather_decision_making.pdf) (PDF)
AIM: Other Sources of Weather Information (http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim/aim0701.html#aim0701.html.3)

Pilot weather reports (PIREPs) are an excellent way to report and learn about current conditions on or near your route of flight. It is in your best interest to seek them out before you go, listen for them during flight or ask the controller, and learn how to properly submit one if you don't already know how:
Chapter 7.?Safety of Flight (http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim/aim0701.html#aim0701.html.43) Gotta love the Yanks...:ok:

[004wercras]

The reason the NSB and the FAA have pretty much nailed the process for safety oversight and safety investigations is in part due to the fact that most Americans won't bend over and grab their ankles like us Australians do!!! Our bureaucrats speak **** and we accept it, cop it on the chin, take another hit in the ass. We need to stand up en mass and fight back.


Long live the IOS!

[Kharon]

004 - Don't think there's much doubt on 'fight back'; 260 or is it 270 submissions is an avalanche. Word on the street is that if the WLR gets the same treatment as the Pel Air inquiry there will be three revolutions for the miniscule to deal with; one from industry, the second from within the National party, Barnaby and Co. leading the charge over thin ice; and, probably the Senate committee. (IMO they have too much information to ignore, with any sort of clear conscience, that is).

Sarcs has a clever little aside at the tail end of this – POST 770 (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/527815-truss-aviation-safety-regulation-review-39.html#post8479892) – (Truss) relating to the Part 61 fiasco; the answer to the question is disingenuous; if it's anything other than NZ /FAA 61. Clever question, dangerous ground. You'd have to wonder why this bloke hasn't sat down with Fawcett and/or Xenophon to get a true picture instead of meekly accepting flawed advice from the creatures who allowed the mess to continue from his last tenure in 2008. The Rev. Forsyth may deliver the sermon but what will happen once the church doors close and the pub doors open is anyone's guess. We shall see, can't be many more sleeps till the WLR is released.

Toot toot.

[Sarcs]

Before moving on from my last I noted the following article from the real AOPA: NTSB seeks better weather delivery (http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2014/May/07/ntsb-wants-better-wx.aspx?CMP=ADV%3A4)

Urges FAA, National Weather Service to improve communication with pilots

In 2010, a Cessna 182R struck mountains near Corvallis, Ore., with two fatalities. The following year, a Eurocopter with five on board struck mountains on the island of Molokai, Hawaii. Another person was killed in 2012, when a Gulfstream jet impacted terrain in Oregon, and four people died in 2013 when a Mooney M20E hit terrain shortly after departure from Angel Fire, N.M.

In each of these cases, weather forecasts provided to the public noted more severe weather conditions than were detailed in aviation weather provided to the flight crews, and the National Transportation Safety Board issued on May 6 a call for the FAA and National Weather Service to improve weather forecast delivery to general aviation pilots.

“What’s difficult to understand is why weather advisories from the National Weather Service to the general public, at times, provide more comprehensive information about weather conditions than the advisories they provide to pilots experiencing the same conditions,” said NTSB Board Member Earl Weener, in a news release. “Why pilots would receive less information makes no sense, and increases the risk of flying in severe weather conditions. That is why this issue is on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List.”

The accidents were detailed in letters sent May 6 to FAA (http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2014/A-14-013-016.pdf) and NWS (http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2014/A-14-017-021.pdf) leaders, seeking action on recommendations to improve forecast data delivery to pilots. Improved aviation weather information distribution is among the items on the agency’s 2014 Most Wanted list (http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl.html), which is updated annually based on accident trends in all forms of transportation.

The announcement follows the May 1 launch of the “Got Weather?” campaign (http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2014/May/01/Got-Weather.aspx) by the FAA and aviation groups including the AOPA Foundation’s Air Safety Institute. That effort will include a variety of weather education products developed by the Air Safety Institute and other organizations that focus on specific weather conditions that have contributed to accidents, with a goal of making pilots better informed, and more aware of forecast information sources and other available weather products.

The NTSB recommendations issued May 6 focus on improving situational awareness for pilots and controllers, and better disseminating important weather information within the aviation system.

“Safety will be enhanced for airmen and their passengers when pilots are given a complete weather report including all of the most current weather information,” Weener said. The statement in the NTSB 2014 Most Wanted list (http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl.html) says...

".....GENERAL AVIATION: IDENTIFY AND COMMUNICATE HAZARDOUS WEATHER

A frequent cause or contributing factor to general aviation accidents is hazardous weather. While having weather information available to pilots, air traffic controllers, and meteorologists is crucial, proper understanding and use of this information is just as critical...."

And from the NTSB SR letter to the FAA (http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2014/A-14-013-016.pdf) Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:


Ensure that all Federal Aviation Administration (and contracted) preflight weather briefings include any products modified or created by the National Weather Service in response to Safety Recommendation A-14-17. (A-14-13)

Require that the National Weather Service (NWS) provide a primary aviation weather product (as recommended in Safety Recommendation A-14-18 to the NWS) that specifically addresses the potential for and existence of mountain wave activity and its associated aviation weather hazards. (A-14-14)


In cooperation with the National Weather Service (NWS), revise the Interagency Agreement between the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/NWS for the center weather service units (CWSU) and its accompanying statement of work if needed to add the new responsibilities of CWSU personnel in response to Safety Recommendations A-14-17 and/or A-14-18 to the NWS, which are in addition to the other responsibilities currently performed by the NWS under this agreement.(A-14-15)


Include centerweather advisories in the suite of products available to pilots via the flight information services-broadcast data link. (A-14-16)

The NTSB also issued five safety recommendations to the National Weather Service.
Acting Chairman HART and Members SUMWALT,ROSEKIND, and WEENER concurred in these recommendations.

The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 90days detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement them. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number. We encourage you to submit your response electronically to [email protected].
IMO this is a perfect example of how a State signatory to ICAO Annex 13 (Chapter 8) is supposed to act. There is no obfuscating of responsibilities to the Annex; there is no resources spared in getting the message across; there is no arguing the toss by the regulator; and ultimately all stakeholders respect the NTSB initiative and get on with appropriately addressing the significant safety issues highlighted.

Wonder if the TSBC will have picked up on this stark difference in methodology, interpretation and compliance by the ATsBeaker to Annex 13??:rolleyes:

Oh well moving on...:E

As "K" points out the WLR report release is imminent, as is the TSBC report...:ooh: Not to mention Senate Estimates (Monday week) and the continued Senate debate on the Govt response to the AAI report. All in all a busy couple of weeks for the miniscule and his minions..."let the games begin!" :ok:

[004wercras]

Beaker, aka 'Count de Money' strategizing how to overcome the issue of the IOS revolt;

Count de Money / "The People Are Revolting" - YouTube


P.S Whisper on the street is that there will only be a 3.25% rise in pot plant allowances in line with the CPI, rather than the usual endless tin of money.

[Kharon]

It's coming from all directions for Truss: had the Senate committee not been gazumped by the WLR, I reckon that by now we'd be a long way down the road where a statement like this would be superfluous.

Sarcs # 1935 "IMO this is a perfect example of how a State signatory to ICAO Annex 13 (Chapter 8) is supposed to act. There is no obfuscating of responsibilities to the Annex; there is no resources spared in getting the message across; there is no arguing the toss by the regulator; and ultimately all stakeholders respect the NTSB initiative and get on with appropriately addressing the significant safety issues highlighted.

Wonder if the TSBC will have picked up on this stark difference in methodology, interpretation and compliance by the ATsBeaker to Annex 13?

The big question (IMO) is what will Truss do? – if anything – track record and form considered. You don't need to pull a horse up to loose a race, just give it an outing doing the minimum legally required (look like you're trying), rather than going all out. Looking at the BRB tote board, there's some small money for a late scratching, some of the pragmatic money is on 'an outing' rather than an all out effort to win; but most of the cynical money is bet on a 'token' effort, made with heavy reliance on 'interference' being called in the final furlongs. Result, our horse finishing fourth (out of the money) with a credible excuse for the mug punters when the stewards rule against the claimed 'interference'.

The smart money is on the Senate entry in the next race – the Conscience cup – a classic race with only the top weight for age performers invited. Save your pennies for this one; but, always said it, punting is a mugs game.

[Kharon]

If, please the gods, we get past the WLR fluff-fest and if the Senate committee ever get another shot at sorting the mess out; the first item on the agenda must be this unbelievable email from CASA, which if you don't say NO, assumes that you are happy to have your personal contact email and telephone number released to a marketing company.

I though it was a wind-up when I heard about it – but No. it's absolutely fair dinkum. FWIW there is thread running – HERE. (http://www.pprune.org/pacific-general-aviation-questions/540084-congrats-you-have-just-volunteered.html)

BTW word on the street is the miniscule will get his WLR report next week, direct into his clammy paws; the ministry won't see it; Oh no: Oh Brother.

[Sarcs]

AQONs have finally been released, see here (http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Senate_Estimates/rratctte/estimates/add1314/infra/index)...:{

Sampling..

On CVD... QON No 197: Senator FAWCETT: I can give you the letter afterwards. I have it sitting right here in front of me from your organisation dated 24 January doing exactly that. I will put it to you that with due respect this is not moving forward, despite the evidence that you gave here at estimates in November that CASA had no agenda or no plans to wind back the gains of the Denison case. This is, in fact, a very deliberate effort to adopt a standard which might medically ascertain that somebody does have a colour vision deficiency, but clearly as evidenced by multiple pilots that have flown for over two decades, it is not an accurate or effective measure of their ability to safely operate an aircraft. This is going backwards and not, in fact, forwards.
Mr McCormick: As I said, what has happened between November when I was here and that letter, this is the first that I know of it. We were, of course, expecting to be in the AAT to respond to a Mr O'Brien in February 2012, however, those proceedings are currently not listed for hearing as the previous hearing to commence on 31 March was vacated at the applicant's request. So we have not had the opportunity to test these things. As I said, that is news to me. I will take it on notice and find out what we have been doing.
…
Senator FAWCETT: If you want to come back to experts, your organisation's previous experts, Ladel, Brock, Wilkins and others, were very proactive in recognising that practical tests were a viable alternative and, in fact, that many people with a CVD were able to fly. Their judgment has proven correct by virtue of the incident-free 20 years of flying. Is it the case that a personality has changed, not the science and not the safety? A personality has changed and now CASA's approach to this issue is changing?
Mr McCormick: I am not aware of any changes around our approach to this. As I said, that letter is news to me. I am not across everything that leaves the building, particularly medical matters where I normally do not involve myself. We will take it on notice and I will get you an answer about what has transpired.
And AQON...

"...CASA is unaware of any specific instances where a pilot’s privileges have been removed by CASA following completion of a CAD test. Since the Senate Estimates hearings, a decision has been made in relation to one applicant who underwent and failed CAD testing, to impose modified conditions of operation on his licence. This included a restriction upon the pilot operating solo at night time. Otherwise the pilot remains able, as has been the position for approximately the past nine years, to operate under the privileges of his commercial pilot licence but not his air transport pilot licence (ATPL).

CASA obtained detailed specialist opinions from within Australia and internationally which supported the restriction upon ATPL operations. The applicant represents a person who has among the most severe form of colour deficiencies and has failed (to CASA’s knowledge) at least eight separate colour vision tests.

CASA also looked at the current aviation medical research across the world in relation to colour vision testing to ensure that a fair and appropriate test was undertaken and that medical certification requirements were properly undertaken. Accordingly CASA is satisfied that it has made a decision that balances the safety of aviation against the privileges of the pilot.

It is not the case that CASA is seeking to “wind back” the Dennison decision. CASA has endeavoured to ensure that the regulatory requirements were satisfied in the interests of aviation safety, this being a position consistently adopted by CASA over the last two decades. CASA remains of the opinion that to permit a pilot with a severe colour vision deficiency to exercise the privileges of an ATPL would be contrary to the interests of aviation safety.

The aviation medicine field has long recognised the deficiencies in the existing testing methods such as lantern and other colour vision tests, and has funded research to improve testing methods over the last decade. CASA considers the creation of new aviation-specific tests (such as the CAD test) are better suited than the previously used practical tests for detecting colour vision deficiency due to their direct relevance to aviation specific tasks and aviation safety concepts. In the case of the CAD test it has also been developed through industry consultation and by reference to medical research methodologies which allow it to be validated as an appropriate and more sophisticated method of testing, providing both vocationally relevant information and a colour vision diagnosis..."

Mrdak on TSBC review...QON No 194:Senator XENOPHON: Further to Senator Fawcett's line of questioning, is the review by the Canadian TSB one on the documents or are they actually seeking to interview people involved in that incident and in the investigation?
Mr Mrdak: I do not know the full circumstances of what they are reviewing. I will take that on notice and come back to you. And AQON...


"...The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has agreed to review the ATSB’s investigation methodologies and processes. Specifically, the review is examining the ATSB’s:

• Investigation methodology and its application
• Management and governance in relation to investigations
• Process for compiling an investigation report
• Approach to communicating with persons and organisations external to the ATSB in relation to an investigation.

As part of the review, the TSB has undertaken to examine the application of the ATSB methodologies to the Norfolk Island investigation and two others.

The review was instigated in response to Senate References Committee criticisms that the ATSB investigation of the Norfolk Island accident did not comply with the requirements of ICAO Annex 13 or the ATSB’s written standards. The review is also intended as part of the ATSB response to Inquiry recommendations concerning the adequacy of the ATSB’s investigation policies, procedures and training.

The exercise is not a reinvestigation of the occurrence, and hence the TSB has not sought to reinterview involved parties. However, as part of reviewing the ATSB’s investigations, the statements and other evidence of involved parties have been available to the review team..."

Clear as mud...read it and weep!:yuk::yuk::yuk::{

[halfmanhalfbiscuit]

The exercise is not a reinvestigation of the occurrence, and hence the TSB has not sought to reinterview involved parties. However, as part of reviewing the ATSB’s investigations, the statements and other evidence of involved parties have been available to the review team..."

This appears to be an important paragraph. Watch out for the press releases to see if this limit in scope is made clear or whether it is implied the TSB re investigated the work of the ATSB.

[Kharon]

The review was instigated in response to Senate References Committee criticisms that the ATSB investigation of the Norfolk Island accident did not comply with the requirements of ICAO Annex 13 or the ATSB’s written standards. The review is also intended as part of the ATSB response to Inquiry recommendations concerning the adequacy of the ATSB’s investigation policies, procedures and training.
I find it hard to believe that the Canadian TSB would commence any form of analysis without an 'in depth' examination of the Australian registered difference to Annexe 13 and take note of how the spirit and intent of the ICAO tenet has been divorced and a new mistress, the MoU been installed. Of course the new regime has forced a difference to Annex 19 to be registered. It's all legal of course, tricky, but....legal.

A study of the TSB web site, their past investigations and their AIP (re Annexe 13) reveals an open, honest crew working well within a system which is not only ICAO compliant, but effective. Somehow the notion that they would be 'hood winked' or 'blinkered' by narrow terms of reference just doesn't seem to be on the square. They have both an international and domestic reputation to protect; are, by nature a proud, independent bunch who seem to take real 'safety' seriously. The language in "the report" may well be diplomatic, but the observations will be made. The real worry is that those words can be transmogrified into another 'soft white paper' response by those with less integrity and much to hide. On the plus side of the ledger, whatever is finally produced still has to pass through the doughty defence of Fawcett, Xenophon and the rest; who will not (IMO) be taking too many prisoners.

If Truss is fair dinkum, he will publish the entire report for the people who paid for it to read and draw their own conclusions. Expect the worst, hope for the best and believe the Canadian TSB will never cross to the dark side.

May the force be with you.

[Sarcs]

I’m confused?? Like Dr Pape initially I thought we were watching a rerun of the ‘Empire Strikes Back’. Then (much like the Star Wars series) with the introduction of the WLR I thought we had fast forwarded (or was it back??) to a ‘New Hope’. However now I think we may be watching a rerun of the ‘Phantom Menace’?? Hmm…still confused…maybe we are all under some sort of Hoodoo Voodoo??
Kharon:I find it hard to believe that the Canadian TSB would commence any form of analysis without an 'in depth' examination of the Australian registered difference to Annexe 13 and take note of how the spirit and intent of the ICAO tenet has been divorced and a new mistress, the MoU been installed. Of course the new regime has forced a difference to Annex 19 to be registered. It's all legal of course, tricky, but....legal.
A New Hope: In 2010 Senator X introduced a proposed amendment to the TSI Act:

TRANSPORT SAFETY INVESTIGATION AMENDMENT (INCIDENT REPORTS) BILL 2010 (http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2010B00197/Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text)
“…On 21 July 2007, a Jetstar Airbus A320 was being flown from Christchurch to Melbourne.

However, upon its approach into a foggy Melbourne, the pilot in command did not perform the go-around procedure correctly and, in the process, the crew were unaware that the aircraft was continuing to descend. The aircraft came within 38 feet of the ground before anyone realised.
After re-climbing, the pilot then attempted to land a second time but this had to be diverted again due to the fog. The plane eventually landed safely at Avalon airport.

Upon their return to New Zealand, the crew reported the incident to the airline operator, who took five days before reporting the incident to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

It was later revealed, however, that the internal report given to the ATSB by the operator excluded key information which led to the authority determining that a formal investigation was not required.

It was only after media reports some months later that the ATSB made further inquiries into the incident and determined that an investigation was required. Its report was highly critical.

Jetstar subsequently adopted Airbus’s standard procedures for go-arounds, and instigated a review of its third party training procedures.

Indeed, the 21st July incident may not have seen the light of day, had it not been for third parties coming forward with information.

Under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003, 'responsible persons' (such as pilots and airline operators) are required to report all reportable matters to a 'nominated official' (such as the Australian Transport Safety Board) as soon as is reasonably practicable.

It provides that if a person improperly influences a 'responsible person' making a report, or penalises them for their report, that they face a penalty of 24 months imprisonment.

This Bill aims to ensure that all incidents are accurately reported and properly investigated so that safety measures can be reviewed, training processes addressed, protocols reviewed both for that airline in particular but also across the industry.

Indeed, without incidents being accurately reported, passenger safety has the potential to be compromised. This Bill is about maintaining the highest standards of aviation safety in Australia…”

History will show that Senator X’s proposed amendment and the subsequent Senate inquiry report was eventually white-washed by the Govt GWEP and this undertaking…

From Govt response to PT Senate Inquiry report:
http://i1238.photobucket.com/albums/ff498/004wercras/ExcerptGovtresponse.jpg


Parallel Universe: Meanwhile in a galaxy..far..far..away…

On the 18 Nov 2010 ICAO, in the course of aligning the various Annexes with the principles (‘spirit and intent’) of their DRAFT version of Annex 19, amended the Annex 13 CH8 para 8.2 from a recommendation to a standard (from 2010 version of Annex 13)…

“…8.2 A State shall establish a voluntary incident reporting system to facilitate collection of information on actual or potential safety deficiencies that may not be captured by the mandatory incident reporting system.
Note.— States are encouraged to establish other safety data collection and processing systems to collect safety information that may not be captured by the incident reporting systems mentioned in 8.1 and 8.2 above…”

The Empire strikes back: Inevitably the hub bub of bigger domestic political issues, bureaucratic obfuscation, a listless MSM competing in a 24/7 news cycle and further political spin led to the Senator X intiative being all but forgotten.

Meanwhile in the halls and offices of the Dept (& its minion aviation safety agencies) it would appear the ‘powers to be’ were hatching a plan to (hopefully) avoid future public scrutiny & embarrassment from Senator X and his IOS cronies. Statement from the ATsB 2011-12 Annual report:

“Response to Senate Inquiry
On 23 June 2011, the Senate Rural and Transport References Committee handed down its report from its inquiry into ‘Pilot training and airline safety; and consideration of the Transport Safety Investigation Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010’.

On 22 November 2011 the Government tabled its response in the Senate.
Copies of the Inquiry’s report and the Government’s response are available at: www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=rat_ctte/pilots_2010/index.htm (http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=rat_ctte/pilots_2010/index.htm)

The non–government Bill, the ‘Transport Safety Investigation Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010’, was directed at making amendments to the ATSB’s accident and incident notifications scheme. The Bill was not supported by the Inquiry or the Government.

The ATSB has been consulting separately on reforms to its notifications scheme. A draft set of regulations was released in July 2012.”

Under the smokescreen of the PelAir inquiry these regulations were introduced to the Parliament (22 Nov 2012) with the title of Transport Safety Investigation (Voluntary and Confidential Reporting Scheme) Regulation 2012 (http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2012L02281) and replaced the Air Navigation (Confidential Reporting) Regulations 2006 (http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2006L04060).

This initiative, in principle, was supposed to protect the principles/concept of REPCON incident reports and reinforce the importance that ICAO now places on protecting both the source and the safety information derived from such reports (i.e. as outlined in Annex 13 CH8 ACCIDENT PREVENTION MEASURES paragraph 8.2).

The significance that ICAO holds on the ‘spirit & intent’ of para 8.2 was further highlighted in a first meeting of the ICAO APRAST (Investigation Ad hoc Working Group), held in Bangkok 6-8 June 2012. Somewhat ironically, agenda Item 7: Voluntary and Non-Punitive Incident Reporting discussed the ATSB REPCON programme, see HERE (http://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/2012_AIG_AWG/AIG%20AWG%20WP%2014%20-%20Agenda%20Item%207%20-%20Australia%20-%20REPCON.pdf).

The Phantom menace: IMO replacing the Air Navigation (Confidential Reporting) Regulations 2006 with Transport Safety Investigation (Voluntary and Confidential Reporting Scheme) Regulation 2012 represents an extreme low point in the life & times of the ATsB & TSI Act 2003.Reading the reg, between the weasel words, you will see that all references to the ANA 1920 (the head of power for the 2006 regs), ICAO annex 13 (spirit & intent) have been omitted and it is dubious whether the assumed protections, meant to be provided, cannot be circumvented.

Finally (& to put the above Kharon quote in context) if we fast forward to the H18/14 (http://airservicesaustralia.com/aip/current/sup/s14-h18.pdf), released 3 April 2014. And then refer to the weasel worded difference to Annex 13 para 8.2 (pg 76); and the differences listed for the newly (November ’13) promulgated ICAO Annex 19 (pg 96-97), you begin to get a picture of the level of deceit our esteemed aviation safety authorities are prepared to go to in order to cover up our deficiencies as a signatory state to ICAO & Annex 19.

Dear miniscule,
ICAO Annex 19 Attachment A-2 sub para 1.3 states (my bold)…

“…1.3 Accident and incident investigation
The State has established an independent accident and incident investigation process, the sole objective of which is the prevention of accidents and incidents, and not the apportioning of blame or liability. Such investigations are in support of the management of safety in the State. In the operation of the SSP, the State maintains the independence of the accident and incident investigation organization from other State aviation organizations…”

TICK TOCK miniscule…:(

[004wercras]

The Fort Fumble dark side has some strong opponents to the IOS Jedi council;

Darth Vader - Herr Skull
Darth Sidious - Kingcrat
Darth Maul - Terry from the West
Darth Plagueis - Dr Hoodoo
Darth Tyranus - The Archerfield manager

Once the bloodletting has ended there will be a number of these Darths who will remain, and rest assured they will regroup and once again take revenge upon the IOS Jedi council.

Tick tock

[dubbleyew eight]

and rest assured they will regroup and once again take revenge upon the IOS Jedi council.

that comment assumes an unrestricted power.

the reality is that they can be sued for abuse of power. ....and probably will be if the activities are revenge based.

[Kharon]

004# 1943 –"Once the bloodletting has ended there will be a number of these Darths who will remain, and rest assured they will regroup and once again take revenge upon the IOS Jedi council."
Dunno mate – W8 may have the right of it. Think on – 270 (plus supplementary) submissions is powerful medicine. That's a lot of research and even more information gathered, distilled into palatable phases; the ugly parts written around lest the daemon libel be conjured and used to scare small children. The problem, for those wishing to extract vengeance, is two fold.

In primus; the 'bank' of information related to those who would wish to extract revenge is considerable and not restricted to minor operational or clerical misdemeanours. There are some truly 'interesting' case studies of matters which could, at worst, result with goal or heavy fines; at best, are career enders with the associated social disgrace and ostracism. A tit for tat battle of attrition would simply be an unviable, mathematically unattractive nonsense.

Secundus, should the miniscule be fortunate (or smart) enough to avoid the pratfall of appointing an incompetent, embarrassing, unpopular DAS and manage to persuade the 'right-person' to accept the job; then the new DAS may well be quite fully aware of exactly what has previously passed as 'acceptable' behaviour and quietly, but ruthlessly, weed out the more "embarrassing" elements. Knowing full well - the world and it's wife will be watching: closely.

No, the old crowd have had their fun for now, they are teetering on the brink of very public disclosure and associated humiliation: the difference this time being a small group of Senators who not only believe the evil empire exists, but intend to eradicate it.

Anyway; if the remnants of the 'old guard' want a piece of me; they'll need to be bloody hungry. We see a lot of bullies, cowards and liars on the ferry; pitiful lot. I usually leave the care and feeding of 'em to the Gobbledock, being as how I like to watch him work. He does the "abandon all hope" pre departure safety spiel so very, very well.
Frequently mistranslated as "Abandon hope all ye who enter here". The word "all" modifies hope, not those who enter: "ogni speranza" means "all hope". – Wiki.

O, vengeance!
Why, what an ass am I! This is most brave,
That I, the son of a dear father murder'd,
Prompted to my revenge by heaven and hell,
Must, like a whore, unpack my heart with words,
And fall a-cursing.

Selah.

[halfmanhalfbiscuit]

Some may recall the senators having concerns over retribution for submittal to the Truss review not being given the same protections of previous Senate Inquiries.

If anybody does feel they are suffering adverse affects I'd suggest looking at bullying and harassment as that legislation seems to be getting stronger.

Bruce Byron don't look too bad now.

[Frank Arouet]

There is ample grist for investigation into discrimination and inclusion in The Attorney General's upcoming inquisition into the legal fraternity. The pre cursor would need to be a desk full of complaints along similar lines involving the CAsA that would trigger a report to go via the enquiry to Parliament with some Independents copied in.


This costs nothing, although the conciliation phase could be open to "trickery" by CAsA. One would need to stand their ground here.


Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986
Grounds of discrimination

Breaches of human rights by any Commonwealth body or agency and discrimination in employment on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction, social origin, age, medical record, criminal record, marital status, impairment, disability, nationality, sexual preference, trade union activity.
Areas covered

Commonwealth body or agency; employment and occupation.
Process for decision making

Complaint must be in writing. It is then assessed and if within jurisdiction is investigated. If complaint is not declined, conciliation is attempted. If it cannot be conciliated, the Commission prepares a report to the federal Attorney-General who then tables the report in Parliament.

[Frank Arouet]

I'm disappointed that nobody has yet added to this post except for one telephone call to advise that CAsA are immune from discrimination complaints because it is written in their charter. I had a feeling this was the case and hoped someone may highlight the relevant rule that makes them immune from transparency in matters of discriminatory treatment such as bastardisation, marginalization, incorrect interpretations, failure to define, selective opinions, personal vendettas, waste of taxpayer resources to prosecute until the defendant is bankrupt, compromising of personal evidence to prevent scrutiny or legal examination, extending proceedings to damage financially and generally misusing their authority for vexatious and petty vindictive pursuits.


If somebody can point to the relevant rule that makes them immune, please advise us all so we can contribute to the Brandis enquiry. Somebody then can start a new thread to concentrate on this upcoming event which may have more sway than the Truss WOFTAM which I'm guessing only served to gazump the Senate enquiry.


It's one thing having laws, but exemptions from the law don't sit well without strident examination and review.

[Sarcs]

Busy week for the miniscule, headcrat MM & his minions and the Senators...

News Bulletin for Day One: The Mayday Aviation Carnival week (A 'New Hope' or 'Extinction') festivities kick off with an evening Q&A session hosted by the Senate ri..ri..RRAT committee.

Guest speakers include mi..mi..mi..Beaker fresh from serious international discussions in Cantberra in regard to MH370 and feeling especially rejuvenated after receiving a $60 million dollar bucket to help keep up appearances that the ATsB is a world leader in AAI.

Other guests also include Mr McComic (STBR FF DAS), who we've been told will be giving us an update on the latest advances in Aviation Medicine while also highlighting CAsA's excellent progress in keeping to the projected 40 year+ timetable expected rollout of the complete suite of the CASR regs.

So grab your partner (or if you prefer your pineapple) and hop'a'long to the fun & festivities at Senate Committee Room 2R1 from 16:30 EST (06:30 UTC) (Note: BYO jar of vas).

Oh an here's a link for the evening's program...:E Day One MAC Week (http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Estimates/Live/rrat_ctte/estimates/bud_1415/rrat.pdf)

[Frank Arouet]

They do but they don't. Clear as mud.


Civil Aviation Act 1988
- C2014C00167
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014C00167
30EF CASA may reinstate if satisfied that holder’s livelihood depends on authorisation
(1) A holder of a civil aviation authorisation who has been given a demerit suspension notice or demerit cancellation notice may apply to CASA to have the authorisation reinstated.
(2) Subsection (1) applies despite paragraphs 30DY(2)(b), 30DZ(2)(b) and 30EC(2)(b).
(3) If, and only if, CASA is satisfied that the suspension or cancellation would cause the holder severe financial hardship because, without the authorisation, the holder would not be able to earn the holder’s principal or only income, CASA may:
(a) reinstate the authorisation; and
(b) impose on the authorisation such conditions as CASA considers appropriate in the circumstances.
98 Regulations etc. (6C) CASA must consult the Australian Human Rights Commission about any proposal that regulations be made containing provisions that are inconsistent as mentioned in subsection (6A) or (6B). However, a failure to consult the Commission does not affect the validity of any regulations so made.
FIRST MENTION OF THE ABOVE IN JULY 2005
This compilation was prepared on 8 July 2005
taking into account amendments up to Act No. 86 of 2005


(6A) The regulations may contain provisions relating to medical standards that are inconsistent with theSex Discrimination Act 1984 if the inconsistency is necessary for the safety of air navigation.
Note: See also Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Aviation Amendment Act 2005.
(6B) The regulations may contain provisions that are inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 if the inconsistency is necessary for the safety of air navigation.
Note: See also Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Aviation Amendment Act 2005.
(6C) CASA must consult the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission about any proposal that regulations be made containing provisions that are inconsistent as mentioned in subsection (6A) or (6B). However, a failure to consult the Commission does not affect the validity of any regulations so made. (6B) The regulations may contain provisions that are inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 if the inconsistency is necessary for the safety of air navigation.
Note: See also Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Aviation Amendment Act 2005.
　

[Sunfish]

You are wasting your time. The Senate is a bad joke. Nothing will be done to curb CASA's power, in fact it will actually be increased as a result of the review.

This will occur because the Senate and the Minister will accept CASA's submission that the current unhappiness with it is due to its lack of resources, lack of regulatory powers and most importantly, the number of regulatory constraints imposed by Government on its functions - for example the requirement to be a model litigant and also its subservience to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

"If you will just unchain us and free us from these fetters, Minister, we can do a much better job!" - along with the not so subtle message that if there is a major accident CASA will point to its lack of powers, as evidenced by its submissions, and blame the Minister for the accident.


...and then the bastardry and embuggerance will continue to new heights. So my message is: BOHICA!

[Kharon]

Sunny eloquently iterates the battle cry of the IOS. From the - Urban Dictionary (https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.urbandictionary.com%2Fdefine.php%3Fterm %3Db.o.h.i.c.a&ei=nHWCU7LVBcO1kgWr94CgBQ&usg=AFQjCNH-XrbGYsZimIYb3AFW5KujFSw9zg&bvm=bv.67720277,d.dGI) – which is always a handy reference source.

acronym, although pronounced as if it is a single word, for "Bend over! Here it comes again."

Commonly used around the workplace when getting repeatedly ****** by the work center supervisor. Very commonly used within the military, specifically the navy and FFG-22.

Big grin icon -

[Sarcs]

Note: Couple of PMs have expressed their opinions that my post #789 from Truss thread would be better represented on this thread...so here it is..

Mayday..mayday..mayday!

Top catch SIUYA at post #782 (http://www.pprune.org/8489159-post782.html) & #785 (http://www.pprune.org/8489410-post785.html)….
“..SUMMARIES OF DISCUSSIONS

Topic 2.5: Implementing new safety management process

44. There was unanimous support for the establishment of a new Annex [19] to the Convention dedicated to safety management responsibilities and processes..”

Meanwhile, in Fort Fumble’s parallel universe, the middle management minions were busy enacting their MAP to roger DJ and the ATsB, while attempting to cover up their obvious shortcomings to properly oversight the PelAir operation.

Anyone else see the irony in the two universes?:ugh:

List of Participants

AUSTRALIA

MCCORMICK J. CD
FARQUARSON T. ACD
TIEDE A.H.R. ANC
ALECK J. D
BOYD P. D
BROOKS L. D
DOHERTY J. D
EVANS P.K. D
MACAULEY K. D

Looking at all the participants from Oz, I also find it more than ‘passing strange’ that Beaker’s crew did not get a look in?? After all the principle body that is fundamental to a successful State SSP is it’s fully independent AAI.

Oh well perhaps bean counter Beaker’s budgetary constraints couldn’t stretch to paying a couple of economy class airfares to Montreal…:E

In regards to Annex 19 & in the context of the WLR panel report, unlike CAsA, hopefully the panel will have not missed the significance and importance that ICAO place on Annex 19 as the lynch pin that ties all the other ICAO SARPs together. This significance was certainly not missed by several of the submitters to the WLR, who have asked for the Govt to seriously consider reviewing/updating our version of the SSP (State Safety Program i.e. Annex 19).

Examples…

Sports Aircraft Association of Australia (SAAA) submission:

2) The Government review the State Safety Program (SSP)

a) The SSP concept as articulated in Annex 19 is the basis of how a State administers aviation oversight and reporting at the state level and internationally to ICAO.
b) Recommend the Government overhaul the SSP and use it to administer all aviation activities in Australia not as a spectator role it takes at present.

Australian Lawyers Alliance (ALA) submission:


5. In light of the Pel-Air and Transair air disasters, Australia should update its State Safety Program in recognition and reflection of Australia’s adherence to safety management standards set out in Annex 19 to the Chicago Convention which entered force on 14 November 2013, to assure the public of confidence in future regulator oversight and surveillance of operators.

It is worth reflecting on the ALA submission because the main author of their submission was Joseph Wheeler from Shine Lawyers. This bloke has a real handle on our obligations, as a signatory state, to the ICAO SARPs and in particular Annex 19. Couple of quotes from the ALA submission…

“…Despite Australia’s admirable domestic and international air safety record, and its respected place among International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) States, Australia does not occupy as high a place as it should in terms of international adherence to ICAO standards and recommended practices (SARPs) – the principal measure of a nation’s air safety oversight obligations…”

And from Part ‘5. Systemic oversight issues following Lockhart River crash in 2005’…

“…In the aftermath of the Lockhart River crash it is recognised that the broader trend worldwide towards risk assessment and management led to the development and approaches being implemented at the operational level by CASA. See for example, the publication “SMS for Aviation – A practical guide: Safety Management System Basics”.51

The ALA’s submission is that while there is now a proactive aviation atmosphere with respect to safety risk management for aviation service providers, as evidenced by CASA’s reliance on such principles in preparing its own responses to SARPs on fatigue risk management and drug and alcohol risk management in aviation, these principles should also not be forgotten in the broader context of the results which can eventuate in the absence of such principles in guiding surveillance or oversight of AOC holders (such as the crash at Lockhart River).

Thus, the ALA recommends and endorses updating of the Australian State Safety Program, as published on the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development’s website, as this was last considered in April 2012, well before the commencement of Annex 19.52 The benefit of this would be to demonstrate to the public the Government’s continuing adherence to regulatory oversight and surveillance at a national level and inspire confidence in smaller air operators to embrace safety risk management principles in the management of their aviation businesses…”

Joseph Wheeler has also produced some excellent articles, published on the Shine Lawyers blog site, on the MH370 search and accident investigation:
MH370 investigation: roles, responsibilities and rule changes (http://www.shine.com.au/mh370-investigation-roles-responsibilities-rule-changes/#sthash.7JgSTbz2.dpuf)
MH370 Preliminary Report released (http://www.shine.com.au/mh370-preliminary-report-released/)

But his latest article perhaps best highlights the essential role that ICAO play in governing how a signatory state must predictively act after a tragic air disaster has occurred.
MH370 search for answers and ICAO work to track airliners (http://www.shine.com.au/mh370-search-answers-icao-work-track-airliners/)

One rule in Annex 13 is that countries which have a special interest in an accident by virtue of fatalities or serious injuries to its citizens are entitled to “have access to relevant factual information which [are] approved for public release by the State conducting the investigation, and information on the progress of the investigation”: Ch 5.27 at 5-8 – 5-9. While it has been argued that no-one knows better than accident investigators the importance of their role (to make aviation safer) we maintained (less than 2 weeks after the aircraft’s disappearance) that:

… passengers’ families need to be represented within investigations, both during the search phase and during the investigation phase. … It is only these people, with their human feelings and passionate concerns for answers (owing to their unique losses and experience), which can serve to remind investigators of the reason they are doing what they are doing – to prevent the suffering which has been caused to family members – not the lofty ambition of “making aviation safer” (a trite comment in the context of the shared global pain of those hoping with the families of MH370 passengers to get answers).

We do not depart from those views.

In this case the ICAO SARPs, along with international community, has helped remind the Malaysians of their obligations to the victims and their families of flight MH370.

Joseph Wheeler’s article also displays how all the ICAO SARPs are intrinsically linked. If you follow the JW Annex 13 reference (i.e. Ch 5.27):

5.27 A State which has a special interest in an accident by virtue of fatalities or serious injuries to its citizens shall be entitled to appoint an expert who shall be entitled to:
a) visit the scene of the accident;
b) have access to the relevant factual information which is approved for public release by the State conducting the investigation, and information on the progress of the investigation; and
c) receive a copy of the Final Report.

This will not preclude the State from also assisting in the identification of victims and in meetings with survivors from that State.

Note.— Guidance related to assistance to aircraft accident victims and their families is provided in the Guidance on Assistance to Aircraft Accident Victims and their Families (Circ 285).
Link for Circ 285 HERE (http://www.icao.int/Meetings/a38/Documents/DOC9998_en.pdf) & ICAO Annex 9, Chapter 8, Section (I) can be viewed HERE (http://dcaa.trafikstyrelsen.dk:8000/icaodocs/Annex%209%20-%20Facilitation/Facilition.pdf)

yr right’s comments…

“…SMS what by any other name is basic common sense. Same as Human factors is. But oh gee we now all have to do it or we are all unsafe. Its these extras that at the end of the day don't really amount to anything but are costing industry heaps…”

“…At the end of the day ICAO whilst it sounds good…”

yr right is right that SMS & Annex 19 is yet another impost to industry stakeholders and is largely based on ‘common sense’. yr right is not right when it comes to ICAO and their SARPs.

Since the Chicago Convention 1944, the ICAO SARPs have been evolving and are produced from over a 110 years of collective (some tragically) international air safety lessons learnt. Those bothersome Human Factors experts may have had a large part in the writing and design of Annex 19, however their combined efforts are not just based on a whim. HF experts in aviation basically study why it is we humans continue to make fundamental errors while committing aviation. They also look at ways to lessen the occurrence & severity of these errors. Annex 19 is a reflection of HF expert research over a good 50 or so years.

That is why it is a total abomination that our numb nuts in CAsA and the Dept (there are Dept names in that list) have the audacity to spend untold millions of taxpayer monies going on junkets to Montreal to show, on paper at least, that we are an ICAO compliant State. But in reality we are merely paying lip service to the ‘Spirit & Intent’ of over 70 years of collective ICAO wisdom…:(

One can only hope that the ALA recommendation 5 features somewhere near the top of the list of WLR recommendations and the miniscule takes heed, hopefully sometime before Mr ICAO eventually comes knocking…:rolleyes:

TICK bloody TOCK! :E

Comment: Have also been doing some research on the history of CAIR/REPCON because it disturbs me how this, ICAO endorsed, essential safety information source, has evolved and been diluted to the current WOFTAM system we have today. Effectively submitting a REPCON is nothing more than a signed, sealed confession open to future exploitation (rogering) by Fort Fumble.

In the course of my research I came across a paper from the then ATSB CAIR manager (2001), the paper was titled "Who Cares About CAIR?" Here is a part of that paper reproduced:Successes, failures and challenges

How do you measure success? How do you ever know if a report of a
notification of a system deficiency subsequently prevents an accident? An
identified system weakness, knowledge of a violation, limitations in training are all factors - known as .holes in the cheese. - and defences are then developed and put in place to limit the risk and improve safety.

Several outcomes can be identified from CAIR reports where action has been taken to make the system safer, such as CASA.s withdrawal of the AOC of shonky operators, changes to inadequate or inaccurate documentation, navigation aids or procedures. But how many accidents has the CAIR system prevented? No one knows. The CAIR office received numerous reports of alleged maintenance deficiencies with a major airline last year. Was it a coincidence that the regulator CASA grounded a number of an operator's aircraft earlier this year? It would be drawing a long bow to say that an aircraft did not crash or have an accident because the early warning system had raised an awareness of deficiencies and action was taken to prevent such an outcome.

What about the recent accident in Bangkok? Were flight crews concerned about deficiencies with training or procedures? Were flight crews aware of the potentially increased risk with the flaps 25 approach, in particular, a high and fast approach to a wet runway - at night. If they were concerned about any of these matters - why was no report submitted to the CAIR system? Are the flight crews of airlines persuaded to not submit reports to the CAIR system because of a negative event that had occurred to one their members in the past?

The greatest concern, and what is considered to be a failure of the safety system, are those occasions when an operator or an organisation seeks to find out who submitted a CAIR report.

If you were the head of an airline, of course you would want your own systems in place to capture any information that identified deficiencies in your defences. For public relations reasons, you would not want these deficiencies known by the public - its bad for business. But it is not as bad as having an aircraft slide off the end of the runway or having large cracks found in the wings or engine pylons, or having a large portion of your fleet grounded.

If you were the head of an airline and one of your employees was aware of a safety hazard but was uncomfortable with the internal reporting system, you would want that person to tell someone, especially someone that had a system in place that would alert you to the hazard. Any attempt to identify the reporter of a CAIR report does make the CAIR manager’s job harder and has the potential to weaken the whole system. A system that was solely developed to protect our industry by improving flight safety.

The history of flight was in its infancy at the beginning of the last century. Thus, the contemporary air safety investigation practices of the 21st century are, by definition, in their infancy. So what are the challenges for confidential incident reporting. First and foremost is the maintenance of the viability and integrity of the confidential program. The demise of the various confidential programs of other countries has resulted from a lack of commitment, funding and the rigid application of robust procedures.

In Australia, the three pillars of CAIR are:

• The maintenance of the confidentiality of the reporter

• The willingness of industry to use the system, and

• The provision of feedback to the reporter and industry.

While the program manager has a degree of control over the first and last of the three pillars, the willingness of industry to use the program can be destroyed in a moment. The CAIR program needs the support of all facets of industry: flight crew, operators, engineers, regulators and managers.

Everyone committed to safety should promote and support the reporting of
incidents through both the open and confidential incident reporting systems... So who..Cares about CAIR (REPCON)? Well quite obviously, through the abrogation of our obligations to ICAO Annex 19, our executive management of the Dept, FF & the bureau don't CAIR..:{

[Up-into-the-air]

The Senate grilling of atsb head beaker has proved interesting, with Senator Fawcett pressing for answers.

This gives some up to date material.

Senator Fawcett grills ATSB head - Dolan | Assistance to the Aviation Industry (http://vocasupport.com/senator-fawcett-grills-atsb-head-dolan/)

[dubbleyew eight]

I'm amazed that no one is celebrating the 100th anniversary of the creation of the incredible pox of aviation paperwork.
I'm pretty sure it was about 1914 that the pommy military, on the premise that someone had sabotaged a spar glue joint, created the elaborate system of signing for work and maintaining inordinately never ending paper trails.

but then people don't celebrate the coming of the black plague either, maybe for the same reasons :E

[004wercras]

D8, I believe CAsA have opted out of celebrating the 100 year anniversary so they can celebrate the 1 year operation of Sky Sentinel instead!! I believe a birthday cake that was created in the shape of Terry's Zimmer frame and it was consumed while all and sundry smoked Cuban cigars with the Skull, Hockey and Corman!

Celebratory skies for all

[brissypilot]

Other guests also include Mr McComic (STBR FF DAS), who we've been told will be giving us an update on the latest advances in Aviation MedicineIt was good to see even the PMO himself getting grilled last night for a change. Top marks to Senator Fawcett :D

AIVWO0conJ8

[Sarcs]

Well done brissypilot...:D

So the DAS (STBR) can't see his way to funding a safety case study into the CVD matter but yet he can justify spending over a 100k in the AAT fighting against the issue...yep makes sense to me..:rolleyes:..NOT!:ugh:

On the ATsBeaker grilling by Fawcett, here is some vid coverage of the TSBC review questioning...

Senate Estimates 26/05/14 - ATSB TSBC review Part 1 - YouTube (http://youtu.be/HQM9M4EoWjk)

www.youtube.com/watch?v=_shiIWF9c5U

Interesting that the WLR panel met with the TSBC in Ottawa to compare notes (Part two above)...:rolleyes:

MTF...:ok:


Addendum

PT Article - ATSB puts itself on the MH370 search stage (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/05/27/atsb-puts-itself-on-the-mh370-search-stage/)


Why is the ATSB claiming a place in the MH370 spotlight when it hasn’t the decency and commitment to properly investigate the lesser mystery of the crash of an Australian jet into a different ocean more than four years ago?


The Australian Transport Safety Bureau putting up its shingle (http://www.atsb.gov.au/mh370) as a an investigative authority in the disappearance and search for Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 is ironic for an organisation that botched its inquiry into the crash of a small corporate jet, a Westwind operated by Pel-Air, into the sea near Norfolk Island in 2009.


Unlike MH370, the precise location of the crashed Pel-Air jet is known, and all six people on board the medivac flight from Apia to Melbourne survived, although one remains seriously injured and uncompensated five years after the accident.


Despite this the flight data recorder on the downed jet, and its potentially embarrassing insights into the weather advice given its pilots, has not been recovered. The ATSB produced a much criticised and ridiculed report into the crash, which did not even discuss the safety lessons learned from the crash, during which the safety equipment on board the jet failed to work as intended.


The chief commissioner of the ATSB, Martin Dolan, was severely criticised by a Senate committee for the testimony he gave to it during its inquiry into the processes that led to its accident report, and John McCormick, the director of aviation safety at CASA, apologised to the hearings for withholding from the ATSB an internal document that found that CASA could have prevented the crash in the first place had it carried out of duties of oversight over Pel-Air.


The leading voices in that damning inquiry were coalition Senator David Fawcett and independent Senator Nick Xenophon, and the public shame and anger associated in aviation circles with the Pel-Air crash report remains unresolved.


The ATSB’s ‘MH370 investigation’ page currently features three background papers that are factually correct, but repeat word for word information that has already been set out with clarity by the Joint Agency Coordination Centre, led by Air Chief Marshal Houston (ret’d).


The JACC site (http://www.jacc.gov.au/media/) is more useful than the ATSB site in that it also carries transcripts of media briefings in which many of the questions or issues not addressed by the ATSB pages are explored in detail.


The ATSB’s positioning of itself in the MH370 investigation would be far more convincing if it were to withdraw and redo its disgracefully incomplete and inadequate final report into the Pel-Air crash of 2009, starting with the retrieval and reading of the flight data recorder from its know location.


A collection of stories relevant to the Pel-Air crash can be found here (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/?s=pel-air). The report of a Senate committee into the ATSB’s handling of the Pel-Air crash investigation and the current government’s response can be found at this link (http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/safety/report/index.aspx). (It is important to read both.)


Senator Fawcett’s parliamentary speech concerning the integrity of CASA and the ATSB in relation to Pel-Air can be found here (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2013/06/21/pel-air-air-safety-issues-spelt-out-by-pilot-and-senator-david-fawcett/), with a full copy from Hansard.


The question remains. Why is the ATSB claiming a place in the MH370 spotlight when it hasn’t the decency and commitment to properly investigate the lesser mystery of the crash of an Australian jet into a different ocean more than four years ago? My sentiments exactly Ben..:D:ok:

[004wercras]

A couple of enjoyable videos brissypilot and sarcs, thanks for posting them.

Snakes and ladders video 1: My oh my, didn't the Angry Man look uncomfortable at times while attempting to answer the astute Fawcetts line of questions? On occasions Herr Skull looked like a youngling desperately searching for its Momma's teat, looking this way and that, desperate to be nurtured, fed and changed, to find protection in the bosom of its comforter :D In this case Uncle Mike was right there beside you, using his shoulders and giant head to provide you with a shelter from the wind, a safe place to run too.

Snakes and Ladders video 2: The beardless Beaker, head bobbing away, rolling the eyes, mi mi mi-ing. At times he too looked ever so uncomfortable, like a teenage boy trying not to get caught whacking off over a K-Mart underwear catalogue! He looks right, he looks left, he doesn't know what to do! But don't worry Beaker, Uncle Mike, aka Pumpkin Head is right there beside you, whispering words of comfort, trying to sooth your nerves and guide you through the embarrassment of being caught out doing a terrible thing :=

The body language on those beneath the spotlight was most amusing (except for Terry the cardboard cutout who customarily sat silent in an almost deathlike state, hiding behind his glasses and ever expanding paunch!)
Fawcett and Xenophon, the dapper Senators remained articulate, poised, focused and engaged. Surely they could smell blood? Surely they could smell that familiar smell of A grade, bureaucratic, steaming warm ****e wafting from the Prisoners corner?? Surely the Senators could see the whites of the eyes of those on trial, the nervousness in their throats, the suit restricting twitches and expressions of discomfort on the Prisoners faces? :E

In preparation for the next instalment of Senate fun and hijinks I have just looked at my checklist;

- Comfortable seat in front of Poohtube/Parliament TV - Tick
- Beer, popcorn and a plate of Antipasto - Tick
- Box of tissues to wipe away tears of laughter - Tick
- Chamber pot close by to allow for quick urination so I don't miss a thing - Tick

Kudos to the IOS honorary members, Messrs Fawcett and Xenophon :ok:

[Sarcs]

004:My oh my, didn't the Angry Man look uncomfortable at times while attempting to answer the astute Fawcetts line of questions?....In this case Uncle Mike was right there beside you, using his shoulders and giant head to provide you with a shelter from the wind, a safe place to run too. Love it 004, gave me a chuckle...:E All true except for the moment McComic went into his hollow-worded Part II Section 9 rant..:rolleyes:...the rest of the time he seemed desperate to try to defer to his sub-continent PMO but DF wouldn't let him...:D

On the Beaker performance don't you just want to wipe that smug look off his face, that and nail (bolt) his vibrating left leg to the floor...:ugh:

Here's a couple more poohtube vids where the Beaker features, the first Fawcett questions him on the Govt response to R21 'safety issues' & 'safety recommendations' ATsBeaker (beyond all sensible reason) approach :yuk::yuk::

www.youtube.com/watch?v=RkfhnXqvWtU

The second Fawcett questions Beaker on the rise in UAV incidents and the Heff :D:D hops into Beaker, which is truly good theatre...:E:


www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xhmqerh6DNU

MTF with vid segments from 'ASA', 'Aviation & Airports'...:ok:

[Jinglie]

Sarcs,

I just watched Dolan mumbling to Senator Fawcett about the Commissioners and Safety Recommendations. Top job to get paid a bucket load when the actually don't make any Safety Recommendations!!
What's worse is none of them have any aviation experience!! :mad: what a joke:ugh:
This is a disgrace, Truss, do something!!!!!

[SIUYA]

Jinglie said:

Top job to get paid a bucket load when the actually don't make any Safety Recommendations!! What's worse is none of them have any aviation experience!!

You bet! :D

From the ATSB Annual Report, the total reportable remuneration for the one ATSB staff member with a reportable salary >$300K (ie., the highest paid person) was $325,926 in 2013, and $367,874 in 2012.

As there was only one staff member with a salary >$300K, I suppose that was Tweedledumb.

Don't count on him having taken a pay-cut in 2013 though, as is suggested by the 2013 pay compared to the 2012 pay, because the weasel words in the ATSB report note that the variation of salary within the band between 2012-13 and 2011-12 was due to the...

'...timing of the final payment of the respective staff member's Total Remuneration Package.'

Whatever the fcuk that means. :confused:

But having watched Dolan's performance in front of Senator Xenaphon, I came to the conclusion that he is totally out of his depth, and so on that basis he therefore seems to be grossly overpaid. :ugh:

And 'YES' Jinglie, this is a disgrace that Truss is not doing anything to remedy the situation. :yuk:

[004wercras]

More excellent questioning from Fawcett. This is a bloke who understands risk management, unlike the mi mi mi muppets in charge of the ATsB and CAsA asylums :D How embarrassing that Beaker, the master bean counter/ex Comcare/ex department of agriculture/ex CFO/excrement can't answer a question about strict liability?? Back to the abacus and law books for you Herr Beaker. Doesn't know, puuuuuulease Mr Beaker, stop, I have a sore throat from laughing :ok:
And all that head bobbing, mi mi mi-ing and uncomfortable movements, could Beaker himself be a drone? I think yes!!

And the Heff! What about him! Straight for the Beakers jugular, nice work. These things only weigh 2kg and are pretty much unregulated, no worries, no risk there. And importantly we shall shelve any reports, fail to close the loop, and wait till a UAV ends up in a Roller and there is an accident, then we will re-look at the unclosed cases. Hell says Beaker, it works for CAsA!

The Senate, unfortunately, has become a circus, a comedy act, a titter on the stand up comedy stage. It is a place where the Senators have an understanding of safety, risk mitigation, investigative processes and regulations. However the $300 - $500k bureaucrats steering the departments are an embarrassment to Australia and to our industry and don't know **** from clay. Surely this **** is a bad dream? You couldn't script something so ridiculous.

TICK TOCK

[Sarcs]

Hansard for 26/05 Estimates is out. Links for ATsB (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;db=COMMITTEES;id=committees%2Festimate%2 F45b905f6-d491-4939-aeb7-56a199165886%2F0004;orderBy=date-eFirst;page=2;query=Dataset%3AcomSen,estimate;rec=4;resCount =Default), CAsA (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;db=COMMITTEES;id=committees%2Festimate%2 F45b905f6-d491-4939-aeb7-56a199165886%2F0005;orderBy=date-eFirst;page=2;query=Dataset%3AcomSen,estimate;rec=4;resCount =Default), ASA (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;db=COMMITTEES;id=committees%2Festimate%2 F45b905f6-d491-4939-aeb7-56a199165886%2F0006;orderBy=date-eFirst;page=2;query=Dataset%3AcomSen,estimate;rec=4;resCount =Default)

The former Labor Govt 'savings through stealth' program and the former miniscule Albo's spin & bulldust was touched on briefly in the ATsBeaker Estimates segment. From the ATsB Hansard:Senator FAWCETT: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2FDYU%22;queryty pe=;rec=0)When did the budget pressures commence that led to your requirement to bid for supplementary funding around redundancies?


Mr Dolan: We had been signalling for a considerable period of time that the forward estimates would require us to reduce our staff, because we had found all other savings mechanisms and used them already. Having had discussions with various parties, we concluded that to find a sustainable position going into the next financial year, 2014-15, we needed to undertake a redundancy program with our staff. As a result of that, by the start of next financial year we will have reduced our staff by 12 from 110 to 98.

Senator FAWCETT: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2FDYU%22;queryty pe=;rec=0)So that funding that you are applying for is coming from the funding that was given to finance as part of the MYEFO process, is that correct?

Mr Dolan: That is correct.

Senator FAWCETT: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2FDYU%22;queryty pe=;rec=0)In practice, then, these 12 staff that you are losing, you are losing because of decisions of the former government, but the current government is having to fund it because the former government, whilst leading to the redundancies, did not fund you to actually make those people redundant?

Mr Dolan: The decisions in relation to staffing were based on the forward estimates as they were recorded in the portfolio budget statements in the last budget. We had contemplated a staff separation program from our own resources, given that we had reserves. But, given there was a government policy decision to make funding available to support those staff separations, we applied for it and had success as a result. Not that he had any credibility before, but this is what the audacious Albo said in parliament on the 18 March 2014 (warning weasel words incoming..:yuk:)...

“….As I mentioned earlier, Labor supports a bipartisan approach to aviation safety. It is too important to be a political battleground. However, there is a role for an opposition to raise concerns about the direction of some government policy, and earlier this month there were reports that the government was considering staff cuts of up to 20 per cent in the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. The ATSB employs 110 people. They investigate accidents, safety concerns and near misses in air, sea and rail transport.

These cuts should not be considered by government. There is a need to quarantine ATSB—just like CASA and other safety organisations, like the Australian Maritime Safety Authority. Their task is simply too important to cut corners by cutting costs and cutting staff, and I would hope that the government maintains at least the support that is there for these agencies…”

Even the man at the back of the room can see the spin in that statement from Albo...:=. I guess that is typical SOP for pollies the calibre of Albo these days...:ugh:, but what about the rumour of a 20% further cut to the bureau staff?? Later in the ATsBeaker segment, under questioning from Senator Sterle, puts that rumour to rest: Senator STERLE: Mr Dolan, page 165 of the PBS shows the program 1.1 expenses table, where it talks about you guys having to do some serious downsizing through one of your programs and how you can operate on a financially sustainable footing from 2014 to 2015. There is no doubt that there seems to be a large drop in resourcing for ATSB's operations following the staff reductions—11 per cent, I think it is, on last year, which is on page 172. Are you aware of the government's request to make savings of $60 million across the Infrastructure and Regional Development portfolio?

Mr Dolan : I am aware of a proposal to make savings to industry as a result of changing the regulatory framework—

Senator STERLE: Mr Mrdak, can you confirm it is $60 million?

Mr Mrdak : That is the portfolio target to reduce costs to industry, yes.

Senator STERLE: Since September, Mr Dolan, has the department requested further savings from your agency on top of that?

Mr Dolan : We have been given an initial indicative figure.

Senator STERLE: There is that word again: indicative. Keep going.

Mr Dolan : There is a current review of the overall framework. Within that, our major regulatory intervention is our mandatory reporting program.

Senator STERLE: So, indicatively, how much are you looking at trying to save?

Mr Dolan : The indicative figure for the ATSB is $7 million.

Senator STERLE: Do you reckon you will get there?

Mr Dolan : My apologies, it is seven per cent, which is $4 million.

Senator STERLE: How do you reckon you will go?

Mr Dolan : What we have to review over time is whether there are more efficient ways of helping people mandatorily report occurrences to us. That is the mechanism that we have to look at in terms of improving the impact on industry.

Senator STERLE: Forgive me, but what does that actually mean in English?

Mr Dolan : Some of the steps we are already taking include better web enabled reporting, drawing on the existing systems of operators and so on for notification of occurrences, a potential review as to whether we are seeking over-reporting from particular elements of the industry and so on—to make the mandatory reporting program, which is fundamental to safety, work more efficiently.

Senator STERLE: I am just a bit worried when we talk about safety and trying to find efficiencies through agencies after you had an 11 per cent downsizing program last year—was it 11 per cent?

Mr Dolan : Yes.

Senator STERLE: I would think that would be a very difficult figure to achieve. How long do you have to try to achieve that $4 million saving?

Mr Dolan : That was an indicative first-year figure, as I recall it. We will review what we can and form an assessment as to what, as you say, in a safety focused regulatory framework we can reasonably achieve in reducing costs to industry.
So Albo/Mrdak/Beaker rubberstamped the cuts to, what some would say is the bureau's most valuable resource, staff. Yet Beaker now believes, that through other efficiencies, he will be able to make a $4 million saving over the forward Estimates, certainly get a sense of this Muppet's priorities while he remains in the CC position...:* Hopefully those dozen redundancies were not frontline staff...:{

Oh well moving on..

Unlike the embuggerised bureau & Fort Fumble, ASA of late seem to be copping less scrutiny in Estimates. However there was an interesting moment when AVM (active) Staib bristled when being questioned by Senator X on the operational introduction of the Integrated Tower Automation Suite (INTAS):Senator XENOPHON: And can you assure me that as a result of this specific line of questioning there will not be any emails or oral communication to your staff for this line of questioning? I am just worried about the issue retribution.

Ms Staib : That is a serious suggestion.

Senator XENOPHON: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2F8IV%22;queryty pe=;rec=0) I am not suggesting that you will do it; I just want to know that you will not be doing it.

Ms Staib : Absolutely not. We value our just culture in Airservices and all these faults are reported by the air traffic controllers so we can investigate them.

Senator XENOPHON: (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2F8IV%22;queryty pe=;rec=0) But perhaps I can suggest to you that while 'just culture' is absolutely critical in aviation, given the nature of the industry and the nature of what you have to deal with that was not necessarily the case under your predecessor. I know you cannot comment on it, but I am just suggesting to you that that was not necessarily the case.

Ms Staib : You know that we have been working on a culture program in Airservices, and one of the values that I have added to the values for Airservices is the value of courage, and that is specifically about having the courage to speak up, speak out, challenge managers and leaders, because it is very important that people do that to maintain those safety aspects that you refer to. Hmm..'Just Culture' within ASA is a touchy subject for Ms Staib...:rolleyes:. Pity we don't have the same dedication & understanding by the other muppets on the importance of upholding the principles of 'Just Culture' within the other agencies..:ugh:

Anyway here is the poohtube segment for those interested:

Senate Estimates 26/05/14 - Xenophon & Airservices - YouTube

[Jinglie]

If the Zucker brothers ever make a follow up to Flying High (1981), they would have to have Beaker as a key character. It would be a blockbuster comedy!:D

[halfmanhalfbiscuit]

Worth watching that clip. Senator Sterle getting increasingly annoyed about questions being taken on notice. Think I heard something along the lines of paid sh1t loads of money and can't answer any questions. Senator Xenophon then warning about potential retribution issues.

[Sarcs]

Definition: APOD – A point of difference.

Word is the miniscule was presented with the WLR report on Friday, which he will make public on Tuesday and the TSBC review report will now be delayed till the end of June...:(

OK ‘what will be will be?’

While we continue to contemplate our navels let us reflect on the poohtube vid that Jinglie refers…“I just watched Dolan mumbling to Senator Fawcett about the Commissioners and Safety Recommendations. Top job to get paid a bucket load when the actually don't make any Safety Recommendations...”

www.youtube.com/watch?v=RkfhnXqvWtU

Apparently, for the sole purpose of austerity (i.e. limited resources), we now seem to be the only signatory state to ICAO that has significant notified (BASR – Beyond all sensible Reason) differences to both Annex 13 & 19.

From Annex 13: Safety recommendation. A proposal of an accident investigation authority based on information derived from an investigation, made with the intention of preventing accidents or incidents and which in no case has the purpose of creating a presumption of blame or liability for an accident or incident. In addition to safety recommendations arising from accident and incident investigations, safety recommendations may result from diverse sources, including safety studies.

And Australia’s ND to that definition (my bold): Safety Recommendation - Essence of definition adopted in legislation and in policy and procedures documents. However, Australia reserves the term safety recommendation for making formal recommendations which are used as a last resort.

Beaker has argued the point (verbatim) that a SR (BASR) will only ever be issued as a last resort if identified safety issues are not proactively addressed by the addressee. This BASR approach is in direct contradiction to the practices/methodology of every other 1st world country and tier one signatories (which includes some resource limited 3rd world countries) to ICAO.

One of those countries that strongly adhere to the, ICAO endorsed, SR methodology is Canada (see here (http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/recommandations-recommendations/aviation/index.asp)). To reinforce their commitment to upholding the (i.e. Annex 13 ‘spirit and intent’) SR methodology, the Canucks also take the additional step to reissue SRs when outstanding SRs have not been adequately addressed:Reassessing outstanding safety recommendations to ensure accountability (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/communiques/autres-other/2014/rec-2014-20140530.asp)
Gatineau, Quebec, 30 May 2014 - Urging industry and regulators to take action on a number of outstanding safety recommendations, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) today released its annual reassessment of responses to Board recommendations. The reassessments show that progress has been slow especially in Aviation where only 61% of the Board's recommendations have been implemented.
Again this year, the aviation (http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/recommandations-recommendations/aviation/index.asp) sector has seen limited movement on recommendations. While 5 recommendations have received the TSB’s highest rating of “fully satisfactory”, another 32 remain unresolved. Indeed, 6 of the 32 have been classed as “dormant” as the TSB foresees no action on the part of the regulator. The TSB remains committed to the Watchlist goal of reducing landing accidents and runway overruns where there are a number of outstanding recommendations including calls on Transport Canada (TC) for longer runway safety end areas or a means of stopping aircraft that provides an equivalent level of safety.
The SR/safety issue is very much an APOD with the TSBC and the ATsBeaker investigative methodology, and therefore very much falls within the ToR of the TSBC peer review. Hopefully the Canucks will point out this discrepancy and include a recommendation with some instructional guidance on how best to administer a proper transparent and effective SR/safety issue system.

IMO Beaker’s politically correct BASR is absolute BOLLOCKs…:ugh:

APOD ICAO (Safety Recommendation system in practice) vs ATsBeaker (politically correct) BASR system – In the ATsB final report of the investigation into the ditching of VH-NGA under the heading Organisational and management information the bureau made the following cursory summary of CAsA’s oversight of PelAir…

“…The regulatory requirements affecting the flight were administered by CASA and established a number of risk controls for the operation that were promulgated in the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) and CAOs. Those controls related to the operator, the pilot in command (PIC) and the conduct of the flight. Surveillance was carried out by CASA of operators’ procedures and operations to ensure that such flights were conducted in accordance with those approvals and the relevant regulations and orders…”

…but after the findings of the Senate AAI inquiry and on CAsA’s own admissions (& the Chamberpot report), there were many obvious deficiencies in the regulator’s oversight of the PelAir Operation that were contributory to the ditching.

However in the ATsB’s blinkered view these safety issues were not significant enough to issue either a significant safety issue or SR to the regulator and the rest is history.

The NTSB have recently issued two SRs to the FAA (one of these SRs was listed as URGENT) in regards to concerns for the regulatory oversight of one of the largest Air Carrier (Part 135, Part 121) operators in the State of Alaska. The following is the background synopsis for those SRs…

“…Since 2012, the NTSB has investigated six accidents and one incident related to operators owned by HoTH, Inc. On September 5, 2012, about 1100 Alaska daylight time (AKDT), Era Aviation (dba Era Alaska) flight 874, a Bombardier DHC-8-103, N886EA, experienced an uncommanded left roll consistent with a stall and uncontrolled descent during climb about 12,000 ft mean sea level (msl) near Soldotna, Alaska.2 The flight crew regained control of the airplane about 7,000 ft msl, and the flight returned to Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport (ANC), Anchorage, Alaska. The 12 passengers and 3 crew members were not injured, and the airplane was not damaged. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14Code of Federal Regulations(CFR) Part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight between ANC and Homer Airport (HOM), Homer, Alaska. Day instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the incident. This incident is currently under investigation…”

And these are the SRs:Conduct a comprehensive audit of the regulatory compliance and operational safety programs in place at operators owned by HoTH, Inc., to include an assessment of their flight operations, training, maintenance and inspection, and safety management programs, and ensure that permanent corrective action is implemented for all adverse findings. This audit should be conducted by a team of inspectors from outside Alaska. (A-14-22) (Urgent)

Conduct a comprehensive audit of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 and Part 121 certificates held by operators owned by HoTH, Inc., and ensure that permanent corrective action is implemented for all adverse findings. This audit should be conducted by a team of inspectors from outside Alaska and should include a review of inspector qualifications, turnover, working relationships between the FAA and operators owned by HoTH, Inc., and workload to determine whether staffing is sufficient. (A-14-23) Which is followed by…

“…The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate receiving a response from you within 30days regarding A-14-22 (Urgent) and 90 days regarding A-14-23 detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement them…”

Through the user friendly NTSB SR system, it is also possible to actively monitor the outcomes of these SRs:
Rec #: A-14-022 (http://www.ntsb.gov/safetyrecs/private/querypage.aspx) (Click for link)
NTSB Status: Open - Await Response
Issue date: 5/1/2014
Accident Date: 9/5/2012
Source Event:
Location: Soldotna Alaska
Mode: Aviation
Most Wanted List: No
Closed date:

Report Number:
Accident ID: DCA12IA141

View Status by Addressee

View NTSB Recommendation Letter [PDF]

Rec #: A-14-023 (http://www.ntsb.gov/safetyrecs/private/querypage.aspx) (Click for link)
NTSB Status: Open - Await Response
Issue date: 5/1/2014
Accident Date: 9/5/2012
Source Event:
Location: Soldotna Alaska
Mode: Aviation
Most Wanted List: No
Closed date:

Report Number:
Accident ID: DCA12IA141

View Status by Addressee

View NTSB Recommendation Letter [PDF]
Certainly is a lot to like about the NTSB/TSBC board system and it is obvious that they are truly operating independently and unencumbered by the regulator.

From the last Estimates it was revealed that the ATsB is beholden to the same budgetary efficiencies ($60 million savings to industry) as the rest of the Dept, IMO this further stresses the Annex 19 requirement that the ‘State maintains the independence of the accident and incident investigation organization from other State aviation organizations’.

Maybe part of the problem with the bureau is that they fall under the Dept and consideration should be put to oversight and funding for the bureau to come (like the TSBC & NTSB) directly from the parliament, food for thought! :ok:

[Kharon]

004 # 1963 –"The Senate, unfortunately, has become a circus, a comedy act, a titter on the stand up comedy stage. It is a place where the Senators have an understanding of safety, risk mitigation, investigative processes and regulations. However the $300 - $500k bureaucrats steering the departments are an embarrassment to Australia and to our industry"

It is clear that the 'department' teams are outplayed, outclassed and without the doughty Mrdak would be decimated by the WVA knitting circle, let alone a united, well briefed, on form Senate team. So why is it that:-

(a) these departmental wallahs feel they can treat the Senate with open contempt, thinly disguised disrespect and expect to be believed?

(b) the work done by the Senate committee is seemingly viewed and treated as 'irrelevant'. What's the point of them doing all the heavy lifting if they can be just be shooed away, like so many noisy children?

Perhaps Creamy, or Sunny or Lead Sled (one of the grown ups) can make the picture clearer; because I just don't get it.

I know – thick as two short planks M'lud: but the questions stand.

[Creampuff]

It’s simple: The departmental and agency officials know that it’s all bluff.

If government intervened and took control, government would be responsible. Better to leave responsibility to the departmental and agency officials. That’s why they are so handsomely rewarded.

It works a treat: Most of the aviation industry will continue to blame the officials, most of the time.

[Kharon]

Cheers Creamy; I sometimes wonder if, behind the cynical, tough outer carapace there lies a tough cynical old geek, secretly revelling in being a fighting member of the IOS – in deep cover. Lukim U. (wink and big smile-here-; if I could get 'em to work)

[Sarcs]

The negative commentary we are seeing on here in regards to the ASRR report for me highlights how toxic the culture in CASA has become under the Skull. IMO that man has wrought more damage in his time than any of the other DAS/CEOs combined, rule 101 divide & conquer. I'm with Ben...Will heads of CASA, ATSB now go? (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/06/03/will-the-heads-of-casa-and-the-atsb-now-resign/)...the angry man & Beaker should be frog marched out of their respective caves immediately...:ugh:

Comment from Ben's article: “The Panel considers that the Pel-Air report was an aberration, and not typical of the high standard that the ATSB usually attains.
The Panel recognises that the ATSB is putting measures in place to prevent a re-occurrence”

It occurs to me that there is nothing in the above statements which leads to the conclusion that the Pel-Air crash will be re-investigated.?

As far as I remember, there is also nothing in the terms of reference on the Canadian inquiry which will allow it to recommend a new investigation.
If the CTSB finds that all the relevant paperwork was completed & all the relevant boxes ticked, they must find that the investigation was completed correctly….

Even though without the FDR’s, the ATSB couldn’t possibly have analysed the complete range of information, before arriving at its (possibly incorrect) conclusions.
Comment: Perhaps too much water/ocean..:E..under the bridge?? :rolleyes:

Although the ASRR report seems to conveniently step around the PelAir debacle, there is an underlying message in the following paragraphs of the Exec summary...

"...The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has been heavily criticised in Australia for its report into the 2009 ditching of a Pel-Air
Westwind off Norfolk Island1. Canada’s Transportation Safety Board is completing a review of the ATSB and will report shortly. The Panel
considers that the Pel-Air report was an aberration, and not typical of the high standard that the ATSB usually attains. The Panel recognises
that the ATSB is putting measures in place to prevent a reoccurrence. To improve the ATSB’s governance, the Panel recommends that an
additional Commissioner be appointed, with extensive aviation experience.

ICAO requires that countries formulate a State Safety Program (SSP), which Australia has done. The Panel considers that Australia should
develop the SSP as a strategic plan for the aviation safety system, under the leadership of the Aviation Policy Group. To implement this plan,
the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development should play a stronger policy role in the SSP, providing policy guidance while
respecting the operational independence of CASA, the ATSB, and Airservices..."

Even though the TSBC review appears to be, on the surface, just another tick-a-box routine I still believe it will be pivotal in the grand scheme of things (i.e. the international connection). The ASRR report says as much with the references to Annex 13 & 19, that and the recommendation for an extra commissioner with aviation experience.

What the ASRR report also provides (finally) are the true ToR that the Canucks are working to:Scope of TSB independent objective peer review of ATSB

Proposed Objectives

To provide the ATSB with an independent objective peer review of its investigation process/ methodology, and of the application of its methodology to at least two selected occurrences (including the Norfolk Island occurrence).

To identify best practices from both organizations that would be shared to improve existing processes and methodologies.

Proposed Scope of Work

1 — Exclusions
The TSB will not re-investigate the Norfolk Island occurrence and will not provide an ‘investigation report’ specific to this occurrence.
This review will be internal to the TSB and ATSB only. The TSB will not communicate with, or interview, any persons external to the ATSB as part of this review.

2 — Review of the Investigation Methodology

The TSB will collect information and conduct a comparative analysis of the ATSB and TSB investigation methodologies, including the approach for the risk assessment of safety issues. The analysis will also include a comparison the two methodologies to the relevant provisions of Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention. This benchmarking analysis will identify the strengths (best practices) and the weaknesses (gaps) of each methodology.

3 — Application of the Investigation Methodology

The TSB will review the Norfolk Island investigation and at least one other ATSB investigation to assess whether the investigation methodology was properly applied. The review team will ask questions such as: Was the process followed? Were the proper tools, systems and resources in place and effectively used? Was the investigation conducted in a thorough manner? Was all significant information adequately considered and analysed? Were organizational and human factors adequately considered? Would we have done things differently? This review will identify any best practices and any issues or gaps in the application of the existing methodology.

4 — Management and Governance of the Investigation

The TSB will review the Norfolk Island investigation and at least one other ATSB investigation to assess the ATSB’s approach to the management and governance of the investigation process. The review team will ask questions such as: How was the investigation managed? How were key decisions made and by whom? Was there adequate documentation and guidance to support decision-making? Were the key decisions based upon solid factual information and robust analysis? Would we have done things differently? Are there any legislative impediments to the conduct of ATSB investigations? This review will identify any best practices and any issues or gaps in the governance and management of the investigations.

5 — Investigation Report Process

The TSB will review the ATSB investigation report process and how it was applied in the case of the Norfolk Island investigation and at least one other ATSB investigation to assess its effectiveness at achieving the desired outcome. The review team will ask questions such as: Was the process followed? Was the report review conducted in a thorough manner and was it effective? Is the analysis contained in the report complete and thorough? Are the findings and recommendations well supported by facts and robust analysis? Were the comments received from directly involved parties adequately considered and was the disposition of these comments full communicated? Would we have done things differently? This review will identify any best practices and any issues or gaps in the investigation report review process.

6 — External Communications

The TSB will review the ATSB approach to external communications (i.e. vis-à-vis the media, public, stakeholders and politicians) throughout the investigation and report production process, upon the release of the final report, and in the weeks following the report publication to assess its effectiveness at achieving the desired outcome. The review team will ask questions such as: What was the methodology and was the process followed? Was information provided in a proactive manner? Were messages crafted with the anticipated stakeholder reaction in mind? After looking at the business process, the TSB will look into the communications issues specific to Norfolk Island and its aftermath. The review team will ask further questions such as: Was the reaction appropriate in response to the television show Four Corners? Why was the ATSB unable to convince the Senate Committee and possibly the public of the validity of its processes? Would we have done things differently? This review will identify any best practices and any issues or gaps in the external communications process.

7 — Deliverables

The TSB will prepare and submit a detailed written report to the ATSB summarizing the results of its review, its findings and its recommendations. The report will contain the following sections:



Introduction
Description of the review process and methodology
Analysis and findings for each section
Review of the Investigation Methodology
Application of the Investigation Methodology
Management and Governance of the Investigation
Investigation Report Process
External Communications
Conclusion and recommendations

The TSB will provide a draft report to the ATSB for review and comments. The ATSB comments will be considered by the TSB and the report will be finalized.

8 — Independence

The TSB will carry out the work described in the preceding sections in an independent and objective manner. The TSB will be fully responsible for the conduct of the review and for the analysis of the information collected. The final report will present the independent views of the TSB.

In the interest of transparency and accountability, the TSB will make its final report public (i.e. post it on its web site). Advanced notification of the release and advanced copies of the report will be provided to the ATSB. Once the report is public the ATSB will be able to reference the report and disseminate it as it sees fit without any restrictions.

The ATSB will provide full cooperation and access to the necessary files, manuals, policies, procedures, and personnel.
Reading between the lines I think there is enough scope in those ToR to really effect a change to the running of the ATsB and get them back to SR (sensible reason). After all it is not the crew on the coalface who are the problem but the numbnuts in the lofty offices above...:ok:

[SIUYA]

Sarcs...

Proposed Scope of Work point 5:

Investigation Report Process

The TSB will review the ATSB investigation report process and how it was applied in the case of the Norfolk Island investigation and at least one other ATSB investigation to assess its effectiveness at achieving the desired outcome. The review team will ask questions such as: Was the process followed? Was the report review conducted in a thorough manner and was it effective? Is the analysis contained in the report complete and thorough? Are the findings and recommendations well supported by facts and robust analysis? Were the comments received from directly involved parties adequately considered and was the disposition of these comments full communicated? Would we have done things differently? This review will identify any best practices and any issues or gaps in the investigation report review process.

ATSB Transport Safety Report, Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2009-072 Final Report:

SAFETY ACTION

The safety issues identified during this investigation are listed in the Findings and Safety Actions sections of this report. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) expects that all safety issues identified by the investigation should be addressed by the relevant organisations. In addressing those issues, the ATSB prefers to encourage relevant organisations to proactively initiate safety action, rather than to issue formal safety recommendations or safety advisory notices.

As far as I can see there were no safety recommendations, so the TSB Scoping doesn't really seem appropriate if it was intending to look at recommendations, does it? :confused:

[Kharon]

There's a fair bit of wriggle room for a bookie in that script (thanks ASRR). Working out the odds the determination of TSBC to protect a solid reputation must be factored in; then there's the integrity of the investigating panel to consider; the current 'mood' of the minister and Senators to weigh in. The IOS entries in the race cannot be discounted, nor can the 'treatment' the WLR has prescribed for the DAS and ATSB be ignored. Beaker and McComic between them, with Wodgers assistance, royally screwed the Pel Air pooch.

Not very often do I wish to be a fly on a wall (high risk job) – but I concede it could be a handy trick.

[Sarcs]

Kharon: Working out the odds the determination of TSBC to protect a solid reputation must be factored in; then there's the integrity of the investigating panel to consider; the current 'mood' of the minister and Senators to weigh in. The IOS entries in the race cannot be discounted, nor can the 'treatment' the WLR had prescribed for the DAS and ATSB bi ignored.
And there's the rub do we truly expect the good investigators at the TSBC, who make their living out of solving (on the face of it) what went wrong across the broad spectrum of a causal chain (Reason Model) and in compliance with Annex 13 Chapter 5, to just rubberstamp their review??
{Comment: Despite the ToR I would suggest that the natural curiosity of the Canuck AAI investigators will have them flicking through the Senate PelAir report and viewing the 4 Corners program both of which are readily accessible off the internet.}
so the TSB Scoping doesn't really seem appropriate if it was intending to look at recommendations, does it? :confused: Totally agree SIUYA it does seem limited in scope. However what does give me some hope are the very lines that you quoted...

"...Was the report review conducted in a thorough manner and was it effective? Is the analysis contained in the report complete and thorough? Are the findings and recommendations well supported by facts and robust analysis? Were the comments received from directly involved parties adequately considered and was the disposition of these comments full communicated?..."

The TSBC adhere strictly (no notified differences) to Annex 13 Chapter 5. Chapter 5 refers you to the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (http://aviadocs.net/icaodocs/Docs/9756_p3_cons_en.pdf), this manual is very much Reason oriented (reference Ch 3 para 3.2), & provides guidance on ICAO accepted practice/methodology of accident/incident investigation.

Chapter 3 ORGANIZATIONAL INVESTIGATION, Paragraph 3.5 METHODOLOGY (my bold): 3.5.1 The application of the Reason Model to accident and incident investigation

The organizational investigator will often rely on other groups to identify active failures, local factors and failed or absent defenses. As this information becomes available, the organizational investigator will be in a position to consider the underlying organizational and systemic factors which enabled the situation to develop.

In the event of a major investigation, there may be daily briefings which will enable the organizational investigator to become aware of the progress of other groups. It may be appropriate, however, for the organizational investigator to arrange for a member of each group to act as a contact and report information which may have a bearing on organizational issues.

In the early stages of the investigation, the organizational investigator may need to attend or review key interviews conducted by other groups such as ATC or Operations. This will ensure that potential organizational issues are not being neglected during the interview. As the investigation progresses there may be a need to conduct interviews specifically directed at organizational issues.

In addition to relying on information from sources such as interviews, and documents, the organizational investigator may choose to collect information via additional means such as structured survey interviews, or questionnaires.

The organizational investigator should develop a listing of the organizations that played a role in creating potential local or systemic factors. For example, if the accident is remote from the organization headquarters, there may be an intermediate level of supervision involved. Similarly, when outsourcing is used for example for aircraft maintenance, there may be several contractual relationships established involving multiple organizations. In this case, the relationship between each organization should be well understood to identify breakdowns in the management oversight and communications. Finally, as the investigator comes to understand the organization’s structure, there must be consideration of the government relationship with the organizations related to the issuing and continued oversight of the operations and/or maintenance certificates.

Potential organizational weaknesses may become apparent during the investigation. Yet these organizational weaknesses may have had no role in the development of the accident. If no evidence subsequently emerges to link these weaknesses with the active failures, local factors and defenses of the accident scenario, the organizational investigator should not list these weaknesses among the accident factors. Such findings should however be included in the accident report and if applicable they should be a subject of a safety recommendation. It might be appropriated to place such findings under additional information in the accident report.
We are all now fully aware that the ATsB pretty much scoped out of their report all organisational issues (including CAsA oversight of PelAir) as not being contributory to the ditching. However, according to the above methodology, the TSBC may have an entirely different view on this and the OI's most definitely falls within the remit of the TSBC ToR…

“…Would we have done things differently? This review will identify any best practices and any issues or gaps in the investigation report review process…”

The TSBC ToR…2 — Review of the Investigation Methodology

The TSB will collect information and conduct a comparative analysis of the ATSB and TSB investigation methodologies, including the approach for the risk assessment of safety issues. The analysis will also include a comparison the two methodologies to the relevant provisions of Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention. This benchmarking analysis will identify the strengths (best practices) and the weaknesses (gaps) of each methodology.
…also means that the Canucks, especially in light of the Senate inquiry findings, will have to consider as part of their ‘comparative analysis’ and in light of the FRMS special audit report & the Chambers Report…

“…Reopening of investigation
5.13 If, after the investigation has been closed, new and significant evidence becomes available, the State which conducted the investigation shall reopen it…”
…to see whether they would have, under their methodology, have come to the same conclusion as Beaker & his fellow Commissioners.


{Note: The ToR also, by design, should encompass both the initially notified and intended Critical Safety Issue & ATSB Prelim Report (Jan-Feb 2010) and the subsequent about face that the bureau took at the time.}

IMO the ToR are definitely not a tick-a-box routine and there is certainly sufficient scope for the TSBC to make some fairly constructive recommendations to the ATsB.

Also as "K" said..."Working out the odds the determination of TSBC to protect a solid reputation must be factored in..." is particularly relevant when the eyes of the international aviation community and the travelling public are focussed on our neck of the woods in respect of the MH370 search & investigation..:ok:

[Kharon]

I just wonder exactly what the Senate team make of the current shenanigans; it's not as though there is no scope for them to act and there's certainly lots of juicy tid-bits on offer. What a smorgasbord of choice. The discarded Pel-Air report (insult one), the dismissive rhetoric in Estimates (insult two), the 'run-around' answers to direct questions (insult three), the flaunting distraction of the WLR (insult four) or the blatant, purblind, arrogant 'finger' publicly delivered on the CVD issue (insult five). There's more, but you get the idea.

These are (for politicians) as honest, informed, intelligent a crew as industry could have wished for – and they seem to care. Cometh the hour. etc.

I would keep an eye on the Senate ball, they just don't strike me as the type to slip away into the night. They may yet call the bully's bluff and that will be worth watching....Time will tell the tale.

Note to self – buy more popcorn.

[thorn bird]

"Reason: Good housekeeping day."

I thought that was what "Mini's" were for??

[Sarcs]

Well finally the ATsB interim report into the ill-fated ATR72, VH-FVR has been released: AO-2014-032 (http://atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ao-2014-032.aspx)

From report...

"...Subsequent to the occurrence on 20 February, the aircraft was operated on 13 sectors, the last of which was a scheduled passenger flight from Sydney to Albury, NSW on 25 February 2014. On descent into Albury the aircraft passed in close proximity to birds, which alerted the captain to the possibility of a birdstrike. There were no indications that a bird had struck the aircraft but on the ground, the aircraft’s pitch trim system fluctuated abnormally.

The captain conducted a walk-around inspection with an expectation of bird damage to the left side of the aircraft. The only abnormality found was a deformity to a fairing at the top leading edge of the vertical stabiliser, which might have been the result of a birdstrike. The captain advised maintenance watch who dispatched an engineer to inspect the aircraft.

The engineer used scissor lift equipment to inspect the tailplane and confirmed that the fairing might have been damaged by a bird but that there was also significant structural damage on top of the tailplane. The aircraft was grounded and the ATSB advised..."

The investigation is continuing and will include review of the:
•meteorological data
•data from the flight data recorder
•data from the cockpit voice recorder
•closed circuit TV footage
•aircraft operator’s procedures and training
•aircraft maintenance records
•maintenance organisation’s procedures and equipment
•arrangements between the aircraft operator and maintenance organisation
•aircraft manufacturer’s maintenance instructions
•information as it becomes available during the repair process.
Makes for a fascinating read but like so many of these types of investigations it leaves you with more questions than answers...:rolleyes:

Here is Ben's, not surprising, take on it so far...:=:Virgin Australia flew 13 passenger flights in broken turbo-prop (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/06/10/virgin-australia-flew-13-passenger-flights-in-broken-turbo-prop/#comments)

Where on earth is CASA as well as Virgin Australia and the Minister for Aviation in relation to the shocking update by the ATSB in the case of a damaged 68 passenger ATR72 turbo-prop (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ao-2014-032.aspx) that was allowed to fly 13 times in scheduled service after a turbulence event on a Sydney-Canberra flight in February?

The core elements of the ATSB report show that Virgin Australia’s engineering contractor and the airline failed to identify and understand serious damage done to this aircraft in the turbulence event.

The aircraft was then allowed to carry passengers for thirteen sectors in that state before an in-flight crisis five days later approaching Albury from Sydney where it was grounded after landing, and remains to those day, pending repairs if indeed it can be repaired.

These are scandalous disclosures. No one in the general flying public in this country expects that a contract maintenance organisation could be so bad at its job that it failed to understand and identify the grave safety of flight issues apparent on the Virgin turbo-prop on 20 February.

It is after all, what the maintenance provider is paid by Virgin to do, rather than scratch their heads and release the aircraft back into service.

It’s Virgin’s inescapable legal obligation to ensure that all aircraft are safe before flying. It didn’t ensure the safety of these 13 flights. It’s CASA’s role to enforce and maintain a safe level of oversight on airline operations and ensure that those who carry out aircraft maintenance are competent and effective.

It’s the Minister’s responsibility, particularly as the leader of the Nationals, to make sure that rural and regional air services, including those that fly him and his colleagues to and from Canberra, are safe. It’s called Ministerial responsibility.

How on earth did this situation arise with this aircraft, and what steps have been taken to ensure that whoever screwed up so badly, within Virgin, and within the contractor, never get to imperil the safety of flight in this country in this manner again?

This may seem harsh. But flight safety standards are by necessity harsh. The harsh reality is that 13 passenger loads were exposed to a broken aircraft, and that is intolerable. Read the ATSB document linked to above very carefully, as it contains inferences and disclosures that are very disturbing.

A statement will be issued by Virgin Australia today and will be added to this report as soon as possible, and further reports on this matter will of course be posted as to future developments "Where on earth is CASA as well as Virgin Australia and the Minister for Aviation"...not to mention where have the ATsBeaker been for nearly three months since the prelim report was meant to be released; or (benefit of the doubt) have they just been told to sit on their hands (& prelim report) while the ducks have been realigned??:= Either way it just increases the intrigue...:cool:

Let's see Miniscule we've got the ASRR report to respond to; the TSBC review report to be released; the CVD matter to address...the list goes on..:ugh:

The Tango comment from another PT article...ATSB Mildura fog crisis report delayed for good reasons (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/06/06/atsb-mildura-fog-crisis-report-delayed-for-good-reasons/) is particularly pertinent to this (further) non-transparent bureau investigation:http://0.gravatar.com/avatar/c6f77856998c94d3c81343ea601c62c1?s=32&d=identicon&r=G (http://en.gravatar.com/site/signup/) Tango


Posted June 8, 2014 at 4:23 am | Permalink (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/06/06/atsb-mildura-fog-crisis-report-delayed-for-good-reasons/#comment-26390)

When Rome is burning do you wait for the report before you get out the fire trucks?

While you may not be able to solve all the problems, you can solve the one in front of you to some degree or in totality.

To delay sounds like more of the Pel Air crash.

In Alaska they remoted the weather stations and even back in the day, we had manned stations all over the state (about the average size of one of the Australian States). We had a population of 150,000 in those days. If that could be managed.

If this was that critical and it looks to be from over here, then it required immediate action even if longer term and better solutions were worked on and out.

Delaying just the report a year, which will become 5 or until something happens is pretty bizarre.

Once again it is cross Ts, dot Is and make sure all is in order before we breath.Busy times ahead Miniscule..TICK TOCK!:{


PT Update:Virgin Australia statement:

The safety of our guests, crew and aircraft is our number one priority at Virgin Australia and we have strong protocols in place to ensure the safety of our operations is maintained to the highest standard.

While this is an isolated issue, we are working with the ATSB, the aircraft manufacturer and our maintenance provider to identify what has occurred. As the investigation is ongoing, it would be inappropriate for us to comment in any further detail at this stage.

Generally speaking, Plane Talking would rather responses to stories stand alone.

However the ‘protocols in place’ referred to didn’t work. If they didn’t work, they need to be made to work, because the fact that they didn’t work seriously compromised the safety of 13 Virgin Australia flights, and if anyone doubts that, damage to the control surfaces on the tail of an airliner, and damage that escapes detection, is a truly serious matter.

The term ‘isolated’ is perplexing. This was a failure that applied to the relationship and quality of service between an airline, a contractor, and its fleet of turbo-props. If you are a regional or Canberra flyer, how would you feel about the term ‘isolated’?

[Kharon]

Is it just me? while happy to have the latest report and some 'facts' to consider, the wording of the ATR investigation seems a bit – 'twee', for the wont of better, fluffy or something:-

The first five paragraphs are totally and utterly irrelevant. Except 20/02/14 VH-FVR departed schedule Sydney – Canberra – Sydney.

That's a full page of fluff to say Routine operations to Canberra and until TOD Sydney. Why bother?

Then later we get the high drama of a runway change 16 R to 16 L – then the information that – surprise, surprise, the Seat belt sign was on and the checklist was almost complete. Nothing of any great value so far - and we are now at paragraph 10. Where the FO started the descent – on AP. Wow, invaluable, that's way cool. Are you not diverted? Ah, but wait – now we come to it.

At 1640 and about 8,500 ft, the crew noticed the airspeed going up quickly and the speed trend excessively high. The first officer reduced engine power and used touch control steering to temporarily disconnect the autopilot before manually raising the nose to control the speed. The aircraft felt ‘heavy’, requiring the first officer’s two hands on the controls to move from the then -4° pitch angle (aircraft nose-up/down). The first officer expected that the pitch correction would be sufficient to arrest the speed trend.

Deconstruct the paragraph, I'll give you a start – airspeed "going up quickly" ; they were 235 KIAS, top speed 250 KIAS; define time line, provide ROD, provide TOAT, provide wind, provide temperature then think inversion layer or, sheer line, or updraft, or stable mountain wave; or even trim fault. But airspeed going up "quickly" is just 'fluff'. Anyway – power off – trim up – two hands - no fix – why not?. Was the auto trim running against the FO input?, had the skipper got his boot braced against the prong? This is a definitive moment and we get "speed going up quickly".

The captain was unsure if the first officer’s control inputs were sufficient to avoid an over-speed so put one of his hands on the controls and disconnected the autopilot to raise the nose further.

Watts on first, Who on second etc. etc. for the next three paragraphs. Then a paragraph worthy of a channel 7 headline, just before an advertisement break :-

To both crew members, what happened next was unexpected and unclear.

High drama indeed.

Suddenly, the crew felt high positive g,[3] the controls felt different and spongy, and cockpit warnings activated.

Somewhere, as yet undefined, between TOD, the "suddenly" moment and 230 KIAS stable; a leg got busted, the elevator channels had split and despite previous "heavy" and "spongy" feeling controls – "suddenly" all is well again - except for some annoying warning lights.

Grounded – Oh, you bet! Engineering next. Despite the window dressing, duty times and the like, (they do fail to mention what the engineer had for morning tea though) you get a sense of more to it. Although it may be just the tabloid style of reporting that gives the impression.

At about 2300 the engineer borrowed a nearby stand to provide a platform at about wing height.

If this is representative of the 'new' style ATSB report, the Murdoch press may be interested in using it. It's not a bad 'press release', not too bad at all – but as an interim report on a serious event......Well we got a nice picture of the aircraft taxiing in....Stellar.

Please Senators, can we have our ATSB back.

[dubbleyew eight]

word is that it is just heads down in CAsA, rally all the support possible from the airlines for the new regs and just soldier it out.
nothing to be changed....

[Sarcs]

Maybe the 'Fluff & bull****e' ATR prelim report (tabloid pg 2 article) is pitched for the man at the back of the room to get a handle on, it certainly seems to have helped with the (always behind) MMSM...:E:Damaged Virgin Australia plane flew 13 times, says safety report (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/aviation/damaged-virgin-australia-plane-flew-13-times-says-safety-report/story-e6frg95x-1226952034257)

http://resources1.news.com.au/images/2014/06/12/1226952/034205-611e6088-f1ed-11e3-aad6-e5c45a718cb3.jpg


A VIRGIN Australia plane flew 13 times with structural damage following a turbulence event on approach to Sydney, a preliminary report has found.

An initial investigation by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) found damage “consistent with an overstress condition’’ was likely to have occurred on February 20 as the plane made its approach to Sydney.

While the 68 passenger ATR 72 turboprop was initially removed from service and an inspection carried out, it was back in the air the next day.
It was not until five days later, following a suspected bird strike as the plane descended into Albury, that the damage linked to the February 20 event was discovered. By that time, the plane had already flown 13 more times.

According to the ATSB report, it was about 4.40pm on February 20 when, as the aircraft made its approach to Sydney at an altitude of 8500 feet, that “the crew noticed the air speed going up quickly and the speed trend excessively high’’.

The first officer reduced engine power and used touch-control steering to temporarily disconnect the autopilot before manually raising the nose to control the speed.

But the captain was unsure if the first officer’s control inputs were sufficient to avoid an “overspeed’’ and put one of his hands on the controls and disconnected the autopilot to raise the nose further.

“The captain believed he indicated his intention to take over control, and while the first officer could not recall it being verbalised, he was aware of the captain’s actions,’’ the report says.

“The first officer recalled that he took his hands off the controls, releasing touch-control steering in the process. Shortly after, concerned about a high nose-up attitude, the first officer put his hands back on the controls. To both crew members, what happened next was unexpected and unclear.

“Suddenly, the crew felt high positive (G-force), the controls felt different and spongy, and cockpit warnings activated.

“At some point, the cabin crew called the cockpit and advised that the senior cabin crew member had injured her leg and that it might be broken.’’

The inspection on February 25 “found broken carbon plies, cracked joint sealant, and deformation in and around the area where the horizontal stabiliser attaches to the vertical stabiliser’’.

“There was also some minor damage to the rudder,’’ the report says.
The ATSB says its initial examination showed that “differential force on the control column that resulted from the captain and first officer applying an opposing force exceeded the differential force required to generate a pitch disconnect’’.

“Each pilot was then controlling the elevator on their side of the aircraft in opposite directions for a brief period before the first officer released his control column.’’

The ATSB investigation is ongoing.

In a brief statement, Virgin Australia said the safety of guests, crew and aircraft was its No. 1 priority.

“While this is an isolated issue, we are working with the ATSB, the aircraft manufacturer and our maintenance provider to identify what has occurred,’’ the airline said. See the Oz almost perfectly regurgitates the original bureau tabloid, why?? Because it is well censored (PC'd) and appeals to the average punter without giving them nightmares. Not to mention it is perfect for the lazy journalist to copy and paste, flick off and get back to the bar..job done!


{Poor old Oz were forced to publish that prior to midnight when SC puts out the rest of his ****e, notice there is no journo staking a claim to that article..please..please RM bring back AK}

On the other hand the Oz aviation mag is pitching to more of a captive audience. Here is their brief, less sensational, summary of the story:ATSB reports on Virgin Australia ATR structural damage (http://australianaviation.com.au/2014/06/atsb-reports-on-virgin-australia-atr-structural-damage/)

See less fluff & BS but probably even more politically correct (PC) with no aspersions on any DIPs or on the quality of that lowest of low reports...:ugh:

This comment at the bottom of the AA report is probably the closest either article goes towards the half dozen hefty elephants in this disgusting tale (so far):Damian says: June 11, 2014 at 7:30 pm (http://australianaviation.com.au/2014/06/atsb-reports-on-virgin-australia-atr-structural-damage/comment-page-1/#comment-19611)
It does make you wonder what could have ultimately happened had the bird strike/possible bird strike not occurred Yep does make you wonder Damo old son...:D

But for really guts and no prisoners commentary you can't go past the comments on Ben's article (that by the way came out < 2hrs of the prelim being released), from HERE (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/06/10/virgin-australia-flew-13-passenger-flights-in-broken-turbo-prop/#comments).

Hmm..still not much comment on that (IMO) crock of a report {comment: maybe we've all become complacent on the standard of BASR bureau reports these days..:uhoh:}

Although there is a TANGO sidewinder towards the bottom...:ok:Tango Posted June 12, 2014 at 1:48 pm | Permalink (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/06/10/virgin-australia-flew-13-passenger-flights-in-broken-turbo-prop/#comment-26467)


Its all in keeping with the more client friendly CASA and ATSB brief.
We don’t want to upset our customers (and if they kill their customers too bad)
So it all makes sense and if you aren’t flying in the airplane, what the heck (maybe the maintainer should have to accompany the aircraft after they say its fine!) :D:D Like his form..MTF :ok:

[Sarcs]

Damn if he hasn't heard me??:rolleyes:

Well it appears the MSM has taken up the ATsB ATR essay challenge, starting with SC (MMSM) with his midnight deadline article...:D:Virgin defends safety after turboprop woes

VIRGIN Australia has defended its safety protocols after a regional turboprop aircraft flew for 13 sectors after an inspection by engineers failed to detect significant damage to its tail section.

An Australian Transport Safety Bureau report released this week showed the ATR 72 was damaged during an incident on February 20 but was not grounded until February 25.

The manufacturer subsequently recommended replacing the plane’s horizontal stabiliser, elevators and vertical stabiliser.

Virgin said this week that safety was its top priority and it had “strong protocols in place to *ensure the safety of our operations is maintained to the highest standard”.

“While this is an isolated issue, we are working with the ATSB, the aircraft manufacturer and our maintenance provider to identify what has occurred,’’ it said.

The plane began flying abnormally on approach to Sydney on February 20 and the incident was serious enough to injure a senior cabin crew member, prompt the pilots to request an ambulance and make a PAN call, a level below a full-blown emergency.

The ATSB was advised initially of a turbulence-related event and began an investigation because of the injuries to the flight attendant.

Two aircraft engineers from Virgin’s contract maintenance operator were told that the pilots were not sure what had happened but the aircraft’s pitch controls had disconnected and there had been a possible overspeed, where the aircraft’s airspeed exceeds safe working limits.

The engineers established that the plane had been subject to a force of 3.34 times the force of gravity and exceeded the acceptable weight limit for the aircraft.

It was removed from service to be inspected and the two engineers brought in a third colleague to continue the inspection overnight.

The third engineer was led to understand that a turbulence inspection had been requested after the pitch controls had disconnected in moderate turbulence.

He also understood that one of the duty engineers had done quite a detailed walk-around of the aircraft in daylight and found no signs of defects.

The manufacturer specified in this case a general visual inspection of the fuselage, stabilisers and wings, with more detailed inspections if any anomalies were found, as well as a more detailed inspection of the wing attachment fittings.

The third engineer borrowed a nearby stand and inspected the upper surface of the wing, rear fuse*lage and tail by torchlight before finishing work and returning the next morning.

“No defects were identified from any of the inspections and the aircraft was returned to service the next day,’’ the ATSB said.

The issue re-emerged on a Sydney-Albury flight on February 25 when the aircraft passed close to a flock of birds. While there were no indications that a bird had struck the aircraft, its pitch trim system fluctuated abnormally.

“The captain conducted a walk-around inspection with an expectation of bird damage to the left side of the aircraft,’’ the ATSB said. “The only abnormality found was a deformity to a fairing at the top leading edge of the vertical stabiliser, which might have been the result of a birdstrike. The captain advised maintenance watch, who dispatched an engineer to inspect the aircraft.’’

That engineer used scissor lift equipment to inspect the tailplane and confirmed that the fairing might have been damaged by a bird but that there was also significant structural damage on top of the tailplane. The aircraft was grounded and the ATSB began investigating.

Its initial examination of recorded data found that both the first officer and captain initially pulled on the control column but shortly afterwards, as the vertical load factor was increasing through 1.8G, the first officer began to push the control column.

“The differential force on the control column that resulted from the captain and first officer applying an opposing force exceeded the differential force required to generate a pitch disconnect,’’ the report said. “Each pilot was then controlling the elevator on their side of the aircraft in opposite directions for a brief period before the first officer released his control column.’’

Damage included broken carbon components, cracked joint sealant, a deformation in and around the area where the horizontal stabiliser attaches to the vertical stabiliser and some minor damage to the rudder.

“The damage was assessed as being consistent with an overstress condition. Subject to further assessment and non-destructive testing, the aircraft manufacturer recommended replacement of the horizontal stabiliser, elevators, and vertical stabiliser,’’ the report said.

The investigation continues. IOS Mark: 8/10 Comment: Very well PC'd, needs work on the sensational factor (refer to GT for future guidance), consider a more grabbing headline next time..;)

The other mob actually beat the deadline, here is their effort:Virgin plane kept flying for five days with 'significant structural damage' (http://www.smh.com.au/business/aviation/virgin-plane-kept-flying-for-five-days-with-significant-structural-damage-20140612-39zxx.html#ixzz34T2Aiwsw)

Virgin Australia Regional Airlines operated one of its turboprops on 13 sectors after an incident that the airline later suspected might have caused "significant structural damage" to the tailplane, says an initial report from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ao-2014-032.aspx).

The 68-seat ATR-72 aircraft, registered as VH-FVR, has been grounded in Albury for more than three months awaiting replacement of the horizontal stabiliser, elevator and vertical stabiliser, which provide stability and control to the aircraft.

The grounding came five days after an initial incident on February 20, in which pilots reported moderate turbulence as they approached landing on a flight from Canberra to Sydney.

The ATSB said the pilots advised the engineers that the pitch controls had disconnected, with a possible overspeed. From the onboard equipment, the engineers were able to establish there had not been an overspeed, but that a vertical load factor of 3.34 gravity force was recorded that exceeded the acceptable limit for the aircraft weight.

A flight attendant broke her leg during the incident, and the ATSB report said an engineer had inspected the upper surface of the wing, the rear fuselage and the tail by torchlight that evening for signs of damage, but had not identified any defects and the plane was returned to service the next morning.

The aircraft was then operated for a further 13 sectors over the following days, including a final passenger flight from Sydney to Albury on February 25. The ATSB said on descent to Albury, the aircraft passed close to birds, which alerted the captain to a possibility of a birdstrike.

"There were no indications that a bird had struck the aircraft, but on the ground, the aircraft's pitch trim fluctuated abnormally," the report said.
The captain alerted the maintenance team to a deformity in the vertical stabiliser which may have been a result of a birdstrike and an engineer was dispatched to inspect the aircraft.

The ATSB said the engineer used scissor-lift equipment to inspect the tailplane and found there was "significant structural damage" on top of the tailplane. The aircraft was grounded for repairs and the ATSB was advised of the situation.

"Later information from the operator suggested that the damage to the tailplane might have been a result of the occurrence involving [the aircraft] on February 20," the ATSB said.

The ATSB interviewed the pilots and engineers and inspected the damaged aircraft at Albury. A final report on the investigation is not due until February next year.

In response to the initial ATSB report, Virgin issued a statement saying the safety of its guests, crew and aircraft was its number one priority as an airline and there were strong protocols in place to ensure the safety of its operations were maintained to the highest standard.

"While this is an isolated issue, we are working with the ATSB, the aircraft manufacturer and our maintenance provider to identify what has occurred," Virgin said. "As the investigation is ongoing, it would be inappropriate for us to comment in any further detail at this stage."

The airline paused growth in its ATR fleet this year, having left an aircraft delivered last September on the ground amid weak demand and talks with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority about improving its procedures after the integration of Perth-based Skywest into its regional arm.

However, Virgin regional head Merren McArthur said this month that she expected the aircraft grounded at Albury to be repaired within a month or so, and for the other grounded aircraft to join the flying fleet within a similar time.

Virgin has deferred the delivery of six more ATR aircraft and Ms McArthur said the timetable would depend on market demand.
IOS Mark: 9/10 Comment: PC factor needs work but acceptable. Headline is excellent but suggest it is a tad light on for SF (sensational factor). Top marks for beating the deadline...:D


Associate Professor for IOS Affairs...Sarcs :ok:

[Sarcs]

Some of us may remember from the PelAir & Pilot training Senate inquiries the sensible, rational contributions made, both in submissions & hearing appearances, from the AIPA mob...:D

Many on here may say that AIPA and it's members (by design) are too far removed from the current machinations and sheer embuggerance being subjectively inflicted upon the GA (IOS) industry.:ugh: However it should also be remembered that most of the AIPA members hail originally from a GA background and although they've reached the pinnacle of their careers as professional aviators, they owe a lot to the grass roots of the industry.
Many AIPA members also still actively participate at a recreational, private pilot/aircraft owner level while employed and once retired. There is also the significant fact that AIPA depends on its existence on actively promoting the aspirations of future aspiring airline pilots (WANNABES).

IMO this puts the AIPA, and other similar {big end of town} airline unions/lobby groups, in rather a unique position as being far enough removed to give an objective view of the current status quo of our ailing industry. Therefore it was with some interest that I read sub #197 (http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/asrr/submissions/files/197_aipa_31_jan_2014_redacted.pdf) from AIPA. This submission is measured, somewhat politically correct (and many may not totally agree with the recommendations) but it does show that Nathan Safe & crew are totally plugged in when it comes to the ToR of the ASRR...:D:D

The AIPA passage on the ATsB provides an excellent starting point and IMO summarises perfectly the current problems, (of our once proud aviation safety watchdog) of the ATsB, while highlighting the importance of preserving a totally independent State AAI..:ok:

SOB :{: The ATSB

In October 2012, AIPA made a submission to the Australian Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee Inquiry into Aviation Accident Investigations (the “Pel-Air Inquiry”). The Committee’s final Report is a vital document for the Review.

However, we believe that our submission for the most part addressed a range of issues that remain directly relevant to the Review’s Terms of Reference and we strongly recommend that you read it separately from the Senate’s final report. It can be found at: https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=31a52199-58c6-4cd8-ad9e-646f2356b23a (https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=31a52199-58c6-4cd8-ad9e-646f2356b23a)

For the present purpose, we do not believe that we need to quote large slabs of our Pel-Air Inquiry submission. However, the following brief synopsis will not do justice to the detail of the argument in our submission nor will it establish the full context. Subject to that caveat, what we said was:

• the ATSB report on the ditching was too little, too late to improve aviation safetyas a result of that event;

• the standard of the report was the antithesis of that expected from the ATSB by the broader aviation community;

• the report appeared to have been rendered of little use by the dead hand of bureaucracy, which then raised questions about why that might have been the case;

• we questioned whether an over-emphasis on the ”no blame” philosophy has overshadowed, if not obscured, the importance of the ATSB’s primary role to improve transport safety;

• we then examined the seismic shift in the relationship between ATSB and CASA from the Lockhart River Coronial Inquiry and the publication of the Pel-Air report;

• the Miller Review was commissioned to redress the “serious, ongoing animosity between” CASA and the ATSB;

• Miller came from the law, which is all about allocation of blame and punishment, to review the relationship with an organisation that eschews those very tenets;

• Miller’s recommendations were adopted by Government and the ATSB was pushed into the background;

• Miller, undoubtedly for all of the right reasons, stated:

“…Ultimately, the ATSB's contribution will be judged, not by the quality of its analysis, conclusions and safety recommendations per se, but by the influence those recommendations have on improving the aviation safety system.”

• we didn’t think it appropriate to judge ATSB against the inaction of those to whom the safety recommendations are addressed; and

• the ATSB became “institutionally timid” and essentially stopped making safety recommendation of any note, but enjoyed a vastly “improved” relationship with CASA.

While clearly AIPA’s submission straddles the first and second objective of this Review, the reality is that the Senate Inquiry largely underlined that the effectiveness of the ATSB had largely been sacrificed in the interests of not upsetting CASA. Had the same Senate Committee inquired into the Lockhart River accident investigation, it is highly likely that it would not have been the ATSB that was side-lined in the aftermath.

AIPA maintains the view that the large scale adoption of the Miller recommendations has had the effect of negatively influencing the true intentions of paragraphs 12AA(1)(b) and (c) of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSIA) by repressing the independence of the ATSB and suppressing holistic examination of the aviation safety system.

AIPA’s submission specifically questioned whether CASA’s role in the aviation system was being adequately scrutinised, but the harsh reality is that the same question could be asked in relation to any of the agencies directly or indirectly influencing aviation safety. Current knowledge, post the Senate Inquiry, suggests not.

AIPA believes that the ATSB has a very clear duty under the TSIA to independently and holistically examine the aviation safety system. Pandering to the ego or behaviour of any stakeholder is anathema to the principles under which the ATSB was established and AIPA strongly believes that the safety message should never be lost in the telling. We strongly support the notion of the ATSB as the watchdog of agency influence on aviation safety.

Recommendation 3

AIPA recommends that the Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development issue a directive to the ATSB clarifying that paragraphs 12AA(1)(b) and (c) of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 require holistic examination of the aviation safety system, including the regulatory framework, and that cooperation and consultation with stakeholders must not be permitted to compromise the independence of the ATSB or the making of safety recommendations.

Nonetheless, AIPA recognises two important factors: first, the current generation of senior ATSB managers may find it difficult to step out of Miller’s shadow; and second, the ATSB is not and never should be a routine auditor of the aviation safety system. AIPA believes that the latter function requires a Machinery of Government change to redress a number of aviation safety governance issues. We will elaborate on that proposal later in this submission.

In regard to the appointment of the ATSB Executive, AIPA is very conscious that ‘profiling’ has its limitations and that the key to success is very much about ‘the right stuff’’ and less about career paths. We will always have a preference for operational experience in executive positions of entities that have a profound influence on aviation safety, regardless of what type of entity is involved. ‘Operational experience’ includes experience as a safety specialist or as a regulator that can be shown to be appropriately proximate to the actual conduct of flight operations. AIPA recognises that there may be a need for appointments within the ATSB Executive for career public servants, but, subject to our ‘right stuff’ caveat, we have deep reservations about such appointments at any level above Deputy CEO (however designated).
TOP STUFF AIPA!:D:D Suggest IOS take the time to read the whole AIPA submission it is definitely worth the effort...MTF :ok:

[Kharon]

Anyone got an idea, or care to make a bet when the Forsyth report is due for Senate debate – must be soon, although it seems they are still sorting budget chaff from the public wheat.

Just thinking out loud, but if the Forsyth and Pel Air recommendations get melded; and handed back, Truss will have a lot to think through. Mind you, I'd expect the Senate crew to be there, holding his hand and making sure he signs the 'right' paperwork.

"Time – gentlemen, please".

[Sarcs]

Hope you don’t mind “K” but your excellent post got swamped by the Boratous contribution on the Truss thread and I dearly wanted to pick up where you left off so…

Take a bow industry; take two, if it pleases. (http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/527815-truss-aviation-safety-regulation-review-47.html#post8523307)The patterns which emerge from the submissions are clear; it's interesting though that only the 'professional pilot' groups had anything significant to say about the ATSB, others made mention but the core issues were taken head on and best addressed by the following: - AFAP (http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/asrr/submissions/files/225_afap_3_feb_2014_redacted.pdf) - : - AIPA (http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/asrr/submissions/files/197_aipa_31_jan_2014_redacted.pdf)- : -VIPA (http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/asrr/submissions/files/184_vipa_31_jan_2014_redacted.pdf).

The ATSB (http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/asrr/submissions/files/157_atsb_31_jan_2014.pdf) submission, like Oliver simply asks for more porridge and can be as easily dismissed as the pathetic (bloody disgraceful) – press release – doled out as an 'interim' report on the ATR incident. Annexe 19 - indeed.
There was also a notable ASRR submission from the UNSW Aviation Faculty that focussed entirely on the damning findings of the Senate PelAir (AAI) inquiry, here it is in full: ASRR sub 160 (http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/asrr/submissions/files/160_j_middleton_31_jan_2014_redacted.pdf)

SUBMISSION TO THE AVIATION SAFETY REGULATION REVIEW
January 2014

Abstract:
The need for the Aviation Safety Regulatory Review arises because of systemic deficiencies and inadequacies in the present system. This submission makes the case that the systemic failures identified by the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee Report entitled "Aviation Accident Investigations", and dated May 2013, may have occurred because of inadequate supervision of the activites of both CAA and ATSB. In this submission, it is argued that both CASA and ATSB will function better in future if overseen by Boards of Directors which have similar influence and control over their Executive Directors as occurs in the commercial world. The Directors of such Boards should be chosen for their expertise and independence. The reporting line between the organisation and the Minister should be that the Executive Director Reports to the Board, and the Chairman of the Board reports to the Minister. In this way the Minister will be able to influence the general direction of responsibilities, but not be able to unduly influence the agencies into making decisions which are not backed by technical knowledge, expert judgement and data.

The role of CASA is arguably too general, in that CASA has executive, enforcement and judicial powers in matters of aviation law and contravention thereof. This can and arguably has led to conflicts of interest within the organisation. It is recommended that a separate body, with expertise in judicial and enforcement matters, be charged with recommending a different structure to devolve some powers to other commonwealth agencies.

In the case of ATSB, the organisation should be resourced suitably to conduct their investigations independently and in a timely manner. The recent example of the Pel-Air investigation (ATSB report) in which systemic regulatory and management issues were apparently ignored, could perhaps be avoided by the use of a more formalised process. If CASA processes themselves are a contributing cause of risk, then ATSB must be able to so conclude without fear or favour. Improving aviation safety must be the prime objective.

The existing Memorandum of understanding (MoU) between CASA and ATSB and/or its interpretation is inappropriate as it appears to have unduly influenced ATSB independence. The MoU should be discarded or re-written.

It is the opinion of the writers, having canvassed a wide rage of industry personnel, that the industry has lost significant respect for both CASA and ATSB.

It is essential that restructuring occur to ensure both organisations become once again suitably effective, and to renew this respect This can only be achieved by restructuring and implementing Boards of management and changing responsibilities and reporting lines.

1. Introduction

The need for the Aviation Safety Regulatory Review arises because of systemic deficiencies and inadequacies in the present system. The Review (as defined by the Principal Objectives and Outcomes) would arguably not be needed if, in the past, there was suitable oversight of the core agencies, being the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

It is assumed that the reader will have a detailed knowledge of the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee Report entitled "Aviation Accident Investigations", and dated May 2013, hereafter referred to as the 'Report". This Report provides essential reading as background to the Outcomes expected in the Review.

A thorough reading of the Report and the submissions has led the authors of this submission to believe that the Executive Summary thereof provides a reasonable summary of matters and events. In particular there are troubling statements in the Executive Summary, three of which are quoted here as they appear to underpin systemic issues in both agencies.

The Executive Summary, page xx, states in part "What is clear is that CASA's failure to provide the ATSB with critical documents, including the Chambers Report and CASA's Special Audit of Pel-Air, which both demonstrated CASA's failure to properly oversee the Pel-Air operations, contravened the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in place between the two agencies and may have breached the terms of the Transport Safety Investigations Act 2003 (Chapter 7). The committee takes a dim view of CASA's actions in this regard."

The Executive Summary p xxi states in part "To simply focus on the actions of the pilot and not discuss the deficiencies of the system as a whole is unhelpful. It is disappointing that CASA and the ATSB continue to assert, in the face of evidence to the contrary, that the only part of the system with any effect on the accident sequence was the pilot". This follows the earlier statement, page 1x, "The committee takes and different view and believes the ATSB processes have become deficient. .. .'

While these are only three examples, the Report, plus the numerous detailed recommendations of the Report, suggest that there are systemic deficiencies within the management of both agencies. Addressing these deficiencies will assist significantly in the improvement of the management of aviation safety in Australia, and provide a way forward to satisfy the Outcomes of the Review.

2. The Regulatory Structure of CASA and ATSB

The Commonwealth Department of Aviation was created in 1982 to manage civilian air transport activities, these being formally held by the Department of Transport. In 1988 the Civil Aviation Act was passed, establishing the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). The investigative functions were further devolved in 2003 with the Transport Safety Investigations Act which established the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). It is expected the reader is familiar with the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (CAA88) and the Australian Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (ATSI2003) to understand the roles and responsibilities of the organisations.

2a) The Civil Aviation Safety Authority {CASA) CASA's responsibilities are prescribed in CAA88 Section 9. The following is a short summary list
1. Developing and disseminating clear and concise aviation safety standards
2. Developing effective enforcement strategies to secure compliance with the safety standards
3. Conducting comprehensive surveillance of the aviation industry
4. Conducting regular reviews of safety to monitor the aviation industry's performance and to identify safety trends and risks
5. Issuing operational certificates to aviation organisations
6. Issuing licences, aircraft registration and other permits
7. Carrying out timely assessment of international safety developments
8. Encouraging the aviation industry to maintain high safety standards through education, training and advice
9. Making aviation industry management and the general aviation community aware of the importance of safety and compliance with the rules
10. Promoting full and effective consultation and communication with all people and organisations that have an interest in aviation safety.

CASA is managed by a Director of Aviation Safety, and while there is a Board, at present the reporting line of the Director of Aviation Safety is directly to the Minister, not to the Board (Report 2.26). A policy of Reporting directly to the Minister may result in the Minister unduly influencing matters, to the extent of possibly ignoring technical facts or professional safety judgements which imply that a contrary position is in the interests of safety. A proper structure would be for the Director of Aviation Safety to Report to the Board, who reports to the Minister.

CASA's functions include the responsibility for overseeing and implementing the development of safety policy, for legislation, for policing, for making decisions about guilt or innocence of those which it accuses of contravening legislation and in setting penalties. The separation of powers of the Executive, the Judiciary and the Enforcement arms of government as occurs in criminal law does not exist in CASA. Few other legal systems in the world (except perhaps those of dictatorships) have such all-encompassing responsibilities (and in effect total control) over a system. It appears that CASA's diverse responsibilities may well result in internal conflict, or role confusion, unless very carefully managed and overseen by a Board with suitable expertise. There is a case to move the policing responsibility (and perhaps personnel) to the Federal Police, as it is federal legislation that is being policed. Certainly this is a complex matter that should properly be reviewed by a body of experts.

It is arguable that, in any case, the present Board members are insufficiently expert in aviation matters to effectively oversee strategy and operations, particularly given CASA's diverse responsibilities. There is no mention of aviation as an area of expertise for any of the current CASA Board Members listed in the "Biographies of Board members" on the CASA website. A stronger oversight might well have ensured a more focused and timely writing of the "new" Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998, some of which have not been seen in first draft form despite that process being active for over 15 years. The complexity of some of those regulations that have been rewritten is sufficiently high that individuals and organisations may not comprehend all the detail, leading perhaps to inadvertent contravention.

There is ample evidence in the literature and on the websites of, for example, the Australian Institute of Company Directors (www.companydircetors.com.au (http://www.companydircetors.com.au)), and the Global Network of Director Institutes (Global Network of Director Institutes (GNDI) (http://www.gndi.org)), that there is need for Company Board members to be chosen on the basis of merit, independence and integrity, including an understanding of the dynamics of the business and marketplace, and that Boards with a diverse membership are most effective. This concept provided perhaps a useful model.

We believe that the CASA Board has not provided, or not been able to provide, sufficient oversight of CASA to ensure its multiple roles role have been executed in a way which is expected by the stakeholders (the industry, the public and government). It is therefore important that the CASA Board be strengthened by adding additional members with aviation expertise, and that the Director of Aviation Safety report to the Board. Issues of potential Conflict of Interest can be handled in the usual ways by disclosure and by member omission from decision-making which affects that member's own affiliations.

In addition, to ensure that the Directors role is maintained within the confines of the strategy set by the Board, contact with the Minister should be via the Chairman of the Board.

2b) The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) ATSB has a Chief Commissioner and two Commissioners. As described in the ATSB website, none appear to have any technical expertise in accident or safety investigation, and none in aviation operations.

There is no Board. Arguably this lack of oversight can (and perhaps has) led to actions and outcomes, some of which form the basis of the criticisms of the Report. The forming of a Board which includes a wide range of technical expertise would help ensure that ATSB keeps within its remit of undertaking and reporting objectively on any safety issues. The ATSB independence is essential, as it is a technical committee, which should not be manifestly able to be influenced by politics. Should those issues involve CASA (or any other federal or state agency) then it is logically clear that ATSB must be able to make that case and report it without fear or favour, to ensure the travelling public is best served in matters of safety.

Contact between the Chief Commissioner and the Minister should be via the Chairman of the Board.

The Pel-Air Report is not of sufficient quality to be useful for the improvement of aviation safety, or to engender confidence in the Industry.


Consideration should be given as to whether the NTSB of the US or other national agency should be given the task of undertaking a fresh investigation and writing an independent report ATSB should only undertake this under revised management.

3. Conclusion

The authors have avoided the temptation to write in detail about the many issues raised in the Report, and re-iterate our belief that the Report is a balanced view of facts and judgements. We are comfortable with all of the recommendations of the Report, although many will automatically or subsequently be addressed by the implementation of Boards with appropriate membership and responsibilities.

The separate recommendation by Senator Xenophon that a separate administrative person (an Inspector General of Aviation Safety) be implemented to oversee both CASA and ATSB might be useful as an interim measure while the new Board structures are being considered and implemented, but is probably not necessary once Boards have been established. In any case management by an individual or overview by an individual cannot bring the benefits of breadth of experience and expertise which overview by a well-constituted Board should bring.

While we have not specifically addressed each point of the published Terms of Reference, we believe our generic discussion is of value across most of the principal objectives.

There you go a balanced, sensible, well reasoned argument for the ATsB to ditch the bureau concept and adopt the board concept. Sure would beat the hell out of this embuggerised BASR approach currently being deployed by the ATsB/CAsA senior management stooges.:ugh:

Perhaps the Miniscule, while the TSBC is in town, should get a briefing from the Canucks on how the board system works (i.e. Pros &Cons)??:rolleyes:

SOB Miniscule...:{

MTF...:ok:

[Kharon]

Cheers Sarcs – I was going to bring up the Uni submission, on this thread – it's first class and much more the Senators line of country. We are spoiled for choice at the moment, Boratous and the big spin machine firing up distracted me from the good oil. I expect the 'minders' and researchers associated with the Senators have already provided the team will a solid briefing and it's a fair bet this stuff has been read.

A birdie whispered in my ear that today, after questions the WLR may get an airing in Senate. Then we may get a glimpse of the future – we shall see.

[Sarcs]

Trolling (as you do..:E) through HoR Hansard I came across an adjournment speech from the Member for Grey (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=CHAMBER;id=chamber%2Fhansardr%2F128494f5-3b78-4d37-9efd-c8ccbc721e70%2F0203;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F12849 4f5-3b78-4d37-9efd-c8ccbc721e70%2F0000%22), which perked my interest...

"...Mr RAMSEY (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fallmps%2FHWS%22;queryty pe=;rec=0) (Grey) (21:05): Tonight I want to bring to this place the plight of and challenge for the air service in Coober Pedy in the north of my electorate..."

Now I had been monitoring this story for sometime, reference article example...

Runway changes could hamper regional aviation and force airlines including Rex to curtail outback services (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-07/runway-changes-could-hamper-regional-aviation/5305180)


...but the last I'd heard CAsA had for once seen common-sense and this seemed to be reinforced in the context of the Member for Grey speech:..When these amendments were made, in 2012, I thought common sense would get the best of it—that we would not have to worry about this, because no-one could be so stupid. In fact these aircraft have been landing on this strip for probably about 15 years, without incident. One would think that with that kind of record it should not be all that hard to grant the same exemption that the aircraft have had for all of that period. I have had numerous conversations with Rex and CASA over this issue. In their latest letter CASA assure me of the following:

I would like to reiterate that the widening (upgrading) of Coober Pedy's runways is not required, unless the aerodrome operator wishes to do so as a business decision … OK so what is the Member's point?? Well the next 2 paragraphs tell the story...:ugh::But CASA are telling Rex, the operators of the aircraft, that they need to go back to Saab and develop a flight supplement that will allow for the narrow-runway landings. They have ordered some simulator tests, and that sounds all reasonable and fair, except that Saab no longer make aeroplanes, so you can see that they may not be totally interested. My point is that if this costs Rex a significant amount of money to develop—maybe $100,000—I do not think they will retain the service into Coober Pedy.


So while CASA are telling us there is nothing to worry about, I am deeply concerned. If the development of the flight supplement with Saab is to cost more than the route is worth to Rex, the flight service will cease on 12 February next year. I continue talking to CASA and they say that it will all be well in hand and will all happen. I just worry about the sands of time drifting out. This has been going since 2012. We are now only seven months away from February, so it is of great concern to me that things are moving too slowly. The shades of Grey and the parallels with the CVD embuggerance started to steam up like a hot pile of elephant pooh, you know 15 years of safe ops on an exemption etc..etc..:rolleyes:

...So I then referred to the REX ASRR submission where I found this:...It is understood that one of the aims of the regulatory reform program is to enact safety outcome based regulations rather than prescriptive regulations. Rex supports the concept of safety outcome based regulations but unfortunately does not always see this carried out in practice. For example, the proposed amendment to CAR 235A effectively removes the ability for CASA to facilitate air operations where equivalent levels of safety can be achieved. It does this by prescribing the method of compliance rather than the safety outcome required.

The new CAR 235A will require operators using runways narrower than the arbitrary default standards set by ICAO to have procedures for the use of narrow runways set out in both the aircraft’s Aeroplane Flight Manual (AFM) and the operator’s Operations Manual. If the manufacturer does not supply the necessary narrow runway certification then the operation is prohibited. For the Rex operation, SAAB has indicated they will not engage in further flight testing to gain narrow runway operation certification to comply with the ICAO aircraft reference codes (ARC). The SAAB AFM does currently make provision for narrow runway operations, however they are not in accordance with the mandated requirements of the CAAP and therefore not acceptable under the proposed new CAR 235A. The new rule will prohibit Regional Express Airlines, Pel-Air Aviation and Air Link from operating into airports with narrow runways thus denying essential air services to some remote regional communities.

For Rex, this will prevent operations to Coober Pedy where it and Kendell Airlines have operated continuously since 23 August 1986. Coober Pedy Airport has a 30 metre wide runway with a homogenous 18 metre sealed centre section and to date CASA has seen fit to issue Regional Express with an exemption (CASA Instrument EX37/12) from the requirements of the current CAR 235A. The new prescriptive CAR 235A will remove CASA’s ability to issue such exemptions in the future and will prevent Rex from operating to Coober Pedy after the exemption instrument expires on 28 February 2015. This is despite more than 27 years of demonstrated safe operations...
No guesses to who has been briefing the Member for Grey and expand the safety case to 27 years...:D


That then got me thinking what's with all these recent FF moves to suddenly endeavour to become compliant with the ICAO SARPs??


I then decided to refer to the relevant SARP for Airport runway width requirements i.e. Annex 14 Ch 3 para 3.1.10.


http://i1238.photobucket.com/albums/ff498/004wercras/Untitled_Clipping_061914_095039_AM.jpg


Hmm...:confused:..so maybe (like the CVD 30 yr un-notified difference) FF were feeling vulnerable because they hadn't notified a difference to para 3.1.10??


So once again off to our convoluted 97 page AIP GEN 1.7 (H18/14) and x-referenced with the 84 page 2011 version (H12/11), & that was when the penny began to drop...:ugh:


First latest '14 NDH18/14 Para 3.1.10 - The existing standards will be strengthened to ensure code 2, 3, & 4 aircraft are operated from fully compliant runway widths… You kind of think well why bother with the notification?? Then..H12/11 Para 3.1.10 - Australian legislation permits some variation on runway width.Wonder how many other little known NDs the FF ICAO compliance crew have been tasked to eradicate??:rolleyes:

Hmm..here's a thought for the rumour mill..:E, maybe the FF numbnuts have got wind of an upcoming surprise (special audit) from the FAA/ICAO??

MTF...:ok:

[dubbleyew eight]

australia is a sovereign nation. why do we cede control of our aviation regulatory environment to the FAA or to ICAO ....or to the European Arse'oles Stopping Aviation?

answer we have in CAsA people who are so clueless as to what they should be doing that they will refer and defer to anyone untouchable by the masses just as long as the half million a year salaries keep on flowing.

utterly cluelessly incompetent CAsA.

[Kharon]

I forget just exactly how many 'differences' we have logged into the ICAO system; but it's a fair lump of a document (97 pages says Sarcs), almost a thick as some countries entire rule set.

It's passing strange that suddenly up goes the rent and everyone scrambles to 'compliance', but in the hard areas. Hard in that there was always going to be stink when an aircraft which has for years and years managed to land on a 'narrow' track; or, CVD pilots are singled out for the treatment.

Maybe the circus is coming to town and there is a desperate need to be seen 'tidying up'; but where to start ?. Brain fart – pick on the contentious areas, make a big stand, thump the safety tub and shake funding tambourine. Then you see we can, in truth say – "Oh we are trying to reduce the non compliance; but we end up in a battle at every turn, as you can see". "But look, don't worry, y'all come back in another five years now; we'll have it all tickety boo by then". "More tea Vicar?, try the iced Vo Vo's".

Perhaps it's just happenstance, it may even rate as coincidence; who can fathom the depths of the regulators tormented, twisted mind.

Toot toot, book early for Christmas......

[Frank Arouet]

It would appear that CasA are shirking any hint at adherence to the recommendations, namely recommendation 30 below, which is self explanatory and contradictory given the letter previously posted, Extract below.
The action taken by CasA provides that the applicant must pay to prove his stated previously satisfactory condition and clearly moves the burden of proof from the regulator to the pilot and fails to give the DAME the recommended freedoms to exercise his/her ability to renew aviation medical certificates. If the DAME recommends the pilot be further assessed it is his responsibility, not CasA’s.


No doubt these will become "renew by CASA only" medicals and the AVMED Branch continue unabated and unshackled as before.


Is this the first Nigerian in the woodpile?
　


" QUOTE" 30. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority devolve to Designated Aviation Medical Examiners the ability to renew aviation medical certificates (for Classes 1, 2, and 3) where the applicant meets the required standard at the time of the medical examination. "QUOTE’


"QUOTE" At the resent time, CASA is aware that CAD testing in Australia is only offered by Dr Elizabeth Livingstone, Designated Aviation Opthalmologist at the Livingstone Eye Clinic in Sydney (61-2) 9362-5820. Please note appointments are necessaryand there will be a fee charged. Any expense incurred will be your responsibility. "QUOTE"

[Kharon]

Voltaire "The action taken by CasA provides that the applicant must pay to prove his stated previously satisfactory condition and clearly moves the burden of proof from the regulator to the pilot and fails to give the DAME the recommended freedoms to exercise his/her ability to renew aviation medical certificates. If the DAME recommends the pilot be further assessed it is his responsibility, not CasA’s."

CASA seem to have mastered this art, reverse onus. We say you are and you must prove us wrong...It's uncertain how many times Robin Speed (RoLIA (http://www.ruleoflaw.org.au/principles/)) and others, particularly in the USA have railed against the rule of the regulator, rather than that of law. We seem to have almost come to accept this, turning it into a 'normalised deviance'. In safety culture the identification of a normalised deviance is essential; much time, money and effort is spent identifying, correcting and educating industry in this matter; it is a true stealth killer.

Yet 'we' sit idly by, watching companies, jobs, careers, lives been flushed away while our basic rights and democratic principles are progressively eroded, in the name of a few who decide when, where and how the mystique of aviation safety may be applied; to achieve the right outcome.

The rule of law is an overarching principle which ensures that Australians are governed by laws which their elected representatives make and which reflect the rule of law. It requires that the laws are administered justly and fairly.’
- Robin Speed, RoLIA President

Tragic really in an independent sovereign nation. Yet the good ship CASA just sails on as we stand by, fluttering our handkerchiefs – "Full and By Mister Maggot". "Aye aye sir, full and by it is".

Toot toot.

Full and By. Said of a sailing vessel when all sails are drawing full and the course steered is as close to the wind as possible. Sometimes known as sailing by and large.

[Creampuff]

Interesting Letter to the Editor of the Canberra Times dated 21 June 14:Out of control
...
Harvard University legal historian Harold Berman wrote in his book Law and Revolution that bureaucratic administrative law is the greatest single threat to the Western legal tradition.

His thesis is that the Western legal system is the result of six revolutions (1) Papal; (2) Reformation; (3) English; (4) American; (5) French; and (6) Russian.

There is now a seventh: administrative law. It is universal. Administrative law is written by the executive and enforced by nearly autonomous bodies and agencies.

Administrative law judges, judicial officers and bureaucrats ... operate under the Napoleonic code: guilty until proven innocent at your own expense.

The constitution has been superseded by administrative law. The bureaucracies make the rules, not Parliament. All over the world bureaucracies have expanded their control over individuals, corporations and private institutions. Almost nobody understands this.

We have surrendered control over our legal system to administrative law judges and salaried bureaucrats. The state wins. Lawyers win. Bureaucrats win. State-accredited victimologies win. The rest of us lose.

[dubbleyew eight]

His thesis is that the Western legal system is the result of six revolutions (1) Papal; (2) Reformation; (3) English; (4) American; (5) French; and (6) Russian.

There is now a seventh: administrative law.


look carefully around the world and you will see the inevitable consequence of the progression outlined above.
preservation of individual rights by the gun, it is called anarchy by the people who seek to control by administrative law.

watch out CAsA big heads make easy targets.:mad:

[thorn bird]

Could it be that the punters dissatisfaction in democracies around the world with their ruling elite, is a direct result of the rule of the regulator?
Maybe this is reflected in voting patterns both here and in Europe where fringe radical parties are increasingly being voted for, because of general frustration by the people that their voices are not being heard or ignored.


A warning for the Miniscule perhaps?, well maybe not, he's just fence sitting till retirement so why would he care, but for sure his successor.


CAsA rules by regulation, they are misusing this power,


They are not consulting all those they regulate,


They ignore the wishes and opinions of those they regulate. Those people have most of the experience, knowledge and expertise and they are cynically ignored!!



The GA industry is in its death throes, regional Airlines have their back to the wall, The majors? well QANTAS could be said to be a basket case, but it aint just bad management that's bringing them down, Air New Zealand manages to turn a profit, but their cost base is so much lower because of sensible regulations.



If CAsA is allowed to continue as they are, the Australian people may start asking why their airfares are the highest in the world, as they were back in the two airline days, and why they cant understand a word of what the guy in the front is saying on the PA, or the cabin crew for that matter.

[Kharon]

Like any well mannered comet, the management of matters aeronautical appear to have remained within their preordained orbit. Which is reassuring, knowing that as the comet passes from view, it will, soon or late return; bright as ever.

Now that the machinations of government change, Senate change and review have all passed and the 'paper road' has been properly tabled; what will the debate produce and how far away is it? The 'crew' don't seem in a mood to mess about with matters; I just wonder how much longer it will be before we see the result. They can't poodle about too much longer, can they? – new DAS and all that, big changes proposed etc. Seems to me the longer they fiddle, the more opportunity for the murky Machiavellian distract, divert and dilute process to operate.

The road to hell is paved with good intentions.

Patience Grasshopper. Selah.

[Sarcs]

{4Bs – Beancounter Beaker’s Budgetary Benefit}

After reading through the latest... Aviation Short Investigation Bulletin - 31 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4908441/ab-2014-085_final.pdf)... I have some serious concerns about the true motivations for such a concept and whether the bureau...

As stated under the title ‘About this Bulletin’ (page 45):

“There are times when more detailed information about the circumstances of the occurrence allows the ATSB to make a more informed decision both about whether to investigate at all and, if so, what necessary resources are required (investigation level). In addition, further publically available information on accidents and serious incidents increases safety awareness in the industry and enables improved research activities and analysis of safety trends, leading to more targeted safety education…”

…are truly scoping for maximum safety benefit/education or for bureau budgetary benefit, highlighted in bullet point 4 (page 46):• In cases where the initial decision was to conduct a full investigation, but which, after the preliminary evidence collection and review phase, later suggested that further resources are not warranted, the investigation may be finalised with a short factual report.With the true reason on why Beaker even bothers in the next bullet point:• It assists Australia to more fully comply with its obligations under ICAO Annex 13 to investigate all aviation accidents and serious incidents.Scrolling through the Jet & Turboprop ‘Serious Incidents’, all of which involved HCRPT operators, one wonders if Beaker’s scoping crew have scoped out of existence all the real causal chain factors involved?? Some of the cursory ‘safety messages’ beggar belief, with the operators involved being the only true beneficiaries of the lessons learnt, reflected in their proactive actions taken.

These HCRPT operators fortunately have the added benefit of having (mostly) their own safety departments & SMS to initiate a more thorough investigation into these incidents.

Not so the poor buggers in the Piston Aircraft section, the most disturbing of which was the grossly under investigated and under reported; Collision with terrain involving a Cessna 210, VH-HGZ (http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4907107/ao-2014-059_final.pdf) where the pilot & pax were quite literally seconds from death and both, according to the report, seriously injured. Yet all the bureau had to say in response was…

“…ATSB comment
From the photographs provided by the operator (Figure 2), the ATSB assessed that a connecting rod appeared to have broken and separated from the crankshaft, resulting in a hole in the crankcase. This precipitated a catastrophic engine failure. The smoke entering the cockpit was likely to have been from burning oil…”

…no safety summary, no significant factors, no nothing really??:ugh:

In agreement with “K” that in combination with the ATR prelim report, the YMIA investigation (love in) and the bureau ASRR submission etc…

“…The ATSB (http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/asrr/submissions/files/157_atsb_31_jan_2014.pdf) submission, like Oliver simply asks for more porridge and can be as easily dismissed as the pathetic (bloody disgraceful) – press release – doled out as an 'interim' report on the ATR incident. Annexe 19 - indeed…”

…absolutely bloody disgraceful...:yuk:

There may be no industry trust when it comes to the regulator but after recent evidence can anyone truly believe what is coming out of the bureau??

From ASRR submission (my bold): The ATSB relies on industry to report accidents and incidents and for its close cooperation during the conduct of investigation. While it is clearly important for the ATSB and CASA to work cooperatively in the mutual interests of aviation safety, it is also important that the ATSB’s independence and role as the no-blame safety investigator remains distinct from the role of the regulator.

Notwithstanding the legitimate need for the ATSB and CASA to share safety information in pursuit of those mutual interests (which needs to be entirely transparent to industry, including with a clear understanding as to how such information will be used and what limitations and protections will apply), any perceived merging of the ATSB and CASA roles creates potential to undermine the confidence industry has to both report openly to the ATSB and to cooperate in the conduct of investigations.{Comment: Certainly got that last bit right}And apparently (at the time of writing their submission) it is only going to get worse for GA accident/incident investigation:Of the $23.9m funded to the ATSB in 2013–14, around $1.6m (7 per cent) has been allocated towards safety awareness, education and research activity. On current forward estimates, it will be very difficult to maintain this level of funding unless further funds are diverted from investigation resources or provided from an external source.
Yet that happened with the tragic disappearance of MH370. However the true motives for the bureau being actively involved are questionable and whether it will mean more resources for the bureau’s main remit (i.e. TSI) is equally debateable.

Sidewinder from Ben (PT recent article: MH370: The news vacuum brings out the vacuous (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2014/06/23/mh370-the-news-vacuum-brings-out-the-vacuous/)): However in the rotation into regular view of this other piece of news the ATSB, the source of the stories on at least two recent rotations through the news media, is just trying to leverage publicity. This coming from an organisation which has recently been discredited by the Abbott Government’s review of Australian Air Safety Regulations for its digracefully botched report into the Pel-Air crash is more than a bit nauseating.

The responsible Minister, or perhaps the PM, needs to apply boot to backside when it comes to the ATSB. This is an agency that couldn’t even retrieve a flight data recorder from a known location in 30 metres of water off Norfolk Island after the Pel-Air ambulance flight was ditched just before it would have exhausted its fuel, and is implicated in a Senate report as having suppressed or dismissed evidence that the failed oversight of the operator by CASA, Australia’s safety regulator, might have been a factor in the crash occurring.

For the sake of Australia’s reputation in air safety matters, someone needs to drop a cone of silence over the ATSB, and get it to redo what is an absurb accident report before it chooses to strut its stuff on the MH370 world stage.
Yes Miniscule boot to backside please (like now) or hand it to Barnaby..:rolleyes:

SOB...:{TICK TOCK Miniscule!:E

[Kharon]

A ramble - Apart from disputing the putative value of a three tier legislative system; one of the few debatable recommendations of the Forsyth report was item 20.

20. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau transfers its safety education function to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.

I believe we have seen enough 'aberrations' recently to realise that the ATSB reports have reached an all time low; even by Beaker Aberration Standards of the Beyond all Reason Model. Forsyth was very 'kind' to the ATSB on the Pel Air imbroglio (delightful word for cock-up); since then, in what can only be seen as a 'finger' to industry and Senate, ATSB have provided two truly dreadful reports; the interim ATR and the C 210. Let's face it; ATSB are not at the top of their game.

However; general industry relies heavily on ATSB reports for 'education', it does not look to CASA. See here on Pprune; ATSB publish and if the troops can winnow out the 'safety message' from the chaff; there is discussion, like an extension of the 'Crash Comic'. Some of the sane, rational discussions are of benefit to all, especially the 'new-bee's'. I have not, to date seen a CASA generated 'safety' oriented missive mentioned; let alone discussed.

It's fine for the companies with a SMS, they can sort out the issues internally and sharpen their game: but they do not publish (why wudjah?) so 'industry' misses out of the refinements and practices which have resulted from 'internal' audit and investigation – no quarrel with this, just saying.

Then we arrive at the Coroner recommendations; there really are a lot of them. Some good, insightful and valuable; others 'not so'. But CASA blithely ignore them all, not deigning to 'educate' industry as to why coroners recommendations are rejected, or indeed why they have been accepted and the reasoning for changes made to facilitate the recommendation. You need to dig deep to find the responses, even deeper to find the changes. Not a good look...

ATSB, will survive the Beaker years and, with a bit of push, start producing the first class material we used to enjoy and rely on. The next logical step (IMO) is to simply expand 'good' reports into 'educational' documents which could suggest or recommend procedures, practice and comment on the lessons learnt from less than salutary experience.

CASA is not the DCA and do not produce anything to match the much revered "Crash comic"; the current 'rag' has not ever been worth reading, being of as much practical value as one wet sock. Nope, give the "Comic" to ATSB as natural extension of the accident report system; cheap, cheerful and above all; valuable. CASA simply squander the resource. Hell I'd chip in a few bucks to help offset the cost; but if I pay, I want the service...

Right then – back to my knitting. (Ear warmers for elephants today– big project...).

[Jinglie]

Anyone have any news on the draft or final report by the Canadian TSB on the ATSBeaker? I think Beaker committed till the end of June at last Senate Estimates. Should be an interesting read.

[Kharon]

Departmental Secretaries
Thursday, 26 June 2014

Prime Minister

The Governor-General today approved the reappointment of Mr Mike Mrdak as Secretary to the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development for a period of three years and the appointment of Ms Jane Halton PSM as Secretary of the Department of Finance for a period of five years.

Mr Mrdak has led the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development with distinction over the last five years and I congratulate him on his reappointment. Mr David Tune PSM proposes to retire as Secretary of the Department of Finance on 28 June 2014.

Since joining the Australian Public Service in 1976, Mr Tune has had a long and distinguished career. I thank him for his extensive contribution to the Australian community and wish him well in his retirement.

There is no doubt Mike Mrdak has earned reappointment; the work he gets through in estimates, shepherding the mumbling and stumbling is enough justification. He is a doughty defender, a tough adversary and has a mind like a steel trap. Just wish we could recruit him to the IOS.

Aye well – Un-begrudged congratulations are in order.

Play nice you lot......

[Up-into-the-air]

I will bite K:

2008 - Incharge of Pink Batts disaster under then PM - Kevin Rudd := :yuk:

2009 - In "charge" of atsb "aberrant" PelAir report, as under Dept. Infrastructure; :=

2009 - In "charge" of casa and the breach [Senate Inquiry] of TSI Act - recommended for investigation :D [wonder where that is up to and is the AFP about to report??]

2012 - Serious Senate inquiry starts into two of his "departments" - casa and atsb

2013 [May] - 27 Negative findings by Senate into mrdak "sub- departments" :=

2013 [November] ASRR Inquiry into atsb and casa

2014 [May] mccomick resigns :D, but given a life-line by the unapproachable casa board.

2014 [June] 37 serious reccomendations and disgust shown by Aviation Industry of particularly casa, but also atsb although Department was not targeted to a great degree - directly;

June 30 2014 - The aviation community holds it's breath to get a proper response to the aviation communities requirements by the Minister and - hang on - big mike gets a further gurnsey, with no blood shown.

:ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh:

A big We......ll.

[004wercras]

There is no doubt Mike Mrdak has earned reappointment; the work he gets through in estimates, shepherding the mumbling and stumbling is enough justification. He is a doughty defender, a tough adversary and has a mind like a steel trap. Just wish we could recruit him to the IOS.
Aye well – Un-begrudged congratulations are in order
Kharon, you've lost the plot. Pumpkin Head is part of the problem. He has refused to 'act' on CAsA, the CAsA Board, ATSBeaker, or any of the issues in play. MM is what I refer to as an enabler. His reappoimmet is a disgrace, and no doubt serves as an indicator at the highest level that very little will change at CAsA or ATSBeaker except maybe a face or two at the top. Let's see how he performs within the next 3 years when a giant smoking hole occurs.
This is pony pooh at its worst

Tick Tock and oink oink

[Kharon]

Kharon, you've lost the plot.

Who?- me. Nah mate; the thick plottens. It's a strange situation all things considered and remarkable given the upcoming barney over airport leases and the like. There is still the ICAC angle to add to the equation, the AFP look-see at the TSI breaches and a couple of other minor issues which, all together make a fairly thick stew. There is also the Barnaby dynamic, should the DPM go tech and need to spend time in the workshop, then events may take an interesting turn. See, I like MM right where he is, had he been shuffled off to another sheltered workshop it would mean having to sort out a different hand of cards, on the run, at short notice. We can recognise his pugmarks and mark his predictable track; so no, it's not too bad a thing at all.

Yup. Marbles all present and correct. Although UITA seems to have lost some: facts grasshopper; facts.....

[Lookleft]

You can't get change coming from the top if the top doesn't change! Following the logic that its better to keep incompetence in place because his incompetence is a known quantity, then Dolan should stay and so should McCormick. :confused:

[Kharon]

Mildly disagree LL; the MM is first and foremost a political animal; if the changes are enforced 'from above', where the really, truly horsepower resides; then they will travel down to IOS level. If the MM application of change is as 'good' as his resistance to it, then all will be well; lest his masters thump him for buggering up their good work.

[004wercras]

You can't get change coming from the top if the top doesn't change! Following the logic that its better to keep incompetence in place because his incompetence is a known quantity, then Dolan should stay and so should McCormick.
Based on the evidence and the understanding I have at hand, I have to agree with Lookleft on this point. Change must start at the top, if it doesn't then it won't filter down the line.
However, I may not have all the necessary info to make the statement I did about Pumpkin Head, if this is so then I humbly apologise. Maybe MM has had some robust KPI's built into his new 3 year contract which includes overseeing the dismantling and restructure of FF and ATSB?
I guess time will tell, but I cannot hide my concerns about his reappointment.
Either way I am a little edgy today. Frank borrowed the Houseboat and got the motor snagged on some FOD in the Styx River. Apparently he hit the safe that all the IOS Forsythe submissions are locked in. Someone naughty tried to dispose of it. Either way I am stressing that the Houseboat won't be serviceable until Monday, and with 2 Engineers off with the flu I am going to have to pull an all nighter, and I know that you have a lot of pax booked in for Monday morning 'K'.

Toot toot

[Prince Niccolo M]

UITA,

2014 [June] 38 serious reccomendations

Bugga! I just replied to 37 ASRR recommendations and now you tell me I missed one! :eek: :{

Where it and what does it say? :O

[Up-into-the-air]

Appreciate the edit!!

[Kharon]

In case you missed it or have not been following, the whole sad tale is – HERE (http://www.pprune.org/pacific-general-aviation-questions/527897-empire-strikes-back-colour-defective-pilots-16.html#post8543607) - . Get behind it if you feel you can; all in, a good cause.

The CVDPA folk have launched a petition calling for Minister Truss to intervene in the current dispute:

Petition to the Hon Warren Truss MP (Deputy Prime Minister & Minister for Infrastructure & Regional Development): To Intervene in the battle between colour defective pilots and CASA which threatens to destroy hundreds of careers

[Kharon]

As is my wont, I had a quiet one with P7 a.k.a. TOM last evening; it's the only time in a long time I didn't enjoy my ale. He was generous enough to buy the first and allow me the pleasure of it, all was well until round two turned up.

TOM: " Sorry mate, but I'm going to ruin your day".

K: "Oh aye". (anticipating for some pawky, humorous gambit).

TOM " Yup, DOLAN is to be reappointed to ATSB, seems they are going to pass it off as an 'interim' measure, until the stench dissipates; then, make it for the full five years". "It's whispered that if the TSBC report is just 'not too bad', he's in."

Happily, TOM had the grace not to speak until my ale was on the bar top; so no spillage or choking, I just stood there, like one o'clock half struck staring at it. Eventually -

K: " Nah, your pulling my leg", says I more in hope than belief, "Shirley not".

TOM: "'tis but a rumour at this stage" says he, quietly and kindly "but it's on the cards, why don't we wait and see, finish that and I'll get us another, there's a good lad".

Well, it spoiled my evening, even got beaten at darts (Blind Freddy); it seemed to be a long walk home, the battered Nav bag heavier than usual as I contemplated another five years of ATSB reports from the parsimonious, incredibly flawed source. IMO Dolan should have resigned after Pel Air: any honourable man would have done so, from shame. The only bright spot is that I no longer have to read the published drivel; nope I can just ignore it.

If this very ugly rumour is proven true, we are in a hole, a very deep one. What is this minuscule saying to us? Gee whiz, I hope it's just a rumour; but expect the worst and hope for the best won't work if this is aberration is foisted on industry. It was bad enough before, but now with reappointment tacitly approving past behaviour, in the words of the bard – "we're Farked". Well and truly, for all money.

A prayer to a pagan god – please don't let happen, please don't let it be true. etc. etc.....

Sotto voce - Toot.

[thorn bird]

Tell me its not so!!!

Hell's Bell's Kharon, I heard a rumour that the miniscule was suffering from dementia, maybe its true!!! Maybe when he has those little turns where he doesn't know who or where he is, his minder puts a pen in his hand and says " Just sign at the bottom , there's a good boy". Or is the idiot determined to make Australia an even bigger world laughing stock?

A chill wind just blew across my thoughts, what if they reappoint the Skull??

Armageddon for the industry.

After all those negative submissions to the Wusses inquiry, the CAsA enforcers will be busy, we all know the ones, heavy set, shaven heads, no necks, wearing dark suits and ray bans, you see them sitting at the back of the AAT and protest meetings taking notes and photo's or lurking behind hangers at air shows.

The Skull will have his revenge!!