UPS Aircraft Down In Dubai

[ManaAdaSystem]

The cheapest option?
Everything stays just like it is. We loose the occasional aircraft, the company gets the insurance money, they save money on crew and the customers get the bill.
Risk vs cost, and as long as it doesn't happen too often, all is well.

Well, not really, but from a bean counter point of view, it is.

[grizzled]

ExSp33db1rd,

With respect, your comments to MAS -- especially your last sentence --sound presumptuous; even a tad arrogant.

This discussion is not restricted to the boundaries you suggest; it's about a horrific crash (sorry, I don't like the word "accident" in this context). At this point there is no information available (publicly) that suggests DG as a cause. And the discussion re another crew member, or other mitigation suggestions to deal with onboard emergencies, is just one small aspect of the overall discussion of this occurrence.

(IMO) MAS's question and concerns re the safety and security of cargo ops are both valid and of interest. Many of us in this business believe that freight ops have been left dangerously far behind in the rush to provide increased security (both real and imagined) for passenger ops.

grizz

[RustyNuts]

For some of those who find that number unbelievable, I'm sure many of those packages are "envelopes"...i.e.-overnight letters...

None the less, the situation remains the same...Night Freight is what it is, and pilots accept it as such...

Unless you as a trusted "Ground CREW" deliberetly load some spooky stuff on my A/C, I'm behind you 100%

Yes, many of them are the overnight letters but the volume will fill 120+ planes a night.

I was on vacation last week when one of my crew members called to tell me of the accident. I have to say that in that moment my heart sunk and I felt physically ill. Every night I go up those stairs and talk to my pilots while they sign off the load plan and NOTOC and I'd hate for any one of them not to come back the next night.

After reading RustyNuts answer, I'm afraid to ask the obvious question; Don't you screen all cargo?
If not, we have the worlds largest security hole flying over our heads.

There really is no way to screen every package, and it's not just UPS. Take a package to a FedEx counter, or even the post office and they will ask you if there is anything liquid, perishable or potentially hazardous in the box. They don't -- can't really -- confirm that you're not lying to them when you tell them no. They have the right to open any package but there is just no time to do so.

Add to that, most people probably don't understand that things you buy in the grocery store or at Walmart are hazardous. I told my mom about the accident and her first question was "What happened?" My guess then was a HAZMAT fire so I told her so. At first she was shocked that we transported hazardous material and asked "Like what?" When I pointed out just about everything under the sinks in her bathroom and kitchen she had no idea. I'm betting that she's not alone.

[boofhead]

It might have been already covered, but just looking through these posts, I have a question about the crew actions. I flew the 744 freighter, and if I had been over Bahrain with smoke I would have pulled the throttles and speedbrakes and landed at Bahrain. Why go back to Dubai?

And xspeedbird is right. Passenger screening is a sick joke and perfect security is not obtainable. Cargo screening is even tougher to achieve, ie impossible.

I disagree with those who claim that security, whether for terrorists or criminals or in this case poorly packed packages, is best stopped at the airport. There is no such thing as airport security. No airport security has ever stopped an attack or an error. We should be prepared for whatever comes our way, and have procedures for every contingency. We should know that in the end it is the flight crew that will have to handle the problems, protect themselves and the passengers. Relying on $10 an hour fools and charlatans in the TSA (I know, they get more than that but that is all they are worth) to protect us is idiotic. And the problems faced by the workers at the distribution centres of the major freight companies are insurmountable.

Remember 9/11? how long did it take before the FAA changed their advice to cooperate with hijackers instead of fighting them and keeping the flight deck door shut no matter what? Yes, it took 2 years after 9/11 before they changed that advice. So much for the authorities.

We are on our own.

[deSitter]

Well you guys aren't on your own - this fire problem has an engineering solution! Since fighting a fire is next to impossible in a closed space made up of thin aluminum, the only realistic option is to starve it of oxygen - that could be done. Even that is of no use for chemical fires that are self-sustaining (Valuejet). But for the large majority of cargo fires, cutting off the oxygen supply should be enough.

-drl

[Graybeard]

Just an idea about something that was used in the early days of automobiles: engine exhaust. It could be routed into the cargo cabin in case of suspected fire. It's oxygen is already depleted, and the volume needed would cool quickly enough.

Oh, and it would be a lot cheaper than nitrogen for tank ullage inerting.

Before you get all wound up, think about it, seriously. I pressurize the fuel tank in my Model T Ford to 2 psi with exhaust gas. It feeds the carb, and provides inerted ullage (space above the fuel.)

GB

[Patty747400]

Hi Guppy

Appreciates you sharing your insight in the fire fighting. Some questions though:

The fire suppression in the lower cargo is based on Halon. Halon works by starving the fire of oxygen. You mean that in most cases this will not be enough? Most wide body passenger jets today are certified with the Halon suppression as the means to stay alive for hours.

The main deck fire procedure is based on de-pressurising the aircraft, fly at 25000 feet and thus starve the fire from oxygen. At the same time the outflow valves will be open and one pack will operate. Don't you think this will draw the smoke to the rear of the aircraft?

[pattern_is_full]

"....if I had been over Bahrain with smoke I would have pulled the throttles and speedbrakes and landed at Bahrain. Why go back to Dubai?"

They weren't "over Bahrain" - they were over the Persian Gulf somewhere. Reports say "100nm from Doha" - which could mean roughly halfway between Doha and Dubai (separated by a ~200-nm-wide bay), or somewhere else on the 100nm circle centered on Doha (and also 20 minutes at climb airspeed from Dubai).

(I haven't seen a map of their actual flight path anywhere yet - except for that ugly final minute.)

Bahrain was the ATC to whom they were talking at the time. But that doesn't mean they were over Bahrain any more than a pilot talking to Denver Center from NE Arizona or central Nebraska is "over" Denver.

[ExSp33db1rd]

ExSp33db1rd,

With respect, your comments to MAS -- especially your last sentence --sound presumptuous; even a tad arrogant.


My apologies if it came over like that.

And xspeedbird is right. Passenger screening is a sick joke and perfect security is not obtainable. Cargo screening is even tougher to achieve, ie impossible.


I'm clearly not alone in my opinon.

Right now all we know is that a 2-man crew died doing their best with the tools and resources - be they mechanical or human - at their disposal, and don't we all want to avoid a repetition ?

Maybe the TSA will have a part to play in achieving that - but I doubt it.

Best of luck chaps.

Over and Out.

ExS.

[swamprat123]

Here's a link to an FAA study that evaluated cargo fire control by depressurization:
www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/2009highlights.pdf

[Squawk7777]

I found this on another bb. The UPS pilots are already being criticized by LH Captain Georg Fongern. Here's the excerpt (full article here (http://www.sueddeutsche.de/auto/rauch-im-cockpit-toedlicher-blindflug-1.998967)) from the Süddeutsche Zeitung:

“Nach dem Ausbruch eines Brandes mehr als eine halbe Stunde in der Luft zu bleiben ist ziemlich lang", wundert sich Georg Fongern, selbst Airbus-Pilot bei Lufthansa und Vertreter der internationalen Pilotenvereinigung*Ifalpa.

Denn nach dem Absturz von Swissair-Flug 111 im September 1998 infolge eines Cockpitbrandes hatte sich die Handlungsanweisung für Piloten bei Feuer und Rauch an ihrem Arbeitsplatz gründlich geändert. "Wenn es eine Landemöglichkeit gibt, und die hatten die UPS-Piloten, kümmert man sich nicht um die Ursache des Feuers, sondern sieht zu, dass man so schnell wie möglich runterkommt", so*Fongern.

Translated:

“To stay airborne for more than 30 minutes after the fire was first noticed is a pretty long time” says Georg Fongern with astonishment, himself an Airbus pilot with Lufthansa and representative of the international airline pilot's association IFALPA.
After the crash of Swissair flight 111 in September 1998 which has been caused by cockpit fire, pilot procedures regarding fire and smoke in the cockpit had been fundamentally changed. “If there was a landing opportunity, which the UPS pilots had, then one doesn't care about the cause of the fire, but lands the plane as soon as possible” according to Fongern.

LH people always being superior... :ugh: :yuk:

[hetfield]

@squawk

Okay obviously you don't like that statement.

Do you like the opposite?

“To stay airborne for more than 30 minutes after the fire was first noticed is NOT a pretty long time” says Georg Fongern with astonishment, himself an Airbus pilot with Lufthansa and representative of the international airline pilot's association IFALPA.
After the crash of Swissair flight 111 in September 1998 which has been caused by cockpit fire, pilot procedures regarding fire and smoke in the cockpit had been fundamentally changed. “If there was a landing opportunity, which the UPS pilots had, then one CARES about the cause of the fire, but DOESN'T land the plane as soon as possible”

[Squawk7777]

@hetfield.

No, I don't like the opposite. I don't like making or reading a statement publicly without knowing all possible facts, either. There's something called professionalism and Captain Fongern hasn't demonstrated much here.

[Mainsail]

Good Day All

Firstly I am not a professional pilot nor am I a professional pilot wanabee.

My field of expertise is the marine industry and one of the jobs I do in my professional capacity is the pre-inspection of hazardous cargo before shipment.
I accept that ships and aircraft are not the same, but the systems for dealing with hazardous cargo are similar.

IMHO The biggest problem with hazardous cargo is the stowage and packing of the cargo, I kid you not, I have seen cartons of cigarette lighters put in shipping containers with a 2000kg crate of machinery placed on top!!!!
The paperwork and correct declerations are vitally important, but don't get to hung up about it,
Correct paperwork and bad packing is much more dangerous than bad paperwork and good packing.

What do you do, both industries need robust check systems and random inspections, but as has been said before some problem cargo will always get through.

A lot has been said about a third crew member who can fight a fire whilst the two pilots fly the aircraft. Correct me if I am wrong but I assume that most cargo loaded on aircraft are unit loads (pallets or containers)
1. It would be very difficult to access a fire inside pallets or containers
2. The working conditions would be almost impossible with the heat and smoke
3. I know that in a burning aircraft health and safety rules may go out of the window, but I do not think that any airline or shipping line would allow one person to go into a burning cargo hold. You would need a fire fighting team of two or three,
for one person trying to work in that enviroment it would be tantamount to suicide.

Again IMHO the only answer is a very good fire suppression system. Ships have lots of space for firefighting kit, and minimum manning levels to ensure that you have the capacity to fight fire, you also have usually, more time before the situation gets critical, and ultimatly you have the option of abandoning the vessel.

Nobody knows if hazardous cargo played a part in the loss of this aircraft and crew but it appears that both industries have the same problems with hazardous cargo.

Please forgive a non pilot for intruding into your forum but I thought that you might like to hear opinions from an industry with similar problems.

[oceancrosser]

Squawk7777,

Having met and spoken with Capt Georg Fongern a few times at IFALPA venues, I respect his words and his knowledge.

Having last year been involved in an incident where the cockpit (and cabin) of a B757 filled with smoke in 20-30 seconds (you have to see it to believe it)
I KNOW you want and have to get down fast. It was not an onboard fire, but engine related and we landed on one engine 12 minutes after the initial event.
Smoke removal of the cabin was not fully accomplished until on the ground, actually the smoke removal was found to have been hampered by an unrelated technical issue.

[Hedge36]

I normally hate reading some of the wildly crazy ideas floated about regarding such issues (Come on - chutes? Seriously?), but I have to imagine someone's run across this notion at some point in their career:

Cargo jettison. It seems quite simple.

Have any of you freight folks ever dealt with a noodling session in which this idea had been floated? Other than the obvious modifications to the aircraft (read: expense), wouldn't it be more cost-effective to lose the cargo (presumably insured) and save the airframe and crew?

There I go, thinking out loud again.

[Machaca]

Hedge36:
Cargo jettison

A bit tricky on a nose loader!

[Check 'Six']

Mainsail, :ok:

I enjoyed reading your post. Certainly makes one think.

Let's see what comes out of the investigation and what the recommendations are going to be?

Thanks and take care.

Check Six

[Oldshrub]

Speaking as someone with knowledge of UPS export systems in the UK, I can clarify for you that at least here, all air export packages are x-ray screened twice, once at package centre and once upon export from the airport of choice. The systems for checking packages for air export in the UK have been extremely hot since 9/11. However even with all the systems inplace, as our friend in Louisville pointed out, one or two may get through..... I would like to assume the systems are the same globlally for international shipments. (US domestic airfreight is quite another matter.)

[Airclues]

It's a predetermined weight of retardant (Halon, incidentally, is no longer produced), and fires in a single shot. If the first bottle doesn't do the job, a second can be discharged.

Many of the 747's I fly in freight service do not have a lower cargo fire prevention system. They are equipped with detection, only.


That only applies to the B742. All B744's and B744F's have lower cargo fire suppression. There are four bottles. After FWD or AFT has been selected, the DISC switch is pressed. This discharges two bottles into the selected hold. The remaining two bottles then commence a metered discharge providing 195 minutes of fire suppressionon the B744 and 210 minutes on the B744F. The difference is because the B744 leaves two packs operating whereas the B744F reduces to one. The two metered bottled fully discharge on touchdown.

As had been said several times on this thread, in the case of a main deck fire on a B744F there is no fire suppression. You have a maximum of 15 minutes to get on the ground. If you can't achieve that then seriously consider putting it on any available stretch of water (while still under control).

Dave

[Hedge36]

SNS3Guppy, thanks (as usual) for the well-sorted reply. I imagined that redesigning the aft pressure bulkheads and adding ramps, et cetera, were probably already discarded notions given the development of the front-load. O but for the availability of a rear ramp and remote pallet latches...

[DozyWannabe]

Whereas the aft pressure bulkhead on the B747 is a critical item, one isn't going to modify it and put in a ramp.
Indeed - the aviation community has known since 1985 that any sudden large-scale failure in the rear bulkhead of a 747 is a Very Bad Thing.

[STN Ramp Rat]

Cargo hold of Chinese airliner catches fire - UPI.com (http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2010/09/13/Cargo-hold-of-Chinese-airliner-catches-fire/UPI-67811284419380/)

Cargo hold of Chinese airliner catches fire

GUANGZHOU, China, Sept. 13 (UPI) -- The cargo hold of a China Southern Airlines plane after passengers had boarded at an airport in Guangzhou, China, airline officials said.

No one was hurt in the 8 a.m. Monday incident, which preliminary findings concluded was caused by "combustibles" in the cargo hold of the plane being loaded at Gungzhou Baiyun International Airport in Guangzhou, capital of Guangdong, the Chinese state-run news agency Xinhua reported.

Officials refused to name the type of aircraft or number of passengers on board Flight CZ3533, which was scheduled to fly to Qingdao City in Shandong province.

[RustyNuts]

Cargo jettison. It seems quite simple. A bit tricky on a nose loader!A bit tricky any way you might try to do it. Assuming we're not going to worry about weight and balance issues as the containers are tossed out the door, and hoping the person(s) pushing the cans don't get sucked out as well, you still have several issues to worry about.

The containers, when loaded, might be anywhere from a couple thousand up to twelve thousand pounds each. We have crews of people loading them on flat level ground so it would be difficult (to say the least) for a single person or two to push them out the door while the plane is in flight. Seems as if 400+ MPH winds buffeting against the doorway may add a bit of resistance too.

Then you have the rollers on the floor. If those get heated they're going to distort. Once they get distorted you're not going to be able to move anything on them.

And even if you were able to push the containers out, the doors are in front of the wing. If you manage to miss the wing I doubt you'd miss the horizontal or vertical stabilizers.

On most aircraft (in most common load configurations) the crew wouldn't be able to make it back to the door opening to begin with so that pretty much shoots the idea down right there.

[Hedge36]

That - roller and track distortion - is definitely something I hadn't considered, and it makes perfect sense. Thanks for that.

[ExSp33db1rd]

Don't forget this one, too !


91.235 Dropping of objects

A pilot of an aircraft shall not allow any object to be dropped from that aircraft in flight unless the pilot has taken reasonable precautions to ensure the dropping of the object does not endanger persons or property.

Gotta be sure !!

Totally impractical, this thread is dissolving into the absurd, which in view of the serious nature of the disaster is a pity.


Goodnight ( again )

[TeachMe]

As SLF I think of pax flights. How often and what are the causes of hold fires? What are we NOT allowed to put in the hold, but OK as carry on? (eg Li-Ion batteries??). I have never seen a restriction such as this, but use common sense myself. How often do dangerous items end up in the hold? How big an issue is this?

[CargoMatatu]

Airdropping is a complex and exact science, guys. (Been there, done it, got the tee-shirt). Not something that's done in the heat of the moment, so to speak.

Let's get back to feasibility and reality.

[outhouse]

One would hope that instances when forbidden DGoods are carried on passenger aircraft are nil. The system that polices the items that reach the hold both as passenger baggage and cargo is strong and the opportunity for unproved items slipping through the net very low.
This however is dependent on the individuals responsible for ensuring that the system works and do the job correctly, honesty in the identification of items by the shipper and origin, and training to ensure that the responsible individual is trained and qualified.
ignorance of the regulation or lack of know age when declaring content of shipment, releasing cargo or any item going onto any aircraft is No excuse and the full order of law should be applied against them not complying and endangering life.

:ugh:

[Awl flyer]

Detailed News (http://www.gcaa.ae/en/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=188)

[Mariner]

Does anyone know if UPS has cockpit doors on their 744F's?
The 744F's & BCF's I have flown didn't, just a curtain, which is open most of the time.

So smoke originating from a cargo fire on the main deck, can come up the stairs or through the floor from the main deck to the upper deck, and migrate forward into the cockpit completely unhindered.

On passenger aircraft, the nowadays-required Flight Deck Security Door seals the cockpit pretty well.
That could help keeping most smoke originating from the cabin out of the cockpit.

For those that don't know; freighters, as opposed to passenger aircraft, are not required to have a reinforced Flight Deck Door, to stop terrorists or other bad guys from coming up front. The reason is simple; weight and cost.

Just wondering if it would have made a difference...

[sunbird123]

Is it possible to modify the aircraft to slightly over pressure the cockpit so that smoke does not enter. This is done in armoured cars tanks etc and stops NBC particles entering.

[Awl flyer]

Hello Mariner

Don't know if UPS has, don't think they have, but our fleet of 400F has the same upper deck layout as mentioned in your message.

the upper deck entry door is the smoke barrier door, as well ...
FCOM V2. Sec.1. directs it must be closed during all phase of flight when aircraft is in motion.

Can't find this in the FCOM but as I can recall curtain must be opened during TO CLB APP and LDG it's a plakard on the wall next to the curtain

BRGD

Awl

[AlexGG]

The containers, when loaded, might be anywhere from a couple thousand up to twelve thousand pounds each. We have crews of people loading them on flat level ground so it would be difficult (to say the least) for a single person or two to push them out the door while the plane is in flight.

Assuming everything happens at reasonable altitude, pilot just starts descending the aircraft and the containers become lighter, all the way to weightlessness (as in "Vomit Comet"). All is left is just to push them out.

:)

[three eighty]

News here in Dubai now reporting that Flight recorders have left for the USA.

[Awl flyer]

“To stay airborne for more than 30 minutes after the fire was first noticed is a pretty long time” says Georg Fongern with astonishment, himself an Airbus pilot with Lufthansa and representative of the international airline pilot's association IFALPA.
After the crash of Swissair flight 111 in September 1998 which has been caused by cockpit fire, pilot procedures regarding fire and smoke in the cockpit had been fundamentally changed. “If there was a landing opportunity, which the UPS pilots had, then one doesn't care about the cause of the fire, but lands the plane as soon as possible” according to Fongern.




"It must be stressed that for smoke that continues or a fire that cannot be positively confirmed to be completely extinguished, the earliest possible descent, landing, and EVAC must be done.

If a smoke, fire or fumes situation becomes uncontrollable, the flight crew should consider an immediate landing. Immediate landing implies immediate diversion to a runway. However, in a severe situation, the flight crew should consider an overweight landing, a tailwind landing, an off-airport landing, or a ditching."
..I have copied it out of the 744 QRH section C/L intro.

this is how airplane manufacturer wants as to act in case of Smoke, Fire or Fume

the crew of UPS 6 made a possible earliest descent, indeed, but was not able to make a landing dew to smoke in the cockpit, ... I feel a respect to decisions they have made and as a pilot realizing they were on the most safe plan of action.
Only investigation will tell as of other factors affected their flight := all other speculations seems to me to be pointless and only investigation can reveal that amount of Human Factor involved not any other of the aviators in the whole world.

[Mariner]

Awl flyer,

The Smoke Barrier Door between the main deck and upper deck won't do much to stop smoke migrating upward, in my opinion.
The curtain, weather open or closed, won't stop smoke.

Plus, if a fire burns underneath the upper deck (from what I read in this thread the fire could have started in front of the wing), it could burn through the floor and allow smoke on the upper deck. Plus there are many pressure relieve panels between Main and Upper deck, allowing smoke to move up.

Slightly over pressurizing the Cockpit might help keeping smoke out. But in that case some kind of door would have to be installed.

A complication would be relieving pressure between Cockpit and Upper & Main deck in case of decompression.



I think the consensus here is that you cannot 100% prevent undeclared DG in freight. Fact of life.

And fighting a fire on the freight deck of an aircraft, between pallets, is a lost battle, unless you get there at the very beginning. Even if you do have supernumerary crew for it.

So the main thing you need to do is get on the surface, ASAP. 10-15 minutes are the numbers I hear.

And then prepare for the case where you won't be able to see anything.

PF; Prepare the nav set up immediately, while you can still see. Closest airport with an ILS, set it up in the FMS and select direct, engage LNAV. Dial in IAA and set up a descent to it. Let the A/P do the work.

PM; do as much from the QRH while you still can.
And switch to guard, because every tower and center has it and perhaps you won't be able to switch frequencies later on.

Plan an auto land with max auto brakes. Configure in time, if you suspect you will lose systems.

Visualise your escape route from the Cockpit beforehand.

If you think you won't make it to an airport and you are over water; a slow descent for the last 500' for a ditching, and lots of luck.

[Awl flyer]

thank you, Mariner...

I'm just trying to show the facts as they appear in the Boeing aircraft docs. I’m not here to argue with anyone. I’m positive thinking, same like you while reading and posting on this thread.
100% agree with you. You made a very professional note on how to handle Smoke Fire or Fume situation. The only thing to add is 10 to 12 deg. pitch UP compensated with PWR during ditching but this is just a technique. Quite unusual comparing with the normal landing but looks like to be right recalling as it was done on the A320 while ditching on Hudson.

Slightly over pressurizing the Cockpit might help keeping smoke out. But in that case some kind of door would have to be installed.

That was a point of discussion a couple of days ago with a friend of mine … I realy wouldn’t want to bore you with all details but we finished with the fact that to make any part of the hull being more pressurized than other is against the Physic Law. The only way to do what you're saying is to make airflow patterns inside the hull by opening or closing AFT Outflow Valves and having FWD OFLW VLV properly working (B747 doesn’t has FWD but 737 has).
What is your opinion on this?

regards
Awl

[boofhead]

Military radios have a Guard button. Press or turn it and the radio goes to 243MHz. No channeling required, no visual contact with the panel. I always wondered why civilian radios don't have such a feature for instant 121.5.
Many times I would have liked to have it, or a button for the transponder. Nowadays we have it for the ELT at least, although if we have the old ELT it does not do much.

[IFIX]

Just a thought;
I know the MD-11F has a "cabin air off" switch.
When pushed it shuts off all airflow to the main deck, all the air from the packs is fed to the cockpit and courier station only.
This provides a sustained flow of clean air and aids in keeping smoke out of the cockpit, and even aft of the courier station smoke barrier.

Surely this should be possible in the 747F?

The cockpit door itsself has two blow out panels which open into the cockpit, they are hinged within the door and are operated (released) by vacuum latches.
Bearing in mind the difference in volume between the cockpit and the remainder of the pressure vessel.
A windshield blow out will have the entire volume of the pressure vessel passing though the opening of the door, whereas a cabin window blow-out will require only the cockpit volume to be relieved.

Ifix

[and14]

Assuming everything happens at reasonable altitude, pilot just starts descending the aircraft and the containers become lighter, all the way to weightlessness (as in "Vomit Comet"). All is left is just to push them out.

Weightlessness ok...but not massless you would still have to push all those pounds of mass.

a.

[AlexGG]

Ah, that looks like little too far offtopic, but the bonus of the weightlessness is a significant decrease in friction. The push is still needed, that's perfectly correct.

[notadog]

Does anyone know if UPS has cockpit doors on their 744F's?

Yes. UPS 744s have cockpit doors.

[widebody69]

Correct me if I'm wrong but I thought some cockpits were already overpressurised? I'm almost sure the A320 series are anyway.

[md80fanatic]

It's clear from reading the pilots on this thread that the universal consensus on smoke is to get the plane on the ground as soon as possible. It makes perfect sense, regardless the number of crew aboard. With that said, I have a question that has been eating at me since this accident occurred.

My understanding is that this plane experienced smoke whilst some 200nm from Dubai, with proper runways all around for diversions, the crew elected to press on back to Dubai. I'm almost certain these two aviators also were aware of the ticking clock once smoke is noticed, but nevertheless chose a much lower percentage route. My question is simply why?

Is it wrong to wonder exactly what it was being transported in that B744, and why it needed to get back to Dubai even at the expense of two lives and a $200 million dollar jet? Could these two pilots have both gone against conventional aviation wisdom and made a tandem bad decision with almost negative odds in their favor? That doesn't make much sense to me.

[hetfield]

Correct me if I'm wrong but I thought some cockpits were already overpressurised? I'm almost sure the A320 series are anyway.

Are you...?

[md80fanatic]

Perhaps I didn't construct my question correctly? It certainly wouldn't be the first time. Never mind, I'll wait for the report.

EDIT: Thanks for the heads up. Based on my memory of the beginning of this thread, I thought the plane was over Bahrain when the first smoke was noticed, and that's 200+ statute miles according to google maps. I think you're saying they were in Bahrain airspace, not exactly over Bahrain, making 100nm to Dubai evaporate my question about decision making. Thanks again (sorry I should have re-read the thread start).

[Razoray]

At this point, everything suggests a crew that against all odds behaved exceptionally, and did their utmost until that time that they could do no more.

SNS3Guppy

excellent post and I completely agree with you. I have been a proponent of the 3rd crew member, and have read the mixed replies to this idea. Everyone agrees that early detection of fire/smoke is essential for survival. Do you feel a 3rd crew member could help in early detection, suppression by doing rounds and inspection?

[RustyNuts]

Is it wrong to wonder exactly what it was being transported in that B744, and why it needed to get back to Dubai even at the expense of two lives and a $200 million dollar jet? Could these two pilots have both gone against conventional aviation wisdom and made a tandem bad decision with almost negative odds in their favor? That doesn't make much sense to me.
What would it take for you, as a cargo pilot, to choose the 200nm descent to Dubai over somewhere much closer? I'm not a pilot, nor a journalist, just a very interested and concerned observer. I could never know what it's like to be on fire and miles from terra firma, but you can ..... and that's why I asked.

It's my understanding that they were about 100 miles out, roughly in between landing locations. The decision could have been made for no more reason than the pilots were familiar with DBX and none of the other locations.

[boofhead]

MD80Fan. You are not wrong, the airplane could have been landed inside 100 miles by making an emergency descent, perhaps much less than that. Getting it down is usually the best choice for smoke and flames in the cockpit, indeed that is what is written in the emergency procedures and checklists. Why this crew did not do so is not something we can answer and might never be able to. The CVR should shed some light on what went through their minds but I doubt that things like what cargo they were carrying or a fear of being criticised had anything to do with it. They were experienced professionals and if there was something they could have done better, we can all learn from what happened and perhaps save some lives in the future.
Even for the most experienced and professional crew there is a period of denial. "this can't be happening to me!" before accepting it and acting appropriately. Sometimes this seems as if the crew is failing to act, although one of the first things you learn is not to be hasty. But there are a couple of situations that absolutely require quick action, such as engine failure on takeoff and wind shear on final. Fire in the cockpit might not seem to require this rapidity but really it does. Getting a 747 down from 35,000 feet in 15 minutes does take effort and the sooner it is started the best chance you will have. Idle power and full speed brakes must be used, then all you have to decide is whether to use the gear or maintain Vne. Finding an airport is not the first consideration.
I remember the Erebus transcript, with the PIC calmly calling for "go around power please" when they were only seconds from disaster and it taught me to always fly the airplane. If I needed to go up or down I made my airplane do just that. Never mind if I looked foolish in the process.

[Gulfstreamaviator]

The GCAA made a statement today, whgich I only heard on local radio on drive to DXB, (slighly foggy).

The crash happened because there was a fire in the cockpit, and smoke too. They crew were cleared to land in Doha, but decided to return to Dubai.

End of report.

Glf

[MountainBear]

SNS3GUPPY writes,

but do not smear the names of the crew when they may very well have done everything right.

Who put ants in your pants. I agree with much of what you wrote but I don't think MD80Fan was trying to smear anyone. I think it's a natural reaction to *wonder* about why the crew did what it did. That's all I see in MD80Fan's post...wondering, questioning, pondering. That's a far cry from smearing... unless you are one of those uptight SOBs that treat a mere question as a challenge to your authority. :=

[jugofpropwash]

Let me admit up front that I am only SLF - however, I have read this entire thread.

I thought a few (perhaps) interesting ideas got lost in the morass. In point:

It was mentioned that on some older aircraft, switches/controls could be more easily identified by touch alone. It would seem to be a very inexpensive modification to at least add an easily identifiable button/switch to the radio allowing it to be instantly switched to the emergency channel.

Along those lines - I think that if I was a pilot, the next time I was in a simulator, I might tie on a blindfold and see how fast I could find various controls by feel.

The inflatable plastic bag system (sorry, I've forgotten the name) seems like a no-brainer that should be required on all aircraft. Maybe it works, maybe it doesn't, but I don't see it making matters any worse.

The idea of a third person firefighter type exchanging their services for free flights seems like a win-win for all involved - even better if the firefighter has at least some rudimentary flying experience such that he could work the radio or read off a checklist. Of course, it will never happen.

And - I have a couple of probably stupid questions...

Some here have suggested that venting the cockpit via opening a window might actually draw smoke from the cabin into the cockpit. If so, would (remotely) opening a vent in the tail of the aircraft pull the smoke the other way (out of the cockpit)?

If the plane sent out a message telling UPS headquarters precisely where the fire was located, then was that information also available to the pilots? If not, then why not? I'm going to assume that if the pilots immediately knew that they had a cargo fire rather than an electrical systems fire, then time would be saved as there would be no reason to fool with shutting down systems, etc.

Along the same line as the above - given the size/weight/relatively simple technology of remote cameras today, would it be possible to locate several cameras in the cargo area which could be accessed from the cockpit? That way it might be possible to determine exactly where/what the problem was before or instead of physically going to investigate it.

[jugofpropwash]

Thanks, Guppy. Hmm, what if the cargo compartment cameras I suggested were thermal? Would that eliminate the problem of them being obscured by smoke? And I understand that it's a huge area and the amount of fire extinguisher to cover the entire area would be prohibitive - but if the fire could be located via camera, would it be possible to have a piped system of fire retardant so that you could just trigger (from the cockpit) sprinklers/jets in close proximity to the actual fire?

It probably wouldn't put the fire out, but slowing the flames/smoke and buying 5 or 10 minutes could make a huge difference.

I do think your suggestion of sitting in the plane with eyes closed figuring out and visualizing exactly where everything is seems like a great idea.

And this is probably a stupid idea (and feel free to tell me why it wouldn't work) - but if hazardous material HAS to be shipped via airplane - could some/much/all of it be shipped sealed inside a fire-resistant metal container? Perhaps even vacuum packed, as most things will not burn without exposure to oxygen.

[CargoMatatu]

In the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations there is a large section regulating the type a packaging required for Dangerous Goods, specific to their nature of hazard.

No need to re-invent the wheel.

[poshjevarta]

Pilots forum afire with courier plane crash theories - Emirates24|7 (http://emirates247.com/news/emirates/pilots-forum-afire-with-courier-plane-crash-theories-2010-09-15-1.290917)

[valvanuz]

Sorry guys, I do not understand all that fuss about an over pressurized flight deck. I do not think anything like an airtight cockpit of a big pressure difference with the rest of the airframe is needed. What is needed is that a flow of outside clean air (pressurized and warmed) that flushes from the cockpit to the rest of the plane. Air flow pattern can be directed from key instrument panel sections toward the cockpit floor or ceiling through a limited number of exhaust points out to the rest of the plane. Inflow valves adjust pressure to regulate the airflow and to keep balance with the rest of airframe.


Pressure differential does not have to me much more than what you get in modern buildings that are over pressurized in winter to keep the cold out or, in Navy ships to prevent NBC contamination. You can still open doors without flying out.


As always, could be difficult to retrofit, but how about on initial design?

[Guy D'ageradar]

My understanding is that this plane experienced smoke whilst some 200nm from Dubai, with proper runways all around for diversions, the crew elected to press on back to Dubai. I'm almost certain these two aviators also were aware of the ticking clock once smoke is noticed, but nevertheless chose a much lower percentage route. My question is simply why?

As has already been stated several times on this forum, the aircraft was approximately 100nm NW of Dubai and 100nm NE of Doha when things started to go wrong. They were NOT over Bahrain (:ugh::ugh:) - they were TALKING to Bahrain centre but over the Gulf, roughly equidistant from Dubai, Doha and Kish island. The only way, therefore, that they could have "landed" sooner would have been to ditch in the Gulf.

[Ancient Mariner]

If anyone is interested in shipping Lithium batteries, this might be a good read. Interesting information on page 11 and 12 regarding passenger carrying spare batteries as carry on and checked luggage. I bet not many passengers knows this.
http://www.ultralifecorp.com/documents/whitepapers/Ultralife_Batteries_Lithium_Battery_Transportation_Regulatio ns.pdf
Per

[Airclues]

What is needed is that a flow of outside clean air (pressurized and warmed) that flushes from the cockpit to the rest of the plane.

That is already done on the B744. The flow of air into the flight deck is higher than the rest of the aircraft and so air vents from the flight deck to the cabin. This does not cause an overpressure but does cause a positive airflow from the flight deck.
Opening the smoke evacuation port is only useful if the smoke is generated on the flight deck. Otherwise opening this port will reverse the positive flow, and draw air in from the cabin.

Dave

[EW73]

Guy D...

What a great, practical idea, from their altitude at that time, that would have taken, what......, about 8 or 9 minutes at most.

But....I know, nobody really thinks that's necessary, until it's to late to do it!

From an old maritime P3 flyer who's thought about such options, just in case, but thankfully never had to try it!

EW73

[Mariner]

From the 777 FCOM:

Air Distribution
[-200, -200ER, -200LR, -300, -300ER, -300ER/ULR]
The flight deck receives 100% fresh conditioned air from the left pack. The flight
deck is maintained at a slightly higher pressure than the passenger cabin to prevent
smoke and objectable odors from entering the flight deck.
[777F]
The flight deck and supernumerary cabin receive 100% fresh conditioned air from
the left pack. To prevent smoke and objectionable odors from entering the
occupied compartments, the flight deck and supernumerary cabin are maintained
at a slightly higher pressure than the main deck cargo and lower cargo
compartments.

So the B777 has it.
But I can't find this feature in any of the 744F or -BCF, B767 or MD-11 FCOM's.

But if they had a fire in the cockpit, like the UAE authorities now seem to report, it wouldn't have done the UPS6 guys much good.

[Diamond Bob]

In a Wall Street Journal article that mostly covers proposed new rules for transporting Lithium batteries, this section was of interest:

The UPS jet's flight-data recorders have been downloaded by U.S. crash investigators, and early analysis is consistent with the theory that the blaze started in a cargo area, spread quickly and then pushed smoke into the cockpit, preventing pilots from seeing their instruments.
On Tuesday, investigators from the United Arab Emirates gave the strongest public signal yet that the blaze originated in the cargo hold. They disclosed that prior to smoke in the cockpit, there was a fire warning received by the crew. Such warnings normally come from sensors in or around the cargo compartments, not inside the cockpit


Tighter Curbs Expected on Lithium Batteries - WSJ.com (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704285104575492212976583750.html?KEYWORDS=du bai+crash)

[Gulfstreamaviator]

Dubai: An investigation led by the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) into why the United Parcel Services (UPS) Boeing 747-400 cargo plane crashed in Dubai has revealed that smoke in the cockpit led to a fire warning about 28 minutes after takeoff.
The GCAA on Tuesday said the plane had been cleared for landing in Doha by Bahrain Air Traffic Control, but the crew decided to return to Dubai. Shortly afterwards they experienced visibility and communication problems.
Later airport authorities received an emergency distress call. The captain was in control up to the moment the recording ended.
The cargo plane crashed into the Nad Al Sheba military camp at 7.43pm on September 3. Eyewitnesses said it burst into a fireball before crashing.
The investigation, led by the GCAA investigation team, is still ongoing as they gather more evidence from the accident site.
They have also been downloading the flight recordings from the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CRV) (known as black boxes).
The two boxes were shipped to the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on Friday, under the custody and supervision of GCAA investigators, and are now undergoing technical analysis.
Engineer Esmail Abdul Wahid, leader of GCAA investigation team, says the investigation will continue until the cause of the accident is known.

Sorry if I reported the radio news this am, as slightly different version re "fire" in cockpit, but I do maintain that is what I heard.

glf

[Mariner]

So that's becoming clear then; it was a cargofire.
A fire starting in the cockpit is quite possible, in electronics or electric equipment, but apparently that was not the case here.

Meaning that keeping smoke out of the cockpit would have made a difference. At least in inside visibilty. No telling which systems would be affected after the fire spread.

Hopefully regulators will soon mandate some changes in how the cockpit is kept clear of smoke, to the extent possible.

And how to keep ignition sources out of the freight, although that would seem a more difficult task.

[Guy D'ageradar]

EW73

..not really trying to present ideas/suggestions, just trying to debunk the myth that they were overhead Bahrain (at any time).

Guy D.

p.s. you're not one of those p3s that persist in flying back and forward through our approach, while climbing/descending through all our levels and justifying it by being in "international waters" I hope! :ugh::ugh::ugh: submarine p3s - who'd have thought!

[Falconpilot]

Hello all,

some words about that tragic event.

The B747-400 ERF checklist specifies that the smoke removal procedure should only be done when at it's worst, AND that smoke from the main deck will be drawn inside the cockpit if it happens to be a cargo smoke/fire.
The smoke removal is done by opening the smoke removal hole situated just behind the observer seat. Shooting the bottles will help ( Freon) as the first one discharges, the rest is discharges for some time, until touchdown where it's all discharged from the remaining bottle.
Said for the smoke/fire fighting capabilities.

Nothing can be said about their decision to come back to Dubaï till now.

Too high... It must have been frenzy in the cockpit. It is reported that they could not see their instruments, how dreadfull is this?

As a freighter dog, having such an event, is quite scary.

Thinking of it...

Cheers.

[IFIX]

Clearing smoke from the cockpit in case of a main deck fire, without opening an outside vent in the cockpit is not a big problem to design.
If you feed all the air supplied from the packs to the cockpit only, it will cause the flightdeck to be slightly more pressurized than the rest of the cabin, even when you completely depressurize the aircraft!

Its the same as smoking in your car and opening up one of the rear windows.
Even the slightest amount of air fed into the car from the dash-vents will cause the smoke to be drawn out the back-window.
Forgive me for comparing an a/c to a car but the idea should be clear.

It will not stop the heat from the fire doing its damage to the airframe but will at least provide the abillity to see the instruments.

I am amazed this does not appear to be possible in a 747, as its only a single switch in an MD-11.
I hope someone with knowledge of 747F systems can assist me on this one.

IFIX

[fesmokie]

IFIX,

There is a way to do what your talking about on the Classic for sure because as I stated previously we would do this when someone wanted to smoke on the main deck below the cockpit. I will now go find my systerms manuals from my last flying job (it's been 6 years since retireing from flying) and see if I can figure out exactly how I accomplished that. My memory is not quite the same now. I do realise that the 400 is different.

[TheWanderer]

The smoke removal is done by opening the smoke removal hole situated just behind the observer seat. Is opening the smkoe removal hole a reversible or an irreversable item?
Can it be closed again inflight after it was opened?

[ExSp33db1rd]

.......Can it be closed again inflight after it was opened?


The original 747 Classic ( 100/200 series ) was designed to take a periscopic sextant as per the 707 - and other a/c of the period - for use by a navigator. By the time the aircraft entered service, INS had proved itself so no specialist navigator was ever carried, but the pressure lock hatch that allowed the sextant to poke through the roof of the aircraft was retained as a 'smoke removal port'

The sextant was inserted into the bottom of the hatch, making a pressurisation seal, then the roof flap was opened with a handle on the side of the assembly, and I can assure you that there were times when I thought that the pressurisation force would extract me with it ! certainly the sextant had to be held down firmly and only allowed to slowly ride up further, into place. After use the procedure was reversed, the sextant being pulled down far enough for the hatch to be closed again.

Certainly no modification to the sextant hatch was ever made to any 747 I flew, through to the - 300, so in those aircraft the short answer to your question is ..

Yes !

I know nothing about the -400, but I believe that there is no change ?

[Floridacargocat]

The document of Ultralife (and many other Li-battery manufacturers) might/will have to be reworked fairly soon, as indications are mounting that DOT/PHMSA/FAA will change the regulations in regards to transportation of Li-batteries in a significant way, subjecting ALL kind of Li-batteries (>3.7 Wh) to DG regulations. Time of publication not yet known. Time of implementation not yet known, but it might come faster than anybody is thinking.
See also
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704285104575492212976583750.html?ru=yahoo&mod=yahoo_hs (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704285104575492212976583750.html?ru=yahoo&mod=yahoo_hs)

[fesmokie]

ExSp33db1,

Yes the DC-8 had the same hole and we used it for vacuming the cockpit in flight however, it was banned from use because some individuals sucked up nuts and bolts left by MX and they ended up stuffed in the vertical and horizontal stab.:ugh: It was also used to suck the cigarette smoke out of the cockpit. Another trick we used on the DC-6 was opening an over wing exit window and one cockpit window thus allowing for smoke removal and air conditioning while operating in the far south. This was needed desperately once as we had a severe chemical leak in the cargo which was causeing us in the cockpit to suffer breathing problems, watering eyes and vomiting. We did not have supplimental O2 at that time.

[Spooky 2]

The 747-8 is (I believe) the first 747 to not have this smoke vent installed. Not sure why they kept it around for so many model changes but they have. At very low differentals I don't think this would do much good.

[hetfield]

Again, beside possible main/lower cargo fire, what about ruptured crew oxy bottles?

What's their location on 744?

[ExSp33db1rd]

Not sure why they kept it around for so many model changes but they have.


Probably because it was cheaper than re-engineering, re-certifying, and re-programming the assembly line.

You think I'm kidding ?

One outfit I worked for bought some passenger seats for the upper deck of a freighter, they had the little video screens fitted in the backs, but of course no IFE equipment was on board to use them, so they just took them out.

The UK certification authority refused to certify the seat installations without new engineering drawings, manuals, etc. to show the empty space in the back of the seat.

This meant going back to Boeing for the engineering drawings to be created, and the FAA for certification of same -'cos it was originally a freighter from a previous US carrier - before changing the Reg'n. for the UK Register, at great cost, as you can imagine.

It was cheaper to put the screens back in and just ignore them !

Bureacracy Rules - O.K. ?

[Intruder]

Again, beside possible main/lower cargo fire, what about ruptured crew oxy bottles?

What's their location on 744?
They're just behind the cargo door in the forward lower compartment.

I doubt that would cause the fire and smoke as described. One broke loose in a Qantas(?) airplane a while back and wound up embedded in the overhead luggage bin behind the L1 door. Did some damage, but no fire...

[EW73]

...meaning they are located on the lower (cargo) deck level, stbd side, just aft of the fwd cargo door...

EW73

[jugofpropwash]

I know this suggestion may not go over well with the pilots - and I understand their reluctance to possibly give up command and put themselves into someone else's hands. However...

If we can remotely control a mini sub in the gulf, or a rover on Mars, or a drone aircraft in Iraq - then there should be a way that in an emergency, an airliner can be remotely landed from the ground.

Now, I know that this isn't going to help if a fire gets into the electrical or hydraulics systems, or causes a structural failure - but in a case where control is lost due to not being able to see the controls or runway...

It's not just a matter of fire. I remember the case a few years back of the plane that crashed when it ran out of fuel because the pilots had been incapacitated by hypoxia. And, there's always the chance of something like 9/11 where the pilots are no longer in control of the aircraft.

Could someone flying remotely make a "perfect" landing every time? Maybe, maybe not - but to be honest, if things have hit the fan sufficiently that you would need a remotely controlled landing, then a survivable crash at an airport may be the best result you're going to get. It could at least help to avoid additional casualties on the ground.

Yes, there would have to be some way to avoid having the system hacked so some teenager on the ground doesn't decide to play flight simulator. Maybe a "dead man's switch" that would turn control over to the ground if the pilots were unresponsive?

[411A]

Msg received today from a usually reliable source...

The UPS guys I've talked to in ANC tell a chilling story about this accident. The pilots were so overwhelmed with smoke in the cockpit that they couldn't even see to tune their radios, and couldn't tell their altitude, heading, etc, never mind find the airport. The pilots were asking the tower to tell them their height above the ground and heading when they crashed. UPS apparently removed the full face masks from the airplanes and replaced them with the old style mask and smoke goggles! They also don't have cockpit doors on any of their airplanes. When they dump the cabin to fight a fire (no main deck fire suppression system like on the FedEx MD-11’s), there is no door to wall off the flames and smoke, so guess where it ends up!

[Intruder]

The 747 employs a ram air system that does somewhat like the air vent in your car...but have you ever tried to drive an 830,000 lb car blind, with a fire on board, producing more smoke that you can possibly remove? Probably not.
That ram air system is in the classic, but not the 400.

[scubashark]

411a

there is also an article in Emirates 24/7 here in UAE mentioning another pilot who was in the air (Bahraini Airspace) at the same time who heard the whole thing over the radio and he says the same as your source.

[notadog]

Msg received today from a usually reliable source...

411A...

Your "source" is not very reliable.

All of the UPS 744s have cockpit doors.

UPS MD11s have solid barriers between the cargo compartment and the front end, and they have cockpit doors.

In fact, every airplane in the UPS fleet has a solid bulkhead between the cockpit and the cargo compartment.

The O2 masks were changed on 2 airplanes to standardize cockpit configurations within the 747 fleet. (And at this point we don't know if a full face mask would have made one bit of difference regarding the outcome of this event, as we don't have the facts yet.)

Stop posting hearsay.

[Resar40]

@SNS3Guppy
"this is something I addressed earlier in the thread. Having said that, however, I worked in very close proximity to a number of unmanned assets in an area near where this happened, fairly recently, and I can tell you that the single biggest threat I faced wasn't IED's, wasn't rockets, wasn't mortars or missiles, but unmanned aircraft. I can't discuss much more than that, but I will say that whatever pie-eyed starry admiration you may have for them based on what you've seen on CNN is very misplaced, as is anything you think you know about their capabilities."

Sorry, I missed that part of the thread, could you reiterate for me? I do wonder what you observed to be the main problem with the unmanned aircraft, was it the machine, or the way in which it was operated?

[big white bird]

Guppy has the floor and the answer in one, a corollary of which is that every unmanned airplane or vehicle is just that, unmanned.

You would never convince the traveling public to get into an unmanned vehicle that operates in more than two dimensions. Whenever called upon to travel in back, I am part of the traveling public.

What about trains, I hear you ask.

Trains operate in two dimensions. Airliners operate in three. The difference is vast and fully misunderstood by the posters who suggest remote control, proof of which we have Guppy to validate from experience.

QED.

Why not just provide the proper equipment to enable the pilot to see through the smoke? Better still, more stringent prosecution of wiful violations and misleading information provided to shippers.

Money talks.

[Resar40]

@big white bird
Not quite sure what you are trying to say. When we talk about unmanned aircraft, we should remember that they generally are not actually unmanned, just that the operator is not in the aircraft. Hence they are subject to all the normal human factors of aircraft operation, but with some further complicating aspects, and this is where most UAV specific problems occur.

[Whenwe]

Perhaps not quite relevant but quite few years ago I was on final at Franceville in Gabon flying a CL44 (Canadian version of the Bristol Britannia). In the back was about 22 tons of meat and vegetables. Suddenly, almost instantly, the whole aircraft was filled with a white-ish smoke. The smell unmistakably oil and where there is smoke there is fire. I could barely see the instruments and very faintly the runway. A go-around with a fire is not a very comforting thought.
Fortunately, at that altitude there is very little pressurization and both of us forced our side windows open giving me enough visibility to land the aircraft. The cause of this was an oil seal that blew in compressor (For pressurization). The oil into a hot compressor and the result was instant smoke.
When I read about this accident I shuddered at the thought of what those guys had to cope with. I had the advantage of know exactly what was in the back.

[Admiral346]

Resar, if the companies won't put a little inflatable plastic thingie through which to see the instruments in case of smoke on board without it being demanded by law, they sur as hell won't modify a 747 for remote control, with all the issues of integrating it into the highly complex systems. Not even talking about weight... And the ground infrastructure needed - with transmitters of the steering signal and also operators, trained and ready within minutes to take over- it's an illusion.
And the military won't let civilians use their channels. The north atlantic is under constant surveiilance by NATO, but do we get radar service?

And, White Bird, if a train operates in 2 dimensions you must be talking about it moving along the tracks (1 dimension) and time (2nd dimension).
In this case, you should view the airplane to be operating in 4 dimensions (space's 3 dimensions + time). Time is a huge factor for flight, much more so than for trains or cars which will just stop if the factor time is exceeded. (Actually, so will aircraft, the stopping is just really hard to survive...)

Nic

[Resar40]

Admiral346, Yeah, definitely not talking about ground based RC stuff. I am talking about more functional autopilot systems, and interactivity of those with ground operators.

[TWT]

Admiral,

A train will be moving along the X and Y axis in the 3 dimensional space model.An aircraft adds the Z axis along which it can also move.Both trains and aircraft have time as a factor.

Three-dimensional space - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-dimensional_space)

[Admiral346]

TWT,, the train moves in 3 dimensions, right.
But it is controlable in only 1 by the operator - forward and back - hence no steering wheel. The automobil is controlable in 2 dimensions - steering wheel is for left and right, the gearbox and pedals is forward and back.
The aeroplane is controlable in all 3 dimensions.

The dimensions correspond to line - plane - space

Nic

[DownIn3Green]

Resar...Rubbish ref "the aircraft is not unmanned, the operator is on the ground"

One of my first sim sessions during F/O upgrade training was "he does well but tends to overcorrect the sim...I'm sure this problem will correct itself once he feels the VERTICAL ACCELERATION IN THE ACTUAL A/C"...

So true...a ground operator can't react to gusty x-winds or nasty up/down drafts...

[M-rat]

In the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations there is a large section regulating the type a packaging required for Dangerous Goods, specific to their nature of hazard.

No need to re-invent the wheel.

Cargo Matatu... I disagree. From a logical point of view the IATA DGR is a dog's breakfast. It's burdensome because it is poorly written and so full of ambiguous, cross referenced mumbo jumbo and myriad exclusions so as to be pretty dangerous at least to my military mind. It needs a massive re-write by a trained, rational, and aviation oriented editor. It needs to be published in a user friendly format. It is a disgrace imho.

Also, thoughts for the general group here: it occurs to me that the EVAS system which is receiving lots of attention in these posts, (not unreasonably), would be useless in a situation where there was anything too hot nearby (in the SwissAir MD-11 crash 12 years ago, there was molten material dripping from overhead on to the flight crew) and this would presumably melt the clear 'bag' material forming the smoke free zone, rendering such a system useless.

[172driver]

A lot of the discussion here revolves around the crew's inability to see the instruments/radios.

Would a head-mounted display (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Head-mounted_display) not go some way to solve that issue? You could have all the vital information displayed in there.

Admittedly, you still have to find the buttons/switches in the cockpit to make any changes or adjustments, but at the very least you are not blind.

Taking this a step further, it should be possible to generate a 'virtual' view of the entire cockpit displayed in these goggles, thus giving the crew a fighting chance.

[172driver]

Being able to see out is the least of concerns. One has to navigate, and to do that one needs to be able to see instrumentation. The 747 is a numbers airplane; one needs to know airspeed and altitude, and needs to be able to program navigational equipment to get down. It does one very little good to stall on approach, or explode in a fireball off the end when one lands far too fast to stop.

Guppy, re-read my post and have a look at the link. This is exactly what I was driving at - a wearable (and thereby not affected by smoke) display of the INSTRUMENTS of the a/c. Didn't say or mean looking out.

[avspook]

Gcca Mar 2010 released a NPA for the Carriage of Dangerous Goods on aircraft tightening the rules & checks. Kudos to them for recognizing the gap, Just bad timing.
As to the smoke in cockpit, yes the Air supply is from a differing source than that supplied to the cargo areas. However the equipment cooling for the flight deck instruments has 17 possible modes of operation some of which use FWD cargo air for cooling of the Flight deck displays & panels. That would be my suspect
The QRH has the equip cooling go to Override to enter mode ensuring air is not being dram from the fwd cargo area and is then dumped overboard by the smoke override valve. This would by my choice of suspect for smoke entering the cockpit from the cargo areas. No override . Possible smoke entry. The 3 source of possible air for the Equip cooling to the Flight Deck are Mix manifold air / Fwd Cargo / & reverse flow draw thru by differential pressure with smoke override valve open


Link FAA video of a Laptop Lithium Fire. Note that cooling, not oxygen deprivation is the only way to prevent thermal runawayhttp://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/2007Confe...tingVideo1.wmv

[F111UPS767]

It seems to me that with a fire producing a large amount of smoke in a closed container (albeit with a relatively small outflow valve) that no matter how you set up the airflow system, the smoke will eventually (and possibly rapidly) fill up the entire container. Considering the massive amounts of smoke that can come from some fires, it doesn't seem to me that one can eliminate a large amount of smoke unless you have an exit path that is very, very large. Am I wrong here?

[Resar40]

@DownIn3Green
"Resar...Rubbish ref "the aircraft is not unmanned, the operator is on the ground"
One of my first sim sessions during F/O upgrade training was "he does well but tends to overcorrect the sim...I'm sure this problem will correct itself once he feels the VERTICAL ACCELERATION IN THE ACTUAL A/C"...
So true...a ground operator can't react to gusty x-winds or nasty up/down drafts..."

No doubt true, but completely irrelevant.

The autopilot is there to fly the aircraft. The question is, why could the crew of the AC in question not use its autopilot to save their lives?

You most likely know far more than me about the details of how much programming, physical manipulation etc is required to setup the presently installed AP and its limitation wrt to 3D nav, approach and landing.

My point is that we now have new autopilot technology (as can be observed in UAVs) which can navigate an aircraft completely autonomously, and of course the autopilot may be manually controlled from the ground (anywhere in the world) with a variety of existing comms links with (for example) click and drag waypoints, climbs, descents, and various configuration changes with ease.

Some people may believe that UAVs or their control systems are still inherently unreliable or do not have the full functionality required for complete flights. This is however demonstrably untrue, but the same fundamental technical and human system problems are present in UAV operation as with conventional piloted aircraft. This should not be seen as a reason to dismiss the technology and its potential to increase safety in situations such as the topic of this thread.

[Ned Parsnip]

One broke loose in a Qantas(?) airplane a while back and wound up embedded in the overhead luggage bin behind the L1 door.

Wound up in the China Sea IIRC.

[GlueBall]

Some people may believe that UAVs or their control systems are still inherently unreliable or do not have the full functionality required for complete flights. This is however demonstrably untrue, . . ."

This had previously been hashed over in a previous thread.

Keep in mind that UAVs are operated by the military and are funded by unlimited tax dollars. That's one of the reasons the government keeps the NUMBER of UAVs that have NOT returned to base a secret. In fact, hundreds have been lost, and not just in combat.

Just as the automatics in an airliner . . . everything works OK until something breaks, except that in a UAV the remote operator may lose control when the autopilot goes on vacation, or when the hydraulic system springs a leak..

[742]

Some people may believe that UAVs or their control systems are still inherently unreliable or do not have the full functionality required for complete flights. This is however demonstrably untrue...

Oh, it is very demonstrably true. Just Google "UAV accident rate". This has been an issue within the Pentagon and it is now becoming an issue in Congress.

[NSEU]

In order to pressurize the flight deck, one would require a higher source pressure just for the flight deck, and this doesn't exist, nor does any way to provide it exist, in the pneumatic system, after the air conditioning packs are done preparing the air for cabin use.

Guppy, it has been suggested in a previous message thread on a similar topic that, on 744 Freighters with Main Deck Fire Suppression systems, that a slightly positive pressure is maintained on the upper deck when the lower deck is depressurised to 25,000' (when the Main Deck Fire Suppression system is activated).

Airconditioning to the Main Deck is cut off and Pack/s in low flow mode provide air to the cockpit.

[Resar40]

@GlueBall
"This had previously been hashed over in a previous thread.
Keep in mind that UAVs are operated by the military and are funded by unlimited tax dollars. That's one of the reasons the government keeps the NUMBER of UAVs that have NOT returned to base a secret. In fact, hundreds have been lost, and not just in combat.
Just as the automatics in an airliner . . . everything works OK until something breaks, except that in a UAV the remote operator may lose control when the autopilot goes on vacation, or when the hydraulic system springs a leak.. "

I apologise for not having seen the other related threads.Please bear in mind that you need to differentiate between the causes of the losses you cite, technical systems failures, human factors and intent. In the first case, that is the same as for piloted AC (dependent on certification requirements), the second is again the same. The third, intent, is clearly a case that particularly in military use, the UAV by the very nature of being unmanned is considered expendable. It is no surprise that the stats are as you mention, but this is irrelevant to the point.

[Resar40]

@742
See above reply to Glueball.

[Resar40]

@Guppy
"Quote:
That's one of the reasons the government keeps the NUMBER of UAVs that have NOT returned to base a secret. In fact, hundreds have been lost, and not just in combat.
I've been present when it's happened (at the business end, not the operator end). I've also seen up close and personal what they can do,and what they can't..."

Me too

Quote:
The autopilot is there to fly the aircraft.
"No, it's not. The autopilot is there as an auxilliary control system; the pilot still flies the aircraft, but flies it through the autoflight system, rather than through the control column. The autopilot doesn't fly the airplane. It's merely one of the controls that pilots use to operate the airplane. You don't fly, do you?"

Yes I do fly. You missed the point, but I apologise for making it a little too oblique.
If an autopilot were to be used to save an aircraft in the situation relevant to this discussion, it would need the full functionality to fly the plane autonomously. Those APs exist and are routinely used in UAVs. There is no fundamental reason they could not be easily fitted to your large jet transport.

"Quote:
The question is, why could the crew of the AC in question not use its autopilot to save their lives?
"I guess that answers the last question. If you have to ask, then obviously you don't fly. The crew was blind, you see."

Bad guess, see above

Quote:
My point is that we now have new autopilot technology (as can be observed in UAVs) which can navigate an aircraft completely autonomously, and of course the autopilot may be manually controlled from the ground (anywhere in the world) with a variety of existing comms links with (for example) click and drag waypoints, climbs, descents, and various configuration changes with ease.
"It would appear that what you know of UAV/UAS systems, you learned from CNN, wouldn't it? "

Negative Guppy

"Chock this up to the same thinking that so far has brought us "give the crews parachutes;" "dive the airplane and push the cargo out the door while it doesn't weigh anything;" and of course "put a doctor, lawyer, indian chief, and marriage counselor, priest, and firefighting brigade on board just in case" ideas. "

Look, I really do understand the reticence on behalf of pilots to give away control. It is quite right to be skeptical, however as with all new and challenging concepts, good skepticism requires an open mind and a strong guard against denialism.

I imagine Mr Sperry may have encountered skeptics at first, but once people realized that overall safety could be improved, and that the technology was able to augment their role rather than diminish it, the future was inevitable. Else you risk to be a Luddite.

[bugg smasher]

If an autopilot were to be used to save an aircraft in the situation relevant to this discussion, it would need the full functionality to fly the plane autonomously. Those APs exist and are routinely used in UAVs. There is no fundamental reason they could not be easily fitted to your large jet transport.

Essentially, that functionality exists at present. The aircraft I fly will capture, autoland, and autobrake to a full stop on the runway, no human intervention necessary. The configuration changes however, flaps and gear, reverse thrust, are still necessary, the autopilots also need to be armed at the appropriate time during the approach sequence, all things great and small being a ‘go’, as determined by the aircraft commander.

In the lightweight, remotely controlled UAV/Nintendo way of things, as far as I understand them, all such configuration changes are unnecessary, a vastly simpler tasking. The accidental loss of a UAV involves cash, only, no lives at stake there.

That is not all to say these decision making issues cannot be automated, that next step in the minimalist, financially advantageous way of current engineering madness is already well under way.

Remove the human, save the airplane. God forbid flesh and blood pilots should usurp the technical academy geniuses who propose to claim that authority.

[voyageur9]

.... that functionality exists at present. The aircraft I fly will capture, autoland, and autobrake to a full stop on the runway, no human intervention necessary. The configuration changes however, flaps and gear, reverse thrust, are still necessary, the autopilots also need to be armed at the appropriate time during the approach sequence, all things great and small being a ‘go’, as determined by the aircraft commander.
So, IF it can be done from a technical/engineering standpoint, then is the issue solely whether (or when) it becomes advantageous from a cost-benefit standpoint. Does that portend a progression to aircraft "commanders" on the ground, handling various aircraft (perhaps in shifts) and still making those 'go' decisions but not from the cockpit. And is that a 'bad' thing in terms of safety?

[Willit Run]

I'd like to see a UAV operator keep up with with the rapid fire directions from a North East controller, and dodge thunderstorms all during the peak rush hour. Or have them do the same from a Hong Kong controller with a chinese accent. This all takes experience and can't be learned from a classroom.


I have dodged way too many UAV's in the "Stans". Its a little unnerving!

[boofhead]

Two things that have not happened yet but surely will: A UAV will hit a passenger flight and bring it down with huge loss of life, and some twit with an attitude will order an airliner that is having comms problems to be shot down because it is approaching a sensitive area.

So if the airliners are also UAVs are we off the hook?

[DownIn3Green]

Perfectly said, Boof...

[Resar40]

@Bugg smasher
Yes the whole lot could be automated, but very few people really want that for airliners, there are too many variables and the humans who design systems and code are way too fallible. Yet why would we not want to take advantage of the means to reorient the Human/AP interface paradigm and allow that slight extra functionality?

I may be unwilling to fly in an airliner with no human pilot, but I would be quite happy for the pilot/s to have a better system to manage. Particularly if they were unable to see their instruments due to smoke, but also if automation of the aircraft were sufficient to allow better automation of the airspace, and therefore better utilization and efficiency. Of course there are many projects underway with this aim, better to participate and help steer it in sensible directions, than attempt to impede it I'd say.

[Captain-Crunch]

It appears, Oh stolid gupp,

You were right about the Belgium 747 bird ingestion/abort accident. Pacplyer sends his acquiescence (Look it up) of your correct interpretation of the unfortunate event. V1 is not to be negotiated, as you were emphatic (Look it up) about. . However, at the time of the K accident, we were not privy to any of the accident facts and were simply deferring to the PIC's judgment until other facts were known. None the less, you were proven right.

In this inevitable accident, going back to my 747-100's, and some 747-200's a sextant smoke vent port was installed near the overhead hatch. I jumpseated 747-400's and noticed no such device. Is it your informed opinion that such installation and use of such a device, under the application of a trained flight engineer might surely have prevented this accident?

Why were smoke evac ports eliminated?

I never understood this.

Crunch - out

[Sygyzy]

It's there on the 744,same place as the -100/200. No need for a sextant so it's called a smoke evac port. Utilised by a gert big 'andle on the center overhead panel.


Too busy looking out of the window were you?:hmm:

S

[bugg smasher]

And for those pilots that still smoke, a very handy port indeed...

[bugg smasher]

Does that portend a progression to aircraft "commanders" on the ground, handling various aircraft (perhaps in shifts) and still making those 'go' decisions but not from the cockpit. And is that a 'bad' thing in terms of safety?

Anytime an aircraft commander does not have a vested, direct, viscerally palpable, and immediate interest in the inherent risks of a given emergency situation, the safety of the aircraft and the passengers under his or her command, said safety becomes secondary to the technical and very inhuman aspects of efficacy, larger question marks overlooked until the aftermath, enter the lawyers.

All engines out, let’s perhaps minimize loss of life by crashing it on that empty football pitch over there.

Commanders on the ground, as you put it, are potentially nothing more than reasonably well-paid technicians, outsider game players without understanding of any significance. In the extreme, they would pander to the dictates of omni-present bean counters, the task masters who control them, an Orwellian proposition by any standard.

How do you think the Hudson River scenario would have played out, given your proposed remotely controlled automation, without the physical presence of Sullenberger?

If you asked him right now about ground-jockeying an airliner full of passengers, I’m reasonably certain he’d say, “I know a damn goose when I see one”.

[Resar40]

Definitely the right man for the occasion. Splendid job.

If smoke had obscured his view? Could deeper level automation help?

[etrang]

Commanders on the ground, as you put it, are potentially nothing more than reasonably well-paid technicians, ... In the extreme, they would pander to the dictates of omni-present bean counters,

And that's exactly why they will happen - they will be a lot cheaper. One ground commander will be able to oversee several flights, for example. They are being used by the military already and the next step will likely be cargo flights.

[PA-28-180]

As Willit Run and others have posted.....I, for another, certainly HOPE NOT! :eek:
Computers can do a lot at the present time....but they aren't as FLEXIBLE as a human at the controls. I don't even want an RC CARGO flight flying over my family....let alone FLYING my family - regardless of the (current) technology! :eek: :ugh:

[Svarin]

Why is this thread degenerating into considerations on fully automated flight ? Why do people who are not pilots at all, and likely unable to ever become one, dream of aircraft that fly themselves ?

The unfortunate fellows who had to face one of the most dangerous situation ever in a civilian airplane only needed a few cheap things, and not billion-bucks drones :

- a way to fly the aircraft with heavy smoke in the cockpit : EVAS
- quick, accurate and reliable information about the fire

It seems maintenance had received ACARS with info on the fire location, and I for one am convinced this info was not available to the pilots.

Now, for those who dream of remote flying, I suggest they try remote lovemaking. Much, much safer.

[TheWanderer]

The autopilot is there to fly the aircraft. The question is, why could the crew of the AC in question not use its autopilot to save their lives?

You most likely know far more than me about the details of how much programming, physical manipulation etc is required to setup the presently installed AP and its limitation wrt to 3D nav, approach and landing.

My point is that we now have new autopilot technology (as can be observed in UAVs) which can navigate an aircraft completely autonomously, and of course the autopilot may be manually controlled from the ground (anywhere in the world) with a variety of existing comms links with (for example) click and drag waypoints, climbs, descents, and various configuration changes with ease.

Some people may believe that UAVs or their control systems are still inherently unreliable or do not have the full functionality required for complete flights. This is however demonstrably untrue, but the same fundamental technical and human system problems are present in UAV operation as with conventional piloted aircraft. This should not be seen as a reason to dismiss the technology and its potential to increase safety in situations such as the topic of this thread.

Reliability or functionality of UAV is competely irrelevant, if one is unable to program or reprogram it.

Just a simple experiment: Program your UAV for a mission and bring it in the air. 20 minutes after takeoff, put on a blindfold and then start reprogramming your mission, click and drag waypoints, climbs, descents, and various configuration changes with the goal to land your UAV safely within 20 minutes on any airport in its vicinity.
Remove your blindfold after your UAV has landed.
Can you do it? Will it be possible?

For all others unfamiliar with UAV's another experiment: Do you see the reply button in the lower right corner of my post? Yes?
Put on a blindfold, then move your mouse, click on that reply button, write a reply with 10 sentences and submit it.
After sending your reply, remove the blindfold.
Have you been successfull? How many spelling mistakes are in your 10 sentences? Did your PC record any sentences at all?

A "simple" task if you can see, but without vision it is a hundred times more challanging and I personally doubt that it is possible to submit a reply when blindfolded and you are untrained in doing so.

Now imagine you are sitting in the smoke filled cockpit of a burning airliner, unable to see your nosetip, its getting hotter than in a steam bath, you use a mask to breath oxygen, you don't know exactly where you are, your heading, speed and altitude are are only guessed from information you received by radio from a radar measurement...

[TheWanderer]

The unfortunate fellows who had to face one of the most dangerous situation ever in a civilian airplane only needed a few cheap things, and not billion-bucks drones :

- a way to fly the aircraft with heavy smoke in the cockpit : EVAS
- quick, accurate and reliable information about the fire

It seems maintenance had received ACARS with info on the fire location, and I for one am convinced this info was not available to the pilots.


Absolutely correct, and if I may add:
- the best available cargo fire extinguishing system on the market, which might be the previsouly discussed FedEx developed system

If the aircraft automatics are able to detect a cargo fire, then there must also be a way to fight this fire as soon as possible, otherwise any detection system is as good as useless.
Any fire detected and not fighted but only the results of the fire like smoke being removed is a lost chance to survive this fire.

[edie]

UPS 9601 a 747-400 just landed in DXB. This airplane will fly the two deceased
UPS pilots back to Louisville shortly.

FlightAware > United Parcel Service #9601 > 20-Sep-2010 > KSDF-OMDB (http://flightaware.com/live/flight/UPS9601/history/20100920/1900Z/KSDF/OMDB)

[Resar40]

@Svarin
" Why is this thread degenerating into considerations on fully automated flight ?"

It is certainly not "degenerating" in that way, why do you consider it so?

"Why do people who are not pilots at all, and likely unable to ever become one, dream of aircraft that fly themselves ?"

I don't know, why don't you ask them? But I would guess that they see the potential, the reality and as humans will, they want to exploit the technology.

The smoke screen may well be a useful and warranted device for this particular emergency, what is wrong with considering more wide ranging help?

PS, it isn't a dream anymore.

[Resar40]

@TheWanderer
"Reliability or functionality of UAV is competely irrelevant, if one is unable to program or reprogram it."

Well that depends on the nature of the program I suppose. Anyway, on the types I operate, it would be much more convenient to don the blindfold and then trip over the datalink power supply cable. On loss of comms, home it comes. Of course we can make it do other tricks, and indeed it doesn't need the datalink at all anyway. Perhaps after having tripped over and still with blindfold, I could use my cellphone to call a friend, the datalink is networked via cellnet and satellite, so any friend anywhere in the world with the ground-station software will do. Then again, we are working to develop voice command, "I think you said, Return to Home, is that correct?"

[ernestkgann]

Out of interest Resar40, are you a pilot?

[Resar40]

@ernestkgann
Non-current commercially trained, recreational pilot and professional research engineer. I am also interested in social dynamics of knowledge hierarchy. My professional and social network spans leading scientific PhD types, big aero r&d, airline and military pilots through to sport, recreational and experimental.

[ernestkgann]

Apologies for the thread drift. A casual observation would suggest you're too smart to be a professional pilot with those interests! Does a UAV operator regard themselves as a pilot and with that all the inherent considerations that go with operating machinery outside the boundaries of 'normal' human physiological circumstances. I wonder if the psychological differences between UAV operators and pilots create differences of opinion about what is acceptable and what is not when it comes to the conduct of aviation in its different forms.

[Resar40]

@ernestkgann
All good grounds for research and discussion. In any case, it is happening, perhaps a new thread would be appropriate, or you could direct me to an existing one.

[ernestkgann]

The esteemed owners of this site may have to make an appropriate venue on these boards for UAV people. You will find that part of the psychology of pilots is the actual flying, remove that and there isn't much desire in that group to participate.

[Resar40]

Ah, well there are plenty of UAV sites. I don't want to talk about UAVs here. The point of interest is to look at how Autopilot technology can be used.

As I said earlier, it need not be seen as usurping the pilot's role.

[Huck]

I wonder if the psychological differences between UAV operators and pilots create differences of opinion about what is acceptable and what is not when it comes to the conduct of aviation in its different forms.

It's the difference between ham and eggs.

The chicken's involved.

The pig's committed.....

[ernestkgann]

Fair enough. There is a lot of discussion at the moment that centres around automations role in reducing piloting ability and particularly manual flying wrt the ability to recover from inappropriate automation use and the the loss of knowledge, manual flying ability and experience. LCCs use automation in modern aircraft to employ lower experienced pilots. No doubt the advent of remotely piloted aircraft fits in there somewhere and as a group we are nearing the cross roads of the benefits of automation versus human/manual flying.

[Resar40]

Only as written. My agenda is to discuss safety, effectiveness and general enhancement of systems using contemporary technology.
I would wonder why the risk of hitting a UAV is so significant. If it is a genuine risk (not a psychological artifact) then there may be a systemic or other factor to be addressed. For example (and this clearly applies to manned AC) it is well known that modern precision navigation systems can cause increased collision risks due to that very precision. Would you blame the technology?

[ernestkgann]

This is now way off track from the original intent of the post, for that I apologise. LCCs can use far less experienced pilots now because at first glance, they are easier to fly using automation, fbw and modern aircraft systems. Have a look in the cockpit of a Super Connie and ask whether a 200 hr co-pilot would be useful. Easy Jet, Ryanair and many others use this technology to keep their passengers safe while driving down their cost base by out sourcing training and employing low experience pilots, amongst other things. Their CEOs suggest that they only need one pilot, the Stewardess' can help if a non-normal requires. With the outsourcing of training and the pay to fly style of endorsement comes poor training. Why would it be different if there is no 'buy in' to the positive results from a training course. Does it matter if the candidate has only a superficial knowledge of the system he or she is being endorsed on?
Captain Sullenberger spoke at length about crew experience and the changes that are now constant in the industry.

[Svarin]

Huck :

I wonder if the psychological differences between UAV operators and pilots create differences of opinion about what is acceptable and what is not when it comes to the conduct of aviation in its different forms.

It's the difference between ham and eggs.
The chicken's involved.
The pig's committed.....
I like that one. It is obvious to pilots.

Now, the following observations exist regardless of current or prospective technology :

For the pilot, one's own life is at stake and hangs on one's skillset.

For the operator, the only thing hanging on their skillset is their job security, and their life is never at risk.

That is one world of difference in the psychology of the relevant persons. It has far reaching effects on how one sees their activity. This goes way beyond mere pleasure of flying, although both aspects are probably more closely related than it would appear.

That is one world of difference in the meaning of the word 'trust' for actual or potential passengers.

[ernestkgann]

I like it Huck, it was however, a rhetorical question.

[DownIn3Green]

EKGann...forget about the Connie...try it on a "newer" A/C like the 727 or 737/200/300/400...Yes I know the 400 may come with CRT's, however that was an option that some airlines didn't employ...

Like to see a new F/O w/ 200 hrs and a brand new set of shiney stripes try to get one of those down when all hell breaks loose...

As for Resar, I think most of us have the picture...

[Weapons_Hot]

Just a subtle creep, but...
Is there any further information on the subject matter - UPS AIRCRAFT DOWN IN DXB?:sad:

[avspook]

Detailed News (http://www.gcaa.ae/En/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=190)

[NukeHunt]

Dubai plane crash investigation focuses on cargo - The National Newspaper (http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100923/NATIONAL/709239978/0/rss)

:uhoh:

[nightflyer747]

Actually NONE of the UPS 747s have cockpit doors. There is a door at the top of the stairs entering the upper deck, but only a curtin between the cockpit and the jumpseat area. The curtin, in fact, is requirred to be open for all takeoff and landings!

[ClassCbird]

I have already posted this on the Freight Dog Forum, but felt that it was relevant to this thread...

It is looking very likely that the UPS cargo aircraft that came down in DXB had a fire in the main deck hold. I am appauled that to this day, there is still no regulatory mandate for cargo aircraft to have fire suppression in their main deck holds (Only required in the lower FWD and AFT holds). I would have thought that after two recent previous events which resulted in hull losses due to fire (FedEx 1406 and UPS 1307), the FAA would start taking this matter very seriously. What will it take for things to change?
I have appealed to the FAA to mandate fire suppression in main deck holds and I urge you all to do the same!
It is worth noting that the NTSB have called for this change through recommendations several times! The FAA responded in a letter two days after the UPS accident in Dubai (Coincidental), apparantly stating it would be too expensive!

I salute FedEx for taking the initiative to install fire suppressant to their cargo fleet. I implore you all to press the regulators for this to be standard as soon as possible before more lives are lost. Not just to pilots but to the general public on the ground.

Why should passenger carrying aircraft be given stricter regulation over cargo aircraft?

Class E to Class C ASAP!!!

[ClassCbird]

Please look at this video...

Industry First Onboard Automatic Fire Suppression System | FedEx Global Newsroom (http://news.van.fedex.com/firesuppressionvideo)

:ok:

[forget]

The FAA responded in a letter two days after the UPS accident in Dubai (Coincidental), apparantly stating it would be too expensive!

Fire suppression in freighters is only too expensive because the money isn’t there. Obvious? I believe there’s a simple and painless solution to this.

At this very moment there are millions of individual packages in the air. Let’s say that all freight companies charge an extra 50 cents per package, irrespective of size or weight. This money, which would very soon add up to $millions, goes to a central fund to pay for R & D on the best suppression systems. Once these are proven the constant flow of money goes to pay for installations.

The whole thing could be kicked off very quickly and is easily administered. Let’s say it starts in January. During that month air-freight company ABC ships 5 million packages – the figures are easily seen from the records – then ABC owes the fund $2.5M less a tiny percentage for administration.

Call it the Air Freight Fire Fighting Fund and no one would mind the extra 50 cents.

Anyone?

PS. By sheer coincidence, and for the first time in months, a FedEx van has just pulled up outside my window. Karma?

[lomapaseo]

The FAA use of the words "too expensive" typically refer to mandated requirements that go beyond current regulations governing all aircraft in class.

Thus it is presumed that the current regulations are safe enough if all procedures and design requirements are followed. To go beyond this requirement places an additional burden on the economics of design and manufacture or operating an aircraft and as such a demonstration of benefit must be shown versus retro of a fleet.

There are two critical items mising in the plethora of words on internet boards.

The facts are not yet obvious to us: were presumed procedures followed or if not should that not be where corrective action is easier taken?

What are all costs associated with mandated changes over and above current requirements, taken into account , out of service time, hangar costs, manpower available, cost of parts, etc. versus number of lives saved, versus number of lives lost becuase the proposed change is never perfect and may result in causing a different type of accident?

So we can continue our "what if" discussions but lets be careful about presuming how simple a fix is for somebody else to adopt.

[Neptunus Rex]

It would have to involve all the air freight companies, including Speedpost. It's a great idea, one which the Insurers should back.

Now wait for the knockers and naysayers....

[RustyNuts]

UPS 9601 a 747-400 just landed in DXB. This airplane will fly the two deceased
UPS pilots back to Louisville shortly.

FlightAware > United Parcel Service #9601 > 20-Sep-2010 > KSDF-OMDB (http://flightaware.com/live/flight/UPS9601/history/20100920/1900Z/KSDF/OMDB)Somewhat back on topic, the pilots came home today. At about 7:05 Eastern time the 744F blocked in front of the hanger here in Louisville. UPS held a ceremony for Capt. Lampe and FO Bell, and have chartered a 737 to take the First Officer and his family home.

[747newguy]

Class operation...

[SaturnV]

U.S. preparing to further regulate air cargo shipments of lithium ion batteries.

Plane Fires Prompt Battery Safeguards - WSJ.com (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748704483004575524353472009056.html#mod=todays_ us_nonsub_section_b)

[Oakape]

Interesting article.

One of the pilots apparently left the cockpit to try to fight the flames but never returned, said people familiar with data gathered by investigators.


That is new.

[infrequentflyer789]

U.S. preparing to further regulate air cargo shipments of lithium ion batteries.

Plane Fires Prompt Battery Safeguards - WSJ.com (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748704483004575524353472009056.html#mod=todays_ us_nonsub_section_b)

Interesting article, especially this bit:

Without such systems, pilots who get fire warnings from the cargo hold often must resort to making emergency descents to depressurize the aircraft and try to starve the flames of oxygen. FAA officials didn't have any immediate comment.



I guess the FAA didn't comment because the concept of using an emergency descent to depressurize had them a bit confused... :)

[mini]

I guess the FAA didn't comment because the concept of using an emergency descent to depressurize had them a bit confused... http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/smile.gif

Not to mention this bit...

to depressurize the aircraft and try to starve the flames of oxygen

:bored:

[F111UPS767]

Assuming you're at cruise altitude and there is not a runway available for an immediate descent and landing, the 767 (and maybe the other Boeings) Cargo Fire procedure is to starve the fire of oxygen by descending (or climbing) to FL250 while depressurizing the aircraft. The 767 is depressurized by going to a reduced flow on a single pack. (I assume the descent to 250 is for crew physiological reasons, but don't know that for a fact.)

We are given no data as to how long this procedure takes to attain a PA of 25,000 feet, but I think it might be helpful to turn off all packs for a while and fully open the outflow valve to hurry up the process. After attaining the pressure altitude of 25,000, turning on a pack for equipment cooling and crew heating would probably be required. (Being a cargo aircraft, we don't have to worry about the pax. However, in a pax aircraft, there are people in the container that hopefully would put out a fire before it got too big to manage.)

Any thoughts?

[MountainBear]

the 767 (and maybe the other Boeings) Cargo Fire procedure is to starve the fire of oxygen by descending to FL250 while depressurizing the aircraft.Why didn't anyone ever tell me that there is a property of fire that prevents it from starting in airplanes below FL250.

I blame the Obama Administration. This is an outrage!

[Patty747400]

Hey MB

Boeing actually has thought about that. The "Main Deck Fire" checklist says that you should "climb or descent" to 25000 feet.

Wonder if following that checklist would have helped the UPS guys? I hope the investigation will give us some clues about that.

[rottenray]

ernestkgann writes:
The esteemed owners of this site may have to make an appropriate venue on these boards for UAV people. You will find that part of the psychology of pilots is the actual flying, remove that and there isn't much desire in that group to participate.I'm apt to reply with the same snide aire and ask "participate in what?"

In most cases, by the time a pilot gets to sit in the left-hand seat of any aircraft with pax aboard, that person has "participated" in many hundreds of hours of training - in flying a plane, in calculating weights and balances, in understanding weather, in learning literally thousands of minutia regulations.

And I'll guess here, about 85% of them do it because they love flight and want to spend their working careers aloft.

There are many working pilots who participate in these forums, as well as many who are hopeful of becoming pilots and some who gave the idea up long ago when they discovered they didn't have the right mentality for it. I'm in that last group, by the way.


... and writes again:
No doubt the advent of remotely piloted aircraft fits in there somewhere and as a group we are nearing the cross roads of the benefits of automation versus human/manual flying.SN3, thank you for making this clear for everyone to see:
Clearly when you entered into the conversation, you did so with an agenda. You finally outed yourself, that's all. I'll throw my $0.02 in. Automation has to go a long, long way to replace the human element in piloting an aircraft. There is a notion amongst smug programmers that all they need is a "concept" and enough "examples" in order to successfully mimic the advanced decision-making process even the least smart of humans use on a daily basis to sh*t and then wipe the backside.

It's utter hogwash. Artificial intelligence is difficult to do with supercomputers, let alone the limited amount of processing you can loft into the air and/or reliably link to on the ground.

Lastly, ernestkgann, I have to comment on your choice of screenname here. The *real* Mr. Gann passed away nearly 20 years ago but if he were alive, he would certainly not appreciate the type of posts you commit using his moniker.


RR

[Feathers McGraw]

@Patty

If whatever started the fire had it's own oxidiser then depressurisation is not going to prevent its continued combustion.

It might help with other cargo that has been set alight.

I'm not certain that lithium batteries contain enough oxidiser to continue burning with little external oxygen, but the real problem is that they tend to be shipped at least partially charged because if the voltage is allowed to drop too low then the battery becomes damaged and is of little use. Hence there's plenty of stored energy to generate heat. Even modern NiMH batteries are going this way, the hybrid versions have a much lower self discharge rate so are now charged after manufacture and are advertised as "ready-to-use".

[barit1]

rottenray:
I'll throw my $0.02 in. Automation has to go a long, long way to replace the human element in piloting an aircraft. There is a notion amongst smug programmers that all they need is a "concept" and enough "examples" in order to successfully mimic the advanced decision-making process even the least smart of humans use on a daily basis to sh*t and then wipe the backside.


Such programmers seem akin to statists who would replace the "inefficiency" of the free market with central planners.

The absurdity of this is illustrated by a common #2 pencil. A slender rod of graphite, encased in a wooden tube, with a natural rubber bit secured by a metal shell. Many technologies combine to form a simple instrument. Is a government factory likely to invent such a complex/simple device?

Did a government invent the violin, or the artificial horizon, or for that matter the airplane?

Don't get me wrong; I've done a lot of programming, mostly for my own applications. I solved a LOT of problems, but realized that solving others would likely cause more harm than good (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/01/AR2010100107205.html). Removing the human element was thus unwise.

[Smilin_Ed]

Boeing actually has thought about that. The "Main Deck Fire" checklist says that you should "climb or descent" to 25000 feet.
Wonder if following that checklist would have helped the UPS guys? I hope the investigation will give us some clues about that.

What would have helped these poor guys more than anything else is a third (or fourth or fifth) crewmember to go find the fire and try to put it out. :ugh:

[GlueBall]

"Assuming you're at cruise altitude and there is not a runway available for an immediate descent and landing. . . "

I doubt that this criteria will be of primary importance when the cockpit starts filling with smoke. If there is no airport in the immediate vicinity, hopefully, practical survival instinct will prevail in getting the airplane down for landing on a road, in a field or on the water. . . before cockpit visibility reduces to zero.

After this UPS crash, the mind-set of having to land on a pavement at a suitable airport is no longer practical reality. :ooh:

[F111UPS767]

I am thinking that the procedure to fly unpressurized at 250 means that someone expects a fire to be suppressed enough to enable flight. However, I would sure like some more info on this. Even if 250 does work in suppressing the fire, eventually one has to descend...

At this time, we do not know when in the flight profile the smoke became so thick, or how much time was spent at lower altitudes, etc.

[Patty747400]

Feathers

"If"... Yes, if it was like that they were doomed anyway. But what if it wasn't?

They didn't follow Boeing procedures. Not that I blame them, I would have done the same, it's just that with hindsight I realize that it might have been better to stay at 250. Maybe that would have suppressed the fire enough to let the outflow valves cleared the smoke and they could have been better prepared for the landing.

Maybe...

Smilin_Ed

"What would have helped these poor guys more than anything else is a third (or fourth or fifth) crewmember to go find the fire and try to put it out. :ugh:"

Have you ever looked down in a fully loaded 747? Even if there's no fire you can hardly walk along the pallets... Read some of Guppy's posts... he knows what he's talking about. They could have had 10 guys from NYFD as jump seaters and with the equipment we carry it still wouldn't have helped.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

Having dealt with 74f, and also chemistry I am trying to work out what on earth can save this.

An inerting device would not have worked.

Keeping the nasty Li batteries away would.

You can't ban them because they will always find their way over here, or where ever that might be.

To kill an Li fire is very, very difficult. Most will say CO2 or N2 type extinguishing, but H2O is by far the best, in other fires it will kill you.

[DozyWannabe]

There is a notion amongst smug programmers that all they need is a "concept" and enough "examples" in order to successfully mimic the advanced decision-making process even the least smart of humans use on a daily basis to sh*t and then wipe the backside.
Not amongst those I know, and I've been learning from and working with them for the last 12 years. In my experience any software engineer worth their salt would be horrified at the thought that a statement so blase could be made.

Can you name any examples, or are we talking about the school of "My Dad always said", the college of "It stands to reason" and the university of "Some bloke in the pub said so"?

@barit1

Let's be honest here though - without the input of the state you wouldn't have the Hoover Dam, the freeway system, the Boeing 707 (which was derived from a tanker design) or Concorde. Sometimes the "free" market is so focused on short-term profit that it can kill innovation in its tracks. I also don't think you'll find that many statists that demand central planning for everything, either.

We're veering off-topic here though, so I don't know how long these posts will stick around.

[barit1]

DozyWannabe:...without the input of the state you wouldn't have the Hoover Dam, the freeway system, the Boeing 707 (which was derived from a tanker design) or Concorde.

I don't believe the state invented anything here. Government provided capital to pull together already-proven concepts into new applications, but whatever invention was done was by private industry.

[bugg smasher]

A US Air Force study of altitude DCS cases reported that 87% of incidents occurred at 7,500 m (24,600 ft) or higher

The 25,000 foot question explained. More here;

Decompression sickness - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decompression_sickness#Leaving_a_high_pressure_environment)

[Deltabravowhiskey]

On the Boeing Freighters you do not descend to FL 250. When you arm the fire suppression system for the main deck the pressurization system dumps the Cabin and maintains an internal pressure equal to FL 250. This allows the aircraft to remain at altitude for best range and quite possibly best forward speed.

Speaking for myself, if I have fire and the regulated cabin altitude of FL 250 is not suppressing the flames, maintaining your original cruise altitude will permit raising the cabin to a higher altitude an possibly suppressing the fire faster or retaining a greater margin of time required for the emergency descent to landing.

The ideal situatuation is to stay as high as you can and as rapidly as possible dive to your intended diversion airport or controlled point of impact with the water.

Even with a battery fire, the batteries have very limited amount of energy to release. Once they have shorted out the lack of oxygen in the cabin (in theory) should provide you with enough time make an emergency descent to landing.

If the inferno damages the airframe, the low pressure on the pressure vessel should help to retain some or most of the structural integrity.

[main_dog]

On the Boeing Freighters you do not descend to FL 250.

Item 7 on our B744F QRH checklist for FIRE MAIN Deck states:

-Climb or descend to 25,000 feet when conditions and terrain allow.


This step is done immediately after pressing the CARGO FIRE DEPRES/DISCH switch which does indeed among other things depressurize the aircraft to a cabin altitude of 25,000' or airplane altitude, whichever is lower, but the checklist still has you climb/descend to 25,000'.

My best guess would be that, as the cabin is still pressurized to 25,000', having the aircraft at the same altitude would decrease Delta PSI to almost zero and thus diminish the flow of air within the pressurized hull, further discouraging combustion.

MD

[EW73]

Patty747400 (#693)...

I don't agree with your latter statement...and I've flown in many a 747 freighter, with and without the nose job!

EW73

[RatherBeFlying]

Once a Lithium battery gets going, it will only stop when it has been cooled or it has consumed itself.

Laptop fires in pax a/c are managed by water and isolation from neighboring combustibles, but that can't be done with something deep inside a pallet that might well take several minutes struggle to reach.

The real problem is propagation to adjacent batteries or ignition of adjacent combustible materials.

It should not be that hard, if not already done, to design a container for li-ion batteries that will contain a runaway, maybe with a cube of dry ice. If that can't be done, then shipping by air has to be a no-no.

If the pallet is sealed so that O2 can't get in, consumption of adjacent combustibles would be limited. But it would be necessary to allow venting for the climb to cabin altitude and subsequent descent. Perhaps a temperature sensor would prevent repressurisation on descent. Perhaps a CO2 container inside each pallet that released at high temperature would help.

[Lonewolf_50]

Razoray
And that's just not good enough....I'm not saying that if there was a Fire Fighter on board that the UPS plane would not have crashed, but at least it gives the crew a fighting chance, and if anything buys them some much needed time...
I don't disagree with you.

It is of interest to see somebody post the rumor that one of the crew had gone to try and fight the fire. Guess: If that is so, perhaps the location of the two dead pilots' bodies suggest one not being in the cockpit? We shall see, hopefully, as more of the investigation's details emerge.
Mariner Fires are feared by sailors and aviators alike.

The sailor can at last resort jump in the ocean without first having to manage a controlled ditching ... though at some latitudes, that just makes you a cold dinner for the fish … :eek: in either case.

Torquewrench
Considerable design time has been lavished on carefully automating all of the official, routine duties of navigators and flight engineers. However, this can easily blind designers to the fact that there were many unofficial, non-routine exertions often carried out by such members of the crew, especially under emergency circumstances, and these are unlikely to be addressed by even superbly foresighted ...

To which Machaca objected.

Machaca, I remember in the H-2, we were at about Airframe change 131 when I entered the fleet. The designers can’t foresee it all – their being human, that isn’t any condemnation of designers.

[Deltabravowhiskey]

The reason for the descent is due to the rapid drop in temperature in the cabin as a result of shuting off the trim air. The procedure also shuts down packs 2&3 which supply air to the main deck and lower cargo lobes. Obviously the aircraft will become very cold very quickly.

Remaining at cruise altitude can buy you time, lower cabin pressure remains an option where as at 250 and below it is not, that additional reduction in pressure and the available oxygen for the fire, put another way you have more time and a lower probability of flashover.

Colder temperatures would also delay the time for heat to transfer that would otherwise ignite combustable materials near the smoldering components that have previously ignited. Example, the pallet next to the one that caught fire. the lack of oxygen, colder temperatures, and distance (albeit 5-10cm) could make it more difficult for radiant heat to become a secondary ignition source and allow the fire to spread. I will grant you that this may be a very small benefit given the heat soaked nature of cargo relative to the ambient temperatures at altitude.

Depriving the fire of oxygen accomplishes everything that Halon, CO2 or other fire fighting gasses do. Once you remove the oxygen time is on your side. anybody that has use halon knows how quickly a fire will re-ignite once the gas disperses. It stops the fire and the secondary ignition sources but it does not remove the primary ignition source or hotspots that can cause re-ignition.

An aircraft kept at altitude retains the benefit of oxygen deprivation, increased time to reduce the heat from the primary ignition source and possibly time to locate and put the fire out.

[Resar40]

"Quote:
ernestkgann writes:
The esteemed owners of this site may have to make an appropriate venue on these boards for UAV people. You will find that part of the psychology of pilots is the actual flying, remove that and there isn't much desire in that group to participate.
I'm apt to reply with the same snide aire and ask "participate in what?"

In most cases, by the time a pilot gets to sit in the left-hand seat of any aircraft with pax aboard, that person has "participated" in many hundreds of hours of training - in flying a plane, in calculating weights and balances, in understanding weather, in learning literally thousands of minutia regulations.

And I'll guess here, about 85% of them do it because they love flight and want to spend their working careers aloft.

There are many working pilots who participate in these forums, as well as many who are hopeful of becoming pilots and some who gave the idea up long ago when they discovered they didn't have the right mentality for it. I'm in that last group, by the way.


Quote:
... and writes again:
No doubt the advent of remotely piloted aircraft fits in there somewhere and as a group we are nearing the cross roads of the benefits of automation versus human/manual flying.
SN3, thank you for making this clear for everyone to see:
Quote:
Clearly when you entered into the conversation, you did so with an agenda. You finally outed yourself, that's all.
I'll throw my $0.02 in. Automation has to go a long, long way to replace the human element in piloting an aircraft. There is a notion amongst smug programmers that all they need is a "concept" and enough "examples" in order to successfully mimic the advanced decision-making process even the least smart of humans use on a daily basis to sh*t and then wipe the backside.

It's utter hogwash. Artificial intelligence is difficult to do with supercomputers, let alone the limited amount of processing you can loft into the air and/or reliably link to on the ground.

Lastly, ernestkgann, I have to comment on your choice of screenname here. The *real* Mr. Gann passed away nearly 20 years ago but if he were alive, he would certainly not appreciate the type of posts you commit using his moniker.


RR"

Wow, and all I really said was that an incapacitated crew could be able to utilize the currently existing automation better. Paranoia jumps on that as an implicit call to un-man the cockpit.

[Patty747400]

EW73

Sorry but I do not understand what you disagree on?

The difficulties of walking on a fully loaded main deck or the lack of proper equipment for fire fighting? Or both?

[Ex Cargo Clown]

Depriving the fire of oxygen accomplishes everything that Halon can.

Not true, not true at all. Halon works by not only starving the fire of oxygen, but reacting with the radicals that propogate the fire. All halogenated extinguishers work this way.

You can put out an self-oxidising fire with Halon, you can't by putting it in an inert atmosphere.

We have three different extinguishers in our labs for very good reasons, they all do a different job, on different reactions.

[SaturnV]

From the FAA warning today on the carriage of lithium batteries, of which the UPS flight was carrying a large number.

The FAA's safety directive said that recent research conducted by its scientists shows that when batteries are exposed to high temperatures they have the potential to create "thermal runaway," a chain reaction leading to self-heating and the release of a battery's stored energy.

A cargo compartment fire can be hot enough to ignite batteries even if they aren't involved the initial fire, "creating a risk of a catastrophic event," the safety directive said. Once one battery experiences thermal runaway, it generates enough heat to trigger thermal runaway in other nearby batteries. Lithium metal batteries — the kind normally used in watches and cameras, for example — can create explosions forceful enough to damage cargo compartments.

FAA tests of as few as six loose lithium metal batteries stored in steel containers found that when exposed to heat they created enough explosive force to blow the lids off the containers, the directive said.

"There are currently no approved and tested containers that can sufficiently contain the known effects of accidental lithium metal battery ignition," the safety directive said. "Common metal shipping containers, pails and drums are not designed to withstand a lithium metal cell fire."

[henra]

Re Lithium Batteries:
The sad thing about it is that it would be realtively easy to transport them much more safely:
They need to be empty/discharged. It is the electric charge which supports the thermal runáway. The electric energy allows to melt the separator between the layers causing a short circuit. The separator contains flammable (alcohol based) substances which cause the open fire. It is not the Lithium that burns, it's the alcohol. That's why a fire is best extinguished with water despite the Lithium which reacts heavily with water.
Unfortunately there is no regulation regarding the charge level of the batteries even being discussed at least to my knowledge.
For example for Lithium Polymer cells a pretty safe energy state would be below 3.5V. That should prevent the much dreaded thermal runaway.
Once they burn openly ignited by an external source, it's difficult to contain the energy. But that applies to Kerosene as well....

[edmundronald]

Are these laptop/camera rechargeables, or the one-time consumables? The rechargeables could obviously be shipped near-discharged commercially.

Edmund

[RatherBeFlying]

The latest FAA SAFO makes it clear that a strong enough container for lithium metal batteries will not be easy to design -- I stand corrected.

Looks to me that a way to keep the batteries good and cold might help -- that or positioning over an ejection port:}

[goldfish85]

SaturnV

"From the FAA warning today on the carriage of lithium batteries, of which the UPS flight was carrying a large number."

Can you provide a link or citation to this warning -- I hadn't seen it.


Goldfish

[goldfish85]

Disregard, I found it.

Goldfish

[Ex Cargo Clown]

I'm now sat next to a nasty piece of lithium. I'll pour water in it, will it explode? I bloody well hope not, because my COSHH is going to look a bit bad. Oh guess what, it got a bit angry.

These batteries that are likely to suffer from "thermal runaway" should not be allowed on aircraft. I know they are currently class 9(RMD), but they should be not allowed. Anyone brave enough to do that.

[henra]

I'm now sat next to a nasty piece of lithium. I'll pour water in it, will it explode? I bloody well hope not,


Did you take a piece of pure Lithium or a Lithium Battery ?
If it was the former: Be careful !!! That's gonna be some serious fireworks.
If it was the latter not too much should happen because Lithium Batteries contain only a very limited amount of Lithium itself. A 60g (2oz) Lithium Battery contains roughly 0,6g (0,02oz) Lithium i.e. very roughly only 1% of its weight is Lithium.
As I already wrote in an earlier post: The whole process in the Batteries requires significant (electric) energy in the cells to be launched. Take the electric energy out of the cells and you won't achieve a thermal runaway.
Yes they are flammable because they contain flammable substances (mainly alcohol). But self ignition only works with sufficient charge of the batteries. Without that you will have to throw them into an open fire and have to wait until the pressure breaks the can (Li-Ion).
Unfortunately the cells don't like being too empty (i.e. below a certain voltage). They will loose capacity or even fail completely (no harm just ending up as a paper weight). Therefore the manufacturers charge them too much for safe transport because otherwise the quote of defective batteries would rise.
(For LiPo the ideal range would be 3,3 - 3,5 V. Below 3 V the cell will suffer, above 3,6 V the energy starts being theoretically suffciient for self ignition, Li-Ion at a bit lower Voltage)

Edit:
Brief explanation how a thermal runaway in these cells works:
The cells contain a high number of thin layers of Copper / Aluminum foils. These layers are separated by a separator which is a sort of alcohol soaked plastic foil.
If at one place the separator is damaged, a short circuit occurs. This creates heat. The heat will melt the plastic foil further and also melt the next plastic foil separating the next metal foil coils/sheets. Thus creating a further short circuit. This continues through the whole battery. The temperature in the can will increase. At a certain point the can will break. Now the hot evaporated alcohol getting in contact with oxygen is ignited by glowing metal resulting from the short circuits and creates the flames you see in vids of this.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

It was on a nice 1g piece of Li metal, it fizzed a bit, but not a lot happened other than lot's of H2 was produced.

Question is, if Li batteries are so flammable, why are the in class 9 and not 3?

[SKS777FLYER]

From the FAA SAFOThese recommendations are limited to lithium batteries transported in the cargo hold of an aircraft (including cargo holds that are not distinct from the flight deck), and do not apply to lithium batteries carried onboard by passengers and crewmembers, or otherwise stowed in the passenger cabin of the aircraft.
more from the SAFOFAA testing has shown that encased or enclosed lithium metal batteries may pose a safety risk. Two types of robust, readily available containers were tested at the FAA Tech Center: five gallon steel pails with crimp on gasketed lids, and 30 gallon steel drums with bolt closed ring seals and gasketed metal lids. For both types of container, as few as six loose CR2 lithium metal cells were sufficient to cause failure when induced into thermal runaway by an electric cartridge heater. The confined electrolyte and the molten lithium ignition source formed an explosive condition, forcefully separating the lid from the container. The explosive force in this test was likely high enough to cause physical damage to an aircraft’s Class C cargo compartment.

Probably good advice from SguppyDon't underestimate this hazard.

[JenCluse]

SNS3Guppy: sir or madam,

The last two paragraphs of your post of 18 Sep, the last para but a line, should be printed on the front page of every log book sold.

Poetic wisdom.

Thank you.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

Let's not downplay the hazard, either. It's not merely a little alcohol, and fighting a metal fire with reactive materials using water is not in anybody's best interest.

Lithium is not that reactive, it will go in water, but compared to the rest of the alkali (Group 1) metals, it isn't that scary, or reactive, hence why I use it in my Grignard reactions. If I was to go for Na then there would be a disaster.

Halon will most definitely quench an Li battery fire, it may however ignite once the Halon goes.

I've not seen the insides of an Li Battery, I may well slice one open in a fume hood this afternoon. I cannot believe there is that much alcohol in it to combust, if there is then why?

[F111UPS767]

Has anyone any information on an aircraft fire where the crew descended to 25,000 unpressurized and what the results were? How about manufacturer or government testing regarding fire suppression at 25,000 pressure altitude?

When descending to FL250 and following the cargo fire procedure, how long does it take to get the cabin pressure to 25,000? Someone posted that the 747 depressurizes at 2500 fpm. Is that correct? Is that the same for all the Boeings? Other manufacturers? Is it advisable or even possible to hurry that up manually? What would be the physiological effects of doing that? Someone posted a USAF study whereas 25,000 was chosen to lesson the chances of decompression sickness. What can we expect as to the possibilities of continued fire at 25,000 cabin altitude? What can we expect at 25,000 physiologically? Will a pack at 1/2 flow keep the cockpit warm? Is pressure breathing required? Et cetera...

I don't know what will happen with the lithium batteries at 25,000 feet. Besides the lack of oxygen, it should get pretty cold back there. If they do continue to burn, hopefully the stuff around them will not and the batteries may eventually burn out. Sound reasonable?

When at cruise at about 5-6,000 cabin altitude, if a major fire develops and an immediate descent is made, will the cabin altitude ever rise to a "fire extinguishing" level? Is it possible and should it be considered to put the fire out at 25,000 unpressurized before descending?

Sorry for the shotgun approach with the questions, but there seems to be a lack of information on a lot of this stuff.

As for the specifics of UPS 6, I'm waiting to learn the flight profile after discovering the smoke. What was the cabin altitude profile during this return? Did the cabin ever get depressurized sufficiently to impede the fire? When did the smoke become so dense as to partially or completely obscure vision both inside and out, both in terms of flight profile and time since discovery?

[main_dog]

Someone posted that the 747 depressurizes at 2500 fpm.

From FCOM 1:

Main Deck Cargo Compartment Suppression

The main deck cargo compartment is a Class E compartment. Pushing the Main Deck Cargo Fire Arm switch configures equipment cooling to closed loop and turns off two packs and airflow to all cargo compartments.

Subsequently pushing the Cargo Depress/Disch switch initiates automatic aircraft depressurization at the rate of 9,000 feet per minute to slightly less than aircraft pressure altitude, or 20,000 feet cabin altitude, whichever comes first. Then depressurization continues as required at the reduced rate of 2,500 feet per minute until the cabin pressure altitude is just below the the aircraft cabin altitude, or 25,000 feet cabin altitude whichever comes first.

[henra]

Let's not downplay the hazard, either. It's not merely a little alcohol, and fighting a metal fire with reactive materials using water is not in anybody's best interest.


and


We're not talking about a small bit of alcohol burning. We're talking about explosive potential, sustained combustion, toxic combustion byproducts, and a sustainable ignition source that can easily propagate to other fuels, to say nothing of melting liquid metal.


SNS3Guppy:
I agree on your conclusion but not on the technicalities behind.
Technically it is mostly alcohol+ plastic burning.
The explosion comes from the metal containment allowing pressure to build which then escapes in an explosive manner once the can breaks. That's what causes the dynamics. It is a bit like blackpowder.
Ignite it openly and it will burn. Put it in a can and it will explode.
Again: It is not the relatively low amount of Lithium which causes the undeniable danger of these cells, it is the other combustibles inside....


Edit:
If you need a further hint towards the fact that the Lithium is not the most critical thing in these cells: The FAA considers water to be the best means for extinguishing burning Litium cells. You wouldn't really want to put out a reactive metal fire that way...

[henra]

SNS3Guppy:

Please read my first sentence carefully, you will note that I don't doubt the conclusion, just the technical background.

[henra]

Sure, downplay the whole thing. After all, the UPS flight didn't really crash and burn, did it? All a hoax?

Or is it possible that one can't take this thread seriously enough, and that the threat is real, and the hazard is real? Could it be?



Hmmm, sounds like the intentions of my posts are a bit unclear...

Again: Iis not my intention to downplay anything.
These cells carry flammable substances in significant amounts and are capable of self ignition under certain circumstances.
The latter part is what makes them more dangerous than most other flammable materials.
I was trying to explain the mechanisms behind this self- ignition process.

Edit:

You don't doubt the conclusion, just the criteria used to reach the conclusion?


When the explanation leading to a conclusion contain errors/faults it tends to damage the value of the conclusion as well, even if completely unjustified. Therfore I like to have a proper understanding how something happens with the proper deduction of the consequences and the associated risks. Makes the conclusion less attackable.

[Shell Management]

henra

Hmmm, sounds like the intentions of my posts are a bit unclear...


I can assure you they are very clear to any intelligent person with an open mind.

[Jet Jockey A4]

Quoting F111UPS767...


"Has anyone any information on an aircraft fire where the crew descended to 25,000 unpressurized and what the results were? How about manufacturer or government testing regarding fire suppression at 25,000 pressure altitude?

When descending to FL250 and following the cargo fire procedure, how long does it take to get the cabin pressure to 25,000? Someone posted that the 747 depressurizes at 2500 fpm. Is that correct? Is that the same for all the Boeings? Other manufacturers? Is it advisable or even possible to hurry that up manually? What would be the physiological effects of doing that? Someone posted a USAF study whereas 25,000 was chosen to lesson the chances of decompression sickness. What can we expect as to the possibilities of continued fire at 25,000 cabin altitude? What can we expect at 25,000 physiologically? Will a pack at 1/2 flow keep the cockpit warm? Is pressure breathing required? Et cetera...

I don't know what will happen with the lithium batteries at 25,000 feet. Besides the lack of oxygen, it should get pretty cold back there. If they do continue to burn, hopefully the stuff around them will not and the batteries may eventually burn out. Sound reasonable?

When at cruise at about 5-6,000 cabin altitude, if a major fire develops and an immediate descent is made, will the cabin altitude ever rise to a "fire extinguishing" level? Is it possible and should it be considered to put the fire out at 25,000 unpressurized before descend?"


Regardless of altitude the percentage of oxygen in the air remains at 21%.

So depressurizing an aircraft at altitude will have no effect on snuffing out a fire.

A fire will sustain itself with an oxygen content down to 16%.

[F111UPS767]

F111UPS767...
Has anyone any information on an aircraft fire where the crew descended to 25,000 unpressurized and what the results were? How about manufacturer or government testing regarding fire suppression at 25,000 pressure altitude?

Jet Jockey A4...
Regardless of altitude the percentage of oxygen in the air remains at 21%.
So depressurizing an aircraft at altitude will have no effect on snuffing out a fire.
A fire will sustain itself with an oxygen content down to 16%.

JJ - I did a bit of searching and came up with "mass burning rate" and have found studies that show that mbr is lower at low ambient pressure at high altitude. However, I cannot find a good answer yet to the original question, above.

[Daermon ATC]

Regardless of altitude the percentage of oxygen in the air remains at 21%.

So depressurizing an aircraft at altitude will have no effect on snuffing out a fire.

A fire will sustain itself with an oxygen content down to 16%.


The fact you present is correct although I believe the conclusion is not.:=

Following the same reasoning, a human needs 21% oxygen to breath, therefore we should all breathe easily at FL450 since as you correctly state the percentage remains the same. :ooh:

However the density does not and there are less molecules of oxygen available per cubic meter the higher you get up. Therefore the recommendation to depressurize the aircraft which should work with all fires except those providing their own oxygen for combustion.

[F111UPS767]

At 25000ft, the standard barometric pressure is 40 kPa (299 mmHg). This means that there is 39% of the oxygen available at sea level.

39%... What is needed to sustain combustion?

Altitude.org | Altitude air pressure calculator (http://www.altitude.org/air_pressure.php)

[Mariner]

Excellent post SNS3Guppy. We're all learning something here. :D

Something else; I hear that Boeing issued a letter with preliminary lessons learned from UPS6. Advising to keep pack 1 or 3 on to keep the smoke out of the cockpit. Anyone have a copy?

[F111UPS767]

FROM: THE BOEING COMPANY
TO: Boeing Correspondence (MOM)
[MESSAGE NUMBER:MOM-MOM-10-0713-01B] Multi Operator Message
MESSAGE DATE: 12 Oct 2010 1812 US PACIFIC TIME / 13 Oct 2010 0112 GMT
This message is sent to all 747-400F and 747-400BCF customers and to respective Boeing 747-400 Field Service bases, Regional Directors, the Air Transport Association, International Air Transport Association, and Airline Resident Representatives.
SERVICE REQUEST ID: 1-1708015942
ACCOUNT: Boeing Correspondence (MOM)
DUE DATE: No Action Required
PRODUCT TYPE: Flight Operations
PRODUCT LINE: 747
PRODUCT: 16 - FCOM/QRH - Flight Crew Procedures
SUBJECT: FIRE MAIN DECK Non-Normal Checklist
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SUMMARY:
Boeing is planning changes to the existing FIRE MAIN DECK and FIRE MN DK AFT, FWD, MID non-normal checklists for 747-400F and 747-400BCF airplanes, and is planning to issue supplemental information on main deck firefighting procedures and environmental control system behavior during a main deck fire. The intent is to increase awareness on the part of flight crews of the intended system configuration during a main deck fire, for the purposes of minimizing fire propagation and preventing accumulation of significant smoke on the flight deck.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DESCRIPTION:
Boeing has undertaken a review of both the environmental control systems used in main deck firefighting, and the associated flight crew procedures, on the 747-400F and 747-400BCF airplane models. This review was prompted by a recent accident involving a 747-400F airplane, in which both a main deck cargo fire and smoke accumulation on the flight deck are believed to have played roles, and in which flight recorder evidence indicates that none of the three air conditioning packs was operating for much of the flight following the cargo fire indication.
As a result, in the near term, Boeing plans to modify the FIRE MAIN DECK and FIRE MN DK AFT, FWD, MID non-normal checklists in order to add text indicating that, after two packs are automatically shut down per system design, either air conditioning pack number 1 or pack number 3 must remain operating to prevent excessive flight deck smoke accumulation during a main deck fire. These modified checklists will be issued via Flight Crew Operations Manual Bulletins, during or prior to November 2010. Other changes to these checklists are also under consideration.
Boeing will also issue a Flight Operations Technical Bulletin on this subject, for the purpose of providing additional technical details on the operation of the relevant systems and components during main deck firefighting, as well as on the overall main deck firefighting philosophy behind the system and procedure designs. This technical bulletin will be issued in the fourth quarter of 2010.
In the meantime, we recommend that flight crews of 747-400F and 747-400BCF model airplanes be made aware that either air conditioning pack number 1 or pack number 3 must remain operating after accomplishing the checklists associated with the following EICAS warning messages: FIRE MAIN DECK, FIRE MN DK AFT, FIRE MN DK FWD, or FIRE MN DK MID. The purpose of this is to prevent excessive smoke accumulation on the flight deck under actual fire/smoke conditions.

Tony Hagen - 747 Fleet Chief
Rick Braun - Acting Chief Pilot, Flight Technical and Safety Boeing Training and Flight Services
Ken Caley
Director - Flight Operations Services
Boeing Training and Flight Services
Commercial Aviation Services
The Boeing Company

[Shell Management]

When fire fighting water does not cvool the fire out it turns to steam and the steam seperates the fire from oxygen. Foam more directly forms a physical barrier.

I see Boeing's notice came after the accident, a sign of a poorprior hazard analysis.

[Oakape]

a sign of a poor prior hazard analysis

True, but as is often the case in this business, nobody envisioned it until it happened.

It is a sad fact that a lot of the safety advancements made in aviation were as a response to learning the hard way. And try as we might to change this, it will inevitably continue to be the case, at least some of the time.

[Shell Management]

Airline culture is SO frustrating.:{

We agree it was a poor analysis. We differ in that I expect a hazard analysis to actually identify the hazards (fire - didn't your mother warn you of that one?) and put remedial mitigations in place. You don't seem to have an expectation of success:ugh:.

You may have heard there is no smoke without fire. Well if there is a fire there is smoke and you need drills to deal with it.

The entire problem in the airline industry is most of you don't learn! You just dismiss the next accident as a surprise.:sad:

Anyone who does want to learn could do worse than start here
http://www.safeopsys.com/docs/SOS_SAFITA.pdf:D

And then apply a sensible hazard management process
http://www.ihst.org/portals/54/2010ihss/Day2_02_02%20IHSS%20Simplified%20Hazard%20Management_Tony%20 Cramp.pdf:ok:

[Jetjock330]

The new A332F Freighter recommends, pack 1 off (pack 2 remains on), then open the outflow valves, whilst descending to FL 200 and allow the cabin to climb to 20000ft. This takes time, but consider you may be 180 minutes out to sea on an ETOPS flight when this all happens. We have 180 min ETOPS with this new A3302F.

That's too far out when when the main deck is getting hot, so I would do it definitely!

[Oakape]

Well if there is a fire there is smoke and you need drills to deal with it.


We do have drills to deal with it. However, the fire drill (checklist) & the smoke removal checklist are seperate, although inter-connected in some ways. The problem becomes - do you deal with the fire checklist first & then the smoke checklist or do you deal with the smoke first?

Logic would dictate that you put the fire out & then deal with any smoke. The problem arises when the smoke becomes a serious issue before you have finished dealing with the fire! Do you then stop the fire checklist half way through to deal with the smoke or persevere with the fire? If you stop the fire checklist to deal with the smoke, the fire may be generating too much smoke for the smoke removal procedure to deal with & the situation would then be getting rapidly out of control.

You just dismiss the next accident as a surprise

That is not what I was talking about & generally is not the case. Aviation is quite complex & some scenarios just weren't considered or were considered highly unlikely. Systems are so complex & interconnected on modern airliners that unintended consequences can sometimes occur.

I don't know what the B744F systems are like - I haven't flown it. I don't know what Boeing considered & failed to consider (if anything) when designing the aircraft, as I wasn't there. But it is possible that so much effort was put into fire suppression that the effect on keeping smoke out of the cockpit was overlooked, or considered not relevant as it was thought that putting the fire out would solve the problem.

Some checklists are quite complicated & it is easy to make an error in the heat of the moment. It's bad enough in the simulator, but try to imagine what it would be like the circumstances of an actual fire with the threat to your well being. Perhaps an error was made. We'll know in due course.

I don't know much about fires either, but I do know that they can be very complex beasts & with the large variety of goods carried these days on freighter aircraft, perhaps not everything is known. I also know that companies trying to get their goods to market quickly have been, & continue to be, a little loose with their application of dangerous goods legislation.

Rest assured that most of the industry personel at the coal face are doing their level best to get it right & don't just dismiss accidents as a 'surprise', as you put it. Accidents, even those with no loss of life, are quite distressing to us in the industry. That is why we dissect them in every way possible in order to learn.

As far as we have come in this industry, there is still much that is not known & more than a few latent failures just waiting to strike.

[Flightmech]

Surely if UPS6 was brought down by a terrorist device someone would have claimed responsibility by now??

[Prada]

I don't know how many divers there are among you. Me as a technical diver work under pressure everytime I dive :)

First - partial pressures. Lets assume that there is roughly 1at of pressure on the surface of earth. So the partial pressure of oxygen is 0,21at in air compared to pure oxygene. If we go down in the water, then partial pressure increases. at the depth of 40m oxygene partial pressure would be 1,05at -it is like breathing a pure oxygene.
If we go up, then at FL450 air pressure is 0.151at. partial pressure of oxygene would be 0.03171at or it would be equivalent of air with 3,17% oxygene content on sea level. Almost nothing. That would retard fire considerably. How much, I couldn't tell. Perhaps there are firemen who know that.
What I know is that oxygene pressures should not drop below 0.16at for human to remain normally functional. Breathing pure oxygen should leave pilots concious if they are fit enough. But 0.15at is at the edge, some may feel hypoxia signs.

Yet there is another problem. There is a nitrogen part in the air we breathe. if surrounding pressure drops too quickly, nitrogen dissolved in our tissues starts to move out. If that process is quick enough, it causes small bubbles in tissues and bloodstream. Bubbles block small bloodvessels. It is called Decompression sickness. If severe enough, it could cause unconciousness in worst case as brain becomes oxygene deprivated due to the blocked capillaries. DCS could paralyse, cause pain, numbness, vision distortion etc. So it is not desired while piloting AC.
That is why, I think rapid descent to much lower level is necessary than it would be necessary because of oxygen issues.

At FL250 air pressure is 0,384at. with oxygene partial pressure 0.08at it is like breathing air with 8% oxygene content at sea level. That is not enough to remain concious. Breathing oxygene is a must. It is enough to breathe oxygene without pressurisation.
Compared to pressure maintained in the cabin during flight - 0.797at, 0.384 is a drop in pressure almost 2x . In diving this kind of quick change in ambient pressures normally does not cause DCS.

Hope this help.

[Easy Ryder]

Flightmech, probably not if that wasn't their intention. ie) the bomb went off early, or was a trial run to the recent events.

[Mainsail]

Morning All

My field of expertise is Hazardous Cargo in the shipping industry not the airline industry, so this may seem a stupid question, and I hope somebody will clarify.

Goods packed in sealed containers on the ground have a pressure of 15psi
8000ft pressure is 11psi, effective internal pressure in sealed container 4psi
25000ft pressure is 5psi, effective internal pressure in sealed container 10psi
35000ft pressure is 3psi, effective internal pressure in sealed container 12psi.

My question is how good are the seals on bottles, drums, jerrycans etc. obviously if they are certified for air transport they are good for 4psi. plus a safety margin.

I am reasonably confident that most containers would not burst at these pressures , but I have some doubts about the caps on drums etc.

Anybody have any figures for pressure testing?

Regards
Mike

[odericko2000]

Dailies in Dubai actually claim a possible connection of the UPS crash to the terror plot that was foiled last week, actually say that similar explosive device found on Friday at the DXB FedEx facility and on a UPS plane at a UK airport

[charter man]

I am totally amazed that in today's speculative press, the obvious potential for a connection between the UPS crash and the recent events with bombs on board freighters has not been made so far. If nothing else, increased security vigilance may have prevented the devices getting on board, or at least made the terrorists re-think their plans?
CM

[Airbubba]

I am totally amazed that in today's speculative press, the obvious potential for a connection between the UPS crash and the recent events with bombs on board freighters has not been made so far.

Several posts raising that possibility, including mine, have been removed. Maybe that's one of the many PPRuNe taboos...

The GCAA points out there was no audible CVR indication of an initial onboard explosion on UPS 6 but as the Times Square bombing recently showed, a dud bomb can start a fire instead.

I don't claim to know the answer as to whether the UPS aircraft events are related but the coincidence is certainly unusual.

[Sir Richard]

When fire fighting water does not cvool the fire out it turns to steam and the steam seperates the fire from oxygen. Foam more directly forms a physical barrier.

I see Boeing's notice came after the accident, a sign of a poorprior hazard analysis.

Airline culture is SO frustrating.

We agree it was a poor analysis. We differ in that I expect a hazard analysis to actually identify the hazards (fire - didn't your mother warn you of that one?) and put remedial mitigations in place. You don't seem to have an expectation of success.

You may have heard there is no smoke without fire. Well if there is a fire there is smoke and you need drills to deal with it.

The entire problem in the airline industry is most of you don't learn! You just dismiss the next accident as a surprise.

I think you are wrong and rather disparaging of Airline Culture and of Boeing's analysis.

Allow me to quote from a 747-400 QRH dated 1st October 2001 (Pax Version)

Later updates for the -400F and -400BCF have.........SET 25,000 FEET
And other minor differences

----------------------------------
FIRE CARGO

Message: FIRE CARGO FWD..........or..........FIRE CARGO AFT

-> LAND AT NEAREST SUITABLE AIRFIELD

-> (Gound Fire Procedures - not relevant here)

CARGO FIRE ARM SWITCH (FWD or AFT)...................ARM
* Pack 3 shuts down

PACK 3 CONTROL SELECTOR....................................OFF

PACK 1 or 2 CONTROL SELECTOR..............................OFF
* Maximum 1 pack on

CARGO FIRE DISCHARGE SWITCH............................PUSH

LANDING ALTITUDE SWITCH...................................MAN

LANDING ALTITUDE CONTROL..................SET 8,000 FEET

* Prevents penetration of smoke to cabin
* 195 minutes of fire suppression available

As you can see, the smoke problem has been thought about.

Boeing's latest words on the subject are a reminder.

(Rather like the 737 Rad Alt reminder after Amsterdam)

[pattern_is_full]

Regarding any link between this incident and the more recent discovery of explosives in cargo shipments: it is being looked into, according to the US deputy security advisor:

Dubai says no blast in September UPS plane crash - World News | Tri-City Herald : Mid-Columbia news (http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2010/10/31/1231403/dubai-says-no-blast-in-september.html)

Dubai authorities ruled out "an explosion" or "detonation" - but then the Xmas Bomber of last year (tied to the Yemeni group suspected in the most recent explosive shipments) also failed to "explode" - simply set himself on fire. A bomb that fizzles can still ignite flammable surroundings. In his case, clothing. In a cargo plane....?

A possibility worth investigating? - yes. A probability? Not yet.

[Mr Optimistic]

...both in timing and geography ? Think I would also wonder about the distances and comms coverage from a population centre.

[hetfield]

According German Magazine SPIEGEL AL-QUAIDA proclaims to be resposible for the UPS crash.

Terror: Al-Qaida bekennt sich zu Jemen-Paketbomben - SPIEGEL ONLINE - Nachrichten - Politik (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,727604,00.html)

[jcjeant]

Hi,


Al-Qaeda group takes responsibility for mail bombs - USATODAY.com (http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-11-05-al-qaeda-bomb-plot_N.htm)

[SassyPilotsWife]

For the sake of Doug and Matt's families as well as all crews both civilian and cargo ( my hubby) and their families, I hope they are bluffing. I am having a harder time as I drop him off now. I am glad however that this claim came late and after Matt and Doug's bodies were released from the UAE as this would have only delayed it even longer. I know in my heart that if this does happen while my husband is at the controls, he will have died doing what he loves but it will really suck that these bastards determined his fate.

The only benefit of this claim is the hope that cargo both freight and pax will be more scrutinized, inspected and intercepted. Especially out of the UAE.

Where is martial law when you need it ? :E

[Payscale]

Lets not link Al Qaida to the tragic accident in Dubai.

[PaperTiger]

Lets not link Al Qaida to the tragic accident in Dubai.
The right-wing media already has, simply because the spurious claim fits their agenda. There may be some in government/security circles who see it as simple grandstanding but they will be prevented from saying so. For the same reason - propaganda.

Remember it took weeks for OBL to 'admit' to having been in charge of 9/11, and many people still believe he was.

[Piper_Driver]

The FBI has concluded that the UPS crash was not related to Al Qaida.

FBI: al-Qaida's Yemen group not behind Dubai crash - Yahoo! News (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101110/ap_on_go_ot/us_mail_bombs_crash)

[hetfield]

The FBI has concluded

Oh my God, where do you live?????????????:ugh:

[Semaphore Sam]

Soooo, the major investigative arm of a government that has been shown to be a paragon of truth (see build-up to Iraq invasion, and Wikileaks), says, with NO substantiation, that 'the UPS crash was not related to al-qaida'. Take that for what it's worth. Sam

[Huck]

They have data that show where the fire started. And they know where all the boxes in that area come from. So I guess it would be possible to rule it out.

But then these two incidents have to be the biggest coincidence I have ever seen in my life.

[Heathrow Harry]

"Mr Bond, they have a saying in Chicago:

'Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time it's enemy action'."

— Ian Fleming (http://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/2565.Ian_Fleming) (Goldfinger (http://www.goodreads.com/work/quotes/983949))

[Shell Management]

Nice of CAA to confirm my earlier postion that US DG regulations are lax and below the international standard:
www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/FOD201030.pdf (http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/FOD201030.pdf)

Perhaps the FAA have managed what evil doers have failed to do.

[larssnowpharter]

Apologies if this has already been covered:

I was having dinner the other evening with a UPS pilot the other night in Chicago and we were discussing this accident. His romour control office is mentioning an pallet of lithium batteries that were damaged by the tines on a forklift while being loaded on ac pallet.

If this proves to be the - or one of the causal factors - one would be interested in taking it down to root causes.

[p51guy]

Hopefully carelessness like this didn't cause the accident. I remember the DC8 out of MIA a while back that nobody put the cargo bear claws up and when all the cargo shifted back after takeoff it stalled and crashed killing everyone on board. Smashing a forklift into a cargo of lithium batteries and loading them on an airplane is like arming a bomb.

[F111UPS767]

This update is intended to cover all investigative work or activities that has been completed by the investigation group – this update doesn’t speculate on the cause of the accident:

December 1-3, 2010: GCAA/NTSB Face-to-Face Coordinators Meeting.
Meeting included presentations from all Working Groups
Opportunity to have a productive exchange of information between all parties.
November 29, 2010: Tour of FAA Fire Labs facilities in Atlantic City, NJ.
Witnessed Lithium Ion explosive test
Round table discussion regarding new threats of carrying lithium batteries
Toured the FAA Fire Lab focusing on facilities test capabilities.
Viewed retrofitted ULD container to test various types of suppression.
November 16 and 19, 2010: UPS Boeing 747-400F Flight Test completed in SDF.
Nov 16th flight test was conducted to sample audio spectrum analysis of the oxygen system and accessibility of emergency equipment from a seated position.
Nov 19th flight test observed functionality and performance of the Main Deck Cargo Fire System. (Provide DFDR data set for comparison)
November 3, 2010: Timeline Group formed.
Master Timeline Group to collect all pertinent data/information related to the accident flight including DFDR, CVR, AHM, ATC, Fire and Cargo. This provides a composite view of information to assist all other working groups.
Deliverables to other Working Groups include:
“Master Timeline” using advanced NTSB tools to correlated data into one cohesive set.
Master timeline of events displayed graphically in using several different analysis tools. To include animation similar to the NASA Space Shuttle Columbia accident – this is the first civil accident to employ this technique--

October-November 2010: Operations Group Activities
Completed a series of interview relevant to the investigation.
Conducted Simulator observations in ANC.
October-November 2010:
FDR Group completed FDR Plots and Report.
CVR Group completed CVR Transcript
October-November 2010: Accident site cleared – wreckage stored in DXB – secured by the GCAA.
On-going Progress Meetings
IPA Party Coordinator participates in frequent teleconferences with GCAA/NTSB.
As needed, IPA Party Coordinator and Working Group members attend additional meetings with industry reps.
Working Group members
IPA members participate in scheduled conference calls (often weekly) and group meetings as required. The next face-to-face progress meeting is tentatively scheduled for the spring of 2011 in SDF.

Crewmember questions:

How long will the investigation take place? As previously discussed, this is an Annex 13 Investigation being conducted by the GCAA. Presently, there isn’t an anticipated final report date – the IPA will continue to be involved in this on-going process throughout all phase of the investigation.

Will the CVR transcripts be released? The GCAA has indicated the CVR transcript will not be released. The transcript – or paraphrased versions – will only be used by the various investigative groups.

Will a final report be written by the GCAA? The IPA anticipates a final report written by the GCAA with a comment period provided for the accredited representatives (including the IPA) at the end of the investigation.

[marcoalza]

Well over 18 months since this happened and there has been no definitive report on the reason for the crash.

Batteries or Terrorism?

[Huck]

Fifty-three days between this:

UPS Flight 6 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UPS_Airlines_Flight_6)

and this:

Fedex Printer Bomb (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cargo_planes_bomb_plot)

I'm not a conspiracy theorist, but what are the odds?

And Al-Qaeda claims they did both......

[Hotel Tango]

If the UPS was terrorism, I wouldn't consider it a particularly effective form of terrorism. Where the terrorist gambling on the a/c coming down in a residential area? It could easily (and more likely) have gone down over the desert or the sea.

[The SSK]

For reasons I don’t quite understand, I found myself not long after the accident reading a well-produced, glossy brochure published by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

While it contained a certain amount of other anti-Western propaganda, most of it was devoted to claims that they had brought down the aircraft. Not triumphalist crowing, though, it was a rather pathetic cry of ‘why doesn’t anybody believe us?’

It was clearly an accident, that was well enough known at the time and is even more evident now. But AQAP were desperate to be held responsible, it was almost pitiful reading their pleas.

I have my own theories about why this desperation.

[JamesGBC]

I do business in Shenzhen China and know quite a lot about trade in mobile phone battery's.
Certain buyers insist on the lowest price around $1.5 US and some company's are willing to supply anything you ask for. Battery's come with certain built in safety devices in the form of 2 integrated circuits. These are supplied as 1 IC or 2 IC one regulates the charge the other detects short circuits and overheating the cost is very low just a few cents. Problem is they take up room in the tiny battery so if you leave them out you can put more chemical in giving the battery a longer life or use chemical of lower quality and cost. Any damage or leakage exits from the weakest point in the battery the end at the convectors. This is a real problem the fluid being a conductor the battery then shorts out and you hope pray its a 2 IC model. Having the pallets sit on the ground in Dubai 40 degrees and then exposed to lower pressure is a disaster waiting to happen.There is no way to determine the quality of a battery without actually destroying it, unless you have your own QC people in the factory, assuming they are not bribed. Labels and boxes mean nothing in China which ever brand would you like is possible.
Its really bad news Phone battery's do not belong in aircraft unless you are 100% sure of the supply chain and fire systems on the aircraft are in place.
The risk of fire is so great I will not deal in battery's.
Last week an electric car in Shenzhen was hit in an accident and burst into flames killing all 3 in the car. There is no petrol in an electric car, the cause of the fire is currently being investigated.

[Shell Management]

AQAP is a good excuse to avoid looking at the poor application of ICAO principles by US airlines.

As said in another threadby an American:
ICAO requirements and procedures may as well not exist. That's foreign stuff, and anyone who even suggests that there might be anything worthwhile in any of them would be laughed out of the room.