UPS Aircraft Down In Dubai

[haughtney1]

Just so I'm reading the info previously posted correctly, from the time of first radio contact regarding smoke in the cockpit, to the crash, the elapsed time was 27 minutes?

[nitpicker330]

How many Pax or Cargo Aircraft do we have to lose before they finally mandate the fitting of better equipment that Pilots can use in thick smoke environments? Such as Evas etc
Why don't we have Cameras fitted into the main Deck and Belly Cargo holds of Freighters as well? Why don't we have Cameras fitted in the Belly Cargo holds on Pax A/C ? There have been a lot of false warnings in the past where a Camera would have been a big help.

The technology is there to do this. It's time to spend some money before more people die.

[BFGCT]

I am of the opinion, as mentioned earlier in this thread, the fire must be starved of oxygen to suppress it in an aircraft. That is the only way forward.

Indeed, but in the case of SAA295 even this would have been insufficient as the investigation pointed to hazardous material with its own oxygen supply, military propellant? And who knows what is carried on many cargo flights.

[blue up]

My personal bugbear on the subject of fire/smoke in the flightdeck is the continual reluctance to print the checklists in larger print for these particular drills. I've bitched about it for 2 years but nothing has been done. "Yes, great idea....and we'll let you know".....

[vovachan]

I am of the opinion, as mentioned earlier in this thread, the fire must be starved of oxygen to suppress it in an aircraft. That is the only way forward.

Agreed

Why on earth does the boeing have to fly fully pressurized to start with? With little oxygen and no fresh air coming in the fire would just extinguish itself

[ralphc]

Thermal imaging can not be used to get a clear view out the window, but couldn't it be helpful in finding the location of a fire on the flight deck? In case of
http://www.bfu.admin.ch/common/pdf/1602.pdf
something like
FLUKE|FLUKE TI9|THERMAL IMAGING CAMERA, FLUKE | Farnell United Kingdom (http://uk.farnell.com/fluke/fluke-ti9/thermal-imaging-camera-fluke-ti9/dp/1700079)
probably would have helped in rapid identification of the faulty switch. Cutting power to the circuit causing the fire as early as possible is very important, because the insulating material used in electrical installations is self extinguishing, but only, if no power is supplied and the fire is still small.

I am only SLF, but going through a checklist that requires you to shut down one source of power after the other and wait each time for the smoke to clear to me as an engineer sounds archaic. Waiting seems to be the last thing you want to do in such a situation.

[ZimmerFly]

Perhaps because the pilots prefer to fly in shirtsleeves rather than space suits.... Maybe you would like to try 11+ hours wearing an oxygen mask :ugh:

[Dubaieagle]

All as reported here 8500ft at 24 km (13nm), 7000ft at 6nm , 4000ft at 1nm and crash site is approx 11.5nm beyond DXB... all in a straight line apart from last turn to the right...

[FIRESYSOK]

Why does the cargo hold need to be pressurised? Just think a bit about the cargo carried. You can't very well take up a load anything to have it freeze, expand, burst, etc. It could be organic in nature as well..

We're starting to get into science fiction here. What is really needed is fire supression via injectable chemicals and foam. Fedex has developed such a system. In the interim, a smoke displacement hood may have saved this crew which, for a billion-dollar company wouldn't amount to pocket change. What you htave here is penny pinching done by actuaries in the bean counting deparment which runs the flight operations group at most airlines.

[Awl flyer]

Some time cargo (perishable) needs to be handled with no less care. This is why it have to be brought in the pressurized cabin. Nothing to do with this, pal :=

[Guy D'ageradar]

All as reported here 8500ft at 24 km (13nm), 7000ft at 6nm , 4000ft at 1nm and crash site is approx 11.5nm beyond DXB... all in a straight line apart from last turn to the right...

Incorrect.

The aircraft, having overflown on a south-easterly heading, turned right approx 200 degrees before then turning left, while descending rapidly. The descent rate then decreased markedly before radar contact was lost.

[doubleu-anker]

The big Russian freighter main cargo decks are unpressurized I believe.
Maybe they have the right idea there. Whether their aircraft are capable of climbing high enough to get rid of a lot of the O2 is another matter of course.

Wont be the first time they lead the "west" is it?

[Pitch Up Authority]

Smoke and/or fire have led to QRH procedures that have changed many times over.

In stead of trying to isolate and/or evacuate the smoke from the flight deck using various system configurations.

It is time to have a closer look to design.

Design should incorporate a system whereby the crew can shut off ALL air supply to the flight deck, reverse the equipment cooling flow and flight deck air (dump it overboard) by use of a SINGLE Switch.

Hereby must (if a choice needs to be made) protection of the flight deck crew have priority over the cabin.

This includes having a look at the possibility to volunarily depressurise to extinguish the fire and reduce the use of electrical busses to a minimum. All with a single switch. Procedure should be reversable.

I's back to the drawing board.

[STN Ramp Rat]

Russian big plane AN124,..it is pressurized, no doubt

Only the passenger compartments are pressurized the Cago compartments remain unpressurized during flight, its the same with the AN 12 where only the flightdeck and crew accomodation are pressurized

[sb_sfo]

I seem to remember that the Boeing LCF that shuttles 787 fuse barrels has a pressurized flight deck only?

[BlueSkye]

The aircraft, having overflown ..... before radar contact was lost.

This is correct.

[willy wombat]

Sorry if I've missed a post, but there seems to be a general assumption that the fire started in the freight compartment and was caused by something in the cargo. Surely its equally possible that the fire had nothing to do with the cargo and was, for example, started by a wiring fault - remember the Swissair MD11.

[Montgolfier]

If the beancounters are really as cynical as some posters in this thread have suggested - ie. "pilots are cheap, why spend money on EVAS etc." - then surely they (the beancounters) are missing the point when it comes to incidents like this? Yeah, it was "just" the two poor souls in the flight deck this time - but it could so easily have been the two pilots PLUS a large section of expensive Dubai real estate and at least a few dozen of its unsuspecting residents.

Surely any incident that renders an aircraft like the 744F essentially uncontrollable is not just an horrendous one for its crew, but for whoever happens to be occupying the space underneath it at the time? What if the next incident like this is shortly after take off from LHR or JFK and they're descending blind over densely packed suburbs?

I'd have thought any responsible operator would have to look at the bigger picture when it comes to incidents like this, and that any responsible solution to these problems should focus on maintaining the aircraft's ability to fly - and the crew's ability to fly it - for as long as possible after a fire is first detected. Crew bailing out James Bond style, even if it were practical for them, would have rather dire consequences for folks on the ground.

[grimmrad]

This is in no way to be disrespectful of the two poor souls on this flight, just a general thought on the pilots bailing out of a seemingly doomed plane.

Sounds cynical maybe but in the bigger picture it is better to loose a crew of 2 than to have an unmanned 744 crash lets say into Brooklyn or Manhattan. In WW2 I guess the crews didn't care much as they were usually over enemy ground and who cares where the plane crashes if the intention was to bomb the hell out of the people below you anyway... Wasn't there though an american B-XX (don't know the number, before the 52) bomber that had engine troubles on a trainings mission from Alaska to the Northwest of the US, crew bailed out and the plane flew over terrain for some thirty minutes or so before crashing in a remote, mountainous area of Canada...?

[Awl flyer]

Russian big plane AN124,..it is pressurized, no doubt

Only the passenger compartments are pressurized the Cago compartments remain unpressurized during flight, its the same with the AN 12 where only the flightdeck and crew accomodation are pressurized

it can be pressurized up to 3.57 PSI on the main deck.

Antonov An-124 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonov_An-124)

[Awl flyer]

Talking point about pressurized or non-pressurized deck is the fact that the cargo fire became more intense while burning cargo was descended out from 25000ft down into the higher pressure environment, this was revealed by FAA research mentioned early on this threat.

[Murexway]

A fire inside the fuselage is the worst possible emergency one can face. You have very little idea of the exact location or severity of the fire, but you know the consequences of it.

Jumping the checklist or rushing is usually not a good idea, but with an onboard fire the checklist is rarely useful beyond the obvious, and direct cockpit-crew firefighting attempts are ill-advised for a number of reasons.

All you can do is to get on the ground ASAP and in order to do that you have to be able to see: the instruments - the ground - something - anything. A sucessful autoland with smoke in the cockpit due to a fire somewhere inside the fuselage is a simulator fantasy.

Anthing you have to do in order to see should be done - forget the book... the clock is ticking; you're going to die.

Opening a DV window (if you have one) depressurized, inflight doesn't cause reverse airflow from the cabin into the cockpit. Very little actual flow occurs due to the fuselage becoming "pressurized" by the forward motion of the airplane, unless you open something in the cabin - such as an overwing exit - which becomes extremely difficult due to the pressure you've created. Once you do manage to get the overwing exit open, there's quite a bit of flow (front to back) and it gets noisy - but you can see. (personal experience, below 5,000 ft and 250 kts).

Someone mentioned the onboard fire that killed Ricky Nelson - here are the firsthand observations of the duty copilot on that flight:

On-Board Fires (http://www.airborne.org/flying/forum3.htm#nelson)

[EK380]

Quote: Blue Up: My personal bugbear on the subject of fire/smoke in the flightdeck is the continual reluctance to print the checklists in larger print for these particular drills. I've bitched about it for 2 years but nothing has been done. "Yes, great idea....and we'll let you know".....

AIRBUS has done this some years ago!

[Bergerie1]

Several contributors have mentioned opening the DV window. Well, as we all know the 747 doesn't have one. But other types do. Many years ago I was involved in some tests, the first on a VC10, the second on a 707.

On the VC10 we lit a smoke generator in the middle of the flight deck and opened the copilot's DV window at around 5000ft and 210 kts. The result was so much noise we could only communicate by hand signals and the smoke streamed forward and then past the copilot's instrument panel further reducing visibility. I think we also tried speeds up 250kts with the result that noise level only got worse. When we tried the captain's DV window the result was the similar on his side.

Some years later I tried the same on a 707 but without a smoke generator, so were unable to check the effect on the visibility. But the noise levels were very high making cockpit communications almost impossible.

Clearly in extremis it might be worth trying to open the DV window, but I would be very, very wary of doing so in view of the above results.

Several people have mentioned how hazardous fire in the air is. I agree. Unfortunately check lists can be of doubtful value. There is really only one option and that is to get on the ground ASAP.

[Airclues]

The 744F QRH calls for the partial depressurisation of the aircraft. This is done by a single button on the overhead panel, which automatically raises the cabin to 25,000ft. The problem comes when you have to descend into the more oxygen-rich atmosphere.
On a two man crew with a main deck fire you are going to lose the aircraft unless you can get to a runway within about fifteen minutes. When running 744F command courses we always discussed the option of putting the aircraft onto any available stretch of water if this could not be achieved.

Dave

[Basil]

a single button on the overhead panel, which automatically raises the cabin to 25,000ft.
We didn't have that on the Classic 747F.
Could be useful if a horse was acting up - after warning the grooms :)

[fiddlair]

Pressurized or not, one thing is for sure: when we are on fire, or we have smoke in the cockpit, we'll be on ground or sea within 15 minutes - then we explain in the office - alive! No pilot should forget this.

[vovachan]

its the same with the AN 12 where only the flightdeck and crew accomodation are pressurized

IL76 can operate pressurized or unpressurized depending on the mission.

[noperf]

B737-200 Combi's had a two position switch for fire fighting. P/C Press and P/c Unpress.

One for pax/cargo ops and the other for all cargo ops.

[OKFINE]

Feb 13/1950. B36 Peacemaker. British Columbia. Dropped the Big One into the Pacific prior to crash. Pentagon never said if it was recovered.

[grimmrad]

The B36 was the one. There was a recent feature on one of the cable channels (which I only have in the fitness room of the building so I didn't see everything) which showed that it was found by the Pentagon in a secret mission, all recoverable items removed including something related to the bomb it carried (which was released over the pacific before) and than destroyed intentionally. Sorry for the deviation of the topic.

[Green Guard]

not sure if it was B52...over western part of Greenland, loaded with atomic bombs on more or less constant standby due to Cold War situation, cca 1960 +/- 10 years, not sure
and after the fire in cockpit the crew bailed out,
what happend next is kind of a not very clear

[Neptunus Rex]

The insurance companies might take an interest after they get the bill for this one, which could be the fat end of half a billion US dollars.

[captains_log]

From reading this fascinating thread, shame on UPS and many other carriers for operating at the bare minimum crew level :confused: I hope unions can make something of this.
Maybe this shouldn't be answered here, due to the press etc, i just wondered if an additional crew member or 2 could of helped save this doomed flight?

Secondly someone mentioned putting the plane down asap on land or water, i was under the impression unless you're very lucky (flight 1549) youre looking at a high chance of complete breakup on water, and a slim chance of survival anyway.

[protectthehornet]

two options:

better fire protection/fire fighting

or

ejection seats

[NWstu]

... Wasn't there though an american B-XX (don't know the number, before the 52) bomber that had engine troubles on a trainings mission from Alaska to the Northwest of the US, crew bailed out and the plane flew over terrain for some thirty minutes or so before crashing in a remote, mountainous area of Canada...?Was it this B-36 carrying and jettisoning an atomic bomb as described here (http://www.user.dccnet.com/welcomewoods/Nuclear_Free_Georgia_Strait/b_arrow1.html), the famous "Broken Arrow?

Sorry, also, for the deviation off topic.

[barit1]

Inasmuch as we still don't know the nature of the cargo, this is speculative:

There are hundreds of reported cases of unwanted cargo being shipped: overweight, contraband, controlled substances, HAZMAT, you name it. At a major trading center like DXB, who keeps watch on the agencies and consolidators? Does UPS have their own staff there? Or does a central agency handle several US/foreign carriers?

If criminal activity is determined, what nation does the prosecuting?

[Spooky 2]

EK380, Boeing uses larger font for the smoke and fire checklists. Which ones are you refering to?

[notadog]

There are hundreds of reported cases of unwanted cargo being shipped: overweight, contraband, controlled substances, HAZMAT, you name it. At a major trading center like DXB, who keeps watch on the agencies and consolidators? Does UPS have their own staff there? Or does a central agency handle several US/foreign carriers?

Yes, UPS has their own staff in DXB. UPS does not accept DG shipments unless it is from a shipper approved by UPS. Any DG item being shipped is inspected for proper labeling/packaging/quantity/, etc., prior to being placed on an airplane.

There have been numerous cases of shippers falsifying shipping documents w/r/t DG shipments. If they are caught they are prosecuted.

[grimmrad]

Yep. There was a feature not too long ago on History channel I believe where they found the crash side and tried to reconstruct what happened. I think some papers are by now released by the Pentagon... (Mods, feel free to remove if too far off topic).

To topic - wasn't the FedEx that made it barely down (was it BOS) where the hazmat was not prepared properly by the shipping company or even factory? So that seems to show that on the side of the freight its tough to change things as too many involved but that a system on board is really neccessary.

[dixi188]

When we do our DG refresher every 2 years, (not UPS) the most prominent thing that is said is that the declared DGs are not the ones to worry about.
It's the stuff that is not declared that is dangerous.
How much gets through, nobody knows!

[Alpine Flyer]

EVAS should be mandatory equipment (which is also the position of IFALPA) and compared to most other stuff installed on A/C it is rather cheap and does not take up a lot of space.

Unfortunately we won't see it on many A/C unless it is mandated or a large passenger plane crashes and the investigation concludes that EVAS would have saved lives.

Many airlines these days seem to be unwilling to spend money on safety unless it is mandated and try to follow the letters of the law as cheaply as possibly.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

DG is a very messy area, mainly because it is based on trust.

As a handling agent and checker, it is mostly based on trust.

Has the shipper declared all their DG? Most airlines charge IATA book rate, or 150% as opposed to the dirt cheap Consol deals, so if they can get away with it, why not.

Is the DG what it is supposed to be? For those who have read the front of the DG manual, the extent to the classification of DG is very complex, and there must be a great temptation to throw things in as RFL Class 3 Un1993, Pkg Gp III. Who would know unless it all goes wrong?

Freight can be checked, documents, packaging, loaded correctly (No ROX next to RFL etc) but it can never be a 100% certain system due to the trust element.

As for fire suppression, are the EU still considering the insane idea of banning Halon and associate haloalkanes as fire suppressants? If so, this is yet another hurdle in the way of increasing aircraft safety.

[misd-agin]

post 253 mentioned that they might have had difficulty RTB'ing to Dubai.

1. Any airliner can out descend it's climb profile.

2. From max. certified altitude to a runway will take approx. 9 minutes and 70 n.m. (Max. Alt to 14,000' = 4 minutes. 5 minutes from 14,000' to runway - max drag profile)

100 n.m. to descend is no big deal from cruise.

(no wind)

[WellFrackMe]

The NTSB will thankfully divulge the CVR transcripts and the entire decision making process in audio form will be revealed
So we will all see what happens under extreme high stress, smoke & fume filled, perhaps high heat seating positions, possible incorrect use of interphone/speaker switches, loss of FMA awareness, CRM breakdowns (understandable here - for example, how can the other pilot confirm QRH items being done correctly if you cannot see the Overhead Panel?), situational awareness being reduced are all there waiting to happen.
Could we have done better?
Maybe they just crashed legally following all the rules, SOP's, FCOMs, QRH's, etc. because we all know the DISCO SMOKE in the sim (if working) ain't the same here.
Not mention only 2 crew to do the workload of at least 3 in this situation.

[grimmrad]

How fast is "land as soon as possible" under real time conditions? As a SLF when you guys at the pointy end are initiating the sink - from that moment to touch down can take 30-45 minutes (in NYC longer). Parts are due to vectoring and traffic which largely won't be there in an emergency situation, but how fast can you bring it down? What if its eastbound on a transatlantic flight somewhere over the Atlantic? Ditching, choice between drowning or burning with being crushed by deceleration between it?

[three eighty]

more pictures here

gulfnews : In pictures: Cargo plane crashes in Dubai (http://gulfnews.com/pictures/news/in-pictures-cargo-plane-crashes-in-dubai-1.677380)

[BRUpax]

grimrrad, the time factor regarding descent in the NYC area is under normal conditions and factoring standard ATC procedures. No matter where you are, in an emergency you go down pronto and ATC will vector everything else out of the way as expeditiously as possible. Getting down is not the only issue. depending where you are, there's also the issue of where the nearest suitable airport is.

[jetopa]

Ya'll can Monday quarterback all you want but all of us will have to wait until the final report comes out.

Fires onboard are absolute time critical emergencies. On average, given past history of accidents like Swiss Air 111, you have 15 minutes tops before an accident is nearly guaranteed at 20. A good brief for smoke or fire must include time. I brief it simply, at the first sign of smoke or fire onboard, we cancel the warning, and I start my clock. We will be on the ground in 11 minutes or less. Period.

So true. And scary as hell.

Heard from an LH driver yesterday that they reckon 15 minutes to be available in case of an onboard fire - knowing that Swissair 111 had 17 minutes until they impacted the sea...

[blue up]

Spooky 2 (post 298)
We've had new issue B757/767 checklists for about 6 months and the smoke-related checklists have been printed in the same font and size as all other checklist pages.

[Flightmech]

The FedEx DC-10 that went into Stewartfield, New Jersey got on the ground just in time. The captain is still with the company on another fleet type and has told me the tale. A very good listen. Their has been some well discussed criticism (by the company) of not using/completing appropriate checklists but at the end of the day he got the jet on the ground and saved his crew.The investigation revealed the exact package containing undeclared dangerous goods and it's origin and I believe a prosecution followed.

However, IF it turns out these two poor guys lost their lives due to the same deal, it may be more difficult to trace at a crash scene. IF this is case, the shipper will probably have no idea what they have done and sadly, get away with it scott free:ugh:

[Boomerang_Butt]

Flightmech, I was asking that question earlier, how easy/difficult would it be to determine where a fire originated (if this was indeed the case with this flight) I know in buildings it's do-able, but does it all depend on the actual condition and location of the aircraft remains at the scene?

That is, does tracing an origin/shipper of a package all depend on how the aircraft ends up?

I'm also curious (sorry for the slight drift but it interests me) in te training done for shippers these days, is there any emphasis given to the actual consequences of shipping something forbidden by air, by disguising it as something it's not? Personally I was shown some pictures/video, but this may have been more due to the fact the guy taking the course was formerly a pilot rather than the company SOP itself...

As an FA, it does concern me that while they train us that fire is the worst possible onboard emergency, I've never heard a time frame given. Perhaps if we all knew that we only (statistically speaking) have 15minutes at best, it would make the crew that bit more aware of keeping alert for signs of fire in-flight (yes I am aware UPS was a cargo flight without FAs, but the principle remains.) I once had a (thankfully false alarm) smoke situation, once the captain informed me we were making an emergency descent, I can tell you my eyes were glued on my watch, if sheer will could have made time slow down I'm sure it did. Luckily not a real fire in that case but nonetheless a very scary situation!!!

[Traffic]

Undeclared DG = terrorism

Its that simple

[Flightmech]

Not really. In most cases I bet the shipper has no idea what the consequences of not declaring dg could be to an aircraft and its crew. I don't think there is any intent there. Absolute stupidity and a total disregard of responsibility is what it is.

[overthewing]

Undeclared DG = terrorism

It may have the same effect on the victims, but the last thing the perpetrators want is the destruction of the flight, and therefore the cargo.

It's not terrorism, it's simply a crime. Stupid, greedy, dishonest, irresponsible, but not terrorism.

[piggybank]

Would it be too extreme to have each package issued with a fireproof tag which was/is reusable after a few shipments. With today's technology add a strip that indicated an extreme temperature had been reached to either show it was the package that caught fire or its proximity to the fire.

Or become more proactive. Use RFID (Radio Frequency ID) tags and a heat sensor. This would involve continual monitoring of all the RFID tags which may not be acceptable with some dangerous goods.

[VR-HFX]

Flightmech & Over the Wing

Semantics.

I spend a lot of time on the freighter these days and although we are not in the DHL/Fedex/UPS biz it is my primary concern.

My personal view is that you need to spend as much time on the load sheet as the flight plan. Lowest common demoninator is what kills you.

[flaphandlemover]

http://i894.photobucket.com/albums/ac142/Flaphandlemover/th_IMG_2912.jpg (http://s894.photobucket.com/albums/ac142/Flaphandlemover/?action=view&current=IMG_2912.jpg)


http://i894.photobucket.com/albums/ac142/Flaphandlemover/th_IMG_2913.jpg (http://s894.photobucket.com/albums/ac142/Flaphandlemover/?action=view&current=IMG_2913.jpg)


It seems to me, they hit the ground left wing first and then the unfortunate final impact...

[mickjoebill]

I agree HUD would not work, but the type of optics found in a virtual reality helmet (projecting an image of the essential instruments) attached to the smoke hood and flipped down when required would do the job?

The get out of jail card would be an option to see a view in the smoke hood from a uncooled low cost thermal camera on the aircraft nose, a handy camera to have in other emergency situations too, when just seeing an horizon would make a difference such as during a night emergency.
http://www.flir.com/uploadedfiles/Eurasia/MMC/Appl_Stories/AS_0013_EN.pdf



Mickjoebill

[deSitter]

Sorry if I've missed a post, but there seems to be a general assumption that the fire started in the freight compartment and was caused by something in the cargo. Surely its equally possible that the fire had nothing to do with the cargo and was, for example, started by a wiring fault - remember the Swissair MD11.

That's extremely unlikely on a brand new airplane.

-drl

[Hotel Tango]

That's extremely unlikely on a brand new airplane.

Just as likely on a new a/c as an old one in my book.

[MountainBear]

Flightmech writes, "The investigation revealed the exact package containing undeclared dangerous goods and it's origin and I believe a prosecution followed."

Actually the link to the NTSB report for that flight is earlier in this thread. The investigation was unable to locate the exact cause of the fire. Suspicion fell on a DNA synthesizer. Post accident investigation revealed that the chemical contents of the DNA synthesizer had not been cleaned out properly by the lab tech prior to packaging for flight.:(

However, they were not able to say that this was what caused the fire. It remains "of unknown origin" officially.

http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1998/AAR9803.pdf

[forget]

Surely its equally possible that the fire had nothing to do with the cargo ...

Agreed. I hope my nagging suspicion of unpleasant surprises coming from this is wrong.

[PJ2]

Flightmech;
In most cases I bet the shipper has no idea what the consequences of not declaring dg could be to an aircraft and its crew. I don't think there is any intent there. Absolute stupidity and a total disregard of responsibility is what it is.In the days when we had the Dangerous Goods Manuals on board, (they are no longer provided to the crew, at least where I worked) so we could look up and verify what we were carrying, we were handed a DG Advice of a shipment of "Flourine gas, 4 canisters, N.O.S.". We looked it up in the DG Manual and it specified "Cargo aircraft only". Though we caused a delay, we had the shipment taken off the aircraft.

We did the flight again the next day. Again, we were handed DG advice showing the same shipment was on the aircraft. Again we delayed the flight while the shipment was removed.

Later the next day I thought I would try something. I phoned our cargo people at the shipment's destination to see if "my" shipment of flourine gas had arrived. It had.

Stupidity? "Terrorism?" Neither, in my opinion. "We" were the problem in someone's mind and this was just someone or a few different people, with, as you observe, an abominable absence of imagination, trying to "do the right thing" as the shipment had been accepted for delivery and they wanted the customer happy.

Whether anybody was aware of the cargo-only designation, I did not find out; it was in the DG Manual. The irregularity went to the regulator and I believe the shipper was banned; not sure what occurred "internally".

Apparently we followed United's example of removing the DG Manual from the flight deck, (can anyone from United comment, please? Do you guys carry the DG book? Anyone?) We were told that the cargo people would be checking appropriateness for shipping and that we didn't have to do that anymore. Though not flying anymore, I still think it's wrong.

Thinking about the removal logically, unless the assessment was made that consulting the manual was somehow "ineffective" and therefore pointless, it can't otherwise be safety-related and it can't be weight so it must be economic - as in keeping the manual up to date and spending time training crews how to use the manual effectively. Also, perhaps it was a "source of departure delays" ?...

I flew the DC8 freighter for a number of years. Then, and perhaps now, it's a different world than carrying passengers. In my experience, the care taken with passenger flights was apparent - with freight, not always so. It's always a rush to load and depart and always something abnormal to deal with such as broken floor locks, (nevermind the chemicals - more than one departure had stuff slide on takeoff) or broken, leaking packaging. Perhaps a factor not often mentioned is, freighters almost always operate during crews' low-circadian cycle times. The goal that drives all this is a satisfied shipping customer, and making money.

The discussion concerning solutions to fire on board freighters offered here which vary in practicality and/or effectiveness, (EVAS, Gas-filled bags for viewing instruments, robust fire-fighting equipment in upper and lower decks, parachutes, etc etc, and all the problems that freight dogs know about which haven't even been described here) don't address those human factors issues we all are aware of, of the obvious human factor of good people making a rare bad decision or a mistake they didn't catch in time, while satisfying the main "goal" described above. The solutions offered belong to the "symptoms" discourse, not the discourse of "originating factors".

The answer isn't more regulation or disciplinary proceedings or even wages, etc. As it has always been with hijacking, the place to stop the risk of fire on board due to inappropriate shipping, packaging etc, (as described above), is on the ground.

While stringent SOPs and tactical provisions are in place in the air, hijacking is almost exclusively prevented before flight. The place to stop risk of fire on board is similarly on the ground.

Clearly, the exceptions are SW111 and a few other accidents which have other antecedents.

The one common theme in the thread is, Once smoke is confirmed, get the aircraft on the ground. I always wondered about the options and what we would do over the Pacific, thousands of miles from any airport...

PJ2

[deSitter]

Just as likely on a new a/c as an old one in my book.

Don't think so, combustibles have been thoroughly expunged at this late date. The type of insulation in SR that caused most of the problem is no longer used.

-drl

[Ex Cargo Clown]

I have to disagree to some extent PJ2, I've sat the 5 day DG course and 2 day refresher every 2 years, and most people to my knowledge who do DG checks whether a loadie, handler or airline do a pretty good job. I'd suggest those doing it day in day out would spot errors quicker than a F/C sat with a DG manual.

As to incomplete NOTOCs, that is unforgivable, as is missing a CAO item (they have different PIs for one)

Having also dealt with skippers who know better than the manual (a tiny minority, but they are out there) I'd still trust well trained, well paid, checkers with reputable companies to do everything correctly. Including a skipper who would not accept than compressed oxygen was not RFG (flammable gas).

It's the shippers I don't trust, especially those on a "budget".

[Gulfstreamaviator]

Just watched Dubai one, Emirates evening news, and there was NO mention of the accident.

4 year old smoking kid in Asia, but nothing about the biggest, and potentially most serious accident in their city.

Incidentally Aviation herald has a very good set of maps showing the site. (look on Pprune Italian thread for link).

glf

[Neptunus Rex]

It's not always easy. I always checked the cargo manifest (passenger aircraft with generous cargo capacity) but I had to ask for it. It was not shown to the captain as a matter of course.

[AN2 Driver]

Flightmech

The FedEx DC-10 that went into Stewartfield, New Jersey got on the ground just in time. The captain is still with the company on another fleet type and has told me the tale.

thanks for that. I had wondered what happened after having seen him criticized. For what? he was the only one I recall who's managed to live to tell the tale from a full fledged fire in cruise in recent history.

Wonder what went through his mind when he heard about SR111.

[PJ2]

Ex Cargo Clown;

Thanks very much - that's the kind of feedback I was wondering about. I've had the DG course as well, (we did it every year at annual recurrent) and got a small certificate that we were required to carry along with our licences. I think you're right about the processes in general - experienced eyes, etc. Just to be clear I'm not "gazing towards cargo people" here but rather asking the questions and making an observation about human factors vice any sense of "negligence". It's hard to capture the sense of a freight operation in anonymous text while at the same time avoiding drawing conclusions from only that text. The rarity of such accidents alone, speaks to the safety of the process. But we have a another fire-on-board accident and we're all thinking about why.

best,

PJ2

[notadog]

The one common theme in the thread is, Once smoke is confirmed, get the aircraft on the ground. I always wondered about the options and what we would do over the Pacific, thousands of miles from any airport...

This is the single most important issue that should be understood in this discussion.

In ANY instance of smoke or fire warning or confirmation, it is imperative that the aircraft be put on the ground immediately, and if over water, ditching must be considered. History has shown that there is about a 10 minute window. After that, it is unlikely to be a recoverable or survivable situation.

We can discuss EVAS or fire suppression or any other method of combatting inflight fire/smoke, but the bottom line is that ANY instance of smoke/fire is time critical.

[Spooky 2]

Blue Up, Post #310

It's the Quick Action Index that I was speaking of, not the actual checklist that has the larger font. My appologies if I was not clear.

One has to wonder how well the electronic checklists would be visible in a situation such as this. At least the paper version can be held up in front of your eyes if that would make any difference?

[TopBunk]

In ANY instance of smoke or fire warning or confirmation, it is imperative that the aircraft be put on the ground immediately, and if over water, ditching must be considered. History has shown that there is about a 10 minute window. After that, it is unlikely to be a recoverable or survivable situation.

That is my view too. My policy on the first sign of any smoke or fire warning, unless it was indicated of being from a known source (eg an oven etc) would have been to initiate a descent towards the ocean in preparation for a ditching. I would then have levelled off at 2000ft or so and made best speed towards the nearest airport. If the situation then deteriorated rapidly I would have been in a position to effect a (hopefully timely) ditching. If the situation was resolved I could then have diverted or continued to destination as desired and dependent on fuel capability.

The debrief afterwards may or may not have been uncomfortable, but I wouldn't have cared, at least I and my crew and pax would have been alive!

The difficult thing in all of this is being brave enough to make the initial decision to descend expeditiously. Certainly a useful discussion point in the cruise.

[MarkerInbound]

The NTSB will thankfully divulge the CVR transcripts and the entire decision making process in audio form will be revealed.


Remember the GCAA is the lead investigator for this crash and the final report will be from them.

[Huck]

Small point, but the DC-10 incident was at Newburgh, New York, at the old Stewart Air Force Base.

[waldorfin]

During walk around saw a pallet waiting to be loaded. 1430 local DXB. OAT 40 plus. Part of the goods was visible. Put my hand on a metallic piece, possibly part of a kitchen electrical appliance. Almost left some charred skin on the appliance. Evidently this pallet had been out baking in the sun all day. Got me thinking....what if there were some sub grade batteries lodged in sub grade material toys!!! hell they put chemicals in baby milk don't they?

[JW411]

I have refrained from commenting so far but it is now time to add to a lot of the nonsense that has been posted so far.

I have probably spent most of my 46 year commercial flying career flying around with "dangerous cargo" ranging from plastic explosives, AVPIN, crew members who haven't changed their shreddies for two weeks to "nuclear waste" with an NEC of 24,000 lbs equivalent.

However, what I want to talk about here is smoke/fire in the cockpit.

This is the ULTIMATE KILLER.

I simply cannot believe those of you out there who have ultimate solutions such as, if the UPS crew had followed your wisdom, they would be alive and well if they had only followed your fantastic advice.

Have you any idea what you would do when you are sat upon a fire such that you cannot even see six inches in front of you and your legs and the rest of your body is starting to melt?

Smoke and fire in the cockpit was always one of my big topics when I was training.

I will relate a very true story.

I was training two SFOs to move to the left seat. Although smoke in the cockpit was not actually part of the syllabus, I made the pair of them do one each (in the simulator) because I always figured that this was about the most difficult scenario that a new captain (or an old one for that matter) could ever face.

We got out of the simulator at around 0300 and arranged to meet for lunch after a sleep.

"Isn't it spooky" said one. "What's spooky" said I? It transpired that when we were doing our smoke drills, SR111 was going into the Grand Banks.

So now I would like to move on to Manufacturers and their Advice.

I can always remember my only experience (outside of the military) of smoke in the cockpit. I was captain of one of Fred Laker's fine DC-10s on my way from LAX to LGW. At about 30 West, the F/E asked the pair of us up front if we could smell burning. (I have to explain to the youngsters that we used to smoke cigarettes in those days so sense of smell was not as good as it is now).

Neither of us could so we carried on (for the MS pilots, there is not a lot else you can do at 30 West).

Then the F/O said that he could smell smoke. That made two out of three so we got the QRH out and started doing an electrical isolation drill. I knew from my time in the simulator that this would take up to 30 minutes to complete.

So, we have the F/O flying and I am watching and monitoring the QRH with the F/E. Then the sun started to come up and I suddenly spotted a wisp of electrical smoke coming out of the F/Es seat!

One of the electric motors in his seat was burning out. We laughed about it afterwards for he was actually sitting on the "fire" whilst conducting the orchestra so to speak but I had already experienced in a previous life a quite nasty incident when a rheostat burned out on an overhead panel.

I will be very interested to see what Boeing and (more importantly) their lawyers will do about the 744 QRH/FCOM.

A lot of you out there are probably unaware that all manufacturers manuals have passed through the legal department many times over before the final document can be printed.

A classic example is the old electrical smoke isolation drill that British Aerospace had printed on Pages 4A and 4B of the BAe146 QRH. I think (and I'm guessing now) as a result of a "happening" somewhere, the pages suddenly disappeared in an amendment. Pages 4A and 4B were suddenly empty and marked "Deliberately Blank".

When I queried this with BAe, I was told that this brought the BAe146 in line with the Avro RJ. The advice given to the Avro RJ pilots was "Land at the nearest suitable airfield". The CAA not only allowed this but (I assume) had allowed the lawyers to back date this reprehensible advice to those of us left on the BAe 146 freighter.

There is NO DOUBT that you have probably less than 15 minutes to get a burning aeroplane down on the sea or the land before you die.

Perhaps the lawyers and the accountants might like to consider this?

PS I, and a lot of others who wanted to stay alive, kept our old QRH handy.

[FoxHunter]

The cause of the fire will be discovered during the investigation but I think all crew members should consider the information received about an event that happened the week before this accident on the ground in one of our aircraft. Those batteries you may have bought at the market in Shanghai may not have been a good deal.:ugh:

Last weekend we experienced a lithium battery event. The battery
essentially spontaneously erupted into flames. While the investigation is
ongoing, I would like to make you aware of some disturbing similarities we
have seen in all the events that I am aware.

First, this battery was not properly packaged for shipment. In this
event the battery was inside a personal flashlight inside a personal
backpack.

Second, the malfunctioning battery was NOT a name brand produced or
purchased within the USA. It was one produced and procured in China.

Third, these fires are NOT successfully dealt with by Halon (the
agent in our fire extinguishing systems on board our aircraft). It was
fortunate that a full (or nearly full) water bottle was next to the
flashlight so that when the battery went high order and erupted into flames
the plastic water bottle was compromised and the water was then dumped onto
the burning flashlight (the Halon was effective at containing the burning
backpack).

[Beavis and Butthead]

An excellent post JW411 :D

[hetfield]

@jw411

Great post:D

Conclusion:

Know the systems well, common sense, don't rely just on papers.
:ok:

[notadog]

jw411, excellent post.

The fact of the matter is that these crew members faced the most difficult emergency that pilots can face.

The reality is that in the event of a cargo or cockpit fire, it is virtually impossible to clear smoke from the flight deck. In the event of a main cargo area fire, smoke/superheated gasses will get to the flightdeck eventually. (Even if the procedures to limit smoke are followed.) Donning goggles and O2 masks will buy some time, but the lack of clear vision will render aircraft control impossible at some point. Checklist procedures may be fine in a training scenario, but ultimately, the only solution is to get the airplane on the ground and get out.

I have had firsthand experience with smoke in a cockpit, and it is unbelievable how rapidly the ability to see the panel deteriorates. In seconds I could not see the instrument panel or the guy sitting 3 feet away. Fortunately, we were able to identify the source, and stop the smoke.

If this was indeed a cargo fire, then cargo compartment fire extinguishing and EVAS must be mandated. Fire suppression won't cut it. Crews must be able to extinguish a fire and get the aircraft on the ground.

[DownIn3Green]

Top Bunk...Great post...glad someone else agrees with me...

[Dream Buster]

JW411 - I always wondered why? Thanks.

A classic example is the old electrical smoke isolation drill that British Aerospace had printed on Pages 4A and 4B of the BAe146 QRH. I think (and I'm guessing now) as a result of a "happening" somewhere, the pages suddenly disappeared in an amendment. Pages 4A and 4B were suddenly empty and marked "Deliberately Blank".

When I queried this with BAe, I was told that this brought the BAe146 in line with the Avro RJ. The advice given to the Avro RJ pilots was "Land at the nearest suitable airfield". The CAA not only allowed this but (I assume) had allowed the lawyers to back date this reprehensible advice to those of us left on the BAe 146 freighter.

I had a suspected 'fire in the rear toilet' call from # 1 soon after T/O - which, after reducing power promptly to get back on the ground as soon as possible turned out to be 'only dense white oil bleed air smoke'.

That all happenned in 2002.

Now I don't fly any more; Like 25% of other 146 pilots, who have lost their health.

Here's the reason - from last weeks successful Australian High Court decision:

Flight attendant wins in toxic-fume case (http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/flight-attendant-wins-in-toxicfume-case-20100903-14ufi.html)

Maybe in the future aircrew and customers will HAVE to be warned in advance of the invisible and visible dangers from oil smoke?

DB :ugh:

[Bartholomew]

JW411... very good post. Balanced, and gave something we can all learn from.

As mentioned before... time is critical. Smell smoke? Start the clock and find somewhere to go. Fast! 10-12 minutes...max.

flaphandlemover (post #318) - great pictures. Looks like the folks in Cedre and Semmer have some SERIOUS thanking to do... that was just too close. Either some very skilful flying, or an indisputable miracle.

My heart is heavy thinking of what those two poor souls were faced with, that particular evening, with that situation... :eek:

Let's hope we can all learn from this - whatever the cause of the fire, as the more sensible posts have suggested here, suppression or egress is not really the factor here. More stringent controls on what is carried, and how it is packaged is the issue.

If nasty things weren't unknowingly carried, or were contained better, then suppression or egress is barred... Apart from the 1-out-of-thousands-of-flights where a/c systems are at fault, the checklist will protect you, but the time-rule still applies. Don't try to reason... Land. ASAP.

My heart goes out to those poor guys that night.... they flew my biggest fear.

Fire in flight. Nothing scares me more.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

Thank you for your response PJ2.

From my experiences, 95% of DG trained staff are very competent, and well trained. Unfortunately this appears to be getting less and less so. Once again money is the problem, companies are looking to pay minimum wage staff to do non-minimum wage jobs.

I spent quite some time at a very Big Airline, and their attention to DG was excellent, staff paid well, training was spot on, and procedures almost watertight (double signed checksheets etc). I would be happy to fly on an aircraft with freight checked by just one member of their old staff, never mind two, safety was paramount, not cost.

However, recently the cheap option has been the choice for most UK handling firms. Young kids on 13k a year checking RADAC etc with just bare-minimum training, supervision and motivation. I spoke to one not so long a go whose idea of a check was "shake it and see if it rattles or leaks" and if it didn't the boxes were ticked and off it went.....

Then we have the actual shippers (no doubt egged on by certain cargo agents) who will do anything to avoid paying top dollar, whether that be dodgy documents, packaging, anything they think they will get away with.

I know this is a very generic discussion, and I don't wish to detract to the main subject of this tragic accident, just that cargo fires appear to be one of the "killer" items that receive very little attention until one occurs. This may or not be one, it is far too early to speculate.

There are many categories of "dodgy" DG, from undeclared items, which are by far the most dangerous, to technical "snags", no emergency phone number on the DG cert etc.

As the industry attempts to cut costs and lose very experienced, knowledgeable and intelligent staff I can see an increase in incidents, the same way as there will be increases in load errors etc as CLC becomes common place.

As always, beware the weakest links.

Fly safe all.

[PJ2]

As the industry attempts to cut costs and lose very experienced, knowledgeable and intelligent staff I can see an increase in incidents, the same way as there will be increases in load errors etc as CLC becomes common place.Deregulation promised passengers, industry leaders and employees alike that aviation could be done cheaply. It cannot.

It was assumed, and not by pilots, that automation promised that airliners could be crewed cheaply because the airplane "flew itself". This legitimated the notions that crew complements could be reduced, training footprints shortened and standards lowered without result. The proof of such folly is in the numbers.

Many knew in the early 80's that cheap yet profitable aviation transportation was a devil's promise and both expected and wrote that the quality of accidents would change while the quantity would remain stubbornly level. It can be done inexpensively and smartly, but not without serious feedback loops which tell managers when they've cut too close to the bone. It is precisely that expertise which is undervalued because the products of flight safety are, "nothing happened". In the discourse of business which values "quantifying" above all else, one cannot quantify for flight operations who are focussed on profit, "what does not occur". There is no ledger entry for "money (and lives) saved". The necessary tension between operations and safety managers should be strong but often, safety departments are organizationally placed under operations, funded by operations and staffing decisions are made by operations.

A flight safety department requires institutionalized, formal independence from both flight operations and maintenance.

The industry's efforts to reduce the accident rate yielded spectacular results into the early '70s where it has essentially leveled off but the causal pathways are materially different, led by loss of control and CFIT. The precursors to such accidents are almost certainly in the data but it requires intelligent, experienced eyes to see the patterns and then present them to a management legitimately although perhaps exclusively consumed by the daily pageant of on-time departures and related operational issues.

Such factors are part of a larger phenomenon which is essentially political and therefore economic in nature and far too large a discussion for one thread which extends back to 1970 or so. But it is the pattern which connects many threads here on PPRuNe and everywhere aviation is seriously discussed.

All of these observations are in reality far more subtle, seemingly inconsistent and difficult to discern than can be portrayed in a threaded conversation. At some point, regress from the cockpit to larger organizational factors must necessarily be book-ended, problems analyzed and solutions highlighted and communicated for change.

What is the pattern that connects Islamabad, Tripoli, Mangalore, Amsterdam, Madrid, Buffalo, and Sao Paulo to name a few?

PJ2

[Whenwe]

Another grim reminder of what can happen with smoke.
Just an extract from the ATC tape, South Affrican Airways SA295 B747-244B Combi crashed into the indian ocean November 28, 1987

295 : PILOT IN COMMAND OF FLIGHT SA 295
MRU : MAURITIUS APPROACH CONTROL
TIME SPEAKER RECORDED INFORMATION
23:48:51 295 Eh, Mauritius, Mauritius, Springbok Two
Niner Five
23:49:00 MRU Springbok Two Niner Fife, eh, Mauritius,
eh, good morning, eh, go ahead
23:49:07 295 Eh, good morning, we have, eh, a smoke,
eh, eh, problem and we're doing emergency descent to level one five, eh, one four zero
23: 49: 18 MRU Confirm you wish to descend to flight level
one four zero
23: 49: 20 295 Ya, we have already commenced, eh, due to a
smoke problem in the aeroplane
23: 49: 25 MRU Eh, roger, you are clear to descend
immediately to flight level one four zero
23:49:30 295 Roger, we will appreciate if you can alert,
eh, fire, eh, eh, eh, eh
23:49:40 MRU Do you wish to, eh, do you request a full
emergency?
23:49:48 295 Okay Joe, kan jy ... vir ons (Okay Joe can
you ... for us)
23:49:51 MRU Springbok Two Nine Five, Plaisance
23:49:54 295 Sorry, go ahead
23:49:56 MRU Do you, eh, request a full emergency
please a full emergency?
23:50:00 295 Affirmative, that's Charlie Charlie

[Ancient Mariner]

Foxhunter:
First, this battery was not properly packaged for shipment. In this
event the battery was inside a personal flashlight inside a personal
backpack.

Second, the malfunctioning battery was NOT a name brand produced or
purchased within the USA. It was one produced and procured in China.

I had some experience with lithium batteries in a former life in the marine electronics business, EPIRB/SART, stuff like that. We had some brand new batteries stored at a location in Asia and came in one morning to find the office filled with soot and smelling like....., not nice.
The battery that went bang was inside a sturdy plastic container with a cap screwed on tightly. The cap had blown off and dented the steel shells and the walls. The explosion did not start a fire, but only because there was not any flammable material close to the unruly battery. The whole office/storage area of approximately 200 meters square had to be completely washed down twice to remove the soot, I can only imagine what it had been like when all this took place. All this from a battery weighting around 300g and not being manufactured in China, but by a well known and respected "Western" company.
"Properly packed" as dangerous goods would not have made much of a difference, more likely kindled the fire.
Per

[Heathrow Harry]

All laptop owners should watch this video in order to know why Li Ion batteries catch fire, how to extinguish the fire and more importantly, how not to do it. See the heap of ice at the end of the video!

> http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/422319-lufthansa-cargo-plane-crash-4.html#post5834284

[ExSp33db1rd]

Not long after the SAA Combi fire I had a SAA Capt. under supervision with our airline as a new entrant, and this, his first trip with his new airline, was a 747-200 freighter.

Shortly after take off we had a main deck cargo fire warning.

Due to the trainee Capt's status we also carried a regular F/O, so we were 4 on the flight deck and I was able to send the F/O to the back of the upper deck to initially look through the viewing window, and he came back to report that all appeared well, no sign of anything amiss on the main deck as far as he was able to see - at that stage.

The tech.log had evidence of a previous false warning, but was I going to show a recent SAA Captain that his new airline ignored fire warnings ? On top of which I had my own hide to consider !

I returned, and just before commencing the approach decided that as all still seemed OK, we would dump fuel to max landing weight instead of boring straight in overweight.

As we eventually taxied in the fire warning light extinguised, so when the engineers came aboard - like - wots' the problem !!

Turned out that the aeroplane had not long before carried a cargo of Durians, an obnoxious fruit with a very heavy, sickly, sh**ty type smell ! and the heavy vapour was still lingering in the fire detection censors - maybe ?

I was not officially censured but quietly criticised by some in management. Too bad, we were all still alive with a - more or less - servicable aeroplane.

[Beez51]

I don't agree with a number of posts dismissing HUD under smoke in cockpit conditions. The HUD equipped aircraft that I fly was tested with a smoke generator in the cockpit generating so much smoke that the test pilot could not see his hand in front of his face. He could still read the HUD.

I suspect that this possibly has something to do with the frequency of the light projected. The HUD projector is not like a normal projector. If you put a sheet of white paper onto the combiner at night there will be no image displayed on the sheet. I'm guessing that the light is not dispersed all that much by the smoke and still gets to the combiner.

I advise other pilots that the HUD will still provide a reliable source of reference provided oxygen and eye protection are properly worn. Seeing out the front is another issue.

If anyone has evidence to the contrary I would like to hear it before I find out the hard way! :)

[barit1]

PJ2:
Deregulation promised passengers, industry leaders and employees alike that aviation could be done cheaply. It cannot.

Are you telling me that safety statistics today are WORSE than during the Carter administration? :*

Don't get me wrong - I am not overlooking the very real tragedies discussed on this board, and surely there are significant improvements to be had. But to blame it all on deregulation seems to miss the target.

[Gulfcapt]

I don't agree with a number of posts dismissing HUD under smoke in cockpit conditions. The HUD equipped aircraft that I fly was tested with a smoke generator in the cockpit generating so much smoke that the test pilot could not see his hand in front of his face. He could still read the HUD.

I suspect that this possibly has something to do with the frequency of the light projected. The HUD projector is not like a normal projector. If you put a sheet of white paper onto the combiner at night there will be no image displayed on the sheet. I'm guessing that the light is not dispersed all that much by the smoke and still gets to the combiner


Where is the projector on your type Beez? Ours is above and behind our head. If we go much further forward than normal the image ends up on the back of our head instead of on the combiner.

I'll have to look into whether the light frequency of the projected image can penetrate smoke.

On further thought, we would have to choose between the HUD or EVAS. The HUD combiner would prevent EVAS from properly inflating. I would choose EVAS because I know it works.
Best,
GC

[mtogw]

Wouldn't a HUD display work built into a smoke hood..??

[By George]

Interesting to note that the checklist only calls for the 'smoke evacuation handle' to be pulled when the smoke is severe and source considered to be from the flight deck. I doubt the cord from the Eros mask would allow you to reach it. Leaving your seat to reach the handle at the back of the overhead might be the last thing you do. Very nasty situation, I cannot feel anything but sympathy for these guys and I hope we find out the cause.

[PJ2]

barit2;
Are you telling me that safety statistics today are WORSE than during the Carter administration? http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/bah.gifNo, and that's not what I said. I said fatal accident rates have leveled off. Some may call that "worse" because the expectation was and is that the downward trend would continue. I think it is important to look beyond a graph, at the nature of accidents.
But to blame it all on deregulation seems to miss the targetWell, that assumes there is "the" target and of course there isn't just one, there are many such "targets". It's not a trivial, "semantic" point. I am not "blaming it all on deregulation", I am exploring original sources and looking for patterns. Like I stated, it is too complicated a discussion for thread material but it follows on what many here have sensed and stated.

I sensed the idea might be misunderstood within this context so I probably should delete the post. But to focus on single cause/single target can, I think, miss ways of solving the problem, which is, as stated, Loss of Control and CFIT which has antecedents far beyond the cockpit as well as ground services.

Ex Cargo Clown opened what I thought was an interesting and valid assessment of the overall state of our industry - traditional expertise and experience is leaving the industry, and parsimony mistaken for "responsible economic behaviours" is coming home to roost in unexpected ways which have yet to be recognized and dealt with. Safety systems are not like PFM boxes which one plugs in to fix a problem, (no slight intended; I know you know this...). I acknowledged that such a rabbit trail was a long way from the thread's topic, which was intended as a signal asking for forebearance while the discussion unfolded.

Hope this helps!

Cheers,
PJ2

[Oval3Holer]

The smoke evacuation handle can be reached from the pilot seat without even having to loosen one's seatbelt.

[barit1]

PJ2:

No argument here. As I said - there are still significant improvements to be made. And I agree completely about the loss of experience and expertise as senior folks retire.

[AN2 Driver]

JW411,

excellent post, thanks a lot.

Sometimes things turn weird. We have you doing smoke drills while a crew struggles to survive and fails. And we have the UPS crew doing the same struggle again and fail exactly 12 years to the day of Swissair 111.

Fire is the single most dangerous thing on the flight decks, starting with a Piper Cub up to the lagrest jets and, even worse, spaceflight. If I recall right, they had one of these in MIR and it was a very close shave indeed.

I was working for Swissair at the time that 111 happened, knew two of the crew on and off. It was then and still is one of the accidents that had a profound impact on my own perception of what the real issues on such flights are. All of these flights did happen in the vicinity of airports, none of them ever did at 30W, as you mention. Even to people who are restricted to armchairflying today it is clear that a situation like that will render all sort of EROPS/STOPS whatever planning methods totally absurd. We can't plan for this contingency or there won't be any long haul flights and not a lot of shorthaul ones either. At 30 West, all you can really do is consider ditching in this situation and does anyone want to contemplate that?

Before SR111, the company lost another aircraft to fire. Swissair 330 was a Convair Coronado going to TLV out of ZRH with a bomb on board. The bomb went off and started to set the airplane ablaze. They did try an in flight return but never managed to land. They hit the ground a few hundred yards from a nuclear research facility. It was not a few weeks ago, when they gave a documentary of this on TV, playing back some of the radio tapes. Words that are in my memory from the report and which I heard spoken for the first time. The Captain, realizing he will crash, saying good bye on the radio. Lost some sleep after that recording, I admit freely.

Then the Munich near accident with the Swissair MD80 discussed in this thread earlier. Then SR111.

I remember that after SR111 happened and the circumstances emerged, a lot of planes landed as precautions for too well done "Chicken a la King" or after flying through residue of a forest fire. Heck, they are all alive and I understand them!


Sorry, this got longer than I thought it would, and more open too. But I reckon, seeing that it happened again, and won't be the last time I fear, we are all in one boat so to speak on this.

[L-38]

Perhaps somewhat now redundant, the following info was relayed to me from a friend.

. . . . Gulf Air Pilot
I had the misfortune of hearing the whole chain of events while we
were going from Kuwait to Abu Dhabi. As time goes by and more
information is gathered and released, the picture will become clearer.

We were in Bahraini airspace when we heard the mayday of a "Fire on
the 'Deck'" and an immediate descent to 10,000'. The captain requested
vectors back to Dubai immediately. As the moments passed the whole
cockpit filled with smoke and the CA indicated he could not see any
instruments at all. With no visual reference and all instruments
unreadable as well as difficulty relaying messages and getting
information (reentered UAE FIR but was still talking to BAH 'cause he
couldn't change frequencies). Altitudes, headings etc had to be
relayed from UAE to BAH to airborne aircraft to UPS and back again (A
MESS to say the least). Wound up straight in for 12L at DXB at 10
miles and 7,000'. Couldn't circle because he couldn't see anything.
Turned south of the airport -blind- the whole while altitudes are
being read to him. It was of no use. The aircraft crashed into a
fairly unpopulated area (thankful for that at least). Words can't
express the whole situation adequately.

. . . . Speed Bird Capt
En route to Iraq, I heard pretty much everything from when they
declared their emergency overhead Bahrain due smoke in the flightdeck,
through their descent and pleas for altitude readouts because they
couldn't see their instruments, or change frequency, to hearing ATC
shout "climb immediately" and then calmly say "loss of radar
contact"...
To hear the initial panic and plain fear during their transmissions
(in real time as opposed to a DVR playback on a documentary) has been
the most chilling event in my 25 years of flying.
My heart is with their families.

[blue up]

If you squint a bit you might be able to read it. Add some smoke and it isn't so easy.

http://i82.photobucket.com/albums/j279/foggythomas/smokey1b.jpg

[deSitter]

That makes me plain old red-dog mad - because this problem should have a g-d- solution!! There is no g-d- reason for a new airplane to burst into flames in mid-flight!!!

-drl

[Neptunus Rex]

L38
My heart goes out to you, sir.

With a little co-ordination, Bahrein could have changed all traffic to a secondary freq, allowing Dubai to use the Bahrein freq as a discrete. Also, part of the emergency procedure should be to declare a Mayday in the first place, then prefix your callsign on each subsequent transmission with the word "Mayday." That alerts traffic joining the freq that there is a dire emergency in progress. It works - I once had to use it, in China, of all places. The American phraseology of "declaring an emergency" is just not so explicit.

[icemanalgeria]

Was there any aircraft that could have been a shepherd to the 744?, Would it have helped?.

Many years ago I was making an approach to when we heard an aircraft in trouble, He had lost his AH. We broke off our approach to try and help the guy.

If the wx was fine, would a wingman have been able to help?

Is it something we can bear in mind?

[ferris]

Neptunus Rex With a little co-ordination, Bahrein could have changed all traffic to a secondary freq, allowing Dubai to use the Bahrein freq as a discrete. 1. What makes you think ATC units can select the frequencies of other ATC units? We certainly can't in Bahrain (note the spelling).
2. What makes you think there wasn't more than a "little co-ordination" going on during this sad event?
3. What makes you think that all non-necessary traffic wasn't switched to a secondary freq, but, as is common, every man and their dog listens in on box 2 anyway?

Give us a little credit.

[ferris]

icemanalgeria Was there any aircraft that could have been a shepherd to the 744?, Would it have helped?. Yes, and probably. However, it would require a re-think of current procedures, which usually call for getting everyone out of the way so that the emergency a/c has a clear run to do whatever he needs to. Given the rapid rate that this situation escalated at, re-running it with the benefit of hindsight might offer a number of alternative outcomes. Certainly a useful suggestion. Might come under the "give every assistance" grab-all, but proper guidance would need to be forthcoming.

[oligoe]

Sad, sad story...

Do you remember the story of the Togo presidential B707 that made an emergency landing in Niamey? Hold 1 was on fire and the flight deck quickly got filled with smoke. The commander managed to land the plane by sticking his head out of the side window. Unfortunately I was unable to find any official report.

[fdr]

Add some smoke and it isn't so easy-Blu Up

One recent smoke in cockpit event had started at 4000' on approach. Cockpit filled up rapidly enough that by the time we had donned EROS masks, the poor FO could not read the ECL at all which was a surprise. eventually he actuated the switches for the recirc and packs immediately above his head which he could still see, on the commands I gave by memory (the Air Con Smoke/Elect Smoke checklists are long passed to non recall...). Near landing, smoke was starting to be dissipated.

Point is, that a prior operator I had worked in took on board some of SR111 findings and did for a short period practice smoke/fore with masks/hoods with degraded optics. It gave a lasting impression of the problem of vision. It is not a panacea, highlighting that some unit such as clearview was needed in order to see the instruments and the cockpit window, but no one invested in that. Same operator had previously had a elec fire checklist that would take almost 20 minutes to work through... which did after some adverse feedback get shortened so that the major power services could get removed faster. It was a checklist for fault finding instead of survival.

The last smoke in cabin I had raised a further learning point, where I asked for the commencement of checklists immediately while initiating an immediate descent with ATC to a close airport. FO being well versed in current "CRM" suggests instead we should chat to Ops Control and Maint Control.... the response was rather direct. Later on, the FO who was otherwise well qualified had not heard of SR111, or read any of the available reports on survival time with onboard smoke/fire.

On board fires remain one of the most critical failures IMHO, that we have to cope with, and the checklists and equipment to cope with the events remain rudimentary, and generally not installed in the aircraft anyway. We spend more on napkins for first class than fire safety.

[ManaAdaSystem]

"Funny" to read how everybody agrees on the need to land ASAP if you have a fire or smoke situation.
Some years ago we debated the Emirates 777 captain's decision to enter the hold over Chennai (Madras) after he got a cargo fire warning. Back then he got a lot of backing from some of the PPRUNE pilots on his decision. The warning was real and an emergency landing was only done after the fire warning started a second time (the first warning went out after they did the cargo fire drill).
Evaluating a cargo fire warning is always a bad idea.

Sorry for the slight tread drift, but the outcome of the situation seems to dictate how we feel about the course of action.

[potteroomore]

Some 4 or 5 years ago a canuck skipper on a koreanair B777 flight flew to destination cyvr after getting an cargo fire warning in mid pacific. Instead of diverting ASAP to the nearest alternate, the crew troubleshoot with maintenance control as well as cabin crew checking the cargo compartment temperature " by feel "( through touching cabin floorboards and walls of the lower crew rest compartment! ). How innovative and resourceful. As it turned out to be a false warning, they were safe and sound in yvr expecting accolades to be heaped on them. However, the medals didn't materialise.... Boeing thought otherwise, stating categorically that all cargo fire warning must be dealt with seriously a genuine without time wasted in troubleshooting.

[hammerhead1]

This is a very unfortunate accident indeed.

Im sure the causes will be determined soon. I will follow with great interest.


Im also of the conclusion these pilots were highly trained and the problem encountered were most likely unpreceeced.

Also one of the previous posts above where 30W was mentioned it really shows you the options or lack of options is available.

[fdr]

Hi Pottermore.

some thread drift, but related:

The company however was very happy that the aircraft was in CYVR... A while after that interference with operational decision making by OCC, another A330 flying from the land of the "not quite right" to the land of clockmakers with a Canadian captain had a report from the cabin crew of smoke in the CCRF. The crew diverted immediately to the nearest airport, Helsinki. Landed. No sign of smoke or fire.

Story had been that the "no airflow" annunciator had illuminated in the CCRF, and the local alarm had sounded. The cabin crew member confused that with a fire/smoke alarm and called the flight deck, stating "smoke". As she exited the area, she fired off the fire extinguisher.

The cockpit crew having been alerted to "smoke" called the purser who went down to check and lifted the trapdoor... "smoke" (extinguishant) flowed out and was reported as "smoke" again by the purser at the same time the cockpit got an ECAM msg of "smoke" detected.

Off they divert. 2 hrs on grd in Finland, and then off to clockmaker land.

Big deal.... except... after return to "not right" land, the company CEO complains.... DOO complains and the captain and FO are withheld for a few weeks and eventually get the pleasure of doing another CRM course for their sins.

Reinforcement works both ways.

It took less time to impact the operation than to tell the story, almost. Within 48hrs a new crew was told not to respond to fire warnings as the CEO was p@@@ed off with the outcome. After that? over a dozen fire warnings not responded to iaw the QRH procedure. Apparently all things between the cover of the QRH became negotiable subject to CEO approval (interference)...

There will be another pepsi cola sign established temporarily at great cost somewhere in the side of a hill (my money is still on Katmandu) at great cost and angst. In the wash up all parties will wring their hands and ponder how such a "compliant" program can have had such a bad day.... as happens. "Just bad luck. Could happen to anyone" Maybe so. Maybe a pathological program...

As before, it will take at least 3 losses with dead bodies before anyone reacts.

[787PIC]

For years ALPA and other unions have advocated for better safety and security at cargo carriers. Their efforts stymied by the greedy management of those airlines and the lack of interest at FAA and other watch dog agencies.
This tragic accident hardly appeared on the radar screens of the US corporate controlled media. After all, there is not much sensational reporting there for a couple of lowly "freight dogs" getting killed in the middle of the night in some far out place such as DXB! I also wonder how much of that lack of interest was inversely proportional to the Dollars UPS spends in media advertising?
It is amazing that even a sophisticated 744 lacks the basic tools to fight or prevent smoke and fire onboard!
Many times I wished I could crack that side window and wondered what I would do in case of a real fire on my 747. Certainly not the same, as in the smoke evacuation procedure in the old trusty 707!
For some 40 years, I went through the routine of engine failures, silly circle to land or ADF approaches in proficiency or initial training to satisfy the regulators and "check the box" at the office! Yet, how much time and effort was dedicated to the most dangerous killer known to aviators, the "onboard fire?".... Hardly any!
Finally towards the end of my airline career I went through the most awkward and unprepared maneuver in training ever. Making one approach in the Sim with the full face mask and on standby instrument in a 777! The procedure so uncomfortable and cumbersome, even the check airman new to the procedure abandoned half way through!
With all the advances in simulation technology, how many operators have opted for real smoke in training devices?
A few Flight Attendant trainers use smoke which is very realistic and useful in their training.
In all those years I had only one "real" engine failure that was handled pretty routine, perhaps because of all the training. How many of us are prepared to handle a situation like the one that killed our defenseless comrades? Hazmat should never be carried onboard an aircraft. You cannot pull over the road and jump out of a burring airliner.
I don't know what really happened to those poor souls and I don't want to speculate on something we know nothing about, so early in the investigation. I hope and pray this had nothing to do with hazmat such as Lithium batteries or inadequate smoke and fire suppression equipment on that aircraft.
If so, I want Boeing, FAA and UPS management tried for our colleague's brutal murder!

Captain Ross "Rusty" Aimer (UAL Ret.)

[Huck]

This tragic accident hardly appeared on the radar screens of the US corporate controlled media.

Not one word on Drudge. Not one.

[goldfish85]

I hadn't realized the significance of the same date as SR-111. That airplane was probably as well placed as possible for a fire-caused diversion over the North Atlantic. It does seem to me that we ought to decide ahead of time that serious smoke means serious fire which in turn means put it on the ground -- a runway if possible -- but get out of the air. Ditchings are survivable -- loss of control isn't


Goldfish

[hammerhead1]

Capt rusty,


You hit the nail on the head.


Every sim check each 6 months is pretty much the same type of detail.

I agree, fire should be practised more and the relevant authorities should include this in the syabulss for all airlines


Circling to lands etc on the LST are procedures you are prepared for.
When something happens out of the norm. I.e. UPS last weekend that is not practised on a regular basis can bring unfavourable results.

[grumpyoldgeek]

If all is lost, why not break out the front windscreen with a fireaxe?

[Ex Cargo Clown]

I don't know what really happened to those poor souls and I don't want to speculate on something we know nothing about, so early in the investigation. I hope and pray this had nothing to do with hazmat such as Lithium batteries or inadequate smoke and fire suppression equipment on that aircraft.
If so, I want Boeing, FAA and UPS management tried for our colleague's brutal murder!

I'm sorry, but if you can find a perfect smoke and fire suppression system then you are better than me.

I could make a pretty good one for freighters, it would however need a hose point for every pallet position, and each position would need a feed from four different channels of chemical, dependent on the freight there.

Unfortunately chemical fires do not have a "one size fits all" solution. For some fires, mostly simple organic ones, halon is a very good extinguisher. For alkali metals (other than Lithium) CO2 is a decent one, as is N2. For lithium batteries, H2O is the best. And for others there are combinations of the above, plus other interesting solutions such as aluminium hydroxide and boron compounds that can act as retardants.

It's best to prevent the fire rather than stop it. Carriage of DG is not inherently unsafe. Only unsafe practises make it this way.

[ExSp33db1rd]

This tragic accident hardly appeared on the radar screens of the US corporate controlled media


Sadly - It's " just a freighter ", and I don't mean that disrepectfully of course, but it is the Public / Media perception. Doubtless had there been a school nearby there might have been some mention of the " heroic " action of the pilot to avoid crashing on it, but there were no newly-weds on board, no one who just missed his connection and saved his life by missing the " doomed plane ", no Grandmother making a first " trip of a lifetime " to visit new grandchild in Outer Mongolia. Sad, but be realistic, no Media Shock ! Horror ! percentage.

I once walked into the Pub and announced that I had just got back from New York, with a freighter. "When are you going to be considered experienced enough to fly passengers, then ? " was one comment.

Cynic ? wot me ?

It has been suggested that another crew member on board might have helped ? As a young pilot I was recruited only because the Union had insisted that all flight decks should contain 3 pilots, and this was in addition to a Flt. Engineer and Navigator ! The rationale being another pair of eyes to monitor the more crucial phases of the flight.

The Company then combined the roles of Nav. and P.3 such that I acted as P.3 for the crucial take-off and landing phases of flight, and navigated the bits in between, seemed to work OK, but now we are down to just two - this is "progress " ? and of course there is no evidence that another cew member would have made any difference, but it's a thought - remember how the 'spare' pilot helped save the DC-10 at Sioux City ?

The Classic 747 started with a periscopic sextant hatch in the middle of the flight deck roof, but even tho' INS made that superfluous, it was retained as a smoke removal hatch, i.e. it sucked ! Does the 744 have one ? and if it does could one of the only 2 pilots, strruggling anyway, have gone back to open it ?

Our 707 even had a steward on the freighter ! We were ridiculed by Macho Red-Neck Freighter Dogs, but it was another pair of hands.

I believe the long defunct Ansett airlines in Aus. demanded a Flt. Engineers panel on the Boeing 767 when they first introduced it, the modification cost probably helped their demise, but their logic was spot on.

A third salary is cheaper than the loss of a hull - and two lives.

Maybe.

Later - my apologies, when in doubt read the instructions ( first ! )

The smoke evacuation handle can be reached from the pilot seat without even having to loosen one's seatbelt.

[MATELO]

With a little co-ordination, Bahrein could have changed all traffic to a secondary freq, allowing Dubai to use the Bahrein freq
as a discreteIt wouldnt have mattered, every aircraft would have still been discretely listening to find out the outcome.One for all........

Many years ago I was making an approach to when we heard an aircraft in trouble, He had lost his AH. We broke off our approach to
try and help the guy.
Only last year a QFI from RAF Linton on Ouse jumped back into his aircraft after landing (minimal checks) and got airbourne after a pilot made a mayday call saying he had "gone blind".

Said QFI, guided the pilot down safely, talking him through his actions.

Pilot lands safely after going blind in mid-air - World news - Weird news - msnbc.com (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27600521/)

A little bit more different in a Jumbo, but principal is the same in dire needs.

[icemanalgeria]

Do all airports have 121.5 ?

If so maybe the first thing on the check list should be establish contact on 121.5

I vaguely remember one major aiprort in the UK had a Notam saying no longer had 121.5, if so are there many airports with out this important frequency.

Also reading the posts about the problems of sight, what about having a big voice to give major info like heading speed and v/speed the info is sent to the fma so would not be that difficult to send info voice.

just some thoughts

[SaturnV]

WASHINGTON – The fire that broke out in a UPS plane that crashed last week in Dubai, killing both pilots, appears to have begun in a cargo compartment, according to people familiar with the accident investigation.

Accident investigators are now trying to verify which cargo aboard the Boeing 747-400 was located just forward of the starboard wing, where the fire erupted, those familiar with the investigation said. Investigators also want to know if there were any lithium-ion batteries in that location. If a battery short-circuits, it can catch fire and ignite others.

The location of the fire was identified so quickly because the plane was equipped with a sophisticated data transmission system that sent information via satellite to the company's airline operations headquarters in Louisville, Ky. The transmissions are so fast, people familiar with the investigation said, that UPS' airline operations half a world away had information in hand indicating the plane was in serious trouble before it crashed.

AP sources: Fire may have erupted on UPS plane - Yahoo! News (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100907/ap_on_bi_ge/us_dubai_plane_crash_fire)

[MATELO]

Not according to the actual pilots SaturnV

http://www.pprune.org/5920238-post362.html

[ferris]

The transmissions are so fast, people familiar with the investigation said, that UPS' airline operations half a world away had information in hand indicating the plane was in serious trouble before it crashed. Wow- there's a can of worms (if true).

Iceman- 121.5 is regularly used by ATS units in this part of the world.

[MATELO]

Come on, they cant pin point the location of flight AF447 because of lack of bandwidth back to the "mother ship".

But they can keep a sly eye on any cargo aircraft to find out which pallet is loaded at which inch on the aircraft.

[IslamoradaFlyer]

Come on, they cant pin point the location of flight AF447 because of lack of bandwidth back to the "mother ship".

But they can keep a sly eye on any cargo aircraft to find out which pallet is loaded at which inch on the aircraft.

Do me a favour.


Umm...yes, they can. AF447 was out of radar coverage, but transmitted data via high speed data link as do most newer aircraft if the airline chooses to install it.

[akwood00]

Quote from Yahoo New Article:
"The location of the fire was identified so quickly because the plane was equipped with a sophisticated data transmission system that sent information via satellite to the company's airline operations headquarters in Louisville, Ky. The transmissions are so fast, people familiar with the investigation said, that UPS' airline operations half a world away had information in hand indicating the plane was in serious trouble before it crashed."

"Among the data transmitted ahead of the Dubai crash, according to people familiar with the investigation, was an alert about a serious problem in the cargo compartment near the starboard wing."

Wow, if the company had the information this quick I'm sure the dispatcher that shared joint responsibility would have loved to have this information.
So the company receives important information indicating the plane was in serious trouble and chose to not disseminate it? If this is true, the Feds might have some questions about this. Why have such sophisticated equipment on board and not utilize it to its full extent? :ugh:

[mm43]

IslamoradaFlyer wrote:-

AF447 ...... transmitted data via high speed data link Try "low speed" data link.

mm43

[20driver]

UPS has done some very interesting things with avionics so it would not surprise me that they would have sophisticated inflight data transmit capabilities.
They owned an avionics company for a while, (they sold it to Garmin), and sold the first WAAS GPS in the US. They have installed a GPS ground tracking system to let them speed taxi way flow at their hub. (Like Fedex at Memphis, UPS runs the ATC at Louisville at night).
That they would have info in their ops center in real time is hardly suprising.

20driver

[grizzled]

matelo...

Ease up on that control column a tad...

SaturnV was simply posting an item from AP that is typical of today's media -- overblown and sensationalist -- but based on some little nut of fact.

That fact is that an ACARS type system no doubt gave the UPS Ops Center 20 or 30 minutes of messages related to flags and failures. You can be certain that everyone in that Ops Center went through a form of agony similar to those who were listening on VHF.

grizz

[Diamond Bob]

A little more on the reporting system on the UPS plane:

UPS spokesman Mike Mangeot confirmed that the crashed plane was equipped with an airline health maintenance system, Boeing's name for the transmission system. He declined to comment directly on the crash or what information the company received from the plane before the accident.
AHM systems help "self-diagnose" problems in flight and alert the airline before landing so that maintenance workers are ready to do repairs and parts are on hand. The systems aren't standard on Boeing planes, but the company has been installing them on 747-400s for customers who request them for about five years, said Boeing spokesman Jim Proulx.
Among the data transmitted ahead of the Dubai crash, according to people familiar with the investigation, was an alert about a serious problem in the cargo compartment near the starboard wing.


The Canadian Press: AP sources: Fire aboard UPS plane that crashed in Dubai may have started in cargo compartment (http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5jnuIPhPVvQ9HYxNlLVRgrJ_ju1kA)

[MountainBear]

"With glass cockpits the norm now (i.e. digital) could this basic information be provided audibly by the flight computer into the headsets using a control column mounted switch selectable by the pilot when his/her instruments are deemed unreadable?"

Now that is an interesting idea. Rather than trying to fix the sense that is broken (sight), switch to another sense (in this case, hearing).

I like the way you think. :ok:

I don't know if it would work because I could see an information overload issue with too much data coming from too many instruments. But I think it's an idea worth thinking about, and I don't say that lightly.

[Guy D'ageradar]

Do all airports have 121.5 ?

I have worked for several ANSPs in several countries - every one of the towers/radar rooms had 121.5 monitored 24/7.

With a little co-ordination, Bahrein could have changed all traffic to a secondary freq, allowing Dubai to use the Bahrein freq as a discrete.

As Ferris has already said, more than a little coordination was done that day.

As for allowing another station to use the frequency, that depends entirely on whether the equipment at said station allows a freq. to be manually selected or not. Some main sets are selectable, some aren't. Many standby sets are, some aren't.

[groundbum]

I have no inside knowledge, but would venture a good guess that the readings sent to UPS HQ via datalink are probably fire/smoke detector signals, and from the sound they knew which sensor first sounded the alarm, so they can backtrack from there.

I mean, any fire detection system worth it's salt doesn't just yell fire, it yell's fire because sensor X yelled fire. Helps you get there quick.

G

[Boomerang_Butt]

Apologies for the slight drift... the earlier post about the cabin crew & 'smoke' interests me...

As a CC, I'm curious as to what the procedure is at the pointy end if we call you with a 'smoke' or 'fire' event... Are you trained to ask us questions or to trust absolutely that we know exactly the situation? Of course, we are trained but the example given above shows that it's possible to miscommunicate and misunderstand each other.

In past airlines I've been taught that you never use the "F word" unless you can actually SEE visible flame... and that if you are seeing 'smoke' you say only 'smoke', with a descriptor (E.g. "I cannot see more than one economy seat row" or "I can see to L2 door from L3" etc etc)

If CC were to call you with "fire" is there any promtfor you to ask us if we can SEE it, or are you taught by training to just go with what we say? I understand that crew need to trust each other, however wouldn't you want to be absolutely sure about the information you receive? Does the procedure vary by airline, personal preference, or other factors?

Back to UPS, I too was wondering if audio cues could help, but weren't some other posters talking about excess wind/airflow noise? (Especially if the a/c is depressurised) would this cancel out any effectiveness of audio cues? I suppose it's better to have SOMETHING on the chance it can be heard, than not at all.

Also, would there be any benefit in having certain controls/switches given a tactile coating/shape so they can be more easily found in low light/smoke. (I realise that by years of use, most pilots probably know the locations, but undre stress would it be handy being able to KNOW you have th right switch/button, just by feel?)

We have them on the overwing exits on the B738, why not in the cockpit? Even some form of 'Braille' might have helped, especially on the radio switches...

Apologies for some out loud thinking, especially as a non-professional with limited flying experience (aside from the cabin end)

[Airclues]

Flaps10

If the pack 1 is switched off then the system automatically uses pack 2 when the QRH is actioned.

Dave

[EXLEFTSEAT]

To " ExSp33db1rd"
I would have never believed my dad, who was a WW2 pilot. But he was right. Technology passes us and we are left on the way side. We are old, retired and useless. We remember, but no one cares. From 5 to 4. from 4 to 3, from 3 to 2.
And people think it's funny when there are proposals to have only one pilot in the cockpit. Just wait and see, that's all I can say. My fellow UPS flyers, RIP.

[golfyankeesierra]

Flaps10, freighter is different from pax. System should shut down two packs and leave one running, but that's all automatic (result of recall actions: arming/pushing cargo fire pushbuttons)

[ExSp33db1rd]

EXLEFTSEAT

Sad but true, my first airline type carried 3 pilots, two Flt. Engineers, 1 Radio officer, 1 navigator - also only 1 Stewardess ( and a few Stewards as well, of course )

I repeat - what we have now is 'progress' ?? or just economics ??

"Those who ignore History are doomed to repeat it" - or words to that effect - W.S.C.

Doesn't the next Generation ever learn ANYTHING ? (except how to programme an iSomething )

[ManaAdaSystem]

Going back a few years, some airliners had autopilot controls with buttons that were made so you could easily identify them by feel only. Newer aircraft often use the same type of buttons for different modes, so you need to feel and remember the correct position in order to identify them.

I know which cockpit I would prefer if I have smoke in the cockpit. This is a DC 9:

http://aviapix.ch/pics/FaAv/129_IMG_1755.jpg

The life of a freight dog is worth less than the rest of us. Why else would we deny some dangerous goods cargo on passenger aircraft but allow the same DG on cargo aircraft?

[By George]

I was wrong in a previous post, you can reach the smoke evacuation handle with the mask on. I guess with more thought that's the way it should be designed. Interesting note in the QRH that if the source is not from the cockpit it will actually make things worse by drawing in smoke. Never stop learning.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

The life of a freight dog is worth less than the rest of us. Why else would we deny some dangerous goods cargo on passenger aircraft but allow the same DG on cargo aircraft?

Because in theory the CAO freight is accessible on the maindeck by the crew, so can be dealt with if there is a problem.

Whether or not this works in practice is quite another thing.

[brakedwell]

Quote:
The life of a freight dog is worth less than the rest of us. Why else would we deny some dangerous goods cargo on passenger aircraft but allow the same DG on cargo aircraft?
Because in theory the CAO freight is accessible on the maindeck by the crew, so can be dealt with if there is a problem.

Whether or not this works in practice is quite another thing.

It is only accessible if a crew member is available to check it, which is doubtful in a full blown emergency with only two pilots on board.

[golfyankeesierra]

Airclue, sorry :\, it was directed at Flaps10.
(Post edited)

[Razoray]

It seems to be agreed that if there is a fire on board you have about 20 minutes to land or ditch the plane before it's too late. In the middle of the ocean that leaves just one option, and not a good one. Shouldn't fire suppression or fire fighting be the first course of action. Put down the list and put out the fire.

but what do I know?

[doubleu-anker]

Well ditching would almost certainly extinguish the fire. However how do you get home? There is the rafts I guess.

[Mechta]

When landing UAVs, particularly at night, it is normal for the external pilot who does the take off and landing and is standing beside the runway holding something like an R/C model transmitter, to ask the internal pilot who is sitting in the ground control station, for information such as 'airspeed','altitude', 'range', 'pitch/roll' angles. A demand system such as this might work, whereas one with a constant stream of information may result in information overload.

Failing that, virtual reality goggles with their own air supply are the only thing I can think that might have helped in this instance if there is no way of clearing the cockpit of smoke.

Hands up who has bought a replacement lithium battery from China for their model aircraft,phone or laptop, only to have it arrive in a little paper envelope marked only with 'gift'? Scary isn't it.

[doubleu-anker]

Yes I have to admit I am guilty.

[notadog]

It seems to be agreed that if there is a fire on board you have about 20 minutes to land or ditch the plane before it's too late. In the middle of the ocean that leaves just one option, and not a good one. Shouldn't fire suppression or fire fighting be the first course of action. Put down the list and put out the fire.

No. 20 minutes is too long. 10 minutes at best.

Fire suppression is fine, but without fire extinguishing capability, there will be more hull losses. The crew must be able to stop fire, particularly as most airplanes these days are 2 person crews.

[sidman]

Two man crew..No one to deal with the fire or to even look down stairs to see if something is on fire. You think there would be some way to put cameras in the cargo holds so the crew can see what is going on below.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

All this talk of lithium-ion batteries made me do a little digging into whether they are actually DG or not. Unfortunately I don't have a DGR book or Technical Instruction manual with me, so most of this is off my head and corroborated off the net, so forgive any errors.

As of 2009, Li-Ion batteries under 100Wh could be carried without a DG cert as excepted quantities (under 10Kg). Those over 160Wh need a DG cert under UN3480 Class 9 (RMD).

So for the excepted quantities class, you could have hundreds of Kgs in an overpack, and it would never appear on a NOTOC, and maybe under a shrinkwrapped pallet where you could not possibly see it. Scary.

[SLFinAZ]

This is one of the few scenarios I can see where "full automation" has a place. Some type of "single button" or even voice activation that can be triggered in the event of some type of impending incapacitation of the flight crew.

Basically the "hail Mary" option for the flight crew when it's all going south and no realistic option exists.

[Halfnut]

Instead of ejection seats, hacking out 2" bullet proof windows with the crash ax, parachutes and other gee wiz Buck Rogers ideas how about keeping this crap off the plane in the first place. Anyone caught disobeying the rules would be band from shipping by air for life.

If it truly has to go by air then the shipper pays for an off duty firefighter to stand watch over the pallet with a full complement of fire apparatus appropriate to the DG being shipped. Manning ratio is one firefighter per pallet.

[20driver]

Expdrd33, if having more crew is safer how do you explain todays safety rate against the "good ole" days?

Carrying around a FD crew of 5 would do wonders for airlines economics and prices, which in turn will reduce the jobs available.

We will have to see what the investigation says but it is clear that batteries are everywhere and can be dangerous. Is there a practical way to scan packaged cargo for batteries?

20driver

[JW411]

Batteries are everywhere; indeed they are and your aircraft is fitted with them. Fortunately, they rarely go wrong.

I had the aircraft battery (NiCad) blow up on me over northern Kenya at night (Aden to Nairobi) in one of Mrs Windsor's Argosys. It started off with a smell. F/E went downstairs (the battery was in a cupboard on the left of the forward fuselage INSIDE the pressure hull). Naturally, he took the asbestos gloves with him to investigate. He came back upstairs and told me that he had found the battery "rather hot" and had disconnected both terminals and so we should have no further problems until after landing.

About 20 minutes later there was a bit of a "whump" as the battery blew. Luckily, everything was contained within the cupboard.

We then had to do an emergency descent (not very far in an Argosy) and then get rid of the fumes.

It transpired that NiCads can indeed start to overheat so a thermal strip was introduced between the first couple of cells and that was supposed to melt. Sadly, it did not and so the temperature kept increasing and eventually a catalytic reaction took over.

The funny part was that a bunch of the passengers downstairs were on their way to a gospel meeting in Nairobi. From the flightdeck we could clearly hear renditions such as "Land of Hope and Glory" and "Abide With Me".

I can also remember one of Fred Laker's DC-10s doing an unseemly dive into Winnipeg on the way from LGW to LAX with serious electrical problems which proved to be the battery.

Just like car owners, we take our batteries for granted.

[L-38]

US Congressman now reacting to UPS Flight 6 . . From Air Cargo News 09/08/10

-The investigators are now looking into whether there were any lithium-ion batteries onboard, which have already raised safety concerns about their inclusion on flights.
“The frequency of events, including the difficulty in extinguishing lithium-battery fire, warrants taking strong action,” said Jerry Costello, chairman of the US’ House of Representatives’ aviation subcommittee -

[BandAide]

Most ELTs on board aircraft are powered by lithium batteries, I believe.

[doubleu-anker]

Economics

When I am confronted by the question, "How much is this all going to cost?" I like to remind the money boys the old and true saying. "If you think safety is expensive, try having an accident." This accident, like all others is going to cost some people a lot of money indeed.

An accident could be the trigger, or the final straw, that puts a company under.

[Razoray]

Yes there will always be a debate about cost of extra crew. But I think on all large aircraft, there should be a safety engineer/officer. Let the pilots fly the plane. Let this person address all the other issues.

[Lonewolf_50]

Yes there will always be a debate about cost of extra crew. But I think on all large aircraft, there should be a safety engineer/officer. Let the pilots fly the plane. Let this person address all the other issues.

In the year 2010, it appears that some of the operating philosophy is to let the robot fly the plane, and let the two pilots address all the other issues, which includes flying when the robot can't. (OK, I shall catch a small ration for that ... fair enough). That would still leave the crew in this case with apparently not the right tools to address a fire, other than "land as soon as you can" as a response.

[deSitter]

Battery fire - nasty stuff

YouTube - Tests on lithium battery fire (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gcd34tt8YPU)

Lithium Battery Fire Could Burn Through a Cargo Hold | Air Safety Week | Find Articles at BNET (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UBT/is_29_18/ai_n6280925/)

One can only imagine the catastrophe possible with a bulk shipment of lithium batteries!

-drl

[L-38]

Heres another on lithium batterys lifted from another forum. . .

YouTube - CR123A Lithium Battery Fire (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fG_UuPmLO1c)

Go ahead . .try this at home.

[goldfish85]

You know, I've always wondered if having an FE on SR-111 might have made a difference. As I said earlier, they were about as well positioned as possible for an immediate diversion over the North Atlantic. However, the workload on two pilots would have been unreal. Let's see, one flies the airplane, the other coordinates with ATC, the other fights the fire, . . . . well you get the idea.

Assuming we could say for sure that a FE would have been the difference between Halifax and the water, I wonder how much the industry has saved by doing away with the FE.

Goldfish

[poina]

doubleu-anker,
I'm not trying to argue with you, but perhaps an accident is cheaper. How much insurance money is collected on a yearly basis against how much is paid in premiums? Then of course premiums are raised to recover what has been paid out. It's a win/win for them and no need for the insurance industry to lobby for comprehensive safety improvements.

However, the fed's have known for years through several complete and partial losses the dangers of lithium batteries.

The real danger to aviation safety worldwide in my view is the incompetence of the regulating authorities who just can't seem to show any balls on a wide range of issues from fatigue to DG's.

We always crewed (MD-11) with loadmasters and while he may not have saved the day, I certainly felt better having eyes and a firefighter in the jumpseat. Said authorities, who were and still are sleeping with the manufacturers, sh@t in OUR messkit when they did away with the FE.

[Razoray]

In the year 2010, it appears that some of the operating philosophy is to let the robot fly the plane, and let the two pilots address all the other issues, which includes flying when the robot can't. (OK, I shall catch a small ration for that ... fair enough). That would still leave the crew in this case with apparently not the right tools to address a fire, other than "land as soon as you can" as a response.And that's just not good enough....I'm not saying that if there was a Fire Fighter on board that the UPS plane would not have crashed, but at least it gives the crew a fighting chance, and if anything buys them some much needed time......

[Huck]

It would be interesting to look at the relative manning requirements of the maritime industry.

Let's say a ship was the same length - 225 feet - and carried roughly the same tonnage of cargo. How many crew would be required to be aboard? Would they be required to be trained in onboard firefighting?

[ExSp33db1rd]

Expdrd33, if having more crew is safer how do you explain todays safety rate against the "good ole" days?

Easy - Statistics, as published by those with vested interests.

Quote.. There are Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics ( Anon ) depends who holds the purse strings.

Cynic ? who me ?

Many past accidents in The Good Old Days occured regardless of the number of crew involved, but were related to the cr*p equipment, engines, navaids, weather reporting and comms. that they had to use, and had those same 5 man crews been flying a modern 777 in todays' conditions, then their accidents might not have happened ? Maybe.

Another pair of eyes / hands 'should' help, but then Mr. Murphy is always with us, and I can recall one accident when the presence of a Senior Check Captain in the jump seat, off duty, interspersed his comments into the actions of the other 3 crew members, even tho' he acted with the best intentions, but that affected the reading of the checklist with subsequent disastrous results.

Not really relevant to the subject accident, but I attended one Sim. training session when we were asked the first action in getting a fire warning ? Won't bore you with the various answers, all deemed to be wrong. Nothing, was the desired reply. Sit on your hands and think before you touch anything. I guess that was a precursor of the Capt and Dog philosophy that is now being suggested as the way to operate single pilot heavy jets ?

[AN2 Driver]

@goldfish85

As you can well imagine, SR111 was discussed widely within the company at the time. If a FE might have helped, I don't know, possibly or maybe not. The situation was extremely tricky and misleading to the crew.

From where I sit and from what I did hear and read about this one from people who had direct access to the investigation, it became so dramatic because of a very unique sequence of events. I am going from memory here, long time, but what was discussed and what seemed to me the most logical chain of events was of a nature that was a "gotcha" from every angle one looked at it.

When they first smelled and later saw the smoke and took the decision to divert, they had no way of knowing the location and the mechanics of what went on. Initially, nothing big happened, and even worse, the smoke disappeared or lessened considerably, giving them the idea they had time to prepare the cabin, dump fuel and all that.

However, what went on behind this bulkhead was a trap truely set. The fire melted a cap fitted over an AC duct not used on the pax version of the MD11. Once the cap was gone, the duct sucked the smoke away from the flight deck. That is when the smoke disappeared. When they then went into the checklists and switched off the cabin bus, the fans which provided the suction stopped working and within very few moments, the fire started to move forward and attack the vital systems. A very short time later, they basically had nothing left and crashed.

Of course, the question arose what if they had not disactivated the cabin bus? Might it have bought them the time to go down and land? Very likely if they had gone straight into Halifax or even cricled. But, and that is the crux, they had NO WAY of knowing this and did the absolutely logical thing by depowering the cabin bus, as per checklist. They were right in their assumption that this fire was electrical, so powering down unessential equipment is perfectly sound and what they were trained to do. As to the duct, nobody knew or thought about it's effect once the silicon cap was gone and probably there would not have been an effect, had the fire only been slightly different. And obviously, nobody knows what would have happened if they had continued flying with the fans still on, probably the fire might have eventually burnt through the fuselage aft of the flight deck.

So what really killed them was the sequence of events of smoke on, smoke disappears, giving them the illusion of time available to prepare for landing, following their checklists and with that unknowingly aggravating the situation to beyond control. Nightmare for everyone of us who ever might have to sort out such a situation.

Had they gone by the principle of "he who hesitates survives" on the checklists and at the same time gotten it on the ground overweight and PDQ, they might have made it, or not. BUT had they done so and the fire had been slightly different in nature, this might have been the recipe for disaster right there.

So the posters here who say evaluating a fire is not done got more than one point. I rekcon all of us would rather take the "blame" of an unnecessary diversion due to a faulty indication or cremated crewmeal than to ever ever get into a situation like the crew of Swissair 111 or UPS 6.

[Ancient Mariner]

Huck,
It would be interesting to look at the relative manning requirements of the maritime industry.

Let's say a ship was the same length - 225 feet - and carried roughly the same tonnage of cargo. How many crew would be required to be aboard? Would they be required to be trained in onboard firefighting?

Hard to say exactly,but a ship has what's called a safety crew meaning not the minimum crew to navigate the ship from A to B, but to operate it safely and being able to cater for emergencies.
Every sailor needs to pass a certified safety course learning first aid, fire fighting and other safety procedures. On every ship I've been on we had safety drills every Saturday after lunch. Fire drills and life boat drills alternate weeks. Comparing a ship to an airplane is of course not fair, we had all the fi-fi equipment you could wish for. In the engine room and cargo tanks we could inject inert gases, we had huge sea water fire pumps and extinguishers all over the place. I've had three serious on-board fires in my career, all extinguished.
Per

[arcniz]

Here's a napkin analysis for actually addressing this problem :
the numbers are approximate, but maybe not unreasonable vs actual:

(assumes various commercial products now available, including those discussed at the beginning of this thread)



Cockpit Smoke-Obscuration protection for the Entire Global Commercial Jet fleet:

Approximate number of turbine Air-Transport aircraft in use around the world : 10,000

Approximate est cost for installation/use life of inflatable smoke-through visibility package for panel and forward view windows :

New installations (in quantity) & 5 yrs support : US$ 25,000 /ac

Sustaining cost for existing installations - addnl 5-yr : US$ 12,000 /ac



So:

Cost for the first 5 years (50,000 aircraft-years) = $250 Million

Cost for each successive 5 years (50,000 aircraft-years) = $120 Million

10-yr cost for solving this problem for the entire global fleet = $370 Million

Nominal cost est for ONE aircraft lost - Passenger -Freight a/c median case = $400 Million


The numbers, even if you find a way to double the cost, are very persuasive. Surely some of those financial geniuses that can sell the same city block 5 or ten times over at half a billion $ a throw can help solve this well-bounded but very important problem? Sell bonds? Ticket Tax? Carriers pay? Crews pay out-of-pocket?? Which will it be?

Solvable problem - time to act appropriately.

[Mariner]

The minimum crew of a seagoing cargo ship of any size is 4, or more depending on the area the ship is certified for. Two officers and 2 sailors, which are (supposed to be....) trained in firefighting, and have a lot of FF equipment. With one on the bridge, all the others can fight fires. Which do happen, on ships as well as on airplanes.
And when things do get out of hand, they can still abandon ship and get into a raft or lifeboat.

Not so in an airplane.

I know of at least one instance where a deadheading (742-) Flight Engineer saved the day on an MD-11, when a fire had started on the Main Deck. An incorrectly installed cable clip (by MDD...) caused arcing from a cable to the fuselage, and melting insulation dripping onto a pallet was starting a fire. The FE went back to see where that smoke warning came from. A quick spray with a fire extinguisher solved the problem, and the flight continued. What if he hadn’t been there?

I always feel a lot safer when we carry deadheading crew, for precisely this reason.

I say lets at least get Main Deck fire extinguishing on freighters. Untill then; carry a trained SNY. And lets get EVAS right now.

[Razoray]

So is it safe to say all aircraft should carry an additional emergency trained crew member. Who's idea was the 2 pilot plane anyway. Could you imagine a incident in a A380 with just 2 pilots flying. Certainly that aircraft should require some sort of safety crew with proper first response equipment.

[ExSp33db1rd]

Who's idea was the 2 pilot plane anyway.


The bean-counters.

Cynic ? Wot me ?

Like I've said, Ansett demanded a mod. to the Boeing 767 to provide a flight engineers panel.

They went bust.

Maybe if they had just put the F/Eng. on as supernumary crew, to draw on his experience if something had gone wrong, and not spent mega-dollars demanding a re-design of the 767, they just might have survived. Maybe.

The only difference between a 2 -pilot Cessna Citation in trouble, and a 2-pilot A-380, is the number of deaths that will occur. The logic is the same.

And it'll happen. One day.

[SOPS]

Actually, the 767 first was designed as a 3 crew aircraft. "Mega millions" was not spent by Ansett for the 3 crew flight deck, it was offerewd as an option by Boeing.

[fireflybob]

Could you imagine a incident in a A380 with just 2 pilots flying. Certainly that aircraft should require some sort of safety crew with proper first response equipment.

You mean like the 747 too or any other a/c with lots of people on board and only two flight crew?

Maybe there is a case for trained paramedics on board who also have had training in fire fighting etc? So as well as the fire risk they could attend to and diagnose sick passengers?

[Mariner]

If I remember correctly, a seagoing ship carrying over 12 passengers needs to have a doctor on board.

Interesting parallels between the Aviation and Maritime Industries.... :(

[pappabagge]

I'm still a skeptic regarding the actual usability of the EVAS system. From the outset I must freely admit it's a new concept to me. Apart from the - quite naturally - self-serving sales footage on the manufacturer's website is there ANY empirical and more importantly independent evidence, military or civil-sourced, to support its real ability to tip the outcome in a "situation"? Call me a cynic, but it simply seems to be a little too much like a Dragons' Den invention for investment and balance-sheet purposes than actual bone-hard Flight Safety. Comments? PB @ ESGG

[doubleu-anker]

EVAS works in the simulator like all my other normal and emergency training. I dont really want to be in a position to try it out for real, like all my other emergency training.

It will probably be the smoke that will incapacitate a crew member.

[TheShadow]

I tried it in 2000 in an enclosed panel-van especially set up as a multi-engined cockpit. The concept is to quickly inflate a large clear conformal plastic bag (not orally however) and to thus give a clear line of sight between the pilot's eyes and the windshield as well as the pilot's eyes and his flight inst panel (including a side annexe to cover the centre panel instruments).

In dense smoke, that you were unable to pierce visually without the EVAS bag, it worked very well and gave unfettered visibility out front and to the flight and engine instruments. This was achieved wearing a full face mask (type that P-3 Orion drivers would be familiar with). The guy in the other seat had goggles and had no difficulty.

The inventor sells lots to bizjet operators and all the FAA-owned aircraft utilize them. They've never been made mandatory for airline use however. It's a vaguely similarly silly situation to the EVACU8 smoke masks for pax. These were banned for boarding after 911.

Many things don't make sense nowadays. Not having EVAS available when you need it, particularly for freight dawgs, is one of those latent nonsenses.

Google EVAS for history and details.

[PA-28-180]

"Maybe there is a case for trained paramedics on board who also have had training in fire fighting etc? So as well as the fire risk they could attend to and diagnose sick passengers?"

While I agree that an additional, safety trained person is NEEDED.....as someone with both medical and flight experience, trying to diagnose in a noisy airplane is especially difficult. It's very hard to hear heart / lung sounds on an airplane, etc.
BUT....I DO agree that having someone with fireman (fire "person"??? I HATE PC cr@p!!) and as a paramedic would be a great idea. If this person also had some level of flight training....it would be PERFECT! :ok:
Having only a 2 person, long haul crew, to my way of thinking is criminal! :ugh:

[lomapaseo]

Mariner


If I remember correctly, a seagoing ship carrying over 12 passengers needs to have a doctor on board.

Interesting parallels between the Aviation and Maritime Industries.... http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/sowee.gif


Would that "minimum crew requirement" also apply to a harbor repositioning that can be completed in a couple of hours?

[Mariner]

Lomapaseo,

Required crew needs to be on board when the ship sails. I.e. leaves the harbor. Repositioning within a harbor could be done with a skeleton crew of one watch perhaps - I've seen it done that way. But leaving port, even just to anchor in the roads, requires a full crew.

Why are you asking?

[WilyB]

trying to diagnose in a noisy airplane is especially difficult. It's very hard to hear heart / lung sounds on an airplane, etc.

Airlines these days use the Tempus IC machine which transmits vital signs to trusted medical support with simultaneous voice and video.

Your lifeline at 35,000 feet - The National Newspaper (http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100819/NATIONAL/708189933/1040/GLOBALBRIEFING)

RDT | RDT Your life With care Anywhere (http://www.rdtltd.com/)

[lomapaseo]

Mariner


Lomapaseo,

Required crew needs to be on board when the ship sails. I.e. leaves the harbor. Repositioning within a harbor could be done with a skeleton crew of one watch perhaps - I've seen it done that way. But leaving port, even just to anchor in the roads, requires a full crew.

Why are you asking?


Thanks for the answer.

For my thoughts, a required crew is what gets the job done at an acceptable risk. I don't see much need for having a doctor on board for a time frame that is unlikely to be needed. Thus comparing crews between mariners and aviation needs to have these thoughts in mind as well.

But thanks for the education on the mariner side of things :ok:

[Mark Swift]

My first post here and not exactly the introduction I anticipated!

GobonaStick: I really do not think there is need for comments of this nature. As an ex Merchant Navy officer and now newly licensed pilot I see no sound basis for this comment at all. Both industries have their issues, that is a given, the fact is however though that they are not so different in application, nor are the safety principles / challenges world's apart. I think it would be nice to see respect when / where it is due, from both directions, I don't think stereotyping is productive here nor necessary.

FYI: I carried the worlds most expensive cargo in 2001, on a ship, glad to say is was also a successful one! Industries should not be judged by those that make the news. The aviation industry has not faired so well recently, and has had some 'lucky' escapes too. That is coming from a very proud new pilot and ex mariner too boot so I like to think it a somewhat informed opinion; if not 'the' opinion.

On another note, most certainly an excellent and knowledgeable forum, the amount of hours I have spent reading on here is a testament to a fascinating and skilled industry. Glad to be a new member (If I make probation after this :eek:)

Mark

[Gulfcapt]

I'm still a skeptic regarding the actual usability of the EVAS system. From the outset I must freely admit it's a new concept to me. Apart from the - quite naturally - self-serving sales footage on the manufacturer's website is there ANY empirical and more importantly independent evidence


I've trained with it in the sim. As I've said previously, could hardly see my sim partner due to smoke (mind you, in a narrow Gulfstream) but could fly the jet to a landing.


EVAS works in the simulator like all my other normal and emergency training.


Concur, well said. There's two of us.


In dense smoke, that you were unable to pierce visually without the EVAS bag, it worked very well and gave unfettered visibility out front and to the flight and engine instruments. This was achieved wearing a full face mask (type that P-3 Orion drivers would be familiar with). The guy in the other seat had goggles and had no difficulty.


And number three.

It's simple and it works :ok:. IIRC, the only ongoing maintenance is a monthly battery check and I think every five years it goes back to the factory for overhaul. For less than $30,000 per jet you've got a fighting chance of flying a jet with dense smoke in the cockpit.

Best,
GC

[Payscale]

PA28

We already have paramedics and firefighters onboard. They serve coffee and biscuits when they dont fight fires and resuscitate pax..

[Razoray]

Payscale.

I hear what your saying. But I'm talking about a real engineer who can even fix the toilets when there acting up. And serve peanuts when needed.

[fireflybob]

We already have paramedics and firefighters onboard. They serve coffee and biscuits when they dont fight fires and resuscitate pax..

Yes, payscale, I know what you're getting at there but with all respect to cabin crew most only have fairly basic training in first aid etc.

It's slightly off the thread but as sector times get longer I think there is a case for trained paramedics/fire fighters being on board. The paramedic aspect might save some unecessary en-route landings for pax who appear to be ill but their condition is not life threatening.

[Razoray]

SOP's for this individual could be inflight inspections, safety and security and overall health of the aircraft.

[Biggles78]

Remember the first Hostesses were trained nurses. Pax tend to forget or not know that CC are really there for the emergency situation and as said above serve tea and coffee in their "spare" time.

It would be interesting to look at the relative manning requirements of the maritime industry.
This too is getting scary. Have a look at slide 8 in this link. (http://www.authorstream.com/Presentation/sukhpreeet-240073-world-largest-container-ship-emma-maersk-others-misc-ppt-powerpoint/)

World's Largest Container Ship Ppt Presentation (http://www.authorstream.com/Presentation/sukhpreeet-240073-world-largest-container-ship-emma-maersk-others-misc-ppt-powerpoint/)

[Mariner]

Fires are feared by sailors and aviators alike.

The difference is that on a ship there are off-duty crewmembers to fight it, with lots of FF equipment. And if they lose the fight, they can leave the bridge, the engineroom, or in the ultimate case, the ship.

The two UPS pilots couldn't...

Btw; that fire on the Emma Maersk destroyed her superstructure while still under construction. The shipyard cut it off and replaced it with one that had already been built for a sister ship. No casualties.

[lomapaseo]

Mariner

Fires are feared by sailors and aviators alike.

The difference is that on a ship there are off-duty crewmembers to fight it, with lots of FF equipment. And if they lose the fight, they can leave the bridge, the engineroom, or in the ultimate case, the ship.

The two UPS pilots couldn't...


In order to continue along these lines of comparison, we must also examine the assumptions in the design of the vessels relative to detection, confinement, extinguishing options and time assumptions to complete a safe flight/docking and get the hell out of the vessel.

Of course I am interested in the facts and the design/regulatory/training assumptions. Having very liitle to go by so early in the investigation for the subject accident I can not judge any comparisons between mariners and cargo flights.

But no harm in showing how it's suppose to work in other than aviation fields :ok:

[DownIn3Green]

When I transitioned from the 727 to the 737 I truly missed the FE. I started as an FE, then FO and finally Capt., so I know how valuable the FE is from several perspectives...

On my 1st airline, all FE's were also pilots and SOP for the approach briefing including showing the approach plate to the F/E...On one or two occasions I actually caught a mistake in the making by the guys up front, as I myself have been saved by my own FE...

In the 727, if there was a commotion in the cabin, or in cargo ops a strange noise or thump or bang coming from the back it was very reassuring to turn around and ask the FE to "Go back there and see what's going on".

Can't do that on a 2 crew A/C...

Paramedics are not the answer as I don't think there has ever been a catastrophic event in aviation due to a "seriously ill" or incapiciated pax...

[Rwy in Sight]

Mariner,

Don't forget the abundance of the most common firefighting material, water.


DownIn3Green,

Virgin had a ground incident (with damage to the aircraft) after a medical diversion somewhere in Canada. I think it was either in 07 or 08.

Rwy in Sight

[torquewrench]

My father is former USAF. There have been abundant opportunities for me to meet and chat with other old-school, now-retired USAF flight crew at various events.

From the former members of USAF's heavy, multiengine, multicrew jets, I have heard many stories about potentially serious fires in or near the flight deck -- fires which had been located and safely extinguished as a result of the immediate attention brought to bear on the fire by either a navigator or a flight engineer.

Considerable design time has been lavished on carefully automating all of the official, routine duties of navigators and flight engineers. However, this can easily blind designers to the fact that there were many unofficial, non-routine exertions often carried out by such members of the crew, especially under emergency circumstances, and these are unlikely to be addressed by even superbly foresighted automation.

[ExSp33db1rd]

With improved communications, pilots took over the duties of the Radio Operators, with their morse key.

With improved Navigation techniques e.g. INS and GPS, pilots took over the duties of the navigators, with their sextants

With improved technology, pilots took over the duties of the Flight Engineers, with their slide rules and detailed knowledge of the systems.

No problem, until something goes wrong, then pilots have to do not only their own jobs, but all the other tasks that they have taken on. ( often to enhance their own remuneration.)

Unfortunately, pilots are still the same Homo Sapiens that once had assistance - now they are on their own.

System overload, in moden parlance, can erode the safety margins, we haven't yet bred a breed of SuperPilots.

But this is " progress " ?

We don't know what went on in Dubai, but I bet that crew wouldn't have refused another pair of hands, and/or eyes had they been available.

[PA-28-180]

WilyB..."Airlines these days use the Tempus IC machine which transmits vital signs to trusted medical support with simultaneous voice and video."

Thanks for the info....I knew that SOME operators used this type of service....didn't know how widespread it was......

[valvanuz]

Interesting parallels between aviation and maritime but some differences If we compare a 747-400 freighter with the equivalent in the maritime world you would get a container ship such as the Maersk Emma. A few numbers

Length: 1200ft
Width: 170 ft
Weight: 200 000 tons fully loaded
Single engine of 88 000 kW
Speed: 25 knots
Cruising range: 50 days / 30 000 miles
Crew: 13 for round the clock operations.

At night, in high seas navigation a single person on duty at the bridge is enough. (Fully automated engines). No doctor. At best, a paramedic trained crewmember.
Different world, really!

[Hellenic aviator]

BC-US--Dubai-Plane Crash-Fire,1st Ld-Writethru, US
Published: Tuesday, 7 Sep 2010 | 7:40 PM ET
WASHINGTON - The fire that broke out in a UPS plane that crashed last week in Dubai, killing both pilots, appears to have begun in a cargo compartment, according to people familiar with the accident investigation.

Accident investigators are now trying to verify which cargo aboard the Boeing 747-400 was located just forward of the starboard wing, where the fire erupted, those familiar with the investigation said. Investigators also want to know if there were any lithium-ion batteries in that location. If a battery short-circuits, it can catch fire and ignite others.

The location of the fire was identified so quickly because the plane was equipped with a sophisticated data transmission system that sent information via satellite to the company's airline operations headquarters in Louisville, Ky. The transmissions are so fast, people familiar with the investigation said, that UPS' airline operations half a world away had information in hand indicating the plane was in serious trouble before it crashed.

Those familiar with the investigation who discussed the preliminary findings asked not to be identified because they weren't authorized to speak publicly.

Atlanta-based UPS, formally known as United Parcel Service Inc., has identified the crew members killed in the crash as Capt. Doug Lampe of Louisville, Ky., 48, and First Officer Matthew Bell, 38, of Sanford, Fla. Lampe had been with UPS since 1995. Bell had been with the company since 2006. Both flew out of UPS's Anchorage, Alaska, pilot base.

UPS spokesman Mike Mangeot confirmed that the crashed plane was equipped with an airline health maintenance system, Boeing's name for the transmission system. He declined to comment directly on the crash or what information the company received from the plane before the accident.

AHM systems help "self-diagnose" problems in flight and alert the airline before landing so that maintenance workers are ready to do repairs and parts are on hand. The systems aren't standard on Boeing planes, but the company has been installing them on 747-400s for customers who request them for about five years, said Boeing spokesman Jim Proulx.

Among the data transmitted ahead of the Dubai crash, according to people familiar with the investigation, was an alert about a serious problem in the cargo compartment near the starboard wing.

The plane's pilots also told air traffic controllers that a fire had broken out in the main compartment, and smoke was so thick that they were having trouble reading their instruments, people familiar with the investigation said.

Among the issues raised by the crash is whether FAA should require equipment be installed in cockpits that would enable pilots to read instruments — in most modern airliners that amounts to computer screens — even in heavy smoke. Pilot unions have been pressing for the equipment.

Pilots have limited options for extinguishing a fire in a cargo compartment, said aviation safety consultant Jack Casey. A continuously smoky fire is especially difficult, Casey said, because it interferes with pilots' ability to breathe and see well enough to fly the plane.

The investigation is being led by UAE's aviation authority, but a team led by the National Transportation Safety Board has flown to Dubai to assist the investigation.

A preliminary report released by UAE authorities on Sunday said the crew reported smoke in the cockpit about 20 minutes after taking off from Dubai on a flight to a UPS hub in Cologne, Germany. Air controllers in the nearby Gulf nation of Bahrain said the plane was returning to Dubai. But the crew on Flight 6 did not speak directly with the Dubai tower. For reasons still unclear, the crew could not switch from the Bahrain to the Dubai radio frequency.

The plane was not in the proper alignment to make an emergency landing in Dubai on its first pass, but then began losing altitude and crashed inside a UAE military camp, authorities said.

Investigators also want to exam the plane's flight data recorder — which also monitors the plane's systems — to see if it verifies the information received through the AHM system. The data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder will be sent to the United States for analysis, UAE authorities said.

[fireflybob]

For reasons still unclear, the crew could not switch from the Bahrain to the Dubai radio frequency.


Possibly because the crew could not see the frequency display/selectors due to smoke?

[Patty747400]

"In the 727, if there was a commotion in the cabin, or in cargo ops a strange noise or thump or bang coming from the back it was very reassuring to turn around and ask the FE to "Go back there and see what's going on".

Can't do that on a 2 crew A/C..."

Why not?

You can go to the toilet, you can go and heat the food, you can go and "stretch your legs", you can take a 40 minute nap in your seat.

But you can't ask your F/O go back and check out a strange noise?

Of course you can! It should even be the first thing you do.

[JW411]

While we are at it, and it seems to be the latest great idea of many of you out there is to have a third crew member who is a combination of:

a. The holder of an ATPL with a type rating.
b. A qualified loadmaster.
c. A qualified fire-fighter.
d. A qualified paramedic.
e. A F/E who can even fix the toilet (when he is doing none of the above).

Can I suggest that this extra chap (or chapess) is also qualified to give the last rites in at least five of the world's major religions?

I really, really seriously doubt that the presence of a third crew member on this aircraft would have made a blind bit of difference.

The outcome would have been three deaths instead of two.

I just thank God that I wasn't on that flight deck and I am sure that our two professional comrades did their very, very best in the circumstances.

[SassyPilotsWife]

UMMM not quite. Case in point. My last trip back to DXB. DL from MEM to AMS and KLM home Aug 14th. About midflight, girl having difficulty walking up the aisle, I look and she appears to having a physical limitation that of polio or CP. She attempts to pass by me and was I was about to ask if I could help, she goes back and is unresponsive. I get up and ask for CC to turn on lights, bring me emergency equipment and 02 and notify flight deck. Out of both of the mouths of these 2 are " we don't know how to turn on the 02, we're formerly NWA crew. There is no AED on board ( or they couldn't decipher an AED from a DVD player. So shame on the CC for taking responsibility of these passengers safety and shame on management for allowing them to without proper check off of this equipment. Fortunately an EMT was sitting next to me who's trip was of a different venue. I wake her up and we start treating this girl. Now in response to this equipment that send VS to medical personnel so that a diagnosis can be made and treatment based on those VS. First of all.. you NEVER treat the machine ( BP cuff, AED, PC02 oximetry etc) you treat the patient. Breath sounds ? why do you need to identify specific breath sounds ?? In this situation, the only thing you need to know is whether they are present or not, and is there equal rise/fall of the chest ? That is all part of what we call a general assessment of a patient. You need to note color of skin, are they blue ? then you have an airway problem.. they aren't profusing. if they are pink, good, they are profusing ( delivering oxygen to periperhals aka arms legs) Depicting certain breath sounds can only be done by an advanced care medical provider and certain breath sounds can determine your emergency but without advanced care ( diabetics with kussmal respirations or asthmatics with wheezing which both require meds and advanced breathing treatments) you can't fix them if you dont have the right training or equipment. Ok so you have a patient who presents with a blood pressure of 80/60.. What now ? the machine is gonna tell you to do what ? First of all put the pt on 02.. Hey.. 02 has never killed anyone.. they should have already been placed on it.. BP is 180/100 ? machine gonna tell you to give them nitroglycerine ? OHHH you better find out if they have taken viagra first. Bottom line, there is NO machine or first responder that can take the place of a Paramedic and you can't do crap for someone with a respiratory problem or cardiac emergency with a bp cuff, 02 or even an AED in most cases aka about 99% without cardiac meds. If you have a Paramedic on board, that person is trained and licensed to deliver that care and now you can do great things without having to land the a/c ( with the exception of a full arrest and less than 5% survive one if they make it to the hospital within minutes. I'll take death any day over surviving a full arrest only to become a vegetable the rest of my life. Guys.. comparing CC to Paramedic is like comparing a Captain to a graduate of flight school. Same thing with a CC being a firefighter! They aren't fully trained to know what to use in which type of fire and if they do.. they are going to have no less than 100 pax freaking out and then guess what, the problem becomes too overwhelming. Why not offer volunteer paramedic positions in lieu of flight benefits ? Was it Lufthansa started talking about doctor's being offered this in lieu of air miles ? I would do it in a heart beat! I'm a UAL retiree's daughter who is married to a freight dog with no family flight benefits. I would volunteer a few hours a month in lieu of free travel and I know alot of other Paramedic / Firefighters who would as well. I also have years of experience in not only flying as a pax but I have worked for Fed Ex and Pinnacle and I know ramp operations as a ramp rat ( took the job for the flight benefits on my days off from the FD) Especially when we're doing this job for less than 50k a year. I would also offer 8 hour courses each month to CC and pilots for more advanced training which teaches them how to really assess and treat a patient in an aisle rather than a classroom where they have all the space in the world and 10 assitants at their fingertips. Sorry to have gotten off the beaten path of the thread but the simplest of things are prevented thanks to bean counters, deregulation and profit mongers . My heart and mind are still with Dawn and Matt's family as well as Dougs. I thank God every day my FO arrives home safely as he flies dangerous goods all the time. Stay safe guys..

[L-38]

Think alternate result for FedEx 705 (the FedEx suicide jumpseater) if without an airplane saving third crewmember. . . . All that's basically required of a third crewmember is the will to live.

FedEx Flight 705 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FedEx_Flight_705)

[Machaca]

torquewrench:
...this can easily blind designers...

Sad to see such a pedantic misrepresentation of an amazingly thorough process undertaken by large numbers of highly accomplished minds who work feverishly to provide every contingency possible.

[SassyPilotsWife]

Guppy..

You are spot on in regards to the need for overhaul etc. My reasons again for not allowing CC to be your Paramedic NOR FF. They can't sit and babysit the scene until the a/c lands. But can you train an FE or jump seating pilot to be the FF in command in the a/c at time ? What if you want to dump the cabin ? Will depressurization put out all fires ? But can a FF survive even with SCBA or MSA in that event ? No. Can AFFF polar solvents work inflight? I know that is more fuel related. What about organic solvents ? They work against corrosion ie.. laurel alcohol. I am not certified in AC FF so i just wonder if a FF is put on board, what is the best recourse ? At least they would be the eyes in the cabin and the professional to handle such emergencies as the crew are there trying to do what is the most important function in an emergency, get the a/c on the ground. I am sure you agree that there are alot of FF's and PM's that would be on " watch" in lieu of free travel for volunteering 8 hours or 16 hours a month.

[TopBunk]

SassyPilotsWife

Is there any chance that you could format your postings a little.

I'm sure that you have lots of good stuff to say, but when it is posted as a single block as above, it becomes almost unreadable, at least to me.

Try paragraphs, thanks:ok:

[727gm]

In her defense, depending on the computer I use here and there, all my nicely formatted, punctuated, posts get run together into a continuous mash-up, too.

[fesmokie]

SNS3Guppy,

Well said!! I agree 100% in what you wrote. I was in aviation for 27 years and a PFE for 23 years starting on the DC-6, and up thru most all 3 and 4 holers requireing an FE. I have been in one accident where a total hydraulic failure kept all 3 of us busy right up to the crash. I can't imagine what could have happened if it were only two crewmembers. Ive had to leave my seat for fire, loose animals, leaking chemicals, open cargo door and several other potentialy life threatening situations. I'm not saying that a third crewmember could have saved this unfortunate accident from happening but I do believe that taking out the third seat on big jets was a big mistake. One word you said "Workload" say's it all. When the sh*t hit's the fan and then it becomes multiple failures the workload becomes excessive and with one pilot flying the airplane and the other working with the FE it can very quickly become overwhelming for all. We see this in the Sim during re-current and initial training all the time. Complacency is also our worst enemy.

My Sincere condolences go out to these two Pilots and there families.

[ThatRedHatGirl]

Slight drift, sorry.

Sassy Pilot's Wife... I see your point but am not sure you understand the purpose of the Tempus.

Yes it's a machine, but it relays all the given info (vital stats etc) to live sat-phone connection to Medaire in the US, has trauma doctors & surgeons on standby. They then take that info and advise the crew on actions to be taken.

Sure, we are not doctors but it's designed to give them the info to tell us what to do (if there is no medical professional onboard)

We can also send still images/video to be used in aid of a diagnosis. Point of the tempus is not to replace a doctor but to allow more accurate diagnosis & decision makign with regards to diversions (espwecially on Ultra Long Haul ops)

And yes at my company in our medical supplies aside from AED we carry a full cardiac kit including all the proper medications (Doctor's Use Only) :ok:

[ExSp33db1rd]

"In the 727, if there was a commotion in the cabin, or in cargo ops a strange noise or thump or bang coming from the back it was very reassuring to turn around and ask the FE to "Go back there and see what's going on".

Can't do that on a 2 crew A/C..."
.....................................................
Of course you can! It should even be the first thing you do.

So now we’re back to the one pilot philosophy again ?

I certainly wouldn’t send one member of a 2-pilot crew ‘down the back’ to investigate anything – suppose he never came back ? I say again, we started with a steward on the 707 freighter, even with a 4 man crew, but eventually lost him to the Bean Counters.

I had an occasion when we felt heavy vibration, cabin crew on the Intercom said a wing panel had blown off, passengers looking through to the ground. I refused to send either the F/O or F/E off the flight deck, all might have been necessary to deal with handling, comms, pressurisation, problems – whatever - that we thought might occur, but we had a supernumary F/O so he went back.

It was almost a non-event, Boeings even said it was not necessary for me to have returned to land as the 747 could fly with a hole 9 feet by 2 feet ( ? memory ?) in that area – my Manager asked what was I supposed to have done, got out and measured it ? Tough, I was back on the ground - but I was still glad the spare guy was on board.

We might eventually know if a third crew member in the DXB case would only have been a saviour or a third casualty, but IMHO that’s not the point.

Alone on the flight deck of a stricken aircraft, can you be sure that 'The Computer' will always be there as your willing helper? My experience is that they fail just when you need them most. ( cynic ? wot me ? )

However, it ain't going to be my problem ever again, it's your ....... ( was going to say funeral - complete to suit ! )

[wes_wall]

Number one priority when you have a fire - - Fight the fire immediately. Good thought, good priority, but with a two man crew, not practical, particularly when the fire is below you on another deck, or even behind you on the same deck. I question how effective a bottle of halon, dry chemical, or water is going to be if such fire is producing smoke to the extend that visibility is limited or not possible. Smoke hoods may provide O2, but will not aid in visibility under those conditions. Thus, an axe, knife, or other tools will likewise provide little assistance and value. Putting the airplane on the ground is paramount and an airport is always a nice choice. This crew attempted to do just that.

[ExSp33db1rd]

This crew attempted to do just that.


and how sad that they didn't quite make it.

So now, let the best brains in the business lock the bean counters out of the room and work out how to give the next crew in that position - and there will be a next crew- a better chance.

[DownIn3Green]

Ex speedbird...100% correct on your comments, IMHO....

Guppy...you just rang a bell with me re:leathermans, etc...

I was working for a low budget Cargo outfit out of MA...if anyone remembers the ill-fated Hawaii - Guam postal contract this carrier got in the early 2000's you'll know who I'm speaking of...

In any case, I was assigned to fly Hawaii - Majuro - Guam in the "Super" 727...

Could be done, but barely...(just ask "Mustang Sally")...

But I digress...about the leathermans etc, I carried one plus a Swiss Army knife in my flt bag...

Turns out we had to access the ramp and our A/C via the pax screening stations...ergo...no leatherman, no swiss knife...(kept for "safe keeping" by our handler)...

Now, What to do??? Company Ops Manual says all crew members WILL HAVE a "multi-purpose" tool while acting as a crewmember on duty...

So now I'm in violation of the FAR's by not complying with my Ops Man...

It's all B.S....Thanks Guppy for reminding me of just one more reason I take AMTRAK when I go on vacation....

The 3rd crewmember is an invaluable asset...anyone who doesn't believe that either hasn't "been there" or must be a PFT wonder or some kind of Cadet with 250 hrs and delusions of self importance with a brand new uniform...

[Graybeard]

McDouglas promised ALPA to never build another two crew plane after the DC-9. When bigger engines became available in about 1978, DAC proceeded to design and build the stretched DC-9, calling it the DC9-80. ALPA howled. By this time, the three crew 767 and 757 were in initial production. Then, lo and behold, accident rates showed the two crew 737 had the best record, followed by the DC-9. The 3-crew 737 was not as good. That ended the controversy.

The UAL and other 3-crew 767s were modified at Boeing to 2-crew, and the DC9-80 got a name change to MD-80. Nobody could imagine 2-crew, 4-engine cargo planes at the time, you can bet.

GB

[EW73]

Hey Heracles...

funny you mentioned that...and I totally agree with your sentiment and your deductions, except...
I've discussed exactly this with several Classic Captains, and each and every time, they said that in the event of similar situation to that which occurred getting back to Dubai, that they would have elected to have the FO go and fight the fire, with the Captain and Flight Engineer getting it all back on the ground!

One of your final comments reminded me of that...

EW73

[GerardC]

Hi EW73,

In my company, the F/E was designated (and trained) to fight a main deck fire.

This left the two of us manage the side panel : not ideal either...

[2 Dogs]

Vuzix Wrap Range from Inition (http://www.inition.co.uk/inition/dispatcher.php?URL_=product_hmd_vuzix_wrap&SubCatID_=16&model=products&action=get&tab=summary)

Surely something like this with a feed from the instruments giving alt, speed, AH would be fairly easy to rig and install.
Not for normal use but better than nothing in anemergency and cud be worn under mask.

[LastCall]

This was a very tragic accident indeed. However, I am more than a little curious about one aspect of the event.

I flew the 747-400 for several years back in the 90’s. Ours were combi versions with the upper deck cargo area located behind a bulkhead which was located approximately even with the back of the wing.

If I remember correctly the pressurized airflow within the aircraft was from front to back, and vented overboard through 2 outflow valves located on the underside and at the rear of the airplane. In this configuration I would imagine that any cabin smoke or airborne contaminants would be drawn towards the rear and vented overboard.

Based on this, I am curious as to how the smoke intensity could become so great to advance forward and permeate into the enclosed upper deck cockpit so as the two pilots couldn’t see the instruments.

Am I missing something obvious here? Just wondering….

[Huck]

Am I missing something obvious here? Just wondering….


I've read rumors that a pack was deferred. Nothing solid yet.

[BOAC]

Huck - I saw a post to that effect here a few days back but it appears to have gone.

[p51guy]

About a year after the Swissair 111 crash, I had smoke fumes throughout the cabin and cockpit. Our checklist said to shut off the non essential busses and see if the smoke decreased.

We were headed south out of MIA over the Keys. I immediately shut off the non essential busses with no checklist and declared an emergency and proceeded direct to MIA. I set up an autoland even though MIA doesn't have autoland. After completing the checklists we landed with smoke fumes throughout the airplane. The source was the galley oven. We shut that off instantly. Two weeks later they changed our checklist to what we did. A flight engineer would have done the same thing. We were in a 757 so didn't have that available. Coming out of a 727 makes it hard to not miss an FE.

[barit1]

Graybeard:
...By this time, the three crew 767 and 757 were in initial production.

IIRC Airbus was calling the A310 a "FFCC" (Forward-Facing Crew Cockpit) - and could be operated by either a 2- or 3- crew consist.

[fesmokie]

Last Call mentioned something that triggered this.

It's been 7 years since Ive flown the Classic but I remember there was a way that if a Crewmember wanted to go downstairs and smoke (Freighter) I would do something with the recirc fans and or the zone trim air producing a higher airflow in the flight deck.You could not detect smoke in the cockpit at all by doing this.
Now I'm just taking this from memory so don't flame me if I'm wrong.

[Basil]

I'd have thought it safer to smoke back in the upper deck - especially with horses and associated straw on board.
Smoking on our aircraft was not permitted, however I had nothing against smoking on the upper deck. I'd have been less than delighted if I'd found anyone smoking on the main cargo deck.

[fesmokie]

Our upper deck had bunks and seats. On the main deck at the bottom of the ladder was the best spot. Of coarse one would have to concider what kind of freight you had on board and make the judgment whether or not if it was safe to smoke. My point though was the fact that it was possible to re-direct the smoke to the aft part of the aircraft.

[DozyWannabe]

In my company, the F/E was designated (and trained) to fight a main deck fire.

This left the two of us manage the side panel : not ideal either...
The thing is that all this discussion of aircraft design dropping the engineer's panel is superfluous to my mind. Even if the aircraft is a 2-flight crew design, nothing is stopping cargo operators from carrying a third crew member - say a relief pilot (of any rank) on the jumpseat - and training all their flight crew in firefighting. The only question there is cost, and with the margins in cargo operations being significantly tighter than thier pax equivalents it would be a big question.

That being the case, we still don't know what kind of fire this was, or whether it would have been possible for a third crewmwmber to fight it.

[hetfield]

The only question there is cost, and with the margins in cargo operations being significantly tighter than thier pax equivalents it would be a big question.Very well said. Accidents like this tragic one are taken into account by the industry. The beancounters balance them against costs. A pilot's or even passenger's life is just a $$$ number.

Sad but true.

[Intruder]

The thing is that all this discussion of aircraft design dropping the engineer's panel is superfluous to my mind. Even if the aircraft is a 2-flight crew design, nothing is stopping cargo operators from carrying a third crew member - say a relief pilot (of any rank) on the jumpseat - and training all their flight crew in firefighting. The only question there is cost, and with the margins in cargo operations being significantly tighter than thier pax equivalents it would be a big question.
You cannot generalize about cargo margins. Some cargo carriers -- including UPS and FedEx -- are (and have been) wildly profitable, even while many passenger carriers have suffered huge losses.

More to the point would be whether procedures would be developed to actually use a 3rd crewmember as a firefighter. While FEs on our 747 Classics are allowed to go to the cargo deck to check out smoke, etc, our 744s do not have the proper O2 masks to do that, so a 3rd pilot would make no difference without a significant change in policy, training, and equipment.

[DozyWannabe]

You cannot generalize about cargo margins. Some cargo carriers -- including UPS and FedEx -- are (and have been) wildly profitable, even while many passenger carriers have suffered huge losses.

Fair point, though in mitigation I'd say that you've picked two of the most profitable cargo operators - I'm sure there are several pax operations operating at a profit, despite several of the big former state carriers having had trouble recently.

...so a 3rd pilot would make no difference without a significant change in policy, training, and equipment.

Which was the point I was trying to make (please excuse me if it was poorly worded) - in short, would the costs involved in changing the policy, training and equipment cut the profit margins significantly, or tip smaller operators into loss-making?

[p51guy]

Going from a 727 to a 767 meant isolating electrical smoke was no longer possible. The pilots didn't have the time to deal with what the FE did. The checklist was simplified to basically land at the nearest suitable airport and let it burn. The day I had electrical smoke in the whole aircraft I shut some non essential busses off immediately then did our simplified checklist. Wish we had an FE that day. It will really get interesting when they get down to one pilot operations.

[simflea404]

I still think the problem needs to resolved on the ground rather than in the air...having a third crew member may have helped...but if it turns out to be a cargo fire (let's face it that is the main bet) then it is a situation that no crew can be expected to return safely without some element of luck....and luck should NOT be a criterion!

[p51guy]

Luck was probably all they could hope for in their case. If they had time to configure for an autoland and braking they might have had a chance. You have to see to set that up. If they were asking controllers to tell them their heading and altitude they had no chance at all.

[Machinbird]

P51Guy

If they were asking controllers to tell them their heading and altitude they had no chance at all.

Particularly if the radio transmitters they were tuned to were in Bahrain.
Relay might help for a while but at some point it would break down.

Unbelievable that the certification standards do not provide for positive smoke evacuation from the cockpit in large passenger carrying aircraft. I am certain that the engineers can design a solution. But first they have to be given the task. ("Engineers" as in the guys who design the things in the first place-not FEs)

[chase888]

I think you have hit the nail on the head.

As SLF even in a provincial Philippine airport we are scanned and searched.

Some major container ports do scanning, so why not do it to airfreight.

An X-ray combined with AWB could very easily discover (some probably not all) incorrectly labelled freight, particularly I suspect, lithium batteries and containers with unlisted liquids therein.

[OKFINE]

The DC9 QRH had pages of procedures to isolate this or that, consuming considerable time. The Unwritten Procedure was Emer Power On, generators Off, Land.

[GLOC]

Machinbird

Particularly if the radio transmitters they were tuned to were in Bahrain. Relay might help for a while but at some point it would break down.

Good point, based on that though does Dubai or Emirates ACC have emergency dial up radios or similar that they could have tuned to pick up the relay with local radios??? :confused: Friends airborne that were involved in the relays said there was a lot of R/T and how up to date the info was by the time it was issued is another problem I guess.

[hetfield]

Coming back to the possible cause of the fire. Somewhere it was said smoke detectors in the fwd hold were activated. This doesn't necessarily mean the fire has started there.

Anyhowe, where are the crew oxy bottles located on 744?

[ManaAdaSystem]

A lot of focus on how to deal with a fire, and there is nothing wrong with that, but the focus should be on preventing a fire in the first place.
To start with, maybe shipment of some types of batteries should never be allowed on board any aircraft?

[rodthesod]

This may not be appropriate in this particular case but it has a general relevance. I was a TRE on the same type to which JW411 refers (4 eng, 2 gen, 1 APU,1 batt) when the manufacturer decided to remove the ‘smoke removal drill’. This was done, probably in fear of possible litigation in the aftermath of the Swiss Air MD11 accident. IIRC the MD11 crew were preoccupied with the checklist and made no attempt to land a.s.a.p. at an airport about 7 minutes away and crashed about 20 minutes after smoke was detected on the flight deck.

Like JW411 I too retained the relevant 2 pages of the FRCs, just in case. I had previously sim trained crews in the use of that checklist on many occasions and always advocated landing a.s.a.p. whilst actioning the checklist. The workload was high (hence the training) and communication with oxygen masks on was difficult (hence the training) but with this training the whole procedure (in the worst/longest case) could be completed by an average crew in 9 minutes. If lucky and the first electrical isolation worked, the whole procedure took about 3 minutes to a smoke-free cockpit.

IMHO, removing that checklist was criminal. How dare the manufacturers of a medium range public transport aircraft that spends a good deal of its operating time more than 20 minutes away from the nearest suitable airport suggest that it’s OK for the crew to sit in a shower of molten metal and plastic rain whilst they land a.s.a.p.? I suggest that the litigiously minded morons who make these changes consult with those at the waterfront first.

rts

[barit1]

I do not understand the mentality of the QRH deletion mentioned by rodthesod & JW411. Post-accident, the plaintiff's lawyers will subpoena ALL PRIOR REVISIONS of applicable manuals to look for such discontinuities.

Those revisions based on solid technical grounds will be looked upon in a positive light; those which appear to be CYA, not so much. :rolleyes:

[Machinbird]

SNS3Guppy
Nobody is going to re-engineer the B747. It doesn't need to be done. There are other ways to address the matter.
With all respect due your experience in type and in structural fire fighting:

Be careful your mindset does not become part of the problem. Preventing fires is important, Retarding fires is important, Controlling internal heat build up is important, but there will be more fires aboard aircraft, of that you can be sure.
You might be surprised what kind of prompt re-engineering of the airflow in the cockpit can be done quite simply with a few meters of linear shaped charge. The closer we get to an open cockpit, the better in a heavy smoke situation. (Might need your long underwear though)The B744 in question wasn't carrying passengers; it was carrying cargo. Between hazmat and the amount of cargo being carried, there's a lot more potential and capability for a fire, as well as a lot more packaged fuel.

Agreed that cargo aircraft have considerably more potential fuel onboard. We have also lost passenger aircraft to smoke so the problem is not unique to cargo aircraft. Almost all cargo aircraft started on the drawing board as passenger aircraft. If the smoke removal system can't handle the job in real life, the design standards are out of whack. We can either put bandaids on the problem or we can put solutions into effect. A blinded crew is a disabled crew. It is time to get serious about smoke removal.

[RustyNuts]

To start with, maybe shipment of some types of batteries should never be allowed on board any aircraft?

The problem often isn't what's allowed and what's not allowed, it's what people stuff into the boxes undeclared that can be the big problem.

I work in UPS' ground operations in Louisville (I load the planes that you guys fly) and you'd be amazed what people ship without thinking. Kids going off to college and getting their first apartment? Let's send them cleaning supplies! How about Lysol, various aerosols, alcohol? And she looooooves candles so let's send her some along with a box of matches. And while we're at it, let's send her a new battery for her laptop and wrap it all up in some nice warm blankets.

I kid you not, that was all in a box that was recently discovered because it was leaking and soaked through. Apparently the lid on the Lysol bottle wasn't tightened down and the contents spilled out. And these people didn't know any better so they didn't declare any HAZMATs.

In the thirteen years I've been at UPS I've seen all kinds of things fall or leak out of boxes. Salvaged batteries just dumped loose into a carton and taped shut. Household cleaners out the wazoo. Even snakes on occasion.

Short of opening each package I don't know how you would eliminate unauthorized HAZMATs on an aircraft. And on the night sort in Louisville we'll run a million packages or more on a nightly basis, in about four hours. Tough task for anyone.

[Awl flyer]

Thank you RustyNuts for your post … and welcome to the community here
I'm new to Cargo air transportation business but being trained on Dangerous Goods transportation and having an idea how all cargo things organized I’m not any longer in doubt what to do with a first sign of Cargo Fire Warning, even having multimillion airplane to operate.
I’m new on 744 as well, and did a thorough reading through the systems description involved in this sad accident. I can say that I have found nothing that contravenes the logic in systems operation and procedures to follow through. FIRE CARGO FWD C/L constructed to make flight deck isolated out of the smoke coming from underneath and Boeing says … plan to land at the nearest suitable airport. For me it sounds now like … go and land ASAP even you don’t have one.
I’m waiting for the report released by investigation folks, indeed, to analyze the whole situation and make that made not just on rumors and reporters news but on CVR and FDR data.

[The Turtle]

I wonder how long those containers, sitting in +45c ramp conditions, probably under the sun as well, were waiting to be loaded on that flight?

Anyone care to guess?

[ExSp33db1rd]

Nobody is going to re-engineer the B747. It doesn't need to be done. There are other ways to address the matter.


The 747-440F doesn't need to be re-engineered, it just needs to be re-crewed.

The 3rd crew can be a steward/loadmaster/firefighter whatever tasks one chooses to heap on them - all it takes is money.

As I've already remarked, there is no way I would send one member of a 2 crew aircraft back off the flight deck in a high-stress, emergency situation- what if he didn't come back. Casually strolling back to the toilet, or galley, in stable cruise, is not the same thing.

Don't forget that the RAF went through a period when a Navigator could be CAPTAIN of the aircraft.

[DownIn3Green]

Ex-Speedbird is right...

As for Rusty, well welcome to the PPrune...aside from that, I've done the sort (from the left seat, so to speak) in Louisville once or twice, but more times than I care to count in DAY...

You have my utmost respect as yours is a thankless job, mainly for the reasons you list...

And you are right, there is nothing you, as a ground CREW, or I as a Flight CREW can do about it unless someone looks into each of the 1,000,000 packeges each night...

For some of those who find that number unbelievable, I'm sure many of those packages are "envelopes"...i.e.-overnight letters...

None the less, the situation remains the same...Night Freight is what it is, and pilots accept it as such...

Unless you as a trusted "Ground CREW" deliberetly load some spooky stuff on my A/C, I'm behind you 100%

[ManaAdaSystem]

After reading RustyNuts answer, I'm afraid to ask the obvious question; Don't you screen all cargo?
If not, we have the worlds largest security hole flying over our heads.

[ExSp33db1rd]

Don't you screen all cargo ?


come on ! we all know how effective - and therefore infuriating - the present passenger screening is, and the bored operatives are in the public eye, just imagine how dedicated the boneheads would be in an almost deserted freight shed on a wet night !

There are sensible precautions in place now, but nothing is 100%.

This discussion is about how to deal with the odd hazardous cargo that does slip through, deliberately, or accidentally, placed on board, or other emergencies that migth benefit from another pair of hands or eyes, which at the end of the day might be the cheapest option ?