Airblue down near Islamabad

[Meekal]

I can't believe that the crash report of the VVIP C-130 was not released because of commercial considerations.

I don't think this straying into restricted area around Kahuta makes sense. He was coming from the Lahore side and joined the ILS-DME for 30 and then did the circle-to-land procedure. To over-fly Kahuta which is further north-east, he would have had to overshoot the extended center-line for 30 and then turn right going away from the field. That's a pretty weird track. I read it and it has zero credibility.

Kahuta becomes an issue when you take-off from 30 and make a RIGHT-hand climbing turn over the Margalla's (forget the name of the SID) and then out on the 160 radial towards Lahore. If that turn is wide you can stray awfully close to (or into)the restricted area.

Many years ago I was watching a BA 747 depart 30 and make that right hand turn. He came right over my house and I was listening to ATC on my VHF receiver and heard Chaklala tell him "Speedbird XXX, expedite your turn". He was low and heavy (Destination Manchester) and you could understand why they did not want to bank it too hard. But I reckon he did not stray into the restricted area because he changed over to Cherat.

I don't believe power lines can cause a F.27 to flip! I think in the Multan crash he pretty much ploughed straight-ahead into the fields. I believe the fatalities were mostly due to the ensuing fire.

The over-loading was a rumor. No one knows. So was the over-boost. These are all rumors. There is no published report! The in-flight fire on the 707 was a rumor too. They say some pilgrim was trying to cook something in-flight!

I would not describe the Airblue crash as 'low energy'. We have all seen the pictures here. There is no recognizable wreckage; nor were many if not all the bodies. An aircraft hitting a hill and exploding is hardly 'low energy'.

[Phantom Driver]

Discussions about circling approaches never cease to amaze me. From time immemorial, the procedure has counted as one of the most dangerous manoeuvres to undertake in a big jet (and yes, I include the A321 in that category). For many reasons, most important being issues of fatigue, combined with poor visibility/night time, combined with low altitude manoeuvring, combined with LACK OF PRACTICE!

Someone many posts ago pointed out that most of us get to “practice” circling approaches in the sim, usually once in a blue moon (lots of stuff to get through on recurrencies these days). I am sure that even the aces that fly for 411A’s outfit would find it challenging if thrown into a circling situation at short notice, maybe after a long multi sector day/night.

My company’s stabilisation criteria require wings level at 400 ft after a circling approach. In a 747/777? Give me a break! The wingtips would have been scraping the treetops just before that, if you were not precisely on the numbers (and who can guarantee that 100% every time? 411A’s boys, maybe…).

The sooner someone in the regulatory department accepts the fact that Cat C/D a/c should not be doing this sort of stuff, the better. Let’s forget the “macho’. Our customers deserve it. I personally resolved long ago not to accept an instruction to circle, certainly not in mountainous terrain; divert is a better option, whether commercial dept likes it or not. Fortunately the situation has not arisen yet.

To the credit of our ops department, we are even discouraged from accepting the last minute side-step to other runways much beloved in US airports. This may be ok for those guys operating in there day in and day out, but not for the occasional visitor.

I can hear the armchair experts spouting now-“this should not be a problem for the professional pilot” and indeed it would not, but it would not be tidy, or comfortable, and in this day and age, our aim is to make everything as drama free as possible. No one likes surprises in the air, be you pilot or passenger. To the uninitiated, you would not believe how much Big Brother (AFDR-data recorder) is watching you in the cockpit. Put one foot outside the many (very tight) approach /landing parameters and it is a call from the office for a discussion with the Chief Pilot (no tea and biccy’s either, and quite rightly so). Flight safety is what it is today because of these sort of policies. It’s the least our customers deserve.

Back to the main topic; someone suggested possible “Map Shift”? Maybe in the older a/c, but in today’s machines with triple IRS/GPS Nav working overtime to maintain RNP/ANP, I doubt if it was a factor. Have a read in past issues of Aviation Week about Chinese airline operations into high altitude, mountainous airfields using RNAV approaches..

[BOAC]

It really is time we knocked this 'map shift' stuff on the head.

We understand an ILS was flown to circling DA - map shift would have no effect.

We understand the a/c was trying to turn right into a left-hand downwind circling approach - a visual manoeuvre - map shift would have no effect.

For reasons as yet unknown the a/c kept going to the north-west of the field. Not even on an extended downwind track. Presumably ILS DME still displayed - map shift should have no effect.

And that's without GPS!

[Walter E Kurtz]

Sound argument Phantom. Poor dumb punters have no idea how dangerous circling is when they buy a ticket, they deserve better.

[aterpster]

411A:

That was my direct quote, aterpster...not what you 'quoted'.....:rolleyes:

I added the statement in parens to my otherwise direct quote of your second sentence. I thought it would be apparent that was my insert to clarify for the thread what I hoped you implied by your statement. :)


Do you not know what procedures are normally used at the airport of intended landing?
If not, why not?http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/icon25.gif

Answering a question with a question is no answer at all.:=

[PEI_3721]

BOAC, in #254, you imply that the FMS/Map position was correct during the approach and thus it would not shift, or if it did the discrepancy would be small.
There are many unknowns, e.g. which type of nav aids could the FMS accept and were these nav aids available for a position update during the descent and approach.
ILS is an unlikely updating aid, so too the associated DME in older FMS’s (problems of coupled systems when switching runway ends – n.a. here?).
Thus, what are the local DMEs, what was their availability – serviceability and line of sight? Does this FMS use TACAN inputs, etc, etc?

ILS displayed – maybe, but it would have to be tied to the map runway/airfield position, and it this position which is being questioned. Pre-empting another question – in some aircraft (all?), an ILS can be flown with a map shift as the beam is ground referenced. If this reference can be compared with the map, it is a good indicator of a possible map-slip. Conversely if not, it’s a hazard as it might generate a false sense of map accuracy.

The same for being 'visual' downwind, this the essence of a circling approach as 'visual contact' ties the aircraft position to the ground (no map shift), but in poor weather at low altitude the crew might be susceptible to mental map shift;- illusion, wish-think, press-on-itis, or only the first officer in contact (no crosscheck of position).

Even in speculation we require more information – and let’s speculate as it might help the investigators, or at least trigger a much needed response; but of greater importance it should enable us to think, and if applicable be shown to be wrong about these problems - thus we learn.

[denlopviper]

Seen a few high energy impact sites recently and a few low every impact site. Rumors site right so I have the right to make my assumption about. Islamabad is pretty flat with no real high rises, an A320 with anywhere near TOGA power at 800 feet would wake up the whole city. Considering people just over a mile and a half away didn’t hear the A320 does support it not being at max thrust.

Last high energy impact site I went to was the PAF F-27 carrying the chief of the air staff, again a CFIT. But of course rumors of it being shot down and deliberate crash and all are around


@ meekal
You may call the things about the multan crash rumors but they are in the incident report. Head over to the CAA and ask for a copy of that report. Then make up your own mind about it. About the Power Lines not being able to flip an F-27. Try it sometime, you'll be surprised. But of course you are entitled to your own opinions

The report of the C-130 incident can be obtained from the MoD, seeing that it was a military airplane with the army chief onboard. Also since you are in the US why don’t you just use the Freedom of Info act and ask for a copy of the report. Its right there

Believe me pax trying to cook on the airplane isn’t that strange. Some old timer in here must have a good story about it. Forget cooking, lit cigarette butts have caused small fires so it’s not that hard to believe. On my way to Jeddah, the avionics of the 777 shorted out because of a power surge. The reason for the surge was overflowing water from the Lav's going below the floor and coming in contact with some badly insulated wiring. The people thought it was wise to shower in the airplane. And this was a Saudi 777

The SID you are talking about is POMAR 1A. You depart R30, climbing right turn to cross the VOR A045 or above, and then track 171 out to pomar. kahuta wouldn’t be an issue on this departure. And correction, those are Prohibited areas not Restricted a total of 4 around OPRN including Kahuta. If something did go wrong, you can be vectored between the presidency and kahuta as there is just enough space for a small corridor.

oh and an airplane will explode regardless of high or low energy so long as there is fuel in the tanks and an ignition source.. And since they carry enough fuel for 2 missed approaches and then a diversion to Lahore, there was at least enough fuel in the tanks for at least 1 hour at cruise.

Anyway since we both have completely different views on the subjects and I do respect your views, let’s put them to rest and not interrupt this thread on Airblue.

[PJ2]

Phantom Driver;

Thanks. What you posted needed saying right from the beginning of this tangential discussion on circling approaches. Airlines today have demonstrated that they are unwilling and/or incapable of teaching and checking such maneuvers and have rightly restricted/prohibited their use.

The A321 flight and nav displays provide a rich visual environment in which may be readily seen the airplane's situation and environment. The technology is easy to use and not that difficult to confirm what should remain a visual approach. Proficiency in autoflight as employed by the Airbus means that crews trained to such a level where both crew coordination and use of all available instrumentation and technologies on board the aircraft should be able to prevent such an accident, but here, did not. Why?

Where is the failure in this accident? Training? Cockpit gradient? Supreme confidence in the left seat, complete and unquestioning compliance in the right? Only the recorders will tell us, but this is another CFIT. Why?

411a is free to call it anything he wishes. The fact remains that few if any airlines operate the way he says his own outfit operates, offshore or no, FAA or 'other'. His entreaties are well understood, but a waste of breath. We are free to lament this degradation as 411a does but "just safe enough" is the reality in today's industry. The industry is as the industry does, nothing more, nothing less. This accident quite likely did not need to occur.

There are many reasons for this state of affairs. They are economic, organizational, and sociological. I, with a number of others, have posted hundreds of discussions on why this is so. The fact remains that the willingness, (on the part of passengers as well as management) to pay for and demand the level of professionalism and highly experienced, skilled crews one needs for airline work has reduced to the point where risk is now meeting capability.

In the eyes of some, this economic "match" is "perfect". How does it look from our point of view?

PEI_3721;
but in poor weather at low altitude the crew might be susceptible to mental map shift;- illusion, wish-think, press-on-itis
From the beginning, I have wondered about the remark that, "we have the runway in sight" and have considered that in poor vis, the captain was looking left-rear at one of the north-south streets, perhaps "Abdul Rashead Rd", for example. It's not as though it would be the first time a highway was mistaken for a runway at some distance in poor vis. I am well aware this requires other procedural failures, but given the distance north, had they not already occurred? I wouldn't suggest this as what happened of course, but the question must be eventually asked if only to be eliminated.

PJ2

[aterpster]

pj2:

From the beginning, I have wondered about the remark that, "we have the runway in sight" and have considered that in poor vis, the captain was looking left-rear at one of the north-south streets, perhaps "Abdul Rashead Rd", for example. It's not as though it would be the first time a highway was mistaken for a runway at some distance in poor vis. I am well aware this requires other procedural failures, but given the distance north, had they not already occurred? I wouldn't suggest this as what happened of course, but the question must be eventually asked if only to be eliminated.

Excellent analysis!!

[Sqwak7700]

One of the hardest tasks for airline pilots is managing risk. What makes it so hard is that we have to put our big egos aside and look at it from a safety standpoint. This is especially crucial in todays world of FDAP and other flight deck data recording programs.

Circling approaches are like engine failures. We practice them in the sim, and should be able to handle them well enough. But, if landing at our destination meant flying a one engine inop approach and our alternate meant landing with all engines - no sensible pilot should continue on to the destination.

There is just too much risk involved in flying a circle in low weather. We've all heard about good landings being preceded by stable approaches. Well, a circle is anything but a stable approach. It is something we do very infrequently, therefore it is very hard to keep it stable. Not to mention that you will most likely be flying manually while trying to keep visual with the airport, often taking configuration changes at non-standard times. Today's airline procedures and cockpits are just not designed to be "circle friendly".

An airliner has no business flying a circling approach in IFR conditions. Circling should be a visual maneuver restricted to high VFR minimums. Yes, a professional pilot should be able to fly a circling approach, but you should stay ahead of the airplane so as to prevent getting yourself into a situation where you have to circle in anger.

[PEI_3721]

PJ2, Aterpster, et al “ … mistaken for a runway at some distance in poor vis.”

See incidents 4 and 5.

http://www.icao.int/fsix/_Library%5CTAWS%20Saves%20plus%20add.pdf

[PJ2]

I made this very crudely-done graphic at the same time I did the others which showed a possible location of the crash site.

This view is looking southwest, (out the captain's side/rear window on a track about 30 - 40deg offset to the "right" of the approach to 30, (track of about 330 - 340deg), just approaching the hills, about 2nm east of the crash site. The street barely seen is Abdul Rashead Rd or 7th Avenue.

A turn radius which would take the aircraft to the crash site may indicate an earlier "sighting" of "the runway" than this, given the visibility at the time.

This IS a theory, not a suggestion or a plot of the track the aircraft may have taken.

As we all know, regardless of a reported visibility of "2nm", visibility is never suddenly fully obscured at 2nm - local rain showers, scud and all sorts of illusions will vary visibility and local features and "a willingness to fill in the obscurities", can play tricks on a mind set on "finding the runway" once lost.

I suspect that there are a set circumstances in which each of us may be similarly deceived by our senses even though some may believe otherwise. Looking inside and interpreting the NAV display map and trying to then make sense of what is seen outside is a tenuous endeavour.

Again - this is most certainly just a thought. Who knows what happened?

Regarding interim reporting, release of information, invitation/participation of other countries who will have recognized legitimate interests and representations here, I very much hope the Pakistani authorities adhere to the ICAO Annex 13 requirements. They are signatory, after all.

PJ2

http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/kk76/batcave777/Nagoya/Obscuredrunway2010-07-29_084945.jpg

[411A]

There is just too much risk involved in flying a circle in low weather. We've all heard about good landings being preceded by stable approaches. Well, a circle is anything but a stable approach. It is something we do very infrequently, therefore it is very hard to keep it stable. Not to mention that you will most likely be flying manually while trying to keep visual with the airport, often taking configuration changes at non-standard times. Today's airline procedures and cockpits are just not designed to be "circle friendly".


Harry Truman said is best...'can't stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen.':rolleyes:

[grizzled]

411A

Can you please expand on your comment above. Was it related to the preceding post? Or?
As a stand alone comment it doesn't make sense (at least to my small brain) without giving some context.

[BOAC]

PJ - I think that image would be of great interest but I fear the 'obscuration' you have applied is a bit too effective:)

Do I take it from your 'theory' that we have a definite crash location and direction of travel at impact? It is the '330-340' track I cannot understand, having (supposition) terminated the ILS at around 2 1/2 - 3 nm, continued towards the field and then turned right (330-340?), presumably aiming to fly a visual downwind on a track of 300. You are 'permitted' under circling rules to 'lose sight' of the airfield during the turn, but in the prevailing vis it would have needed to be a reasonably tight downwind to keep the airfield in sight in the reported vis with probable heavy showers dotted around too. Not ideal to say the least. Any ideas? As GG has said, loads of 'runway like' roads but unless spatially disorientated the heading should give it away immediately. Also an ex-mil F/O would surely have been getting the hairs on his neck standing up a bit?

Meekal has also 'gone silent' on my requests for these 'procedures' for circling on 12 he spoke of in #93 and #100 and his mention of a 'back course' for R12. Presumably, as I said earlier, 'home grown' and unofficial, but they might cast more light on this.

Lastly, and more of interest than speculation, the projected track' from datum to crash site almost exactly overlays the outbound hold.

Edit: Do we have a crash site elevation?

[RegDep]

BOAC:
Edit: Do we have a crash site elevation?

Avherald gives "...impacted the Margalla Hills about 10nm north of the airport at a height of about 1000 feet above the city/aerodrome".

This would mean some 2600 ft ASL, and the highest points of those hills are at 3800 ft ASL.

Reg

[BOAC]

Thanks RD - pretty well circling altitude!

[Meekal]

Agreed. Let us not detract from the subject at hand.

So he was not in TOGA before impact? BOAC thinks it is self-evident. I am getting confused.

If he was not in TOGA mode then he got no terrain warning and ran smack into high ground?

For what it is worth, I have urged that the circle-to-land on 12 be banned by the CAA right away.

[PEI_3721]

The safety problem is not necessarily during the procedure, it’s more likely to be the decision to attempt the procedure (or even allow it) – these observations are made in hindsight.

411A suggests that judgement of ability is a factor “if you can’t bear the heat”. I disagree; how your personal performance can vary is a more realistic consideration. “It’s often the best pilots who make the biggest mistakes” (James Reason)
Similarly, the dependence on ‘all available resources’ will not protect against every error, particularly optical effects which can affect both crew similarly, or just the one with visual contact.

A better decision (hindsight) would have been to have held or diverted; preceding traffic appeared to come to this conclusion. Thus, why did this crew decide to make the approach? Complacency, they thought that they were better than they were, familiarity with a local airport, the weather changed, or they were just human – they suffered an error in awareness.
It’s unlikely that any factor in this area will be identified with certainty, or any deeper human reasons behind the decision.

I recall a quote “Don’t ask why the lights could go out; consider what you will do when the lights do go out”, which may relate to this thread where the focus of debate is on why the accident occurred.
An operational ‘technical’ investigation is worthwhile to a point, but the thread conclusions focus on how ‘this’ accident might be avoided by considering how the procedure can be done, as opposed to should it be attempted.
The judgement should consider how to avoid such situations – even if it’s within the charted limits, within the SOP guidelines, within your capabilities, or someone else has done it.
We all require a safety margin, which will vary with each situation, and thus requires our assessment of the situation on that day, at that time, and thence the choice of action.
This choice is not the minimum safe option; it should be the safest option – that which avoids ‘unnecessary’ risk. But what is unnecessary?

Meekal, “If he was not in TOGA mode then he got no terrain warning … ”
No, this is not necessarily a logical assumption. See the link in #262; any one of those aircraft could have crashed, they did not.
The key to understanding this accident is to look at how this situation (including crew decisions and action) differed from the non accident situations.

[PJ2]

BOAC;
PJ - I think that image would be of great interest but I fear the 'obscuration' you have applied is a bit too effectivehttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/smile.gif

Do I take it from your 'theory' that we have a definite crash location and direction of travel at impact? It is the '330-340' track I cannot understan
Yeah, the obscuration is almost total, as it may very well be if one encounters a local rain shower or cloud while maneuvering in poor weather. One can barely make out the roads in this graphic, but of course that is the point.

I don't have a crash elevation or a ground track. On the location, using a lat/long and other info from aterpster and BrooksPA-28, I worked from the photographs that Machaca posted and using Google Earth, came up with an approximation given the mountain profiles, road, city and horizon. It is a very rough approximation, especially the G.E. Terrain feature, and is therefore not reliable - but I think it is close.

On the level of obscuration/road-for-runway, in order to explain the comment from the aircraft published in the Pakistani newspaper as part of the ATC communications, that they, "have the runway in sight", I chose the right turn of about 30 to 40 degrees because of ground witnesses who were in or near the area where, by the chart note aircraft were restricted from flying, (to the NE of the airport), saying they saw the aircraft flying low overhead and heard the crash a few minutes later. A right turn, not straight ahead or a left turn off the approach to 30 made sense.

The theory behind all of this is confirmation bias in mistaking roads for runways, having likely lost sight of the airport for whatever reason. While to me the track made most sense, to my knowledge none of us know what track the aircraft took.

The entire theory could be very wrong.

But we know they were circling for 12 and hit the hills, perhaps even after being warned by ATC and possibly the TAWS. What factors that we all pay close attention to in such circumstances made sense to the crew, (particularly the captain) that permitted acceptance and therefore continuance of their current flight path and altitude for the maneuver they were executing? Why did they consider what they were doing successful in relation to their goal, which was (visually) lining up with 12?

PEI_3721;
411A suggests that judgement of ability is a factor “if you can’t bear the heat”. I disagree; how your personal performance can vary is a more realistic consideration. “It’s often the best pilots who make the biggest mistakes” (James Reason)
Exactly. Let's explore Truman's statement; While I think most of us understand the intent of the statement, ("get stronger..., or let those better than us do the heavy lifting"), I think it is being used here incorrectly to goad rather than teach.

Harry Truman was a politician, not an airline pilot. The phrase was intended to lead others politically, not to describe oneself in a cockpit.

The notions of "heat" and "kitchen" are not fixed nor are they one-dimensional or universally applicable to all at all times. Truman's demand that someone stand aside while another who is deemed "more competent" doesn't have a lot of currency in commercial aviation. In politics one only gets voted out - not so in aviation.

In aviation, one constantly chooses one's "heat" and the kitchens out of which one will stay while making a perfectly reasonable decision regarding more heat and other kitchens one might accept and do very well in, and at different times.

The decision about how much heat one will take on is always on the move depending upon many factors, most of them human, including one's experience, training and innate abilities. Even the best and most iron-clad of us may wisely choose another place, another day. That many did not is not proof that the kitchen was too hot. If it was, Accident Investigation Boards would be redundant. On any one day, it could be "us".

But if the idea behind Truman's statement becomes a fixed, prescriptive formula by which judgement is made either of one's own capabilities or of others' then at some point it will fail oneself and others should they take the statement seriously. As a "lesson", the statement should be set aside.

Would that more had made such a decision according to their own varying levels of training, skills, personal fatigue levels and other continuums which are always changing and of which one must constantly be aware in order to stay alive.

Neither excellence nor competency, which are both required for safe flight, is set aside here. What is set aside here is a peculiar attitude.

PJ2

[Ex Cargo Clown]

I'm with BOAC on this, a circle to land is an ILS letdown followed by a visual circuit.

Map shift should have nothing to do with this whatsoever. Unless they have broken the rules and payed the ultimate price for themselves and their pax, ie created a "homemade" FMC based procedure, which would be insane.

[BOAC]

So he was not in TOGA before impact? - why do you come to that conclusion? Application of TOGA when confronted with a rock face just in front will not produce much change in altitude as the Habsheim 320 found when confronted by trees - these things take a finite time. As for 'banning' the circle onto 12 - in my opinion a totally unnecessary suggestion - I would have thought it was one of the easier circling patterns to fly in general and certainly not particularly obstacle threatened. Are you going to answer your original comments about DME arc on R12 and 'back course' or were they irrelevant?

PJ - I fully understand what flying in those conditions is like - they are by no means unknown to me - the point was that I can see virtually nothing of the 'road' and thus cannot resolve the puzzle of the location being '2nm EAST' of the crash site as I would surmise they flew into the rocky cliff face on the same track as they were following to the site and hence I cannot understand your comment about a 'turn radius'.

Regarding 'heat and kitchen', I think my views on Arizona's finest's 'unique understanding' of circling procedures are obvious and I have actually had to empty my PM inbox to cope with the number of 'interesting' and supportive PMs I have received (including one FAA chappie!). :eek: Amen to your last sentence.

As a final 'bigger picture' thought tacked onto this post - in my opinion, circling areas need to be set between the ludicrous TERPS and the over-expansive PansOps. Do folk agree? I understand the TERPS is being reviewed, but is there any move to reduce the PansOps? Having CatD at 5.6nm is totally unnecessary. With my eyesight I'd be lucky to even see an airfield that far away:D

[Sqwak7700]

Harry Truman said is best...'can't stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen.

Thanks for proving my point. :ok:

One of the things you should leave out of the cockpit is ego. As someone already pointed out to you, when you are in command of the aircraft it is your choice how much heat you subject yourself to.

You don't go starting fires simply because you have a fire extinguisher, do you?
:rolleyes:

[PJ2]

BOAC;
PJ - I fully understand what flying in those conditions is like - they are by no means unknown to me - the point was that I can see virtually nothing of the 'road' and thus cannot resolve the puzzle of the location being '2nm EAST' of the crash site as I would surmise they flew into the rocky cliff face on the same track as they were following to the site and hence I cannot understand your comment about a 'turn radius'.
Sorry, yes I knew you were more than familiar with the scenario...didn't mean to be pedantic...I see what you mean now and didn't explain my thinking very well...

I was considering that a left turn was made towards the west at that point I show in the graphic which is right at the mountains. What I meant by "turn radius" was a turn to the west for the "runway", and that an earlier turn would have missed the hills and a later turn would have placed the point of impact further north given a rate of turn at maneuvering speeds...so again, a SCWAG and I realize what a huge stretch in thinking this is at this point in whatever investigation is going on.

On the impact speed, this has all the hallmarks of "surprise", so if TOGA and a pull-up were used, it is likely only at the last second. I think it is reasonable to assume that the impact speed was close to maneuvering speeds - I recall reading somewhere that a witness in the NNE area stated the gear was down - so, "Config 2, gear down", 180kts +/- ?

I sure hope something is released shortly - any news on the recorders?

PJ2

[flyawaybird]

:hmm:That was an interesting comment. I am not a pilot but you make a lot of sense, in the way you have applied your logic. After all, I think there is a saying that goes, "hands were made before forks". It goes without saying that, manual operation came before auto operation. What is so wrong if one can save their own life, by applying the latter where possible and when logical to do so.:ok:

[Fuel Dump]

I believe that banning circle-to-land from aviation is unrealistic an economically unfeasible. In the airline I work for we fly these approaches a few times (maybe 5 or 6) a year and despite being very demanding they work very well. The problem is that you must stick to the procedures, maintain yourself inside the safety area and ALWAYS keep the runway in sight. Looking for a 10 nm final on a circling approach is bizarre! A normal downwing leg is never more than 25-30 seconds... Unfortunately our egos sometimes don't let us take the right decisions... GO AROUND!!!
PS: problem 2: if some pilots don't know how to circle properly, how can they know the correct go around procedure? :{

[aterpster]

Ex Cargo Clown:

I'm with BOAC on this, a circle to land is an ILS letdown followed by a visual circuit.

Map shift should have nothing to do with this whatsoever. Unless they have broken the rules and payed the ultimate price for themselves and their pax, ie created a "homemade" FMC based procedure, which would be insane.

But, we don't know whether he flew the ILS correctly to the circling MDA before he departed the electronic guidance. If he did so, then the map would be (should have been) unimportant at that point.

There is always so much for the industry to learn from this type of accident. Sadly, it appears politics (national false pride) will trump safety this time around.

[PJ2]

Fuel Dump;
I believe that banning circle-to-land from aviation is unrealistic an economically unfeasible.
If I may, I don't think "banning circling approaches" is either being considered, or is the point here. I think competency in flying them is, which is the point you are also making.

Regarding economically-feasible, I think this is the main reason why many major carriers have as a matter of policy, essentially stopped doing them.

The cost of the sim time necessary to train crews to do them safely and then regularly check them to ensure the standard is being maintained, is high, and, given that they are generally rarely-used and that sim time is already at a premium, crowded with other training items of higher priority, (bear in mind that at some carriers, sim times have been reduced to 3.5hrs, and under AQP, time between recurrent sims/PPCs can be as high as 8 months vice the normal six months), I think that for most carriers it was less expensive to accept the occasional diversion than to spend the money on training.

I say this with some experience; I know airlines which, for example, do not teach the Managed Approach procedures for the A320 based upon the fact that they do not use or teach use of the Bird (and Mustache) - the Flight Path Vector and Flight Path Director - too expensive to train in the sim when they can use heading and vertical speed. :ugh:

I think the safety of the circling maneuver was a lesser consideration primarily because we know that the maneuver, though of higher risk, can still be done safely under the correct training and checking regimes. I did many Canarsie approaches onto 13R at JFK in the DC9, DC8 and L1011 and loved flying every one of them but that was a time when we trained for and did circling approaches regularly. No longer.

PJ2

[Fuel Dump]

PJ2, I agree with you.

My questions now are:
1- Are the Airblue crews trained for circling approaches?
2- Were they rushed into one due to a late wind change without proper briefing this complex procedure?

[aterpster]

PJ2:

I think the safety of the circling maneuver was a lesser consideration primarily because we know that the maneuver, though of higher risk, can still be done safely under the correct training and checking regimes. I did many Canarsie approaches onto 13R at JFK in the DC9, DC8 and L1011 and loved flying every one of them but that was a time when we trained for and did circling approaches regularly. No longer.

Canarsie = late base to final while descending along a well-marked path with the lead-in lights and probably runways in sight at MDA. Not remotely close to a CTL to the reciprocal runway, such as with the accident at issue.

[PJ2]

Fuel Dump;

Good questions. Let us wait to see if the Pakistani authority answers these and other questions in an interim report, due as required by Annex 13 I believe, in 26 days.

PJ2

[PJ2]

aterpster;

Yes, thanks - The two types of approaches, in total, are not remotely close -different skills and the maneuvering area and the visual sector were not an issue at JFK - it was just the maneuvering itself that was enjoyable and the leg was always sought after...

[denlopviper]

as far as the crash site goes, the impact point is near vertical, about 70 to 80 degree incline. highest point in the hills is just over 4000. impact point is about about 2800 feet. the impact caused a landslide which covered part of the wreckage.

will get fresh pics tomorrow and will upload then.

Edit

are Airblue crews trainign for circle to land? answer is yes. i know most of the crew and the training they go through. but i'll let you hear it from the authorities

[Meekal]

Gentlemen,

I agree that banning the circle-to-land on 12 is reflexive, not thought-through and perhaps a little emotional.

I also agree that IF flown correctly it is perfectly safe.

But if we apply that stricture/caveat to all approaches there would never be an accident on approach. Fly it by the book and by the numbers and you will be fine.

That is self-evident.

That procedure has risks. IF not flown 'perfectly', there will be an accident some day.

Murphy's Law.

I always had that lingering worry in the back of my mind. I thought I was this doomsday fatalist.

When I heard of the accident I KNEW it was the circle-to-land on 12.

You are far away from high ground if you are capturing the ILS to 30 coming in from the Lahore/Jehlum side or coming in from the west (from overhead Kabul and Peshawar) and flying the pattern as depicted on the chart for the ILS-30.

The PIA forum says that many residents heard the surge of power before the explosion. I said that our most-decorated fighter pilot said that on TV and some here said that was not true. Why?

He was not a commercial pilot but I respect his flying credentials. He said the aircraft passed over-head his house in Islamabad and he heard the surge of power.

I think there is one point that has not been discussed.

Experience in-type.

I have the impression that the pilot was new on the A321. Nothing like the 747 that he must have been so comfortable with. Some of the old-timers in PIA flew those things for 15-17 years. There are airmen here so I don't need to elaborate on the sharp differences.

The co-pilot was even newer in-type. This is not an F-16 though the side-stick must have felt very natural.

Then you have the cultural thing of a 25,000 hour very senior captain and a "new-be" in the right seat, half his age with a tenth of his flight hours. You are unlikely to speak up and say to him he is going to kill everyone if he does not immediately bank hard left or execute a GA.

It is all very well for us to say he should have pushed the side stick priority button and taken over. It does not work that way. Not in the west; and certainly not in the east.

Airblue needs to do a better job of pairing.

Thanks for the link. I found the article very interesting and I will pursue the references as well.

BOAC, the arc is certainly not 12 miles since he crashed at 9.5! You have to keep her tight and close and in sight.

I have been unable to find a description of the procedure although the approach chart for the ILS-30 has the minima for circle-to-land.

Yes, I suppose it could be called "home grown" but there must be something written since many foreign airlines come into OPRN.

One additional point. The captain was very religious and the previous night was a deeply religious one and he could have been up ALL night praying. He also could be fasting. I have known PIA (and other Muslim-nation pilot's I am sure) to fast -- certainly during Ramadan -- and fly.

That is a deadly combination but how do you check it? There are no pre-flight tests for fasting!

This could be crucial for his level of alertness and reflexes -- or may be not.

A (retired) Air Marshall of the PAF has come out with an article in the papers. Nothing new, really.

I am surprised that no commercial pilot, active or retired, has put forth his views. However, the President of the Pakistan Airline Pilot's Association did say that "fatigue" was a factor. The MD of Airblue said Capt. Choudhry had 36 hours of rest before this flight.

Take your pick.

[BOAC]

BOAC, the arc is certainly not 12 miles since he crashed at 9.5!. - not quite sure what you are talking about - you started the 'DME Arc to 12' (#71) and then 'the back-course to 12' (#83) You are still keeping very quiet about these. Any chance of saying you made it up or perhaps telling us about it? It might have some relevance to the crash.

I have been unable to find a description of the procedure although the approach chart for the ILS-30 has the minima for circle-to-land.

Yes, I suppose it could be called "home grown" but there must be something written since many foreign airlines come into OPRN. - what exactly do you mean by that? There will be no 'procedure' published - a circle is a circle. It is 'written' in PansOps

[p51guy]

I thought circling approaches were safe and didn't require extraordinary pilot skills. They are required for an instrument rating. If now because of lesser qualified pilot applicants we have to eliminate circling approaches because they are a little harder maybe we should raise the requirements as congress is doing now. Having done hundreds of circling approaches in mountains with no problem, some at minimums, TGU, most of them I think we have to get pilot standards up to what they were when we were new.
Don't lower the pilot standards because some can't do it. I think the post "If you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen" came from. Don't bid flights to places you don't feel comfortable.

[IFixPlanes]

Let us wait to see if the Pakistani authority answers these and other questions in an interim report, due as required by Annex 13 I believe, in 26 days.

<nitpicking mode on>
Please do not mix up Interim and Preliminary.
"Preliminary Report" in 26 days acc ICAO Doc 9156. (1 month)
"Interim Report" in 360 days acc ICAO Annex13. (1 year)
<nitpicking mode off>

[Shore Guy]

As has been mentioned by a few previous posters, a direct GPS input to EGPWS to is necessary for the unit to operate to its maximum capability.

GPS input to the navigational suite (FMC) does not guarantee the same protections as GPS direct input. You can still have map shifts with GPS input to the FMC. In fact, on Honeywell units, GPS direct input has unique software that provides additional protections close to the surface.

The creator of GPWS and EGPWS, Mr. Don Bateman of Honeywell, had this article in the FSF magazine AERO SAFETY World recently.

flightsafety.org/asw/aug08/asw_aug08_p18-20.pdf

It has been my passion to try and convince my airline to install GPS direct to our EGPWS. Most of our aircraft are not wired this way.

Boeing recommends it ….Airbus recommends it (yes, I have the documentation)….Honeywell recommends it.

To my knowledge, all aircraft built by Boeing and Airbus have left the factory in this configuration in recent years.

What I cannot understand is why this has not been a FAA (and other worldwide regulatory agencies) mandated upgrade.

….by the way, the FSF publication is available free online, with e-mail notification of a new issue available. Should be on every aviators Bookmarks.

AeroSafety World Magazine | Flight Safety Foundation (http://flightsafety.org/aerosafety-world-magazine)

[PJ2]

IFixPlanes;
<nitpicking mode on>
Please do not mix up Interim and Preliminary.
"Preliminary Report" in 26 days acc ICAO Doc 9156. (1 month)
"Interim Report" in 360 days acc ICAO Annex13. (1 year)
<nitpicking mode off>
Clarification much appreciated, thanks. - PJ2

[Slickster]

Oh, Jeez, i don't often feel compelled to reply to a thread, but this one is doing my head in!

Circling approaches? Yes, a more challenging situation than an automated coupled approach to an ILS, but not beyond the wit of man/pilot, and not worthy of diversion. Now, I used to fly the 747, and my eyes would be out on stalks if someone asked me to do a circling into Genoa, or Pisa on that thing. I daresay, it could be done, but it was just not the "done thing". Fortunately, we, and nobody else went there on those craft.

On the other hand, I now fly the 737, and get plenty of practice at NPAs, the occasional visual, and the even more rare circling (even for me!). As I said before, it is not beyond the wit of us. it's a visual manoeuvre - your aircraft can do it; you proved that in base training, if you can remember that! Even better, can you remember flying into into the circuit in your puddle jumper? It ain't that much different, except now, everything happens faster, but you also have all sorts of gizmos to help you, and another person.

This talk of banning circling approaches is pathetic. They're not ideal, but then lots of our working lives are not. Grow up. Fly the aeroplane (isn't that why you became a pilot?). I don't often side with 411a, but I'm with him on this, and you'll be shocked to hear (411a) that I grew in the FMS environment.

Practice makes perfect, and that is why my eyes would be on stalks on the Jumbo, being asked to this; more than likely you haven't been there for over a year, or, indeed, never. However, no bother for me now, and shouldn't have been a problem for shorthaul Pakistani pilots flying into an airport in their own country.

None of this talk of "macho". I enjoy my job, and like to practice my skills, but I am more than aware of the people behind me, and make the appropriate decisions (I hope). I don't particularly want to die, either, then have my name dragged through the Papers.

[aterpster]

slickster:

This talk of banning circling approaches is pathetic. They're not ideal, but then lots of our working lives are not. Grow up. Fly the aeroplane (isn't that why you became a pilot?). I don't often side with 411a, but I'm with him on this, and you'll be shocked to hear (411a) that I grew in the FMS environment.

There is circling, then there is circling. OPRN, being a PANS-OPS airport has a realistic circle-to-land maneuvering area. I have no quarrel with circling at such an airport provided the pilot has proficiency and currency in CTL procedures in a heavy jet transport. In that case circling at OPRN can be quite safe.

TERPs is a different matter. The protected airspace less than 50% of that provided by PANS-OPS. Is ICAO wasting airspace or is the FAA deadly wrong? It's the latter.

[Slickster]

Well, circling for me is breaking off from an ILS, flying downwind, starting the stopwatch abeam the threshold, turning base, then landing. Anything more complex (rare) is covered by a chart. It really isn't rocket science, unless the weather is poor (although, in my experience it's usually tailwind that causes it). If the weather is that poor, then you know the answer......

I wish everyone would stop making mountains out of molehills, and blaming the "circling approach". If you can't do one of them, or make the appropriate decision before, or during, then the problem is a little bit more fundamental, is it not?

[PJ2]

This just in...(CNN) [photo] A Pakistani official carries the black box from the crashed Airblue passenger plane at the Margalla Hills on the outskirts of Islamabad on July 31, 2010.

The data recorders will be sent to Europe
The crash investigation could take months
Pakistan is enduring its annual monsoon season
Islamabad, Pakistan -- The data recorders for the plane that crashed and killed 152 people in Pakistan have been found, a government official said Saturday.

[BOAC]

aterpster - TERPS is not 'deadly wrong'- it is unnecessarily tight. I have circled several times (Cat C and used the full 1.7nm!) At 30 deg of bank the 737 needs just over 1nm to turn base, so unless there is a howling x-wind it is 'do-able', but does require excessive care/skill..

I'm not sure why TERPS fixed the area as it did - I suspect the number of places where a larger area would have seriously 'upped' the minima would be insignificant - maybe the TERPS office was full of 'macho' 411A aces at the time, all revelling in the hot kitchen?:)

If you check my post #274 you will see that I believe they are 'reviewing' the area - and yes, I believe PansOps IS wasting the 'airspace'.

[JW411]

Slickster:

I totally agree with you. There is nothing difficult about flying a circling approach as long as you are well trained and up to date with the procedure.

I have spent a huge amount of my life teaching pilots to fly circling approaches. I can also honestly state that I have personally done a hell of a lot of circling approaches for real and in anger. (Some of you out there might just find it difficult to imagine that all we had in the old days was an NDB let down to visual followed by a hand flown circle to land).

Nowadays, you have a decent auto pilot to make life easier for you but it is still a procedure that needs a very thorough briefing before commencing the approach.

Let me reinforce something that several others have mentioned in previous posts. It is NOT repeat NOT a requirement to keep the runway in sight throughout the procedure.

What IS required is to keep the runway "ENVIRONMENT" in sight throughout the procedure (but not necessarilly the runway per se) but it is absolutely VITAL that you do not leave circling height until the runway or the approach lights are in sight.

(If some of you out there are finding it difficult to understand that concept, let me give you an example. If you were circling at night at Liverpool, you would easily be able to see the ramp lights on the downwind leg but the runway lights themselves would not always be visible in the background).

The trouble nowadays is that whilst in the old days, circling approaches were very common, the modern button-pushers simply cannot cope with combining their button-pushing empire with a good-old "take the auto pilot out and enjoy a nice hand-flown exercise".

One thing I know for a fact is that Ryanair pilots, with their company's affection for using downtown airfields, are probably the last bastion of hand-flying and making circling approaches.

[BOAC]

It is NOT repeat NOT a requirement to keep the runway in sight throughout the procedure. - it appears to be for old 411A - or he'd have his 'ticket' torn up by that nasty FAA man (who doesn't know the rules either):)

[JW411]

Bless his heart!

By the way, I was also an FAA Check Airman (part 121) on the DC-10 so I know a little about it.

I have no doubt that the old chap made it to being an FAA Check Airman but I seriously doubt that he was also a CAA/JAR TRI/TRE.

Not that it matters very much. Whatever the rules are in Arizona are surely the rules throughout the rest of the world!

Honduras being the notable exception. We need to be nice to them.

[BOAC]

.ah! But you would, no doubt, have been 'Mr Nice Guy'..............

[saeedkhan]

It is very disheartening to say the u have been an active contributor to this forum since the crash all kind of speculation on baseless hypothesis would u please have patience to hear the investigation report,u have been very bitter about in the last few posts as the dead man never defends mr intelligent i suggest u first find out what the ac was doing there prevails] has huge experience in flying the northern areas and he knew the area at the palm of his hand hi professional capability is beyond doubt now coming down to u r next question how do u assume that he was new on the type and did not know how to fly tis ac please put u self in his position and ask u self would u go on a heading of 334 or 340 else the radar asks u the circle to land is an exercise done executed in a low vis . staying within 1.8 miles so please answer why would a captain do eight miles and his experience on the bus had been for the last 2,5 years please update i will come on this forum in due course and this is my actual name i will not hide my identity.

[aterpster]

BOAC:

If you check my post #274 you will see that I believe they are 'reviewing' the area - and yes, I believe PansOps IS wasting the 'airspace'.

I posted somewhere earlier the facts:

1. The review has resulted in two attempts at revising TERPs CTL criteria to have some real science in it. The first attempt failed to even get into the criteria stage.

2. The second attempt actually resulted in criteria, which was published in Change 21 to TERPs (FAA Order 8260.3B). That was over one year ago.

3. All changes in Change 21 have been implemented except the new CTL criteria. The obstructionist is a high-level FAA manager who has made the other pertinent FAA managers nervous. He sounds like Chicken Little, as in "The sky is falling." "Minimums will go up everywhere." In fact, by doing sector restrictions the impact would be minimal and the safety gains would be very significant.

These new TERPs criteria are reasonable and realistic, and is a lot larger than today's criteria but not as large as PANS-OPS. Maybe the new TERPs criteria is "about right" whereas PANS-OPS is excessive. Having said that, the fact that the CAT D visibility minimum is 1.94 n.m. at OPRN but the area is 5.2 miles is really irrelevant. Prevailing visibility, as you well know, can be quite different from the flight deck than from the ground observation point. It's up to the pilot to keep the runway or at least the airport in sight, or go missed.

Alas, the new TERPs criteria very well may never come to pass.

[mary meagher]

Alas, Saeedkhan, we would like to learn from the unfortunate experiences of others as soon as possible, especially as in the case of some jurisdictions the official results appear very slowly or sometimes never at all. This is as true of the AAIB as in many Eastern countries.

Aterpster says that according to US rules, commercial operations cannot begin a circle to land unless the PREVAILING visibility is greater than 2.3 nautical miles. It seems to me that with monsoon conditions veiling the hills, the prevailing visibility was dodgy and the circling approach should have been refused. Regardless of the skill or experience of the pilots.

When in doubt chicken out works better than sweating in any kitchen.

[BOAC]

'Mary' - a correction- aterpster and PansOps say the visibility (Cat D) must be at least 2 SM (I make that 1.74nm aterpster?), not 2.3nm

[latetonite]

The discussion wether 2.3 or 1.8 NM prevails is of trivial importance. The plane crashed more than 7 miles from the runway. Now the question is why it got so far astray.

[BOAC]

Now the question is why it got so far astray. - spot on. late Now read posts #291 and #295? If you have any ideas, feel free to post them here in the meantime.

[High 6]

Having flown wide body aircraft into Pakistan for over a decade, it still amazes me that both Islamabad and Karachi do not have ILS approaches in both directions. For those of you who have not had the privilege, RW 12 Islamabad and RW 07 Karachi do not have any published approaches.. precision or non precision. The only options for landing on these runways are

1. Conduct ILS on opposite runway and circle - discussed in depth on this forum

2. Land straight in from the ILS with a tailwind close to or slightly above the max limits for the aircraft type.

3. Or in Karachi, get a radar vector to a point 5 nm on extended centerline RW 07 and cleared for a visual approach. We all know of someone who has lined up with the military field approx 2 km to the right of centerline.

It is sad that this tragic loss of life may be the catalyst to get the authorities concerned to install this relatively common and cheap (compared to a crash) approach aid.

Only recently the famous "flower" VOR approach in Peshawar was changed to a more standard tear drop pattern, this only after a few scares from operators. :ugh:

[RetiredF4]

saeedkhan The Circle To Land At 12 Rwy
............ i will come on this forum in due course and this is my actual name i will not hide my identity.

This saeedkhan? Capt. Saeed Khan (http://www.historyofpia.com/hijackings.htm)

franzl

[Meekal]

They won't install the ILS on 12 at OPRN because a new airport is being built out west near the city of Fathejang -- with thankfully no high ground around.

I don't know about Karachi or Lahore but they will say that at OPRN it would be a 'waste of money' (even though some of our aid donor's would happily install one for us with a non-debt-creating grant).

The 'kick-back' factor on a grant would come into play as well. I know government well.

I know it is a circle-to-land on 12 after letting down on the ILS to 30. But it seems we are not even sure he was doing that.

When I spoke of the arc I was mentally truncating the circle to define only its most critical points: the arc that is defined by the immediate proximity to the Margalla hills. Once you are past that arc of the circle and on base, you are OK.

I apologize for being unclear.

The excellent diagram with the approach plate superimposed on it is all over the inter-net. I thank you folks for drawing it.

I don't know who the rather hysterical gentleman from Pakistan is in case anyone thinks he is a side-kick. For starters, he should learn how to type.

The media in Pakistan has not done a mature job of reporting this accident. It has been very sensationalistic. I have tried to tell them it is pretty much the same in the west with TV stations and reporters camped outside the front door of dead pilots -- or those who lost their lives.

I have one question: wasn't he under radar control? Radar vectoring at OPRN is quite good as I am sure those who have been there will attest. I have heard many times on my VHF receiver 'thank you sir, that was a great job' or words of praise to that effect.

So what happened this time?

[denlopviper]

nope, you are handed over to TWR once established on the LOC. you go back to APP on executing missed approach crossing 2000 feet in OPRN

[Lonewolf_50]

saeedkahn

I think I have been able to analyze your post, and ask you if this is how the basic meaning of your observations are organized. I expect that English is not your first language. Appreciate your putting the effort in with an incident of this gravity.

If I have misunderstood where your thoughts/observations break down, please let me know. If your post was a response to a particular writer, it helps to identify that post, or poster, so we know what you are responding to, other than the general discussion about the incident in Islamabad.

It is very disheartening to say the u have been an active contributor to this forum

since the crash all kind of speculation on baseless hypothesis

Respectfully, a good deal of the discussion, and some speculation in this discussion, have not been grounded in "baseless" hypothesis. A good deal of it has been based on the fact of the crash, the location of the crash, the approach in use, and what seems to be, based on the approach in use, how most crews would try to bring the plane to safe landing. It was noted early in the discussion that other flights in the same rough time frame diverted elsewhere, but that doesn't close the book on the approach. Weather changes and vis/holes move.
would u please have patience to hear the investigation report,u have been very bitter about in the last few posts as the dead man never defends mr intelligent
It has been pointed out that the investigation report may never become public, though we are all hopefull that the CAA in Pakistan will share as much information as they can based on the black box information. Other crews and airlines who fly into that airport will have an operational and safety interest in what were contributing factors.
i suggest u first find out what the ac was doing there prevails] has huge experience in flying the northern areas and he knew the area at the palm of his hand

And I had to call for the "gear!" loudly three times when the check pilot had the controls once, to save us both a gear up landing, a man who knew his aircraft and airfield well. Each flight, each approach, each landing, is an event that cares not how much time you or I have in type, model, or airfield. Each approach can become an accident if we make an error we should not.
hi professional capability is beyond doubt now coming down to u r next question:

See above.
how do u assume that he was new on the type and did not know how to fly tis ac

Who was this question for?
please put u self in his position and ask u self would u go on a heading of 334 or 340 else the radar asks u the circle to land is an exercise done executed in a low vis staying within 1.8 miles

Most of us reading this thread have.
so please answer why would a captain do eight miles and his experience on the bus had been for the last 2,5 years

This question concerns all of us.
please update i will come on this forum in due course and this is my actual name i will not hide my identity.

See you again on the forum soon, I hope. :)

[aterpster]

BOAC:

'Mary' - a correction- aterpster and PansOps say the visibility (Cat D) must be at least 2 SM (I make that 1.74nm aterpster?), not 2.3nm

I don't know what the standard visibility for CAT D CTL is under PANS-OPS. I do know it is charted as 3600 meters for OPRN. That is 1.94 n.m. or 2.24 s.m.

[aterpster]

mary meagher:

Aterpster says that according to US rules, commercial operations cannot begin a circle to land unless the PREVAILING visibility is greater than 2.3 nautical miles.

Not me. 2.3 n.m. is the limit of the TERPs protected airspace for CAT D CTL. If the MDA is not excessively high the standard visibility minimum is 2 s.m.

[aterpster]

Meekal:

They won't install the ILS on 12 at OPRN because a new airport is being built out west near the city of Fathejang -- with thankfully no high ground around.

A VOR IAP might fit. An RNAV IAP would almost certainly. Either of those is a low-cost option.

[BOAC]

aterpster - I'm very sorry! The '411 saga' has done my head in. It is as you say.

[Meekal]

He was executing a missed approach?

[saeedkhan]

That is wrong it originated from karach it was up and pown

[poina]

aterpster,
It is unbelievable that in this day and age of tech that the rnav option is not readily available at airports where they actually would do some good.
We used to circle to the east (rnwy 11 if memory serves) in Addis Ababa and what a pleasure when they finally introduced the rnav app.

[Lonewolf_50]

saeedkhan
That is wrong it originated from karach it was up and pown
What post are you responding to?

What originated from Karach?

What was up and down?

:confused:

[aterpster]

poina:

aterpster,
It is unbelievable that in this day and age of tech that the rnav option is not readily available at airports where they actually would do some good.
We used to circle to the east (rnwy 11 if memory serves) in Addis Ababa and what a pleasure when they finally introduced the rnav app.

Some aviation authorities are not ready to sign onto RNAV. Some of them don't want to use the U.S. GPS system for political reasons. Others haven't had the prerequisite WGS84 surveys.

But, at OPRN it appears to me that technically a VOR DME approach to Runway 12 would have been feasible since the installation of the RN VOR/DME.

I found an old (1959) U.S. Army topographical map on the web. I drew up the following VOR DME approach to Runway 12:

http://tinyurl.com/28bfbha

[BOAC]

What height is R 213?

[saeedkhan]

Here i would like to put some thing very straight for the record that pervaiz iqbal the captain had been in islamabad since we all started flying .the way things work is usually hush hush. I had asked this question on one of the forum that ,would the EGPWS work in case of radar jamming or since the bus is fly by wire all the systems work computer in case of a total jamming would the control function.Secondly we all know as professional pilots that he should nor be there where he was so what made him go there was it am armed intrusion or it a sabotage or simply the radar guidance those of u who have flown in Pakistan would bare with me it is always a very difficult approach in isb reason the area is so restricted because of prohibited areas very little one can do i do agree at the same time the procedure or the airman ship is in doubt get out from there as for his training for mr mekel he was trained by the pia flying academy no offence for any, the circling man . is easy to execute in the bus then any ac i have flown by th e way mr mekel ihave also flown for the last 43 years BY THE GRACE OF GOD an all the airplane pia as well the bus most modern the point to emphasis is not the ac but the simplicity of the procedures and the evolution of the aviation toward the user friendly concept

[aterpster]

BOAC:

What height is R 213?

Ground to 14,000. It's for the "Islamabad/Chaklala Flying Club."

Need I say more? :)

[Meekal]

Mr. SaeedKhan,

You need to be a bit more clear. I cannot understand you.

Are you referring to what I just wrote on ET?

[BOAC]

Need I say more? - no - kind of gets in the way. Still, what is more important..................?

[Lonewolf_50]

Here i would like to put some thing very straight for the record that pervaiz iqbal the captain had been in islamabad since we all started flying .

the way things work is usually hush hush.

I had asked this question on one of the forum that ,would the EGPWS work in case of radar jamming
or
since the bus is fly by wire all the systems work computer in case of a total jamming would the control function.

Secondly we all know as professional pilots that he should nor be there where he was so what made him go there was it am armed intrusion or it a sabotage or simply the radar guidance

those of u who have flown in Pakistan would bare with me it is always a very difficult approach in isb reason the area is so restricted because of prohibited areas

very little one can do
i do agree at the same time the procedure or the airman ship is in doubt

get out from there as for his training for mr mekel he was trained by the pia flying academy

no offence for any, the circling man . is easy to execute in the bus then any ac i have flown

by the way mr mekel i have also flown for the last 43 years BY THE GRACE OF GOD an all the airplane pia as well

the bus most modern

the point to emphasis is not the ac but the simplicity of the procedures and the evolution of the aviation toward the user friendly concept

Having hopefully understood which points you were raising, I'll point out that user friendly for an instrument approach includes the ground based infrastructure. I found a localizer more user friendly on final than a VOR or NDB approach, an ILS moreso. Part of the discussion in this thread is that Islamabad is perhaps, as an airport, user unfriendly due to not having instrument (straight in?) approaches to both runways 30 and 12.

As to radar jamming having an effect on fly by wire suites in modern aircraft, consider this: fly by wire capability is organic to most modern fighters, fighters that are expected to operate in a jamming environment. Do you have any reason to believe that fly by wire in the Airbus is susceptible to jamming? (Do any of the Airbus pilots on this board know of cautions in that area??) Airbus A400M has fly by wire in its design, for military environment. I think you are making some unfounded guesses ... unless you have evidence of jamming or EMI signal source ... is that what you mean by hush hush? :confused::confused:

EMP is another matter, but why would it be related to this case? What about the crash would lead one to consider that?

EMI is another matter (did a bunch of passengers all turn on their remote electronic devices?) and I'll let that guess sit for a moment. What evidence is there to support that causal factor?

If EGPWS was to be jammed (what, jam the radar altimeter? :confused: ) how would one know? How would one do it, given how radar altimeters work? I think you are fishing, and I think this idea is a red herring.

Sabotage or armed intrusion ... the CVR data might help analyze that odds of that. Guessing again? :confused:

Lastly, on radar jamming, if one is executing a circle to land, a visual procedure, how would radar jamming influence you since you are not using radar cues to fly?

How thoroughly have you thought through this? :confused:

[denlopviper]

no offense, but the post just didnt look like from a guy who has been flying for 43 years.

[BOAC]

It is inevitable that national issues and sensitivities among friends and colleagues will surface here, but we must re-focus on the basic question. Why did this crew fly straight towards the hills for what must have been nearly 3 minutes through what must have been pretty 'difficult' visual weather - scud and showers, and remain at the same height at which they probably broke off their initial approach, when they should have stepped out about 2 miles, flown downwind and landed - or gone around.

We really should leave all more complicated questions aside. We need the CVR.

[Meekal]

Lonewolf 50

Very well said.

BOAC yes, I think we are allowing personal issues to intrude into the discussion. As his friend I too would be aggrieved at fingers pointing at the flight crew -- and specifically the aircraft commander and would come up with anything to try an exonerate him -- jamming, sabotage and so on.

I was wondering, if the ATC tapes that were published are to be believed, was the captain on the radio AND flying the plane as well? Obviously it could not be the co-pilot sitting to his right telling ATC he had the runway in sight as well as the Margalla hills?

[BOAC]

I was wondering, - CVR will tell.

[Neptunus Rex]

Too right BOAC. I wondered the same myself, almost three minutes at their likely groundspeed, one can only imagine that there was some huge distraction in that cockpit. The hackles on my neck would have been raised long before one minute, let alone more.

[aterpster]

Neptunus Rex:

Too right BOAC. I wondered the same myself, almost three minutes at their likely groundspeed, one can only imagine that there was some huge distraction in that cockpit. The hackles on my neck would have been raised long before one minute, let alone more.

They would have been in compliance with the procedure flying at an IAS of as high as 205 knots. Do you have any idea what Airbus would recommend as an IAS for downwind on a circle-to-land?

[BOAC]

No, but if I were feeding in from an ILS I would (routinely) expect 150-170kts in a 737.

[HundredPercentPlease]

F speed - so this depends on variant, weight and so on. But somewhere around 145 or so. Nice and slow.

[aterpster]

I just received this week's Aviation Week. They have a short article on the accident. They state there was heavy rain at the time, TRW, surface wind 050-16 knots, visibility 2,000 meters.

That visibility is well below the 3,600 meter minimum.

[glob99]

What happens to the autopilot on the A321 when there is an EGPWS alert?

[HundredPercentPlease]

Nothing.

FYI though the GPWS manoeuvre is:

1. AP off.
2. Pitch: full up. Full backstick and keep it there.
3. Thrust levers: TOGA.
4. Speed brakes: check retracted.
5. Bank angle: Level (or adjust).

In reality just pulling back the side stick will do the trick. This will disconnect the AP and rapidly raise the AOA, which will give you TOGA thrust, which will automatically stow the speed brakes. Slamming the levers forwards though will give you the thrust marginally sooner and is part of the general Airbus escape manoeuvre of stick slammed back and levers slammed forward. The array of computers and sensors will give you every last ounce of performance available.

[aterpster]

HundredPercentPlease:

In reality just pulling back the side stick will do the trick. This will disconnect the AP and rapidly raise the AOA, which will give you TOGA thrust, which will automatically stow the speed brakes. Slamming the levers forwards though will give you the thrust marginally sooner and is part of the general Airbus escape manoeuvre of stick slammed back and levers slammed forward. The array of computers and sensors will give you every last ounce of performance available.

That is great technology. What about when the speed is at minimum for a given flap configuration, say whatever is required to fly the CTL downwind at 150 KIAS. Presumably, the aircraft was at 2510, msl, and had to clear terrain that topped out at 4,000-4,300, msl, or thereabouts. The terrain would have been unknown to the crew until the EGPWS/TAWS started its first stage of alert.

[PJ2]

aterpster;
What about when the speed is at minimum for a given flap configuration, say whatever is required to fly the CTL downwind at 150 KIAS. Presumably, the aircraft was at 2510, msl, and had to clear terrain that topped out at 4,000-4,300, msl, or thereabouts.(I don't think the terrain in that area was much above 3000', but that is immaterial.) HundredPercentPlease's statement provides an important key to your question: "The array of computers and sensors will give you every last ounce of performance available." This applies regardless of aircraft configuration. The available performance energy at slow speed, Config 3 may or may not be sufficient as an escape maneuver. A TAWS Caution of Terrain is approximately one minute's distance and a TAWS Warning is approximately 30 second's distance. Sixty seconds distance is plenty of time to climb 2000' in a GPWS escape maneuver; even 30" distance would be sufficient if the maneuver were done briskly. This is assuming no map-shift of course. I have read the arguments for GPS-linked EGPWS systems and have made the argument myself at my own airline to no avail...the SOP in the FCOM is to switch off the TAWS if NAV ACCURACY is LOW.

I think the aircraft was travelling faster than near the min-speeds for Config 3 as has been posited. I think the aircraft was at Config 2. Regardless however, we know that the TAS would have been slightly higher than the CAS, and, taking the wind information (albeit on the ground) from your post just above, there may have been a tailwind component, strong if they went straight ahead over the airport, stronger if they turned left, (NW), more of a crosswind than a tailwind if they turned right. I think the speed was closer to 180kts.

My reasoning is, by the FCOM, Config 3 is the normal Landing flap, although Config FULL is always available. Both Config 3 and 2 are Takeoff and Approach (maneuvering) flap settings, and Config 3 is also a Landing flap setting. Config FULL is only a Landing Flap. Although maneuvering at Config 3 is a normal procedure and is a plausible scenario here, "Landing flap", whatever the setting is, (3 or FULL), is not normally selected until established on final.

I'm thinking here of the distance travelled past the airport in poor vis; - In short, a possible loss of SA. Whether any of this is the case here or not, cannot be said until the recorders are read.

PJ2

[aguadalte]

Isn't A321 a class D aircraft?
I would imagine a speed of around 170Kts during go-around.
Loss of SA, definitely a factor. But what caused it?

[PJ2]

Hello aquadalte;
I would imagine a speed of around 170Kts during go-around.
Yes, likely that speed, but only after the Thrust Reduction/Acceleration Altitude which is usually 1500' AGL.

On the go-around, the flaps are raised one step - From FULL to Config 3, for from Config 3 to Config 2. The FMGEC SRS (Speed Reference System) maintains the go-around speed for the configuration until the Thrust Reduction/Acceleration Altitudes, usually 1500' AGL although there is provision for 3000' AGL for Acceleration. The initial SRS go-around speed is maintained until that point - that speed would be around Vapp to Vapp +10kts, (that is not a computed speed - I'm just estimating here to illustrate that flaps are not retracted, climb thrust is not set and the airplane does not accelerate until after the Thrust Reduction/Acceleration Altitude of 1500' AGL).

Aircraft behaviour at the Thrust Reduction/Acceleration Altitude is, - the thrust is manually set to CLB, and, if on autopilot, the nose lowers slightly, the aircraft continues to accelerate and the flaps are raised to the next step, usually Config 1 and then when the speed is above the minimum for Config 1, flaps are set to the Clean configuration. The aircraft then continues to accelerate to 'Green dot', (Max L/D speed - that would be around 205 kts or so but it varies with weight, etc) or 250kts depending upon what is set in the FMC.

[Lonewolf_50]

PJ2/Hundred Percent Please:

I put your two posts together. It made me think. So, of course, my brain hurts. :\
A TAWS Caution of Terrain is approximately one minute's distance and a TAWS Warning is approximately 30 second's distance. Sixty seconds distance is plenty of time to climb 2000' in a GPWS escape maneuver; even 30" {thirty seconds} distance would be sufficient if the maneuver were done briskly.
Is the escape maneuver based on best angle of climb or best rate of climb? Which "best" is "every ounce of performance" trying to achieve for you?

Also, Hundred Percent points out that the pitch change will disable auto pilot ... by that do you mean that you go into Alternate Law? If so will Alternate Law provide AoA protection (in terms of control of pitch rate) to avoid stall from too abrupt an AoA change in this transition to an emergency climb configuration?

I hope this question isn't too elementary ...

The idea that this crew had a TAWS originated thirty seconds of warning for terrain does not seem to fit the flow of events, as we try to decipher them in the absence of FDR/CVR information.

[Meekal]

PJ2,

Thanks very much for this enlightenment.

No one knows whether he got to that stage or not. In the present context, executing a GA would be inhibited/constrained by a feeling of shock/disbelief at the alert/warning and the fact that it would be an admission of piloting failure. They do have ego's in the cockpit -- especially when you have 35 years of service and 25,000 plus hours and the guy sitting to your right thinks you are god!

And you know that.

But he may have been in GA mode as some witnesses on the ground attest...but too late for the reasons I have adduced.

Had he changed over to Cherat APP as someone suggested? No way. The last thing on my mind in the frantic last-second execution of this escape maneuver with the Margalla hills looming in front of me would be to look down and change frequencies to tell ATC what I was doing. He can wait -- especially after the bugger kept telling me how to fly the aeroplane. I would worry about that later -- when safely up in the sky.

I think ATC is hugely complicit in this tragedy since he must have been on their radar (unless it was U/S).

The captain was 61 so assuming he got his job with Airblue immediately after retirement from PIA he could not have many hours in-type. The F/O was on his first or second regular flight on the line. Were they 'paired' correctly?

Contributory factors I would say but not sufficient to explain flying a fatally-flawed approach at what appears to be a 45 degree off-set from a parallel down-wind. The mind boggles.

Thanks again.

[PJ2]

Lonewolf_50;
Is the escape maneuver based on best angle of climb or best rate of climb? Which "best" is "every ounce of performance" trying to achieve for you?The question is an excellent one.

I do know the difference between the two speeds but in truth I'm not sure what the software is programmed for - I suspect rate of climb given how I've seen it perform in the sim. The performance is pretty spectacular, especially in a light aircraft. I once tried it in the sim, with a low weight...held the stick full-back, applied TOGA thrust and released the brakes. The aircraft rotated at about 90kts, it simulated a "scraping of the tail" so to speak, and lifted off at about 115kts and went into Alpha Floor immediately. It continued to climb at about 3000fpm; by the end of the runway (9500ft long), the aircraft was 3000' above the end of the runway - 20deg bank turns while climbing were not a problem. It was essentially an escape maneuver with turns.

What I do know from the FCOM is, for a maximum effort escape maneuver with the stick held full back and the aircraft "sits" just above AlphaProt, (a prot + 1° ) and is only maintaining an AoA - the pitch attitude "floats" in relation to the AoA. Although the SOP is to firewall the thrust levers, the thrust is automatically set to TOGA in Alpha Floor mode. As described, the airplane will vary the AoA to stay just above the stall. In Normal Law it is not possible to pull hard enough to "stall" the airplane. The AFS limits the pitch rate change to keep the AoA out of the stall range. But under certain circumstances the AFS could go into Alpha Floor mode with the sudden increase in AoA - but that's how it's designed. In Normal Law, the pitch rate is limited by the AoA, (and the rate is still very respectable).

At high pitch angles during the escape maneuver, Normal Law still applies. It is only when the pitch attitude exceeds 50deg that the AFS reverts to 'Abnormal Attitude Law'. Reversion to Alternate Law (with or without protections), is different, and is a function of autoflight capabilities/failures and associated systems, (hydraulics/electrics) and not pitch attitude.

Meekal;
For what it's worth, my discussion regarding go-arounds was more for information...I don't think this aircraft was in a "go-around" mode. As for what the crew did within a minute of the accident, we must wait for the recorders.

I understand both the "shock/surprise" response and the "ego" factor you describe. Disbelief may be the response to the first factor, and denial may be the response to the second. I do not believe these are broad, cultural issues but they could be training issues.

I think we cannot state anything about ATC until much later. There is not enough known about these communications, ATC's capabilities (what they saw on radar) and what was going on in the cockpit, to make statements of complicity, etc. I think we have to be very careful about affirming or attributing actions when we don't know about them.

PJ2

[p51guy]

GPWS was max power 20 degrees nose up so that sounds like a lot closer to best angle than best rate for obvious reasons. Clearing close in terrain is the object, not reaching altitude quickly.

[PJ2]

p51guy;

GPWS was max power 20 degrees nose up so that sounds like a lot closer to best angle than best rate for obvious reasons. Clearing close in terrain is the object, not reaching altitude quickly.
I'm just thinking this through a bit. Since Max "Rate of Climb" is maximum altitude over time and "Max Angle of Climb" is max altitude over distance and since EGPWS works on a specified time (60" and 30" approx), and therefore varies distance according to speed, it is reasonable to conclude that the priority is Rate of Climb, but I gotta say that in Alpha Floor, the actual speed is just above the stall (at AlphaMax) so perhaps the designers chose an immediate pitch-up & power response and never considered either rate or angle of climb, neither of which would likely be the actual speed flown when executing the maneuver!

The other thing to consider of course, now that we're on this tack and which renders moot any discussion of rates and angles of climb, is, 99% of the time, the aircraft is a long, to a very long way from Alpha Floor. So the response to any full back-stick (or 20deg pitch-up) and TOGA thrust application will be very brisk indeed....6000 to 8000 fpm for a brief period, trading energy for altitude, would not be unrealistic.

PJ2

[DozyWannabe]

I realise this is heavily simplified for the TV audience, but apropos of nothing, the "full backstick" escape maneouvre is demonstrated in this video:

YouTube - Bruce Dickinson flies the A320 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKBABNL-DDM)

Obviously it's a completely different situation when simulated over the Pyrenees as opposed to following a TOGA event in Islamabad, but for anyone interested it should give you an idea.

[p51guy]

PJ2, we were required to add max power and pitch up 20 degrees for max angle of climb if we got a GPWS alert. It might not be the same for all airlines.

[barit1]

GG - see:

http://www.pprune.org/aviation-history-nostalgia/203154-image-posting-pprune-some-tips-you.html

[PJ2]

p51guy;
PJ2, we were required to add max power and pitch up 20 degrees for max angle of climb if we got a GPWS alert. It might not be the same for all airlines.Okay, see what you meant now, thanks. The 20deg/max power is likely airplane-related, not airline related. The 20deg/Max power is a standard GPWS response (from the DC9 on, if I recall)- some advise "until the stickshaker", (B767), Embraer (190) advises "increase pitch to a max climb attitude" which seems to leave the pitch open to interpretation.

PJ2

[Lonewolf_50]

For PJ2 and P51guy: many thanks, my brain hurts less now. :ok:

In re PJ2:

I understand both the "shock/surprise" response and the "ego" factor you describe. Disbelief may be the response to the first factor, and denial may be the response to the second. I do not believe these are broad, cultural issues but they could be training issues.
We used to teach in CRM courses that those responses were common to all pilots, low time, high time, and a trap for any of us.

Reducing to the smallest possible time fragment the transition from "WTF" and "what was that" and "can this be happening to me?" to diagnosis and problem solving, and acting mode, ( and eventual return to standard OODA loop) requires teaching crews about that tendency, and why going into pure problem solving mode is how to recover.

That said, from some of the drills we ran to task saturate crews in the sims, the time delta in transition was as much personality driven as anything else. Training and habit forming, and reforming, and continual awareness (the infamous "war against complacency") were the equalizer.

I think my favorite anecdote was an evening sim one of our wing's sqaudrons scheduled to get some instrument time to keep up on proficiency. These events were typically "let's shoot x approaches and get the numbers up in the log book."

I turned it into a series of opportunities to discover how they handled surprises.

While I got a few "why are you screwing with us?" remarks between approaches, by the time we were done, we had all learned a thing or two.

I bought the first round at the O'Club after the debrief. I admit I'd been indulging myself a bit.

[BOAC]

I'm not quite sure why we are so engrossed in the AB go-round software? We do not know for sure whether a g/a was in progress, and SURELY the focus needs to be on why were they anywhere near the cumulo-granitus?

[taimoor78]

If evidence is provided that passengers were informed before crash. Will this be help full.
I have received cell phone of a passenger . Lets see if i recover any data out of it. People do make videos during landing and take offs. cell phone must be working at this Altitude...

[Captain-Crunch]

.
Old school here again. :8

In your super-side-stick airbus of tomorrow, that I'm always told is so advanced and superior to older models, do we not pan the radar on the mountains anymore? I always did on the A310's and A300's. I used to fly into volcanic rock bowls, and would manually point the antenna tilt down to see bright red where the rocks were.

Why wasn't this crew doing this? Why aren't you doing this? I'll tell you why: because you are over-reliant on automation and autopilots. You (Glass pilots) seem to think nothing can go wrong with the moving map. This all but guarantees that the first time that this very possible phenomenon happens to you due to a dicked up automatic Nav update it could very well put mountain goats in your windscreen. It's even more possible though, I think, as PJ2 said, that in this accident the Captain locked-in on the main drag and mistook it for the runway. This would sorta explain why maybe he didn't turn downwind and got so far North. But the F/O should have caught it. Maybe if somebody was in rose mode, they would have seen this circuit was not parallel with the runway. :eek: Maybe the fairly new F/O was hunched down putzing around with the Honeywell-two-finger-torture device instead of cross-checking raw DME and Weather radar in manual gain, and looking out the window. :suspect::=:=:= It was a left circuit. It's probable in that poor weather the Capt was flying.

Weather Radar is another back up, along with raw DME which if thrown into your cross-scan is unlikely to fool you like a map shift might. One guy in the crew room quipped: But how can you know the difference between a cell and mountains?

Our answer was "Hey, who cares, we want to avoid all that stuff!" :}

Get out of auto, turn up the manual gain, tilt the antenna down till you get a little ground clutter, and avoid that dangerous RED!

Crunch

(The above is all just my opinion only).
.

[ManaAdaSystem]

If you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen

I hope this is not the foundation for this accident!

25000-30000 hrs, the majority long haul boredom, then retirement and into the world of short haul on an unfamiliar aircraft, and with new SOP.
What was his age when he crashed? As BOAC said; "With my eyesight; I could probably not see an airport from 10 miles".
Age does not improve ones vision, and after 60, things start to go downhill quite fast.

With (allegedly) two aircraft diverting before this accident, one have to ask why this captain saw the situation differently.

[BOAC]

Back to post #353. Now we are talking about panning down with the radar to see terrain during a circling approach? Really!

These guys either knew where they were going in which case they were at the wrong altitude or thought they were in the circuit - which they were not. Forget mapping radar, g/a mode, ATC radar, DME arcs. They were either both being stupid or both ....... being stupid.

The question we should be asking is WHY? One very experienced Captain, one ex-Mil F/O, both with some sort of acquired self-preservation instinct, surely? Things just do not stack up here.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Old school flying. From the era when airplanes did not crash?

Why did they install GPWS on the old irons? They were all hand flown by aces. No magenta line and a basic auto pilot. Hmm...

[aterpster]

BOAC:

These guys either knew where they were going in which case they were at the wrong altitude or thought they were in the circuit - which they were not. Forget mapping radar, g/a mode, ATC radar, DME arcs.

I would think an in-country air carrier, such as this one, would have all kinds of pointers and "gouges" for the CTL maneuver at the capital city's IAP-deficient airport.

A DME ARC certainly wouldn't be one of them. The geometry alone is bad, with the VOR being 2.2 miles SE of the approach end of Runway ("AER") 12.

Now, a waypoint at the AER of Runway 12 that could be referenced with an RMI in a GPS/RNAV aircraft, would be useful.

I hope we get the official information at some point. That would include what procedures, if any, did the carrier have for this inevitable requirement to land on Runway 12.

Being confined to flying my PC and doing U.S. TERPs these days, I was unaware until this thread that some countries in the region have moved forward with RNAP instrument approach procedures.; SSH and ADD being noteworthy.

[Lonewolf_50]

We do not know for sure whether a g/a was in progress, and SURELY the focus needs to be on why were they anywhere near the cumulo-granitus?
As I read through the discussion, the GA software linkage discussion is linked to the TAWS/GWPS, and the idea that GA power would be what you select (or what George gives you when responding to the GWPS?) in the estimation of whether or not terrain avoidance features were activated, or not, as cumulo-granitus approached. By the way, you got a chuckle out of me with cumulo-granitus. :ok:

[BOAC]

aterpster- "I would think an in-country air carrier, such as this one, would have all kinds of pointers and "gouges" for the CTL maneuver at the capital city's IAP-deficient airport."

I really hope not! This is suppose dto be a visual manouevre and no pointers and "gouges" should be used or ..we finish up possibly with the same accident all over again.

"A DME ARC certainly wouldn't be one of them. The geometry alone is bad, with the VOR being 2.2 miles SE of the approach end of Runway ("AER") 12."

Yes - I did not mention the DME arc in the first place - it was the reticent Meekal!

[Captain-Crunch]

Now we are talking about panning down with the radar to see terrain during a circling approach? Really!

Yes, really BOAC. It's a safety thing that old hands did when mountains or hills are close to the airport. It only takes a second for one guy to reach over and set it up. The new radars are so much better than the old bendix units you're probably familiar with. Some of the old bendix green screen radars were not stabilized. These new Collins and other units have an IRU (Like INS) stabilization input into them (even in manual), and work great even though you're pitching up and down. They recover faster after coming out of the turns also. Unfortunately, we had a lot of trouble with the automatic declutter function in auto. It would black out everything sometimes (software thing) which is why I advocate manual gain :)

Forget mapping radar, g/a mode, ATC radar, DME arcs. They were either both being stupid or both ....... being stupid.


Well since we may never see a voice recorder transcript or a flight data recorder printout and know for sure, we have to take educated guesses. Beyond your diagnosis of extreme stupidity, is that all you have to offer? :)

All the things you just ruled out, would have probably have saved them, if they had known the importance of backing up your visual with some sort of safety net.

The question we should be asking is WHY? One very experienced Captain, one ex-Mil F/O, both with some sort of acquired self-preservation instinct, surely? Things just do not stack up here.

A fighter jock co-pilot, with little airline experience paired with an old Captain with no appreciable Airbus experience is a formula for disaster imho (If that rumor is true.) I was struggling just to keep Outto out of the rocks and the new fighter jocks had no clue which way the thing was headed. I was completely solo with a couple of them.... "What's it doing now?" was all you ever heard, and the guy's head would go down for another adventure in command-line programing. And if you were on the Airbus jump seat, the most dangerous thing you could hear was: "so what do you think this mode does?" High workload, distracting machines, unless you downgrade them to the lowest level of automation: da pilot.

I'll get my hat and coat.....

CC

[aterpster]

BOAC:

I really hope not! This is suppose dto be a visual manouevre and no pointers and "gouges" should be used or ..we finish up possibly with the same accident all over again.

"Fences," properly built, can serve to keep the foxes out.

One that would have been very, very useful would be ODALs for Runway 12. Ah, but that doesn't seem to be the way of this state's aviation authority.

[BOAC]

when mountains or hills are close to the airport. - NB there are not any! Beyond your diagnosis of extreme stupidity, is that all you have to offer? - I did not SAY extreme, but what else do you suggest? You have a theory? Share it? How do you think they got 8-10 miles away from the airport into a range of hills in a reported 2km vis with heavy showers whilst flying a circuit?

PS Done lots of terrain mapped flying, including using some fairly old-fashioned kit. Know how it works - and know WHEN to use it (and when not to).:ugh:

A fighter jock co-pilot - generally, if they live more than a year or so on a squadron, they develop a "where the *** am I" mode which would have been of use here.

[Yamagata ken]

I have difficulty understanding this. Someone please help me, Fighter pilots are in trouble dealing with the complexity of of flying an Airbus?

[gimmesumvalium]

I am tired of all the armchair experts.(including you 411A) who all have their expert opinions of areas beyond their proffessional expertise. All your bull**** is subject to any facts or (questionable??) reports.

Unfortuneately, you MUST wait for the official facts.

As for circling approaches, I am going to throw in a huge controversy:
I believe (after flying heavy jet transports for in excess of 35 yrs (probably similar to you 411A) and many circling approaches) that a circling approach in a current jet transport aircraft is an extremely HIGH RISK manoeuvre for which a successful outcome is positive for the EGO of the pilot, but a non-successful outcome can be FATAL to ALL on board. (I do not care whether the criteria is 2nm or 2.3nm.).

I have been a passenger in the back of an aircraft doing a circling approach, and I have resolved never to be in that position again. (I now resort to the internet weather forecasts before boarding the flight.)

Accordingly, in the absence of any risk/benefit analysis, I recommend that any 'circle to land manoeuvres' for JET transports be BANNED. You kids in your Cherokees, Navajos and Glass Cockpit 320s please go ahead and do circling approaches.

BUT I plan to be on the ground when you aces do so.

Please realise that you cannot throw around a transport airplane the way you would like to throw around a Pitts.

[411A]

Please realise that you cannot throw around a transport airplane the way you would like to throw around a Pitts.

Don't have to, if the pilot doing the circling...knows what he is doing:E
Gosh, what an absolute surprise.:rolleyes:

[gimmesumvalium]

411A
Pls explain how you comply with the Flight Safety Foundation Stabilised Approach criteria when you do a circling approach to minima.

[Captain-Crunch]

I have difficulty understanding this. Someone please help me. Fighter pilots are in trouble dealing with the complexity of of flying an Airbus?

Well, most everybody has some trouble with the increased complexity of modern automated airplanes.
Not not necessarily in flying, but in programing and supervising the automation. It's not an intelligence question (unless you're talking about a Marine :}), it's an experience question in airline workload management. Everybody had some trouble programing the old FMS units when they were new on the equipment. The point is that single pilot fighter experience is very different from CRM transport work. Most all fighter pilots make great airbus drivers in about six months or so imho. But until you knock out at least one season on big iron, you're still in a pretty good learning curve. You're still easily saturated (at least in the third world). Now if you haven't studied the books, because you were somebody's squadron buddy, you can be a real handicap to a new (on the airbus) Captain.

Maybe that problem is not widespread. Maybe it only happened to me. I am not indicting fighter jocks; I'm merely pointing out that it was a problem many of us first time captains complained about. The former airline F/O's were sharp and watching a new Captain closely helping him along as a real asset to crew safety, whereas many of the fighter guys were still on the big airplane learning curve. That's life in the cockpit. Don't take it personally.

So I'm not convinced by arguments that the F/O was competent based on his past Fighter Squadron experience. Are we flying Mirage fighters here? No. That type of flying doesn't necessarily make one an asset in a bus.

Remember reporters, all these speculations by us are exactly that. We have nothing to go on without ATC radar tracks, Flight Data Recorders, and Cockpit Voice recorders transcripts.

Fly safe everyone,

CC - out

[Lonewolf_50]

CC:

To further BOAC's point on hills near the airport ...

Islamabad pakistan - Google Maps (http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&q=Islamabad%20pakistan&um=1&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=wl)

From this Google map of the Islamabad area (when I called it up the legend was 2 miles), you can find the airport and see the hills to the north and northwest. I used the "satellite" choice as it gives an OK presentation of terrain ...

Not sure what your criterion for hills being "near" the airport is, 8-10 miles represents a few minutes flying at approach speed if 170 knots speed is agreed as assumed speed while circling to land on RWY 12 from a RWY 30 istrument approach. (Quite a bit of discussion on the details of that earlier in the thread).

for aterpster:
One that would have been very, very useful would be ODALs for Runway 12. Ah, but that doesn't seem to be the way of this state's aviation authority.
And since it isn't, one flies the approaches that are available as best one can.

What do you think the odds are "the state" write up that it has contributed to risks in airline safety by parsimony with Navigation Aids ... as the result of its investigation?

[gimmesumvalium]

411A
Read my post again.
I was a passenger in a 747 doing a circling approach and the passengers were SCREAMING. After landing with a "successful" outcome, the pilots no doubt thought they had done a great job getting their passengers to their destination. However, I do not think the passengers had paid an entrance fee to Magic Mountain! and I do not think their ticket had qualified them for a roller coaster ride.
Passing an FAA checkride (written for a Convair) does not address passengers REACTION - and passenger reaction determines a succesful airline operation. (not pilot egos)

[filejw]

FYI most US airlines use circling minimums of at least 1000' and 3 miles....

[gimmesumvalium]

kontorshotell

When I said I was a passenger on that flight, I was actually positioning along with my crew.
This was subject to an investigation by my airline, and therefore I cannot identify the airline involved. (subject of course to the risk of my termination)

[411A]

When I said I was a passenger on that flight, I was actually positioning along with my crew.
This was subject to an investigation by my airline, and therefore I cannot identify the airline involved. (subject of course to the risk of my termination)

Fair enough...IF it actually did happen.:}

Pls explain how you comply with the Flight Safety Foundation Stabilised Approach criteria when you do a circling approach to minima.

We don't look to the Flight Safety Foundation for our criteria, we look to the aircraft manufacturer, and our past experience.
This is...stabilized, on speed, by 500aal...this is possible because we are circling at 600aal (or charted higher minimum, whichever is more) in our heavy wide body jet transport airplane, whilst circling, in conformity with laid down regulations.
It the circling maneuver somehow difficult for some?
Of course, it is...unless trained for, properly.
Rocket science it ain't.:rolleyes:

[xcitation]

Any official release of ATC comms?
Were there any comments from other air crews on the same frequency at that time?

[aterpster]

filejw:

FYI most US airlines use circling minimums of at least 1000' and 3 miles....

Thus, they escape any training on circle to land. And, if the circling MDA is higher than 1,000 feet they use the MDA, again without any training as to the tiny TERPs protected airspace or how close beneath them obstacles may exist.

[Meekal]

27 years in Islamabad and scores (well...a slight exaggeration) of circling approaches. No one was screaming -- either in the front or the back!

When I said ban it, I agree I was being reflexive and emotional.

The only thing I take from all this is the self-evident truth that IF you fly it by the book and the numbers, you will be fine.

That did not happen this time and Murphy's Law says that will not happen that one time.

So, is the approach inherently unsafe or were these pilots in a fatal screw-up?

CC, I do see your point about the fighter-jock. He had 300 hours on the A321. First flight or second on the line and he has to cope with -- not an unsafe procedure per se -- a very challenging approach in marginal weather with strong winds. He must have been overwhelmed and on that very steep learning curve and as someone suggested he must have been looking down fiddling with his FMGS -- and therefore of no help to his captain.

I have known many jocks and their skills coming from the PAF onto PIA flying are good but variable. Mind you there are many who were great in the PAF and our PAF pilots are highly rated.

The question is whether they make good commercial pilots. Some do. Some never quite get the hang of it.

There was this one guy who really terrified me.

Coming in to land at AMS from the south he kept saying "he is bringing us in from the north" as if to enlighten me.

Talk of spatial/situational unawareness.

When I asked if he wanted the automatics on for the ILS he said "no, I failed my last check-ride", or something to that effect. He was all over the place, weaving back and forth, hand-flying and the controller asked us "Pakistan XXX, are you established"?

All I could say was "Sir, we are establishing right now".

Well, his actual touch-down was featherlight with no excessive flare and probably the best I have experienced!

So, as the American's say, "Go figure".

The next sector to Heathrow was better since he was the PNF. He only admonished me with "Not more than 15 degrees, BOY!" as I rotated on TO.

As for the gentleman who wants a valium, methinks you are too harsh on your comrades. This is what we do here. We ask and we speculate to be sure -- but responsibly I hope -- in the absence of solid evidence to the contrary.

Reticent Mikal

[Lonewolf_50]

;)
CC, I do see your point about the fighter-jock. He had 300 hours on the A321. First flight or second on the line and he has to cope with -- not an unsafe procedure per se -- a very challenging approach in marginal weather with strong winds. He must have been overwhelmed and on that very steep learning curve and as someone suggested he must have been looking down fiddling with his FMGS -- and therefore of no help to his captain.
Wouldn't it be fair to change "must" to "may" since we are so in the dark as to what he actually was doing? CVR's will hopefully shed some light.

[BOAC]

Coming in to land at AMS from the south he kept saying "he is bringing us in from the north" as if to enlighten me.

Talk of spatial/situational unawareness.

When I asked if he wanted the automatics on for the ILS he said "no, I failed my last check-ride", or something to that effect. He was all over the place, weaving back and forth, hand-flying and the controller asked us "Pakistan XXX, are you established"?

All I could say was "Sir, we are establishing right now".
- if that was possible in PIA it may well go a long way to explaining what happened here.

[p51guy]

Doing hundreds of circle to land approaches in the mountains in Honduras over many years have never had one approach questionable. I don't know why they continued to fly out of their protected airspace and fly into the hills. My flights were mostly in a B757 so close to the same size aircraft. Unless they were too high and trying to lose altitude there was no reason to be over 7 miles on base leg. We need the CVR to find the answer to this one.

[dvv]

411A, well, let's see… To stay within 2sm from the runway, not exceed 20° in bank and not overshoot the centerline in base/final, one has to maintain the ground speed at no more than 143kt and do a descending turn all the way to the touchdown zone… Well, I guess it's not that hard for you in your heavy wide body jet transport airplane.

[p51guy]

Most approaches use 30 degrees bank so why talk about 20 degree bank angles?

[dvv]

p51guy, because people scream when you bank this much at 500' AGL?

[misd-agin]

25 degrees of bank, 700-800 FPM sink, 180 degree turn, starting at approx. 700' AGL, SOP for TGU.

We just ignore the screaming because avation rule 1 states "fly the airplane". :ok:

[Sciolistes]

The protected area is defined assuming 20deg of bank. Nothing whatsoever to do with technique! :p

[ManaAdaSystem]

Effoh 300 hrs on type, and the captain had how many 320 hrs?

My money is still with the gentleman who suggested a circling approach with some low level maneuvering to avoid a shower or two on downwind.

You may be surprised to find that fighter pilots in some areas of the world are not the best pilots up there. Don't ask me how it's possible for an ex fighter jock to have problems with basic flying, but I have seen this myself.

[deSitter]

25 degrees of bank, 700-800 FPM sink, 180 degree turn, starting at approx. 700' AGL, SOP for TGU.

We just ignore the screaming because avation rule 1 states "fly the airplane".
ROFL

Nobody's gonna scream unless the G-forces get out of hand! You should do a 1-G chandelle and give the customers their money's worth :)

-drl

[eagledares]

The Captain of this ill fated aircraft was well airline experianced pilot and flown B747,A310's 737 and have more than 1000 hrs as a captain on this type( A321) and is well reputed. The First Officer was also serving the airline for last one and hlf years and have more then 300 hrs on the type and both of them have excellent flying record

[FullWings]

The Captain of this ill fated aircraft was well airline experianced pilot and flown B747,A310's 737 and have more than 1000 hrs as a captain on this type( A321) and is well reputed. The First Officer was also serving the airline for last one and hlf years and have more then 300 hrs on the type and both of them have excellent flying record
Testimonials and flying records, unfortunately, don't count for much when you wander into the side of a mountain.

I think what most of the professional pilots who read this thread are trying to understand, is how this aircraft ended up at low level so far away from the airfield (and heading further away from it) when they were supposedly doing the equivalent of a tight visual circuit. They appear to have been attempting VFR flight in IMC and the usual outcome has prevailed... As soon as the airport disappeared from sight an immediate climbing turn towards the runway should have been started but why wasn't it?

Many points have been made about the serviceability of TAWS/EGPWS, map shift, etc. but what the crew attempted, circling off an ILS to the reciprocal runway, is a *purely visual manoeuvre*. No fancy gadgets necessary.

It appears to be a massive loss of SA, especially for pilots who were familiar with the terrain around the airfield. Where did they think they were, up to the last few seconds before impact and what were they trying to do before that? Will we ever know?

[BOAC]

My money is still with the gentleman who suggested a circling approach with some low level maneuvering to avoid a shower or two on downwind. - BUT -
a) they were not 'downwind'
b) granted we might be 'flexible' with the odd shower during a circle, but routing off 30 degrees for minutes???

Fullwings - I appreciate the help in trying to re-focus this:ok:

[Mr.Bloggs]

Recalling the Everglades L1011 crash, where all 3 crew were focused on a gear light and gently flew the aircraft into the ground, I have a feeling that a similar event may have occurred here. The two may have thought that they were tracking down-wind, without assiduously checking their navigation. It could have been the MCDU tying both of them up, perhaps setting up a Secondary Flight Plan that had been deleted, perhaps re-entering Performance data. Who knows? By my reckoning the crew flew for nearly 2 minutes on an extended 45 degree leg before coming to grief, having made no left turn. (Of course, it is entirely possible that an incapacitation or a tech problem could have taken the pilots' attention away from the navigation, but as this was a visual procedure, none of these excuses warrant the subsequent event)

The CVR may provide the best clues to this accident. I hope so.

[PBL]

Just to comment on some estimates which have appeared here, the crash site is shown approximately in This FlightGlobal article by Leithen Francis (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/07/29/345507/details-emerge-about-fatal-flight-path-of-pakistani-airblue.html) which appeared on the 27 July. The article states that
The crash site is in the Margalla mountains and satellite images show the crash site is 9.66nm from the airport but they don't say from which point on the airport is being measured. It is consistent with being 9.7 nm away from the approach end of RWY 12. I note that the Islamabad VOR is actually at the approach end of RWY 30, so further away. The graphic with scale in this week's paper Flight International (3-9 August) is roughly consistent, so Flight is sticking by these figures.

Circling should take place within 5nm, according to Flight, so the impact occurred at almost twice the allowed circling radius, not just the 7 nm which has been mooted here.

PBL

[Green Guard]

...with or without glasses
this is what pilots might have seen JUST before commencing the CIRCLING,

and no wander, two times reporting to have a RWY in SIGHT

But which one they saw ??

(RWY must be positively identified with DME or GPS (FIX to APT) and CRS of course..)

The "ONE" on right is much longer (it is not RWY but a street) and would take them straight to where they finished the flight..


http://mjr.org.uk/pprune-016.jpg

Barit1 and Mike-WSM Thanks for help
[/IMG]

[BOAC]

There are some inaccuracies of concern in the Airblue CEO's supposed statement - 'crash site is north/northeast of the airport' and ATC stopped it landing on 30 (as far as I know ATC cannot do that).

Apart from the loss of SA we must be looking at, I seriously wonder if PIA have some sort of unofficial 'procedure' for a back-course on 12 that this ex-PIA Captain might have been aiming to fly? It might even have been 'known' to a mil pilot as well. I think 25/2600' would actually 'do' (if unwise) if you stayed away from the hills for such a 'home-grown'. I really wish 'Mr Reticence' would come clean on this, having shot the hand grenade into the crowd in post #83, and now claiming '27 years' of 'flying' in and out of Islamabad - don't pretend you don't know! It would be of relevance to this accident, especially when we hear of the dramatic lack of SA in a PIA crew in AMS of which he/she speaks in later post.

[Meekal]

BOAC,

How on earth would I know what this captain was doing and whether he had his 'own' procedure -- or something that PIA pilot's have up their sleeve!?

There is nothing mysterious about circling to 12 after a letdown on 30. Capt. Choudhry must have done it himself many times and since we run our 747-200/300 on the domestic sector as well (Karachi-Lahore, Karachi-Islamabad, and return), he would have had all that extra 'practice' as it were.

May be that is part of the picture: complacency and over-confidence.

[Meekal]

BOAC,

Following on my recent post, let me do some snooping around. It has been so many years and all my colleagues are retired (at 60 -- the old rule) and have gone off to places like Jordan and Bahrain etc. where they are still flying I am told. I don't have their contact numbers/e-mail's but I could do a search.

Let me check with a couple of old PIA pilots still in Pakistan but their information could be dated. CAA probably won't answer me since they will guess I am trying to find out something pertinent to the accident.

Let me give it a shot.

Thanks for your patience!

[Lonewolf_50]

p51guy, because people scream when you bank this much at 500' AGL?
What?

I've never been a passenger in a plane when the passengers screamed, no matter the angle of bank. I have heard a few grumbles on a firm landing, I have heard applause (always heard them on Alitalia flights) when the pilot makes a nice landing, and I've heard grumbling and moaning during turbulence. My wife went white knuckled on a flight from Malta to Rome back in 97 when we went through some stormy weather, back of the plane, and you could feel the tail shift and shake. Even I was a bit ruffled by that segment of the flight. It was a rough flight at both ends, but ... no screaming.

My first flight as a passenger of an airplane was at age 10 months. (Back when air travel wasn't the annoyance it is now). I've been on over 200 trips as fare paying customer.

Never heard passengers scream, and certainly not when the pilot was simply banking to turn the plane.

Does this happen often, this screaming thing? :confused:

By my reckoning the crew flew for nearly 2 minutes on an extended 45 degree leg before coming to grief, having made no left turn. (Of course, it is entirely possible that an incapacitation or a tech problem could have taken the pilots' attention away from the navigation, but as this was a visual procedure, none of these excuses warrant the subsequent event)
The core puzzle in this mishap.

[dvv]

Lonewolf_50, well, I was at least once in a plane among screaming, crying and praying passengers. So?

[Lonewolf_50]

Ok, dvv, what were the circumstances? Angle of bank greater than 15, or something actually going wrong with the plane? :confused:

I accept that my experience is not universal, nor even that large, given how many of the pilots and cabin crew here have thousands of trips under their belts.

But about this screaming passengers thing ...

was there any evidence, for example, of the folks who landed in the Hudson screaming as the final flare was undertaken?

Granted, Sully wasn't at a high angle of bank ... so maybe the stimulus to scream wasn't excited. ;)

[gtaflyer]

Correct me if im wrong gents but i do believe this was the second CFIT to have occurred to this country. the first was an PIA Airbus A310 which crashed into kathmandu and now the Airblue A321 of last week crashing into the margala hills. Both occured as a result of bad weather, resulting in possible loss of situational awareness and deviation fron SOPs.

whichever way one looks at this one thing seems to stare us in the face and that is that this is a human error rearing its ugly head once again and not one involving aircraft technical failure as far as i am aware.

maybe (and there are many maybes) the people that train in PIA AND AIRBLUE are from same airforce backgrounds so much so that they really are the wrong stuff for airline material. From an CRM perpective the experience gradient is all too true and familiar in this case of an experienced captain (whose attitude is i can do everything cos i flew fighter jets all by myself) and the 300 hour f/o who dare even to to question the former. How can a F/O ever question a senior captain or put it more simply why did airblue OR GOVERNMENT CAA allow such an experince gradient to exist in the cockpit in the first place ? and should there be a cover pilot in the third seat in such situations?

and i hear some of you pruners now saying but they had GPWS OR EVEN EGPWS and the airplane shouting TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP PULL UP but alas not all airbus are created equal....

Perhaps Pakistan we need to review and learn from the past mishaps before we can even consider going forward.The eyes of the world are once again upon this troubled nation

I share the grief of the families who have lost there loved ones, and deepest condolences..ALLAH DE MARZI to all whome have lost there loved ones on the airblue flight and also from the recent floods in the region.:sad:

[Meekal]

PBL,

If the crash site is north of the Faisal Mosque (a prominent Islamabad land-mark) which is located at about the foothills of the Margalla, then this accident gets crazier by the day. I don't know how anyone can be so far off.

My late father's house faces the Margalla hills. That is why he bought it because he liked the view. If you are doing the circle-to-land on 12, you are about two/three miles when viewed from the backyard of the house flying parallel to it before turning base.

[ManaAdaSystem]

If he was flying a circling/semi visual approach (if the reports are correct, he did call Rwy AND terrain in sight), he might have been confident enough to deviate away from his ordinary circling pattern.

He should have a lot of bells and whistles going off in the cockpit, but again, if he had the mountains in sight?
I've flown myself into GPWS/EGPWS territory during visual letdowns, and as per SOP, continued since I had the terrain clearly in sight.

[Meekal]

gtaflyer,

How are we going to learn from mistakes and move forward as you say when we keep ALL air accident reports secret?

The CFIT at Khatmandu was not due to 'bad weather' although there were misty conditions but aircraft were landing.

He was a fatal one-step ahead of the step-down Sierra One approach and hit a ridge. The Nepalese authorities released some sort of report wherein it was stated, inter alia, that the reason ATC did not challenge the crew (because the crew transmitted height and distance) was because they are "under-confident".

CAA may have investigated the accident and then everything was hushed up.

So there were no lessons learnt, were they?

I fear the same will happen this time.

[BOAC]

How on earth would I know what this captain was doing and whether he had his 'own' procedure -- or something that PIA pilot's have up their sleeve!? You 'suggest' you fly/flew for PIA and operated into Islambad so as a 'PIA pilot' I guess there is a reasonable chance you might know of such?

There is nothing mysterious about circling to 12 after a letdown on 30. Capt. Choudhry must have done it himself many times and since we run our 747-200/300 on the domestic sector as well (Karachi-Lahore, Karachi-Islamabad, and return), he would have had all that extra 'practice' as it were. Who mentioned 'mysterious'? It is not the circling approach I am querying, is it? I would have thought that should have been pretty clear by now

Regarding crash site location, you may wish to rewind to macacha #81 and PJ2 #124 to get an idea of where it is. On Google earth you can pick up the two 'roads' in PJ's crash site simulation.

[aterpster]

BOAC:

Regarding crash site location, you may wish to rewind to macacha #81 and PJ2 #124 to get an idea of where it is. On Google earth you can pick up the two 'roads' in PJ's crash site simulation.

Here are some Google Earth reference points:

Mosque:

N 33 43 46.3
E 73 02 16.3

6.85 n.m. from approach end runway (AER) 12, true bearing 339.6


Crash Site # 1:

N33 44 40.5
E 73 01 51.2

7.82 n.m. from AER 12, true bearing 339.5


Crash Site #2 (the one I "vote" for based on recovery photos we have seen)

N 33 44 48.9
E73 02 26.6

7.80 n.m. from AER Rwy 12, true bearing 343.2

[BOAC]

Yes - whichever - we do not as far as I know have the exact position. Which/whatever it is, they must have roared over the city at some point which would surely have triggered a ?

[BOAC]

Meekal - I think it is time you 'came clean'? Your talk about what the other pilot said to you at AMS 'in the cockpit' etc etc - Straight question - do these words from the Tribune from an article by [email protected] sound familiar? Post #71?

"A doctor buries his mistake. A pilot is buried with his. Even though I sit 7,200 miles away from the scene of the crash, the shock was palpable. I have lived in Islamabad for 25 years. I love commercial aviation and have read countless books on the subject with a focus on flight safety. Despite many air accidents that we read about, flying is the safest form of travel. It is calculated that if you were born on an airplane and flew in it and never got off, you would not be involved in a fatal accident until you are 78 years old. Those are pretty good odds."

So - PIA pilot or not? It will colour our judgement of your comments somewhat. We also prefer that journalists declare themselves clearly.

[PJ2]

aterpster;
Its a small detail as the general site is known but regarding the Crash Site #'s 1 & 2, I don't think either fit when their lat/long is plotted in Google Earth.

Site #1, (see second graphic below), is on the other side of the mountain and shows no road in the area so I think it is not the right location.

Site #2 is closer but is almost at the top of the peak which is contrary to crash site photographs taken from the road, which generally show the crash site against the face of the mountain and not near the top. (The tip of the yellow "push pin" of the original crash site I plotted, is visible in the first graphic.)

The distance from the RN VOR to the crash site plotted originally is about 9.3nm.

When I plotted the site I originally posted, (Post #124 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/422401-airblue-down-near-islamabad-7.html#post5836217)), I used crash-site photographs to examine the amount of city visible and the mountain profile - the profiles in Google Earth aren't super-accurate but they're sufficient to plot a rough location given the view of the road and how certain curves and straightaways of the winding road "line up" when comparing the photos with the Google Earth theoretical site.

==============

The following is the "view" from crash site #2 - again, the terrain profiles are only approximate in Google Earth but here, even given the slightly higher elevation that the view is taken from in GE, the entire city is visible and that is not the case in the crash-site photographs.


http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/kk76/batcave777/CrashSite2_2010-08-06_091337.jpg


This is another photo from the crash site looking SE, showing the road, fairly close to the hair-pin turn seen in the above graphic.


http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/kk76/batcave777/202-02.jpg


This is a view of all three theoretical crash sites plus the location of the Faisal Mosque.

http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/kk76/batcave777/GeneralCrashsitesurvey12010-08-06_091840.jpg




This is a plan view of the area, from the airport, (RN VOR), to the 3 theoretical crash sites. The map is oriented on the runway heading; the track to crash site #1 and the original one I posted is about 330deg at about 9+ nm.


http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/kk76/batcave777/CrashSitesSurvey2AirporttoSite2010-08-06_092830.jpg

[aterpster]

pj2:

Its a small detail as the general site is known but regarding the Crash Site #'s 1 & 2, I don't think either fit when their lat/long is plotted in Google Earth.

Makes sense; i.e. "my" crash site #2 but a bit lower on that hill.

[PJ2]

aterpster, " but a bit lower on that hill.", yeah, I think so - mine's a bit high. PJ

[Lonewolf_50]

Both occured as a result of bad weather, resulting in possible loss of situational awareness and deviation fron SOPs.
Your conclusion of cause appears to be in advance of the facts being provided from the CVR and FDR.
whichever way one looks at this one thing seems to stare us in the face and that is that this is a human error rearing its ugly head once again and not one involving aircraft technical failure as far as i am aware.

Given that data to help us arrive at such a conclusion are absent, I'd be careful of eliminating mechanical or technical fault as a contributing factor. We don't know what had the attention of the crew, or if a system was not working right, or failed. Since we don't, most of the folks here are eager to find out.

maybe the people that train in PIA AND AIRBLUE are from same airforce backgrounds so much so that they really are the wrong stuff for airline material.
I am sorry, this is sloppy thinking. An Air Force pilot or a Navy Pilot shows, if he lasts for a while in that profession, that he is trainable. If he or she is to transition to transport flying, or passenger flying, what is needed is the transition training. To presume that the pilot cannot adapt nor train for the new task requirements is utter rubbish, since here in America we have found quite the opposite: the Air Force and Navy Pilots from a variety of backgrounds can transition to the new profession ... via a training syllabus and experience.

From an CRM perpective the experience gradient is all too true and familiar in this case of an experienced captain (whose attitude is i can do everything cos i flew fighter jets all by myself) and the 300 hour f/o who dare even to to question the former.

Those cultural issues are a danger to any multi crew aircraft, regardless of where the captain and the FO come from. It is also a danger in multi place helicopter crews.
How can a F/O ever question a senior captain or put it more simply why did airblue OR GOVERNMENT CAA allow such an experince gradient to exist in the cockpit in the first place ? and should there be a cover pilot in the third seat in such situations?
Under CRM principles, any time flying an FO can question a senior captain when flight safety is an issue. If that isn't being embraced by the organization, a third pilot isn't going to solve the problem of a Captain not listening.
Perhaps Pakistan we need to review and learn from the past mishaps before we can even consider going forward.The eyes of the world are once again upon this troubled nation
Hopefully more than just Pakistan will learn something from this mishap to help air safety in general.
I share the grief of the families who have lost there loved ones, and deepest condolences..ALLAH DE MARZI to all whome have lost there loved ones on the airblue flight and also from the recent floods in the region
It has been a tough month, my heart goes out across the seas to the people there.

[411A]

Hopefully more than just Pakistan will learn something from this mishap to help air safety in general.

I doubt it, or if they do, very little.
Why?
Because, airlines will continue to look to 'automation' to solve all their accident problems, whereas....good old fashioned hand flying skills (and the training required...IE: not cost effective, so many airline claim:eek:) will be more than likely rejected...with the results we see today...with the 'automated' aircraft.

[Meekal]

BOAC,

Boy! You are really 'on my case' as the Americans say and are spoiling my day -- which has been nice despite late-afternoon T-storms.

Please type in FINANCIAL POST, PAKISTAN and go to 'Letters to the Editor' where I briefly speak of myself. I changed the wordings a little bit because obviously I don't want to use the same exact words in another newspaper -- even if I take no money from anyone and they hold no propriety rights over my words.

I HATE talking about myself. "Putting on the medals" as someone called it.

Go to History of PIA and then to Forums. I don't introduce myself. I just write -- try and put some balance into the discussion. They are very knowledgeable about aircraft types and the engines fitted on them, cycles and hours and stuff like that but their aviation/safety issues understanding is quite mediocre -- with exceptions as always. I write and gently try and correct them. Inevitably, someone will come back all aggressive and ask "Where YOU in that cockpit? If not, how do YOU know"?

I keep quiet.

If you want I can direct you to another paper -- which is a joint venture of the International Herald Tribune and a local Pakistani paper. There a Capt. for Shaheen Foundation (run by the Air Force boys) held forth on what happened to #202. I did NOT put on the medals or an air of superiority but tried to correct a few of his points. I know Shaheen only flies a 737-200 so he is guessing about the Airbus.

I may have written elsewhere but I cannot recall.

Most of what I write these days is on economics which is my second passion. I write for five Pakistani papers and three think-tanks. I take no payment from any of them -- and my family thinks I am completely daft.

I wish to say to you that in all my years (and I am an oldie now) no one in Pakistan, the US or the UK where I have lived has ever challenged my integrity. Coming from a country which is sadly ranked very high on the Transparency International Corruption Index, that is no small accomplishment and I am very proud of being the exception. My late father was one of the most outstanding civil servants Pakistan has produced in 62 years and was, amongst other things, Minister of Defense and therefore in-charge of PIA and CAA. No one in his 45 years of service would dare, or has dared, raise a finger at him even though he has been gone for 20 years and dead people, like dead pilots, don't talk.

I would give you his name but I feel I would be desecrating his memory by doing so to a complete stranger. I hope you understand my reticence.

Since you doubt me and I feel uncomfortable with that thought, it is best I take my leave. It has been great logging in here and listening to you guys (I don't think they are any women around). I have learnt a lot and had a lot of fun too.

BOAC, prattle on about curved DME arc versus circle-to-land approaches. If someone was only watching the DME, curved, straight, circle or not, this accident would not have happened. So what is your beef?

I have to write about the economic costs of the floods in Pakistan that have displaced 3.5 million people and damaged vital infrastructure.

Before I end, I do remember as a young boy the BOAC Comet I visit to Dacca, then East Pakistan. I think they lost one on take-off at Karachi because for some reason the take-off on the Comet I was very challenging.

Mikal (NOT, like EVERYONE else here my real name).

[Mr.Bloggs]

Meekal,

No one was doubting the integrity of your father. Of course not.

However disputatious discussions on this site abound. I am sad that you feel the need to leave, as I think your contributions were honest and valuable.

Perhaps you could re-consider. (I don't know what BOAC's beef is either)

After all, I think that you may be in the best position to institute a proper inquiry into the ED accident.

Bloggs.

[deSitter]

The following is the "view" from crash site #2 - again, the terrain profiles are only approximate in Google Earth but here, even given the slightly higher elevation that the view is taken from in GE, the entire city is visible and that is not the case in the crash-site photographs.

Not to worry, this is easily accountable as varying perspective - I think you have the impact site pretty well narrowed down.

-drl

[HarryMann]

Yes PJ, think you've got it pinned down pretty well now.:ok: Slightly down that hill, what a great tool Google Earth is !

[PJ2]

HarryMann;

It is a great investigative tool, indeed remarkable; - very fast in scrolling - big improvements over when it first came out.

[Captain-Crunch]

Hey Meekal,

Please don't be offended by, shall we say, some of our gruffer "Wheelchair-Aviators" in this forum who clearly have no experience with electric jets, but still feel a need to wear four bars rolling around in the nursing home. They mean well; they are just trying, like all of us, to flesh out lines of inquiry in the face of nothing to go on. I find myself becoming more and more like them eveyday! :E

I think your contributions are some of the best in the thread. We have gained insight into the proceedures, terrain and some of the culture of CAA/PIA/Airblue. If you were the son of the Defense Minister, then although maybe not rated, it would not surprise me at all if you had flown a few of Pakistan's best birds. :ok:

I would like to ask you to stay, Meekal. I would also like to ask you a favor. Perhaps by some inadvertent accident, someone you know might leak the CVR recording to Wikileaks or Youtube. :E:= Though terribly unfortunate, if that were to happen, you might learn of it, let us know, and prevent this sort of tragedy from happening again. The CVR of Adam Air in Indonesia which was covered up by investigators, appeared on Youtube, and made it clear it was a spacial disorientation accident by the Captain. It was caused by the crew selecting both sides of attitude info to the bad IRU.

Had it not leaked, local investigators might not have had the courage to even finish the report.

These are all just my opinions only,

Cheers,

CC

[BOAC]

OK - my 'beef'

1) PPrune has always 'expected' those in the media, especially those who write for newspapers and cut and past PPrune forum comments on other fora to declare themselves.

2) All through Meekal's post we have the 'hint' that he might have operated as an airline pilot (in PIA) and knows how to fly these procedures - I see Meekal has also been active (moderating?) on a flt sim forum too which may explain some of this. Even 'examiner.com' has been confusedAirline pilot Meekal Ahmed described it this way.An example of a 'Walter Mitty' experience is here There was this one guy who really terrified me.

Coming in to land at AMS from the south he kept saying "he is bringing us in from the north" as if to enlighten me.

Talk of spatial/situational unawareness.

When I asked if he wanted the automatics on for the ILS he said "no, I failed my last check-ride", or something to that effect. He was all over the place, weaving back and forth, hand-flying and the controller asked us "Pakistan XXX, are you established"?

All I could say was "Sir, we are establishing right now".

Well, his actual touch-down was featherlight with no excessive flare and probably the best I have experienced! 3) Seeds of confusion have been planted thereby
If he was doing a back-course to 12, he would be nowhere near the hills either. They would be well to his left.

So, since he did hit the hills, he must have been executing the circle-to-land DME arc for 12. I have done that at least 20 times from the front and the back of the bus.

It is not unsafe per-se but you need to stay alert because you need to approach on 30 and then break away and fly parallel downwind to the Margalla hills and swing around for a back-course landing on 12. No margin for error though. From his Tribune articles:or if the hills are shrouded in low clouds as they were that fateful day, he stays within an arc (which is drawn from a point at the airport). This arc is clearly displayed on the navigation display (ND) as a curved line. I do not recall the distance of the arc from the airport but obviously the arc is calculated to keep the plane clear of the surrounding high terrain.I know the ILS is on 30 while 12 has the “back-course” approach which is non-precision. It would now appear that Meekal used the wrong words through lack of understanding of the correct ones, but in so doing has not helped to cast any light on this accident here.

As forI write and gently try and correct them. Inevitably, someone will come back all aggressive and ask "Where YOU in that cockpit? If not, how do YOU know"? he obviously has a short memory because the comment was NOT addressed to him as he conceded to the poster ('temporal' on another forum) "OK, fine. Sorry I misunderstood."

Now - you may have a large axe to grind against the current government of Pakistan, and therefore Mr Blogg's suggestion "you may be in the best position to institute a proper inquiry into the ED accident" would be a bit of a non-starter.

'Leave' if you must. Personally I would rather see all contributors continue in an open and honest manner, contributing facts or 'reports' to this puzzle in line with the excellent work of others.

Lastly, dragging his father into all of this perplexes me - it is irrelevant.

On the subject of the accident, I read that the a/c crashed in a left turn and was thought to have impacted at 3000'MSL.

[RegDep]

Mikal,

Please stay, as you now stay as a journalist and now we know that. You write well, very well indeed; here and elsewhere. Bring in all the experience you have and guide us through the issues in Pakistan - where you are, no doubt, better than anyone here.

What took some of us aback was that you presented direct experiences as they had been yours. This we really do not like. Not at all. There must be a difference between artists' freedom and factual reporting. Please take no offense of others taking offense of your conduct in this.

Reg (not my real name, because of personal reasons)

PS: Maybe strictly taken not "journalist" (an IMF Advisor, maybe still) but a person looking for information to publish elsewhere, which is close enough.

[BOAC]

Now I have been 'trawling' the various fora, this post by 'Evan' elsewhere produced this interesting theory.Ok, theory time:

I've noticed a smaller, decommissioned airstrip alongside the Islamabad Hwy, about 30° off from RWY 30 (red line on my diagram). Is is possible that, after breaking off the RWY30 approach at the VOR and heading away at a 45° vector, the fatigued and/or distracted crew neglected to make the downwind turn in time to come abeam the runway, and, in poor daylight visibility with broken clouds subsequently mistook the older airstrip for OPRN? If so, this would have them heading directly for the Margalla Hills, yet they would still report having the runway in sight. As the hills rapidly came into view (after the last radio transmission), they would attempt to climb and possibly veer off to clear the ridge, but not in time...

It seems unlikely, but if this was a purely visual procedure under stress, and something was distracting them, not impossible.

Total speculation, but I can't help myself. http://forums.jetphotos.net/attachment.php?attachmentid=2845&d=1280415530

"I can see the runway and the hills......................................"?????

I feel my money is going that way, and I could probably draft a CVR transcript for you. It may even have been the 'inexperienced' F/O who initiated the pull up?

[Efe Cem Elci]

I have to completely agree with BOAC about Meekal. From the beginning of the thread, the wording and expressions in his messages seemed to hint towards being an airline pilot with years and years of experience. I went back just as BOAC did and re-read the thread, concentrating on Meekal's posts especially to see if I was mistaken.
Obviously we jump to assume things when reading on a forum with 'Professional Pilots' in its name and I wanted to make sure it wasn't just us presuming he was from the technical nature of his posts. I kept telling myself that he could've been riding the jumpseat for most of the messages relating to being in the cockpit until I got to the message about talking with the ATC.

I could probably draft a CVR transcript for you
I'd be interested in reading that just out of sheer curiosity. It seems plausible but as always from the beginning of this thread the same "how could it happen?" question looms. Unfortunately for most accidents of this nature it is not one mistake but rather a series of mistakes or occurrences that coincide simultaneously.

[BOAC]

Well, like everything else, guesswork.I will refrain for posting a 'CVR Transcript' attempt as a mark of respect.

However, I do see 'Evan's' theory as the best we have yet.

Right turn off the ILS at MDA (or above)
A 'left turn' onto downwind'
Sight of 'runway'. Too close in really but vis is err........ poor.....
Left turn onto final, blowing through with strong 'slackening' wind.
The rest?

There must have been some question mark in P2's head, and I assume the sight of a large city under the base leg would have clinched it for him, but too late.

Summary - 'disorientation' of at least one pilot.

[denlopviper]

thats not a decommisioned strip. the highway was being widened and that construction work caused ALOT of inconvinience when going up and down to the airport from my place, which happens to be about 2 miles from the crash site.

theres are a few straight stretchs of newly constructed roads in the city which may appear like a runway to a non local operator, but even those are way outside the circling area.

knowing the parttern flown in OPRN by all operators, including CX, BA, Qatar, EY, EK etc. they stay west of the highway, and the track is pretty much parallel to the highway. they start the base turn just abeam where the red line is marked on the map. most operators fly a teardrop when flying this circle to land instead of the the 30 degree offset followed by a parallel downwind.

[captplaystation]

Just to jump back a few posts where someone suggested that "cockpit gradient" could be solved by adding a 2nd F/O , Er, just remind me how many of these were sat in the front in AMS when Turkish showed the problems with having ex air force pilots in almost all your left hand seats.
Having a little experience of a Turkish company , and the mentality of their ex fighter jocks, it is a BIG problem,& this straight from the horses mouths of the local F/O's I flew with.
CRM/MCC ? forget it !

[BOAC]

denlop - I bow to your local knowledge, but looking at May 2009 Google Earth image

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v293/boacphotos/Noname-1.jpg
I think there is some credibility in the theory? After all, we've had nothing else.

[fox niner]

Captplaystation,

You're absolutely right. Take a look at the turkish crash at EHAM thread, the very last page. Cockpit gradient problems can be impossible to solve in some regions...

[BOAC]

Are we saying, then, that cockpit gradient' cause by an ex-mil Captain was a problem here? I thought he was a long-serving ex PIA man.

[denlopviper]

theory yeah, but from an old pic.

the road has now been completed and is open. the highway you see in the pic you posted has now been doubled in width essentially. heres a pic from 2004 of that same intersection. that specific area is just in the corner but is visible

http://img189.imageshack.us/img189/2046/pict0040gb.jpg (http://img189.imageshack.us/i/pict0040gb.jpg/)
Uploaded with ImageShack.us (http://imageshack.us)


but yes i can think of a few other roads which could be mistaken for a runway.

[denlopviper]

well actaully, having a pure civilian in AirBlue is rear as over 85% of their crew are ex-PAF, captains and FOs. the Captain on the flight was one of the few non military guys in the outfit. and there is not such rift between military and non military guys.

for Shaheen Int'l, almsot all their crew is ex PAF, but ofcourse that airline was started by the minstry of defence for ex Military pilots

[BOAC]

Denlop - that does not look too promising- shame as the geometry looked to fit.

[dvv]

BOAC, now if they really do that teardrop along the highway and break left abeam that airfield-like structure, then it is possible to fly a 4.5 (or so) DME arc to final and remain within 3sm of the field. Hm…

[BOAC]

I think if the wx was so bad that I needed a DME arc to circle to land I'd push off!

[denlopviper]

it doesnt have to be a DME arc, just make a tight left turn and you end up on base. if you are visual you continue, otherwise keep the turn going, head to the beacon and go missed. and yes you avoid all the prohibited areas doing this.

[BOAC]

Off topic again, but for the avoidance of doubt, otherwise keep the turn going, head to the beacon and go missed. - there is NO requirement to 'head to the beacon', and if you are talking about a g/a from base the most sensible option would be to head direct for the 240 radial, I would suggest.

[denlopviper]

it would be the logical choice yes but have seen crews do both ways, thats why mentioned it. depends on company SOPs as well

[Captain-Crunch]

Exactly denlopviper,

There's not just one way to do everything. US Intn'l non-radar guidance the AIM allows several methods of course reversal, procedure turn etc; all up to the pilot on how to accomplish them as long as he remains within protected airspace IIRC. And every airline operation is different. In the states the airline's FAA POI may or may not grant permission for interpretations of FAR to the particular airlines advantage. He'll consider a lot of things before making his decision on whether or not to grant relief or concurrence with the stated request.

The going outside the airport's reported vis in statue miles (say vis is 2sm) is a good example. If your outfit allows you to do it, then it's up to the crew to stay within the (obstacle) protected airspace area and keep visual with the airport area and the terrain. We had a stipulation on us, by our POI's judgement, that we had to first identify the landing runway threshold before we could venture further out into protected airspace (to loosen up the pattern). That was if the pilot's vis was better than reported by the airport. As other posters have commented, this means you might loose sight of the runway briefly in the turns, in the real world.

In Pakistan, who knows what the local procedures are as practiced by the local carriers as governed by their CAA? We were about to find out until one of us started shouting "You're not a pilot" because you said 12 mile DME arc.... etc

Which of course, is not what he said.

I mean, English is a second language for the guy. In the dozens of countries I flew into it was a common truth that you couldn't just take the guy's verbage literally. You had to ask the question several different ways several times to figure out what he means. But being polite was essential.

In Pakistan, it's been said in this thread, that the head of Defense was also the head of PIA. If true, it would likely follow that the Defense minister's son would get trained in the sim, since he was a cadet already, and fly positioning flights for the airline. Can he call himself a legal pilot? No. But I've been at airlines where Captain's sons and mechanics, FAA guys, Flight Engineers, board members, flight attendants and doctors all flew the equipment a little bit in the old days. Then on their days off, they might fly GA airplanes for free as co-pilot to gain experience.

If that's the case, then why run this guy off in such a rude fashion? Deposing his every word as if he was on trial? Just because he took a little "journalistic license?" Most flying rags in the US are the same. Many journos admire and pretend to be "pilots" since they once touched the controls of a jet for an article. O.K, we know he's a journalist as he stated that from the start. I've read his stuff, and it's 100 percent better than the trash that's aired by CNN or FOX for example, with non-flying journos. I agree with Meekal's last sentiment especially, that the airmen I knew of the old established trunk airlines, were polite, well-educated, articulate gentlemen, who would not exclude from the going conversation others in the industry with different backgrounds or different responsibilities. This guy's family background was in government and maybe journalism, and he no doubt flew various aircraft at the field for his father, so his father's background certainly is relative.

And to make the insulting comment that he is not entitled to have an opinion about or criticize his own government ("you hate the gov" )is the height of exaggeration. His remarks here on PPRuNe were all in the context of, and related to, air safety, as he cited numerous examples of covered-up accidents (that I never even knew occurred); it was not some vendetta against the government imho.

Then there's this bizarre attitude, held by some, that mountains 4,000 feet high only a couple miles from the edge of the pan-ops protection zone are not really "mountains near the airport" and don't justify a safety backup like airborne weather radar. Let's say he was shaving mountains, hills, whatever, at 7nm. At 180 kts zero wind, he would be doing 3nm/min. But let's just say, hypothetically, he starts the circle too high, and up high, there's a twenty-knot quartering tailwind (just for the worst-case sake of argument), so now we're doing say, 190 kts ground speed or 3.16 nm/min. Maybe that's only 45 seconds or less to impact past the 5.x pan ops obstacle protected area. Right?

But glass pilots never think about wind while hand flying and making turns, because none of them ever has the ROSE display up, where you can look at a full compass rose (especially the back side as it's rotating) and say to yourself, O.K., the wind up here is out of 090 at twenty knots, since I told the F/O to quit dickin with the electric toys and instead just roll in the runway 12 heading in the FCP course window; BEHOLD: I now can now tell, at a glance, map shift or no, whether or not I remembered to turn downwind. I also can tell, since I never fly on autopilot much, that since the 090 is now to the right of my tail that this next turn to base will have to start way early, since the wind will now be trying to push me into those hills that don't qualify as "terrain close to the airport".

Egads, just how many airframes do I know of, still sitting there around the world, in hills ten miles from the airport? Dozens. But these Brave Sim Gods, in their Proud Simulators have never hiked up there and looked at them. These brave new Pushbutton Pilots of Tomorrow, think map shift and distraction are impossible.

411a is right. Basic airmanship no longer exists at many airlines who swallow the "automation will always save you" argument that is peddled by some manufacturers. Honeywell glass is a horrible distraction and insidious additive crutch even when everything works right. As these airframes get older, more and more distracting anomalies are going to plague a crew already in high-workload operations.

The above are just all my opinions only.

CC

[BOAC]

Where do I start?you might loose sight of the runway briefly in the turns, in the real world. - not just in the 'real world' but a fully approved part of circling.We were about to find out -hmm! I don't think so.Which of course, is not what he said. - quite right, as I said. What he actually spoke about was a 'back course to R12'You had to ask the question several different ways several times to figure out what he means. - you mean like I did?since he was a cadet already, -what sort of cadet?If that's the case, then why run this guy off in such a rude fashion? - funny - I thought he 'ran himself off' in a huff?Then there's this bizarre attitude, - more a bizarre idea of yours about how to circle-to-land - 'shaving mountains in a circle at 7 miles' :confused: what on earth is that about? Using weather radar to 'dodge the hills in a circle? - I wonder if you are actually a pilot too. Leaving aside 411A's nightmare FAA tester, you would not get a seat up front that way anywhere, and I would suggest if you have one that you abandon circling forthwith for the sake of everyone else!

Lastly, Many journos admire and pretend to be "pilots" since they once touched the controls of a jet for an article. - indeed they do, and PPRune has a fine reputation for unmasking such - and getting child molesters convicted too - in its history, and we do prefer the truth rather than the make-believe since that enables a serious focus on events. Of course he may well have been handling the radio for the crew on a scheduled carrier from the jump-seat into a major busy international airport, but I leave the rest of this forum to make their own judgement on that and what it might say about PIA.

Yes, Meekal's insight into the intrigue and politics in Pakistan would have been of use, but presented differently.

[sharpshooter41]

BOAC

I couldn't agree with you more. Meekal is indeed a strange person. First he makes us believe that he is a pilot. Then he starts to take on the local CAA as well as PIA.

He also belittles a pilot by saying that getting into AMS, the pilot incorrectly told him that the controller was bringing him in from the North, whereas it was from the other direction.

And, now when he is caught out, he sulks off and guess what, goes off to another aviation site www.historyofpia.com (http://www.historyofpia.com) and starts spreading pearls of wisdom to the unsuspecting.

CC

Please don't support a person who is firstly not a pilot, only posing to be one and secondly is acting as judge and jury on an accident which he knows very little about sans what he has been able to put together from various aviation sites.

[BOAC]

ss41 - thanks for jogging my memory there - I had not visited that forum for a few days, but what IS again of interest there is 'Tailwind' (who appears to know a bit about it) saying on Sunday
"First there are published procedures for NDB or VOR approach for rwy 12 OPRN, however these are non-precision approached. These procedures have their own limitations and minimas as is the case with any approach. "

My bold - I think there is more to fall out here.
Meekal is sadly still feeding confusion into that forum as well - on Friday, circling R12 - 'you should not go further than 2.5DME' - could make for an interesting final:)

[aterpster]

BOAC:

ss41 - thanks for jogging my memory there - I had not visited that forum for a few days, but what IS again of interest there is 'Tailwind' (who appears to know a bit about it) saying on Sunday
"First there are published procedures for NDB or VOR approach for rwy 12 OPRN, however these are non-precision approached. These procedures have their own limitations and minimas as is the case with any approach. "

Any procedures that the country intends to be for public use would appear in their ICAO-compliant AIP. Those procedures would be charted by both Jeppesen and Lido.

[BOAC]

Depends how they are 'published' does it not?

[aterpster]

BOAC:

Depends how they are 'published' does it not?

If they appear in the AIP they are public and for everyone's use, subject to approach category limitations.

There is also a provision, not used by all ICAO member states, to issue non-public procedures to sponsoring carriers, but that is a very limited process.

If you are implying "cocktail napkin" procedures those are usually not flown in IMC in radar airspace, and especially not by air carriers.

[BOAC]

I think I know what you mean by a "cocktail napkin procedure" although it is not an expression I am familiar with - I think we use "back of a cigarette packet" - and I can understand your 'position' because of your current role, but yes, the same, and it would not get within 100nm of an AIP. Don't get fixated on my idea - I am merely scratching around and looking for some explanation of a bizarre flight path in the complete vacuum that exists, and am nudged in that direction by the unsubstantiated comment by Meekal and now by this other forum post. I had been hoping for a little more light on the query.

The world is full of "back of a cigarette packet" procedures, particularly the private and military world, and just such killed the British racing driver Graham Hill a few years back.

[Lonewolf_50]

Timing:

I am not an accomplished glass cockpit kind of person, so I 'd have to ask: do pilots still use timing/the clock during non precision approaches?

Do pilots still time their teardrop/procedure turn legs?

I accept that the circle-to-land isn't the same thing as timing from a NAVAID inbound to an FAF ... but ... if the clock in one's head isn't working, flying away from a runway at x degrees (30?? 45??) and then a minute or so later seeing "runway" next to you or infront of you ... doesn't match. Basic VNAV.

However, as I don't do that sort of flying anymore, I do not know where the state of the art is, nor what common practice is.

"We've been outbound from the runway for a minute/two minutes, we need to turn back to the runway to land"

Based on where the plane ended up, it looks like something prevented that thought from raising to number one in priority of things to act upon. :(

[BOAC]

I would not expect a crew to use timing on a circling approach until they passed the approach end of the runway (some might choose to time the dog-leg - I used to eyeball it unless the track was 'defined'). The other clues like heading, map display, DME range high and increasing, ATC, 'haven't we been going this way a long time, Skip?', appear also to have been missed.

[aterpster]

Lonewolf 50:

Do pilots still time their teardrop/procedure turn legs?

The modern FMS navigator does a better job with course reversals than pilots, whether they be teardrops, procedure turns, or hold-in-lieu-of-procedure turn. (positive course guidance throughout the maneuver.) The pilot nonetheless has the duty to monitor the flight path for reasonableness.

accept that the circle-to-land isn't the same thing as timing from a NAVAID inbound to an FAF ... but ... if the clock in one's head isn't working, flying away from a runway at x degrees (30?? 45??) and then a minute or so later seeing "runway" next to you or infront of you ... doesn't match. Basic VNAV.

Circle to land is a nasty visual-segment option from the dark ages of aviation to visually proceed in sometimes lousy, unforgiving weather conditions to a runway that lacks an IAP. Why is is usually done? Because of straight-in tailwind limits, the very winds that send you rapidly on your way to the other runway.

[aterpster]

BOAC:

The world is full of "back of a cigarette packet" procedures, particularly the private and military world, and just such killed the British racing driver Graham Hill a few years back.

We Yanks, especially pilots, have mostly given up smoking. But, we still go to the cocktail lounge. :D

[BOAC]

Anyone read Pakistani? Someone has posted a copy of a letter on the PIA site.

History of PIA - Forum :: View topic - AirBlue jet down in Islamabad (http://www.historyofpia.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=17832&start=375)

[sohailsf]

You'll be shocked to know that the article claims that the AB was downed because it was hijacked by Blackwater, for the purpose of crashing it into the Quetta nuke plant (that's when I stopped reading :oh:)

The evidence is irrefutable, and its absolutely true!!

This kind of conspiracy journalism is a staple in pakistan, in all sectors and at all levels of education. And its almost always America's fault. Don't you get it??

With this mentality in Pak, we hardly ever get the truth, but hopefully we will find it this time for the sake of prevention if nothing else.

[BOAC]

Hadn't thought of that one. Thanks - nailed! Nice to see they have their weirdos as well:)

[Fawad]

@BOAC

Its not pakistani, its called Urdu and its the national language there.

The article is pure BS from a local newspaper and claims blackwater people hijacked the plane and wanted to attack the nearby Kahuta nuclear facility and stuff like that. The basis of all this is that why hasn't the voices of the cockpit been made public yet.

Nothing to be taken seriously. Actually, I even doubt this is from the newspaper. There is no journalists name and it quotes "sources that wouldn't like to be named". Even the font and style doesn't seem to match a scan from a paper thought I won't be surprised if it is.

Unfortunately, and as mentioned above, some local channels and newspapers thrive on such made-up news by sensationalizing things and twisting facts. If you want to follow local news, try Dawn newspaper (DAWN.COM | Home | Latest News, Pakistan, World, Business, Cricket and Multimedia (http://www.dawn.com/)). Its english language and is far more respectable than others.


Also its not PIA site but some private forum.

[Lonewolf_50]

Lonewolf 50:


The modern FMS navigator does a better job with course reversals than pilots, whether they be teardrops, procedure turns, or hold-in-lieu-of-procedure turn. (positive course guidance throughout the maneuver.) The pilot nonetheless has the duty to monitor the flight path for reasonableness.
Thank you for summarizing why I have stopped flying as a passenger unless absolutely necessary. That viewpoint, and its acceptance in the aviation industry. Not your fault, but the state of being that this paragraph describes makes me puke. I shall cross reference the discussion on rudder reversals and AA 587 and conclude that all the pilot is for in the airline is to provide a scapegoat on demand, eh? (Yes, a bit of sarcasm there, sorry ... ) Grrrr. Time turn time transition ... basic airmanship, the fundamentals.

EDIT: As to why it makes me puke, let's think about what the auto pilot is designed to do ... it is designed to imitate, or to attempt to replicate the pilot flying task.
Quote:Circle to land is a nasty visual-segment option from the dark ages of aviation to visually proceed in sometimes lousy, unforgiving weather conditions to a runway that lacks an IAP. Why is is usually done? Because of straight-in tailwind limits, the very winds that send you rapidly on your way to the other runway.
Dark ages? That's a curious take on what they are there for. Granted, I'd prefer straight from the FAF to the RWY every time. It's easier.

Circle to land got me home, and into a few airports that were not home, very nicely (thanks very much!) when NAVAIDS weren't working or a bit of equipment was on the fritz leading me to a non-precision approach. Granted, I was not hauling three hundred people at the time (the most I ever had in the back was five) but I don't find the flexibility that CTL allows to be a bad thing.

[BOAC]

@BOAC

Its not pakistani, its called Urdu and its the national language there. - my apologies for the mistake.

[wiggy]

The modern FMS navigator does a better job with course reversals than pilots, whether they be teardrops, procedure turns, or hold-in-lieu-of-procedure turn. (positive course guidance throughout the maneuver.)

To which you replied:

Thank you for summarizing why I have stopped flying as a passenger unless absolutely necessary

Yes there are some aspects of the FMS that are pants and need watching - "my" FMC flies a dire direct entry to the Ockham hold as an example :bored:, but given the choice, to get me home, in dire weather, of flying, say, a Non precision approach using stopwatch and heading, or flying the same approach "coupled" using GPS and database for guidance I'm quite willing to forgo the heroics and use my braincells to monitor the flightpath.... and I suspect the several hundred folks down the back might agree with the more conservative approach.

[aterpster]

Lonewolf 50:

Thank you for summarizing why I have stopped flying as a passenger unless absolutely necessary. That viewpoint, and its acceptance in the aviation industry. Not your fault, but the state of being that this paragraph describes makes me puke. I shall cross reference the discussion on rudder reversals and AA 587 and conclude that all the pilot is for in the airline is to provide a scapegoat on demand, eh? (Yes, a bit of sarcasm there, sorry ... ) Grrrr. Time turn time transition ... basic airmanship, the fundamentals.

When did you get your instrument rating? I got mine in 1958 and flew four-course range procedures as well as VOR without DME. And, when ATC had radar identification was done with turns, sometimes into mountains. I flew a lot of light G/A time then was with TWA from 1964 through 1990.

I wouldn't think about going back to some of the lousy stuff earlier in my career. Today's modern air carrier aircraft, used by competent pilots, is a modern wonder compared to the past.

Also, I have stated my position on hand-flying skills on this forum many times.

As to circle-to-land getting you home, there were times I was happier getting home the next day.

[Lonewolf_50]

aterpster, I got my instrument rating in 1982. My first instrument check included holding at an NDB in a nice cross wind, in actual IFR conditions. Yes, the sweat pumps were working.
EDIT: I also did a bit of instrument training down in the Rio Grande Valley. At the time, it wasn't radar covered, which made position reporting and navigational accuracy, and dead reckoning, pretty important ... one didn't want to end up in Mexico's airspace, for one thing!

Aerodymanics hasn't changed much since then, nor since you got your card, nor has physics, nor has time and distance, and for that matter, nor has the requirement for a crew to fly as a crew.

Would I rather shoot an ILS than an NDB? Hell yes, particularly when the weather is poor. Given a choice, would I like some auto trip, airspeed hold, and other aids to controlling descent on glide path? Sure, why not?

Would I rather fly a GPS approach than a TACAN or VOR/DME approach? Yes. And if one NAVAID is down, or broken, which happens, I want to be able to complete the flight it the weather hasn't gone to complete crap.
Today's modern air carrier aircraft, used by competent pilots, is a modern wonder compared to the past.
It certainly is.
As to circle-to-land getting you home, there were times I was happier getting home the next day.
But your paying passengers often are not.

I too, as a pilot in command, have sometimes had to land elsewhere than my intended destination when the weather was too bad to continue. (That consideration is relevant to this mishap, given the diversion of some other flights in roughly the same time window).

That said, there was a point earlier in this thread asking why that airport didn't have the ILS or LOC approaches servicing both runways, which is answerable only by the non-flying element of the industry ... though when I look at the terrain north and west of the airport, I suspect the approach would need to be designed with some care.
Also, I have stated my position on hand-flying skills on this forum many times.
Indeed you have, which takes us back to a crew that flies well, or competently as you put it, to get the performance out of their modern miracle of metal, glass, rubber, and plastic that achieves their mission.

[Fawad]

There was a special program on a local tv last night about the crash with the CEO of Airblue and director of CAA (civil aviation authority). Nothing breakthrough in it, just the usual questions. A few points below (most of which we already knew)

- The captain, though had a 36 hr break since his last flight, but he wasn't supposed to fly. He was just called in 2 hrs before since the pilot on duty had to excuse himself. There was also a question raised on whether the captain that flew was on standby or not.

- The black boxes are already in France for decoding and the report will come in 2-3 days (doesn't mean it will be shared publicly though).

- At the time of landing, there were 5 planes waiting to land at the airport, and the doomed airblue flight was 2nd in the queue.

- A 5 member team from Airbus also participating in the investigation, and a person(s) from the engine manufacturer also visited the crash site.

- The plane was equipped with an EGPWS

- There is a senior Airblue pilot in the investigation team too and the lead investigators are well qualified with lots of experience.

- The main focus of the program, however, was why CAA is doing the investigation and why isn't there an independent body such as NTSB and even if there isn't, why isnt there parallel investigations? given that it (CAA) could be a party to the investigation. Also the issues of the qualification of both ATC and CAA officials were raised as well as their training but just the usual 'they are well trained' answer.

[aterpster]

Lonewolf 50:

That said, there was a point earlier in this thread asking why that airport didn't have the ILS or LOC approaches servicing both runways, which is answerable only by the non-flying element of the industry ... though when I look at the terrain north and west of the airport, I suspect the approach would need to be designed with some care.

You perhaps missed earlier in the thread where I posted pro-forma VOR approach to Runway 12. With DME the terrain is not an issue. But, the VOR may have performance issues in that sector. I also "penciled in" an RNAV approach, which would work great with vertical guidance all the way in. Restricted airspace is the issue much more than terrain.

An ILS would be difficult to site and not worth the expense if the reports in this thread are correct about moving the airport.

[Lonewolf_50]

aterpster:

I didn't "miss that," so I may go back and have another look.

When I was reading through that sequence of posts a few days ago, most of the pictures didn't come up on my PC -- all I got was nice blank yellow background. *shrugs* Not sure why.

EDIT:

I have a question for you, please bear with me.

There is circling, then there is circling. OPRN, being a PANS-OPS airport has a realistic circle-to-land maneuvering area. I have no quarrel with circling at such an airport provided the pilot has proficiency and currency in CTL procedures in a heavy jet transport. In that case circling at OPRN can be quite safe.

TERPs is a different matter. The protected airspace less than 50% of that provided by PANS-OPS. Is ICAO wasting airspace or is the FAA deadly wrong? It's the latter.
I agree with having 5nm to work with allows the pilot of a heavy room to work, but I think you see what I am going to say next: instrument approaches and the procedures that go with them are intended to work under IMC, which is typicallly < 1000/3. If you can't see the 5nm, of course it doesn't do you much good to have that much room to work with. :\ Losing sight of the RWY environment puts an end to the CTL.

Granted, there are some days when it's pretty clear vis below an OVC or BKN layer, but I don't think you can design an approach based on that assumption.

On the other hand, time and distance for a heavy, particularly with wind, makes the 2.3nm circle hard work in bad weather relatively low to the ground.

In your comparison of either/or, and I think you have a detailed understanding of this, why won't the FAA budge on the 2.3 nm? Why not 3sm or 3nm? There is probably a reason, but I don't know what it is.
Mention was made earlier of the procedure having been designed for the Convair being applied to faster jets, and I note disagreement on why CAT C or D should, or should not, accept the CTL.

[BOAC]

Indeed, Lonewolf - as I said way back, PansOps is too big and Terps too small. The advantage of PansOps is that there is more room for 'error' in positioning whereas as a few Terps circlers have discovered, go slightly outside the normal circuit distance and you hit a hill. We were expecting Terps to increase their cleared area, but I think it was Aterp who said earlier that they now decline to. I am at a loss to understand their logic.

On the topic of a 12 VOR, it could actually easily have been designed without DME using the 'old-fashioned' timed outbound leg - the hills are not THAT high. In any case, with 2 DMEs available at the airfield I cannot see a problem.

[RegDep]

Just realized the GoogleEarth seems to have updated the satellite images of Islamabad since the beginning of this thread. The current ones are from 15 March 2010, but the ones used by PJ2 and BOAC seem to be from 17 May 2009. Not that it would make much of a difference to this thread, but wanted to point this out.
Reg

[Lonewolf_50]

BOAC: Aye, the old two minute then 45 deg barbed Procedure turn approach, descend at X ... which would typically in this day and age be more often given as a vectors to final. DME? Just makes it a better approach. Mins would be higher, though, than an ILS or LOC.

The non-flying element of the industry in Pakistan might want to explain why such an approach was either abandoned, or never certified ...

[BOAC]

Thanks Reg - good spot! I see the 'pseudo-runway' is still there in March. Who knows? I still wonder. Denlop reckons the 'roadwork' has been finished - it would be really good to see a July image. Nothing much else to go on while we wait ?6 months? for the CVR transcript - hmm?

[Lonewolf_50]

His bona fides considered, Meekal's earlier point about the habits of the authorities there, regarding accident investigations, look to have been close to the mark. Junaid Ameen, the director-general of the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority ... stated that the box would be examined by "foreign experts" in Germany or France as Pakistan does not possess the equipment to decode the flight recorders. He also stated that the process of extracting information may take six months to a year.
I'd be willing to bet a few francs that the experts in France could get the info out a bit more quickly than that ...

[aterpster]

Lonewolf 50:

I'd be willing to bet a few francs that the experts in France could get the info out a bit more quickly than that ...

The raw data can be read very quickly. To compile and render the DFDR data can take a few days if the experts have only that task to do.

The CVR is the really tough one. You have to hopefully get a sharp pilot from the carrier who speaks both the native tongue and French, and you need a second "trusted agent" also fluent in both languages to keep the pilot translator on task, so to speak.

Then, you have the non-trivial task of rendering a correct English translation.

[Neptunus Rex]

English, yes. Urdu, yes. Why French? There are plenty of 'Les Anglais' working for M'sieu Airbus, so why introduce a middle man?

[aterpster]

Lonewolf 50:

In your comparison of either/or, and I think you have a detailed understanding of this, why won't the FAA budge on the 2.3 nm? Why not 3sm or 3nm? There is probably a reason, but I don't know what it is.

FAA and U.S. air carrier politics. ALPA and others started working for better CTL criteria for TERPs perhaps 15 years ago.

The 767 CTL crash in Korea got the technical folks at the FAA off the dime. When Change 21 to TERPs was issued about a year ago, it contained vastly improved CTL criteria--sort of the fit BOAC would like.

But, a fairly high level FAA manager placed a "stop" on the new CTL criteria even though the signatories and industry had signed off on it and it became "law" (FAR Part 97) so to speak.

[Lonewolf_50]

Thanks for all the replies, sorry to see FAA "in the way" on the CTL issue. :(

In re CVR, hopefully the talent necessary will be found to help AB get the info extracted.

[aterpster]

Neptunus Rex:

English, yes. Urdu, yes. Why French? There are plenty of 'Les Anglais' working for M'sieu Airbus, so why introduce a middle man?

Middle man? Without a translation into French, there would be no France. :ooh: :)

[PEI_3721]

Meekal, re your … I am sure the runway symbol had disappeared from their ND. and … you could select and display on your ND.

Very few things in life are ‘sure’. Using the ND would be a good idea if the crew could be sure that map position was correct; we don’t know if ‘map-slip’ was a factor in this accident or not, but scant evidence suggest that the aircraft’s navigation system was not to the latest standard (no GPS) which could provide some protection from map-slip.
If the map position was incorrect and the crew used it, then this could have contributed to the accident.

Re Radar – when flying a circling procedure, the captain takes responsibility for terrain clearance, radar need not look for the aircraft; but if they do – well done. However, any safety information given should avoid confusion.

It might help your position when presenting issues to separate items, stick to facts or with supposition, provide supporting evidence or good argument.

[aterpster]

I'll summarize the procedure issues one more time:

We don't know whether the back course of the localizer has sufficient fidelity to support an instrument approach procedure. But, let's presume it does. Same for the VOR radials west of the airport.

Let's say both the LOC and VOR are fine for Runway 12.

The terrain would support three instrument approach procedures:

1. VOR/DME lined up quite good with Runway 12 with either a teardrop course reversal or a DME ARC initial approach segment.

2. A LOC Back Course/DME approach to very good minimums with either a teardrop course reversal or DME ARC initial approach segment. Reverse sensing has been a thing of the past for many years with modern even 1960s HSIs.

3. A perfectly aligned RNAV IAP with a Baro VNAV vertical path for a precision-like approach. It would have to be a GPS aircraft for this third option. But, if not, the other two IAPs would be available.

#3 would have worked even had the other two not. If neither the VOR or back course are useable, then a separate front course or LDA type facility should have been installed years ago.

The fact none of these existed makes the country's aviation authority cupable to some extent in this tragic accident in my view.

[BOAC]

The fact none of these existed makes the country's aviation authority culpable to some extent in this tragic accident in my view. - not in my opinion. Pakistan is certainly 'guilty' of not spending the necessary on investigating, implementing and gaining international approval for instrument approaches on R12, but the fact that they do not exist does not make the CAA 'culpable' in any way. Despite some 'suggestions', the circling is all that there was for crews seeking to land on 12 in less than full visual conditions. It is there for crews who are capable of flying it to do. It is perfectly safe. It is not the country's or the CAA's fault if someone does not, for whatever reason, fly it correctly.

Can't do it - either don't start it at all or execute the appropriate missed approach from it. Time to stop 'blaming' the P CAA?

[kotakota]

I was in Islamabad the day before . I have only been there 3 times , but there is NO procedure which takes you to the North of the runway , only after take-off with its left turn out ( a no brainer ) and the G/A from 30 which also invilves a left turn . Any circling approach to 30 is from the South.
The accident scene is due North of the airfield ( maybe 350 degrees ), past the northern suburbs , only the slopes after that . What the hell were they doing there at all , especially in an aircraft with EGPWS and its Data base . Even the 737-200s do not make a habit of flying into high ground , of which there is a lot in North Pakistan.

[MOON65]

Most Probably It Is A Case Of Cfit In Adverse Weather Conditions,however The Dfdr Has Been Found And Truth Will Come Out,

[aterpster]

BOAC:

Can't do it - either don't start it at all or execute the appropriate missed approach from it. Time to stop 'blaming' the P CAA?

You would have made a great chief pilot at TWA in my earlier days there. :)

Mitigation is the duty of the airport owner and national aviation authority.

You've seen plenty of accidents with the probable cause followed by perhaps a dozen contributing factors. That is where the lack of facilities belongs, somewhere down that list of "a dozen."

Also, I did state "...cupable to some extent..."

[aterpster]

Kotakota:

Any circling approach to 30 is from the South.

That is your opinion, but it's not supported by the facts. We've been through a fairly good assessment of the circle-to-land protected zone earlier in this thread. Circling to the north side is just as safe and protected as circling to the south side. Captains, when given the choice, would rather have the airport on their side.

If circling to the north did not meet PANS-OPS' generous CTL criteria, the approach chart would not authorize it.

Departures are an entirely different matter. There is really high terrain slightly further to the north than the crash site terrain. That problem doesn't exist to the south for departures.

Departure issues and circle-to-land issues are a whole different set of technical issues.

[BOAC]

Mitigation is the duty of the airport owner and national aviation authority. - of course, but as a firm believer and practiser of 'Captain's responsibilities' I still say that P cannot be 'blamed' in any way for the crash. Blame them for lack of foresight, intelligence, common-sense, management ability, attention to practical safety issues, governmental oversight - yes.

If a facility is not there to be used, you make the best of what you have. EG You cannot 'blame' an airport with a CATI ILS if someone crashes trying to fly to CATIII limits.

Incidentally - I'm sure there is a restriction in Islamabad on circuit direction is there not? I seem to recall it was only on R30 (!?) but restricted circuits to the north? Now who on earth thought no-one would do circuits on R12?

As for being CP of TWA - suppose YOU had been, and one of your high-time crew filed an ASR for a g/a in hilly terrain in marginal weather at around DME9 on a visual circle - "don't worry - the airport should have put in an ILS"?

[Gulfcapt]

I can't recall whether this data has been posted yet or not; sorry if its a repeat.

From the Jepp 10-9 Airport/Info dated 24 Feb 06: Runway 30 right-hand circuit.

From the Jepp 11-1 ILS DME Rwy 30 dated 23 May 03: No restrictions shown for circling pattern. Straight in mins of 1965' (309')/800m with ALS. Circling mins at 135 kts of 2410' (742')/1600m and 180 kts of 2510' (842')/2400m.

There is the prohibited area due south of the airport, plus a note on the 11-1 to avoid overflight of the city south and west. Certainly casts doubt on the right-hand circuit.

Best,
GC

[BOAC]

"Certainly casts doubt on the right-hand circuit."????

[Gulfcapt]

"Certainly casts doubt on the right-hand circuit."????

Oops, sorry, seemed perfectly clear in my head :O

The right-hand circuit statement on the airport diagram conflicts (to me) with the prohibited area to the south of the airport and the request to avoid overflight of the town that is south and west of the airport. Maybe a light aircraft could complete a right-hand circuit without violating the prohibited area and without overflying the town, but I don't see how a turbojet could.

In other words, the 10-9 and the 11-1 contradict themselves for circling purposes...

Hopefully that's better than my first attempt!

Best,
GC

[BOAC]

I think we have a different interpretation of a 'right-hand circuit'.

[Gulfcapt]

"I think we have a different interpretation of a 'right-hand circuit'. "

Oh snap! ...thanks BOAC :O

This is why I don't rent cars in your country...

Best,
GC

[BOAC]

Ah! But do you fly circuits in 'our country' (that is Jeppesen-land.......):confused:

[aterpster]

Gulfcapt:

I can't recall whether this data has been posted yet or not; sorry if its a repeat.

From the Jepp 10-9 Airport/Info dated 24 Feb 06: Runway 30 right-hand circuit.

From the Jepp 11-1 ILS DME Rwy 30 dated 23 May 03: No restrictions shown for circling pattern. Straight in mins of 1965' (309')/800m with ALS. Circling mins at 135 kts of 2410' (742')/1600m and 180 kts of 2510' (842')/2400m.

There is the prohibited area due south of the airport, plus a note on the 11-1 to avoid overflight of the city south and west. Certainly casts doubt on the right-hand circuit.

We have discussed the CTL protected area a lot, and have used the premise of 205 knots, MDA 2,150, because that is in fact the protected airspace the ill-fated flight had, whether the airplane was Approach Category C or D.

I have all the current Jepps for the airport. Because the "right circuit to Runway 12" note is on the airport diagram page, I took it (and take it) to be a VFR operations advisory. Because the weather was less than VFR the CTL charted minimums would, to me at least, take precedence over an "airport manager's preferences." Had the state aviation authority concurred, it would have not authorized unrestricted circling.

[aterpster]

BOAC:

- of course, but as a firm believer and practiser of 'Captain's responsibilities' I still say that P cannot be 'blamed' in any way for the crash. Blame them for lack of foresight, intelligence, common-sense, management ability, attention to practical safety issues, governmental oversight - yes.

I doubt we can reconcile our differing view on the authorities responsibilies at their air carrier airports. :)

If a facility is not there to be used, you make the best of what you have. EG You cannot 'blame' an airport with a CATI ILS if someone crashes trying to fly to CATIII limits.

Bad analogy. The ill-fated captain wasn't attempting an unauthorized procedure.

Incidentally - I'm sure there is a restriction in Islamabad on circuit direction is there not? I seem to recall it was only on R30 (!?) but restricted circuits to the north? Now who on earth thought no-one would do circuits on R12?

See my recent post on that one.

As for being CP of TWA - suppose YOU had been, and one of your high-time crew filed an ASR for a g/a in hilly terrain in marginal weather at around DME9 on a visual circle - "don't worry - the airport should have put in an ILS"?

They wouldn't have been required to file any report because they didn't do anything wrong nor did they request priority handling.

After AAL crashed a 707 at KCVG in, I believe 1964, we soon thereafter stopped doing CTLs in weather of less than 1,000 and 3. The only airport on our system in the U.S. at which that was an issue was KMKC. The FAA designed a marginal VOR approach to help us avoid the high-risk CTL we had been doing at that airport. New ILS IAPs sprung up "everywhere" after the AAL KCVG crash. But, MKC had bad terrain to the south, so a good IAP for landing north was not possible in pre-TERPs days. (2 or 3 years later TWA moved out of KMKC to KMCI, but not before a 707-300 left his main landing gear on Runway 18's levee on a nice clear day.)

[Gulfcapt]

BOAC, thanks but I'm gonna quit while I'm behind; aterpster was able to make the point I was trying to much better than I could. UTC+8 tonight so I'm off to bed.
Best,
GC

[BOAC]

I doubt we can reconcile our differing view on the authorities responsibilies at their air carrier airports- I think we are well apart on other issues too!Bad analogy. The ill-fated captain wasn't attempting an unauthorized procedure. - my 'authorisation' never permitted me to CTL 4nm outside the protected area in the hills - did yours?See my recent post on that one. - yep - seen it. My comment was about 'circuit' not 'circle'.They wouldn't have been required to file any report because they didn't do anything wrong nor did they request priority handling. - no understand.:confused:

PS Your last paragraph will wake up 411A, I predict. I'm sure we are about to be 'educated' on AAL:)

[aterpster]

BOAC:

Quote:
I doubt we can reconcile our differing view on the authorities responsibilies at their air carrier airports
- I think we are well apart on other issues too!

I didn't realize that.

Quote:
Bad analogy. The ill-fated captain wasn't attempting an unauthorized procedure.
- my 'authorisation' never permitted me to CTL 4nm outside the protected area in the hills - did yours?

Nonetheless, unlike your flying CAT III on a CAT II ILS, he was authorized to CTL. Using your ILS analogy, he was flying an authorized CAT II ILS, he just couldn't keep the localizer from going full scale.


Quote:
See my recent post on that one.
- yep - seen it. My comment was about 'circuit' not 'circle'.

My Post 483 was about both.


Quote:
They wouldn't have been required to file any report because they didn't do anything wrong nor did they request priority handling.
- no understand.http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/confused.gif


I thought my statement was quite clear. Where did I go wrong? :sad:

BTW, I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I believe both you and I have been operating on the premise that the ill-fated captain was required to keep the airport, if not runway, in sight at all times during the CTL. Because it was an in-country carrier, they were subject to only state aviation rules. In the U.S., until 1981, or so, we did not have to have the runway in sight if we knew the area and had objects we could associate with the airport in sight during progession to sighting the actual runway. It was called "The Farmer Jones' Barn Rule." The Pakis may have a similar such rule today.

[BOAC]

we did not have to have the runway in sight if we knew the area and had objects we could associate with the airport in sight during progession to sighting the actual runway. - I do not want to drag this out any further because it is going nowhere, but need to point out in case others may be confused - that is STILL the case. Whether it changed or not between 1981 and 1988 I do not know. It is called the 'runway environment' I believe.

My concern of today was that I might find myself head on to Gulfcapt on base leg while I am flying a right-hand circuit.

[aterpster]

BOAC:

Quote:
we did not have to have the runway in sight if we knew the area and had objects we could associate with the airport in sight during progession to sighting the actual runway.
- I do not want to drag this out any further because it is going nowhere, but need to point out in case others may be confused - that is STILL the case. Whether it changed or not between 1981 and 1988 I do not know. It is called the 'runway environment' I believe.

I'll drag it out further, then. The rule changed in the U.S. (and for U.S. carriers operating home or abroad) circa 1981 that the airport, per se, must be in sight at all times during CTL.

Pertinent regulation:

(A missed approach must be commenced) "...Whenever an identifiable part of the airport is not distinctly visible to the pilot during a circling maneuver at or above MDA, unless the inability to see an identifiable part of the airport results only from a normal bank of the aircraft during the circling approach." (emphasis mine)


My concern of today was that I might find myself head on to Gulfcapt on base leg while I am flying a right-hand circuit.

Hopefully, that wouldn't be the case when the weather is such that VFR operations are not permitted.

[BOAC]

I think I'll give up before I quote Shakespeare/Churchill:ugh:

[aterpster]

BOAC:

I think I'll give up before I quote Shakespeare/Churchill:ugh:

Churchill wouldn't want you to give up unless your quiver is empty. :eek:

[Gulfcapt]

"My concern of today was that I might find myself head on to Gulfcapt on base leg while I am flying a right-hand circuit"

Doah! I guess I deserved that...:}

That's it, no more posts after happy hour.:ugh:

Best,
GC

[Fawad]

Pakistan Air Crash Blamed on Poor Visibilty, Pilot Error

By ANDY PASZTOR (http://online.wsj.com/search/term.html?KEYWORDS=ANDY+PASZTOR&bylinesearch=true)

An international team of safety experts believes poor visibility and pilot navigation slipups likely caused last month's crash of a Pakistani airliner that killed 152 people on approach to Islamabad, aviation-industry officials said.
The Airbus A321 operated by Airblue Ltd. was en route from Karachi when it flew into heavily forested hills as it was circling to land at the Islamabad airport in fog and rain. Preliminary information retrieved from the plane's flight-data recorder, according to officials familiar with the details, indicates that its engines, flight-control systems and other onboard equipment operated normally before impact.
Readouts of the recovered "black box," these officials said, also indicate that the cockpit crew at the last moment may have realized the jetliner was on a collision course with the slope and apparently tried to climb out of danger. The plane impacted near a ridge of the Margalla Hills. Early reports indicated that many flights into Islamabad had been cancelled or diverted that morning due to poor visibility, but some eyewitnesses said the weather improved somewhat before the Airblue plane's approach.
While the Islamabad probe is far from finished and no determination s have been made, Airbus last week gave the strongest signal yet that it essentially has ruled out aircraft malfunction as a probable cause of the crash
Continue with the article (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703791804575439900157222346.html?mod=googlen ews_wsj)

[Green Guard]

I have all the current Jepps for the airport. Because the "right circuit to Runway 12" note is on the airport diagram page,

I do not have any Jepp chart right here, but if this "note" is there,
even if drawing on the chart was CORRECT, that "note" is definitely WRONG.

If it stated: "Turn Right to Downwind", it would be OK,
but definitely not the "right circuit",
whether you are in UK, USA or any other country in the world today.

Cheers

PS. Sorry , to disrupt the party.

[BOAC]

GG - the 'note' as I understand it is that Ccts on R30 are right hand. I am not aware of any 'note' for R12. I think most of us normal folk would interpret that as a gentle nudge that we should consider circling to the north too, especially in view of the 'sensitive' areas.

PS Welcome to the party

[PJ2]

BOAC;
I think we have a different interpretation of a 'right-hand circuit'.Let's clarify this to avoid these unplanned meetings between BOAC and Gulfcaptain!:): a right-hand circuit places the airport on the starboard side of the aircraft when the aircraft is downwind and a left-hand circuit places the airport on the port side of the aircraft when downwind. Left-hand circuits are preferred because that affords the PIC the best view of the airport; right-hand circuits are "non-standard".

This may or may not have any bearing on which side a CTL procedure would begin. In the absence of guidance, (as is apparent here), a left-hand start to the CTL procedure, (airport to the left) may be preferred simply because the PIC is sitting on the left side of the aircraft and has the best opportunity to keep the airport in view even if the F/O is flying. Of course, we here know nothing although it seems that there are those who have read/heard the recorders now know.
Mitigation is the duty of the airport owner and national aviation authority.While the PIC is always responsible for all that happens on or to the aircraft, that requirement makes complete sense and is indeed a duty of care responsibility.

PJ2

[BOAC]

PJ - I think we cleared GulfCaptain's confusion up a few days back.
a left-hand start to the CTL procedure, -got my heart racing for a moment but then you recovered with (airport to the left) may be preferred :)

Regarding "authorities' duties" - it seems to me that the P authorities provided a perfectly safe, well-tried and used procedure to land on 12 from a 30 approach. Quite safe if flown properly - mitigation complete? If, for whatever reason, someone then cocks that up, who's fault is that? If they, for whatever reason, decide not to spend money on an IAP for 12, to me the only criticism you can lay at them is that they were too mean with money.

[PJ2]

BOAC;
it seems to me that the P authorities provided a perfectly safe, well-tried and used procedure to land on 12 from a 30 approach.
That was the CTL PANS-OPS procedure I believe?, (don't have the chart in front of me)

The questions remain however: Why 9nm north in poor vis? Why not climb to the sector altitude and turn left to the airport to re-establish? What made sense to them such that they continued what they were doing? Why didn't the EGPWS (TAWS) warn earlier, (or did it and they ignored it, or was it u/s and the TAWS turned was off or was there map-shift?) We don't yet know the answer to any of these questions. One hopes the P authorities will provide this information shortly.

PJ2

[BOAC]

That was the CTL PANS-OPS procedure I believe?, (don't have the chart in front of me) - there is rarely a 'chart' for a CTL unless there are 'prescribed tracks' as we say in this neck of the woods - just minima and possible circling area restrictions, normally described in text. .

I don't believe anyone is disputing your 'questions' - whether we will ever know...................

[PJ2]

BOAC, thanks...yes, that's all I meant - that the chart was labelled pans-ops and not terps - I know there isn't a CTL chart as such. The accident referenced earlier (I think by aterpster) was an AA B727 into Cincinnati, 1965 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_383).

[BOAC]

Quite some accident!The airport is situated at an altitude of 853 feet (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foot_%28length%29) (260 m (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metre)) and the aircraft had descended to the level of 553 ft (169 m) above the airport while it was still about 5 nm (9.3 km) northeast of the airport. It descended to just 3 ft (per altimeter) above the airport while it was about 3 nm north of the airport.- what can you say?