Air India Express B738 crash

[GlueBall]

"...I am asking because occasionally I and my family need to travel from point A to point B"

Check the weather forecast. Choose a fair weather day flight. :ok:

[Willie Everlearn]

infrequentflyer789

Yeah. I wouldn't expect with a missle to the wing that it would matter much whether or not your aircraft had any HYD check valves or not. I was thinking more if the CF6-50C2 threw a fan disc or came apart inflight. FWIW, the old A300-B4 is not a 3rd or 4th generation aircraft.

Also, cartwheel was a poor choice of words on my part. You're correct. It DID NOT cartwheel. However, it did roll and tumble upside down as it broke up. That's as close to cartwheel as damn is to swearing, I'd say. Is there a suitable word between tumble and cartwheel? (please don't say 'and'?)
Cartwheel or tumble, no matter what generation you're in a cartwheel or tumble is going to ruin your day, no matter how you slice it.

Willie :ok:

[Willie Everlearn]

This may seem rather obvious, but if my company tells me that hard landings are unacceptable and it is official company policy pilots will only conduct smooth landings, does that mean....
I must do smooth landings on dry runways, wet runways, contaminated runways, heavy crosswinds, it doesn't matter, no exceptions or what???

What if I don't? What if I'm so mezmerized by my skill I forget to sufficiently round out and hammer it on? What if I plant the aircraft to break the contaminant or water layer, or slush layer for more effective braking in an attempt to avoid hydroplanning???

Do Air India management, fleet managers, safety officers give you a Mulligan for staying within the required landing distance? Or, if I overshoot the touchdown zone, a little high on speed, slide it on and end up in an overrun or off the runway, do I get an attaboy? Or, if I were to do the same thing, paint it on, overrun and because the overrun turns out to be a 150 foot sudden dropoff and my aircraft plummets to disaster will they promise to check the FDR and confirm that I, at least, did make a smooth landing in compliance with that policy and that I won't be blamed for stuffing it up??? How does it work?

What professional pilot would give two seconds notice to such a silly edict? :ugh:

Smooth landings are every pilots M.O. Give me a break! Putting it in writing is hilarious, it's such a joke.

Willie :mad:

[EMIT]

An edict on smooth landings is indeed ridiculous. However, that is not what was quoted.

The AI guideline, or whatever, was about landings producing more than 1.65 g touchdown. Well, that figure is quite a banger.

Somebody after that wrote, huh, but the aircraft is stressed for 2.5 g, so what is the problem? Well, mixing up things. The 2.5 g limit is for loading the wings in a positive direction (the wings in that state deliver an amount of lift equal to 2.5 times the aircraft weight). The limit of 2.5 g applies only to the flaps up configuration, with flaps not up the limit is 2.0 g.
The negative g limit is -1.0 (flaps up) or 0.0 (flaps not up).
These g limits apply to flying the aircraft.

The touchdown g is something different, sure it is about 25 meters per second squared in acceleration, but this time the landing gear is doing the "lifting" thing and the wings try to continue on their way down, in other words, they are loaded in the same direction as if the aircraft is flown with negative g - there go your remarks about being stressed for 2.5 g.

Strength for touchdown is obviously calculated by manufacturers. Testing for it may be done literally by dropping the aircraft from a certain height onto the ground (possible/conceivable with fighter size aircraft). Anyway, quite a different method than the well known "load a wing to ultimate load capability" scenes. Do you remember from other threads the interesting technical discussion about, allegedly, the MD-11 gear being "too strong for the wing construction" (Fedex Narita)

For touchdown, techie information will prescribe what kind of inspection is needed after a hard landing, it depends on touchdown g, but also on aircraft mass, how much fuel (mass) was present in wingtanks, etcetera.
To keep it simple, hard landings have to be reported, therefore the touchdown g is monitored, may be by onboard means (ACMS printout firm landing or hard landing?) but also by flight data monitoring. Abnormally high rates of occurrence may rightly lead to investigation of piloting technique and/or training issues.

Of course, rambling about "pax comfort" in this context, if done in the official statement of AI would be utter stupidity.

[ECAM_Actions]

What was the point of shock absorbers again? :E

If you land too hard, one of two things happen: you either put the gear through the wing or you bounce.

I rather like this: "Any landing you can walk away from is a good landing. Being able to use the aircraft again afterwards is a bonus."

I wonder what the safety department think now the aircraft is a smoking hole and nearly everyone on board were killed?

ECAM Actions.

[latetonite]

A "long" landing will also show up on the QAR. So avoiding a "hard landing" by making a touchdown at half the rwy, does not save your day.

[protectthehornet]

A carpenter has many grades of sand paper and knows when to use each type.

So too a pilot with landings. Sometimes a landing should be a good firm PLUNK right on the spot with max braking right away.

Sometimes you can give yourself the luxury of a ''grease'' job.

Exceeding 600 FPM can damage the plane at normal landing weights. Overweight landings should be less than 300 fpm.

But if you are at all stable on approach and you do virtually nothing, you will have a decent landing. (in a transport).

While there have been plenty of pilots who ran airlines...right into the ground, I think that anyone who runs an airline but hasn't the piloting experience to back up decisions of an aeronautical nature, shouldn't be running the place.

[Plectron]

Carjockey - SOME large and otherwise successful airlines hire "cadets" with zero flight time. Some of those airlines apply parameters to the hiring bias of race and nationality along with a mandatory docile and non-assertive nature. If you have ever been in trouble you will not be selected so anyone with any experience in risk assessment is kicked out of the pool. Toss in an exaggerated sense of entitlement and *voila*, there you are. 400 hours of flight time and off you go into the dead of night into a monsoon at some 3rd world "airport" with a 10 year "veteran" at the helm plying his CRM.

The right seat guys I flew with at a large and non-bankrupt major carrier ranged in experience from former Commuter Airline Captains with type ratings and thousands of hours to trained killers who had lots of experience in everything from F-18s to F-16s, Air Force Fighter pilot instructors, C-5 Commanders, and the odd rotor heads who were a delight in every way to work with.

I guess it is a judgement call I don't want to make for you but I know who I am more comfortable waving see-ya-later to my family with.

Just for clarity, not all the low time cadets are frightening and those who are selected properly and trained well (along with a strong elimination program for those not suited for the job) go on to a career with no hiccups. My previous comments notwithstanding.

[iflytb20]

Been reading through all the posts here and found some measured, some bodering on hysteria and a lot completely unrelated to the issue at hand. I would like to add a few sane comments to all those flying about here.

Just to give you a background to my comments

1. I am a Line Captain; one of those low time ones to be precise.

2. Have flow with lots of expats and Indians as p2 and p1

3. Have operated to and landed Mangalore several times (will have to check my log for an excat figure but atleast 10 or more; a few times in rain) ...

Issue 1 Mangalore Airport

Comment 1. The Mangalore airport usually gives you a DME arc approach which is not particularly challenging but you can end up high if you're not on the ball (situational awareness) or the........

Looks like Khaleej times stole / borrowed your post.

This is your captain,
we are landing
at Mangalore… (http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2010/May/opinion_May162.xml&section=opinion&col=)

[Wannabe Flyer]

Whispering willows deserves credit! The bugger from khalej has made it sound that it was his "breaking News" effort! :ugh:

[Farrell]

I think that anyone who runs an airline but hasn't the piloting experience to back up decisions of an aeronautical nature, shouldn't be running the place.

Have you been out this direction lately, PTH?
You'd be ....... amazed!... stunned even! :)

[protectthehornet]

Farrell

I am stunned. I am stunned at the entire course aviation throughout the world has taken.

And its not for the best!!!

[Carjockey]

Plectron:

I appreciate your very honest reply, and I congratulate you for your ability to retain your professional integrity amidst all the BS which currently exists in the world of commercial airline operations.

I wish that I could say the same for GlueBall, whose response to my post seems to confirm my very worst fears :eek:...

CJ

[Plectron]

Gents - Mr. Boeing and Mr. Airbus promised the airline execs, 25 years ago, airplanes that anyone could operate and..... that the pay would be under $100,000 for Captains and under $50,000 for the FO by the time all was said and done. I was at the week long seminar on automation in 1984 in Washington.

No one should be surprised at what is happening.

CarJockey - I am afraid that Glueball has a point. I certainly do check the weather and consider what airline I am riding on.

[Joles]

Wah Wah WW ! Didn;t know you were a reporter as well ! ! ! ! Way to go Cap'n ! ! ! !But yes, this proves that Khaleej Times reads PPrune as well ! :=

[100BMEP]

If they are not speaking English, German, or Dutch....get off!

[deSitter]

Just a thought - could it be that mandating soft(er) landings came about because poorly trained officers were "dinging" too many airplanes?

-drl

[protectthehornet]

Plectron

I spoke with the occupant of theBoeing Chair at MIT (Massachusetts Institude of Technology) in 1989...He agreed with what you have just posted regarding automation and pilot skill levels.

He went on to say that a 300 hour pilot would be adequate for something as big as a 747.

OUCH

[RAT 5]

Can someone please find a link to that wonderful sequence from "Space Cowboys" where Tommy Lee along with Clint & others bring the Shuttle back to earth, under manual flight, just for the hell of it, to show the youngsters what might be necessary and what can be done when micosoft 95 crashes and freezes. Magic.
I still find it scary that some airlines ban night landings without glide path guidance. We have to pass vision medicals but Mk.1 eyeball is not allowed. Can't wait for the press release when PM's a/c is diverted due to ILS failure and pilots are not allowed to land because no PAPI's. It will take just such an inconvenience to put the fire-craker up where it belongs. We are surely making backwards progress in skills. If it continues in such a vain consider where we'll be in 20 years. It will make playstations seems complicated. I wonder if we have more kids who play Wii tennis or golf than the real thing. Frightening, & fattening.

[413X3]

What kind of 300 hour pilot? The kind that 1000 hours later, thinks it's a good idea to put flaps up while your Q400 is in a stall like the Colgan Air FO did? I believe there are some people as you could say "born to fly" who learn and understand flying. Then there are those that are not gifted in coordination and not very good with piling things on their plate in stressful situations. Truthfully at any hour they are a danger. So let's not just bash low time pilots. How many high time pilots made stupid mistakes that cost hundreds of people their lives? It goes both ways

[filejw]

With regret that i find and smile at all on thread like this in that we are talking about loss of life. However is there a pilot any place that would make a hard landing intentionally ??? firm on occasion but never hard....

[protectthehornet]

certainly there are some terrible pilots with alot more time than 300 hours.

I wasn't bashing 300 hour pilots. I was a very fine 300 hour pilot...over 30 years ago.

I've actually learned a couple of things since then. I think my passengers appreciate that.

Wouldn't you be more comfortable, all other things being equal, with a 10,000 hour pilot than a 300 hour pilot? Just experience with weather, poor ATC, would improve your abilities as a pilot.

Indeed, 1500 hours is the minimum legal requirement for a pilot in command (atp requirements) at a major airline in the USA (part 121)

[413X3]

Of course I would be more comfortable, but that is why the left seat is there. And what better person to learn from with an inexperienced but eager to learn right seater with low time?

[Callsign Kilo]

However is there a pilot any place that would make a hard landing intentionally ??? firm on occasion but never hard...

And it is something that you occasionally have to do on the 738. Flap 40, ensure you cross the threshold at 50', touch down on the markers, apply reverse (2nd detent or beyond) without hesitation and let the autobrake and anti-skid do it's job. If it ain't, max manual and keep the reversers until you ensure that stopping is guaranteed. Short, wet runways with poor friction coefficients can ruin your day. They may leave the passengers gasping after a firm touchdown and plenty of braking. However if the PI says you can do it then make sure of it. The FCTM describes how this should be approached and makes it pretty obvious of the methods that should be adopted. Lessons were already in place from the Southwest 737-700 overrun at Chicago Midway in 2005 and more recently the American Airlines 737-800 at Kingston in December. We will all await the report from the AI accident, however it seems possible that stark similarities will be drawn.

[DC-ATE]

RAT 5 -
I still find it scary that some airlines ban night landings without glide path guidance. We have to pass vision medicals but Mk.1 eyeball is not allowed. Can't wait for the press release when PM's a/c is diverted due to ILS failure and pilots are not allowed to land because no PAPI's.

Uh....with some of today's Captians accepting minimum fuel all the time, just how do you think they will divert? They won't have any fuel.

[rubik101]

Did I read it correctly that AI/AIX management require an air safety report after a Go-around? If so, the management need to be fired, now, the lot of them, from the chief pilot on up, right up. If true, then it is quite possible that the commander's reluctance to call off an unstable approach or a bad landing is the biggest contributory factor in this awful accident. The inept 'management' team are as much to blame with their dangerous and misguided directives as the poor captain who had to live and ultimately die with them.

[de facto]

DCATE,

Quote:'Uh....with some of today's Captians accepting minimum fuel all the time, just how do you think they will divert? They won't have any fuel"Unquote.

DIVERTING means you have reached your planned reserve for diversion,,,hence you WILL have the fuel legally.Diversion fuel includes a go around at your destination...so diverting at your holding altitude will provide an extra margin of fuel at your alternate airport.
I fly around 95 % with minimum block, I diverted 2 times in the last 6 1/2 years.Even used 400 kgs less than minimum block due to a JAA rule when alternate fuel is not required.(cavok/2 runways/different app aids)..by the time i arrive at the airport i saved the 400 kgs(as i usually do/knowledge of routing/flightplan) and still have all the reserve for a flight without this regulation.
Being quite familiar with your company flight plan/airports/routing/ATC/Weather/ground delays/aircraft performance will avoid diverting even by taking the odd 300 Kgs extra just for the sake of it,which costs hell of a lot of money to your airline over the years.
My previous airlines had a fuel monitoring policy and it was clear that if 99% of crews took minimum fuel they would make it with the legal reserve to their destination.
Diverting due to reaching your reserve fuel was not even calling for an office meeting,not even a phone call to the boss:cool: (much cheaper for the airline)but overfuelling just for the sakes of it did call for a few emails exchange , i was told.

When time comes to add fuel to to storms and long flow controls,then please do it and you wont feel bad about it believe me.

So please this above statement is purely nonsense.
Know your regs,aircraft and company ops and you will with time realize it.

[Centaurus]

Automation is great and has been paid for and definitely increases SITUATIONAL AWARENESS and contributes to Flight Safety

Not always so, unfortunately. During a simulator session the FMS was made inoperative prior to a VOR/DME approach. The purpose was to give the crew currency in using radio aids to navigation. The captain virtually downed tools and said it was not possible to carry out the instrument approach without the FMS. He was wrong. It was, but he did not know how to fly a straight forward VOR/DME approach including the DME arc. Later the FMS was restored but the IRS was unable to update and cockpit indications revealed the present position was actually 15 miles from the correct geographical position.

Despite this, the captain with his first officer gazing blankly at the nav display, proceeded to enter the VOR holding pattern into the CDU and then flew the holding pattern magenta line using heading select. It never occured to the crew that the actual VOR and the entered information were 15 miles away from each other.

A glance at raw data from the VOR/RMI needles would have shown the tracking error. Neither of the two pilots knew how to interpret the readings from the RMI. They had been accustomed to receiving ATC radar vectors for most of their flying career and relying totally on the magenta line. Their situational awareness did not exist..

[de facto]

Scary:sad:

However a crew who is properly trained will be able to revert to raw data procedures without losing his situation awareness.Lets not blame it on the A/P.
However awareness may be degraded due to system failures(Flights after loss of both Generators),(ATC is there for you!).
Flying a raw data full procedure with the A/P does give you an extra brain power to increase your situation awareness by spending some of your neurons cross checking your position instead of using this time/effort flying manually.

I hope they got extra training, this performance should ban them from flying the line again until proven they can manage it after extra sessions.

Complacency is not all due to A/Ps but crews personal will to stay at a level required for safe flights.
Airlines must check basic skills before allowing pilots to fly their aircraft.

[Tee Emm]

Airlines must check basic skills before allowing pilots to fly their aircraft.

An awful lot of airliners would remain grounded if that happened

[iflytb20]

Hope these have not been posted earlier

http://cache.daylife.com/imageserve/06eT7x58kEc8a/610x.jpg

The Right Aft section of the fuselage being removed from the site. Just behind you can see the nose section with the Nose wheel Well, Forward E&E bay and a more or less intact Radome. Sad to think that two colleagues died there in the line of duty.

http://cache.daylife.com/imageserve/0e9I7BH94iexs/610x.jpg

Various equipment from the E&E bay. Almost every equipment is untouched by the fire. Just behind the guy one can see the Throttle Quadrant. I just hope they decode the DFDR fast.

[aa73]

looks like the flap lever is at 40, if one counts the notches visible on the throttle quadrant. Also looks like the broken-off throttles are at full forward?

[Flaperon777]

Hey iflytb20,
Great pics man.Where on earth did u manage to get them from.I heard from some of my sources that maybe the FO was flying the leg.Isnt this a captains only field?ANd by the way,are you by any chance associated wit AIE.Since you know so much about their ops....thanks

[Flaperon777]

Also....is there any way at all of ascertaining whether is was a Lhs or Rhs landing...?? I mean by the dfdr's etc and the cvr channels maybe...??

[Sqwak7700]

Also....is there any way at all of ascertaining whether is was a Lhs or Rhs landing...?? I mean by the dfdr's etc and the cvr channels maybe...??


Yes, company SOP and CVR recordings (who's making PM or PNF callouts, position of certain controls)

[DC-ATE]

de facto -
So please this above statement is purely nonsense.
Know your regs,aircraft and company ops and you will with time realize it.

Uh.....I know, or rather KNEW, my regs very well...sir. I retired from this racket 20 years ago.

[iflytb20]

Great pics man.Where on earth did u manage to get them from.

I got these pics from mangalore air crash - News, photos, topics, and quotes (http://www.daylife.com/search/photos/1/grid?q=mangalore+air+crash)
I heard from some of my sources that maybe the FO was flying the leg.Isnt this a captains only field?Your source might be better than mine - i still have no clue who was flying this leg.
ANd by the way,are you by any chance associated wit AIE.Since you know so much about their ops....thanks And yes, i do fly for IX.

[100BMEP]

DC-ATE:
I suspect you have forgotten more than many posters here have learned. I always enjoy your input, Sir.

[DC-ATE]

Thank you, 100BMEP (http://www.pprune.org/members/55551-100bmep) , for that Sir.

[protectthehornet]

until recently, it was not uncommon in the US to have copilots that were as experienced (in terms of flying time) as the captain. Indeed, Sully's copilot (on the miracle landing in the hudson) had MORE flying time (total time) than Sully did (...now what was his name...oh yeah, stiles).

But in other parts of the world, passengers are not that lucky. copilots are copilots in virtual name only.

ouch

[odericko2000]

@cross check

:ok: very sobre and informed comment i must say

most threads are jus totally mis informed or blanket condemnation of certain individuals, race or organizations yet we are the proffessionals who are most informed n widely travelled hence should have a broader scope of lookin at issues not tunnell visioned and myopic as most people on this thread are

[Machaca]

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/IAX-09.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/IAX-12.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/IAX-14.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/IAX-10.jpg

[Machaca]

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/IAX-15.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/IAX-13.jpg

[Farrell]

It's upsetting to see so many workers without masks.

The amount of MMMF and other 'horribles' in the air must be very high.

Farrell

[MD83FO]

they're used to it

[caulfield]

I flew for AIE 2005-6 and can confirm that it was a dangerous outfit and a crash waiting to happen.They didnt understand flying and the guy in charge was a 777 pilot who knew nothing and cared even less of the 73 operation.They used the QAR unethically,busted FTL's and indulged in nepotism/favoritism even when it came to passing checks etc.
Like someone said already,as with all ASIAN carriers it was strictly rote flying;AP ON at 500 on TO,SOP call-outs verbatim(the be-all and end-all of their entire operation),AP OFF and AT disarm @ 500 on landing.No visual approaches(or maybe the type with AP and LNAV engaged!),magenta line monkey-see monkey-do flying.I remember they called a chap in after downloading the QAR for hand-flying without FD and warned him.I heard after I left that they started to tire of EURO-Yank expats and so brought in a whole bunch of Yugoslavs who were "easier" to mould to their way of thinking.GA's were ASR-mandatory.So is it any wonder that it all ended in a smoking wreck at the end of Mangalore runway?The real dilemna here is that there must be a a hundred AIE's operating around the world and the only thing that saves them from a smoking hole in the ground each and every week is the robustness and reliability of Boeing/Airbus products.Plus the fact that they practically fly by themselves and dont really need pilots up front but just 2 pavlov dogs..or better still,2 monkeys.Passing x feet,press that button there,passing y feet operate this switch here...

[RAT 5]

And given the discouragement doled out by some managements to their crews over visual approaches, raw data flying, indeed anything other than A/P & AFDS opertions here in Europe, how long do you think before this standard of opertioning is the norm here? The current crop of newbies will be captains after 3000hrs in one blinkered outfit. They know nothing else and believe verbatum what they've had rammed onto their empty data bases. They then pass this on to the next generation of newbies. Their basic knowledge and handling skills will be rock bottom and spiraling ver downwards. There have been loads of commenst here about this trand. I don't wish to rehash that, but you commented that this was the world in AIE. Europe is not very far from it in the near future. There is a belief that costs will be reduced and safety improved if George does more. The more reliable it seems to be the more passive the pilot becomes. Perhaps piloting will improve if there are more failures and less back-ups. Keep you more awake that's for sure.

[captplaystation]

If you are referring to a certain lo-co with 200+ of the same type as this accident I hate to say it but I agree with you.
An S.O.P. for every eventuality will cure all, if not ? well write another FCI and all will be fine.
A number of their incidents in the last 6 years,with a little bit of inquisitive thinking added for good measure, can show pretty clearly where it is going.

[NephewBob]

Flew over the site yesterday, as Rwy 6 was in use.

The vast damage to the surrounding terrain & forest and the huge scar down the side of the hill to main wreckage would seem to indicate very high energy.

This could have been the result of a rejected landing, that never got airborne, OR a very high speed runway over-run.

Even at an est. ldg wt of 65tons, there seems to be enough airfield & natural obstacles to arrest the aircraft from the extent of its actual excursion, if the speed was 'say' 60 kts.

Just my observation...

Tragic,
RIP.

[Airbubba]

Mangalore crash: Captain ignored co-pilot's plea to abort landing

Saurabh Sinha, TNN, May 31, 2010, 01.15am IST

NEW DELHI: The horrific Air India Express crash in Mangalore on May 22 that killed 158 people could have possibly been averted had the expat commander heeded his Indian co-pilot's advice. Records of the conversation between the pilots and ATC has shown that co-pilot H S Ahluwalia more than once urged Captain Zlatko Glusica not to land and instead go around.

Importantly, Ahluwalia's warning had come well before the aircraft had descended below decision height - the critical level at or before which a final decision on whether to land or go around is to be taken - said highly placed sources. Ahluwalia, who was based in Mangalore and had landed there 66 times, voiced his concern when the aircraft was about 800 feet high, they added.

"Ahluwalia warned at least twice against landing and urged his commander to go around. He had probably realized the aircraft was either too fast or too high on approach - indicating unstable approach - and would not be able to stop safely on the table-top Mangalore runway. In such situations, going around is a standard operating procedure which enables the aircraft to land safely in second attempt," said a source at ATC. The aircraft (IX 812) was coming from Dubai.

But the warning went in vain and the aircraft did not go around. It landed, only to crash and fall off the cliff from this table-top runway. The latest revelation only confirms Ahluwalia's excellent knowledge of the local runway condition. The co-pilot lived in the city. He was due for commandership later in May.

The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has guidelines for cockpit resource management (CRM) that makes it mandatory for commanders to listen to their comparatively less experienced co-pilots as they may also have something valid to say. According to industry sources, CRM training is very strong in Jet Airways, where Ahluwalia had served earlier. "This is the backbone of Jet and this training would have made Ahluwalia call out very strongly," said sources.

Authorities are now pinning their hopes on details from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (black box) to know what exactly transpired inside the cockpit in the final moments. More importantly, they now want to know what made Ahluwalia give the warning for a go-around and why the commander did still went ahead to land. But the CVR and black box have got substantially damaged and may have to be sent to the manufacturer (Boeing) in US for decoding...

Mangalore crash: Captain ignored co-pilot's plea to abort landing - Mangalore - City - The Times of India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mangalore/Mangalore-crash-Captain-ignored-co-pilots-plea-to-abort-landing/articleshow/5992615.cms)

From ATC records?

[Sqwak7700]

More importantly, I would be wanting to know why the FO didn't take over control of the aircraft. I'm surprised the TOI didn't ask that question in the article.

I wonder what policy AIX has to resolve crew conflict. I know one former carrier of mine, there was a 2 call policy. If the CA did not respond by the second deviation / concern call-out, the FO had the legal support of the company to take control and assume the CA as incapacitated.

Wish more places had such a policy.

[ManaAdaSystem]

And all this information they got from the ATC tapes? The hero Indian Effoh was not to busy to inform ATC of all this? "Tower, I have told my Captain to go around twice, but he is not listening?"

Why did he leave Jet Airways?

They will blame the white guy.

[TopTup]

"Indian crash investigators are focusing on the speed and touchdown point of an Air India Express 737-8HG that crashed at Mangalore-Bajpe Airport Saturday morning, killing 158 of the 166 passengers and crew onboard. Air India Express is a low-cost subsidiary of the state-run carrier Air India. Flight IX812 was en route from Dubai to Mangalore and the crew did not report any problems with the aircraft or weather. The flight skidded off the 2,450-m. runway, plunging down a 200-ft. gorge and bursting into flames. Mangalore’s airport is located on a hilltop and the main Runway 24/06 has gorges at either end. It was India’s worst aviation disaster in 14 years. There has already been some fall out from the crash as the Indian pilot community has wasted no time in attributing the crash to the fact that the pilot was an expatriate."

CX DFO Update 28 May 2010. (underscored by me)

Just check out the views and brain dead denial on the South Asia & Far East Forum of anyone daring to comment negatively, or state some eyewitness facts & experiences about Indian Aviation. The denial is laughable, if not so damn scary. With 175 hrs TT pilots are in the RHS of a 777 (& 744 as I understand it). Or, with 175 hrs TT they DEMAND such jobs on A320, 737, 777, etc. With 1000 hrs pilots are deemed "highly experienced" (quote from Mangalore ATC). I wonder where this omniscient aviation culture stems from then, eh?

Your "expat" 20,000 hrs is not welcomed when local guys are unemployed with 175 - 250 hrs TT. In their eyes they are just as qualified.

Let's hope the person leading the inquiry is not either a) as xenophobic and / or b) open to corruption.

[aterpster]

TopTup:
Let's hope the person leading the inquiry is not either a) as xenophobic and / or b) open to corruption.

Hope springs eternal.

[rspilot]

Mon, May 31 09:20 AM

Jammu, May 30 -- A major air tragedy was averted on Sunday, when an Indigo airlines flight from Srinagar aborted landing at Jammu airport and became air borne again. This incident took place at around 1.55 pm.
The aircraft managed to land successfully in a second attempt. 123 passengers were on board the Indigo airlines flight from Srinagar to Delhi via Jammu.

"At the time of landing Air Traffic Control (ATC) officials cancelled the landing clearance and the aircraft had to take off again and after that getting clearance from ATC again, the air craft landed successfully," said Indigo Airlines Manager Dev Prateen Choudhary

Sources at the airport said, "The aircraft over-flew from the actual landing area and the pilot of the aircraft showed his extraordinary skills and was able to save the lives of people when he managed to take off again after seeing that he had over flew (sic) from the actual landing zone." Rejecting the claims of Indigo airlines that ATC cancelled the clearance for landing at the last moment, an ATC official, requesting anonymity, said, "We had given the clearance to the aircraft for landing.



I especially like the way the pilot showed extraordinary skills to avert a disaster.

[Jazbag]

Being a CRMI in a private airline I sometimes wonder at the problems faced by co pilots in decision making... there is so much fear to act ... and so overwhelming is the thought of repercussions that the question keeps coming to my mind... inspite of the third warning with no response being indicative of subtle pilot incapacition

why didnt the copilot take over? can any copilot answer this question???

[A330AV8R]

Standard 2 call protocol in Jet ! after which the first takes over regardless of the age and experience of the capt.

whatever the case the F/O in this case SHOULD HAVE taken over after calling him twice !!! no exceptions .

RIP

[Octane]

How on earth can a First Officer take command from a Captain who doesn't wish to relinquish same?

[Neupielot]

How on earth can a First Officer take command from a Captain who doesn't wish to relinquish same?

was thinking the same thing. 2 ppl fighting over control hmm...... whoever is closer to the crash axe wins i guess.:bored:

[TopTup]

Gents,

Until you have witnessed an illustrious "Cmdr" belittle and humiliate an FO at dispatch and continue the barrage in the cockpit then it is very difficult to appreciate the CRM culture at AI. This is and was not a one-off event, but regular: all be it at varying degrees and levels.

When I spoke to the Capt about it he all but abused me stating "you foreigners do not understand...." Damn right I don't. As a CRMI in other airlines, trying to reason with this fool was impossible. He didn't want to listen. In his mind he didn't have to.

That same FO sat there and copped it. All the while "Yes sir, Yes sir, Yes sir....." He then thanked the Cmdr for the flight afterward.

PF / PM roles are ignored with the Cmdr (on the VERY rare event of allowing the FO a t/o or landing) will, when as PM, randomly manipulate the MCP, select speed brake, change the speed...or as PF do the RT requesting track shortening, wx avoidance, their own flap and gear, and so on and so on..... Boeing FCOM Areas of Responsibility? HA!

Do some reading on "social norms" and then the social structure, etc in India (caste system, hierarchical roles in society, perceived "respect" that must be given right or wrongly so....) and you'll be able to appreciate but a small amount of the culture at AI. In Asian nations the "loosing face" issue is also by and large to blame. Hence a "Cmdr" will vary rarely heed the advice, ask for let alone accept a junior's (FO or others') input.

And what happens? The same is repeated onto the next generation.

Before some state that I am picking on AI: Yes, you are right because this is what the thread is about and I witnessed / experienced it for 2 years; and secondly, I admit other airlines in [western] nations also have long histories of poor CRM training, differing abilities to influence social (personal and airline) norms, arrogant and autocratic Capts as well as FO's.

I was ignorant that such behavior could exist until I witnessed it.

[Airline] CULTURE and SOCIAL NORMS affect safety and training. The ability to WANT to change, to WANT to learn, to WANT to look from the outside in is lost on many. In our profession (becoming more and more a lose term) the end results can be fatal to many.

From the latest incident reports surfacing the Swiss Cheese slices are still lining up. Let's hope for a resounding change. It'll take at least a generational shift away from such behavior. KAL ring a bell, anyone?

[shanx]

AI Express flight plunges 6,000 feet- TIMESNOW.tv - Latest Breaking News, Big News Stories, News Videos (http://www.timesnow.tv/AI-Express-flight-plunges-6000-feet/articleshow/4346355.cms)

[captplaystation]

TopTup,

sounds a bit like some Turkish Capt's I have seen in action, and if we go back 10yrs some Italian too.

Regretably the "old guard" still exists in many countries, particularly those where a large percentage of Commanders are ex-military/ legacy carrier bred.

There is a vast chasm between being in command, and inflicting this status on all around you regardless of the consequences.
Some nations/cultures , historically, have more difficulty to find the middle ground than others, and that won't change any time soon.
The other side of the coin is that it is quite degrading to have someone try to force their viewpoint just because they happen to have the same nationality as the carrier you are flying for, but for sure they won't find any evidence of that in their cosy insular investigation.
Just because the one on the right was squaking doesn't mean he was right, some F/O's I have flown with who were expecting a command sometime soon could be a right pain in the jacksy, this could also have been the case here.

[jpsingh]

"Not always so, unfortunately. During a simulator session the FMS was made inoperative prior to a VOR/DME approach. The purpose was to give the crew currency in using radio aids to navigation. The captain virtually downed tools and said it was not possible to carry out the instrument approach without the FMS. He was wrong. It was, but he did not know how to fly a straight forward VOR/DME approach including the DME arc. Later the FMS was restored but the IRS was unable to update and cockpit indications revealed the present position was actually 15 miles from the correct geographical position." Unquote
My comment about automation was related to the bravehearts who wanted to handfly from TOD to touch down.Also in your above example it is not quite correct to quote a simulator exercise because the aircraft and the sim behave quite differently and the guy at the back can make you lose Situational awareness in no time. Even by doing a simple thing like increasing speed at 2X ,inorder to cover more syllabus, you can put the trainee off and create loss of SA.

[Centaurus]

How on earth can a First Officer take command from a Captain who doesn't wish to relinquish same?

Quite simple really and I don't know why airlines do not include this in their operations manuals. If it is quite obvious that the captain has ignored repeated calls from the first officer to go-around and is intent in pressing on regardless then desperate measures are called for to prevent a certain accident.

The first officer must loudly call "GO-AROUND CAPTAIN" and simultaneously retract the landing gear. Under those circumstances no captain, no matter how culture driven will then press on and deliberately do a belly landing.

Having now forced a go-around, the first officer will probably be blamed for the go-around and have to face the consequences. That all depends on management culture. But as second in command he has taken a responsible action and by doing so possibly saved an accident. If anyone can think of another sure-fire way for a first officer to prevent a potentially deadly unstable approach by the captain then let's have it now on Pprune. Just remember there are some types of captain who think that real men never go around. They walk among us...

[Neptunus Rex]

Centaurus
Following such a scenario, all can be revealed by pulling the QAR after the next landing, even if the CVR has been wiped.

[IcePack]

Um at the risk of upsetting the Mods.

Final Approach, by John J Nance, gives an interesting take on CRM and how even a hesitation by the co-pilot can lead to disaster.

worth a read by those who do not believe in CRM.

[p51guy]

Just pushing the thrust levers to go around power worked for me one night when the captain was high and fast on a short runway with heavy rain. You may be looking for a job later so make sure you are prepared for that. I was.

[rubik101]

As Centauraus has said, raising the gear is a fairly definitive method of indicating your intent as an FO. Better would be to select Flap 15, hit the TOGA button and then raise the gear. If the 'Cmdr' tries to pull the power levers back, a well placed foot will keep full power on the aircraft. The power will cause the aircraft to pitch up and a climb is inevitable. What happens next is entirely a matter of conjecture but quite often the realisation that one has phucked up is quite enough to allow the situation to be taken out of one's hands. Indeed, research has shown that most of the culprits will meekly submit to the new circumstances when the inevitable has been brought home to them. I know it takes a brave man to take such action but until this course of action becomes the norm in an extreme situation, these accidents will continue. Training, culture, education must be altered in ALL airlines to reflect this as accepted behaivour amongst pilots, be they LH or RH seat.
From what I have read so far, I would apportion a great deal of the blame, if blame needs to be apportioned, on the inadequate, arrogant and misguided management of the company, from the very top down to the Chief Pilot/Training Captains. Forcing Captains to write a safety report after a Go-around is simply ridiculous and goes to the very heart of this easily preventable accident.

[Airbubba]

I wonder what policy AIX has to resolve crew conflict. I know one former carrier of mine, there was a 2 call policy. If the CA did not respond by the second deviation / concern call-out, the FO had the legal support of the company to take control and assume the CA as incapacitated.

Seems like United has had the two call policy since at least the early '80's. It was also part of an old gouge interview answer about what you did if the captain insisted on busting minimums. Newer interview questions seem to be more like what you do if the captain is wearing a dress to dinner (sadly, I'm not joking on this one :rolleyes:).

Until you have witnessed an illustrious "Cmdr" belittle and humiliate an FO at dispatch and continue the barrage in the cockpit then it is very difficult to appreciate the CRM culture at AI. This is and was not a one-off event, but regular: all be it at varying degrees and levels.

Some of this is indeed cultural in my view. As an American, I'll certainly talk back and I want the folks who fly with me to speak up if they think I am wrong about an operational matter. In other cultures this might be viewed as weak leadership or disrespect.

Forcing Captains to write a safety report after a Go-around is simply ridiculous and goes to the very heart of this easily preventable accident.

At a lot of U.S. companies, you don't have to write a report if you elect to go around, but if you land out of an unstable approach you'd better be doing ASAP's and NASA reports and hope the feds decide your disregard of the rules was not 'intentional'. Kinda the reverse of a couple of decades ago when it was considered heroic to salvage the approach and save the company the cost of a go around.

[JW411]

jpsingh:

"Even by doing a simple thing like increasing speed at 2X in order to cover more syllabus".

Sir, you really have to be joking. All tests in the simulator for a very long time now have had to be conducted in "real time". If that is not your experience, then you should complain at the highest international level.

Incidentally, I have experience as a TRI/TRE of teaching and examining for two separate FE airlines.

The most bizarre problem that I ever came across was a young captain that came into my hands. The upgrade to the equipment involved was a huge step for him and he was unfamiliar with the concept of the possibility that the captain might be wrong.

Despite failing his first course, he had "tidy hands" and I was convinced that he had a future. We did the best part of another course and he passed.

I next came across him when he came for a LOFT/LPC renewal and he was absolutely brilliant for all of the two days in the sim. He had obviously listened, learned and put into practice what I had taught him. Since I have always believed in writing and saying things exactly as they happen, I gave him an "Above Average" on his airline's company paperwork.

A few weeks later, I was told that I simply could not do this because the young man concerned now had a higher assessment than that of the chief pilot and would I please rewrite the paperwork to reflect this?

I refused.

[A4]

JW411........ You beat me to it.

A4 :rolleyes:

[leftseatview]

Without the CVR transcript how do they know that the F/O asked the Capt to Go around at 800'?
Either they have heard the CVR already and have a good idea of what really happened... or they are speculating/rumour mongering.
The ATC tapes are hardly likely to have such specific info.
i am very surprised that only ManaAdaSystem has caught on to this very obvious flaw in this report

[protectthehornet]

who are reading this thread.

concepts like: how can the captain be wrong? (it happens)

how can the first officer manage a situation in which the captain is wrong?

how are cultural differences magnifying problems?

its tough. not all airline pilots are great. let that sink into your brain...

it seems that the first officer tried to get the captain to ''go around'' to avoid a problem. some of us have thought that the first officer was flying the plane and didn't do it right.

but the truth is we really don't know.

But what we can say for certain is:

table top airports have special problems (this one and that one in Brazil not too long ago).

Stable approaches usually give perfectly acceptable landings.

Going for a grease job (smooth landing) on a table top airfield should be discouraged.

There are right ways to fly and wrong ways. Sadly, the wrong ways are resurfacing due to cost.

good luck to all

[Sqwak7700]

How on earth can a First Officer take command from a Captain who doesn't wish to relinquish same?

As someone mentioned, there are many ways to do this, like adding thrust. I remember once announcing to the tower that we were going around due to operational reasons. It worked for me.

And it was never an issue at the airline with a written two callout policy, because all crew know that they will not be supported if they ignore the concerns of the other pilot. Without such a policy, there is hesitation on both sides.

[Doors to Automatic]

You may be looking for a job later so make sure you are prepared for that. I was.

So the imbeciles in charge would rather have a smouldering wreck at the end of the runway? If that really is the case then you are better off in a company where averting a disaster is appreciated rather than punished - and better off alive!

[rspilot]

Are you guys really pilots? I can't believe what I am reading. Push the thrust levers forward? retract the landing gear? flap position to fifteen?

All of these methods are very risky. You are decreasing the stability of an aircraft at a dangerously low altitude. The whole desire to "go around" in the first place is because the aircraft hasn't stablilized, why make it worse?

Maybe upon landing the FO immediately grabbed the trust levers and pushed them to Max thrust causing the aircraft to lawn darted of the end. If the flaps are retracted indescriminately you could get stick shaker and then aggrivate it even more by trying to pull back on the stick.

I am being overly sarcastic of course but never try to influence a "go around" by destablizing an already unstable aircraft.

Why not simply tell the tower to cancel landing clearance due to bird activity, we have to go around. I find it hard to believe that anybody would continue to land an aircraft if the tower instructs a "go around". you are also giving the flying pilot a chance to save face without incriminating anybody and he will be glad to make it right the next time.

Bye the way, I have done this and it works. No, I didn't have two hundred fifty hours when it happened. I had years of experience and I know that every pilot wants to get it right but sometimes needs a bit of encouragement.:ok:

[p51guy]

Pushing the thrust levers to go around power keeps you airborn and climbing. It is not dangerous if the captain was doing something stupid in the first place. Talking on the radio to the tower is not appropriate at that time, action is. Each airline or company is different about how they would accept FO taking control but taking aggresive action is sometimes required to prevent a disaster. Staying alive is the goal.

[protectthehornet]

no matter how you slice it, taking over from a captain is a tough situation. the best thing to do is to avoid the situation way in advance...when I was a copilot, my flight instruction days paid off in keeping ahead of the captains.

if you are in a difficult situation you must speak up. if no reaction say something like: captain, its now on the tape that your FO tried to get you to go around and if you **** up and kill us, everyone will sue YOUR ESTATE and take all of your things away from your family.

OR..CAPTAIN if you go around right now, I will be on your side at the inquiry...if you don't, I will move up on the seniority list when they FIRE YOUR ASS.

and if this doesn't work, push the throttles forward and keep them there...this will force the situation as things will get even WORSE and the captain will have to go around.

a cup of coffee in the face might help too.

I've only been in even one close situation...and when we landed and the captain started screaming at me I said: fine, let's go to the chief pilot and the FEDS ( FAA). I'll be able to prove you were wrong and you will lose your ticket. HE BACKED DOWN like a prarie dog after seeing the shadow of a hawk.

[infrequentflyer789]

....
if you are in a difficult situation you must speak up. if no reaction say something like: captain, its now on the tape that your FO tried to get you to go around and if you **** up and kill us, everyone will sue YOUR ESTATE and take all of your things away from your family.

OR..CAPTAIN if you go around right now, I will be on your side at the inquiry...if you don't, I will move up on the seniority list when they FIRE YOUR ASS.

and if this doesn't work, push the throttles forward and keep them there...this will force the situation as things will get even WORSE and the captain will have to go around.

a cup of coffee in the face might help too.
...


Reminds me of something read recently in another report (referenced in Tripoli thread) http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/793232/ao2007044.pdf:


Although aware of the
requirement to alert the pilot flying of the continuing descent, the copilot was
momentarily unable to recall the correct phrase to be used


Be careful with that "push the throttles forward", "things will get even WORSE" may be an understatement - that "continuing descent" was on climb thrust at <100ft :eek:

I'm guessing that by then the "correct phrase" would be something a lot shorter involving "PULL UP" (and expletives, if time)... ?

[ note: I don't think that report is relevant for this incident, but it does make interesting reading - mode confusion, again... ]

[p51guy]

My flight when I forced a go around by going to go around power was before the airlines in a 4 engine corporate jet.
I have never felt that need in the airlines but I can see it approaching again with the new way of doing things. Soon we will be hiring computer pilots that don't have any experience, just pass the tests to be a pilot. Scarey. I see my previous airline dumbing down procedures and making it a totally mechanical approach with acars data telling the company they didn't do it their way. You can't add that extra 20 knot on final any more because of wind shear because you will be told on by acars. That 20 knots with known windshear has saved me several times but now you can't do it. The FO's are responsible to adhere to these parameters too so they can't protect you as the captain. I am happily retired but would hate to fly now with these silly restrictions. Who comes up with this sh-t?

[protectthehornet]

about 25 years ago, a TWA 767 pilot told me he added 23 knots to land at PHL.

The chief pilot called him in...he said: if you have to add 23 knots, you should have diverted.

OK, so...mechanical flying from now on...divert.

[p51guy]

Will reality ever come back to flying airliners? Why can't we fly like we have done for decades with great results? Sucking the natural flying abilities out of our pilots to fly like robots hooked to an acars is not promoting safety. This will bite them in the ass. Just wait. Tic Toc. My bet it will be a low level windshear that the pilots were not allowed to compensate for to keep the acars happy.

What do you think?

[TopTup]

p51wiseguy, the answer is "bean-counters". They rule aviation. No care, no responsibility but for a hefty quarterly bonus in their salary. This is their only concern. "Safety" is a catchphrase used to sell. Luck is the gambling tool. And the pilots? How long a sad history is there of pilots selling their soul to fly a shiny jet for below poverty line salaries and an over-zealous willingness to bow down to the boss' demands at the expense of that "safety" word, let alone professionalism. Egos and aspirations cloud judgement.

To answer other questions or points regarding an FO taking over, the FO needs to be
a) confident;
b) experienced;
c) have received sound and proper training;
d) posses skills to be able to take over;
e) know what an unstable approach is, despite what the SOPs say;
f) be assured that the airline will support him/her as opposed to blindly not letting the Cmdr lose face;

.......and so on and so forth.

How can they with 175-250 hrs (max) TT? What experience or confidence let alone training have they to call on? Their tool box is all but empty.

So, when NONE of these parameters are present due [criminally] negligent training programs, the FO simply does not posses these skills, by way of knowledge, experience, confidence, etc.

That is why guys like many of us would have or did have no problem about calling "GO AROUND" when the time came to do so. We came from a different [airline] culture or training and standards, let alone the "hour building" in GA and/or regionals.

We practice engine failures (all types), hydraulic, electrical, pneumatic failures, etc but not always CRM in the sim. A trick of mine was to pull the FO aside and tell him when I tap him on the shoulder he is to call "GO AROUND" despite CAVOK, nil wind conditions. (Does the Capt know what the FO saw mid-way down the runway when his/her attention is in between scan and touchdown point at 500-300 ft altitude?) Interesting results when dealing with a known autocratic Capt and / or submissive FO. Or, ask the PF to deliberately make an unstable approach (usually the Capt I would ask) to see how far the PM (usually FO) would let it go. Did he/she know the required callouts? Would he/she use them correctly? Would they have the confidence to call it, or take over? Same with reverse roles.

All pilots say (the Monday quarterbacks) "If I was there I would've....." So let's put them "there" via the sim.

How can we expect the CRM we teach in the classroom to be implemented inflight when it, unlike the other phases of flight, are not practiced, let alone even taught? Add to that nationalistic cultural issues and problems.

[aterpster]

protectthehornet:
There are right ways to fly and wrong ways. Sadly, the wrong ways are resurfacing due to cost.

Sigh, a sad amen.

[aterpster]

protectthehornet:
about 25 years ago, a TWA 767 pilot told me he added 23 knots to land at PHL.

The chief pilot called him in...he said: if you have to add 23 knots, you should have diverted.

OK, so...mechanical flying from now on...divert.

There must have been some other issue, such as a badly unstable approach. I didn't retire until late 1990 and never had a chief pilot be so arbitrary at TWA.

[RatherBeFlying]

Twice in the last several weeks, I have eagerly carried out an order from a senior instructor that increased the danger. After knowing the guys for a few years and being on good terms with them and trusting their judgement, there is a tendency to do what you're told without thought.

I'm going to have to work harder on my skepticism, especially as the first lesson did not seem to take:\

[protectthehornet]

aterpster

it really happened. the pilot in question and I discussed it for along time. Even quoting the book, "handling the big jets" by davies.

I honestly have addes substantially more than 20 knots to land through difficult conditions, but had a long runway .

I also went through a great deal of effort to include in our ops manual the idea of adding speed for takeoff. EG; if you are below max takeoff weight for a runway...bug up to max takeoff weight speeds and have a cushion on takeoff in semi windshear conditions

[vapilot2004]

How on earth can a First Officer take command from a Captain who doesn't wish to relinquish same?


There's a wee button in the Airbus and VIA muscle on most Boeings and McDs.

[TopTup]

RatherBeFlying,

Good input in that what you went through is indicative of what (would assume ALL) pilots have gone through to varying degrees in their career. What we are taught in ground schools, what the SOPs state, etc comes up against some very strongly dominant social norms that are more embedded into a persons behavioral attributes than a 2 hr, 1 day or even 3 day CRM course can hope to over-ride.

At least you have the humility and training to look outside in and learn, adapt, change, improve. :ok: (Sorta sounds like set, hold, trim, monitor.....basic IF stuff?)

I also think that all too often (we as) Capts forget too quickly what it was like to be an FO. Not all cases, as it too comes back to social norms and airline culture.

Now, lets look back at AI / AIE and the systemic culture failing these pilots.

As CRM begins to divert toward a title of Threat Error Management (TER), will a simple name change, or definition include the need for LIVE CRM APPLICATION training, as did LOFT so many years ago?

(I'm sure some psychologist will develop a super-cool abbreviation for it! Hang on... LCAT! Now to only make some money out of it!)

[Centaurus]

I also went through a great deal of effort to include in our ops manual the idea of adding speed for takeoff. EG; if you are below max takeoff weight for a runway...bug up to max takeoff weight speeds and have a cushion on takeoff in semi windshear conditions

Now included in modified form in the Boeing 737 FCOM. Quote: "Consider increasing Vr speed to the performance limiting gross weight rotation speed, not to exceed actual gross weight V2 +20 knots. Set V speeds for the actual gross weight. Rotate at the adjusted (higher) rotation speed. This increased rotation speed result in increased stall margin and meets takeoff performance requirements. If windshear is encountered at or beyond the actual gross weight Vr, do not attempt to accelerate to the increased Vr but rotate without hesitation".

[protectthehornet]

thank you CENTAURUS

I learned it from the book, "Fly the Wing" by Webb...in its latest edition. I had the honor of speaking with the author on the phone for about an hour and he was kind enough to send the latest edition to me along with some short stories (excellent science fiction which he wrote but remains unpublished).

It amazes me how much knowledge is out there, but somehow gets lost as the years go by. Even Wilbur and Orville knew of windshear, calling it Wind Fluries.

[Rananim]

Centaurus,
Dont agree that FO should put gear up to force a GA.Do you really think this is safe?
GA decision rests with PIC and the FO.ATC cannot command a GA for anything other than traffic/ blocked rwy.This Indigo incident,if true,is a worrying dvelopment.Hysteria and over-reaction following Mangalore.

[Green Guard]

So true.....

And as a result,
we are coming faster and closer
to so far unimaginable future of a
"single person cockpit"
and
probably even safer
"no persons in the cockpit"
Just computers up there...

[rspilot]

Proper Go Around technique is pitch first than thrust (albeit almost simultaneously). It is NOT thrust first than fight over pitch. This is almost certainly to cause a lawn dart effect.

[protectthehornet]

rspilot

on any plane with underwing engines, adding thrust will pitch the nose up if nothing else is done.

[drive73]

Just tell the tower your going around, I can't figure out you guys who want to fight over controls or reconfigure an airplane at low altitudes. Have fun putting the gear up before flaps 15 in a 737.
I recall an article which states the captain was popular amongst fo's for allowing them to fly and being a good guy. This doesn't fit the profile of an autocratic captain who would disregard several go around calls from a first officer. This smaks of a cover up by the great Indian government.

[protectthehornet]

Drive 73 makes a fine point about government cover up.

perhaps the ICAO should handle ALL crash investigations and publish the transcript of the CVR to all member states.

IN this way, foreigners would know the real status of airlines without a government cover up.

[Capt Apache]

Can somebody please explain WHY the Indian government would want to cover up ?

[leftseatview]

Can Somebody Explain How Do They Know That The F/o Called For A Go Around At 800 Feet....without The Cvr Being Heard?

[Capt Apache]

Well said leftseatview.So lets not talk the language of these dumb journos who haven't a clue what they are talking about. Everyday people are reading Crap -and it is getting to them.

[Neptunus Rex]

Captain Apache
Of course the Indian Government don't want a cover-up. The Captain was an expat, so they have the perfect scapegoat. Furthermore, the systemic failures in Indian aviation as described by Top Tup and others, can be ignored, yet again.

[Capt Apache]

You think they would have found it so very tough to make a scapegoat out of an Indian Captain ? I don't think so.


Furthermore, the systemic failures in Indian aviation as described by Top Tup and others, can be ignored, yet again.


I am sorry but I refuse to be so pessimistic about the outcome of this investigation.There is a lot of corruption here, but the entire system is not corrupt, like some people will make you believe.

[moon11]

Something interesting about hiring for Air India:

From: http://www.airlinepilotforums.com/foreign/39334-air-india-hiring.html :

Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2009 19:20:31 +0000 (UTC)

This is information for retired Delta pilots who might be interested in a 777 expatriate captain position with Air India. Air India is in the process of hiring 53 expatriate captains in this year (2009). They are taking delivery of 7 B777's this year. In addition they have 28 B787's on order.

The requirements are age 63 or less, B777 type rating, 100 hours PIC on the B777, having flown the aircraft in the last 7 years, and current (meaning a simulator PC in the last year, there are a couple options here).

The job pays $11,500 per month for a line captain and a little more for a check airman, instructor (TRI), or an examiner (TRE). The schedule is 3 weeks on 1 week off or 6 weeks on and two weeks off. You can be based in JFK, ORD, or possibly SFO (starting in August). There is a 12,000, 13,000, and 15,000 dollar bonus for staying with Air India for 1, 2, or 3 years respectively.

Myself (Scott Murray), Ray Bell, and Velibor Slavuj have started a company, Nightingale Aviation of North America to recruit for Air India. Ray and I primarily recruit 777 pilots in North America.

Just a little background:

Ray Bell, retired Delta Air Lines, line captain, check airman, current Air India B777 line captain, check airman, instructor, and examiner.

Scott Murray, retired Delta Air Lines, line captain, check airman, instructor, current Air India B777 line captain.

Velibor Slavuj, retired Yugoslav Airlines, line captain, director of operations, current Air India B737-800 line captain, check airman, instructor, and examiner.

We have a very strong presence in Bombay with Air India. One of our partners is in Bombay most of the time which gives us the ability to monitor the application process very closely.

If you have an interest in learning more about Air India or if you have a friend with another airline that might have an interest, feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

…………….

[Airbubba]

Some discussion of AI's hard landing and go around policies in today's TOI:

The commander of the ill-fated Air India Express flight, Capt Zlatco Glusica, had been called for a counselling session and admonished by the airline's air safety department in March for a hard landing in Thiruvananthapuram. The landing was well within the limits laid down by the aircraft manufacturer and the Directorate General of Civil Aviation.

"He was paranoid about hard landings after that. Due to the fear of being hauled up by the executive director (flight safety), Capt Glusica, like many pilots in AI Express, used to extend the flare (aircraft floating over the runway) resulting in loss of valuable runway for stopping after touchdown," revealed a senior commander. International airlines do not haul commanders for a few hard landings within the limits as it puts undue pressure on pilots.

The Air India spokesperson confirmed Capt Glusica was called for counselling for a hard landing. "As per our airline policy, if the hard landing limit values exceed, suitable action is initiated or DGCA is informed depending on the level of excess," said the spokesperson, adding the aircraft maintenance manual also stipulates that an inspection must be carried out by engineering if the limit is exceeded.

The TOI has a copy of Vg (vertical acceleration due to gravity) limits followed by AI and AI Express. For a B737 aircraft with a 1.65g landing, the pilot gets an email, for a 1.74g he is called for counselling, for 1.8g the report goes to the DGCA and only for a 2.1g landing is the aircraft sent for inspection. "Any normal landing is around 1.2 to 1.4g. The figure of 1.74g is way below manufacturer's limit. To counsel a pilot for that is to keep him in a negative frame of mind for all approaches and landings," said Capt A Ranganathan, an airsafety expert. Another shocking revelation, which, too, goes against airsafety norms followed worldwide, is Air India's policy towards go-arounds.

"In Air India and Air India Express, there is no emphasis or encouragement to pilots to do a go-around if they are doubtful about the quality of approach and the subsequent safe landing. In fact, pilots in Air India and Air India Express are petrified of a go-around as many pilots, though not all, have had to explain their action to the executive director," another commander said. "This is apart from filing an Operations Incident Report. A copy of this goes into the records maintained by the airline's air safety department and another goes to the Directorate General of Civil Aviation," says a senior commander.

Air India's Flight safety website has a list of incidents reportable to the DGCA including "discontinued approach necessitating a go-around" in it. It means, irrespective of when a go-around was initiated, it has to be reported to the DGCA.

Aviation regulators abroad and airlines like Emirates, Singapore Airlines, Korean Air, have long done away with the practice of asking their pilots to file reports on go-arounds to give them complete freedom. The AI spokesperson said the airline encourages go-arounds in case of unstabilised approach. But he did not mention anything about pilots being questioned or not questioned for go-arounds.


IX 812 pilot was rapped for hard landing - India - The Times of India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/IX-812-pilot-was-rapped-for-hard-landing/articleshow/5996584.cms)

As I commented earlier, at most U.S. carriers you worry about doing a report if you don't go around from an unstable approach but not if you do go around.

[Little Prince]

100 hundred hours minimum entry requirement for B777 Captain??
Is it typing error?? Somebody is kidding, I believe...

[SLFinAZ]

"100 hours PIC"

[rspilot]

You are very right...in the MD80, stall recovery is to acually pitch the nose up slightly during stick shaker and you won't lose one foot of altitude. However, proper go around technique in any jet is pitch up simultaneously adding power. To push the thrust lever forward with no pitch adjustment (as would happen without coordinating with the pilot on the stick) will not provide sufficient upward pitch movement because the engines are already generating quite a bit of thrust because of the aircraft in the full drag configuration.

As previously stated, the SAFEST response is to tell the tower that we are going around. Tower will then give go around instructions and the Captain won't want to explain on the ground why he ignored the tower's instructions.

[jimmygill]

TopTup wrote:
I also think that all too often (we as) Capts forget too quickly what it was like to be an FO.

Quicker than that, we forget how it was like to be at 175 hr or 250 hr. I guess its natural to some of us.


@drive73
This smaks of a cover up by the great Indian government.


No thats not a cover up, thats merely unethical and false reporting. Misuse of the right of press to protect its sources of information.

If Indian Govt or AI were this agile to start a cover-up, the AI would not have been in a mess that it is in.

Besides a cover up is staged usually to get away from an incrimination or liabilities, as the laws stands in India AIX crash is not an incriminating one, and liabilities will be very limited and will be paid by insurance firms, AIX is not even a privately held company.

So please be assured there are little chance of any cover-up in this investigation.


@protectthehornet
There is a difference between Congo and India.


@Neptunus Rex
Furthermore, the systemic failures in Indian aviation as described by Top Tup and others, can be ignored, yet again.

Why would you think there exists a sufficient personal incentive to someone to ignore the systemic failures?
And, is that some one going to have sufficient control over the conduct of the investigation?

[PT6A]

Air India is a very unsafe company with awful working practices and some people in charge who have a terrible attitude... I know I was on contract there....

However, in the Air India Express 737 SOP they make it very clear they want pilots to do a go-around... just like any western airline - however the culture on the ground is very different from what is written.

Here are a few quotes from the AIX 737 SOP manual. (If someone knows how to put a few pages out of a PDF on here let me know)

India really should of been downgraded, the DGCA is a total joke... just one look at their offices should be reason enough to downgrade them!#

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
At 1000’ AFE, callout: “Stabilised, No Flags”

If not stabilized, callout by “Unstabilized - Go Around”


If Required visual reference is confirmed,
“VISUAL, LANDING” or
any reason to abandon the approach,
“Go Around – Flaps 15”

A/C must be in Landing configuration & stabilized by 1000 ft AFE in IMC/NIGHT and 500 ft AFE in DAY VMC.
(if NOT Go Around must be carried out)

At 1000’ AFE, callout: “Stabilised, No Flags”

If not stabilized, callout by any crew member “Unstabilized - Go Around”

• If suitable visual reference is not established by MDA+50’/Missed approach
point, follow go around procedures.

A/C must be in Landing configuration & stabilized by 1000 ft AFE in IMC/NIGHT and 500 ft AFE in DAY VMC.
(if NOT Go Around must be carried out)

At 1000’ AFE, callout: “Stabilised, No Flags”

If not stabilized, callout by any crew member “Unstabilized - Go Around”

All approaches should be stabilized by 1,000 feet AFE in IMC/NIGHT
and by 500 feet AFE in DAY VMC.
Do not attempt to land from an unstable approach.
An approach that becomes unstabilized below 1,000 feet AFE in
IMC/NIGHT or below 500 feet AFE in DAY VMC requires an immediate
go-around.
ELEMENTS OF A STABILIZED APPROACH:
An approach is considered stabilized when all of the following criteria
are met:
• The airplane is on the correct flight path.
• Only small changes in heading and pitch are required to maintain
the correct flight path.
• The airplane speed is not more than VREF + 20 knots indicated
airspeed and not less than VREF.
• The airplane is in the correct landing configuration.
• Sink rate is no greater than 1,000 fpm; if an approach requires a
sink rate greater than 1,000 fpm, a special briefing should be
conducted
• Thrust setting is appropriate for the airplane configuration.
• All briefings and checklists have been conducted.
• ILS approaches should be flown within one dot of the glideslope
and localizer, or within the expanded localizer scale.
• During a circling approach, wings should be level on final when the
airplane reaches 300 feet AFE.
• Unique approach procedures or abnormal conditions requiring a
deviation from the above elements of a stabilized approach require
a special briefing.
These conditions should be maintained throughout the rest of the
approach for it to be considered a stabilized approach. If the above
criteria cannot be established and maintained at and below 500 feet
AFE, initiate a go-around.
At 100 feet HAT for all visual approaches, the airplane should be
positioned so the flight deck is within, and tracking to remain within,
the lateral confines of the extended runway edges.
As the airplane crosses the runway threshold it should be:
• Stabilized on target airspeed to within + 10 knots until arresting
descent rate at flare
• On a stabilized flight path using normal maneuvering
• Positioned to make a normal landing in the touchdown zone (the
first 3,000 feet or first third of the runway, whichever is less).
Initiate a go-around if the above criteria cannot be maintained.

[NephewBob]

When landing in South India, Tower will ask for 'registration' (I suppose for Landing fee invoice), sometimes even on the landing roll, with speed brake & reverse configuration.

Of course all this information is available on the filed flight plan, including PIC name, and I often suggest that the ATIS request this on first contact, if really necessary.....but then again maybe I have been talking to myself.

By the way, receipt of ATIS code to TRACON or Tower seems to be optional in India as well as many other places by Indian pilots, (to be fair by too many other airlines in the Arabian gulf as well for instance)

In the event of a missed approach, (done my fair share in the monsoon seasons, although maybe elevated heart rate, have never been intimidated, control wise by ATC), ....on the subsequent landing, the tower asks for the Captain's name, and the reason for the missed approach which they presumably write down in a big register.

I have always given the same answer...."We couldn't see the runway"....

[King on a Wing]

Whilst on the topic of Go-around's and Missed approaches...How the hell does any one of us know that they were even ATTEMPTING a go-around or a MA. I mean the frieking Cvr is a mangled mess at this point in time(as per the same irresponsible jounos' reports)and which FO in his right state of mind(may god rest his soul)would report to the Atc of ALL people that 'hey i've been begging with this guy all through to go-around,and we are now crashing in the valley'.Does it take a rocket scientist to tell us that this is just opportunistic,irresponsible reporting...!! The agenda being...blame the frieking expat!! Cause that seems to be the ONLY agenda in India for the past 2 years. Blame the white guy and get him outta here!
Poor thought process on all our parts,to say the least! And WE are supposed to be the analysts here...

[strobes_on]

Positioned to make a normal landing in the touchdown zone (the
first 3,000 feet or first third of the runway, whichever is less).

In various companies I have worked for over the last 30 years (flying 737 size and above) , I have never seen figures of "3000 feet" or "first third of the runway" used.

It just leaves too much usable runway behind the aircraft.

The aiming point is generally 1000 ft - 1500 ft, which will lead to a touchdown using correct technique within 2000 ft. Where available, the electronic glideslope is the primary source of slope control down to the runway.

Is the AIX manual an issue here ?

[galaxy flyer]

Strobes ON

That 3000 foot number would be the FAA definition of touchdown zone and the layout of the touchdown zone lighting. Does that settle it? Yes, on a dodgy runway, might be better to aim at 1500 feet. I do all the time, so I'm in the habit.

GF

[PT6A]

Operations Training Division,
Santa Cruz (East)
MUMBAI- 400 029
September 29, 2005
To:
ALLFLIGHTCREW
Recently, one of our B747-400 aircraft was involved in a runway overrun incident after landing during a heavy shower on runway 14 at Mumbai. There was no damage to the aircraft and no injuries to the passengers or crew. However, to highlight the problems faced during landing in adverse weather compounded with wet / slippery runway conditions this circular is being issued
The information will subsequently be incorporated in the Operations Manual/SOP.
BrakingAction is reported as "Good", "Medium" or "Poor" after analyzing the readings of friction measuring devices such as DBV(Diagonal Brake Vehicle), ASFT(Airport Surface Friction Tester).
The British Mu meter and the "Griptester" trailer, etc. To increase friction, runway treatment is carried out. It is simply removal of rubber deposits by chemical or water blast techniques, or mechanical scrubbing.
Anywater on a runway creates a potential slippery situation and should be treated with caution.
Cross-wind/ tailwind components add to the threat.
When runway is wet or contaminated, calculate the landing distance required including the factored distances for components unserviceable, ego Thrust reversers, spoilers, etc. If landing distance required is marginal, compared with landing distance available, then consider diversion.
Determination of Landing Distance
For Boeing aeroplanes:
Tables are provided in the QRHfor DRYRunway and Slippery Runway with Braking action as Good, Medium and Poor. When the Runway is wet, the slippery runway table with "good" braking action is to be entered. However, if the braking action is reported as Medium then the 'Medium' table is used. In case of runway contaminated with water with no reports of braking action use Braking action "Medium". However, if the reported braking action is "poor" consider diversion except when there is no option. If diversion is not possible, then the "poor" table must be referred to.
For Airbus aeroplanes:
Acutallanding distances are given in the QRH for Dry, wet, 6.3 mm water, 12.7 mm water, 6.3 mm slush, 12.7 mm slush, compacted snow, and ice.

2
Landing Geometry:
The tables in the QRHgive the actual landing distance from the threshold assuming approximately 1000 feet of air distance, which is included in the tabulated distance. It is being emphasized that this caters to only 4 secs of flare to touchdown from the 30 feet point. However, the average flare
time ranges from 6 secs to 8 secs and therefore, it would be prudent to add another 1000 feet to the distance extracted from the table to give a more realistic landing distance. The landing distance is the distance from the landing threshold and not from "beyond glide slope". It is emphasized that this is the actual distance covered by the aircraft from the threshold including the
air (float) distance and does not include the Regulatory (FAA) 60%additional margin. When reported braking action is medium or braking action in the pilots' judgement is medium or
when the R/W is soaked with water, use Auto brakes as stated below :-
'Max' (B747-200/300)
'Max Auto' (B747-400 &: B777)
'Medium' (A-310)
In all cases monitor the deceleration rate. If it is observed to be less than the required rate of deceleration, then use maximum manual braking (i.e. full brake pedal deflection) which gives the highest deceleration ra,te.
Further emphasis should be placed upon the following :-
• Select appropriate auto-brake as per SOP.
• Approach on glide path at the correct approach speed.
• Avoid extended flare and ensure a firm touch down.
• Use maximum reverse thrust as soon as possible.
• Confirm extension of ground spoilers.
• Do not delay lowering nose-wheel onto the runway. This increases weight on wheels and activates aircraft systems associated with nose gear squat switches! proximity detectors.
• Monitor auto-brakes or apply pedal brakes with continuous steady pressure. Do not pump brakes or apply then release and reapply. The Anti-skid will regulate the braking most effectively if continuous pressure is maintained.
• For directional control use rudder pedals and differential braking. Do not use nose wheel steering tiller.
• At taxi speed use nose wheel steering with care.
Finally, it is being emphasized that at any point during final approach it is felt that adequate landing distance may not be available due to changed circumstances or weather, there should be no hesitation in executing a missed approach. Abrief write-up on Runway conditions and Hydroplaning is enclosed for information.
( CAPT.S.C. BAPTISTA )
GENERAL MANAGER-OPS (TRG)

[Willie Everlearn]

rspilot

:eek: You've got to be kidding: quote
"You are very right...in the MD80, stall recovery is to acually pitch the nose up slightly during stick shaker and you won't lose one foot of altitude."

If this isn't one of the scariest statements I've read in a long time, I don't know what is. During approach to a stall, stick shaker is NOT a stall, the first thing to do is reduce the angle of attack to below shaker. That means lower the nose. Loss of altitude is quite often a necessity. How much altitude loss depends strictly on your altitude. At FL350 be prepared to lose several thousand feet. Pulling up at shaker approaching a stall at high altitudes could mean, secondary stall, over booting an engine, compressor stall, loss of control.
The FAA PTS only talks about minimum loss of altitude, the acceptable 'number of feet lost' is not published ANYWHERE. Check it out.

Please, do some reading or get some instruction on low and high altitude stalls before you toss out such an incorrect statement.

(just trying to help)
Willie :ok:

[drive73]

Jimmy,
This isn't a hard cover up to engineer. Well placed source = dgca. If the expat broke sop, then everything Indian is in the clear. The final neat little bow is the "well trained" local fo begging for go arounds from 800 ft, even though the cvr is in the US at honeywell being decoded. The dgca makes the rules oversees aviation and investigates the accidents and in true indian government form can do no wrong. I may be wrong, but I doubt we will ever see the true cvr transcript or an final independant agency report on this accident.

[White Knight]

Looks like the TOI is wrong yet again (from Airbubba's post)

Aviation regulators abroad and airlines like Emirates, Singapore Airlines, Korean Air, have long done away with the practice of asking their pilots to file reports on go-arounds to give them complete freedom.

Here at Emirates an ASR is definitely required to be filed in the event of a go-around or missed approach... I guess the difference from AI is that there's no comeback from management (unless you muck the go-around itself up horrendously).

[NephewBob]

Heard from a little bird today, that FO was PF. Media may want to change their spin doctoring...(if true)

[jmmilner]

But, if as some have reported, this is a captains only airport, allowing the FO to be PF would be a violation of SOP and still the captain's fault. If the FO was about to be made a captain, it's still the captain's fault but it might reflect badly on the system having placed the FO on the verge of promotion.

I'll stop now, all this spinning is making me ill.

[jimmygill]

@driver73

I understand coverup is not hard to engineer. My contention is that there is no motivation for coverup on the part of the investigator.

Despite this if we start with an assumption of cover up, it will be hard for us to accept the truth even if its revealed without bias.

Lets all start with the these fair assumptions:

1. The captain made a mistake doesn't mean that all expats are like that.
2. The F/O made a mistake doesn't mean that all F/O are like that.

At the same time the safety of the aircraft is primary responsibility of the Captain, so even if f/o was at mistake, the blame will be properly assigned to the captain. This, if happens, shall not be construed as bias in the investigation.




@NephewBob (http://www.pprune.org/members/155405-nephewbob)
Heard from a little bird today, that FO was PF

Is this info any more credible than the fiction in the newspapers?

[drive73]

Jimmy
I wouldn't accept those are fair assumptions as the investigation is far from over. It could have been a component failure. And how good of a report are you going to get out of the dgca if they share any of the responsabuility? I know you may be Indian and defending your country is admirable, but you have to admit the dgca is not well run, and corrupt. Do you feel the airspace runways, taxiways, atc are safe and well run? Why would you repave the bom runway and not groove it? Why no preperation for monsoon ie, burning tread away repainting centerlines, ect. I have been in 3rd world central american airports with smoother taxiways and runways. Why is this happening in India? Poor oversight with no real safety in mind. Bunch of guys with titles and a little power sipping tea and showing what big shots they are. Taking payoffs and taking care of themselves. Explain to me where you think I am wrong.

[premkudva]

Let's hope the person leading the inquiry is not either a) as xenophobic and / or b) open to corruption.

Just today I read that a retired air marshal of the IAF will be heading the Court of Inquiry.

Govt sets up court of inquiry into Mangalore plane crash - Home - livemint.com (http://www.livemint.com/2010/06/03215533/Govt-sets-up-court-of-inquiry.html?atype=tp)

[leftseatview]

While the existence of corruption cant be denied....the DGCAs record on accident investigation has been pretty good actually(the reports of the last few years are available on line)
The Air Marshal who conducted the Patna 737 Court of Inq. in 2000 had put on line the entire FDR and CVR downloads pretty early on in the investigation, and his final findings were not challenged.
The Govt. and the DGCA is also quite open to accepting foreign(especially US)expertise as required.They have regularly done so in the past. And unlike the case of Egypt Air or Silk Air, the press in India is unlikely to allow a disenting view (if it were to arise)from the NTSB to go unnoticed without a vigourous(if sometimes ill informed!) public debate.
Already some good is coming from this sad event...the public is being educated by the media on the need to get the touchdown zone correct,sometimes at the expense of a "smooth touchdown"
The travelling public tends to rate the quality of the entire flight based solely on how smooth the landing was.

[stepwilk]

Whenever I'm sitting next to a passenger who makes some negative remark about a solid landing, particularly in a crosswind/short-runway situation (LGA, say), I smile at him or her and say, "How interesting! So you have experience landing a 737?" Or whatever the type is.

Funny the answers you get...

[Green Guard]

Heard from a little bird today, that FO was PF

Is this info any more credible than the fiction in the newspapers?

It should be easy to find out..ATC or those in the air at the time,
just need to check who was on RT during APP.

[A37575]

Dont agree that FO should put gear up to force a GA.Do you really think this is safe?

Bloody sight safer than going off the far end of the runway and killing people.

[Green Guard]

Why the hell would F/O put the Landing Gear DOWN in the first place....?
Unless there would be something bloody wrong with that F/O as well....

[BOAC]

Well, GG, in normal operations it makes for quieter landings.

[jimmygill]

ATC tapes gave crash probe early lead - India - The Times of India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ATC-tapes-gave-crash-probe-early-lead/articleshow/6001049.cms)

"Pilots have a 'press to talk' button in the cockpit for communication with the ATCs. When this button is pressed, any background noise in the cockpit including any conversation between the co-pilot and commander is also picked up. We routinely hear such things in the cockpit while speaking to pilots," said a senior ATC official. The co-pilot's warning against landing come through clearly in the ATC tapes along with the conversation between the pilot and the ATC.



Scenario 1
FO was pilot flying, and Captain was Pilot Pushing the 'press to talk' button, why would FO warn for a go around instead of initiating a go around?

Scenario 2
Captain was pilot flying and FO was Pilot Pushing the 'press to talk' button
Why would F/O chose to be talking to both ATC and warning the captain at the same time?

Scenario 3

The Ill Informed Journo:
"Is it possible to listen to pilot's conversation using the ATC radio?"

Senior ATC Source:
"Pilots have a 'press to talk' button in the cockpit for communication with the ATCs. When this button is pressed, any background noise in the cockpit including any conversation between the co-pilot and commander is also picked up."




Don't attribute to malice which can be adequately explained by stupidity. Don't rule-out malice.

[vapilot2004]

Routine radio calls from ATC should be complete well before the MAP is reached. Surely Indian ATC adheres to this convention.

What an odd set of circumstances going on just the tapes and the skewed journalistic interpretation of them.

[johannschmith]

PT6A

Interesting - but what really matters is the attitude of Operations Management to actual G/As. Do they query the crew in an inquisitional manner (and demand reports of every G/A) or do they try to find out why it happened in a positive way in order to understand if there's a systemic problem with either the airline SOPs, the training, the airport, ATC or whatever.

I've flown for quite a few operators in my time and I've yet to see an Ops Manual that genuinely tells the crew to G/A if they're unhappy with the approach, safe in the knowledge that there will be NO COMEBACK to them.

Well, one can dream...perhaps we'll see it one day ............???

[rubik101]

johannschmith says;

"I've flown for quite a few operators in my time and I've yet to see an Ops Manual that genuinely tells the crew to G/A if they're unhappy with the approach, safe in the knowledge that there will be NO COMEBACK to them."

You could always join the UK's favourite airline which is the butt of constant crticism in every aspect of their operations by all the enlightened souls who contribute to these forums (or is it fora?), open their Ops manual and find that indeed, if you are unhappy with the approach then you MUST Go-around. Nowhere does it say that you will be subseqently questioned as to why you did so.

So, yes, there are airlines who adopt such an enlightened policy, you just need to be fortunate enough to actually work for one of them.

[Rananim]

Bloody sight safer than going off the far end of the runway and killing people.

So can the FO put the gear up at 100'?50'?
FO can command a GA and this should be done by calling "GA" and advancing TL's.If the Captain resists and the FO is 100% sure that to continue the approach and landing will result in mortal danger,then yes okay he/she can do whatever is necessary,including raising the gear(200' at latest).But this is extreme action designed only to prevent a disaster.Its not to be taken because of SOP infringement alone.The Captain is PIC,not the FO.
I agree its a fine line and a tough call for the FO but taking control from the PIC is only to be done when a clear and present danger is self-evident and the PIC refuses to heed any warnings.
We already have an indication in India that ATC are now taking it upon themselves to command a GA for reasons that are clearly beyond their jurisdiction(Indigo).We dont want FO's taking control or putting the gear up because the plane's a bit high or a bit long .The remedy must fit the problem.An Asian airline once banned all FO landings because of one overrun in wet weather.Disproportionate and counter-productive response.Lets not see the same mistake made here.

[trashie]

I continue to be amazed at the number of approach and landing accidents that have occurred over the past few years.

Six years ago I was involved in the Flight Safety Foundations roll out of their approach and landing accident reduction program (ALARP) in Australia. At the time ALA accidents made up almost 60% of all accidents. I hazard a guess it is even higher at the moment. According to the FSF at the time implementation of the program amongst South American airlines had been the main reason accident rates in that region had substantially decreased. The culture of the airlines involved had been turned around with simulator training emphasising that G/As were fully supported if a stabilised approach had not been achieved at a certain point of the approach. This training was fully supported by the airlines management.

Most code sharing airlines are now subject to the IATA IOSA audit program. Perhaps the ALARP program should be included in an airlines operational audit program as part of the cultural assessment of the airlines management.

[heavy.airbourne]

(...) and the FO is 100% sure that to continue the approach and landing will result in mortal danger,then yes okay he/she can do whatever is necessary,including raising the gear(200' at latest). :mad:

How stupid is this? You only raise the undercarriage if you have a positive rate of climb, be it either T/O or G/A, but certainly not to force the PF into a G/A from an approach...:=

[stepwilk]

And there is no clearer sign that this thread--and all too many others--is largely populated by FlightSim players who know nothing about positive rate.

[Rananim]

How stupid is this? You only raise the undercarriage if you have a positive rate of climb, be it either T/O or G/A, but certainly not to force the PF into a G/A from an approach

Tired of people who wont read a thread before they post.
This idea of raising the gear to force a GA was put forward as a last ditch option for the FO if the Captain refuses to abort a landing.I dont like it anymore than you do.However,perhaps it is sometimes called for if the Captain seems intent on killing everyone.The B737 Indonesian crash is a case in point.

Read the entire thread and dont ever wave your finger at me again.

[paulg]

Given the outcome of this accident any action taken by the PNF could hardly have made things worse.

[BOAC]

If this suggestion (raising gear) is coming from professional pilots I am worried.

If the situation is so desperate (3 calls and all that) that drastic action is needed, a firm push forward on the T/Ls will stop the a/c landing and force a g/a. Raising the gear when the other pilot is so obviously 'out of it' and fixated could well result in a wheels up landing. A quick punch in the jaw works too. I once had to 'karate chop' a student in RAF days who had landed with the footbrakes on - that worked too:).

Better to be arguing with the chief pilot about why you did it than being dead.

[Flyingphil]

Folks, first to outline before questions:

I am not a pilot but I work in the Safety-Department of a european airline.

Those of you who assume that the PNF might have initiated a GA may have a look at this
ASN Aircraft accident Airbus A300-622R B-1814 Taipei-Chiang Kai Shek International Airport (TPE) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19980216-0)

This is how a flight ends if the PNF interupts (or better counteracts) the PF's actions shortly before landing!
I hope we do NOT have a similar case here!

My firm does not work together with HRM-Agencies so may I ask those of you who work (or have worked) for such suppliers how training is performed before you join an operator?
Any SIM-Rides, Trips with a TRI or anything before you start your temporary life at an airline?

[Centaurus]

If this suggestion (raising gear) is coming from professional pilots I am worried.


I see the situation as this: Scenario: Captain (culture fixated maybe) where real men never go around as it is a loss of face in front of a subordinate member of another caste or simply determined to make a go at getting in.

Have witnessed this many times during simulator training of certain countries. F/O has already been alarmed enough to call for a GA or at the least has indicated he is most unhappy at the prospects of an over-run after a non-stable approach well below the mandatory go around of 500 ft VMC or 1000 ft IMC.

Some captains - again depending on their character type - will strongly resent "advice" from the subordinate and be determined to force the landing all the while risking a long float. In most cases where culture dominates the flight deck the F/O will sit glumly watching as events unfold while making weak attempts at dissuading the captain from pressing on regardless of the potential consequences. And to be blunt, that could mean if the aircraft goes off the end at high speed, it is probable (judging by recent gruesome pictures on Pprune) that people will die a horrible death in their seats -all because the captain stuffed up badly and the F/O should have taken drastic action to stop him.

How does the F/O fix the problem, exactly? his support calls went unheeded. It is usually obvious by 200 ft agl that the aircraft is going to finish in the over-run if high and fast on a short wet runway - or in the under-run if undershooting. So what happens if the F/O says calmly "Captain - I have control and we are going around Sir".

Is the captain then expected to happily say "Handing over, First officer" and himself becomes the subordinate until the F/O hands over control back to the captain with an apologetic and sickly smile knowing he will soon be out of a job. Well it ain't going to happen that way - ever.

The captain would likely shout at the F/O to get his dirty mitts of the controls and continue to press on regardless. In other words there is a chance of blows on the flight deck.

What else is left to the hapless F/O under these circumstances? Pprune readers have come up with several choices -each to his own. Shoving the throttles forward on the captain will catch the captain by surprise and he better be real quick to stop the nose from pitching up fast under the influence of full power and full flap. He may even fail to react quickly enough to prevent the nose pitching up and there is a great risk of a high power high nose attitude stall and fall-off. If the captain is that incompetent as to press on regardless on short final despite several warnings from the F/O, the chances are he will also be incompetent to handle an unexpected power increase and subsequent rapid pitch up not of his own making. That then is the great risk of the F/O shoving open the thrust levers against the stops and hoping his captain can recover from the shock of his subordinate having the hide to question his actions.

On the other hand, the captain will have probably completed numerous normal go arounds from an ILS DA on instruments - both in the real aircraft and certainly in the simulator. Presumably he has been certified competent at that manoeuvre.

If, as a last resort, the F/O elects to call "Go Around" and then pulls up the landing gear lever while leaving the captain to conduct the go-around, then I believe it may be the safest(?) method of forcing a recalcitrant captain to abandon the approach. It would be highly unlikely the captain would then deliberately press on and land gear up. If however, he does press on after the landing gear has been selected up, then the F/O is justified in taking his last chance card and start fighting the captain for control of the aircraft.

It is wrong to ignore the realities that fatal over-runs have occured and no doubt will continue in the future. It is also head in the sand and unfair to the first officer, who is given precious little written guidance in company FCOM on how convince the captain that his approach is basically dangerous. Fighting for control when near the ground is a recipe for disaster and that is the reason why the F/O should select gear up to force a go-around rather than risk a loss of control. It then becomes a matter of personal opinion between pilots which of the two choices is the lesser evil.

[BOAC]

You can argue 'what ifs' all day - and I did not suggest firewalling the throttles, by-the-way - so 'what if' the gear going up at 200' ALSO catches the Captain 'by surprise' and he firmly shoves it down again? Which is the safer option? Which, in the RHS would you prefer? At least one pilot would be ready for the pitch up!

FlyingPhil - I can see no suggestion in your report of ANY interference by another crew member - I would suggest PF managed to stuff it up all by him/herself, and in fact the LACK of 'interference' is probably what caused the accident?

[highcirrus]

I hope that readers will not take any of my post amiss as I only seek to assist in clarifying events surrounding the recent IX 812 accident at Mangalore.

My experience to date is nudging on 30K hours of military jet and heavy jet transport time with RAF and major national carriers, world-wide. I’m currently on contract with Air India (AI) as an aircraft Commander. I pass on this experience sketch to establish that I know what I am talking about.

I spoke a couple of days ago with two AI senior management Captains who separately confirmed to me that they had heard the CVR tapes relating to the accident and they independently confirmed that all seemed to be going well on the approach until approx 1500 AGL, with Captain as PF (Pilot Flying) and FO as PM (Pilot Monitoring). Subsequently, the FO was heard five times to exhort the need for a Go Around, with no response heard from the Captain.

For information, the Captain was not “of Serbian origin, travelling on a British Passport” as reported by a “spokesman” in the Indian press. He was a Serbian national with a Serbian Passport and possessing an Indian Employment visa issued by the Indian Embassy in Belgrade (both of which documents I recently saw copies of). He and I knew each other and I can confirm that he was a mature, capable, humorous, sociable and well-respected air transport professional.

I’ve just checked one of my log books and I note that I made a VOR approach to R/W 01 at Porto Santo (Madeira Islands) in 1978. I was PM as FO and the Captain (hugely experienced and very well respected) was PF. Aircraft was a B737-200. Final approach track (from memory) was 10-15 degrees offset from R/W track and just before seeing the R/W we flew through a rain squall at about 1000 AGL, which seemed to unsettle the Captain. From then on I started to realise that he was both disorientated and fixated with getting in and was making no attempt to line up with the R/W but seemed to be heading for open, rocky ground. I mentioned, conversationally at first, that we would have to line up with the R/W or think about Going Around but got no response. After three or four increasingly urgent calls I finally called “Ok xxx we’re Going Around”, put on G/A thrust, selected 15 degrees nose up, G/A flap and raised the gear with positive climb indicated. We then made a safe landing (Captain as PF) on the reciprocal runway. Captain subsequently quietly expressed appreciation of my actions and I said something to the effect that “shucks, ‘twern’t nothing” and he could buy the beers at the next opportunity. That, of course, was in the days prior to DFDRs, CVRs and the requirement to exhaustively report every fart and belch to the relevant authorities (all great safety tools but their absence meant my thoughts and actions were completely free of any consideration of, or worry about, justifying my safety actions at a later date).

Bottom line? Anyone can make errors of judgment or skill at any time but we rely on our PM colleagues to correct them and maybe save the day if necessary – but they can only do this if we operate in a non-punitive and non-negative regulatory regime (ie. no worries about executing vital safety actions). The Indian Regulatory System has an amount of self-examination to go through before it achieves this sunlit elysian state.

On a final note, as I get towards the end of my flying career, I become more and more aware of the daily potential for air transport disaster, of how quickly and easily things can unravel in any aircraft and of the absolute need, as pilots, to stay humble, acutely aware and very well informed in our uniquely unforgiving operating environment.

[Neptunus Rex]

High Cirrus
A great post, and who can argue with your logic and experience?
You demonstrated great airmanship, survival instinct, flying ability and cojones in what you accomplished.
However, what chance for the passengers in a similar situation sitting aft of the 250 or even 1,000 hour wonders that now undermine our profession?
Nobody I care for will ever fly with a LoCo.

[NephewBob]

"Fighting for control when near the ground is a recipe for disaster and that is the reason why the F/O should select gear up to force a go-around rather than risk a loss of control. It then becomes a matter of personal opinion between pilots which of the two choices is the lesser evil."



Maybe the fight for control was not near the ground, but ON the ground (during those 12 or so terrifying seconds)

For example, IF it was a long ****ty landing, and reversers selected..(standard procedure) SB up and slowing ..last 1000 feet in sight..and...even if possible overun.. bad situation.

If reverse was (even partially) deployed, and just ONE of the cockpit crew-members decided at that point that it was time for a go around with Flaps40......well say no more.... (as is very clearly written in the manufacturers manuals, that for a variety of reasons, this is absolute folly)...very bad situation.

What the hell do I know...just speculation...so far...like almost all the previous posts on this terrible tragedy.

All over the world, thousands of times, day in, day out (even last stormy night), we mix the ingredients, and mostly the recipe turns out alright.

NB

[totempole]

While searching through previous threads on near disasters and go arounds I came across this gem by a certain true gentleman :

4th March 2008, 21:36 #252 (http://www.pprune.org/3956480-post252.html) (permalink (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/316096-lh-a320-rough-landing-hamburg-13.html#post3956480)) OKhalsa (http://www.pprune.org/members/191795-okhalsa)

Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: Asia
Age: 59
Posts: 10


Captain's landing in marginal weather? Well, my present and past airlines practise that. However, there were cases where the humble eff oh did a better job.
Years ago in another life flying the old A300 B4 into old Kai Tak at the onset of a typhoon. X-Winds were within limits but very gusty. After the checker board, we were turning beautifully for a textbook gusty X-W landing when a mighty gust turned everything pear shaped! The wings went wiggy waggy, the concentration and focus throughout the whole IGS 13 approach was so intense that the skipper ended up with tunnel vision and keep struggling to salvage the landing. The F/E was pretty quiet; the young F/O just grunted " GO A... " and pressed the Go levers! In a daze the skipper and F/O struggled together for a split second before, unbelievably, the skipper shouted " you have control " and the young f/o took it around. The skipper , ashen faced, with shaking knees and squeaky voiced asked the f/o to fly to TPE. Since we had plenty of fuel ( no problem with 8 extra tons ), the young f/o proposed another try. Skipper agreed with f/o flying..well f/o brought it down beautifully on the IGS to an equally beautiful landing. Later we celebrated at the bicycle bar!
The skipper was : YOURS truly. The F/O... well he has moved on to become a great skipper. The F/E; he probably learnt a lot that day and too took up flying as f/o and is now a junior skipper!
http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/statusicon/user_offline.gif http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/buttons/report.gif (http://www.pprune.org/report.php?p=3956480) http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/buttons/reply_small.gif (http://www.pprune.org/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=3956480&noquote=1)





What a fine captain to share his humble experience and what a fine first officer he had!

[Airbubba]

Those of you who assume that the PNF might have initiated a GA may have a look at this

ASN Aircraft accident Airbus A300-622R B-1814 Taipei-Chiang Kai Shek International Airport (TPE) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19980216-0)



Dynasty demoed an earlier A300 go around mode stall in Nagoya in 1994 with similar fatal results:

ASN Aircraft accident Airbus A300B4-622R B-1816 Nagoya-Komaki (NGO) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19940426-0)

The copilot was over the alcohol limit for many countries (although alcohol has never been blamed for a crash according to some here):

China Air co-pilot over limit for DWI 05/06/1994 | Archives | Chron.com - Houston Chronicle (http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=1994_1200278)

After the 1998 TPE crash and customary resignations, China Air management decreed that the A300 autoflight system was incompatible with local training culture and the A300 became an almost totally expat fleet for its last few years.

[jimmygill]

Probe into Mangalore crash begins - Mangalore - City - The Times of India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mangalore/Probe-into-Mangalore-crash-begins/articleshow/6021190.cms)


I hope this assuages fears about partiality of investigation to some extent.

Gokhale said the court of inquiry would also set up a website where the progress of the inquiry would be posted for people to follow. "We are here to perform a thorough and serious job," he said, adding that it would also get in touch with other officials who have already gone through various evidence. The court of inquiry would be headquartered in New Delhi, as per an official notification.

[Sunny Boyle]

Thanks totem and Okhalsa, what a delightful thing to share! My guess is that with the nature of the Kai Tak IGS RW 13 approach with the right turn after the checker board, your F/O was able to judge the crosswind and gusts better the second time around. This is not to detract from the great job he did.

[BOAC]

What is the point of posts #394 and #401 (Flyingphil and Airbubba)? They have nothing to do with this thread!.

a) The a/c quoted did not touch down
b) Approaches were flown by F/O
c) A300
d) Incorrect g/a procedure
e) Not Mangalore
f) No (public) suggestion that the AIX co-pilot was over any alcohol limit

The only common factor appears to be poor command by the Captains concerned.

[olster]

Brilliant post,Highcirrus -you are quite correct in saying that a little humility is important and goes a long way.Not always apparent,unfortunately.

[Airbubba]

The only common factor appears to be poor command by the Captains concerned.

Sounds like you used to fly single piloted.:)

Today we tend to fly as crews. There was a discussion here of PF and PNF botched coordination and disagreement on a go around decision and Flyingphil cited the CI TPE crash as an example of how not to do it. I replied with a mention of the eerily similar CI NGO crash. My apologies if we were out of line.

Caveats, Flyingphil is not a pilot and I drive the lav truck so we always appreciate your superior views here.:ok:

[BOAC]

I drive the lav truck - and I willingly fill it for you.:ok:

To repeat: Flyingphil's 'accident' does not state who flew the g/a

Your first shows a botched HANDLING during an INADVERTENT g/a , not a 'decison'.

Your second doesn't even mention a g/a:ugh:

Mangalore = no go-round. Compute.

With my inferior knowledge of how you fly today as crew, it looks very much like all the Captains involved in those accidents failed to exercise command of a crew (of more than one)?

Edit: Thanks Aditya

[Flyingphil]

Sorry Guys, I copied the wrong link.:ugh:
Read about this incident in a book years ago in which several CVR-Recordings were listed. This book contains several incidents/accidents of A300s in Asia unfortunately.

This one here is the correct one:
ASN Aircraft accident Airbus A300B4-622R HL7296 Cheju Airport (CJU) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19940810-0)

And here with the detail of "disagreements" between the flight-crew whether to abandon or execute the landing.
Accident Database: Accident Synopsis 08101994 (http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?airline=Korean+Air+Lines&date=08101994&reg=HL7296)

Concerning to the book mentioned the Captain was a US- or Canadian Expat and PF on the leg and gave the "Contine Landing"-Command when suddenly the F/O initiated a GA.
This lead (as mentioned in the links) to a delayed Touch-Down with subsequent overran of the RWY.

May I ask again if anybody who works or has worked for a Pilot-Agency to share his/her experiences of Training before joining an operator?!?!
I knew some pilots of my company who worked elsewhere before and had to get used to our procedures although they joined us as DEC.
Some of them were retired guys from our national major airline:mad: with over 20K in the log.

In addition I watched several Justplanes-DVD's in the past and came across a bunch of different tasks and procedures with the same acfts e.g. A320
Would be interesting to know how this potential for critical mistakes (Which might also be applicapable here) is handled!

[Airbubba]

Sorry Guys, I copied the wrong link.
Read about this incident in a book years ago in which several CVR-Recordings were listed. This book contains several incidents/accidents of A300s in Asia unfortunately.

It's easy to get the wrong 'bus crash in Asia, there were indeed many in years past.

Concerning to the book mentioned the Captain was a US- or Canadian Expat and PF on the leg and gave the "Contine Landing"-Command when suddenly the F/O initiated a GA.
This lead (as mentioned in the links) to a delayed Touch-Down with subsequent overran of the RWY.

On this one, the captain BW was a 'North American' (i.e. a Canadian, not an American or a Mexican :)). I believe he came from Wardair and had to flee the country on short notice to avoid possible charges as an expat commander involved in an accident. I think he may be retired from Air Canada by now.

It is a classic case of how not to do it. They probably had room to either land long and stop or go around but not do both halfway. I too thought of this crash when details began to emerge on the AIX mishap: expat and local crew, reported dispute over landing or go around and reports of a late touchdown.

[aditya104]

Bangalore = no go-round. Compute.



@BOAC u mean Mangalore?

[Lonewolf_50]

Interesting point on the options as FO to call for go around (waveoff in some circles) by either pushing power forward, or raising gear.

My first instinct would be that the better choice is add power. Power and attitude are the first two determinants of performance, tough configuration is a non trivial third.

Seems to me that raising the gear merely adds the chance of a gear up landing to an already f&!@$#d up situation.

I may be biased by the number of times I yelled "power" and slammed the throttles forward (yes, attitude to climb chosen) to initiate a waveoff when a student pilot got us too slow, or too something, a bit too close to the ground. Power gives you options via energy.

What was instructive was to see other ways of looking at it. Many different ways to peel the onion.

[Idle Thrust]

On this one, the captain BW was a 'North American' (i.e. a Canadian, not an American or a Mexican ). I believe he came from Wardair and had to flee the country on short notice to avoid possible charges as an expat commander involved in an accident. I think he may be retired from Air Canada by now.


This is a quote from an archived post on PPRuNe - sent on 23 Feb 2001:

"This is old news but it's worth mentioning. I just found out today that the captain of the ill-fated KE A300, died of cancer a few months ago. He was a CDN 767 F/O before his death. RIP"

[Airbubba]

This is a quote from an archived post on PPRuNe - sent on 23 Feb 2001

Thanks for the sad news update of his demise, I never met him but had several mutual acquaintances from the expat world years ago.

[Capt.Oveur]

How does the F/O fix the problem, exactly? his support calls went unheeded. It is usually obvious by 200 ft agl that the aircraft is going to finish in the over-run if high and fast on a short wet runway - or in the under-run if undershooting. So what happens if the F/O says calmly "Captain - I have control and we are going around Sir".

I'm just a PAX so may be talking rubbish but wouldn't it make more sense to make it mandatory for a GA if any pilot is unhappy with the approach and calls for a GA. The Whys and What Ifs can then be discussed afterwards once everyone's safely on the ground.

[BOAC]

Capt O - in reality it is - the problem discussed here is when it is ignored, either through tunnel fixation or just pig-headedness.

[Centaurus]

I'm just a PAX so may be talking rubbish

Captain Oveur? The captain rank as a Pprune username is probably a bit inappropriate for a passenger and leads others to the wrong conclusions?

[wisperingwillows]

Hi!,

Thank you for pointing this out IFLYtb20. I cant believe that a newspaper would use posts without so much as an acknowledgement.

I guess professionalism is not their strong suit.

Just wondering if the administrator has any comments on the issue (on pprune policy)?

Cheers
Wispering Willows

[doubleu-anker]

All very well bashing up on foreign pilots, down there in India..

Clearly the handling pilot got it "wrong".

What if the PIC was incapacitated, through fatigue or some other reason? Is it not the f/o's job and indeed duty, to take over if he thinks there will be a crash?? It doesn't matter how inexperienced or experienced the other pilot is, that is his most important duty. If necessary get the axe out! From the CVR transcript, he was of that opinion, or he would not have suggested a go around.

Have we not moved on from, 1976, Tenerife?

When I interview a prospective f/o a question I throw in is this. "If I was carrying out an approach and you thought we were going to crash, what would be your actions??"

[wisperingwillows]

Thank you for your comment.... I was also hoping to ignite a rational debat on the casues of the crash. But that dosne't seem to have happened.

Cheers
Wispering Willows

[daved123]

Centaur,
Perhaps only an eye-brow raising title for those who don't admit to having watched the Airplane movie...ROFL.. Roger, Oveur and Out..inflating autopilot now, getting hat and coat.
DaveD

[lesenterbang]

Interestingly, after the first few pages of this thread there is no more mention of the crew duty cycle, which seems to be at the end of a sleepless night.

[King on a Wing]

End of a tiring duty cycle and a very hard Qtr in the peak of a circadian low...
It gets one thinking. I've personally found myself nearly nodding off during the approach phase of an usually tiring 9 hour / 2 landing duty cycle doing PM for the F/O. This is an effort just to keep awake...
What happens if you have a complicated decision to make towards the fag end of that duty cycle...
It bothers me...and thus came FRMS.
:cool:

[aditya104]

WSJ article Pilot Error Seen as Likely Cause of Air India Mangalore Crash - WSJ.com (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704050804575318553971705946.html?mod=googlen ews_wsj)

While it's still early for conclusions, some formal findings could be announced shortly. A spokesmen for India's civil aviation ministry said Friday that "the probe will be completed [by the] end of this month and [a] report will be out July 1." On Friday, a spokesman for Air India, the national carrier, said it "will announce some new plans" next month, but declined to elaborate.

Prompted partly by the crash, DGCA officials are scrambling to demonstrate a tougher approach. They are considering imposing or reiterating rules that for many years have been mainstays of global aviation safety.


Any steps resulting in improved safety is :ok:. Safety comes before comfort and facilities. SAFETY FIRST.

[rspilot]

Yes!!!! they have increased safety tenfold..require all expats an air force medical Must be able to do 100 pushups in under a minute, 30 Chinups in under a minute and run 3200 meters under 11 minutes.

[aditya104]

Its the 3rd of July, no report out yet?

[jimmygill]

Government of India, Ministry of Civil Aviation (http://civilaviation.nic.in/mangloreCrashCOI.html)

[10DowningSt]

100 pushups in under a minute, 30 Chinups in under a minute and run 3200 meters under 11 minutes

They're some athletes, then.........how many actually pass these tests?

[arem]

I doubt if I could have when I was a youngster - loooong time ago - let alone now!!!!!

[avionimc]

Here is it.
Government of India, Ministry of Civil Aviation (http://civilaviation.nic.in/mangloreCrashCOI.html)

Maybe I am missing something. In the above link, if you look at the first picture of the Photographs of Mangalore Crash (http://civilaviation.nic.in/COI/Pictures for COI Mangalore Crash.pdf) it shows a red mark (plane crash) before the approach end of RWY 24 (i.e.: end of RWY 06)?

Also, the picture is several years old, apparently taken from Google Maps?

Surprising for an official report of such significance.

[A4]

Well as an interim report it tells us........... nothing? The attached photos are also confusing. Why does it show the crash site at the 24/27 threshold area? It went off the end of 24. If they can make such a fundamental error in an official report it doesn't give me much confidence to the validity of the final one.

Or is it me.

A4 :hmm:

We were typing together avionimc....

[aditya104]

Nothing significant in the initial investigation report. More than half of the report is about the credentials of the investigation team. :*
@avionimc @A4
Use Contact (http://civilaviation.nic.in/COI/Contact%20Us.pdf) to notify them of the error. And also tell them that you will pass on the information to the press if they don't rectify within 24 hrs :E

[av8r76]

You guys are waiting for something that's never gonna happen. If and when a report does see the light of day it will gloss over all the facts and mitigating circumstances and just assign blame on the pilots.... case closed and a job well done by the politically influenced team of so called investigators.

No recommendations for SSR, grooved rwys, practical FDTLs or just plain basic safety standards for aircrew training. It's all the pilots fault.

The AF 447 crash saw a flurry of regular updates with relevant and pertinent information slowly unravelling the accident...... what does our esteemed DGCA have to show so far?

As I said it's gonna be a perpetual waiting game.

[TopTup]

Should we act shocked? After all, who saw this coming?

EVERYONE

Well, ANYONE with ANY first hand experience with the DGCA and / or AI. (Except for those still denying what they cannot or have not the experience to).

[jimmygill]

I believe lots of people would have emailed them about the wrong placement of the crash site. They have now changed the map.

The new position is departure end of Runway 27.

We must salute Air Marshal Bhushan Neelkanth Gokhale.

[RegDep]

Opened the link, it was there, closed the link, took a glass of water, opened the link again. It was still there.

I join your salute.

[strella]

Let us hope the report comes out soon. The CVR should have been analysed by now.

[aditya104]

someone did inform the press!

Mangalore crash report gets runway wrong - India - The Times of India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Mangalore-crash-report-gets-runway-wrong/articleshow/6145282.cms)

[aditya104]

Air Marshal Bhushan Neelkanth Gokhale should b stripped of his designation of Air Marshall:mad: they are making the investigation a joke

I salute him though.........

[Capn Bloggs]

Speaking of attention to detail, from the TOI article (0416 UTC, 9Jul2010):

TOI has carried the picture released by the investigation team and an another one which shows the actual site of the crash.

Don't throw stones in glass houses...

[leftseatview]

Ok they have finally nailed the crash site.
Good to know that they are atleast open to "help" from any source.
Hope they make the CVR and FDR transcripts available in some time.
If its an open and shut approach/landing accident, then being transparent is the best thing that the investigation can do.

[aditya104]

8.1 Preliminary report by the Inspector of Accidents/ Inquiry Officer should be finalized within ten days of the accident as stipulated in the appointment order and in the format of ICAO and provided in procedure manual for Aircraft Accident/Incident investigation of DGCA. It shall contain the requisite information including any safety hazard, either in human factor, Aircraft factor and/or any other relevant factor that is prima facie evident during the early stages of investigation such as lack of piloting proficiency if any or any unwarranted disregard of safety requirements, in case these are obvious to enable framing and implementation of immediate corrective safety measures.


Source CAR India Section5 Series C Part I

In short the inspector should have finalised the preliminary report bu Jun 2. That didn't happen. So, the inspector has broken a rule. He is liable for the appropriate penalty.
Also reported by DGCA misses own deadline on Mangalore crash report - India - The Times of India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/DGCA-misses-own-deadline-on-Mangalore-crash-report/articleshow/6156781.cms)

[stepwilk]

Seems to me "should" does not make a rule. "Must" or "shall" would do the job.

[jimmygill]

The ATC transcript doing rounds in media



ATC 6.04.17 a.m. “Wind calm, runway 24 clear to land,”
IX812 6.04.22 a.m. “Clear to land Express.”
IX812 6.04.38 a.m. “Go around captain”
ATC 6.05.04 a.m. “Express India 812 back track runway 24, vacate via Delta.”
IX812 6.05.21 a.m. “control”

ATC 6.09.29 a.m. “Express India 812, Mangalore control correction Express India 812 Mangalore Tower”
ATC 6.09.39 a.m. “Express India 812, Mangalore Tower.”


Co-pilot’s cries went in vain (http://www.deccanherald.com/content/89772/co-pilots-cries-went-vain.html)

[silent_scream]

Can we be sure these transcripts are the real copy of CVR ?
And the DFDR data is required to match the panic. But that will most probably never come out.

[jimmygill]

The above are transcripts from the ATC recordings not teh CVR, the Court has promised that it will release the CVR during public Hearing at Delhi.... 6th September

So far we don't even have exact crash time in public domain... I fail to undestand why CVR/DFDR cannot be released before hearing... may be they don't want informed questions or witnesses at hearing... a ploy to safeguard own incompetence...

The court provided excuse that forensic labs have not given details of Viscera of deceased pilots, and the investigators were not able to query deceased captains widow on what kind of medications he was on, because of VISA problems...

Even though court has promised they are not going after blame-worthiness instead after opportunities to find and correct systemic flaws... the secrecy being practiced puts the intentions to question.

Apparently when a journo showed the court that they already have the 'leaked' ATC transcripts court stated,

"We have received the decoded data of DFDR and CVR. I don't know how ATC transcript got out earlier, but what you got on Wednesday was authentic"

Of course the court is not a cautious speaker.

[leftseatview]

So did the F/O intentionally press the PTT when he asked the Capt to Go-Around so that it would be on ATC record ?
Maybe his previous "advice" was ignored by the Capt.
Is the query on possible medications just routine?
i guess the only way to find out is to show up at the public hearing,where is the venue?

[Green Guard]

So did the F/O intentionally press the PTT when he asked the Capt to Go-Around so that it would be on ATC record ?
Maybe his previous "advice" was ignored by the Capt

Maybe you should swap your "APTL" for ATPL, and never ignore "advice" from your F/O.

To comment your first Question. As aircraft was in a position to crash, if you were in the seat of that F/O, all your hairs would go straight,
and of course you would most probably TX
EITHER by error instead (to Capt. via intercom), to ATC,
OR just did (as he did) very correctly with one transmission, informing his Capt. and informing ATC of next action.
:ooh:
Tike ?

[stepwilk]

He actually has an, uh, ALTP. Or is that the union?

[jimmygill]

So did the F/O intentionally press the PTT when he asked the Capt to Go-Around so that it would be on ATC record ?
Maybe his previous "advice" was ignored by the Capt.
Is the query on possible medications just routine?
i guess the only way to find out is to show up at the public hearing,where is the venue?

In my speculation it seems a deliberate action that the F/O pressed the PTT, and for the same reason as you mentioned.

It better be that his previous advice were rejected by Captain, else we are going down to ugly on a good-bad-and-ugly scale.

Apparently the query on medicine is regular...

Not sure of the venue.... but I am sure it will be crowded, mostly by media..



Maybe you should swap your APTL for ATPL, and never ignore "advice" from your F/O.


Thats a very revealing statement.

[gsmart329]

Mangalore Air crash due to pilot's error Mumbai, Sep.8 (ANI): An investigation into the four month old Mangalore Air crash that involved death of 158 lives, has revealed that the mishap occurred due to pilot's error.

An analysis of audio on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) shows that the Air India Express Boeing 737 was incorrectly aligned to the runway while attempting to land, an NDTV report stated on Wednesday evening.

It has been found that the plane, the audio recording establishes, was too high to make a safe landing and the Ground Proximity Warning System sounded several times.

The co-pilot is heard on the audio asking the captain, a pilot of Serbian origin, to abort landing. "We don't have enough runway left," the co-pilot told the captain, as heard on the audio.

It has also been found that Thrust reversers, critical braking systems on jetliners, were applied late, only after the Boeing 737-800 jet was 6000 feet down the length of 8038 foot runway.

The Bajpe airport in Mangalore has a table-top runway with steep cliffs on all sides.

On May 22, the Air India Express Boeing overshot the runway and plunged down a ravine bursting into flames. It was 6:05 am.

The only survivors from among the 160 passengers and six crew members on board were those who were thrown off the plane.

The Boeing 737-800, which was inducted on January 15, 2008, was being piloted by a British national of Serbian origin, Captain Zlatko Glusica, who, Civil Aviation Minister Praful Patel later said had 7,000 hours as a pilot in command, with over 2000 of those on a Boeing.

He was familiar with the Mangalore airport and had landed there 19 times, the Minister had stated.

The Indian co-pilot, HS Ahluwalia, had landed at Mangalore airport 66 times. (ANI)

[aditya104]

Should the GPWS be sounding alerts if the aircraft is high? And in landing configuration?

[Capi_Cafre']

Should the GPWS be sounding alerts if the aircraft is high? And in landing configuration?


I'm guessing that it alerted to an excessive sink rate below a prescribed altitude. That would be consistent with an aircraft high on approach.

[MountainBear]

aditya104. The term in the article is simply "high" which is vague. It also doesn't say what warning sounded whether it was "sink rate" or "Terrain" or what. It's entirely possible that the pilot experienced it before and treated it as a nuisance alarm. I wouldn't draw any specific conclusions based up that published report.

[Rigid Rotor]

Check out this article in today's Deccan Herald --Pilot was asleep before crash: Black box data (http://www.deccanherald.com/content/95131/pilot-asleep-crash-black-box.html)

[MountainBear]

The first report says the he landed an 4K feet and thrust reversers were deployed at 6K feet.

Then the second report says that the wheels were found at the the take-off position and the engines at high thrust.

So I guess he tried to land but then tried to take off again with 2000 feet left and the thrust reversers still deployed? :uhoh:

[Rigid Rotor]

@ aditya104 Air Marshal Bhushan Neelkanth Gokhale should b stripped of his designation of Air Marshallhttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/censored.gif they are making the investigation a joke Aditya104, your remark's totally uncalled for. I served under the Air Marshal long enough to know that he is a sharp and meticulous professional. He has this sixth-sense sort of insight when it came to ops & flight safety. His 'handle' in the IAF was 'Bingo' Gokhale, incidentally.

[Rigid Rotor]

The Deccan Herald report says that the crew attempted a 'go-around' with only 800 feet of runway remaining.
Despite the high speed and landing in the middle of the runway, had the pilot tried to stop the aircraft instead of taking off after making touch down, it would have stopped at least at the end of the run way averting the disaster,” a Boeing official said. In support of the evidence that the pilot tried a “go around,” the DFDR shows that Glucika activated the takeoff gear and that the engine was in powered to high speed. “During normal touch down the engine speed is always low”, the official said.

“The main reason for the accident was that the pilot(s) tried to take off when just 800 feet of the runway was left. It was a wrong judgment while attempting a takeoff,” he said.

[MountainBear]

Rigid Rotor. Incorrect. The paper only says that 800 feet is what the Boeing official *thinks* the crew did. However, the paper doesn't offer any support for the 800 feet mark. You're reading more into the words than are there.

Further, the second report doesn't say *anything* about the thrust reversers which is an interesting omission.

Wise to wait for the official report.

[aditya104]

Aditya104, your remark's totally uncalled for. I served under the Air Marshal long enough to know that he is a sharp and meticulous professional. He has this sixth-sense sort of insight when it came to ops & flight safety. His 'handle' in the IAF was 'Bingo' Gokhale, incidentally.

Ok I take back my criticism and apologize to you if you got offended. As an aviator who is still young in the industry I don't expect such mistakes from the enquiry committee. The standard that they are setting is very low. We need the future of aviation to be safer. That requires accident investigations which are able to issue reports that are transparent and timely. I hope you and Mr. 'Bingo' Gokhale are with me on this.
THANK YOU

[Rigid Rotor]

@ Mountain Bear - I agree with you on that one - what we are getting are 'leaks', calibrated, deliberate or otherwise. From what I can gather – that as of now it appears to point to an HE landing accident, unless of course, the CoI comes up with something otherwise. It’s definitely very important to reconstruct what exactly happened in those last seconds, second-by-second, so as to pin-point the exact reason(s).

@Aditya104 – May I request you to hold your final judgement on Air Mshl Bingo’s performance on this one, till the CoI releases the report? It appears from previous posts in this thread (of a whole lot of other members) that its quite fashionable to bash in the Indian system (or lack of it or whatever), without waiting for the report.

[aguadalte]

The cockpit voice recorder is only able to keep record for the last half-an-hour of the flight. It is therefore impossible to the investigation team to say the pilot was asleep for 110 minutes. That's bull**** and the Indian DGAC is showing the world, what we already knew: that they are not impartial or trustworthy. Hilarious is also the role of the journalists that publish whatever they are told to publish, without even taking the time to investigate. Bad journalism associated with unreliable investigation teams is the receipt for a lost opportunity to LEARN from this accident and to PREVENT other accidents. What a shame...what a waste!

[BOAC]

In all probability in a 738 the CVR would be a 2hour recorder.

[stepwilk]

"Hilarious is also the role of the journalists that publish whatever they are told to publish, without even taking the time to investigate."

But...

"In all probability in a 738 the CVR would be a 2hour recorder."

Hilarious is also the role of some posters.

In defense of journalists, it needs to be pointed out that no newspaper on earth can afford to have on its staff an aviation expert, a police expert, a firefighting expert, an MD, a true automotive authority... They do as well as they can, writing one day about an aircraft accident, the next about a school-board issue and the day after that a ship sinking 8,000 miles distant.

The journalist certainly would have investigated if his information was that "somebody in India" claimed the pilot had been asleep. Since he/she apparently was quoting a DGAC report, I don't think that required them to re-invent the wheel when they're on deadline.

People are too quick to criticize others who perhaps work in professions about which they know little and couldn't themselves possibly participate in. (You Aguadalte, would be rejected for semi-literacy and an inability to punctuate correctly. See me after class.)

[iflytb20]

"In all probability in a 738 the CVR would be a 2hour recorder."Hilarious is also the role of some posters.


What is hilarious about that??? The acft had a 120 min CVR.

[BOAC]

I trust he was referring to the other poster

[stepwilk]

Follow me through here: the previous poster said the CVR only looped for 30 minutes, so how could the DGAC know the pilot had been asleep for 110 minutes? BOAC essentially said, "Because the CVR held 120 minutes..."

Works for me.

[captjns]

As this was one of the later manufactured aircraft it had the 120 minute capacity systems versus 30 or 60 minutes as installed on the older aircraft.

[iflytb20]

Follow me through here: the previous poster said the CVR only looped for 30 minutes, so how could the DGAC know the pilot had been asleep for 110 minutes? BOAC essentially said, "Because the CVR held 120 minutes..."

Works for me.

Sorry....my bad. :ouch:
Note to self : Look before you leap :}

[WellFrackMe]

Having been involved in the AXI Flight Training Dept. I can confirm the following;

The CVR was 120 mins. as are ALL of AXI's fleet.

"Controlled Rest Breaks" were the norm flying these sort of sectors. Their purpose was to increase the situational awareness/performance of the crews. To avoid exactly this sort of an event!
Usually 30 mins. before TOD, both crew members should have been awake and preparing for approach, etc.

The SOP/FCTM clearly stated the criteria for stabilzed approaches and so forth.

The Boeing FCTM clearly states what "not to do" when reversers are deployed after touchdown on landing!
These facts seem not to have been acknowledged nor followed by this crew.

The GPWS obviously worked, and provided very important inputs to the crew and were avoided.

The CP seems to have felt his abilities were equal to that of a Boeing Test Pilot, who maybe could have managed after landing, to cancel reversers, stab. down trim, speed brakes down detent, Max. thrust and to retract flaps to at least 25. Then maybe rotated at SS+1kt before it was too late and they would have made it.

Was this CP a B737 Test Pilot ever?

The FO who rightfully knew they were un-stabilized demonstrated the lack of Command Capability (he was doing his UG I believe?) in taking control of the aircraft, instead thought it better to transmit his essentially useless RT or Inter-cocpit calls. We see the price he and all others paid for that decision. Maybe in this case physical intervention or even a slap on the CPs face would have proven to have been the right choice?

In my opinion AXI was extremely poorly run from the training/checking side while I was there and from reports of current training personel - still is.

Not one Foreign CP was ever checked by their Agent for their credentials, experience, References nor seriously probed for their past history before joining.
Foreign Pilots who had an Instructor Rating from Timbuck Too Authority on Piston Aircraft were given TRI Validations on the 737NG by the DGAC and provided their form of training and checking for AXI! These were people who were experts on Carb Heat, now knew all there was about HMU's without looking at one book or receiving any approved TRTO courses!

No interview was ever held nor any sort of serious sim. check to join as a Foreigner.

Initial Line Training for new Foreign CPs consisted usually of 4 sectors - with one night landing that was it and release for flight!

Nepotism, favourtism, etc. are factors that led to this. That includes most Managers (all Indians by the way), etc. were in their current positions mainly due to - you guessed it -Vitamin A-! They all knew the current status but it was accepted and allowed to get worse since 2006. Dozens of qualified Foreigners commented on this, but to fall on deaf ears.

During my time there, after dozens of Flight Safety Reports written, many serious QAR violations being recorded by our Safety Dept. on crews. In one 3 month block 6 GPWS Terrain Warning in IMC and the CPs never disconnected the AP and took appropriate actions!
Such items -very very few were ever responded too by Management correctly...... so this all catches up eventiually as we see here.

That is why I left AXI long.

The best is the Manager/Chief Pilot who was in charge of this Fleet during those times, has been removed and is now in charge of Foreign Captain Recruitment for AXI.

[Rigid Rotor]

:sad: If even half the posts regarding the flying environment in AI Express had some element of truth in them, it all adds up to some extremely alarming stuff!! I do hope the CoI recommends appropriate corrective measures and more importantly, those measures are imposed on AI!

[ironbutt57]

Until very recently, 'go-arounds" were an "offense" in India, and reported directly to the highest level of the DGCAA..maybe that was also on their minds..:eek:

[ManaAdaSystem]

All they know is that one pilot was sleeping during cruise, they just assume it was the captain.
For some reason they are trying to make sleeping into a negative issue, something that may have contributed to the accident.
Catching some shut eye during cruise on single/double night sectors is a necessity and good airmanship. You sacrifice some alertness during cruise and transfer it to the more demanding approach and landing phase.

It's only a temporary fix if your roster is legal but extremely tiring. Having said that, I know naught about the AIX quality of rostering.

[BOAC]

All they know is that one pilot was sleeping during cruise, they just assume it was the captain - they are not that stupid, actually. A lot of pilots know that it is rare for a sleeping pilot to activate his/her transmit button.

[TopTup]

Well-Fracked:

Thank you for being one of the only Indian Nationals to admit openly the training standards and recruitment methodology at AI / AIE.

If you were anything like me, the continued breaches, while bought to the attention of "management" and the respective "safety" departments, were dismissed, lost or brushed under the putrid carpet. (Possibly more dirty than the one at 1st Class check in??)

What you said about expat recruitment is so true. As well as the rampant corruption and nepotism in basic recruitment and training.

And what has been learnt from this AIE tragedy? NOTHING. Even the report was shown to be so immature & pathetic in its review. Some scams and standards were bought to light here and at AI / AIE but they are found somewhere under that stinking carpet.

So, who here wants to risk a flight on a VT registered (AI / AIE) aircraft, "if" as one person wrote only half of what is written is true??

[captjns]

Frack and Top

The two of you seem to be bitter anti expat nationals with chips on your shoulders and under the impression that if the expats were not there then more national F/Os were be upgraded by default.

Your allegations concerning the DGCA about certification and vetting of expat pilots are without merit. I've experienced the process of the DGCA interview, Air Law exam, credential verification too. Now I can't speak for all expat crews or pilot in India. Perhaps what you say about Air India Pilots may be true, being that AI is a state owned carrier.

The purpose of the expat is to fill a void until such time that the likes of you two, national pilots, can assume the responsibilities of aircraft commander. The private carriers of India ala INDIGO, JET AIRWAYS, SPICE JET, and KING FISHER do have a choice in the matter.

They can cave into the malevolent malcontents and cancel the contracts of expat pilots and let their aircraft sit on the ground without crews until the nationals can successfully succeed in their command upgrades. But the shareholders would never stand for that... and rightfully so.

What happened in Bangalore is a truly a tragedy. Your news agencies don't make it better either with their biased reporting. IMHO, Indian news agencies such as the Times of India and CNN-IBN are riddled with reporters which provide nothing short of material misrepresentations of facts which go unchecked concerning the expat pilot.

[jimmygill]

The FO who rightfully knew they were un-stabilized demonstrated the lack of Command Capability (he was doing his UG I believe?) in taking control of the aircraft, instead thought it better to transmit his essentially useless RT or Inter-cocpit calls. We see the price he and all others paid for that decision. Maybe in this case physical intervention or even a slap on the CPs face would have proven to have been the right choice?

Most humans, barring a few existentialists don't consider death as imminent until they die one day. The F/O seemed to have thought more about protecting the medium term aftermath of an un-stabilized approach, and keeping his job intact.

To do the justice to F/O the death was not imminent at the time he made the apparently self protecting (but post facto determined to be essentially useless) R/T call about go around.

[ManaAdaSystem]

BOAC, I don't understand whay you are talking about?

The analysis of the CVR revealed that there was sound nasal snoring and heavy breathing for nearly two hours, indicating that one of the two pilots—in all likelihood Serbian national Captain Zslatko Glucika, 55—had fallen asleep on his seat on the 200-minute flight of IX-812 that originated in Dubai (local time 1:10 am) on May 22.

I've been puzzled about the Effohs intercom calls going "on air", as this would be the last thing I would have time to do in what must been a high stress situation. However, if AIX -800's have a "press to talk" hot mike switch, rather than the type that stays in the hot mike position, it's possible he just pressed the wrong switch when he tried to talk to the captain. It's a two way switch on the yoke, press up for ATC, down for intercom. Easy to make a mistake.

[TopTup]

Captjns:

Wow...Have you got me wrong! Do the slightest bit of reviews of my previous posts on this thread.

I was an expat TRE at AI on the 777.

I agree with you about the purpose of the expats. Again, just do the minimal research on my previous posts...... I am completely in favor of the nationals being employed 100% WHEN and IF they receive the correct standards of recruitment, training, and on-going support. Nepotism, bribery, abhorrent corruption and an airline culture void of accountability (AI) prevents this. In my opinion it'll take perhaps 2 or 3 generations willing to change this as it is so deep rooted.

Until then the aviation scene under the DGCA is fraught with pure luck and risk. Safety is not part of it.

[BOAC]

BOAC, I don't understand whay you are talking about? - do you understand what you can get from a CVR? I cannot see from your profile.

[ManaAdaSystem]

One of the CVR channels picks up noise in the cockpit, there is no need to press a button to get it to record a snoring pilot. AFAIK, it does not have separate channels for the left and right side of the cockpit, so they can't say for sure who was asleep.

[beeps]

They would make out from which side the PTT was pressed to make ATC position reports and could thus deduce very easily who was asleep and who was not.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Doh, you are right, but I still don't understand why they are saying "in all likelihood Serbian national Captain Zslatko Glucika, 55—had fallen asleep on his seat", if they know for sure who was sleeping.

I've flown in near radio silence across the Arabian Sea a number of times. Sometimes the HF would be impossible to use, and you would just wait for Chennai VHF coverage.

Anyway, sleeping has nothing to do with this accident, unless he was sleeping during approach.

[Neptunus Rex]

My fellow pilots and I have oft had 'Combat Naps' in the cockpit. (One at a time, of course, and never more than 20 minutes.) I have never, ever heard one of my colleagues snore.
Even in the wee, dark hours, the arousal state of the non-napping pilot was always enhanced. No worries!

[VONKLUFFEN]

....it's the speed.

Who cares if he slept. That did not kill them. It was the unstable app.( if it is proven it was the case) So back to the topic and the real problem.
Where I work it used to be like that. Lots lots of unstable app with all its consequences , tragic some of them. It was until company culture , training tools , effective monitoring and people willing to make a change, that flying become more safe. When I hear about this case and all what has been mentioned I feel sad for the poor Indians that take public and privet transport. Until CORRUPTION, NEPOTISM BLA BLA BLA, disappears things will stay the same. Airplanes are SO safe that is why in India and other places as well, don't have the same number of tragedy's every year as they do with buses, trains and ferries.

Where there is a crack the root will grow in. Then is just a matter of time for the wall to collapse.

Remember snakes have no boobs, cats don't fly, birds don't bite, dogs have fur no feders.

Don't think to much:
UNSTABLE APPROACHES ARE NOT SAFE AND KILL PEOPLE!!!!
Don't think it wont happen to you.

Lets review:

Plan to be fully configured AND stable for instrument app at 1000 ft AAL. Stable at 500, if visual.

A/C in landing conf
Sink rate no more then 1100ft/min
Airspeed on target plus corrections according to AC type
Engines spooled up
No more that One dot above , below, right or left of GS / LOC
No more then 5 radials deviation left/right on a non precision app.
VASI PAPI no full Red / White.
Be sure A/C will land at the Touch Down Zone (TDZ)

Criteria not met: GO Around IS mandatory.

SO SIMPLE!
Now leave EGOS and Top Guns mentalities back home.
Be a Real Pilot and Stand for WHAT is right NOT WHO is right. If you do this your whining will be heard with respect. If not, go somewhere else, you don't belong here.

[ve7pnl]

That sums it up in a nutshell!:D

[Stick_Rudder]

DGCA has released it's report on the accident...
http://www.dgca.nic.in/accident/reports/VT-AXV.pdf

[BOAC]

Password protected

[Denti]

No password required here.

[captjns]

Unable to access. Long and short, anything new other than overspeed, overshoot, and unstable approach?

[BOAC]

Well, denti, it does for we lesser mortals:yuk:

Any chance you could upload it to a site and provide a link?

[mojomoh]

I'm a lesser mortal and it simply opens a reader pdf file with no password required!!

191 Pages though!

[BOAC]

OK - if ANY of the master race could save and upload please I would be humbly and deferentially grateful.

[gleaf]

http://www.fearoflanding.com/files/2012/01/MangloreCrashReport.pdf

[Ancient Observer]

Er, dunno if this is easier. No password here.....
How would I "upload" a pdf to somewhere so that you could get at it?

http://www.dgca.nic.in/accident/reports/VT-AXV.pdf

[BOAC]

Still rolling around in the inferior gutter here, AO. You could try Google Docs?

[Piltdown Man]

I think the DGCA should have a pat on the back for this one. Obviously there will be elements which you can disagree with and others which should be included. Personally, I liked the way they addressed the cultural issues regarding AI vs AI Express and also Locals vs Foreigners issue. On the negative side, I think the possible reasons as to why the captain continued with a hopelessly hot and high approach were not gone into in sufficient depth. Some were addressed, such as the 'counselling' and go-around reporting but I think there has to be more to this incident than that. But that also says something about the quality of the report. Only very rarely do reports come from this part of the world which contain sufficient facts (History of Flight) which enables an alternative view to be held.

[Ancient Observer]

BOAC.
I've put it on goggledocs. Open to the public. A first for me. Have messaged you the location.

[BOAC]

AO - that was kind of you. As it happens I had a copy from another PPRuner (thanks EC) and it is on view for the lesser mortals here (https://skydrive.live.com/?cid=0ae2bb258d61c947&id=AE2BB258D61C947%21110). (I hope!)

[Machaca]

From page ix of the Executive Summary:

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/VT-AXVcause1.jpg

[drive73]

Boy, what I really get from this report is, the captain for whatever reason (probably sleeping to long and not alert for landing), wasn't aware of his height on the approach until it was way to late and the first officer was just not effective at making the captain aware of his altitude during the approach. Then the capt. Really screwed up by pushing it in. Really sad, could happen to any one of us if we try and rescue things too much, but he was really really high on that approach and didn't seem to understand until 3 miles he was on the false glide.

[captjns]

The man was never on the GS.

Yes it can happen to anyone that feels they are impervious to mistakes.

[drive73]

It appears he was on the false glid slope at 9 degrees rather than the 3 degrees. That's why the ap was flying the glide slope descending at nearly 1700 fpm. The first time I think it dawns on him is whe the fo states the runway in site below us. That's when he turns off the ap and starts descending at almost 3 k a minute.
I wouldn't think he was in a mental state that he could do no wrong at this point. It really appears he was way behind the situation and it lead to tunnel vision, which is why I say it can happen to any one of us. The lesson to learn is effective communication is key. After waking the fo didn't properly let the captain know about the state of the descent profile, the captain didn't properly understand why his fo was telling him to go around. This crash is a perfect example of poor cockpit communication, the barrier being the capt woke up too late to fully get his brain running properly. Tunnel vision in critical places can happen to anybody and pilots really need to recognize when someone is in this state and know how to jolt them out of it and bring them back in the game.

[lederhosen]

The report is suitably critical like the recent one from Pakistan. The investigators have done a good job and the failings of the unfortunate crew and their employer are well and truly exposed.

Equally I think this is a tragic example of what can happen. You are a pilot with your national airline, which for reason's largely beyond your control no longer offers you further employment. You work your way through jobs on several continents ending up with the low cost offshoot of another national carrier.

On paper you are well rested. In reality you have been rushing round the world trying to find a better job. On a night turn just back from leave you are so exhausted you fall asleep.

The co-pilot who resents not already being a captain watches from the sidelines as you monumentally screw up the approach. He has already mentally started drafting yet another report about incompetent foreign captains. He makes an attempt to get you to go-around at the last minute when he realizes you have really lost the plot.

In panic you make the screw up even worse and try and take off again after deploying the reversers. Your last words as you realize your mistake, this is going to be.... a big one, you know you are doomed. Personally I cannot help feeling a bit sorry for him and very sad for his passengers.

[captplaystation]

lederhosen,

With that small summary I think you have filled in the gaps that cannot be said on the official report, but that most of us truly know exist. Well said.