Agusta AW139

[noooby]

wde, are you talking the ELT with the antenna in the fin, or the CPI with the beacon on the LH side of the fuselage?

[Arcal76]

Yes, we had one 2 weeks ago.We have the 406 in the fin.
We also have a caution light on almost every flight about different things.
Electrical cable are not good,connection are not done properly and now Agusta is talking about an upgrade of the electrical wire who will require a lots of work.
We have lights coming ON and OFF for no reason.

[noooby]

Arcal76, Sounds like you have a bit of a dog there.

Only advice I have is to do a thorough acceptance inspection. One company I know of sends 4 guys for acceptance checks and they get Agusta to tear the machine apart. They basically punish Agusta for any sloppy install work by having everything replaced (not repaired) that they are not happy with.

This seems to be the only way to make Agusta understand that they need to concentrate more on the finishing of their product.

Agusta don't like spending manhours pulling apart a new helicopter, so hopefully they will learn to put them together better in the first place!

Yes, acceptance checks of that nature can be expensive, but I'd rather spend the money then, at the factory, and get as many of those annoying bugs sorted out on Agusta's dollar. Convincing the accountants in your company may bea totally different matter!

Speaking from experience, machines that have had a proper acceptance check have gone into service relatively easily. The couple we received with no acceptance check (management said engineering inspections at delivery were not cost effective) have been plagued with electrical defects and other issues that should have easily been found and rectified on an acceptance inspection, leading to a few days of down time, and a lot of lost revenue. Not cost effective? The hell it isn't!

Do a proper acceptance check!!! Pull out EVERY box in the center console. Check each box for damage. Check the wiring. Pull up the cabin floor, check wiring and liferaft cables. Pull down the ceiling, check wiring, ductwork, and control runs. If you see wiring rubbing on the structure, try to get the loom replaced. the wires could already be damaged, so don't accept a localised repair. You have forked out a lot of money, don't accept a machine that is not ready to go into service. Get Agusta to put it right BEFORE you fly away.

The guys at Agusta that I've dealt with on acceptance checks have all been very helpful, and while they don't like pulling a new helicopter apart, they do understand that the customer has the right to request it, and will put in long hours to make sure everything you find is rectified to your satisfaction.

The onus is on YOU as the customer to pick up things that they have missed.

And no, sorry, I don't know what is wrong with your ELT, I haven't seen an ELT on a 139 for about 5 years, only CPI's :} Check your G switch? Or the ELT itself?

[Arcal76]

Well, we have between 80 and 150 snags on the aircraft at the end of the line in Philly on each aircraft, so there is a big problem at the factory.To fix this problems is not easy, they are only interested in having this aircraft gone as soon as possible.Q&A is poor, and the job is not well done.
We had a piece of the main rotor who was damaged during installation and we only found out about it later,after delivery. I am just a pilot, I don't accept the aircraft,but the factory is over busy and Agusta is easy to blame partners when there is a problem:=...Buying so many aircrafts and having so many problems is not normal.When you complain, Agusta is saying that you are a difficult customer.It is great!!

[noooby]

I totally understand. I must say, the machines coming out of Philly don't seem to be finished as well as the ones from Vergiate.
Be a problem customer, specially if you have multiple aircraft coming! I saw one company that made them pull the tailbooms off their machines before delivery! Agusta weren't happy about that, but at the end of the day, they want your money!
Your snag count is about what I find, although a lot of them are paperwork issues. Usually the wrong logcards in the logbook and things like that.
Last acceptance I did at Philly I made them replace the windscreens because we weren't happy with their condition. They didn't want to do it, but delivery was refused until it was done, so they did it.
Acceptances are always a bit of a battle.
Agusta seems to be a victim of their own popularity! If they weren't selling so many machines, they'd have more time to finish them properly! Not sure that they would though :ugh:

[Outwest]

What is the general thought on float arming? The RFM says "over water" Is that what most of you are doing? What about a speed restriction? Did AW test an inflation at 140kts?

Personally I'm pretty nervous about having the floats armed at 140+, I think an inflation at that speed would not be a ride I would like to be on.........

[Flying Bull]

Ho Outwest,

I´m not flying the A139 but spent quite a time flying over water.
You shouldn´t worry to much about inadvertent inflation - just keep you fingers from the inflation-button....
But in case of an emergency, you might be so busy flying the bird, that you won´t recognize, that you haven´t armed the floatation gear - until it is to late.
If you have a chance to do some simulator training the instructors will certainly be pleased to prove that to you....
Just stick to book - arm the flotation when passing the coastline.
Greetings Flying Bull

[Outwest]

Well I'm a firm believer in Murphys' law, what can go wrong, will. Many other types have a speed restriction on the arming of floats........ that is for a very good reason.

[Flying Bull]

Hi Outwest,
so am I - even my dog is called Murphy.....
But in this case - the risk of ******* up an emergency, cause you are just to busy flying / ditching the bird - and forgetting thereby to arm the floats - by just don´t having enough spare capacity is much higher than the risk of inadvertent flotation of the flotation gear.
I´m lucky, that my employer offers me the chance of visiting Helisim once a year for a couple of hours.
I´ve learned a lot there about capacity and spare capacity, target fixation, flying the bird, cheklists and so on - as pilot and as copilot.
Inadvertent lotation wouldn´t be fun - and if it´s not your day, they will rip of and go through the tail rotor.
Still, with 140 or more knots the bird might still be somewhat flyable - hopefully...
Imagine the other side, gearbox captions coming on rapidly on you, grinding noises as well, you start feeling extrem uneasy and you looking for the wind and swell, where to put down the bird. Passengers getting uneasy too, as well as the co.
And then you are a few feet from the water - everything right for ditching and you press the inflation button and nothing happens.....
I personaly would arm the flotation gear!!!
Greetings Flying Bull

[Senior Pilot]

The subject of float arming was discussed back in January, from Post 958 (http://www.pprune.org/5431051-post958.html) on.

Eivissa posted this from the AW139 Flight Manual:

GENERAL INFORMATION
Emergency Flotation and Life Raft System Part N° 3G9560F00111
The flotation bags are automatically deployed on ditching by water sensors (2 of the four sensors must be activated for flotation inflation) or by manual operation of the guarded FLOAT pushbutton on either the Pilot or Copilot collective grip.
For operation of both automatic or manual flotation inflation the switch on the FLOATS EMERG control panel mounted in the interseat console (pilots side), must be set to ON. The control panel also incorporates a self test function for the flotation system.

WARNING
Do not deploy flotation bags in flight. Bags will automatically deploy on water touchdown.

IN FLIGHT PROCEDURES
1. FLOATS EMER switch
Over land operation — Confirm OFF.
Over water operation — Confirm ARMED, FLOAT ARM caution displayed on CAS

[Aser]

What is the general thought on float arming? The RFM says "over water" Is that what most of you are doing? What about a speed restriction? Did AW test an inflation at 140kts?

Personally I'm pretty nervous about having the floats armed at 140+, I think an inflation at that speed would not be a ride I would like to be on.........

If you ask nicely , Agusta will send you a document stating that they have no technical objection if you want to use a speed restriction, so you can arm it or not.
Opinions are as varied as personalities, I prefer to use an altitude restriction than speed, I'm happy flying with the floats armed or not at 5000' but I won't fly at 1000' without floats armed regardless of speed.

Personally I arm them even at take off, when I'll be over water in a few minutes.
I'm with Flying Bull.

Anyway I would like to know more about the floats tests flights...

Regards
Aser

[Outwest]

Thanks for pointing out the previous posts SP......seems like there is no consensus ;)

Having read all thru the previous posts and that some people think that these floats are now so well tested that an inadvertent inflation is "impossible" then why are we disarming them on the deck? Why are they only armed over water and not all the time? Why is there even an "arming" switch at all?

I still want to see the video of AW popping the floats at 140+ kts

[AW139 Engineer]

Hi, anyone have any success with the latest PN 1865-44 Hydraulic bypass switch, I would like to here from someone who has success with the latest switch.

[Geoffersincornwall]

During the lifetime of this design of float system (which I believe is the same as that used on the Merlin and the Lynx) there have been no reported instances of inadvertent inflation in flight and the many many thousands of hours of their use whilst 'armed' testify I believe to a well designed and reliable system. There have, however, been several instances where folk have perished or very nearly perished thanks to an inadvertent ditching with the floats un-armed - in other types (S76 for example, NY and SW)

I empathise with those who have a weird feeling thrashing around with floats armed when that was not the case in a previous type but the stats tell it all.

If you choose to go against the flight manual then please do it formally with a written submission to your NAA and or AW rather than just 'doing your thing' and maybe finding out the hard way that making up your own rules can be a tricky way forward when the proverbial hits the fan.

G.

[Shawn Coyle]

Geoffers:
I don't see why one would need to submit a change to the FM to the NAA or AW - the normal and emergency procedures sections can be changed by operators. They are not limitations that must be obeyed.
If the operator's manual is subject to some other regulation (Part 135 in the US, for example) where the manual is a company document, then that's another matter.
I know of only one civil flight manual (and it's FW) where it says that only the procedures in this manual are to be used...

[Sandy Toad]

Yippee! All 139 systems will always work as advertised - guess I can cancel all our Sim slots! ;)

Sorry Geoff but the new age Safety Culturists keep telling me that because I've done something safely for thirty years doesn't mean I will be able to do it safely today.
So the fact it hasn't failed yet doesn't mean it won't.
A perfect design isn't the end of the story, it has to be manufactured, checked and installed. We are all aware of AW Quality Control..:rolleyes:

Aviation is littered with accidents/events caused by unforeseen circumstances or things that "just can't happen" - Airbus Computer progamming thro to Little Mexican Lady miswiring B407 FADECs.

I too would love to know exactly what modelling/flight testing was used to show the 139's reaction to float inflation at 145kts.

Personally I think the potentially dangerous time is when you arm the floats and I either do this on the ground or reduce speed briefly while arming airborne. I still expect it to go Bang being an old Wessex man!

I guess we should be grateful AW's intentions are very clear in the Flight Manual instead of that statement of old - "Floats should not be Armed above....Kts". Manufacturers could never decide whether they meant the Float switch should not be moved to the Armed position or should not remain in the Armed position.

[Outwest]

Aviation is littered with accidents/events caused by unforeseen circumstances or things that "just can't happen" - Airbus Computer progamming thro to Little Mexican Lady miswiring B407 FADECs.

So true......but the S92 MRG strikes a bit closer to home for me

[Geoffersincornwall]

If you have ever been witness to the way flight crew are chewed up and spat out by lawyers and barristers at 'The Subsequent Enquiry' you may take my words as wise advice.

Once again I quote the stats - people have died in floatless ditchings (that is to say they were fitted and automated but were not armed) but so far no-one has died 'cos of AW floats popping off in flight. I bet I could find those comments about float arming in the texts about parachutes back in the First WW. People - well I use the word advisedly because I am referring to Fixed Wing Chappies - have often been heard to say the very same thing about helicopters.

Is there an aviation equivalent to the Luddite?


G. :ok:

[BristowXJ]

Love the 139 :)

[Epiphany]

Me too - and I actually fly it. :)

[griffothefog]

Hello all 139 drivers and interested parties....

Here we are today at 6500ft with the tail rotor still firmly attached.. :D

Its a great machine...:ok:
http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/kk50/marcusdoha/IMG_0153.jpg

Safe fluglin you all :D

[ec155mech]

great now you got it up there.. how are you getting it down ;)

[griffothefog]

Easy.... we throw it over cliff and autorotate to the deck, great fun!!:ok:

[Variable Load]

Geoff,

I'm going to call your hand on this one:

Once again I quote the stats - people have died in floatless ditchings (that is to say they were fitted and automated but were not armed)

Can you back up your statement and give details of "ditchings" involving an aircraft equipped with automatic flotation inflation equipment that was not armed and that cost lives?

I would counter your potentially "luddite" position (your word, not mine), in that there have been a number of inflight inflations involving automated systems that I know of. (332 during the early days of the BHL system and more recently an S92)

If the AW139 was subject to initial FAA certification it would have had to do an inflight inflation. Lucky for Agusta they only had to deal with ENAC :sad:

[malabo]

We blew the floats on our 76C+ at 140kts, 500ft, over water. Copilot playing around with buttons. No big deal. Embarrassing.

Know of at least 2 S76 that CFIT into the ocean in the GOM, both at night, one outbound one inbound. Everyone died in the first, one pax in the back in the second. All the offshore 76C+ an C++ I ever flew had the automatic belly switches.

I fly the 139 armed over water, disarm on deck for the passenger swap. Everyone I fly with does the same. The old 76 system is a fossil with the exposed inflate button instead of the guarded one on the 139. I sleep like a baby at night.

[spinwing]

Mmmm ...

I do the same as malabo .....

I have no reason to doubt or need to 2nd think the RFM ..... :=

[Variable Load]

It's an interesting debate so I'll keep this running
Know of at least 2 S76 that CFIT into the ocean in the GOM
I don't know the details of these accidents. Do you think inflation of floats would have made any difference in these cases, given they were a CFIT?

The Aux Flotation systems are designed to keep the aircraft afloat in the event of a ditching (i.e. controlled alighting on the water) long enough for the occupants to get out and board the liferafts. For any other events e.g. CFIT at speed, then all bets are off.

I have no reason to doubt
Really? I'm surprised you would say that. I have gone through my career doubting and asking why! The fact that the AW139 is the only offshore helicopter that doesn't have a float arming speed coupled with the lack of OEM in-flight testing makes me doubt!

I'm not saying my doubt is founded on facts, it as actually based on the lack of facts!

[krypton_john]

Nice pic, Griffo. Was that the first Heli to make it all the way to Mars?

[Outwest]

I sleep like a baby at night.
I have no reason to doubt or need to 2nd think the RFM .....

I can't believe some of these statements :ugh:

Have you all forgotten so quickly the "extremely remote" defense that Sikorsky made with the S92 MRG.....look where that got that crew :(

Please gentlemen, question everything.....everyone and everything is fallible

[Geoffersincornwall]

The first one I will mention is the New York Ditching of a corporate S76 in which the pilot was last known to be 'critical' having suffered 'salt water drowning'.

Second helicopter crashes in New York - World - smh.com.au (http://www.smh.com.au/news/World/Second-helicopter-crashes-in-New-York/2005/06/18/1119034103365.html)

The second was another S76 flow by a colleague whilst on SAR duty in the Baltic. I had a first hand account of how he flew into the water positioning at night for a medevac on a remote island. He told me in graphic detail how, with the last breath on his STAS he crawled out of the cockpit and inhaled water, became unconscious and floated to the surface where he was resuscitated by his colleagues who had made it out OK.

I ask myself 'will every step forward that designers make be faced with this approach by the Luddites?'

If you fly a helicopter then you have to accept that so long as is made by humans and maintained by them then mistakes are always possible and every year bad things happen. Would Variable Load and Outwest kindly share with us the types they fly and then I'll give them a list of things that have historically been the cause of tragedies. As far as i know no helicopter is immune from the kind of failures that may be fatal.

Ask the guys who fly around with Ballistic Parachutes fixed to their aircraft if they are happy or unhappy that this feature is aboard.

I'm not going to persuade the unpersuadable and I feel no obligation to save you from your own views but if you chose to do something other than the RFM procedures on a regular basis then get it in writing first. In my experience the guys higher up the tree, the guys in the regulators and the establishment have a well trodden pathway when it comes to getting out from under and leaving you holding the baby.

G. :ugh:

[Shawn Coyle]

Geoffers:
I agree about the floats not armed part.
Why don't we fit a duplex airspeed signal to arm the floats automatically when the airspeed falls below a certain value?
Also, we know where all the water in the world is (from the GPS), so why not incorporate a position signal so that when we're over water, the floats arm automatically? I mean, this can't be a big thing to do can it??
Let's think a bit laterally.

[Geoffersincornwall]

Some interesting ideas there. I wonder what the design engineers would make of them. I can certainly testify that when driving on the highway my TomTom satnav clicks over the change of speed limit within a few metres of the sign.

Of course the long term aim has to be to keep us out of the water altogether - then we can do without floats, just like our fixed wing cousins.

G. :)

[Epiphany]

Why don't we fit a duplex airspeed signal to arm the floats automatically when the airspeed falls below a certain value?
Also, we know where all the water in the world is (from the GPS), so why not incorporate a position signal so that when we're over water, the floats arm automatically?

Or why not simply fit a 'Float Arm' switch and have the highly paid offshore pilot who has very little else to do simple reach across and turn it on when coasting out?

P.S I am a highly paid, offshore AW139 pilot who performs this action on a daily basis and also sleeps well at night.

[Outwest]

As far as i know no helicopter is immune from the kind of failures that may be fatal.

My point exactly, I agree 100% with that statement....floats coming out at 140+ knots and ripping off and going thru the tail rotor being one of them.


BH47,206,204/205, 212, 412 HU 50, AS350, SA341G, Sk76, 61, AW139

It will be a long list :)

[krypton_john]

"floats coming out at 140+ knots and ripping off and going thru the tail rotor"

Has this ever happened?

[vfr440]

Add - FH1100, A109, Rotorway, H269 as initial thoughts - VFR

[Outwest]

"floats coming out at 140+ knots and ripping off and going thru the tail rotor"

Has this ever happened?

I don't know, and I hope I never hear about it happening......just as I wish I had never heard about a S92 gearbox lasting 9 minutes without oil.

I am only bringing this whole subject up to try and get people to not blindly follow something because it is written somewhere.......it was only written by a mere mortal.

BTW, I have had it confirmed that AW never tested float inflation at any speed. You know why? Because it was not required by the legislation for certification.:mad:

So my question has been answered, no one, not even the manufacturer can tell us what will happen if there is an inadvertent inflation at 140+.........and I hope we never find out the hard way:uhoh:

[Geoffersincornwall]

We seem to be going round a circular argument. If the highly paid pilot was as reliable as he professes then all would be well but as the stats reveal - they are not!

Helicopter manufacturers are not required to test the in-flight detachment of doors/hatches/access panels/or windows. These could be equally tragic events and in some types you feel that it occurs often enough to be a certification issue. By the same token a system that has a fail-safe design can avoid such testing. I am assuming that the 139 certification team took that view.

I am a simple soul. Designed to save my hide and never having malfunctioned is the argument for flying with floats armed versus a tragic history of even the best pilots being caught out by a sequence of events that led to an otherwise survivable contact with the water.

We as an industry have an extraordinary resistance to the embracing of SOPs and much more than our FW colleagues appear to feel we have the right to chose when and what we do by way of procedures. Above all I see a regular resistance to the use of formal checklists that have been 'de-rigour' in the FW world for decades. Be it upon your own head. Read the accident reports on a regular basis and you will see what poor cockpit procedures, poor CRM and poor MCC brings - death and misery, that's what.

For the 'I know better' brigade remember those famous words - "You don't know what you don't know". I have no more confidence in 'sales-blurb' than the next guy but the stats speak for themselves.

G. :ugh:

[Epiphany]

I have just been reading Supplement 9 (Ditching Procedures) and was interested to see that AW recommend that during the pre-flight test of the flotation system personnel must stand clear of the floatation bags in the event that the system malfunctions!

A bit unnecessary I would have thought as AW say they cannot malfunction? ;)


During the following test personel must NOT be close to flotation bags as an internal mal- function of the FLOAT system may cause the flotation to inflate.

FLOATS EMER switch — ARMED, confirm FLOAT ARM caution displayed on CAS and
flotation system does not inflate. Select switch to OFF.

I suppose the AW logic being that if they haven't inflated during the ground test then they will not inflate when armed during cruise flight? So don't forget the flotation test.

[Aser]

When you press "test" you are like activating the system, nothing compared to just arming the floats, the only thing that could prevent the inflation is that the guard is down.
Same thing as in the hoist, try to do a "test" while the guard is up... no, don't do it, others already have done it... :}

So you are comparing to be flying with floats armed, with to fly while continuously sending a signal to wires... :=

Regards
Aser

[Geoffersincornwall]

If the human element had been at work (maintenance!!) then who knows what gremlins have been introduced into the system? Best way to find out? ...... test the float system ....... best way not to be hurt if said gremlin has been introduced into the system? .... stand clear when I test them please.

At this point I want to say 'simple' just like the meercat on the TV. .... with a funny little noise at the end.

(apologies for non-UK TV viewers).

G. :)

[js0987]

Don't fly the 139 but have a little experience with the 76. Actually flew one with the floats inflated about 100 miles after my CP accidently pushed the button that was then located on the underside of the collective. Aircraft actually flew rather well at around 75 knots.

That being said, there was a 76 that had the floats accicently deploy while the aircraft was IFR and doing around 130 kts. The crew got it under control but it was a close call. An electrical short was found on investigation.

As far as Murpy's Law is concerned, reminds me of a discussion I have many moons ago with a couple of Allison engineers. A couple of us informed them that we were flying the 76 with the electrical engine overspeed C/B's pulled. They insisted that the system was incapable of inadvertent activation.

Sounds like a scenerio that out to be practiced in the sim.

[spinwing]

Mmmm ...

...Sounds like a scenerio that ought to be practiced in the sim....

Well for that to happen ... then a real activation would need to have occurred and than modeled so that the sim could be programmed to react correctly ... in which case we/they would then know exactly what to expect and then 'perhaps' the RFM would/may be changed to reflect any realities ...

Surely the sim only will do accurately what the programmers allow .... ;)

[Scorpygixxer]

Damn, I KNEW there was something I wanted to try in the sim this Rec period...

Oh well, have to wait until next time. Was having too much fun laughing at people trying to recover tail rotor snags...

:D

[Epiphany]

Why would you want to fly a back-up profile from an elevated helideck? The back-up profile is only of any use from a ground helipad with obstructions in the take-off path preventing a 35-70 foot TDP.

For an elevated platform the 20 foot TDP and 30 foot rotation would be the correct profile.

[zudhir]

Epiphany,

To be Cat A compliant, maximum cross wind component must not exceed 20 kts.
Some offshore installations (generally production platforms) that don't give you a clear takeoff path would necessitate either an out of wind takeoff or, if you want to be Cat A compliant, the back-up procedure.

[Epiphany]

Outhouse - I wasn't being critical, just interested in the reasons why.

Zudhir - I'm aware of the CAT cross wind limits but I have never had occasion to fly a back-up profile from an offshore elevated helideck even with obstructions. There's more than one way to skin a CAT A. :)

[outhouse]

In any simulator project you have to get stuff correct, one is the profile mentioned. Regardless of when needed and I have used it, it needs to work as advertised. If you use the Augusta sim it don't work, you end up short of the deck unless you modify the profile, try it next time you visit.
:ok:

[spinwing]

Mmmm ....

Back up procedure .... Offshore .... where I work/have worked doing this will require immediate consultation of the 'positions vacant' section of your trade magazine of choice .... and you will most likely NOT get a very favourable reference from your ex employer!

Ya just DON"T DO IT ... so don't even talk about it !! :=





Sorry if I sound a bit oversensitive BUT I lost a friend to this a few years ago and the subject still gets to me.

[malabo]

Maybe Jim Lyons can wade in on this one and give us the regulatory intent that seems to be driving some parts of the industry to back-up procedures.

I agree with Spinwing, and I don't know of any pilot that does back up either onshore or offshore. I haven't worked for any employer that endorsed back up procedures as part of their SOP's. The consensus being that you are introducing a hailstorm of real tangible risk for the sake of a statistically improbable engine failure. Like Spinwing, I too have had friends that inadvertently came to grief by letting themselves drift back when coming out of a tight area.

[JimL]

malabo,

It seems rather pointless to comment now that the offending post has been removed. I did not comment originally because I knew others would!

Clearly, anyone who thinks that a back-up procedure should be used offshore does not understand the helideck environment. It is because there is no deterministic procedure (CAT A) that can address all of the environmental conditions (of which cross wind limits is one) that PC1 is not possible offshore.

I can only suggest that, in order to understand the issues, 'outhouse' re-reads the PC2e thread.

I am not aware of any regulatory push towards PC1 offshore although it is clear from comments (that have been made) that the issues are not well understood by some NAAs (even in Europe).

Jim

[cayuse365]

The cannon plug for the Float System is the same as the Wiper System and can(was) be reversed. I can't understand how this kind of engineering can be certified.

Also, I was told by DART at the last HAI that the AW109 floats were tested to 110kts.

[Aser]

400th AW139 Delivered to the Qatar Armed Forces | Vertical - Helicopter News (http://www.verticalmag.com/control/news/templates/?a=17238)

:ok:

Regards
Aser

[EPacH]

Does anyone have real time range and speeds for a de-iced corporate / VIP equipped 139? Interior would be four fwd facing and two aft facing swivel seats operating from sea level landing sites in a cool Euro climate? If it helps then forget the de-ice bit! Two pilots and four pax plus 200lbs bags.

[spinwing]

Mmm ...

With or without the Aux tanks ??

[malabo]

Aux tanks? Maybe get the 6800kg increase first. Empty in Corp fit with deice will be close to 5000kg. Add two pilots, 5200. Add 4 stuffed shirts in the back and their 100kg of bags and you are at 5700 kg. 100 kg start and taxi, 200 kg reserve, leaves you one way VFR 400kg fuel, or about 120 miles at 145 knots.

Oh course you spent the big cash on deice so you could go IFR. Two approaches at 75kg, an alternate, and your range is about 20 miles. Go for the 6800 kg gross and you've got a reasonable 170nm. Don't forget all the flight planning limitations with the deice.

You are grossed out before a drop of fuel gets to the aux tank, even at 6800.

[Furia]

Are you sure about those BOW numbers?
How much does that Corporate and Anti-Ice kit weights? 1000 kg?
A long nose sar version with extra radar, FLIR, double hoists, external rafts , operator console, aux fuel tanks, and A LOT of extra installed equipment and avionics weights around 4400-4500 BOW.

[frozen cyclic]

More to the point Furia, are you sure about your weights?

[NRDK]

Furia is correct on the Basic wt being approx 4500 for a SAR cab (not sure about with Aux tank). With a crew of 4 and ALL the SAR equipment ready to launch minus any fuel i.e APS wt, you are looking at between 5000-5100kg (less Aux tank).

[Furia]

I am very sure about those weights. :cool:

[wde]

Hey guys:

Does anyone have an idea on what the delta is for the IPS kit on the AW139 for an identically equipped aircraft? Slip rings, magic boxes, etc?

Thanks

Walt

[Collective Bias]

Approx 150 kgs I think.


CB

[wde]

Thanks

W

[Collective Bias]

Sandyhelmet


220 kg sounded high, I had to check in my Agusta information and it says 160 kg, and this should include glass windshield. I have seen a number of different weights on this kit, where did you get your numbers from?


CB

[wde]

Does anyone have information on a pending BT that will require the removal and quarantining of AW139 T/R assemblies at the 600 hr mark?

Rumour has it this BT/AD is in the chute and ready to be issued any day now.

wde

[KiwiRotorWrench]

Got the call this morning from Agusta Philly PSE. BT139-265 will supersede BT139-251, and PT I is same , but Pt II will require blade removal at 600 hrs and quarantined until investigation of latest Brazilian crash can determine if TR Blade is an issue. BT to be issued today, and would not be surprised to see AD's immediatly following. Unless you have blades with less than 600 hours, you will be sitting and waiting for replacements for a while I believe

[wde]

"From Shell Aviation:

We’ve now received confirmation from Agusta Westland that the Brazil AW139 accident has involved the loss of a tail rotor blade and bears similarities to the blade failures of the 2010 Hong Kong accident and 2011 Qatar blade failure.

As a result an Airworthiness Directive (AD) is being issued by EASA that will restrict use of tail rotor blades to a 700hr life limit. The blades that failed on this and the other accidents were between 1500hrs and 2200 hrs. Because that AD is currently held up in EASA, this email is to be taken as an instruction for Shell operations to , before next flight, confirm the current tail rotor blade flight hour life of contracted AW139 aircraft and, until further notice, restrict all AW139 flight to those aircraft with tail rotor blades below 700hrs.

Further advice may be given on the AD when issued and SAI guidance will be reviewed when that is received.

Agusta Westland is developing further testing methods that may extend the 700hr limit, but until those have been proven, the restriction is likely to stay in place.

Consideration has been given to stopping the use of AW139 helicopters altogether, but with the information known, this limitation is considered appropriate at this time.

I’m aware that this news may not lessen concern amongst our travelling staff, so further briefing material will be prepared for BU use. If you have any questions or specific concerns, please call


Regards Shell Management"

[Outwest]

Unless you have blades with less than 600 hours, you will be sitting and waiting for replacements for a while I believe

Anyone care to comment on availability of spares? Does AW have a stock pile of blades ready to ship?

BTW, has tail rotor failure been confirmed on the Brasil crash, or is this a cautionary AD based on other events?

[MS29513-017]

COMPLIANCE:
Part I: within 25 flight hours from receipt of this Bollettino and then every 25 flight hours after first compliance with PART I.
Part II: within five (5) flight hours or thirthy (30) days from the receipt of this Bollettino, whichever comes first.

DESCRIPTION: As a result of the first available information of the AW139 event in Brazil, while the investigation is ongoing and waiting for additional information/analysis, as a precautionary measure, this Bollettino prescribes inspection and quarantine of the tail rotor blades meeting the criteria reported in the above paragraph.

NOTE
If the number of landings applicable to each single blade is not known throughout the entire service life of the blade, the number of landings shall be calculated multiplying the blade flight hours by a factor of 4 (four).
Example:
0-150 FH: landings unknown
150-450 FH: accumulated landings 550, based on helicopter logbook
Total landings = 150*4 + 550 = 1150
Remaining landings = 1500 – 1150 = 350 landings
In the meantime collection of all necessary evidence is going on in order to isolate the root cause and determine the final corrective actions


Part II:
1. Prepare the helicopter for safe ground maintenance. Disconnect the battery and all the electrical power sources and/or the external power supply.
2. Get access to the tail rotor and remove the tail rotor blades P/N 3G6410A00131 or P/N 4G6410A00131 having logged more than 600 flying hours or more than 1500 landings whichever occurs first. Refer to AMP, see DM n° 39-A-64-11-01-00A-520AA or n° 39-B-64-11-01-00A-520A-A for the remove procedures.
3. Quarantine the removed tail rotor blades at step 2 in an appropriate segregated area, and contact Product Support Engineering (FOCSE. [email protected]) for further instruction, providing the following details of the removed tail rotor blades: helicopter S/N and total time, tail rotor blade P/N, S/N and total time since new and landings.

[Outwest]

To answer my own question, I was just told that AW says that it will take 45 days to supply enough blades to completely replace all that are over 600 hrs.

Of course who gets priority will be interesting to see...

[Aser]

UTair signs MoU for 20 AW139s | Helihub - the Helicopter Industry Data Source (http://www.helihub.com/2011/08/30/utair-signs-mou-for-20-aw139s/)


Russian Helicopters (subsidiary of JSC UIC Oboronprom, part of Russian Technologies State Corporation) and AgustaWestland (a Finmeccanica company) have recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a planned order of 20 AW139 helicopters to be assembled in Russia. AgustaWestland and Russian Helicopters have also recently announced the establishment of HeliVert, a joint venture company which will assemble and deliver to UTair a batch of AW139 helicopters from its Tomilino plant in the Moscow region.
Regards
Aser

[9Aplus]

AW says that it will take 45 days to supply enough blades to completely replace all that are over 600 hrs
My question is: SAME or upgraded design and composite technology?!
:E

[wde]

A Question for the gathered masses:

We have received inquiries from a client about the AW T/R A/D and they expressed a desire to complete this inspection twice daily rather than the 25 hr frequency. This seems to be overkill to me given that the OEM has essentially chopped the life of these TR blades to 600 hrs / 1500 landings.

Are there operators out there who are completing the AD on a more stringent basis? It is particularly difficult as we have a mandate to operate the aircraft on a 24/7 footing. Any feedback is welcomed or PM me.

Thanks

wde

[lowfat]

Regarding inflight deployment of the floats it would seem we have a guineapig....

CHC helicopter makes emergency landing at Great Yarmouth - News - Eastern Daily Press (http://www.edp24.co.uk/news/chc_helicopter_makes_emergency_landing_at_great_yarmouth_1_1 010713)


Could be a 76 0f course but my money is on a 139

A HELICOPTER carrying 11 offshore workers to a North Sea oilfield had to make an emergency landing today after its flotation equipment suddenly deployed.

The CHC helicopter was minutes into its flight to the Leman oil field 20 miles off the Lowestoft coast when the flotation equipment used for emergency landings on water deployed in mid-air.

The pilot was forced to turn around and return to Yarmouth Heliport in Caister Road where it landed safely shortly after. Neither the pilot nor the passengers on board were hurt.

Dave McDermid, spokesman for the helicopter’s owner CHC Scotia, described the flotation equipment as an “airbag” for helicopters and similar to a dinghy which inflates out of each side of the aircraft.

However, he said the dinghy would only inflate if the pilot pressed a button in the cabin if the helicopter was about to hit water, but on this occasion a malfunction caused the flotation equipment to inflate 1,000ft up in the air while the helicopter was over the North Sea.

[XV666]

Silly of me, but maybe we ought to wait to see what the cause was before jumping to conclusions... oh, wait, this is PPRuNe... jumping to conclusions is how most of you get your exercise.:ugh:

I totally agree that it is a pretty clueless newspaper article, but where has anyone on Rotorheads jumped to a conclusion? In fact, where has anyone surmised what was the cause, if it was an AW139 :confused:

I know that the GY fleet is AW139, but there is always the possibility of a spare non 139 airframe coming in from elsewhere. Does that meet your criteria? ;)

[Outwest]

It was a 139.....at 140 kts.

So much for all the flack I got a while back about this being impossible to happen. What can go wrong, will.

At least now we know an inflation at this speed is survivable, thank god for that.

[Geoffersincornwall]

My recollection is that nobody said that it was impossible, just that it had never happened and as the operator is one who supports the idea of NOT arming the floats over water as a general rule I am guessing that they were switched OFF at the time. In which case there was either finger trouble or a manufacturing defect or some other screw-up because this IS the first such incident.

Nonetheless flight testing in this way is, as you say, rather unorthodox but welcome anyway. Does that mean that folk will now follow the FM recommendations and arm them over water?

G.

[Outwest]

Not sure where you get your info, but this operator follows the RFM recommendation, "armed over water".

This was your quote Geoff:

During the lifetime of this design of float system (which I believe is the same as that used on the Merlin and the Lynx) there have been no reported instances of inadvertent inflation in flight and the many many thousands of hours of their use whilst 'armed' testify I believe to a well designed and reliable system.

[Outwest]

This from Malabo:

The old 76 system is a fossil with the exposed inflate button instead of the guarded one on the 139. I sleep like a baby at night.

How ya sleeping now?

This from Spinwing:

Mmmm ...

I do the same as malabo .....

I have no reason to doubt or need to 2nd think the RFM .....

Still no reason to doubt the RFM?

[Geoffersincornwall]

You have quoted me perfectly and I stand by what I said. Best we await the incident report methinks.

G.

[pulse1]

A bit more relevant news:

BBC News - Coastguard helicopters grounded over tail rotor safety (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-dorset-14732675)

[IntheTin]

Outwest.
How can you post when you possibly don't know what actually happened for the floats to inflate. Either crew could have been messing with the guarded cyclic switch for all we know! :hmm:

[Outwest]

So just because we don't know the cause of the inflation I should not post the fact it happened????

:=

[IntheTin]

Lowfat already posted it had happened. Sorry, I think you are just being smug!

I'm glad to see that there wasn't a problem after the inflation. Is there some other information that states they inflated at 140kts?

[Outwest]

No need to apologize....you have your opinion and I have mine ;)

If you re -read the OP they did not know the a/c type.

What I posted is a fact, both the type and the speed.

[IntheTin]

I wasn't apologising, quite the contrary! You are being smug. I'm sure you don't fly it and don't care too either. I understand that in the present climate!

The OP didn't know the type I agree but it had been posted since so we knew what aircraft had the incident!

What I posted is a fact, both the type and the speed.

Must have missed that post! Where does it mention speed!! :confused:

[Outwest]

You make a lot of assumptions and apparently can't read or should I say read what is not there. Not one post before mine stated that it was a 139, some speculated, but no one confirmed it until I did.

I am not at liberty to say how I know the speed, but you will just have to trust me when I say I posted facts.

And btw, not that it really matters, but I am currently flying it......

[Outwest]

as the operator is one who supports the idea of NOT arming the floats over water as a general rule I am guessing that they were switched OFF at the time

Geoff, I stand corrected, you are right, floats were NOT armed at the time of inflation. I thought we were all one big happy family.....apparently not ;)

[IntheTin]

The only assumption I made was that you are smug! You are! Not an assumption!
Think I'll go the way of most others and wait on the report!

And yes you knew it was a 139. Well done...:cool:

[malabo]

Outwest,
I still sleep like a baby. This incident simply demonstrates the ignorance of pilots second-guessing a manufacturer. This one had nothing to do with whether they were armed or not, and in any case the inflation was simply an inconvenience that required a return and normal landing. By flying without the floats armed, all the operator is doing here is giving away a safety net in the case of a CFIT or inadvertent ditching.

Interesting your inference that a so-called high quality operator like CHC would have both an "armed" and "non-armed" over water policy in two different locations. How does that happen? Does every pilot make it up on his own in your company?

[Outwest]

This incident simply demonstrates the ignorance of pilots second-guessing a manufacturer.

I'm afraid I don't follow your reasoning here Malabo. As you say, it had nothing to do with armed or not, it was an equipment failure. So whether it was an ignorant pilot or a genius, the same thing would have happened.

All I have been saying from the very beginning of this whole discussion is that we should not blindly follow something that MAY be an accident waiting to happen.

Yes, thank God this turned out well for the crew, but I just wonder what everyone would be saying if it did not have a happy ending.

"Learn from the mistakes of others, as you will not live long enough to make them all yourself"

[Epiphany]

Outwest - are you saying that CHC Den Helder and CHC North Denes have different policies (OMB) on arming of floats or that individual pilots do?

[Overthewater]

AW139, 140Kts, Floats not armed, no "finger trouble" (stupid comment), floats inflated of own accord.
Those are the facts.
Wait for the engineering report to find out why, if the reason can be traced.
Do not guess at the company policy re arming floats if you do not know the policy, which obviously no-one does. It does not show knowledge only ignorance.

[Epiphany]

So what is the CHC company policy on arming floats over water? Simple question that some of us who fly the 139 offshore are interested to know.

[Epiphany]

Telephone conversation overheard today at Vergiate:

"Ahhhh wella Signore I am soo sorry buta at Agoosta we clearly say thata de flotas MUSTA be armed over water - alla da time. Why CHC no do this??? It is not a problem for Agoosta no?? Ciao."

[MirkoR]

... again the lazy horse to be taken to the water ...

Who did you talk to at Vergiate? That is not the customer support center.

According to your funny way of emphasizing your terrible Italian, I do understand you cannot speak any Italian.

The only thing that is clear is that, despite your flying skill that I'm pretty sure are a point of reference in the entire world of aviation , you are really not proficient at all as a human being.

Consider to stop offending Italians every now and then.
You are also not making any good job to the colleagues of your same country and do not be so generic if you have to blame somebody do it clearly specifying name and position otherwise do not spam the forum with your conversation with the Vergiate, Milano, Rome or wherever phone operator !

[Epiphany]

"Dire ancora una volta - oltre" ;)

[Outwest]

AW139, 140Kts, Floats not armed, no "finger trouble" (stupid comment), floats inflated of own accord.
Those are the facts.

Careful there Overthewater, you are sounding a bit smug ;)

[MirkoR]

"Dire ancora una volta - oltre" http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/wink2.gif:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D

[Savoia]

MirkoR: Sono certo che Epiphany voleva solo essere simpatico e non intendeva offendere gli Italiani.

[Squeaks]

I seem to recall a discussion about the nose up attitude of the AW139 when winching, as part of the SAR-H thread a while back. Yesterday's light aircraft fatality off Curl Curl produced this photo: is it a normal hover attitude for the 139?

http://iphone.news.com.au/story_images/380606/resized_full.jpg

[Savoia]

Squeaks, unquestionably the 139 has, as with the 76, a nose-high hover profile. Presumably this is reduced (how much I don't know) with the reduction of fuel and the increase of cabin load/pax?

The video below shows a landing followed by a take off with increased fuel load.

F-hP0dFr_hk&feature=related

[Epiphany]

MikoR. Savoia is correct. It was attempt at humour and no offence was intended so I apologise if you thought otherwise. I have some good Italian friends who delight in making fun of out of me (very easy) and my attempts to speak Italian. They also gracefully ignore the fact that, despite my best efforts to dress well, I always look like a tramp tagging along with Royalty whenever we are together.

It is always a pleasure to visit your country. I skied there last winter, I have drunk more Barolo and Cappuccinos (which is named after the colour of the Capuchin monks habits by the way) than is good for me, eaten more spaghetti alla vongole than I should and stared far too long at more beautiful Italian women than my wife was happy with.

You also make the worlds best helicopter. Grazie mille. :)

[peroni]

Has anyone heard anymore on the in-flight float inflation?

The only other A/C I have had anything to do with where the floats were live at all times (guard over switch) was the BK117, we had an inadvertent inflation with it as well. The company obtained an engineering order to put an ON/OFF switch in the circuit. No problems after that!

[Geoffersincornwall]

If you read the posts from 2nd Sept you will see that OUTWEST has confirmed that the floats were NOT armed at the time. They were, in other words, NOT LIVE at the time of inflation. The cause is sub judice until we get the full report on the incident which should be forthcoming very soon with any luck.

If you are not familiar with the system on the 139 then you should be aware that the system is designed to be 'safe' until the arming switch is selected ON. Then they can be inflated either automatically (primary method) or manually (secondary method).

The great concern was that an inadvertent inflation in cruise flight would be fatal and at least some good has come from this incident in that it provides a measure of reassurance to this is likely not to be the case. Such an unscientific 'trial' hardly constitutes a certification process but it will steady the nerves of those that are adherents to the FM requirement to have the floats armed at all times over water.

Incidentally the SOP whereby an altitude limit is imposed (Armed below 1000 or 500 feet depending on the company*) would appear to be a sensible compromise but as with all checks it doesn't matter where the check is in the SOP. When it's forgotten it is forgotten and that is at the heart of the philosophy to ARM at all times OVER WATER. As long as the crew doesn't forget the 'Descent Checks' all will be well. Maybe the descent check is a more 'defined' moment compared with the 'crossing the coast' check which perhaps is a less well defined as it does not precede or succeed a change in flight path.

I would be interested to know what the various 'schools of thought' on the subject think now.

G.

* NB Don't forget to get formal agreement from AW and/or your NAA if you vary the FM procedures in your SOPs.

[Variable Load]

* NB Don't forget to get formal agreement from AW and/or your NAA if you vary the FM procedures in your SOPs.

Geoff,

The OEMs are so bad at writing sensible and use-able checklists that I would be amased if any professional operator follows RFM procedures verbatim.

The only part of the RFM that HAS to be followed is the Limitations section. I am sure the OEMs don't want to be inundated by "no objection" requests for every NCL in use!


VL

[aegir]

MirkoR: Sono certo che Epiphany voleva solo essere simpatico e non intendeva offendere gli Italiani.
e comunque una minima conoscienza di inglese a vergiate sarebbe quanto meno auspicabile...
Translation: However, a little English knowledge would be rather desirable in vergiate.

[Geoffersincornwall]

OEMs don't write FMs to facilitate the end user's day to day operations they are written as a legal statement of how they believe the helicopter should be operated given all the knowledge in their domain - which may be more than the knowledge in the public domain. Should you chose to operate in another way then that is at your risk not then at their risk. If you chose not to get some kind of approval* or 'no objection' statement then you risk having to stand up in court and justify why your version of a protocol is more valid than the one created by the bloke that designed and built it. Not a task I would relish.

I am the last person to agree that OEMs get everything right for any emergency checklist that omits the three vital components:.........

Immediate Actions ........
Subsequent Actions .......
Considerations .........

cannot be considered to be complete. But then again the OEM's Emergency Procedures lack a context which is best provided by the operator. He is the only one intimately acquainted with his fleet configuration, his operating area and the type of work undertaken. It's only ignorance, laziness and/or lack of resources that leads people to live with the OEM's QRH when it could be improved upon considerably if they had the time, the money and the inclination.

Onwards and upwards

G. :)

* If the company includes its revised checklists in it's OM which is then reviewed as part of the AOC/CAT process and it comes through unscathed then the chances are you have dotted that particular 'i'. I think this is what in effect occurs in JARland whether we realise it or not.

[peroni]

G,

Sorry missed Outwest's comment, one Peroni too many!

Yes I am familiar with the AW139 float system and was hoping that information such as, whether or not the sytem was tested and passed prior to departure or whether engineering has found a fault in the system would be shared so that we can all learn.
I am glad that it all worked out for the better; this crew/company has all the information on what will hopefully be a once off event.
Unfortunately, if engineering don't find anything there will never be a BT issued for the rest of us.

Our school of thought; After obtaining an NTO from AW we fly with the floats disarmed. We have a company checklist to capture float arming/disarming.
We have created our own Emergency Checklist to include Immdiate Actions.... Subsequent Actions.... and Considerations.....
Were floats are required they are included in the Immediate Actions.

Any technical info on this incident would be greatly appreciated.

[he1iaviator]

Has anyone come up with a good iPad2 mount for the central instrument panel on the four screen 139? Preferably without wires so as to keep a Minor Mod.

[Outwest]

Has anyone come up with a good iPad2 mount for the central instrument panel on the four screen 139?

Ain't TSOed or pretty, but a 10 inch strip of velcro works great :ok:

[stacey_s]

Falls off, drops down into controls/TR Pedals, great!!!

S

[Outwest]

Falls off, drops down into controls/TR Pedals, great!!!


Anythings possible ;)

[noooby]

Where I work they have trialled with a strip of velcro in the center console and it is the most stupid thing I've ever seen. Whoever thought of it needs a kick in the bollocks for stupidity.
"Oh, lets use some dodgy velcro stuff to hold a tablet onto the instrument panel ABOVE THE FUEL CUTOFF SWITCHES!!!"
Absolute genius. Of course there is absolutely no way a tablet can fall off, bounce and on the upward bounce unlock the fuel cutoff switch. Is there. Is there???
Keep it in a bag and take it out and hold on to it when you need it, or get a proper mod done. Mods are not difficult to do, it is just that most companies are too lazy to do things properly.

[stacey_s]

Nooby, thanks, thats what I meant I just didn't want to go into the STC etc etc syndrome, I just thought that anybody in the business understood the implications of 'moding' an aircraft has on the airworthiness of that machine, no matter how small that MOD may seem.

S

[Outwest]

Where I work they have trialled with a strip of velcro in the center console and it is the most stupid thing I've ever seen.

Were you sitting beside me yesterday? ;):D

[noooby]

Negative Outwest :)

[Savoia]

In the meantime ..

https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/-U0fyPyHWtCw/ToOGuihTmNI/AAAAAAAAFGo/ZAA0dCH512Q/AW139%252520UAE%252520AF%2525202010%252520Lyons%252520St%252 520Exupery%252520Apt%2525205%252520Sep%25252011%252520%25252 8Jacques%252520Lienard%252529.jpg
AW139s of the UAE Air Force at Lyons St. Exupery Airport on 5th September 2011 (Photo: Jacques Lienard)

These are cited as being operated by the UAE Air Force (presumably in a VIP role?). The near craft carries the discreet registration "2010" and seems to be a 'Long Nose' 139. Out of curiosity what is the 'bump' atop the nose cone please?

[spinwing]

Mmmm ...

Bump on nose cone covers the fwd TCAS antenna ...

:)

[Turkeyslapper]

Gday all

One of our machines has experienced debonding on the tail boom. "new" tail boom, left side in the vicinity of previous instances on the "old" booms.

Anyone else experienced this yet? Not sure what the prognosis is yet or what the outcome will be however will keep you posted.

Cheers

Turkey

[blakmax]

So the new design disbonds too. Now maybe someone from AW will listen. This is a processing issue, not a design issue. And I hope that they don't use the scuff sand and solvent clean process for repair. Otherwise the repair will disbond too!

TS I have sent you a PM.

Regards

Blakmax

[500e]

:ugh::ugh::ugh:

[Furia]

Hi!
Do we have any further information related to the inflight inflation of the flotation system on a 139 on the North Sea?

I have tried to find some additional news on the web with no success.

The Operator I am flying with have the NTO from Agusta allowing the possibility of not having the floats armed while off-shore in some specific conditions and I am quite interested in learning a bit more about what happened with that "inccident"

Was the helicopter really flying with Floats NOT ARMED? Are they operating under that NTO from Agusta?

Do they have a clue why the system triggered the floats?

At what speed where they flying when this happened?

How bad was to regain control of the aircraft?

Did they made a dictching or they continue to destination or to an alternate?

I have not been able to find any information about this event in the AAIB website neither.

Can someone bring some light into this? Would be most welcomed :D

[Outwest]

In cruise at 140 kts.

Floats NOT armed.

A loud bang (explosion) followed by rapid deceleration in IAS.

No extreme attitude changes.

A/C returned to base at reduced airspeed.

Cause not yet determined.

[Furia]

Thanks Outwest.

I will be looking forward to hear about the inccident report outcome.

[BackHive]

Hi Guys,

Sometime ago, after the catastrophic tailboom fracture in the middle east a discussion ensued regarding the integrity and inspection etc. of these carbon/glass fibre structures, somebody posted a link to a handheld device (ultrasonic I think), with a large colour display for inspecting these type of components. I searched for that post at length but I couldn't find it. Does anybody have a link to that device's website or similar websites ? My own operator, like many others, are very concerned about the ongoing tail rotor blade issue and perhaps such a device would be very useful for inspecting the problematic area of these blades (as a supplement to the visual inspection) and other similar parts. Has anybody any experience in using these devices and can vouch for their usefulness ?

Many Thanks.

BackHive.

[9Aplus]

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/450392-yet-another-aw139-tail-incident-gulf-helis-5.html#post6436846

That device was my above post, perhaps....
human tap testing against machine.... who can be more accurate :}

[BackHive]

That's the one 9Aplus, bang on!
Thanks a lot.

BackHive.

[9Aplus]

:ok: you welcome...
just small favor to you and
my friends in Cascina Costa

Note:
For sure that or similar "tool" can be useful for
both bonding and crack problems detection. Someone
must develop suitable procedure. In mean time
keep and compare data of inspections in between,
something must be "visible" before major failure...

[cayuse365]

Turkeyslapper did the tailboom have a metal honeycomb core?

[Aser]

Nice door kit!
DART Helicopter Services Announces FAA Approval of the New Maintenance Kits for the AgustaWestland AW139 / AB139 Model of Aircraft

Friday October 14th 2011 - DART Helicopter Services


http://verticalmag.com/news/article_files/392604522407055.jpgDART Helicopter Services (DHS) is pleased to announces that DART Aerospace Ltd. (DAS) have received FAA approval of the following New Maintenance Kits for the AgustaWestland AW139 / AB139 Cargo Door Fwd Opening, Maintenance Step, Floor Protector Kit and Engine Wash Kit. Transport Canada and EASA approvals are pending.

Cargo Door Fwd Opening Kit
The DAS Cargo Door Fed Opening Kit provides improved safety by converting the existing upward opening cargo bay door to a forward opening configuration. The kit includes two sturdy CNC machined hinges, an additional latch and a gas spring that assists in opening and closing and ensures that when opened the door will not inadvertently close. This kit may be installed on either or both the LH and RH cargo bay doors.

Maintenance Step
The new DAS Maintenance Step Kit provides a secure work platform that is ideally located on the left and/or right side of the aircraft roof so that it can be used by the pilot and maintenance personnel to perform inspections on the main rotor and transmission. The kit installs easily with bolts into existing plug locations (for blade fold and mooring provisions) at STA 5795.0 and 5128.3. Fabricated from sturdy CNC machined components, the Maintenance Steps feature a non-slip embossed relief pattern for added personnel safety and a machined design for additional durability.

Floor Protector
Durable lightweight protection for the cargo compartment area honeycomb flooring. The Floor Protector panels are constructed of high density, impact resistant aerospace grade polycarbonate that will not warp or crack from extremes of heat or cold. The kit consists of three panels that are securely attached to the floor into existing nut plates.

Engine Wash Kit
The DAS Engine Wash Kit plumbs into the existing engine wash fittings, making the engine wash system easily accessible from the ground. Also available though DHS as a related product is Red Barn Machine’s Series 500 Compressor Wash System with Auxiliary Air Tank ideal to be used in conjunction with DAS Engine Wash Kit. This system will deliver was and rinse cycles within manufacturer specifications so you can be confident that critical engine components are being maintained safely, easily and with precision.


Regards
Aser

[MirkoR]

Sono certo che Epiphany voleva solo essere simpatico e non intendeva offendere gli Italiani.
e comunque una minima conoscienza di inglese a vergiate sarebbe quanto meno auspicabile...
Translation: However, a little English knowledge would be rather desirable in vergiate.


:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:mad:


Pleeeease give me a break ...!!!!

[Aser]

The National Security Agency Flight (ANSV) hosted an international meeting of three days for the sharing of technical issues raised during the technical investigations of three AW139 helicopters in Qatar (http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=es&rurl=translate.google.es&sl=it&tl=en&twu=1&u=http://www.dedalonews.it/it/index.php/05/2011/agustawestland-lancia-formazione-sicurezza-per-aw139-settore-petrolifero/&usg=ALkJrhjy-rN6jXLdDf2hkZPDFZfNU7R-SQ) , Brazil and Hong Kong (http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=es&rurl=translate.google.es&sl=it&tl=en&twu=1&u=http://www.dedalonews.it/it/index.php/07/2010/hong-kong-ammara-aw139/&usg=ALkJrhgT7ZQ6Y1r8nGnVlrHji_t1e06-MA) . This was announced ANSV, involved with their representatives as Italy is the design and construction of the AW139 and promoter of the meeting to share evidence gathered. The other participants - in addition to the manufacturer AgustaWestland - were the investigating authorities of the three countries in which events occurred, the United Kingdom and Macao, EASA, ENAC and Air Force. The meeting, held October 17 to 19, will be followed by a second in February 2011 to check the status of ongoing investigations and the effectiveness of activities. Technical content of the meeting and action was not given any indication.Google Traductor (http://translate.google.es/translate?hl=es&sl=it&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dedalonews.it%2Fit%2Findex.php%2F10%2F201 1%2Faw139-incontro-tecnico-internazionale-presso-ansv%2F)

Regards
Aser

[Epiphany]

You can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink :)

Molte scuse Mirko. Originariamente ho scritto che famosa citazione in italiano per il vostro beneficio, ma misteriosamente tornato alla notte inglese.

[blakmax]

I wonder if they will look outside the issues identified by the manufacturer and look at other issues such as I have raised on this forum? When evidence exists of the widespread occurrence of a specific bond deficiency which is known to produce a 53% loss of peel strength in bonded joints and 28% loss of honeycomb peel strength, surely they will not ignore this?

I remain prepared to talk to anyone of the investigators if required.

Regards

Blakmax

[KiwiRotorWrench]

Might be old news to you all but FAA just catching up with BT sequence. New AD supersedes old Emergency AD from late 2009.
AD 2011-20-06, iaw BT139-195 Rev B, supersedes AD AD 2009-19-51, and allows pilot to comply with daily visual check per para (a)

[9Aplus]

Just today I was reminded on existence of one another piece of composite NDT ultrasonict
testing technology. ("For dummies" :E)
On first hand spec. this one can be more than useful for quick results almost
no special training & ramp testing... for sure more accurate than "tap" test :rolleyes:

http://www.ge-mcs.com/download/ultrasound/thickness-gages/Bondtracer/om-bondtracer.pdf

http://www.ge-mcs.com/download/ultrasound/thickness-gages/Bondtracer/GEIT-20057EN_bondtracer.pdf

Any existing experience, out there?

[gittijan]

Any rumours/news on this one?

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 139FW Make/Model: A139 Description: AGUSTA AB139
Date: 11/11/2011 Time: 1600

Event Type: Incident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Minor

LOCATION
City: LEEVILLE State: LA Country: US

DESCRIPTION
N139FW AGUSTA AB139 ROTORCRAFT SUSTAINED MINOR DAMAGE UNDER UNKNOWN
CIRCUMSTANCES, LEEVILLE, LA

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: 111555Z AUTO 06005KT 10SM CLR 15/01 A3033

OTHER DATA
Activity: Unknown Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER


FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 11/14/2011

[blakmax]

Sorry 9A+ I have been away on R and R, so I did not have a chance to reply.

In reality it does not matter what method is employed, the essence of the matter is that NDI depends directly on managing defect detection before the defect exceeds a critical value where failure may occur. Different methods may have different levels of accuracy and while that accuracy is sometimes important, it is even more important to understand the validity of the estimated "critical defect size". This is usually determined by the OEM by analysis or testing, typically based on artificial defects, usually teflon inserts for testing and disconnected elements for analysis. This procedure is known as Damage Tolerance Analysis (DTA).

So how valid is DTA? A fundamental feature of current DTA methods is that they all assume that the adhesive adjacent to the defect maintains the original properties (especially strength) of the original adhesive material. In reality, there is only ever one condition where DTA is valid, and that is in assessing the significance of defects identified in post-production inspections, and then only if the defects are large voids.

Let me be clear: If the defects are the micro-voids (porosity) exhibited in some AW139 disbonds, then DTA is inappropriate because the adjacent material will have a lower strength than the pristine bond material without porosity. Unless the testing or analysis is based on a reduction in localised strength, the analysis is invalid.

Next, if the defect is an in-service disbond, then again the localised material properties will be lower than for pristine material because in-service disbonds are due to interfacial degradation (or fatigue of micro-voided bonds such as those which have been reported in AW139 boom structure) so again DTA is invalid.

This is explained in my recent paper http://www.adhesionassociates.com/papers/57%20Safety%20Risks%20in%20Applying%20Damage%20Tolerance%20A nalysis%20to%20Certification%20of%20Adhesively%20Bonded%20St ructures%20and%20Joints.doc

So really the method of inspection is not really relevant; the validity of the defect size you are looking for is the really important issue. It is a bit like argueing about how many angels one can engrave on the head of a pin, when the real question is if the pin will hold up your trousers!

Regards

Blakmax

[Ian Corrigible]

Any rumours/news on this one?
The rumor over on the dark side is blade strike on a cowling which came loose.

I/C

[js0987]

This is third hand information on the 11 Nov incident. Apparently a cowling came off/loose and came in contact with the MRB's. Initially it was thought there may have been some engine FOD and the blades would need to be changed, but on closer inspection it was determined that there was no FOD damage and the blade damage was superficial.

[Aser]

AgustaWestland, a Finmeccanica company, is also pleased to announce its intention to establish the JV as an AgustaWestland Authorized Training Centre. ADA/Mubadala will then provide training services using a European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) certified AW139 Level D Full Flight Simulator (FFS) designed, developed and supplied by CAE and AgustaWestland. The JV is subject to any required antitrust and other regulatory approvals. Offshore operators will benefit from specific mission training services once the Authorized Training Centre achieves operational readiness.
http://www.agustawestland.com/sites/default/files/AgustaWestland/AW915web.JPG

Bruno Spagnolini, Chief Executive Officer, AgustaWestland said “This latest announcement continues AgustaWestland’s strategy to expand its worldwide network of Authorised Training Centres to deliver high quality training services to our growing number of customers. The Middle East region is an important market for AgustaWestland and particularly the AW139 helicopter, so we are very pleased to be partnering with ADA/Mubadala who will be able to provide AW139 type conversion, recurrent and operational role training to operators across the region.” Abu Dhabi Aviation is the largest commercial helicopter operator in the Middle East with a fleet that includes 16 AW139 helicopters. The bulk of the company's business activity is in support of Abu Dhabi offshore oil and engineering and construction companies. Other business activities include medical evacuation, survey, photography and charter.


AgustaWestland to Establish ADA/Mubadala JV as an AW139 Authorized Training Centre in Abu Dhabi | AgustaWestland (http://www.agustawestland.com/news/agustawestland-establish-adamubadala-jv-aw139-authorized-training-centre-abu-dhabi)

Regards
Aser

[Redhawk 83]

I checked the NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board (http://www.ntsb.gov) site for the US NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board site and can not find this?

[chopper2004]

Interesting to see that the 139 is doing well in the para public sector lately what with orders for Maryland State Police and for Automony state of Trento in Italy for the local fire emergency services.

Though looking at the AE advertisement in Vertical Magazine and other pubs, noticed a New Jersey State Police 139 shown and knew they were ordering a new fleet to replace their S-76B but didnt see anything on the AW web to announced they been delivered which I thought was odd for AW not to publicise this.

I've seen other pics of the Bon Jovi :ok: :cool: state police 139 in flight so figured they must have been delivered earlier this year.

[030Outbound]

Just heard that CHC had another uncommanded float inflation in flight. Does anyone have an info on this?

[malabo]

Uncommanded or unintentional? Like it went of on its own, or after the pilots fiddled with the switches and inadvertently caused their own misfortune - like we often see on float tests?

Haven't heard of any accident as a result, not even a PAN call, so assume they just flew it home and asked for a re-pack? Seems to confirm the Agusta position that the world will not end if they inflate in flight.

[Outwest]

I can confirm it was unintentional for sure. As to un-commanded I guess that would depend on your interpretation of that. It was commanded, but not by the crew ;-)

They are still investigating, but seems the culprit may be the float control box (the box with the arming switch)

Yes, the floats did stay attached again this time and other than a VERY rapid decrease in speed, did not seem to have too much effect. Of course this was in severe VMC.

Actually AW has no official position on this matter, they never tested them at any speed.

Sorry, no simple repack allowed.

[Shell Management]

Who says they were never tested?

[Outwest]

Who says they were never tested?

AW will tell you they never tested them as it was not a requirement for certification.

[hillberg]

As an STC thay sure are TESTed, Up tp Vne, Added Limits published by float manufacture.

[Outwest]

OK, I'm not going to be dragged back into this.......

I was simply confirming that there was indeed another occurrence.

[Shell Management]

So they have been tested then (before they were 'tested' in service).

[Variable Load]

SM,

You need to ask AW yourself if you want an answer you can trust. I did :E

[AW139 Engineer]

The latest news is a single float deployed / not all 4 as expected / the float control panel is the primary suspect not the pilot / deployment was at 150 knots and the bag is in good shape.

[Outwest]

Not sure where you are getting your info from Engineer, but you are misinformed. A single "bottle" fired, but all 4 bags inflated. That I can confirm as I seen the a/c in question myself.

Deployment was at 140 kts, not 150.

Bags were in good shape after the fact.

[139GoM]

If CHC has to file some type of official report where could I find it?

[Geoffersincornwall]

MORs are usually raised in the following circumstances:

In the event of a hazardous situation occurring
In the event that a hazardous situation would occur unless corrective was taken
Whenever the reported believes that there is a safety operational, maintenance or airworthiness-related issue that should be investigated by the CAA.

I believe that a Quarterly Digest of MoRs is published but not sure how a non-AOC holder gets access to that.

G.

[cayuse365]

They should check the cannon plugs for the wipers and floats as they can be reversed.

[helimutt]

It would be filed in the CHC SQID system.

[vfr440]

Geoffers
I get mine in an e-mail from CAA. You register with CAA (FOC) and check all the boxes you wish to receive auto-e-mails about. The Occurrence Reports are 'hidden' in the link to Safety Information. If you click it there are 2 x pdf files to choose. One is the Safety info digest (around 200Kb) and the smaller one is the occurrence listing which includes all small planks, but the rotary wing section is at the end before balloons.

Give it a try :ok:- VFR

[3D CAM]

c365.
I don't doubt your info but surely if either system had been worked on, then the next step for the engineers would be to check that it worked as advertised.:confused:
3D

[Aser]

AW139M
https://fbcdn-sphotos-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/325051_10150463638964381_725044380_8226193_1582473841_o.jpg

Regards
Aser

[ODEN]

Hi all 139 drivers.

Could you please give me some facts on how long your type rating on the AW139 was before your skill test.

All the same hours with an approved typerating course, or different depending on operator and country?

SIM hours and actual hours please.

Thank you in advance.

[Arcal76]

We had a one week ground school and 2 weeks on the SIM in Whippany, 25 hours on the left seat and 25 hours on the right seat (Flying seat) before doing the check ride and it looks just enough to get use to all profile and system available on this machine.You are still looking for your "marks" the first week you fly the real machine and after it is OK.It looks complicated but in reality it is not so hard.It is important to know all systems and the QRH.

[HLCPTR]

You received a custom eight-day ground school (due to the pre-class CBT you did). The usual ground school is ten work days.

Simulator time depends on client/country. The normal minimum is 20 hours PIC. An additional 20 hours SIC if you have a training partner.

[outhouse]

10 days GS, *Simulator and Aircraft as per JAR FCL *2 dependant on if you are MCR or First Rating. *Skill test 2 hrs for IFR and VFR course on the sim, Enjoy. Back into my hole.:}

[ODEN]

Thank you for your answers.

Outhouse Simulator and Aircraft as per JAR FCL *2

Does the JAR FCL state any minimum hours for training?

Reg

[outhouse]

Well if ageing memory serves.
First MP rating VFR. *Minimum approved flight instruction 10 hrs. Not including the skill test.
If using a approved FSTD. 12 hrs total, minimum 6 hrs in aircraft. Plus 1 hour skill test, can be completed in simulator if approved.

MP to MP. VFR Rating. Minimum approved flight instruction 5 hrs. Not including skill test.
If using approved FSTD. Minimum 7 hrs, minimum 2 hrs in aircraft. Skill test as above.

IFR, MINIMUM 5 hrs, using a FSTD 2 hrs in aircraft 3 in the sim. Plus 1 hr skill test. Aircraft or sim as above.



Have fun, if memory failed sure will be corrected.

Regards O.:ok:

[bogey@6]

2 weeks ground course, 8hrs Sim, 2hrs aircraft, 1hr skills test.

check the new syllabus that's coming out.. everything seems to be abbreviated into modules on the new one..

[ODEN]

Hi, is there anyone out there who could give some information on how the anti/de-ice system is working (if it is reliable, any problems) on the 139? I mean anyone with experience using it in icing conditions?
Is it approved in the FM for flights in known icing (light)?

[UCLogic]

From HeliHub today

Is the global downturn reaching Hong Kong?

Sky Shuttle sells AW139 fleet

Helihub RSS Feed (http://feeds2.feedburner.com/HelihubNews/) http://www.helihub.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/aw139-skyshuttle-150x150.jpg HeliHub.com (http://www.helihub.com/2012/01/03/sky-shuttle-sells-aw139-fleet/)

3 Jan, 12 In a press release back in October 2009, the Hong Kong proudly announced “Sky Shuttle’s fleet conversion programme to progressively phase-out its Sikorsky S-76C+ helicopters and bring into commercial service, the first of its six, brand new, high-performance AW 139 helicopters”.
But now, local press are reporting they have changed their mind and have sold the AW139 fleet to Canadian company Eagle Copters and are reportedly returning to the Sikorsky S76 as their prime aircraft. The three 76C+’s that the company had were sold to Canada, but never appeared on the register there – perhaps they are still available?
Sky Shuttle was formed in 1998 as East Asia Airlines, rebranding in 2008 with the first AW139 arriving late that year. In July 2010 one of the AW139 fleet suffered a tail rotor issue which led to a controlled ditching of the aircraft in Hong Kong harbour, with the 2 crew and 10 passengers all safely rescued.
HeliHub.com contacted Sky Shuttle for comment on this story, and were told that someone would call us back to provide further information. No call was received prior to the time we told them we would publish this story.
The company is owned by Chan Un Chan, the third wife of Stanley Ho Hung Sun.
Jeremy Parkin – HeliHub.com

[squib66]

Ironic, one of the other passenger shuttle operators, CopterLine, went the other way to AW139s after a (fatal) S-76C+ accident.

[IntheTin]

Here's the updated version :ok:


AgustaWestland says Sky Shuttle AW139 sale story “incorrect” | Helihub - the Helicopter Industry Data Source (http://www.helihub.com/2012/01/03/agustawestland-says-sky-shuttle-aw139-sale-story-incorrect/)

[Chi Sin Gei Si]

Haha!

What a ****-up!

Don't believe everything you read here...afterall, its a 'rumour' network.

3 Jan, 12
AgustaWestland has issued a statement this morning regarding the article originally published by Macau Business which we reported on earlier today in which it claimed Sky Shuttle had “sold four of its five Agusta Westland AW139 helicopters and continues to operate with Sikorsky S76C+ helicopters” – see Sky Shuttle sells AW139 fleet

AW says that Sky Shuttle has actually sold four of its old Sikorsky S76C+ helicopters that were withdrawn from service in 2009 when they were replaced by the AW139 on its popular Hong Kong, Macau, Shenzhen helicopter shuttle services.

$3900HKD ($503USD) for a 16 minute trip on a weekend, now!? Good grief! Global downturn...what global downturn?

[Ian Corrigible]

Easy mistake to make...

http://i.imgur.com/9o0YTNi.jpg (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/logistics/article2766196.ece)

:E

I/C

[Chi Sin Gei Si]

Maybe some industrial warfare between the two!

Haha!

Anyway, nice to see the SkyShuttle S76's moving on...they looked so sad, all stripped down, cluttering up the hangars getting dusty and old.

I wonder if the new owners will remove the silly 'collective detent' switches.

[Arcal76]

For Oden:
The Ice protection on the 139 is certified to protect for known icing condition up to 10 000ft.Flight in freezing rain or freezing drizzle in not approved.The system weight about 200 kg and is certified FAR 29 and JAR 29.There is 2 AC GEN added to the main transmission,one 45 KVA and one 25 KVA. AC power provides heating for the main rotor blades,tail rotor blades, the windshield and the ice detector heads.The tail rotor deicing is ON all time when the system is ON,the main rotor blades have 6 different zones,3 critical and 3 non-critical,the heat goes ON by cycle,one zone at the time,to remove the ice.
It never worked on any of our aircraft.We had a tail rotor slip ring failure who could have been catastrophic.The slip ring transmit the power to the tail rotor blades, there is fix part on the tail rotor gearbox and one moving part attached to the blades.The attachment on the fix part broke and the all piece started to spin around......every aircraft had damage on this system and they were removed in order to figure out what to do next.Apparently Agusta came with a modification to fix the problem....Will see.....So,we are in Winter and we are not able to use it(which is good for me...)

[Saint Jack]

Chi Sin Gei Si is correct, it's the S76's that have been sold, as a batch, to a Canadian buyer. They've been de-registered and will shortly be disassembled for shipping.

[ODEN]

Arcal76:

Txs for the information.

[Rotorbody]

Did you know that Gulf Helicopters recently took delivery of a new AW139. They sent 2 local pilots (not mere locals mind, 2 with job titles and fat salarys) to ferry it back to Doha.

Did you know that the same helicopter is grounded since arrival at Doha. Main Rotor overspeed apparently.

Oops

Keep it to yourself for now, maybe there'll be a couple of vacancys for those with management hopes shortly.

[Epiphany]

If they were Qatari pilots then there will be no vacancies. They will find some expat to blame. Inshalla.

[outhouse]

Well rotor person, guess you work or have a friend who is close to GH, Is easily *influenced by ill informed and inaccurate talk, and has nothing else better to do than pass on to the world through this forum what you considered a chance to * * slag off a GHC National crew.*
The statements made by rotor person are not true and are an affront to the Qatarie National Captain (the commander of the delivery flight) and should be withdrawn.
*

[Turkeyslapper]

G'day all

We have been utilizing the sar modes fairly extensively for about a year or so and a few little gremlins seem to pop up occasionally across all of our machines. A couple of examples:

1. When TU is engaged, the aircraft just "waffles" up and doesn't really accelerate. Normally, momentarily reengaging HOV (via the force trim release or trim switch) and then reselecting TU fixes the problem.

2. When passing through the fhaf on a mot and soon after path and decel are engaged, the fd occasionally just disconnects all modes without warning allowing the aircraft to continue to descend if left unchecked. The radalts both appear to remain functioning during this as well.

Usually these aren't too much of a big deal as long as things are being
monitored adequately but they certainly aren't ideal traits.

Has anyone had similar issues or is there something floating around addressing
similar issues? Thanks in advance.

[Aser]

G'day all

2. When passing through the fhaf on a mot and soon after path and decel are engaged, the fd occasionally just disconnects all modes without warning allowing the aircraft to continue to descend if left unchecked. The radalts both appear to remain functioning during this as well.

Has anyone had similar issues or is there something floating around addressing
similar issues? Thanks in advance.

It happened to me at least two times... no malfunctions, everything just disengaged suddenly :confused:

On the TU, I can't remember any problem apart that is really "slow" accelerating and at the same time climbing to 200'.

I'm not flying the SAR version anymore...

Regards
Aser

[Epiphany]

Excel have received this immediate requirement from our African based client and are currently seeking an AW139 expert to assist, ideally starting around 16/01/12.This short contract involves the inspection of an AW139 aircraft that has suffered a heavy landing, and putting together a report detailing the damaged areas, and what work/materials and time will be needed to rectify them. You will not be required to actually carry out the repairs,...

Anyone know what happened here? It was found on a jobs website today.

[outhouse]

A short e mail to Agusta requesting help may be the best option. Plus a review of the insurance policy.*
:bored::eek:

[9Aplus]

Sniffing smell of another (non existing) incident in Gulf, where some happy Ev****n masters are within learning curve :cool:

[Aser]

I don't think so... unless the gulf has moved to AFRICA!
Salary details - UP TO £2K FOR 1 WEEK!!

Location - Africa

[9Aplus]

But the company is right.....:mad:

[vfr440]

£2k for a week's survey and report? Well, if I was an expert with the machine (and I'm NOT) I wouldn't do it for less. Can you imagine what the Liability Insurance premium would rocket up to>:(

And the complications of an African operator and 3rd party (4th party?) repairs and finding something else distorted perhaps, when it is mounted in a fixture? Very stressful, anmd loadsa wine required ! LOL :ok: - VFR

[LtColGraves]

Anyone have reliable, current fleet hours on AW139? Any reliable sources for this?

Thanks!

[tcvennen]

This question is directed towards the offshore operators. Specifically those who fly IFR offshore.
Section 1, Limitations, of the RWFM under "Avionics Limitations", FMS and GPS Limitations, states;
"3. Instrument approaches must be carried out in accordance with approved instrument approach procedures that are retrieved from the FMS data base."
We have a letter of authorization (LOA) from the FAA allowing us to execute OSAP approaches with our AW 139. Does our LOA allow us to violate the limitations section of the RWFM?

Second question: Also under 3.
"When an alternate airport is required by the applicable operating rules, it must be served by an approach based on other than GPS navigation and the aircraft must have operational equipment capable of using that navigation aid, and the required navigation aid must be operational.
Does this eliminate use of an "offshore alternate" which is allowed under our LOA?
What are you other guys doing?
I know the FAA will never specifically waive a limitation of the RWFM, how do I get around it?

[tottigol]

Tcvennen, an OSAP is not an FMS approach; the FMS MAY be used to set up a DFAP and FAF, however the radar remains the primary sensor to identify the destination and the 1/2 mile separation required by the FAA in the relevant circular (the specific number escapes my memory).

The alternate limitation also is in regard to the use of GPS as primary sensor for the approach.
Notice that the alternate minimums are generally labeled NA in those IAPs to airports where the only available approach is GPS.
Unless you have a published GPS approach to a specific offshore block lease in the GOM.:rolleyes:

HTH

[tcvennen]

I know the OSAP is not an FMS approach, that's the whole point.
There is a limitation in the RWFM that REQUIRES all instrument approaches be "retrieved" from the FMS.
You can't retrieve the OSAP, therefore the limitations section indicates you cannot execute the OSAP approach. Specifically BECAUSE it is not an FMS approach!
Reading the limitations section, "Instrument approaches must be carried out in accordance with an approved instrument approach procedure", (which the OSAP is), "that are retrieved from the FMS data base" (which the OSAP is not).
Hey, we've been doing OSAP's in the 139 for 5 years now, a pilot brought this up. According tto the limitations section we shouldn't be.

[Ian Corrigible]

Anyone have reliable, current fleet hours on AW139? Any reliable sources for this?

"Over 425,000" as of January.

I/C

[tcvennen]

I just had a question. Can the AW 139 execute an SAR or PAR? also approaches not "retrievable". According to the limitations section, no. Isn't that crazy?

[tcvennen]

I'm getting a head ache!!!
9 days to retirement!!!

[tcvennen]

The alternate minimums are not aircraft specific. The limitations section, is. You can use an OSAP in an SK 76, or SK 92, but according to the limitations section for the AW 139, you have to have an airport served by an approach other than a GPS. and yes, the GPS is required for the approach.
Very poorly written limitation. Still it's there, black and white. Now do we just ignore it?
"Note" "The pilot must not continue and instrument approach inside the Final Approach Fix (FAF), unless the "APP" advisory is displayed on the PFD." You don't have the "APP" light when executing an OSAP.
Like the folks writing the RWFM never flew a helicopter? Have no idea what an OSAP is???

[Aser]

tcvennen: easy, don't use the FMS and fly your app of choice
That's the point. They don't want you to program your own ifr app.
Contact Agusta.

And yes you can fly sar apps with the fms and FD modes provided by Agusta

Regards
Aser

[aseanaero]

What's the quoted price of the AW139 and how long for a new delivery ?

I spoke to an operator yesterday and they were quoted 12.5 million euro including offshore,medevac options and external life rafts

With over 200 built (430 orders) they should have had all the bugs ironed out now ?

Any weak points on the heli ?

[aseanaero]

Agusta have a 2006 AW139 for sale , 2,342 hrs , US$9.65 million

[JollyGreen]

Paragraph 3 of The FMS and GPS Limitations section refers only to approaches being flown by the FMS, i.e. with LNAV selected, rather than NAV, on the DICP, and PRV mode not selected.

The same section also states "Use of ILS, LOC, LOC-BC, LDA, (landing directional aid), SDF(simplified directional facility) and MLS (microwave landing system) approaches are not authorised." This doesn't mean you can't fly an ILS in the AW139, only that you must fly on raw data.

I don't believe that an approach must be in the database if flown raw, be it a VOR, an OSAP or any other approach type.

[aseanaero]

Anyone know the new price of a Pratt PT6C-67C as fitted to the AW139 ?

[JCJC]

$1.3 mil :ok:

[Virolai2000]

Hi, i´m new here. I´ve found this:

Agustawestland is pleased to announce that the certification ofthe new Tail Rotor Blade has been achieved on February 9th, 2012, as stated by EASA major change approval 10038371, well in advance of the estimated period (first quarter 2012) as foreseen in our previous statement dated December 2011.

The new Tail Rotor Blade has been certified initially with a life limit set at 1200 Flight Hours or 3200 Landings, whichever occurs first. Activities are currently underway with the Certification Authorities progressively to extend these thresholds in the course of 2012, with the target to stay ahead of the fleet leader in order to prevent any requirement of new blades replacement.

In order to sustain the demand generated by the in service fleet and new helicopter
deliveries, Agustawestland is processing also the qualification of an additional source of raw material from an alternative Supplier. In conjunction with the certification of the new Tail Rotor Blade, production process has been launched with the target to start the deliveries in the second quarter of 2012.

Since the introduction into service of the new Rotor Blade will require a complete set for each helicopter, Agustawestland will continue to supply the previous configuration Tail Rotor Blades, as necessary. This will allow the support ofthe current fleet operations until an adequate number of new Tail Rotor Blades will be made available by production.

[Virolai2000]

Politicians being... politicians

Opposition attacks safety of air ambulances, but Ornge says concerns addressed - Winnipeg Free Press (http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/arts-and-life/life/health/ornge-air-ambulance-helicopters-not-safe-rotors-can-fall-off-tory-critic-says-141461473.html)

The former transport minister pointed to an air-worthiness directive he said was issued "just days ago" by the European Aviation Safety Agency. Klees said it warns the owners of the AW139 that they are required to conduct "repetitive inspections" and maintenance of the tail rotors every 25 flight hours, and orders to replace them every 600 hours.

Just days ago? Actually 6 months ago

[chopper2004]

Italian Air Force (http://www.agustawestland.com/news/italian-air-force%E2%80%99s-hh-139a-enters-operational-service)

Il portale dell'Aeronautica Militare - L'HH-139A entra in servizio al 15° Stormo (http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/ElicotteroHH139Aal15StormoCervia_090312.aspx)

[Plain Torque]

Just wondering about the news I've been hearing regarding the AW139 hydraulic system. How many 139 operators/engineers/pilots are having problems with their hydraulic lines. I hear that more than one operator has had multiple failures and are expecting more. If this is true then surely it isn't acceptable? The information I have heard is that one company has had 4 separate failures causing the complete loss of one of the hydraulic systems. If it has happened 4 times on different occasions then Murphy's law states that a double failure could happen! Oh no that could never happen... God forbid!!!:ugh:

I find it hard to believe that we haven't heard much about this issue, if it is out there. If it does exist then it is very serious and Agusta need to do something about it! Lets put it into context and compare the problem to another system with redundancy... the engines! now if there were 4 separate engine failures within one company and reports of other companies having the same problem would the industry be happy? At least if both engines go then there is a chance of surviving the failure by lowering the lever and going into autorotation. I don't like the options for a dual hydraulic failure.:eek:

So pray tell, what is the score with the operators and pilots out there at the sharp end?

PT

[lowfat]

We have had far more hydraulic line failures with our eurocopter 365n3's than our 139,s. similar hours and cycles.
I believe the case your referring to is a chaffed line to the tail.Caused by the operators maintenance personnel putting the wrong screw (way too long) in a panel.
I get the feeling some people expect things to never wear out or fail around here...........

[Plain Torque]

Thanks for that input lowfat, sounds like it isn't entirely an Agusta problem but more a minor maintenance issue. Hopefully it will be solved with no more incidents.

However, I must point out that I'm not sure about your latter comment. If one type has problems it doesn't mean it is acceptable for another to have a similar problem. Additionally, I would like to think that with accident/incident reports and other systems we are working towards an industry that can expect things not to wear out, especially critical components. I thought that was why aviation pays so much money for the certification process. Train for these things to happen and be ready if they do, but accepting that things will just wear out... I'm not sure that should be encouraged so I can only assume you are taking the piss ;)

[Dragstay]

I performed the inspection on one of our ships,
Found that the screw hole is much lower than the rigid hydraulic line.

In my opinion the finding on the H/C which did have chaffing on the hydraulic line is typically an example of Murphys Law (caught on the right time).

1. The screw which had been installed was too long.
2. Somebody has been leaning/standing on the rigid hydraulic lines causing them to bend a little downward causing the outer line to vibrate against the screw.

regards,

Dragstay.

[mddc8]

Troubleshooting question: If you choose to help, greatly appreciated.


ONLY in cruise, one of our 139's RPM switch set at 100% at straight level flight momentarily bumps up 2% percent with no pilot assistance.

Collective wiring rang out good
LVDT's on order yet no test box

Any starting points?:ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::{

[hihover]

Any Flight Director Collective Modes engaged?

Any turbulence or strong windy conditions?

How often does it happen?

TM

[Mike C]

We have had Tq surges in the cruise with ALT hold engaged, and that caused momentary Rrpm to 102. It was a faulty bleed valve. But at the same time we would also have an overspeed to 102-103 on raising the collective moderately quickly as on lift off to the hover.
If 1 or 2 Tq is spiking at the same time, swap the bleed valve over and see if the other engines Tq spikes, if it does, problem solved.
Regards
Mick.

[noooby]

You could try cleaning the bleed valve filter first. Much easier than changing the valves over side to side. Many bleed valve issues are caused by a partially blocked filter.
If no change, then sure, go ahead and swap side to side to help troubleshoot.

[ODEN]

Hi, does anyone know what the flight manual of the AW 139 says about flying in icing conditions?

I know its approved to fly in known icing conditions but is it approved to fly in moderate icing or only light icing?


Txs

[Geoffersincornwall]

This from the RFM, Supplement 71, Ice Protections System (IPS)


TYPE OF OPERATIONS
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) Day/Night in known icing conditions



No IPS, No clearance at all.


G.

[Jet Ranger]

Is that IPS extra equipment? How much does it cost?

[ODEN]

Txs....soo known icing? Is that light, moderate or severe? Thats the question....

No aircraft I know ( fixed wing or rotor) are approved to fly in severe icing.

Anyone know what the certification stated? Or can you asume
known icing= moderate icing?

[Aser]

GENERAL INFORMATION
The IPS is designed to allow full icing operations by automatically deicing
MR blades and anti-icing TR blades. The functioning of the system
is controlled automatically (with two independent Channels A and
B) in relation to the severity of the icing conditions encountered at any
time. An additional cockpit indicating panel shows the status of the IPS
and additional IPS Master Warning and Caution lights (Figure 3) are
provided for both pilot and co-pilot positions.
Main Rotor Ice Protection is provided by electrical heating of the MR
blades (sequential heating of six leading edge zones along the blade
span). Tail Rotor Ice Protection is provided by continuous heating of
the leading edge of the four blades.
Electrical power is provided by two Main Gearbox mounted AC generators.
Electrical power to the blades is controlled by a control box and
distributed through distribution boxes and slip rings. Atmospheric
information is provided to the control box by Outside Air Temperature
Sensors and Ice Detectors sensors (Liquid Water Content - LWC). The
Ice Detectors and windshield heating are active at all times with the
IPS ON.
The MR de-icing system works in AUTO by allowing a small amount of
ice to accrete on each leading edge zone and then sequential heating
of each zone causes the ice to be shed. It is normal, therefore, to see
an increase in torque required that will cycle up and down in accordance
with the heating cycles. Part of the torque increase (2 – 3%) is
due to the power required by the AC generators which also supply the
TR anti-ice function when the IPS is set to AUTO mode.
The torque variation, due to ice, can be expected to be around 5 ÷
15%, depending on OAT, LWC, and Water Droplet size (Mean Volumetric
Diameter - MVD) when the system is working in icing conditions.
Higher torque increase may be experienced in more severe
icing conditions (higher LWC, larger MVD), but such conditions do not
occur frequently in the atmosphere.
No rotor unbalance is to be expected as a consequence of ice shed,
because of the symmetric 5 MR blades heating and the continuous TR
blades heating.
Ice shedding from the MR will be experienced during system functioning
in ice and this can occasionally be seen and heard, with small
pieces of ice striking the windscreens.
With the IPS selected ON and in AUTO mode on the overhead panel
(See Figure 1), an encounter with ice is indicated by the ICING caution
illumination on the MFD CAS, when OAT is less than +4°C and LWC
values being shown on the IPS Panel ICE SEVERITY window (See
Figure 2). Icing is also indicated by a build up of ice on visible aircraft
structure, e.g. unheated area of windscreens, wiper arms, SLD
marker.
The SLD marker is a composite sphere, installed on the right side of
the fuselage, in view of the pilot through the lateral screen. It is
designed to help the pilot visually detect if SLD conditions are encountered.
The sphere has a black central circle with yellow and red rings
around it. Ice accretion can be easily seen on the black marker.
A MANUAL mode is provided, selectable by the pilot, that overrides
the normal control system and applies the maximum possible heating
to the MR blades.
Different types of ice will form on the aircraft depending on the icing
conditions. The main types of ice are Glaze and Rime. Glaze ice is
clear and will tend to form at higher sub-zero temperatures (0°C to -
5°C) and is more likely with higher LWC and larger droplets. This type
of ice can generate high drag increase to occur due to the shape that
forms. Rime ice is white and opaque and tends to form at lower temperatures
with smaller droplets. Rime ice forms in a more streamlined
shape and causes a smaller increase in aircraft drag. It is possible to
have a mixture of both, which is know as Glime or Mixed Ice.
Flight in Freezing Rain or Freezing Drizzle is not permitted because it
is not covered by the current Airworthiness Rules for any type of aircraft.
Freezing Rain and Drizzle (also known as Supercooled Large
Droplets - SLD) consists of supercooled water droplets of sizes
greater than the EASA/FAA CS/Part 29 Appendix C, atmospheric definition
used for Certification. These conditions, although rare, have a
serious effect on any aircraft’s performance. Pilots must use normal
operational planning and techniques to avoid flight in these conditions.
If encountered inadvertently, the conditions must be vacated immediately.

PILOT ACTIONS IN CASE OF SEVERE ICE ENCOUNTERS
Severe icing conditions are indicated by some or all of the following:
• High PI rise (>30% above normal for flight condition)
• Steady increase in base PI with heating cycles
• High LWC (>1.5 g/m3)
• Heavy amounts of water streaming across windscreens
• Evidence of SLD (ice forming on sides of aircraft, SLD
Marker)
• Increase in vibration
• Tendency for significant speed loss.
Actions:
• Reduce speed to 80 KIAS
• Select 102% NR
• Use up to 110% PI
• Check for system failures
• Select MAN
— if PI reduces Select AUTO, and use MANUAL to
reduce subsequent PI rise.
— if PI does not reduce, or rises steadily, select AUTO
and do not select MAN again (possible runback ice)
• Change altitude – severe ice conditions are usually near the
top of the clouds
• Consider vacating icing conditions if severity does not reduce

Just a copy&paste from the supplement

Regards
Aser

[ODEN]

Txs Aser :)

[P2bleed]

There was a rumour floating around about a possible upgradeto 7.1t. Was this just a rumour or actual news?

Apologies if this has been raised before.

[Shawn Coyle]

Look up the definition of Severe Icing to see why no-one is approved for flight in that condition.

[sycamore]

Surprised that there is no mention of icing on the horizontal stabiliser,as it can make pitch control `interesting` in some helos..

[noooby]

It is heated by the exhaust stream pretty much across the whole span, as you can tell by the amount of exhasut soot that collects on it! :)
So it probably doesn't get any ice forming on it, same with the fin.

[Arcal76]

Well,I can tell you that we do not wait to fly in this conditions:\ the system still do not work at this time and we don't know if it is gone be usable this Winter.We don't know how much ice we will get on the horizontal stab and the vertical fin,but we know that if we have ice on it,it is a no go for take-off.The slip ring problem is supposed to be fixed,so will see,but we all anticipate serious problem and some epic flights if it works.

[Swinging Spanner]

Hi nooby-spot on with the BOV filters to clean 1st.

The other thing I would/have done after cleaning BOV filters is checking BOV closure point. I have found over time that making a mark on hex adjustment shaft-then move 1 full turn in & out and then return to original position. Yet to confirm from PWC but this has affected BOV closure behaviour.

Also I would suggest "matching" BOV closure point to within 0.5% Ng of #1 & #2...again affecting this behaviour in cruise.

If you go to trouble of swapping after all that-once removed check the valve for smooth travel by moving with your fingers.

Good luck :)

[KiwiRotorWrench]

Wondering what percentage of 139's have glass or heated glass windshields?
We do have plain glass and have busted 4 each ( 1 RH, then 2 LH and just now the second RH) in the space of 14 months and 103 flt hours.

PPG says FOD impact, but we only go airport taxiway to airport taxiway 99.99% of the time. Always hangared.
Anyone with glass seen any micro chipping or such and not had window shatter.

PPG says that the specification for airworthiness is 10% damage depth and still OK, ie 0.012" is limit for damage on each layer of 0.125 glass. I measured our last FOD crush mark and got around 0.007", but optical micrometer will get more accurate data when returned to PPG.

Fly to Philly tomorrow to let AW investigate and determine if we have a freak airframe with a weird frequency or vibe and/or flexing nose section. Owner will not fly in again until cause is found.

Anyone got any info on glass windshield reliability, care to respond.

Thanks in advance
KC

[cbox chip]

There was an issue with ppg glass windows on Bell mediums a little while ago, our fleet had three or 4 new ppg glass windshields crack, two cracked with the aircraft just sitting on the ground.

I believe it came down to a run of mis-formed windows, they were not contoured to match the airframe and when installed were put under constant stress.

I would check to see that the windshields fit properly when installing the next ones.

[KiwiRotorWrench]

Oh yeah, we are down on shimming and trimming and radiusing inside edges after 4 of these. Third window (2nd LH) took 3 attempts to get a window that didn't arrive with defects or would actually fit in airframe contour of opening without rocking from corner to corner.

Coincidentally our first one happened in our hangar overnight too. That has the "experts" stumped

Cheers
KC

[noooby]

Wow, you've been unlucky!

I've done a couple of glass windscreen installs and they fitted perfect.

No trimming, all holes lined up perfect, no shimming required, fitted the curvature of the airframe perfectly.

Both plastic screens off and glass on and sealed in 8 hours.

They have been on for more than 3 years with no issues and I've seen a 5 year old machine still with original glass windscreens with no issues or damage.

A bad batch perhaps?

I have only fitted them to AW machines, not Philly machines. Having accepted machines from both factories, I would have to say the Italians put out a better product. Hard to believe I know!

[cbox chip]

5 years is nothing. Our ships get new windshields during heavy overhauls and that would be 10+years of sandblasting and abuse.

[lowfat]

We have 3, 2 with heated glass screens the other is plastic. we have had 1 screen failure LH at around 15 hours (Italian machine). No problems since and around 1200 hours.
The heated screen inverters Keep failing must have had 3 or 4 now. Pain as they are under the cabin floor.

[cbox chip]

Whaaa a windshield cracked with 15hrs TT on the machine? How does that even happen?

[KiwiRotorWrench]

Yeah, unlucky is one way of putting it! Our ship is an Italian built one from Oct 2006. The original windscreens lasted 5 years and approx 350 hours. Next two have lasted 25 and 103 hours over 14 months. Serial numbers start with the year and have been 08, 10, 11 and now 12.
A couple of replacements that arrived were U/S due to possible cracking in edge and one that rocked from either corner to corner in opening and a worst gap originally of 0.125?. Last replacement of LH window was done at annual insp due to one of the earlier replacements having a 2" band of distortion along the bottom edge and took 5 hours to have out and replaced. My opinion of PPG QA is pretty average at the moment.

Interested to know if anyone is flying around with glass that has minor pitting from FOD or ?? and if so is it just 1 or 2 impact/crush points or is it numerous.

As I implied we are not flying out of a gravel pit in East B*mfu*k and can't recall where we might have picked up so many FOD impacts, unless it's those stuffy corporate jets at the airports we go to throwing up sand in our face!

https://mail-attachment.googleusercontent.com/attachment/u/0/?ui=2&ik=29babfea7d&view=att&th=13332d4444af37d5&attid=0.2&disp=inline&realattid=f_gu4kkr4e1&safe=1&zw&saduie=AG9B_P9s_4Mttj7anL0G__2n-yP2&sadet=1345936740687&sads=HLHIyVfOYDaPxZeVnh_DCr8UxOo

[cbox chip]

EASA CS29 and FAA FAR-29 regulations require that:

The aircraft is able to continue safe flight and landing (Cat A) or safe landing
(Cat B) following impact with a single 1kg bird at the greater of the maximum
safe airspeed (VNE) or maximum level-flight airspeed at rated power (VH) (at up
to 8,000 ft).

How do these windshields manage to pass that requirement and crack while sitting on the ground? I recognize that there is a difference between a crack and having a 2lb bird go right through the laminated sections of glass but come on.

[BluenGreen]

The Aussie MRH90 has been going through lots of windscreens. NHI (with AW in there somewhere) say it is probably FOD related - the composite airframe transmits much more stress to the windscreen, then any small chip or thermal imbalance can set up a crack mechanism. Might be the same for 139. NHI fix is to mount windscreen with more flexible "glue", have slightly larger locating holes, and fit a clear film on the outside. The film has been trialled and works really well.

[MTNHELI]

Hello folks,

I was hoping to get some help solving this mystery. I have had the same results on 3 separate aircraft.

When plugged in to the single cabin ICS panel and trying to speak over the cabin PA system there is this constant overbearing squealing feedback which renders the message all but unreadable. I have followed the instructions in the manuals and every possible variation of settings on the control panel and used different headsets.

Any feedback would be appreciated. Thanks.

Jeremy

[9Aplus]

This is normal.....
Parasitic oscillation is an undesirable oscillation caused by feedback.The problem occurs notably in [/URL]audio and other (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parasitic_oscillation#cite_note-0) electronic amplifiers. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parasitic_oscillation#cite_note-2) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parasitic_oscillation#cite_note-4)
Parasitic oscillation is undesirable for several reasons. The oscillations may radiate from the circuit, causing interference to other devices. The oscillations waste power and may cause undesirable heating. For example, an audio power amplifier that goes into parasitic oscillation may generate enough power to damage connected speakers[URL="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loudspeaker"]. A circuit that is oscillating will not amplify linearly, so desired signals passing through the stage will be distorted. In digital circuits, parasitic oscillations may only occur on particular logic transitions and may result in erratic operation of subsequent stages; for example, a counter stage may see many spurious pulses and count erratically.


If you insist to speak from inside PAX area you need one extra
piece of electronic kind of phase inverter in line after your mike, or you need to manually reduce volume on PA on appropriate level before parasite oscillation starts. Tip: Go and talk from cockpit....

[spinwing]

Mmm ...

Check you headset microphones ... they possibly need their modulations adjusted ...

We have found that Dave Clark H10-13H headsets (with the Electret mics) work very well as standard with the Aw139 avionics set up.

Good luck ...

[MTNHELI]

We have quite a few of these ships in our fleet and they are all configured similarly with the single cabin comm panel. I will look into that modulation adjustment on the mics and we may have to set aside a kit for "cabin only" headsets if that fixes it. There are no problems with David Clarks, or any other brand, on our standard 139 cockpit avionics systems.

@9Aplus
I think we've all experienced normal feedback from a speaker to a microphone, and thats what I tried to compensate for by trying "every possible variation of the settings" as I said. Oh, and thanks for the tip but its not me who insists on speaking from the cabin, its the customer, I'm fine doing it from my seat and the PA works great from there. If there were an additional piece of electronic phased inverter needed one would assume that the manufacturer would know this and it would be installed...

Being that Agusta sold us all these ships with this configuration, and the few I've tested are all producing the same results, we'll probably need to get their help in figuring it out. I just wanted to see if anyone has had similar experience with this particular aircraft in a similar configuration and if they found a solution.

I'm just a pilot trying to help my guys out. Thanks for the suggestions. :ok:

[MTNHELI]

Most of ours are glass but I have seen at least two without. The scratches from the wipers are the biggest problem with those non-glass types from what I can see.

As for the cracking; I can't speak from experience on the AW139s but I have seen a bad batch of UH60 glass from PPG in the past. During one 45 day training exercise in the California desert we replaced around 15 (I think it was more) panels, one day after the next, both LH and RH on multiple aircraft. At first we were thinking it was caused by intense heat changes inside and out but we ruled that out, then we were afraid the install procedures/shimming was being done wrong, ruled that out as well after having a dozen or so people involved in supervising the process. Eventually chocked it up to a bad batch. We eventually got through that batch and never had problems again.

As for the pitting; Some of our S76s have glass that is so old that you can see micro pitting and scratches across the whole panel, looks as if its been on there for 20 years or more. It is not noticeable unless you really look up close though. Now that was a good batch of glass!

[9Aplus]

One more on my mind you may have problem wirh ANR sistem switched ON PA.... Your speaking is treated like common noise.....

[John Eacott]

I picked this up from BookFace: surprised that we haven't mentioned it on Rotorheads yet? 1800 hours on the blade,

This is what happened during our flight on the 7th of Sep 2012 on you way back from Gilgit(OPGT) to Islamabad(OPRN) on the 139. Experienced strong vibrations at 120 kts, reducing speed to 60 Kts did not help our case, hence had to force land in huripur, 10 mins short of OPRN. The first skin of the blade was pealed off. Did field repairs and changed the blade, flying back to base early next morning.

http://www.eacott.com.au/gallery/d/5131-2/AW139+debond+1.jpg

http://www.eacott.com.au/gallery/d/5133-1/AW139+debond+2.jpg

http://www.eacott.com.au/gallery/d/5139-2/AW139+debond+4.jpg

http://www.eacott.com.au/gallery/d/5136-2/AW139+debond+3.jpg

[spinwing]

Mmmm ...

MAX .... what do you think of this 'de-bond' ?? :eek:



(Perhaps this is a 'once off' ... I hope!).

[blakmax]

Firstly the terminology is wrong. This is a delamination, not a disbond.

My initial thoughts are that the white surface is suspicious. When composites are supplied there is a release ply on the surface so that the roll of material does not stick to itself on the roll. That release material is usually left in place until the next ply is just about to be laminated over the top of it. The release ply is then removed. If it is not removed, then there is a very high probability of delamination. I suspect that this is the case, but to be sure I would require a sample of the white material.

If this is the case, there has been a QA stuff-up in processing the laminate. Good QA practice would require checking every release ply has been removed either by visual examination prior to the next laminate being applied and/or by reconstructing all of the release plies after the lamination process.

What concerns me about these pictures is the "no disbond" notes on the areas surrounding the delamination. This is a very clear indication of how totally ineffective NDI is. It would be an absolute miracle if that release material was limited only to the delamination area. What is happening is that there is sufficient contact around the delamination between the release ply and the next layer that ultrasound (or tap testing) can not find the release material. It will be there, NDI just can not find it.

People need to understand the limitations of NDI. It can only find some defects when there is an air gap. It is a negative test, not a positive test. Passing NDI is not definite evidence of airworthiness.

Regards

Blakmax

PS Hi Spinwing. Good to hear from you again.

[spinwing]

Mmmm ...

Thank you for the input Max ....

.... I wonder what Agusta will have to say about it !

[Outwest]

Heard a rumor that Agusta is doing flight testing to amend the performance graphs to discontinue the use of 102% Nr.

Apparently they think 102% is creating a harmonic that is causing the failure of the rotor brake actuators.

How many of you are using 102% on a consistent basis, i.e. all take-offs/landings, only PC 1 take-offs/landings, only heli-deck take-off/landings?

[139GoM]

In our operation 102% used only during CAT A operations. This is as per the RFM. I have noticed/heard other operators using 102% all the time. This is not correct. I know this will cause some debate, just ask Augusta or show in the RFM where it says you can other than performing CAT A.

[Granny11]

102% NR is also required for hoist operations.