View Full Version : Are we facing a safety issue?
Michael Moore's pointing out something no one in the media seems to want to discuss: How little money the people who are flying commercial planes are getting paid. As he says, these are not the people you want working a second job:
We're on the descent from 20,000 feet in the air when the flight attendant leans over the elderly woman next to me and taps me on the shoulder.
"I'm listening to Lady Gaga," I say as I remove just one of the ear buds. I know not this Lady Gaga, but her performance last week on SNL was fascinating.
"The pilots would like to see you in the cockpit when we land," she says with a southern drawl.
"Did I do something wrong?"
"No. They have something to show you." (The last time an employee of an airline wanted to show me something it was her written reprimand for eating an in-flight meal without paying for it. "Yes," she said, "we have to pay for our own meals on board now.")
The plane landed and I stepped into the cockpit. "Read this," the first officer said. He handed me a letter from the airline to him. It was headlined "LETTER OF CONCERN." It seems this poor fellow had taken three sick days in the past year. The letter was a warning not to take another one -- or else.
"Great," I said. "Just what I want -- you coming to work sick, flying me up in the air and asking to borrow the barf bag from my seatback pocket."
He then showed me his pay stub. He took home $405 this week. My life was completely and totally in his hands for the past hour and he's paid less than the kid who delivers my pizza.
I told the guys that I have a whole section in my new movie about how pilots are treated (using pilots as only one example of how people's wages have been slashed and the middle class decimated). In the movie I interview a pilot for a major airline who made $17,000 last year. For four months he was eligible -- and received -- food stamps. Another pilot in the film has a second job as a dog walker.
"I have a second job!," the two pilots said in unison. One is a substitute teacher. The other works in a coffee shop. You know, maybe it's just me, but the two occupations whose workers shouldn't be humpin' a second job are brain surgeons and airline pilots. Call me crazy.
I told them about how Capt. "Sully" Sullenberger (the pilot who safely landed the jet in the Hudson River) had testified in Congress that no pilot he knows wants any of their children to become a pilot. Pilots, he said, are completely demoralized. He spoke of how his pay has been cut 40% and his own pension eliminated. Most of the TV news didn't cover his remarks and the congressmen quickly forgot them. They just wanted him to play the role of "HERO," but he was on a more important mission. He's in my movie.
"I hadn't heard anywhere that this stuff about the airlines is in this new movie," the pilot said.
"No, you wouldn't," I replied. "The press likes to talk about me, not the movie."
And it's true. I've been surprised (and slightly annoyed) that, with all that's been written and talked about "Capitalism: A Love Story," very little attention has been paid the mind-blowing stuff in the film: pilots on food stamps, companies secretly taking out life insurance policies on employees and hoping they die young so the company can collect, judges getting kickbacks from the private prison industry for sending innocent people (kids) to be locked up. The profit motive -- it's a killer.
Especially when your pilot started his day at 6am working at the local Starbucks.
Alright, that is not really new, but my question is, what can we do? Is the situation going to get worse in the future? And the most important: Is it going to influence safety?
Is that a supply and demand (too many pilots trained) issue?
Is that because of the recession only?
How about the fuel price in the next few years?
Are we about to face a change, or the end of this career?
Bruce Wayne
14th Oct 2009, 11:40
As long as lowest priced tickets are available they will live happy with the mis-understanding that pilots earn hundreds of thousands a year, live in big executive homes, send thier progeny to private schools and have a yacht on the med.
Unfortunately the media and the travelling public don't really five a t0ss as long as ticket prices stay bargain low.
Flight_Idle
14th Oct 2009, 12:13
As a non pilot, I have difficulty understanding how a UK airline Captain can be earning £100,000+ per year & junior first officers maybe a third of that, yet the OP states that some American pilots earn $17,000 per year.
Is the rate of pay in the UK & America so different?
170to5
14th Oct 2009, 12:25
Yep...but if we're not careful, we'll be equal before too long...
Maybe I should give the source of the article:
Michael Moore: Do You Want Airline Pilots to Be Working Two Jobs? | Crooks and Liars (http://crooksandliars.com/susie-madrak/michael-moore-do-you-want-airline-pil)
The title is: Do you want airlines pilot working two jobs?
I don't know to what extend Michael Moore tell the truth and don' t exagerate, but when I read this article, first I feel it is the reality of many pilots, and second I start wondering about the future, about safety.
So here you are: an other questions I am asking you, does this unconfortable pilot situation concerns only north american and low cost companies, or is that a general and worldwide trend and phenomenon?
Bruce Wayne:
Unfortunately the media and the travelling public don't really five a t0ss as long as ticket prices stay bargain low.
The low cost tickets... But are we carrying more passenger with less pilots than before yes or not? Low cost tickets should mean low pilot salaries?
Flying idle:
As a non pilot, I have difficulty understanding how a UK airline Captain can be earning £100,000+ per year & junior first officers maybe a third of that, yet the OP states that some American pilots earn $17,000 per year.
Here is a real issue: A new F/O should have the possibility to work on his knowledge, procedures, aircraft systems instead of working in an other unrelated field. Here is one aspect of the safety issue right?
Fitter2
14th Oct 2009, 12:40
Michael Moore: Do You Want Airline Pilots to Be Working Two Jobs? | Crooks and Liars (http://redirectingat.com/?id=42X487496&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcrooksandliars.com%2Fsusie-madrak%2Fmichael-moore-do-you-want-airline-pil)
I assume the last three words are the job titles of the author of the article - honesty for a change...........
Beanbag
14th Oct 2009, 12:43
Of course these salaries seem crazy, but remember nobody is forcing these guys to work for peanuts. They're all well educated people, they could get other jobs, but they choose to fly because they love it. And since deregulation the airlines have been able to exploit that.
We should also remember that there are far more jobs for pilots now than there were before deregulation - force salaries - and fares - up and there'll be fewer jobs.
It's a trade-off - few people would deny that it's gone too far in one direction, but there will be consequences that not everyone will like of pushing back in the other direction. And then of course there's the question of exactly how one might push back in the other direction. Government regulation to increase air fares wouldn't be an easy political sell.
flying headbutt
14th Oct 2009, 12:56
The fact is that many of the new joiners to the industry in the UK, at some of the leading players are not even getting paid. Some are even paying circa 30,000 pounds upfront for a few hundred hours on a shiny jet (not including the cost of getting their licence). Others are 90,000 in debt, get 1000 pounds a month "allowance" - which is actually their own money that they're getting back (otherwise they'd be paying tax and national insurance on it), to be unceremoniously shown the door after six months to be replaced by the next starry eyed wannabe. But we all know this, and nobody seems to give much of a sh*t. Safety best practice, hmmm????:ugh: Unfortunately, this is now becoming the norm worldwide. When it ends in tears with a smoking hole it'll already be too late. First officers have become a revenue stream when in fact they should be there as capable 2 second in commands.:yuk:
Fitter 2:
I assume the last three words are the job titles of the author of the article - honesty for a change...........
Yes, that is why I have added the source.
Still, who would have thought 10 years ago that Michael Moore would be interested by the supposed "demise" of the airline pilots? Itself it is something.
Speaking about Irak, Weapon industry, capitalism, I think we all can understand (agree or disagree), knowing who the guy is. But airline pilots?
Beanbag:
Of course these salaries seem crazy, but remember nobody is forcing these guys to work for peanuts. They're all well educated people, they could get other jobs, but they choose to fly because they love it. And since deregulation the airlines have been able to exploit that.
What about the airlines, the training industry?
Let' s say the accident rate rises a bit, and that we even evaluate that in some cases, that is because fatigue, low salaries... Who is responsable?
Training industry? The crew? The airline?
So first we have to evaluate wether there is a link or not between low wages and safety. If this is the case, who has to do something?
Curiously, and by almost complete coincidence, I came across this thread just after posting (several times) on this forum (http://www.ybw.com/forums/showthread.php?t=216578) on a related point (my handle over there is "Observer"). I think this is a real worry and I wish I could feel it is more widely recognised in the air travel industry. Anyway, I hope you guys (commercial pilots) appreciate that some of the SLF you carry have some understanding of your concerns.
Some of the most beautiful antebellum mansions in the port city near me were built a hundred years ago by ship captains. They were the very cream of society in the 1800's.
Now, my uncle is a ship captain in the Gulf of Mexico. At the age of 55 he makes about $70,000 U.S. a year - which happens to be the median income of the U.S.
It's the Law of Entropy, applied to career earnings. Nothing we can do, I guess... go to law school and learn to sue people if you want to make a killing.....
atpcliff
14th Oct 2009, 13:36
Hi!
There is proposed legistlation in the (US) Congress, that will require ALL Part 121 (Domestic, Regional and Supplemental airlines that fly large aircraft, ie: Delta, Mesa, FedEx, USA Jet) carriers to employ ONLY pilots that have an ATP-MEL (same as the ICAO ATPL).
So, all new hires would need an ATP, which has, as part of its' requirements, at least 1500 hours TT. Under 1500 hours? No ATP. No -121 airline job.
It seems that pay would go up for new joiners.
cliff
NBO
PS-I applied, in 2000, to a number of US -121 airlines, with my ATP-MEL, and was told by most that I was unqualified. At the same time, they were hiring guys with 500 hours TT. Too bad for me!
GXER.....very interesting link.
The common thread among posters was their appreciation of getting value for money, particularly the individual who is proud to book tickets months in advance for 1 Euro a time.
I would be loathe to eat a fast food hamburger offered for 1 Euro............(how could I be sure of the origin of the meat or the age and contents of the frying fat for example, let alone the hygenic habits of the cook !).
So where low cost means no newspapers, drinks, bags and boarding cards and this is visible to the punters then they can make a straightforward and informed evaluation.between service providers.
But if all the cost components taken in to consideration in running a safe airline are reviewed, then surely lower cost must be eating in to the efficacy of these operations and therefore the punter who is proud to pay 1 Euro or 26 Euros is surely gambling based upon an area of operations about which they can have little or no knowledge and therefore can have no informed opinion on what "value" they are receiving.
Checkboard
14th Oct 2009, 17:07
As a non pilot, I have difficulty understanding how a UK airline Captain can be earning £100,000+ per year & junior first officers maybe a third of that, yet the OP states that some American pilots earn $17,000 per year.
Is the rate of pay in the UK & America so different?
A turbo prop freight pilot in the UK is on a similar wage, and turboprop and instructors un the UK aren't a world apart ...
Whiskey Papa
14th Oct 2009, 17:08
I would be loathe to eat a fast food hamburger offered for 1 Euro
Wrong comparison there! A one penny flight is available today with Ryanair. It's common knowledge that the FR fleet is the newest in the industy, and for all FR's faults, I've never seen any suggestion that their maintainance/operation procedures isn't up to scratch. This thread is about flight crew incomes, and that dosn't seem to relate to the airline being either legacy or lo-co.
WP
Well WP, in my opinion a reasonable comparison because those costs are hidden from me and I cannot have an informed opinion.
But just to choose one area related to this thread, does BA charge junior pilots for their type ratings and flying experience and then show them the door after 6 months ? does Ryanair or any of the other locos ? I am happy to be informed by a source who is close to the action.......
Is there evidence to suggest that a younger fleet needs less maintenance in the short term and that clever bulk purchasing can create a short term model which may not be sustainable in the long term ?......
Whats your definition of "common knowledge" as opined in your post, is that based on informed opinion ?
In hindsight however, I can see that spiralling house values, overinflated stocks and consumerism based on the never never had to come to a crashing stop, even though, once again, I personally had no informed opinion on the weak debt structures of the financial sector.
I just remember the old saying "no such thing as a free lunch".
However, if anyone can explain to me in an informed way that it is possible to deliver a very cheap fare structure without compressing crew salaries, as I have written I am willing to be open minded about how the "magic formula" works.
mercurydancer
14th Oct 2009, 17:54
Ryanair does post fares for one penny, but after all the additions its not far from the other airlines, its just their gimmick. I have few safety concerns about Ryanair because if I did I wouldnt fly with them. The crew on every flight Ive flown with Ryanair have been polite and reasonable, its the set-up that makes passengers feel like cattle, which is bearable for a short while but not my preference. As an airline its ways arent the worst lo-co UK outfit, BMI Baby takes that position, and for my money, the best - Easyjet.
BA is not likely to get a fare from me for two reasons- they provide the same level of service as Ryanair for a lot more money and secondly, Heathrow. I loathe travelling from there and will avoid it at all costs.
US crew are indeed getting a bad deal but a low cost operation need not be either unsafe nor pay stupidly low salaries. Michael Moore has a knack for pressing the right buttons when needed. I'm glad hes doing what hes doing despite his political associations. If anything we need more Moores.
robertbartsch
14th Oct 2009, 18:04
I thought the U.S. government's PBGC (Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp) insured employees vested defined benefit pensions in cases where the employer became insolvent, declaried bankruptcy and elected to reject pension claims.
In cases where the pilots "lost" pensions, did this involve "voluntarily" exchanging vested pension rights for future employment contract rights when a carrier restructured in or out of bankruptcy?
Thx.
lomapaseo
14th Oct 2009, 18:08
I just can't seem to develop a link in my head between pilot poor pay and safety performance.
I guess if Michael Moore says so there must be something rotten.
But aren't all pilots motivated to save themselves as well as their passenger's or is there a suicidal urge somewhere to end it all?
Based on what I have read I thought that safety was supposed to be tied to the money grubbing big businesses sending out our airplane tied together with speed tape. But if Michel is on to something could we as passengers just add in a few bucks per ticket each and guarantee that our crew is well fed and happy enough to fly the damn plane.
Perhaps there should be a tip jar at the exit doors to ensure our money is well spent and that we survived long enough to reward the crew.
I'll get my coat I was just leaving
angelorange
14th Oct 2009, 18:17
"As an airline its ways arent the worst lo-co UK outfit, BMI Baby takes that position, and for my money, the best - Easyjet."
Actually bmi baby pay their pilots reasonably well and don't charge masses for type ratings unlike RYR. As for EZY just look at this thread:
http://www.pprune.org/terms-endearment/390845-easyjet-holding-pool-2.html
Some FO's only offered a few weeks work having forked out £100k in training through an approved scheme......
Gary Lager
14th Oct 2009, 18:23
Pilots on low wages aren't a safety risk becasue they don't care about doing a good job, but because they may:
- have to take two jobs = fatigue risk
- be burdened by debt = distraction, and easily threatened by airlines (safety culture, working practices etc)
- not necessarily be the best candidate for the post, but just the one who can pay for it i.e. training/the job (literally, paying to fly) the lifestyle by having another income stream
Whilst FOs coming into jet jobs in the EU/UK aren't on the kind of wage highlighted in Moore's article, most of them will have anywhere between £30000 (£50000 if they have a degree) and £100000 of debt, whilst still in their early twenties, and without a mortgage. Similar problem.
No matter how much people want to do the job, if it doesn't pay enough to live on compared to other jobs requiring an equivalent level of qualification, the talent will desert the industry and we will get left with the monkeys earning peanuts and the talentless playboys.
angelorange
14th Oct 2009, 18:26
"Continental Connection Flight 3407, which crashed on Feb. 12 as it prepared to land at Buffalo-Niagara International Airport, killing all 49 aboard and one man in a house below.
Testimony at a National Transportation Safety Board hearing in May indicated the flight's captain and first officer made a series of critical errors leading up to the accident, possibly because they were fatigued or unwell. The flight was operated for Continental by Colgan Air Inc. of Manassas, Va.
Documents released by NTSB show the 24-year-old co-pilot earned less than $16,000 the previous year, which was her first year working for the regional air carrier. On the day of the crash she said she felt sick, but didn't want to pull out of the flight because she'd have to pay for a hotel room."
from : US Congress Airline safety is on US lawmakers agenda - eTurboNews.com (http://www.eturbonews.com/10679/airline-safety-us-lawmakers-agenda)
surely not
14th Oct 2009, 18:33
Maybe the rapid advances being made with UAV's will solve the problem? Only a few ground controllers to pay when they take over, so their rate of pay can be suitably large.
Just take a look at Asia now gentleman. Why is that in Japan and China they can not find people willing to fly as Pilots ? Most middle managers in these countries earn much more than a beginner pilot and that is why they are outsourcing to us in the west.
By the way I am a captain and earning a salary that I was paid in 2001, but happy to be working. With the way the roster is I don't have time to take a second job.
Lomapaseo:
But aren't all pilots motivated to save themselves as well as their passenger's or is there a suicidal urge somewhere to end it all?
Lomapaseo, you missed the point. Nobody said that being under paid will make you become suicidal, but may, indirectly affect safety if you have to take a second job to reimbourse your loan, to pay your rent... you got the idea.
And it seems that it is the reality for many, taking a second job. Here is the point.
I thought the U.S. government's PBGC (Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp) insured employees vested defined benefit pensions in cases where the employer became insolvent, declaried bankruptcy and elected to reject pension claims.
Yes but it is a set amount, regardless of your pension. And Airline pilot pensions were disproportionately large - typically half your final salary.
My uncle is a retired United pilot. The pension he worked for was somewhere north of $100k U.S. He's getting around $36k from the PBGC....
cityfan
14th Oct 2009, 19:26
Maximum PBGC benefit for Age 60 pilot was $28,500 when United Airlines pension was terminated. Average pilot pension after 30+ years was AT LEAST FOUR TIMES THAT.
cityfan
14th Oct 2009, 19:33
Funny you should mention ATC! In the US, they just signed a new contract that provides controllers about $160,000 on the top end AND a guaranteed Government pension at required retirement age of 55.
Compare that to a United Airlines 747-400 Captain, whose "normal" retirement age is now 65, whose pension has been terminated, and who currently earns $180,000 after 30 years on the job (something MOST controllers are unable to achieve due to the early retirement requirement).
You tell me who has the most stressful job with the greatest mental and physical demands for upto 18 hours per day. (Hint: It is NOT the controller!!)
cityfan
14th Oct 2009, 19:41
Alcohol and fatigue studies have PROVEN that the often chronic fatigue experienced by many, many pilots is akin to flying while drunk. However, because managements and the government have little or no interest in further restrictions of flight crew FT/DT, then we are not routinely "screened" for fatigue, only drugs and alcohol! Ironically, it is often those two things people revert to in order to TRY and recover some level of normalcy through "forced" sleep brought on by their effects.
cityfan
14th Oct 2009, 20:05
By the way I am a captain and earning a salary that I was paid in 2001, but happy to be working. With the way the roster is I don't have time to take a second job.
As a U.S. based Captain earning the same hourly rate as in 1991, with 18 flight days scheduled per month, and no more pension, I do not have the time to work a second job either, nor did I think I would ever need to!
Throw in the fact that it costs $200,000 to go through the university flight program I attended and one comes out the other end with about 250 hours of actual light aircraft flight time and some sim "experience," and one wonders who would EVER do this again?
The new hire FO position at my airline pays about $32,000 (~£19,000), we have just laid off the 1500 pilots (again) whose 12 years of experience were insufficient (not to mention their military careers or years of regional carrier experience!), grounded our 100 aircraft fleet of 737-300/500s, and entered into an international outsourcing agreement with Aer Lingus, who has ALSO just grounded aircraft and laid off about 500 pilots!!!
Throw in the fact that over 50% of the domestic flying at United Airlines is done by OUTSOURCED REGIONAL CARRIERS operating under a fee-for-departure system, and paying their pilots what that Colgan crew was getting, and there is clearly NO REASON for ANY reasonably intelligent person to EVER get involved in a flying CAREER ever again. Throw in the scheduling/rostering issues, and one would be FAR BETTER OFF getting a "real world" job and getting a 1/4 share of a light aircraft with at least one A&P owner and ENJOYING GOING FLYING when you want, to where you want.
Just sayin' :ugh:
mercurydancer
14th Oct 2009, 20:13
Angelorange
I was referring to my experience as a passenger. BMI Baby is pretty bad. From their website (which has a few nasty tricks when you actually book) to the continuation of a service or route its awful. Out of the 5 lo co I have flown with Easyjet is the one I prefer, although that amounts to which is the least worst experience rather than a comfortable one. As a matter of persepective flying out of MRV on a Tu 154 is more pleasant than flying out of EMA on BMI Baby.
lomapaseo;
I just can't seem to develop a link in my head between pilot poor pay and safety performance.
I guess if Michael Moore says so there must be something rotten.
But aren't all pilots motivated to save themselves as well as their passenger's or is there a suicidal urge somewhere to end it all?
Based on what I have read I thought that safety was supposed to be tied to the money grubbing big businesses sending out our airplane tied together with speed tape. But if Michel is on to something could we as passengers just add in a few bucks per ticket each and guarantee that our crew is well fed and happy enough to fly the damn plane.
Perhaps there should be a tip jar at the exit doors to ensure our money is well spent and that we survived long enough to reward the crew.
Under most circumstances, there is no direct link between a poorly-paid pilot and the safety of his or her flight. Clearly this principle does not obtain in the Colgan case, which I think is a serious indicator of this very problem but which will not be seen as such by any airline in the US or Canada. Of this, more in a moment.
The link is not resident within the individual pilot but within the much broader processes of who is coming into aviation and the nature of the pilot selection process.
This won't be taken well by anyone so I'll just say it bluntly: Those who have the native intelligence and personal discipline as well as the talents and strong motivations to make a good pilot are not coming into the profession anymore, simply because it is an atrociously-treated and horribly-paid profession with no security, no pension and no real respect or status within the business community and these candidates know this very well.
Instead, those with the necessary qualities and abilities are going into other, far more rewarding careers while those with stars in their eyes but perhaps without the same level of capabilities choose to go into flying. Please understand that I do not mean this unkindly - it needs to be stated that some are suited to aviation, most are not, and the qualities it takes to do airline flying safely and well are not that common. It is not a career one just "decides on day" to do. I won't elaborate further. It needs to be lived to understand this.
Although it is far reduced from a decade ago there is still a pilot pool to hire from but, and this is important to comprehend, standards have had to be lowered significantly to fill the seats.
Combine this with an absent regulator under SMS and the airlines will cut corners where they will, including in training. Productivity demands are very high and the issues of fatigue risk management have been dismissed by both the airlines and the regulator in Canada. (At least the FAA is saying something about this major concern).
One very big sign of this is the MCPL licence which puts what I consider a "non-pilot" into the right seat of medium and large size aircraft. An MCPL can't rent a Cessna 172 but can sit in an airliner as one of two pilots.
This initiative has been discussed at length and those interested can do a search of the threads on PPRuNe for further. I absolutely don't intend to insult anyone in this category but this is aviation and "being nice to people" sometimes creates unwarranted dangers and can even kill people so take this the way it is intended - as "advice" from experience and not an arrogance which is inappropriate in the cockpit.
As a (now retired) captain of 35 years and 20,000hrs or so who has flown all heavy transports except the B747, B777 and A300/310 series and spent a career in flight safey work, I do not want a 250hr simulator wonder helping me make decisions on the ramp about MEL items, fuel and the dozens of passengers items that come up during the cockpit check, or over the Atlantic or Pacific on weather diversions, TCAS responses, ETOPS diversions or alternate changes while enroute. I want an experienced First Officer and Augment Pilot up front while I'm back on my break who are disciplined, knowledgable, can use the radar intelligently and otherwise won't do something stupid outside of the SOPs.
The Colgan accident took a highly-motivated, marginally trained, poorly-paid First Officer who had no idea of the kind of airline she was working for and no concept of the overriding risks inherent in the working conditions and job on the Q400 she was doing. This was through and through an organizational accident and it's going to happen again because the standards have been lowered to fill the two seats up front. She was likely just super-glad to be flying for living and making it work just to get by. That said, she flew after commuting across the country, with a cold and with the knowledge that her training was indeed marginal. THAT is the reality of airline flying today and while there are many, many highly-experienced, highly-capable veterans flying for airlines today, that is slowly changing.
THAT is the connection between poor pilot pay and flight safety. No MBA is capable of seeing it because first of all they dont' believe it and second of all, they know nothing about aviation and flight safety work.
A lot more could be said, but it's all been said before, perhaps more politely but it's time to ditch that approach and convey some of the realities of airline flying today to those just getting their first job but especially to some SLF's (not you lomapaseo, who's contributions I always enjoy) who continue to offer their views but still will complain about air fares.
lomapaseo
14th Oct 2009, 20:18
KAG
Lomapaseo, you missed the point. Nobody said that being under paid will make you become suicidal, but may, indirectly affect safety if you have to take a second job to reimbourse your loan, to pay your rent... you got the idea.
And it seems that it is the reality for many, taking a second job. Here is the point.
A fair point, (my bold)
So let's address the primary issue, which is fatigue. IMO you shouldn't expect to throw money at problems hoping that you can buy your way out when you have no data to confirm it efficacy.
mercurydancer
14th Oct 2009, 20:29
SLF here who will continue to offer his views!
PJ2, In the main I applaud your approach to making the realities of today's airline practices known. As I said in a previous post, if it takes a Michael Moore to bring that into the very public forum then thats all to the benefit of the crew and the SLF.
EISNN
14th Oct 2009, 20:39
and entered into an international outsourcing agreement with Aer Lingus, who has ALSO just grounded aircraft and laid off about 500 pilots!!!
CityFan. Where did you get that info from? Aer Lingus have not laid off 500 pilots. Aer Lingus have 500 pilots approx. Aer Lingus have never laid off any operating pilots in the last 18 years that I know of. There are new cut backs being suggested and there are 100 pilots threatened with the chop but knowing the Aer Lingus guys.
As for the outsourcing agreement; Me thinks that might end up being a dead duck. Bookings are not that good from what I've heard.
Retire2015
14th Oct 2009, 20:47
I believe PJ2 accurately and concisely described the current situation.
R
mercurydancer;
Your posts are worth reading as well.
the benefit of the crew and the SLF.
Absolutely. The matter is far from simple. Deregulation has its strong side and benefits - airline flying CAN be done more cheaply and still safely. However, like all good things, the industry has said to itself, "Gee, size 9 fits so well I think I'll buy size 12."
Airline fares need to rise so that the industry can recover both experience and appropriate succession as thousands of experienced pilots retire and are replaced, by, some airline managments assume, automation - another long thread.
I have a great deal of difficulty accepting that normal people who wait in Starbuck's lineups for 15 minutes and spend nearly five bucks on designer lattes can sometimes go postal at the first sign of the same time and cost differences when it comes to airlines.
True, airlines have taught their customers that a dollar and a minute makes a "huge" difference so must share in these unrealistic expectations and sophisticated software programs have taken Bob Crandall's notions of loyalty programs and the selling of seats at different prices as departure time draws nigh, but it has been taken too far in an attempt to squeeze every last penny from their ATM machine, (as Sully said), their employees.
Because an airline's inventory evaporates and becomes worthless the moment the door is closed, selling it all before becomes really critical, so different prices apply to get bums in seats. But this industry has consistently sold its product, (time), for less than it costs them out of some hope that people will come and the enterprise can make some money. Notwithstanding the known fact that, like owning a sports team, owning an airline is sexy and puts one into a different category of entrepreneur, the business is heavily capitalised and always will be. That is a reality which escapes everyone, SLFs included.
Small raises in airline fares will make all the difference in the world for the industry, but the wailing and knashing of teeth that would follow keeps that change from happening. I just can't get over the fact that people will hand over a five dollar bill for a coffee and get a bit of change and then dump all over the airlines for "overcharging" when less than a man's lifetime ago, "safe airline travel" was an oxymoron.
mercurydancer
14th Oct 2009, 21:35
PJ2
As a matter of essential importance, the raising of air fares for the adequate training of air crew wont meet any objection from the vast majority of passengers. I certainly wouldn't object.
You are correct that owning and running an airline is a very challenging (I'm being kind in that comment) and so attracts the so called cream of the business world. Its certainly not tough. An airbus with both engines out and nowhere to go but into the Hudson is tough. The "tough" decisions are made by airline management in the interest of the shareholders. Flight crew are frequently the most harshly treated by airline management.
I would like to distinguish between bad airlines and bad crew. In the main if a passenger undergoes a horrible experience, it is provided by the airline as a whole and very very seldom during flight time. We in the back make a choice to where we want to go and how much we will pay to go there. We have no allegiance to shareholders of the airline. That is the crucial point. SLF have a vested interest in the safety of the aircraft and crew. If the airline bosses had any kind of business acumen at all it would be to advertise, very loudly, that their airline has the calibre of captain such as Capt Sullenberger, and would support the training and qualification of the best kind of pilot. This was one of the main reasons why BA was so successful. It had a structure for flight deck crew that was the finest in the world. It doesnt seem to do that nowadays. Would I be prepared to spend an additional 30 euros ( just a speculative figure) to provide such training then yes I'd pay it in a New York minute. I'd also hunt down the airline who said the addition was to go to pilot training and get on their aircraft.
As for people going postal at the aircraft, the worst I have ever been treated was by BA terminal staff (not crew) so by the time I got on board I was ready to strangle someone. Yes it was at Heathrow.
DingerX
14th Oct 2009, 22:19
Can I just butt in and say that I'm sick of the argument that "Safety in back is the fault of the meat in back that wants to pay so little?" If nothing else changed but that the tickets cost ten times as much, we'd still have the same problem. An administrator gets paid by cutting costs, regardless of the company's position. Two easy ways to cut costs are to cut salaries and to declare bankruptcy so that the pension fund might be raided.
In every civilized country, an airline ticket is issued guaranteeing transport to a minimum standard of safety, that the government ensures through regulation. In most places, the suits and marketing types get angry if one airline advertises its superior safety: safety is something that is supposed to be equal across airlines.
So it's not a problem higher ticket prices will resolve. And yes, passengers will seek the cheapest fare, but when that door closes, they forget about the ticket price.
The "efficiency experts" are always several steps ahead of the safety regulators, and several steps behind common business sense. So maybe it's time for a complete overhaul of regulation, considering that the crew's life and well-being as a whole has a direct impact on safety? There are ways to regulate a higher salary, the easiest of which is to reduce the pool of qualified personnel.
While they're at it, they can look at best practices for keeping the passengers calm. The latest batch of MBAs seems to have forgotten the wisdom of past generations: mammals become skittish and aggressive when enclosed together and denied food. Charging for meals may make a few bucks, but even giving out free crackers will calm the folks down and establish the proper power dynamic (provider-client as opposed to servant-patron), which, by the way, will help tremendously in an emergency.
An administrator gets paid by cutting costs, regardless of the company's position.
It reminds me the japanese CEO and president paid less than the captains in the japanese airlines...
While they're at it, they can look at best practices for keeping the passengers calm. The latest batch of MBAs seems to have forgotten the wisdom of past generations: mammals become skittish and aggressive when enclosed together and denied food. Charging for meals may make a few bucks, but even giving out free crackers will calm the folks down and establish the proper power dynamic (provider-client as opposed to servant-patron), which, by the way, will help tremendously in an emergency.
Most surprising affirmation I have ever read concerning safety... Interesting... Food for safety, who knows?
Dream Buster
15th Oct 2009, 07:19
Beanbag,
I am still uncomfortable that, as the BBC reported recently (again), BBC - Today - Can planes be poisonous? (http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_8270000/8270978.stm)
many young pilots are being diagnosed with brain damage and yet those same young, keen pilots are not being informed of the possible, known risks from contaminated air.
Officially, it still isn't an accepted risk despite all the evidence.
It may well affect only around 30% of people exposed but it strikes me as a little short sighted to keep this subject - so secret?
Aerotoxic Assiociation - Support for sufferers of Aerotoxic Syndrome (http://www.aerotoxic.org) for the facts.
DB:ok:
Oakape
15th Oct 2009, 07:32
DingerX,
Can I just butt in and say that I'm sick of the argument that "Safety in back is the fault of the meat in back that wants to pay so little?" If nothing else changed but that the tickets cost ten times as much, we'd still have the same problem.
Yes you are right, we would have the same problem. However I do believe that this is the basic underlying problem that has led us to the current situation. The LCC's told the public they could fly for less - much less & they bought it. Basic human nature. Pilots rushed to these new airlines as it was finally their chance to get into jets, as recruitment in the 'legacy' carriers was just a dribble. They thought that pay would improve as the new airlines became established. They were wrong! The public thought that they would continue to have a choice - higher priced airlines with all the service perks or the lower cost airlines where they gave up the service for a lower price. They were also wrong! The choice has almost ceased to exist as the 'legacy' carriers drive down cost in an effort to compete with LCC's & maintain market share. (Market share is everything to airline management). Service is starting to suffer.
Now that we are in this position, simply putting fares back up will not change anything as the airlines would simply say "thank you very much" & pocket the extra profit. As in most things in life, it will be quite difficult to restore what has been carelessly given away.
In every civilized country, an airline ticket is issued guaranteeing transport to a minimum standard of safety, that the government ensures through regulation. In most places, the suits and marketing types get angry if one airline advertises its superior safety: safety is something that is supposed to be equal across airlines.
To be blunt, this only exists in an ideal world. It is a myth that the travelling public foolishly believe when they rush to purchase their super cheap tickets. As they say, perception is everything! Governments are only interested in keeping the vested interest groups from clamouring too loud & business is a very vocal vested interest group across all industries. Also, regulation is simply a compromise between the desired outcome & the cost to achieve it. And to have any chance of working it requires adequate enforcement, something that most, if not all, regulators struggle with. Add to that mix, the issue of some airlines having considerable influence over their regulator in certain corners of the world & you have, at best, doubtful government assured minimum standards of safety.
The final resposibility for safety in the air rests with pilots, despite what the regulators & airline management would have the travelling public believe. The pilots who have perished, along with their passengers, in recent years didn't want to die. They were doing the best they could with their natural ability, the training they had been given & possibly the fatigue they were fighting on the day. The events that they were required to deal with were just too much for them, given their ability, training & fatigue levels.
In order for the safety standards to remain as high as possible, pilots need to be properly trained & that requires time & money, which relates directly to ticket prices. You also need to attract the best possible people to the profession & that requires adequate renumeration & decent rostering to provide lifestyle & fight fatigue. That also relates directly to ticket prices. However, I don't believe that the relationship between these costs & ticket prices is as significant as has been suggested by some here or by airline management.
The public needs to be informed of the cost vs safety issue in a clear & unemotional way. Then they can realisticly decide what level of safety they are willing to pay for. The governments won't be doing this any time soon & neither will the airlines. Perhaps it is time that airline pilots all over the world stop stepping on each other to get ahead & finally come together with a united voice to get the message across.
lomapaseo
15th Oct 2009, 15:05
Dream Buster
I am still uncomfortable that, as the BBC reported recently (again), BBC - Today - Can planes be poisonous?
many young pilots are being diagnosed with brain damage and yet those same young, keen pilots are not being informed of the possible, known risks from contaminated air.
Officially, it still isn't an accepted risk despite all the evidence.
It may well affect only around 30% of people exposed but it strikes me as a little short sighted to keep this subject - so secret?
Nice try at taking this thread further off-topic by slipping in your shop worn Advert for chicken-little nuggets:ok:
Dream Buster
15th Oct 2009, 19:55
Iompaseo,
Well i'm getting a bit fed up with telling people why they are seriously ill after a few years flying jets - the aviation doctors can't seem to work it out, whilst the specialists are just about to prove it - beyond reasonable doubt.
Both can't be right.
Ask Boeing, they have worked it out.
I'm so pleased that you don't appear to suffer (are you sure?), but just try to think of others....
DB :ok:
I read on these boards a consistently voiced concern, of those who should know, about the competency of future generations of flight crew. Does nobody in a position who should hear this concern actually hear it? Or do they turn a deaf ear?
GXER;
Does nobody in a position who should hear this concern actually hear it? Or do they turn a deaf ear?
No. Yes.
It is bureaucratically inconvenient and career-suicide to attempt to turn the tide from within. We in the ranks who witness the daily operational decision-making are as King Kanute sitting in his throne with his feet getting wetter.
This is because the level of flight safety in the industry is being taken for granted and this is because, as experience is lost (because it is expensive so the accountants highlight it as the first thing to go), the newbies assume that "aviation is safe now". That is because they have no concept, no idea of how aviation "got this safe".
To me it is as clear as the lines on my face and hands...the accident rate is going to rise because of this. The regulator in Canada is abdicating its responsibilities and handing safety over to private corporations: the airlines. It is the deregulation, and privatization of flight safety. An independent voice is disappearing from aviation and being replaced by compliant, ignorant, ambitious bureacrats both within the airlines and within the regulator.
Even if a serious aviation safety matter such as an airframe limitation exceedence occurs in Canada, the airline may "quietly" decide to fly the aircraft anyway if the regulator isn't around to oversee the decision-making process.
In Canada there is now no one to go to, to even inform of the fact let alone someone independent of the airlines to take action. In fact even if they knew, the regulator would not take action at this point in the development of SMS.
We cannot go to the Minister of Transport because it is to his benefit to have the responsibiity of flight safety off his desk and onto the airlines. The protection of the Minister is paramount. While complex, such dynamics fundamentally prevent an "open conversation" about flight safety issues under SMS as it is presently constituted. Thus there is no point in going to anyone under the Minister.
The industry is such that it can absorb such inattention for a period of time. Good processes have been built into the system and good flight safety work is done by all airlines in Canada. The failures of SMS will take a period of time to emerge; long enough that the original causes will be gone, along with those who made the decisions.
MaxBlow
16th Oct 2009, 07:33
I work 2 jobs now myself to support my family.
Job 1: Airline captain (to pay the bills)
Job 2: Driving a limo on my off days (pay for life)
I will continue doing this until the industry is picking up again. Than, I will probably quit job 1 because job 2 is easier work for almost the same pay...:{
framer
16th Oct 2009, 08:01
The industry is such that it can absorb such inattention for a period of time.
PJ2 is spot on with this. We are basically riding on the back of decades of hard work and it will take a while to become obvious that something has gone wrong. It is very obvious to us as airline pilots but that is because we understand what makes up flight safety, those creating the legislation may grasp some basic principals but they don't have an innate understanding of it like we do. We are the canaries in the mine in that we are the first to sense it.
IMO working a roster that gives plenty of free time is critical to flight safety and having to work two jobs is just downright dangerous. As a personal example; when I am flying 50 hours a month I am enthusiastic about each work day. Before the shift I will enjoy the opportunity to order a coffee, review the routes, muse over latest NOTAMS, review some system notes, check my company email for operational notices etc etc. I enjoy it and feel a sense of satisfaction because I am well prepared. When I am working nearly 100 hours a month I do little of that. All my spare time seems to be spent sleeping or catching up on household chores, personal paperwork and if I'm lucky a catch up with friends for a coffee. There is no doubt in my mind that I am much more efficient and safe when flying the lighter roster.
Where exactly is the line in the sand when the reduction in flight safety becomes unacceptable? 60hrs? 75 hours? Who knows because every individual is different. One thing though is obvious to me, we have crossed that line.
bear11
16th Oct 2009, 09:50
Forgive the intrusion (and I have no issues with the first half of your post), but surely in most airlines there is a mix of quiet months and busy months given the seasonal nature of the business, are you saying that it's unacceptable to have a mix? Even if you do 100 hours per month every month, FTLs will mean you have a few months off in most countries who have max 900/1,000 hours per year, let alone in some airlines where union agreements mandate less than that.
I don't dispute your safe comment, but how are you more efficient when you fly 50 hours a month? I might understand what you mean, however I can imagine the MBA man snorting when you make that comment. Equally, MBA man would snort when he hears words like "lifestyle" and "prestige" mutating into "safety", one is not the opposite of the other. I would agree mostly with sharksandwich - in some countries like the US currently, pay and safety are the opposite ends of the same spectrum given some pilots are paid so little they have to do other jobs, but for many still well-paid pilot jobs, pay and safety are not in the same ballpark.
I would suspect the line in the sand is not actual hours but the type of hours you are flying, ie; back of the clock / back to back shifts / length of shift or sectors and rest times, all of which makes it infinitely more complicated and easier for MBA man to ignore. Only legislators can cure this ill, MBA man will push the boundaries as far as he can.
framer
16th Oct 2009, 11:37
Even if you do 100 hours per month every month, FTLs will mean you have a few months off
Bear11, that statement makes me think that I didn't make my point well or that you are not a line pilot. Having two months off at the end of the years doesn't help you for the other ten months.
but how are you more efficient when you fly 50 hours a month?
Do you seriously not understand how a pilot can be more eficient when refreshed and enthusiastic than when knackered and just wanting the shift to end?
If you are not a line pilot then you have helped make my point that
It is very obvious to us as airline pilots but that is because we understand what makes up flight safety, those creating the legislation may grasp some basic principals but they don't have an innate understanding of it like we do. We are the canaries in the mine in that we are the first to sense it.
jurassicjockey
16th Oct 2009, 12:54
PJ2
I think that aviation is the most obvious example of the differences of thought in long term planning. For the CEO's, and RM is an obvious example, long term planning may go out as far as 6-months depending on the exact disposition of their profit sharing plan. For flight safety types, a decade is not unreasonable. The robber baron CEO's are very aware that they can ride the coat-tails of their predecessors for a year or two, and mortgage the company safety record. This allows them to pocket their millions in bonuses for making the company more "efficient", and the real cost of their decisions will not be know until long after they have left. It's left to the active participants to pick up the pieces of the safety margins that are left, and make it work. As you state, the calibre of the entrants gradually weakens, leading to a decline in safety, followed by much gnashing of teeth, and wailing from the taxpayers that the government should do something. At this point the public is just a willing participant in the flight-safety mortgage scheme.
Of the 3 or 4 people that have approached me over the last four years with queries about entering aviation, none have followed through. Not because of doom and gloom from me, but solely due to a realistic assessment with actual details of the payback (or lack thereof) of the career. I left two viable careers to follow this one. I wouldn't make the same mistake again.
Sharksandwich
Though there is not a direct link between high pay and safety, rest assured that there will be a direct link between low pay and safety. The trained professionals will not be around in the next generation. But perhaps that is something best left to the kids to worry about, once it's too obvious to ignore. Colgan is the tip of the iceberg.
PJ2,
Thanks for a thoughtful and lucid explanation (your trademark, if you'll permit me to say so).
It occurs to me that there are some striking parallels between the symptoms that are now seen as pre-cursors of the financial crisis and the indicators present in the passenger air transport industry:
robust, external regulation replaced by weaker or self-regulation; aggressive marketing; 'too good to be true' offers; quantity not quality attitudes; prudence and caution displaced or distorted by self-interest and short-termism.
I'm sure there are others I haven't identified.
Signs of an industry that, if not in crisis, is heading the wrong way.
bear11;
This industry has hearkened to the "snorting MBA" for far too long already.
Time was when real aviation people ran the airlines with a no-nonsense approach and a full comprehension of the business including the risks. Today's airline CEOs, COO's have no clue about what makes their business safe and what addresses the risks of aviation. As such they are not "leaders" in the traditional sense at all, but opportunists who know that the game regardless of one's business, is speculation on stock price, not running a bricks-and-mortar enterprise. jurassicjockey's comments are accurate and prescient in this regard but any airline pilot who has been in the business for longer than, say, twenty years or so knows all of this to be true.
Your comment about the MBA snorting after hearing about pilot working conditions, (the first reason being the shift to short-term planning, mortgaging good safety programs and established practises which keep their investment safe until they can leave), is an accurate reflection of how this business is currently run. The shifts from a "manufacturing" mentality to a "speculative" mentality has taken about thirty years since a number of political and economic events took place in the early 70's, (dismantling of Bretton-Woods (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system)by Nixon, repeal of Glass-Steagall (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glass-Steagall_Act) under Clinton to name two major changes). That shift reached the airlines much later simply because the business does not lend itself to speculative behaviours but smart CEOs have learned how to reap millions in stock options alone even from this business despite the tremendous and chronic challenges of making any profit at all in the airline business.
The "snorting MBA" and the greedy CEO who takes great advantage of a speculative vs manufacturing economy, are essentially though not wholly the reasons why the airline business and the increasing risks to flight safety are as they are today. They have taken advantage of the tremendous improvements in safety, without comprehending why this is so. Any incidents or untoward trends are "normalized" as "part of the business" instead of hearkened to. In fact, not paying attention to trends is part of the mentality simply because "safety isn't a profit center".
The "canary in the mine" for this industry is actually the regional carriers where the accident rate has already begun to define how the rest of the industry will unfold over the next two decades.
With an absentee regulator in Canada and the FAA caught with their regulatory oversight pants down and now desperately playing catch-up after being either absent or very cozy with the airlines under their own SMS initiatives, the trend will advance until the fatality rate begins to attract the attention of the insurers and perhaps airline passengers themselves.
The time these trends take to unfold and gather momentum and then become noticed is much longer than the flying public's or even the regulator's memory but flight safety people know the patterns and are discussing them just as they are being discussed here.
DingerX;
Can I just butt in and say that I'm sick of the argument that "Safety in back is the fault of the meat in back that wants to pay so little?" If nothing else changed but that the tickets cost ten times as much, we'd still have the same problem.
I never, ever think of my passengers as "the meat in the back" and have never liked the term "SLF" which I consider disrespectful to those who pay my salary and are the reason I still have a pension.
That said, if I may, you need to broaden your view of the industry so that the "pattern which connects" - that pattern being discussed here - may be observed.
Customers in all businesses will, because of the way our economy is philosophically conceived, try for "the cheapest prices possible". While such economic behaviour seems "natural", unthinking cheapness in some areas of the economy is expensive, not cheap.
Demanding cheap fares is fair game within the limited thinking which defines the present economic values we all hold but there are consequences to such thinking.
Every once in a while we run across a situation in which there is a perceived (and likely real) risk to our well-being and we ponder, "I hope they didn't give this job to the lowest bidder". Why do we think that? Because we know that competency and address do not come cheaply. Retaining experience has a price. So does retiring and otherwise ignoring experience.
There are indeed, well-paying airline pilot jobs but they are rarer and rarer. The Colgan accident's First Officer Shaw's salary was about US$16,000/year; She was living with her parents in Seattle, commuting to work across the country and flying sick that day because the airlines, (MBA thinking) increasingly dock pay for calling in sick.
Captain Sullenberger was right when he stated in his testimony before Congress,
I am worried that the airline piloting profession will not be able to continue to attract the best and the brightest. The current experience and skills of our country’s professional airline pilots come from investments made years ago when we were able to attract the ambitious, talented people who now frequently seek lucrative professional careers. That past investment was an indispensible element in our commercial aviation infrastructure, vital to safe air travel and our country’s economy and security. If we do not sufficiently value the airline piloting profession and future pilots are less experienced and less skilled, it logically follows that we will see negative consequences to the flying public – and to our country. Captain Sullenberger's testimony is worth reading in full. The link to the pdf is here (http://transportation.house.gov/Media/file/Aviation/20090224/Sullenberger.pdf).
The lo-cost mentality has two problems:
1. Aviation can't be done cheaply. At some point, the system will break and aviation will kill. The problem then becomes "what is acceptable?" To be very blunt but realistic for a moment, the response to that question is different for families of victims than it is for CEOs and senior executives of airlines. It should be the same answer, however.
2. Aviation can be done less expensively and safely but at some point which, due to the nature of the business cannot be pin-pointed or for the MBA's, "quantified" in terms they can understand, the increase in risk to the operation curve will pass the return on investment curve and there will be an accident.
The business has to make money, but not at all cost. If the business isn't viable in balancing costs and the price it charges for its products, perhaps the price is too low? Certainly, costs are down to the bone, certainly with airline employees and not just pilots, most of whom now have no pensions and must take a second job just to make ends meet.
At some point, the investment in cost-control behaviours which are designed to enhance the stock price for investors (who don't give a rat's behind about the airline business or even know anything about it) will reach down into salaries and benefits, treating employees like an ATM machine. Because airlines consistently sell their product, (time) for less than it costs them, cost savings have to come from somewhere. Fuel prices, capitalisation costs for equipment, even senior executive salaries and bonuses cannot be controlled so suppliers and employees become the "snorting" MBA's targets. Colgan is a prime example of this but no airline either in the US or Canada is any different today.
So please don't take the comments personally but as a sign (of which there is ample, if one has their eyes open), that all is NOT well within this industry and that passenger safety is, for the first time in about 50 years, at increasing risk.
The difficulty in getting those who manage but have no aviation knowledge in seeing these issues is, to put it bluntly, extreme, even when they are shown animations and flight data of near-accidents. It is as though they know but don't care because they know they're in a short-term game and know they won't be in line for blame - that's for the pilots. Hopefully, the Colgan accident will be the US's "Dryden" but I doubt it; we are about ready for another Dryden in Canada.
"Love of flying" will bring some good and talented candidates to the business. But the business as presently constituted, won't keep the best. The best know what they are worth and will leave before finishing a career at an airline. "Turnover", a term familiar to Walmart and MacDonalds, will become familiar to pilot hiring committees.
In fact, it is revealing that those who manage airlines today expect that the kind of stellar candidate one wishes to hire and fly one's aircraft safely, will at the same time be stupid enough to not see these corporate values and dynamics and still apply for the job.
It just doesn't work that way. Those now coming of age and growing into the work force already have seen and know very well how business has treated their parents. These young people are already wise enough to such tactics and are taking measures. I know many "airline families" whose children are not going into the business but seeking their futures elsewhere.
For what it's worth, I think it is time for airline passengers to perhaps examine these issues with a bit more attention. In my view, up until a few years ago, passengers quite rightly deserved to "sit back and relax". They still have very good reason to because the business is still vastly well-run. But the trends are responding to fundamental changes and are expressed here.
An administrator gets paid by cutting costs, regardless of the company's position. Two easy ways to cut costs are to cut salaries and to declare bankruptcy so that the pension fund might be raided.Precisely. Except in Canada it is (so far) illegal to use pension funds for operations and do what the US has done to their pilots and other employees. Canada's economy has weathered the latest economic earthquake for good reasons but business leaders hate regulations...
"Cutting salaries" has it's own rewards, long discussed here and elsewhere. Like most planning strategies, such a solution is very short-term thinking.
Like any pilot who has put this kind of time in at an airline, I have seen these developments and changes in my industry first hand and quite frankly don't sleep well at night.
GXER;
It occurs to me that there are some striking parallels between the symptoms that are now seen as pre-cursors of the financial crisis and the indicators present in the passenger air transport industry:
I think you are absolutely correct in this. These are human dynamics at work here, not "aviation" dynamics. It is a management issue, a values issue, a priorities issue; It is NOT an aviation issue. Aviation just has that extra factor which makes it seem different - the capacity to kill innocent people through incompetence, incapacity, or negligence.
It is a complete mystery to me why airline managements cannot see this, or if they can, how they can sleep at night; we don't. I have shown near-accidents to the CEO of a major carrier and it never sunk in as to what was being viewed. It made the DFO's blood run cold, (though the effect only lasted a day or so), but not the CEOs; he had no clue. No CEO does.
PJ2
bear11
16th Oct 2009, 17:21
PJ2, re; your finishing comments and GXERs, I would suggest that CEOs/MBAs don't need to get it. The only cure for this is the legislator/regulator - someone, to a certain extent, who has been long-absent in many forms of commerce given it hasn't fit the "pro-business" (Thatcherite) mindset we have seen in many governments in the past 20 years. We have seen low-fat regulation for most of that time, and we have just been witnesses to what has happened - or more to the point, been allowed to happen - in the financial sector as a result. Hopefully that lesson will sink in, and governments will examine their regulatory system plus the enforcement of it.
I concur with jurassicjockey, you cannot convince senior management who have to appease shareholders today in order to justify mad bonuses any more than you can convince a politician to draft a 10 year budget plan for the good of the economy when he is up for election in 2 year's time. The cocktail of these characters on one end, plus hordes of literally desperate wannabees with big bills and no concept of supply and demand on the other, is a very dangerous one.
bear11;
I've been reading and discussing neoliberal economics and their expressions in Thatcherism and Reaganism since the mid-80's. I will tell you that some of the best books on the topic were available in Ireland; Dingle to be exact, was where I found a few. The Europeans also had far clearer views of the United States and its handmaiden PM in Britain. For years, one could not find such books in North America except for Chomsky, Zinn, McChesney, Parent and a few other observers who dared to think independently from Milton Friedman and the Chicago Boys. To digress a moment, they actually had a following along with other more obvious dissident activities but in the early days of the Vietnam War for example one risked getting shot (Kent State), jail, or at least tear gas for speaking out against the US government which was trying to spread democracy to the rest of the world but which was inconvenient at home. Some of those scenes we saw in the US in the 60s are now repeated in military dictatorships like Burma. When it first came out, I had to go to a 2nd level alternative bookstore to find Chomsky's Manufacturing Consent; I felt like I was buying porn, and to those supporting the neoliberal policies of Reagan and Thatcher, I suppose it was. We have, however, turned the corner.
Since then, and since the first few economic crises and crashes especially last October's, the dialogue has "broadened" somewhat into acceptability so one no longer need hide one's books from the rabid ignorance of the Bu****es in the US. Thank god for boring Canadian reserve.
You're right that the CEOs dont' have to "get it", and ironically that is precisely my point - they are excused from culpability (even with "accountable executive laws" ). If you've been reading the whole thread and others like this for the past few years here you will see common themes, among them the deregulation and privatization of flight safety. It is for this reason alone that I hold no hope whatsoever that the regulator will arrive anytime soon to do it's job. It has handed its job over to the airlines and that will go where it is going to go - all anyone who sees what is coming can do is try to retard the retreat somehow but "dissidence" and aviation are not bed-partners by any stretch and is usually greeted with the parental raised eyebrow and an, "are you mad?" As always, it seems kicking tin is preferred to preventative safety programs.
People in the lower ranks are doing earnest good work and, as has been observed, the changes spoken of here will unfold over years, not months. The difference between now and when the last great changes in aviation safety were made (radar, INS, basic computerization, TCAS, EGPWS,(thanks to Don Bateman of Honeywell and human factors CRM and finally the notion of the organizational accident first broached by prescient men like Perrow, and Reason but with unsung hundreds contributing), was the massive public dialogue now available through forums such as these. Even with the occasional bluntness, these forums are extremely valuable.
Too, the meaning of the word, "accident" has changed. In fact, we might say that the broad approach to industry flight safety has gone "left" while the industry itself has gone far "right", ostensibly with the same results as the economy has demonstrated.
PJ2
lomapaseo
16th Oct 2009, 20:50
bear11
I would suggest that CEOs/MBAs don't need to get it. The only cure for this is the legislator/regulator
On that I certainly agree.
I do expect the CEO/MBA's to run a business model. I expect the regulator to put forth safety models (with our help) and that the regulations then require each airline to incorporate one acceptable to the regulator.
I view boards like these as only an opening of what you all feel works best. To simply use up the available bandwidth wringing one's hands (not you of course) does little to promote solutions.
Meanwhile others may read what we write here.
pineridge
16th Oct 2009, 21:00
Bear11 said...............
" Even if you do 100 hours per month every month, FTLs will mean you have a few months off in most countries who have max 900/1,000 hours per year, let alone in some airlines where union agreements mandate less than that"
I understand your point but you are missing a serious fundamental about flying; it is not acceptable from a safety perspective to have a gradual erosion of capabilities from the beginning of a duty period to the end.
As a pilot one can be called upon to produce all the skill and experience one can muster at the last few minutes of a duty day/month/year.
To accept that a pilot can fly right up to the maximum permitted FTL`s
for a complete duty period, or for a maximum month or year for that matter, without experiencing a degradation of performance, is totally unrealistic.
Even the first day after a relaxing vacation period a pilot can be in the danger zone at the end of a maximum duty day with multiple sectors in bad weather.
My point is that fatigue is cumulative and is bloody dangerous; the fact that airline CEO`s and government regulators don`t seem to understand the situation is a tragedy, and any FTL`s that ignore the cumulative effect are not worth a pinch of coon-merde.
mercurydancer
16th Oct 2009, 21:37
PJ2
It may well be career suicide to state that due to inadequate training accidents are going to increase. I do not doubt that for a moment.
May I offer a few points regarding this?
Forums such as this permit intelligent debate about matters that concern both airline staff and passengers. If a fundamental concern such as safety is raised then it is as powerful as any advertisement for an airline.
Whilst air travel is not essential it is largely an inescapable part of modern life. SLF invest money and their lives in air transport. I imagine that I am not alone in thinking that I would want to pay my fares to a company with both reliable aircraft and ground staff, (which as it is regulated is demonstrable to passengers) but also to a company who invest in the aircrew. A measured career pathway where the FD crew are taught appropriately, and gather substantial experience is not a privelege of select airlines but should be essential. Ive posted before about the trust that UK people had in BA and not without reason. To provide a long-term structure to air crew development is not optional it is essential and if MBA man thinks that it is not essential then he (or she) will see the company go the way of all things.
Metro man
17th Oct 2009, 00:13
I'm mid career in flying and starting to think about retirement in around twenty years time. The reality of the job has changed beyond what I would have thought possible when I started in the 1980s.
I remember the airline pilots of the 1970s, well paid, respected professionals who enjoyed a rewarding career and retired on a good pension.
These days it's a race to the bottom in terms and conditions. Final salary index linked pension ? Join the civil service. Loss of licence insurance, pay for it yourself. Training, come to us with the aircraft already on your licence and we'll have a look at you, done at your expense and risk. Oh and pay us GBP50 to recieve your application.
Nice roster doing 600-700 hours per year, dream on, you'll be rostered right up to the legal limits. 5* hotel on night stops, forget it, 3* and don't expect any special treatment as the company screwed the hotel right down on the room rate.
First class crew meals ? They had those once upon a time. Now expect to see pilots buying sandwiches at the airport SUBWAY/QUIZNOS/PRET A MANGER. Bring your own tea bags and you can have the hot water for a cuppa though.
Join a union to protect yourself, trouble maker, we'll fix you at your next checkride.
Now that all the standard extras have been taken away, the only thing left is the salary so let's get stuck into that. Reduced pay for new f/os and recently upgraded captains. Make an increasingly large % of your earnings dependent on your flying hours, no work = very little pay.
These days it's not worth going into flying as a career unless someone else pays, either the military or an airline cadetship(if they still exist).
Given the huge expenditure involved in training, uncertain and insecure job prospects, and lack of rewards at the end I couldn't recommend it to anyone.
The legacy airlines are a dying breed who are having to join in the race downwards to stay in business. Once, plum jobs such as Cathay or Emirates are now very average when measured against the old standards. British Airways are losing serious money trying to compete against RYAN AIRs 9.99 airfares.
The legacy airlines are in a difficult position vs the low costs. An LCC focuses on price that's all. A legacy airline has to offer a better service to those people prepared to pay more, make a profit doing it yet still keep ticket prices within a reasonable distance of the LCCs ie how much more can they get away with charging before the extra starts turning people away in large numbers.
With fewer pilots coming out of the military, fewer airlines offering cadetships and potential pilots doing the sums and coming to the conclusion that it's not worth the risk/reward we will see declining quality and experience on the flight deck (if we're not seeing it already).
Better hope all the automatics and protections work.:(
mercurydancer;
Whilst air travel is not essential it is largely an inescapable part of modern life. SLF invest money and their lives in air transport. I imagine that I am not alone in thinking that I would want to pay my fares to a company with both reliable aircraft and ground staff, (which as it is regulated is demonstrable to passengers) but also to a company who invest in the aircrew. A measured career pathway where the FD crew are taught appropriately, and gather substantial experience is not a privelege of select airlines but should be essential. Ive posted before about the trust that UK people had in BA and not without reason. To provide a long-term structure to air crew development is not optional it is essential and if MBA man thinks that it is not essential then he (or she) will see the company go the way of all things.
I concur wholeheartedly with all you say regarding what is essential and not merely a privilege and I suspect even airline managers would agree with this notion and so too, I expect, would the regulator.
However, in your post you are talking about "should". The reality is substantially different and I see no dynamics (short of the kind of event which occurred in Canada and created the Moshansky Inquiry), that the industry in North America anyway, is about to change.
With profit margins as thin as ever, a recession on in most western countries except Canada and Australia and fuel prices at US$75/barrel and climbing, and unrealistic investor time frames and expectations keeping down share prices, the freedom to long-term plan, or provide "career development strategies" for pilots simply does not exist and, given industrial matters alone, would be next to impossible to establish.
I hope I understand what you mean here and please help me if I have misperceived. If I have understood your notion, I have to state that there is no such thing as a "measured career pathway" in this industry today or even when I was flying. There is no long-term structure for air crew development, and what's more, no manager is ever going to even broach the notion because it will go nowhere in today's operational environment.
While training, standards and checking, pay and benefits are, to varying degrees of robustness and success, all part of the mix in this industry as it has unfolded over the last thirty years, airlines today want "98.6" in the cockpit seats; only then do they deal with these other issues. The Colgan accident at Buffalo and the Comair accident at Lexington for two examples, highlighted what I and many in the industry have known and have been writing about for years - that the industry is just getting by in these initiatives and responsibilities. With an increasingly absent regulator which has, via "SMS" (Safety Management Systems) downloaded flight safety responsibilities in terms of self-regulation and self-auditing onto the airlines, the opportunity to do even less has opened up. Airlines are always searching for ways to reduce costs - a legitimate business strategy, providing there are both programs and metrics in place to advise when management has cut too close to the bone. Such programs are generally unpopular with cash-strapped managements however, and, with an absentee regulator, can "safely" be ignored until/unless something serious happens, (in which case we are back to kicking tin).
Please know that I fully understand that these notions and this writing are very black-and-white, polarizing ideas rather than teasing out the subtleties and exceptions, the vast number of unsung successes and making clear that the industry is still extremely safe in comparison with other modes of transportation. Highlighting weaknesses in a high-risk system is what safety people do all the time. My views, while perhaps to some seem like bleeding on and on here and in other threads as to signals and causes, are by no means alone. These are long-term trends that are unfolding, that will end in an increasing accident rate within our industry unless measures are taken to address the issues being raised. The FAA has actually responded in the US and for very good reason as illustrated in the serious maintenance violations discovered at Southwest Airlines, American Airlines and others.
I think it is naive to expect or believe that airlines would develop pilots at a "measured pace" and that career advancement is something that airlines actually care about. They don't - not one bit. If they could get an autoflight system that got rid of one of the two expensive resources in the cockpit, they would buy it in a heartbeat. Beyond a reluctant acknowledgement in cases where push comes to shove such as long-haul crew augmentation, they don't even care how fatigued their pilots are, a fact demonstrated by airlines' refusal to involve themselves more than they must to keep peace, in formal discussions on fatigue risk management approaches for domestic and overseas long-haul pilots alike.
The industry is at a turning point in its safety record. For various reasons expressed here and in other threads, (the constancy and lengths of posts for which I apologize), those who are coming into and managing this industry and who are far away from the coal-face, have little to no idea of how it got so safe and are taking for granted its spectacular safety record and the processes which brought about that record including a strong willingness to take a very close look at its ugly parts.
The dynamics of airline traffic growth in an increasingly de-regulated environment where regulatory oversight is concerned, versus the availability of experienced, "case-hardened" pilots who actually still want to work in this industry, have placed these two phenomena on a collision course and we are already seeing early results. That is the only point being made in all these words.
I know only too keenly that this isn't pleasant stuff for most to read. But it is the kind of stuff that made this industry as safe as it is. If, as lomapaseo expresses, others read these discussions and take away some doubts as to their own operation and find "new eyes" with which to view their operation's approach to safety, then this will have been worth the effort by all. This is anything but critical of the industry I love. While criticism is traditionally anything but popular and is usually seen as not being a "team player", (big mistake, in my view), to me, strong criticism is the highest form of loyalty. We need more than ever, an inquiry into how this industry is changing.
I've said more than enough. We will see where this goes.
punchus
17th Oct 2009, 18:53
This is one of the most interesting and relevant threads here in a long time.
It seems to me that some of the LCC have relentlessly driven costs out of the business to such an extent that salaries and conditions and moral are so low that eventually a straw will come that will break the camels back. If that event is a serious safety incident than maybe the resulting spotlight will reflect on the Major way the industry model has changed over the past say ten years.
One of the other issues appears to be career management. People who jump from ship to ship and stay for a few years, drive more costs and conditions from their host companies , then take their bonuses and bugger of to repeat the trick elsewhere.
Maybe I am wrong and I well realise that we must continually change and adapt as economic and business models changes. BUT if pilots are holding down two jobs to make ends meet because of faceless managers who have driven costs to the bottom of the barrel, and those same pilots are involved in an accident, then we must ask ourselves when do we as a group of professionals say STOP.
In my view it's a little late for an industry wide reflection on the issues raised when there's a hole in the ground.
Comments or Maybe I am just letting of a bit of steam??
In answer to the threads question
Are we facing a safety issue? YES YES YES
framer
17th Oct 2009, 19:28
then we must ask ourselves when do we as a group of professionals say STOP.
It sure is an attractive idea, but how do we go about saying "STOP" ?
.....something global would be good.
lomapaseo
17th Oct 2009, 22:37
It sure is an attractive idea, but how do we go about saying "STOP" ?
.....something global would be good.
Industries don't relate to the word Stop, they do however relate to words like go
It's time to get positive and not negative in the rhetoric
mercurydancer
17th Oct 2009, 23:30
PJ2
You havent misunderstood me at all.
Yes it is probable that I am naive in envisioning a structure for FD crew development. It is sad to hear that but I perfectly understand the reasons why it isnt so. For airlines not to invest in long term development of crew may be infleunced by short term financial priorities but it obstructs the longer term benefits of having FD crew who are very capable.
To use a phrase I dont particularly like, its my "blue sky thinking"
mercurydancer;
I have spent most of my career in naiveté. Flight safety work is mostly fighting rear-guard actions when in fact a career-development process would resolve many, though not all these issues. While I do not support the notion of the MCPL, like SMS it is not because the training or the concept itself is wrong but because I have no reason to believe that the MCPL will be handled properly by the airlines. Under the heading of "98.6" and the bare minimum the law requires in terms of experience levels, they will consider that anyone licensed to operate the aircraft is "competent".
That is where the "consolidation period" rule-making came from - airlines were pairing newbies with newbies (new on the airplane or new in the business) because they could. Wisdom never entered (or enters) the picture.
I know pilots who began flying transport aircraft at 250hrs and did just fine but that was because, at the time, the airline I worked for had a Second Officer's position and one "learned the ropes" in the back seat...so to speak.
Today, new hires, especially in the regionals, are "qualified" even though they may not have any experience in demanding circumstances.
Aviation is such that most of the time, nothing happens. But Charles Perrow's notions of the organizational accident and Jim Reason's now-familiar expression were meant to convey the notion that disparate circumstances randomly occur and sometimes very close together in time, and result in an otherwise-avoided accident.
I truly desire that aviation was as you blue-sky it! Perhaps a "College of Aviators" which sets standards, issues licences and examines candidates would resolve some of the issues. I think however, that both the medical and legal professions have much to teach anyone actually contemplating such an initiative...
lomapaseo
18th Oct 2009, 02:44
exeng
Thanks for the clarity of suggesting at least one area that may need fixing. If others support this with the same clarity than at least that item however small (one airline/one country) may get some attention.
Metro man
18th Oct 2009, 05:03
Today, new hires, especially in the regionals, are "qualified" even though they may not have any experience in demanding circumstances.
Some of the 200hour f/os I've seen, I doubt have even flown when it's been raining let alone had any experience of demanding conditions.
mercurydancer
21st Oct 2009, 19:53
Hi PJ2
This is one of the reasons (not James) why I find this site so fascinating.
I'd like to coin the phrase "professional jealousy" - Healthcare incident investigation is really in its early stages of development. Our gold standard is aircraft accident investigation. You would be surprised how rudimentary some healthcare investigations are, and even the well documented ones with sensible actions to take often shrivel and die in the bureaucracy.
CRM is also a concept that isnt easy to translate to a healthcare setting but it is possible with a little thought. Even so applying the concept has huge benefits.
It sounds like there is a possibility for mutual exchange of ideas and concepts here. Healthcare, in particular, nursing and medical career pathways, are very well regulated and have such things as competency training and experience measured in the number of procedures undertaken for instance. Qualification is rightly considered to be the first step, not a licence to be protected from inexperience. I'm not holding medicine up to be the best, just commenting that there appears to be some areas which we do better.
framer
21st Oct 2009, 20:34
I'm not holding medicine up to be the best, just commenting that there appears to be some areas which we do better
What areas are they? We could learn from each other. For the last few years I have regularly found myself in a corner at the family bbq's with a family friend who is a surgeon discussing CRM and human factors in general. The conversations always go the same way as he tries to learn more about how it works in aviation and how he could apply it within his industry. From these conversations I have developed the impression that medicine is literally decades behind aviation in this respect.This may just be for my my part of the world but I doubt it, NZ and Ausi are normally pretty good with industry standards.
Honest question so I can put it to him at the next bbq, which areas are better? (please don't say fatigue management)
Kind Regards,
Framer
framer;
The notion of "safety" comes from knowing, vice not knowing.
"Knowing" comes from education, experience and intuition.
"Knowing" is not merely someone's opinion, especially if they happen to be in a position of power, (under a possible guise of "knowing").
Therefore, flight safety is always about "what", not "who".
If a junior Relief Pilot calls up front to correct an altimeter setting that would have taken the aircraft into the ground in IFR weather, that is about "what", not "who".
I flew with WWII and post WWII guys who treated any question/suggestion/exclamation with derision. One kept notes on each commander and how he liked dinner and what to say when transferring fuel. SOPs were a guide. That approach killed a lot of people.
Today, if someone doesn't speak up, they're in trouble.
The intervention is then sorted out and if real, adjustments are made and the situation resolved - right then and there.
It isn't about junior people "taking over" or trying to fly someone else's airplane. If it is, that's not CRM. The captain is still the commander and makes the final decision - it is NOT a democracy in the cockpit; it is an information-gathering place based upon "what", not "who".
Your test for any situation that feels like it is coming off the rails is that. If it is about "who", (ego, power, pouting, petulance and the other childhood emotions) then someone needs to intervene and get it back to "what".
It was a tall order when the change came twenty five years or so ago. We thought that many of the guys who needed such a change the most, never "got it" and retired not knowing.
That is how it is going to be for the medical profession. It will be different because of the nature of the work. If you sense the perceptions and the actions are about "someone", you're not doing CRM. If you keep only "what" in mind, you're safer.
The notion of "safety" comes from knowing, vice not knowing.
If we speak about CRM, and human factor in a cockpit, maybe.
Otherwise safety is the state of being safe.
Knowing that the airplane in on fire doesn't make anybody safer.
Safety is also what the airline do or not, what the maintenance do or not, what is the weather condition...
There is so much to do to improve safety, aside from knowing.
mercurydancer
21st Oct 2009, 22:19
framer
The areas where we in medicine do well are continuing education/accreditation and competency training. This is the career structure I was dicussing with PJ2.
For CRM, we arent dacades behind aviation but certainly the CRM culture isnt developed in healthcare. I wish it was, but there are complicating factors. Even in an environment such as an operating room it is not a team doing one event, such as an aircraft in flight, its a number of teams with diferent values and allegiances who are in close proximity to each other. Its odd how it works out, a surgeon has total responsibility for his surgery but the anaesthetist has total responsibility for the patient and the nursing staff have total responsibility for the OR itself. The surgeon does not hold the same role as the captain of an aircraft by any means.
framer
22nd Oct 2009, 09:03
Cheers mercury, I will bring up that side of it, the ongoing training etc.
Ta.
framer;
The notion of "safety" comes from knowing, vice not knowing.
"Knowing" comes from education, experience and intuition.
"Knowing" is not merely someone's opinion, especially if they happen to be in a position of power, (under a possible guise of "knowing").
Why was that addressed to me? I never said anything about junior people "taking over" or trying to fly someone else's airplane. ...whats the go PJ? Regardless, I totally agree with what you said :)
A37575
22nd Oct 2009, 11:36
The surgeon does not hold the same role as the captain of an aircraft by any means.
I am relieved to know that. Using Pprune discussions as an example, we occasionally read of Generation Y first officer's attitudes bolstered by their lectures on CRM where assertiveness on the flight deck is encouraged.
Time and again one hears of lack of respect for the captain's operational decisions and in turn this causes quiet resentment. One typical discussion occured where the captain asked the F/O to call ATC and request approval for a deviation 30 miles off track to avoid a large thunderstorm ahead seen on radar. The F/O disagreed with the captain's assessment and said he felt 30 miles was too much - and suggested 15 miles deviation was sufficient. This leaves the captain in a difficult situation.
His experience dictated a 30 mile deviation but he can either order in no uncertain terms the F/O do his bidding or he can compromise to keep the F/O happy and say OK make it 20 miles off track. Assertiveness is fine where there is a flight safety hazard but plain idiotic when it comes to deliberately making a point to score a point. And this type of exchange is a lot more common in some airlines than you would expect.
Presumably that would never happen in a surgical procedure where the surgeon is entirely on his own without someone monitoring his every decision and playing assertiveness because he can.
framer;
I apologize to you and to KAG for my complete lack of clarity in my response. I failed to make my meaning of the notion, "knowing", and therefore my point, clear, because I wrote the response in a hurry - always a mistake! Permit me a second shot at it:
The comments were in response to your post which I thought was very interesting and posed and interesting question. Nothing "directed at" you, just a response about CRM-type situations and how the medical profession could make progress in adopting, with substantial modification (for reasons given, ie, the surgeon is not the "captain", etc) such human-factors processes.
KAG, you're correct in saying "safety is the state of being safe", and that "knowing a wing is on fire" doesn't make things "safer". I can see where the confusion arose!
The key point I was attempting to make was, flight safety is about "what" not "who". It was trying to acknowledge that "knowing" (which is about 'what'), promoted understanding and therefore a safer operation, than "who", which is about someone's opinion, usually subtlely grounded in "authority" or "position", of how things should be run and which rarely produces understanding because it seeks obedience, not questions.
The difference is subtle. Obviously, knowledge and opinion may be the same in many circumstances but one is grounded in information available to the crew which someone is referencing, and the other appeals to a position of authority.
CRM is about information exchange, or "knowing", without regard to who was conveying the information. Dismissing information based upon who is conveying it is the exact opposite of what is intended by CRM.
Let me describe it in very black-and-white, simplistic terms, realizing that most issues and circumstances are far more subtle than this.
Previously, (pre-CRM type communications in cockpits), if a junior, (read "inexperienced") member of the crew said something, the crusty old captain might dismiss it and even think that the guy in the right seat was trying to take over his airplane.
F/O: "Captain, should we be descending to the procedure altitude out here?"
Captain: "He cleared us for the approach, didn't he?!"
F/O: "Yes, but we're thirty miles out..."
Captain: "We're cleared for the approach and that means we can descend!"
F/O: "But the chart... ,"
Captain: "I've been in and out of here hundreds of times. It's fine..."
In this admittedly-extreme example of a conversation, the decision-making process is about "who", (the captain vs the F/O), not "what", (should we be descending...?" The captain dismisses the F/O's comment subtlely using his position and claiming his experience with the airport which is about "who", to justify the descent instead of going further with the F/O's intervention and determing "what".
These circumstances applied at Tenerife, at Buga, (Colombia), Little Rock (Arkansas) and dozens of other accidents. CFIT accidents typically though not always, begin with poor CRM. The F/O on the KLM B747 questioned the captain's decision but he elected to take off, dismissing the intervention.
What I meant by my comment about "junior people flying the airplane" is, it is a serious misunderstanding of CRM on the part of both crew members to think that CRM is equivalent to "the F/O is taking over the airplane" if he or she raises questions about the operation. Questioning the captain is not the same as trying to fly his/her airplane. The captain is always in command by law, (one significant difference between aviation and medicine), and will always make the final decision unless it clearly threatens the safety of the flight. That does not relieve the other crew members of the duty and responsibility to speak up in all circumstances that require "knowing" about a situation.
Far more often however, it is not a "beligerant" captain but a captain who may have made a small error, didn't know something or assumed something and other crew members were either afraid to speak up out of embarrassment of possibly being wrong, or out of respect because the commander was "such a good pilot" or possibly out of fear because the commander was known to "bite off heads" if challenged. The dynamics are as varied as people are but the common thread is, "nobody said anything" and so there were two or three different understandings of the operational situation riding in the cockpit instead of one.
CRM came about because accident investigators realized through the CVR that a perfectly serviceable airplane was flown into the ground or into another aircraft killing a planeload of people because communications did not effectively establish a full, common understanding of the situation.
CRM doesn't end just with understanding.
One example of CRM in action was the United Airlines DC10 at Sioux City, where Denny Fitch, a dead-heading pilot sat behind the captain and First Officer and manipulated the throttles to fly the aircraft to the Sioux City airport. The captain handed control over to someone not even in his crew but who was "best qualified in the moment" to do the job; - "What", not "who". It was a brilliant command decision that saved 185 lives.
I hope this is a bit better explanation of what I was trying to say and that the simplifications are not otherwise patronizing your aviation knowledge. The subtleties of CRM and what CRM has evolved into now would take a much longer post but I hope the idea comes across reasonably well. I think medicine could benefit tremendously from such an approach, though, (as stated), modifications to suit the unique dynamics of medicine (vs aviation) would have to be made.
the shrimp
22nd Oct 2009, 22:11
Are we facing a safety issue?
In France: http://af447.20minutes-blogs.fr/archive/2009/07/05/airbus-af-447-la-france-les-a-tues.html#more
mercurydancer;
I'm wondering if you've encountered Dr. Atul Gawande's two books, "Complications", and "Better"?
In Complications he states, in part:
"The British psychologist James Reason argues, in his book Human Error, that our propensity for certain types of error is the price we pay for the brain's remarkable ability to think and act intuitively - to sift quickly through the sensory information that constantly bombards us without wasting time trying to work through every situation anew. Thus systems that rely on human perfection present what Reason calls "latent errors' - errors waiting to happen. Medicine teems with examples.
. . . . etc"
In these fascinating books in which he talks quite frankly about medicine, he does take a few moments to discuss approaches to medicine which draw upon the techniques of CRM. Medical people with whom I've discussed these techniques believe there is a strong need. The driving force for aviation was, frankly, "headlines" - a lot of people dying at once, to be blunt about it. I believe the health industry has a fatality rate that is substantially higher than aviation and even higher than the automobile in the US, (> 45,000/year) but because no headlines result, such rates do not "capture the imagination" of medicines' "safety people", (I doubt if there are such dedicated positions - they might be closer to "risk management" positions?).
I think the value of a "human factors" approach modelled after aviation's approach is high and desireable. However, establishing and changing the mentality of the health industry, (where error and resulting fatalities is a "net positive" for some in the same way that the Exxon Valdez was a "net positive" for Alaska because it raised the GNP of the State...), would face inevitable resistance.
As in aviation, such change usually takes a full generation - about 25 to 30 years, to become established.
Thought you might be interested.
PJ2
mermoz92
22nd Oct 2009, 22:57
A37575 You have touched the main safety problem I lived for 12 years on my A340...
:ok:
mercurydancer
23rd Oct 2009, 20:12
PJ2
There are specific roles for patient safety. I'm one of them! Certainly medicine teems with latent failures but there are some factors which arent present in the airline industry which makes a direct comparison difficult. In an airline, unless a passenger dies of natural causes during flight, death is avoidable. The 45,000 you quote is an accurate figure but not all the deaths were avoidable, just that the medical mistakes contributed to the death to a greater or lesser extent. The hard fact is that people die in hospital and the more complex the care then the higher the rate of untoward incident. A thorough analysis of such incidents indicates that the huge majority of incidents have little impact on the final outcome. This by no means absolves medical staff in improving practice.
As Ive mentioned, CRM is more difficult in a medical setting as sometimes it is hard to define a team. In an operating room there isnt one "captain" but three: the surgeon, the anasthesiologist and the nurse in charge. All are aimed at the successful completion of the surgery and are interdependent, but each has the final say for their own particular role in the surgery. No one person has complete control over the OR. Conflict ensues when the aims of each role diverge.
Interestingly enough, a UK airline captain unfortunately lost his wife in a surgical procedure and his analysis of the incident is very much along the lines of CRM failure.
The basic tools for incident investigation within healtcare have been unashamedly taken from transport accidents and have proved to be very useful indeed. Our incident reproting system is years behind the airline industry but is developing.
framer
24th Oct 2009, 05:15
CRM is more difficult in a medical setting as sometimes it is hard to define a team. In an operating room there isnt one "captain" but three: the surgeon, the anasthesiologist and the nurse in charge. All are aimed at the successful completion of the surgery and are interdependent, but each has the final say for their own particular role in the surgery. No one person has complete control over the OR. Conflict ensues when the aims of each role diverge.
Maybe it is not "more difficult" but merely different.ie a tweaked version will be neccessary in order to serve the medical environment. Defining 'a team' is, IMO, not the main driver in aviation CRM, forming one is often the result though. Maybe more cohesive teams would result in the '3 Captain medical environment' if CRM was better applied. Communication, the flow of information, is important. Keeping everyone abreast of changes that may initially seem unimportant, is important. What is right not who is right, as has been mentioned above is key (gotta lose the ego's). Also, TEM, which most pilots have been adept at for decades is a massive factor. Red flags pop up on most flights/missions/medical proceedures and being aware of what they are and taking conservative action to counter them is the difference between non-events and "exciting flights".
Possible? Framer.
gravity enemy
24th Oct 2009, 05:49
I am a pilot, not an economist. But it's clear to me that full deregulation of airlines simply does not work. At least not in the pilots favor. Over the last few years airlines have constantly been cutting costs, often from the personnels pockets.
Its the most bizarre scenario really! If the oil price increases, gas prices increase, and therefore ticket prices should increase proportionally. But instead fierce competition between the airlines drives them to cut salaries instead of increase prices. Surely some sort of dynamic laws will have to be introduced to prevent this. If all the airlines had to increase their prices, then the competition would remain the same. Surely a passenger would pay an extra 1$, but be sure that there is a competent person at the sharp end, who is not a millionaire, but has a decent lifestyle and gets treated well.
If this continues, clever people will turn away from becoming pilots and we will end up with a bunch of nitwits and hillbillies flying buses in the air. Sad really!:ugh:
PAXboy
25th Oct 2009, 13:52
Regular PAX speaking, although from a flying family and nephew is current RHS on 738. I have read the complete thread and am going to be pessimistic in this post.
The comparisons with the financial world are more than apt. I was working for an American merchant bank in the late 80s (in telecommunications) and saw outsourcing start. I knew it was going to be bad but did not realise quite what a tip-of-the-iceberg it was. However, the financial prang of a year ago did not surprise and there is clearly more bad times to come. That is because not enough people have yet suffered financial crisis. I know that seems harsh to those who have - but if bonus' are being paid so soon, then there is more pain to come.
The comparisons with the medical world are also I apt and I suggest the problem is NOT in the operating theatre but at the bedside. When the consultant is making the diagnosis and deciding on treatment they ARE 'god' (at least in the UK). I have seen and heard many stories of the doctor (or nurse) not being challenged on the basis of common sense and what can be seen from the history chart. One area they have improved is that, before an operation, they now mark your body with a black felt-tip pen. This was because of too many times when the wrong knee/kidney/leg was operated on.
gravity enemyIf this continues, clever people will turn away from becoming pilots and we will end up with a bunch of nitwits and hillbillies flying buses in the air.I think that many bright people will continue to want to be pilots and will do their very best to overcome the new limitations. I also think that they will be killed along with the others.
mercurydancerAs a matter of essential importance, the raising of air fares for the adequate training of air crew wont meet any objection from the vast majority of passengers. I certainly wouldn't object.Me either but we all know it ain't gonna happen! The money would be siphoned off faster than a 3rd world dictator takes the profits of his country.
DingerXCharging for meals may make a few bucks, but even giving out free crackers will calm the folks down and establish the proper power dynamic (provider-client as opposed to servant-patron), which, by the way, will help tremendously in an emergency.THANK YOU. one of the single most interesting observations I have seen in years.
It is human nature to repeat ourselves and our history. We often learn that 'new' ideas were well established in civilisations 1000 years ago. We did not learn the lessons of October 1929 and we are paying for it now. We have become complacent about prangs and we are going to have more of them.
Why? Because the only thing that changes human behaviour is money and death. It is the desire for more money that is making the industry less safe and the bell-curve is more advanced than many realise. Once more deaths occur (= less money due to costs and failing bookings) then the industry will have some bright ideas about how to improve it.
There is a well know French expression:
Plus ça change, plus c'est le même chose
The more things change, the more things remain the same.
lomapaseo
25th Oct 2009, 15:57
Safety is gained by knowledge
Knowledge in a highly technical environment is gained by Lessons Learned.
I contend that we aren't completely ignorant, but instead something is standing in the way of Lessons Learned.
I don't put money in the forefront but rather arrogance the kind of stuff like
it can't/won't happen to me because (fill in the blank)
so how do we address this?
AirRabbit
25th Oct 2009, 19:56
I guess someone is going to have to explain to me why anyone starts a business. Is it to ensure that the employees are paid handsomely, provided unequalled benefits and a glowing retirement? Or is it to make money for the person owning (and perhaps running) the business? Why would an airline be any different than a hamburger stand? Yes, it true that airlines provide an essential service that the economy has become quite dependent upon … and to that extent, the folks who are responsible for the economy probably need to take heed regarding the perils and successes of the airline business. But, who are those who are those people responsible for the economy? Who controls the economy? Anyone? Is it the government? I’ll ask you, what does a government do that no one else can do and does it better than anyone could, even if someone else wanted to do it? Whose money would a government use as the “front” money to get a business started? Who would reap the profits … assuming there were any profits to reap? If the government doesn’t actually run the business, should the government step in and set limits on people’s salaries in any/every business? How about limits on what a business can charge for a product or service or, perhaps, all products and services? Would all products and services have to meet some level of acceptability? For example, should only 4-star hotels be allowed to rent rooms over night? Who would hand out the “Stars?” The government? Should the government decide where a business is located, or what goods or services they produce or provide? Where does government’s role in the conduct of business start and stop? Should the government decide who works where – or should the government have the authority to tell a business owner who they should hire … how many employees they need … and what each should be paid? Should the government keep very careful track of the cost of raw materials and force companies to increase or decrease the price of goods or services if that business is affected in any way by the raw material price changes? How big would that government have to be to do these things – and what source of funding would be provided for the government to maintain those records and keep tabs on those businesses?
-OR-
Should the government set minimum safety standards, applicable to everyone and keep it’s nose out of the rest your/his/her business?
lomapaseo;
so how do we address this?
Organizations which have not had a major accident with which to deal are prone to an unusual arrogance with regard to examining information which is contrary to their collective self-image or "culture".
Curiously, these are the airlines which are most at risk because production-driven managers see their priorities and their behaviours as "successful" and see no reason to change because they have already "learnt".
NASA
Despite clear precursors in their operational data, NASA continued to operate the shuttle with ongoing O-ring anomalies and foam-shedding. Both precursors had signficant and numerous data-points throughout years of operations. Such anomalies were "normalized" into each launch, to the point where serious questions could not be asked of the engineering people without concurrent heavy resistance from a "can-do" mentality.
The key to understanding this is the question always asked by "production-minded" managers, "so if you think we're not safe to operate, where are the accidents to prove your point?" In other words, precursors to accidents are not taken as "real", nor are near misses. The notion of "luck" and "skill" are often invoked in such a mentality.
The Concorde accident was the result of the same kind of thinking. There were many, many data points indicating that shrapnel from tires shredding retread material could and in some cases did, damage the wings and compromise the fuel tanks. A flight out of (I believe) Washington DC actually caught fire when the tank was holed by shrapnel but the fire did not continue.
To cite an example much closer to the homes of most airlines, the Australian Accident Board's report on QANTAS' B-744 overrun at Bangkok stated quite succinctly that the overrun accident was in their flight data in the years leading up to the overrun. Reduced flap settings and idle reverse plus high speeds over the fence and long landings were all in the data but nothing was done to address these issues and so they continued to build data-points. The accident occurred when, as always, several other issues coincided in combination with these factors. The accident was "preventable" (by changing the approach SOPs) but the data cannot tell an airline "which airplane, which day?"
I know another airline in which this very same phenomenon is occurring even as I write but the holes haven't lined up yet; but they will. The data is telling them something, in fact a number of things, that production-minded managers have so far ignored because they have a habit of "explaining away" the outliers and reflecting on and otherwise being satisfied with, an admirable, relatively accident-free history.
Your question may be posed on many levels and thus any tentative response must be understood on these different levels, to be effective and implementable.
First, we must recognize that we are seeing fatal accidents of a different nature today than just twenty years ago, a very short time in this business. Twenty years ago, mid-air collision, CFIT and a few mode-confusion causes were seen. Off the top of my head, we have at least a dozen, possible thirteen major loss-of-control accidents in the last eight or nine years* in which training, competency, skill or situational awareness are a signficant part of the discussion on causes of these accidents.
We may examine a single "event" in the data and pose one response which may resolve that one issue, once, and it may re-occur because it is not "learned from". We may move to a much broader view and discuss how deregulation of the airlines has provided fertile ground for the emergence of serious but thus-far latent systemic safety issues. Such discussions can't resolve individual problems but can point to revisions of a system which preclude the worst of individual events.
It is important to be able to move within these levels but I wonder if most airline CEOs are capable of such thinking these days with production pressures so high? In such cases we must turn to other areas in which to work and otherwise evoke a response that suitably addresses the precursors of an accident without instilling an irrationality to the operation.
We obviously can't "re-regulate" and expect to solve the problem at that very high level of systemic cause. What's next?
Next level "down" might be defined in terms of SMS. If the regulator continues or returns to a level of oversight such that airlines will not or cannot get away with cutting corners by privileging commercial priorities over safety priorities, then SMS will survive as a very effective data-driven safety system just as it was originally conceived.
What is next follows on SMS. Data analysis by competent, experienced individuals including pilots and not just amateur interns who are paid next to nothing, is the least harmful, least expensive and most benign response possible: I think looking at and understanding the data in terms of "precursors" is where the solution and the answer to your question lies. The difficulty is, being shown information that "all is not well" interferes with egos and the self-image of the airline as a completely safe operation, and therefore intereferes with the feedback process which is essential to "learning lessons". How do we address this?
We accomplish this by using the lessons learnt by NASA as a result of the Challenger and Columbia accidents and which are extremely well documented and openly available in just two very good books, "The Challenger Launch Decision" by Diane Vaughan, and "Organization at the Limit" by William Starbuck and Moshe Farjoun.
We first examine the theme of these easy lessons then we examine how such lessons may be tailored to our own operation. Then we take it to the practical level, using materials which reflect our own operations "at the street level", turning theoretical work into practical approaches to daily safety issues. Culture is informed by the data, and the value of data is enhanced and valued within the culture.
The questions asked are the most important. Bill Starbuck's paper, "Fine-tuning the Odds Until Something Breaks" is also well worth reading but many works by for example Sidney Dekker, now address these issues in a much more practical way for those airlines that are serious about knowing and learning.
This is what I meant by "what", not "who" in the discussion above. Where "learning the lesson" fails and arrogance wins, we will always find that what took the organization off the right course was "who", never "what".
If an airline either does not use, look at or respond to their data (or doesn't even do data collection except to tick the box), then there is effectively nothing to be done. Organizations cannot be "forced" to be safe, especially when they can point to their record of "no accidents", or "explanable accidents".
Data analysis works because recognition is the first step to addressing a problem if there is one. Then avoiding denial is the next step followed by defining the problem using experienced people examining the data and addressing the SOP or the procedure then publishing the results in their ops manals.
Of course, as we have discussed here and elsewhere, this assumes an airline is first of all aware of these issues (that it may be 'at risk' even though they dont' want to think so) and that they wish to do something about a problem which is showing up in the data.
One can work "inside", with similar-minded people who also have the power and courage to do the right thing. That happens once in a while and we shouldn't be too idealistic - it works and is sometimes needed.
Short of reasonably-expected intelligent responses or working with those outside the organization but who have the power to enact change, the alternative frankly, is "heroic action" - the kind of direct action that, for example, Greenpeace, Amnesty International and thousands of other groups engage in. Whistle-blowing actions for example are both short-term solutions and far riskier in terms of achieving the originally-conceived goals. In other words, unless an organization is cognizant of all aspects of its operation and not just the commercial, profit-making aspects, sooner or later, in a relatively high-risk operation such as aviation, the outcomes are well understood.
If the airline isn't doing any of this on a daily basis then nothing has been learnt and the answer to your question is, there is nothing to be done except to wait; the airline is on it's way to learning from an accident. Just ask NASA.
* Gulfair 320, Armavia Air 320, TAM 320, Spanair MD83, Turkish B737, Colgan Q400, One-Two-Go MD82, Garuda B737, Comair CRJ, Pinnacle CRJ, Helios B737, Adam Air B737, possibly AF447...
Why would an airline be any different than a hamburger stand?
For many reasons, for exemple:
if you are a Mac donald's employee, forgetting the big mac sauce when preparing this hamburger will have very little consequences on the customer.
If you are an airline employee, forgetting to lower the gear may have huge and definitive consequences on the customer.
When you are in the transport industry (Boat, train, airplanes) you are responsible for the body and the saoul of your customers, just because they actually have to come into your vehicle.
Making money whatever it takes doesn' t apply to the transport industry.
AirRabbit
25th Oct 2009, 21:24
If you are a Mac donald's employee, forgetting the big mac sauce when preparing this hamburger will have very little consequences on the customer.
If you are an airline employee, forgetting to lower the gear may have huge and definitive consequences on the customer.
OK - I didn't expect anyone to take that comment literally ... however ... while the "big mac sauce" may have, as you say, very little consequence on the customer (unless he really likes big mac sauce), it will have also have very little consequence to YOU - at least for the time being. Not so with failing to lower the landing gear. Sure, the customer may have definitive consequences, but YOU will have arrived at the scene of the "happening" prior to the customer and have every bit as much as stake as the customer - perhaps more. But, my point was that businesses are in business, mostly, to make money - period. If you have a "better mouse trap" you can make money selling mouse traps. But, if you have an inferior mouse trap, you're going to lose your shirt if you stay in business - unless you have a dynamite sales pitch. If not, would it be fair to have the government raise the cost to purchase all mouse traps because you can't make money selling yours? Almost all businesses are like bathtubs with a lot of holes in the bottom of the tub. Most bath tubs (businesses) have only one source of water into the tub (source of income) - The faucet (the sales price of the product or service). When you have all sorts of holes in the bottom on your tub (costs of doing business - fuel, rental, purchases, salaries, insurance, etc., etc.), the only way to keep water in the tub (money in the business) is to ensure that the outflow (expenses) are not as great as the inflow (total price of products or services). It's called "bathtub 101." If you have robust competition, you're not terribly anxious to futs around with the income, lest you chase away your otherwise dwindling sources of income ... that leaves only the outflow for you to play with. Unfortunately, YOUR Outflow is almost always someone else's Inflow. Most markets can only stand just so many participants - even with some sort of governmental interference. If your company is one of the successful participants - you'll probably do OK. If your company is one of the ones who wants to break into that particular business - unless they can develop a niche that no one else is seeking or using - it is likely that your company will have a difficult time successfully managing the inflow vs outflow ... and, in my not-so-humble-opinion, having the government step in to rescue those kinds of companies is not only wrong, it is damaging to the entire business line. Sure, the government can do it ... and it might look to be successful for a while ... but eventually it will fail. They always have - throughout history.
Making money whatever it takes doesn' t apply to the transport industry. I wish you were right (I really do!) - and it used to be so. However, since the airlines have been managed by the "bean counters," they each have become mere businesses, just like hamburger stands. Inflow vs. Outflow. Nothing more. Nothing less. And as long as the decision makers are insulated from the successes or failures of their respective businesses, there isn't likely to be a change. When their tub runs dry, they move on to another tub in another venue. Welcome to life.
tommojonm
25th Oct 2009, 22:00
Best response to this thread by far... Thank you for taking a logical stance to what seems to me to be an illogical arguement.:*
lomapaseo
26th Oct 2009, 03:05
PJ2 above introduces the word precursor and acknowledges the arrogance by management to recognize lessons that need to be learned (sic)
As always the trouble with data is the inability to recognize data in vs actions out.
OK, my first inkling is to not kid yourself that operational data is a solution. It's not even a tool, however it is the ingredients.
The concept of Lessons Learned in safety is to couple the operational data with global experience (not just a single airline, manufacturer, etc.) to agree on what has constituted Precursors or what some may call "regression factors" If you add in the concept of precursers to the data it often infers that the data is OK fo now only due to luck or chance. Conversely when you run out of luck by repeating a similar data chain then you have an accident and big time economic impacts.
The knowledge of precursors (that's what safety professionals are expected to know) coupled together with in-service data within an airline or a manufacturer must be actionable or expect accidents and claims of negligence which can bring an organization to the brink of extinction.
The concept of precursors can only be sustained by safety professionals and certainly not by bean counters. So beware of ignoring a safety professional who has verifiable knowledge of precursors.
Again, the concept of the Lesson Learned is a combination of data and the knowledge of precursers
Rob21
26th Oct 2009, 14:28
1 - Airlines will "cut corners" whenever (and wherever...) they can.
2 - Airlines have a strong "lobby" with the government to keep requirements (via regs) on the limit. If you have a chance to talk to any FAA POI, he (or she) will tell you that most airlines give poor training to their pilots.
3 - Nice training comes sometimes only by pressure from insurance companies. I've got some nice factory training (in helicopters) not because my boss was nice, but because he would have significant reduction on insurance premiums if he would send all his pilots to factory "refreshment" courses every year, to include power-off touchdown autorotations.
4 - Unfortunately, insurance companies only "think" statistics. More airplanes will have to fall off the sky due to lack off pilot training before they put some pressure on the airlines to raise their "standards".
When I fly as a passenger I look for an airline that has new aircraft flown by old pilots. Unfortunately (again) what I see more is young pilots flying old airplanes...
Rob
postman23
26th Oct 2009, 14:58
Best response to this thread by far... Thank you for taking a logical stance to what seems to me to be an illogical arguement.http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/bah.gifNot so fast Tommojonm.
Fact is that the majority of our infrastructure was financed by taxpayers money, years ago I must admit (unless you are Italian :}).
When the automobile industries went tits up, when the banks started collapsing, where agriculture is concerned, where steel comes into play, where the arms industry is at stake, yes even at Boeing and Airbus, the government steps in.
AirRabbit's argument has value IF and only IF you reject all of the financial support in the mentioned and additional examples. In which case the government apparatus starts to become obsolete, i.e. it is no longer governing. What do you present as an alternative, surely not free market. That was the inital trigger of the ongoing downhill slide of the airline business and therewith the definite trigger for pay-for-training, crap salaries and the likes, ultimatly degrading safety to an extent that US Congress is looking into Colgan 3407. By my knowledge the first time ever that politicians cared for an accident in the transport sector.
Kindly awaiting response.
postman23;
FWIW, I couldn't agree with your comments more.
But the fact is, here we, rather this industry, are; what do we do?
The FAA has realized, very late in their game, that corporate enterprises cannot be left on their own and trusted to do the right thing. In Canada, the regulator has yet to comprehend that fact and I am franky standing by for a "correction" here which I hope will be adminstrative in nature and not an accident like it took to get both the FAA's and Congress's attention in the US.
The precursors for an accident exist in the data now and are already communicated to those whose responsibility it is to act. An organization thoroughly focussed on the control of costs to the exclusion of all else, is at risk. For change to occur, situational awareness is critical. How that occurs is the question in such an environment. Sites like this help but are not primary agents of change. Regulatory oversight and POI action are required.
postman23
26th Oct 2009, 16:55
PJ2, a valid question you ask.
The answer is complex if one were to tackle the problem in total.
On an individual basis it is a lot simpler: you draw the line somewhere and do not cross it!
That line may be one of income, aircraft status, health, commercial pressure, you name it. All these lines are laid down carefully in manuals and laws by people who make their living writing legal texts. One of the purposes of these legal aspects is to simplify nailing your behind to the wall if something goes wrong, which means you need to protect yourself while it is an illusion that legislation will protect you. That self protection requires discipline and courage, two factors that easily buckle when peer-pressure and financial concerns exist. In the end though, the choice is ours.
One may not make friends in chosing what is right, but it just might save that behind one day.
PS: the "U" word could provide some basic protection but attempted to stay clear of subtopics, where most people nowadays associate unions with T & Cs alone, instead of including best industry practices in their sales raps.
flyhigh85
26th Oct 2009, 17:22
As we all know these days the terms and conditions are degraded alot in regards to the deep crisis the whole aviation industry is experiencing right now.
But my mind I would think that as soon we are getting over the crisis and things are opening up the salaries will get higher again because the demands for pilots will be higher than the supply.
So is this the normal cyclus that happens every 5-10 years or are we facing a new situation? Are we just too many pilots around? Can we blame the low cost Airlines?
I have put to many $ on the line so it pisses me off that is has to be so hard to get a job with a decent salary:mad:
postman23
26th Oct 2009, 17:34
That supposedly normal cycle, I have yet to witness any evidence of that in my time aloft.
What I have seen is a steady and determined deterioration of working conditions on planet Earth. No stopping that, if you ask me. Surely salaries will go up, usually not by as much as they have gone down the years before though. And that is excluding inflation. If you want to become rich you must start up a flight school and keep on drivelling about that cycle that never comes. Don't feel bad about it, they got me :ok: and I am sure there are plenty that will follow us.
mercurydancer
26th Oct 2009, 22:08
PJ2
"The key to understanding this is the question always asked by "production-minded" managers, "so if you think we're not safe to operate, where are the accidents to prove your point?" In other words, precursors to accidents are not taken as "real", nor are near misses. The notion of "luck" and "skill" are often invoked in such a mentality."
Wise words indeed. I recently encountered exactly that in questioning the design of an intravenous pump which is capable of delivering a lethal amount of moprhine. The problem was so simple, the casing had a hinge mechanism which was insecure. Once the casing was open then it would be very easy for a confused patient to inadvertently depress the driver button and inject a lethal dose. It was reported on an incident reporting mechanism but the "management" adopted exactly that defensive approach. No one has died so whats the problem?
mercurydancer;
No one has died so whats the problem?
In flight safety work, this approach to risk is known by a number of terms beginning with "tombstone safety". Another term is "blood priority".
For your, and for postman23 and lomapaseo's benefit and hopefully others who have continued to read this thread, I want to reproduce (rather than just link) an article that covers all areas of interests expressed thus far. I think it answers the question, "How do we do that?"; I think it provides some basic notions on how serious flight safety work must be done but too often isn't and I think it provides a positive way forward without a sense of pointing fingers or giving up in the face of daunting odds.
I have colored blue those statements which I think are especially valuable and would apply equally to medicine as to other industries including of course, aviation from whence it came.
PJ2
http://www.fsinfo.org/docs/FSISpecial052603.pdf
Organizational Culture and Safety
The beginning of the organizational culture period of accident investigation and analysis can be traced back to the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986 (Cox & Flin, 1998). On April 26 1986, two explosions blew off the 1000-ton concrete cap sealing the Chernobyl-4 reactor, releasing molten core remains into the vicinity and fission products into the atmosphere.
It was the worst accident in the history of nuclear power generation. It has so far cost over 30 lives, contaminated approximately 400 square miles around the Ukrainian plant and significantly increased the risk of cancer deaths over a wide area of Scandinavia and Western Europe (Read, 1990).
Poor safety culture was identified as a contributing factor in the Chernobyl disaster (Cox & Flin, 1998). Since then safety culture has been discussed in other major accident enquiries and analysis of system failures, such as the King's Cross Underground fire in London and the Piper Alpha oil platform explosion in the North Sea (Cox & Flin, 1998; Pidgeon, 1998).
According to Meshkati (1997), the most dramatic turning point for "safety culture" in the United States came with an aviation accident that killed 14 people -the in-flight structural breakup and crash of Continental Express Flight 2574 near Eagle Lakes, Texas, on September 11, 1991. As a member of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) at that time, Dr. John Lauber suggested that the probable cause of this accident included "The failure of Continental Express management to establish a corporate culture which encouraged and enforced adherence to approved maintenance and quality assurance procedures" (Meshkati, 1997).
As a result of this and other similar aviation accidents, safety culture came to the forefront as the exclusive topic at the U.S. National Summit on Transportation Safety, hosted by the NTSB in 1997. The acknowledgment of the meaning of safety culture in preventing accidents has led to many studies attempting to characterize safety culture in a number of high-risk manufacturing companies. Cox and Flin state, there have been few attempts to examine the various definitions of safety culture that have been proposed in the literature, nor have there been any attempts to culture within organizations.
Furthermore, such terms as "safety climate" are often used in conjunction with safety culture, with little if any differentiation between the concepts (Cox & Flin, 1998). Consequently, while the concept of safety culture continues to attract more attention, "the existing empirical efforts to study safety culture and its relationship to organizational outcomes have remained unsystematic, fragmented and in particular under-specified in theoretical terms" (Pidgeon, 1998).
The first thing to recognize about Safety Culture is that it cannot be quantitatively measured. Instead, it is more appropriate to survey attitudes, and observe employee and management behaviors, and the quality of the work process. The rapid development of new technology has fundamentally changed the nature of work and has increased the complexity of systems within a variety of industries (Hendrick, 1991). Among these complex systems are those commonly known as "high-risk" systems, such as nuclear power plants, chemical processing facilities, and aviation operations that require a tight coupling between both technical and human subsystems. It is critical to have positive workplace attitude – from the president to the newest hire.
Management is the key to a successful safety culture. This positive attitude must flow from the top down. How may times have you heard the expression "flavor of the month" directed at a new organizational program or process? It’s common for corporations to adapt this lack-luster attitude and it is one of the largest mistakes made. Deliberate how safety programs are conventionally presented to would-be participants. A corporate administrator learns about a new safety program and orders the appropriate materials. Some companies go as far as to hire a trainer to teach the new step-by-step procedures to certain personnel. Then these employees demonstrate the new procedures to others while on the job, and thus a new safety program is implemented plant wide.
But to many this is just another set of temporary procedures, which attempt to reduce recordable injuries and make management look good. It is commonly believed that the new program won't really work to reduce injuries, and therefore it won't be long before it will be replaced with another "flavor of the month.” The "flavor-of-the month" attitude occurs when people are not taught the principles or rationale behind a program. They are just trained on how to implement the new process. They are not educated about the research-supported theory and corporate mission statement from which the program originated.
A true safety culture is established when safety is valued consistent with productivity and profitability. Managers and supervisors need to be held accountable for safety in the same manner as production and profitability.
Paul O’Neill, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, as printed in the Industrial Safety and Hygiene News (ISHN), March 2001, explains: “Many companies still see safety management as a costly legal requirement with no real business benefits, but this is not the case. He explains that all truly great organization must be aligned around values that bind the organization together." “This is how companies withstand competitive pressures and operate consistently on a far_flung global basis.”
He stated that: great organizations have three characteristics:
• Employees are treated with dignity and respect.
• They are encouraged to make contributions that give meaning to their lives.
• Those contributions are recognized.
According to O'Neill: "Safety is a tangible way to show that human beings really matter." He continues to state that: "Leadership uses safety to make human connections across the organization. Stamping out accidents (which at Alcoa O'Neill called "incidents"), and telling employees we can get to zero incidents is a way to show caring about people. This is leadership."
Leadership accepts no excuses, and does not excuse itself, when safety problems arise.
• Simply caring about safety is "not nearly enough, not nearly enough,” He continues to say: "At the end of the day, caring alone is not enough to make sure that an incident never happens again."
• What's needed is for "safety to be as automatic as breathing," "It has to be something unconscious almost."
• This won't happen by leadership simply giving orders. "You need a process in place to get results." A process based on leadership, commitment, understanding, and no excuses.
• "Safety is not a priority at Alcoa, it is a precondition. If a hazard needs to be fixed, it's understood by supervisors and employees that "you do it today. You don't budget for it next year."
He continues by stating: How do you get an organization to believe this? "You always must be constantly thinking about ways of refreshing the organization's thinking about safety."
O'Neill outline five steps he took soon after coming to Alcoa. He called in the safety director to review the company's performance.
O'Neill was told Alcoa's rates were below industry average. "That's good," "But the goal is for no Alcoan to be hurt at work," he told his safety director. No injuries down to first aid cases. "The only legitimate goal is zero." Otherwise, who's going to volunteer to be that one annual case, or whatever?
Getting to zero is a journey of discovery, O'Neill said, and at no point can you stop and say, "We've reached the point of diminishing returns and can't afford to get better."
O'Neill met with employees and gave them his home phone number. "I told them to call me if their managers didn't fix safety problems.
What I was doing was making a point to my managers." O'Neill had 26 business units. Vice presidents call him personally whenever their group experienced a lost workday case. "This constantly engaged them about safety," he said. It forced them to confront themselves: "Why do I have to make this call I hate to make?"
When Alcoa launched an internal computer network, safety information came online first, before marketing, sales or finance, according to O'Neill. Just another way to keep safety in front of employees and managers and reinforce that it is a precondition, he explained.
O'Neill told his financial people, "If you ever try to calculate how much money we save in safety, you're fired." Why? He didn't want employees looking at safety as a "management scheme" to save money.
"Safety needs to be about a human value. Cost savings suggest something else. Safety is not about money; it's about constantly reinforcing its value as a pre-condition."
OSHA strongly believes that an effective safety and health program is the answer and results are the proof. After focusing on its safety and health program, an Atlanta company reported that, from 1994 to 1996, their annual Workers' Compensation claim costs fell from $592,355 to $91,536, a savings of $500,000. After implementing a 100% fall protection program and supervisory accountability for safety, Horizon Steel Erectors, Inc., had a 96% reduction in its accident costs per person per hour, from $4.26 to $0.18 (Mallon, 2001).
To go along with the “flavor of the month syndrome”, a lot of companies cannot release the Blood Priority or otherwise known as the Tombstone Safety Program. Mr. Richard Wood, author of “Aviation Safety Programs,” states that Tombstone Safety refers to the idea that it’s a lot easier to get something corrected if you just had an accident or killed someone - there is literally blood on the accident report.” The result to this is that it is difficult to get something corrected if it has not caused an accident.
This is the, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix” attitude. This type of attitude is taught, and it comes from the top down. If the corporation has the Tombstone Safety Program, then that’s what the employee’s will do…Tombstone Safety!
Team Building and Safety Culture Building a safety culture is not a safety function, but a project management function. And no one person can do it alone. Kenneth Blanchard, author of the “One Minute Manager Builds High Performing Teams,” states, “Not one of us is as smart as all of us put together.”
Empower the employee’s and getting them involved is exactly Paul O’Neill done at Alcoa. He built a high performing team that was focused on safety culture. To do this one must be totally involved and empower the workforce. However you manage your other projects, you need to build a safety culture in a particular way.
Consider the ATTAM approach: Assess, Train, Teach, Assign, and Monitor.
Assess. Observe people working, and take notes. What are the recurring unsafe acts? Record each unsafe act as it occurs. Once employees notice you in an area, they put on a face of safety and limit your ability to observe. That's the time to ask, "Why are these unsafe acts occurring?" Assess your people to determine who can champion the correcting of attitudes, behavior, and ignorance. Who are the key players? Usually, they are crew leaders, supervisors, and others with authority. Identify the people, and then identify their attitudes and basic safety knowledge.
Train. Once you've selected your safety champions, you must do
more than just tell them, "Now I am making safety part of your performance evaluation." They must learn the causes of injury and alternatives to practicing those causes. You must train everyone that safety is equal to or greater than all other goals, including production. Safety champions are teachers, but they are only as effective as their training and the backing of management allow them to be. Consider purchasing "train the trainer" safety programs.
Teach. Your trained safety champions teach safety to the rest. The simple teaching method has three parts. First, stop when you enter an area. Scan the area, then look, listen, smell, and feel for unsafe conditions. Look for such things as improper tool use. Listen for high ambient noise. Smell for gasoline fumes. Feel for high heat. When you notice an unsafe act, approach the worker, making him or her aware of the unsafe practice. Then you must follow up to ensure that worker corrects it. You also teach by looking for safe acts. For example, if you see an employee- working overhead and wearing a safety belt, let that person know you recognize and appreciate his or her attention to safety.
Assign. Some unsafe acts wouldn't happen if you could correct environmental problems. For this, you must hold individuals responsible. If it's nobody's job, nobody will do it. Make specific work assignments and hold individuals accountable for certain safety objectives. • Assign individuals to inspect equipment and work areas for problems such as poor lighting, missing guards, damaged equipment. • Assign ownership of an individual problem to an individual (who may lead a group in resolving it). • Assign individual safety ownership of specific power distribution equipment, so such activities as breaker testing and transformer inspection actually happen. • Assign someone to audit inspections, safety tours, safety meetings, and other activities.
Monitor. Check your safety culture progress by asking key questions. How are employees responding? How are your teachers carrying out their duties? Do they need more training? What are the recurring types of unsafe behavior? When did you last observe people working? Are safety inspection reports precipitating action? Is it easy to report unsafe conditions or equipment? Are you replacing unsafe equipment? Are you rewarding your employees for safe or unsafe acts?
Everything boils down to two questions: Do your employees know how much you value safe behavior? Are you sure you want them to know?
Safety Culture vs. Tombstone Safety By Gary L. Hanes
44 Flight Safety Information Journal - May 2003 www.FSinfo.org (http://www.FSinfo.org)
References
Blanchard, K. (2000). One-Minute Manager Builds High Performing Teams. Retrieved May 7, 2003:
Ken Blanchard Companies (http://www.blanchardlearning.com/default.asp)
Cox, S.; Flin, R. (1998). Safety culture: Philosopher's Stone or man of straw. Retrieved April 18, 2003:
http://www.aviation.uiuc.edu/new/html/ARL/conf2002fullText/zhawiegvonshamithf02.pdf
Read, P. (1998). Ablaze, The story of the heroes and victims of Chernobyl
Retrieved April 19, 2003: http://www.ceet.niu.edu/faculty/vanmeer/chernob.htm
Meshkati, N. (1997). Chernobyl Accident. Retrieved April 20, 2003: http://www.worldnuclear.
org/info/chernobyl/inf07.htm
Hendrick, W. (1991). Ergonomics in organizational design and management. Retrieved April 20, 2003:
www.ehs.cornell.edu/Geneva/safety_manual.pdf (http://www.ehs.cornell.edu/Geneva/safety_manual.pdf)
O’Neill, P. (2001). Safety Exchange of America. Retrieved April 25, 2003:
http://www.emeetingplace.com/Culture_Series/culture_series/introduction/Part 2.htm
Mallon, J. (2001). Nine Oklahoma Companies Earn 2002 Safety Award. Retrieved April 29, 2003:
http://www.state.ok.us/~okdol/press/pr042202.htm
Centaurus
27th Oct 2009, 13:50
I think that many bright people will continue to want to be pilots and will do their very best to overcome the new limitations. I also think that they will be killed along with the others
I don't think that will happen. And the reason is that current automation is so good that even idiots are protected by it. With advent of the really superb reliability of automation, crashes due to navigation errors are rare. In the old days running into hills used to be the major cause of accidents.
There will always be differences of opinion between pilots on whether or not manual flying skills are still vital in highly automated aircraft. But, despite my personal views on the subject, it seems to me the generally accepted procedure where automatics are engaged as soon as practicable after lift off, until the last few second before touch down, has largely contributed to the good safety record of big airliners. This, despite newly graduated barely out of flight school first officers who, by definition, are second in command of a big jet, and who lack real world experience of the art of manually flying especially where an emergency dictates such a skill.
AirRabbit
27th Oct 2009, 16:06
@AirRabbit
Quote:
Best response to this thread by far... Thank you for taking a logical stance to what seems to me to be an illogical arguement.
Not so fast Tommojonm.
Fact is that the majority of our infrastructure was financed by taxpayers money, years ago I must admit (unless you are Italian ).
When the automobile industries went tits up, when the banks started collapsing, where agriculture is concerned, where steel comes into play, where the arms industry is at stake, yes even at Boeing and Airbus, the government steps in.
AirRabbit's argument has value IF and only IF you reject all of the financial support in the mentioned and additional examples. In which case the government apparatus starts to become obsolete, i.e. it is no longer governing. What do you present as an alternative, surely not free market. That was the inital trigger of the ongoing downhill slide of the airline business and therewith the definite trigger for pay-for-training, crap salaries and the likes, ultimatly degrading safety to an extent that US Congress is looking into Colgan 3407. By my knowledge the first time ever that politicians cared for an accident in the transport sector.
Kindly awaiting response.
I would submit that the “free market” is the ONLY method that would be acceptable – because it is the only mechanism that can function, continuously. Where that free-market function is interrupted by government intervention is exactly where (and when) the trouble starts. To believe differently is to believe that government has the responsibility for ensuring the success of any business; and, I would ask that if the government is responsible for ensuring the success of any business, why would it not be a responsibility for the government to ensure the success of every business?
A good many Americans forget what the US Declaration of Independence actually says. The rights of all Americans are, what the framers called “unalienable Rights,” limited to “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.” No where in that short list is found the right to be successful in any business.
You make the statement that When the automobile industries went tits up, when the banks started collapsing, where agriculture is concerned, where steel comes into play, where the arms industry is at stake, yes even at Boeing and Airbus, the government steps in. Let’s look individually:
Automobile industry – in history, only once did the government provide assistance for an automobile manufacturer – It was Chrysler Corporation and the government made a Load to that corporation – that was paid back, in full, with interest, prior to the note coming due. Recently, the current Administration decided it would step in and provide “stimulus” funds – and, as far as I know, Ford declined any of the money. The jury is still out on what the result will be.
Agriculture – there are some farmers today who are paid NOT to plant, grow, harvest, and sell specific crops. Why? Because lobbyists have convinced the legislature that too many farmers growing the same crop will cause some farmers to go bankrupt because of the decline in the salable price of those crops (more supply = less demand = less money it will draw). As a result, we have some farmers breaking their necks to “till the soil,” while others drink mint juleps on the porch? What’s fair about that?
The banking industry – while everyone says the banking industry fell onto hard times – it wasn’t because of bad management or substandard risk taking on their own. What happened? The government REQUIRED banks to make sub-prime loans to persons who would not normally qualify for that loan. Some – likely a majority– of those loans were interest only loans – requiring the client to pay only on the interest for the first part of the loan. Unfortunately, they were still not able to make the required monthly payment – so whatever what not paid was added as debt to the principle. When the loan reverted to payments including both interest AND principle payments … the borrower still couldn’t make the payments. So it was necessary for the bank to foreclose. Unfortunately, where the bank could normally foreclose, take possession, and sell the home for at least the equity the bank had invested, but not now. Now, the outstanding principle was so high the home was not worth what was due on it. However, banks were given the opportunity to “sell” these “upside-down” loans to the Federally supported Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie May”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”). Note that both of these organizations are chartered by the US Congress – sort of an underhanded way to have the government pay for housing that the home “owner” couldn’t pay for. That is why the banking industry fell on its face. A good share of the loans that were out were secured by less and less valuable real estate holdings … pretty soon, the bubble burst! Guess what … well, you know the story.
Sorry, I know very little about the steel industry nor the arms industry.
My point is that things were going well for most businesses until the government got involved - and they got involved to help those who had less “stuff” – so that they would be able to have more “stuff” – whether or not they were able to afford that “stuff.” Who paid for it? I’ll give you a guess – yep – the tax payers. My concern is whether we, as a country, are going to continue to throw good money down that same rat hole in the attempt to buy “stuff” for those who cannot otherwise afford that “stuff.” The Declaration of Independence says an unalienable Right is the pursuit of happiness – NOT that everyone is guaranteed happiness of their own choosing. That is simply NOT the role of government, it’s probably against the law, and it certainly isn’t provided for in the US Constitution or the Declaration of Independence.
Oh, and I doubt that the US government is officially going out on a limb to help out Airbus – unless it is a reciprocal agreement for aircraft certification (something like … the US accepts French certification of Airbus Aircraft and France accepts US certification of Boeing aircraft). And as you probably are aware, Boeing just recently moved its corporate headquarters from Washington State to Illinois … why – because the tax structure in Illinois was better for Boeing’s concerns. Government enticement is a lot different than government regulation. The US aviation industry, in my non-so-humble opinion, doesn’t need government intervention into the running of airlines – salaries, salary caps, personnel decisions, markets, market shares – unless they can provide an equal distribution of the revenue dollars – and can you imagine the cost to the taxpayer to support such a burgeoning bureaucracy? Only to have the government restrict who can go into that business, have the government tell you what you can fly, where you can fly, how much you can/must pay the crewmembers. Shoot, they can’t even control the price of jet fuel.
No thanks. I’ll take my chances on the free market methodology.
AirRabbit;
All that is recognizable as pretty standard right-wing fare straight out of Milton Friedman and the Chicago Boys, Hayek and others.
Interesting that there is the felt need to come to the defence of such views in a thread on flight safety.
While I am keenly aware that the notions of laissez-faire, neoliberal economics, Reaganism/Thatcherism, the deregulation of this industry all may be applied to flight safety, may I suggest we return to the specific subject at hand, please?
postman23
27th Oct 2009, 18:33
@AirRabbit, the point I was trying to make is that without any regulation most businesses, including aviation enterprises, would have been out of business a long time ago. By not letting that happen, governments have exercised a certain influence with its ups and downs.
'Free' market is the equivalent of prostitution. You get what you pay for at the lowest possible price, influenced by the needs of the prostitute and/or the needs of the clientele. How that is supposed to guarantee a certain quality is a mystery to me. Free market boils down to the principle of the 'survival of the fittest' and as much as I like a good competition, it will definitely NOT benefit safety where the aviation industry is concerned. I hope you can agree with me on that one. If not, I suppose you consider nothing wrong with life at your average regional airline these days. In conclusion, there is nothing free about a 'free market', people are forced to work in the worst possible conditions, with the lowest possible standards and under a continuous pressure and fear of losing their jobs, because some new hooker may pop up on the block and steal their clients.
It wasn't me who came up with this picture but I find it very fitting for aviation post 911.
http://www.marxist.com/images/stories/capitalism.gif
postman23
27th Oct 2009, 18:45
"You always must be constantly thinking about ways of refreshing the organization's thinking about safety."
Not much mental room if one's personal existence is at stake... with the free market and all.
Deregulation has been an unmitigated, proven disaster as far as aviation goes; the last "Act" in this worst-of-all-possible political economies is now unfolding under SMS - the deregulation and privatization of flight safety where managers of "for-profit" corporations are responsible at once for commercial and safety decision-making.
We in the flight safety department at a major carrier were once characterized as a "profit center" and had to show where our activities provided reasonable expectation of profit. It was hard to believe we were in the aviation business, so stupid and ignorant was this free-market, profit-at-all-cost thinking which has naively been adopted by those who can't tell the front of an airplane from its tail.
The term "free market" actually refers to the systemic privatization of profit and the socialization of risk. As presently constituted, capitalism is not a social system nor does it care about its effects upon people; it is merely a technique for the concentration of wealth; the emaciation of a society and its values is immaterial to those who believe that the free-market can come to terms with human problems.
With others, I have compared the reasons for last October's economic collapse of Western economies with the reasons why organizational factors cause airplanes to crash. Surely someone would have written a paper on this but so far the lessons are not seen because they are not believed.
We could debate this until the cows (or the commodities) come home and my only interest is how the "free-market mentality" which has been taken to its natural, greed-driven extremes, has effected aviation and how the serious issues which have arisen might be dealt with within the present capitalist system. This is mainly because the lessons of last October have yet to be learned let alone even understood. We are far too focussed on propping up a system which delivered us into this disaster and will do so again, just like accidents are repeated by those who fail to learn from them.
lomapaseo
27th Oct 2009, 20:45
We in the flight safety department at a major carrier were once characterized as a "profit center" and had to show where our activities provided reasonable expectation of profit.
I'll have to agree that sounds far out. However there is nothing wrong in applying measurements to one's effectiveness.
From a safety standpoint I can think of at least two measures that might be considered
"minor" safety related (against the FARS) incidents per flight hour
cost of insurance vs cost of doing business.
lomapaseo;
That the products of a preventative safety program should be measured by suitable metrics is obvious and necessary to substantiate the program. It was the lack of comprehension of what the department did and the bureaucratic requirement that was frustrating.
We called for "measurement" at every turn but received nothing in terms of feedback for the products produced nor engagement with these products. They ranged from how long an airplane had to wait at the gate burning fuel before it finally docked, to single-engine taxis in and out, (with solid, dollar-value metrics and at what weights such procedures were most effective) to the usual information, including a number of events which are known to be serious precursors to an incident. We were able to provide dispatchability in the field when the crew reported a flight control problem. Utility was however, highly selective and where 'inconvenient' the data was ignored. We still have no idea how to deal with this.
The other problem is one of accounting and it exists in all safety work; how do you show a prevented incident/accident, in short, "nothing happened", on the books? Where in normal accounting practises do such "non-events" show up as credit towards what every non-aviation accountant sees as merely a very expensive program that produces "nothing".
How do you change that perception? The only way I've ever seen it changed is through an accident which is a tremendous failure of a flight safety system and only prevents, (perhaps), the second accident.
AirRabbit
28th Oct 2009, 14:54
While I’ve never avoided the label of “right wing,” and although I would much prefer the label of “conservative,” I would stop short of aligning myself with the likes of Milton Friedman, primarily due to the fact that, even though many of the principles he advocated are those I would advocate as well, there are enough differences between his philosophies and mine to make a primary distinction.
Also, while PJ2 may think it odd to respond to specific thoughts or suppositions in posts that may not lend themselves directly to the over-arching theme of the thread, I tend to agree that flight safety was the primary thread of this series of posts, and, therefore, turn to the response from postman23 to agree – to at least some level – that I, too, am not advocating an elimination of ALL regulation in the aviation business. There are, as we all know, substantial regulations that apply directly to safety. In fact some say that those regulations are too hampering when it comes to the free application of some business models. This is precisely where I think regulation – from a national perspective – is advantageous to the aviation industry. Safety regulation is not supposed to, at least to my knowledge, be dependent on the cost involved – the theory being that if everyone must do the same things by regulation, this process, in itself, provides for the long-sought-after “level playing field.”
In advocating this situation (and I do), I think it is clear that I also agree with his position that a “free market” will not, by itself, garner and support safety - and why I am saying that I don’t advocate an elimination of ALL regulation. But, I DO NOT agree that the regulators (i.e., the government) should decide on what portion of what industries get governmental support and what portions and what industries do not. I also agree with postman23 when he says “there is nothing free about a 'free market', (when) people are forced to work in the worst possible conditions, with the lowest possible standards and under a continuous pressure and fear of losing their jobs, because some new hooker may pop up on the block and steal their clients.” However, the absence of governmental regulation on airline ticket costs, pilot salaries, or other things that he may think necessary, is not “forcing people to work in the worst possible conditions, with the lowest possible standards, under a continuous pressure and fear of losing their jobs." I would guess that any pilot finding himself or herself in such conditions, would find that they are welcome to resign and walk off the property. Also, I would think that if any such person was promised a certain salary or benefit and the management of the company did not fulfill their part of that bargain, there are legal remedies to follow. Do I think that all regional airlines are providing their crewmembers a wonderful, magnanimous, enviable salary? Certainly not. Do I think that those crewmembers were hoodwinked and tricked into signing on to fly for that airline? Also, certainly not.
Several decades ago, airline cockpits were heavily staffed with ex-military aviators – some sources say as high as 95%. Why not today? Yes, there are not the same numbers of military aviators getting out of the military. Why is that? Because the military had invested a lot of time and money in training those folks and they want a return on their investment. But there ARE some getting out of the military. Why don’t they grab up these regional airline flying jobs? Because they can make 10 or 15 times the offered salary by selling insurance (or similar) – and they are willing to sell insurance because they don’t believe their time is worth a tenth or a fifteenth of that insurance-selling salary to fly airplanes. What is your time worth?
As for the picture posted under postman23’s post, anytime anyone has anything that someone else wants badly enough, it is likely that the guy “without” will point a gun at the guy “who has.” In my view, that is what happened on 911. Of course it doesn’t have to be a gun – it can be any weapon available – including marketing strategy.
PJ2 states that “Deregulation has been an unmitigated, proven disaster as far as aviation goes…” Look at how successful start-up businesses are in the US – and how many remain in business more than 5 years. (If I knew the recipe for how to do that, I wouldn’t post it here, I’d go start my own business chain – and retire to some nice sand beach with a MaiTai in hand.) But I think it’s fair to say that starting and running an airline isn’t all that it’s cracked up to be. How many airlines have started and how many closed since airline deregulation in the late 1970s? Has deregulation been a success or a failure? I guess it depends on how you want to look at it. Are there less airplanes flying today than in the early 1970’s. Are there less passengers or cargo being carried by airplanes today?
In short, it’s almost a given that a new industry elbowing its way into business, wanting to capture a share of the market for the way it wants to do business will ultimately inflict a cost to someone, somewhere. Look at “Mom&Pop” grocery stores and the supermarket chains. Look at small businesses in store-fronts along Main Street in your town, and the “big box” stores. Look at the success of organizations like Federal Express or UPS … and look at the US Post Office Special Delivery option. Look at the internet and look at the remainder of the US Post Office (look quick, ‘cause it may not be around much longer). Does that mean that the Mom&Pop stores were wrong? Does it mean that the US Post Office was wrong. What happened to Pan American World Airways? Where is National Airlines? Eastern? New York Air? People’s Express? Air South? Western Airlines? Just how many airlines can the economy of the US support? Are there greedy people in this business? Sure. Will they succeed? Probably … at least for a while. But, as flawed as any free market enterprise may be, I’ll still take it over a government run, socialistic society, where someone else makes all of the decisions for you – because, they know better than you what is good for you.
NOSIGN
30th Oct 2009, 01:59
Individuals directly employed by government safety regulators have likely read this thread; care to comment or release official statement?
There are indicators and concerns that the decline in pay and conditions of Pilots is affecting safety.
Is the regulator negligent by not offering an investigation into the concerns raised in this thread, and others like it?
AirRabbit
30th Oct 2009, 17:54
There are indicators and concerns that the decline in pay and conditions of Pilots is affecting safety.
Is the regulator negligent by not offering an investigation into the concerns raised in this thread, and others like it?
Just curious ... in that most officials (government and otherwise) would say that the current aviation environment has never been more safe than it is right now, recognizing that of course there are airplane accidents ... there have always been airplane accidents ... what indicators exist that would prompt anyone to believe that there is a precipitous decline in safety, or what would you say are the indicators or concerns that there is any decline is safety ... and then following that ... why would anyone presume that if a decline in safety does exist, the decline is tied to the salaries of the pilots?
framer
30th Oct 2009, 18:16
what indicators exist that would prompt anyone to believe that there is a precipitous decline in safety, or what would you say are the indicators or concerns that there is any decline is safety .
This is cut and paste from the IATA website.
IATA hull-loss accident rate figures for 2008 to 1 December tend to support the case for airline safety stagnation. IATA says that, having been improving steadily from 1998 to 2006, the Western-built jet hull-loss rate per million flights was 0.77 in 2008 up to 1 December, compared with 0.75 for 2007, but that the best-ever figure of 0.63 was recorded in 2006. The association says a levelling of safety gains is also showing in the accident rate for its own member carriers - now all required to have completed an IATA operational safety audit by the end of 2008.
I'm not saying it supports either argument here, but it is relevent and interesting. What has caused the rate to steadily improve for eight years and then go from .63, to .75, to .77? Is it even statistically relevent?
I'm sure someone will tell me.
It makes me think that there is something to all the strong feelings being expressed on these forums by very experienced commercial pilots.
Regards,
Framer
AirRabbit;
there have always been airplane accidents ... what indicators exist that would prompt anyone to believe that there is a precipitous decline in safety, or what would you say are the indicators or concerns that there is any decline is safety ... and then following that ... why would anyone presume that if a decline in safety does exist, the decline is tied to the salaries of the pilots?
I intend no disrespect nor rudeness here, but you are not a flight safety specialist nor are you an experienced airline pilot and are therefore not qualified to make such statements. Neither does reading government reports on the industry provide a complete picture.
The arguments expressed in this and other threads by those who either are flight safety specialists or airline pilots or both, recognize the complexity of these factors; these arguments do not adhere to or rely upon a mechanical model of causality and trending. Your arguments thus far "read" as typical arguments presented by accountants and managers who deal in financial concepts and priorities or by those who are organizationally a long distance from the daily operation and who haven't spent time in or had any contact with flight safety work.
All of these issues have been discussed at length in PPRuNe by many; they are not in doubt, but nor are they claiming that all is falling apart around us. That is not the nature of safety work. Flight safety work today is, or ought to be, preventative - we have the tools and the mandate through SMS. Such tools, training and experience reveal clear trends in the character of accidents and are expressing concerns as any early-warning system might. The nature and requirements of risk perception and management has changed dramatically just as the industry and airline piloting profession itself have changed.
Dismissing these changes with a wave-off statement like, "there have always been airplane accidents ... what indicators exist that would prompt anyone to believe that there is a precipitous decline in safety, or what would you say are the indicators or concerns that there is any decline is safety" tells me that you don't understand flight safety work and don't understand what is being said. The people who are watching this industry and who are in the cockpits daily, know. That is what this discussion is about.
Regards,
PJ2
framer;
IATA is the umbrella organization for each country's "ATA" organization and which are traditionally the lobby for airlines. For example, it was ATAC - the Air Transport Association of Canada, which lobbied very strongly for the airlines against the proposed duty day regulations when the CARS were first being written. Canada's Flight Time and Duty Day Regulations are an abomination and a safety issue because of this lobbying against those who understood the issues of fatigue risk management.
ATAC no longer represents airlines in Canada. I don't know why they don't but the fact remains that IATA seems to speak out of both sides of its mouth: they lobby strongly for legal and policy support regarding the airlines' commercial priorities and also have a flight safety wing with boasts the "IOSA", (IATA Operational Safety Audit) process. This process is not without its controversy and standards issues; I know for a fact that passing an IOSA audit can be done on a conditional basis where something may not be up to the IOSA standard but the airline is passed anyway pending the commitment to address the sub-standard audit matter. The issues were not "light bulb" issues but substantive.
Flight safety specialists could see reasons why the improvements in the accident rate were going to level off and have written about it here and elsewhere. These figures are not surprises. The industry and the regulator cannot continue to cut resources and support and expect the same level of incidents and accidents will obtain. I have said many times here now that newbies and those who do not comprehend the flight safety process as it is done at Part 705 (Canadian) and Part 121 (US) operations are not understanding how aviation got as safe as it is and are either cutting support and resources to preventative programs or are not providing such support in the first place, because the product of good flight safety programs is "nothing" and is very difficult in and of itself to justifiy in the face of tremendous commercial and investor pressures.
Such cuts or non-support are coming at precisely the time in history when the regulator is down-loading oversight responsiblities to private corporations under SMS; essentially the regulator has no idea what is going on at Canada's airlines and the same applies to the US as evidenced by the serious maintenance issues at Southwest, American and others.
While no dire predictions are made here because the system is still very good, these dynamics have the makings of a perfect storm, should they be permitted to continue under the present financial pressures and reduced regulator oversight.
If one requires a "nutshell" approach, that is the issue "in a nutshell" - unlike financial disasters such as last October's, (which in the view of many including my own are borne of the same processes of ignoring the precursors to the accident), these things do not occur overnight but are, even as we speak, in a period of gestation.
These characteristics and changes is the data speaking. They are not mere opinion or any narrow focus on an "agenda"; "what, not who", in other words.
The only agenda here is the anticipation of causes of, and the prevention of, aviation accidents be they mainline or regional carriers.
Such cuts in preventative safety programs arise from the inability to see and therefore believe in the "unseen": - those accidents which did not occur due to preventative programs but which nevertheless existed in the data as precursors or near-misses. Because "nothing" is the outcome, nothing is communicated and the precursors are set aside.
The only thing financial and insurance people comprehend after they begin to question expensive safety programs and press for cuts everywhere is "kicking tin": cleaning up after an accident and dealing with the headlines, the lawsuits and the loss of reputation. The bill for a major fatal today is about ten billion US. The term "tombstone safety" and "blood priorities" have already been used in the context of this dialogue; while it may be hyperbole, it is also a possible outcome of not using the broader flight safety tools and programs available to intervene and divert the present shift.
PJ2
AirRabbit
31st Oct 2009, 21:05
I intend no disrespect nor rudeness here, but you are not a flight safety specialist nor are you an experienced airline pilot and are therefore not qualified to make such statements. Neither does reading government reports on the industry provide a complete picture.
First, let me thank you for your sensitivity toward me as a person who you believe might otherwise construe your comments as either disrespectful or rude. Please know that I offer my responsive comments in exactly same way – with neither disrespect nor discourtesy intended in any way. Of course you have no knowledge of my personal or professional background and I’m aware that simply my providing that information over this medium doesn’t qualify as “proof-positive” – in either direction. However, I can assure you that your assumptions are completely off base. I started my aviation experience quite some time ago, serving in both the military and the civilian world. I’ve been involved in a good share of the various parts of the aviation industry from aircraft certification involvement to airline operations to accident investigations; and, while my airline history includes flying the line, my primary involvement (and interest) has been, and continues to be, as an instructor / evaluator, including the increasingly popular role flight simulation plays in modern aviation. I will hasten to add that, as human, I sometimes get to the “preaching point” or take my position to the “absurd example” posture without a lot of effort; but I attribute that to my passion for wanting this industry to be as error free and enjoyable as it can be. While I attempt to mediate the somewhat overly emotional response all the time – there are those situations where it just … well, “slips out.”
The arguments expressed in this and other threads by those who either are flight safety specialists or airline pilots or both, recognize the complexity of these factors; these arguments do not adhere to or rely upon a mechanical model of causality and trending. Your arguments thus far "read" as typical arguments presented by accountants and managers who deal in financial concepts and priorities or by those who are organizationally a long distance from the daily operation and who haven't spent time in or had any contact with flight safety work.
I don’t, for one second, dismiss the complexities involved in airline operations – nor the extremes those complexities may achieve when discussing human nature in the cockpit – or the human nature of those who comment on those features. My comments were intended to address the attitudes of those who currently seem to be in the decision-making positions of most airlines (perhaps all airlines – but, I’ll stay away from such a broad-brush comment). I said, and I continue to say, that people who start businesses usually start them because they believe they will be able to make a living by running that business. The more entrepreneurial those persons are, the more they tend to believe that they can not only make a living, but a very good living, by running that business. That, in general, is not a bad thing. It’s when the motive to make more money over-rides or hides the damage that is or may be done elsewhere in the company or the community that I tend to take a more objectionable view of the motives. But, as a practicing conservative, I strongly believe that governmental regulation should be kept to an absolute minimum – governed by legalities and improprieties. In other words, monopolies shouldn’t be allowed. Mistreatment of employees shouldn’t be allowed. Conscription by employers shouldn’t be allowed. Collusion and “price fixing” shouldn’t be allowed. But there should not be a governmental practice that ensures the success of any specific business. Such a practice merely ensures having policies (heaven forbid, laws) that allow steps to be taken to have the taxpayer or business customers pick up the cost of that specific business being successful when the business owners/managers can’t make of go it on their own. It is particularly reprehensible when such “bailout” measures are taken by the government that generated the reason for the “bailout” necessity in the first place.
All of these issues have been discussed at length in PPRuNe by many; they are not in doubt, but nor are they claiming that all is falling apart around us. That is not the nature of safety work. Flight safety work today is, or ought to be, preventative - we have the tools and the mandate through SMS. Such tools, training and experience reveal clear trends in the character of accidents and are expressing concerns as any early-warning system might. The nature and requirements of risk perception and management has changed dramatically just as the industry and airline piloting profession itself have changed.
I couldn’t agree more that safety is the work of preventative effort. The question then becomes “what form is that prevention to take?” That is precisely where accident investigation comes into the picture. Why did that accident happen? What could we do that would allow the prevention of such an accident occurring again? It usually comes down to the mechanics involved (which are, by the way, getting better and better – although I am somewhat concerned that we may be getting way too dependent on computer-based systems for decision making and application – but that’s another issue for another time), or the actions of the crewmembers involved, or “an act of God.” Given the probability that we’re not going to influence God’s actions, and given the fact that this discussion isn’t centered on the reliability or functioning of the aircraft systems … it comes down to the actions of the crewmembers. Did the crew know what was going on? Did the crew properly identify the circumstances? Did the crew respond properly by exercising the skills they had been taught? Were those skills themselves insufficient to adequately rectify the situation?
If the answer to any of these questions is “no,” then there is probably an issue with the quality or quantity of the training.
If the answer to all of these questions is “yes,” then there is probably an underlying issue that has not been recognized previously.
But, invariably, the solution is not, and cannot be, that if we had only paid the crew members a higher salary, the accident/incident would have been avoided.
Dismissing these changes with a wave-off statement like, "there have always been airplane accidents ... what indicators exist that would prompt anyone to believe that there is a precipitous decline in safety, or what would you say are the indicators or concerns that there is any decline is safety" tells me that you don't understand flight safety work and don't understand what is being said. The people who are watching this industry and who are in the cockpits daily, know. That is what this discussion is about.
Please understand, my comment was not dismissive; and I maintain that it was, and is, accurate. There have always been airplane accidents. But, restricting ourselves to the crewmember issue … we’ve always been interested in finding out what we could do to prevent that particular situation from occurring again in the future. We train differently. We train more. We train different tasks or skills. We recognize the existence of outside influence with greater impact than previously understood (i.e., fatigue, mental distraction, etc.) and attempt to set in place restrictions to obviate their effect. We look for a better way to determine if competency is actually achieved. We look for a way to be able to rely on that competency being able to be called upon after not having practiced it for some time.
If the current methods used to train and determine competency are inadequate – we need to determine the resolution to that deficiency. More training? More frequent training? Different training? More evaluation? More frequent evaluation? Different evaluation? This is where the regulations come into effect – then the regulator must step in and set the requirements to ensure those levels are met – and met regularly, by each person going through those training and evaluation cycles.
If the persons going through airline training today are simply unable to assimilate the necessary training objectives – those persons should never be deemed qualified and allowed to operate as though they were qualified. There can be no excuse for saying that a person meets the necessary objectives when they do not. If an airline isn’t willing (or capable) of determining when a crewmember is competent to do the job he or she has been trained to accomplish – with the training and evaluation completed (both content and frequency) and is able to draw on that competency whenever necessary – it then becomes the responsibility of the regulator to correct that willingness or capability.
It simply makes no sense – to me or, in my experience, to anyone who knows human nature – for a pilot to believe that his or her salary and benefits package is so “substandard” that he or she may deliberately perform less diligently, fly more sloppily, make decisions less professionally, or take greater risks. If the persons who are hired by an airline are identified as prone to be unaware of the diligence that is essential, the meticulousness that is necessary, the professionalism that is required, or the fact that risk-taking is unwarranted and ill-advised, then the airline must be informed immediately and the airline must take appropriate action before those personality characteristics can contribute to an accident.
My opinion is that safety may be compromised by incompetent, ill-trained, poorly trained, forgetful, overly confident, fatigued, or distracted pilots; but safety is not being compromised by underpaid pilots because they are underpaid. If that were true, why is it that accidents still happen to airlines providing enviable compensation packages to their crewmembers?
cessnapuppy
31st Oct 2009, 21:53
My opinion is that safety may be compromised by incompetent, ill-trained, poorly trained, forgetful, overly confident, fatigued, or distracted pilots; but safety is not being compromised by underpaid pilots because they are underpaid. If that were true, why is it that accidents still happen to airlines providing enviable compensation packages to their crewmembers?
Hey man, I'm a little concerned. Hopefully it's just your debating style is suspect, and you dont really believe what you say.
What about cause and effect? You think that a pilot or mechanic that second guesses a decision to buy a proper meal or is juggling foreclosure options on their house is in the best frame of mind to put 400 lives in the air?
why is it that accidents still happen to airlines providing enviable compensation packages? <-- Without a qualifying numerical comparison, suggesting equality is just disingenuous :(
Some doctors dont wash their hands, some doctors scrub meticulously under the nails and all the way up to the elbows.
Both sets of doctors have adverse outcomes in their patient profiles. Should we not practice basic pre-op hygiene according to your logic?
AirRabbit;
An abiding respect and an attending to simple manners in public discussion is fundamental to a collegial dialogue and it certainly is mine in my posts.
In professional discussions there is no percentage in getting personal with an anonymous poster on the basis of a few words. "What, not who" is a priority. I thank you for your response in kind.
Thanks for providing a bit of your background; it helps in interpreting and understanding your views.
But, as a practicing conservative, I strongly believe that governmental regulation should be kept to an absolute minimum – governed by legalities and improprieties. In other words, monopolies shouldn’t be allowed. Mistreatment of employees shouldn’t be allowed. Conscription by employers shouldn’t be allowed. Collusion and “price fixing” shouldn’t be allowed. But there should not be a governmental practice that ensures the success of any specific business. Such a practice merely ensures having policies (heaven forbid, laws) that allow steps to be taken to have the taxpayer or business customers pick up the cost of that specific business being successful when the business owners/managers can’t make of go it on their own. It is particularly reprehensible when such “bailout” measures are taken by the government that generated the reason for the “bailout” necessity in the first place.
If that is what was meant by "de-regulation", then I would be a "practising conservative" as well.
We won't debate last October, Greenspan, Bernanke, Bush, Obama here but I know it would be a lively discussion over a few ales. I'm not exactly sure what "politics" I'm a "practitioner" of except to keep watching and thinking, but to me the hypocrisy which on the one hand boasts an unbridled fundamentalist capitalism and which on the other hand swiftly bails out failures of the richest capitalist organizations because to not do so would cause the collapse of the nation, (so say some), simply brings home what I have observed to be a standing rule in the US, less so in Canada, Australia and Europe, of the privatization of profit and the socialization of risk and failure. One is a capitalist and actually believes it and lives by those rules or not but placing oneself in a position of bringing down a nation's (and therefore the world's) economy either because the "government made us do it" or by traditional capitalist greed and institutional avarice is the best of both worlds for the bonussed few while the majority of the middle class, (or what is left of the middle class), have watched their wages, benefits including pensions and lifestyles steadily decline. It was the ultimate capitalist Henry Ford who thought employees should make at least enough wages to buy the product they made. Today, the opposite obtains in an economy run off taxpayer largesse in the greatest re-distributionist scheme ever, just to save a few sorry capitalist behinds. Perhaps we are of a common mind on this.
Greed and avarice require some measure of control because it is obvious over the last year certainly, that those who value these characteristics will not control themselves.
Whether further intervention or a true laissez-faire economy where the population is no longer a community and is instead atomized where it is every man for himself, is a decision which the present administration, and practising conservatives and liberals alike, must wrestle.
George Bush squandered the US' position in the world as no other president (inherited huge surplus, left with the largest deficit) and that is not only a sad thing for the world's economy, it is a dangerous position to be in because, to use a hackneyed phrase, power abhors a vacuum. Returning the US to a position of respect and power was the promise so we'll see where it goes.
I apologize for the thread drift but the broader economic mileu in which de-regulation of business, and specifically of the airlines, now over thirty years old, are intimately related to business's (and the airlines') welfare - THE topic under discussion here.
In my experience and not just my opinion, a private corporation in the aviation business will not always, of its own accord, "do the right thing", but will instead privilege commercial priorities over flight safety priorities either until something breaks or until they are caught in a rare audit, rather than taking the more conservative path of prevention. That is my objection to SMS; Oversight is required because capitalists, left on their own, will not behave in the public interest, but in their own narrow interest, which, curiously, is, in the long term, against their own interests as well. We have turned from a manufacturing economy to a speculative economy which values short-term gains in which quarterly results actually mean something. There is only money to be made in such an economy but not a substantive replenishment of capability. Speculation is a shell game, while making things and creating new things is not.
I have seen such unfortunate short-term principles and commercially-drivien decision-making at work and will tell you that if a captain had made these self-same decisions for his/her operation, he/she would be fired if not on the carpet, but SMS protects such management decision-making from "sunshine".
It is not "de-regulation" or "SMS", in and of themselves which is the concern. I agree with your optimistic views described in the quote above but frankly such outcomes are rare. An independent, non-interested third party is required to oversee those private activities which, if not done well, have the power to harm those who are otherwise unable to assess such products on the market, be they water quality, meat quality, cars, drugs or airline travel. We had such a case in Canada where the absentee regulator, (in fact they had been de-regulated) caused the deaths of (if I recall) 26 people across Canada through bad meat. Maple Leaf cleaned up their act but not before having a serious "accident".
The same holds with the aviation industry, obviously. We may part ways on our views of these matters but I can offer from personal experience that the lack of regulation and the absence of the regulator will, not may, provide fertile ground for commercial-priority decision-making in aviation where investors, not the passengers, are the enterprise's first priority.
I too, am "guilty" of passion but I can think of no better reason to be in the present circumstances; acknowledging that things are not coming apart at the seams is part of advancing a more accurate picture of the industry and they are not at all, "dis-integrating". The present move towards the privatization of flight safety here and in the United States is thus far a latent phenomena, the gestation period having just begun. Flight safety people are not unreasonably concerned.
It simply makes no sense – to me or, in my experience, to anyone who knows human nature – for a pilot to believe that his or her salary and benefits package is so “substandard” that he or she may deliberately perform less diligently, fly more sloppily, make decisions less professionally, or take greater risks. If the persons who are hired by an airline are identified as prone to be unaware of the diligence that is essential, the meticulousness that is necessary, the professionalism that is required, or the fact that risk-taking is unwarranted and ill-advised, then the airline must be informed immediately and the airline must take appropriate action before those personality characteristics can contribute to an accident.
My opinion is that safety may be compromised by incompetent, ill-trained, poorly trained, forgetful, overly confident, fatigued, or distracted pilots; but safety is not being compromised by underpaid pilots because they are underpaid. If that were true, why is it that accidents still happen to airlines providing enviable compensation packages to their crewmembers?
I fully agree with your view here. "Poor pay does not cause accidents; it is the lack of professionalism, incompetency, etc etc" which causes accidents.
But I have been saying and re-stating this view here and elsewhere for a number of years now, the latest being on page 3 of this thread which I expect would be read as a matter of form as part of this discussion. It is at the following link:
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/392314-we-facing-safety-issue-2.html#post5253205
The "pilot pipeline" is emptying. Those with the smarts and talent to fly professionally are, because they are smart, taking a look at other professions and careers because they are looking at airline work, both regional and mainline, (domestic/international) and saying, "I dont' think so".
It costs a candidate roughtly $100,000 to get qualified for airline work. As has been observed, the military is keeping their pilots so that supply is essentially gone.
Let me ask you, AirRabbit, what intelligent person in his or her right mind, (naivete regarding the industry excepted for a moment), would spend that kind of money to merely qualify one for a profession that has one away from home every important family day, pays poverty-level wages instead of a living wage and increasingly lousy, crappy wages even for senior members, is wholly disrespected by one's employer, their accountants, the organization's investors and increasingly the flying public, (because "automation" does it all so why should they be paid a high wage?), provides a minimum of training, has their pensions "stolen" through favourable bankruptcy laws and demonstrates in negotiations that pilots (their wages and benefits) are a significant liability in achieving profit and who, in one swift second can find themselves either dead or in court defending themselves against charges of "negligence" or worse in most countries of the world? One can only survive a short period of time on the "love of flying". Being an airline pilot today is extremely nasty, unpleasant, unpredictable business and many who I know have retired miss their compatriots, the flying and the layovers but not the industry. Captain Sullenberger said it best (and continues to do so); you can access his comments before Congress in February at:
http://transportation.house.gov/Media/file/Aviation/20090224/Sullenberger.pdf
Who would ever come into such a profession when there are other, far more lucrative, benign, predictable careers that respect both the individual and family needs and not the mere need for "98.6" in the cockpit seats?
I agree that these are strong views; they deserve to be. This was the career and profession that I loved deeply for 35 years and ached as a young kid to get into, and fought my entire career to defend in my own way as others do even now. I have seen it degraded and desecrated by managements who must deliver double-digit returns on investment for short-term investors here and overseas and who will take from the easiest place, employees, what they can and transfer it over to the profit column.
The single point being made here addresses the question you have asked: The incident and accident rates are going to reflect this kind of thinking, that is driving away "the best and brightest", and still no one has recognized this so-far latent factor.
Shorter posts are certainly desireble but simply cannot be done if even a reasonable discussion is to be had in this kind of format. I have attended enough safety conferences and made enough presentations myself to see the reality of these factors, all of which find agreement among those doing this work. Regardless of one's political turn, conservative or liberal, these are emerging factors which will, not may, affect the industry. It is to the industry's benefit to hearken to these matters if only to maintain their own edge and potential for modest profitability. The alternative is a ten-billion dollar bill which is about what a major fatal accident costs those involved today. Not an investors' dream, and the ethical issues haven't even been addressed in such thinking.
cessnapuppy
1st Nov 2009, 18:15
I fully agree with your view here. "Poor pay does not cause accidents; it is the lack of professionalism, incompetency, etc etc" which causes accidents.
Often in debate, we present exaggeratedly opposite responses to the other's increasingly belligerent position, until we are both shouting red faced across an increasingly widening divide.
Similarly, perhaps in an effort to avoid the aforementioned, and achieve the common ground identification essential not only for continued debate, but for also working toward a solution of some kind, we give up some ground (perhaps ground not worth fighting over)
However.
In this case, I feel the salary issue is waived too easily and too soon.
We have duty hours limitations: why??
Because we dont think it is safe for a pilot (or a truck driver) to be running 12 hours out of a day, or 60 hours out of a week or some such.
Are we naive enough to think that by keeping them out of the LEFT HAND SEAT (either truck cab or cockpit) but not out of the greeter's Aisle at WALMART where he she is forced to augment their income satisfies our commitments to safety?
And it's not so much pilots, but the incremental "swiss cheese" mechanics and ground crew down the line, ( swiss cheese because they are all handlers of the lattice work 'swiss cheese' of failure /success that when properly holes aligned, the 'mouse of disaster'* slips through)
* I apologize for any metaphors mangled in this post.
cessanpuppy;
Begging your pardon....either you're not being very clear in your writing or I am being obtuse, (not the first time), and I would very much like to understand your post. I am interpreting your remarks to mean that even in present circumstances, pilots are working longer, (greater production) and supplementing income by working a second job, (I did, as a young S/O in the early '70's), that duty day regs are liberal to permit more money to be earned, etc etc?
If that's what you're saying, I agree with you. Production pressures for wage earners are enormous and not only in this industry and yes, that has a great deal to say about present safety priorities and possibly about causes. Colgan is emerging as an example of this.
The issue however, is within an overarching approach to how the airline business is being run, the larger factors being, to nutshell it I suppose, "poor pay and lousy prospects are not attracting the best and brightest." As such, there is no direct link between poor pay and a specific rise in incident rates. While some industrial psychologists might state that poor pay demotivates people and while it might be trivially true, it is not a huge factor in aviation safety, mainly because sloth and incompetence can kill oneself. Fatigue will kill with far more frequency and direct connectedness than poor pay will.
What poor pay, lousy conditions and poorer prospects will do is "dis-arm" one, distract one, produce a lack of engagement or inhere a mild "malaise" within one which can have the same results. I doubt very much whether F/O Shaw was "demotivated" but she may have been "disarmed" and focussing on other matters which may be collaterally associated with poor pay, terrible working conditions, training issues and so on. In that sense, I think such a point is well worth attending to.
As stated in my previous post above, I have been making the point about "poor pay not attracting the best and brightest" since the late 90's/early 2000's and here beginning in 2003 so there is no "giving ground to get along and continue the dialogue" going on. Nor do I mind being challenged on my views but I do expect responders to read what I have written first. That is what continues the dialogue, for me anyway. Being accomodating by altering views to be nice isn't what any of this is about; being respectful and mindful of "the other" is simply the way one behaves in public with others when differences emerge. Being rude only says something about oneself and does nothing to convey one's point of view.
Regarding overstating cases or responding to belligerance, (none of which I see or sense in the present discussion, btw), I am not scoring debating points here. This isn't a debate in which one "wins". I try not to exaggerate because that only weakens one case - if anything, I can state without equivocation that I have vastly underplayed what I have experienced and seen and which supports my views.
cessnapuppy
1st Nov 2009, 19:22
you are correct, both on the first point (That I could be clearer) and on the second. (re: Colgan)
AirRabbit
1st Nov 2009, 21:25
We won't debate last October, Greenspan, Bernanke, Bush, Obama here but I know it would be a lively discussion over a few ales. I'm not exactly sure what "politics" I'm a "practitioner" of except to keep watching and thinking, but to me the hypocrisy which on the one hand boasts an unbridled fundamentalist capitalism and which on the other hand swiftly bails out failures of the richest capitalist organizations because to not do so would cause the collapse of the nation, (so say some), simply brings home what I have observed to be a standing rule in the US, less so in Canada, Australia and Europe, of the privatization of profit and the socialization of risk and failure. One is a capitalist and actually believes it and lives by those rules or not but placing oneself in a position of bringing down a nation's (and therefore the world's) economy either because the "government made us do it" or by traditional capitalist greed and institutional avarice is the best of both worlds for the bonussed few while the majority of the middle class, (or what is left of the middle class), have watched their wages, benefits including pensions and lifestyles steadily decline. It was the ultimate capitalist Henry Ford who thought employees should make at least enough wages to buy the product they made. Today, the opposite obtains in an economy run off taxpayer largesse in the greatest re-distributionist scheme ever, just to save a few sorry capitalist behinds. Perhaps we are of a common mind on this.
Yes, I think we are of a common mind here. I wholeheartedly agree with just about everything said in your quote here … and the only place where I twinged was the reference to Henry Ford … who, while not generally discussed, and despite his laudable goal of providing affordable automobiles, has long been known as one of the most virulent anti-Semites in American history. However, lest I be accused of being anti-Ford or anti-automobile industry, let me point out that, to its credit, the Ford Motor Company has done much to reverse the hateful legacy of its founder, through the donation of millions of dollars to Holocaust educational projects and human rights charities. Also, I must say you are obviously an astute observer of things political in the US in that you have recognized what many of my US countrymen feel is embarrassingly hyprocritical of our presently advocated stances on many things … and the “bailout” provisions mentioned are right at the top of my, and many of my colleagues’, list of such things. Unfortunately, there are some very cleaver folks who have managed to secure seats in the US government and have been able to push through legislation that actually made it unlawful, and thereby punishable, to withhold unsecured loans at below prime rates, to persons who would otherwise not be considered for any loan. In these cases, while a financial institution may have desired to allow the free-market system operate, they were prevented from doing so, by law, under the threat of penalties – some of which could have been business-ending.
Please excuse the deliberate side-step from the main theme of this thread, but, like you, I believe that to understand the safety issues currently being discussed, the general philosophy governing business decisions must be understood.
As typically there are two sides of every discourse, in these instances in the US, one side clearly believes in equal opportunity for citizens, ensured by careful, constructive, and minimal government involvement in business practices – essentially providing the backbone for the success enjoyed by the US, and other similarly motivated countries. Also, the other side clearly believes that the US has been as successful as it has been, not because of its citizenry, but because of its government. Therefore, in their minds, the only way to improve the outlook for the US, is to increase the size of the government and the involvement of that government in more and more of the business decisions of that citizenry. I have described this attitude as interpreting the US Declaration of Independence statement of the rights of its citizens to “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” by re-defining liberty and happiness as “the possession of equal numbers and qualities of things.” In other words, to be truly as happy as your neighbor who owns a Mercedes, you must be allowed to own a Mercedes as well – to be as free as your neighbor who owns a nice home, you, too, must be able to own a house. Some, in a transparent attempt to “be fair,” have said that the house doesn’t have to be as glamorous, or as large, but everyone who wants one should be allowed to have one – notice, that is “allowed to have,” with no caveats about being able to afford to do so. How then? Such “fairness” would come through increased taxes – supposedly only on the ‘arrogant rich,’ and to some, this is eminently fair. The interesting part is that many who feel this way are now not even trying to avoid the “re-distribution” accusation – rather they are attempting to justify such re-distribution as the goal would be to ensure everyone has been afforded their basic “human rights.”
Taking this premise to the next logical (nee “illogical”) expectation is to recognize that any business has a “right” to be successful. That means – do whatever is necessary to have the balance sheet come out positive. If someone looses his/her job in the process – they would merely have to understand that it’s “not personal, just business.” As I indicated in an earlier post, this is the justification for twiddling with the salaries and benefits of pilots, flight attendants, dispatchers, and mechanics. It’s not personal … it’s just business. Surely (they say) anyone can understand the necessity of a business being able to make a profit. But it’s the same in almost every industry. Look at the shambles in which we find our current public education system. Who runs that system? Private corporations? No. It’s the government. How can they do that? Through taxes. You may not have to send your kids to “public” schools, but you do have to see that your kids are educated. And if you choose to do that through any system other than the government’s, you have to pay (through taxes) for the ability of your neighbor to send his kids there. If you desire to provide your kids an education better than that provided by the “public” school system – you can, you just have to pay for both. Isn’t that a re-distribution of the funds you have available? Of course it is.
I’m not saying that all government is bad. There are some things that only governments can – or should – do for the population. Police forces. Fire protection services. There should be building codes and speed limits. Not everyone should be able to drive a car – there should be some sort of training and licensing system to allow that. You find someone who doesn’t want to get a license but says he needs to get to work? Tell him to buy a house within walking distance of his job. Not everyone should be allowed to fly a plane. Particularly if that person is flying a plane on which passengers have paid a price for that transportation. There should be stringent (but fair) requirements levied on that pilot. If we allow an airline to advertise and sell seats, shouldn’t there be some regulation governing some, many, most (?) of that operation to reasonably ensure that passenger that he can get to his chosen destination safely for the price he paid? It’s a tried and true realization. “Supply and demand” works. However, when there is an over-supply of anything – the demand is affected and so is the “going price.”
Let me ask you, AirRabbit, what intelligent person in his or her right mind, (naivete regarding the industry excepted for a moment), would spend that kind of money to merely qualify one for a profession that has one away from home every important family day, pays poverty-level wages instead of a living wage and increasingly lousy, crappy wages even for senior members, is wholly disrespected by one's employer, their accountants, the organization's investors and increasingly the flying public, (because "automation" does it all so why should they be paid a high wage?), provides a minimum of training, has their pensions "stolen" through favourable bankruptcy laws and demonstrates in negotiations that pilots (their wages and benefits) are a significant liability in achieving profit and who, in one swift second can find themselves either dead or in court defending themselves against charges of "negligence" or worse in most countries of the world? One can only survive a short period of time on the "love of flying". Being an airline pilot today is extremely nasty, unpleasant, unpredictable business and many who I know have retired miss their compatriots, the flying and the layovers but not the industry. Captain Sullenberger said it best (and continues to do so); …
I suspect that you would like me to answer your question with a response something like “Surely, no one would.” But, the fact is that there are something like 600,000 pilots in the US flying for the airlines.(Edit: Woops - sorry. That reference is to pilots World-Wide, not just US - the US figure would be closer to 27 - 30 percent of that number ... or about 180,000. That's what I get for trying to rely on an over-used top-noggin - at least that's my excuse!) However, even with this impressive figure, I’d tend to agree that, with the reputation of some airline salaries and the regulatory/governmental inquiries ongoing at just about any time, the prospect for future airline pilots may not be as robust as it once was. But, you tell me, if tomorrow American, or United, or Delta were to announce they were hiring 600 pilots over the next 8 months, do you think the employment office would be closed for lack of interest? Colgan probably has the dubious position of being the “hottest” airline, in a negative way, at the moment. Pose the same question … what if Colgan announced a similar pilot hiring effort (of course, it probably wouldn’t match the 600 in 8 months level in the other examples) would you think there would be pilot candidates show up for the interview? Do you think they would be ignorant of the salary, schedules, requirements, vacations, sick leave, life and health benefits, etc? All of this notwithstanding, however, after all of this is addressed and the pilot agrees to provide his/her time in exchange for his/her services, here is where I think the government CAN and SHOULD play a significant role.
It shouldn’t make a lot of difference who Colgan (as an example) hires. The airline has an FAA-approved pilot training program. Any pilot completing that program should be able to meet the expected requirements. This is where the “rubber meets the road.” Does the pilot have the competence to do the job? Are the training program requirements stringent enough? Are those requirements stringently upheld? What is, or should be, the expectation of pilots who complete that program? Do they merely have to complete the hours required? Or, is there a proficiency standard that has to be met? If the proclaimed standards are not met within the scheduled program, what happens? Does the pilot graduate anyway? Is there any remedial training? Is it possible to not make it through the program? Do ALL pilots hired make it through the program? Should there be a review of those programs – of similar programs of all airlines? How frequently? What should those requirements actually say?
Once these issues are resolved, we can look at things like duty day, rest periods, route structure, leg lengths, clock times for start of duty day, commuting to work – and I understand that the US FAA is feverishly working on just such a program review – as I think you mentioned – at the behest of the US Congress.
Shorter posts are certainly desirable but simply cannot be done if even a reasonable discussion is to be had in this kind of format. I have attended enough safety conferences and made enough presentations myself to see the reality of these factors, all of which find agreement among those doing this work.
Well said – and I’m fully in agreement. It is for exchanges such as these that I find myself returning to this forum. My hat is off to you sir.
AirRabbit
1st Nov 2009, 22:21
Often in debate, we present exaggeratedly opposite responses to the other's increasingly belligerent position, until we are both shouting red faced across an increasingly widening divide. Similarly, perhaps in an effort to avoid the aforementioned, and achieve the common ground identification essential not only for continued debate, but for also working toward a solution of some kind, we give up some ground (perhaps ground not worth fighting over)
However.
In this case, I feel the salary issue is waived too easily and too soon.
We have duty hours limitations: why??
Because we dont think it is safe for a pilot (or a truck driver) to be running 12 hours out of a day, or 60 hours out of a week or some such.
Are we naive enough to think that by keeping them out of the LEFT HAND SEAT (either truck cab or cockpit) but not out of the greeter's Aisle at WALMART where he she is forced to augment their income satisfies our commitments to safety?
Please understand, I’m not saying that government has no responsibility in this area. They do – and for a good long time, in my opinion, they’ve bungled that responsibility, rather handsomely, in fact. For what it may be worth, I would imagine they would offer that they were trying (perhaps too vehemently) to stay out of the business of the individual airline. However, while I do believe there is going to be some additional thoughts expressed on this specific subject by the US FAA and/or the US Congress in the not-too-distant future … that is not the sum and substance of this particular argument – to whit …
Doesn’t the individual pilot have a “lion’s share” of the responsibility here? At what point would a pilot be expected to recognize his/her own failure to meet his/her own individual standards of competency, alertness, and general health to go fly that day? Could it be that pilots have not determined what their own limitations are? Could it be that they can recognize such limitations in others, but are blinded by the “mirror” of self-recognition? If a pilot has a report time of 0600 at JFK for a flight to MIA, and the crewmember lives in SFO, what are the obligations of that pilot to be available, fit, and ready for his/her flight? Should living this far away from the duty station be allowed? Should the airline pose a restriction on how far from the duty location a pilot may reside? Should a restriction be couched only in terms of proximity to duty location within a standard time frame of the start of the duty day (e.g., the pilot should be within a 1 hour commute of the duty station for at least 12 hours prior to the start of the duty day)? Should the government pose such a restriction if the airline does not? Will that ensure the pilot arriving fit and ready for his/her flight? There are drinking regulations in place already. Are they stringent enough? Is 12 hours between bottle and throttle sufficient time for the body to assimilate ingested alcohol? What about television watching? No TV within 9 hours of the start of the duty day – except for the World Series or Superbowl? How about, no Wallmart Greetings within 12 hours of start of duty day? What is reasonable? And, by the way, the military doesn’t seem to have any better handle on this issue. I witnessed a squadron colleague of mine being dressed down rather handsomely by the squadron Deputy Cmdr. Ops. after falling while waterskiing and dislocating his shoulder. It was the Squadron Cmdr at the controls of the boat behind which my squadron colleague was skiing!
And it's not so much pilots, but the incremental "swiss cheese" mechanics and ground crew down the line, ( swiss cheese because they are all handlers of the lattice work 'swiss cheese' of failure /success that when properly holes aligned, the 'mouse of disaster'* slips through)
It’s my belief that exactly the same personal responsibility issues apply throughout the business world … including mechanics, ground crew, dispatchers, police officers, nurses, doctors, teachers … you name it. When it comes right down to it, the only thing over which you have definitive control is YOU – and the airplane, when you’re flying. You had better know your own limitations and those of the airplane and never – but NEVER, exceed either one. The price is just too much – and habits (both good and bad) are very hard to ignore – they just, well … habitually … crop up … and when they’re of the bad kind, it’s almost always in the wrong places. Know what you’re doing and do it. Do it right. Do it right all the time; and particularly, when no one is looking! And then, when it’s necessary … walk off the flight. When it’s necessary (notice, I said necessary)… grab the controls and tell the guy/gal in the other seat “I have the airplane.” Deal with the ramifications later – don’t let your next of kin deal with what you’ve left them.
postman23
2nd Nov 2009, 15:58
A few lines to the money factor.
Years ago, working for a crappy outfit with an even crappier chief pilot our crew meals (average at best) were being scrapped under alleged budget reason's following 911. Never saw more pax post 911 and did not see the logic but then again, I am a pilot and not an airline manager.
The process had already been initiated in reducing the amount of food making up the meal and a steady deterioration in the quality in general. During one of the pilot meetings, a fellow colleague asked if it was possible to give the crew member a small amount of money so that he/she could purchase a decent sandwich at the airport, while saving the company money. After all, the delivery charges for the crew meals are usually not in relation to the quality or quantity of the food.
The beloved individual at the front of the foodchain replied: money is no substitute for food.
Although technically correct, the answer bears no relevance to the fact that 'his' boys were steering 'his' aircraft on an empty stomach.
From a safety point of view the financial compensation for scrapping the meals while saving the company money could be a big win. Needless to say that the proposed suggestion was dismissed. As was the airline some years later.