Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[Arkroyal]

JP:but the reason why we climb to safety altitude in IMC is surely so that possible errors like that can be discounted Do you have a problem understanding that a climb was not possible within the aircraft's limitations? No ducking or weaving now!

XM147 is in tune with the rest of us, and the various eminent investigative bodies he mentions.

What DID cause the tragedy is irrelevant to the argument, as there is not, and never will be, proof to the required standard of ANY cause.

It is simply unjust, immoral and counter to the RAF rules in force at the time of the finding, to allow the finding of Gross Negligence to stand, as it was arrived at without the necessary proof.

Simple innit?

[ShyTorque]

Ark,

Concur.

John Purdey. Here you are again banging your old drum, despite having promised us your final comment on at least a couple of occasions before when the discussion didn't go your way.

Perhaps you will answer these two questions? I have asked you at least once before but got no answer.

Firstly, what is your motive to have the blame pinned on these two pilots?

Secondly, HOW do you KNOW without any doubt what the pilots were thinking in the few seconds before the accident?

Finally, are you really who you say you are? I see you still have no details in your profile.

[John Purdey]

ArkRoyal, OK, in this case climb or turn left we have discussed this before.
ShyTorque, Banging on because we are hearing the same repetitions from others! Not keen to 'pin the blame on the pilots'; nobody likes it. But what all the refs quoted by XM147 amount to saying is that we don't know what caused this accident. I do not believe this is good enough from a Service that has the very high standards that we have, especially when even the original BofI said (I do not have the exact wording in front of me) that there was a matter of airmanship involved. It is my belief, and that of many others, that there certainly was a matter of airmanship involved. JP.

[ShyTorque]

You said:

"It is my belief, and that of many others, that there certainly was a matter of airmanship involved".

But there was inconclusive EVIDENCE, which is what is normally required.

I make no excuses for saying the following again - It is quite obvious that there are two "beliefs" involved here.

One "belief" is that it is acceptable to convict two deceased aircrew on inconclusive evidence because there is no other way of explaining the accident.

The other "belief" is that it is NOT acceptable.

You pinned your colours to the mast some time ago, and repeatedly come back to this webpage to bang on about it. But you say you do not want to pin the blame?

Sorry, that just doesn't fit.

The official verdict of the MOD IS that the pilots WERE grossly negligent, so why do you feel you have to keep trying to persuade others that this is the correct case? You seem to be on a crusade to get us to drop the matter.....for reasons which I find difficult to understand. That is the reason I suspect you might not be quite who you claim to be.

Again, at least for the third time of asking. How do you KNOW what the crew were thinking? You do not KNOW, no-one knows, and no-one can ever know what they were thinking. Your repetition of this, quite frankly, is ridiculous.

[Brian Dixon]

Hi Mr Purdey.

Thank you for your comments. Yes, I am determined (although some say more irritating than determined!). I also firmly believe in loyalty (both ways).

Like M134, I would agree that at the time of impact, the aircraft was in IMC, however I again say that no-one knows what went on prior to that.

Furthermore, I would again make the point that the lighthouse keeper was stood in the cloud and not looking at it from the same point as the crew (unlike the much ignored Mr Holbrook).

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[John Purdey]

Brian, yes, but there were other folk up on the hills who confirmed the poor conditions. But many thanks for your balanced comments over the past months. ShyTorqe, Not trying to persuade others, merely unable to understand how the aircraft's progress beyond the waypoint change at low level and towards cloud-covered hills can be seen as other than an airmanship question. Meanwhile, no-one is persuading anyone. Is there really anything more to say?
As to who I am, does that matter? But I can assure you that I am not one of the AMs or an ex-member of their staffs, and nor am I MOD (heaven forbid!)
With all good wishes and professional respect, John Purdey.

[Arkroyal]

But what all the refs quoted by XM147 amount to saying is that we don't know what caused this accident. I do not believe this is good enough from a Service that has the very high standards that we have

Indeed, JP.

So you believe that to uphold the high standards of the service, the truth must be bent, evidence invented, witnesses ignored and the strict rules designed to uphold the said standard brushed aside.

Why can't you accept that the cause will never be determined? That is what the original BoI concluded, yet you still seem quite happy to leave a stain on the characters of two of (I guess) your former colleagues, without a shred of conclusive evidence.

I hope for your sake you never find yourself in a similar kangaroo court, either alive or dead.

[BEagle]

'......can be seen as other than an airmanship question. Meanwhile, no-one is persuading anyone'

A 'question' perhaps. Which is very far indeed from 'beyond any doubt whatsoever'.

NOT POSITIVELY DETERMINED can be the only finding. Perhaps it's just that, by declaring 'Gross Negligence', MoD is able to wriggle off the hook of liability for corporate manslaughter and the costs thereof?

[ShyTorque]

JP,

There is a large difference between being unable to understand what happened and going on to accuse the crew of gross negligence.

There are a number of scenarios, which COULD have resulted in the accident, all of them speculation, but equally as valid in the absence of solid evidence. As the BOI stated.

Quote from your last post: "Is there any more to say?"

Your opinion is in line with that of the MOD. So why are you still eager to make your point that the pilots were entirely to blame? :confused:

IMHO, there was almost certainly negligence further up the chain. That particular aircraft, or any other Mk2, should NOT have been flying that sortie, or any other at the time. The pilots, although they possibly made mistakes of their own, paid the ultimate price for those management chain errors. They were then spitefully castigated by the management that they had perhaps been perceived to have "let down". Disgraceful stuff.

[John Purdey]

If you read my last posting again, you will see that what I said was 'unable to understand how it can be seen as other than....' in other words, unable to understand how anyone can see/judge it as, say, technical failure, rather than a question of airmanship.
Sorry if that was not clear first time round.
Meanwhile, I really do not think there is more to be said. Way back, we had already agreed to disagree.
Regards JP

[aviate1138]

JP - having just plowed through all the 20 pages available I can see that you have a mind that is in need of updating.
To digress slightly but in order to make a point, if I said to you that a man would fall asleep towing a trailer and that at the one second of window of opportunity available, would find a minute gap in miles of fencing and slide down a grassy bank and in a matter of seconds, derail a train which would then remain stable but meet the only set of points in miles that would steer the locomotive into an oncoming express that shouldn't have been there anyway, would the faint possibility of a Chinooks possible locking of controls at a critical moment have any relevance to a verdict of not sufficient evidence?

yours,

B J
Ex RAF but a simple private pilot that believes in the truth and not supposition based on prejudice.

[Arkroyal]

Jp:If you read my last posting again, you will see that what I said was 'unable to understand how it can be seen as other than....' in other words, unable to understand how anyone can see/judge it as, say, technical failure, rather than a question of airmanship.

A view you are perfectly entitled to hold.

However, what is it that prevents you from seeing that your assumptions do not equate to proof beyond any doubt whatsoever that they are correct?

You can believe what you want, but the finding of gross negligence against these pilots can never be upheld in accordance with the RAF's own rules on that alone. EVIDENCE man.

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

[John Purdey]

Aviate1138
Not really; the negligence occured when, and because, the crew carried on towards the the hills in obvious IMC conditions. Nothing to do with the several alleged and unproven technical errors.
ArkRoyal;
Well, at least we agree that we are each entitled to our own opinions. You know mine, and I know yours. Meanwhile, and as I stated a couple of days ago, there really is no more to be said about this whole very sad tragedy (you will also note that my finger did not slip this time!)
Goodbye, for the last time, and with all professional best wishes. John Purdey

[Brian Dixon]

Mr Purdey,
if this is your last time, may I thank you for your contributions. A courteous and sound argument, lacking (if I may, with respect, use such a word) only in achieving the required standard of proof.

I shall continue my endeavours.

I wish you well.
Respectfully,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[John Purdey]

Brian Dixon,.....and thanks for your courteous efforts, and as I said before, I admire your determination. One very last thought occurs to me; in an odd way my contributions may perhaps have helped to cristalise your arguments for your future endevours (such as before a new Secretary of State!!??), even though as you know I do not share them. Regards and best wishes. John Purdey.

[walter kennedy]

Come on all you RAF Helo pilots that did the NI - Scotland run, your silence on this topic is profound!
Did you not use the DME function of the Macrihanish TACAN for getting up close and personal with the Mull?
Did you get adequate performance at low level from the TACAN at the aerodrome (Ch 116 civil at present) when approaching the Mull?
Or was ch107 (the one actually selected by ZD576's TACAN CU at the time) a temporary location on higher ground specifically to aid the regular flight plan used by such flights?
It would only take one of you to have the courage to answer this and the truth would come out; not only would the pilots be rightly cleared but also the real investigation into the responsibility for this disaster could begin.

[Shackman]

walter K


Did you not use the DME function of the Macrihanish TACAN for getting up close and personal with the Mull?

I refer to my previous post (now a long way back). Machrihanish as a military base was in the process of closing down. They had already pulled the plug on all or most of the radar services - which we only found out a day or two before on arriving for a radar service. Unfortunately I can't answer for TACAN/DME - Walter Wessex didn't have much on the electronic nav aid side of things at that stage - but that could just have easily been switched off even as the crew were using/relying on it!

[Arkroyal]

walter (still in OZ!)

Not quite up with your banter old man, but should all those RAF (and RN!!) pilots out there admit to theiruse the DME function of the Machrihanish TACAN for getting up close and personal with the Mull it would be more likely to hinder the case rather thanthe pilots be rightly cleared It was a VFR flight after all, and the DME, even if it had a signal in that location (which I doubt), would only ever be a secondary source of nav info.

It's just another blind alley. The real point is still that the RAF broke its own rules by coming to a finding without a shred of credible evidence.

[walter kennedy]

Arkroyal
Thanks for your input (still working on that trip but am running a bit late in the season!). Here's some food for thought:
From Boeing document which analyses the flight in great technical detail and which I recommend that you download and read in full
8-7D20-DSS-0306, Enclosure 4
Dated: June 18, 2002

<<In light of the actual flight path that was followed, however, this discussion becomes moot. For, as shown in the previous discussions, instead of turning left to follow the directed course of ~12 degrees True to Waypoint B, the flight crew elected to turn right on a course of 26 degrees True. At the aircraft position corresponding to the last steeringcommand calculation, the cross-track error to the directed flight path would have been ~0.16nm. This turn should not be considered as being the consequence of allowing the flight path to drift, as there was a clear aircraft heading change made, and the heading change was into the wind, rather than with the wind, which would have been more likely if the turn was purely due to drift. Consequently, the real issue that should be addressed with respect to the aircraft horizontal flight path is why this right turn was made.
A possible answer can be determined from the setting of the TACAN Control Unit (CU), this was set to Channel 107x, which is the channel for the TACAN beacon at RAF Macrihanish. If the flight path of the aircraft is extrapolated from the position of the
aircraft corresponding to the last steering command calculation, along the course it was then following, the flight path arrives at RAF Macrihanish, although not on a direct course to the TACAN beacon. This information provides a possible explanation for the
right turn, but does not explain why this turn was made. It is possible that the flight crew had determined from the existing weather conditions that continuation of the flight plan
under VFR rules was no longer possible, and that they were transitioning to IFR conditions using the Macrihanish beacon for direction. Certainly, making this turn placed the aircraft flight path across the highest points of the local terrain, with the sectional map showing the terrain rising to ~1500ft before it descends at Macrihanish. >>

Don’t you think that this suggests the possibility that they had a useful signal?
Boeing puts the altitude during the approach at better than 600ft.
What could put this argument to bed – or develop it – would be if someone retraced the approach in a light aircraft equipped with DME and found out for sure.
Better would be the word of a RAF pilot who did this (regular) run.
The simplistic rule for DME is that you need line of sight for a useful signal – but, having had some experience as a radio engineer with the CAA, with regard to the topography in this case and that a “strong” signal is transmitted by the ground equipment, a severely attenuated but possibly still useful signal may have been obtained; this would certainly be marginal but why doesn’t someone clear this up? It is, after all, a nice area for a jaunt for anyone who flies in the general area anyway.
A little story for you:
When I went over to the UK purposefully at the time of the FAI, I spoke to the lighthouse keeper. We were standing part way up the slope between the lighthouse and the crash site at a point where below us we could see the sea/lighthouse but around us and above there was thick mist. A helicopter came in very close and turned very near us – we could feel it but we could not see it. “They do that all the time” he said; “They turn over that big rock” he said pointing to a prominent feature right on the shoreline. Now, I don't not believe that you come in that close in those conditions without using some reliable primary aid.
The TANS would not have been trusted and ZD576 did not have radar.
Ask SAR helicopter pilots what navaid they would use under these circumstances and you will see my point.

[Brian Dixon]

Hi all.

Now that the Summer Recess and Party Conference season has come to an end, the campaign will, again, gear back up to take the fight to the House of Commons (not that we haven't been busy in the meantime).

To that end, the campaign group is to have a strategy meeting at the end of this month. I will advise you all as to what is discussed and where we go from here. I will be pushing for a group action similar to the previous EDM (or other such action) so look out for the call to arms when it arrives. Your support is vital.

Alternatively, MoD and Mr Hoon - you could save yourselves a lot of work if you simply remove the unsustainable verdict from the records of Jon and Rick.

Regards, as always
Brian

[NorthSouth]

WalterWhat could put this argument to bed – or develop it – would be if someone retraced the approach in a light aircraft equipped with DME and found out for sure. Love to, but I don't think it would prove anything, for several reasons:
1. At the time of the accident the MAZ TACAN was operational. Now it's a civil DME, albeit on the same frequency but for sure it will have different operating parameters such as power levels etc
2. You can't assume that a DME receiver in a particular light aircraft will perform in a similar way to the equipment in ZD576. On the whole I'd expect the light a/c to have worse reception but the point is you just couldn't possibly make any assumptions.
3. It's not known exactly what height ZD576 was flying at when the supposed DME signal was received. Even a 50ft height change could make the difference between receiving and not receiving the DME signal
4. The old TACAN and the current DME are in significantly different locations - the TACAN was 2nm west of where the VOR/DME is now. Again, if anything one would expect that to mean the DME is less receivable from low level off the Mull of Kintyre than the TACAN was, but you just can't make assumptions.

I do think, though, that the Boeing study raises one of the key questions of the ZD576 mystery, and that is, why did they make that heading correction to the right?

and annuvver fing:We were standing part way up the slope between the lighthouse and the crash site at a point where below us we could see the sea/lighthouse but around us and above there was thick mist. A helicopter came in very close and turned very near us – we could feel it but we could not see it. “They do that all the time” he said; “They turn over that big rock” he said pointing to a prominent feature right on the shoreline.Just because you're in fog on the ground doesn't mean your unseen helicopter pilot can't see anything. The key is in what the keeper told you - "they turn over that big rock". As far as I'm aware there ain't no navaid on that rock. So how do they know to turn over it? Because they can SEE it.

[Brian Dixon]

Hi again everyone.

Just to update yo as to how the meeting went. It was very well attended, with lots of apologies sent as well. The only plus with that is that if everyone who had said they were attending actually had, we wouldn't have all got in the room! About thirty attended, with some 20 being unable to get there.

So, what did we all talk about?

Firstly, a huge thank you and vote of support was made for the Mull of Kintyre Group chair - James Arbuthnot MP. He has worked tirelessly both in and out of the House.

A point was raised regarding the recent unanimous vote by the Church of Scotland General Assembly. You may recall that they were going to write to the MoD to ask that the slur of negligence be removed. Well, in May of next year, the General Assembly will, again, review the Chinook crash issue, and perhaps be a little more vocal with their concerns.

Further action within Parliament was discussed and I have asked for another Early Day Motion (Parliamentary Petition) on the Chinook crash. This will give us the opportunity to write to our MPs and the MoD to again express our concerns over the safety of the verdict. So dust off your keyboards and get the Fax Your MP link ready again.

Why another EDM some of you may ask. Well it's vitally important that our MPs are constantly reminded of this injustice and that they are tasked with doing something about it. Both the MoD and the MPs need to know we are not going to go away. Arkroyal - I recall what happened with your MP last time (still makes me chuckle!). To save you time, I have just checked and to date he has signed 38 EDMs :ok:

Very sad to think that next June is the tenth anniversary of the accident, and this injustice has been allowed to go on for so long. Let's see if we can resolve this prior to then.

I'm sorry the campaign has been quiet of late. We haven't, we've just not been quite so loud. Time to make amends!

I will, of course, keep you all updated.
Once more dear friends!!

Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Arkroyal]

Excellent, Brian.

My keyboard as ever ready. Thanks for checking Mr Robathan's EDM activity for me. It will make you chuckle even more to know that he wrote to me again enclosing reams of requests he had received asking him to sign EDMs. 'Have you got nothing better to do than check how many I've signed?' err..... well actually no! When your MP says he 'Almost invariably does not sign EDMs', but is caught out signing others, is he being economical with the truth? He was more thgan a little irritated by your e-mail to him too!

Just moved house, but sadly still within his constituency.

Let's hope we can get Michael Howard on our side. He could land a few blows on Buffhoon for us!

[Vage Rot]

We've all pushed on in bad weather and been caught out - fortunately for most an abort and steep climb, plus clean underwear, gets our little pink bodies out of the poo.

At the end of the day, these guys were below SALT, IMC and hit terra firma. Schoolboy error or could they not climb for some reason? Whatever the answer it's been killing us aircrew since some wag decided to try and fly like the birds.

Nobody can dispute that they should not have been in that situation, the question is whether they had a choice? If the answer is that there was no other option then they cannot be found negligent. If they could have done something else then maybe they were? I've seen the SAR helicopter crawl through a Blizzard, landing every 50m or so then clearing ahead the next 50m before moving on. From what I remember, the Chinook hit the slope at a fair rate of knots so the guys were obviously happy with where they were - or can't a helo hover these days?

We all make mistakes, maybe this was one?

[chippy63]

Maybe, maybe, maybe....
Hardly meets the "beyond any possible shadow of doubt" test, does it?

[Brian Dixon]

Hi Vage Rot.
Welcome to the thread.

As you say, it may well have been an error. It may well have been negligence.

However..... as Chippy said, unless you can say so with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, the pilots should be given the benefit of the doubt.

That's the whole point of the campaign.
Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Vage Rot]

Brian,

I'm not a helicopter man, fixed wing thru and thru and the Chinook incident is a long time ago now so I may have forgotton some of the bits and pieces but........

Unless an aircraft is on a published approach to an airfield then maps and Nav aids are not to be used for terrain avoidance. That little task is the job of the Mk 1 eyeball or, if your Group Orders permit, your own on board Radar. Indeed ATC will not descend you below sector SALT using their area Radar. JSP318 used to be quite specific! I think the thread of MAC being U/S or intermittent is a Red herring, they probably wouldn't have relied on it anyway unless they were already in the **** and couldn't climb, or land, or hover, or turn around in the hover - get the drift??

BTW, was the ac equipped with the Cossor GPS? if so what software state was it? The older versions vere prone to 'running away' at a vast rate of knots - but even so - not to be used for terrain avoidance!!!

Cheers

VR

[Arkroyal]

That you are not a helicopter man is obvious from your comments.

If you are interested and have time on your hands, read back over this and the archived thread.

No, they could not climb, as the Mk2 Chinook had an icing clearance (sic) of +4 Degrees C.

Whatever happened, and as Brian points out, even negligence is not ruled out by the campaign, it has to be proven beyond any doubt whatsoever for the slur of Gross Negligence on your colleagues to stand.

With no evidence either way, it is an unsustainable finding.

[ShyTorque]

Vage Rot

Please don't come asking about why they didn't carry out an IMC climb into icing conditions or come to the hover whilst allegedly in IMC without first reading up on your subject, we tend to get a bit weary of answering those same questions.

When you've finished this thread, the archived previous one "Chinook - Hit back here", started by John Nichol, has another 66 pages of light reading for you.

Thanks.

[Brian Dixon]

Hi Vage Rot,
Yep! Got the drift - had it for ages.

I agree that the Mk1 eyeball comes highly recommended (except if you are a yachtsman using your Mk1 eyeball to see the sun glinting off a low flying Chinook and the coast of the Mull).

Although I respect your point of view, I still don't see how it proves with absolutely no doubt whatsoever what happened in those final moments, let alone who was responsible.

As you say, it was a while ago. Please don't think me rude or patronising if I say that you may like to refresh your memory by visiting the dedicated web site and re-reading the BoI. It may not change your mind - and that's fine, but it may be of use as a reference to support your views.

Chinook Justice (http://www.chinook-justice.org)

I don't think it was a Cossor GPS (but I'll check). Worth bearing in mind that Jon Tapper was the Flight specialist in electronics and had met with manufacturers to get the best insight possible into the equiment.

My regards, as always
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[seafuryfan]

Our crew was today tasked to the Mull of Kintyre Lighthouse LHS.

We were unable to shut-down on site, but paid our respects while in the hover, next to the memorial, for a few moments.

RIP - remaining in RAF SH crews thoughts.

[ShyTorque]

What more could be said than "Well done chaps"?

:ok:

[Brian Dixon]

Seafuryfan, Thank you, to you and your crew.

All,
I promise that despite the fact that the campaign appears to have gone quiet, we are all still very much active. Letters continue to go to and from the MoD, and several questions have just been asked in the House of Commons.

I know that there is an EDM to be tabled the week after the Queen's Speech (next week, I think). Once that is tabled, I will post a link here and ask all our supporters to contact their MPs and to write to Mr Blair to ask that this injustice be put right.

They need to know that there is still widespread support for the campaign - and that it matters!

As always, I am grateful to each and everyone of you for your support.

Regards, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Vage Rot]

Having spent some considerable time reading all the reports I offer my sincere apologies to anyone whom I may have offended.

The case here is that the cause of the accident will never be determined with any certainty and, as such, the crew cannot be found negligent.

Yours, feeling very humble,

VageR

[Brian Dixon]

Vage,
apologies not at all necessary, but thank you for your courtesy.

As you now see, once all available information is read, it is clear that the actual cause of the accident can never be determined.

The burden of proof of absolutely no doubt whatsoever is seriously undermined and should be removed immediately.

That's why I'm such an irritating sod!! :ok:

I take it you will be writing to your MP when the EDM is tabled ;)

Kind regards, and much respect to you for posting as you have.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[M134]

VageR

Brian’s right. Don’t beat yourself. Think about what you’ve done over the past couple of days. You came to the thread with a pretty universal crew room view of the crash, took the time to read up on it and saw a new perspective.

Few, if any in all honesty, actually argue that they KNOW what happened, and as you now realise, that’s the point.

Don’t be humble, be pleased to know that it’s heartening, to me at least, that all these pages do have a purpose.

M134

[ShyTorque]

Vage,

Thanks for taking time to read the thread and having the very good grace to declare you have changed your mind.

Welcome on board! :ok:

[Arkroyal]

Vage

When I suggested you read all the thread, I didn't really expect you to do it!

Well done. If you can grasp the point, why can't the eejits who fight so hard to uphold this miscarriage of justice?

Good on yer!:ok:

[Susan Phoenix]

I just have to drop in and say thank you to seafuryfan and his crew for paying their respects at the Mull- still much appreciated almost 10 years on.
Whilst I'm here, continued heartfelt thanks to Brian and Ark Royal for their stoic loyalty to the cause of this campaign.
Wonderful to see such a brave change of mind Vage Rot - it gives us hope that the beligerent MOD bods may also have someone with a conscience amongst them to eventually(soon???) over-ride this unecessary miscarriage of justice.
2004 will be the year that we see that justice carried out I KNOW it has to be so for the Tapper and Cook families - please keep up the good work. Nearly there........(would love to add a wee angel smiley but don't know how!!)

[Brian Dixon]

Hi susan,
hope you and yours are well.

But surely, you are the wee angel??

Assuring you of my continued support for as long as it is needed.

Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Vage Rot]

ArkRoyal, I'm never one to give up just because the facts are burried - years of test flying have seen to that! It was a hell of a lot of bloody reading though! Lucky that the Job is very slack at the moment!

Susan, not a brave change of mind, just now that I'm aware of all the facts in the report I realised that I was talking out of my derriere! An opinion based on outdated info lodged in an alcohol-abused brain!

Keep up the fight, I can't see how the MoD can uphold their verdict with all the known problems with the aircraft - especially as there was no ADR/CVR to tell what happened. Sadly, nobody will ever know the facts.


Good Luck

VageR

[Arkroyal]

Susan, thank you for your kind words, but to mention me in the same sentence as Brian rather overstates my part in this.

I am a minor irritant to the body political, whereas Brian is a major thorn.

As Brian Says, ut is your bravery in this matter which lights the beacon for others to follow.

Vage Rot, I thank you humbly for your tenacity. Worth the read, wasn't it? Perhaps your MP will be more help than mine in making your voice heard where it matters.

[walter kennedy]

NorthSouth
Sorry about delay in responding..
Thank you for your input, it was a point that I had missed that both Mac DME and TACAN at Mac were both Ch116 - I don't think Boeing would have made an error quoting Ch 107 so the obvious question is "WHERE WAS THE EQUIPMENT WORKING ON 107 LOCATED".
Lighthouse, perhaps?

[Brian Dixon]

Hi all,
just to keep you updated as to what is going on.

Another letter sent to the MoD today requesting further information.

Verbal abuse given to a few MPs asking where my EDM is!!
I can promise you that I will let you all know when it has been tabled so that we can all get our own MPs to support the matter.

My thanks for your patience and for your support.

Season's greetings to you and yours.
Regards, as always
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[BEagle]

This year will see the 10th anniversary of the Chinook crash of 2 Jun 1994.

Let's hope that Brian's unstinting efforts will continue to be supported by all of us - and that the unjust findings of Wratten and Day will finally be overturned.

Happy New Year to all - and raise a glass to absent friends.

[Brian Dixon]

BEagle,
thank you, as always, for your kind words.

10 years......... Doesn't time fly when you're fighting for justice!

I hope that in this anniversary year, the MoD can see their way to removing this terrible and unjust allegation against Flt Lts Jon Tapper and Rick Cook.

If not..... well we all know how iritating I can be :E

As before, I guarantee my absolute support to the Tapper and Cook families. To our supporters, I can only say thank you very much for being there when we need you. We will need you again this year too!

Happy New Year to each and every one of you, regardless of your view of the accident.
My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[HectorusRex]

MoD prepares to fight Kelly compensation claim
By Michael Smith, Defence Correspondent and Matt Born
(Filed: 05/01/2004)
The Ministry of Defence has set up a team of lawyers to prepare for the outcome of the Hutton Inquiry by examining ways of countering any attempt by David Kelly's widow Janice to claim compensation over his death.
Mrs Kelly could claim a substantial sum for her husband's apparent suicide after he was exposed as the source of a BBC report that the Government's dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction had been "sexed up".
She could sue the MoD for the loss of her husband, his salary as a Government scientist, and possible future earnings.
Martin Hemming, who is heading the team, refused to comment yesterday on reports that it is planning to "fight dirty" by smearing the scientist, suggesting that he was mentally unstable for the last two years of his life.
An MoD spokesman said: "I cannot say what we might do if [Mrs Kelly] decides she wants to take action against us. It is really down to her whether she wants to take us to court."
While preparations to counter such a claim would be normal contingency planning, defence sources questioned whether many of the officials driving the MoD's response to Dr Kelly's suicide would still be in their posts after Lord Hutton delivers a report that is bound to be highly critical.
"You also have to wonder whether any attempt to portray David Kelly as mentally unstable would be a sensible approach," one source said.
"Not only did they get themselves into a terrible mess over the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction but they did so knowing that one of the leading advisers was mentally unstable."
There was also controversy yesterday over the BBC's possible response if Lord Hutton criticises the corporation for its original story by the Today reporter Andrew Gilligan and its subsequent response to the affair.
The BBC reacted angrily to claims that its head of radio news, Stephen Mitchell, was being lined up as a fall guy for the corporation's role.
Richard Sambrook, the BBC director of news, said the article, which appeared in The Independent on Sunday, was "plain wrong".
Speculation that BBC chiefs were looking for someone to carry the blame have been rife since a senior executive last week refused to rule out resignations at the corporation over the Hutton Inquiry.
But the BBC yesterday insisted that the remarks by Caroline Thomson, its director of public policy, had been taken out of context.
Gilligan also issued a statement yesterday denying reports that claimed he was threatening to reveal how his bosses had urged him to "out" Dr Kelly, if they forced him to resign over Lord Hutton's report.
"It is outrageous to suggest that I am threatening anyone in the BBC," he said. Claims that he was in talks with publishers over a book about the Kelly affair were also unfounded, he said.

Is this those nice people who stitched-up The Chinook Crew (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/01/05/nhutt05.xml)

[BEagle]

Personally I've always had a suspicion that any verdict other than the grossly unjust one trumped up by Wratten and Day could have left MoD et al wide open to very substantial compensation claims from the relatives of the deceased.....

Corporate manslaughter as a result of carrying passengers in an aircraft over which there were known airworthiness concerns and which subsequently crashed in circumstances which have never been conclusively proven 'beyond any doubt whatsoever'?

[HectorusRex]

Whatever happened to the British sense of fair play?

[Brian Dixon]

Hectorus,

I'm still playing!! :E :ok:

Happy New Year.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[HectorusRex]

And a Happy New Year to you Brian and all the fellow Pprune supporters of your unceasing efforts to get a FAIR result for the crew.:ok:

It was MoD and the incumbent Secretary of State at whom I was directing my ire:mad:

[Rex 1100]

A new Chinook ZD576 EDM has been put down in Parliament. It concerns principally the Church of Scotland General Assembly Deliverance concerning the accident, and calls on the Government to overturn its verdict of gross negligence.

It has been tabled by Robert Key (Con, Salisbury) and seconded by Angus Robertson, Ming Campbell and Lady Hermon amongst others. 14 signatures on its first appearance.

I'll post a link when it goes up on the web if I have the chance.

:ok:

[BEagle]

Here is the link to the EDM:

http://edm.ais.co.uk/weblink/html/motion.html/ref=371

Here's to a just outcome for the deceased, their families, colleagues and friends.

[Brian Dixon]

Thanks Rex.

The EDM is number 371, and will be on the Parliamentary website tomorrow (9th Jan).

Please contact your MP and get them to support this EDM. It is extremely inportant that the MoD and the Government are made aware that there is still widespread concern over this injustice.

The last EDM managed to attract 170 signatures. Lets see if we can beat that this time around. To see if your MP supported the last EDM Click here (http://edm.ais.co.uk/weblink/html/motion.html/EDMI_SES=01/ref=829)

Ark: your man - 4 so far this session :ok:

Please spread the word, contact your MP, and also contact Mr Blair to ask that this injustice be rectified. Let's make the tenth anniversary the last one!

As always, the campaign is eternally grateful for your support.

My best.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[BEagle]

For those who are unsure as to how to contact their MP, here's how:

1. Go to http://www.locata.co.uk/commons/ . Enter your postcode where indicated and click on 'search'.

2. When the name of your MP is displayed, you will see that there is an e-mail contact link. Click on this and a simple form will then appear.

3. Write your comments and click on 'send'.

Be polite but firm with your comments!

[ShyTorque]

Emailed my MP, Mr John Mann, today.

He signed last time, at my request, so hopefully he will again sign.

[Arkroyal]

Thanks for the heads up, Brian. As you know my local tory boy 'ex SAS' MP 'invariably does not sign EDM's'. Only 4 so far this session, so I'll be checking what's hot on his agenda (last time it was the campaign to return the epilogue and national anthem to TV!), and ask him once again if he would be so kind as to support two of HM's loyal servants against an injustice he claims to disagree with. He was most indignant at being contacted 'by, I assume, one of your friends who goes by the name of "irritating sod"'

Just moved house, sadly still within his constituency!

Beags, agreed. I said in my opening gambit to the original thread that money just might be behind this travesty. When the MoD lost its immunity to claims, we were all told, as military pilots, that we could be held personally liable for any accidents. To the groans of disbelief came the reply 'of course, chaps, that would only be so in the case of your gross negligence, so nothing to worrry about eh?'

Next fatal crash, and guess the outcome..................... :yuk:

[FJJP]

Jonathan Djanogly participates in the Parliamentary Armed Forces affiliation scheme (or whatever it's called); he has regularly flown with the RAF, recently the Nimrod and Tornado. He supported the last EDM and I've just winged a message off to him requesting he supports the latest.

Happy new year to all Pruners, especially to you Brian.

FJJP

[Brian Dixon]

Thanks everyone for your support. It means so much to those involved in the campaign.

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[BEagle]

Have already had a reply from my MP thanking me for bringing the matter to his attention and indicating that he will look at it carefully and is inclined to sign the EDM.

[pulse1]

Mr Robert Walter (CON, North Dorset) has been e mailed. He agreed to sign the last one so I am hopeful that he will again.

[Tuba Mirum]

Mr Robert Jackson (Con, Wantage) has been emailed. His name didn't appear on the last EDM, but maybe as he's about to retire...

[pulse1]

I am pleased to report an immediate response from Robert Walter telling me that he has signed EDM 371. His name is not on the website list yet but I guess that it has not been updated yet.

Now he has a new leader I might even vote for him next time.

[Brian Dixon]

Currently up to 42 signatures.

Thank you everyone. Keep 'em coming!!

Regards, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[lightbob]

Just heard back from my MP Timothy Loughton (West Worthing) that he has signed the EDM. Asked yesterday, heard back today.

[Boxer42]

Have just emailed my MP, Nick Palmer (Lab,Broxtowe) urging him to sign the EDM

[FJJP]

Had an acknowledgement from Jonathan Djanogly's office today. I await further developments...

[walter kennedy]

Gentlemen, you are not going to clear the pilots’ names without addressing the navigation issue:
They were in control past the waypoint given for a turn by a navigation system; they could only reasonable have continued on if they had sufficient visual detail of the Mull to judge their distance off OR they were using another type of navaid for a closer in turning point.
Some of you would know pilots who had done this run – and could ask them what was the practice at the time; surely it is time to find the personal courage to come forward, whatever the official directives and sanctions, and get a proper objective investigation started?
Justice goes further than clearing the pilots’ names – for the safety of services personnel in the future and the security of our nation it is very, very important that any possibility of sabotage in this incident be investigated. (Let me put it this way, the nation’s top anti terrorist team gets wiped out and sabotage is ruled out very early on! Years later, is there anything other than blaming it on pilot error to justify this?)

[HectorusRex]

Blair fails to back Hoon over soldier shot in Iraq
By George Jones, Political Editor
(Filed: 16/01/2004)
Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, was last night under mounting pressure to resign over a soldier killed in Iraq after being ordered to hand back his body armour.
The Tories called for Mr Hoon to go and Tony Blair failed to back him publicly.
Sgt Steve Roberts, 33, of the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, was shot dead by Iraqi dissidents last March. He had been told to give his flak jacket to other troops.
His widow, Samantha, of Bradford, has already called on Mr Hoon to resign. She published her husband's audio diaries describing the demoralisation of British troops in Iraq. Michael Howard, the Conservative leader, said Mr Hoon should "do the honourable thing" by accepting responsibility and quit.
"I do not think there is any greater dereliction of duty for any Government than to send men into battle without the proper equipment.
"We know that the probability is that Sgt Roberts would not have been killed if he had had body armour."
The Prime Minister said an investigation into Sgt Roberts's death had started but he stopped short of supporting Mr Hoon.
Asked at his monthly press conference whether Mr Hoon should resign, he said he understood Mrs Roberts's concerns but insisted that the "only proper thing to do" was to await the outcome of a "thorough" inquiry.
Asked whether there was not already enough evidence to apologise to Mrs Roberts, Mr Blair said it was for the inquiry to apportion blame.
He said he did not want to prejudge the issue and would wait until the inquiry report was in.
Nicholas Soames, the Conservative defence spokesman, said Mr Blair's failure to back his Defence Secretary was remarkable.
"If Sgt Roberts had been equipped with the correct body armour, he would not have died," he said.
"It was the direct responsibility of the Ministry of Defence to ensure that our troops were properly equipped. There were sufficient amounts of equipment available but much of it never reached the front line."
The inquiry into the circumstances of Sgt Roberts's death is being carried out by the Royal Military Police special investigation branch.
Mr Hoon told the Commons this week that once the investigation had been concluded, an Army board of inquiry would be convened.
He said that 38,000 sets of enhanced body armour were sent to the Gulf and they should have been sufficient to equip all who needed it. But not all of the equipment reached every unit before the start of combat operations.
Mrs Roberts has been provided, in confidence, with a summary of the attack in which her husband died, as well as a ballistics report.
Blair fails to back Hoon (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/01/16/nhoon16.xml)

[Arkroyal]

Walter says ;They were in control past the waypoint given for a turn by a navigation system; they could only reasonable have continued on if they had sufficient visual detail of the Mull to judge their distance off OR they were using another type of navaid for a closer in turning point.


1 We have no evidence that they were in control

2 No navaid would have allowed them to continue in IMC below SALT, so it is unlikely that they were IMC.

The point is, the evidence required to find negligence simply does not exist, in the same way that there is no evidence to prove the opposite.

No evidence = No Known Cause = cleared pilots.

[walter kennedy]

Arkroyal
With regard to your 1st point, may I refer you to Boeing’s document:
8-7D20-DS S-03 06, Enclosure 4
Dated: June 18,2002
Mull of Kintyre -Analysis of Available Data
This suggests to me that they selected the next waypoint while not steering away from the landmass – at that point, if they were experiencing any difficulties, they would hardly be expected to be bothering with inputting changes to their route navigation.

With regard to your 2nd point:
With respect, the simplistic IMC vs VFR argument may not be appropriate here; the regular route was, I believe, a low level approach to the Mull with a close in turn, thereafter handrailing up the coast, perfectly reasonable for a comfortable flight in the prevailing conditions in the area – that is at low level where visibility was good.
The only problem here is that the Mull would often have a localized mist due to the prevailing wind forcing moist air up over the Mull often obscuring detail that a pilot would need to judge his distance off. This is further exacerbated in this case as the approach direction is very much “end on” to the headland hindering spatial orientation between, say, a couple of laterally displaced large topographical features. Provided that the pilot can judge his distance off, then there would be no problem flying VFR (a point made somewhere in one of the enquiries) – but at the speed in question, how could he do that safely? If he could not see sufficient ground detail, he would have to use the TANS (which was ignored in this case) or play it very safe and turn away well clear (try flying close to a large cloud as opposed to a small one that one can see around). It would be a shame to not be able to come close in for, say, operational reasons, in these circumstances for want of a simple, reliable beacon that could have been placed for the convenience of just such (regular?) flights at little expense.
Of course, this could be simply addressed by others who flew such flights – hence my previous post.

Your closing remark “…..
The point is, the evidence required to find negligence simply does not exist, in the same way that there is no evidence to prove the opposite.
No evidence = No Known Cause = cleared pilots. …..”
Misses the point that there is a lot more to this tragic event than the loss of those on board if there was any foul play – there was an opportunity for foul play if a local navaid was used – and this must be addressed.

ZD576’s TACAN CU was set to ch107 (if the Boeing report is correct in this regard) – I cannot identify anything relevant on any frequency listings in the public domain – does this channel ring a bell with anyone reading this?

[BEagle]

Machrihanish VOR/DME (MAC) is on 116.0 MHz. To receive the DME element on a TACAN receiver, you need to set Channel 107.

However, the old MAZ TACAN used to be on Ch 107 before it was closed down and a DME incorporated into the MAC VOR system.

Now, according to my calculations, the location of MAZ (55:25:59N, 005:39:02W) was 275.2 deg True and 2.03 nm from the location of MAC (55:25:59N, 005:42:35W). So, if you read your distance as, say, 4 miles west of what you thought was MAZ, you would, in fact, be only 1.97 miles from where it used to be if you were actually tuned to the MAC VOR/DME.....

Is this relevant?

[Brian Dixon]

Hi everyone,

65 names so far.

Thank you to everyone for your efforts and to the MPs who have supported the EDM.

If your MP has signed, perhaps consider sending them an E-mail thanking them for their support (it means a lot to them to be recognised for doing something).

If your MP hasn't signed, please consider contacting them and asking them to do so. It does make a difference.

As always, my thanks and best wishes to you all.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Arkroyal]

Walter

Sorry to be so long getting back

1 I disagreed that they were known to be in control past the waypoint. I agree that at waypoint change on TANS they were in control

2 Having done the route myself, I'd agree with your method of flying it. That's why I'm sure they were VMC in sight of the mull at waypoint change. My point is that what happened subsequently will never be established.

3 Your closing remark “…..
The point is, the evidence required to find negligence simply does not exist, in the same way that there is no evidence to prove the opposite.
No evidence = No Known Cause = cleared pilots. …..”
Misses the point that there is a lot more to this tragic event than the loss of those on board if there was any foul play – there was an opportunity for foul play if a local navaid was used – and this must be addressed. Not quite sure of your thrust. There is no navaid which would have allowed flight to continue without visual contact. Had the crew been using one then they would indeed have been negligent. The conspiracy theory regarding foul play with a local navaid is spurious, and I stand by my comment as exactly the point which needs to be driven home in order to reverse this finding. Going down the route of fanciful theories will only muddy the water.

[FJJP]

My MP, Jonathan Djanogly, has replied to my e-mail request for him to support the cause:

As you know already, I believe that the causes of the crash need fuller investigation. I will sign EDM 371 and my Conservative colleagues on the defence team will also sign it.

Thank you again for writing and for drawing this important EDM to my attention. I will also forward your support to the Ministry of Defence in order that your views can be taken into account and will write again when I have a response from the Minister.


Good to have that support - gives one a warm and fuzzy feeling that eventually we're going to win. It would be very satisfying to have the guys' reputations restored and the faces of those 2 arrogant b******s rubbed in the mire...

[BEagle]

Well, my MP has yet to sign, despite his earlier comment. So I have sent him a polite nudge.

I'm not particularly interested in what becomes of Their Airships or their reputations, more that the thoroughly unjust verdict, attributing blame when no positive proof has ever been established, is overturned.

It's not often that Jeremy Paxman is fazed - but the unbelievable arrogance of 'Ba$tard Bill' stunned even Paxo....

[chippy63]

Mark Oaten, Lib Dem, Winchester, signed the earlier EDM; I e-mailed him to urge that he sign the present one, but no response to date. Any Prooners in the Winchester constituency might like to e-mail him to urge his continued support...

[Brian Dixon]

Hi everyone.

As you all know, this year will be the tenth anniversary of the crash. There will be a private memorial service on the Mull on 2 June for families and close friends.

However, the campaign group are considering holding a memorial service somewhere in London, thereby making it more accessible to people who would like to pay their respects. It will be a short memorial service for all who were lost and not just for Rick and Jon.

It will take a bit of planning so I'm just using this thread to guage the level (if any) of interest in attending. Would you be interested in attending? You can either e-mail me or post a reply.

It will be either on, or as near to 2 June as we can get it and will (hopefully) be around 6.00pm, the time of the crash.

The campaign is still going strong with many questions still going into the MoD. The EDM currently stands at 71 signatures - thank you. One piece of news is that Mrs Bellchambers, from D Sec Air, has taken early retirement. May I publicly thank her for all her responses and letters, and wish her a very long and happy retirement. To whoever takes her place - get used to the Irritating Sod being around :E

My very best, as always, to you all.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Tandemrotor]

Brian, excellent idea!

I know the formal service on the Mull is strictly for families only, however I intend to be somewhere close by at the appointed hour.

I have to say that the idea of a service somewhere more accessible is a very good plan. Not only for people with personal reasons for celebrating the lives of ALL of those on board, but also to demonstrate that this is not forgotten.

We will get justice for the guys, have no doubt.

Well done Brian.

[Thud_and_Blunder]

Hi again Brian,

Noted details for 2 June 2004 - I'm not on shift then, so hope to be able to attend.

Ah, EDMs. The ideal opportunity to see if my MP has launched himself into the latter half of the 20th Century. Alas, even though our part of Devon not only has 240 volts (most of the time) but also broadband and even digital terrestrial television, our local representative at Westminster hasn't yet seen fit to acquire an email address. Back to the same old tiresome procedure as last time - amazing how impenetrable the Lib Dems can be.

Best wishes,

T_B

[chippy63]

Nice letter from Mark Oaten, Lib Dem, Winchester agreeing to sign the EDM- "The tragedy that took place should not be forgotten. Everyone aboard the Chinook helicopter should be remembered fondly".
Haven't seen his name on the EDM yet, but will check next week.

T_B: if you check Beagle's post of 10 January on page 54, you will see a link to e-mail your MP. He also posted a link to check who has signed the EDM.

[BEagle]

From previous posts:

To find out whether your MP has signed the EDM, go to:
http://edm.ais.co.uk/weblink/html/motion.html/ref=371

If you don't know who your MP is, he/she isn't worth voting for. But you can find out by going to http://www.locata.co.uk/commons/ . Enter your postcode where indicated and click on 'search'.

When the name of your MP is displayed, you will see that there is an e-mail contact link. Click on this and a simple form will then appear. Write your comments and click on 'send'.

Be polite but firm with your comments!

I note that, despite his earlier reply, Mr David Cameron, MP for British West Oxfordshire, has yet to sign the EDM although 80 others have.....

[Thud_and_Blunder]

chippy63,

Thanks, but I'm familiar with communicating with my MP from the earlier stages of this campaign. As I learned during the previous attempts to get our man to sign an EDM, he really doesn't have an email address! To communicate with him by non-telephonic, non-postal means you have to get in touch with his party headquarters. They were not able to provide satisfaction last time; I ended up writing old-fashioned snail-mail. Not to worry - he's retiring at the end of this session.

[OKOC]

Will anyone ever get to the bottom of this. I hate to say it, but I doubt it.

Cell-phone/GPS interference from the punters in the rear is what I think it was caused by.

I was airborne from Leuchars to Kinloss at the time and the weather was not at all brilliant for low-flying especially at top Chinook speed. It did after all hit the Mull going balls-out. Why?

I flew with them both in the other seat in the 80's and they were both good blokes. It certainly was not pilot error unless they were drunk. (And if you believe that then my cockerel IS a kipper).

Sadly, there are demons about.

[BEagle]

Have just received a letter from my MP, David Cameron. He states:

"Thank you for your e-mail of the 11th January regarding the Chinook crash on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994.

As you will know already, I believe that the causes of the crash need fuller investigation. I will sign Early Day Motion 371 and my Conservative colleagues on the defence team will also sign it.

I have enclosed the text of the EDM for you to read (etc).

Thank you again for writing and drawing this important EDM to my attention. I have also forwarded your support to the MoD in order that your views be taken into account"

Thank you, David - particularly for the support of all your Conservative colleagues on the defence team!

[Brian Dixon]

Hi all,
EDM is now up to 93 signatures. Thank you all for your support and hard work.

Top marks BEags, thank you . Good result.

Welcome to the thread OCOK. I agree that no one will ever know for sure what happened or, indeed, what the cause was - The whole thrust of the campaign.

Chippy, hope all is well with you. Thanks, again, for contacting Mr Oaten. I'm off to London again in the near future so will look out for him again.

Thud, hope all is well with you too.

As always, I will keep you all updated with events.

My best to you all.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[FJJP]

Amazing, isn't it? Beags reply from his MP is identical to mine! Still, if achieves the desired result, who cares?!!

[chippy63]

Fiddling with the EDM website, noticed that 1 Lab MP has withdrawn his signature; I wonder who that was, and why?
Mark Oaten doesn't appear to have signed yet, I'll check again at the end of the week.
Incidentally, is there a closing date for the EDM? just wondering how it works.
All the best to you, too, Brian; by the way, would you be planning to send invitations to the memorial service in London to MP's who sign the EDM? Just a thought.

[Brian Dixon]

Hi Chippy,
yes, we've thought of inviting the MPs, and once the date has been confirmed/authorised we'll be formally inviting them - in addition to inviting everyone else, of course!

The EDM should remain in place for the whole of this Parliamentary session, so I hope that we'll be around for a little longer. If not, we'll just come back again with another one! Don't know who it was that removed their name. I'll have a dig around and if I find out who, will contact them (and, of course, name them here).

Regards, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[BEagle]

100 signatures now on the EDM!

And my MP has yet to sign - but has said that he will!!

KEEP 'EM COMING

[smartman]

As a PPS, my MP for South Ribble felt unable to sign the EDM, but he did pass my letter to MoD. This is MoD's replyto me, signed by the Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP:

Quote - "We have been entirely open and honest about this tragic accident. You may recall that following the publication of the House of Lords Chinook Select Committee report, Geoff Hoon made a detailed statement on the crash on 22 July 2002 explaining why the Government had not been able to support the conclusions of the Select Committee (Official Report columns 689-698 refer). The same afternoon Lord Bach made a simi;lar statement in the House of Lords (Official Report columns 11-17 refer. There was insufficient time for a debate before the summer recess, but Lord Jauncey of Tulichettle, Chairman of the Select Committee, was eventually able to present the Committee's report to the Lords on 5 November 2002 and a fairly lengthy debate ensued (Official Report columns 635-705 refer).

You may be interested to know that according to the Manual of Flight Safety AP3207, which was in force at the time of the accident, "only in cases in which there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased aircrew be found negligent". In the years since this accident, we have examined all the technical, legal and airmanship issues raised by those oppsed to the negligence finding but have found nothing that undermines thart finding. The two senior Reviewing Officers remain convinced that the required standard of proof was met and the Government retains every confidence in their decision" - end of Quote.

I have replied to my MP pointing (among other things) out that the phrase 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever' is indeed the key issue, and that there remains a huge and growing groundswell of highly knowledgeable opinion that disagrees with the Government, MoD and the 2 Reviewing Officers in their assertion that the 'standard of proof was met'. There's only one 'standard' -the need to show 'absolute no doubt' - and as claimed by all those from the BoI President to the Select Committee, and the many inbetween, there is much unequivocal doubt.

As I've said before on this thread, my own gut feeling is that it's probable that the guys screwed up. But that is subjective irrelevance - and as a twice BoI President and staffer of several, there is IMHO quite insufficent evidence to meet the criteria for negligence as required by AP3207.

I guess there'll have to be a change of Def Minister, PM, and possibly Government before a reversal can be expected? Nonetheless, keep at them!

[BEagle]

I quote a certain Miss Mandy Rice-Davies (Profumo affaire for those who weren't around in the early '60s):

"He would say that, wouldn't he?"

[Boxer42]

My MP (Nick Palmer, Labour Broxtowe) couldn't sign the EDM for some reason, which I can't remember and haven't got his email to hand. Anyway, he said he would write to the MOD instead and raise the issue with them.

I received a letter from him yesterday, enclosing a letter from Adam Ingram with the exact same wording as Smartmans message above.

No doubt everyone else will get the same exact response.

[BEagle]

Yes, how right you are.

I have also received the same brush-off letter from Ingram. File ref is D/Min(AF)/AI 0264/04/C dated 5 Feb 04 for anyone else who wishes to check whether they have also been sent a standard letter.

The sooner Bliar, Hoon, Ingram and the rest of the oily crew currently in power get the heave-ho the better. Particularly Hoon.

"The two senior Reviewing Officers remain convinced......" is written in the present tense. That must mean that they have been consulted recently.... Or does it mean something else in Bliar-speak?

2 officers convinced, thousands of others unconvinced.

Edited to add: Just had a reply from my MP. He has now signed the EDM. He is also going to write to Ingram to request clarification over the use of the present tense in his letter as I indicated above.....

Irritating sods of the world unite - keep up the pressure!

[Brian Dixon]

Thanks everyone for all your hard work. It is greatly appreciated by all involved in the campaign.

It is interesting that, once again, the MoD deem it appropriate to deal with the concerns surrounding this injustice by way of proforma reply.

It will be interesting to see what reply is given to your MP BEagle.

If the MoD are so willing to show their support the two, now retired, Air Marshal's opinions, why did they not go the whole hog and make one CAS before he left?

Perhaps they had absolutely no doubt whatsoever, that we would be irritating them all the more if they did :E

EDM currently stands at 114 - Fantastic!!

As always, my sincere thanks to you all for your support.
Regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Arkroyal]

Excellent results so far Brian.

I've been waiting for the pace to quicken before again trying to engage my tory boy in the EDM. He has signed a few this session, but has refused to get involved in our cause thus far. Time for another nudge.

Interesting that that little toad Ingram now dishes out the blandishments previously handled by Mrs Bellchambers.

Where was he before defence. I seem to remember him greasily defending some other no hoper before he became Buff's stab vest.:yuk:

[nimrodnosewheel]

I have today emailed my MP Sir Robert Smith (Hereditary Peerage, did nothing to warrant it), Lib Dem for West Aberdeenshire & Kincardine. His neighbouring Lib Dem in Gordon Const., Malcolm Bruce, has already signed. Will keep you posted on result.

[Chocks Wahay]

Emailed my MP (Paul Goodman, Con) on Thursday via the House of Commons website (link a few posts earlier in the thread). Received a personal reply from him this morning which was very supportive. He had not been aware of the EDM but he has kindly committed to signing it. :ok:

I have written again to thank him for his support. Keep at it everyone, it works!

[XM147]

Hi folks
Emailed my MP today (via faxyourmp.com)

[Brian Dixon]

Hi everyone,
thank you all very much. 121 signatures so far. Let's keep the pressure on.

More updates, as and when.

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[chippy63]

Brian,
The MP who withdrew his signature from EDM 371 is Frank Cook, Lab, Stockton North. However, looking at the list of EDM's that he has supported is an amendment, printed below, supported by 13 MP's. The names supporting the amendment do not seem, from a spot check, to be supporters of EDM 371.

For reference, here is the wording of EDM 371:

CHINOOK ZD576 07.01.04
Key/Robert
That this House endorses the Church of Scotland General Assembly 2003 Deliverance, which urges Her Majesty's Government to ensure that the Ministry of Defence revisits the issue of the Chinook helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre on 2nd June 1994; notes that the General Assembly noted the findings of the Fatal Accident Inquiry held in Paisley, the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons, and the House of Lords Select Committee, all of which rejected the finding of gross negligence by the RAF Board of Enquiry against Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Richard Cook and of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee; supports the General Assembly's pastoral concern for all the families affected by the accident; and calls on Her Majesty's Government to overturn the verdict of gross negligence ascribed to the deceased pilots before 2nd June 2004, the 10th anniversary of the accident.

and here is the amendment:


EDM 371A1
CHINOOK ZD576 Amdt. line 9: 15.01.04
Lewis/Julian
Line 9, insert after 'accident': 'recognises that the Royal Air Force's rules on fatal accidents have subsequently been changed, such that the Chinook aircrew would not have been blamed after their deaths.'

The MP for Winchester, Mark Oaten, has not yet signed, despite his earlier agreement to do so, so an e-mail is on its way to him.

Regards chippy

[Brian Dixon]

Thanks Chippy.

Just to update everyone - the EDM now has 137 supporting signatures, and the amendment to the original EDM has 15 signatures.

This is a fantastic result, and combining the two totals, not far off the number of signatures for the previous EDM during the 2001/2002 session, which reached 170 signatures.

Quite astounding that there is still such depth of feeling after almost ten years!

The campaign thanks each and every one of you for your support.
Regards, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[TD&H]

Finally got a response from my MP (Eric Pickles) who states 'As Shadow Secretary of State for Local Government' he is only permitted to sign certains EDMs and that he will check to see if 371 is on the 'approved' list.

Would have thought he could have checked that first! Will let you know what happens as/when/if he does so.

In the meantime, best wishes

H

[janet walker]

A reply for Chippy!

The amendment to the EDM was tabled to make the subtle point about how unjust it is to leave Rick and Jonathan charged with gross negligence for a crash, when that crash directly resulted in the rules which convicvted them being changed. Does that make sense?

Great bunch of signatures on the EDM, and more to come.

adios

[ShyTorque]

Emailed my MP. John Mann. He has replied saying that he has signed the EDM, but as yet his name has not appeared on the list. :confused:

If it does, that will be 141 signatures.

[Brian Dixon]

157, if you include the amendment Shy!! :ok:

Thank you all (again).
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[chippy63]

Thanks for the comment, Janet, understood!

[ShyTorque]

I emailed John Mann again to inform him that his name was still not on the list. He replied to say that he HAD signed in January and didn't know why his name was missing.

He has now contacted the administrators who have rectified this.

Thanks, Mr Mann! :ok:

[wullie wallace]

This will probably be my one and only message to this forum so here goes - Strike command lies without a shadow of doubt - from personal experience.
With regard to the C130 and SeaKing incident:-
The provision of three State of the art (for that time) Radars at Byron Heights, Mt Alice and Stanley was a complete waste of taxpayers money then?
From the elevated position of three main surveillance Radars it is difficult to imagine how two out of the max of 8-10 local flights (Bristows and milk runs) could be missed by all three Radars (range in excess of 250Nmiles). Knowing a bit about the positioning of the three Radars I would say that at least one of the Radars would have, depending on range and height obviously, had returns from the C130 at least! More likely is that both flights were seen at one time or another by at least two Radars - what about the controllers? If the Sea King was ship launched then the ship would have had recordings of voice traffic.

SOP for at least two of these Radars indicate that there would have been a good chance that the RACAL ICR64 voice recorders should have been recording all AGA voice traffic - I suppose the disclosure of these recordings at that time would not have been "in the public interest" funnily enough we are the "public" and it certainly interests us!.

The chinook flight:- Similarly the voice traffic of the NI Chinook flight in 1994 would probably have been recorded on RAF Bishopcourts recorders as well as those of certain ATC cells in NI and Scotland - (loudon hill, Prestwick) again would the release of such information be "in the public interest"? In fact the Type 93, classified as Remote Sensors, dotted round the UK at that time (Bishopscourt, Buchan, Bulmer Bridlignton and Hopton) had full recording capability with live data being passed back to the different UKADGE control centres! Believe me someone had (or has) that information.
Even if the primary Radar was down on any of these sites it does not preclude AGA voice recording!
Be aware the NATC software was seen to be freezing during developement - ask Bill Mansfield of Siemens Plessey Systems (now AMS)

[Hot 'n' High]

You know what is so very, very sad about this affair which we have all watched for so long? The reality of it is far, far deeper than the sordid outcome of the BOI (as Amended). It actually sums up the nature of Politics in the UK today.

Democracy and Logic? Let us not kid ourselves about the political institution we live under today. Notwithstanding the odd courageous (often backbench) MP, IMHE many of them are a bunch of self-indulgent parasites bent on self-preservation. And this sad saga is only but one example I have experienced of the "I'm all right (actually, I'm doing very nicely since you ask), Jack" attitude displayed by so many of the so-called honourable Members of the House.

.......... "MP (Eric Pickles) who states 'As Shadow Secretary of State for Local Government' he is only permitted to sign certain EDMs and that he will check to see if 371 is on the 'approved' list"........ Mmmmm, obviously something that came across the Baltic from the days of Stalin!!!

Still, my outlook probably explains why I am still a "Gash Shag" and will die a pauper! At least I sleep (and will die) with a clear conscience!!!!! Poor kiddies though; no fortune awaiting them upon my demise!

H 'n' H

PS IMHE - the "E" = Experience!

:bored:

[Argus]

Agree completely.

In the current post Iraq environment both in Oz and the UK, there’s a real need for our politicians to lift their game.

We need a politics where politicians speak in Parliament and on TV like normal people, setting out arguments in a rational manner, acknowledging the strength of opposing points of view, admitting previous mistakes, eschewing high blown rhetoric and the politics of personal abuse and deceit. We need a form of politics where statistics are no longer used in a deliberately misleading way; where issues are discussed and views put forward because politicians believe in them rather than for short term tactical gain; where politicians are motivated by concern for their country and its people, rather than mere self interest and political survival. Yet, too often, politicians behave as if scoring points against one another was the real art and purpose of politics.

Also, there is enormous danger for a free society where those who are elected to office are, because of the very fact that that they have been elected, distrusted. Increasingly, it is unelected bureaucrats, rather than Ministers, who decide policy. These ‘experts’ may offer useful advice. But politics is about more than expertise; it is about wider judgments of the national interest and recognition that decisions in one policy area can have profound consequences in other areas. In a democracy, it’s the people’s representatives, and not bureaucrats, who must take the decisions, after weighing up the opposing views and arguments.

It’s time for a new civility, accountability and seriousness in our nation’s politics. Politicians must find ways to restore faith in politics; and it won’t be easy. It will require fundamental changes to politicians’ behaviour. People want a new politics; an honest politics; and a politics that brings genuine improvement to people’s lives. It’s time for the politicians to deliver.

[ShyTorque]

Can't agree more. They're all in it for their perks and pensions and little else.

One example: a certain very senior politician extolls the virtues of our modernised, read "dumbed down", educational system (Oh yes it is) while sending his own offspring to a private school.

Similarly, he tells his "subjects" that a controversial vaccination is perfectly safe for children whilst refusing to confirm or deny whether his own children have been given that same vaccination. Amazing leadership...

Let's see now.....would our Prime Minister and his cronies prefer to retire to Hackney? Or perhaps Nottingham, Sheffield, Birmingham, Newcastle or any other of the terribly depressed centres of our once fine manufacturing areas? Is he even aware they exist?

Or will it be a nice little villa in France or Italy?

Almost every week now, another new hare-brained scheme is put forward by the Ministry of Stupid Ideas. These are having a radical and harmful effect on our society.

There is one answer though. At this present time, although this government seem hell bent on destroying it, we do still live in a democracy. We all have a vote. We can and should all still use our vote, unlike last time when our government were re-elected on a vote of approximately 18%, because most of the population couldn't be bothered to get off their jacksy, go down the village hall and put a cross on a piece of paper.

I hope he takes in what has just happened in Spain.

This time, I'll vote for the Common Sense Party. All I've got to do is work out where they are....although I've got a fairly good idea.

Danny will probably pull this. We aren't supposed to talk politics any more. It's also off-thread, so my apologies to Brian Dixon. Just wanted to get it off my chest, it's been brewing for a while. :*

[Brian Dixon]

No apologies needed Shy. I agree with what has been said.

I will, if I may, take a quick moment to point out that just occasionally one decent chap slips through the net.

That chap is James Arbuthnot MP.

Initially he was a strong supporter of the negligence verdict. However, following a meeting with Capt. John Cook (Rick's father), James went off and did a little more independent research. He subsequently stood up during a Parliamentary debate on the Chinook accident and admitted he had been wrong, and that his opinion had now changed in support of the campaign. He also apologised for his initial stance. A most unusual and courageous Parliamentary occurrence.

He is now the current Chair of the Mull of Kintyre Group.

With regard the campaign, we are currently in the planning stage for the forthcoming tenth anniversary of the accident. Details will be made available as and when things have been confirmed.

That said, it is worth pointing out at this early stage, that all arrangements for the tenth anniversary will be related to the memories of 29 lost souls and their families, and not a campaign issue. The two, in my humble opinion, should remain separate.

Early Day Motion 371 has continued to collect signatures, and I am delighted to inform you all that it currently has a grand total of 152 signatures, with a further 18 signatures against the amendment. As I have said many a time, thank you so much to each and every one of you for your support.

Nearly ten years on and to still have this much support is clear testimony to the level of feeling of the injustice of the verdict. The MoD and Government should really take the hint. The campaign will not cease until this terrible wrong has been addressed and corrected.

My very best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[ShyTorque]

Thanks Brian.

Malcolm Rifkind, too, saw the light and had the guts to stand up and say so, did he not? Good on him also.

Up the revolution, eh? :ok:

[BEagle]

A friendly letter from my MP David Cameron today, attaching the following predictable and disappointing reply from Ingram:-

Thank you for your letter of 20 Feb quoting an e-mail from your constituent about the Chinook accident on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994.

I have no reason to believe that either of the Reviewing Officers (both of whom have now retired) have changed their opinion since they explained the reasoning behind their finding of neglgigence before the House of Lords Select Committee in 2002. Certainly, on the last occasion on which we contacted Sir John Day's office in respect of this subject (July 2003) there was no indication of a change of heart. The Ministry of Defence has always said that we would fully investigate any new evidence on this accident. However, no such evidence has been put forward and consequently there has been nothing to prompt either the Department or the Reveiwing Officers to remain anything other than convinced that the correct decision was reached.

I am sorry to send what I know will be a disappointing reply, but neither we, nor the Reviewing Officers, see any reason to overturn their original finding of Gross Negligence.

".....neither we, nor the Reviewing Officers, see any reason...". How very true.

[Arkroyal]

Typical Ingram.

I have no reason to believe that either of the Reviewing Officers (both of whom have now retired) have changed their opinion since they explained the reasoning behind their finding of neglgigence before the House of Lords Select Committee in 2002.

Stops a little short doesn't it? That'll be the same HoL select committee that rejected the Reviewing officers' findings then. :yuk:

Why can't these fools see that it requires no new evidence in order to find that the original decision was flawed.

[Brian Dixon]

Many thanks BEagle for your persistance.

Whilst the letter from Ingram is little moe than a cut and paste paragraph from the MoD, it is interesting that he now feels the need to point out that both Reviewing Officers are now retired.

I wonder why that is?

You may consider writing back to him, stating that his belief that the reviewing officers have not changed their opinion is correct. However, that is exactly what it is - opinion. Not fact proved with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.

Also, as Ark correctly points out, the information the Reviewing Officers based their opinions on was, in actual fact, not entirely correct.

More evidence that the decision is unsafe!

As always, my thanks for your support.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[semirigid rotor]

OK I've bitten the bullet and started wading through all 57 pages (maybe more by the time I've finished). As a current helo pilot flying a FADEC equipped machine, has anybody got a working theory as to what happened on that awful day?

[ShyTorque]

Possibly an engine runaway up took place at a critical moment. This would explain the apparent discrepancy of the yachtsman's evidence that the aircraft was flying slowly and the aircraft hitting the ground at high power shortly afterwards. He said he thought it was possibly involved in a SAR because of its low speed when he saw it.

(I too fly a FADEC equipped aircraft, of a more modern spec than this type of aircraft had. Quite often, if we get a FADEC malunction, shutting the aircraft down completely and turning off the battery power removes the fault indication, leaving no evidence).

It is also feasible that an optical illusion took place in the marginal weather conditions.

Perhaps a navigational error, caused by the the TANS, occurred(apparently had been previously reported by other crews as playing up, no fault found or corrected by maintenance).

Maybe some other failure took place, after all, the co-pilot's i/c box was found in the emergency position.

Accident likely to be a combination of more than one thing.

Possibly, feasibly, perhaps, maybe, likely.

But evidence of the actual cause? Insufficient to be determined.

Gross Negligence? Unlikely.

Unjust, spiteful overturning of correct BOI verdict? Definitely.

[semirigid rotor]

Thanks for the reply, I'm still reading but can only get online when I've kicked the kids off!

The FADEC problem seems to me to be the most likely. I agree that initially they were flying at a sensible height and speed for the weather conditions at the time. But a high side FADEC failure at the turn point would have increased the work load ten fold. While all pilot training deals with a "traditional" engine failure - that is the engine ceases to produce power - do we know from the training records for the pilots concerned, if they received any training in "other kind of engine failure" or did they expect the failed FADEC to freeze? Did the Flight Reference Cards contain any info about High and Low side FADEC failures?

I'm sure Wessex pilots would like to jump in here, but it is a sad fact of life that sometimes experience and knowledge can get lost over time and lessons have to be relearned. I of course refer to the Gnome twin pac and it's fuel computers.

[walter kennedy]

SEMIRIGID
There is the question of the TACAN, which the crew would probably have relied upon rather than TANS, to get to the close in turning point had they got a useable reading. But no one seems to want to contemplate this.
The TACAN CU was set accordingly and this crew had grave misgivings about the accuracy of TANS.
Other crews who have done this run could clear this up as to what was the usual practice but seem somewhat shy about disclosing it.
The accident is wholly explained by simply running on too far by reference to a false reading on the TACAN when ground detail was obscured by the ground hugging mist.
Those who look for control faults must realise that the aircraft appears to have been in control for at least the last 5 seconds as the final evasive manouevre needed that much time to get them from the extended straight and level bit (Boeing simulation, etc) - this leaves a narrow window of slightly more than 10s for a control fault to have had effect and then clear while the pilots did nothing when the greatest danger was to carry straight on towards the high ground that they knew was there and that they were preparing to turn away from at close range AT ANY SECOND (this WAS their intended path) - no engine hiccup should have distracted them from that.
Of course, had the TACAN been used its nature is that it is accurate - unless the ground side was tampered with to give a false reading (which is ridiculously easy to do in practice). BUT this would have been sabotage and therefore the authorities immediately ruled it out ...????

[walter kennedy]

OK let's stick to basics just to clear the pilots' names:
a fresh inquiry is justified in that the RAF effectively misled both the Parliament and the FA inquiries on two major points:
1. The planned path.
2. The usual practice on that path.

wrt (1), look through the transcripts - the most obvious starting point for such a crash into terrain should surely be what were they intending to do? - I gather that this was a regular flight (a "milk run"?) involving coming in close to the Mull and then "handrailing" up the coast, at low level - I challenge anyone to get that scenario from transcripts from the inquiries - indeed, anyone would be shocked by the obfuscation on this basic point.

wrt (2), if this was a regular flight plan and the prevailing conditions were commonly adverse to seeing ground detail on the Mull - what were the usual practices? - why were no pilots who had done this type of flight before called before these inquiries to explain the difficulties and any special operational/security requirements imposed, and cosequently any special practices to get round those problems?

At the very least, they should be put on the spot by clear, straightforward questions on the above two points - after 10 years the most basic navigation aspects of this crash have not been dealt with to the satisfaction of at least one member of the public - anyone else share this view?

[semirigid rotor]

Thanks for that Walter.

After such a long time, chatting to friends etc. a certain amount of myth and rumour still surrounds the accident, and I'm just trying to get back to the original facts to make up my own mind. I've tried searching but cannot find the original report online - can anybody help there?

All I can say for sure is that I have more questions than answers.

[Brian Dixon]

Semi Rigid,
you could try the dedicated web site and follow the links. From there you will get an overview of the Report, and also details on how to obtain a full copy.

The full report has not gone online due to copyright etc.

Hope that helps, if not, please come back to me.

Regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[walter kennedy]

RADIO CONTACT
Of course, there is one other really obvious thing that, to my knowledge, has not been brought to closure - and it is one that any of you mil flyers should be on to:
the un-answered call from ZD576!
There are two sources from which this matter should have been cleared up:
(1) recordings at the various ground stations that could have picked them up (as suggested by someone else recently on this thread);
(2) in the apparent absence in recordings of any further calls either way between the a/c and ground, why was the ground controller not hauled before the Parl inq or FAI to make a clear statement - after all, a reply from ground was to be expected in the circumstances and there was time for this to have happened - and without this call, it needs explaining why ZD576 continued without prompting the ground controller again.

This issue has been too lightly ignored in the inquiries and yet it is very pertinent, surely?

[Arkroyal]

Walter said:The accident is wholly explained by simply running on too far by reference to a false reading on the TACAN when ground detail was obscured by the ground hugging mist.
If that was so, then there'd be a pretty strong case for negligence. To do as you suggest would be attempting to fly IFR below VMC conditions, and I am quite sure that our men did not.

As one who had flown a similar route before, I would not have been surprised by getting no reply to transmissions. I'd simply wait until further up the coast, and speak to Maccrihanish once within line of sight.

THe whole point is that there is no evidence to support the finding arrived at by Wratten and Day.

[walter kennedy]

Arkroyal
The basic points that I made in the postings here on 1st & 2nd April still stand - what is wrong with clarifying the situation by raising those points at an inquiry and getting definitive answers from the horses' mouths?

[short&shapeless]

Walter, an additional inquiry could produce lots of detailed theories but in the end it would solve nothing. It doesn't matter what any number of experts say about the situation - the only 'horse's mouths' that matter cannot give evidence because tragically they are not with us to do so.

Any evidence from any other source is still only speculation - and under the rules in force at the time of the accident, because the crew were not alive to present their case, that was not good enough to determine a finding of gross negligence.

The original Board got it right and the 'powers that be' ignored their own rules to find otherwise. It is an absolute scandal that this is still rumbling along but all power to Brian and the others in their fight for justice for the families

S&S

[walter kennedy]

S & S
The “horses” I refer to in my posts on 1 & 2 April are:
Firstly, other pilots in that flight who had done the run before to answer the questions
<<What was the planned path>> and
<<what was the usual practice on that path>>; and
Secondly, the controller who could state why either recordings are not available after ZD576’s call or why it was unanswered.
This last point was dismissed by Arkroyal (in his posting of 3rd April) thus:
<<As one who had flown a similar route before, I would not have been surprised by getting no reply to transmissions. I'd simply wait until further up the coast, and speak to Macrihanish once within line of sight.>>
BUT the absence of any further communication (on record) beyond that call is odd and may be significant as follows:
ZD576 was supposed to get acknowledgement before entering particular airspace at low altitude as I recall and made the call at the appropriate time; now, this call was received and recorded at a ground station and so if a reply was made by that ground station there should have been no problem with that reply being recorded (obvious surely, at the source/ no propagation etc considerations);
Thus, either the reply was not made, or recording stopped at that critical point, or the recording has been withheld from the public domain.
If the reply was not made, the controller must be asked why not.
If the recordings did stop there, it should be established why so and the controller should state what was said.
There may be an explanation for the latter case (recordings withheld); for example, some information on, say, a perceived threat, may have been passed to the crew that may have changed the “milk run” into an operational flight – thus changing the flight rules somewhat (I hope the significance of this is apparent to some of you at least – on a routine flight, the VFR vs IFR simplistic argument has been used to dismiss any reliance upon TACAN for judging distance off the Mull when coming close in).

Anyway, why go into conjecture – as I have said, these fundamental aspects of the flight have not been addressed and yet the “horses” are available – they can’t all have gone for a walk in the woods ….

Oh and generally, I believe that the verdicts on the pilots was wrong and very unjust – a disgrace, in fact, But it is not enough to close this issue with the clearance of their names – although this would be a very good thing in its own right – do not forget that the UK’s top antiterrorist team went down that tragic day. Their demise opened the way for THAT peace process (that I am sure these guys would have vigorously opposed) with profound consequences for the people of Northern Ireland. Getting to the truth of what happened just may cast a different light on the sponsors of THAT process and break the deadlock before the spirit of the British people there.

[lightbob]

Walter,

Are you suggesting that the passengers on the flight were opposed to the peace process that was eventually hammered out? Or have I completely misunderstood you last paragraph?

[walter kennedy]

Lightbob said
<<Are you suggesting that the passengers on the flight were opposed to the peace process that was eventually hammered out?>>
Yes, but this is my conjecture only based on information in the public domain (such as newspapers at the time, a published book, etc).
What I have gathered over time is the following:
1. That the consensus within that group was that a military solution was possible (ie. The IRA terrorism could be fought and won against);
2. They had a major campaign in plan that would have considerably weakened the IRA had it been successfully carried out and consequently would have weakened the IRA’s bargaining position (generally and particularly in the upcoming peace process).

Point (1) above would have needed the will, cooperation, and support of the British institutions which Airey Neave, some years earlier, had questioned immediately before his assassination (he had gone so far as to name proposed new heads for MI5 & MI6 to improve matters). It is of note that specific technical evidence that survived suggested that the bomb that killed Airey Neave was at least in part American. I will not spend time here conjecturing on possible American agendas wrt NI but suggest reading some of the late Enoch Powell's opinions on the subject.

From discussions with people on both “sides”, my feeling is that the result of the crash was profound and opened the way for the American sponsored peace plan with the IRA ceasefire that followed so soon after the crash. Casual comments from others and my intuition suggest to me that one particular aspect of the peace process that this team would never have accepted was the involvement of the IRA whilst still being armed.
Your phrase “…the peace process that was eventually hammered out” – try getting a good deal without your champions present. The integrity of a corner (stone?) of the British nation is being weakened with the peace process as is.

[lightbob]

I cannot answer for the civilian or the police members of the team. Those in the military would have had a role to advise the senior military staff in NI on options based on the intelligence sources that they would have had access to. Those senior military could then advise the politicians etc etc. My point is that those who died in the crash, Majs and Lt Cols would have been on a 2 year tour (probably due posting to another theatre) and not have had the influence to block a particular governement policy. Very few junior to middle ranking officers have that influence in UK.

[walter kennedy]

This team as a whole was the one at the coal face, with irreplaceable qualities and experience - the loss was severe. Even the popular press at the time questioned why so important a team was all on one helicopter.
In terms of influence on govt policy, who can block it?
The point is that they could have objected strongly and been a great embarrassment to the govt, they knowing what was and was not possible better than the politicians - and their counsel during negotiations would have been invaluable (to one side at least).
And points 1 & 2 still stand.
Thus I find it strange that sabotage was so lightly dismissed so early by the authorities.
There may well have been no skulduggery on any parties part in this tragedy, but it appears to me that fear of contemplating such is blocking people's minds to objectively determining what actually happened - all I am asking on this thread is that anyone with particular knowledge of this flight confirm the usual flight plan and contingencies and clear up the actual navigation practice in such conditions - and help explain some anomalies (eg the incomplete sequence of radio calls, for example). I am surprised that such basic considerations were not the starting point in the inquiries - the vigour put into distractions and the appalling obfuscation at the inquiries only suggests that there may be something the govt or RAF does not want made public.
Let me put my perspective as simply as I can:
The best analysis I have seen on the flight suggests that the a/c was basically flying straight and level at a high cruise speed, showing no signs of control problems until a vigorous evasive manoeuvre was executed shortly before impact, and controls were as expected to have got the a/c to the attitude that it was in at impact – ie the a/c was under control.
Seems to me that they were closer than they thought and thus navigation should have been the primary issue.
So, after 9 years of exhaustive debate on everything else, let us spend a short time on navigation and put it to bed:
Let us determine, from those who would know, what exactly was the intended path of this flight.
In regard to the frequently occurring localised mist on the Mull, was there any special practice to allow routine flights to continue at low level in close proximity to the Mull?
Were there any special conditions (eg security concerns) that would allow such routine flights to change their status and modify their flight plans (eg go in real close to the headland to mask approach, using such and such prearranged procedure and equipment)? And who would make the decision to apply them.
Let us ask for the complete radio recordings, or a statement from the airspace controller involved explaining the unanswered call, or if it was answered but the recordings withheld let us ask why so and what was said (eg was anything said that could have caused the a/c to something non routine).

That’s it – all it would take to close this aspect. Just to finish off, here is my theory as to what happened:
The intention was to approach the Mull at low level and close in turn up (at waypoint A as referred to in the inquiries) the coast towards Macrihanish (as was common practice for these flights).
They were in control at waypoint A or they would not have been bothering to update their enroute nav (TANS) with a distant waypoint.
Under the prevailing conditions of a ground hugging mist obscuring detail on the Mull, waypoint A was already too close in to safely rely on the Mk1 eyeball for distance off the Mull for starting a safe turn at their high closing speed – and don’t forget that this crew had little faith in the accuracy of the TANS anyway – and yet they carried on.
The only thing that such an experienced and responsible crew would have trusted in to go in so close in such conditions was the good old reliable and accurate TACAN – being just about ahead of them, the Distance Measuring (DME) function would have been an ideal countdown for their turn (don’t forget, they were in clear air until the last moment – it was the judgement of distance off the misty Mull that was the problem – VFR was OK so long as they stayed clear of the localised mist – what a ****** to have to consider IMC for just this one point on the route! – how many times would flight crews on this “milk run” have debated this point?).
ZD576’s TACAN CU was set to ch 107 (Macrihanish DME). They were not supposed to be landing at the aerodrome and had the TANS for en route nav.
Now, readers, what do you think they had that set for?
And it is very, very easy to alter the internal delay in the DME on the ground to give a false reading of, say, 1 mile.
Never mind the detractors, what was the practice on these runs according to the other pilots who made them?

[kilo52]

W K

The person you want is the person who actually planned the sortie but didn't fly it.

However, He is not (as far as I know) a contributor to this forum.

[walter kennedy]

kilo 52
Yes and although maybe not on this site, hopefully someone who does visit here could get motivated and make contact.
The same goes for any aircrew that flew this route - after all I believe that it was regular in terms of the low level approach and close in turn (eg when we were standing halfway between the lighthouse and the crash site,the lighthousekeeper told me, when a helo passed unseen but close overhead in near identical conditions, "...they do that all the time...") - anyone who visits this site and could draw their attention to this debate would be doing their bit.

[ShyTorque]

Something to bear in mind re radio calls. The crew were under NO obligation to make radio calls and would have not expected ATC instructions of any sort. In the military the general principle in any event on such flights is to fly round everything and speak to who ever can give the best service, probably expecting just a flight information service at best.

They were flying at low level on an operational flight (it is politically incorrect to call the NI situation at that time a civil war) and had no option to climb into the prevailing icing conditions because of the limitations of this unserviceable airframe / uncleared type which was grounded the previous day by the MOD test pilots responsible for giving the aircraft a Release to Service. The Boscombe Down test pilots refused to fly the Mk 2 airframe in their charge 10 minutes up the road to RAF Odiham for servicing. Draw your own conclusions....

[Ben Leice]

ST,

A driver on the Aldergrove-Carnlough-Kintyre flightpath got quite a shock when he saw a Chinook coming straight at him near Parkgate at more or less hedge top height. Around the same time up on the north coast near Portrush another Chinook on a different flightpath skimmed a low ridge. John Spellar's reply to William Ross that there was only one Chinook in flight has yet to be corrected and the identity and role of the Portrush Chinook have yet to be established.

In light of your comments about the state of the Mk2 Chinooks on June 1 you must have been surprised that the ZD576 Mk2 was flown over to Northern Ireland on May 31, the first MK2 to be based at Aldergrove. If I remember correctly this helicopter had just been upgraded in the US a few weeks earlier. JATOC claimed that on May 31 he had recommended the use of two Pumas for the transit but this was changed on June 1 to one Chinook.

[ShyTorque]

Ben,

Two Pumas would have made infinitely more sense, especially in view of the importance of the pax.

I still firmly believe that someone above station level was trying to make a political statement by ordering this very important flight in this particular aircraft. The statement was probably supposed to show that the Mk2 was perfectly safe in spite of what was being said by the people that flew them, including Boscombe Down's test pilots.

It went tragically wrong and in an attempt to put a lid on this dreadful management mistake, the crew got the blame.

[Ben Leice]

ST,

Can you explain the role and identity of the second Chinook? Do you know where it was based?

[ShyTorque]

Ben,

No, I can't explain it, but the RAF might still have archived authorisation sheets, detailing who was flying where on that day. It's probably a vain hope after all this time. Although I know that used auth. sheets were retained by all squadrons, I can't remember how long for and I'm not sure if the data is in the public domain, if you know what I mean.

But I'm not sure what the relevance of another aircraft would be. :confused:

[kilo52]

Ben,

It may well be that your witness saw a Helicopter at that time and place but what type of Helicopter is a matter of speculation.

It is not unknown for "eyewitnesses" to convince themselves that what they saw was "the one" involved in the particular incident.

ps welcome back


W K

"The root cause of this accident is that the crew while operating in poor weather and close to high ground flew the aircraft into the ground." OC RAF ODIHAM

"The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre" BOI para16e

Oh - incidentally

I always understood that the Boscombe Pilots DID NOT refuse to fly the Chinook but that pre - planned maintenance was brought forward whilst awaiting further data to arrive to enable icing trials to be carried out.

[walter kennedy]

ST
Wrt your posting 12 April:
BUT the a/c DID make a call – surely you are not saying that the ground controller could be so ambivalent about responding? This matter should be examined fully as I explained earlier.
Secondly, you rightly say that there was no option to climb, etc BUT this is not the point – I believe that there was a regular flight plan (for the typical milk run) for this bit whereby a close in approach was made to the Mull and thence up the coast (this was also suggested by one of the witnesses at one of the inquiries) and therefore it was not an unusual situation for such an aircraft to be in (coming in close and turning up the coast at low level) – let us be clear about this, they were not being constrained by limitations on that particular aircraft to stay low – it was their intention. It was not that they had left insufficient time to climb over the Mull – they were late making a small left turn. They were intending to go in close before the turn – they just went too close.
. It may well have been that, due to operational considerations, they were to come in particularly close; that is as the pax were such a potential target that the a/c should use the terrain to mask its approach. Way back when I originally made this assumption, I had suggested that they may have used DME for judging the close in turning point but repeatedly got the simplistic reply that it was not an operational flight and therefore would not deviate from the flying regs (VFR vs IMC) and therefore would not rely on DME (in this case a function of the TACAN) when at low level flying visual; I am thankful, therefore, to you for your comment that it was, effectively, an operational flight.
Again I call for pilots who did this run to come forward and clear up this issue of what was the practice – if you know someone, lean on them!

[Ben Leice]

Kilo52,

The helicopter seen near Portrush had twin rotors and a patchwork quilt type camouflage. Surely that's a Chinook. The patches appeared to be about 3 to 4 feet in size. Sorry I can't give you the colours but I'm colour blind. I think I'd probably recognize the pattern if I saw it.

[ShyTorque]

Ben,

Crews flying at low level under VFR are not obliged to make radio calls to ATC unless requiring to penetrate controlled airspace. I did not intend to infer that they should not have made such a call, or that it was imperative that it was answered. What I hoped to make clear was that it was probably not a major surprise at the time for no reply to be received to a routine call made from low level. Comms at low level are often sporadic due to terrain masking. An aircraft in distress would certainly make a call, but during an inadvertant entry into IMC (if this did in fact happen) a call would no doubt be made at the appropriate time, in order to obtain a radar service or whatever assistance was required by the Captain. The immediate priority and a pilot's gut instinct would normally be to climb as rapidly as possible and / or turn away from relevant obstructions. It is possible the crew had a problem, there were two pieces of evidence to suggest this, namely the transponder setting, which had been changed to include a "7" (7700=Mayday) and the co-pilot's intercom, which was found in the emergency position, as if the normal system had failed. It is possible that a lack of intercom at a critical time was a factor, but this will never be known.

The last person to see the aircraft in flight was the yachtsman, who said that the aircraft was flying slowly enough for him to think it might be involved in a SAR, as if searching the surface of the sea. What none of us can understand is how the aircraft went from low speed in VMC to very high speed, in a climb, towards high ground, probably then in IMC. It makes absolutely NO sense for a crew to normally do this, normally speed is converted to height.

However, an engine runaway up would require the pilot's full attention and very rapid intervention. To contain the rotor RPM within structural limits, a great deal of collective pitch needs to be applied without a second's delay. This WOULD result in a rapid acceleration. A pilot's initial reaction would be to try to keep the aircraft in VMC, especially so in this case, without an icing clearance, but in marginal VMC conditions that could prove impossible.

I am NOT saying I believe this occurred, no-one ever has, but it is just as likely a scenario as any other supposition. It is known for FADEC problems to occur in flight (not only on this aircraft type) and subsequently leave no evidence once electrical power has been removed from the aircraft. I understand some engine runaways had already occurred on the MK2 and one aircraft in the USA had been severely damaged on the ground. It is now known that MOD were suing Boeing because the FADEC software was of dubious integrity. To complicate the issue, it had been written in an obsolescent programming language, which made changes extremely difficult. This latter fact was not revealed by MOD until well after the BOI (and well after the crew had been deemed Grossly Negligent).

K52,

My recollection is that during the HOL inquiry, Sqn Ldr Bob Burke, the RAF Odiham UTP, stated that he was detailed to bring the aircraft back to Odiham for maintenance because at that time no-one at Boscombe was prepared to fly the type again, even for 10 minutes to Odiham, until uncertainties about the engine software were resolved.

I have NO wish to re-convene the BOI. There is no need, in my opinion. That isn't why this thread is here.

The RAF's Board of Inquiry found that there was not sufficient evidence to determine the cause. The original findings (verdict) of the BOI, as convened by the RAF, consisted of Chinook pilots and other very experienced Support Helicopter pilots, were not accepted and overturned by two officers higher up the chain of command. Without firm evidence and without further investigation, the pilots were deemed to be Grossly Negligent.
This was against the RAF's normal procedure, as the officers concerned had perished in the accident and could not defend themselves against the allegation.

One of those two officers, when asked to explain his reason for disregarding the findings of the BOI, arrogantly retorted that the President of the BOI (who was a Wing Commander Chinook pilot of some 19 years service and well experienced in the NI theatre) was "a relatively inexperienced pilot and officer" or words to that effect. One can only wonder why he was promoted at all in that case (actually I know Wg Cdr Pulford of old, in no way could he be described as such, he was well respected and undoubtedly still is).

I have seen, read or heard nothing to change my original viewpoint that this crew, or any other, should not have been found guilty of manslaughter in the absence of actual EVIDENCE to prove it.

I remain convinced that this sorry affair was motivated by a political desire to divert attention away from the flawed decision to put this suspect type of aircraft into service BEFORE it was proved airworthy, as required by the normal RAF and MOD prodedure. Who made that decision has never been revealed.

Any amount of supposition, theorising or pontificating cannot compensate for lack of EVIDENCE. I think Brian Dixon will confirm that he placed the thread not so much to determine the cause but to fight against the unjust placing of the blame.

No apology offered for reiterating this yet again.

[kilo52]

S T

The BOI found that the forecast weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre.

When the aircraft was last seen in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre it was not being flown in accordance with IFR. The aircraft crashed at high speed whilst the crew attempted to fly VFR in unsuitable conditions which had been forecast.

It is difficult to conceive of any verdict other than that arrived at by the AOC.

[BEagle]

"When the aircraft was last seen in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre it was not being flown in accordance with IFR."

That might have been the opinion formed as a result of comments made by an inexpert witness. It is NOT sufficient proof for the verdict passed by Wratten and Day.

[ShyTorque]

"When the aircraft was last seen in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre it was not being flown in accordance with IFR".

By definition, if the aircraft could be seen, it would have been clear of cloud and in sight of the surface. That is all that is required for a helicopter, even by civilian rules. Military rules are even less stringent. RAF aircraft have been flown for years in similar weather conditions. I spent 3 years on my first tour in a theatre where a 100' cloudbase and 500m visibility was deemed acceptable for day VFR ops.

The aircraft was unsuitable for IFR. The crew knew this and so did the higher authority that mandated the flight to be flown in a MK2. The crew asked to use a MK1 that was IFR capable. They didn't get one.

I can only conclude that this was an accident caused by bad management, if ever there was one. Unfortunately that same management was allowed to protect itself by allocating ALL blame elswhere.

K52, You and I will never agree. You are prepared to accept that a crew should be found guilty of manslaughter despite the lack of conclusive evidence. I am not.

[Ben Leice]

ST,

Apparently there were two Chinooks based at Aldergrove on a staggered 6 week rotation. The ZD576 was the first Mk2 to be based in NI and it was flown in on May 31 two days before the crash. I've been told that the 1991-1994 tasking records were destroyed about three weeks before Christmas 2000 which funnily enough more or less coincides with my report of the Portrush Chinook on PPrune.

Mrs Bellchambers in a letter dated 19 September 2002 claimed that one of the two Mk1s based at Aldergrove was returned to RAF Odiham on May 31. She also reported that the remaining Mk1 was 'not in service on 2 June 1994'. The ZD576, a Mk2 with single-tone dark green camouflage, was definitely not the Chinook seen near Portrush. 'There were no Mk1 Chinooks (which have a "patchwork camouflage") or any other RAF Chinooks flying in Northern Ireland on 2 June'.

If the Portrush Chinook with its military camouflage wasn't an RAF Chinook who might it have belonged to? Why wasn't the remaining Mk1 at Aldergrove used?

[ShyTorque]

Ben,

I can't help you in respect of other aircraft that were flying at the time. If the official authorisation sheet records have been destroyed, then it will never be known unless a pilot with the record of the flight in his personal logbook comes forward.

I understand there were no serviceable Mk1s available at the time. I think this was declared in the evidence given to the HOL inquiry.

Shame the pax weren't just moved to a civvy flight, or any other with an IFR capability. The fact that it wasn't says something of the mentality of those ordering the flight. No "loss of face" allowed and all that.

I think it was Mr Day who stated that as far as he was concerned the gross negligence was committed before the flight took off. That is something I could agree with but at least some of the responsibility for what happened that sad day was almost certainly not the crew's.

Something that was never really examined is why the flight was allowed by the duty supervisor at Aldergrove, in view of the weather, limitations of the type and unserviceability of this aircraft.

The biggest mistake the crew made was taking off. They were put in an unenviable situation by severe management pressure but in my opinion they were just trying to get the job done, as ordered. That the senior management took a big step backwards when the flight safety chain broke while they were pulling at least one end, is appalling.

[Ben Leice]

ST,

Apart from some cloud on top of the Mull was the weather not quite reasonable? Near Portrush the sky was a little darker than usual following some heavy early afternoon rain but visiblity seemed quite good. The Chinook ZD576 should have been able to veer a few degrees to port as it approached the lighthouse and continue flying at the same height.

I was reminded of the Kintyre crash when I read www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=1999/3/1/223707] (http://www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=1999/3/1/223707) and this brief passage from the Guarino report:

"Velji Do, Croatia, 2:58 Pm.:

Everyone in this tiny collection of stone huts at the base of Sveti Ivan hears a plane go directly overhead in the clouds, then power its engines mightily for one instant.

Aboard the plane, the klaxon of its ground-proximity warning device suddenly blares, jolting Captain Davis. He immediately jerks the plane upward and to the left.

The two to three seconds of warning are far too little. The plane’s left wingtip touches ground, spinning it directly into the rocky hillside, making an earth-shaking explosion. There is the crackling hiss of a huge fireball as the plane and its large load of fuel burn. Then a dead silence in the mist."

[Brian Dixon]

Hi again everyone, and welcome back to Ben and K25. Hope you are keeping well.

A quick point on the Mk3 Chinook fiasco - Interesting that, yet again, the Government choose to have this information released to the public at the start of the Easter Recess, thereby avoiding further awkward questions on such a shamboic procurement.

Still, as John Cook was quoted as saying in a newspaper article, "At least we haven't had to do a body count this time to prove they were wrong."


Right, a date for your diaries: 2 June 2004. This will be the tenth anniversary of the accident. Memorial services are being held on the Mull of Kintyre, with a mirror service at a church in Hampshire (to allow John Cook to attend, as he is unable to get to the Mull). The services will be conducted at the same time, commencing 2.00PM. Interested parties wishing to pay their respects are invited to attend.

I must stress that the memorial services are to remember all 29 individuals who were lost, and for their families. They are not connected to the campaign. All campaign activities will be suspended for a 24 hour period as a mark of respect.

It would be useful to know, in advance, of numbers attending, so may I ask you please either e-mail me or PM me with numbers, stating your preferred location. Once the Hampshire Church details have been finalised, I will post full details here, along with a Multimap Link for directions.

As always, my regards.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[astazou]

K52 writes "I always understood that the Boscombe Pilots DID NOT refuse to fly the Chinook but that pre - planned maintenance was brought forward whilst awaiting further data to arrive to enable icing trials to be carried out."

This is not correct. Boscombe grounded the aircraft for safety reasons. A report had been prepared for the Commandant explaining why the flight trials should not continue. As I recollect, the premise was that further work would be unjustifiable (on safety grounds) until a solution had been found to the existing FADEC issues.

As it happens, the Mull accident happened between the date the report was completed (and the appointment with the Commandant was booked) and the meeting taking place.

Be in no doubt that all concerned realised the magnitude of the step they were taking in stopping the trials.

[kilo52]

astazou

Let me get this right.

Are you stating that A&AEE had decided to ground the Chinook Mk2 BUT THAT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BECAUSE THEY WERE UNABLE TO GET AN INTERVIEW WITH THE COMMANDANT?

[BEagle]

If that's true, it'll be the most ridiculous piece of administrative bungling since the Japanese translator was unable to type out the Pearl Harbour warning note in time for it to be delivered before the attack took place.

[kilo52]

BEagle

WORSE - because if ithe Chinook HC2 was supposed to be grounded before the crash then why was it not grounded AFTER the crash?

[BEagle]

Perhaps because to have done so would have obliged MoD to admit that there were critical safety of flight concerns over the Mk2 - and perhaps a case of corporate homicide would have been open to the realtives of the deceased.

I still hold the view that the appalling verdict of 'Gross Negligence' was brought to protect MoD from some very expensive claims being made against it for allowing passengers to be flown in an aircraft which Boscombe Down wouldn't even allow Test Pilots to fly....

[Brian Dixon]

Hi all.

I am now in a position to confirm that the memorial service in Hampshire will be at the church of St Mary the Virgin, Bagwell Lane, Winchfield, Hampshire. It will start at 2.00pm on 2 June 2004.

As I have stated in previous posts, this service is nothing whatsoever to do with the campaign. It is to remember all who were lost, as well as their families.

For directions to the church, click here (http://www.multimap.com/map/browse.cgi?lat=51.28&lon=-0.8974&scale=25000) It is shown, just below Court House.

If you have any other questions relating to the service, please don't hesitate to contact me.

Regards, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Tandemrotor]

kilo52

Perhaps I can help. You wrote:

"WORSE - because if the Chinook HC2 was supposed to be grounded before the crash then why was it not grounded AFTER the crash?"

I am familiar with all the flight crew that perished in the Chinook accidents of the 1980s, and 1990s. Your question reminds me of one that occured in the Falkland Islands in the mid '80s.

It was the first time the aircraft had flown since a deep service, when (amongst other things) the aft pylon had been removed, and refitted, with no supporting paperwork.

On a clear sunny day, in the cruise, the aircraft very gently nosed forward from 500'agl.

45 seconds later it crashed at high speed in a vertical dive.

Eyewitnesses saw no succesful attempt to correct the flight path, with the inescapable conclusion that the aircraft was uncontrollable. All (7, I believe) on board perished, in spite of one's effort to vacate the aircraft prior to impact.

The only transmision made, was the middle portion of the phrase **cking he**, from one of my fine colleagues.

The subsequent reaction of the RAF, to this 'one in a million' accident which HAD EYEWITNESSES!! Was this.

"We should really ground every Chinook, until we find out what caused this crash. However, there is so little of the aircraft still remaining, we have to accept we may NEVER know what caused it!"

We now enter 'La-La' logic.

Their worry was that, once this enormously important resource was grounded, how would they clear it to fly again, if the cause was never determined!

They incredibly arrogantly, calmed everyone's sensitivities by placing the Station Commander, the Squadron commander, and one or two other 'faces' on the next chinook to fly, and upon their successful return, proclaimed:

There you are boys, WE believe it's safe, and we've just proved it is, off you go!!

The subsequent, extremely protracted, investigation did indeed find no definite cause. Two plausible technical possibilities were advanced, neither of which could be proven. One of which had massive implications for the manufacturer, Mr Boeing.

10 years later, neither of these possibilities was excluded as being responsible for the tragedy on the Mull.

Imagine the fun Messrs Wratten, and Day could have had with the Falklands accident, had there been NO EYEWITNESSES!

As a footnote, this was one of the accidents whose subsequent recommendations was that CVRs, and FDRs be fitted to all Chinooks.

Ten years later, it seems to me, two fine men, and pilots, have paid an enormously heavy price for the continued absence of that equipment.

God bless them.

Think of them ALL on the 2nd June.

[kilo52]

Tandemrotor

As you are probably aware, it is the duty of the President of the BOI to issue a signal WITHIN 48 hours of an Accident giving the BOI's initial findings and any subsequent recommendation regarding airworthyness.

I happen to know (because I asked the question) that during my relatively short RAF career there were 764 "accidents" (including motorised gliders). If the RAF grounded the fleet every time an accident occurred the the RAF would never get airborne.

The finding of negligence in the Mull accident was because the Pilots were attempting to fly VFR in weather conditions that (in the words of the BOI) "required flght in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre".

Incidentally, I put "accidents" in inverted comma's because the definition has changed over the years.

[BEagle]

The finding of negligence in the Mull accident was because the Pilots were attempting to fly VFR in weather conditions that (in the words of the BOI) "required flght in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre".

Which was their opinion and cannot be proved beyond any doubt whatsoever.

It is an unjust finding and must be quashed. Is MoD guilty of corporate manslaughter in that they knowingly allowed passengers to fly in an aircraft which experienced TPs had stated was unsafe?

[kilo52]

BEagle

The quote was from the BOI's assessment of the Wx forecast; ie the planning for the flight SHOULD have been for "flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre". It was not; and was not so conducted. Moreover, the witness statements from those on the Mull at the time of the accident leave no doubt as to the unsuitability of the Wx for VFR flight. I would draw your attention to the statements from the hillwalkers who heard the impact, felt the heat of the fireball and were enveloped in smoke but saw nothing until they stumbled into the wreckage some 100 metres later.

It was not the C in C or AOC who processed the aircraft into Service. That was the Controller of Aircraft, after the Chinook had been assessed by A&AEE. The release to service use of an aircraft type is his responsibility unless that aircraft is one that has been adopted without modification from the Civil Register.

I find it difficult to believe that A&AEE were aware of a significant safety problem with the Chinook Mk2 but that no action was taken because the Commandant was unavailable. IF, however. that was the case then that lets the AOC and CinC "off the hook" because they were utilising an asset that had been cleared by A&AEE without any knowledge of a potential problem.

[walter kennedy]

That mist was forming as the prevailing air current rose up the Mull and therefore was localised - common conditions there - a short way out to sea conditions were fine for VFR - they just needed to judge their distance off the Mull.
This was a regular flight plan - a milk run - there's no way such conditions would have mandated IMC in the vicinity of the Mull spoiling so many such flights.
It boils down to how they were judging - or measuring - their distance off before their planned close in turn.
All the conjecture about possible mechanical/control problems (that leave no trace) is puzzling to me - the a/c needed to have been pushing along at its high cruise speed in a normal attitude without disturbance to have got to where it did when the final evasive manouvre was executed - at which point it seemed to have been very controlable.
The Americans were so close by that they were lucky not to have been hit by pieces of wreckage ... do any of them have any comments?

[astazou]

In response to my note about a planned meeting with the commandant of A&AEE, K52 wrote "Are you stating that A&AEE had decided to ground the Chinook Mk2 BUT THAT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BECAUSE THEY WERE UNABLE TO GET AN INTERVIEW WITH THE COMMANDANT?"

The answer is easy "No, I am not saying that !!" I did not say that NO action was taken and I did not say that no interview was granted.

A meeting had been arranged with the commandant but the accident happened before the interview. It is not unusual to have to suspend a trial. In this case it was clear to all concerned that not only were the safety issues very significant but also that this was a very politically charged decision; and that was BEFORE the accident! With hindsight, we might think an immediate meeting should have been granted. However, it was not unreasonable that an appointment had been made a few days ahead and time was needed to marshal the facts for such an important meeting.

That the RAF should have been continuing to fly the aircraft (not only on training but also, latterly, operationally) when not only A&AEE but their own people were expressing concern is THE ISSUE. The expressions of concern made by A&AEE to the RAF about the FADEC modification went back to 1989 (sic). This was no new issue. The meeting with the commandant was more about preparing him for the inevitable flak from MoD about stopping the trials. I don't think anyone thought that the RAF would change its decision to plough on regardless with using the aircraft.

Don't overestimate the power of A&AEE to restrict the services in using imperfect equipment. Whether A&AEE's "recommendations" are followed is, in the end, up to the Services. In those days, there was a document called a Service Deviation [probably still is]; a very useful way of over-riding or ignoring a restriction or recomemendation made by A&AEE. The most obvious risk of using a SD is to the career of the senior officer who signs it ! How sensitive would you feel if an aircraft you were operating on a Service Deviation crashed in apparently inexplicable circumstances ?

[kilo52]

W K

The BOI based their statement on the same weather forecast that the crew had. This view was upheld at HQ 1 Gp, STC and MOD by highly experienced helicopter aircrew. Irrespective of the actual conditions (which would not be apparent until they approached the Mull) the forecast required that the flight be planned to fly in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull.

astazou

Surely the facts should have been marshalled before the decision was taken to request a suspension of the trial?

[walter kennedy]

K52
They were in control at waypoint A which was, I suggest, already too close in to climb to IMC height and therefore it is evident that they were going to stay low and turn up the coast VFR in the all-too-common conditions.
So the question still stands - what was the practice in this situation? ie the Mk1 eyeball or TACAN. Or was it always just left up to the crews? - I rather think that this situation was too common on this route for this to have been the case.
Anyone reading this thread or the transcripts of the inquiries would probably think that this particular crew was doing its own thing on some special route in unusual conditions - why the fear of discussing what was the usual practice? Why was this not the starting point for the inquiries?

[Tandemrotor]

kilo 52

The BOI stated quite clearly, that due to the lack of evidence, the captain of the aircraft SHOULD not be criticised, and the co-pilot COULD not be criticised, as it was;

impossible to recreate the sequence of events leading up to the accident.

The President of the BOI, was a highly experienced SH (Support Helicopter) pilot, with very extensive Chinook experience. Certainly the most relevant flying experience of any officer involved in the entire BOI!

How can it be that he came to completely the opposite conclusion to you?

Unsurprisingly EVERY SINGLE SUBSEQUENT INQUIRY, has totally endorsed his line of thinking, and discredited yours.

Why do you think that is?

[Arkroyal]

the forecast required that the flight be planned to fly in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull.
Nice idea K52 but impossible due to the lack of icing clearance for the Mk 2 Chinook.

Instead, the crew were faced with a 'VFR or nothing' transit. Lack of a decent forecast never prevented SH crews form quite legally having a go. Provided that VMC was maintained, then there is nothing wrong with that. If the SH force was grounded by every poor forecast then they would rarely fly. It was only a forecast after all.

That transit, Walter, would require that the crew flew in accordance with VFR, in VMC and no other than visual contact would be legal for use in terrain avoidance, so the DME is not relevant.

What subsequently caused the crash would have to be proven beyond any doubt whatsoever in order to find the pilots guilty of gross negligence.

The fact that that has not been done is why we are still here ten years on fighting for justice.

I'll be away on 2nd June, but my thoughts will be with those who perished on that day, as they were this morning, when leaving BFS with the Mull in sight.

[walter kennedy]

Ark Royal
Thank you for your posting of 4th May – it was refreshingly clear on the options that the pilots had; unless I am mistaken, you are affirming that the turn up the coast at low level was their intention as planning for IMC was not on.
On the issue of the use of navaids in VFR, however, I would like to restate my hypothesis:
I have been involved in many sea trials in the NW of Scotland over many years and am very familiar with typical weather conditions; further, I have done much precise coastal navigation off the SE of the Isle of Wight (running wreck diving trips) and on many occasions the prevailing wind formed localized mist as it rose over the landmass; on one such occasion I was coming into our most popular site which I fixed visually with transits; I could see the shoreline clearly and was not using Decca or radar to get to the approximate position to wait for the mist to clear for the transits; however I could not see familiar features that were higher up from the shoreline and when the mist momentarily cleared I was surprised at how (dangerously for the boat) close in I had got; subsequently, in those conditions I moved in using Decca and not the Mk1 eyeball – and that is with the shoreline clearly visible at a very familiar location.
ZD576 was coming in very fast and was heavy;
If, say for operational reasons, it was desired to turn as close as possible to the land – just clear above the ground hugging mist (as a helicopter actually did while I was talking to the lighthouse keeper in identical weather conditions) – it must have been awfully tempting to use the TACAN for a convenient countdown (distance wise) to the starting point for the turn; they would have been approaching in clear air with the land mass clearly visible (and its shoreline) but with detail and features obscured by the ground hugging mist; you would not be comfortable heading towards that coast too closely in a boat at 20 kts never mind 150+; ZD576s TACAN CU was set accordingly.
I believe that I have put my view in an earlier posting that for strictly VFR waypoint A was already rather too close in (fixed by TANS) in those conditions and that it would have been risky to approach closer at their speed unless they were using something else. Don’t forget that they had bothered to change the TANS waypoint just before “A” – not something that would have concerned them if they had not been in control at that point. Further, this crew in particular had misgivings about the accuracy of the TANS – they would not have relied upon it alone to get as close as waypoint A in those conditions – either they got there and beyond visually or they were using the TACAN.
What is needed is for some pilots who regularly did this run to come forward – if none read this thread, then someone who does could perhaps contact them.

[FJJP]

Look, we're missing an essential point here. Forget all the fancy [or primitive] nav gear and nav techniques. I know exactly what the crew were going to do - I've done it many times myself. The plan was to conduct a VFR transit. You use the nav kit to take the hassle out of navigation, timings, etc, but you use the Mk 1 eyeball to make the decisions. The Mull was shrouded in mist - big deal, been there, done that, dozens of times [specifically the Mull - V-Force, flying low level up the West Coast or through the middle] - but I've continued up the coast using the eyeball to avoid hitting the ground. It's called low flying techniques. It doesn't matter that 500 feet above you there is a solid layer of cloud. If, subsequently, the weather threatens to close in on you, you make the decision to either re-route via an area of better weather [spotted by the Mk1 eyeball], or you climb to safety altitude.

We DON'T KNOW why the crew didn't do what they must have done a squillion times - SOMETHING WENT WRONG THAT PREVENTED THEM FROM STOPPING THE AIRCRAFT HITTING THE GROUND.

Sorry to shout, but I am getting increasingly frustrated by people muddying the waters and forgetting the fundimental principle - the first person to die in a crash is the pilot, and self preservation is the strongest instinct for survival. No one will ever convince me that this flight deck had any control over events that led to the crash.

[Tandemrotor]

FJJP

Well said. I think you have a better understanding of military low level operations than a number of people involved in this issue!

10 (TEN!) years.

God bless them.

[BEagle]

FJJP - absolutely correct.

A shame that neither Wratten nor Day can understand such a blindingly obvious summary. Or perhaps they find it convenient not to?

[Arkroyal]

FJJP

Well put, and shouting excused.

Do you get it now, Walter. The low flying is and must be entirely Mk 1 eyeball. Waypoints plugged in to TANS are just for convenience, there is no requirement ir even INTENTION to actually overfly them. (TACAN is never a primary aid at low level, it just isn't reliable enough around hills, but you'd probably put in a local freq as a back up).

I'd have planned exactly the same trip, and turned up the coast. Why they didn't WILL NEVER BE KNOWN.

If the BoI had been reviewed by officers with some understanding of SH flying we wouldn't be here now ten years on trying to knock some sense into some very thick heads. They'd have agreed with their President.

[walter kennedy]

FJJP
Thank you for your confirmation of the common met conditions.
With all due respect to your experience in flying VFR in the region, this flight was not just recognising and giving a wide berth to the Mull – it was going in very, very close and turning up practically on the coastline. Given that their approach was very much “end on” to the Mull, there were no other features on either side to aid perception – just that amorphous grey lump ahead.
My point is that to military helicopters on that route, this would have been an all too common situation.
If there was an operational situation (eg carrying the security team that was such a potential target) whereby it was preferable to mask ones approach to the mainland by approaching directly the high ground (at low level) and turning in close hugging the ground, as it were, then you may want to consider ways of achieving this safely as, in my humble opinion, it would be very difficult to judge the starting point of such a turn which would have taken some significant room given their high speed and weight. Judging purely visually may result in a turn too soon to achieve the objective of getting in close – or too late which would have catastrophic consequences (it would have been too late once the coast was crossed or the mist was entered to do anything other than what was in fact done – an up and left evasive manoeuvre which has always suggested control at this final point). This latter point, to me, suggests that endless discussions about (unprovable) control problems has been “muddying the waters” – at least until the details of the flight plan have been clarified and this surely has improved through recent contributions from several ppruners, wouldn’t you all agree?
If you are really frustrated by people discussing this aspect, may I respectfully suggest that you can constructively close it off by assisting with bringing this line of inquiry to closure by using any contacts you may have to get input from military helicopter pilots who have done THIS flight?

[FJJP]

Walter, sorry, you missed the fundimental point I was making - MK1 EYEBALL is the be-all and end-all of low flying. Don't even think of introducing ground terrorist threats as a consideration of route. It just is not a factor. Emotive words like hugging the coast = terrain masking, which would be appropriate if there was a high threat. There is just no case to believe that there were any bad guys sitting around the Mull on the off-chance of having a go at a passing helio. My low flying experience in the UK, European and N American environment is extensive, spread over 38 years.

As for the 'perception' case, there is a thing called situational awareness. You don't reveal you experience in your profile, therefore it is difficult to judge whether or not you have the experience of flying in marginal conditions - believe me when I tell you that the senses sharpen up very rapidly and there is a high 'pucker' factor. That crew would have been well aware of their proximity to the hard place. Apart from everything else, they would have been well aware of the local geography, and would have had a mental picture of the shape and position of the Mull relative to the aircraft.

Also, forget any arguments about turning circles, speeds, performance et al; I used to fly round the Mull at 300 KIAS. OK, I'm used to flying at that speed and know what the performance of the aircraft is at that speed. Flying a Chipmunk at 90 KIAS frightens me f*artless, because I can stand it on its wingtip at 50 feet and do half a dozen tight turns in 30 secs. Each pilot knows his aircraft and its capabilities.

Oh, and by the way, my son is a Chinook pilot. 'Nuff said?

[KENNYR]

FJJP.........way to go fella!! With you 200% on this. Navigation aids are useless at low altitude.....MK1 eyeball is the only way to go. I got caught during an Ireland tour in Gazelles where I had to climb to safety altitude and shout "help". I agree with you more experienced chaps that we will never know why the skipper didnt make different choices, if indeed he was able to make a decision or the decision had been made for him.

I am an ex QHI Gazelle/Scout.

[Chocks Wahay]

This latter point, to me, suggests that endless discussions about (unprovable) control problems has been “muddying the waters”
Quite the opposite, it is in fact the crux of the matter. I was in the House of Lords, sat next to Brian Dixon in fact, when Tony Cable of the AAIB said this:

"Where there is no fault found that does not mean that there was not a fault present. In this case I found it probable that on the engineering side as far as I could see there was not a fault highly relevant to the accident, but I certainly could not dismiss that possibility"

In the absence of qualified witnesses, flight data recorder information or other hard information, and where there are other possible explanations with equal credibility to the obvious one of "pilot error", surely it is unfair and unjust to place the blame on deceased aircrew?

All the other debates about what others did and what the crew of ZD576 might have done, about possible radio calls and navaids, simulations and speculations are irrelevant. Jon and Rick have been dead nearly ten years, surely they and their families deserve justice by now.

[walter kennedy]

FJJP
Thank you for your detailed response which I believe deserves a considered reply.
Firstly, if you son is a Chinook pilot then this may make it easier for you to help with that last point I made in my last posting – “…to get input from military helicopter pilots who have done THIS flight.”

With regard to that fundamental point of the Mk1 eyeball, I have tried to convey my concerns that in a common situation on a regular flight path there may have been some special arrangement to ease the pilots’ workload and reduce the risk inherent in a purely visual approach in these circumstances – whilst I recognise that reliance on the eye only was “legal” and that dependence upon a radio navaid would not be. I would have thought that you have enough flying experience to agree with me that judging ones distance of, say, an isolated cloud is an exercise that may convince you of the problem of approaching the Mull visually at their speed in those circumstances.
On that tragic day, the crew had passed a point already rather too close for visual under the prevailing conditions having had the time to change their route navigation waypoint – which would rather suggest that they were in control at that point.
Between that point and just before impact, work by a Mr Mitchel of the Boeing company suggests that the a/c had no time to have deviated significantly from its path to have got where it got to (ie. No dramatic turns, slowing, climbs/dives, etc) which suggests that they were basically just carrying on – although others would have it that there was an a/c malfunction that did either of the following:
1. rendered the a/c uncontrollable somehow (whilst leaving it stable and leaving no trace and no call to this effect from the pilots in the 10+secs they had – although this last point seems to have been covered by the lack of recording of the last communication from the ground to the air);
2. sufficiently distracted the pilots that they did not do anything but carry on towards the high ground (your words are so relevant here “…situational awareness... believe me when I tell you that the senses sharpen up very rapidly and there is a high 'pucker' factor. That crew would have been well aware of their proximity to the hard place.”) – in all those arguments about the FADEC etc would there have been no control available to them to avoid that worst case of carrying straight on? – think about it.

Just before impact, the attitude of the a/c and the control positions were entirely consistent with their having SEEN just how close that they had got (eg the shoreline passing underneath or mist flitting past the screen, perhaps) and reacted with an evasive manoeuvre (they very nearly made it, too) – suggesting that they had control at this point too. The hypothesis that a control malfunction occurred for just such a short time at such a critical point, without throwing the a/c off its trajectory or axis in any significant way, and then cleared itself is not credible.
Something had misled them to get so close.

I suppose a brief summary of why I am pushing the nav issue is in order:
Upon hearing of the crash, I immediately suspected sabotage because of who was on board and their plans for a new “offensive” against terrorism in NI. While expecting all possible types of sabotage to be thoroughly investigated by the authorities, I merely wanted to bring their attention to the possibility of the tampering with ground equipment (of the system that I thought would have been used) so that such equipment could have been investigated before evidence was disturbed, say, before a maintenance visit).

I am satisfied by the FAI alone that there was a no evidence of explosion or impact from another object, etc and so the more usual types of sabotage I accept probably did not happen.
The question of navigation, however, seems to have been avoided like the plague in the inquiries – even the actual intended route was not made clear – rather hidden by obfuscation – coming out only in incidental snippets by witnesses and subsequent discussions.
I would like the nav issue to be brought to closure one way or the other – for me this would require a statement from the flight responsible for ferrying such personnel on this route to the effect that the practice in closing with the Mull was:
Purely up to the pilots as per VFR;
Used such and such a navaid in these special circumstances;
Other
And that would do it for me – it is the continued avoidance of this issue that perplexes me – perhaps some of you reading this thread have the connections to apply pressure to achieve this?

As regards you comment “Don't even think of introducing ground terrorist threats as a consideration of route. It just is not a factor. Emotive words like hugging the coast = terrain masking, which would be appropriate if there was a high threat. There is just no case to believe that there were any bad guys sitting around the Mull on the off-chance of having a go at a passing helio (sic)..” well, I rather think that is naïve and the threat would have been more organised but the motive and who may have done it is a big issue in its own right and inappropriate for this thread –although I am happy to send by private message if you are interested.
All that I hope to achieve in this thread is to get experienced people to see this perspective and help bring this line of enquiry to closure – and not just shoot down the arguments with generalisations and simplistic arguments about rules.
Let me make this very clear – I believe that these pilots were NOT to blame and that their names must be cleared; but it should be by way of getting to the full picture of what happened – and not by petty legal arguments.
Every possibility of sabotage should have been thoroughly considered in view of who was on board and this one line of thought I have endeavoured to express here is one that could be cleared up from constructive input by military aircrew visiting this site.

[FJJP]

Walter K - You make a number of points and make a number of assumptions that I will address. I do not intend to get drawn into any discussion concerning terrorism, sabotage or intelligence - I think that those subjects are inappropriate for an open forum, and believe that they are not involved.

It is for my son or any other Chinook pilot to decide for themselves whether or not to input opinion to this forum. I discuss it with him occasionally, but the decicision to post is entirely his - I would not presume to influence him one way or the other.

You appear to have the belief that regular flight paths are established and havespecial arrangements to ease pilot workload and reduce the risk inherent in a purely visual approach in these circumstances – whilst I recognise that reliance on the eye only was “legal” and that dependence upon a radio navaid would not be
I am at a loss to understand the significance of this statement. It matters not that you have flown a particular route a hundred times - the same rules of airmanship [and self preservation] applies each time. There are no 'special arrangements to ease pilot workload'. Workload is not reduced by familiarity with a particular route. The ac still has to be flown, with checks to be done, navigation to be carried out [whether visual or electronic] and the ac systems to be tended. Legality is a smokescreen. Weatherwise, you can be legal as hell and still crash the ac through mishandling of the ac or its systems. VFR outside CAS, there is no 'legal'requirement whatsoever to become involved with radio aids.

I know of no pilot who would approach a rock filled cloud without due caution - they would not be trying to judge ANY distance from cloud visually. They knew where they were, could see that the Mull was cloud covered and would have adjusted their intentions accordingly, say, by turning early. Except the ac didn't turn.

Another fact of which you are probably not aware [and have no reason to be] is that the typical time from the onset of an unusual ac malfunction to the pilot physically reacting to it can be as long as 10 SECONDS. This came from an AAIB psychologist who helped me with an unrelated Board of Inquiry. It goes like this - first the pilot has to become aware that there is a problem. Then he has to figure out what the problem is. Then he has to work out what is causing the problem and then react by doing something with the ac and/or ac systems to recify or amelierate the effects of the problem. This is where flight sims come into their own. By repeatedly practicing emergencies and failures, pilot reaction becomes almost instinctive, shaving valuable seconds off the recognition/decision-making process; seconds saved = lives saved.

And knowing roughly where they were, just how likely do you think it is that a highly experienced crew continued on a straight line to make contact with land? I don't think so. [More especially since CRM was in the forefront of the flight safety world at the time]. Furthermore, a crew typically prioritises their attention to tasks according to the prevailing circumstances. A million miles visibility and not an aircraft within a hundred miles = crew chatting about the local barmaid. Marginal visibility with rock-filled clouds about = crew take a special interest in navigation and a plan of action to avoid IMC. Mr Boeing stated the blindingly obvious - OF COURSE THEY JUST CARRIED STRAIGHT ON - how the hell else would they have hit the ground. I note that he did not offer any alternative explanation as to why, other than to suggest the the crew had thumbs up b*ms and mind in neutral. But then, Boeing are unlikely to commit commercial and financial suicide by admitting that there is a possible problem with one of their products.

You hit the nail on the head with:

- in all those arguments about the FADEC etc would there have been no control available to them to avoid that worst case of carrying straight on? – think about it.

That's the whole point in nearly 1000 posts on the THIRD forum devoted to the subject.

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PILOTS HAD NO CONTROL OVER THE AIRCRAFT FOR A CRITICAL PERIOD AS THEY APPROACHED THE MULL OF KINTYRE.

And you state that it is just not credible that control of the aircraft could have been frozen at a critical time. Oh really? Have you ever had a rudder freeze on you at high level, where you had to fly below the zero degree isotherm to allow the ice to thaw out? - I have. Have you ever had the situation where the autopilot would not disengage on the instinctive cutout? - I have. Have you ever experienced an ac major system failure not covered by the checklists? - I have. So if I agree with you it is statistically exceptionally unlikely that there was a loss of control of the ac at a critical time - can you guarantee that that 'exceptionally unlikely' = 100%? I suggest not.

So, we're finally back where the thread started:

NOBODY CAN GUARANTEE 100% THAT THE CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT WAS PILOT ERROR.

QED - the findings of those 2 fine, upstanding Air Ranking Officers was flawed, and the findings should be quashed. But then, having experienced both of these men, hell will freeze over before their arrogance allows them to admit they were wrong.

[Arkroyal]

FJJP:

Brilliant post.

If only our two Air ranking friends had such clarity of thought.

Walter. Listen to FJJP. There was no thought in the crew's minds of terrorist threat. Just none.

They would NEVER rely on electronic aids to fly without sight of the ground or water. If they had, then they would have indeed been negligent.

I too heard Tony Cable's words in the HoL. Their Lordships heard them and took note.

Every enquiry into the verdict since this tragedy has found against it.

[kilo52]

Arkroyal

The BOI specifically state " The icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow." You obviously know something that the Chinook qualified Aircrew and Engineer on the BOI were not aware of?

Walter Kennedy

How do you justify the assertion that this was a "milk run"? If that was the case then there would have been a standard Flight Plan. What the BOI were presented with was a photocopy of a map prepared by the Captain of the 2nd crew who had planned the trip on the assumption that crew duty considerations would require the utilisation of both Detatchment crews to complete the days tasking.
-------------------
The BOI concluded that the crew "selected an inappropriate rate of Climb to safely overfly the Mull" Later in their deliberations they concluded that Flt Lt Tapper " made an error of judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull"

In my own opinion (and one that is emphasised throughout the entire RAF); if you find yourself IMC at low level there is only one option - which is a max rate climb on a safe heading to Safety Altitude. Continuing to fly towards the Mull would not be my idea of "a safe heading"

The BOI further concluded that it was likely that the Captain "made an error of judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull"

OC RAF Odiham stated that " the root cause of this accident was that the crew, while operating in poor weather and close to high ground, flew the aircraft into the ground."

It was the AOC who grasped the nettle and stated-
" This sortie was planned to be a low level daytime passenger carrying transit flight flown clear of cloud under Visual Flight Rules. Yet when the aircraft crashed it was flying at high speed, well below safety height in cloud in direct contravention of the rules for flight under VFR or IFR."

Now just read those last three paragraphs again.

[Fat, Dumb & Happy]

K52 - I'm no-one here would disagree that in the event of inadvertant entry to IMC then a climb to safety alt as you describe is the only option. Indeed, some of the evidence (notably relating to engine speed) indicates that this might be exactly what the crew of ZD576 were trying to do. Can you prove otherwise?

As to your other points:
The BOI further concluded that it was likely that the Captain "made an error of judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull" The key word here is likely. Again few would dismiss this as a possibility, but where's the evidence?
OC RAF Odiham stated that " the root cause of this accident was that the crew, while operating in poor weather and close to high ground, flew the aircraft into the ground." OC RAF Odiham was no more in the cockpit that day than you or I, so how on earth can he know for sure?
" This sortie was planned to be a low level daytime passenger carrying transit flight flown clear of cloud under Visual Flight Rules. Yet when the aircraft crashed it was flying at high speed, well below safety height in cloud in direct contravention of the rules for flight under VFR or IFR."
These are the facts, however there's nothing in that sentence (or the evidence) that proves conclusively, beyond doubt, that the crew were the only cause of the crash.

I say again - there is no evidence to support the conclusion of negligence.

[kilo52]

F D &H

AAIIB could not find any reason for the aircraft flying into the Mull based on the evidence they accumulated from the wreckage site. The evidence from eye witnesses before the crash gave no indication of any problem. There was no Distress call or any indication of any attempt to indicate Distress made by the crew. No distress call was received despite world wide satellite coverage of the international distress frequency

What you are postulating is a massive control failure for which there is no evidence whatsoever. Unless you wish to include AAIB in your conspiracy?

[walter kennedy]

Ark Royal
“There was no thought in the crew's minds of terrorist threat. Just none.”
Well, after what happened to Airey Neave (very much of the same attitude as that team) someone should have considered a threat from our “friends” – you know, the ones who when challenged about being on the crash site before our services said that they were “…looking for our stuff”. But I agree with FJJP on this, as he says:
“I do not intend to get drawn into any discussion concerning terrorism, sabotage or intelligence - I think that those subjects are inappropriate for an open forum”
– I agree that this thread should be kept to what happened to the flight – but that causes of the crash that could only result from sabotage should not be dismissed off hand – we need to establish what happened and this can lead to other debate elsewhere. For me, the real investigation into what went on only starts with the determination of what happened to the Chinook.

“They would NEVER rely on electronic aids to fly without sight of the ground or water. If they had, then they would have indeed been negligent.”
But they were flying in clear air with the sea and the Mull visible – it was how they were judging the distance off the Mull before starting their turn that I wish to get clarified.

kilo52
“How do you justify the assertion that this was a "milk run"? If that were the case then there would have been a standard Flight Plan. What the BOI were presented with was a photocopy of a map prepared by the Captain of the 2nd crew who had planned the trip on the assumption that crew duty considerations would require the utilisation of both Detatchment crews to complete the days tasking.”
Certainly, I believe that the approach to the Mull and the close in turn to run up the coast was part of a regular flight plan and it is the details for this portion of such a regular flight plan that would be of great interest to many of us. What did the 2nd crew’s map show? – a low level turn up the coast or a climb over? I have said before that at the point that they had changed the waypoint in the TANS – which suggests that they were in control and under no duress at that point – they were already rather too close to make a smooth climb over without perturbing their cruise speed and so I believe that it was their intention to turn up the coast (a common practice). The arguments that they had selected an inappropriate rate of climb etc because they had found themselves in poor visibility are odd – the mist was very close to the ground, forming as the air rose over the Mull (localised on the hazard), and so it would have been too late by then – turning too late was the problem, as I see it.
I recall the question of crew duty hours at the FAI – the OC of Aldergrove (if I recall correctly) stated that they would have been over the ten (?) hours allowed for the NI theatre if going all the way to Ft George and stated that no request for extension was asked. However, they would have been within their hours to get to, say, Macrihanish. I do not know if a short break of a couple of hours would have allowed a continuation later. This, together with the golf equipment, rather suggests that they were going up the coast – I have heard that stopovers on that golf course had been done before.

FJJP
“It is for my son or any other Chinook pilot to decide for themselves whether or not to input opinion to this forum. I discuss it with him occasionally, but the decicision to post is entirely his - I would not presume to influence him one way or the other.” Well, I just suggested that you (or anyone else who had contacts with relevantly experienced aircrew) in effect directed your energies outward to help bring this issue to closure as opposed to getting frustrated arguing here with what limited information we have as I recall that you expressed frustration with this debate.
“Mr Boeing stated the blindingly obvious - OF COURSE THEY JUST CARRIED STRAIGHT ON - …… But then, Boeing are unlikely to commit commercial and financial suicide by admitting that there is a possible problem with one of their products.”
I anticipated this perfectly rational reaction to the quoting of any conclusions by Boeing – but I referred to the analysis by a Mr Mitchel of the Boeing company who in great detail works out the dynamics of the flight from the available data – I highly recommend all interested in this debate to download it – it is also the only written reference that I have come across which raises the question of the TACAN CU being set for ch107 (and this document only came out in 2002, as I recall).
If you have sufficient time and motivation you can follow the calculations through yourself – I found them to be quite reasonable.
The point that I was drawing from this Boeing work is that the a/c had not had time to deviate from its path significantly – it was already at the top end of its cruise speed and would not have been able to get to where it did if it had deviated as there was no reserve of speed to recover to the path on time.
And those comments about control problems (eg “ …rudder freeze”) etc….
It is surely the case that an inherently unstable beast like a helicopter is exercising its controls continuously even to maintain its straight and level flight? – I do not know if an autopilot was involved, though.
All I ask is that we all put or efforts into closing off one aspect that we CAN close off – and that is what was the flight plan and what was the practice for safely executing that close in turn to the Mull in those prevailing conditions.

[kilo52]

walter kennedy

The question of crew duty time is, I believe, central to the issue. A "stopover" for a rest would not have solved the problem - it would have exacerbated it. Crew Duty time accummulates from the moment the crew assembles for the Task. It can be extended under clearly defined rules and one extension had already been requested and approved for this task.

What we have is the Captain of this aircraft facing a one sided interview with his Station Commander for breaking the strict rules on Crew Duty and/or nightstopping outside Theatre without the approval of HQ NI. His only option was to complete the task in the least possible time.

[psyclic]

He would have had an even more one-sided interview if he had declined the task.

[kilo52]

psyclic

A valid point

The crew duty problem was, however, of his own making. Utilising both crews on that day would have obviated the crew duty problem and enabled the crew who were to perform the task to monitor the weather and adjust their flight plan if necessary.

[Fat, Dumb & Happy]

K52 - You appear to think that the AAIB ruled out technical issues, however this is emphatically not the case. Please read again the following quotation from the AAIB:
"Where there is no fault found that does not mean that there was not a fault present. In this case I found it probable that on the engineering side as far as I could see there was not a fault highly relevant to the accident, but I certainly could not dismiss that possibility"
As to your second point, regarding a conspiracy, I am at a loss - what conspiracy?

[psyclic]

K52; how would the other crew have adjusted the flight plan?

[Brian Dixon]

Hi everyone,
I have to admit to not seeing this, but it was sent to me by Mike Tapper. Article written by James Goffin from The Sun, dated 5 May.

Squadron Banned from Memorial

The Ministry of Defence was last night accused of being "vindicative and disgraceful" in banning an RAF squadron from attending a memorial service for four colleagues killed in action.

Four RAF crew and 25 anti-terrorism experts died in June 1994 when their Chinook helicopter crashed on the Mull of Kintyre.

Families and friends are holding a memorial service to mark the 10th anniversary of the tragedy, but Mike Tapper, whose son Flight Lt Jonathan Tapper was one of the two pilots killed in the crash, says his son's colleagues have been banned from attending the service.

"I have had calls from RAF Odiham, where Jonathan's colleagues are based, and they have been told that no one from No 7 Squadron will be attending the service," said Mr Tapper, who lives at Burnham Market.

"It is a basic tenet of the armed services that they honour their dead. I think it is part of the culture of the MoD under this Secretary of State that things like this happen. It is very upsetting for us and for Jonathan's colleagues."

The circumstances surrounding the crash have been contentious since a 1995 RAF board of inquiry ignored its own initial findings and found Flight Lt Tapper and co-pilot Flight Lt Rick Cook guilty of gross negligence.

A subsequent civil inquiry by Paisley Sheriff Sir Stephen Young and three parliamentary inquiries have all called for that verdict to be overturned, but the Government has refused to budge.

Mr Tapper said: "The MoD claims the memorial service is being used as a campaigning tool, but it is about remembering the 29 people that died.

"It seems that an unworthy coalition of middle-ranking officials has made a knee-jerk reaction."

Last night, former Conservative defence minister James Arbuthnot called on the MoD to explain its actions.

"I was minister at the time of the board of inquiry and defended the report in the House of Commons, but I now feel I have no choice but to speak out against it. Every piece of evidence has shown that it is wrong," he said.

"If it is true that the squadron is not being allowed to go, it is an extremely shameful thing to do. That they may not even be able to remember their friends that were killed in the service of their country is vindictive and disgraceful. These were two pilots at the top of their game."

A spokeswoman for the MoD last night said plans for the memorial service had yet to be confirmed, but would not deny that service personnel at RAF Odiham had been told they could not attend.

"I do not want to get into what has or hasn't been said. We have been told that the details have not yet been finalised, and it is something being run by the families rather than a military affair," she said. "If the squadron wanted to go and all the relatives are OK with that, we would not object."

A private ceremony will be conducted at Odiham on June 2 by the base padre for service personnel.
End

I would certainly hope that individuals are given the freedom of choice over such a sensitive issue. May I point out, again, that these memorials are nothing to do with the campaign. We may be organising a few of them, but we have enough compassion and dignity to separate the two issues. I find it deeply offensive that the MoD try to score such cheap points over this issue.

Anyone with an interest is welcome to attend - irrespective of your opinion of what happened. Let us just meet, to pay our respects to 29 individuals who made the ultimate sacrifice for their country.

My best to you all, as always.
Brian

(No usual quote - to try to prove a point to the MoD)

[polyglory]

Brian,

I have to say I am disgusted with that decision by MOD.

One wonders if they are on the same Planet as the rest of us mere mortals.

Lest We Forget

[FJJP]

Walter K.

Sabotage has not conclusively been proved or otherwise. However, I am prepared to accept that as a possibility. It would only go to prove that pilot error was not the case.

Judging the distance from the Mull would have been with the Mk 1 eyeball - 3 pairs, actually. Experience born out of years of visual low flying, coupled with an awareness of the size and shape of the Mull, would have allowed the crew to judge fairly accurately the distance involved [something to do with visual spacial perception, or something like that].

Standard Flight Plan. I would suggest that Ft George as a regular venue for this kind of meeting would be unlikely. Rather, in the interests of security, the venue for regular meetings would have been varied to prevent a pattern developing. In any event, the VFR route would have been dictated by the prevailing weather conditions in the Highlands - unlikely that there would have been a 'standard route'.

As with most inertial nav systems, the pilot has the option at any time of selecting the next waypoint early, often in airliners used to cut corners as air traffic allows. Therefore, it is highly likely that seeing a slight deterioration in weather ahead, the flying pilot could have selected the next waypoint after the Mull to cut the corner and avoid the deterioration, at the same time maintaining visual with the coast, albeit slightly further out initially. Having safely turned to parallel the coast, they could then ease in closer. That's certainly what I would have done, as I suspect most of us who fly low level would have done.

Golf stopovers unlikely. More probably carrying their clubs in case they got stuck due weather or unserviceability at Ft George.

Re Boeing reference to TACAN.. This is entirely irrelevant and a grade one red herring. The Mull would have been between the ac and Machrihanish and therefore not locked on either in range or azimuth. It is likely that it was selected as belts and braces for when they were further up the coast and came into line of sight (for possible nav kit update?).

Flight plan would have been straight lines drawn between turning points, along which the ac would have been flown - approximately. The flying would have been done visually, with the TANS steers available instantly should IMC be encountered. The TANS route and data would be used for timing and speed maintenance purposed, not for 'which way to point next'.

The turn at the Mull would certainly have been planned to have been eyeballed, confirmed by the TANS steer, with the option to turn early and switch to the next waypoint as described above.

Only they didn't. Why? You can speculate all you like, but we will never know the answer for sure.

So many different factors could have come into play; the people that post on this forum have never stated categorically that it must have been one or the other.

Just that settling for pilot error is clearly not justified. Ergo, the fight goes on to have the decision reversed. And there are enough of us that are going to be around for a long time striving to do just that.

And a ban on Sqn members attending the memorial service - I am speechless with rage. I am not PC by any stretch of the imagination, but I would ram 'HUMAN RIGHTS' right where it hurts. I would encourage the press to vilify the pratt that made that decision.

Jacko - how about it?

[BEagle]

Which faceless $hit in the mad MoD-box dared even to suggest that current sqn personnel should be banned from attending.

I sincerely hope that this is an incorrect report - and that Bliar will be asked to confirm or deny it at next PMQs by the shadow defence secretary.

At least the topic will emerge into the spotlight of publicity, if nothing else.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

There is no ban on 7 Sqn or any other Service personnel attending. Let's not detract from the point of this thread by spreading stupid gossip like this.

HPT

[Brian Dixon]

Absolutely no intent to spread stupid gossip HPT.

I was just passing on what I was given by one of the fathers. If it is incorrect, I will be first in the queue to make a public apology.

Brian

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Because I am on 7 Sqn.

Is that good enough!

HPT

[polyglory]

HPT,

Not getting at you, then I would expect to see 7 Sqn to the Fore in that event and the rest is spin .

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Those on 7 Sqn that wish to attend will do so. No one will make them go or will stop them from going.

Whilst this was a tragic event, not too many of the current 7 Sqn crowd knew the guys that died almost 10 years ago. I wonder if anybody here can name all of those that have served and died whilst serving on 7 Sqn between 1914 and 2004 - Will anybody be visiting their graves on the anniversary of their deaths?

Failure to attend a memorial service should not be read into as an indication of a lack of respect. We all grieve in different ways!


HPT

[polyglory]

HPT,

It is a sad Day in my view when that becomes the case, granted it is an individuals choice to attend any Memorial service.

What happened to Squadron/Regiment histories and the observance of the same.

I do it every month where I am on the Continent, for all three Services and it is done from the heart.

I see where you are coming from in one way, but the newer members of the Squadron should know their Squadron history and then make their choices, to wether they attend or not.

From Waterloo to the present day, it is all the same to my family and and all the others

Lest we Forget

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Polyglory

To get more than a couple of Sqn members together in one country at the same time is a miracle and then they are on one standby or another. To get them to attend every memorial for all the Sqn blokes that have died over the last 90 years would be an impossibility.

Perhaps when you were serving we had the 'flex' to do these things - we do not today, so please do not blame the Sqn blokes, blame the politicians who have caused to to keep this thread going and that have culled our numbers to the point of breaking strain.

Another of ours passed on today. It would be good to think we could all attend his funeral, but I somehow doubt that will be possible.

HPT

[polyglory]

HPT,

Thank you for explaining the facts of modern service life, they become more difficult every day and I had forgotten that.

It has been a wee while since I left the Service and I thank you for reminding me of the strains of the modern Service and very sorry to hear of your recent Squadron loss.

Lest We Forget

[meadowbank]

Responding to Kilo 52:

You wrote
In my own opinion (and one that is emphasised throughout the entire RAF); if you find yourself IMC at low level there is only one option - which is a max rate climb on a safe heading to Safety Altitude. Continuing to fly towards the Mull would not be my idea of "a safe heading"

This presupposes that they found themselves IMC at low level whilst having control of the aircraft. It is entirely possible that they had already tried very hard to avoid the aircraft flying them into IMC and were trying very hard to climb away from the granite-stuffed murk when they impacted the ground. The point is, and it's been made lots of times, that we shall never know what happened on that day and it is therefore unsafe in the extreme to arbitrarily decide that the accident was the fault of the pilots. There are several other possible causes and the more I think about them, the less likely it seems that the pilots were to blame. Pilot error is, indeed, a possibility, but is far from being the certainty that was required to find them negligent.

This finding of negligence must be quashed and those of us fighting in places other than this thread will eventually force this to happen.

[Arkroyal]

Thanks, Meadowbank and FJJP

K52, you continue to assert that a climb to SALT was an option. IT WAS NOT.

Without delving into my files (I haven't time just now) I believe that the local SALT was 2800ft and the SALT for the next leg was 5900ft.

By any yardstick available to the crew, they would be working to a max Alt of 2500ft (the 4 Deg C isotherm)

If you are going to defend the finding of Gross Negligence, words like 'likely' have no place in your argument. They either committed gross negligence beyond any doubt whatsoever, or the finding was wrong. SIMPLE

[Brian Dixon]

Hi all,
after some frantic researching, it would appear that the initial concerns over the memorial attendance were caused by good old fashioned chinese whispers.

However... the bottom line is that I was wrong. Perhaps I should have done a little more digging than I initially did.

I accept full responsibility for my post and would therefore like to offer full and unreserved apologies to the following:

The Ministry of Defence
7 Squadron - in particular, HPT
Anyone whose blood pressure was raised by reading the post.
Anyone who was offended by the post.

I can assure you all I won't make the same mistake again.

Despite my embarrassment, I offer you my best, as always.
Brian

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Brian

Thanks for the apology (none needed really), but more importantly thank you for your unceasing efforts with the campaign.


HPT

[ShyTorque]

K52,

You said "How do you justify the assertion that this was a "milk run"? If that was the case then there would have been a standard Flight Plan".

Although some fixed wing squadrons may have used "standard flight plans" As far as I am aware, certainly at that time, this was not generally the case for rotary wing ops as it wasn't / isn't appropriate on this type of flight.

It is misleading to attempt to apply fixed wing thinking to rotary ops.

[walter kennedy]

ShyTorque and K52
Re the “milk run” and “standard flight plan” business. Please let me explain in layman’s terms what I was on about:
You are crossing the sea at low level where it is clear and pleasant towards the Mull;
Your only visual reference ahead is the end of the Mull itself BUT it is so obscured in mist that, at any distance, no useful ground detail is visible;
You want to stick to a popular route for such flights and when you are close enough, you can eyeball the shoreline (which close up is visible because the mist only starts forming as the air rises up the slope);
It is the getting close enough to see the shoreline clearly without creeping cautiously along towards it that is the problem;
With a high speed and weight you need to anticipate the turn somewhat;
Neither the TANS system or the Mk1 eyeball can safely get you close enough to that shoreline for your recognition of small detail that would give you your near field judgment;
Dependence upon the TANS and the Mk1 eyeball would demand prudence and therefore a turn well away from the Mull - spoiling the usual route because of this one aspect or requiring a climb into the world of instrument flying where (being so cloudy) neither the crew nor the passengers would be so comfortable even if this option was possible in the light of the icing limitation;
Given that this was probably a “popular” route and that these conditions would have been a regular occurrence in that area, it had occurred to me that there may have been an established practice to get around that last bit of the approach to the Mull – a bit like knowing the height of lighthouses or similar features can help coastal navigators judge their distance off in the days before radar (ZD576 did not have a radar) or radio/satellite navigation aids – once you are parallel (and close) to the shoreline all is good;
If I had been a thoughtful and responsible planner of operations, I think that I would have suggested something like using the TACAN for that awkward part – perhaps even installing a portable set of DME say at the lighthouse (cheap for the service it would have provided) – for a trial period – even borrow a set from our “friends” – but no! – who would be responsible for its security and monitor its accuracy? – a silly idea – especially as it is so easy to tamper with such ground equipment to give a false reading – it would have been beyond negligent to suggest such a scheme. Anyway, it was just an idea – I wonder what other arrangements could have been made, if any (it could have been left to the pilots all the time)?

I maintain that they demonstrated control at the last moment by starting the evasive manoeuvre which was consistent with either their SEEING how close they were (shoreline passing beneath or mist flitting past windscreen) or when the altitude warning went off suggesting that they were not (successfully) judging their distance off that mist visually; the point at which they had selected their next waypoint, although before the actual waypoint, was already so close in under those conditions that they must have had something else to go on – not the eyeball as explained here.
If not the TACAN then what?

[polyglory]

I see in the Times this morning that John Major has come out in support of the verdict being overturned.

The former Prime Minister calls today for blame to be lifted from the pilots of an RAF Chinook which crashed into the Mull of Kintyre ten years ago while carrying Britain's top counter-Irish-terrorist experts.

[Wee Weasley Welshman]

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,482-1108030,00.html

John Major makes a very clear, plodding argument. I fear it may not be read in full by too many as it is a little dry. It remains though a compelling piece of writing.

I tip my hat to the man.

Cheers

WWW

[ShyTorque]

Walter,

My apologies for saying this but I'm not sure that your conjecture (or any other, nothing personal) is relevant at this late stage. We can neither prove or disprove conjecture.

Unfortunately, due to my present personal circumstances I do not have time or wish to go into a protracted argument of semantics but I could also think up a number scenarios that would fit the circumstances. I wholeheartedly agree that any number of factors not discovered or even undisclosed might have been very relevant, not that I am saying there was a conspiracy of any sort.

The news about Mr Major is very welcome. How glad I am that our persistence is beginning to make more and more people, now including the Prime Minister of the time, realise that a great injustice has been done and needs correcting.

[chippy63]

WWW,
It is indeed a solid and thorough piece of work, and has a pretty prominent place opposite the leader page, rather than being tucked away obscurely.
A valuable addition to the groundswell of opinion.

[Brian Dixon]

I agree. An excellent article.

I am aware that the Chair of the Mull of Kintyre Group, James Arbuthnot MP had been speaking to Mr Major recently, so my thanks to him for any 'clarification of points' he may have made.

I wonder if Mr Major recalls the initial briefing he received?

Thanks also to WWW for posting the link to the article.

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[sangiovese.]

BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/3710403.stm)

Similar news article. Keep up the struggle Brian.

[Rattus]

This welcome intervention by a former PM may be even more significant than many of us realise. My memory of the occasion is hazy, but I think it was a chance remark by another former PM, Harold Wilson, many years after the event, which led to James Thain being cleared of blame for the Ambassador accident at Munich in the 1950s.
Sadly, it came too late for Capt Thain, who died a broken man, but it may have set a valuable precedent, and it can never be too late for those whom death has denied the opportunity to speak in their own defence.

[kilo52]

Shy Torque

You and I are not at odds here at all. This was not a route where there could conceivably have been a standard flight plan. It would not have been a standard destination.

The idea of this being a "milk run" is a non starter.

This does not detract fom the arguement as to whether the crew that had NOT planned the sortie were the best qualified crew to carry it out.

[janet walker]

Just to let everyone know...

On Tuesday 8th June, at 14.00, there will be a wreath-laying ceremony beside the Innocent Victims Plaque outside the front of Westminster Abbey, in memorium to all 29 people who died in the crash of ZD576.

If anyone would like to come and share a few moments to remember the dead, they would be most welcome. The ceremony will last about 10 minutes, and is meant for those of us who cannot get to the Mull or to Winchfield in Hampshire on the 2nd June.

Hope to see some of you there!

[Tandemrotor]

Hi, thank you Janet.

Such a posting reinforces to all, what a truly tragic day the 2nd June 1994, was to everyone with any connection to those events. I hope you are well supported.

I saw the Channel 4 news item with John Major this evening, and was struck by his candour. I am sure that all would want to see justice done, and the truth revealed. Perhaps the clearing of the names of the two pilots may be the first step on a long road to discover that 'truth!'

Thoughts to all on that difficult day.

"We owe justice to the dead, I am not persuaded they have had it!" ..... Rt Hon. John Major MP, Prime Minister of the day.

How long must this injustice continue?

[John Purdey]

Roghead. Your recent post was very interesting. Did your relative have anything to say about the visibility and cloud conditions on the top of those hills at the time of the tragedy? Others have said they were in deep clag; the lighthouse keeper said that visibility was around 20 yards. John Purdey

[Bigears]

It may be of interest to note that on Tuesday, the General Assembly of The Church of Scotland has noted under 'continuing work'
Note the tenth anniversary of the Chinook helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre, welcome the planned attendance of the Moderator and the Church and Nation Convenor at a service to commemorate the event, re-iterate the pastoral concern of the Church for the families of the victims, and renew the call to the Ministry of Defence to reconsider the judgement of "gross negligence" on the pilots of the aircraft.

http://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/webcast/downloads/dailypapers4b.pdf page 94 para 6 refers

[Vertico]

Brian Dixon

Had a reply today from my MP in response to my request that he sign EDM 371. He said that, as an Opposition Whip, he was only allowed to sign EDMs on the approved Conservative Party list.

I've therefore e-mailed Michael Howard with a reasoned request for him to follow the lead of Sir Malcolm Rifkind and John Major by adding EDM 371 to the approved list before 2nd June.

Could I suggest that other PPruNers also e-mail Michael Howard, so that he can't claim to be unaware of either the FACTS or the depth of feeling on this topic? All power to your elbow!

[Maxflyer]

This subject has just been discussed in PMQ's today. I didn't hear all of it, but I'm sure that Tony Blair said that he would talk to interested parties with regard to the decisions made by the previous Government.

[Brian Dixon]

Vertico,
very many thanks for your support. I can tell you that Mr Howard has already had a letter from me, following the latest statement from John Major. He is aware of the concerns surrounding the verdict and is looking into the matter. That said, the more mail he receives on the subject will reinforce just how many people don't agree with the MoD or the two reviewing officers.

Maxflyer,
James Arbuthnot put a question to Mr Blair during PMQs, and Mr Blair has agreed to meet a delegation from the Campaign Group. I don't have the full question, or reply available at the moment, but will post once I do.
Thanks to Mr Arbuthnot, and congratulations to him for catching the Speaker's eye!

10th anniversary just a week away. Hope to see some of you at a memorial service.

As always, my thanks to everyone for your support.
Regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Brian Dixon]

From the Press Association:

BLAIR TO MEET CHINOOK CAMPAIGN MPs
By Joe Churcher, Chief Parliamentary Reporter, PA News

Prime Minister Tony Blair today agreed to meet MPs campaigning to clear the names of the pilots of an RAF Chinook helicopter which crashed, killing top counter-terrorism experts. But despite John Major - who occupied 10 Downing Street at the time - joining calls for the negligence verdict to be overturned, Mr Blair said he could make no promises.

Mr Blair said he was prepared to meet an all-party group and "look at it in the light of what has been said by the previous Prime Minister. But I give no guarantees that we will change that particular decision. There was a decision taken at the time that was then endorsed by this Government as well.

However, I understand the very strong feeling there is, not least in respect of the families of the pilots concerned, and I am very happy to meet an all-party group. But that has to be done without any prior commitment or guarantee as to what the outcome would be.''

All 29 passengers and crew died in the accident over the Mull of Kintyre ten years ago. An RAF board of inquiry concluded that the pilots, Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Richard Cook, were guilty of gross negligence in crashing the helicopter in thick cloud cover. It ruled that the helicopter was flying too fast and too low when the pilots attempted to take emergency action to avoid a steep hillside.

Last month, Mr Major wrote in a newspaper article that "no evidence existed that either pilot - both of whom died in the crash - was negligent''.
His comments came after Sir Malcolm Rifkind, Mr Major's defence secretary at the time, also called for the verdict to be set aside.
The RAF judgment has been the only official verdict into the accident, although a number of inquiries - including reviews by the Commons Defence Committee and a House of Lords special select committee - have disagreed with the ruling.

A 1996 fatal accident inquiry held at the Sheriff Court in Paisley also concluded that it was not possible to be certain of the cause of the crash.

The helicopter was flying from RAF Aldergrove in Ulster to a security conference and passengers included a senior MI5 officer and leading Special Branch officers.

Mr Blair had been pressed at question time by Tory James Arbuthnot (Hampshire NE), who said a meeting should be held to "bring fairness and a conclusion to this matter''.
End

Regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[pulse1]

An e mail to Michael Howard got an immediate response from his office which included the following:

"Now that the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary and the Procurement Minister at the time have all accepted that there was a miscarriage of justice and called for the pilots to be cleared, we believe it is appropriate that the Ministry of Defence should give the pilots the benefit of the doubt and clear their names."

It doesn't say that he will allow support EDM 371 as requested though.

[Vertico]

Brian,

Thank you for your kind comments.

Michael Howard's office replied promptly to my message, also saying "Now that the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary and the Procurement Minister at the time have all accepted that there was a miscarriage of justice and called for the pilots to be cleared, we believe it is appropriate that the Ministry of Defence should give the pilots the benefit of the doubt and clear their names".

I've replied asking if this means that Mr Howard, my MP and others will now sign EDM 371?!!!

In the light of Tony Blair's answer in PMQs today, it looks like we're getting somewhere! Let's keep up the pressure and ALL ask Mr Howard and our own MPs to sign, as visible evidence of the (entirely justified) strength of feeling behind this campaign.

[Vertico]

Brian,

Further to my message above, I have now received the following from Michael Howard's office in reply to my suggestion that I hoped he and my MP would now be signing the EDM:

"Yes you can assume they will be signing the Motion."

So, it's now evidently on the "approved list" for Conservative MPs. Can I suggest all those PPRuNers who have previously been rebuffed now contact their MPs again?

An irresistible tide seems to be moving our way!

[Brian Dixon]

Vertico,
well done and thank you for your tenacity! Good luck with your own MP.

For those wishing to read Mr Arbuthnot's question to the Prime Minister yesterday, Click here (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/cm040526/debtext/40526-03.htm#40526-03_spnew22)

It will be interesting to see how soon Mr Blair will see the delegation, and also how long he will take to respond once they have been seen. (I wonder if the reply will be, as usual, just before a recess of Parliament).

As always,
my best to you all.
Regards.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Tandemrotor]

Don't want to sound like a damp squib, but we are entering critical times for the campaign, and for the two young men for whom we wish to see justice restored.

Anybody who has an interest in this case needs to pull out all the stops NOW!

NOW!

If we fumble this, we may not get another chance of correcting this searing injustice for a very considerable time.

Attend the memorial services if you POSSIBLY can. It is CRUCIAL they are well supported. ALL those who perished 10 years ago deserve that. Their families deserve it!

Flt Lts John Tapper, and Rick Cook can't speak for themselves. They are relying on you and I!

Do EVERYTHING you can do, whatever it is.

It's the 10th anniversary, and we just went to the 'nuclear' option!

[Self Loading Freight]

FYI - an article, "A slur on the pilots" by Omar Malik in this week's Spectator reiterates the affair. The full text is available at http://www.spectator.co.uk/article.php?table=old&section=current&issue=2004-05-29&id=4660 (free registration required): the conclusion bears repeating.

"The RAF BoI was a military tribunal run by amateurs both in accident investigation and in law. Its findings have been rejected by professionals, by a Scottish sheriff, by the public accounts committee and unanimously by the eminent select committee of the House of Lords, whose cross-examination totally destroyed the evidence of the two reviewing officers. However, the select committee failed to understand that what was needed was not a lordly tut-tut, but red blood — lots of it — on the carpet. Only a tabloid feeding frenzy coming their way secures the immediate attention of the Establishment.

This continued injustice is a failure of competence. It is a failure of truth and decency. All of which we have become resigned to with this government. But we won’t put up with it in the RAF."

R

[Archimedes]

Shouldn't the criticism directed at the BOI actually be aimed at Messers Wratten and Day, who overturned the BOI's verdict?

[HectorusRex]

The following from The Spectator article appears to raise some new and valid points.

"The legality of its verdict could be challenged on several different grounds. The first, Lord Ackner has told the Lords, is ex debito justitiae, in the interests of justice. A second is the total failure of the reviewing officers to substantiate the required level of proof (‘absolutely no doubt whatsoever’). A third is the possibility that the reviewing officers acted ultra vires, beyond their powers. Queen’s Regulation QR 1271 provides that ‘each transmitting authority is to examine the proceedings and record thereon an opinion upon the matters investigated’ (QR 1271(6), AL3/Jun 01, emphasis added). The RAF Directorate of Legal Services has been unable to cite the express authority of the reviewing officers to alter or interfere with the findings. Evidently none exists. This raises the interesting possibility that decades of RAF boards of inquiry have been improperly conducted."

Where does this statement now leave Messrs Bill Wrotten and Peep O' Day?

It must also make it considerably more difficult for Tony Blair to ignore the injustice of their findings.

[walter kennedy]

I would have thought that the conclusion of the BOI was so obviously wrong that it does not need complex legal arguments to push for a full review – let us recap on that conclusion “… that the pilots, Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Richard Cook, were guilty of gross negligence in crashing the helicopter in thick cloud cover. It ruled that the helicopter was flying too fast and too low when the pilots attempted to take emergency action to avoid a steep hillside.”

This is downright misleading – I believe that the following is a more accurate description of what happened:
“They were flying in clear weather towards a headland shrouded in localised mist on a regular path requiring them to make a slight turn up the coast but they failed to turn in time.”
This is what happened, they just did not commence that turn in time, and this part of the flight plan should have been known to those at the BOI.
Had this been acknowledged, then perhaps the way would have been open to ask the obvious question “why they did not make that turn”.
This in turn would have led to the two possible cases:
1. The aircraft had some momentary control problem;
2. The pilots misjudged their proximity to the landmass.

I believe that case (1) has been thoroughly discussed but most interested parties won’t touch case (2) with a barge pole. I believe that it is possible to find out what the practice was on this regular leg by interested parties pressing the RAF and respective flight members for details. This is how I think case (2) opens up:
1. Pilots maintaining low level in this area had only their own judgement to rely upon to make this turn, or
2. There was a radio beacon provided for their TACAN in its DME function so that such flights would have a nice distance to go reading on a (normally) trusted, accurate system.

Now, if (1) here is the case, we are to believe that, in this high tech world, this commonly used route (the shortest from NI) with this all too common local weather problem had no special practice to assist pilots – a bit like not bothering to put distance markers on approaches to motorway exits. OK if this was the case then RAF planners would surely have a case to answer – and a share in the blame.

If an interested party with sufficient authority would address (2) - ie was there a navigation beacon used etc - with a specific question in the right forum (eg at an inquiry or parliament) then we could put the navigation issue to bed.
I personally believe that the avoidance of specifics on the flight plan in the inquiries has been deliberately misleading – why can be debated when the plan is clarified fully.

[Brian Dixon]

Archimedes,
Omar's article also makes the comment, The board of relatively junior officers did not find the pilots negligent, bravely sticking to their guns in the face of their air officer's repeated criticism.

Hectorus,
I think it leaves the air marshals still fairly isolated, yet convinced that their opinion is fact. I doubt anything will ever change their mindset.

Walter,
I'm still researching for you. Hopefully I will get somewhere soon.

Now that Mr Blair has said he will meet a cross-part delegation from the campaign, it may be a good time for you all to write to him. Not only to thank him for agreeing to meet the delegation, but to reinforce the disquiet over the length of time this terrible injustice has hung over both pilots.

Regards,
as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[HectorusRex]

Well said Brian.

Is it just possible that after all the previous false alarms, that the light visible IS the end of this long and tortuous tunnel?:ok:

[Brian Dixon]

I certainly hope so!

However, if it's the usual obstructive MoD :mad: with a torch, I'll be up for the challenge!

Someone, somewhere should've realised by now that I'm not going to go away! :E

My best,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Chocks Wahay]

Momentum continues to build - some excellent coverage in the Sunday Times today:

Crash pilots feared Chinook was unsafe link (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,176-1128583,00.html)

Fathers for real justice link (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,2764-1126047,00.html)

This article is the lead story in the Ecosse section of the Scottish edition.

[soddim]

Channel 4 news tonight did a pretty good job of putting forward the argument for justice. Maybe truth and fact will prevail.

[pulse1]

The Channel 4 news report centred on the forthcoming book written by Air Commodore Bleckley, a retired RAF engineer. This book reports on all the maintenance problems which had been experienced with this particular helicopter before the final flight. This is all factual and apparently included two front engine changes within a few days.

I have followed this campaign pretty closely and I had never heard of this. Could this be the new evidence which the MoD has required before changing thier minds? If it is, it makes them look even sicker than I thought they were. Why was this evidence not brought up at any of the enquiries?

[Mr C Hinecap]

From your news-reading man ahead of GMT....

Chinook inquiry findings 'biased'

Two former senior military officers have expressed concerns about the inquiry into the Chinook helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994.
The RAF inquiry into the crash, which killed 29 people, found the dead pilots guilty of "gross negligence".

But the two helicopter experts told Channel 4 News that there were flaws in the RAF inquiry and called for the pilots to be exonerated.

Air Commodore John Blakeley accused the inquiry's findings of being "biased".

He said that engineering evidence "was not correctly analysed or followed up".

And he added that the RAF's board of inquiry had either been directed to blame the pilots or was not competent to do its job.

His findings have been backed by Rear Admiral Ron Holley - former director of helicopter projects at the MoD.

He described the aircraft's defect history as "not a happy one".

He has called for the pilots to be exonerated, the first former MoD insider to do so.


"The Board of Inquiry's findings were heavily biased in favour of the verdict that the RAF themselves were not questioned on their decision and shortfalls in their process"

Air Commodore Blakeley


The crash, which killed 25 senior intelligence officers and four air crew, was the RAF's biggest peace-time disaster.

The RAF inquiry blamed the pilots, Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Rick Cook.

Subsequent investigations raised concerns about the airworthiness of the Chinook - sparking a long-running campaign by the pilots' families, the Church of Scotland, and politicians, including former prime minister John Major, to clear the men of any blame.

Air Commodore Blakeley, who was the RAF's most senior engineering officer during the Falklands conflict, has compiled a detailed report.

He said there was a "significant amount of doubt that the fleet of Chinooks was airworthy", and that the helicopter that crashed had carried "a potentially significant number of defects".

The retired officer said: "The Board of Inquiry's findings were heavily biased in favour of the verdict that the RAF themselves were not questioned on their decision and shortfalls in their process."

The report has been backed by Rear Admiral Holley - former director of helicopter projects at the MoD.

He said: "Air Commodore Blakeley's report is certainly a credible piece of work. The MoD should take it seriously because he has drawn his research from their own aircraft documentation - and that documentation is hugely important.

"The cogent and important point in the Air Commodore's report is the record of that aircraft's defect history. It was not a happy one."

[John (Gary) Cooper]

[The crash, which killed 25 senior intelligence officers and four air crew, was the RAF's biggest peace-time disaster]


Sirs
Whilst perusing your article on the Chinook Inquiry you refer to 'The crash, which killed 25 senior intelligence officers and four air crew, was the RAF's biggest peace-time disaster'.

I have written to the BBC thus:-

I am afraid this statement is incorrect:-

1> A RAF Hastings transport aircraft crashed near Baldon, Oxon, on 6th July 1965 where all 41 on board sadly died.

2> A RAF C-130 Hercules crashed into the sea off Italy on 9th November 1971 killing all 52 on board.

If you mean it is the RAF's worst peacetime helicopter accident you would then be correct.

Could I ask you to amend your records accordingly

Thank you

John Cooper

[ShyTorque]

C Hinecap,

Excellent, this is literally great news!

It highlights the great significance of the recent statement by John Major. Now that the he and other members of the government of the day have opened Pandora's box, it has allowed "insiders", who would have been reluctant to make controversial statements at the time, to also come forward.

Some of us knew there was an RAF / MOD face-saving whitewash all along, but now perhaps the real truth about the disgraceful and incompetent way that this aircraft type was rushed into service can be aired in public.

Let's hope B. Liar & co can finish the job soon.

[Av18tor]

J(G)C

If you look at the thread more carefully I would gather the comments were meant to relate to the worst loss of so many important and irreplaceable military intelligence personnel in UK history. I would most definitely call that a disaster on its own.

Lets not turn this into a numbers war but look at it from a positive perspective, that at long last, there seems to be a positive effect off all the campaigning to clear the pilots names.

And about time too!

[tucumseh]

C Hinecap,

I believe Rear Admiral Holley was Director General Aircraft (Navy) in the mid-to-late 80s. That is, customer, not supplier.

The use of the word "defect" is significant. In law, it has a definite meaning related to Product Liability. If there were truly defects (in any product) then by definition an investigation has taken place and the design contractor has acknowledged liability.

All such records would be available to the BOI, who could order further investigations. Is the "not correctly analysed or followed up" comment a criticism of (a) staff who knew how to analyse and follow up but did not, (b) a system which no longer requires such competencies at the relevant rank/grade, or (c) possible lack of funding to conduct fault investigations in the first place?

I look forward to reading the Air Cmde's report!

[Tandemrotor]

tucumseh

Interesting first post, on this thread (and on pprune!)

Do you have a more familiar name?

Are you questioning the implication that the Chinook HC2 was unsuitable for service 10 years ago, or just pointing out semantics?

Incidentally, the history of engine changes on the accident aircraft; (rather unusual, I agree!) was well known to the BOI.

Perhaps only one of the reasons the \'professional aviators\' in the process were more circumspect in their findings?

[XM147]

I have written to my MP, yet again.
Brian, keep up the good work! Thankfully you will not go away. You can be assured that there are an awful lot of people standing right behind you...... and we wont go away either! We are often quiet: but we are resolved.

[slj]

Excellent and clear coverage on BBC Radio Guernsey this am.

Obviously a feed from London so likely to be on other local radio stations today.

Report clearly stated pilots were not blamed by Board of Inquiry but blamed by two AMs. Pointed out the momentum to clear the pilots mentioning John Major by name.

See also = http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/3768157.stm and

[url]http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/3749977.stm which states that Blair is wiling to meet politicians pressing to clear names of pilots.

[Brian Dixon]

Ten years on...

DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF ALL WHO WERE LOST

Richard Allen
Christopher John Biles
Dennis Stanley Bunting
Desmond Patrick Conroy
Richard David Cook
Martin George Dalton
Phillip George Davidson
Stephen Davidson
John Robert Deverell
Christopher John Dockerty
John Charles Brian Fitzsimons
Graham William Forbes
Robert Patrick Foster
Richard Lawrence Gregory-Smith
William Rutherford Gwilliam
Kevin Andrew Hardie
John Stuart Haynes
Anthony Robert Hornby
Anne Catherine MacDonald
Kevin Michael Magee
Michael Bruce Maltby
Maurice McLaughlin Neilly
John Turbitt Phoenix
Roy Pugh
Stephen Lewis Rickard
Gary Paul Sparks
Jonathan Paul Tapper
John Tobias
George Victor Alexander Williams

Thoughts and prayers remain with them, and their families.

Brian

[SOMAT]

Excellent coverage this am on Radio 4's 'Today' programme and most (Radio 2 etc) news bullitens.

[Arkroyal]

I'm at the Mull today in spirit if not in body.

The coverage has been very positive, and I live in hope for justice which must come soon

RIP you 29:(

[Av18tor]

For The Fallen

With proud thanksgiving, a mother for her children,
England mourns for her dead across the sea.
Flesh of her flesh they were, spirit of her spirit,
Fallen in the cause of the free.

Solemn the drums thrill; Death august and royal
Sings sorrow up into immortal spheres,
There is music in the midst of desolation
And a glory that shines upon our tears.

They went with songs to the battle, they were young,
Straight of limb, true of eye, steady and aglow.
They were staunch to the end against odds uncounted;
They fell with their faces to the foe.

They shall not grow old, as we that are left grow old:
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.

They mingle not with their laughing comrades again;
They sit no more at familiar tables of home;
They have no lot in our labour of the day-time;
They sleep beyond England's foam.

But where our desires are and our hopes profound,
Felt as a well-spring that is hidden from sight,
To the innermost heart of their own land they are known
As the stars are known to the Night;

As the stars that shall be bright when we are dust,
Moving in marches upon the heavenly plain;
As the stars that are starry in the time of our darkness,
To the end, to the end, they remain.




Rest in peace.




My thoughts are with the families and friends at the Mull today. Lets hope there will be a positive end to this tragedy, and soon!

[John (Gary) Cooper]

Thinking of everyone involved.....................