Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[dwhcomputers]

AC
Although it has taken 2 years as you rightly say if my recollection is correct (I did not want to plough back the last two and a half years of entries) some of this time has been taken in awaiting replies under the Freedom of Information Act from the MOD only to be told 1. Its too expensive 2. We lost the documentation 3. etc etc etc Perhaps if we did not have a part time Minister of Defence (for the first time ever?) things might move a bit quicker .
Keep it up Brian. Justice will prevail

[Brian Dixon]

Hi everyone.

I just wanted to apologise for the lack of updates. At present we continue to wait for the SoS to announce his findings. I am, however, hopeful that the Cook and Tapper families won't have to wait too much longer (not forgetting, of course, the families of everyone else lost on that tragic flight).

As always, I thank you for your patience and for your support.

I promise that I will bring you any news, the instant there is anything to report.

Kind regards, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Winch-control]

Hoping that no news is good news, Brian, 2 1/2 weeks on...
Waiting for the expiry date...

[Shep Turner]

The Chinook affair leaves many unanswered questions and I agree with all that has been done to try and overturn the MOD's position. I was the watchkeeper on duty in Air Operations Aldergrove that day and witnesses the last "Ops Normal" call from the aircrew taken by Mick Huddard standing beside me that day, 20 minutes later we were receiving the first initial reports of what has now become one the the great unsolved military mysteries and a sore on the conciences of too many people. The MOD HAS made a mistake and is simply too arrogant to back down. These were good people whose professionalism and integrity has been tarnished for too long. Theres more to this than meets the eye.....

[tiarna]

I am sure the families must be consumed with tension due to this protracted waiting game! I am not related but still feel irratated by this delay on an answer. The pilots were unfairly branded - let justice be done.

[walter kennedy]

What is wrong with you all?
You profess to want to clear the pilots' names but you will not contemplate a scenario that guarantees their exoneration – why is this?
Information keeps coming in that supports the already strong case that they were involved in a thus far undisclosed exercise – how can the MOD do anything but exonerate them if it is found that it has for 14 years omitted to mention such?
All that is required is for a few of you to come forward into the open with what you know.
I can only think that your reluctance is because you have swallowed a line something like “Unfortunate accident – keep it quiet to avoid needless serious embarassment – not a deliberate act – bad for PR – serious political repercussions – security considerations for future use of important system – blah, blah”.
And you loyally follow the line.
But you didn't expect the pilots to take such a fall, did you?
Why should you keep quiet when these young men were so unfairly dealt with?
And the longer it is dragged out, the greater is going to be the shame if and when it does get exposed.
Let me tell you just how far it has unfolded to date:
(Remember that my analysis pointed to a particular type of equipment being on board?)
I am told that not only was the requisite onboard equipment fitted but the ground crew (who worked on ZD576 immediately before that final flight) were making good a botched (a common occurrence) special trials fit working on that very equipment's (anti-vibration) mounts (doesn't fit with their story at the BOI, does it Brian?);
And this equipment had been around in the RAF for trials for at least a year before the crash so a good many of you would have been familiar with it and could have saved a lot of time - years in fact.
Get your act together:
cooperate amongst yourselves using this thread constructively to get as full a verifiable picture as possible – don't be shy of communicating – ignore Orwell's sheep;
as a group demand where the sets used for those trials are now – account for them all;
demand to know who expedited the fit to ZD576;
demand an explanation as to why that significant piece of nav equipment did not get a mention in the AAIB report (or anywhere else for that matter) and where the hell is it now.
.
There is nothing to loose – if you start seriously to explore this aspect, the MOD may loose its nerve and move to clear their names so as as to take the wind out of this thread ... its objective achieved.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Walter,

I was always suspicious of your mental stability but your latest diatribe once and for all removes any doubts I may have had :rolleyes:

"All that is required is for a few of you to come forward into the open with what you know.
I can only think that your reluctance is because you have swallowed a line something like “Unfortunate accident – keep it quiet to avoid needless serious embarrassment – not a deliberate act – bad for PR – serious political repercussions – security considerations for future use of important system – blah, blah”.
And you loyally follow the line."

Have a look at any of the following threads, or the many more like them on PPrune,

http://www.pprune.org/forums/military-aircrew/335173-pissed-up-chinook-crew-cause-embarassment.html (http://www.pprune.org/forums/military-aircrew/335173-pissed-up-chinook-crew-cause-embarassment.html)

http://www.pprune.org/forums/military-aircrew/334581-half-armed-forces-considering-quitting.html (http://www.pprune.org/forums/military-aircrew/334581-half-armed-forces-considering-quitting.html)

http://www.pprune.org/forums/military-aircrew/335096-daily-mirror-today.html (http://www.pprune.org/forums/military-aircrew/335096-daily-mirror-today.html)

http://www.pprune.org/forums/military-aircrew/335148-sir-jock-impresses-press.html (http://www.pprune.org/forums/military-aircrew/335148-sir-jock-impresses-press.html)

http://www.pprune.org/forums/military-aircrew/242005-nimrod-crash-afghanistan-tech-info-discussion-not-condolences.html (http://www.pprune.org/forums/military-aircrew/242005-nimrod-crash-afghanistan-tech-info-discussion-not-condolences.html)

http://www.pprune.org/forums/military-aircrew/334918-forces-afghanistan-years.html (http://www.pprune.org/forums/military-aircrew/334918-forces-afghanistan-years.html)



Now consider the disdain that our senior management are currently held in, the continual downward spiral with regards to moral, manpower deficiencies, equipment levels etc etc and then revisit your feckin ludicrous suggestions above that it's due to misplaced loyalty that your ridiculous fairy tale has never been corroborated :ugh:

[jayteeto]

The main reason we have not gone down that line is because it it utter bo££ocks.....

[Green Flash]

I was fishing with a friend a few weeks ago. He was on duty at Machrihanish that day and I was on duty at the flights planned destination. We agreed that hardly a day goes past when we don't wonder what really happened. Many people have been marking time for 14 years so please SoS, make a decision. And soon.

[walter kennedy]

What has happened to the three posts that were on the thread immediately following #3533?

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Apparently the 3 posters all received omni directional information from an unknown source that caused them to veer away from their planned.........................or maybe common sense broke through :rolleyes:

[tiarna]

I posted previously, nothing inappropriate or anything, so yes indeed, why has my post and that of two others been removed??

Seldomfitforpurpose (re: your post above), did I post something that you had difficulty with? I mean if my post was so far removed from common sense one has to ask the question why so many of your posts still exist :p

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

The disappearance of your message has nowt to do with me, I am just a mere member in here......................:=

[tiarna]

Seldomfitforpurpose it seems that I did have at least that much common sense to figure that out for myself. I was not suggesting or hinting in anyway that you had anything to do with my missing post and my appologies if my post does not make that clear.

[classjazz]

Since retirement I only occasionally dip in to this thread and what I have to say will not progress the arguments any further but having had one of my sons fly the Chinook as a pilot, I maintain some interest.
Not too long after the accident, I was down at Farnborough and I was looking at the wreckage laid out in the hangar there.
I was talking with an inspector - whose name I cannot remember now - and we discussed the various theories that were being bandied around as to the cause of the accident.
I remember him telling me that they had examined the "chips" from the nav equipment (they were more proficient at that than Boeing apparently) and all he would say was "the chips told us that the aircraft was where it said it was" .
Read into that what you like.
I had left the service by then and was working in commercial aviation and to this day I do not regret leaving. One can escape from the MOD but one cannot escape from the politics.
Sorry if this contribution is a little off the normal mark.

[nigegilb]

I don't understand the heavy handed policing going on in this thread. I posted a transcript, a transcript which is a matter of public record from a public inquest and it has been removed.

Why?

Why is this thread being censored?

My post was in reply to Walter Kennedy's which referred to the Special Trials Fit on the Chinook. Have we upset someone regarding Special Trials Fit and the obvious breach in airworthiness regulations?

[Chugalug2]

Nigel, you led the successful campaign to battle harden the Hercules fleet and now ESF is fitted after a 40 years old shortfall in airworthiness in that respect. You have contributed greatly to the Nimrod thread where an admission of an even more serious shortfall in airworthiness has been made. Now you have posted here and mentioned the "a" word! Eventually the Chinook Mk2 will prove to be the final part of this ghastly menage a trois. As long as we knock ourselves out pleading for the Wratten and Day verdict to be scrapped we are tolerated, mainly ignored (as now), but tolerated. As soon as the fitness, or otherwise, of ZD576 for what was to be its final flight is alluded to - posts disappear into a Black Hole. I find this very unsettling and a little alarming. "Waiting for Des" is par for the course. Censoring you of all people is a disturbing and distinctly sinister twist to the thread. What's going on, Pop?

[nigegilb]

OK Chug, in the absence of an explanation, let's try again shall we? This transcript from a trials specialist, was given in evidence at the recent Nimrod public inquest with no "in camera" sessions, and as such, can be regarded as a public document. I have also been shown evidence which indicates that ZD576 was carrying STF equipment on that fateful day and I think it important to establish that breaches of airworthiness regs continued from that day to this day specifically regarding Special Trials Fit procedures.

Chug, bearing in mind the Nimrod Navigator's evidence when he criticised Special Trials Fits (and by extension the whole Service Modification system) keep an eye on what happens here because the evidence of widespread deceit and airworthiness shortcutting will bite MoD sooner or later, as you say, all these cases are linked.

MALE SPEAKER: And (several inaudible words) if there was any heat detail it is alive in your mind. You were asked a series of questions (several inaudible words) in response. The questions put to you, you were asked this, is there anything else you wish to discuss with us, and your response was, “My thinking is STFs of this aircraft”. Do I understand STF to be Standard Trials(?) Fit?

SQN LDR ATKINS: Special Trials Fit.

MALE SPEAKER: So it was a special trial.

THE CORONER: Did you have any problems with Special Trials Fit in the equipment?

SQN LDR ATKINS: To put it in context, I am a qualified trials officers at the General Duties Air Assistance Course in 1992 and then spent three years from 1992 to 1995 at Boscombe Down as a trials officer doing special trials fix on the Comet aircraft, the laboratory aircraft. So I did have a bit of knowledge of the system and how it should be used and I just wanted to sort of point out as part of this that I thought you were abusing it slightly.

THE CORONER: And why would you it was being abused?

SQN LDR ATKINS: From what I remember of my training, the definition of a special trials fit is a fit that has gone onto the aircraft for the duration of the trial which, in exception circumstances, could be taken into operational use.

THE CORONER: So, your criticism here is that the special trials fits just stay?

SQN LDR ATKINS: Exactly. I mean, yes, my interpretation would be you had an urgent operation requirement, special trials fit onto an aircraft, take it to theatre, get the job done, bring it back, take the equipment off. Whereas, we were doing go to theatre, take it back, onto a different aircraft, that goes out. So, yes, there were ... and there are reasons behind that why I think it is not quite the way to play business.

THE CORONER: And why do you think it is not quite the way.

SQN LDR ATKINS: Okay, one of the reasons I have a degree in electrical and electronic engineering, so to my mind moving cable harnesses regularly is not good practice.

THE CORONER: Why?

SQN LDR ATKINS: Just potential damage.

THE CORONER: To the harnesses?

SQN LDR ATKINS: To the actual cable harnesses when they are moved from one aircraft to stored, moved back to another aircraft.

THE CORONER: So potential damage to the cabling and constant shorting?

SQN LDR ATKINS: Potentially.

THE CORONER: With a fire?

SQN LDR ATKINS: Potentially.

THE CORONER: Potentially, yes.

MALE SPEAKER: Right, you say specifically, and this was the reason I wished to ask you this question, “we will (inaudible) in writing but before the accident there were three circuit breakers we were meant to pull before taking it and we didn’t”. What did you mean by that?

SQN LDR ATKINS: Okay, what had happened was when we first arrived in theatre, the problem is you do not have ready access to this equipment in the UK. So you often arrive out in theatre to an aircraft that has got, in this case I believe it was four or five separate special trials fits fitted to it, and that is the first time you have really got, to get to grips with it again. Somebody at Kinross had tried to be helpful when they produced like a local briefing package where they had in the back of the release to service document for each special trials fit they made, sort of make a waiver of, if you are going to do air to air refuelling you need to pull the circuit breaker or not use this particular item.

THE CORONER: Why do you think that was? Why did they say pull those circuit breakers?

SQN LDR ATKINS: Because of the way it is being fitted to the aircraft, it is another safety break, if you like, just in case. Because they had not had the opportunity to fully embody the equipment onto the aircraft and perhaps test it as thoroughly as it should have been.

THE CORONER: So, (inaudible) if the system is switched off during air to air refuel then chances of any problems associated with electrical shorting or failure in that period are removed?

SQN LDR ATKINS: They should be zero.

THE CORONER: Yes.

MALE SPEAKER: What was it about air to air refuelling in particular that meant that the special trials fit had to be switched off during that process?

SQN LDR ATKINS: Well, as if have just explained, it was because of ... when you have not properly embodied something onto the aeroplane, the big issue for us as the operating crew is that the air to air refuelling checks when you have not embodied it will not reflect what you need to do. Until a piece of equipment is serviced embodiment modification that will include changing all the paperwork that goes with it. So as part of your air to air refuelling checks you would have then been told pull this circuit breaker, pull that circuit breaker, do not use that. What had happened was that was not in the formal checklist so crews had ... as I say, somebody had tried to develop a local checklist that had an error in it and as a result of the accident we had a quick look back to make sure we were doing things properly, and that is when we discovered that error.

THE CORONER: Do you think that error might have had anything to do with what happened to this aircraft?

SQN LDR ATKINS: In reality I do not, but at the time I made this statement obviously, you know, it was fresh after the event and --

THE CORONER: So, fresh out of the event, what made the connection in your mind?

SQN LDR ATKINS: Purely because with my background I was aware of how we were using special trails fits and I wondered if the way we had used them might have been significant.

THE CORONER: So it was just in your mind that there might have been some electrical failure that might have been responsible for the ignition of fuel?

SQN LDR ATKINS: Possibly that. The other aspect was were trying to sort of, you know, put ourselves into that crew’s position in terms of the time line as it was described to us. And one of the things post having done your air to air refuelling is obviously putting circuit breakers back in to get this equipment working again, and potentially that might have been significant.

THE CORONER: Potentially, yes, thank you.

[Chugalug2]

Well, this is cosy Nigel, just thee and me it would seem! Such weighty moral issues, yet so little said by so few! So let's dot some i's and t's (well OK, cross them). Only mods can remove others' posts I believe, so how about spelling out the pros and cons, mods? Oh and can we take as read the whole Danny's train set spiel?
The only reason that occurs to me as to what might have motivated this is to prevent the rocking of the MOD boat. If the reward for non-rocking is that Jonathon Tapper's and Rick Cook's names might be cleared as against never, I would only comment that no spoon is long enough to sup with the MOD! Both the Nimrod and Hercules threads were instanced by brave NoK determined that no other families should go through such pain as they have had to endure following possibly avoidable accidents. They faced patronising and even hostile comments on this very forum, but were determined to discover what had happened and how best to avoid it in the future. In that regard they showed greater adherence to the tenets of Flight Safety than many of the professionals that post here. I realise that what they did not have to do was to clear the names of their loved ones, as with this tragedy. If the price of doing so is to prevent wrong doing from being exposed and thus being repeated again, is it not too high to pay? For that would be blackmail, an ugly word for an ugly deed. The greater good here surely would be to expose the way that airworthiness has been consistently compromised by the very authority charged with its enforcement, ie the MOD, as has been testified to in the Hercules and Nimrod threads. Appeasement never works. Censorship never works. The truth will out. Better if all here are at least agreed upon that.

[Brian Dixon]

Not ignoring you chaps. Been working 17hr + days at the moment, so will catch up once I've had a bit of sleep.

Hope that's OK.

Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[PPRuNe Pop]

Please keep this thread on topic.

Placing posts from other topics on here is not acceptable.

[nigegilb]

PPP we have exchanged PMs this morning. I don't wish to distract this very important thread, nor do I wish to detract from the massive amount of work done to clear the names of the two pilots, one of whom was known to me.

However, there is clear evidence that five fatal crashes are linked by a failure of the MoD to enforce its own airworthiness regulations. This Chinook was clearly not airworthy on that fateful day. A fact sometimes lost in this enormous thread. By stating this fact clearly, at this critical juncture, it may even help provide the tipping point for clearing the pilots once and for all.

MoD has consistently stated that ARS-6 was not fitted. I believe this to be total deceit and I also believe this thread is an appropriate place to highlight that deceit.

[Chugalug2]

PPRuNe Pop, is it not for the OP to state whether Nigel's post was off topic? It was not abusive, it followed up on another post from Walter. He has as we all know not gone directly for the Wratten/Day verdict, but for a scenario which he believes conforms to the known facts, which include the ARS-6 trial fit. He has been ridiculed, admonished and patronized but has never been "moded" AFAIK. nigegilb, with a track record of responsible campaigning and posting, follows on with a transcript that underlies that last point is immediately wiped! You keep a famously loose hand on our tiller Pop, and for that we are all very grateful. I fear though that here your hand might have slipped temporarily. I respectfully ask that we resume sailing without a "man overboard".

[John Blakeley]

For reasons which Walter knows I will not join in the debate as to whether a STF for the ARS-6 was installed in ZD 576 on that fateful day - except to say that if it could be proved that it was then regardless of whether any "unofficial" trial was also taking place it would "blow a major hole" in the BOI's evidence and hence the findings. However, I believe that Nigel should be supported in his comment on the airworthiness failures - failures that have come back to "haunt" MOD in so many ways since then. This is a long thread and people will have forgotten, so it may be worth reminding them that the document below was personally handed to the then SofS by Lord Chalfont in, as I recall, late 2003 - it has never generated, to my knowledge, any response from MOD. Since that paper was written we have, of course, seen further information which confirms that the Chinook Mk2 fleet in general, and ZD 576 in particular, were operating against the advice of the RAF's own flight clearance authority - perhaps by necessity in terms of real operations, but certainly not a wise decision, even without the benefit of hindsight, in terms of a high profile passenger sortie. Jonathan Tapper undoubtedly recognised this when he asked to keep a Mk1 in theatre for this sortie - but, as was confirmed in the BOI evidence, his request was refused.

Airworthiness Summary

In making its early decision to “eliminate as possible causes: major technical malfunction or structural failure of the aircraft prior to impact” and to focus “on the crew’s handling and operation of the aircraft” the Board, including the Review process not only ignored taking potentially significant evidence but also failed to follow up evidence showing potential airworthiness, engineering and maintenance issues that was placed before it. As such, either by direction or of its own volition, the Board behaved in a partial and inconsistent manner and their findings were heavily biased in favour of a verdict that ensured that the RAF themselves were not questioned on their decisions and shortfalls in their processes.

Even with these limitations on their investigations the Board did not find any human failings in either pilot with their only criticism being an error of judgement by Flt Lt Tapper in terms of the attempted climb over the Mull (but the Board never explains why, with the waypoint changed, they assumed that they planned to overfly the Mull at all). The change in verdict to Gross Negligence by the Senior Reviewing Officers, could not have been justified if the available evidence had been correctly analysed and followed up. Such actions would have shown that the airworthiness status of the Chinook HC2 fleet at that time, potentially coupled with a major technical defect on ZD 576 itself, was a plausible alternative cause for the accident.

JSP 318 (Regulation of Ministry of Defence Aircraft) defines “Airworthiness” as “the ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, groundcrew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which the airborne systems are flow

The Board’s Terms of reference do not specifically task the Board to look at whether the aircraft was “airworthy” in terms of MOD’s own definition of airworthiness, despite the fact that the “problems” of the Chinook HC2 fleet at that time were well known to supervisors and commanders. However the Board is specifically tasked to assess the equivalent “Human Failings”.

The Board, including the Reviewing Officers, does not mention “airworthiness” at any point, and the Board, including the Review process, does not consider the central question of whether, either as a result of the MLU design, Release to Service process and/or the defect history of the aircraft, the “airworthiness chain” was still intact for ZD 576. There is clear, and unused, evidence that it was not, and that there is at least one more plausible explanation for the accident. It is also clear that the RAF’s decision to operate the HC2 at all, against the recommendations of A&AEE, and with the introduction to service problems it had at the time, as well as the choice of the HC2, and ZD 576 in particular, for a high profile but non-operational, passenger flight should be called into question.

The bottom line is that even though we will never know whether, like the DC10 cargo hold door, this was the airworthiness accident waiting to happen, the Chinook HC2 was, in airworthiness terms, totally unfit for purpose as far as its use for this sortie was concerned. This should have been known to all levels of RAF management, as it clearly was to the crew, and as well as having major faults in the procurement processes of this project MOD failed in its duty of care on this particular sortie, and then tried to cover this up by putting blame on the pilots.

JB

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

What about maybe Nige and Walter start another thread, Walter has been asked to do this on many occasions in the past. If they both believe in the Trials Fit theory and have the moral courage to challenge folk with their evidence then they can explore that to their hearts content on another thread :hmm:

My take on this thread is that is has been looking to right a legal wrong doing and at this delicate juncture is it right that the thread is almost certainly going to get hijacked in this manner :confused:

[tiarna]

The cause of this crash is a mystery and unless someone is cliaming that aliens are responsible then it may only then be reasonable to request they go elsewhere. But when people simply suggest a possiblity based on a previously unexplored scenerio are shouted down --well one must question who it serves by doing so? I think it would be a very sad developement if Chugalug2, nigegilb or Walter leave this thread for a more obscure one. The debat is all the more healthier for their contributions. If there was an STF involved then such probing may inadvertantly force the injustice to be rectified now, least the MoD case be further unraveled. If the STF contributed to the crash then the MoD have an out now and would be wise to take it.

[walter kennedy]

Tiarna
Your post has a very significant point:
<<... If there was an STF involved then such probing may inadvertantly force the injustice to be rectified now, least (sic, lest?) the MoD case be further unraveled. If the STF contributed to the crash then the MoD have an out now and would be wise to take it.>>
.
Indeed perhaps they should go into “damage control” mode – this is an opportune time for them to minimise their problems and make most people happy – including me.
.
If they went beyond acknowledging the STF and took the opportunity to disclose an exercise using it giving a full explanation of its planned execution (pls ignore the double entendre!) such that a reasonable man may be satisfied that there was no opportunity for foul play then the pilots get cleared, the MOD has a direction to follow (big review to improve airworthiness, safety issues in ad hoc exercises, etc) and conspiracy theories stop – we all get closure and move on.

[Sand4Gold]

MoD has consistently stated that ARS-6 was not fitted. I believe this to be total deceit and I also believe this thread is an appropriate place to highlight that deceit.

Also,

I have also been shown evidence which indicates that ZD576 was carrying STF equipment on that fateful day and I think it important to establish that breaches of airworthiness regs continued from that day to this day specifically regarding Special Trials Fit procedures.

Was an active, passive or redundant STF a contributory factor in this accident, and were airworthiness regulations breached as a consequence?

Are we still on topic? Yes, we are.

AA

[meadowbank]

Chugalug2 andnigegilb
You queried the lack of response to your posts, but this will be due to the fact that even regular contributors to this long-running debate are waiting for Des Browne's response to the document that we have provided for his perusal and have not been visiting this site. The document remains priviliged for the moment but, rest assured, it includes an examination of airworthiness shortfalls.

[nigegilb]

I doubt Des Browne will be in post come September, hope you are bringing whatever pressure you can to bear. Have to say I was impressed by JB's post, it would seem the airworthiness aspect has been taken care of to a degree.

Perhaps it is best to do everything possible to hurry up the process, before SoS Def is replaced.

[Chugalug2]

meadowbank, thank you for your kindness in replying to Nigel and myself. I can only endorse his comments. The people who have campaigned for this injustice to be righted are principled and fair minded. I wish them well.

[dalek]

Cazatsou, and John Purdey
You are very free with your opinions.
What do you thinnk of the airworthiness aspect?

[meadowbank]

Chugalug2 and nigegilb

Unfortunately, Mr Browne promised a response prior to the MPs' summer recess, which has now started.....erm....without said response. On the other hand, we've all seen Mr B (actually both Mr Bs, come to think of it!) having a lot else to think about recently, so the lack of response is not totally surprising.

The recess lasts until 6 October but, given the salary (plus allowances!) paid to Cabinet Ministers by we tax-payers, I imagine that Mr Browne will now have time on his hands to settle down with a good book (the missive he was sent by this group) and come up with his (correct?!) response way before then. Anyone for a breath-holding contest?

[cazatou]

dalek

I think that, if your occupation is as given in your profile, you should take more care with your spelling.

[tiarna]

Cazatou
Can you be less pendantic and more specific please? (does this help any?) What do you think of the airworthiness aspect???

[cazatou]

tiarna

For once in my life I agree with SFFP.

If you read this thread from its inception (it is obvious that you have not -nor have you read the BOI itself) you will note that ALL the contributors who were actually there that fateful day are adament that the equipment you are talking about was NOT fitted to ZD 576 on 2 June 1994. Having done that then you may consider reading the AAIB report as well as the BOI in its entirety.

Once you have completed reading those documents you may be in a position to comment usefully to the discussion.

[tiarna]

Cazatou

Ops! I have read them. I also have previous experience of other cases wherein, personnel or equipment, are for various reasons not disclosed in legal reports or to the courts.

Like you I would like the truth to come out --the unfortunate thing about that is we will never know it. What I am convinced about in this case is that these men should have their good names restored. I believe that the crash was not the fault of the pilots. If they were at fault then there is insufficient evidence to establish a case against them. If they had survived they would have cleared their own names a very long time ago as being innocent or simply no case to answer. Their families have suffered a double tragedy, in that they lost loved members of their family and then have endured their good names being tarnished by those they served.

[walter kennedy]

Cazatou
<<ALL the contributors who were actually there that fateful day are adament that the equipment you are talking about was NOT fitted to ZD 576 on 2 June 1994>>
Kettle calling the pan black re spelling aside :8 they may have been adamant but how? - how obvious would it have been unless it was pointed out/mentioned?
And there are other ways of communicating other than via the open forum.

tiarna
More like a triple tragedy - that those really responsible have got off without penalty.
And don't forget what we all lost - a most dedicated and competent anti-terrorist team, the like of which we shall never see assembled again without fundamental political change.

[cazatou]

tiarna

If you have read them then I congratulate you. The BOI with its annexes was (IIRC) some 15 inches thick and you would, of course, have required copies of the relevant parts of RAF Aldergrove and RAF Odiham Flying Order Books, HQ1 Gp ASO's, HQSTC ASI's and JSP 318 to cross reference the Orders and Instructions pertaining to the Flight.

Perhaps you would care to comment as to what effect the disparate sub scale settings on the Pilots altimeters - leading to a large discrepancy in height readouts - would have had on their actions in the final few seconds of the flight as they attempted a low level abort. Indeed you may wish to comment as to why there was such a disparity, how it was that the Pilots had failed to pick up that disparity in their routine instrument cross checks and why they had got the aircraft and its passengers into a situation that required such action as an emergency low level abort whilst flying at high speed directly towards cloud enshrouded high ground.

[jayteeto]

Could someone just confirm a fact for me please, saves me going through hours of posts. What were the different subscale settings? I know the radalts had different settings that the enquiry questioned. Everyone else knew that the settings were similar to threat band settings used by crews in the province. If these are the ones you mean, the rad alts would read EXACTLY the same, one alarming as you enter the threat band, the second when you descended below the band. I quite often operated around the world with different settings.

[Brian Dixon]

Hi everyone.

Good to see healthy debate continuing, whilst was (still) wait for a response from Mr Browne. There’s nothing much to add on that front, other than I am aware that checks on ‘certain issues’ are being made within the MoD. At least things are moving along. I was hoping for an announcement on the last day of Parliament when there was the MoD input to the House but, sadly, it was not to be. Hopefully not too much longer for the families to wait though.

There have been several issues raised since my last post. Please don’t think I’m ignoring people as that is not the case. I am more than happy to contribute when I have something worthwhile to say (or to post an update). I’ve also gone from cable connected to wireless internet and had a few teething issues (I know, I know – if it’s not broken etc…). :ugh:

Just to answer a few points – there is no evidence I have seen that suggests that FTS equipment was on board ZD576, whether in an active, passive or redundant role. Doesn’t mean it wasn’t there, but I have read a substantial amount of paperwork and asked several direct questions on this subject and never had even a hint of any such equipment.

Airworthiness does get a mention in the document submitted to the MoD, but that’s all I’m saying on that.

Unfortunately, it is still a waiting game. However, we are confident in the work put in to, and content of, our submission. We also believe that Mr Browne will give the submission due consideration and then make his decision. Until then, as I keep getting reminded by others, I will have to be patient!

I assure you that as soon as we hear anything, our fantastic supporters on PPRuNe will be first to hear of it.

I thank you all for your patience and continued support.
Regards, as always.
Brian

“Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook

[tiarna]

Cazatou

I did not realise you meant such an extensive study of the BOI, annexes and cross-references. If you have read all that then my hat is off to you. My interest is not to nitpick at other contributors as you --like little typos in spelling and things. My focus is an attempt to understand the tragedy and it cause as best we can. Fact is we will only ever arrive at a best fit answer and even in that there will be differences of opinion. Unfortunate I know....

I have no clue as to the consequences, if any, regarding any STF equipment being fitted. There is a possibilty that it was installed, regardless of its status, it may still have represented a threat. Nigegilb made a very valuable post at #3543. It seems one neutralising procedure carried out to disable any STF is to rip out the cabling. The idea being that it returns the craft to it original state. Wrong!! As it is equipment still in it beta stage --its support software is still beta, which can be very unstable. This software is installed in the Chinooks AFCS Computers (which also controls the Baro and rad alts) and presumably left running at start up. On a home PC have you ever uninstalled something and then run a common application like Acrobat or MS Word to find that as soon as you activate it something strange happens or the system tries to connect to a network. My point is that millions of users are using these applications every day and report bugs consistantly --and they are still not bug free. Whereas, military/aviation software is more exclusive and with less frequent bug fixes because they are often only discovered in the field. If STF is involved and even removed --would we really know for sure if the software was left running and may have re-configured something in its attempts to communicate with the mysterious STF? The STF software and Alt meter software are all using the same resources. This may not answer your question regarding the sub scale settings but it may have contributed to the problem.

T.

Ps. One must also keep in mind that there was a high demand on all these resources simulteanously because the SuperTANS was calculating the location at WP change.

[walter kennedy]

Cazatou
What a disgraceful way to try and obfuscate a new poster – you yourself posted on the issue of baro alts and so why would he have to go through all the other stuff to get an answer?
My experience at the FAI told me what to expect from the authorities ...:yuk:
So Caz and Jayteeto I would like to refresh your memories with the information and my interpretation of it below (Jayteeto – it was the RADALT ALARMS that were of interest):
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The QNH at that time at Aldergrove aerodrome was 998,
The QNH at that time at Campbeltown aerodrome was 998,
The regional QNH (used by all aircraft in the area for route flying – briefly so they all have the same reference for altitude rel to each other, ATC info, etc) forecast was given by Aldergrove ATC to ZD576 as follows:
“The Belfast regional QNH from sixteen to seventeen hundred is niner niner one, changing on the hour niner niner zero and the Portree regional QNH sixteen to seventeen hundred niner niner one changing to niner niner zero”.
.
The AAIB Investigation/Racal Report gives:
<<… Barometric altimeter subscale settings were probably at 989 and 991.5 mb. Several defects in the radar altimeter system were identified but had probably not severely degraded its performance and signs suggested generally correct indication at impact; low level warning cursors were at 850 feet and 69 feet, the selection of the audio warning could not be established>>
The “probably” indicating a high degree of confidence that the settings found in the wreckage had been set at these values before the crash.
Obviously the 991.5 makes sense as the regional QNH setting and thus increases confidence that both settings as found were as before the crash.
The 989 setting is a significant indication of their immediate intentions as explained below.
.
The elevation of the base of the lighthouse is taken here as the elevation of the meteorological equipment located there at ground level according to the Met Office – this is 82m or 267ft. The lighthouse landing pad is right there and the“green triangle” landing area (that I have described in many previous posts) is nearby (waypoint A is 280m to the SE) on the same local area of flat ground – let us say roundly, 270ft ASL.
[Using the approximation of 1 millibar for 30 ft altitude change.]
For a QFE (a subscale setting that gives a reading of zero at ground level) to use for landing at that landing area at 270ft el, one would use the nearest suitable local QNH (from Met Office archives, RAF Macrihanish QNH at the time was 998) and compensate for its altitude by reducing the figure by 270/30 = 9 millibar to give an altimeter subscale setting of 989.
This is what was found set on one of the altimeter subscales.
.
The suggestion by the BOI that the subscale setting of 989 could have been the Aldergrove QFE without equal consideration of the lighthouse landing pad nor the “green triangle” landing area (used previously by mil helos incl Chinooks) is misleading for the following reasons:
While the QFE for Aldergrove could have been 989 (at an elevation of 268 ft and with its local QNH of 998), they left with good visibility around the aerodrome and so would not have needed a QFE setting and indeed ATC informed them of the Aldergrove QNH which should imply a directive to use that setting;
It was 40 miles behind them;
They had crossed the Antrim hills with their track over a substantial area of ground in the region of 1000 ft ASL and with peaks nearby to 1500 ft;
There is a requirement that, if you are flying below Transition Altitude, regional QNH MUST be set unless approaching for a landing – that is to say, at the time of the flight, they should have had 991 set on BOTH subscales unless they were imminently landing at (or passing close to) a specific location.
.
The Rad alt warnings set support the idea that they were attempting to land – an experienced pilot has given this description:
”The Rad Alt warnings were not set in accordance with the SOP. One was set above cruising altitude and the other at minimum* where it would have given little, if any, warning of impact with the ground. Again there was no indication that these settings had been altered by the impact.”
*The lower Rad Alt warning was set at 69 ft – this would only make sense if they were imminently intending to use the Rad Alt for touching down in bad local visibility.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


tiarna
The system as described too me when fitted to the HC2 Chinooks seems to have been “stand alone” - however, without a fully detailed technical desciption of the fit I do not know if there was any feed to the HSIs – manufacturers of the on board equipment have supplied diagrams showing the route of data to HSIs which is a normal and common fit – easy where there is a CDU and BUS architecture (eg 1553) that supports interfacing with inputs from several navaids as was the case in even the first HC2 Chinooks (eg HSI can select the nav aid to work from via the mode selector panels – typically either pilot can have his own HSI course selector working off the Doppler/GPS nav computer [SuperTANS in this case] or say a TACAN) and it makes sense to have the handling pilot's course selector working off a feed from such an interrogator as the ARS6 as they close in with the target – but perhaps the MOD preferred the captain having to relay the info to the handling pilot rather than have the trivial addition – do they still use speaking tubes?:confused:
Had the common practice of feeding the CDU with the data from the ARS6 (or whatever it is called in the RAF – we havn't even got that clear yet) been the case then the handling pilot's (HP's) course selector being set on 035 is apparent – from the position of waypoint change to the crash site was 035 mag (at the time) which would strongly suggest that the ground handset (PRC112 that such interrogators work off) was on that bearing from the position of waypoint change (someone on the ground with it who should have been at the landing area but who was ½ a mile or so up the hill for whatever reason explains all thet is known about this crash).
If the captain was verbally guiding him, it could only have been that the HP had selected 035 as an aide memoire for the course to follow – hardly worth it at such short range.
But alas unless some have the balls to come forward describing the actual configuration in HC2 Chinooks when they actually had then (which they did at some time) such discussions can't get anywhere.

[pulse1]

Walter,

Like some others on this thread you do have a tendency to ignore questions, and answers, which do not suit your particular arguments.

May I therefore repeat a question which I asked you some time ago and which you ignored.

If a landing on the Mull was planned, why do you think that they changed the Tans waypoint to Coran just before they reached the lighthouse? It just doesn't make any sense to me, especially in marginal weather and using an untested navaid as you suggest. Surely, they would have used a Tans waypoint more appropriate for the landing site as a back up, either the field itself or an IP.

[tiarna]

Walter

Your reply mostly details hardware and perhaps my post was not clear but when I mention 'shared resources' I mean purely in the virtual sense of software code. The ARS-6 may phyisically be stand alone but if it is accompanied with support software then that is I presume installed within the system cabinet. I would then imagine that it is not reliably 'standalone' if it makes any function or subroutine calls on any of the (virtual) system resources, it could even write a single line of code which might effectly re-configure a shared block of computer code. If you have ever experienced a computer virus then you can see what a single line of code can do.
T.

PS. I only just came across this and you might find it interesting;
CCSR:The Chinook Helicopter Disaster (http://www.ccsr.cse.dmu.ac.uk/resources/general/ethicol/Ecv12no2.html)

[Sand4Gold]

I certainly do not wish to challenge the veracity of nigegilb's statement:

I have also been shown evidence which indicates that ZD576 was carrying STF equipment on that fateful day

But we have to complete the loop here so we don't keep going around in circles,

there is no evidence I have seen that suggests that FTS equipment was on board ZD576, whether in an active, passive or redundant role. Doesn’t mean it wasn’t there, but I have read a substantial amount of paperwork and asked several direct questions on this subject and never had even a hint of any such equipment.

If it was to be proven that a redundant STF was in place, then this opens up a debate of possibilities that nigegilb and tiarna have alluded to.

[nigegilb]

AA, I am wary of stepping on anyones toes here, I do not think it is for me to present the facts known about STF, some facts are still being teased out. My own background is no secret and I have some knowledge about how trials equipment can appear on aircraft. I was serving on a specialist section when our fleet lead aircraft was destroyed in the Kosovo war.
Given that the pilots were SF-trained and the kit was originally intended for such people, there are different methods and routes as to how that trials equipment might have been;

a Purchased,
b Fitted,

which are not necessarily "mainstream". With the MoD teams responsible having no experience whatsoever in the implementation of airworthiness, treating it as an unnecessary evil.

As for POSSIBLE breaches of the regs, it is probably safe to start from the generally accepted baseline that the Mk2 was not airworthy at the time (as described by John Blakeley). It is highly unlikely that, against that baseline, a SM/STF installation was implemented iaw the regs because it is one very obvious area where MoD don't adhere to their own regs. (See Nimrod evidence, for more recent breaches).


Regarding the delayed response from Des Browne. Could the reason for the delay be because Government and MoD has realised the implications of “allowing” an “appeal” which is largely based on airworthiness issues. A “result” on any one of those would re-enforce the position on Nimrod and demonstrate wider and longer term failures by MoD, and stop it claiming Nimrod was a one-off?

MoD suddenly looks very weak and vulnerable on airworthiness issues.

[walter kennedy]

pulse1
<<Like some others on this thread you do have a tendency to ignore questions, and answers, which do not suit your particular arguments.>>
I would have thought that I have made my best efforts to answer all questions put – despite lousy feedback and often misleading answers.
.
<<May I therefore repeat a question which I asked you some time ago and which you ignored.
If a landing on the Mull was planned, why do you think that they changed the Tans waypoint to Coran just before they reached the lighthouse? >>
.
I believe that I have thoroughly addressed this in numerous previous posts if you care to read through them – I will nevertheless summarise here and now:
From data recovered at the known position of the crash, it was possible to make two significant conclusions as to the accuracy of the SuperTANS, which were:
1 The SuperTANS position at power down accurately reflected the actual crash position;
2 The accuracy of the Doppler component was sufficiently accurate to suggest that the a/c had not been manouvring much/had been on steady tracks for a significant period (briefly, if you are turning the Doppler system does not get a steady velocity component and this throws its algorithms out).
(This latter point reinforces the argument that they had been on a steady course and were surprised at their proximity to the ground in the last seconds.)
So the SuperTANS would have been an accurate aid which gives us two conclusions:
1 The position according to the SuperTANS for the waypoint change was accurate (and as can be seen from the maps I posted some time ago, this was very close in);
2 Their position relative to waypoint A would have been invaluable (as had been mentioned by one of the RAF witnesses at one of the inquiries who said in so many words that in changing it, they had thrown away their only accurate reference of use to them in their situation) – so the question you ask is very relevant – and I repeat my thoughts:
Although it had been accurate on the day, Flt LT Tapper was an acknowledged expert in nav systems and knew full well the limitations of the SuperTANS especially after a flight over water (the Doppler usually gets screwed up and this usually is dominant in the algorithms when mixing with the GPS data) – in fact he had warned others in his outfit his concerns over this;
the bottom line is that he would not have trusted it to have been accurate to within ½ a mile or so after a sea crossing;
this has two consequences:
1 with no other (permanent) external radio navaid within range (other than the Mac NDB which would not have been of much use in their situation) there is no way he would have thought it prudent to have got anywhere near as close in as the position of waypoint change (up to and including which they surely had no control problems) relying upon the SuperTANS alone (the margin for possible error was greater than the distance to the shoreline);
2 The only thing an experienced pilot would trust to be relied upon in those circumstances and which would be taken as more accurate than SuperTANS would be a local DME system of some kind – as they do when extracting personnel in exercises and operations, approaching a FAF in bad conditions, avoiding a local hazard near FAFs, etc, etc, relying so often on an ARS6/PRC112 combination.
.
But still, as you so rightly ask, why drop waypoint A in the SuperTANS?
My only suggestions for this are:
1 The captain had decided that the SuperTANS was in disagreement with some other prefered reference and so no longer needed in the immediate locale and so it was moved on to the next waypoint to which they would be headed immediately after the completion of their immediate planned manouvre;
2 If ARS6 was being used and if data from it could have and was being used to drive the HP's HSI, perhaps such data and waypoint A data from the SuperTANS was too close to be unambigious (not much obvious difference) and so waypoint A was dropped so that the HP could not have inadvertently steered on it had his HSI been left selected to the SuperTANS.
.
<<It just doesn't make any sense to me, especially in marginal weather and using an untested navaid as you suggest.>>
The “marginal” weather that I have gone to great lengths to describe in past posts that affected them was the local upslope mist that converged with the orographic cloud at about 800ft – they were not lost in fog but the land ahead had its ground detail obscurred and the hill top topography was obscurred such that visual judgment of their distance off would have been seriously impaired – they would not have approached at any sort of speed without some local, accurate reference for range – as they did not have radar the only thing I can think of is a PRC112.
“untested navaid” ? - it is intrinsically accurate as a local DME and its interfaces with the a/c are by design simple – as likely to interefere with other systems as plugging a GPS into your car's cigarette lighter (as I have described before).
.
<< Surely, they would have used a Tans waypoint more appropriate for the landing site as a back up, either the field itself or an IP. >>
I have been to the site with a GPS and plotted on maps/charts the position of waypoint A – it is the obvious (virtual) inner marker for the landing area (the “green triangle” that I have described in previous posts) – the site used by Chinooks previously – waypoint A is just off the cliff that is the threshold for that reasonably spacious, firm, level area of ground.
The landing pad at the lighthouse (the marked hardstanding) is too small for a Chinook.
You could not want for a better waypoint to put in your system if you were wanting to land on that green triangle – Flt Lt Tapper had himself landed a helo at that site on at least one previous occasion – it used to be used frequently for exercises by mil helos incl Chinooks.
Funny how no one on this site nor anyone in any of the inquiries (Oh!, apart from one of the AVMs who was quite specific about Chinooks landing there) had mentioned the relevance of waypoint A to a known landing area.
.
I hope this answers your questions – now how about some constructive feedback?
.
Tiarna
Much of the software debate has centred on the FADEC – I have made numerous posts pointing out that the engines were found to have been matched – this is a condition achieved when in steady state for at least several seconds when either the FADEC has actively matched them or the pilot has himself matched them with his beep trim buttons – it would be an unexpected state for a Chinook that was experiencing some sort of undemanded power surge or in a situation where the pilot was making emergency manouevres.
The Special Trials Fit (STF) issue cropped up from the clue of the work done on the anti-vibration mounts immediately before the final flight (a common consequence of STFs was initially incorrect anti-vib mounts being fitted) – in no way do I expect that ARS6 equipment (had it been fitted), because of the simplistic interface requirements, had anything to do with any other avionics malfunction that may have contributed to this crash.
Such a system is intrinsically very accurate but, and this is the thrust of my argument that this aspect be thoroughly checked out, the handset on the ground being somewhere other than where the pilots expected it to be would explain everything that is known about this crash – EVERYTHING.
.
Ancient Aviator
There are others who have said privately that it was definitely on board but subsequently are loathe to put their heads up in the public forum – no doubt they have had a flea in their ear.
Why anyone with information would hold back in these circumstances is beyond me – what personal or group considerations outweigh the public good of examining whether a system was being used that could have been wilfully misled by a third party bearing in mind the people on board – the implications for this in our country are just too profound.

[tiarna]

Walter

Thanks for your detail rundown in response to my post. Can I stick my neck out once more and ask (I was aware of the FADEC software issue) could there have also been an ARS-6 software issue. If as you say that ARS-6 was fitted but undisclosed then any software issues relating to same would hardly be disclosed. My understanding of ARS-6 is basically silch, but are there two versions? -exclusively standalone hardware and a software supported version and if so which was fitted? You have stated standalone but both can be referred to as standalone --just as a scanner or printers are standalone but there must be compatible software on the pc to recognise and operate them.

T.

[walter kennedy]

Not operate - just take in the bearing and range data - by analogy, the HSI can get, say, data from a TACAN (via some other black boxes for now) but the radio system working off the TACAN is set up by the pilot - the data is effectively just routed (that is if it is connected at all which we still don't know).
I'll explain the role of the main nav computer in HC2 in some detail by PM when I have a little more time - v briefly just now, it would have to have the s/ware to recognise the data (as per all the other nav data it receives) - not to operate the unit, though.
And I have no idea about the HC2's equivalent of the 47D's HSI mode select panel (which has good descriptions in the public domain) - only that it appears (to the eyeball) to have a good many more options.
Again, for academic interest alone, it would be interesting if someone who was familiar with the systems would come forward to give us a functional description (excluding any sensitive bits, of course).

[Arkroyal]

Caz,

Your post once again indicates your total lack of any knowledge of SH opererations.

Barometric altimeters mean nothing in low level ops, unless you have any chance of requiring an abort to high altitude.

Such an abort was not available and unflyable to the accident aircraft due to the icing level.

The turn left along the coast was available and (most likely) intended.

Why the aircraft continued to imact the mull in local fog is a mystery. It has nothing to do with subscale settings.

Clutch at any straw you like, you have NO evidence with which to assume Gross Negligence, any more than did Wratten and Day.

[cazatou]

Ark Royal

Nice to hear from you again.

I agree that I have limited experience of SF operations - prior to 1968. I would point out that in 1968 and later years one (meaning "I") was occupied with SF operations involving not only "the Hooligans from Hereford" but also other (perhaps less newsworthy} tasks performed by Special forces other than the SAS.

Or, perhaps, I was not?

[cazatou]

WK Warning

I have thought long and hard about this but I feel that the time has come to point out the dangers of involvement with the fantasies of Walter Kennedy.

The theories he has regarding the crash of ZD576 are his and his alone. They do NOT represent the views of any of the berieved families ; nor of the Civil & Military Authorities whose duty it was to investigate this Accident.

I would be prepared to meet WK at a venue of his choice and to receive from him whatsover evidence he has of malpractice in this investigation so that this matter may be laid to rest.

WK

Over to you

[Chugalug2]

WK Warning
I have thought long and hard about this but I feel that the time has come to point out the dangers of involvement with the fantasies of Walter Kennedy.

Congratulations Walter, I do believe you've got a bite at last. Just shows the importance of patience in the art of angling. Caz, you promise to point out the dangers of involvement with the "fantasies" of Walter, but you do not enumerate those dangers. What exactly are they? Or is a nod as good as a wink, nudge nudge? You say that you would like from him:
whatsover evidence he has of malpractice in this investigation so that this matter may be laid to rest.

I would ask the same of you, that is evidence of gross negligence against the two pilots. No need to meet, just set it down here please.

[ShyTorque]

I think it is important to point out that ArkRoyal wrote SH, meaning Support Helicopters.

Cazatou, you were a VIP fixed wing pilot whilst operating over NI (operating under separate rules and different limits to SH operations).

You replied by referring to SF, meaning Special Forces, completely off topic.

How much personal flying experience of RAF support helicopter operations do you actually have?

[walter kennedy]

Cazatou
<< I would be prepared to meet WK at a venue of his choice ...>>
I was in the west of France (not too distant from where you reside) for a couple of weeks last summer and I telephoned you - I told you that I had a lot of material with me - I offered to come to your town to meet you at your convenience - you politely declined.
I was in that region again Easter time.
Does this now mean that you are willing to come to Western Australia?:}
.
Don't be embarrassed - I spent a total of 5 months in UK this last year with all my info, maps, etc and tried hard to get a hearing with anyone in the Mull group - nothing.
.
Now about you and those subscale settings - I believe that you were fundamentally correct in drawing attention to them - trouble is, I found them to be relevant and thanked you for it way back when it first came up - then you changed tack and made statements as to distance from me - and here you go again - where are your balls, man?
Again, you are not the only one afraid of being seen to support this theory so don't feel too ashamed.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Caz,

It's been previously enquired about, now you have been directly asked, so just for the record just how many SH hours have you got and on which types :rolleyes:

[jayteeto]

SH/SF......... This is the Chinook thread for goodness sake!! Since when are some of these people concerned with facts?? It has an S in it, so that automatically qualifies!! In fairness to Caz, he is pretty consistent and is entitled to his view, even if the majority here disagree.

[Brian Dixon]

I'm beginning to wonder if the MoD are deliberately holding off from releasing a decision as it would appear that everytime there is a period of waiting, the same arguments start, followed by personal abuse. It must be quite entertaining for them in a strange kind of way.

How about we all wait patiently (bit rich coming from me though!), or channel our energies towards the MoD to get them to respond to our submission, rather than vent our frustratioons on each other.

Not policing the thread, but trying all sorts in the hope that the MoD pull their finger out!

Regards, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Chugalug2]

Brian, I'm afraid that Nigegilb has it about right when he says that for the MOD to now allow an appeal in this case would open up a Pandora's Box for them. The understandable preoccupation of this thread has been to restore the reputations of two experienced and gallant pilots. In effect those reputations are held hostage by the MOD. If they are restored then the obvious question re-emerges. Who and/or what was responsible for this accident? The MOD knows that would shine a light into murky corners, as it has on the Nimrod and Hercules threads, as it has in fatal accidents on Tornado, Sea King and others. The connection in all these accidents, and possibly this one, is airworthiness or rather lack of. The judge and jury in this court room is also the chief suspect. I would not expect from the MOD; "I dunnit, I dunnit, I dunnit, its a fair cop, cor blimey you've got me banged to rights and no mistake, guvnor". Restoring the reputations of these two pilots is a noble cause, granted. Restoring the proper enforcement of UK Military Airworthiness Regulations by wresting them away from the MOD into an independent MAA will save many lives and avoid wholly unnecessary accidents in the future. I submit that is an even worthier cause.

[Sand4Gold]

Wise words.

Although (sourced from today's The Independent),



Gordon Brown is planning to reshuffle the Cabinet in the first week of September in an attempt to re-assert his authority over his divided government.


All ministers are being told by Downing Street to return from holiday early next month. David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, has already cancelled a visit provisionally arranged for that time.
The Prime Minister's instruction to be in London signals that a wide-ranging ministerial reshuffle is likely as early as 1 or 2 September. It would be followed by a meeting of the Cabinet where the new ministers hammer out a series of policy initiatives designed to win back disillusioned voters.
All eyes will be on Mr Miliband's fate in the reshuffle after he infuriated Downing Street this week by implicitly staking his claim for the top job.
The Foreign Secretary will not be sacked in the next reshuffle and some advisers are urging the Prime Minister to "lock" Mr Miliband into his top team by making him Chancellor of the Exchequer. Alistair Darling, who has endured a torrid year in the post, could swap jobs with him and move to the Foreign Office. One party source said: "If David is so interested in the domestic agenda and attacking the Tories, then this is the perfect job for him."
Mr Brown is also considering creating a post of deputy prime minister with Alan Johnson, the Secretary of State for Health, another potential leadership rival, likely to be given the job.
The Prime Minister is planning to elevate a number of ministers of state to the cabinet table. Front-runners for promotion include Liam Byrne, the Immigration minister, Caroline Flint, the Housing minister, Jim Knight, the Schools minister, and Pat McFadden, the Employment Relations minister.
Current cabinet members who could be vulnerable include Des Browne, the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, the Chief Whip, and Paul Murphy, the Welsh Secretary.



Des Browne
The Defence Secretary, who has struggled to make a mark in his current job, could fall victim to some Brownites' determination to reduce the number of Scots in the Cabinet in order to help win over voters in Middle England.


I will be very surprised if this appeal ends up with the mark of Des Browne on it; I think we are going to have to wait until the next S of S for Defence is in the chair, or 2010.

AA

[nigegilb]

Worse still, I hear that Des Browne hates his job as Sec State Def and wants to leave. He is being held back by greater political issues concerning PM.

I would place money that he is part of the reshuffle in September. This would set the cause back a long time.

Still think he is a decent man in the wrong job. He might respond to serious lobbying now. Respectfully suggest this is the way ahead. I would try myself, but me and Des have had our differences!

N

[pulse1]

According to the Torygraph today, Des "would like to drop one of his jobs. His preference would be to lose Scotland"

[A2QFI]

I think Des Browne the is the wrong man in a decent job!

[walter kennedy]

Noticed this on an obscure site - is this fresh news? Looks like a lot of money riding on outcome - interesting to see differences/errors in tech details/perceptions!
--------------------------------------------------------------
Intelligence, N. 63, 30 June 1997, p. 23


GREAT BRITAIN

CHINOOK CASE CRASHES IN THE COURT


The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has paid almost œ8 million in
compensation to the relatives of 17 top intelligence officers
killed in the Chinook helicopter crash in Scotland, in June
1994. The information was revealed after Delyth Gregory-Smith,
the widow of an Army intelligence officer, accepted an
undisclosed out-of-court settlement (believed to be in excess
of œ500,000) on 16 June. Twelve of the 29 claims against the
MoD have still to be settled. If the present rate of
compensation is maintained, payments will eventually exceed œ14
million.

The twin-engine, recently-modified Chinook Mk2, with 25
passengers and four Royal Air Force (RAF) crew, had been
travelling from RAF Aldergrove, in Belfast, to a weekend
conference of intelligence and anti-terrorist experts at Fort
George, in Inverness, according to the MoD, when it failed to
clear the mist-covered, 240-meter high Torr Mor on the Mull of
Kintyre. Ten Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Special Branch
members, nine senior Army intelligence officers and six MI5
agents attached to the Northern Ireland Office, as well as the
four RAF crew, died in the crash. An MoD/RAF board of inquiry
blamed the crash on the "gross negligence" of the pilot Flight
Lieutenant Jonathan Tapper, and his copilot, Flt. Lt. Richard
Cook. However, a Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry later found
that there was no evidence of pilot error (INT, n. 34 1).

Mrs. Gregory-Smith sued the MoD claiming the helicopter had
been flying too low in poor visibility and had ascended to
rapidly in an attempt to clear the rocky outcrop when the crash
happened. The Chinook had been fitted with a computerized
automatic pilot, called a Mission Management System, which,
using a set of vectors and other flight data, allows pilots to
sit back and fly by computer.:eek:

Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Gregory-Smith, of the Army
Intelligence Corps based at Army Headquarters, in Lurgan,
County Armagh, could have expected to reach the rank of full
colonel by January 1996, and eventually brigadier. He was
posthumously awarded the Queen's Commendation for his covert
work in Northern Ireland. The agreement on compensation for
loss of earnings and bereavement was reached as the case was
about to be heard by the High Court in London. The MoD had not
contested the claim, but had failed to reach agreement on the
amount of damages. Later an MoD official, Ian Burnett, said
his department was satisfied with the outcome, especially as
Mrs. Gregory-Smith had not been required to take the witness
stand.
... -- Of course, the settlement also means that no MoD
officials were called to give evidence or face cross
examination and, as a result, the cause Chinook crash still has
not been properly explained. The MoD may have decided to avoid
a confrontation in court if it "got wind" of a recent U.S.
Department of Justice case against Boeing for providing
defective parts that caused two Chinook Ch-47D helicopters to
crash, one at Fort Meade, Maryland, and the other in Saudi
Arabia. The government claims Boeing knew that Chinook engine
transmissions, made by subcontractor Speco of Springfield,
Ohio, were faulty but nonetheless sold them to the U.S. Army.
The suit charges that for more than seven years Boeing
knowingly delivered helicopters with gears that did not meet
contract specifications. The RAF's Mk2 may well have been one
of those helicopters. Boeing has consistently refused to
answer questions concerning the Chinook involved in the Mull of
Kintyre crash.-------------------------------------------------------------------

[tiarna]

Good find Walter. I can see the MoD would like to use the two pilots as buffers against serious liability claims, but why cover up for Boeings' shortcomings if that is where the ultimate blame might be found?

[walter kennedy]

I just posted that for interest, esp re compo.
I do not see from analysis of this flight that there was any evidence of any kind of malfunction.
Everything points to a controlled flight as planned until something misled them re range from LZ.
Malpractice by someone on the ground - not malfunction of the a/c.

[ShyTorque]

Walter,

As I have pointed out to you on more than one occasion in the past, SH crew do NOT fly at high speed whilst searching for a landing site, either ground led or not. Especially in marginal weather. To approach at high speed goes against the very basis and logic of helicopter operations; either routine military, special ops, or civilian ops.

I don't think for one moment this is what they were trying to do. This one fact makes nonsense of your theory that the crew were trying to locate a point on the Mull and land and were led astray for reasons unknown, accidental or deliberate.

There are a number of other possibilities, as discussed here over many years.

The one thing I do agree with you about is that there was malpractice by persons on the ground. This was not by men in green or black, on the Mull, but by senior officers who recklessly insisted that the Mk2 was flown in any capacity on that fateful day. Especially in view of the concerns of the crew involved, other crews who had been required to operate it both in NI and in the Falkland Islands and most particularly by the Boscombe Down test pilots, who refused to fly the type any more (theoretically preventing its use by the RAF) until the issues over its safety had been resolved.

[Vertico]

ShyTorque,

As I've said on this thread before, as an ex-Boscombe Down tp myself, I find it simply mind-boggling that the flight was allowed to go ahead the day after Boscombe had declared the type unfit to fly, even for a flight test programme.

The reason for carrying out such programmes is to find faults in aircraft or their equipment which need to be fixed before the type or equipment can be cleared for Service use. It is all too common for quite alarming faults to be found. Usually, there are ways of working around problem areas pending a "fix" so that the programme is not brought to a standstill - with the inevitable delay then to the Service clearance.

As I have written here before, in all my years at Boscombe it was extremely rare for a whole trial to be halted because the aircraft type concerned was considered unsafe for flight - and unprecedented for the RAF/Navy/Army then to continue to operate the type. The importance of this particular mission simply emphasises the absurdity of the senior Commanders' decision to allow the flight to proceed. That decision is all the more absurd in the light of the crew's concerns, which you mention.

[walter kennedy]

ShyTorque
<<As I have pointed out to you on more than one occasion in the past, SH crew do NOT fly at high speed whilst searching for a landing site ...>>
And as I have gone to great efforts to point out:
the weather was typical and that the component of greatest significance was localised on the slopes;
they could have seen those slopes from NI coast;
at what speed do you approach a known position with a local aid giving you exact range in clear conditions?;
at what distance to go do you start to slow down? (The evidence according to Boeing's analysis was that they had already started to do so.);
what sort of distance do you need to slow down (smoothly even) from cruise to <80kts?;
if they had thought themesleves, say, ½ a mile further away from those misty slopes, would this have made sense?
.
You could have gone to the Mull in the last 14 summers to get familiar with these typical conditions – why not?
Flying in the clear over the sea but with visual cues to range obscurred on the landmass:
you wouldn't go fast that way unless there was something else you were relying upon – you would not have gone in at their speed as close as the position of waypoint change unless you had something else that you trusted more than the SuperTANS that was telling you that you had a bit more to go (as I have described in a recent post, you would have to have erred on the safe side regarding the SuperTANS and the position of waypoint change – according to the SuperTANS which was deemed to have been accurate over the time of interest by AAIB et al – was already so close in that a turn or other action would have been required before they dumped waypoint A.
.
<<I don't think for one moment this is what they were trying to do. This one fact makes nonsense of your theory that the crew were trying to locate a point on the Mull and land and were led astray for reasons unknown, accidental or deliberate.>>
“Trying to locate” is not the same as going for a known position – I am saying that it was a judgment of distance that screwed them – imagine how even in clear conditions a TACAN on the deck of a ship giving a wrong range reading would spoil your day – I cannot see why you are having such diifficulty understanding this concept - whether you agree with the whole scenario or not is irrelevent, it is a concept worth understanding, a possible case study that could help prevent other similar approaches going wrong.
As I have said before, they had started slowing down which at cruising speed would have had the engines at the lowest power setting for any flight profile - there was no room at that site for an overrun and their low power situation would not have left any significant thrust above that required to maintain altitude (except for the stored energy in the rotors which had been found to have reduced to about 90% normal rpm by impact) such that any significant turn away would have resulted in an immediate loss of height;
The engines being found at a matched power level indicated very little time to react so they were surprised in the last seconds – there had not been time to get the engines to start spooling up despite the full collective found (turbine lag/FADEC response time).
The only manouevre appropriate that offered a chance of slowing down significantly was a slew (takes no energy as twin rotors are unstable in this axis) – and that is what it looked like they had started – a recognised manoevre for Chinooks but one which was described in one of the inquiries as not being so.:confused:

[ShyTorque]

Vertico, Yes I totally agree, you echo my point, exactly. I believe the MOD decided to protect a tragically flawed decision (somewhere in the command chain) to go against normal airworthiness procedures, which had been breached in the case of this aircraft. I believe this was because of a lack of airframes mainly caused by the unexpected and unprecedented problems experienced with the engine software. As aircrew we were always warned about "press-on-itis"; in this a case it was senior management suffering from that malaise, with respect to the too-hasty insistence that the type was ready for service.

Walter, Do you think in my 30 years of aviation, almost all of it at low level at the time of this accident, and some of it in the same operational theatre, I might not have encountered marginal weather such as this before and not found myself in a similar situation to this crew? To operate in similar weather conditions was (and is) far from unusual for RAF support helicopters, despite what the likes of Cazatou might try to put across here, because he can only relate from his own experience, to fixed wing operations above safety altitude in such weather.

I do not believe this crew were attempting a landing on or near the Mull. Whether "special" homing equipment was or was not fitted (and I have never seen evidence to suggest that it was), the final flight parameters of this aircraft simply do not fit in with a crew attempting a landing, especially in poor weather. Group Captain Pete Crawford (who I knew quite well) said exactly the same thing during the original investigation.

It is important to understand that the most critical thing about a field landing is that the crew are spatially orientated with their surroundings. The physical capability of the rate of slowing of the aircraft is secondary; a crew would never attempt to initially increase speed using maximum power to a high cruise speed and then use a maximum rate of slowing. This applies whether a DME of any sort is in use. That type of equipment would not be used as the primary navigation aid in low level operations to a field landing site, especially on unfamiliar, high ground in marginal weather.

[walter kennedy]

Shytorque
I do not understand why you are changing the parameters from those described – I would be grateful for answers to some of those questions that I put to you as you would surely be able to answer them off the top of your head with your experience.
.
<<the final flight parameters of this aircraft simply do not fit in with a crew attempting a landing ...>>
Baro Alt subscale appropriate QFE for altitude of LZ;
One RADALT warning set on minimum appropriate for imminent landing;
Deliberate turn to heading from position of waypoint change to LZ;
HP's course selector on that heading;
Slowing down;
Call sign appropriate for SAR exercise.
.
<< ... especially in poor weather.>>
But what about the localised weather that I described? I maintain that it was not poor at low level over the sea.
.
<<... a crew would never attempt to initially increase speed using maximum power to a high cruise speed and then use a maximum rate of slowing.>>
Where did that come from? - after a long leg at cruise speed they had started to slow down. As I asked you before, what distance would have been reasonable for a smooth slowing (thrust just balancing weight letting speed wash off with drag)?
Would they have been OK with ½ mile more?
.
<<That type of equipment would not be used as the primary navigation aid in low level operations to a field landing site>>
mmmh .... that is one of the main reasons it is intended for, surely? It is even used to mark local hazards to temp landing zones/ Forwrad Air Fields/ whatever you call them – in other NATO countries anyway. Have you ever used it or at least are you familiar with it?
Very useful tool for insertion/resupply/extraction etc etc..
.
<<... especially on unfamiliar, high ground in marginal weather. >>
It was not unfamiliar ground to mil helos who used to come over from NI to that site for training or rather perhaps drop off squaddies for training – Flt Lt Tapper had landed there before – it is quite spacious, the hazard being the very steeply rising ground ahead leaving no room for a wave off in that direction – at their angle of approach to the coast, a slight turn left would have kept them clear.
What do you know of the past use of this site? (You mention much time operating in the area.) - you'd hardly be causing a security problem now, would you?
.
You see, you say you have all that experience and as no one else contadicts that I have to believe your claim – but some of what you say is in conflict with what others have said (in aviation but not on this forum and in the avionics business and in the field of navigation systems) and with common sense and with local knowledge (some personal local knowledge and a lot of locals' knowledge). Reasonable rebuttals that make sense would be gladly accepted as it would have saved so much time but you (plural here) so often dismiss certain points in a way ... well why don't I give an example of one issue at the end of this post?.
.
There is no evidence whatsoever for an airworthiness problem if you analyse the flight in detail whereas everything that is known fits with an exercise (callsign) deliberately approaching a specific location that had been used by Chinooks before (waypoint A was the inner marker for it and they did a deliberate turn [course selector was same as track on final leg] towards it) being ready to land (alt s/scale per QFE, RADALT warning min, slowing down) and having a local reference of some kind in which they had more confidence than the SuperTANS (doesn't leave much, does it?).
.
EXAMPLE OF DEBATE
This is from memory just now.
Remember the squawk code and the radar issue?
I asked was there any significance to the sqawk code as found (7760).
Ans, NO – probably got there while they were changing 7000(?) to an emergency one or perhaps got there due to impact – 7760 had no significance.
Oh, I thought, that's a shame because it could have been an important clue as to what they were doing – I had been told by someone in a position to know at EuroControl (as I recall it was) that the UK at the time was short of codes for special exercises and may use a code from its domestic allocation where there is no confusion – and 7760 being a domestic one for use in the area of the Channel Islands (so no confusion), this seemed worth following up.
My misgivings as to the practice of changing code in an immediate emergency and my doubts as to whether impact could have got to that combination aside, I asked what it had been earlier in the flight.
Ans, various like Aldergrove had no secondary radar at the time and Tyree was out of range.
Then I mentioned a report in the press by a reputable journalist that someone had seen recordings of the flight at Prestwick – said that the track looked like they had gone straight in or something like that (ie there must have been enough/multiple returns that were plenty enough to get a definite track).
Ans, various strenuous denials that it could have been possible, people claiming to have been there and there was no record or rather that there was nothing on the recordings that they saw – even someone making the puerile remark that Prestwick aerodrome radar would not have got it (obviously).
I pressed the journalist who could not give me the identity of his source but was adamant that the person was senior, in a position to know, and had seen recordings.
Now here is the important bit – no one here had mentioned Lowther Hill!
Fancy that – the main site for the area of interest and no one mentioned it – Lowther Hill feeds to the control centre at Prestwick.
So I ran a propagation model that uses actual topographic data from the shuttle for the terrain – you actually have line of site down to their cruising altitude from the point where they got their feet wet up to close to the Mull – at the range from Lowther and with the Chinook presenting just about broadside you'd expect a strong return on primary radar, never mind secondary.
For it to have been otherwise would beg the question "how could this area not have had radar cover, between the NI coast and the mainland, right down to low level, in those times?".
I also dug out a story about the air ambulance that crashed into the sea a good deal further away (west of Mac runway) which, though presenting its tail end (presumably a smaller radar cross-section than the broadside of a Chinook) was held with consistency by the primary radar as well as the secondary.
One would have thought that at least a couple of secondary returns would have come back from the Chinook which would have confirmed the squawk code.
So in this example, it is important to realise the sequence of the rebuttals and the omissions – a simple, reasonable answer in the first place would have saved so much time.
Oh and we still don't know what it was.

[ShyTorque]

Walter, from this post and many others, you still seem to think there is a conspiracy amongst us to keep "the truth" from coming out. You obviously believe you have found the answer and have put in a huge amount of work to prove yourself correct. Unfortunately, many military and ex-military folk here have tried to tell you that this equipment was NOT fitted to this aircraft. Certainly, it was not in use in the RAF to the best of my knowledge at the time of the accident (and never had been).

I was an SH pilot from 1979 and an Operational Conversion Unit instructor from 1984. From 1979 the original TANS came into service. It was widely publicised because we had to learn how to use it and how to teach others to use it. It was certainly no secret, although it revolutionised helicopter navigation. Why would another piece of equipment, effectively a mobile DME and far from revolutionary, be kept secret from crews likely to have to use it or to teach others to do so? It defies logic.

I'm afraid if you want any of the other more detailed questions answering by myself you will now have to begin your own thread on the subject, as I've asked you to do many times before.

[jayteeto]

If you had to carry out an emergency Tans or RNS252 approach in poor weather, you certainly kept the speed to an absolute minimum during the approach whilst IMC and near to the ground. I stated years ago, try and drive down the motorway at 70mph with your eyes shut and that equates to flying low level/high speed/IMC. You just don't do it. In other words, even if they did have special kit fitted (they didn't), this would not have been the approach profile. If it was special trial kit, you would certainly back everything up on the RNS252 to x-refer, but they didn't, because they were not doing it. When will you understand Walt?? I was in the planning room with the crew and in the crewroom pre-flight. I even remember jealously looking at their planned route and particularly at the golf clubs ready to be loaded. It was a thinly disguised golf jolly for a bunch of senior officials who deserved the break. Some of them were missing body parts thanks to the IRA. Should the crew have launched?? Debatable for a MK2, certainly with a MK1. They were told to get on with it, even after trying to cancel. We all knew the chinooks were grounded at Boscombe, we talked about it!! Would you carry out such a risky approach in an aircraft you didn't fully trust?? If you knew Jon Tapper, you wouldn't even suggest it!! Walter, you make me very very very sad with your rambling. Cover up????? If there was a cover up, I would fight to make it public!! :(

[walter kennedy]

ShyTorque
<<Unfortunately, many military and ex-military folk here have tried to tell you that this equipment was NOT fitted to this aircraft. Certainly, it was not in use in the RAF to the best of my knowledge at the time of the accident (and never had been).>>
Unfortunately someone in a position to know has told me otherwise on both points - better update yourself.
And what is the big deal about answering those simple questions? - just do it.


Jayteeto
Still don't understand the weather? - you've never approached a misty headland at low level over sea? They were in the clear until just before impact - simple - do you believe that they were in IMC at low level? - you're not giving them much credit.
.
The pair of you are just time wasters, eh?

[ShyTorque]

So you must resort to insults yet again because folk will not go along with you.

And what is the big deal about answering those simple questions? - just do it.

Take off your blinkers. Just open another thread.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

"The pair of you are just time wasters, eh?"

Pretty obnoxious even by your standards Walter. You ask questions and when you do not like the answers you simply throw insults and stamp your petty little feet.........that'll give credibility to your non argument.

You have the thoughts of an experienced SH pilot of 30 years standing and the written observations of another SH pilot who was actually there as the crew were auth'd on that fateful day and you dismiss them as time wasters :ugh:

Not sure about the identity of Shy but I flew with with JT on numerous occasions during my NI days and would trust what he has to say implicitly, so take notice you ar@e :}

Considering some of the recent posts on here I am reasonably certain where your "Unfortunately someone in a position to know has told me otherwise on both points" has come from and if your whole theory now hangs on that....................................:rolleyes:

[jindabyne]

Walter K

I don't know why I'm wasting bandwidth on you, but can I tell you that if you had any remaining credibility on here, you have just expended it with your insulting and unwarranted remarks in your last post. We almost met up in London during your last visit to the UK, at your request - it's as well that we didn't.

[Brian Dixon]

Walter,
why don't you simply write to the MoD and use the Freedom of Information Act? Ask them all about whether ZD576 was fitted with and/or carrying any additional equipment.

That should give you the answers you seek. If they write back and refuse to confirm/deny, then that will have to be dealt with at the time.

I hope this can remain the dignified campaign it was meant to be.

Good luck with your questions.
Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[jayteeto]

I wrote a long reply but then decided not to press submit, so here is the short version. If I have wasted peoples time by telling the facts that I know from that day, then I am truly sorry and apologise to you all. The facts obviously don't matter. I believe a time waster is someone who clouds the truth with wild theories and lies, ie they waste your valuable time..... hmmmmmm.......

[Sand4Gold]

If we took all the mud-slinging away, I do find some of Walter's replies thought provoking. Recent posts by nigegilb and tiarna, in response, do invite questions that remain unanswered.

However, I do not believe there was a secondary mission that day.

I was in the planning room with the crew and in the crew room pre-flight. I even remember jealously looking at their planned route and particularly at the golf clubs ready to be loaded. It was a thinly disguised golf jolly for a bunch of senior officials who deserved the break.

I agree with Jayteeto here, I met Jon as he was descending the stairs - opposite the entrance to the Sqn - he had just retrieved his survival equipment. I recall him being slightly tired and I got the impression that if he had had a choice he would of preferred not to have flown anymore that day.

What caused the accident? I do not know, neither does Walter. Again, I still think the debate should be allowed to continue without restrictions being placed on individuals. Something may come of it; stranger things have happened.

AA

[Chugalug2]

AA, I hope that your post will encourage everyone to just take stock. We seem to have arrived at a stage where the consensus is represented as a tacit agreement to sit on our hands and wait for a SoS to announce on his way out of the office for the last time that; "By the way, those pilots in the Mull Chinook were not guilty of Gross Negligence after all". That has been the case for the last 8 months or so. The result has been a fractured and often irritable spat at most in the way of discussion. Most who post here are, or were, professionals in Military Aviation. If the majority, who believe Wratten and Day's verdict to have been very wrong, are honest there has to be a core reason for the crash. Unlike Walter I feel that the Airworthiness cloud that hung over this fleet culminating in the unprecedented scenario of a type which BD would not fly though the Squadrons were obliged to holds the key. If that is a likely cause then it should be examined minutely. Why? Because Military Airworthiness implementation was not only found wanting on this Fleet, but on Tornado, Sea King, Nimrod and Hercules, all of which suffered fatal accidents, all of which had airworthiness shortcomings that were causal factors. The MOD's stewardship of Airworthiness Provision is a boil that must be lanced and swiftly too, or this forum will have further lengthy anguished threads like this one. W&D's Red Herring is obvious for what it is, a disgrace to a proud service. If the RAF does not want to go down with the MOD it should disown the verdict, and them, without delay.

[Arkroyal]

Caz,

SH = Support Helicopters

SF = Special Forces

I believe you have zero experience in SH. Any fixed wing experience with SF is irrelevant to this arguement.

I (meaning 'one') spent a long time in SH sometimes involved with SF. I would ask expert opinion before forming any views on the competence of a truckie. Maybe you could glean some expert opinion on SH from these posts and digest them.

[tiarna]

I think Walters' slight outburst unfortunate, he has unwaveringly followed a track that perhaps frustration has taken a toll. Even if he is wrong, his probing is exacting and thorough. Unless anyone can give the exact cause of the crash then no avenue should be left unexplored. Perhaps some could be more co-operative with him rather than taking the first oppurtunity they can to denigrate and obstruct his investigation. No theories on this crash put forward to date have been without holes. If all the facts are known then the best fit theory can be determined. Shouting down Walters' theory for ones own preferred version does not mean his is wrong, especially if there are other facts having gone unconsidered.
If ARS-6 was or was not fitted is still debatable regardless of who said it was not --there could have been an operational or other consideration as to why that information might have been withheld. For those of you with sufficient experience may have come across such cases where the Freedom of Information Act does not tread.

[dervish]

why don't you simply write to the MoD and use the Freedom of Information Act?


For those of you with sufficient experience may have come across such cases where the Freedom of Information Act does not tread.


My understanding of the Act is that information provided under it does not have to be accurate. I think someone posted about this before but maybe not on this thread.

[walter kennedy]

Chugalug2
<<... the unprecedented scenario of a type which BD would not fly though the Squadrons were obliged to holds the key.>>
I agree - and with those VIPs on board - perhaps it had after all been planned to use this a/c weeks beforehand and it was a damn nuisance for the planners that BD took this step - I think you should all do your best to look at the planning of this flight.:E

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Walter,

I have asked before but can you please tell us how the equipment you mention actually got fitted to the aircaft in question, who fitted it, who briefed the crew on how to operate it and who briefed the authorising officer for the trip on what was going to happen?

[tiarna]

Seldomfitforpurpose,

Good god man! :ugh: have you not followed Walters' posts??:ugh: He has gained some information that suggests there was an STF involved with this aircraft --all the difficulty you and others have been having with him is his repeated attempts at confirming the very questions that you yourself are now asking of him! I will spell it out for you --If --HE --KNEW --THE --ANSWERS --TO --THOSE --QUESTIONS --HE --PROBABLY --WOULD --NOT --BE --ASKING.
T.

PS: Now I understand W. frustration!!

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

tiarna

I spent the first 14 years of my service life as an aircraft technician and my question from early this morning is as valid now as it has been when previously asked. I know how new equipment gets fitted to aircraft.......do you :rolleyes:

The question I have asked is quite simple and therefore should not be too difficult to answer. All I am asking is, if the supposed secret equipment was installed then how come after all this time not a soul has come forward to tell us about it?

It would have needed some sort of installation process by aircraft engineers whether they be from 7 Sqn itself, some external agency (IPT etc) or Boeing are you seriously suggesting someone would not have exposed it by now :eek:

Lets suppose that the kit was on board then who conducted the relevant training for the aircrew who would fly and operate said equipment, surely after all this time someone would have come forward from that empire to let the cat out of the bag.

Now lets suppose that the installation and training was all done in complete secrecy and has remained buried............. what about the crews themselves.

7 SF is a very close knit community would you have us believe that apart from the 4 crew members souls who sadly perished not a single other soul would have had even the remotest idea about Walter suggests

Do you then suggest that the authorising officer or any of the other senior management involved have kept quiet all this time out of some sort of loyalty to the "System"

The cynic in me tells me that with that many folk involved there is simply no way it could have stayed covered up this long and despite "He has gained some information that suggests there was an STF involved with this aircraft" I for one wait for him to produce something more substantial than the continued supposition that he has shown us to date :=

[tiarna]

SFFP

You make a valid point regarding the fit process, and it is possibly one that walter would be unable to answer, but that does not make him wrong either. I do get your point --and also Walter's, but they are not each mutually exclusive. That a secondary op was involved I think unlikely but had something been fitted or removed then that may have contributed to the crash. If these pilots are responsible for this crash then it is not because they were negligent. Given all the known facts, the aircraft had questionable safety records, the pilots knew this, they also knew the area they were flying in and the conditions, airspeed etc....if the crash is their fault, then negligence is out of the question, because they knowingly and with some certainty would have intended to crash. It is much too mind boggling to consider that they switched of all caution and --will to live even. If they are are not to blame then the cause was due to the aircraft and equipment specifically. I believe the pilots did not have a suicide pact, therefore that can only mean that 'at least' one piece of the equipment jigsaw is missing. That could mean something that was on the aircraft at time of impact or had been removed prior to the flight. Walter's theory need not entirely be true but some of it can have been the cause. A theory is just that --neither proved or disproved. So yes you are right but so is he until the final poeces of the jigsaw can be found or accurately determined.

T.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

I know it's late on friday and I have had several beers................but what the f@ck is that last post all about................:eek:

[tiarna]

Seldomfitforpurpose

You wrote

Pretty obnoxious even by your standards Walter. You ask questions and when you do not like the answers you simply throw insults and stamp your petty little feet

I thought Seldomfitforpurpose was just your log in name not your whole way of life!!

T.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Walter/tiarna................................................:confu sed:

[walter kennedy]

SFFP
For the benefit of readers who recently started or just occassionally drop into this thread who may think you have a valid rebuttal I will explain a couple of the points you have raised.
<< ... I know how new equipment gets fitted to aircraft.....>> and
<<It would have needed some sort of installation process by aircraft engineers whether they be from 7 Sqn itself, some external agency (IPT etc) or Boeing ...>>
A long time ago, I asked for someone on this thread to explain how it was fitted but initially no one came forward – and still no one has on the open forum;
a manufacturer disclosed a configuration for several units as delivered to the RAF in 1995 along with an idea of the interface with the a/c and what was involved in the fit;
subsequently PM and other follow up contact off the forum has confirmed the description I had along with trial dates that confirm its presence in early 95 in some RAF Chinooks;
the description was basically a self contained unit with minimal interface requirements that could be fitted or dismounted in about 30 minutes – designed for ease of exchange between Chinooks.
Are you familiar with this equipment and how it was fitted? (The level of personnel and the details would surely be of general interest to many.)
.
<<... if the supposed secret equipment was installed then how come after all this time not a soul has come forward to tell us about it?>> and
<<7 SF is a very close knit community would you have us believe that apart from the 4 crew members souls who sadly perished not a single other soul would have had even the remotest idea about Walter suggests>>
Time for some soul searching – someone who posts regularly and appears to have had considerable experience at a senior engineering level told me that he had tried asking colleagues (with whom he said he had had good relations) about this system – he said he got a very frosty response – seems to be a taboo subject within the RAF – it's no secret in other NATO countries, although they don't actually splash it around for the public – it is used for so many different roles, some of which are understandably sensitive – perhaps it has unhappy connotations here?:E
.
<<... who conducted the relevant training for the aircrew who would fly and operate said equipment ...>>
I have asked this question a long time ago as to when the equipment was first installed and trialled, when was this, who, etc – presumably for sufficient familiarity and training so as to justify ordering multiple units and time for training for Bosnia (early 95 when it was definitely fitted to several RAF Chinooks) there must have been at least one set available earlier in 94.
Flt Lt Tapper I believe had the reputation of being one of the most up to date and capable officers in the area of navigation and avionics – he would be the #1 choice for evaluating such gear for SH.
It is not that difficult to use, it is intrinsically very accurate, and the Mull with its fixed local weather was an ideal site for a demo hardly being a deviation from their route. Don't forget that it was described as a training flight at one of the inquiries – the explanation given being something like shortage of time/opportunity/allocation of assets for training such that often some training aspect was thrown into flights with other main objectives.
.
<<Now lets suppose that the installation and training was all done in complete secrecy and has remained buried............. what about the crews themselves. >>
Two members of separate crews of Chinooks who have said that they had used the equipment have come forward.
.
<<Do you then suggest that the authorising officer or any of the other senior management involved have kept quiet all this time out of some sort of loyalty to the "System">>
Who knows – stuff that has been secret since WW2 is still being revealed for the first time to the public – this crash had significant consequences for a large chunk of Britain.
.
<<"He has gained some information that suggests there was an STF involved with this aircraft">>
Not quite right – as I have explained in a fairly recent post when the STF issue first cropped up:
The work that was done on ZD576 just before its final flight was described to me as having the mounting pallette (of the ARS6 unit) resecured as it had come adrift by almost 2 inches from the deck;
someone else commented that this was symptomatic of a Special Trials Fit as often, when such fits are done “in the field”, the wrong anti-vibration mounts are used (they have to suit the weight of the equipment, the main vibe frequency of the particular a/c, etc and yet so many look so similar that ones with the wrong characteristics are fitted).
That is to say, the work done suggested an STF needed correction – which in turn suggests that something had been fitted in that less formal way – a common occurrence, I am told.
What else could have been stuck hurriedly into that nice refurbished a/c?
Don't forget that the work was not said to have been on the familiar control palletes – it was said to have been on the GPS (as I've said before, I always had misgivings about this reason) and no formal paperwork was raised.
If the work had been on the control pallettes I am sure that, in the light of the BD grounding, there would have been some paperwork or other fallout/discussion with superiors, etc.before the flight.
.
Do not forget the thrust of my main argument:
For some time I have suggested that analysis of the flight and some research into helicopter operations has it most likely that they were heading for a known landing area with the intention of landing or a close wave-off;
that they were using a SAR exercise call sign;
that they misjudged or were misled as to their range from it during approach;
and that this latter point, in the particular conditions on the Mull that day, was the critical factor, there being no room for an overshoot and their reduced power state with the commencement of slowing down limited their capability in terms of immediate manouevres.
The evidence strongly supports the above and you need not delve into any further “conspiracy theories” to debate amongst yourselves and investigate what they may have been tasked with – any so far undisclosed activity identified now gets their names cleared for sure.
The particular equipment that seems so contentious is just my considered suggestion as a candidate that could have misled them - very simply by the groundside handset having been erroneously or wilfully ½ mile or so up the slope from the LZ where the crew were expecting it to be – this equipment is intrinsically very accurate and is trusted by helo crews in the most difficult operational conditions.
My personal hypothesis, with no evidence for it whatsoever, extrapolates the above scenario based upon the conflict of interest between on the one hand a branch of the intelligence services that was serving the government interest in getting a final solution to the problems in NI based upon secret negotiations with the terrorists
and on the other hand the team on board whose objectives at the meeting at Fort George (as I have posted some time back) included more aggressive action against the terrorists and whose members were not at all enthusiastic about the peace process.
The cease fire became effective only a month or so after the crash, the main obstacle to it having been removed.
I believe that that particular branch of the intelligence services, with the support of some in positions of real power, somehow pushed the idea of a demo onto the MOD.
I believe that any such conspiracy would not have been known to the RAF but that it was suggested that disclosure of any such exercise would be a serious embarrassment with serious repercussions – hence the cover up.
Just my thoughts – don't get hung up on them – just use the first bit (exposing the exercise) to get some justice for the crew.

[jayteeto]

:ugh::ugh::ugh: OK you win, I give up. I can't believe it has got to this, to be there first hand on the day obviously has no significance because people are actually supporting this theory. Even if the kit was fitted and authorised, they wouldn't have flown the profile like they did. Brian, good luck with the campaign to clear two of my friends, I won't post again here. :sad:

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Walter,

So correct me if I am wrong but after all these years, all your investigation and all your posts you still do not have one single piece of substantiated evidence to support your theory :(

[Chugalug2]

jayteeto, sffp, I understand the irritation you feel with Walter's theory and how it doesn't match any likely scenario that you can envisage. You may well be right and he wrong, but at least he has posted an explanation of how this accident occurred, albeit without:
one single piece of substantiated evidence
To my knowledge no-one else has either, including the BOI and Wratten and Day,
All the eggs in this thread’s basket are with the hope of an MOD reprieve. It seems to me to be an ever less likely possibility. What was done was a blatant injustice, clear to many within and without Military Aviation. It was done for a purpose, ie there was much at stake. Presumably there still is. Eventually this stand-off must end. Then whence? Ancient Aviator pleads for discussion to continue. So do I. As to the “I was around then and can tell you that….”, I was around Borneo in the early 60’s during Confrontation. All the drops that we did were inside the Malaysian Border, yards only in some cases, but all inside. If you had asked me if UK troops made incursions into Indonesian territory and were even supply dropped there I would have said you were wrong. It would now appear that I would be wrong, despite having been there….

[tiarna]

Jayteeto I think you are responding to your emotions more than logic --even if Walter is wrong. I will confess I have on occassion considered something close to his own suspicion --considering the ceasefire --a lot of memoirs will not be written by those closest to what was a very dirty war. It was no more than a suspicion of mine but walter would probably be right in that RAF would not know. It came to me as a momentary suspicion many years ago.

SFFP will you ever get a grip and attempt something more original than your sardonic oneliners. Big deal you have 14 years experince with NI --will I have have longer and I know sh*t happened and was kept off the books or people 'were there but not there' if you can unravel that one? Further in case you have not noticed the whole campaign to clear the pilots has not succeeded yet so stop nitpicking with Walter's efforts just because you cannot understand things. The whole world is full of things that we do not understand --that does not mean they do not exist.


Chugalug2, very well put.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Tiara

As well as 14 years as a technician I also have 20 years flying experience as an ALM, and in my 34 years of service to date I have found that, in general secrets seldom stay secrets for ever :ok:

In this case for Walters theory to hold water there simply would have been far too many people involved for something not to have emerged by now. Imagine the amount of folk that would have been involved with the procurement, fitting, training, operating and authorising for his scenario to take place, then you can quickly see why I find it impossible to believe that that many folk would have stayed quiet, out of loyalty alone for this length of time.

Walter paints a very good picture of what he believes happened but as I said before he has not one shred of hard evidence to back his theory up.
In the same way that he is, and rightly so I might add, free to continue to espouse his opinion I will continue to exercise my right to question him in the manner I do, although you may have noticed that when questioned on some specific matter he shys away from the only credible answer :=

[paddyfactor]

Whilst not agreeing with Walters theory, it is true that elements of the security services did capitalise on this crash. My fathers entire department was subsumed by a group of ex public school boys with questionable motives something he had fought tooth and nail while alive. Capitalising and organising however are two different things.

There may be an element to Walters posting that does have some relevance and that concerns airworthiness issues in retro fitting items to MOD aircraft. It is this avenue that is worth exploring particularly in light of other airworthiness issues circulating at the moment. It is also due to these issues that Brian might be waiting for rather a long time for any info from the part timer in Westminster. The MOD is running scared from airworthiness criticism and to review the Chinook at this particular time will only highten other deficiencies in the MODs cavalier attitude to airworthiness.

Also I would say to Walter that of all those on that helicopter my father was probably the biggest advocate of aggressive action. Despite this he was fully cogniscent of what was happening in the halls of NIO and had long ago resigned himself to the lack of political will in dealing with terrorists on our own soil. He was a civil servant like all the rest and not an agitator. As a servant he was not in a position to block any peace process and nor would he have wanted to. Also despite his energy and drive even he was tired of looking under his car every morning. There is no motive here, no requirement for convenient accidents. Truth is my father didnt even want to go to the conference and the thing he was most looking forward to was the fishing.

Something went badly wrong that day and we'll never know what it was. Lets just hope some one develops a conscience and finally does the right thing.

On a good note though I bought a new fishing rod the other day and as soon as the weather improves my son and I are going to try it out.

Good luck Brian and thanks again for all your hard work.

[walter kennedy]

paddyfactor
You don't have to make a choice between the full “conspiracy theory” and the airworthiness scenario – there is the analysis which points to an undisclosed activity near the Mull – just that part gets them cleared.
Of course, analysis pointing to a controlled approach that was misjudged for whatever reason does contradict the relatively innocuous airworthiness debate and leads to further questions as to how they were misled as to the range to their LZ.
And regarding your dismissal of any kind of “conspiracy”:
<<... my father was probably the biggest advocate of aggressive action. Despite this he was fully cogniscent of what was happening in the halls of NIO and had long ago resigned himself to the lack of political will in dealing with terrorists on our own soil. >>
Someone else had this view many years before – Airy Neave – consider for a moment his situation (very briefly):
he was to be Thatcher’s intelligence co-ordinator and had replacements lined up to head MI5 & MI6 (Christopher Tugendhat and Sir Christopher Sykes respectively);
he wanted a big move against the IRA, hard tactics and at least a big round up;
he was blown up in a secure underground car park, Sykes was shot dead outside his own home, and there was an attempt on the life of Tugendhat.
Now consider the team aboard ZD576:
despite your reassuring comments, they were also planning hard tactics including a possible mass round up and many of that team believed a military solution was both possible and needed.
Neither Neave et al nor the team on ZD576 could have been stopped as and when they were without “inside” help – certainly many well placed figures thought that about the Neave affair at the time.
“Stuff” happens.

[cazatou]

Walter

You forgot about "THEM" being involved in the attempted assassination of Mrs Thatcher and other members of the Conservative Party at the Party Conference. Of course they also planned the attempted raid in WW 2 which gave rise to the book "The Eagle has landed". As for WW1 their forgery of the "Zimmerman Telegram" was a masterpiece which brought the USA into the war on the Allied side.

Now, may I suggest that you go back and read my post 3217 on 15th February 2008 and then count how many posts there are disagreeing with the content of that post.

:ugh: :ugh: :ugh:

[Sand4Gold]

cazatou,


unable to accept that the equipment at the crux of your theory was NOT fitted to the aircraft

I have also been shown evidence which indicates that ZD576 was carrying STF equipment on that fateful day

Sorry, what bit of equipment are we talking about here?

AA

[walter kennedy]

After 14 years there is one thing that most contributing to this thread would surely have to agree on and that is that after all this time there is nothing known publically that would justify the verdict of gross negligence to a “reasonable man” (in the legal sense) let alone to the required standard of absolutely no doubt.
Bearing in mind how soon after the event that verdict was pronounced, one has to wonder what made them so assertive – indecent haste springs to mind.
Further, let us recall how soon after the event it was stated that sabotage was not the cause – and how equally assertive that was.
Now, which came first?
Certainly, as time progressed, the perception of many was that as the pilots were said to have been grossly negligent, which implied “absolutely no doubt whatsoever”, any other cause, including sabotage, was not worth considering – but was it not the case that sabotage had been ruled out long before any fair inquiry could have taken place?
Does this not suggest a political decision? - perhaps to allay public concerns in view of who was on board?
I suggest that this could be a block to the Mull group's efforts to clear the pilots' names – it is necessary to go back to the earliest decision (who made it and why) to unblock the process – I suggest that this predates the BOI.
Surely the Mull group has the right to ask for a formal investigation into the origins of the decision – if the MOD insists it was made by the AVMs and not before, then the chronology of the statements regarding sabotage become important – if these statements predated the BOI and the AVMs' involvement you would know that you were not getting full disclosure and would need to press harder - who was the source? And on what grounds? Until you get to this you are likely to remain frustrated.

[Chugalug2]

one has to wonder what made them so assertive

Well exactly Walter. That is the question that has scarcely dared to speak its name on this thread, and I suspect that situation will continue. If any part of the picture that you paint is true then it means not only that the finding was a gross injustice and should be swept aside without delay but that it was a deliberate and cold blooded injustice perpetrated by senior officers of their own service. If that is indeed true it is a betrayal of trust and a misuse of power that would have ramifications extending far beyond this case. It would strike deep at the maintenance of morale and discipline in the Royal Air Force. It seems to me that no such admission will ever be made for these reasons, unless those with personal knowledge are prepared to reveal it themselves after all this time. One would have hoped that the pilots have now served their purpose and their reputations could thus now be rehabilitated. I suspect though that the calculation has been made that such a move would inevitably reopen the sort of speculation inherent in your thread. So where to now? This injustice will not go away, and in time the truth will out, it always does. If there is any advice for those in the corridors of power, for my part it would be to give these pilots back the reputation that was so summarily and unjustly torn from them without further delay. Whatever other dark secrets remain will be your preoccupation and purpose to keep hidden, at least you will have done a decent thing albeit long overdue.

[cazatou]

Ancient Aviator,

Apologies for a tardy reply but we had unexpected "Guests" when a Niece and her Family came to stay having been forced to abandon the flooded Camp Site in Brittany at which they had been staying.

The piece of equipment I was refering to was that which WK is so insistant was the cause of the crash. Persons who were present at Aldergrove, and who had walked out to the Aircraft with the Crew, have given testimony on this thread that such equipment was NOTfitted to the aircraft that day. No such equipment was recovered from the Crash Site.

Now we have WK suggesting that the investigation as to whether or not the crash was the result of sabotage is itself suspect. Given the situation in NI at the time, and the importance of the Personnel who were the aircrafts passengers, such investigation took the highest priority. There was no evidence of sabotage or any pre-impact explosion. Of course it is possible that the disparate altimeter subscale settings may have caused some confusion during the final desperate escape manouvre.

Incidentally, may I ask if you looked up the meaning of the word "Ancient" in a military sense before deciding on your user name. Try Shakespeare's Henry IV Part 1 Ch 4 V 2 & V 21.

[walter kennedy]

Cazatou

<<Of course it is possible that the disparate altimeter subscale settings may have caused some confusion during the final desperate escape manouvre. >>
You described the requirements for altimeter settings some time ago such that those as found were not appropriate by regulation, practice, or common sense for the en route part of a simple ferry flight, even at low level.
If you maintain that they were not doing anything special in the area of the Mull, then are you saying that they were incompetent regarding their setting and use of the altimeters?
I am surprised that no one else has replied to this post of yours in this regard.
I find it hard to believe that they would have been using altimeters inappropriately given their experience and ability.
I have explained in great detail a possible explanation for the altimeter settings as found – they were entirely appropriate for a landing or close pass to ground at the elevation of the landing area I have described.

[cazatou]

WK

You have repeated your theory many times so please explain why the Rad Alts were also not set in accordance with the SOP's; something that would have been essential if they were operating in accordance with your scenario.

In addition, perhaps you would explain why they had changed the Supertans waypoint to Corran thus removing reference to the HLP which would have been in the locality of the portable homing device.

Given that under your scenario they had never operated the equipment before, why did they carry out their first ever approach utilising said equipment flying directly towards high ground in poor visibility at a speed approaching 3 miles per minute?

Finally, who were the passengers who were on the flight deck for this demonstration?

[dalek]

Cazatou,
Over three weaks since you corected my speling but ignored the important point. What do you think of the airworthiness question?

[walter kennedy]

Cazatou
Must be your shift, eh?
I know you have read most all posts thoroughly so I'll reply very briefly just to jog your memory (and hopefully your conscience):
RADALT warning set on min was appropriate for an immediate landing in marginal conditions, was it not?;
re waypoint change, I have explained in detail several times why I thought they may have done so – had they the hindsight of the investigators and known that the SuperTANS had been accurate at the time despite their long sea crossing (and therefore beyond their expectations) their actions would most probably have been different – if you care to do the chartwork (as I have suggested to all interested in this case) you will see that the position of this waypoint change was already so close in that they should have turned away earlier (by some margin with Flt Lt Tapper's low regard for the SuperTANS) IN THE ABSENCE OF ANYTHING ELSE TELLING THEM DIFFERENTLY – instead they, whilst presumably under control, dump that important waypoint and turn onto a heading reflected in the handling pilot's HSI course selector setting which was a straight line to the crash site.
.
<<Given that ... they had never operated the equipment before, why did they carry out their first ever approach utilising said equipment flying directly towards high ground in poor visibility at a speed approaching 3 miles per minute?>>
I'd be surprised if they had not used it before – it was in ZD576 well before that flight – and wasn't Flt Lt Tapper one of the most up to date SH pilots re nav and avionics?
They were not in poor vis – it was on the ground obscurring detail and therefore visual cues as to range to the ground.
And it was not really high ground – just that the LZ was at foot of a steep slope and they were in a low power regime slowing down (Boeing's analysis) – distance to go would have been critical.
.
<<... who were the passengers who were on the flight deck for this demonstration?>>
I don't think you would have to have been on the flight deck to appreciate what the pilots told you – how the quicksmart approach to a hidden pinpoint was aided by the new gizmo – “here we are with no mucking about” sort of thing – I dunno – it was what it used for in many scenarios – a useful piece of kit when used properly.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Just to jog your memory

Walter,

So correct me if I am wrong but after all these years, all your investigation and all your posts you still do not have one single piece of substantiated evidence to support your theory http://static.pprune.org/images/smilies/sowee.gif

[cazatou]

Walter,

I hate to appear rude - :rolleyes: -but could your repeat that in ENGLISH please?

I seem to have been under the mistaken appreciation from your previous voluminous posts that you were convinced that you were the only person who knew exactly what had happened that evening - now you seem to be saying that it is just your opinion; one of many opinions expressed on this thread.

If the crew of this Chinook were merely expected to "try out" the system you consider was the root cause of the crash then there was absolutely no need whatsoever for the "trial" to have taken place on that transit flight. It would only have been necessary if the "trial" had already taken place and this was to have been a demonstration of the efficacy of the equipment. I would, however, point out that such a demonstration would have to have been sanctioned by AOC 1 Gp at the very least; indeed I would suggest that it would have needed, considering who the Passengers were, approval at C in C STC level under strictly controlled conditions. No such sanction would have been provided until the equipment had been approved for Service use by the appropriate Authorities such as the Controller of Aircraft and A&AEE.

Having said that; there is no evidence that such a demonstration had been sanctioned - nor that any such trial had taken place. If it were demonstrated that the Pilots of ZD576 had agreed, without approval from Higher Authority, to carry out a demonstration of equipment which had not been trialled on the Chinook Mk2; for which there was no CA Release nor Release to Service and of which they had NO experience; then there would be no dispute whatsoever on this thread as to the cause of this tragedy.

[walter kennedy]

SFFP&Cazatou
Perhaps you can satisfy each other?:E
SFFP wants evidence and Cazatou, with his knowledge, can give him one piece by answering my recent query addressed to him (in response to a point he raised and to which he seems to be professing expert knowledge by his tone):
<<RADALT warning set on min was appropriate for an immediate landing in marginal conditions, was it not ?>>
Well, Cazatou, a simple answer will do.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Walter,

I have deliberately not asked Cazatou any questions as, on this subject he and I are diametrically opposed as to the whys and wherefores.........

However I have asked you on several occasions

"So correct me if I am wrong but after all these years, all your investigation and all your posts you still do not have one single piece of substantiated evidence to support your theory"

Have you an answer to that fairly unambiguous question?

[walter kennedy]

I have previously laid out the analysis "voluminously" - even posting annotated map sections.
I have pointed out many parameters that had not been explained properly or dismissed as having no significance “officially” and attempted to put them in context in the light of information from other sources – hoping that “you” (“”=plural/many posters here) on this thread would hopefully recognise them and confirm their meaning in that context or otherwise give a reasoned, plausible explanation why they were not significant.
The altimeter settings and the RADALT alarm setting were good examples - another is the call sign – and so on.
As I have said so often, the evidence for their having been involved in something extra is that analysis – the specific equipment you seem to be hung up on is just my suggestion for a candidate that could explain them being misled in range, that a helo pilot would trust more than a TANS in approaching a point location, that could also have given them the bearing that the HP had on his course selector which they followed from the position of waypoint change to the crash site.
It is “you” that have failed to confirm or contradict the meaning of so many parameters that could have established beyond reasonable doubt whether they had been involved in an extra activity or not – I believe that I have presented more than enough to justify informed debate into this suggested possibility – I came to this site to get answers – and it will be to “your” shame if it was the case and you helped obstruct and delay the exposure of this.

[ShyTorque]

Walter, I'll try to answer this question (despite your totally unwarranted invective last time I answered a question you posed; I would be grateful if you would refrain from this in future). Cazatou cannot answer with any certainty because he has never been a helicopter pilot and has no experience of the appropriate SH SOPs, rules or limits.

It isn't / wasn't normal to set a radalt bug to minimum for a landing in bad weather (I assume by 'minimum' you mean zero height, or close to it, depending on the individual aircraft installation). That would be rather like a parachute that opens on impact. It is normal to set the bug (to an SOP height) above ground level, whatever the stage of flight. This would have been covered in Chinook SF SOPs. It was normal during my time for the Handling Pilot (HP) to set the bug in transit to the minimum authorised transit height and the Non Handling Pilot (NHP) to set his slightly below the minimum authorised transit height, up to a maximum of 50 feet less. It is normal for the radalt needle to "flick" at low level, causing the HP's warning light to go on and off, but a steady warning would alert the crew that the aircraft was operating below the minimum height and the aircraft would be climbed to cancel the warning.

For an approach, 50 feet was an appropriate setting. Once the aircraft was below that, it was common to re-bug to a low hover height, again dependent on the actual aircraft installation, or a suitable height to keep an underslung load just clear of the ground. It must be stressed that the aircraft would be at very low airspeed, say 10 - 15 kts at this stage, certainly not the high speed at which this aircraft impacted.

I must stress that these figures are taken from my copies of SH SOPs, but not SF SOPs, which may be slightly different. If they were, someone's memory may be jogged to correct them.

Now, in return, please answer my own unambiguous question (now probably the fourth or fifth time of asking):

Walter, WHY do you NOT begin a separate thread on your theory? You have always totally ignored this request in the past. Please do not do so this time.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Walter,

In tandem with Shy could I have an answer to my question.....

""So correct me if I am wrong but after all these years, all your investigation and all your posts you still do not have one single piece of substantiated evidence to support your theory"

Pretty please :rolleyes:

[cazatou]

ShyTorque

My thanks to you and, if I may, a warning to others.

Some time ago I replied to a PM from Walter and, as a courtesy, appended my name at the end of the message. That was a foolish thing to do as a few weeks later Walter telephoned me from inside France seeking to come and stay whilst he expounded his theories. I declined his "generous offer".

With my name and the information against my user name he had obtained my telephone number in France - not difficult as France Telecom operate an English Language Hotline (00 33 (0)1 55 78 60 56 ); there is also a Minitel directory enquiries in English: 3614 ED.

I suggest that everyone is very circumspect when communicating with Walter.

[cazatou]

dalek,

I did not correct your spelling, I merely suggested that you should (as a Teacher) pay more attention to it. Maybe I should have got my Wife to reply as she is the one with the Pilots Licence, MSc and B Ed.

Regarding the Airworthiness of the aircraft for its final sortie; the Crew had flown the aircraft for several hours already that day and had not raised any concerns regarding airworthiness or handling qualities of the aircraft - nor had they raised any paperwork regarding faults or defects. Moreover, the AAIB found no evidence of any technical fault which could have caused the crash.

What we do know is that the crew had received every extension of Crew Duty time that was possible to enable them to complete the task and they were thrown even further behind schedule by the late arrival of their Pax. They therefore faced the possible embarassment of having to ask SRAFONI for a further (exceptional) extension of Crew Duty Time or exceptional permission to nightstop out of Theatre.

Perhaps the question you should be asking is "what was the Fleetwide Modification Programme that resulted from this accident to prevent it happening again?"

[antenna]

Cazatou

Rick Cook's final recorded words were caught in conversation before takeoff. He expressed concern about the engine control units. In addition, i) the PTiT guage was lagging during the Ballykindler sortie; ii) the satellite tracking ghosts caused Jon Tapper so many concerns that neither he nor ground crew got the answers they were looking for before take-off; iii) the AAIB didn't find any evidence of a technical fault but they were not able to rule it out either. Call me old fashioned but in an incident where the remaining aircraft is category scrap and 20% is obliterated entirely, that is not an unreasonable conclusion.

Extension to flight hours was a red herring then and is now. They were flying within permissible hours and Cook had an overnight bag should they have to stay away. SF can handle long days. It's what they do.

There are to this day no answers. Of course questions should continue to be asked. But don't suggest something that is demonstrably false.

The Mark Two crew fleet-wide were barely current. The potential Mark Three crews, and all the attendant dangers in Afghanistan today, are directly linked to the unexplained incident on Beinn na Lice. If we had the answer from 1994 those Mk 3 helis would be in flight in Helmand today helping. They can't be there in support to any real degree because of contractual disputes and risk assessments involving MoD legal services. Whitehall officials who declare cause of the Mull accident known (pilot gross negligence) also look to learn lessons from the Mull on how not to introduce such upgraded aircraft to service generally. You and they cannot have it both ways.

[Chugalug2]

Cazatou:
the Crew had flown the aircraft for several hours already that day and had not raised any concerns regarding airworthiness or handling qualities of the aircraft

Are you saying that there were no airworthiness concerns of the Chinook HC2 at the time? It is my understanding that there were serious concerns known and shared by most concerned with its operation, not least by the TPs at Boscombe Down. As to such concerns being recorded officially by the Flight Crew, just how would you suggest they do that, given that they held them? The only entries possible in the Tech Log are factual ones, ie the recording of defects. Can we nail this dichotomy for once and for all? An aircraft can be fully serviceable and yet unairworthy. The first is the province of the air and groundcrews, the second of the Airworthiness Authority. In the case of UK Military Aircraft that remains the MOD, ie the very authority holding hostage the reputations of these pilots.

[cazatou]

antenna

"Extension to flight hours was a red herring then and is now. They were flying within permissable hours." ----- "SF can handle long days --its what they do."

It was because of people with views just like yours that Crew Duty Limitations were imposed. It does seem to be that some people interpret it as a slur that limits should be imposed when they "know better". I remember the Flt Cdr who explained to the Sqn Cdr (in the presence of 1Gp EU) that these "Crew Duty limits" did not apply to him because he was fitter than everyone else. He did not remain a Flt Cdr very long.

Yes, they were flying within permissable hours when they crashed; that is not the point. What is the point is whether they could complete the task and return to base within the remaining already doubly extended Crew Duty time; something which was exceedingly doubtful after their delayed departure from Aldergrove. Did this affect the way the flight was conducted? Did the possibility of having to telephone SRAFONI to request a further exceptional extension to crew duty time or permission to nightstop out of Theatre affect the decision making process and/or the conduct of the flight?

Just remember that this was a routine passenger flight carrying Service and Civilian personnel. Those passengers had the right to expect the same level of care as you would expect AT crews to extend to your Family. The excuse that Detatchment crews preferred to operate on a "day on -day off" basis does not justify playing the rules on Crew Duty time to achieve that end.

[cazatou]

Chugalug 2

What was the fault that caused the crash?

As there has been no repetition of this tragedy - what was the modification that cured the fault?

When you talk about airworthiness are you including the crew? Remember that the BOI were quite specific that the Detatchment Crews preferred to work on a "day on - day off" basis and that the Crew had been on duty for 9-10 hrs when they took off on the fatal flight. Moreover, they were quite specific that it was unlikely that the crew had anything to eat in that time other than a few biscuits.

PS I think we have been here before.

[Chugalug2]

Airworthiness is defined in JSP553 Military Airworthiness Regulations (2006) Edition 1 Change 5 as:
The ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which such airborne systems are flown

Cazatou:

What was the fault that caused the crash?


Evidently it was the Gross Negligence of the two deceased pilots, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, despite the absence of FDRs or CVRs. That is my understanding of the MODs logic and their apologists. All I can say is that not only have the goal posts moved since my day, it is now an entirely different game played to some very one sided rules.

When you talk about airworthiness are you including the crew?

No I am not, the crew operate to the regulations laid down by the operating authority, in this case the RAF. I have no reason to believe they operated outside those regulations, other than due to Force Majeure immediately prior to the crash if indeed they did so at all. Perhaps you know different and can share that with us.
As to their Crew Duty Limitations, what exactly is your point? We have all been subject to delays that effect our ability to complete a duty within them. The procedures to follow then are clearly laid down, whether civilian or military. Is your case that though you would have accepted the possibility of an enforced night stop away from base, they would have not? Why?
If your case, re airworthiness, is that the aircraft must have been airworthy as no subsequent airworthiness action was introduced for the remainder of the fleet by the MOD I can only refer you to the Hercules and Nimrod threads. To say they were reluctant to do anything meaningful in that regard until goaded into it by public outrage, coroners, even PPRuNe threads, would be to understate the appalling situation that still exists in UK Military Airworthiness Enforcement by the MOD.

[KG86]

I have thought long and hard as to whether to join in on this thread, well here goes!

I am close to this subject. I knew Rick Cook well. I also knew, and had worked with, many of the pax. When the RAF BOI was released, I was one of those who had to knock on a grieving widow's door to explain, as best I could, why her husband had died.

Having read the BOI from cover to cover, it is my opinion that we will never know, with absolute certainty, the precise cause of the accident. There is no, and never has been any, evidence to suggest that there was anything wrong with the ac. If it hasn't been found by now, it never will be. In my opinion, all of the emotive discussions on this (FADEC, STF equipment etc) is futile.

In my humble opinion, the only debate is about whether the charge of gross negligence should have been levied on the pilots. That question remains valid.

Retreating below the parapet.....

[pulse1]

cazatou, you asked:
Perhaps the question you should be asking is "what was the Fleetwide Modification Programme that resulted from this accident to prevent it happening again?"

You have made this point before so I will ask the same question I asked last time which you ignored.

I understand that, at the time of the accident, there was an instruction to check the DECU connector every 15 minutes because vibration had been causing intermittent contact problems with very serious consequences. I imagine that this is no longer current practice in the Chinook fleet so something must have been done to improve the connector design. Please explain.

[Chugalug2]

If it is not too presumptuous of me, KG86, welcome to the thread and, as it's your second post only, to PPRuNe! Given your closeness to the sad subject of the thread you are surely more fitted to post here than most, certainly than I. Like you I have had the sad duty of being the ‘face’ of the Service for a newly bereaved wife, though mercifully she had already learned of that from others. I have never felt so inadequately fit for a task, nor so in awe at such raw courage as that young mother displayed to the world. You are right to remind us of the human cost of this tragedy, that will go on still, whether we succeed here or no. I would however demure from your conclusion that the only debate is whether the finding of Gross Negligence should stand or be put aside (sorry, I’ve rephrased your words as they were of course never charged, and the outcome of the ACMs’ review was a finding, not a verdict). I would suggest that the appropriate finding should be that the cause is unknown. Unsatisfactory of course, but realistic. That would then leave open the possibility of being able to revise the finding in the light of later evidence. Accident Investigation is much like Police work, and cases can be reopened years later if new evidence comes to light, often with the aid of new techniques and new technology. Why is that so important? It is because the raison d’etre of BOIs and Accident Investigations is to prevent future accidents rather than to lay blame. If Flight Safety were granted a motto it would surely be; “Never Say Never”! So there is a point to such discussion. It does not, and should not, have to be emotive but it should not been written off as futile either. There is a reason why this crash happened and it has yet to be determined. It should be the hope of every professional aviator that posts here that one day it will be.
Now if you could just move over a little perhaps I could squeeze in next to you below your parapet?

[nigegilb]

Outwith the primary quest to squash the finding of gross negligence, this is another very big reason why Chinook crash is still highly relevant today.
No prizes for guessing, continued failure to implement airworthiness regulations;

Today's Independent,

A memo sent last month from the head of the MoD's supply department reveals that the organisation is struggling to process urgent orders for land and surveillance equipment to be sent to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The memo calls for staff to be co-opted from other departments for 12 months to plug the gap, a move it admits is a "sticking plaster" solution.

A second memo, from the MoD's Aircraft Maintenance Policy Board, circulated widely in the MoD in May, warns that years of privatisation and staff cuts have left the ministry without the expertise to maintain its own aircraft.

"This paper argues that recent and future changes in the employment of crown servant engineers will soon leave the MoD unable to fulfil its intelligent customer remit and hence jeopardize airworthiness," it says. "[Engineering teams] are punch drunk with additional requirements... and there is evidence that they do not have the capacity to comply with existing regulations...."

Several crashes have been attributed by insiders to either a lack of know-how or loss of experience, most significantly the Nimrod aircraft which blew up in Kandahar, Afghanistan, after a fuel leak in September 2006, killing all 14 men aboard.

In a meeting with the victims' families earlier this year, the Defence Minister Bob Ainsworth admitted that a lack of trained engineers was responsible for the delay in bringing the remaining Nimrod fleet up to minimum standards.

MoD struggling to maintain aircraft and supplies to troops - UK Politics, UK - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mod-struggling-to-maintain-aircraft-and-supplies-to-troops-907211.html)

[cazatou]

Chugalug 2

You said "If Flight safety were granted a motto it would surely be Never say Never ".

As a former Flight Safety Officer I would disagree - the motto would be:-


" Nothing is Foolproof - Fools are too ingenious!!!"

[Chugalug2]

Cazatou, then let us adopt both! I would be the first to agree with you that "human error" is the likeliest cause of any accident, be they fool or otherwise. Pilots may well be the first on the scene of such an accident, but that does not mean that the "human error" was necessarily "pilot error". So someone probably screwed up bigtime prior to this tragedy, but who and where? As a former SFSO I want to know the answer to that question, as I'm sure that you do too.

[walter kennedy]

Shytorque
<<Cazatou cannot answer with any certainty because he has never been a helicopter pilot and has no experience of the appropriate SH SOPs, rules or limits.>>
Well he brought it up and you seem to be trying to get him off the hook – one RADALT alarm was found set at 69 feet (somewhere I had it referred to as the “minimum” setting but cannot locate that ref just now) - you don't need to know what SOPs were to realise that a RADALT alarm setting of 69 feet would have been about right for setting a helo of that size down on ferns and grass in the absence of clearer ground markings and in marginal weather that spoilt visual cues from objects any distance ahead.
The investigators ascribed the highest degree of confidence that the setting was as pre impact and I recall two references wherein it was suggested that their last moment evasive manouevre was initiated when that alarm went off (check the ground profile against track in the last few seconds) – one an AVM at an inquiry and the other in Boeing's “Analysis of Available Data” (the only decent effort at analysis I have come across from an authority) – so I think it is relevant.
<<For an approach, 50 feet was an appropriate setting.>>
So 69 was of the right order for approaching that landing area?
<<... certainly not the high speed at which this aircraft impacted.>>
They had started to slow down and their airspeed had reduced by about 15 kts (Boeing analysis) and had they not been so close to the ground they would not have had such a strong tail wind - if I am correct in saying that they thought they had ½ mile or so to go, it would be about right, wouldn't it?
.
Anyway, it just goes on – every parameter which could point to a landing or close pass is challenged – the problem is that none of “you” (plural) want to contemplate a scenario wherein they could have been set up.
Fair enough, even with an obvious motive for a section of the intelligence services it would have required collusion at the highest levels to execute and cover up – very high levels – you would have to have been a mountain climber to top them.:cool:

[cazatou]

W K

I am one of those few who has "Exceptional" in their Logbook.

I have never (except for a few minutes under the supervision of Buck Rowland) flown a helicopter.

I will therefore accept any correction made to my posts in respect of technical matters by those who have spent their lives in SH and are still there today putting themselves "in harms way".

I agree that I set very High Standards in regard of the standard that I am prepared to accept from those whose job it is to fly VIP's on a daily basis.

What you are unequivocably stating is that, by default, the Pilots are guilty of negligence.

PUT UP

OR

SHUT UP

[ShyTorque]

Walter, read back over the previous posts, your questions have been answered before.

(Re Cazatou) Well he brought it up and you seem to be trying to get him off the hook

I've come to realise that everything written here is likely to be twisted in your strange mind to fit in with your this huge conspiracy theory of yours. Ask Cazatou himself if he thinks I, of all people, would ever try to "get him off the hook". I answered your question because I was concerned that anything Cazatou wrote would be taken in the wrong context by yourself, if it had fitted in with what you needed to read.

I say again, trying to slow any helicopter from 160 kts from half a mile range in bad weather to a landing site is simply not a normal flight manoeuvre, especially where a crew had (going on the evidence of the yachtsman), already slowed down some short distance previously. This is in simple terms, the equivalent of a driver of a truck driving at maximum speed when searching for a parking space in poor weather.

One other thing you have also failed to take into account. The captain of the Chinook didn't want to fly this particular aircraft at all, it is well documented that he wanted to use a Mk1 for the mission, asked for a Mk1 and was refused.

How in your mind would he have been able to complete "your" secondary and most secret mission using his preferred Mk 1 if this (allegedly) fitted new homing equipment was only fitted to this particular Mk2, as you claim? Or will you simply claim it was fitted to all aircraft and the conspiracy is wider than you initially thought?

Brian Dixon, I'm now very sorry to say, this will be my last contribution to your thread while Walter Kennedy outrageously continues to insult. For some time he has inferred that I am part of some MOD or RAF cover up against him, which I most definitely NOT, as you well know. Sorry, my patience with Walter has run out, it's been coming a long time.

Good luck with the cause, Brian.

[cazatou]

Walter Kennedy

Yet again you have managed to alienate somebody who was doing their level best to provide you with accurate information based on their own experience and expertise.

You have spent an inordinate amount of time trying to prove your theory but have totally ignored your duty as a resident of the United Kingdom.

If you sincerely believe that you have evidence that the crash was the result of a deliberate act by a person or persons unknown, it is your duty to present said evidence to the appropriate Police Authority.

[OmegaV6]

Unfortunately (or possibly fortunately from his past behaviour), WK is NOT a resident of the UK .. but of Australia ... so your comments don't apply to him legally.

Morally they do, but somehow I sense that will cut no ice here.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

"If you sincerely believe that you have evidence that the crash was the result of a deliberate act by a person or persons unknown, it is your duty to present said evidence to the appropriate Police Authority."

He never has had one single shred of concrete evidence so therefore any submission would be total bollocks.....................:ugh:

But whats most annoying is that Shy, someone I have flown with and have the utmost respect for now feels that because of WK's meanderings he should no longer contribute to this forum.................sad :(

[cazatou]

OmegaV6

Walter's profile states his residence - what proof do you have of where he lives or that I live in France?

Actually I do - and if you PM me your telephone number I will call you and you can check the phone number.

But then you would not know if it was me or Walter - would you?

PS

Walter's Nationality is that of a Country in Central Africa - or maybe it is not.

[meadowbank]

ShyTorque
I hope that you are still reading this thread. You may wish to follow a suggestion that I followed some months ago and that is to filter out Walter's inputs thus:

At the top of the page, click on 'User CP' then, from the resultant menu, click on 'Buddy/Ignore Lists'. Here you are able to ignore specific contributors and
all you see when they have posted is:

This message is hidden because walter kennedy is on your ignore list.

. . . . . . a highly satisfactory method to avoid being wound up by Walter's tedious posts! :ok:

[Chugalug2]

No doubt meadowbank’s advice re Walter will equally apply to my posts now, for I fear I am going to be an even more “irritating PPRuNer” than Brian by suggesting that by sitting here dormant (well as near as) this thread is doing the work of those in the MOD (including the SoS?) whose philosophy is “out of sight, out of mind”. Nigegilb points us (at #3653) to the issue of airworthiness again. Why does this theme keep recurring? Because here and on other threads, principally the “Nimrod crash in Afghanistan (not condolences)” one, there have been posts showing that from the very beginning of the 1990s the RAF Flight Safety system was deliberately subverted by the MOD to achieve immediate financial savings. The result was that the MOD’s own Airworthiness Regulations were no longer adhered to. In particular the Build Standards could no longer be maintained, creating an immediate and deadly effect on airworthiness, not only of the Nimrod, Hercules and Chinook fleets discussed on different threads on this forum, but of every single military aircraft type in service since then! With the introduction of Safety Cases and the loss of Crown Immunity occurring at or about that time, one has to wonder at what was going through the minds of Senior Officers implementing this meltdown of Military Flight Safety. Their methods though could be quite brutal, witness tucumseh’s post #1432 here:
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/242005-nimrod-crash-afghanistan-tech-info-discussion-not-condolences-72.html
Now it might be the feeling of this thread that there is one issue and one issue alone that matters, ie putting aside Messrs Wratten and Day's finding of Gross Negligence against two experienced Chinook pilots, the subject of review by the SoS. Given that has been the situation now for the last 9 months or so, by my understanding, am I alone in suspecting that process to be one of prevarication rather than review? If the situation in the MOD is anything like as terminally chaotic as would appear from the threads and posts elsewhere on this forum that I have described, is it likely that the “Red Herring” landed by Wratten & Day is going to be obligingly thrown back into the waters by the SoS, inviting others to immediately cast for the real causes of this tragedy? It seems to me that this thread must grasp the nettle and accept that a gentlemanly solution to this injustice just isn’t going to happen. The only gentlemen involved in this injustice are sadly deceased, those that seek to perpetuate it have, I would suggest, a vested interest in doing so. It is now for others with a far more intimate knowledge of this terrible accident than I to do what has been done on the Hercules and Nimrod threads, that is to broaden out discussion on what was going on, not on the Mull that day, but in the corridors of power at Main Building and elsewhere. It is my belief that there will be found the likely cause of this accident. Then and only then will the MOD be forced to set aside this unjust slur. It is my belief that nothing less will succeed than shining a light into the dark crevasses of MOD enforcement (or lack of) of UK Military Airworthiness Regulations over the past two decades and in particular its effect on the introduction of the HC2 to RAF service. It has already been admitted to being a cause of Nimrod XV230’s accident by ACM Loader (see tuc’s post) and an audit report in 1996 stated that loss of experience meant that maintaining specifications had been utterly compromised following savage cuts to engineering project staff. All this adds up to a de facto sabotaging of the airworthiness of the UK Military Air Fleets to my mind. The cuts meant build standards were not maintained, thus Safety Cases were invalid, and thus the Airworthiness Audit Trail was broken. That is where real Gross Negligence is to be found, and wilful Gross Negligence at that!

[nigegilb]

Bad news for the review, but predicted widely. (3 days out on my estimate).

Time to concentrate on airworthiness issues a little more perhaps?

Let's see what happens at trowbridge.

[PPRuNe Pop]

Sorry this is going to cause you more plodding Brian.

I suppose though, that it sorta defines what we suspected DB would do - drag his feet again.

I am sure everyone wishes you, and Lord O'Neill, well in getting John Hutton to take great strides to get this new thorn in his side removed as quickly as possible.

Make JH understand what an irritating sod can be like!

[Brian Dixon]

Hi everyone,
Well.... I've lost count of the number of Secretaries of State for Defence we have now been through. I wonder when we will get one with enough mettle to actually take a hold of this injustice and right the wrongs.

I have to admit to being very disappointed in Mr Browne. Upon submission of our now long-standing document, he gave an assurance that the matter would be given his personal attention and that a decision would be made in a relatively quick period. Now, ten months later, here we go again!

The Chinook Campaign has, throughout this time, behaved with both dignity and integrity, and I see no reason to change that now. However, I now call upon the MoD and Mr John Hutton to do the same and accept that which has been staring them in the face for years - there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict of gross negligence.

As part of his initial briefing, I would hope that someone includes the advice, "Minister, there's this little issue that simply won't go away. Perhaps you should take a look". I would add my own advice to Mr Hutton - We will not go away until this injustice is put right. When, oh when, will the MoD realise that :ugh:

Airworthiness is, of course, an issue concerning several terrible accidents. However, I feel that each incident should be presented to the MoD, and Mr Hutton, by those best placed to present their particular case. After all, why should it be only our magnificent service people who are forced to fight on more than one front!

The Chinook Campaign will, of course, be meeting to discuss this new twist in the tale, and I will update everyone as soon as I am able.

May I thank you all for your continued support and for your patience.

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[antenna]

It was the day after the accident that Jeremy Hanley told the assembled press that as armed forces minister he would ensure the investigation was prompt and the answer would be found forthwith. Fourteen years on, he, his boss Malcolm Rifkind and his boss' boss John Major all say the answer that was found - gross negligence - was wrong and the findings against Jon and Rick must be set aside. Sir John in particular is supreme in his clarity on this point.
Almost all who served in office now publicly disagree with the finding they were unable to change. Give him a couple of weeks but Des Browne would be a fine interview for Jon Snow. I think he did want to change it, like his predecessors but couldn't. And it is that terrifying gut conclusion that worries me most. Who is running the MoD? Elected officials or the permanent government of Whitehall?
I vote for a dignified ramping up of the campaign. Brian is right - this isn't going away. The MoD know it too but are given a break every time the SoS changes. It's Yes Minister, the gilded version. When I helped brief Crispin Blunt, Rob Key and James Arbuthnot three years after the tragedy, they were stunned by the submission. The permanent government had never given them the information and they, God Bless them, have fought tooth and nail in opposition to affect change, to right this wrong.
I say put all the intervening Parliamentarians who have been exposed to the FULL briefing before a microphone. Let us hear from them again publicly. Almost to a man (and in the Lords, women) they know AP3207 was neither applied nor met.

[Winch-control]

I totally agree:

"Minister, there's this little issue that simply won't go away. Perhaps you should take a look". I would add my own advice to Mr Hutton - We will not go away until this injustice is put right. When, oh when, will the MoD realise that :ugh:

It matters not how many people fill the shoes, Justice will prevail.

[Tandemrotor]

As always, very well said David.

PS. The 'other thing' is on the back burner for the moment. Don't suppose you are anywhere near the West coast on Mon?

[Chugalug2]

Brian Dixon:

Airworthiness is, of course, an issue concerning several terrible accidents. However, I feel that each incident should be presented to the MoD, and Mr Hutton, by those best placed to present their particular case. After all, why should it be only our magnificent service people who are forced to fight on more than one front!


Which War, Front or Battle this campaign commits to is of course the business of those who do the fighting. As an Armchair ex-Cold War Warrior (all derogatory terms in the PPRuNe lexicon I believe) far be it from me to attempt to direct them to do otherwise. I would suggest, however, that the "Airworthiness Issue" is very much on the same front, though perhaps in a Strategic rather than Tactical sense. As to your why? Brian, I would say that the worthy aim of this thread, the rightful restoration of the reputations of two gallant officers, would be even more worthy if it also helped to reinstate the proper provision of Airworthiness to the UK Military Airfleets now known to be so severely and deliberately reduced by command of Senior Officers at the MOD. Such reinstatement would mean lives being saved in the future, by avoiding avoidable accidents such as the one which is the subject of this thread.

[Vertico]

Brian,

You referred to a "new twist in the tale". Is there not now also an opportunity to twist the tail of the new SoS in a slightly different area?

Whilst I entirely agree that the airworthiness "policy" needs to be amended in order to avoid future loss of life, can the point not also be made that the sheer financial costs of these losses (and their aftermaths) should also be avoided?

Or perhaps that doesn't count in the eyes of a government which has, it seems, suddenly discovered an apparently limitless supply of cash with which to bail out the grotesquely incompetent banking industry. Perhaps the true problem is that our Armed Forces are just too competent to merit consideration!

All power to your elbow in dealing with yet another new incumbent.

[Brian Dixon]

Hi everyone.

Chugalug2 - I certainly agree with your comments about lives being saved, and I hope that the combined efforts of all those currently in dispute with the MoD bring about a common result. Perhaps it has already started, as evidenced by the MoD's reluctance to introduce the Chinook HC3 into service.

Airworthiness is, as I'm sure all will agree, vital, but I can't comment too much as our document has been with the MoD for 'a short while' now and we have given our word not to discuss its content yet.

For those with access to the BBC iPlayer, you might like to take a look at this report:
BBC iPlayer - Newsnight Scotland: 09/10/2008 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00dw65d/Newsnight_Scotland_09102008/)

The Chinook issue is discussed from 16:10 minutes in.
I hope it brings you all up to date as to where we are at the moment.

Thank you, as always, for your patience and your support.

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Chugalug2]

Thank you for the link Brian. The piece is indeed succinct and compelling, especially the summarisation that the RAF's prime policy is the defence of its higher command, right or wrong. How many bells that sets chiming! My concern though is with:
our document has been with the MoD for 'a short while' now and we have given our word not to discuss its content yet.

I presume the "for 'a short while'" is ironic, but the crunch word is of course; "yet". I hope that has been defined, and if not will be so defined forthwith. The high standards this thread, this campaign, and you personally stand for Brian are not necessarily shared elsewhere. If further lives are to be saved by the drastic reform of Military Airworthiness Regulation then time is of the essence. That is not a preoccupation seemingly felt by the Ministry of Defence.

[kaikohe76]

While I have only limited knowledge on this whole tragic event & aftermath, those who can continue to have an input (Brian Dixon etc) should be afforded a free hand throughout.

The RAF to my knowledge is shortly to have a new CAS, well top of his `things to do list`, surely should be a complete new & unbiased look at the whole event & the following enquiry. Forget any help from the present Defence Secretary & his cronies, his total lack of any respect & consideration for the armed forces is shamefull.
I will admit though,that many years ago during my own military service, I had reason to work closely with the then Defence Secretary Roy Mason & also Merlin Rees, although from the Labour benches, both these two had great respect & feeling for all our service personnel. These two had what is so badly lacking within the present political area, integrity & trust.
Keep at this one folks, the truth will come out eventually.

[Hot 'n' High]

Hi K76,

"The RAF to my knowledge is shortly to have a new CAS, well top of his `things to do list`, surely should be a complete new & unbiased look at the whole event & the following enquiry."

Alas, any "club" such as the Masons, any Political party, any major Corporate entity - and the RAF/Navy/Army - have "rules" which prevent such open-ness. Tis a fact of life. Lets face it ... the current global economic crisis sees an ex-Chancellor, who should have been watching the greed which fueled the current crisis and should have done something about it then, rather than pontificating as PM now, which illustrates this to the core. Like the AVMs, the PM can't own up that, under his watch as Chancellor, a major fiscal cock-up took place - or, rather, was set up!

Call me a cynic but……! In this world, protectionism is rife. What was it that was said following the Alaskan MD-83 accident by an FAA official? “If you really want to whistle-blow (ie tell the truth) in this (aviation) industry, make sure you don’t want to remain in the industry any longer!” I have paraphrased the quote – but it was words to that effect!

Mmmm, tis an interestingly ethical world we live in!

Cheers, H ‘n’ H.

[tucumseh]

Call me a cynic but……! In this world, protectionism is rife. What was it that was said following the Alaskan MD-83 accident by an FAA official? “If you really want to whistle-blow (ie tell the truth) in this (aviation) industry, make sure you don’t want to remain in the industry any longer!” I have paraphrased the quote – but it was words to that effect!


Very true Hot’n’High. The only thing I’d add is “i.e. tell the truth about wrongdoing”, because a bus was deliberately driven through the airworthiness regulations and the rules governing BoIs by people who had a legal obligation to comply with them.

And, while I respect the belated change of heart by the likes of John Major and Malcolm Rifkind, the fact remains they spoke up after they relinquished power (or were booted out). Even at that level, if you fight from within you’re for the chop.

The inevitable result can be seen in the recent Nimrod and Hercules verdicts. Different aircraft, different roles, different causes (as far as we know) but just one step up the airworthiness and safety ladder of responsibility and you get to precisely the same few names in MoD. In case my view isn’t clear, I don’t agree with their, admittedly consistent, rulings that implementing the airworthiness regs is optional and you must face the consequences if you disobey an order to ignore them and refuse to make a false declaration that you have complied. (MoD(PE) / DPA 2* in charge of Chinook, and all his bosses). As he said to me in a letter of Dec 2000, if you don’t like it, get another job.

[Valkyriejmp]

With reference to the Chinook crash: I'm an engineer and during my time I have had to collect a few ex-people from hills and holes in the ground. In almost every case we engineers were the first to be blamed. I have found in extensive flying around the world that if you fly above the ground ahead, it is impossible to hit it. I have flown a lot in Chinooks and "suffered" the terrain matching flying that is great fun until a solid object appears on the nose. The aircraft in question was not cleared to transit at that altitude and collided with the first bit of solid object after crossing the sea. I can not comment on the specific facts, as I suggest many of the posters in this thread can not do. However, I know from bitter experience that engineering is the first port of call for crashes, especially where deaths are involved. For the board to so clearly state the cause as pilot error makes it clear to me that there was absolutely no other cause of action. Sorry, but using emotion to follow a political path is not on.

[Brian Dixon]

Welcome to the thread, Valkyriejmp. Especially as you chose this one to make your first post. Let's have a look at what you have written shall we?

I'm an engineer
On Chinooks?
During the introduction into service of the HC2?

I have flown a lot in Chinooks and "suffered" the terrain matching flying that is great fun until a solid object appears on the nose.
Sat in the back, with little input or knowledge of what was going on at the front end? Did you report this 'maverick behaviour' upon landing? If not, why not?

I can not comment on the specific facts
Then go away and read what facts are available. Look specifically at the rules in place at the time of the accident, the introduction into service of the Chinook HC2 and the history of the documented problems that were rife in the fleet at that time.

For the board to so clearly state the cause as pilot error
The Board didn't. The Reviewing Officers did (after reading the same evidence as the Board).

Sorry, but using emotion to follow a political path is not on
I totally agree. That is why the Campaign is based upon dealing in factual evidence and rules in place at the time - rules that were in place to protect deceased aircrew. It is an apolitical campaign - our current Chair is a Labour Peer, who took over from a Conservative MP. There is no hidden aganda.

I would urge you to read all the available evidence (if you have the time), and must point out that I have no objection to your opposing viewpoint to mine. However, please don't base your opinion on defending engineers, we have no issue with engineers. The issue is that the rules in place at the time were clearly broken by those who should have known better.

This whole Campaign is about justice. Justice for those who have been wronged and are not in a position to defend themselves. Nothing more, nothing less.

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[8-15fromOdium]

I take it Valkyriejmp that you were/are an engineer on Chinooks. If you were/are you will realise there are many imponderables that may have caused the Mull crash, one of which may have been aircrew error. However, in the absence of conclusive evidence to exactly what caused the accident the crew must be cleared of any blame.

I to speak as an engineer (an ex one) who spent over a decade working on Chinooks, including being on 7 at the time of the accident. I have flown with the deceased pilots on a number of occasions including at low level and (as with all Chinook crews) I never observed any behaviours that could be deemed dangerous, you may deem it 'great fun', as many are doing it now in theatre(s) others may call it 'operationally essential'.

Valkyriejmp please review this thread I think after doing so you will come to the same conclusion as the majority of posters here that Rick & Jon should be cleared.
“ONLY IN CASES IN WHICH THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER SHOULD DECEASED AIRCREW BE FOUND NEGLIGENT”

AP3207 – RAF Manual of Flight Safety, Chapter 8, Appendix G, page 9.

Have a look here for further info:The Campaign for Justice for the Pilots of ZD576 (http://www.chinook-justice.org/) (Brian hasn't plugged his own website so I will.)

[airsound]

Hallo Valkyriejmp

I was going to rush in with a denunciation of your maiden post (‘maiden’ with that name, at any rate), but then I thought that if I waited a bit, someone would probably do a better job of replying than I. And sure enough, Brian came scything in with his customary unassailable points, and his unwavering courtesy. And now the Man on the Odium Train, with further good points.

I would, though, like to add another thought. You see, it all seems a tiny bit strange. You’ve flown a lot in Chinooks you’ve carried out extensive flying around the world and you’ve had to collect a few ex-people from hills and holes in the ground. So, despite your marginally tasteless turn of phrase, I think we can assume you’re not a spotty eighteen year old. (Sorry, that was probably an ‘acne-ist’ remark.) And yet, in the six years plus, and 3,678 posts of this thread (to say nothing of previous threads on the same subject), this is the first time you’ve seen fit to post anything. Not only that, but you don’t seem to have read any of that plethora of information that was readily available to you.

So, I wonder who you really are. It couldn’t be, could it, that someone put you up to writing your post, someone who might be getting a touche concerned about the way things are going? Or possibly, (be still my heart) could it even be that you are actually that person? Or am I veering way too far towards the conspiracy side of the possibilities, when all along the lack of rigour in your argument was really just due to cockup?

Go on, give us a clue. Tell us some more about yourself.

airsound

[Chugalug2]

Valkyriejmp:

Sorry, but using emotion to follow a political path is not on.

Wow, that's such a good Username you've chosen! Isn't it a bit of a waste though for its one and only use, or may we expect some more? The deriding of emotion is a bit of a sy slip, I'm afraid. You see your chums have already fielded that one in trying to discredit Chappie on the Parliamentary thread. Big mistake, someone should have warned them, as they should have warned you. Low posts are a bit of a giveaway you see, and maiden posts you might just as well hang up with neon lights and big flashing arrows.
As to:

makes it clear to me that there was absolutely no other cause of action.

That had me puzzled as it seemed such an obvious typo, ie you meant course, but you chaps don't do typos, do you? Could it be a Freudian slip? As has been pointed out the BoI did not find the cause to be pilot error, Wratten & Day did. I have often wondered what was the cause of their action. Perhaps you know?

[cazatou]

It never ceases to amaze me how (on this thread) denunciation turns so quickly to denigration - almost as if it was an orchestrated response. Are those that instigate this so unsure of their case that this has become an automatic practice?

Much has been made of the lack of paperwork associated with the introduction of the Mk 2 into Service - something that I have experienced on more than one occasion. I remember DG and I delivering 2 Mk3 Jet Provosts to Aldergrove for upgrade and collecting the first 2 Jet Provost 3A's to take back to Leeming. We sat in those cockpits for 10-15 minutes and then we both unstrapped, got out and said to the groundcrew "How the **** do you turn these radios on?" It took 30 mins before they found someone who knew!!

There was NO paperwork (including Pilots notes and FRC's) for those aircraft -nor was there paperwork 10 years later for a different type of aircraft;one was that totally new to RAF service.

At the end of the day the Aircraft Captain is the guy who gets to wear the badge that says "The Buck Stops Here". He is the one who can say "NO" if he believes it is unsafe - and "YES" I have said "NO" (even to Mrs T/CDS/CAS etc).

PS My opening remarks DO NOT apply to Brian!!

[Chugalug2]

I'll only respond to your opening remarks Caz, as they were obviously aimed at me. If I have wrongly ascribed motives to Valkyriejmp, then I unreservedly apologise. In explanation, though possibly not mitigation, I would point out that similar posts to his appeared on both the Nimrod and Hercules threads at a similar stage, ie when the issue of Airworthiness deficiencies in those respective accidents was raised. Like his such posts were penned by low/maiden posting members offering little other than to slate the direction that the thread was taking. One particular contributor even managed a veiled threat of the invoking of the OSA!
So if I have misconstrued your contribution, Valkyriejmp, then I am sorry. Of course you have a perfect right to express your views if they be that, as have we all. Perhaps Brian could publish some advice on remaining cool calm and collected while countering every weak and incorrect post, and always with impeccable politeness of course!

[airsound]

M. Cazatou - you of all people should know that there is no need for an orchestrated response. Like the best sommeliers, we all have olfactory processes that are always ready to detect the faintest sniff of something not quite right.

So it shouldn't be too much of a stretch when we all detect at the same time something a bit corked.

Btw, I'm not quite sure what not knowing how to turn the radio on in a Jet Provost has to do with putting a new and not fully tested Chinook on operations....?

airsound

[Tandemrotor]

There was NO paperwork

Ah indeed. So was the case involving a fatal Chinook crash in the Falklands in the mid eighties, killing yet more of my friends!

Deep servicing of an HC1 had involved removal, and replacement of the aft pylon (a fairly major piece of engineering endeavour??)

NO supporting paperwork was raised. Who even knows if any suitable protocol was followed? Nontheless, the first time it moved into forward flight, all aboard perished. Including some of Valkyrie's colleagues; engineers accompanying the first test flight.

Just to remind those unfamiliar: The a/c was seen flying in glorious weather at approximately 500', when it very slowly entered a vertical dive from which it never recovered. Impacting the ground at extremely high speed (and with one of it's occupants attempting to leave beforehand!) the only radio call transmitted was the middle portion of the phrase; "******* hell"

It's not just pilots that cause accidents my friend!

BTW
The aircraft in question was not cleared to transit at that altitude
Please enlighten us with your familiarity with this case.

Or accept you are utterly ignorant of the FACTS and are simply bumping your gums!

[tucumseh]

Caz

We sat in those cockpits for 10-15 minutes and then we both unstrapped, got out and said to the groundcrew "How the **** do you turn these radios on?" It took 30 mins before they found someone who knew!!

Tandemrotor

NO supporting paperwork was raised. Who even knows if any suitable protocol was followed?


These are depressingly familiar statements to anyone remotely familiar with Mull, Nimrod, Hercules, Sea King, Tornado etc. They represent major failings in the airworthiness system. I wish I’d a fiver for every time someone has said “Ditch training” or ”Don’t bother modifying (or even buying) the simulator” as a means of “saving” money. They think it’s clever and, worse, are praised. If you ignore either, the aircraft or equipment should never be offered to the RTSA, never mind actually released to service. First came across this on Harrier in the mid-80s. Pilots got in, said WTF, and got out.

But, as ever, instead of going into denial, MoD should also study examples where such failings didn’t occur and ask why.

[cazatou]

tucumseh

In the case of the JP's we had just flown Leeming - Aldergrove and were quite content to return as the weather was more than adequate for a VFR transit if necessary. In the other case the aircraft had been fully certified by the CAA and had just been modified with the addition of some military radio and navigation aids; again the weather was benign. In neither case would I have had any hesitation in declining to fly the aircraft if the weather conditions had been marginal. There are, however, occasions when the Aircraft Captain has to bite the bullet and say "No" - irrespective of the rank or status of the passengers.

[tucumseh]

Caz


Thanks. Understood.


There are, however, occasions when the Aircraft Captain has to bite the bullet and say "No" - irrespective of the rank or status of the passengers.

Agreed.

However, I’d say that to make such an informed decision, one must be first of all informed. A common factor in all the examples I quoted is that the various problems/risks were known by a few, but not conveyed to the aircrew. Again, that is a serious, and systemic, breakdown of the Airworthiness and Safety Management Systems. As reiterated by Coroner Masters a week or so ago.

[cazatou]

tucumseh

I would not disagree;there are times, however, when fault detection and analysis are only paid lip service to - irrespective of the experience of the Aircrew.

Back in 1991 I can remember an Andover which had been left at Brize with a control restriction. No fault was found - therefore I and another very experienced (ex TQF) Captain went to do an Air Test on the aircraft. No fault was experienced in level flight, however a distinct obstruction was evident if even the slightest combination of "roll and pull" was attempted.

We returned to Brize where the Engineers were inclined to disbelieve us - so I played the trump card detailed in GASO's and impounded the aircraft. This, of course, had to be reported to Group HQ who did not seem best pleased. The engineers put the aircraft up on jacks and found the fault within 2 hours. It took another 2 days to rectify it.

I wonder how many Aircrew have read that paragraph regarding "Impounding an aircraft".

[Chugalug2]

Caz, fascinating as your personal aviation anecdotes always are, I don't quite see the relevance to this thread of your last one. Are you saying that this captain knew of an identifiable fault on this aircraft prior to departure but, unlike you, was unable to say "NO"? Or perhaps you mean that the disquiet alone that existed about the HC2 at the time, despite it being cleared by the Airworthiness Authority with restrictions into Squadron service, should have caused the captain to say "NO"? If that is the case should not every other captain on the fleet have said "NO" on every other occasion? Would you have said "NO" if such a captain for merely feeling disquiet? Does not such a situation reflect poorly on the Airworthiness Authority especially given that BD had grounded their fleet the day prior to this accident?
By the way, I think that many captains have enjoyed the thrill of saying "NO" to senior officers, I know I have. But Mrs T? Now that's something else...respect! :ok:

[cazatou]

Chugalug 2

Apologies for the delay - weather - something beyond my control.

Regarding the "impounding" of an aircraft; as far as I am aware AT NO TIME did any Chinook HC2 Pilot institute this procedure in regard to control or other problems - yet the procedure was there to be used if the situation demanded. Did they read GASO's - or just sign for them?

Regarding Boscombe Down "grounding its fleet"; the trials underway at BD were suspended because BD could not validate the data obtained using its preferred method of validation and a Meeting was called to establish a way forward for the trials.The aircraft were not "grounded" - they just did not fly because the trials had been suspended.

On a lighter note; I always felt that Lady Thatcher (as she now is) was the perfect VIP passenger. One always got a written "Thank you" following a flight and she did throw an excellent Cocktail Party - the surroundings were pretty impressive too!!

[meadowbank]

Valkyriejmp
The aircraft in question was not cleared to transit at that altitude and collided with the first bit of solid object after crossing the sea.
To what transit altitude are you referring?
The crew set out to transit under VFR to Inverness, and the Flight Authorisation Sheet will have included a mimimum altitude for the transit (I'm not a rotary pilot, but let's say 100 ft). The aircraft was seen shortly before the crash by the yachtsman, whose evidence indicated that ZD576 was probably at a few hundred feet above the water - perhaps you can explain what the aircraft wasn't cleared to be doing in this context?
Yes, the aircraft collided with the Mull, but that is not per se an indication of 'Negligence' or even 'Aircrew Error' and there are several possible causes of the impact which cannot be ruled out, meaning that 'Negligence' would be very tough to prove 'Beyond Reasonable Doubt', let alone the 'Beyond any doubt whatsoever' that the (ex) Air Marshals claim to have satisfied and for which the 5 members of the House of Lords' Select Committee who, let's face it, ultimately have every motive for finding in favour of the Establishment, failed to find any grounds.

[Chugalug2]

Sorry Caz, still not getting what you're driving at here. I'm fairly sure that if anyone had "impounded" a Chinook per GASOs we'd have heard about it by now, so lets agree to accept that hasn't happened pending evidence to the contrary. So what? I don't even see that as implying any ignorance of your "trump card", merely that the solid grounds for doing so, ie a control restriction as you instanced etc, were not present. The grounds for BD suspending, grounding, impounding, call it what you will (it still quacks so effectively is a duck), were there but only to their skilled eyes, ie as you say software discrepancies. If they were not prepared to continue with their trials which presumably involved more than software evaluation, and given that their rules allow for greater risk taking than RAF squadron peacetime operating, one has to query why the latter was not suspended as well.
As for your lighter note I suspect that you were yet another to fall under the allure of that femme fatale and her shapely ankles!

[cazatou]

Chugalug 2

If you want a male candidate for "Perfect Passenger" then it would have been
the Labour Minister Roy Mason at the NI Office - he gave memorable Cocktail Parties too!!

Re Chinook,

People have been complaining for years on this thread about "known defects" for which there was no rectification programme; yet there was no record of multiple Incident Reports detailing system failures.

After the penultimate sortie the crew "mentioned" an avionics snag to the groundcrew who "re-seated" the avionics box in question. No paperwork was raised. Who knows what other potential or actual faults were dealt with in this way on that Detatchment; thereby leaving no written evidence of any such problem.

[tucumseh]

People have been complaining for years on this thread about "known defects" for which there was no rectification programme; yet there was no record of multiple Incident Reports detailing system failures.


It is a well documented fact that, in the previous few years (early 90s), the RAF had systematically cut the funding for conducting, inter alia, Fault Investigations (which is effectively what you speak of). And if you have no MF761 to underpin the requirement for a rectification programme, then the latter is seldom, if ever, approved. Engineering Authorities (as they were called then) were “advised” by Suppliers (who, when AMSO was formed, had gained control of funding designed to maintain airworthiness) not to bother requesting investigations, to save up MF760s and submit omnibus MF760As; in an effort to save money. The natural outcome was delay and often, at unit level, cessation of raising MF760s, it being deemed a waste of time as no visible action was being taken. (MF760/A/1 – Narrative Fault Report / Fault Investigation Request / Fault Investigation Report respectively).

As little money was being spent on investigations, requests for re-instatement of funding fell on deaf Supplier ears, who responded with the ludicrous argument “You never spent any last year (as none was released!) so you don’t need any next year”. Another cracker was “Reliability improves with age, the kit is old, so it shouldn’t fail. The MF760s must be wrong”. If I recall, that was severe cracking in gearboxes. And thus, a crucial part of the Airworthiness Regs (JSP 553 Ch. 5 Maintaining Airworthiness) could not be complied with. The situation became progressively worse. At first (1990-ish) money would be released eventually if the problem was safety related; in time the policy became “no safety tasks to be undertaken”. Suppliers / non-engineers being permitted to make engineering decisions has been a problem more or less ever since, although funding has improved somewhat since the Suppliers lost total control. But, not sufficiently to take retrospective action, so there remain huge gaps in the airworthiness audit trails. This is not only my view, but was later re-iterated by the House of Commons Defence Committee and the Public Accounts Committee. Their reports are open source. It has also been mentioned during recent Inquests.

When considering Mull (or any other accident), please consider what happened in the preceding years. Don’t be fooled by the MoD argument that everything is ok now, so it can’t have been a problem 15 years ago. I think this important perspective is missing from much of the debate.

[Chugalug2]

Tuc, you do well to remind us of the early corrupting of the Flight Safety system by those often referred to as "bean counters", for it was those very people assiduously simply "doing their job" that started the whole inevitable slide from proper Airworthiness provision to the fatal accidents which brought with them the pain and anguish visited on so many. Were not the restrictions on Engineering reporting that you describe also levelled on Aircrew reporting, ie a big reduction in the processing of Incident Reports (F765B in my day) called for? With the Airworthiness Authority (the MOD) presiding over such a sabotaging of RAF Flight Safety little wonder that many of those at the work face did what was expected of them and simply stopped reporting. Result? The virtuous loop of incident, diagnosed fault, report, statistical assessment, preventative mod, enhanced safety, was broken. After that you just have to wait. The rest is now tragic history. Whether or not that ticking bomb led to this accident I don't know, nor I would suggest does anyone else. There were, we are told, concerns at Squadron level over the airworthiness of the HC2, a concern echoed in the Nimrod and Hercules fleets over deficiencies that did indeed lead to fatal accidents. Time now for the Airworthiness of the HC2 prior to this accident to be fully discussed.

[cazatou]

Chugalug2 & Tucumseh

I totally refute any suggestion that there was an orchestrated campaign to reduce incident reporting in the years prior to this accident. Moreover, in view of the fact that my final tour was in Flight Safety at HQ 1Gp, I take it as a deliberate slur on my character and integrity that you insinuate that this was the case and that, by implication, I was involved in such a campaign.

There was, in fact, a campaign to encourage personnel to submit such reports even if they considered the incident to be trivial.

[tucumseh]

Caz


I’m sure you’ll be pleased to know that the “orchestrated campaign” was in fact initiated by those, like you, who held positions of responsibility for safety and airworthiness – in our case those with airworthiness and technical approval delegation. Our aim was to have the policies and practices I spoke of overturned. I’m sure you would have joined us.

Luckily, we were supported by an independent audit instigated by the EAC and another carried out by MoD’s own Internal Audit team. They conducted their business in the face of very high level opposition, in particular the 2* responsible for maintaining airworthiness, who had publicly threatened his technical staff with dismissal for daring to insist on meeting their legal obligations (to PUS and SoS). A similar stance was later adopted by his opposite number in PE, who was responsible for Chinook (post Mull). But, credit where it’s due, many of his junior officers, mainly Wg Cdrs, expressed their deep concern and supported us jumped-up civvies. I’m sure you know what it’s like – the lunacy of one or two men at the top does not constitute an orchestrated campaign, but those below must immediately make career decisions. Some chose their career, others chose airworthiness and safety. That is why the situation is variable across aircraft and equipment fleets, and why MoD will always be able to cite success stories.

As I said, there was only partial success and the inevitable outcome is recorded in various BoI reports, Audit reports and Committee proceedings.

[BEagle]

Well, I submitted a fair number of IRs for all the engine failures and bits not working correctly I experienced in 5000 hrs on the Vickers FunBus and I don't recall any directive being issued to restrict or persuade against submitting such IRs.
http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/Internet/zxzxz.jpg

I was, however, rather disappointed at the lack of follow-up action to such IRs at times.

As en ex-FSO, I agree with cazatou - at least in the (then) 1 Gp and also in Learning Command, there were no attempts to stifle honest reporting. The only disincentive being the likes of Ba$tard Bill :yuk: who wanted IRs to lead to disciplinary action.........:hmm: So at one stage, a 'grown up' was required to 'approve' IRs in case they might 'embarrass the squadron'. Yes, there really were people so inadequately testiculated that they would try to sanitise the truth to protect their careers :ugh:.

[tucumseh]

Thanks Beagle.

If you refer to my earlier post, I mentioned that the instruction was to EAs, the 2nd link in the chain, to encourage them to save up narrative reports and/or reject more. The initial narrative reports continued, although I noted a reduction in these because, as you say, units perceived a lack of follow up action - action which is mandated by the regs even if it is just informing the originator that nothing is being done. (The failure of process noted during the recent C130 inquest). Crucially, the regs demand this decision be made by a suitable competent person.

The actual edict went something like "A MF760/A costs £xxk to process, cut back because we seldom get free rectification so there is no point in conducting an investigation". In other words, we don't care a toss if the fault is real, or the effect it's having, we're only interested if there's a chance of designer liability. Of course, only a complete idiot would think of it this way. Not least because MoD can seldom demonstrate they have complied with servicing instructions etc, so they haven't a leg to stand on. Crucially (in the case of a number of accidents discussed here) if MoD have introduced a Service Engineered Modification without following the mandated regs (which is most of the time) then all the DA has to say is you've altered the product without referring to us, we're not liable. Read any warranty and it says the same. But, in my opinion, this does not mean you don't investigate faults (or incidents).

There are two important points here. First, forget the detail of whether it is a 760, 765 or whatever. The procedural Def Stan lists them all, and tells you what to do with each, but the overarching subject is maintaining airworthiness (and hence safety). The policy directive compromised this and the HCDC & PAC reports I mentioned note the inevitable outcome. Second, and I detest this one, the faceless wonders who didn’t have to actually sign for airworthiness passed the buck to the EAs who, at that time, were normally senior NCOs or junior civvies. It was they who were put under pressure to reject reports or not submit requests for further action. Very few would grab the phone to call a senior and complain. The reaction to those who did was immediate – normally a Gp Capt phoning your boss and demanding disciplinary action. (In my case, my boss refused, and the AVM himself traveled 250 miles to carpet me and threaten dismissal. He didn’t even stop for lunch. Started at 0900 and “did” 8 of us before leaving at 1700. He started with the most senior, and each one had to remain and watch the next. By the time the last one was taken (me) 7 of my colleagues were sat up against a wall. And the fact there were 8 of us means there are plenty witnesses). When your other colleagues see this happening, what do you think the natural reaction is? Head down, cite the policy directive and don’t bother investigating faults, incidents or maintaining airworthiness in general.

There you go. RAF “man management” policy, December 1992, and how it affected airworthiness. I won’t say any more. There is no need.

[cazatou]

tucumseh

Thank you for that clarifcation.

BEagle

Thank you for the support. I agree with you that there were people who saw a path to promotion in "coming down hard" on personnel who suffered major incidents/accidents - an attitude which is counter - productive as it deters people from reporting incidents and thus increasing the chance of a accident. One also had to contend with the BOI Presidents who came to an instant decision regarding "negligence", and manipulated the BOI so that "inconvenient" testimony/evidence was brushed aside or ignored.

The Courts Martial system now has a cadre of Permanent Presidents - I see no reason why the BOI system should not follow that example.

[Chugalug2]

Caz, the corrupting effects of which I wrote were effected at a far higher level than that of Group FSO's. Having said that I was unaware that you personally were at Group then as an FSO. As tuc says the attempts were resisted by good men and women up and down the chain, but nevertheless the corrosive effect of such pressure would have had a debilitating effect on Flight Safety in the RAF generally. As to my contribution, it has been my understanding that the attempts to reduce the narrative reports extended across the system ie involving reports from both engineers and aircrew. I have heard of this before and believed it to be the case. However I take note of your comments and Beag's to the contrary, and am willing to edit out my "belief" to that effect in my post if there are no other recollections in support of that. This is not about individuals, other than the people who initiated such attempts to shut down the system, but of the Flight Safety system itself.

[ShyTorque]

The aircraft were not "grounded" - they just did not fly because the trials had been suspended.


Cazatou (aka K52),

You have obviously forgotten something. The Boscombe trials aircraft needed maintenance and the Handling Sqn pilots refused to fly it to Odiham (just 31 nautical miles away) where said maintenance was to be carried out!

The RAF Odiham unit maintenance test pilot was eventually transported to Boscombe Down to recover the aircraft. If I'm not mistaken, this was in Sqn Ldr Burke's evidence (the unit test pilot himself) as given during the House of Lords' Inquiry.

The pilots responsible for the introduction of the aircraft to squadron service had lost confidence in the safety of the aircraft. They were not in an operatiional environment and had the backing of their immediate superior officers, unlike the unfortunate squadron pilots who were ordered to carry on regardless despite the request for a Mk 1 from the captain. Had they been made aware of the full facts those squadron pilots involved in this accident might have also seen fit to say no too and this accident would then never have happened.

[cazatou]

Shy Torque

Having done a tour on Handling Sqn at Boscombe Down I can assure you that it is a :




GROUND TOUR





It would not be surprising, therefore, that Handling Sqn Pilots refused to fly the aircraft. In my tour I flew a total of 12hrs 50mins as 2nd pilot over a period of 2 years.

[ShyTorque]

Cazatou, yes my mistake. Obviously, I meant the Boscombe Down test pilots refused to fly it, so read "D Sqn" for Handling Sqn.

[cazatou]

ST

Pas de probleme.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Shy,

I suspect that anyone who had read this thread knew exactly who you were referring to, well almost everyone it would seem :rolleyes:

[cazatou]

SFFP

I agree that Rotary Wing Aircrew would know what was being referred to - as would anyone who had experience of A&AEE.

That would leave only approx 56 million UK Citizens (including a large percentage of UK Military Personnel) who have little or no knowledge of RAF Rotary Wing operations - plus, of course, those PPrune members from overseas who have not served in the UK Military.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Caz,

As I said anyone, be they Rotary, FJ, FW, Civilian et al who has read this thread will know EXACTLY who Shy was referring to :ok:

However on behalf of the 65 million other folk who may inadvertently stumble into this forum unannounced I would like to thank you for clearing up Shy's glaring error :rolleyes:

[antenna]

It is all really quite simple isn't it.
The aircraft was not trusted by Boscombe Down. MoD expert witness Malcolm Perks, a principled hero in this tragedy if ever there was one, went public to tell all about the problems with the engine control system.
The shortcomings of the Mark II led to a shortage of operational Chinooks, leaving Jon and Rick at Aldergrove barely current.
ZD576 had had a serious of flight critical problems - and the paperwork to back the claims up - engines were robbed etc. There were the debonding incidents (and subsequent ad hoc wiggle-before-takeoff-SOP) that still make my hair stand on end.
The precautionary landing of ZD576 at Luton Airport a week before the tragedy. No fault found.
Last recorded conversation from Rick Cook minutes before takeoff when he spoke of his concerns with the engine control units.
The boys didn't make the rules but the rules were made for them, to protect them so that only in cases where there is no doubt may deceased aircrew be found negligent. Lady Thatcher, recently cited, voted against Wratten and Day's position in the Lords. She had grave misgivings. The Duke of York, himself of course a helicopter pilot, has also privately raised concerns.
The Ministry must reconsider the finding because the answers left wanting do nobody in the service justice. And as we head into Remembrance Day itself, it is that wider injustice that is poignant. Nimrod et al continue to be echoes of the 94 tragedy.

[cazatou]

SFFP

Hamlet - Act 3, Scene 2, Line 225.

:D

[Chugalug2]

Hamlet Act 3 Scene 2:

O! my offence is rank, it smells to heaven.

Not sure about the line though caz, so probably a different quote. Just seemed strangely appropriate if Polonius represented the MOD! :ok:

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Chug,

That caused a little titter this end as I am certain that is not the line our clever chum was alluding to, but in the circumstances yours is oh so apt :ok:

[cazatou]

Chug,

May as well get it right - its Act 3, Scene 3, line 36; spoken by Claudius.

Perhaps SFFP would prefer Act3, Scene3, line 97 ?

[OmegaV6]

Hamlet Act 3 Scene 2 line 225 ??

Player Queen : Sleep rock thy brain,

Hamlet (http://www.shakespeare-online.com/plays/hamlet_3_2.html)

:)

[Winch-control]

Never seen such a quiet crewroom as the day Sqn Ldr Burke walked in and asked for a volunteer to recover the Boscobe cab to Odiham.
My understanding was that the aircraft was being recovered because Boscombe would not progress the trials any further (risk). I agreed to crew it back because.... no one else would...The CH47 mk2 fleet didnt fly that week...but it wasn't grounded!

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Caz,

Have a read of the posts by antenna and winch control and if you still want to play your "clever dickey" games then crack on Sir :rolleyes:

From my perspective those two posts pretty much sum things up and lets hope that real justice will shortly/eventually prevail.

[cazatou]

SFFP

Merely returning the "Compliment".

[Arkroyal]

Whilst we are busy Caz-bashing:That would leave only approx 56 million UK Citizens (including a large percentage of UK Military Personnel) who have little or no knowledge of RAF Rotary Wing operations May I assume that you, Sir include yourself! :} The enginer hoist by his own petard Hamlet

[cazatou]

Ark Royal

I have never pretended otherwise. The AOC 1 Gp at the time of the accident was, as I am sure you are aware, someone with a wealth of rotary experience garnered in his 30 + years of RAF Service. In addition there was a Gp Capt SH and his Staff.

I had no Harrier,Jaguar, Phantom or Tornado experience either - but there were suitably qualified persons in similar positions to those mentioned above whom I could consult as required.

CinC STC similarly had an Air Staff whom he could consult during his review of the BOI; as did CAS who also reviewed the BOI before it was published.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Caz,

Priceless response, absolutely priceless :p

Now care to enlighten me on just what that Hamlet quote was.............was it along the lines of "He doth protest too much"......ring any bells at all.......:rolleyes:

[Chugalug2]

cazatou:

The AOC 1 Gp at the time of the accident was, as I am sure you are aware, someone with a wealth of rotary experience garnered in his 30 + years of RAF Service. In addition there was a Gp Capt SH and his Staff.


Is it another play, caz? A King and his son, The Prince, bring grief and sorrow to their land with an arbitrary and unjust edict. All their courtiers are implicated for they have given the advice on which the edict is based, save one who forbore to do so. Eventually both King and Prince are denounced along with their courtiers, with the exception of the one who did not offer encouragement in their unwise act. He was a wise and noble man who went on to become a Prince himself, one who was loved and looked up to by those who lived in his Commune. More Aesop than Shakespeare though, I would have thought. So would it be a Fairy Tale, or Tragedy, or both?

[ShyTorque]

I had no Harrier,Jaguar, Phantom or Tornado experience either - but there were suitably qualified persons in similar positions to those mentioned above whom I could consult as required.

Why did you need to consult them "as required"? So are you saying you had more to do with the outcome of the BOI than you have previously declared?

[meadowbank]

Cazatou
CinC STC similarly had an Air Staff whom he could consult during his review of the BOI; as did CAS who also reviewed the BOI before it was published.

Was it normal for CAS to review the Board? I thought it was a job for AOC the Group concerned, plus CinC STC.

[John Purdey]

Meadowbank. Did you really think that CAS would not take such a close interest in what was bound to be a high profile accident. After all, the PM himself -as I recall- made an early statement in the House about it. (Long silence by me caused by absences abroad- and, no, not incarcerated!) John Purdey

[Brian Dixon]

Hi Mr Purdey,
welcome back. I hope that your travels were enjoyable.

One would assume that the Prime Minister would not make any public comments without first speaking to his advisors who, in turn, would probably have been briefed by the CAS or his team. I seem to recall that subsequently, Sir John Major has stated that had he known then, what he knows now, he would not have accepted the MoD's position.

The CAS did, indeed, take a close interest in this tragic case, so much so, that he made a non-too complimentary comment in a letter to a former colleague. The 'interest' as you put it, from those right at the top of the food chain clearly indicates the pressure the President of the Board of Inquiry must have been placed under. Mr Pulford is one of the few people who can hold his head up high, as he had the courage to both stick to his guns and stick to the facts.

What a pity that those entitled only to express an opinion could not do the same.

Hopefully the not-so-new Defence Secretary is getting up to speed with the case and will make a decision soon.

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[cazatou]

Shy Torque,

I could comment (after consulting those in Authority current on the relevant Type) on Andover, Hercules, HS125 and BAe 146 incidents/accidents as I had direct experience of operating all those Aircraft Types. With Fast Jet and Helicopter incidents and accidents I consulted with the relevant Air Staff and Engineering Staff and passed my comments through them for approval prior to submission.

With regard to Incidents; I often found that a more "Broad Brush" approach was necessary. One example will suffice:

I was sitting alone in the FS Office one morning (GFSO was absent at Staff College) when a young (and very smart) LAC from the Movements Cell came in with a single sheet of A4 paper and said "We think this is for you Sir". The sheet of A4 held a cartoon which had been Faxed from RAFG and showed a Tornado Aircraft with "Tractor Tyres" crossing a newly ploughed field and a sign post saying "RAF XXXXX" 1/2 mile.

I phoned the SFSO at XXXXX who drove around the Airfield perimeter and located the Aircraft tracks in the undershoot area of the main runway. I then drafted a suitably worded signal from SASO to the Stn Cdr RAF XXXXX asking why no Incident Signal had been received regarding the touchdown by a Tornado in the undershoot - what damage had been suffered by the aircraft; and what further action he proposed to take over this Incident.

I then briefed SASO who reviewed the evidence and signed the signal.

It was not a 1st Tourist or somebody refreshing on type - it was a Sqn Exec who had failed to report the incident!!

I believe there were "ramifications".

Doubtless you will think my actions were reprehensible.

[ShyTorque]

Cazatou, My question was:

Why did you need to consult them "as required"? So are you saying you had more to do with the outcome of the BOI than you have previously declared?

I don't see a reply to that question, which I asked only with regard to the Mull accident.

I have no interest in commenting on your actions regarding fixed wing accidents such as the one you mentioned. They are totally irrelevant to this thread and I have no experience of those types. I would not even try to pass judgement on those involved. But thanks for asking.

I would be grateful if you could reply to the question I asked though.

Thank you again.

[meadowbank]

JP
Welcome back indeed.

Did you really think that CAS would not take such a close interest in what was bound to be a high profile accident.
So what you are saying is that CinC STC will have discussed what he was about to publish with CAS and will have therefore been aware of his views on the subject? It would seem to follow, therefore, that AOC 1 Gp will have performed a similar process with CinC STC. This way all the Command Chain ducks will have been put into a neat little row. Doesn't this seem a rather unfair process for those at the receiving end of this combined judgement? Wanting one day to be CinC STC himself, it was in AOC 1 Gp's interest to say what he knew CinC STC and CAS had already agreed, especially given CinC STC's "unequivocal views" as laid out in his appalling letter to Stn Cdrs in Feb 95.

The Board of Inquiry process has since been changed and, under the new regime, a finding of 'Gross Negligence' in these circumstances could not occur. Accordingly, the finding against Tapper & Cook should now be withdrawn.

[John Purdey]

Meadowbank. Have a care! You know quite well that I said no such thing; indeed, I had understood from (much) earlier posts that CinC and AOC had expressly refused to discuss the findings until they had first seen the papers. With all good wishes, John Purdey

[Brian Dixon]

... and when the CinC did see the papers, he sent them back because the verdict was not the one that he wanted. :=

Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[cazatou]

Shy Torque,

Group Flight Safety Staff had a duty to comment on each and every incident and accident from a Flight Safety perspective. This would require consultation with the Air and Engineering Staff for that type of aircraft -irrespective of any assessment of Human Failings. It could also require consultation with Medical, Administrative, Air Traffic Control and Movements Staff.

This process would have been repeated at STC level and, in this particular case, it was repeated at MOD level with the final review carried out by CAS.

[John Purdey]

Brian. Your 3732; I seem to recall you saying all those months ago that 'I have the documents'. Could you please say what exactly they reveal about the handling of the original BofI? Regards as always. JP

[Brian Dixon]

Mr Purdey.
Let me change that to "I still have the documents".

The Campaign gave it's word that no disclosure of said documents would be made until the SoS for Defence has made a decision. Nothing has changed to make us go back on our word.

Hopefully not much longer though.
Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[John Purdey]

Brian. Understood. Let us hope that these disclusures will be made before too long, including of course a clear answer to my last question. With all good wishes, JP.

[John Purdey]

Brian.
You tell us "... and when the CinC did see the papers, he sent them back because the verdict was not the one that he wanted. :="
But that would mean that CinC was guilty of telling the HofL Select Committee what Churchill once called 'terminological inexactitudes' in other words LIES.
I do hope that you can justify such an astonishing accusation. John Purdey

[tucumseh]

John

But that would mean that CinC was guilty of telling the HofL Select Committee what Churchill once called 'terminological inexactitudes' in other words LIES.


I'm afraid telling porkies, or being economical with the truth, to HofC and Public Accounts Committees is par for the course. I can only speak from personal experience, but recall being held up to ridicule when I offered to brief our 4 Star to ensure he knew the facts. The record shows some of what he said was utter nonsense, and if anyone was interested they could trace adverse comments in recent Boards of Inquiry reports directly to these hearings. A good example;

House of Commons - Public Accounts - Thirty-Second Report (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmpubacc/300/30008.htm)

[Thud_and_Blunder]

JP - I once had the great misfortune to fly a certain 4-star on a task in an overseas theatre, with him at the controls while I occupied t'other front seat in my capacity as Sqn QHI. Before the flight I asked if he'd ever flown that type of aircraft before and without a moment's hesitation he replied in the negative. Now, as an instructor yourself you'll know not to ask a question to which you don't already know the answer - I'd already spoken to the QHI who'd flown with him previously.

Now if that certain 4-star happened to be someone being referred to here then it could be said that he has "form" (as members of the constabulary allegedly say) for telling porkies. That would be astonishing, wouldn't it? Or perhaps junior officers don't count and are there to be misled anyway, although I don't remember seeing that on my commissioning scroll.

[Brian Dixon]

Mr Purdey,
I'm not accusing anyone of lying. During the examination of Mr Wratten, by the HoL Select Committee on 28 September 01, he stated that he had sent the report back to the Board President.

Now, on the issue of 'Terminological inexactitudes', I would have to agree. There have been many, but one that sticks in my mind was the use of the phrase 'black box' during the Select Committee hearings. Used, with no intent to deceive, but simply to refer to a box that was coloured black and that just happened to provide some computer data. :rolleyes:

Shall we just wait for the Secretary of State to report?

With every good wish,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[John Purdey]

Brian. It will not do. You are indeed accusing the CinC of lying. I have had an acqaintance check Hansard, and he tells me that during the oral Evidence in that September, on page 148 para 437 he read this reply by Wratten to the direct question by Lord Brennan. "..it was a prerogative that Air Vice Marshal Day and I had to send it [the findings] back to the Board of Inquiry and to draw that to their attention and to say, 'Come on, you have to be more positive than this. We did not do so......"
I also have received a PM from someone who was very close to the process at the time, and he is adamant that the findings were not sent back.
Meanwhile, since Wrattens address is in the public domain, why do you not get in touch with him so that this very serious allegation can be thrashed out by your lawyers and his?
Another suggestion that you might find helpful would be to contact (now AVM) Pulford who, as you know, was President of the Board?
I very much fear, Brian, that like many other contributors to this thread you are simply adding to the general confusion. As I said a couple of years ago here...'More smoke than Krakatao; more mirrors that the Great Hall of Versailles; more red herrings than a Shanghai trawler'.
Regards. JP

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

'More smoke than Krakatao; more mirrors that the Great Hall of Versailles; more red herrings than a Shanghai trawler'...........but not that one piece of evidence which proves conclusively the finding in this case, so I fully aggree with you JP that there is

'More smoke than Krakatao; more mirrors that the Great Hall of Versailles; more red herrings than a Shanghai trawler'.........:ok:

[Brian Dixon]

Mr Purdey,

I repeat - I am accusing no-one of lying. I take your point on the second sentence of Mr Wratten's evidence and accept that I misread it. Even irritating sods can make mistakes, and I therefore offer an apology.

Feel free to make the best use of this error. I'm sure you can twist it around to prop up the MoD's position.

Your final comments, after all these years, still do you no credit.

Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[walter kennedy]

While I was going through the analysis, final check, it struck me that many of you had perhaps not plotted the data on a big chart nor paced out the positions at the actual site (with a hand held GPS) and so may not be grasping the scale of the area on the Mull at and approaching the crash site – because one fundamental and relevant aspect would have been obvious to you had you done so, as I will attempt to explain briefly below:
Take the position where the waypoint was changed as that in the SuperTANS (AAIB deduced from position data at impact that STANS had been accurate in latter part of flight);
Accept Boeing's analysis that a turn to the right was made at that point;
Remember that a course setting of 035 was found set on the handling pilot's Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) – this of course meant a magnetic course and if you want to plot this on a map now you must use the magnetic variation appropriate at the time in that area;
Accept that waypoint A just happened to be on the threshold of a known landing spot for Chinooks on exercise – an obvious inner marker;
Accept that they were in clear air over the sea and the mist & cloud of concern was on the landmass affecting their sense of orientation from topography and blurring ground details past the shoreline making judgment of distance off the landmass the issue.
.
The final evasive manoeuvre did not start until the final few seconds – Boeing's analysis had it that the a/c had flown a straight track from waypoint change up to this final manoeuvre.
If you draw a line representing 035m from the position of waypoint change on a large map you will be able to see that the initial impact point is only 150 metres off to the left of this track.
Remember that the final evasive manoeuvre involved the a/c turning and slewing to the left but was only enacted in the final few seconds such that any deviation off track would be small and to the left.
Is it not intuitively obvious that the a/c was on 035 until the last few seconds? - the course setting as found on the handling pilot's HSI course selector.
So 035 looks deliberate? - and yet noteables on this site have dismissed it as pure coincidence.
.
If you work back from the crash site on 035m, using a ground speed of, say, 150kts, they would have crossed the shoreline at 13 sec before impact;
that is about 9 sec before the final evasive manouevre was initiated.
9s decision time when in low power regime (Boeing's analysis had them slowing down wrt TAS – the increase in wind at the Mull masking this) and perhaps wondering what was going on ...
Remember that the position where they changed the waypoint was already too close in in the prevailing conditions for this crew to have relied upon the STANS to have gotten them there at their cruising speed – despite having been pronounced accurate by AAIB in that part of the flight with hindsight, Flt Lt Tapper would not have trusted it after a sea crossing – and yet they made an intentional turn 8 deg to the right at that point.
There was no more suitable waypoint loaded into the STANS than waypoint A and this they had discarded – so what on earth is there that an experienced helicopter crew could have used as a reference at that point? Something that influenced their judgment more than the STANS and their growing perception of proximity to the landmass – something they trusted to be intrinsically accurate, perhaps – something that if conflicting with their senses could cause 9 seconds worth of hesitancy.

[John Purdey]

Brian Dixon. Your apology should be directed to Wratten; you have his address.
Meanwhile, let us hope that the written submission to Sec of State does not contain any such serious and defamatory discrepancies caused by your "mis-readings". JP

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

JP,

Perhaps when Messr's Wratten and Day have apologised to the families for their outrageous misuse of power and the subsequent miscarriage of justice Brian may feel inclined to heed your words.

But as you previously said

'More smoke than Krakatao; more mirrors that the Great Hall of Versailles; more red herrings than a Shanghai trawler'

which I suspect is at the forefront of your current indignation :rolleyes:

[Brian Dixon]

Mr Purdey,
the error was made in public and so is the apology. If Mr Wratten wants the apology it is there for him to see. I have never stated I am infallable. When an error is made, or pointed out, I have always accepted responsibility and apologised where appropriate.

I have confidence in the submission to the SoS for Defence, but am grateful for your words of wisdom :rolleyes:

Let's wait and see, shall we?

Regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[MrBernoulli]

Wratten and Day? Pair of jumped-up dipsticks who rose well above any level of competence they themselves thought they had. The pair of them deserve each other and I hope they rot in hell. I'm sure they will.

And no, I'm not apologising for saying so.

[HectorusRex]

A short précis of how and why this discussion has continued for so long.

Bill Wratten
Bill Wratten - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Wratten)
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten GBE, CB, AFC (b. 15 August 1939) was Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of RAF Strike Command from 1994.
[edit]Flying career
Educated at Chatham House Grammar School in Ramsgate Wratten was the first Station Commander at RAF Stanley in the Falkland Islands after the 1982 war. He had previously served as Officer Commanding No. 23 Squadron, and went on to serve as, inter alia, Station Commander RAF Coningsby and Air Officer Commanding No. 11 Group.
As an Air Vice Marshal he was Air Commander British Forces Middle East from 17 November 1990 until the end of the Gulf War (as such he was the senior air force officer in Operation Granby).
[edit]Chinook helicopter crash Board of Inquiry
In 1995, following the Chinook Helicopter Crash on the Mull of Kintyre, Wratten was the Senior Reviewing Officer of the Board of Inquiry which had failed to find a cause of the accident. Despite a lack of Accident Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder, Wratten concluded that pilot error was the cause of the crash and found the pilots guilty of gross negligence[1]. Following a subsequent Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry and House of Commons Public Accounts Committee report, a House of Lords Select Committee was appointed to consider all the circumstances surrounding the crash and unanimously concluded "that the reviewing officers were not justified in finding that negligence on the part of the pilots caused the aircraft to crash".[2] However, to date (Dec 08) the MoD has refused to alter the verdicts.
[edit]References
1. ^ Scotsman article
2. ^ Report from the Select Committee on Chinook ZD 576 dated 31 Jan 02

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

Wake up and smell the coffee!

It does not matter how highly qualified the pilots were.

This was classic CFIT.

Better pilots (and worse) than these guys have done it.

God help me, It may be my fate one day.



Let it go.

[BEagle]

This was classic CFIT

That cannot be proved beyond any doubt whatsoever - which is the whole point.

The cause was 'Not Positively Determined' - except in the narrow minds of Wratten and Day.

[davaar lad]

In any case if it was "classic CFIT", is that always gross negligence?
Is this the crux of this particular aspect of the arguement?;
If it is, should we go back through the records and re classify all the possible CFIT incidents as gross negligence.?

i'd be interested to know the views of the "hang the guilty b@st@srds" posse.

DL

[John Purdey]

BarbiesBoyfriend. Pls see yr PMs. JP

[Brian Dixon]

BarbiesBoyfriend,
I pray that it will never happen to you.

God forbid it does, I hope you have friends that will stand up for you if they believe that you have been unjustly blamed.

I'm sure Mr Purdey has reminded you how stubborn and pig headed we all are ;)

Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Chugalug2]

BBF, The difference between this accident and a similar one that might befall you is that yours would be in an aircraft subject to a competent Airworthiness Authority and could therefore be reasonably assumed to be:
1. Of an airworthy aircraft type at the time and,
2. Be fitted with a Flight Recorder, thus greatly assisting the determination of the cause of the accident.
With this accident no such assumptions can be made as no such Airworthiness Authority presided.
As has been said above, despite these shortcomings and the inability of the BoI to determine the cause, Messrs Wratten and Day were still able to come to their infamous finding. You seem to share their decisive ability to see the truth that evades all others. Have you ever considered a career as a Senior RAF Officer? You would seem eminently well qualified.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

I'm not foolish enough to think I'll change anyones mind on here.

However, if I banjoed my aircraft into the Mull while doing a bit of a low level navex in marginal conditions I sincerely doubt there'd be 188 pages on pprune arguing about whether or not there could be some other explanation for my accident than the obvious one.

I'd be dead so not at all bothered and you splendid RAF chaps, if you thought about me at all, would regard me as a bit of an idiot who had the classic VFR into IMC accident that claims PPLs every year.

And you know what? You'd be right!

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

BBF,

Just a humble thought but based on the scenario you put forward you meant to type

"And you know what? You'd probably be right!

After all with the obvious lack of conclusive evidence available it would appear rather difficult to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that it was actually your fault that you crashed, or am I missing something here?

[John Blakeley]

BBF,

I had hoped to stay out of this debate whilst the MOD looked at the evidence again, but given that John Purdey seems to have forgotten his own commitment not to comment further and you are contributing to further circular arguments I feel I need to join in again!

If indeed you were to "banjo" your aircraft into the hillside "whilst doing a low level Navex in marginal weather conditions" (a situation that did not apply to this flight anyway) your last thoughts might indeed be "what a **** I am to have got myself into this position." On the other hand if, as a specialist SF crew (which you seem to be happy to equate to PPL holders) well used to such conditions, you had pointed out that the aircraft you had been asked to fly on what was essentially a civil passenger flight was not fit for purpose, and, having failed, for reasons beyond your control, to make the planned turn as selected for the next waypoint, you were struggling to get over the hill you knew was in front of you with an uncommanded engine run-up, or a jammed control crate or just the distraction of a "known" (in RTS terms) false engine fail indication you might well be having different thoughts! Actually, more likely you entire thoughts would be devoted to trying to get out of an impossible situation!

I do not know which of these scenarios, or indeed any other scenario, applied - nor do you and, more importantly, and by his own admission, nor did the Senior Reviewing Officer - who then went way beyond the findings of the BoI in his own findings. Given this, whilst you may well still think that this was a pilot error accident - and you may even be right, this is not the basis for finding two pilots who are not there to defend themselves guilty of gross negligence (effectively the crime of manslaughter). That is what these 188 pages are meant to be about - and if you had been the victim of this gross injustice I am sure you would want to see your family, friends and professional colleagues fight to put it right - even if, as you put it, you were not there to care about the verdict.

As to the true cause of this accident it is a fact that "no-one will ever know" - a position acknowledged by the House of Lords Select Committee who did not accept the gross negligence findings and, dare I say it, were eminently more qualified than you, and a did a great deal more investigation of the facts, including listening to the full submissions of the Reviewing Officers, to make such a judgement. The were also prepared to make it under their own names!

JB

[pulse1]

BBF,

the classic VFR into IMC accident that claims PPLs every year.


As a PPL who takes considerable interest in such things I can tell you that the "classic VFR into IMC" fatal accidents by PPL's in the UK are caused by inadeqately equipped pilots not qualified to operate in IMC. Hardly a description of Cook and Tapper, although it would appear that "inadequately equipped" might be relevant.

Surely, the benefit of the considerable doubt in this case should be given to the pilots if only on the basis of their experience and qualifications to fly in the prevailing conditions. If you add the doubt about the state of their equipment, the case for a more just verdict is surely made.

[John Purdey]

John Blakeley. I rejoined, not to discuss the cause(s) of the accident, on which I have nothing new to say, but because the exchanges had moved on to make serious personal accusations. With all good wishes. JP

[endplay]

I hate to ask but...CFIT?

[Fitter2]

Controlled Flight Into Terrain.

My pleasure.

[John Blakeley]

Endplay

The word "controlled" being one of the assumptions!

JB

[davaar lad]

BBF

quote:
"I'd be dead so not at all bothered and you splendid RAF chaps, if you thought about me at all, would regard me as a bit of an idiot who had the classic VFR into IMC accident that claims PPLs every year."


I'm sorry that you have such a low opinion of the Junior Service, but I daresay that you may be dead but as in the case of the Mull of Kyntyre accident there would be plenty of grieving relatives and friends and aviation professionals asking "how and why?"
As for the splendid RAF chaps regarding you as a bit of an idiot for a classic VFR into IMC accident..you clearly do not know many RAF chaps who are splendid enough.
It might be said that your interpretation of this "classic IMC into VMC" accident (whatever that is?) is pretty much the same conclusion as Wratten and Day came up with, it says more about them than it does about you.
The point is, how do you, they, anyone, know if this was CFIT and certainly not a straightforward VMC/IMC accident, unless you were there, then; how could you?
I'm glad that you have brought the issue up again, around the bouy or not it keeps the topic alive, and likewise i'm glad WK is back, he may have some wacky ideas but he does make us think about it from another POV.
I have still to see a satisfactory explanation of the Lowther Hill and fishing boat issues raised by Walt.

rgds

DL

[ShyTorque]

John Purdey said:
but because the exchanges had moved on to make serious personal accusations.

You seem to be glibly forgetting that the whole point of this thread is because the person/s you wish to defend did just that. Their advantage is that both of them are still on this earth to defend themselves here and anywhere else, if they so wish. The crew they accused are not. :=

[walter kennedy]

J B
I, too, have not been saying much lately but not for reasons of waiting on the establishment – but I feel obliged to challenge some points made in you recent post.


<<If indeed you were to "banjo" your aircraft into the hillside "whilst doing a low level Navex in marginal weather conditions" (a situation that did not apply to this flight anyway) ...>>
Well, many parameters point that way – why are you so certain? Has anyone come forward as a witness to the preflight briefing? Have you had a privileged look at the hitherto absent flight plan?


<< ... having failed, for reasons beyond your control, to make the planned turn as selected for the next waypoint,...>>
As I have pointed out in detail on several occassions, they had already come in very close when they made the change in waypoint – which presumably implied that they were under control at that point – see the map I posted some time ago. Furthermore, despite the misleading track presented at one of the inquiries by the RAF showing a straight track through a misplaced position of waypoint change to the impact area they had actually turned right at that change and held that track and there is reason to believe that track was planned.


<<...you were struggling to get over the hill you knew was in front of you with an uncommanded engine run-up...>>
That's out because the engines were found at an intermediate power level and MATCHED strongly suggesting a steady state that neither the pilots nor the FADEC had had time to disturb with the full collective pulled up in the last second manouevre. Boeing's analysis had it that they had slowed down (in air speed) in the last leg which would have required less power than the preceding cruise level and therefore further negates the probability of an uncontrolled run up.
I have argued before that they had no intentions of going over the hill as they seemed to be going for the LZ at waypoint A and had altimeters set for landing at that height – which is why I suggest they were slowing down.


<<... or a jammed control crate ...>>
That could only have happened when they were already too close as per argument above – and they seemed to hold the track OK of 035 from waypoint change to the last seconds when the a/c appeared to respond as expected to the emergency actions evidenced by the control positions – you remember, 035 was set on the handling pilot's HSI. Just what part of this leg shows any evidence of jammed controls? Let's look at collective alone by way of example:
The rotors RPMs at impact tells us a lot:
they were down about 10% from memory;
the collective was fully up and they had gained some height in those last seconds – so the rotor pitch had responded;
if you check with Boeing's specs, the rotors could loose a significant bit more RPM and still function – that is, there was still some significant lift to be had in an immediate emergency – lift or (air) braking effort – regardless of what the turbines were doing;
they very nearly cleared that cliff and were starting a full slew that is a good way of slowing a twin rotor without loosing height – a bit more time and they may have landed in a heap but at a significantly reduced speed;
that they did not cause the rotor RPM to have reduced further before impact suggests not that there was a control problem but rather that they were surprised at their proximity to the ground.


<<...Actually, more likely you entire thoughts would be devoted to trying to get out of an impossible situation!>>
I agree that it was an impossible situation that they were in at the end – but for different reasons than yours:
Now I could well be wrong with the following description of the power situation but I think that you in a much better position to know should think about this – just to get the ball rolling is my tuppence worth that hopefully you will constructively correct as required:
Starting with Boeing's condition that, after the right turn, they had started to slow down (in air speed, but they had gotten very close to the Mull by that time and the very much increased local wind speed had resulted in the ground speed remaining unchanged);
straight and level but slowing down when still at high speed in a helo is a minimum power sitiuation (thrust just balances the weight – drag does the slowing) and further, there is a tendency for the rotors to speed up as the drag decreases on the leading etc etc such that the FADEC (as fitted in this case) would be reducing the fuel to maintain (ie limit to) 100% rotor RPM (you lot could explain this better than me) – this may introduce a slight further delay in FADEC response and/or turbine lag when emergency power is demanded/collective pulled up;
in this condition, you must remember that the thrust = the weight and that any sudden turns, for example, before the turbines can spool up, would result in a loss of height without using the stored energy of the rotors by way of increased collective;
so if you were intending to land just before steeply rising ground (with no option for an overshoot) and for whatever reason misjudged your distance to go, you would be flying into a vertical corner.


So what could you do if you had got too close before slowing down enough?:
if you suddenly realise that you are approaching steeply rising ground in this power situation, a steeply banked turn is out because you don't want to loose height, you would use your rotor energy best by gaining height whilst slewing sideways (thrust still vertical) to wash of speed (takes no energy to slew in a Chinook) – and this is what they had started to do.
Yet one S.O.A.B said at one of the inquiries that this was not a recognised manouevre for a Chinook – yet you see it at air shows all the time and it is described in American docs – and yet further, not one of you venerable aviators challenged that S.O.A.B.


<<As to the true cause of this accident it is a fact that "no-one will ever know" - a position acknowledged by the House of Lords Select Committee >>
What does this mean? - a directive from those on high? - how can this be a fact?
IMHO there is a good deal more that can be established about the circumstances if you “regulars” could drop that mantra for a while.


Now to other posters:
While you all seem to like blasting Mssrs Wratten & Day, you are not appreciating the position that they may have been in: at the time; any open findings that allowed any possibility of foul play had to be dismissed a.s.a.p. or there may have been significant public unrest and perhaps disquiet within the police/security forces involved in NI – in the absence of anything positive to prove an accident/equipment failure, what else could they have done if directed by the politicians to contain speculation? - the verdict implied “absolutely no doubt whatsoever” did it not? Nothing less would have done it. They would surely have accepted that it was their duty to do this for the greater good.
A (difficult and distasteful) job well done and probably amply rewarded but they have to live with themselves – which may be very hard if it were to eventually emerge that the crew had been involved in an extra activity which may or may not have left them exposed to an error by a third party whether accidental or wilful – and their action had delayed investigation for so many years.
My point here is that it is of no use targetting those two AVMs – look at the bigger picture.


One aspect that is not in doubt is that this crash took the teeth out of the anti-terrorism effort leaving the concilliatory path the only option – the ceasefire followed so very soon afterwards – the secret negotiations had triumphed – Clinton had a feather in his cap – Westminster could wash its hands of its most difficult obligations to the people of those provinces.
But it is important to look at Ireland and realise that the end did not justify the means – the peace process has proved lousy for all sides.
Looking back, is it enough to just clear the pilots' names based upon the AVMs not satisfying the legal niceties? - or is it in the peoples best interest to get as full a picture as possible of what actually happened – just in case this dreadful event was not just a convenient, fortuitous break for the politicians?

[Brian Dixon]

Looking back, is it enough to just clear the pilots' names based upon the AVMs not satisfying the legal niceties? - or is it in the peoples best interest to get as full a picture as possible of what actually happened – just in case this dreadful event was not just a convenient, fortuitous break for the politicians?
It is right and proper that the pilots' names are cleared, as the burden of proof required to find them negligent was not made.

However, I agree that it would be in the best interest of a great many people to get as full a picture as possible. There is a great deal of information somewhere that has not been made available. I was told, quite a while ago, by the MoD, that they have an 800+ page spreadsheet relating to documents associated with the Chinook incident (and, I believe the whole Chinook HC2 situation). It was decided that it would be too costly to let me have sight of that spreadsheet and the list of documents it contained.

As and when it is decided that all this information can be released into the public domain, someone may be able to piece together everything.

What can be done at this precise moment in time is restore the reputations of Jon Tapper and Rick Cook, who were found guilty of negligence despite the lack of evidence required to prove their guilt with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.

Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[walter kennedy]

<<...they have an 800+ page spreadsheet relating to documents associated with the Chinook incident (and, I believe the whole Chinook HC2 situation). ....As and when it is decided that all this information can be released into the public domain, someone may be able to piece together everything. >>


This would be regarding the aircraft's airworthiness? What a dreadful waste of time if there was nothing (pertinent to this accident) wrong with the damned aircraft.
And it sure as hell shouldn't prevent in the meantime consideration of the numerous parameters I have brought to your attention that point to a deliberate local activity in the vicinity of the Mull – that would only require your group to assess their meaning using their knowledge and contacts and hopefully arrive at a reasoned concensus – a few days or one meeting at most.
What have you got to lose?

[Brian Dixon]

Walter,
with the greatest of respect, it doesn't matter what 'reasoned concensus' is reached it will not fulfil the requirement of absolutely no doubt whatsoever.

Please believe me when I say that we have discussed many a scenareo, including one of negligence, but there is no hard evidence to support any one option. The Board of Inquiry concluded that the most likely cause was an inappropriate rate of climb and the reviewing officers used a degree of speculation, but no one is in a position to say that they know exctly what happened on that terrible day.

I am not actually dismissing your theory, but if the MoD say that the equipment you suggest was not in use, there is no available documentation relating to this equipment being used on this flight, there is no documentation available about an alternative landing site and there is no one speaking out about this scenareo, where do you suggest we look?

The only right conclusion, taking into account the rules in place at the time, and the limited amount of evidence available, should be 'cause not positively determined'. If there is evidence proving negligence with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, let the MoD produce it and we can all get on with something else.

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Chugalug2]

walter kennedy:

This would be regarding the aircraft's airworthiness? What a dreadful waste of time if there was nothing (pertinent to this accident) wrong with the damned aircraft

So a known conspiracy, that is to subvert the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations over the last twenty odd years, as testified to on the Hercules (Parliamentary Questions) and the Nimrod accident threads, should go unconsidered on the presumption that even if it adversely affected the airworthiness of the Chinook, such consideration would be "a dreadful waste of time if there was nothing (pertinent to this accident) wrong with the damned aircraft"? Some presumption, Walter! Others have paid you the compliment that your realpolitik conspiracy theory may or may not have substance, but it does at least compel us to review and revisit all facets of this dreadful accident, and for that they applaud you. In return you pour scorn on another possible explanation, that airworthiness shortcomings in the HC2 at that time might have a bearing on why this aircraft crashed. You should set your sights on the MOD, not those who like you question their motives. There are those who simply say this was pilot error, and grossly negligent error at that. There are others who say that is not proven, and W & D's finding should be put aside, though pilot error was the most likely explanation. Others such as you and I feel that there were other factors at work involving skulduggery. Your skulduggery was committed on the Mull, mine in the MOD. Perhaps those 800 pages will tell which of us, if either, is right

[tucumseh]

The “spreadsheet” referred to will have been initiated to track the plethora of questions from various sources over the years; and, more to the point, ensure consistent answers were given. (Because the “Mull team” in MoD could not possibly retain the same staff for 14 years). To this end, they failed.

This is partly because the referenced documents, that is, a large part of the airworthiness audit trail, do not exist or cannot be found. These gaps in the spreadsheet are crucial, because they equate to gross failures or breakdown of process. Wherever you look, Hercules, Nimrod and others, this is the common denominator – failure to maintain airworthiness, including an audit trail. In the case of Mk2, an obvious example was the Boscombe decision to discontinue flying accompanied by their expert advice to MoD(PE) as to why they made this decision. To close the loop (audit trail) it was incumbent upon MoD(PE) and their Customer (the RAF) to be equally clear, in writing, why they chose to disregard this advice. I predict a large gap in the spreadsheet around this time.

This does not mean people have deliberately withheld evidence, although of course that is common practice. It is more an indication of the management ethos; call it the arrogance of power if you will, whereby senior staffs of the day (throughout the 90s) felt confident enough to issue edicts that airworthiness shall NOT be maintained. I well remember the Director responsible for a large part of this process gathering his troops together in the St Giles cinema and telling us (those holding delegation and responsible for maintaining airworthiness) that we were “the rump end of PE” and no longer needed. That would be about early-1992. Think of that timescale in the context of ZD576 and Mk2 in general, and you’ll see what I’m getting at. Quite frankly, the system was falling apart at the seams.

It would be an easy task to simply burn a CDR of the spreadsheet, even if the referenced documents have not been scanned and held electronically. The cost would be in redacting classified material, which one assumes is already done. No, I suspect the reason why Brian has been denied the information is because of what it doesn’t contain.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

Let me make myself clear (er).

It was an aeroplane.

It was flown by pilots. (like me)

Pilots make mistakes.

Sometimes pilots do stupid things (IMHO like these guys....but I'd still buy them a beer)

I too, have done stupid things (in an aeroplane, but maybe these guys would still have bought me a beer:))

But, luckily, I'm still alive!:ok:

Now I'm not qualified to say what really happened. period!

However I am an ex Loganair pilot who's been into Campletown a great many times. (but not for a few years).

Used to be the MAC had no DME- might have saved them?

The Mull is oft shrouded in orographic cloud. These guys were in a VFR machine- presumably in VMC.

Their aeroplane was not an IFR aeroplane.

Why not turn back?

(Thats what the PPL accident reports usually say...."the commander elected to continue etc.etc.)

I'm sorry guys but they WERE negligent. They had pax.

They pressed on.

They fu%&ed up.

Not bad pilots in any way-well no worse than all the other live pilots who'll die in accidents in the next year or two.

But **** it up, they did!

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

For the record my personal mode of transport, while at work is a 4 engine jet that's certificated for 'known ice' and IFR.

And that is how I operate it, on behalf of my employer.

Were it to be otherwise, I'd have to operate it otherwise.

If the company said it was VFR, VFR it would be!

The poor guys who flew this aircraft are dead now. As are their passengers.

In the medium to short term, we'll join them.

Those who continue the fight to make out that they screwed up a bit less than they're getting the blame for are only taking time out of their own lives with this futile (look it up!) struggle which-QED-will change nothing.

Let it GO!

[Atlantic Cowboy]

As a former member of the "Mull" team I think I can comment usefully that you need to get real and smell the coffee. My recollection and knowledge of the spreadsheet is that it simply records dates of communication from members of the public, MPs, Lords etc. It has no information in it other than the subject matter of the correspondence and where it is filed. It certainly does not contain the airworthiness audit trail because that was not the purpose for which the speadsheet was designed. It was purely to track correspondence nothing else.

[tucumseh]

Atlantic Cowboy

I agree. What I said is that it should contain references to other documents, which themselves would form part of the audit trail. Those documents would surely be necessary to ensure the reply was accurate or consistent with the party line? (Two entirely different things). The problem with persisting with a party line in favour of the truth is that, over time, and as postholders change, it breeds inconsistency. The Chinook case drips with such inconsistency, and gets even worse when you take a wider view and study the answers given in other cases. Many of the replies I see are arrant nonsense. On occasion, you even find someone in post who refuses to lie or mislead, putting the cat well and truly among the pigeons. And MoD's position becomes ever more untenable.