Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged) [Archive] - Page 22

walter kennedy

12th Jul 2009, 23:14

Brian
Pardon my frustration I expressed recently at the Group but I really think there is something very specific you can follow up here.
I had pointed to a transcript which surely you would have access to (the BOI).
I had pointed out a specific piece of blacking-out that may help us all understand possible actions in this flight.
I had (previously to your prompt) asked specific questions under FOI and am …. waiting for the MOD to respond.
I have thought of a way that the answer on that classified equipment may be obtained without their having to disclose what the equipment was to the public domain in the case that it was not relevent: could the Mull Group not, as an interested party, ask someone they trust who had eyeballed the un-abridged transcript to comment on whether it was the CPLS system or not? If there is no one available who could remember, could a deal not be done whereby a trusted 3rd party, say a senior judge or the like, who the state could also trust to be discrete could eyeball the un-abridged transcript and answer only in the scope of whether the blacked out text (describing the classified equipment) was “Covert Personnel Locator System” or not?
You may not like the path I am following but it at least gives you (the Group) two angles to try to get a review of the case (if they can be established to some reasonable extent):
!. If there was a piece of kit fitted that could have been used for local navigation in any way yet has not been disclosed, then the original BOI would have been inadequate;
2. If there had been an extra task put on them that has not been disclosed then again the original BOI would have been inadequate.

John Purdey

13th Jul 2009, 09:43

8.15fromOdium.

Thanks for your 5310.
1. I have not seen the letter to which you refer, but the quote you give is along the lines you suggest.
2. The para seems less than clear to me.

We have, of course been here before, but just to repeat one last time; if the Chinooks were not airworthy, exacly what rectification was undertaken?
If no rectification was undertaken, then presumably the Chinooks are still not airworthy.

Is that what you are saying?

Regards JP

cazatou

13th Jul 2009, 10:05

Airborne Aircrew

Your #5321

I feel you are being a trifle pedantic.

Surely, if contemplating the use of the "Ignore" faclity, "Seldom" should be the watchword.

Chugalug2

13th Jul 2009, 10:31

Walter Kennedy:
It's annoying, having people put the wrong spin on something you've written, isn't it, Chugs?

More a case that some people are simply annoying, Walter.

Cows getting bigger

13th Jul 2009, 10:35

JP, the way I read that RWTS paragraph is that they were not convinced the aircraft was safe, a relatively small step short of saying it was unsafe. They had questions about a number of FADEC issues that they did not understand and were not willing to endorse the aircraft until they received a satisfactory answer. This stance seems to be entirely reasonable to me and, if ignored, someone in a position of power accepted an extraordinary level of personal risk.

I agree that if RWTS stand by that statement and no changes have been made to the aircraft, then it is still not airworthy. Furthermore, if one were to apply civilian standards, the aircraft would never be airworthy unless a back-to-birth process were properly followed.

cazatou

13th Jul 2009, 11:17

Chugalug2

Your #5331

Is your "annoying" the same as "irritating" - like Brian Dixon's motto?:=

Fitter2

13th Jul 2009, 11:34

We have, of course been here before, but just to repeat one last time; if the Chinooks were not airworthy, exacly what rectification was undertaken?
If no rectification was undertaken, then presumably the Chinooks are still not airworthy.

As a matter of interest, is it still a requirement that vital connectors have to be checked every 15 minutes?

If not, then something has changed.

Of course, if the paper trail does not reflect reality, anything might have changed.

dalek

13th Jul 2009, 13:28

John Purdey,
It seems that our game of "truth and consequences" has come to an end.

You have learned well from your "Masters", young apprentice.
Only enter into evidence that which suits the cause. Studiously ignore everything else.

No matter. Your answer to my Q1 give me all I need.

If the Boeing and TANS simulations were not true and accurate portrayals of events, then it is impossible to deduce any "facts" from them. You admitted this for the first time.

By producing simulation evidence to the HOL as "facts", Sir William and Sir John were deliberatlely attempting to mislead them.

This could only be due to the fact:
a. They were deliberately being "less than honest."
b. They had been badly briefed by their Staffs.
Either way,it was a pretty shoddy attempt to influence the outcome.
The "dumb" civilians were clever enough to see through the attempt.

When in a hole stop digging.
It is you that insisted on simple yes / no answers but were completely unable to follow your own instructions.
"what did the two pilots say to each other, What does it matter."

Every competent Accident Investigating Branch in the world regards CVR evidence almost as important as ADR evidence. It is essential to find out not only what happened but why it happened. If you cannot see the importance of this you are clearly no expert on Flight Safety or Accident investigation matters.

John Purdey

13th Jul 2009, 16:34

Dalek. Please yourself., but spare me the childish accusation that I am speaking on behalf of MOD. JP

8-15fromOdium

13th Jul 2009, 17:29

Mr Purdey,

thank you for your response to my last. If you click the link labelled 'Channel 4 Website' in my #5310 (http://www.pprune.org/5055951-post5310.html) this will bring up the letter. I would appreciate you having a look at it and giving your considered response to my questions:

(1) If you agree that I have transcribed the paragraph accurately.
(2) This letter indicates that OC RWTS thought that the Mk2 Chinook was unsafe.

Now in response to your question to me:

If no rectification was undertaken, then presumably the Chinooks are still not airworthy.

I am not qualified to make a statement on the aircraft airworthiness, but I seem to remember a lot of work going on on the Mk2 Chinook post arrival from Boeing (and both pre and post the Mull). I also seem to recall that some of this work was to the FADEC. However, I must place the caveat on this statement that it was not my trade area and my mind could be playing tricks. This is the reason I asked Atlantic Cowboy, who claims to be involved in the investigation, if an airworthiness audit was carried out (#4070 (http://www.pprune.org/4782300-post4070.html) ) an answer which you agreed was required (your #4355 (http://www.pprune.org/4903654-post4355.html)). Since then Atlantic Cowboy has not been about.

Best regards 8-15

Seldomfitforpurpose

13th Jul 2009, 18:46

As an aside:

An ignore list is the BBS equivalent of sticking one's fingers in one's ears and shouting loudly "I can't hear you"... All it lacks is the drama of the foot stamping.

AA,

The most satisfying thing about being placed on their ignore list is the knowledge that the questions those being ignored have posed, because of there simplicity and absolute unambiguity have proved so troublesome to answer that "ignore" is the only option :ok:

8-15

Atlantic Cowboy is most definitely around right right now, he is simply posting under another name :ok:

John Purdey

13th Jul 2009, 18:47

8.15from Odium

I seem unable to bring up the letter to which you refer, but I am happy to accept what you say. In answer to your question ie:

"((2) This letter indicates that OC RWTS thought that the Mk2 Chinook was unsafe".

What did OC RWTS do about it? The allegation was that AOC, CinC and even CAS, and their staffs, knew that the aircraft was not fit, and then insisted that it be flown, and when this machine crashed, they (to quote another contributer) "stitched up the pilots".
Do you believe that?

Did RWTS follow up their unease, and if not then why not? And, if RWTS did not follow up, then I do not see that we are any further forward, even if you believe (and as you know I do not so believe), that the crash was caused by some kind of technical failure rather than gross negligence by the crew

I hope my reply will not provoke yet another repetition of the familiar arguments!

With all good wishes, and thankyou for your courteous post JP

Cows getting bigger

13th Jul 2009, 19:09

JP, I think the RWTS para 7 summary says it all:

As such, RWTS deem it imperative that, in the strongest possible terms, the RAF should be provided with a recommendation to cease Chinook HC2 operations until the conditions in paragraph 6 are satisfied.

With my ex-RAF staff officer hat on, I'm not sure RWTS had anything else they could do; they have made a very strongly and direct statement and not the typical read-between-the-lines staff officer type message. If you are wondering about their post-accident actions, then that is indeed a different question and well worth pursuing, regardless of the perceived cause of the crash.

dalek

14th Jul 2009, 07:02

JP.

I apologise for the last sentence. Not only was it a cheap shot it was also irrelevant. It has been edited out.

cazatou

14th Jul 2009, 09:01

Wrathmonk

Re your #5304 and subsequent Posts. It is not the case that JP (myself or anyone else) has to produce new evidence to "PROVE" that the finding of the BOI was correct. If, in UK, a criminal case goes to the Court Of Appeal; the Prosecution does not have to produce new evidence to maintain the Guilty verdict. It is up to the Appellant (and that persons Advocates) to produce new evidence that justifies overturning the original verdict in the eyes of the court. The same applies in Civil cases.

Thor Nogson

14th Jul 2009, 09:23

It is not the case that JP (myself or anyone else) has to produce new evidence to "PROVE" that the finding of the BOI was correct. If, in UK, a criminal case goes to the Court Of Appeal; the Prosecution does not have to produce new evidence to maintain the Guilty verdict. It is up to the Appellant (and that persons Advocates) to produce new evidence that justifies overturning the original verdict in the eyes of the court. The same applies in Civil cases.

Two obvious observations here.

1) If there has been a miscarriage of justice, and/or there was relevant evidence which was either ignored or withheld, that surely cannot be the case.

2) This is not a criminal, civil or military court. At the risk of stating the obvious, this is a discussion forum.

With the latter point in mind, none of us are not bound by these conventions. In particular, we are discussing the merits of the original verdict, and the means by which it was achieved. We can, and should, consider all the evidence available, and indeed informed speculation

With the former point in mind, I think a number of us believe this is the case.

Kind regards,

TN

Fitter2

14th Jul 2009, 09:30

It is not the findings of the members sitting on the BOI that some posters have a problem with.

It is the overruling of their findings, contrary to the rules in place, as approved by the Air Force Board, that has caused this protracted discussion.

The fact that every independant analysis of the evidence has disagreed with the action of the Reviewing Officers tends to support those who object to the RO's action.

Wrathmonk

14th Jul 2009, 10:39

cazatou

Thank you for replying (effectively on behalf of John Purdey;)).

Without wishing to sound like a broken record, IMHO, if this had been a case heard in the law courts, then there are grounds for it to be declared a mis-trial in that the rules / regulations / procedures / protocol (call them what you like) in force at the time were not followed. However, it was not in a court of law but that does not change the fact that the BoI was, IMHO, flawed, at the very least, proceduraly. My point throughout the few posts I have made on this sad topic is that I cannot see any evidence (only opinion) to justify the BoI outcome and hence my request for it to be highlighted clearly to me.

Without wishing to get flamed, whilst I think the faults in airworthiness etc being highlighted in this (and other accidents) by the likes of Chug, tuc, Brian, nigegilb, DV, TD et al is laudable, my (perhaps selfish) best outcome in this case would be to get the Gross Neg charges removed. NPD would satisfy the majority of posters on this thread I am sure. With that battle won focus could then turn to the wider war of airworthiness etc.

Finally, whilst I can't remember the exact details, IIRC it was not long after the outcome of this board that the procedures were changed again whereby blame would no longer be attributed. Timing, it seems, is sadly everything.

John Purdey

14th Jul 2009, 12:36

Cazatou. I have sent you a PM. Regards. JP

cazatou

14th Jul 2009, 14:32

Wrathmonk

Your 5345

Thank you for your comments. If JP does not always respond promptly, try to remember that he was operating Canberras at the time of Her Majesties Coronation. I, on the other hand, am a mere youngster as I did not join the RAF until the day after Sir Winston Churchill died.

You must remember that the BOI was conducted in accordance with the rules and procedures current at the time. Those rules have, I am given to understand, been revised and a BOI is no longer required to pronounce on negligence. That had not happened in 1994 and it was a requirement for the BOI to pronounce on negligence. In this context the BOI consists of the Investigating Board and the Reviewing Officers; who are not bound by the opinions that the Investigating Board put forward.

To put this into context ( I have mentioned this before but it will do no harm to repeat it); there was another BOI in progress at the time into the crash of a Tornado at the NATO Range, Decimomannu. A Tornado suffered an explosion and titanium fire in one engine which resulted in the loss of the aircraft. The Investigating Board found the crew negligent as they had not carried out the Engine Fire Drill. What they neglected to consider was that the initial explosion had blown off the engine bay doors of that engine; this removed the major part of the Fire Warning detection system and ensured that if the engine fire extinguisher was fired then the extinguishant would immediately dissipate to atmosphere. The crew, therefore, had no indication of a fire until the aircraft they had requested to carry out a visual inspection got them in sight and ordered them to "Get Out - Get Out".

The AOC and AOCinC rejected the findings of the BOI.

Oddly enough, I have never heard anyone complain about the Reviewing Officers "overturning the findings of a properly constituted BOI" in respect of that accident.

Fitter2

14th Jul 2009, 14:56

Of course not, since in the Phantom case there was doubt, therefore the BOI were incorrect (although they may not have been made aware of the evidence) and the ROs found in accordance with the AP and the Air Force Act.

In the case under discussion, the ROs ignored the requirements, and therfore did not comply with their legal requirements.

John Purdey

14th Jul 2009, 15:02

Wrathmonk. I did not reply because if you had spooled back to the many endless discussions along those lines, you would have found the answer you were looking for. (And I am not as old as Caz seems to think!).
JP

Wrathmonk

14th Jul 2009, 15:53

JP

You're sounding like a politician ..... then again, maybe you are one ;)

Glad I'm not on the naughty step anymore!:ok:

John Purdey

14th Jul 2009, 17:46

Please see my 5349. AL1. After 'not' insert 'quite'
JP

cazatou

14th Jul 2009, 17:49

JP

I've never said I wasn't prone to hyperbole in certain circumstances. It is, after all, almost a requirement - judging by some of the contributions on this thread.

cazatou

14th Jul 2009, 18:00

Fitter 2

Your Post 5348

What Phantom was that?

Or have you just emphasised my point and pronounced a verdict on something that never happened because you did not read the statement correctly?

I await your reply with interest.

:ugh:

walter kennedy

14th Jul 2009, 18:51

If you all just want to play at lawyers then why don't you take the planning aspect on its own – no conspiracy needed – to show that fundamental information pertaining to this flight was either not known to or was improperly addressed by the original BOI and those who revised the findings? That should get a review.

Cows getting bigger

14th Jul 2009, 18:59

Would it be fair/reasonable to question the 'rules and procedures at the time', devised, audited, checked and utilised by the same organisation? It really is rather incestuous and something akin to the current MPs expenses farrago where the standard MP defence is "in accordance with the rules", quietly forgetting that these rules were approved by the same.

Maybe a better analogy is the execution of deserters during the First World War; those were the rules the military devised and implemented. I believe the government finally saw sense after 80 years or so.

I'm struggling to understand how the MOD could publicly reach a verdict that amounts to manslaughter on the basis of a flawed process. I wonder why the MOD changed their procedures so soon after the Mull crash?

Fitter2

14th Jul 2009, 19:00

Apologies, Caz; I concatenated one incident involving a crew I knew with the other you were referring to.

However, I belive the principle still applies - Air rank does not confer the ability to change the rules.

Wrathmonk

14th Jul 2009, 19:17

Olive

I'm not convinced it was progress either as it could/would/did protect those who were truly negligent (and would have been proved so under the old system ....;)) but that's another thread all together. But had the new rules been in force in this case PPRuNe would be several thousand post lighter!

I'm sure I could get a dig by saying it's all down to protecting Human Rights.

Apologies to Brian for the thread drift!

8-15fromOdium

14th Jul 2009, 19:35

JP,

in reply to your #5339 (http://www.pprune.org/5058156-post5339.html), I do not know what caused the Chinook to crash into the Mull, I feel that there is no overwhelming and conclusive evidence, hence why I believe the crew should be cleared.

You ask "What did OC RWTS do about it?". The letter he wrote is not to his mum! It is to higher authorities, surely you would agree that the question that should be asked is:What did those who received the letter do about it?
It would though be useful to know what OC RWTS meant by "associated political pressures", and who/where those pressures came from and what they were.

The questions we are both asking should surely have been considered in the investigation, however I do not believe they were (if you know differently could you please point me in the right direction). On this subject JP, do you think the investigation would be complete if an airworthiness audit had not been carried out?

Thanks for your time, 8-15

Finally SFFP: Thanks for the gen on Atlantic Cowboy, I thought he was a troll at the time.

Chugalug2

14th Jul 2009, 20:27

Caz:

it was a requirement for the BOI to pronounce on negligence. In this context the BOI consists of the Investigating Board and the Reviewing Officers; who are not bound by the opinions that the Investigating Board put forward.

Wrathmonk:

Finally, whilst I can't remember the exact details, IIRC it was not long after the outcome of this board that the procedures were changed again whereby blame would no longer be attributed. Timing, it seems, is sadly everything.

Olive Oil:
Not everyone believed that was progress, although clearly a section of contributors here would have us believe that it should be applied retrospectively.
Well here we all are again in violent agreement guys. The problem though IMHO is that the clear evidence of OC RWTS BD (suspends flight testing of type, suggests suspension of Service flying), independent testing of FADEC code (suspended due to shear volume of bad code discovered), in service experience of ZD576 (Tech Records), in Service problems of type; HoL testimony of Sqn Ldr Burke and Witness A (SF Chinook pilot) all point to a serious Airworthiness Deficiency of a type that nevertheless received its RTS (restricted). Rather stronger evidence of negligence (and "New" to the BoI, as it chose not to call it at the time) than the "modelling" of the case against the pilots! But perhaps negligence can only be found in JO's as a matter of policy?

Atlantic Cowboy

14th Jul 2009, 21:25

SFFP

Reference your post at 5338.

I can categorically state that I do not post under any other title or nickame.

I find the thread is, like the campaign, going absolutely nowhere. It is now 15 years on, several Prime Ministers, several Secretaries of State, many Chiefs, many Assistant Chiefs and and god knows how many of us civil serpents have written brief after brief for all of them. End result - no change. Complete waste of defence expenditure that could have been spent on equipment etc.

There is no possibility of the MOD, Prime MInisters or Ministers present or future ever changing the findings of the BOI. (Ainsworth took one look at it and accepted the findings of the BOI - BOI's are not complete until the comments of the RO's are made). Cameron will look at the advice he is given (should he get in) and come to the same conclusion. Trust me, serpents know how Ministers (any brand or status) think and will act.

If the campaign group had any thoughts of gaining a change to the findings they would have gone for a judicial review or other legal route. They and their advisors, know it would be a complete waste of time.

Perhaps you all might consider why the MOD are so clear that their position holds irrespective. They get advice too.

AC

Chugalug2

14th Jul 2009, 23:41

Wrathmonk:

Without wishing to get flamed, whilst I think the faults in airworthiness etc being highlighted in this (and other accidents) by the likes of Chug, tuc, Brian, nigegilb, DV, TD et al is laudable, my (perhaps selfish) best outcome in this case would be to get the Gross Neg charges removed. NPD would satisfy the majority of posters on this thread I am sure. With that battle won focus could then turn to the wider war of airworthiness etc.

Atlantic Cowboy:

There is no possibility of the MOD, Prime MInisters or Ministers present or future ever changing the findings of the BOI. (Ainsworth took one look at it and accepted the findings of the BOI - BOI's are not complete until the comments of the RO's are made). Cameron will look at the advice he is given (should he get in) and come to the same conclusion.

And there speaks a man who knows Wrathmonk. Nothing of course about honour or justice or duty of care but everything about how the Whitehall machine works and how to succeed in it. I for one bow to such specialist knowledge. The words Hell and Freeze-Over come to mind if you think that the MOD will ever do the decent thing and reinstate Rick's and Jon's reputations alone. They haven't, as he so rightly points out, done that for 15 years and have no intention of doing it in the next 15 years or ever. According to them this was an Airworthy and Serviceable aircraft recklessly and wantonly ploughed into a mist and cloud shrouded hillside. But then, these are the people who assured NoK that the Hercules, the Nimrod and the two Sea Kings in which their loved ones died were all Airworthy, so par for the course. The various BoI's into all those accidents failed to discover that they were all airworthiness related. Thus it was, I believe, with this one. Everything that Atlantic Cowboy writes tells me how urgent it is that UK Military Airworthiness be wrested away from the MOD into a separate and independent MAA, and that Accident Investigation be lead and under the control of an independent MAAIB. This accident has to be properly investigated, possibly by the AAIB until its military equivalent be formed, unless the RAF is prepared to ensure that a fair and thorough re-investigation be done. If that had been done in the first place it is just possible that other avoidable accidents since might have been avoided together with needless deaths. I say that this accident was the worst one of all caused by the Gross Negligence of the UK Military Airworthiness Authority, the MOD. Could it bear the same responsibility that has been hung on the memory of two Junior Officers for 15 years? I doubt it.

cazatou

15th Jul 2009, 05:08

Chugalug 2

Re your 5348

Do you also intend to do away with the Military system of Justice; including Courts Martial? It would, after all, seem logical that if the Military cannot investigate and pronounce on Accidents then it should not do so in Disciplinary and Criminal matters either.

Of course you have a problem there in that Civil Police are not allowed, under the Geneva Convention, to take an active part in Miliary Operations - so how would you Police the Military on Active Service?

John Purdey

15th Jul 2009, 08:49

8-15FromOdium.
Your question is not clear: "On this subject JP, do you think the investigation would be complete if an airworthiness audit had not been carried out?" ???
I think you know my view. With all good wishes. John Purdey

Chugalug2

15th Jul 2009, 11:36

caz:

Do you also intend to do away with the Military system of Justice; including Courts Martial? It would, after all, seem logical that if the Military cannot investigate and pronounce on Accidents then it should not do so in Disciplinary and Criminal matters either.

Thank you for the offer, caz, but one dragon at a time please. In the case of accidents that have subsequently been found to be airworthiness related alone, the military Accident Investigation has failed to discover that fact in each case. It really is a huge waste of time carrying out such an investigation if you are not going to find out the prime cause of the accident, for whatever reason. I don't have to tell you of all people caz that the main aim of such an investigation is to prevent a recurrence. If you fail to find the cause then the accident repeats itself, somewhere, sometime, and more people die for no good reason.

Olive Oil:

I thought the correct phrase was "negligently", not "recklessly and wantonly", and that the degree of negligence was deemed by the ROs to be gross.

You are quite right to bring me to task, Olive. So important to get the wrong finding quoted correctly, isn't it?

Fitter2

15th Jul 2009, 13:04

Hi Chugalug

It’s best to avoid Cazatou when he introduces yet another irrelevant red-herring to the thread. It only encourages him to muddy the previously clear waters.

I am sure it has not escaped his notice that there exists a parallel universe where people climb onto airborne devices with reasonable confidence that purchasing a ticket will mean delivery to their destination alive. It has been established for many years that an independent accident investigation system designed to determine all the facts and produce any recommendations to prevent future accidents (with allocation of blame not in their remit) is the best system to improve flight safety.

I have not noticed an increase in the number of untried murderers or rapists at large resulting from the application of this principle.

Chugalug2

15th Jul 2009, 13:49

Hi Fitter2, well point taken, but whatever muddying he might perform, caz was an "A" cat truckie VIP pilot/trainer and a Group Flight Safety Officer. It is to that professional knowledge and experience that I am trying to appeal. In case he, or for that matter others here, missed it there was a file on 4 programme yesterday about Military Airworthiness:
BBC - BBC Radio 4 Programmes - File on 4, 14/07/2009 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00lk028)
I hasten to add that it did not include this accident, having its hands full dealing with the Nimrod, Hercules and Sea King tragedies. However the theme was that there is a systemic failure of the Airworthiness system extending beyond those specific accidents. It is for that reason alone that I raise it on this thread. Listen especially to AVM Hillier thrown completely by a reference to an incident predating the Nimrod crash, and to his CS minder stepping in to shut down that line of questioning. Another resounding success for the team, eh AC?

cazatou

15th Jul 2009, 14:09

Fitter 2
Re your #5357

Anno Domini catching up?

I would point out, however, that the Reviewing Officers kept strictly within the rules as laid down by the Air Force Act. The Investigating Board did not decide the ultimate Findings of the BOI; that was not within their remit, although they were invited to give their opinion.

The Findings were the responsibility of the Convening Officer (AOC 1 Gp) and they were agreed by the AOCinC STC. In this particular case the CAS also reviewed the BOI (and the Findings) before publication.

dalek

15th Jul 2009, 14:42

Caz,
Air Force act now.

Abandoned the claim that they complied to the AP3207 because that has shown to be total b0llocks.

Ready for your next libellous accusation on the dead aircrew?

8-15fromOdium

15th Jul 2009, 16:39

Mr Purdey

Thanks for your time, and yes I do know your view, but please be patient while I try to change it ;-)

Now (re #5365 (http://www.pprune.org/5061863-post5365.html)), to clarify my question: "do you think the investigation would be complete if an airworthiness audit had not been carried out?". I rephrase as:Do you think that the BoI needed to consider how the Chinook Mk2 was certified airworthy?The reason I ask is, I feel it would have been a serious omission by the BoI not to study how the aircraft was released into service and the airworthiness issues associated with the release (such as the issues raised by OC RWTS).

Things do move on a pace on this thread and the individual who may be able to clear up this issue, Atlantic Cowboy, has resurfaced. In his post of 6 Dec 2008 ( #3773 (http://www.pprune.org/4574914-post3773.html) ) he alluded to the fact that an Airworthiness document existed (my highlighting).

My recollection and knowledge of the spreadsheet is that it simply records dates of communication from members of the public, MPs, Lords etc. It has no information in it other than the subject matter of the correspondence and where it is filed. It certainly does not contain the airworthiness audit trail because that was not the purpose for which the speadsheet was designed.

I have asked Atlantic Cowboy on 2 occasions the following question:

can you enlighten us if there was a seperate document drawn up that recorded the airworthiness audit trail as part of the investigation and if such a document exists has it (to your knowledge) been made publicly available

Atlantic Cowboy if you are out there what is the answer?

bast0n

15th Jul 2009, 19:03

DALEK

Abandoned the claim that they complied to the AP3207 because that has shown to be total b0llocks.

Ready for your next libellous accusation on the dead aircrew?

They must be so proud of you for this sort of posting......................

Seldomfitforpurpose

15th Jul 2009, 19:49

DALEK

They must be so proud of you for this sort of posting......................

Whilst on the face of it, it may seem unpalatable, some of the comments from Caz over the past months show that Dalek does rather have a point :bored:

dalek

16th Jul 2009, 06:46

No Bast0n,
I do actually feel rather foolish and ashamed of letting my anger and frustration get the better of me.
Cazatou, do you feel the same about your completely unfounded allegations agaist the crew?
Do you think he should apologise Baston?

I have seen you raise not a single word of complaint about these.
Fair and balanced are we?

cazatou

16th Jul 2009, 07:43

dalek

1. The Investigating Board found that "the forecast weather was suitable for the flight -BUT WOULD HAVE REQUIRED FLIGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH IFR IN THE VICINITY OF THE MULL OF KINTYRE."

2. All the Witnesses on the Mull gave evidence regarding the extensive Fog covering the higher ground at the time of the crash.

3. The much quoted yachtsman reported sighting the Chinook when "2nm south-west of the Lighthouse." He stated the the aircraft was flying "in a straight line and in level flight and was proceeding towards....the cloud localisation covering the Mull." His best estimate of the speed of the aircraft was "somewhat faster than Sea Kings in level flight." Sea Kings normally operate at 100-110 kts. Groundspeed at impact 2nm later was approx 150 kts.

4. No credible evidence of any technical malfunction which could have caused the crash has been found.

5. Even if, after all this time, evidence could be produced that gave credence to a technical fault; it would not alter the finding of negligence in respect of the complete disregard of the rules for VFR flight.

Cows getting bigger

16th Jul 2009, 07:47

Caz, please remind me, what was the verdict on the Shackelton crash some 2-3 years earlier? Were they complying with IFR? Why the application of different standards?

cazatou

16th Jul 2009, 08:29

Cgb

I remember that crash and I knew the Captain from Acklington in the 60's. I was not, however, involved in the BOI and I have never read the full BOI; only the Flight Safety precis. I am aware of certain "sensitive" facets in respect of matters pertaining to the Accident and subsequent investigation. I do not think it is correct to air such matters on this forum but (if you wish) PM me and I will reply with what I remember. I suspect, however, that you are already aware of those matters.

John Purdey

16th Jul 2009, 09:14

8-15Fromodium. I regret to say that I cannot see any way of helping you. But if you have uncovered something new, then you might like to pass it on to the Mull Group, who, Brian Dixon told us, is still active. Regards. JP

Cows getting bigger

16th Jul 2009, 09:54

Caz, thank you for your reply. I'll PM later (got to go flying :) )

bast0n

16th Jul 2009, 10:11

DALEK

Thanks.

Do you think he should apologise Baston? (CAZ you mean)

I have seen you raise not a single word of complaint about these.
Fair and balanced are we?

Has he been libellous?

Well - no. He believes I think, as I do that this aircraft was flown in cloud into the ground. I have not seen anything to dispute this sad fact. There is a hell of a lot of negative arguement, "the what if" brigade, but no evidence to dissuade me that to fly an apparently - ie: not proven otherwise - serviceable aircraft into the ground in IMC was at the very least careless and probably negligent. I was not on the BOI or privy to the RO,s deliberations so that is far as I can possibly go.

The surrounding airworthiness issues, breakfast et all are very much chaff in my opinion and do not add much to the discussion of the last tragic moments of flight that against all the rules was in cloud..

BOAC

16th Jul 2009, 11:28

What is so worrying in all this is the stubborn resistance of the caz/baston/JP brigade to recognise that we ALL know it was 'flown' in IMC/cloud into a hill. We all know the Mull has frequent typical up-slope stratus. That has never been in dispute. Do the 3 of you understand that? I do hope so.

The key questions are the meaning of 'flown', and was there sufficient proof of deliberate action to justify the RO's 'finding'. This constant soap-boxing of the actual weather conditions does NOTHING to answer those questions and actually indicates a lack of understanding of how low-level flights are conducted by operational crew. Not one of you have offered any proof of negligence, only assumption. Like the ROs, you have simply ignored the clear requirements of a Board of Enquiry for reasons we know not.

I should add, as before stated, I do not see this campaign as a campaign to 'clear the pilots' names'. I see it as an effort to have a significant breach of Air Force instructions by the ROs over-turned, a clear admission that the Mk II was not 'fit for service' at the time and that tasking it for this mission was probably an error. We now have, in the public domain, the fact that the condition and suitability of at least 2 of the RAF's aircraft types was not ''fit for service'. A significant change since 1994 which casts doubt on the integrity of senior officers and politicians in this matter. I personally would settle for a cause 'not determined'.

It appears that in all probability, part of the Mull was visible at WPT change. That, I think, is a 'reasonable' assumption from the evidence.We know it continued towards the Mull and crashed in cloud. The gap here is what happened between those two events. It could have been 'gross negligence' indeed, but it cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt. That was the requirement for judgement. It was not followed.

bast0n

16th Jul 2009, 12:01

BOAC

I think I understand your frustration..........it works both ways!

It appears that in all probability, part of the Mull was visible at WPT change. That, I think, is a 'reasonable' assumption from the evidence.We know it continued towards the Mull and crashed in cloud. The gap here is what happened between those two events. It could have been 'gross negligence' indeed, but it cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt. That was the requirement for judgement. It was not followed.

The moot point is "what happened between these two events" - with no evidence to the contrary I think, is a 'reasonable' assumption from the evidence that nothing happened. They just made a fatal error of judgement.

Further and was there sufficient proof of deliberate action - No - but does there have to be? In-action is more likely on the evidence. No one does this sort of thing on purpose

Chugalug2

16th Jul 2009, 12:58

bast0n:

The moot point is "what happened between these two events" - with no evidence to the contrary

Sorry, bast0n, not quite with you there. To the contrary of what? To the finding? Well, if so that's the whole point! It was arrived at in that very manner, with no evidence (to the contrary of loss of control for example). The whole RAF BoI review system seems to rely on the basis that SO's are infallible because they are...SO's. Once they have made such a ruling it must not be overturned because of "Command Integrity". I'm sorry, but you cannot run Accident Investigation on that basis. This aircraft crashed for a reason. Whatever that reason was, one thing is clear to me, that reason has yet to be properly discovered by the RAF. Neither the BoI nor the RO's did so. One senior officer backed up by his seniors, coming up with a reason on the basis of "modelling", disregarding some evidence, constructing cloud extent, using the absence of evidence as the evidence of absence doesn't come close to the standards required.
Fitter2 draws our attention to the standards of Flight Safety taken almost for granted in civil aviation when you buy a ticket to fly. Would you have such confidence if the Chief Pilot of BA was the final arbiter of why his 777 landed with a crump in the LHR undershoot? Would its unique problems of icing in the engine fuel delivery system have been discovered, as it was by the AAIB? Far more likely that yet two more pilots would have taken the rap. This finding is unacceptable. This system is unacceptable. Both must be changed.

bast0n

16th Jul 2009, 13:17

CHUGAZ

Sorry, bast0n, not quite with you there. To the contrary of what? To the finding?

Sorry if I was not clear.

If there is no evidence as to what happened between the two occurrences, waypoint and impact - and there is not - anyone can try to insert any and every scenario that crosses their mind. (and looking at lots of posts that is exactly what is happening). If there is no evidence can we not surmise that nothing happened? Just a mistake as I have said before?

Chugalug2

16th Jul 2009, 13:34

Thank you for coming back so promptly bast0n, and apologies BOAC for jumping in on a post directed to you. I will attempt to jump out of the way again ASAP!

If there is no evidence can we not surmise that nothing happened?

Brief answer, bast0n, no! No surmising at all would be a very good rule of thumb to adhere to anyway in Aircraft Accident Investigations, but certainly where you are constrained by regulation to be right "beyond all doubt whatsoever". Sorry, I know your attitude to the latter, but neither you nor I (nor W&D!) decide these things, the Air Board does it seems, and did!

bast0n

16th Jul 2009, 14:02

Chugaz

No surmising at all would be a very good rule of thumb to adhere to

Well yes - but is not that exactly what lots of people here are trying to do - insert possibilities into the gap between air and impact...........?

Chugalug2

16th Jul 2009, 14:16

Well perhaps bast0n, but that simply shows that there were many possible permutations of what actually happened, other than the RO's finding. If you have a feeble accident investigation topped off with an arbitrary finding based on a "model" then this is what you get. 15 years of alternative solutions! Unlike the BoI or the RO's findings this forum is not a formal accident investigation and is thus not constrained by the rules that they (in theory at least) were bound by. Yet I would suggest that more has emerged here, at the FAI and especially at the HoL than was ever considered or revealed by the BoI or RO's. That is not a judgement on those who post here. That is a judgement on the BoI, the RO's and the RAF!

Seldomfitforpurpose

16th Jul 2009, 14:28

Chugaz

Well yes - but is not that exactly what lots of people here are trying to do - insert possibilities into the gap between air and impact...........?

Is that not what the RO's have done :confused:

8-15fromOdium

16th Jul 2009, 15:40

Mr Purdey,

I am not seeking your help, merely your opinion:

Do you think that the BoI needed to consider how the Chinook Mk2 was certified airworthy?

I would also welcome the view of Bast0n & Caz on this matter.

bast0n

16th Jul 2009, 15:59

8-15 from odiam

Do you think that the BoI needed to consider how the Chinook Mk2 was certified airworthy?

No from me. Not relevant to the final moments.

John Purdey

16th Jul 2009, 16:29

8-15fromodium. No from me, as well JP

BOAC

16th Jul 2009, 16:40

Well yes - but is not that exactly what lots of people here are trying to do - insert possibilities into the gap between air and impact...........? - I'm not! I don't think anyone else is claiming absolute knowledge either - apart from you three and the ROs..

tucumseh

16th Jul 2009, 16:44

8-15 from odiam
Quote:
Do you think that the BoI needed to consider how the Chinook Mk2 was certified airworthy?

No from me. Not relevant to the final moments.

Safety is relevant to all aspects of aviation. The CA Release and Release to Service are products of the Safety Management System, as applied to aircraft.

The BoI process is an aspect of aviation safety management, playing a vital role in identifying problems and preventing recurrence.

The Secretary of State mandates safety management shall be carried forward through service to the disposal phase.

That there were failures in the mandated Safety Management System as it applied to Chinook Mk2 is beyond doubt; MoD has admitted it. For example, CDP when giving evidence to the HCDC in 1999.

MoD has stated airworthiness was not in the BoI’s remit. Therefore, unless delegated elsewhere, it rests with the convening officer. Has anyone seen his report on the subject?

bast0n

16th Jul 2009, 17:26

BOAC

I don't think anyone else is claiming absolute knowledge either - apart from you three and the ROs

Please read all my posts and you will see that I do not, and never have claimed absolute knowledge. That is as silly as "beyond all doubt".

Oh - perhaps I am not one of "you three" and should not be answering...:)

dalek

16th Jul 2009, 17:55

Cazatou,

For the first time in my life I have some sympathy with JP. We are making enough circles for several Olympic flags.

1. Read again our long "debate" on forecast v actual.

2. Lighthouse certain IFR. Crash site almost certain IFR.

3. Two to three miles from the coast probable VFR.

4&5. Very little evidence of a technical malfunction. ( Before you say none whatsoever read Burke and Witness A again at HOL.)
Also absolutely no evidence whatsoever that a technical malfunction did not take place.
You need an ADR and CVR for that. Not a TANS or Boeing simulation.

Bast0n,

Feel free to quote back at me whenever you like but do so accurately. I never use bold.

1.3VStall

16th Jul 2009, 18:24

Chaps,

This thread is getting so very tortuos.

I have said before that there are only two people alive who know with "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" what happened on that fateful day: Wratten and Day.

There are many people on this thread who believe/think/surmise/postulate etc, etc about possible influencing events ranging from extra-terrestial infulences to a bee sting and, of course, including airworthiness. All such theorising is a total irrelevancy in this case. I, too, have my theory - but that is also irrelevant, only fact is relevant.

Is there anyone out there who will categorically state on this thread that they know, with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, what happened that day?

If so, could they please make the statement and, more importantly back it up with fact and not supposition?

bast0n

16th Jul 2009, 18:42

DALEK

Feel free to quote back at me whenever you like but do so accurately. I never use bold.

I was emphasising a point. I apologise if it upset you - but pretty trivial in the overall scheme of things.

1.3VStall

absolutely no doubt whatsoever

Not a scenario that can ever be played out practically in any aspect of life - therefore a meaningless aspiration. As I have said before - several times - there can never be "absolutely no doubt whatsoever", so why keep going there?

John Purdey

16th Jul 2009, 19:03

Chugalug2

16th Jul 2009, 19:31

So the basis of the RO's finding, JP, is a negative. Because the aircraft wasn't turned away from running into the mist shrouded hillside the pilots were Grossly Negligent? Is that the RAF's case? To make that stick the RO's had to be content that the aircraft could have been turned away. An aircraft type with a history of jammed flight controls, wreckage in which all the control springs were detached from the control pallet, wreckage in which the pedals were 70 degrees hard over. Now those facts don't prove that they couldn't turn away, but how on earth do they prove, along with everything else, that they could beyond all doubt?
This roundabout will keep on turning I'm afraid!

Seldomfitforpurpose

16th Jul 2009, 20:17

1.3Vstall.

You are absolutely right of course, except that tedious is an understatement.

As to what happened between waypoint change and the granite hillside, again we shall never know; but we DO KNOW what did NOT HAPPEN, ie the crew DID NOT turn away from the cloud-covered hills ahead of them and we simply do not know why. We suspect That failure was the negligence but we cannot say so with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.

Shall we now call a halt to this roundabout? JP

There now, that reads as a better reflection of what we actually know.

John Purdey

16th Jul 2009, 20:20

Chugalug2. I thought as much; we are now back to the belief that in the last few seconds the controls jammed in all three axes, together with the power controls, and the R/T failed, and yet the aircraft entered a climb, which, had it been on track, would have meant it cleared the hills ahead by a few hundred feet.
If you really believe that, then be my guest, but I will now leave you to explain it. Regards.
JP

Chugalug2

16th Jul 2009, 20:32

Is that the new finding then, JP? It's certainly new to me! Oh, thanks for reminding me! To the list of evidence found in the wreckage I should have added metal particles in the hydraulic boosters. Cheers!

BOAC

16th Jul 2009, 21:22

Please read all my posts and you will see that I do not, and never have claimed absolute knowledge. That is as silly as "beyond all doubt". Is your post 5382 included? You appear to be certain.They just made a fatal error of judgement.

bast0n

16th Jul 2009, 21:35

BOAC

Is your post 5382 included? You appear to be certain.

You missed out the "I think" bit -I did not say I was certain........:ok:

BOAC

16th Jul 2009, 22:02

.....err no - have another go? 'I think' were my words (the clue is the blue bit). Yours was They just made a fatal error of judgement. Seems like a statement to me.

walter kennedy

16th Jul 2009, 23:36

BUT we now know that deliberate and planned actions were taking place at the position of waypoint change, actions that were not consistent with any kind of control emergency – and that position was so close in that, in the prevailing conditions, they would indeed have been at fault had there not been a reason for those actions. If you really want to clear their names, you have to uncover what it was that they were doing there.
To re-cap: re recent posts (including annotated maps), it is clear that the navigator in the left hand seat had set up a course 028 on his HoSI which together with the selection of waypoint B on the STANS indicated that they intended to go to the track H-B (as explained previously) after they had done whatever at the Mull. Let us now consider the handling pilot's HoSI: the position of waypoint change was exactly on the 027 radial from Aldergrove VOR extrapolated to way point A and it seems reasonable to assume (as Boeing's dist/time analysis has it), to have held this track over the long leg across the Antrim Hills and the sea and with geographic features on the distant Mull a little foggy, that the handling pilot would certainly have had 027 set on his course selector – this of course would have given him a nice track bar to stick to while the STANS still had waypoint A selected, which was up to the position of waypoint change.
After this point, one would assume that the HP would have reset his course selector to a meaningful heading or just left it on 027 if he had not needed it – he had obviously twiddled it off 027 at that point – it was found on 035 – was 035 in any way meaningful? Let's consider this:
If you inspect the area on a nice clear day, with a compass and allowing for the different magnetic variation from back in 1994, it is apparent that 035 would have been the optimum approach to that LZ, following the short straight line of rocky shore and being along the long axis of that LZ, an obvious line to take to it;
035 from the position of waypoint change passes within 10s of yards of the crash site – and these 10s of yards can be attributed to the start of a slew to the left which was apparently initiated in the last few seconds – so that last leg from the position of waypoint change to the crash site (about a mile) was 035, as set on the HP's HoSI course selector. This required a turn of 8 degrees at the position of waypoint change which is at odds with the map produced at one of the inquiries (see post #3094, page 155) where the MOD had unforgiveably misplaced the position of waypoint change so as to give the impression of the a/c going straight in – eliminating from consideration by those at the inquiry this all important turn.
If you add that the setting on the HP's baro alt subscale would have been appropriate for a QFE at the elevation of that LZ and that one of the RADALT alarms was set appropriately for an imminent landing in marginal conditions, then it rather looks like they were intending landing at that LZ.
Problem is, if they had been confident of the STANS range and bearing to waypoint A at the position that they changed from it they would have known that they were too close at that speed to turn towards the LZ – and the LZ was not on a bearing of 035 at the position of waypoint change – they had turned too soon for it. So in the absence of considering any other influences at this point, we have it that they got close to the Mull, set up the STANS for when they eventually left the area, ignored their proximity to the ground that the STANS had given them warning of, and turned in set up to land at the LZ – but for their speed too close and not lined up with it. Sounds suicidal? - there is an explanation for it:
In the typical conditions that were prevailing in the late afternoon of that day, the shoreline should have been visible at the position of waypoint change but the ground beyond it? – well, imagine a sodden DPM smock in front of a fire with steam billowing off it and you are a fly trying to land gracefully on it and you might get the scene – they were not intending to go over the fug, they were not tying to go through the fug, they were trying to land at a spot at the base of the fug but it would have been fugging difficult to judge their distance off visually if doing a fast approach – they would surely not have had anything visual clearly enough to have dismissed the STANS data! They simply had to have been getting some other information that they would have trusted to be intrinsically accurate and yet which misled them – what and how?
Suppose, with a PRC112 in hand, instead of being at the LZ you were here:
http://i229.photobucket.com/albums/ee134/grauniad/DSCF0391.jpg

(That's the LZ down below, the “green triangle”.)
The a/c crossed this point and crashed behind/right further up the slope – the geometry fits if you plot this posn, accounting for ½ mile out in range and turning in too soon.
Suppose you are enjoying being a ********, talking to the HP on the UHF guard frequency (as such sets cater for and which the HP has been said to have had his intercom switched to) perhaps saying that the ground is clear at the LZ and you should see me, etc – then you consider 20 tons at 150 kts is heading for you – no worries, already thought of that, look at this video clip:
DSCF0398.flv video by grauniad - Photobucket (http://s229.photobucket.com/albums/ee134/grauniad/?action=view&current=DSCF0398.flv)

Didn't take long ambling backwards, did it? - just a few seconds for an athletic young man in a hurry. What a perfect bunker – here's a pic with the exposure better:
http://i229.photobucket.com/albums/ee134/grauniad/DSCF0395.jpg
An oaf like me could hop down easily onto a roomy platform – the knotted rope was for getting to a further deep level to have a look around just in case there was some interesting rubbish.
You don't have to get into this conspiracy stuff – just consider that with the settings found and the planning done (eg manually input waypoints) it looks like they had a LL VFR route planned “handrailing” along Jura but which Flt Lt Tapper amended to include an excursion to the Mull – he had told the other officers who had done much of the routine planning for the sortie that he and his crew had planned “intensively” for this sortie when he pushed for his crew to do it. You don't just do uneccessary excursions at your own whim, especially with those passengers on board, so someone must have approved this higher up. Surely a new inquiry is justified addressing this planning aspect that is so obvious now but has been witheld from previous inquiries? A couple of experienced pilots, when looking at the available data from this perspective, should be able to recognise this and advise the Mull group technically. What have you got to lose?

dalek

17th Jul 2009, 06:47

June 1994
Re Walter's last

Weren't all approaches still compulsary QNH, or had we gone back to QFE by then.

Anybody remember?

Bertie Thruster

17th Jul 2009, 07:37

Trouble is Walter, if your scenario was the truth, that would simply confirm the MOD's position.

BOAC

17th Jul 2009, 07:51

and it seems reasonable to assume (as Boeing's dist/time analysis has it - problem with your scenario, WK, is that you are taking 'guesswork' for point of waypoint change as fact - "reasonable to assume ". We do not know where they were at waypoint change. Any TANS memory is only reading TANS position. Is it 'reasonable'? We are told that TANS cannot be relied on after a sea crossing.

Like so many, you are reading fact into supposition.

cazatou

17th Jul 2009, 08:02

RE Walter's 5406

If they were not carrying out such a trial as Walter suggests; then they were negligent for flying too fast and too close to high ground in weather conditions that can only be described as, at best, exceedingly marginal.

If they were using the equipment that Walter suggests for an approach to the HLS, then they were negligent for carrying out an unauthorised approach at high speed, in exceedingly marginal weather, to a landing site adjacent to high ground utilising equipment that had no CA Release and no R to S for the Chinook.

BEagle

17th Jul 2009, 08:02

Perhaps this, maybe that, if the other....

Perhaps the flying saucer which landed Wally's little green men with their wacky wirelesses caused a rift in the space-time continuum?

'Perhaps' is not a sufficient degree of evidence to support Wratten and Day's flawed verdict - and that's about the only thing about which there is no doubt whatsoever!

bast0n

17th Jul 2009, 08:13

BOAC

.....err no - have another go? 'I think' were my words (the clue is the blue bit). Yours was They just made a fatal error of judgement. Seems like a statement to me.

Yes, I borrowed your blue bit! But yes - they just made a fatal error of judgement seems OK to me on the evidence presented so far. Evidence, not the "what if" lot again!

bast0n

17th Jul 2009, 08:22

Beagle

Perhaps this, maybe that, if the other....

Exactly - you have it in one! Cut out all the conjecture from the "what if" brigade - stick to what is known and there you have it. An aircraft flown into the ground in bad weather that they should have avoided.............

Seldomfitforpurpose

17th Jul 2009, 08:28

Beagle

Exactly - you have it in one! Cut out all the conjecture from the "what if" brigade - stick to what is known and there you have it. An aircraft flown into the ground in bad weather that they should have avoided.............

Just to satisfy my curiosity can you tell me exactly why the above happened :confused:

tucumseh

17th Jul 2009, 08:58

Cut out all the conjecture from the "what if" brigade

“What if” is a recognised, indeed mandated, Safety Management technique. For example, SWIFT – Structured What-If Technique”.

One generates a list of questions based on the experience of the safety engineers, designers, users etc, combined with known Hazards. Then applied to the system or sub-system. (A very simple summary).

The results are recorded and followed up…. Again, both mandated in the airworthiness regs.

So, at what point was this “what if”, or equivalent, technique carried out, recorded and followed up? For example, here’s a question arising from experience gained before the accident;

“What if the DECU connector came loose in-flight?”

Or,

“What if there was a control jam caused by detached springs?”

Or,

“We know the software hasn’t been validated or verified, what if we just ignore this?”

And so on………

The outcome may only be entries in the FRCs. Let’s face it; there were plenty of blank spaces. But, questions and answers there must be. If not, that is gross negligence and dereliction of duty.

All, of course, airworthiness stuff, which many here think irrelevant.

Thor Nogson

17th Jul 2009, 09:00

RE Walter's 5406
If they were using the equipment that Walter suggests for an approach to the HLS, then they were negligent for carrying out an unauthorised approach at high speed, in exceedingly marginal weather, to a landing site adjacent to high ground utilising equipment that had no CA Release and no R to S for the Chinook.

Caz,

Since you've commented on this hypothetical approach, I take it that you consider it a possibility?

TN

bast0n

17th Jul 2009, 09:45

Seldom

Hullo again!

Just to satisfy my curiosity can you tell me exactly why the above happened

Pilot error?

walter kennedy

17th Jul 2009, 10:49

BOAC
I believe I have addressed in detail several times why, retrospectively, AAIB and Boeing ascribed a useful (to analysis) accuracy to the position at waypoint change derived from the STANS data (working back from the data at impact correlated with the recoded data to Corran at waypoint change).
The crucial thing is that the pilots did not have the benefit of this retrospective and would not, indeed, have had confidence in that position after a sea crossing and whilst still over sea - such that had some other local point reference contradicted the STANS, say by 1/2 mile or so, they would have preferred to believe the local reference.

walter kennedy

17th Jul 2009, 10:55

Cazatou
The equipment is practically self contained and intrinsically accurate and reliable - like sticking a GPS on your car windscreen and plugging it into the lighter - if they thought they were 1/2 mile or so further out then how can you say that they were approaching too fast? - the dist/time calcs (remember the increased tailwind component as they neared the landmass) and engine state indicate that they had started to slow down.
The sets of such equipment delivered in early 1995 were designed to be easily transferred between HC2 Chinooks - how would your formal certification apply to such kit?

walter kennedy

17th Jul 2009, 11:08

A picture says a thousand words ...
http://i229.photobucket.com/albums/ee134/grauniad/Mullhousehighbmp.jpg (http://www.pprune.org/%3Ca%20href=)">http://i229.photobucket.com/albums/ee134/grauniad/Mullhousehighbmp.jpg (http://s229.photobucket.com/albums/ee134/grauniad/?action=view&current=Mullhousehighbmp.jpg)

Chugalug2

17th Jul 2009, 11:23

Walter, I have no reason to doubt that "the equipment" as you describe it exists and is accomodated into the Chinook with the ease and speed with which you tell us. But I'm afraid that caz is quite right you know, if the scenario that you describe had occurred then the RO's finding effectively stands (not withstanding that it was itself in contravention of RAF regulations). Both JP and you have come to variations of the same lack of airmanship. He proposes that they miscalculated their position such that a "cowboy" climb into IMC caused them to crash instead of clearing the hilltop, and you propose that they miscalculated their position by putting all their faith into "the equipment" before making a "cowboy" high speed approach into an IMC obscured LZ, causing them to crash. Whoever the person might be with the handheld gizmo and wherever he was and regardless of his intent, the responsibility for making such an approach lay solely with one person, the aircraft captain. Someone more qualified than I in SH Ops should really respond, but that's my take and my attempt to answer your question:

What have you got to lose?

Everything, I would suggest.

Seldomfitforpurpose

17th Jul 2009, 11:44

Seldom

Hullo again!

Pilot error?

Sir, that speaks volumes.

bast0n

17th Jul 2009, 12:08

Seldom

Sir, that speaks volumes.

I assume the ? speaks volumes?

It does, but Pilot Error does fit all the known facts.

dalek

17th Jul 2009, 12:25

Baston,
All of the "facts".
A radar fix followed by a hole in the ground 20 minutes later.

I between a "fairy story" based on Boeing and SUPERTANS simulations.
Even John Purdy has admitted there are no "facts" there.

The, (according to Caz), idiots on the HOL committee were bright enough to spot this. As an old bold pilot why aren't you?

UFCM, Power Interrupt, Visual Illusion, Spatial Disorientation et al. They also fit the "facts."

There are no other "facts."

Seldomfitforpurpose

17th Jul 2009, 12:31

Seldom

I assume the ? speaks volumes?

It does, but Pilot Error does fit all the known facts.

If you had typed

"It does but Pilot Error does seem to fit all the known facts however because we simply do not know what happened aircraft unservicability, based on evidence recovered at the crash site, cannot be completely ruled out."

then that, surely would have been a truer reflection of known facts?

Thor Nogson

17th Jul 2009, 15:02

But I'm afraid that caz is quite right you know, if the scenario that you describe had occurred then the RO's finding effectively stands (not withstanding that it was itself in contravention of RAF regulations).

But, if the scenario had occurred, then someone not on board would have known about it, and it would seem highly likely that those who signed off on the verdict would have known about it too.

The information given to the BOI, HOL etc would then be missing clearly relevant information. With that in mind, the original verdicts would have to be overturned.

If it were true, though, this scenario makes it more likely that negligence occurred. At least I could understand why they were approaching the Mull.
It would also give the MOD another witness to the events, who would have been able to give a very informed view on whether negligence was the cause.
And that might be the root of why they are set on maintaining the verdict, because they would actually know, even if they couldn't tell for some reason.

Without this scenario, it seems incredulous they would have been anywhere near the Mull.

Just my 2p - I'd still have expected someone to have blown the whistle by now if it was the case.

TN

Chugalug2

17th Jul 2009, 15:39

Olive Oil:

The overwhelming evidence is that two competent pilots flew a serviceable aircraft into the ground whilst IFR.

Not quite Olive;
The overwhelming evidence is that two competent pilots flew an unairworthy aircraft into the ground whilst IFR. I suspect that "they were trying to fly an unairworthy aircraft to avoid it flying into the ground whilst IFR, but failed", would be nearer the mark. How on earth do you conclude that the overwhelming evidence is that the aircraft was serviceable when it crashed?

bast0n

17th Jul 2009, 15:59

Olive Oil

The overwhelming evidence is that two competent pilots flew a serviceable aircraft into the ground whilst IFR.

Yup. That's what I have been saying.

Ghugaz

The overwhelming evidence is that two competent pilots flew an unairworthy aircraft into the ground whilst IFR. I suspect that "they were trying to fly an unairworthy aircraft to avoid it flying into the ground whilst IFR, but failed", would be nearer the mark. How on earth do you conclude that the overwhelming evidence is that the aircraft was serviceable when it crashed?

Unairworthy maybe - but unserviceable? Where do you get that from? Also why were they in IMC in the first place? We are getting back to the story that somehow this aircraft had a will of it's own, and there is no evidence for that scenario.

Fitter2

17th Jul 2009, 16:21

We are getting back to the story that somehow this aircraft had a will of it's own, and there is no evidence for that scenario.
Well, no, because there was not enough left to discover conclusive evidence, (although some possible indications) and no flight recorder/cvr.

But there is sufficient evidence of other Chinooks having a 'mind of their own', both flight controls and FADEC, to include it as a possibility.

There is no direct evidence available of a deliberate cover up either, but there is enough circumstantial evidence from the behaviour of some of those close to MOD at the time to make one wonder.

Chugalug2

17th Jul 2009, 17:23

bast0n:

Unairworthy maybe - but unserviceable? Where do you get that from?

Nowhere, bast0n, have I ever said that the aircraft was unserviceable when it crashed or even when it took-off. Why? Because I don't know! Nowhere, bast0n, have I ever said that the aircraft was serviceable when it crashed, etc etc..Why? Because I don't know! If ever there were a case for RAF, and for that matter any UK Military, Aircraft Accidents being investigated only by professional accident investigators then it must be this one. Instead we have an investigation that turns its back on known airworthiness deficiencies, on crash evidence of control problems and instead puts its faith in the manufacturer to construct a model, based on incorrect data, that has the effect of pointing the finger away from their product and towards, well we know who don't we boys and girls? Remove UK Military Airworthiness from the MOD and remove Aircraft Accident Investigation from the Armed Forces ASAP, before more lives are wasted!
BTW I was asking why Olive Oil said:

The overwhelming evidence is that two competent pilots flew a serviceable aircraft into the ground whilst IFR.
when there is no such evidence. Olive?

dalek

17th Jul 2009, 17:58

Olive,
If I am out of order, report me to the Moderator.
Regards

Chugalug2

17th Jul 2009, 18:32

Blindingly obvious to you perhaps Olive , and no doubt to Messrs W&D as well, but I'm afraid that your construction does not amount to overwhelming evidence! The cavalier way in which evidence was selected, rejected, ignored and constructed by this Accident Investigation is nothing short of a scandal in itself, along with the unairworthiness that was probably the cause of the accident. The evidence of the dysfunctional way in which this investigation was conducted and in which its finding was arrived at is overwhelming I would suggest!

bast0n

17th Jul 2009, 18:46

Chugaz

along with the unairworthiness that was probably the cause of the accident

Gosh - where did that emerge from.................?

Olive Oil speaks for so many practical, experienced pilots in the art of low flying, in this forum. Perhaps more would like to speak up...........?

Chugalug2

17th Jul 2009, 19:33

It emerged from my opinion bast0n, you'll notice the word "probably" rather than "overwhelming evidence" to differentiate my opinions from those of Olive Oil. And what's all this malarkey about "practical, experienced pilots in the art of low flying"? Any serving or ex serving pilots surely qualify for that epitaph at some time or another, surely?

bast0n

17th Jul 2009, 19:50

Chugaz dear boy!!

And what's all this malarkey about "practical, experienced pilots in the art of low flying"? Any serving or ex serving pilots surely qualify for that epitaph at some time or another, surely?

There are many around, then and now, with whom I would not be happy to sit in the back of their cabs as they flew me around at low level - and so I did not!

Just to tempt your curiosity - I hit something in a cloud whilst flying.........:ok:

Cows getting bigger

17th Jul 2009, 20:02

Gents, I fear the impasse we have reached is smothering good discussion. Any chance of moving things on?

Tony Collins

17th Jul 2009, 20:38

"If it had developed an unserviceability, a competent and careful pilot, mindful of crew and passengers not to mention self, could have and should have remained VFR and returned to base."

About 600 parts have been recovered from the Airbus A330-200 which was lost off the coast of Brazil on 1 June. There is no evidence yet that the Airbus was unserviceable [though the ACARS comms system sent 24 error messages] in the 4 mins before loss of contact].

Should BEA, the French accident investigators investigators, conclude that the pilots of the Airbus were to blame on the basis that there's no evidence the aircraft was unserviceable?

In reality the BEA is not making any assumptions because they don't have the CVR and FDR. It is a pity the MoD and the RAF, when it comes to the crash of ZD576, have no such sensitivities.

When two 757s crashed in 1996 the investigators worked backwards from the black boxes and found that tiny problems had set off a chain of events which caused the loss of about 400 lives.

Without the black boxes it's unlikely they would found the probable causes.

Should the BEA, in the absence of black boxes, make assumptions that everything was working on the Airbus and that the pilots should have landed safely if they had "developed an unserviceability"?

bast0n

17th Jul 2009, 21:18

Tony Colins

As you well know there is a huge gulf between these two tradegedies. The AF jet just disappeared off the plot in very unknown circumstancies. The Chinook smacked into a hillside.

Your attempt to compare these events is incomprehensible. There are no black boxes to be found on the Mull - only wreckage. We know what happened - the Chinook flew into the ground in fog. We have not a clue what happened to the AF jet, and maybe never will.

Just try to stick with the facts as they are known, and try not to cloud the waters with irrelevant comparisons to other crashes. Stick with the known facts of this one and the answer is before your eyes.

Chugalug2

17th Jul 2009, 21:46

Tony Collins, good post. :ok: I agree with you that there are some useful similarities between what appears to be two completely unrelated accidents. The first is that to date there is no CVR or ADR evidence. There never will be of course from the Mull, the Airworthiness authority was content that they need not be fitted! The Air France A330 was so equipped of course, but the chances of location and recovery recede with each passing day. Both aircraft had "previous" regarding suspected airworthiness problems, the Chinook Mk2 with flight and engine control shortcomings , the A330 with ice prone pitots. The difference is of course that only one Accident Investigation is under a separate and independent authority; the BEA. The parallel with Mull would be an investigation into the accident by Air France; their Mulhouse A320 pilot received much the same "finding" as Rick and Jon did from the RAF, in the days when Airbus and "la Gloire" were synonymous. They've moved on hopefully, time the RAF did so as well!

Seldomfitforpurpose

17th Jul 2009, 22:11

Tony Colins

As you well know there is a huge gulf between these two tradegedies. The AF jet just disappeared off the plot in very unknown circumstances. The Chinook smacked into a hillside in very unknown circumstances.

Your attempt to compare these events is incomprehensible. There are no black boxes to be found on the Mull - only wreckage. We know what happened - the Chinook flew into the ground in fog but we don't know why. We have not a clue what happened to the AF jet and we don't know what ACTUALLY happened to ZD576, and maybe never will.

Just try to stick with the facts as some folk insist they are known, and try not to cloud the waters with irrelevant comparisons to other crashes. Stick with the small number of known facts of this one and the answer is before your eyes.

Now that is a slightly more accurate assessment don't you think :ok:

walter kennedy

17th Jul 2009, 22:45

Chugaqlug2
I wish you would stop posting twisted versions of the scenario I have tried to describe – it should not be necessary and correcting wastes time.
<< … you propose that they miscalculated their position by putting all their faith into "the equipment" before making a "cowboy" high speed approach into an IMC obscured LZ, ...>>
I believe that I have described the conditions a bit differently (see recent previous posts).
Calling a fast approach “high speed” shows a misunderstanding of the manouevre – why not ask your colleagues or others in aviation what it implies for rotorcraft.
Many pilots approaching decks of frigates or oil rigs regularly put their faith in a TACAN for judging their closing range – it is so important to know the range exactly and it is so easy, even in clear weather, to misjudge it visually.
If they were misled somehow by the data they were receving and thought they had ½ mile or more to go than they actually did, then they were denied the common practice of having a loadmaster stick his head out of the window – you see, they were still way over 120 kts air speed as they crossed the shoreline, which, I suggest, would mean that the window was still shut; had they got down to 80 kts or less (which they could have done with ½ mile more coasting with the drag washing off their speed) then it would be expected that the loadie was looking out and would have seen the detail of the shoreline better as it approached – as it was, everyone was looking through perspex – the pilots concentrating on looking for the LZ threshold ahead as the shoreline (at their altitude) was lost under the nose – it would have come up unexpectedly rapidly and the loadie may only have recognised just how close they had got to it as it passed by to the side – this would have left a maximum of 5 seconds to alert the pilots and for them to react (on the track they took, shoreline to impact less than 9 secs less the 4 secs of evasive manouevre).

Beagle
<<Perhaps the flying saucer which landed Wally's little green men with their wacky wirelesses caused a rift in the space-time continuum? >>
Why are you afraid of calling the equipment by its proper name? Why don't you acknowledge when it came into service and how it was used? Are you saying that you are unaware of the presence at the time at Macrihanish of an American SF unit that was equipped and practiced in the use of said equipment?

bast0n

18th Jul 2009, 06:11

Seldom

Now that is a slightly more accurate assessment don't you think

No!:ok:

Chugalug2

18th Jul 2009, 07:22

Walter Kennedy:

Chugaqlug2
I wish you would stop posting twisted versions of the scenario I have tried to describe – it should not be necessary and correcting wastes time.

Walter, if I have done that then I apologise, it certainly has never been my intention. You are right to say it is not necessary. However I do try to comment on what I perceive to be your scenario in my own words and from my perspective. That surely is allowable. Thus "cowboy" is shorthand for a procedure lacking airmanship, which is what I believe the one you describe to be. Comparing a handheld transceiver with a ship's calibrated and approved TACAN installation is nonsense Walter, and I suspect that you know it is. Your procedure is reckless in anything other than VMC. Anyone who authorised it any other way was reckless. Anyone who flew it any other way was reckless. It may well be that it is used any other way in operational environments, looking for downed aircrew in theatre for example. This was no such scenario. They had 25 pax on board and were supposedly en route to Fort George. If what you say is right then the pilots were indeed responsible for this accident, though to what degree is debatable I'll allow. Sorry Walter that's my take. As I keep saying better someone more qualified than I gives it the "DS" verdict.

dalek

18th Jul 2009, 09:34

Tony Collins,

Your analogy is accurate and relevant.

Bast0n,

Appart from flying into the ground, at a place we all acknowledge was (almost certainly) in fog.

Just what "known facts" do you want us to stick to?

bast0n

18th Jul 2009, 10:12

Dalek

Appart from flying into the ground, at a place we all acknowledge was (almost certainly) in fog.

Just what "known facts" do you want us to stick to?

I think you need to read the posts, once more, from the begining. I am not sure this thread has any life left in it - the going around in circles has been going on for too long.

I and others think the crew made a dreadful mistake - you and others don't - so why not leave it there and let the politicians sort it out - don't hold your breath chaps...................:ok:

BOAC

18th Jul 2009, 10:33

I and others think the crew made a dreadful mistake - yes, Baston, circles indeed, and you amongst a few others are creating them. I suspect your understanding of English is imperfect. Where exactly does 'think' translate to 'known'?

Just try to stick with the facts as they are known

bast0n

18th Jul 2009, 11:12

BOAC

- yes, Baston, circles indeed, and you amongst a few others are creating them. I suspect your understanding of English is imperfect. Where exactly does 'think' translate to 'known'?

What a very inspired post - adds so much to the debate....well done!

Airborne Aircrew

18th Jul 2009, 11:30

Appart from flying into the ground, at a place we all acknowledge was (almost certainly) in fog.

Just what "known facts" do you want us to stick to? I think I can see the problem. It's Baston/JP/Caz Maths.

Allow me to demonstrate. In "normal" mathematics the sum of all the parts equals the final result:-

1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 = 15

Let's assume that 15 is, in fact, a finding of "gross negligence" and the integers added are pieces of damning evidence that, when combined, quite correctly lead to the finding.

In Baston/JP/Caz Maths we find the following:-

1 + x + y + z + 5 = 15

In this form of maths we have a start point and and end point yet there are, (by their own admission), several unknowns. Because the start, (1 = Aldergrove), and the end, (5 = the crash site), are the same as in normal maths in Baston/JP/Caz Maths it's quite reasonable to ignore the unknowns and substitute the appropriate figure that results in 15 as the total. Job done, off to the pub.

Before long they will be telling us there is an invisible being in the sky who made the universe in seven days. They will base this conclusion on a 4,000 year old book written by men that believed lightening was a demonstration of the wrath of said being. After all, we have a start point, (a vacuum), and an end point, (a universe), so it's no less preposterous really, is it? :}

walter kennedy

18th Jul 2009, 12:10

Chugalug2
I can only recommend that you do some homework on this system off thread – ask colleagues/contacts just how it was used – come back and enlighten us.
Answering your points for the benefit of other readers in the meantime and not really wanting another deluge from you:
The handset is a UHF radio and transponder – factory calibrated, it is intrinsically accurate and either transponds or it doesn't as opposed to giving an inaccurately timed return – same as for on board kit – works or it doesn't – if you are getting consistent returns of the right order (say, in rough agreement with a STANS or what you could visually judge) then you would expect it to be very accurate such that you could forget about the STANS and your fuzzy visual judgement and concentrate on the readout.
Plus it is a radio – the operator on the ground can talk directly to the pilot – as you can so clearly hear helos approaching, you could be standing halfway up the hill in mist but pulling the pilots leg about it being clear on the LZ and you can see them and their approach is fine, etc..
If they had been doing a fast approach but were misled as to their range to go, they could reasonably have expected to have been down to a speed at which the pilots and the loadmaster could have clearly seen the shoreline by the time they got there as opposed to its whizzing past unexpectedly.
They would not have been at fault if they were misled as to their closing range by a third party on the ground using this equipment.
For those of you wondering about about ½ mile extra being sufficient for slowing down enough to actually land there, bearing in mind there was a 30kt tailwind and, while within the capabilities of a Chinook with an experienced crew, there would not have been need to demonstrate the equipment by landing, especially with the passengers on board – just a tight turn at 60kts right over the LZ would have been impressive enough – hence the H-B track aready being set up – just turn around and head NW until picking it up.

walter kennedy

18th Jul 2009, 12:18

AA
Talking about maths, analysis of the known data has it that they had got too close in the conditions (with the expected accuracy of the STANS after a sea crossing) while still at speed, to a position where their actions with instrument settings suggested that they were not in control difficulties, for them to have been acting responsibly in a ferry flight passing by the Mull - a bit harder than integer addition but the calculations are just as robust.
I believe that is the point several people are making that you criticise.
Better start thinking about what else could explain their excursion to the Mull.

dalek

18th Jul 2009, 12:25

Bast0n,

In one respect you are right. This must soon come to an end.

I have read the thread from the beginning when I posted under a different name.

The only "facts" I have ever seen have come from the simulations. I think the vast majority on this thread and elswhere accept these are now, at the best, theories or hypothesis.

The BOI and the RO's never took this into consideration. Just as they did not consider the Burke evidence. The HOL did so and saw the "facts" for what they were. Mere speculation.

Do you think the HOL were correct to dismiss the simulations?

Without these, there is no evidence one way or the other.

Radar fix, twenty minute black hole, hole in ground. End.

bast0n

18th Jul 2009, 12:38

Airborne aircrew

You do neither yourself or this thread any credit.

I suggest you go away until you have grown up a bit.

Walter Kennedy

Spot on once again.:ok:

John Purdey

18th Jul 2009, 12:45

bastOn. Your 5435. Several expeieced aircrew who share your view have joined the discussion in the past, but eventually seem to have given up. They probably did so because there were so many off-beat theories being bandied about that they realised they were in the wrong company. Those theories included;

1.The crew were seduced into the hillside by a false IRA beacon.
2. Both pilots were simultaneously distracted by a fly or flies in the cockpit.
3. Both pilots were simultaneously distracted by a wasp or wasps in the cockpit
4.There was a secret piece of US equipment on board, which caused a malfunction (and which explained the alleged presence of US SEALS as the first people to reach the scene.)
5. All the aircraft controls jammed, so that the crew did not fly the aircraft into the granite, the aircraft flew the crew into it, while the crew sat helplessly and watched it happen.
6. Both pilots simultaneously suffered spatial disorientation.
7. It may (or may not ) have been a case of government sponsored murder

To recall the others gives me a headache, but I think you get the picture.

Some folk will try anything to avoid the facts that without any doubt whatever (as we say) the crew should have turned away from that cloud-covered hill; and without any doubt whatever, they failed to do so. The most plausible explanation for their failure to turn away is that they misidentified the Fog station compound on the clifftop, thinking it was the Lighthouse compound. This put them about 500 yds to the right of their intended track, which meant (have a look at the map) that the hill in fron of them was around 300-400 ft higher than they expected, and they could not avoid it in the very limited vi=sibility.

Such a failure to act as any reasonable person, given the same corcumstances would do, in this case turning away, is the definition of negligence.

This wil attract a lot of flak, but no convincing counter arguments.
Regards. JP

Chugalug2

18th Jul 2009, 13:36

Walter, if this is a deluge I know not, but it is a response to your post. My point about the ship TACAN v handheld gizmo was not that the latter may not have functioned correctly, for it might well have done, but that the former is installed and calibrated on the ship to be used if necessary to make an approved approach to the ship in IMC conditions, whereas the latter could not have been with respect to the Mull LZ. It is for that reason that your:

They would not have been at fault if they were misled as to their closing range by a third party on the ground using this equipment.
is just plain wrong. Am I alone in this? It cannot be a serious contention that you can stand by a hillside with such a device and expect a pax loaded Chinook to rely on you to be in the right place in IMC and then to make an approach. Such action by the pilot would amount to Gross Negligence, to coin a well known phrase, surely? Or am I so out of touch that I should shuffle off in my slippers as has been previously suggested? Sorry, your quote has slipped me into bold, not intended!

eagle 86

18th Jul 2009, 14:08

As one who, in my opinion, has been poorly treated by a BoI can I ask, with the greatest respect to those that perished and their families and loved ones, yet again what is the purpose of this thread.
E86

bast0n

18th Jul 2009, 14:43

Eagle 86

You are so very right - I stated in a recent post I am not sure this thread has any life left in it - the going around in circles has been going on for too long.

John Purdey

So true - watch out for the "incoming" from those who cannot see the blindingly obvious.......................:ok:

Thor Nogson

18th Jul 2009, 16:12

So true - watch out for the "incoming" from those who cannot see the blindingly obvious.......................:ok:

bast0n, if it is blindingly obvious, how come only a handful of the posters can see it?

You've admitted yourself, many times, that you aren't 100% certain, and that is the whole point.

I agree that whyever they were that close, then it was probably pilot error that led to the crash, but I can't be sure, and unless those who made the judgement knew something that wasn't divulged at the original BOI or subsequently, neither could they.

Chugalug2, you're right - if they relied on something to guide them that close to something they couldn't see, they were negligent, but surely the BOI and all subsequent reviews would be undermined by not knowing they were intending to go there in the first place?

TN

Chugalug2

18th Jul 2009, 17:18

JP:

Some folk will try anything to avoid the facts that without any doubt whatever (as we say) the crew should have turned away from that cloud-covered hill; and without any doubt whatever, they failed to do so.

Well no quibble from this folk, JP, for I fully endorse your quote! Catch him someone, I think he's fainted! As to your list of "off beat theories:
1,3 and 6 all stem from variations of Walter's scenario and, before he has a go at me, probably misrepresent it to boot.
2 and 5 I suspect were offered as examples of how an aircraft under control could finish up in a CFIT.
Which leaves 4. Again over egged as no-one to my knowledge has said that all the controls jammed (though it was a feature of the control pallet that they could have done). It is also in poor taste to say that if that were true that the pilots would merely have sat there helplessly. I suggest that they would have fought with the condition to the very end, whether the jam was in 1,2 or 3 axis.

bast0n

18th Jul 2009, 17:27

Chugaz

I fainted as well!

You left out this bit of JP's post.

Such a failure to act as any reasonable person, given the same corcumstances would do, is the definition of negligence.

JP's spelling is suffering as he recovers from the shock.:)

Chugalug2

18th Jul 2009, 18:47

I'm sorry, bast0n, I hope you are fully recovered now! As to JP's post I can only quote the bits with which I am in agreement with, I'm afraid.
Thor Nogson, sorry I forgot to respond to your point re intentions to go to the LZ. Point taken but it's all getting a little esoteric to suggest that the BoI didn't know or didn't want to know about a planned overflight/landing at the Mull DZ when there is no evidence of such intention, other than the circumstantial evidence that Walter proposes to us, let alone how that would affect its finding. There is already enough evidence that other issues surrounding the RTS, the airworthiness and the experiences of aircrew (in particular that of the Odiham UTP) that the BoI didn't know or didn't want to know that makes the finding untenable. But that is in the real world of course, and not in the Kafkaesque one of the MOD which no doubt will soon threaten to "Thcream and thcream 'till it's thick" unless we all go away!

bast0n

18th Jul 2009, 21:11

Chugaz

Kafkaesque

It can also describe an intentional distortion of reality by powerful but anonymous bureaucrats. "Lack of evidence is treated as a pesky inconvenience, to be circumvented by such Kafkaesque means as depositing unproven allegations into sealed files ..." Another definition would be an existentialist state of ever-elusive freedom while existing under unmitigatable control.

The adjective refers to anything suggestive of Kafka, especially his nightmarish type of narration, in which characters lack a clear course of action, the ability to see beyond immediate events, and the possibility of escape. The term's meaning has transcended the literary realm to apply to real-life occurrences and situations that are incomprehensibly complex, bizarre, or illogical.

I just thought that I would pop this in to help those less able than you and I to see the grass for the trees................eh?

I now need to go and lie down.

Goodnight:ok:

John Purdey

19th Jul 2009, 07:15

Chugalug2. Your 5460 - crikey!!
I'm off to church, I need spiritual sustenance. Regards. John Purdey

Airborne Aircrew

19th Jul 2009, 12:06

You do neither yourself or this thread any credit.

I suggest you go away until you have grown up a bit.It's SOP with you isn't it? You see something you don't like and you attack the author rather than the content. My point is absolutely valid. There are significant portions of the events during that flight that you cannot know. But from a hole in the ground and some wreckage, you, (and others), manage to conjure up a sequence of events that lead to a conclusion you like.

It amuses me that several here allow themselves to simply accept "simulations" from Boeing as reasonably accurate accounts. I quite clearly remember being told in the mid 80's when a Mk I went in in the Falklands killing several friends of mine that we were not to discuss the DASH runaway because there may be legal ramifications for Boeing. They were the same company when this aircraft flew into the Mull as they were in the mid 80's and have no interest in having the failures, faults and shorcomings in their airframes brought to light.

The FADEC software would be a joke if it weren't such a serious failure at the most basic level. To hear that it can't be independently audited is laughable... It contains known bugs that have manifested themselves in unpredictable activities... Yet it has full authority over both engines simultaneously. That's lunacy if you are the inventor and are flying the aircraft yourself. To put it in numerous airframes and send others out to fly it borders on attempted murder.

You keep toeing the party line Baston, you're a credit to your leaders. Those leaders whose lack of integrity has them disregarding their own rules at the cost of their subordinates. Like you, they should be ashamed of themselves.

dalek

19th Jul 2009, 12:45

Bast0n,

My 5424. Just what facts are you working to?

You have not replied.

Chugalug2

19th Jul 2009, 12:49

In your passion Airborne I think that you are close to the nub of this scandal; vested interests. As usual the biggest vested interest in the UK Military is not the armed forces but those who supply them, those who work for those who supply them and those who hope to work for those who supply them. Add to that the arrogance of Senior Officers who know more about modern operations than those involved in them directly, because they did something vaguely related too long ago than they would care to admit, and you have a potent cocktail. Stir in rather than shake the secret British ingredient and you have our very unique "Bombe Surprise" in sadly every sense. That ingredient is of course the once renowned and envied Civil Service. Sir Humphrey has morphed into a monster, proud of the fact that he can ensure that scandals like this will never be put right, endex, as Atlantic Cowboy tells us. Well, we shall see. This aircraft was unairworthy, and known to be so by the very crew flying it that day. They may not have used the "A" word, very few seemed even to know what it meant or what it didn't mean. They had no illusions though about the Chinook Mk2, and begged for a Mk1 for this task at least. "No, get on with it", was the reply from above. So they did, but at least they took the sensible precaution of replanning the trip for the shortest over-water leg. In that at least they succeeded, for when what they feared happened they were able to make land-fall. Unfortunately it was hilly and cloud covered and whatever the malfunction, and we now know enough about the Mk2 to know that it was probably very basic and very severe, it defeated them. It does not do to dwell too long on those final few minutes in that flight deck, but they would not have stopped fighting until the very end. That a Chain of Command that so betrayed them and their passengers should so resolutely set out to destroy their memory is unconscionable and a comment on itself rather than them. There is a great deal to be put right here. I have enough faith left in the RAF at least to believe that it will make a start sooner, I hope, rather than later. My views on the MOD are clear and well rehearsed to not need repeating for a change!

bast0n

19th Jul 2009, 13:11

Airborneaircrew

You keep toeing the party line Baston, you're a credit to your leaders. Those leaders whose lack of integrity has them disregarding their own rules at the cost of their subordinates. Like you, they should be ashamed of themselves.

Sorry to disappoint you but my views are strictly my own. I am not ashamed to hold to the view that this was a tragic accident caused by pilot error. I have never toed a party line as those who know me will attest to!

Dalek

Please read my previous posts.

To the rest of you -

I think that this thread has had it's day - I am leaving it for pastures less unpleasant and more logical. I have enjoyed the twists and turns of the argument but think it does no good for the friends and families of those who died to keep reading this rather petty repetition that is leading nowhere.

I wish you all well in whatever you are trying to achieve and bid you all a very friendly good bye.:)

John Purdey

19th Jul 2009, 18:20

bastOn. And it's goodbye from me too. John Purdey.

walter kennedy

20th Jul 2009, 00:01

Chugalug2
You wrote in post #
<<They had no illusions though about the Chinook Mk2, and begged for a Mk1 for this task at least. "No, get on with it", was the reply from above. >>
If they had worries about the MK2, it wasn't about handling – the previous day's crew reported that ZD576 had performed very well, smoother than a MK1, etc..- one would have thought they would have liked to have more of a go of it in this respect – they had indeed had serious reservations but at that point it would have been difficult to refuse – there is after all no evidence of control difficulties anyway in the decisive part of the flight.

<<So they did, but at least they took the sensible precaution of replanning the trip for the shortest over-water leg. In that at least they succeeded, for when what they feared happened they were able to make land-fall. >>
Check the maps – there is no difference at all – further, the landfall options on the other route would involve low, level, and clear (weatherwise) ground. What you have written here is absolute nonesense.

<<Unfortunately it was hilly and cloud covered ...>>
And as someone who posted here who was flying in the Antrim Hills area at the time said the weather was “sh**ty” over those hills too – how was this track safer than the flat, low land via waypoint H then B if they had any reservations re the a/c?

Bertie Thruster

20th Jul 2009, 07:12

Walter....if there's a problem over land......land and sort it out.

if there's a problem over water.....ditch and...sink.

Chugalug2

20th Jul 2009, 09:40

Walter, you haven't taken over from JP or bast0n as chief MOD apologist by any chance? I only ask as their fall back position was always to make some incredible statement and simply stick to it. The talk in Chinook crewrooms in those days was of little else than the problems that the new Mk2 was bringing with it, especially uncommanded power excursions (ie FADEC problems) and even jammed flying controls (ie "broom cupboard" problems). That's not of course from my own experience but from those who flew it and have stated as much on this thread. To say that didn't happen to the aircraft on the previous day, or even earlier that day is rather like saying that the Nimrod performed flawlessly right up to when it exploded. We now know that it had been ready to do just that for years, that its very construction meant that it was an accident waiting to happen. Thus it was with the Chinook Mk2, Walter. In a word it was unairworthy.
As to maps I am indebted to you for the very same.
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/39182-chinook-still-hitting-back-3-merged-264.html
The overwater leg, ie flying between landmasses, is shorter from Aldergrove to the Mull than any other. From the Mull they could hug the coast, and as Bertie reminds us this was a helicopter and could force land if necessary. I suspect that was their intention, but the aircraft was to have the last word...

walter kennedy

20th Jul 2009, 12:15

Chugalug2
<<The overwater leg, ie flying between landmasses, is shorter from Aldergrove to the Mull than any other. From the Mull they could hug the coast,>>
No it is not - are you not looking at the path via Rathlin Island?
Compare Rathlin to Islay with Carnlough to Mull - insignificant.
Is not the coast of Islay flatter than the Mull?
Is not route H-B a more obvious "handrail" up the coast, nice and straight with the wind on it so that it was clear and you could keep close to it as opposed to Kintyre where the aerodrome was fogged in at the time, the weather would have been following that side, and the coast was very much more indented/irregular for following?
Just do your own chartwork and ask people who have "handrailed" up the coast thereabouts just which coast was more likely.
You are a fine one too talk of roles in this debate - I take it you are rostered on in the Orwell sheep mode at the moment. Pathetic.
And when it comes to performance of the a/c you can totally discount undemanded engine runups because of the matched power levels found and absence of record of excessive rpm - oh, and it would have been the hand of God if they had experienced such as an immediate action in dealing with such is to limit rotor rpm by pulling up on the collective and using that power, is it not? - would have resulted in a sudden climb which would have saved them.
Just doing your bit to keep nothing determinable - a disgraceful tactic by all you doing it.

Thor Nogson

20th Jul 2009, 13:29

Just doing your bit to keep nothing determinable - a disgraceful tactic by all you doing it.

IMHO that's way out of order. Chugalug2 has stated repeatedly they believe it to have been a control problem occurring in an unairworthy craft. Quite clear, I'd have thought. Certainly not disgraceful, unless not sharing your opinion is the criterion.

Your perfectly coherent explanation lacks one supporting bit of information - without that, it's no more likely than any other view.

Now that Bast0n, JP and (it appears) Caz have said goodnight, should we argue with ourselves. I wonder, given the timing and manner of their withdrawl from the thread, they know something we don't.

TN

Chugalug2

20th Jul 2009, 13:40

Ok, let's just calm down Walter. I have never flown helicopters let alone the Chinook, and defer to anyone who has in the matter of planning a trip necessitating the crossing of the North West Channel with pax in an aircraft that a crew had essentially no confidence in. Picking up on Bertie's point I would have thought that the very shortest over water leg would be the way to go. "Insignificant" differences might just be that between life and death, though in the event the latter resulted anyway. As has been pointed out to you before, evidence extracted from the BoI is very suspect. It was either heavily qualified at the time, or constructed (modelled) from dubious data by the aircraft manufacturer, and though similarly qualified used as a basis of fact with which to come to the infamous finding. I have said before Walter that you have a prima facie case which should be properly investigated by Professional Accident Investigators along with every other possible reason as to why this tragedy happened, including pilot error (negligent, grossly negligent or otherwise) and lack of airworthiness. We know what your theory is, just as we know mine. That is all they will ever be until a proper investigation into this tragedy occurs. It hasn't happened yet, in that at least I hope we can agree.
Thor, I'm sure that you are right. Perhaps we are to find out what that "something" is soon? Oh, and thank you!

cazatou

20th Jul 2009, 15:32

Firstly, apologies for my absence but the new security measure prior to log on gave me some problems that appear to be sorted now.

Chugalug2

Your post #5472

"The talk in Chinook Crewrooms in those days was of little else than the problems the new Mk2 was bringing with it."

Your post # 5475

" I have never flown helicopters let alone the Chinook."

Psychic are we? Or are we just repeating what has been said by others on what is a RUMOUR NETWORK?

Chugalug2

20th Jul 2009, 16:38

caz, delighted that you at least have not abandoned ship, and that rumours of your doing so are greatly exaggerated! As to:

Psychic are we? Or are we just repeating what has been said by others on what is a RUMOUR NETWORK?

No and Yes! I've said it before and no doubt I'll say it again caz, this forum is no more than as you describe it. For to complete my quote...
That's not of course from my own experience but from those who flew it and have stated as much on this thread.
What this accident needs is a proper Aircraft Accident Investigation. It has yet to receive it.

pulse1

20th Jul 2009, 17:14

Or are we just repeating what has been said by others on what is a RUMOUR NETWORK?

Or is Chug repeating what Witness A said at the FAI and HoL enquiry?

Chugalug2

20th Jul 2009, 18:57

Yes he is, pulse, and thank you for picking me up on that! Though to be fair, the MOD puts no more store by the deliberations of the HoL or FAI than it does to ours here. Indeed it is uninterested it would seem in any views other than its own. Whether that includes Mr Hadden-Jones QC and his Review into Nimrod (and airworthiness in general) remains to be seen. The higher they are the further they fall! If only that held true for SO's, eh caz?

cazatou

20th Jul 2009, 20:02

Chugalug 2

May I point out that MOD wrote and published "the Rules". They are not guidelines - they are definitive/absolute/peremptory.

The Pilots signed as having read and understood the Orders and Instructions in the Flying Order Book/ GASO's/STCASI's and JSP 318 every month.

Disobeying/ignoring Orders and Instructions are disciplinary offences in the Military at any time. Doing so on Active Service raises the seriousness of the offence to another level. When such offences result in needless Fatalities they are viewed with extreme gravity.

You will recall that the Reviewing Officers deemed the Pilots to be negligent before the "Waypoint Change" (0.95 NM from impact) - when even the HOL Committee admitted the Pilots were in control of the aircraft.

Even if there was an emergency after waypoint change (for which there is no evidence) that does not alter the liability of the Pilots because they had already failed in their duty.

BEagle

20th Jul 2009, 20:20

Sorry, but I am frankly just getting rather sick of posts containing unsubstantiated comment and finger-waving 'I know better' emoticons.

Cazatou you have no proof 'beyond any doubt whatsoever' as to what happened; neither did Wratten nor Day.

Quite why you seem so keen to perpetuate the wholly unreasonable decision of Wratten and Day is frankly incomprehensible. Fortunately I have secured the agreement of the next Prime Minister to overturn this abysmal decision unless he has 'overwhelming' reasons not to.

Cows getting bigger

20th Jul 2009, 21:02

Caz, I ordinarily respect your reasoned and objective argument. Who broke the rules bringing an apparently unairworthy aircraft into service and what price did they pay? Furthermore, who broke the 'rules' regarding BOI findings?

Fitter2

20th Jul 2009, 21:05

You will recall that the Reviewing Officers deemed the Pilots to be negligent before the "Waypoint Change" (0.95 NM from impact) - when even the HOL Committee admitted the Pilots were in control of the aircraft.
Caz's way with words is quite amazing. The HOL did not have any reason to believe the pilots were not in control of the aircraft at waypoint change - they also were agreed there was no evidence that the pilots were negligent.

Every independant examination of the limited facts agrees that the ROs were both out of order, according to the rules they were duty bound to obey, and had a personal interest in diveriting attention from the appalling state of the 'airworthiness' system.

To allow the systemic failures can be understood on the grounds that they judged (or misjudged) budgetary considerations to override safety. To foist this verdict on two JOs who were no longer in a position to defend themselves, is conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.

walter kennedy

20th Jul 2009, 22:39

Fitter2
<<To allow the systemic failures can be understood on the grounds that they judged (or misjudged) budgetary considerations to override safety. To foist this verdict on two JOs who were no longer in a position to defend themselves, is conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.>>
What about "In order to not to embarrass the service over an exercise gone wrong with great consequences, leaving the two JOs to blame rather than come forward with information is ..."?

cazatou

21st Jul 2009, 05:39

Shame about BEagle - we first met in the early 70's when I was instructing at The School of Refresher Flying RAF Manby. He was doing a quick refresher between OCU's on his way to become a Vulcan Co-Pilot.

CGB

I just turned this on to look for messages etc. If you don't mind I'll have breakfast before replying.

Atlantic Cowboy

21st Jul 2009, 06:25

BEagle,

I refer you to my post at 5361.

Cameron will find 'overwhelming' reasons not to change the findings of the BOI. As a former serpent, I assure you that Ministers and Prime Minsters listen to the advice they are given. Cameron won't be any different at at all. Why do you think he put a caveat in the response to you?

Regards
AC

tucumseh

21st Jul 2009, 07:27

I refer you to my post at 5361.

And, like I said, there came a time when MoD abandoned the requirements for experience, competence and engineering qualifications when filling vacancies in the team charged with preparing answers to Mull PQs.

Only one reason for doing that. They wanted people who would simply regurgitate the party line, without actually knowing anything about what they were talking about. How else can you explain the nonsense they wrote?

A simple example - I remain convinced ZD576 was a converted Mk1. But, apparently, I’m wrong. That is not a minor issue. The clear purpose of such a deceit is to create, in peoples’ minds, a false airworthiness baseline of November 1993, so hiding legacy Mk1 problems and the failure of mandated process when creating a new Mk of aircraft.

Lying has only one purpose – to hide the truth. In this case the inescapable truth is that senior officers knew the haste with which the Mk2 was rushed into service, while still in the development stage, was unjustifiable.

BEagle

21st Jul 2009, 09:54

If you like.

I've never made any secret about being chopped from the Bucc OCU.

However, I've never been to Manby in my life. SORF left Manby some 4 years before I started my Vulcan training and I don't think that even Cazatou was instructing at SORF for over 6 years....:confused:

My post was rather insulting, I admit, and unnecessarily so. Regrettably, I was pretty angry at yet another unsubstantiated comment about the accident. However, I have now toned it down and apologise for my earlier intemperance.

pulse1

21st Jul 2009, 11:15

Beagle, your frustration is quite understandable.

Only a few pages ago I posted an extract from the testimony of Witness A given to the HoL.

852. You heard the question that was put to Squadron Leader Morgan by me. I repeated to him the one question that was put to him by the Board, "what unforeseen malfunctions have occurred on the Chinook Mark II since its introduction?" He listed a number of things in his answer, which were not, at least on the record, pursued. Just so that we understand the flavour of it, how much were these matters the subject of discussion at the time amongst helicopter pilots, these various problems that were apparently manifesting themselves and the problems at Boscombe Down?

A. They occupied our minds to a great degree, my Lord, crew room talk was of little else at the time. The crews felt extremely uneasy about the way the aircraft had been introduced into service. This perception was reinforced by the lack of information contained in the aircrew manual, the poor state of repair of the flight reference cards and such like as well.

(my bold)

And yet, we now see that cazatou accuses chugalug2 of being psychic or just repeating Pprune rumours when he quotes what Witness A said, not on Pprune, to the FAI and HoL.

That is the disgraceful level of the man's argument. Perhaps he should become a politician. He certainly has the ego to go with it.

Chugalug2

21st Jul 2009, 18:35

caz:

You will recall that the Reviewing Officers deemed the Pilots to be negligent before the "Waypoint Change" (0.95 NM from impact) - when even the HOL Committee admitted the Pilots were in control of the aircraft.

Even if there was an emergency after waypoint change (for which there is no evidence) that does not alter the liability of the Pilots because they had already failed in their duty.

Was that "negligence" not due to the "certainty" that the aircraft was in IMC at the "Waypoint Change", caz. Has the MOD not since admitted that there is now no such certainty? On what basis are they still negligent before "Waypoint Change". Please, please don't let it be something to do with breakfast! Are you now saying that even if an emergency (such as a control jam) happened after "Waypoint Change", that the finding stands as far as you are concerned?

cazatou

21st Jul 2009, 19:19

Chugalug 2

In their evidence to the HOL Committee both the Reviewing Officers stated that negligence had occurred by the time the Pilots made the waypoint change. If they were IMC then the flight should have been conducted in accordance with IFR. If they were not in cloud then they had flouted the basic rules of Airmanship by flying too fast and too close towards the cloud covered high ground of the Mull which they subsequently impacted.

You will note in this respect that Mr Holbrook gave sworn evidence to the BOI that the aircraft was flying "in a straight line and in level flight and was proceeding towards.... the cloud localisation covering the Mull." Mr Holbrook estimated the height of the Chinook at "between 200 and 400 ft". You will remember that Mr Holbrook recorded his position as "2NM southwest of the Mull".

The Pilots had plenty of time to decide on a course of action to avoid "the cloud localisation covering the Mull". They failed to do so with tragic consequencies.

Chugalug2

21st Jul 2009, 19:34

So they were in control of the aircraft, flying towards the cloud enshrouded Mull intending as planned to turn left at the "Waypoint Change" but were already Grossly Negligent? Why? Because they were "flying too fast"? How fast was that, caz? The only speed known to any degree of accuracy is the speed deduced from impact damage. Is that the "flying too fast" speed? Why? If you were the BoI President and had done a proper Accident Investigation, that uncovered the Lack of Airworthiness and took into account the evidence of Flight Control malfunction in the wreckage, you would still find the primary cause of the accident to be the Gross Negligence of the pilots before "Waypoint Change" even though they could still have been flying in VMC? Amazing!

BEagle

21st Jul 2009, 21:04

the basic rules of Airmanship

Whilst the Rules of the Air Regulations are stated in Section 2 of the ANO, I know of no equivalent legal definition of the alleged 'Basic rules of Airmanship' (sic) which would support the flawed findings of Wratten and Day....

....beyond any doubt whatsoever, that is.

Chugalug2

21st Jul 2009, 21:28

Olive Oil

Chugalug, excuse me for butting in here but do you know what is meant by "Rules of The Air" and do you know what the Rules of The Air are?

Are they the ones that rule against "flying too fast", Olive? Can you quote them if so?

cazatou

22nd Jul 2009, 05:04

Chugalug 2

I'll answer that one if I may

They are the same rules that say "Don't drive down narrow Country Lanes at or above the maximum permitted Speed Limit in thick Fog."

They are the Rules of Survival.

Chugalug2

22nd Jul 2009, 06:05

As it seems before waypoint change they were most likely not in fog, thick or otherwise, caz, that doesn't really help. Instead of answering questions that you were not asked, please answer the ones that you were:

So they were in control of the aircraft, flying towards the cloud enshrouded Mull intending as planned to turn left at the "Waypoint Change" but were already Grossly Negligent? Why? Because they were "flying too fast"? How fast was that, caz? The only speed known to any degree of accuracy is the speed deduced from impact damage. Is that the "flying too fast" speed? Why? If you were the BoI President and had done a proper Accident Investigation, that uncovered the Lack of Airworthiness and took into account the evidence of Flight Control malfunction in the wreckage, you would still find the primary cause of the accident to be the Gross Negligence of the pilots before "Waypoint Change" even though they could still have been flying in VMC?

Thank you

tucumseh

22nd Jul 2009, 06:19

Caz

In their evidence to the HOL Committee both the Reviewing Officers stated that negligence had occurred by the time the Pilots made the waypoint change. If they were IMC then the flight should have been conducted in accordance with IFR. If they were not in cloud then they had flouted the basic rules of Airmanship by flying too fast and too close towards the cloud covered high ground of the Mull which they subsequently impacted.

Is it not a reasonable assumption they intended to turn at or shortly after the WP? If a pilot intends to change direction at a waypoint which will take the aircraft away from cloud, it is not mandatory to transfer to IFR.

It is my understanding that, if at any point the Chinook had a latent control jam preventing the helicopter from turning, but the helicopter were continuing on a straight course (i.e. Aldergrove to WP A) the aircrew may not have had any indication that there was a problem. The problem would only become apparent when they tried to instigate a change of course away from dead ahead.

I’m no pilot, but does the above not completely negate the basis upon which the ROs made their decision? Especially given the plethora of evidence available about control jams, their cause (and sometimes unknown cause) and effect?

cazatou

22nd Jul 2009, 07:36

Chugalug 2

There is a known time for them leaving the Aldergove CTZ and a known time for impact. The average groundspeed between those 2 points was 158 kts and groundspeed at impact, whilst attempting an escape manouvre, was conspicuously similar at approx 150 kts(AAIB).

The Yachtsman could see that the Mull was shrouded in cloud and the Chinook passed approx 200 ft above him. It flew straight on, without deviation, until the final desperate attempted escape manouvre.

They were in control of the Aircraft at Waypoint change and they were in control for that final attempted manouvre. There was no evidence of any technical malfunction that could have caused the crash.

What you have to do is come up with evidence - not hypothesis - that proves the existence of a major systems failure so serious that it prevented the Pilots from transmitting a Distress Call, Squawking Emergency, activating a Distress Beacon or even getting their Pax to adopt Crash Positions. You would also have to explain how such a malfunction managed to disappear without trace and how it is that there has been no repetition of such a malfunction in the 15 years since this tragedy.

I would point out that no such evidence has yet been produced.

1.3VStall

22nd Jul 2009, 07:58

So Cazatou,

Where is your evidence to prove that they were in control at waypoint change and during the final attempted manouevre?

Chugalug2

22nd Jul 2009, 08:30

Caz, is it not true that the average groundspeed that you quote has been challenged? Was not the boundary time that of a radio call reporting clear of the CTZ rather than exactly crossing it? Was the time of impact from the same time base? I cannot see how as the first must have been an ATC one, the second from the aircraft data base. Whatever the average groundspeed overall, how does this reflect your "flying too fast" speed which is presumably based on IAS and reflects GASO Helicopter Low Level VFR speed restrictions. Is that so and if so what is that max IAS? Is it not also true that the "150 kts" impact speed was not deduced from impact damage by the AAIB, as I thought, but by Boeing's infamous model and your supposed escape manoeuvre inferred by the position of cyclic, yaw and thrust controls. Could these same indications have been rather signs of vain attempts to regain control, together of course with the detached collective spring balance found in the wreckage? Contrary to what you say Mr Cable stated that the possibility of a control system jam could not be dismissed. If that had happened I cannot think of anything more major, with both pilots solely and desperately concerned with regaining control of the aircraft to the very end.

Wrathmonk

22nd Jul 2009, 09:24

1.3

Caz will trot out the following mantra, as he did when answering, on JP's behalf, an even simpler request for evidence (see Posts 5304 and 5342).

It is not the case that JP (myself or anyone else) has to produce new evidence to "PROVE" that the finding of the BOI was correct. If, in UK, a criminal case goes to the Court Of Appeal; the Prosecution does not have to produce new evidence to maintain the Guilty verdict. It is up to the Appellant (and that persons Advocates) to produce new evidence that justifies overturning the original verdict in the eyes of the court. The same applies in Civil cases.

As far as he is concerned, despite IMHO the BoI being flawed, he does not have to prove anything to anybody. Wratten and Days verdict, in his opinion, was correct and proper and therefore until someones finds some new evidence that is positively, undeniably and "without any doubt whatsoever" contrary to Wratten and Days opinion he will not change his position.

Shame Wratten and Day didn't apply the same policy, particularly with regrads to evidence.:(

Fitter2

22nd Jul 2009, 10:02

In any case, Caz is not a legal expert, as is evidenced by his mantra.

The defence in an appeal merely has the prove that there was a procedural error in the original prosecution to have either the 'guilty' verdict quashed, or a retrial ordered.

The fact that the ROs ignored the requirements of the AP as approved by the Air Board is sufficient.

The defence in this case can also point to the deliberate withholding of vital evidence known to the prosecution.

In a court of law this would have been overturned many years ago.

Chugalug2

22nd Jul 2009, 11:57

Wrathmonk, caz stated that even if a major emergency occurred after waypoint change the finding would still stand because they were "flying too fast". I am not asking him to defend the finding, I'm asking him what "flying too fast" means specifically, and how he knows that they were "flying too fast". Of course if anyone else can answer those questions it would be instructive. The more one probes into this BoI the more it seems that the pilots were hung out to dry on the evidence "modelled" by the manufacturer. Given that there is a very good chance that the aircraft crashed because of known deficiencies in ALL Chinook Mk2's, that evidence is suspect even before one studies the reliability of the data on which it was "modelled". It is at that point that I find I have very little faith in it whatsoever. It would be interesting to see what view an objective and fair Accident Investigation would make of it. That has yet to happen.

tucumseh

22nd Jul 2009, 12:45

Caz

See my #5499.

Any thoughts?

Thanks

Chugalug2

22nd Jul 2009, 15:07

Olive, thank you for the link to past posts on VFR, from which we get the MOD's version (to the Mull Group):
"The Board members concluded that the prevailing weather conditions were such as to demand flight in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre. The prescribed minima for flying visually, VFR, are horizontal visibility of 1 km beneath a cloud base of at least 250 feet, if flying below 140 knots; and a visibility of greater than 5kms, 500ft minimum cloud base, and 1500 metres horizontally from cloud, if above this speed.
which you confessed yourself content with at #4576. Thus it would seem that "flying too fast" would imply an IAS in excess of 140kts. Messrs W&D were obviously of the opinion that was indeed the case, as they seemed to suggest to the HoL that conditions could well have been VMC before waypoint change as compared to "the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre" requiring IFR as above. Other than the "modelling" by Boeing, why should there be reason to believe that IAS was indeed above 140kts? Other than suggesting that to gainsay the RO's findings is absurd, is it not true that as ever we just don't know what their precise IAS was?

Seldomfitforpurpose

22nd Jul 2009, 15:16

The Rules of The Air for an aircraft flying under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) are simple and brief:

1. Pilots are responsible for maintaining separation from other aircraft.

2. Pilots are to maintain visual meteorological conditions (VMC). If a pilot is unable to maintain VMC, instrument flight rules (IFR) are mandatory. The conditions for VFR vary according to aircraft type and speed and are stated earlier on this thread. (4560 region).

The ROs were both experienced and accomplished pilots in their respective rotary wing and fast jet fields, with clear understandings of the Rules of The Air when making their judgements. It is absurd to suggest that they made their decisions lightly or that they selected information to fit their findings.

Olive,

I would be genuinely grateful if you would cast your eyes over this missive in it's entirety as I would value your thoughts.

If the RO's had told us exactly what had happened, stated exactly why it had happened and furnished everyone with proof that satisfies the requirements to enable them to reach the verdict they had, then this thread and the campaign would have never have come to fruition.

I spent the best part of 10 happy years as a Puma crewman, initially when it was 2 crew ops, then operating in NI in some of the most awful weather day and night, then in Germany with trips to Belize etc. I hark back to those days and the healthy respect for weather that rotary crews were taught from day 1 and there are, amongst many others, 3 main things here, that for me simply do not add up.

1. Nobody can state with any degree of accuracy as to at what exact point the aircraft departed VFR and entered IFR. In fact whilst it's generally accepted, based on witness statements that at some point prior to impact they ended up being IFR at max chat, no one can prove conclusively that they were ever IFR.

Before people snort in derision I ask the aircrew amongst you to consider how many times you have been aloft and seen the edge of fog/low cloud where within 100 yards or so you could go from absolute porridge to gin clear? Or the drivers amongst you to consider how many times on a motorway have you gone from fog to clear in a few car lengths? Unless I have mis read things there was no witness at the point of impact so how can anyone say with 100% certainty the crash site was in fog?

2. Nobody can state with a 100% degree of certainty that the aircraft was serviceable prior to impact. I agree fully that no one can state the aircraft was definitely U/S but there is undeniable evidence to suggest a control malfunction could have occurred but was discounted.

3. Based on the assumptions made by the RO's nobody can tell me why an experienced 4 man crew would ever act in the manner required to confirm the verdict reached. Not a shred of what is assumed fits with SH SOP's and for the life of me I cannot understand why anyone would reach this conclusion.

I spent the first 14 years of my service life as an aircraft technician and whilst I would have loved to have been a pilot I was simply never clever enough so I applied for ALM. One of the main reason for my acceptance and subsequent success, as debriefed by many, was my ability to apply common sense and logic to situations which is all I have tried to do here.

Common sense and logic tell me the aircraft was almost certainly serviceable prior to impact and the crew quite probably porked up. What common sense and logic also go on to tell me is that probably etc simply does not support the verdict reached and tells me that for the life of me I don't know now and never will know exactly why this accident happened.

Now I have always admitted to not being the sharpest tool in the box and all I have ever asked of John Reid on the flight deck of Albert, JP, Caz, Baston, Atlantic Cowboy and others is to show me the conclusive evidence, the smoking gun if you like that give a 100% confirmation of the RO's findings.

Prove to me without a single shadow of a doubt at what point the aircraft went IFR and prove to me without a single shadow of a doubt that the aircraft was fully serviceable at the point of impact and you will convert me to your way of thinking.

But if all you have in your locker is the same supposition that I have this could go on for a while.

short&shapeless

22nd Jul 2009, 16:50

Apologies for an intrusion from a non-aircrew long-time lurker but may I suggest a slight amendment to SFFP's previous missive.

"Common sense and logic tell me the aircraft was almost certainly serviceable prior to impact and the crew quite probably porked up. What common sense and logic also go on to tell me is that probably {etc simply} does {not} support the verdict reached by the ROs, however it does not meet the rules in force at the time that "there should be no doubt whatsoever" as to the cause. "

Some have said recently that "no doubt whatsoever" is an impossible standard to achieve and they may well be right - but as this concerned aircrew not able to represent themselves, maybe that was the hidden intent of the standard. After all the rules for ascertaining blame were changed not long after this weren't they?

No matter though because whether or not it was impossible to meet the standard surely the ROs were not entitled to ignore it. The fact that they did use assumption and 'educated' guesswork to support their ruling is the reason this thread was started and is still going.

Back to watching.......

Bertie Thruster

22nd Jul 2009, 18:26

Unfortunately "no doubt whatsoever" requires no evidence to back it up. It is a belief. No proof is required.

Chugalug2

22nd Jul 2009, 19:27

It would seem that the Boeing simulation, the whole basis for the 158kts impact speed and for the "final flare" which W & D claimed showed that the aircraft was under control 4 secs before crashing is at best a red herring, at worst it brings the motives of those who produced it, offered it as evidence and used it to arrive at the "finding" into question. From the HoL Report:

Detailed examination by the AAIB of the flight control system disclosed that the DASH extensions found did not correspond to a high speed level flight condition whereas the LCTA extensions did, and it appeared possible that the settings could reflect a dynamic aircraft manoeuvre at the point of impact. Boeing were therefore asked to undertake a study to assess the consistency of the settings and to define the possible manoeuvre. The simulation was a mathematical exercise which, as Mr Cable stated, was "looking really for fairly gross manoeuvres over a pretty short period of time" (Q 957). It was not intended to produce an accurate reconstruction of events but rather to demonstrate what could have happened within certain parameters (Q 982)....
123. The Boeing simulation considered a wide range of possible starting conditions, i.e. conditions pertaining immediately prior to a final manoeuvre. Having rejected possible conditions at an airspeed of 135 knots, they concluded that an airspeed of 150 knots (groundspeed 174 knots) with a ROC of 1000 feet per minute provided "a ready match" with the criteria and was therefore the most likely (AAIB statement para 8)....
The groundspeed of 158 knots at impact derived from the Boeing simulation exceeded by 11 knots that of 147 found in the cockpit ground speed indicator (AAIB statement para 6). Moreover, the postulated ROC of 1000 feet per minute at 150 knots airspeed is unattainable. Squadron Leader Burke doubted whether it was achievable with ZD 576's load (Q 920). Witness A explained that while flying he had tried to see whether Boeing's chosen ROC was obtainable at 150 knots and had found that it was impossible in similar conditions (QQ 813-23). He had achieved no more than 400 feet per minute at 150 knots.

There is much more of the same at
House of Lords - Chinook ZD 576 - Report (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldselect/ldchin/25/2506.htm)
but I would be getting my collar felt for adverse effects on PPRuNe Bandwidth. The HoL Report demolishes W & D's, the RAF's and the MOD's case. Trouble is of course they just don't admit it. Someone somewhere has to bring them to account. This was a scandal 15 years ago and remains so today. This aircraft was unairworthy and most probably crashed for that very reason. Time that was faced up to.

Cows getting bigger

22nd Jul 2009, 19:28

S&S, good to see you around again. You are, of course, correct.

Atlantic Cowboy

22nd Jul 2009, 20:16

Chugalug,

Perhaps you can tell me who made the input to flare the aircraft 4 seconds before impact if it wasn't the pilots.

AC

walter kennedy

22nd Jul 2009, 20:22

"no doubt whatsoever" implies to the general public and to (legal minded politicians) that there's nothing to see here, move on, no foul play, no undisclosed exercise, nothing other than bad airmanship/ pilot error, ignore the conspiracy theorists, no need for more thorough investigation, aircraft and its kit were fine, etc, etc.
Wrt SFFP's (rather excellent, I concede) post, this bit sums up the thoughts of many:
<<3. Based on the assumptions made by the RO's nobody can tell me why an experienced 4 man crew would ever act in the manner required to confirm the verdict reached. Not a shred of what is assumed fits with SH SOP's and for the life of me I cannot understand why anyone would reach this conclusion. >>
I agree totally – simplistically blaming the crew does not sit right – at all.
But if the desired impression is as the first paragraph above then, working backwards, a verdict of gross negligence is required to get it.
So:
1 why was this result so important?; and
2 why is it still necessary to maintain it?

I suggest that while dispelling doubts on the airworthiness of the (then) new HC2s could have been a reason for (1), with their subsequent successful record (2) should not apply.
If it had been a case of an exercise gone wrong, (1) may have been expedient at the time but, with the determination of this campaign, surely the MOD would have yielded, sharing the blame and reducing the judgment against the pilots? So (2) should no longer hold.
I subscribe to the theory that there could have been possible public unrest in NI if there had been any chance of foul play so at the time (1) held – had the peace process been universally accepted as a good thing and people had moved on (sort of the end justifying the means) then (2) wouldn't be explained – but the peace process is still not universally accepted as a good thing 15 years on so (2) holds – and one would hope that just clearing the pilots' names would never be enough, that accepting the crash we had to have for the peace process would be OK if only some of your own service didn't have to carry the can would never be right.

taxydual

22nd Jul 2009, 21:35

A total amateur dipping his toes in.

Could someone explain, in simple language, why two highly qualified pilots (in their SH/SF role) would voluntarily fly into a hillside?

Were they both suicidal? Were they both confused? Or were they both convinced of their actions?

Chugalug2

22nd Jul 2009, 21:58

Atlantic Cowboy:

Chugalug,
Perhaps you can tell me who made the input to flare the aircraft 4 seconds before impact if it wasn't the pilots.
Well that's the whole point AC, there was no flare because the aircraft was not under control, hence the unusual combination of power and flight controls and other evidence of flying control abnormalities found in the wreckage and all tidily ascribed to impact effect. Read about it at the HoL Report Link in my previous post. Only don't let anyone catch you doing it, they might doubt your commitment to "Command Integrity" (nice Humphrey-ism that, don't you think?):

128. The Boeing simulation postulations of a ROC of 1000 feet per minute and a speed of 150 knots were essential to the conclusion that a final flare was initiated some 4 seconds before impact. Now that those postulations have been shown to be unattainable, the circumstances and indeed existence of any such flare must be very doubtful. That there was such a flare was crucial to the Air Marshals' conclusion that the crew must have been in control of the aircraft for the last 4 seconds before impact (e.g. QQ 280, 1088). Sir John's calculations (above) give no support to such a conclusion, since they are independent of and in no sense a substitute for Boeing's postulations.

Seldomfitforpurpose

22nd Jul 2009, 23:13

Thank you for your post 5509. I am away for a few days with no access to PRuNe but I will reply in due course.

Enjoy your trip, I hope it's somewhere with better weather than we have here :ok:

tucumseh

23rd Jul 2009, 06:51

AC

This has probably been posted before, and I’m sure you considered this, or similar events, when briefing Ministers that you knew exactly what occurred in ZD576, but to my non-pilot eyes this is bloody frightening.

The issues that stand out (to me) are highlighted toward the end. Notably, “complex”, “confusing”, “limited guidance” and, probably quite significantly, 2000’ AGL at the beginning of an incident that lasted 20 mins.

I also note the incident took place over 5 years after Mull, yet perfectly describes events reported by test pilots BEFORE Mull (but which were withheld from the BoI) and were STILL considered a safety hazard. One assumes in those 5 years the Mk2 had progressed from a development aircraft to one of acceptable design maturity (which it certainly wasn’t in June 1994) and the crew had the benefit of an acceptable number of hours experience (as opposed to a quick conversion course, followed by some months back in the Mk1, then having an immature and sub-airworthy Mk2 foisted on them a few days before the final flight).

AIR INCIDENT ODI/381/99 CREW REPORT

Chinook Mk2 ZD98l - 18 Squadron. RAF Odiham

5th October 1999, 15l0Z VMC I20kts, +6 deg C, 2000ft AGL

ZD981 was the Lead a/c of a 2 ship formation transiting from Shawbury to Odiham. Approx 10 mins after departing Shawbury, a small jolt was felt throughout the airframe and the capt'n in the RHS noticed that some of his fit instrument power flags briefly showed and the Master Caution Panel (MCP) lights flashed on and then off. A check of cockpit indications was made but all appeared normal.

Approx 2 mins later, similar symptoms were noted again without any subsequent indications of a problem. The jolts were very similar to that felt when the AFCS (Automatic Flight Control System) extendable links centre after a power interrupt and the conversation amongst the crew concentrated on this possibility.

Approx l min later, a series of jolts and power interrupts was experienced and the Captain elected to switch the AFCS off to prevent the a/c jolting.

Approx 2 sees later, the Master Cautions and all the captions on the CAP illuminated dimly. ALL power was lost to the primary flight instruments, including the main Al (Attitude Indicator) and the HSI (Horizontal Situation Indicator), and to the engine instruments. The only services remaining were those powered by the essential battery busbar. A loud hum was also heard through the intercom system which pulsed in phase with the captions of the CAP.

A check round the cockpit was made and all the CBs were checked and confirmed to be OK. The forward LCT (Longitudinal cyclic trim) was seen to be in the fully retracted position so speed was reduced to approx 80kts (Vmax with LCT retracted) as a precaution. The aft LCT indicated just below the ground position.

The Captain ordered all non essential equipment to be switched off and the formation was turned hack towards Shawbury - the nearest Military airfield. A practice Pan was in progress on guard so the formation changed frequency to Shawbury Approach and a PAN was declared.

CB's were checked once more and the crewman checked the TRU vents (Transformer Rectifier Unit) and the external bays for any evidence of a malfunction, but nothing untoward was seen.

The co-pilot attempted to find a relevant page in the FRC (Flight Reference Card) to assist with the diagnosis but none of the cards fitted the indications. The Captain had recently discussed electrical problems with the Brintel Simulator Staff and recalled a similar scenario where isolating the AC and DC cross-ties enabled one of the two electrical systems to be brought back on line. The co-pilot was ordered to trip the No 1 PDP (Power Distribution Panel) DC and AC cross-lies, but this had no effect and the CB was re-set.

The Captain then tripped the No.2 PDP DC then AC cross-ties. Tripping the AC cross-lie resulted in restoration of services from the No PDP. All the Captains flight instruments returned to normal as did the No2 ECU indications but all the services powered by the No.l PDP were still inoperative. The CAP partially cleared with the following captions remaining:

(a) L FUEL PRESS
(b) RECT 1
(c) AFCS 1&2
(d) XMSN OIL PRESS & XMSN AUX OIL PRESS

A check round the cockpit was done and the LCT indications were noted to be in the same positions as before.

With partial electrical power restored and the a/c in a safe configuration heading towards Shawbury, control was given to the co-pilot to enable the Captain to consult the FRC.

A scan of XMSN temps and pressures showed all to be normal, so the XMSN oil and AUX oil captions were dismissed as spurious. However the jump seat occupant wsa ordered to monitor the indications.

CAP indications were now similar to a single TRU failure with no cross-tie and Card 31 was used as reference. The Captain decided not to re-set his cross-tie CB having diagnosed a Bus-Tie fault of some kind.

The cross feed was selected open to start balancing fuel but with no success. The crewman operated the XFEED valves manually which cleared the L Pressure caption and Illuminated the XFEED caption.

An attempt was then made to program the forward and aft LCT in manual with no success indicated.

On short finals to land, the LCT were selected to retract for 30 secs IAW FRC35. At this point No2 a/c of the formation informed the Lead a/c that his aft wheels had swivelled through approx 45 degrees. The captain took control and made a vertical Landing followed by a gentle taxi forward to straighten the aft wheels. As weight was placed on the aft wheels a small power spike was seen on the Captains HIS power flag.

As the LCT were in an intermediate position it was decided to clear all the passengers from the a/c prior to shutdown. A visual inspection of the front and rear rotor disc attitudes appeared normal so the Captain elected to conduct a normal shutdown but with No2 PDP AC and DC cross-ties left tripped.

APU start was normal. The No.l generator was selected OFF with no change to indications. As No.2 generator was switched OFF thereby allowing the APU to come on line, all electrical services and indications returned to normal. The LCT were selected to AUTO and the fwd and aft LCTs were seen to trim to the GND position.

As a precaution against possible power spike induced FADEC faults, the ECL (engine condition lever) were selected to 55 degrees prior in ECU (electrical control unit) shutdown and the following codes were noted.

No1 DECU A7, Al, DB
No2 DECU 88

A normal shutdown was then completed with normal response from FADEC. Post shutdown it was noted that the avionics cooler fan had tripped.

This entire incident lasted 20 minutes. Indications were complex and confusing and initially the FRC were of limited guidance. In the end Cards 31, 32, 33 & 35 were consulted. It should he noted that the Brintel simulator training proved invaluable in producing a quick albeit partial solution to the loss of electrical power.

The fault was considered to be a major safety hazard, and had the crew been less experienced or in IMC or at night the outcome might have been considerably different!

dalek

23rd Jul 2009, 06:55

S&S,
There was nothing "hidden" in the "burden of proof" requirement for deceased aircrew. It was always intended to absolve them of all blame unless the evidence against them was overwhelming.
If after fifteen years far greater experts than you and I cannot agree on this evidence, there must be (considerable) doubt.

Chugalug2

23rd Jul 2009, 10:14

It would seem that the Chinook, incredibly important workhouse that it is, has posed a challenge to its crews from the start. The incident that you highlight, tuc, and the professional way that it was handled is yet another example, as if one were needed, of the competence of the crews who fly it. That is why it is so frustrating that the Mull pilots have been dealt with so arbitrarily and harshly when the fault lay far away, IMHO, among much lesser men and women. So to return to Mull:
It seems to me that with a 25kt wind up their chuff it is almost impossible to imagine the transit was in excess of 140kts IAS, indeed from the leaving zone time fix provided much much later by the MOD and the time of impact, the MOD's own timings infer an average IAS far below that. So they were not "flying too fast" as they were probably flying in accordance with VFR to the waypoint and hence not negligent. That further reduces the energy available at the start of the climb, in turn further reducing the ability to perform the flare manoeuvre which wasn't possible even using the AM's/ Boeing's postulated figures. Thus the configuration at impact, as found in the wreckage is more likely to be what it seems, the shattered remains of an aircraft that crashed out of control. For those who have until now been resigned to the likelihood of pilot error but were repelled by the epitaph of Gross Negligence passed in flagrant disregard of RAF procedure, I would simply say please think again. Go to the HoL link in my previous but one post and read between the lines. In particular study the testimony of Mr Cable the AAIB Accident Inspector. I would suggest that here is a man deeply concerned with the RAF Investigation and its outcome. An Investigation that was not his and to which he was merely attached to do the bidding of the BoI. His continual qualification of the BoI conclusions speaks volumes. There was Gross Negligence on that hillside undoubtedly, but it had been deposited into that airframe long before by those who far outranked the JO's that have been the scapegoats for those actions ever since.
Let Right Be Done!

Seldomfitforpurpose

23rd Jul 2009, 10:29

You would have to ask the Chinook crews for confirmation but I seem to recall that anything above 140 kts and the thing shook like a bastard and was very uncomfortable.

walter kennedy

23rd Jul 2009, 19:07

The previous crew using ZD576 reported that it was very smooth and they had it going in excess of 140 without any probs ... different to MK1

Chugalug2

24th Jul 2009, 10:31

Rather like a very famous film star, Walter, when she was good she was very very good, but when she was bad....! From the evidence given by Sqn Ldr Burke and Witness A (not to the BoI of course, not wanted there!) the Chinook Mk2 was very Jekyll and Hyde then. "So what's changed since?", we keep getting taunted with. Well a lot clearly, but what was done about the DECU connector, the FADEC software and the contents of the "broom cupboard" so prone to shedding vital springs etc and then being vulnerable to the very same loose articles, I have no idea. But I know some people who would, the MOD. That is the organisation responsible for the appalling lack of airworthiness of the Chinook Mk2 when it was released to RAF service despite the protestations of, amongst others, the OC RWTS at Boscombe Down. They are the ones who would have realised the enormity of their Gross Negligence after this tragedy and set about doing what they should have done before, instead of granting an RTS to this aircraft, ie making it airworthy. Would they have highlighted that action? Given that they deliberately obscured the RTS condition of the aircraft in the Accident Investigation and deflected attention instead towards the pilots who were labelled as solely responsible for all 29 deaths, what do you think? How the paperwork could be hidden I have no idea, but the corporate memory developed Alzheimer's Disease over Nimrod and Hercules without any problem, and I suspect much the same thing was managed here. BTW I know that I have morphed the RAF High Command into the MOD above. To all intents and purposes that is how I see it. Command stops at the Station gates in the RAF, above that level it is a beaurocracy bent on enforcing "policy". AOC, AOC in C, etc, etc are impressive titles but a case of lesser fleas etc, IMHO. What I am clear about is that this aircraft, along with its sister Mk2's was not airworthy. It was if you like an accident looking for a place to happen. In my view it found it, but of course I don't know for sure. Despite all the above it could have simply been a case of CFIT, it could have been an authorised visit to the Mull LZ that went wrong, planned or otherwise as you propose, Walter. We don't know. What we do know is that the ludicrous proposal of W&D, that the aircraft was flared and hence under control immediately prior to crashing, was wrong. Despite being "reverse engineered" obligingly by Boeing for them it just doesn't work. Even the attempt to show that the pilots were "flying too fast" before waypoint change hence not complying with VFR (for they were still VMC then) doesn't work. There was no Gross Negligence by the pilots and that slur should be dropped forthwith. There may have been pilot error, that should be investigated. There may have been an authorised clandestine "exercise" behind this tragedy, that should be investigated. There was definitely Gross Negligence by the Airworthiness Authority, the MOD, in allowing this unairworthy type into RAF service. That must be investigated and a solution found to guarantee military airworthiness again. In short this accident must have a proper and fair Accident Investigation, for the same reason others should, to prevent further accidents. It is already 7+10+14 lives too late by my calculations.

cazatou

25th Jul 2009, 09:18

Chugalug 2

You consistently fail to acknowledge in your Posts regarding the Investigating Board that it consisted of 2 experienced Chinook Pilots and a Chinook Engineer. They were well versed in the problems that had arisen during the introduction of the Mk2. They were unable to find any evidence that the pilots were NOT in control of the aircraft prior to impact. On the contrary, the aircraft attitude at impact indicated a belated attempt at an escape manouvre.

You also ignore the Finding that the Pilots were negligent in that they had neither slowed down, climbed to a safe height nor turned away from the high ground BY WAYPOINT CHANGE.

The Pilots possesed the necessary degree of skill and knowledge to maintain safe flight. They failed to do so, which led inevitably to the finding of negligence.

Fitter2

25th Jul 2009, 10:16

Excellent parroting of the Wratten and Day mantra.

But the '2 experienced Chinook Pilots and a Chinook Engineer' did not find any evidence to support a verdict of negilgence, even when relevant evidence was withheld from them (but subsequently available to the HOL enquiry).

Caz does not seem to have any rational response to recent posts repeating the evidence that supports why Messrs. W & D simply overuled their BOI to divert attention away from the state of airworthiness (or lack of) subsequently exposed by the Hercules and Nimrod tragedies.

2 down, 1 to go.

dalek

25th Jul 2009, 10:34

Cazatou,

You very conveniently forget:

1. The BOI were not "experienced" they were "inexperienced". That is not my opinion but that of Sir William Wratten, given in his interview to Jeremy Paxman.

2. The BOI in spite of failing to take any evidence from Burke, Witness A or any other evidence of Airworthiness did not find the pilots guilty of Gross Negligence.

It was only the "inexperienced" Wratten and Day who did so.

Fitter2

25th Jul 2009, 11:39

Whether an aircraft tasked for use in a hostile environment, and that has equipment intended to make a major safety contribution available, but not fitted (contrary to the policy applied by other air forces with the same type) has an airworthiness issue is a matter of opinion - as is the cause of the accident in this thread.

BEagle

25th Jul 2009, 12:21

Wratten, given in his interview to Jeremy Paxman.

That was a most memorable interview. I don't recall having seen Paxman flummoxed by such sheer unblinking arrogance from any other interviewee before or since.

tucumseh

25th Jul 2009, 12:40

There is no conceivable airworthiness link to that.

Read JSP 553 and Def Stan 00-970.

As for Chinook, the Chief of Defence Procurement (4 Star) openly admitted to the Public Accounts Committee that one of the core, mandated components of airworthiness was not implemented. By definition, the RTS was flawed, as there was no audit trail (also a mandated requirement).

You will, I think, understand that these committees give advance notice of such questions. However, the members don't necessarily understand the question, so when CDP made his admission they didn't follow up. Not that he would have been in a position to answer more detailed questions, as junior staffs had been actively prevented from briefing him. "We can't have you telling him the truth".

It must be obvious to all that such a staggering admission was actually damage limitation. Take the hit on that, hope they don't go deeper (and hope it goes unnoticed by the likes of the Mull Group). I think Haddon-Cave will, but too late for some.

Chugalug2

25th Jul 2009, 13:19

caz:

You consistently fail to acknowledge in your Posts regarding the Investigating Board that it consisted of 2 experienced Chinook Pilots and a Chinook Engineer. They were well versed in the problems that had arisen during the introduction of the Mk2. They were unable to find any evidence that the pilots were NOT in control of the aircraft prior to impact. On the contrary, the aircraft attitude at impact indicated a belated attempt at an escape manouvre.

You could no doubt say the same of the Hercules and Nimrod BoIs, caz, and not withstanding Olive's default MOD "blame the crew" for its own failures, neither identified the cause of both accidents - lack of airworthiness. It took HM's Coroners to do their job for them, just as it took the HoL to do the job of this one. Accident Investigation is an integral part of the Regulatory Process, and yet separated from the Regulator (the CAA) in Civil Aviation to ensure complete objectivity. My abiding image of an AAIB Inspector is of him standing on the rim of a crater in Lincolnshire. He wears an old tweed jacket with leather patches sewn at the elbows. He sucks on an empty pipe and declares, " It was fully stalled and yet there was at least intermediate power being produced". He is a professional, interested only in discovering what caused the accident and how to prevent it in future. OK, my image is set in my time, a long gone era of which we now know little, but come forward to the BA777 LHR accident and we see his modern counterpart bent on exactly the same objective task. As I have said before, if he and his colleagues were instead "experienced BA pilots and engineers" co-opted by the Chief Pilot to a "BA BoI" the chances of a professional and objective investigation would be minimal. Self-Regulation always fails. In aviation it kills. The failure of self-regulation in UK Military Airworthiness and Aircraft Accident Investigation has cost at least 60 lives if you include, as I do, this accident (29 dead), Sea King (7 dead), Hercules (10 dead) and Nimrod (14 dead). Time to move Airworthiness Provision and Accident Investigation away from the MOD and RAF to a separate and independent MAA and MAAIB as a matter of great urgency.
PS. As regards what the BoI was able or unable to find, see my posts above. I contend that for the most part they were not even looking!

John Purdey

25th Jul 2009, 14:05

Fitter2. If you are referring to me in your 5292, it is not a case of 'down', but of sheer boredom with folk who cannot see where the negligence ocurred!
JP

Fitter2

25th Jul 2009, 16:45

JP

Not me, chief, 5292 was Tecumseh.

As for where and when the negligence occured, the appropriate officer of the Crown has decided that. If the MOD continue to stick their fingers in their ears and go "Nah, nah, nah" I am not responsible for that.

John Purdey

25th Jul 2009, 16:54

Fitter2. Sorry about the misprint; it should have read 5528. JP

Fitter2

25th Jul 2009, 17:11

2 down refers to the MOD's acknowlegement that failings in the airworthiness system caused (or contributed to, depending on your interpretation) the fatal accidents to a Hercules and a Nimrod.

Whether the CDP's acknowledgement of the failings in the RTS of the Chinook Mk2 referred to in Tecumseh's post #5533 above means that three are now down will not be true until Wratten and Day's refusal to comply with the AP is recognised and overturned.

BEagle

25th Jul 2009, 17:22

sheer boredom with folk who cannot see where the negligence ocurred!

Boredom? Boredom??

I'm so very sorry that you feel 'bored', Purdey, but others are more concerned about justice and the real truth rather than mere boredom... Justice will out, even if it might be 'inconvenient' for those in the MoD more concerned with political expediency than the good name of the Chinook crew.

As for where the negligence lay? Pretty obviously with those allegedly managing airworthiness standards.

Anyway, all this information will be passed on to the next PM, so that he might know the truth rather than whatever biased rubbish will be fed to him by MoD $hit-filtering civil serpents.

Anyone who ever had the misfortune to serve under Wratten will know full well why he had the the nickname he did; it was, if anything, far too generous... Certainly not someone who would be likely to take an impartial view of an aircraft accident....

I'm still firmly of the opinion that any other verdict would have laid the MoD exposed to accusations of corporate homicide, the financial consequences of which would have been very expensive. So Wratten and Day were determined to find a way, any way of avoiding the truth coming into the public domain.

bast0n

25th Jul 2009, 18:42

JP

it is not a case of 'down', but of sheer boredom with folk who cannot see where the negligence ocurred!

So true!

I'm still watching the children at play - but no more comments............:ok:

cazatou

25th Jul 2009, 19:00

Dalek

Your #5529

The Officers on the BOI were experienced on the Chinook as either Pilots or Engineer.

Yourself?

ShyTorque

25th Jul 2009, 23:24

But neither Wratten nor Day were experienced on Chinooks.

Wratten was through and through fixed wing (like yourself, Cazatou/K52) and Day flew mainly Wessex; as far as I recall, he was never operational on Chinook, either Mk 1 or Mk 2.

Cazatou, kindly remind us again how much rotary wing experience you have?

It's a rhetorical question and I say remind again, but actually, you have never answered the question here, despite me asking you at least twice before, I think.

walter kennedy

26th Jul 2009, 00:31

Perhaps the most valid criticism of the scenario I have put forward, that they were approaching a position where closing range was critical, is that such an experienced crew would not have committed themselves to such without visual confirmation.
And of course they did not plan to do so as I hope I will be able to explain below, briefly.
From the various snippets that are known, this was a planned flight that Flt Lt Tapper had claimed his crew had trained for “intensively” (if that was the word I recall from memory just now). They were certainly familiar with the area.
I recommend readers acquaint themselves with the section in the Boeing (Mitchell) Analysis regarding the elevation profile on the final leg.
One of the possible profiles is that they were just about level along that leg right up to the final flare, albeit coasting (power levels found and slowing).
For argument's sake and for demonstrating graphically the situation, let's say they were at 700 ft.
Using Google Earth, you can lay down tracks (“paths”). To get a track corresponding to 035 mag at the time, draw you paths at 028 (near enough for this illustration) – use the ruler to give the line at an angle and then draw your paths over that line.
Do a long line through the position of waypoint change and another through the middle of that LZ (I have posted these coords previously). The line through the position of waypoint change is the track they actually took up to the last manouevre; the line through the middle of the LZ is the track I believe they thought they were on.
First, zoom in and out and tilt your perspective to get a feel for the two tracks;
then use the flight simulator tool on Google Earth thus: using the prop light A/C model, fly the two tracks at about 130 kts-ish and at about 700 ft.
See the difference?
Through the LZ, the slope is progressive and the ridge is just about their height – just a little pull back or an easy peel off to the left down the slope to the sea does it, if they had overshot the LZ or just failed to make it out clearly enough – the slope would have been such that the RADALT alarm would have been a sufficient warning. Regard the mist (which hugged the ground and was not that deep) and ground as a single surface and you can see that this would have been quite reasonable – just like approaching a sand or heath ridge at about the level of the top.
However, you should notice that on the track they took, not only is the ground ahead higher but presented a broad front with no easy exit left and had an abrupt cliff (that would have been hidden by the mist) which they impacted in the event.
You can check the realism of the topography against OS maps or Shuttle radar data – I suggest that for this illustration, Google is good enough.
So, if they had been on the track through the LZ they would have been OK for a wave-off.
Now, there is no way, with the best planning in the world, a sensible aviator would rely upon being that accurately on track without there being a local point reference on that track.
Had they been reliant upon a local reference that was supposed to have been on that LZ but was ½ mile or so up the slope, with their having planned a safe approach on the right track, how could they be negligent? So you don't have to be jeopardising the case for clearing their names by digging deeper into the activity planned at the Mull – nothing to lose.

dalek

26th Jul 2009, 08:52

Cazatou,

I have never claimed to be a Chinook expert. Whenever I need "expert" advice, I PM those on this site who obviously are.

I don't have any problem with the composition of the Board. I am just quoting Sir William, who obviously did. They had just failed to bring him the verdict he demanded.

I do have 224 hours helicopter time in my logbooks. How about you?

John Purdey

26th Jul 2009, 17:16

BEAgle. Your 5539, apart from the personal insults, you are now suggesting CORPORATE HOMICIDE!! I must add that item to my 5455, meanwhile, why do you not give us your real name so that the suggestion might be pursued in court? Chicken, are we? JP

dalek

26th Jul 2009, 17:39

John Purdey,

Beagle is correct. Wratten and Day did indeed lie to the HOL committee.

OmegaV6

26th Jul 2009, 19:09

John Purdey

BEAgle. Your 5539, apart from the personal insults, you are now suggesting CORPORATE HOMICIDE!! I must add that item to my 5455, meanwhile, why do you not give us your real name so that the suggestion might be pursued in court? Chicken, are we? JP

Even for you thats a bit low. As my father used to tell me... when someone resorts to name calling they have just proved they have lost the debate.

Fitter2

26th Jul 2009, 20:12

I would suggest the last thing Wratten and Day want is for this matter to be aired in open court. Is anyone else claiming responsibility for the policies which allowed the indefensible premature release to service and feels libelled, JP?

Atlantic Cowboy

26th Jul 2009, 22:33

BEagle,

I really do take exception to being called a $hit-filtering civil serpent. I merely provided the ammunition for CAS, ACAS, Ministers and S of S to be able to refute the poorly written submission(in my view - done by a QC really?) from the MOK Group.

Cameron will be provided with a full brief should he become PM that will say exactly what briefs have always said - there is no reason to amend, change, review, alter or tamper with the findings of the original BOI.

Consider that in the fifteen years after the accident nothing has changed. Nothing will.

THe MOD has always been open to new information about the crash of ZD576 specifically but going on about airworthiness, incidents in other aircraft etc without being able to link it directly to ZD576 on the day of the accident is a complete waste of time.

Why don't you ask Wratten and Day if the evidence of the MOK Group convinces them that they made an error. They would equally have a right to challenge any attempt to amend the findings of the BOI. A BOI is not complete until the Reviewing Officers have appended their remarks.

Chugalug2

26th Jul 2009, 23:24

The pride you take in doing your job is apparent, Atlantic Cowboy. But just what is your job? Do you ever ask yourself that? You work for an organisation that isn't dealing with this problem because it is the problem. Flight Safety only works if it is the sole concern of those charged with ensuring its implementation. That is why Civil Aviation has a Regulator completely separated from the Operators. That is why Accident Investigation in Civil Aviation is separated from them both, because either could be the problem. In Military Aviation all three are one and the same and objectivity goes straight out of the window. The Banking Crisis was bad enough with Independent Regulation which was weak. How much greater the crisis if the Banks had been merely monitored by themselves? We'd all be queueing at the Soup Kitchens! That's just money, this is about lives. Eventually the cost in lives due to the failure of the MOD to provide for airworthiness will be known. As I have said above, it is sixty and counting by my reckoning. When I asked if you ask yourself about your job, I mean you and everyone in the MOD who has an input in maintaining the status quo. That status quo is the problem. You are the problem. Think on!

tucumseh

27th Jul 2009, 06:04

THe MOD has always been open to new information about the crash of ZD576 specifically but going on about airworthiness, incidents in other aircraft etc without being able to link it directly to ZD576 on the day of the accident is a complete waste of time. The usual crass MoD stuff and nonsense. Only non-aircrew, non-engineer and someone wholly unfamiliar with airworthiness could make the statement that, if it can’t be directly linked to ZD576, then it is irrelevant.

The policy concerning trend failures and how they are managed has been deemed not applicable to the Mull accident, driving a bus through whole tracts of the airworthiness regulations.

Think of it. A number of aircraft in your particular fleet exhibit the same problems, each time being deemed flight safety critical. As a pilot you’d be apoplectic if the support staffs treated every case as “isolated”, failing to recognise a trend. It would be incompetence on a grand scale.

But what if the resources required to implement such a process had been systematically withdrawn over the previous 3 years, by senior RAF staffs? Where does the incompetence lie?

And, to answer a point made by Purdey/MoD earlier, what offence has been committed if those staffs were advised their actions would compromise airworthiness yet knowingly continued? Take your pick from Misconduct, Maladministration, Breach of Duty of Care amounting to Gross Negligence. And, if deaths result, Manslaughter by Gross Negligence.

Compound this with the fact that the organisation charged with preparing the CA Release recommendations had grounded their trials aircraft, and in their report made it clear the aircraft is still in development and not fit for service (8 months after it has been prematurely released).

AC, I’m afraid your admission that you breached the Civil Service Code says it all.

Cows getting bigger

27th Jul 2009, 06:37

Can anyone prove, with not doubt whatsoever, that a technical fault/malfunction brought about by a deliberate failure to comply with airworthiness standards did not contribute to the crash?

Thought not. :bored:

John Purdey

27th Jul 2009, 07:41

BEAgle. Reflecting on your claim of CORPORATE HOMICIDE, it seems to me that you have a duty to report this to the police, who, of course, have a duty to follow up your accusation. (unless you think they are part of the 'stitch-up').
You would have to reveal your identity rather than hide behind the anonimity of PPrune, but in the interests of justice I'm sure you would agree that this is a small price to pay.
Do let us know how you get on.
JP

Fitter2

27th Jul 2009, 08:45

AC:
I really do take exception to being called a $hit-filtering civil serpent.
Understandable, but then I merely provided the ammunition for CAS, ACAS, Ministers and S of Swhy supply evidence to support the statement?

And if my brief failed to convince the HOL Committee, whereas the poorly written submission(in my view - done by a QC really?) from the MOK Groupdid, I would not be advertising the fact, from the reflection on either my competence, or the weakness of the MOD case.

Chugalug2

27th Jul 2009, 13:00

JP, BEAgle's post stated:

I'm still firmly of the opinion that any other verdict would have laid the MoD exposed to accusations of corporate homicide, the financial consequences of which would have been very expensive.

Seeing as the possibility of "State Murder" has been made before on this thread, and reacted to by you, as a possible variation of the authorised LZ visit theory (and please note that it was never, as you then suggested, my theory) your outrage that the MOD might be exposed to accusations of "corporate homicide" seems a little contrived. I certainly accuse the MOD of Corporate Manslaughter occasioned by its Gross Negligence. As to the old chestnut of user names I notice that you use one. If there is indeed need to report anything to any authority I very much doubt if a PPRuNe user name will satisfy them. BTW are we to be treated to a succession of your farewell posts only for you to pop up again rather like the Crazy Gang? Do you do "Underneath the Arches"? Perhaps on second thoughts you ought not to encourage requests!

John Purdey

27th Jul 2009, 13:12

Chug.
There are some accusations that even a retired poster like me cannot ignore, ie 'Stiched up', 'State-Sponsored Murder' and 'Corporate Homicide'
Do you, as a matter of interest, support any of them?
JP

Chugalug2

27th Jul 2009, 14:04

JP, I support the term "Stitched Up", and as you didn't mention it a reminder that I also support the term "Corporate Manslaughter". So are you now a retired poster, like me? Or are you a "retired poster" that is forever going to be emerging from retirement?

Atlantic Cowboy

27th Jul 2009, 19:16

Tuc,

You really do need to concentrate on facts.

Just remind me (in round figures) how many RAF Chinooks HC 2 have been ploughed into the ground since ZD576. A round number - you don't have to be accurate. (Clue - it is a round number)

Boscombe Down use TRIALS aircraft for TRIALS. Perhaps you don't see a difference between these and those in service with a limitation on operational tasks.

So, if service aircraft are not airworthy no doubt all the crews will stop flying them forthwith?

Go read the Civil Service Code carefully.

A civil servant gets quite used to dealing with the general public who have little concept of the workings of administration of government.

Er, my memory recalls that negligence on the part of the pilots has previously been accepted. Then again that's probably imagination on my part or, a transgression of the Civil Service Code.

I must agree with John Purdey (well, I would, wouldn't I?) that this thread and the MOK Group have outlived their usefulness.

Nothing to show after 15 years and MOD is just wasting time and money humouring your requests for information/reviews etc. Cameron and his lot won't change anything.

About time to call it a day.

Fitter2

27th Jul 2009, 19:47

AC

I am sure that will the line you peddle to the next PM (or his appointed Min of Def).

The MOK group will no doubt also make their request, including the independant assessment of the HOL Committee.

You don't have to hang around here until after the next election, when it gets interesting again. Your brief then may have the same effect as it did to the HOL.

walter kennedy

27th Jul 2009, 19:49

Atlantic Cowboy
Unless they take their blinkers off, you are quite right.
There is enough circumstantial evidence to warrant answers to straightforward questions that I have put forward regarding this flight. However, if a particular aspect is termed "OpSec", they get a warm feeling and shut up, leaving these guys hanging out to dry without exploring the (now) obvious.
The general public does not need proof without any doubt whatsoever as to what happened here, just on the balance of probabilities it looks like there has been a conspiracy of silence and that the obstacle to getting to the truth is the RAF as a body.
Certainly, the original pacifier of pilot error beyond any doubt whatsoever is no longer acceptable.
There was a chance through this forum for the circumstances to have been exposed gradually and gracefully; even if particular aspects had to be addressed with some discretion, the interested parties (eg the MOK group) could surely have done so behind closed doors with the MOD and at least somehow satisfied the public that such aspects were relevant or not; any initial omissions at the inquiries could have been accepted as oversights without the benefit of later analysis.
Without rigorous assessment of an event such as this, you could have a state thinking it could get away with murder – again.:E

Chugalug2

27th Jul 2009, 20:00

It seems quite clear that you haven't asked yourself about your job as I suggested, AC, indeed unless "directed" to do so I suspect that you steer clear of such activity as thinking. The points you make in your last post are so facile as to be risible. If it were not for the fact that we are literally talking here of a matter of life and death they would be amusing, but I do not find you or your bumptious manner in anyway amusing but terribly depressing. The thought that the Defence of the Realm is dependent on such careless and callous attitudes as you display to this thread fills me with despair. That our brave young men and women who risk and often lose their lives, or come home terribly maimed for life, have to depend on the likes of you and your "cleverness" for their equipment and necessities essential for their very survival induces cold anger in me. Have you ever served? Do you have any military commitment at all? I know that many CS do and I honour them for being willing to stand in harms way with our Armed Forces. Do you? Your contemptuous dismissal of "Cameron" speaks volumes. Not expecting to be around in this job by then are we? Expecting to move on? I can't be bothered to address the "points" that you make, maybe tuc can but I would understand completely if he treats them with the contempt that they deserve and ignores them and you completely. You are the sort that gives the Civil Service a bad name and perhaps those who share your profession might feel induced to add their thoughts about your posts.

tucumseh

27th Jul 2009, 20:05

Just remind me (in round figures) how many RAF Chinooks HC 2 have been ploughed into the ground since ZD576. A round number - you don't have to be accurate. (Clue - it is a round number)

Completely irrelevant. Read the MoD’s safety regs. Your argument is the same as that used by the RAF suppliers of the day, who held Ch. 5 (maintaining airworthiness) funding. "OK, we have a safety problem, aircrew have been injured, let's wait and see if it happens again before we investigate".

Boscombe Down use TRIALS aircraft for TRIALS. Perhaps you don't see a difference between these and those in service with a limitation on operational tasks.

You clearly don’t understand the concept of the Build Standard or the process which leads from TI to PI to, ultimately, CA Release trials. Or, the scope of what Boscombe does.

The aircraft Boscombe declined to fly in May/June 1994, on airworthiness grounds (as admitted by MoD), MUST have been to a defined build standard stated in the RTS. Otherwise the trials would not be representative. Any minor differences would be recorded and assessed for impact – and there would inevitably be such differences given the fleet was being converted from Mk1s. (Contrary to MoD’s assertion. It wasn’t you who advised Ingram ZD576 was a new build was it?). At the time, the PE Fleet was just another aircraft category, along with FAE, TAE, IR6 et al. That is, the RAF were given funding specifically to maintain them at the in use build standard.

Maintaining the Build Standard is crucial to managing such differences, which is why it is mandated. When you briefed Ministers did you advise them this mandated requirement had been ignored, thus rendering any Safety Case or Argument invalid?

Crucially, you completely miss the point that on the day of the crash Boscombe still regarded safety critical software to be in the development phase. How did you explain this extraordinary state of affairs when you briefed Ministers? How did you explain how a development aircraft came to be tasked to carry VVIPs? (Despite the stated concerns of the aircrew, who asked for a Mk1).

Go read the Civil Service Code carefully.

Impartiality. Say no more.

BEagle

28th Jul 2009, 12:52

Mr. Purdey, my opinion is just that. It is not necessarily correct.

It is only certain senior officers, it seems, who confuse opinion with fact. Beyond any doubt whatsoever.

8-15fromOdium

28th Jul 2009, 19:05

Fifth time of asking Atlantic Cowboy:

can you enlighten us if there was a separate document drawn up that recorded the airworthiness audit trail as part of the investigation and if such a document exists has it (to your knowledge) been made publicly available
Why is this important?

The content of such a document will answer many of the questions placed on this thread concerning STIs, FADEC, Contol Pallets etc etc.
If such a document does not exist it would indicate that the original investigation was less than thorough.Now what is the answer Atlantic Cowboy?

Airborne Aircrew

28th Jul 2009, 23:51

8-15:

Now what is the answer Atlantic Cowboy?You're not holding your breath I hope...

AC:
Nothing to show after 15 years and MOD is just wasting time and money humouring your requests for information/reviews etc. Cameron and his lot won't change anything.Because, perhaps:-
I merely provided the ammunition for CAS, ACAS, Ministers and S of S to be able to refute the poorly written submission(in my view - done by a QC really?) from the MOK Group.So, by your "standards", something that is "poorly written" has no merit whatsoever. In that vein the evidence from a victim of child molestation would, to you, carry no weight either because it was crayoned in barely legible English.

A civil servant gets quite used to dealing with the general public who have little concept of the workings of administration of government.You're arrogance becomes you. It perfectly compliments your inability to see why some may see you as a "$hit-filtering civil serpent".

Perhaps you can come some way to redemption by answering the question 8-15 asks and answering it in an unequivocal and direct fashion.

walter kennedy

29th Jul 2009, 01:24

What a charade – asking each other questions that will not be answered and which are irrelevant anyway – while ignoring or not having the balls to ask nor answer basic questions on practice, procedures, and equipment. To an outsider there are so many such questions but which appear to be taboo with you lot – for example, the PLS of the time has been superceded by a much more secure system and other NATO countries describe its operational use openly in exercises, yet even for general interest no one here will touch on it with a barge pole – why is it still sensitive/classified 15 years on? - and why, when there is enough circumstantial data to at least warrant its consideration, be bound by restrictions on discussion of such equipment, restrictions dictated by authority which has so obviously wronged the aircrew involved and which also may have so wronged the British public? - is there not a point where the public interest surpasses the dictates of a particular state institution? - and perhaps demands you coming out of you own personal comfort zone?
Get some nuts.:}
Here's another one: the anomaly of the unusual squawk code found set; when I asked what was seen on secondary radar, there were denials that it would have been covered by secondary radar, several sites being described so as to show that no cover could have been expected WITHOUT MENTIONING Lowther Hill; when I did coverage simulation and found Lowther would have had LOS all the way across, gave examples of an a/c with smaller radar cross section having contact at greater range, and quoted an article by a respectable journo wherein someone reported having seen recordings of ZD576, no one here accepted that there would have been secondary coverage; the nature of the switches to select the SSR code are such that they are not readiliy displaced by impact (the loadie who authored “Chinook” had it that you couldn't move them with a sledge hammer) such that the explanation of their having been in the process of changing the SSR code seemed the only explanation BUT it sure looks like they were surprised by the closure with the terrain and so would not have been preoccupied with changing it. But no disclosure of what type of SSR codes would have been used at the time for exercises were offered to the debate. A European ATC authority described the UK code allocation at the time as being short of special codes and so used ones from the domestic allocation where there was no chance of confusion – 7760 (set in ZD576) had the normal meaning of a domestic flight in the Channel Isles (so no chance of confusion up in Scotland) and also, in several Euro regions, had the meaning “ground transponders, tests, trials” (obvious one to use if you were doing a trial with a system using a transponder on the ground like the PRC112 really, one may have thought, but the only feedback on this was to point out that it was only for a/c flight testing fixed navaids – oh, so that one's dead, I suppose I should assume).
Oh and the one that even Peter Seller's Clouseau character would look foolish overlooking – as the PLS of the time could give precise range and approx bearing, it was regarded operationally in other NATO countries as an accurate point navaid for extraction, etc and so was OK for “tactical approaches” - and ZD576 was using a tactical call sign.
You can lead a horse to water but you can't make it drink, eh?:=