Use of simulator time and new ICAO sim standards

[GarageYears]

I work for a company that supplies equipment used in flight sims. Over the last 3-4 years the standards and training needs for flight simulators was subject to a huge review (led by the RAeS) resulting in a new standard currently in final review by the ICAO - the document is available here:

http://www.raes-fsg.org.uk/uploads/090311022731_ICAO_9625_3rd_Edition_2009.pdf

Based on many comments in this AF447 related to the use of simulator time, and noting that it seems that the great majority believe simulator time is valuable, my question is fairly simple:

Have any of the current line pilots seen the document referenced above, or been asked to comment? Are any of you even aware this effort was underway? I ask this, since all flight simulators built over the next 10-15 years will be built subject to these standards, but more importantly the training needs and the simulator capabilities are derived from this document.

More specifically does the document include the type of training tasking that is being suggested as useful (i.e. upset training, loss of major subsystems, etc) as opposed to the current LOFT, loss of engine @ V1, etc, type training currently undertaken?

I look forward to all comments.:hmm:

- GY

[Tee Emm]

More specifically does the document include the type of training tasking that is being suggested as useful (i.e. upset training, loss of major subsystems, etc)

I haven't read the document but it is my experience that unusual attitude recovery training is not seriously acknowledged at management levels that are responsible for simulator syllabus design. All too often, it is seen as a "fun-hack - flick -zoom," exercise to be slipped in towards the end of a final recurrent sim session and that a pilot cannot be failed if he stuffs up a fun exercise.

Having observed a significant proportion of crashes in the simulator following incorrect recovery from an unusual attitude or jet upset, I can readily understand why Loss of Control has superseded CFIT as the leading cause of hull losses. Yet, even that statistic fails to convince those that make the rules to direct priority to jet upset training in simulators.

[MFgeo]

Based on a quick scan of the cited standard, it does not appear to expand the scope of the data package on which the simulation is based. If true, then it is completely unclear that the resulting simulations are appropriate for upset training, since the behavior of the simulator may differ substantially from the behavior of the actual aircraft at the edges of the flight envelope. The simulator may extrapolate provided performance data, but any training based on these extrapolations is suspect. For example, see the last two pages of the article on "Airplane Upset Recovery, A Test Pilot's View" available at
SmartCockpit - Airline training guides, Aviation, Operations, Safety (http://www.smartcockpit.com/pdf/flightops/flyingtechnique/3)
There an Airbus chief test pilot states that the bulk of the data on which the simulations are based are obtained from quasi-static manoeuvers not far from the center of the flight envelope, and that "Simulators can be used for upset training, but the training should be confined to the normal flight envelope." It seems that there should also be an expansion of the flight test data provided for use in programming the simulations if pilots are going to learn appropriate upset recovery techniques from simulator training.

[A-FLOOR]

Not meaning to rain on your parade, but there are a few things which need consideration:

Expanding the scope of the simulator data package to include aircraft behavior outside of the envelope inherently means that airframers would have to start conducting tests in real aircraft to record their behavior outside of the flight envelope. There is already one scenario during which the existing flight test data is recorded of the flight envelope: this is the 1G stall in both clean and landing configuration. Fly-by-wire aircraft with flight envelope protection features also have to conduct all these tests with their protection removed.

Going deeper than this in real-world flight testing is not only inherently dangerous, but how would you even begin to generate data for an extreme upset scenario? Do you want to do a full 360 deg roll in every new aircraft? Using the rudder to induce excessive sideslip? And what do you do for aircraft types which had already been flying for years or decades? Send them up again?

But let's say we succeed in somehow getting all of this data, the question then remains whether the motion cues generated by even the most modern Level D devices are adequate to properly train such scenarios, as the motion systems even in level D machines are only really suited to generate longitudinal and vertical cues, and lack the same fidelity for lateral cues.

Just my 2 cents.

[john_tullamarine]

or, alternatively, one considers whether the sim might be a useful generic training aid for upset situations .. providing that the behaviour is notionally reasonable. My view is that most pilots,

(a) not having had any exposure will, necessarily, be at a significant disadvantage on the day

(b) having had some exposure will, quite possibly, be in a position where they will have some chance of recovering from some upsets.

Apart from the potential value in upsets, an improvement in the basic I/F confidence and competence is readily observed in the sim. Provided that suitable briefing caveats are given, I really can't see any counter argument ?

[Bullethead]

Having done unusual attitude (UA) recovery exercises in a training aircraft during my military training and also in various flight simulators I would have to say that any of this type of training has to be benificial for pilots who have not previously done any.

However the exercises conducted in a simulator lack a lot of realism due to the limitations of the simulator, in that they can't simulate sustained G forces or the ability 'to hang you in the straps', and are in reality an exercise in instrument interpretation and subsequent recovery.

Not to devalue the exercise but I believe all airline pilots would benefit from some real UA recovery training in an aerobatic aircraft with an acredited instructor, not necessarily on a recurrent basis but at least as part of CPL level training.

Airliner flight simulators are not designed to extend the flight envelope with which they are programmed and the fidelity of the simulation once the boundaries of that programmed envelope are reached is dubious at best. Further I think it impractical to expect the airframe constructors to subject a real aeroplane and crew to extreme manouvres in order gather data to facilitate such training.

Regards,
BH.

[groundfloor]

Bullethead - Agree 100%!! It`s pretty obvious even in the simulator who has and who has not had this exposure.

If I remember correctly Davies in his book "Handling the Big Jets?" espoused exactly the same thing. ie: Airline pilots being exposed at intervals to aerobatics/unusual recoveries in an aerobatic aircraft.

A long time ago pilots used to do limited panel spin recoveries under the hood on: a turn slip ball indicator, ASI and once wings level a DI. Did wonders for one s confidence and spatial awareness. It came with all the physiological effects and G that a sim cannot deliver...

[rubik101]

As this is a new thread then I feel that a repeat of the point I made earlier in a related thread might bear repetition here.
Can the esteemed trainers on this site please expalin what possible merit there is in carrying out the manual closure of the start valve, the cancelation of a start due to no acceleration, the taxying of the simulator to the hold, the loss of the Blue/B Hyd system in climb, the pack trip off at FL 280, the CiC calling to tell me that a passenger has a heart attack and we need to land asap, the decent and approach to my home base followed by a reverser failing to deploy on landing? And all this in a very expensive machine designed to instruct and test, at great expense, my ability as a Captain/Co-pilot.
All of the above could be covered perfectly adequately on the line with a TRI/TRE/Trng Captain on board. LOFT should be done where it says it is, on the Line.
I would like to use the simulator to learn how to recover form the inevitable 'worst-case-scenario' which is just around the corner. High altitude recovery from the stall, handling in severe CAT, approach/landing config stalls, climb out stalls when clean and so on; these are the things that kill people, not Hydraulic system failures.
And can someone please tell me just how often a modern engine has failed at V1? We slavishly practice just this one 'w-c-s' to the exclusion of so many other killers; why?
Time for a radical rethink in the Training Depts I feel.

[777den]

at least United Airlines crews see "advanced maneuvers" training every 18 months. This puts the simulator in an unusual attitude and then the crew has to recover back to stable flight.

[rubik101]

camel, would you care to elaborate as to why you think only the so called 'flag carriers' should implement this training?

[411A]

Hmmm, the so-called 'upset training' was tried by the 'new guard' in the training department at American Airlines.
The result?
The First Officer, on AA587, followed such 'training', and promptly bicycle peddled the rudder...until the vertical fin departed.

Such fools do not belong at the pointy end of a jet transport airplane, and as for the training department at AA (advanced maneuvering program)...should be expunged therefrom, forthwith.
They are fools, personified.

[rogerg]

Tho slightly "off thread" a certain academy doing MPL training include a number of hours aerobatics in the course. Cant be bad.

[320 driver]

I understand that JAA approved courses no longer include aerobatics and full spin recovery. Once again the authorities have placed the airlines' wish to reduce the cost of training ahead of the safety/skills required.

[rogerg]

"Tiger Cub" Isnt that an old motor bike?

[A Comfy Chair]

CAMEL,

QF do it as part of the endorsement sims and I believe as part of the recurrent training program, but I can't say exactly how often.

Of interest the cadet program they run includes 20 hrs of basic aerobatics, and besides being good fun is supposedly designed to give a basic level of upset recovery training.

My personal opinion is all pilots should be exposed at some level to this kind of "basic aeros" course. If nothing else it gives a good understanding that the aircraft does work in strange attitudes, and hopefully means that you are somewhat less "surprised" if it ever happens, and have at least a fighting chance of getting yourself upright again, having previously experienced the sensations of unusual attitude flight.

Its a shame they've even removed spinning from the requirements of a PPL.

[Tee Emm]

Hmmm, the so-called 'upset training' was tried by the 'new guard' in the training department at American Airlines.
The result?
The First Officer, on AA587, followed such 'training', and promptly bicycle peddled the rudder...until the vertical fin departed

From what I read the aircraft was not in an unusual attitude. It simply hit wake turbulence and it is drawing a long bow to claim that American Airlines actually taught the pilot concerned to apply full rudder to and fro.

The subject of unusual attitude training in the simulator has been discussed many times on Pprune and there are always for and against among readers and responders. Some may recall the Boeing test pilot that demonstrated a aileron roll or barrel roll, in the first 707. There is anecdotal evidence that test pilots and others have rolled an HS 748. Presumably both types displayed normal roll characteristics. What's more, I wouldn't be surprised if the Boeing test pilot had done a few barrel rolls earlier in the 707 simulator and had enough technical knowledge to know that the real 707 would be reasonably close to the simulator characteristics -or is it vice verca?

Where aircraft have gone in after entering an unusual attitude (Adam Air B737 Indonesia, for example), the apparent lack of proper upset training meant the pilot probably applied incorrect recovery procedure and the aircraft broke up in the ensuing spiral dive (it's FDR indicated this, I believe). In fact, it would be a fair bet to assume that many accidents involving IMC unusual attitude situations, may not have occured if the pilot had been trained how to recover on instruments.

Forget for the purpose of this discussion that control forces cannot be replicated in the simulator throughout extreme manoeuvres - although an emergency descent is obviously within acceptable simulator fidelity tolerances and that is the nearest to an unusual attitude most pilots get to in a simulator. But, faulty interpretation of flight instrument indications have been major factors in fatal accidents involving jet upset/unusual attitude situations. If not, the crews presumably would have always recovered safely.

Most ADI's in today's low cost synthetic trainers, offer full 360 degrees of roll and a pilot can practice unusual attitude recoveries on an el cheapo machine and be a safer pilot for it. Pull through from inverted and any aeroplane will lose considerable altitude in an attempted recovery. A pilot never having been taught to recover from that manoeuvre - or any other extreme attitude - would surely crash if faced with the real event - particularly in IMC.

So, whether you practice recovery on instruments in a 737 flight simulator or an Elite synthetic trainer; or even under the hood in a Cessna 150, the instrument indications would most probably be the same. Better a little knowledge of unusual attitude recovery technique than none at all. And certainly a lot better than reading all about it in a text book, and expecting that to get you out of trouble if you are upside down in the real thing..

[despegue]

The Belgian Aviation School (BAS), Nowadays Sabena Flight Academy (SFA) had a Aerobatic course which had to be passed to get a Belgian CPL.
All too often, we see accidents where the crew is unable to recover correctly from an offset, induced by crew, weather or mechanical failure.
Stick-and-Rudder competency is still the best insurance of avoiding an accident.

[GarageYears]

Firstly thanks to all who have contributed, much of what has been said is not unexpected based on my personal contact with flight crew, but if I can redirect a little...

Is it fair to say that the new standard (ICAO 9625 rev 3 link per original post) does not address unusual attitude recovery and similar, and as such "we" (meaning anyone who contributed to the creation of that document - myself included, but admittedly only for a small slice constrained by my expertise) missed an opportunity to move this issue forward.

Personally it seems logical that any training in this area is better than no training, but one mantra that is relevant is the need to avoid negative training. What I suspect is the case here is over-protectionism at work - in other words, since we cannot get real aircraft data to base our modeling on (since that is inherently dangerous) then we can't train it, and/or don't want to, and by the way there are very few living pilots to verify what the simulator might do anyway. This of course is ignoring the fact that we CAN develop VERY REALISTIC engineering models for aircraft in all flight attitudes/conditions (remember computing power and indeed engineers to program them are relatively cheap).

May flight simulators are developed for aircraft that have not flown one NM - there were A380 FFS long before the first aircraft flew, and the same is true for the 787 currently. True enough that those sims are updated with revised aero packages once the aircraft are in the air, but having seen this from the inside, these updates are very minor - the original engineering models are very, very good.

So I would venture it is possible to get representative data to use as the modeling basis.

It is unavoidable that the motion system cannot replicate the full experience; at best it provides cues as to what happens, but again, given we can't have you hanging off the straps, wouldn't it be better to have some idea of what will/might happen in an upset situation, versus none?

I'd venture as a frequent flyer, I'd prefer the folks at the pointy end to have some training, since not having any at all seems rather like rolling dice... and just recently I experienced a roller-coaster ride in the pan-handle region of Northern Florida, that had me hoping the flight deck crew were ex-military, since having worked with many such folk, I am pretty confident they would have likely the right experience AND training to handle what we flew through. Not that many/most of the non-military flight deck crews couldn't have handled themselves just fine, but I KNOW this is not part of the normal training syllabus, and that was pretty much front and center in my mind as we bounced our way to a (fortunately) very safe landing. And please understand I absolutely want to be clear this paragraph is not intended to denigrate the flying skills of the very many non ex-military crews - it is the training basis for those skills I am focused on here.:eek:

- GY

[lefthanddownabit]

The ICAO document doesn't replace existing NAA documents such as FAA Part 60 or EASA JAR-FSTD. I'm sure the goal of harmonised simulator design standards is a fine one, but the industry has come close to this before but diverged again. It also throws a few curve balls into the process.

Confusingly it introduces a new set of device types without clearly identifying what they are (Types I-VII). From what I can see Type VII is a full flight simulator, so the document ignores the existence of Levels A thru D devices. It also sets some criteria which are in excess of existing (for example minimum lateral visual FOV is put at 200 degrees when many operators are struggling to meet the existing 180 degree standard set out in JAR-FSTD). That is 50 degrees more than most existing simulators. How much training in simulators requires such a FOV anyway?

So the simulator world isn't going to change overnight.

As has been stated above, unusual attitude and jet upset training requires data which doesn't exist at present. Incomplete data could well result in negative training. Even stall behaviour is not adequately presented in current airliner aero models, nor does it have to be.

UA and jet upset scenarios have been programmed into simulators for decades, but risk negative training due to lack of data and the unrealistic way such upsets must be introduced. An early set of UA scenarios I recall simply put the simulator in a particular condition, frozen, then required the crew to recover when freeze was released. Some ramp in the attitude and the crew are requested to be hands off during this process. You can subtly induce a UA by failing attitude indications, but if the failure is identified the UA is never reached and so no recovery is taught.


Tee Emm
From what I read the aircraft was not in an unusual attitude. It simply hit wake turbulence and it is drawing a long bow to claim that American Airlines actually taught the pilot concerned to apply full rudder to and fro.
411A is correct. The NTSB report on this accident certainly mentions the AA unusual attitude training as a possible contributor. It wasn't an unusual attitude of course, but it appears that the F/O may have learned to use the rudder to pick up the wing at high AOA and applied this technique to regaining wings level in the wake turbulence, when a wheel input would have been more appropriate.

[ZFT]

It also sets some criteria which are in excess of existing (for example minimum lateral visual FOV is put at 200 degrees when many operators are struggling to meet the existing 180 degree standard set out in JAR-FSTD). That is 50 degrees more than most existing simulators. How much training in simulators requires such a FOV anyway?

Every circling approach.

[Tee Emm]

The NTSB report on this accident certainly mentions the AA unusual attitude training as a possible contributor.

It would be instructive to read exactly what technique American Airlines published for unusual attitude recovery. Can any reader provide a link? While the NTSB report apparently stated the AA unusual attitude training as a possible contributor, the term "possible" means just that. A good lawyer would make mincemeat of "possible."

Certainly Boeing (737) suggest that cautious use of appropriate rudder pedal input may be necessary to assist in recovering from a nose high low airspeed attitude if elevator or stab trim is insufficient to drop the nose, and a roll input is needed to allow the nose to drop to the horizon.

[downwind]

relavent article;

Civil Simulator Special: Reality check for civil simulators (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/04/24/325608/civil-simulator-special-reality-check-for-civil-simulators.html)

[lefthanddownabit]

Every circling approach.

These can be done even in simulators without continuous FOV visuals (with certain constraints relating to scene content). Many FAA Level C sims still have monitor visuals and can be qualified for circling approaches. What percentage of sim time does this exercise represent? Does that justify the significant extra cost?

Extending 150 degree visual displays to 180 is achievable cost effectively. A 200 degree requirement (imposed without any real industry-wide discussion and exceeding current FAA and EASA requirements) requires additional visual channels and projectors as well as a new mirror and back-projection screen. It can be achieved but should it be a requirement for all new simulators?

[lefthanddownabit]

It would be instructive to read exactly what technique American Airlines published for unusual attitude recovery. Can any reader provide a link? While the NTSB report apparently stated the AA unusual attitude training as a possible contributor, the term "possible" means just that. A good lawyer would make mincemeat of "possible."

The NTSB report is here:
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/AAR0404.pdf

Here's the relevant extract from the training programme as quoted by the NTSB report (page 85).

• Apply climb power
• Maintain 15º to 30º deck angle
• Respect the stick shaker (Fly in the PLI [pitch limit indication])
• Now roll alternately left and right to 40º of bank –


MAINTAIN HIGH AOA• First, use only ailerons and spoilers
– Note: Sluggish roll response – Developing sink rate
• Second, use only rudder – (smoothly)
– Note: Improved roll response – Developing climb rate
• Third, practice combination (both aileron & rudder)
– Note: Optimum roll response

It's clear a trainee might conclude that rudder inputs are always to be used as roll rates are improved. However this is intended for high AOA situations (close to stick shake), AA587 was accelerating through 255 knots and climbing in a normal attitude so AOA was low.

The NTSB often has to use words like possible and probable. Even lawyers have to accept the concept of doubt. The point made was not that AA's training was at fault, but that a trainee might have applied it in the wrong situation. Testimony about a previous wake turbulence encounter seems to support this conclusion (pages 12-13). So it's hard to see how a lawyer could make mincemeat of the possibllity given the supporting evidence.

The report quotes the initial bank angle deviation as 10 degrees (from the 23 degree banked turn). Not an unusual attitude by any standard.
Certainly Boeing (737) suggest that cautious use of appropriate rudder pedal input may be necessary to assist in recovering from a nose high low airspeed attitude if elevator or stab trim is insufficient to drop the nose, and a roll input is needed to allow the nose to drop to the horizon.
That says it's for nose high, low airspeed conditions. Note also it says "cautious use". Repeated full reversals were employed on AA587. The pilot may well have assumed the rudder limiter would take care of structural issues, but this is not always true for an A300-600. Even if the A300-600 did have a rudder limiter (and not a pedal limiter), the stresses imposed may not have prevented the fin shearing off.

[AirRabbit]

The ICAO document doesn't replace existing NAA documents such as FAA Part 60 or EASA JAR-FSTD. I'm sure the goal of harmonised simulator design standards is a fine one, but the industry has come close to this before but diverged again. It also throws a few curve balls into the process.
While this is true, at least for now, it is likely that the ICAO member nations will adopt the new standards. However, what some may not know is that adopting the new standards will have no effect on the simulators that currently exist … a process that has come to be known as “grandfathering” … and the new standards would only affect the new simulators coming into the inventory.
Confusingly it introduces a new set of device types without clearly identifying what they are (Types I-VII). From what I can see Type VII is a full flight simulator, so the document ignores the existence of Levels A thru D devices. It also sets some criteria which are in excess of existing (for example minimum lateral visual FOV is put at 200 degrees when many operators are struggling to meet the existing 180 degree standard set out in JAR-FSTD). That is 50 degrees more than most existing simulators. How much training in simulators requires such a FOV anyway? So the simulator world isn't going to change overnight.

True, the simulator world isn’t going to change overnight – but it IS going to change. It is possible that you haven’t had the opportunity to read the entire set of documents and see the specific requirements including how the Summary Matrix was developed. In short, there were slightly more than 200 piloting tasks evaluated against 12 simulation features, where each feature has 4 levels of fidelity, and each of these combinations were distributed over 15 different kinds of training or license levels, and separated into two categories – training introduction and training to proficiency. This results in a rather massive matrix of just less than 300,000 data points. Obviously, this wouldn’t be manageable by many persons, so once this work was completed, there was a concerted effort to group together those training and license levels that had similar results in the matrix – and where it didn’t make sense to group types of training or licensing requirements together – they were left as a “group of 1.” It was this grouping that generated the 7 types of flight simulation training devices:
Type I includes PPL, CPL, and MPL-1 Core training;
Type II includes training for Instrument Rating;
Type III includes training for a Class Rating;
Type IV includes training (and training to proficiency) for MPL-2 Basic;
Type V includes training for Initial Operator, Recurrent Operator, Recurrent License, and Type Rating;
Type VI includes training for MPL-3 Intermediate; and
Type VII includes training to proficiency for MPL-4 Advanced, Type Ratings, ATPL, Initial Operator, Recurrent Operator, Continuing Qualification, Recurrent License, and training for Recency of Takeoffs/Landings.

The traditional Level A, B, C, and D simulators will continue under the “grandfather” authorizations.

The field-of-view (FOV) requirements were not blindly selected. If you fly an airplane at the designed traffic pattern altitude on the downwind, the location of where you would normally check the runway threshold to begin your turn to base would require you to turn your head just very slightly less than 100 degrees toward the runway. Therefore, for both sides of the cockpit, the required FOV for the visual system would be 200 degrees to fly a VFR traffic pattern. This 200 degree requirement is also just under the logical horizontal FOV for an installation using just 4 visual projectors (going to something like 210 degrees would require a 5th projector). An FOV of just 180 degrees would put whatever 90-degree reference point you may desire right on the very edge of the visual display and any movement might place that point out of view – and the 180-degree system would also require 4 projectors.

Simulators are currently being delivered with 200 degree FOV visual systems rather regularly.

As has been stated above, unusual attitude and jet upset training requires data which doesn't exist at present. Incomplete data could well result in negative training. Even stall behaviour is not adequately presented in current airliner aero models, nor does it have to be.
While it is true that a sufficient quantity of data has not been routinely collected that will allow an accurate development of a mathematical model of the aerodynamics of a given aircraft beyond the boundaries of a given flight envelope, it is also true that taking the simulator outside of that envelope is not like it used to be. Aerodynamic math models used to be terribly limited – to the extent that rolling the simulated airplane to a bank angle of something like 60 degrees would confuse the programming and the simulator would often freeze in position. Those kinds of circumstances are not seen in simulators built over the past couple of decades. These “newer” aerodynamic models are fully functional through 360 degrees of roll and 360 degrees of pitch. But – like I said – these models have to be modified with specific airplane data to allow the simulator to perform and handle like a given airplane. It is this data that is missing for a completely accurate math model to be developed.

Also, while I said there was not a sufficient quantity of data beyond certain limits, that does not mean that data has not been gathered beyond those limits. Data does exist well beyond the supposed “flight envelope,” but it’s not sufficient to be able to relied upon 100%. So going beyond the “flight test validated envelope” is possible – and while not 100% accurate, it is quite accurate just beyond the limit and gets less so the farther away the simulated airplane is taken from those limits. However, there are some things that are still quite accurate regardless of the attitude of the simulated airplane … the visual display will accurately display what the pilot would see in that attitude; the flight instruments will accurately display what the pilot would read on those instruments with the airplane in that attitude; the performance indications of the change of those instruments (rolling, accelerating, climbing, descending, etc.) would be accurate with regard to what the airplane would be doing in that attitude. Where this lack of data becomes problematic is the aircraft response to given control inputs. The simulator will respond to control inputs to the simulator controls – but we don’t accurately know how quickly the airplane will respond and we don’t accurately know the magnitude of that response. Therefore, we cannot use the simulator to teach or test a specific control application, with the expectation that a pilot experiencing that same circumstance can expect his/her airplane to respond the way the simulator did in those areas.

Another piece of information is that we do have substantial data on aircraft performance and handling qualities all the way down to the stall – that means to the stall break or the controls reaching displacement limits. It would be incorrect to say that going just barely beyond that point puts the simulator into “no man’s land.” But, it is also true that the performance and handling qualities at that point cannot be absolutely guaranteed – it will be close, but not exact.
UA and jet upset scenarios have been programmed into simulators for decades, but risk negative training due to lack of data and the unrealistic way such upsets must be introduced. An early set of UA scenarios I recall simply put the simulator in a particular condition, frozen, then required the crew to recover when freeze was released. Some ramp in the attitude and the crew are requested to be hands off during this process. You can subtly induce a UA by failing attitude indications, but if the failure is identified the UA is never reached and so no recovery is taught.
Because of these limitations and because of the value of training in a simulator rather than risking exposure in an aircraft, there are teams currently working on how to use what is available in existing simulators, recognizing the limitations that exist, and structuring training programs around the areas that could be problematic yet still providing the crew members with very valuable training on what to expect and what courses of action might be considered in an array of circumstances. Teams are also working on what kind of data might be able to be gathered and what kind of compromises might be available for the structure of an accurate math model where we’ve never had math model accuracies previously.

[lefthanddownabit]

AirRabbit:

I've been in the simulator industry for 30 years. So for the sake of peace and quite I'll ignore the "egg-sucking lessons" you gave me in your lengthy post (I'm well aware of grandfathering, for example):

EASA and the FAA have both invested considerable time and effort in creating their respective approval standards. They aren't going to ditch those in a hurry. FAR Part 60 is part of US aviation law it so will not be so easy to change as ACs used to be. So Levels A-D will continue to be current, not grandfathered, for years to come. There have been attempts to ditch Levels A and C before, both strongly resisted by operators of same.

What may happen is that operators will seek to achieve MPL standards in addition to the meeting the FAA/EASA standards as before.

I certainly did read the whole document and found the definition of the various device types, but it is not presented in a clear or cocnise manner. Type VII effectively equates to a Level D FFS, leaving Levels A-C hanging. Many very capable FFSs exist at Level B and C which seem to be falling through the net here. The change to different terminology when the entire industry quite happily understands the existing terminology, is questionable. Defining simulators by the training that can be done on them is not new either (CAA CAP 453 did this years ago).

Some simulator operators I've spoken too were most dismayed that having got used to and upgraded to the 180 degree FOV, 200 degrees was now being discussed. With FAA and EASA regs, operators are included in the discussions and rule making. The ICAO document appears to have been constructed without the normal levels of discussion. I realise the concept of MPL introduces changes, but these should not force a re-write of existing, satisfactory and well understood standards.

As I said in answer to a previous post, the circling apprach scenario is a relatively small part of the FFS training requirement to hang such a costly change on. Operators can by all means specify such a FOV when they purchase simulators, but should it really be considered the minimum necessary?

[GarageYears]

Lefthanddownabit, I suspect AirRabbit was not directing all of his post directly at you, but (hopefully) the broader audience, but either way, please understand (and perhaps you do already) it was Ed Cook of the FAA that initiated the whole effort to produce this standard.

I believe the whole process was kicked off at an RAeS conference in 2005 - I came on-board during mid-2007. The intent of this effort was both the harmonization of international standards and a revamp of the standards to reflect current technology capabilities. Remember both the FAA Part 60 and JAA JAR-STD 1A ammendment 3 are dervied to greater or lesser extent from the RAeS Aeroplane Simulator Evaluation Handbook 3rd Ed, 2005.

I do take exception to the statement "The ICAO document appears to have been constructed without the normal levels of discussion.". That could not be further from the truth at all! All manner of airline reps, simulator manufacturers, aircraft manufacturers, regulatory authorties and subject matter experts were part of the International Working Group. I can probably dig up the list if that is of interest.

Right now Larry McDonald from the FAA NSP is heavily involved in developing the Helicopter equivalent to the ICAO 9625 Rev 3 document, so the FAA and EASA are not sidelined here, but part of the process, in fact central.

Please see: RAeS ICAO 9625 International Working Group - Index (http://www.raes-fsg.org.uk/cgi-bin/yabb2i/YaBB.pl)

[AirRabbit]

Hey GarageYears

First, thanks for recognizing that I wasn’t presuming that our friend (lefthanddownabit) was in need of any pointed lectures – of course, if he took any of my comments that way, I certainly want to extend my most sincere apologies. It was only because I have some knowledge in this area that I decided to provide anyone interested with some information on the subject – and in doing so, I was thinking that rather than offer comments in a teasing manner, I’d tell anyone who might be interested what the facts are about this particular subject. I didn’t mean for it to come off like a lecture – just presenting the facts ma’am.

I think you are abolutely correct about the FAA and their intentions. Of course until we actually see something in writing there is always a bit of conjecture about what any regulator is going to do, and the FAA certainly doesn’t have a particular corner on that market.

lefthanddownabit makes some good points about certain simulators currently in service – and no one would want to see them disappear completely. However, with the computer industry expanding like it is, it won’t be long before it will have an even greater impact on the aviation industry – particularly the training parts, and most specifically, those parts having to do with flight simulators. Additionally, keeping older simulators up to spec is becoming increasingly difficult - particularly in light of the falling prices of brand new simualtors and simulator systems. In fact, according to the FAA’s website, out of almost 800 active simulators there are something like 25 – 30 of them that are not Level C or Level D. And, if I’m reading that material correctly, it doesn’t appear that very many Level C simulators are entering the inventory on a permanent basis. It seems that the most sophisticated simulator (Level D) and a couple of levels of the smaller flight training devices, are what is desired most by the training industry – and that, too, is reflected in the ICAO documents. Of the seven types of ICAO devices all but the top two are fixed-base devices – without motion – but all of them have a pretty sophisticated visual system – and all the visual systems will be equipped with at least that same 200-degree FOV presentation we discussed the other day. The lower level devices are designed primarily to address PPL and CPL training – again, probably channeled very much along the lines of the ICAO defined MPL training process.

I also know that one of the reasons that this particular effort was undertaken was that, despite the industry’s familiarity with levels of simulators and flight training devices, there was a wide range of differences between many of them – so the familiarity wasn’t so familiar when it came right down to the specific device. Additionally, without there being an accepted standard, some simulator owners who leased time on a simulator to several organizations from various countries, had to endure the evaluation of that one simulator by the regulatory authorities in each of the respective countries. According to the material on the Royal Aeronautical Society’s website, at the moment, there are apparently some 27 or 28 different levels of simulation that range from table top instrument trainers to the top-of-the-line Level D simulator in service around the world. By any argument 7 levels has to be better than almost 30 – and if all the regulators can get past the personalizations involved, it just might allow one evaluation of a simulator to satisfy all the regulatory authorities’ need to be sure the thing works properly.

[ZFT]

leftanddownabit
As I said in answer to a previous post, the circling approach scenario is a relatively small part of the FFS training requirement to hang such a costly change on. Operators can by all means specify such a FOV when they purchase simulators, but should it really be considered the minimum necessary?

Why is the 180 – 200 FOV a costly ‘change on’? The latest LCoS systems can easily support 200 degrees with a 3 channel system and in fact the existing 180 optics can almost be stretched to achieved 200 as well (during a recent upgrade we experimented with optically stretching the FOV and found we could achieve 197)

With a new build, the delta between 180/200 optics should be negligible.

I would also dispute circling approaches being a relatively small part of the FFS training requirements. This may well be true for some operators who only fly into major international airfields, but there are many other operators who typically operate into airfields with very limited facilities where circling approaches are the order of the day. It is these operators who require extended FOVs, highly detailed databases etc.

[simulation.org.uk]

A very interesting article ...

[A37575]

would also dispute circling approaches being a relatively small part of the FFS training requirements. This may well be true for some operators who only fly into major international airfields, but there are many other operators who typically operate into airfields with very limited facilities where circling approaches are the order of the day. It is these operators who require extended FOVs, highly detailed databases etc

I agree. The present situation for circling approaches in simulators (I am more familar with the 737), is that instead of conducting the circling manoeuvre with the emphasis on watching the runway all the way from downwind to final, pilots are authorised to cheat a little and navigate around the circuit on instruments because otherwise a missed approach would always be the case once you lose sight of the runway as it passes your 90 degree.

I have observed crews building a lovely little picture on the MAP which Picasso would have been proud of, and they LNAV their way around the magenta line with head firmly glued inside. It works beautifully of course and may or may not be a safe policy in real life. I guess it is better than nothing at all, especially where the regulator demands a circling approach form part of the instrument rating test conducted in the simulator and pretends not to notice the crew are heads down typing away on the downwind leg to get the turning point on base entered into the CDU.

Yet I have seen crews castigated for being high turning final when they had no hope of picking the runway when the instructor has set the visibility to the published minimum which under Australian AIP is 4 kms for Cat C types.
On the other hand, if the pilot opts to extend downwind but still stay within the circling MDA safe area of ICAO 4.2 nm, to avoid the risk of getting too high on final, some instructors will say that is cheating!

While a circling approach with low MDA takes more skill than a normal 1500 ft visual circuit, especially if the chart limiting vis is fed into the equation, then surely a wider field of vision in the simulator is a significant factor in terms of flight safety. There is a saying that "get away with anything long enough, and the perceived risk diminishes." So it is with flogging around a circling approach on instruments simply because of a simulator limitation with side vision.

[777den]

On most of the simulator designs I am familiar with going beyond 180 degrees runs in to problems with the simulator structure limiting the field of view. at minimum you are looking at replacing the BP screen and probably the entire mirror cell assembly. The mounting surface the projectors sit on may need replacing and area of the outside of the sim just aft of the mirror cell may need redesign. going from a 3 to 4 projector system means that you end up with an edge blend right in the middle of the primary field of view which is something I personally would try and avoid.

[GarageYears]

The new standard will only apply to new-build simulators, so existing operators of existing devices can leave them as-is if they choose. There is no intent to force the new standard to apply retrospectively - per previous posts those existing devices will retain the current certification under grandfathering rules.

Whether current designs can/do support 200 degree FOV is a problem for the manufacturers. These standards have been available as a draft and in discussion for 3 years or so; so it would be rather hard to claim this was a surprise or news to anyone with a vested interest in this aspect of sim design. :{

[AirRabbit]

GarageYears you are correct – as has been the policy virtually everywhere around the globe, new standards for simulation apply only to the new simulators coming into service under that new standard. And the 200-degree FOV is becoming rather routine today. Yes, there is an edge blend right down the middle of the visual scene – but the technology is getting pretty darn good – at least to the point where you’d have to know where to look and what specifically to look for in order to determine that there was a blended edge in view.

I recognize the simulator structure issues that 777den referenced, but the new designs in simulators and working with display system vendors are effectively dealing with those issues as well. The real problem is not the horizontal field of view, but the vertical fields of view – particularly an issue for the helicopter simulators because of the very large, almost directly down, field of view those operators would like to have. I think you mentioned in your earlier post that there is an effort underway to update and modernize the helicopter simulator standards as well, and I know that the 60-degree vertical FOV systems that are out there now (which is 20 degrees more than the airplane simulators require) are pretty impressive. The struggle there is going to be whether the helicopter simulators will require collimated systems (like the fixed wing) or if they will require a direct projected system – and some of those direct projected, 60- X 220-degree FOV systems currently in use get pretty fancy with multiple (5 or 6) projectors.

The thing about this that really interests me is that this is the first time that there have been truly international experts working on a common set of circumstances where everyone involved has a vested interest in the correct, successful, and effective result … and I include the regulators in that mix.

[GarageYears]

Can I ask this though - since the users of the simulators are the crew, how many crew are involved in specifying what the simulator supports, and the features/training capabilities these devices provide?

Although the sim manufacturers obviously interact with their customers, can any pilot comment on their direct involvement with the purchase of a new simulator, or is that handled by some training department, that defines what those devices will provide?

In the case of the new ICAO standard were any crew aware of this effort?

- GY

[AirRabbit]

Hey GarageYears

:ok:A good question. Yes, there was substantial representation by "crew members." The working group was made up of 10 FSTD vendors and manufacturers, 6 airframe manufacturers, 6 FSTD operators, airlines and independent training centers, 12 industry bodies (two of which were the US Air Line Pilot's Association and the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations) and regulators. In addition there were individual researchers, helicopter OEMs and others. Overall, this group consisted of approximately 80 regular members from 16 countries. Beyond this there were 306 individuals registered on the RAeS website - to stay abreast of what was being discussed, to offer their own opinions, and exchange ideas, thoughts, concerns, etc., with others, including those on the "official" working group. The only reason that this method was settled upon was that having a working group that consisted of as many as 306 members would have been completely unmanageable. There was a requirement to provide only a log-on name and password to participate, and, therefore, it would be difficult to identify all of these 306 persons as to what specific aspect of the industry they were representing. However, the "odds" are that a substantial number of those persons were cockpit crewmembers.:)

Additionally, the workings of this IWG has been presented at 2 WATS conferences, 2 FSEMC conferences, the EATS conference once, 2 APATS conferences, 4 meetings of the Royal Aeronautical Society, and 1 SimTech meeting. Also there were special briefings provided to EASA/JAA (twice), the US FAA (twice), the CAAC (China), as well as several Airlines and Training Centers. Also, the workings were covered in several aviation publications.

Of course, we must also recognize that many of the groups that were represented, although not normally be considered "cockpit crew" members on a regular basis, many of these individuals maintain flight operations (line) currency and would be required to do that through the use of one of these FSTD device types.

In all, it is apparent that this effort has been vetted in just about every way possible - and the results are indicative of thoughtful consideration and many, many hours of review, revision, thought-proving conversations - many of which often were of the "slightly elevated temperature" type - but blows were never exchanged - and the results were eventually agreed to by all parties involved. It is a significantly forward looking and profound work by as large an international workforce as likely has ever taken on such work.:D

[A-FLOOR]

Interesting article in Flight: FAA proposes new certification category for upset training aircraft (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/08/06/330720/faa-proposes-new-certification-category-for-upset-training.html)

Clearly some prayers were heard... :D