Use of simulator time and new ICAO sim standards
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Use of simulator time and new ICAO sim standards
I work for a company that supplies equipment used in flight sims. Over the last 3-4 years the standards and training needs for flight simulators was subject to a huge review (led by the RAeS) resulting in a new standard currently in final review by the ICAO - the document is available here:
http://www.raes-fsg.org.uk/uploads/0...ition_2009.pdf
Based on many comments in this AF447 related to the use of simulator time, and noting that it seems that the great majority believe simulator time is valuable, my question is fairly simple:
Have any of the current line pilots seen the document referenced above, or been asked to comment? Are any of you even aware this effort was underway? I ask this, since all flight simulators built over the next 10-15 years will be built subject to these standards, but more importantly the training needs and the simulator capabilities are derived from this document.
More specifically does the document include the type of training tasking that is being suggested as useful (i.e. upset training, loss of major subsystems, etc) as opposed to the current LOFT, loss of engine @ V1, etc, type training currently undertaken?
I look forward to all comments.
- GY
http://www.raes-fsg.org.uk/uploads/0...ition_2009.pdf
Based on many comments in this AF447 related to the use of simulator time, and noting that it seems that the great majority believe simulator time is valuable, my question is fairly simple:
Have any of the current line pilots seen the document referenced above, or been asked to comment? Are any of you even aware this effort was underway? I ask this, since all flight simulators built over the next 10-15 years will be built subject to these standards, but more importantly the training needs and the simulator capabilities are derived from this document.
More specifically does the document include the type of training tasking that is being suggested as useful (i.e. upset training, loss of major subsystems, etc) as opposed to the current LOFT, loss of engine @ V1, etc, type training currently undertaken?
I look forward to all comments.
- GY
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More specifically does the document include the type of training tasking that is being suggested as useful (i.e. upset training, loss of major subsystems, etc)
Having observed a significant proportion of crashes in the simulator following incorrect recovery from an unusual attitude or jet upset, I can readily understand why Loss of Control has superseded CFIT as the leading cause of hull losses. Yet, even that statistic fails to convince those that make the rules to direct priority to jet upset training in simulators.
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Can the simulator provide appropriate upset training?
Based on a quick scan of the cited standard, it does not appear to expand the scope of the data package on which the simulation is based. If true, then it is completely unclear that the resulting simulations are appropriate for upset training, since the behavior of the simulator may differ substantially from the behavior of the actual aircraft at the edges of the flight envelope. The simulator may extrapolate provided performance data, but any training based on these extrapolations is suspect. For example, see the last two pages of the article on "Airplane Upset Recovery, A Test Pilot's View" available at
SmartCockpit - Airline training guides, Aviation, Operations, Safety
There an Airbus chief test pilot states that the bulk of the data on which the simulations are based are obtained from quasi-static manoeuvers not far from the center of the flight envelope, and that "Simulators can be used for upset training, but the training should be confined to the normal flight envelope." It seems that there should also be an expansion of the flight test data provided for use in programming the simulations if pilots are going to learn appropriate upset recovery techniques from simulator training.
SmartCockpit - Airline training guides, Aviation, Operations, Safety
There an Airbus chief test pilot states that the bulk of the data on which the simulations are based are obtained from quasi-static manoeuvers not far from the center of the flight envelope, and that "Simulators can be used for upset training, but the training should be confined to the normal flight envelope." It seems that there should also be an expansion of the flight test data provided for use in programming the simulations if pilots are going to learn appropriate upset recovery techniques from simulator training.
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Not meaning to rain on your parade, but there are a few things which need consideration:
Expanding the scope of the simulator data package to include aircraft behavior outside of the envelope inherently means that airframers would have to start conducting tests in real aircraft to record their behavior outside of the flight envelope. There is already one scenario during which the existing flight test data is recorded of the flight envelope: this is the 1G stall in both clean and landing configuration. Fly-by-wire aircraft with flight envelope protection features also have to conduct all these tests with their protection removed.
Going deeper than this in real-world flight testing is not only inherently dangerous, but how would you even begin to generate data for an extreme upset scenario? Do you want to do a full 360 deg roll in every new aircraft? Using the rudder to induce excessive sideslip? And what do you do for aircraft types which had already been flying for years or decades? Send them up again?
But let's say we succeed in somehow getting all of this data, the question then remains whether the motion cues generated by even the most modern Level D devices are adequate to properly train such scenarios, as the motion systems even in level D machines are only really suited to generate longitudinal and vertical cues, and lack the same fidelity for lateral cues.
Just my 2 cents.
Expanding the scope of the simulator data package to include aircraft behavior outside of the envelope inherently means that airframers would have to start conducting tests in real aircraft to record their behavior outside of the flight envelope. There is already one scenario during which the existing flight test data is recorded of the flight envelope: this is the 1G stall in both clean and landing configuration. Fly-by-wire aircraft with flight envelope protection features also have to conduct all these tests with their protection removed.
Going deeper than this in real-world flight testing is not only inherently dangerous, but how would you even begin to generate data for an extreme upset scenario? Do you want to do a full 360 deg roll in every new aircraft? Using the rudder to induce excessive sideslip? And what do you do for aircraft types which had already been flying for years or decades? Send them up again?
But let's say we succeed in somehow getting all of this data, the question then remains whether the motion cues generated by even the most modern Level D devices are adequate to properly train such scenarios, as the motion systems even in level D machines are only really suited to generate longitudinal and vertical cues, and lack the same fidelity for lateral cues.
Just my 2 cents.
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or, alternatively, one considers whether the sim might be a useful generic training aid for upset situations .. providing that the behaviour is notionally reasonable. My view is that most pilots,
(a) not having had any exposure will, necessarily, be at a significant disadvantage on the day
(b) having had some exposure will, quite possibly, be in a position where they will have some chance of recovering from some upsets.
Apart from the potential value in upsets, an improvement in the basic I/F confidence and competence is readily observed in the sim. Provided that suitable briefing caveats are given, I really can't see any counter argument ?
(a) not having had any exposure will, necessarily, be at a significant disadvantage on the day
(b) having had some exposure will, quite possibly, be in a position where they will have some chance of recovering from some upsets.
Apart from the potential value in upsets, an improvement in the basic I/F confidence and competence is readily observed in the sim. Provided that suitable briefing caveats are given, I really can't see any counter argument ?
Having done unusual attitude (UA) recovery exercises in a training aircraft during my military training and also in various flight simulators I would have to say that any of this type of training has to be benificial for pilots who have not previously done any.
However the exercises conducted in a simulator lack a lot of realism due to the limitations of the simulator, in that they can't simulate sustained G forces or the ability 'to hang you in the straps', and are in reality an exercise in instrument interpretation and subsequent recovery.
Not to devalue the exercise but I believe all airline pilots would benefit from some real UA recovery training in an aerobatic aircraft with an acredited instructor, not necessarily on a recurrent basis but at least as part of CPL level training.
Airliner flight simulators are not designed to extend the flight envelope with which they are programmed and the fidelity of the simulation once the boundaries of that programmed envelope are reached is dubious at best. Further I think it impractical to expect the airframe constructors to subject a real aeroplane and crew to extreme manouvres in order gather data to facilitate such training.
Regards,
BH.
However the exercises conducted in a simulator lack a lot of realism due to the limitations of the simulator, in that they can't simulate sustained G forces or the ability 'to hang you in the straps', and are in reality an exercise in instrument interpretation and subsequent recovery.
Not to devalue the exercise but I believe all airline pilots would benefit from some real UA recovery training in an aerobatic aircraft with an acredited instructor, not necessarily on a recurrent basis but at least as part of CPL level training.
Airliner flight simulators are not designed to extend the flight envelope with which they are programmed and the fidelity of the simulation once the boundaries of that programmed envelope are reached is dubious at best. Further I think it impractical to expect the airframe constructors to subject a real aeroplane and crew to extreme manouvres in order gather data to facilitate such training.
Regards,
BH.
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Bullethead - Agree 100%!! It`s pretty obvious even in the simulator who has and who has not had this exposure.
If I remember correctly Davies in his book "Handling the Big Jets?" espoused exactly the same thing. ie: Airline pilots being exposed at intervals to aerobatics/unusual recoveries in an aerobatic aircraft.
A long time ago pilots used to do limited panel spin recoveries under the hood on: a turn slip ball indicator, ASI and once wings level a DI. Did wonders for one s confidence and spatial awareness. It came with all the physiological effects and G that a sim cannot deliver...
If I remember correctly Davies in his book "Handling the Big Jets?" espoused exactly the same thing. ie: Airline pilots being exposed at intervals to aerobatics/unusual recoveries in an aerobatic aircraft.
A long time ago pilots used to do limited panel spin recoveries under the hood on: a turn slip ball indicator, ASI and once wings level a DI. Did wonders for one s confidence and spatial awareness. It came with all the physiological effects and G that a sim cannot deliver...
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As this is a new thread then I feel that a repeat of the point I made earlier in a related thread might bear repetition here.
Can the esteemed trainers on this site please expalin what possible merit there is in carrying out the manual closure of the start valve, the cancelation of a start due to no acceleration, the taxying of the simulator to the hold, the loss of the Blue/B Hyd system in climb, the pack trip off at FL 280, the CiC calling to tell me that a passenger has a heart attack and we need to land asap, the decent and approach to my home base followed by a reverser failing to deploy on landing? And all this in a very expensive machine designed to instruct and test, at great expense, my ability as a Captain/Co-pilot.
All of the above could be covered perfectly adequately on the line with a TRI/TRE/Trng Captain on board. LOFT should be done where it says it is, on the Line.
I would like to use the simulator to learn how to recover form the inevitable 'worst-case-scenario' which is just around the corner. High altitude recovery from the stall, handling in severe CAT, approach/landing config stalls, climb out stalls when clean and so on; these are the things that kill people, not Hydraulic system failures.
And can someone please tell me just how often a modern engine has failed at V1? We slavishly practice just this one 'w-c-s' to the exclusion of so many other killers; why?
Time for a radical rethink in the Training Depts I feel.
Can the esteemed trainers on this site please expalin what possible merit there is in carrying out the manual closure of the start valve, the cancelation of a start due to no acceleration, the taxying of the simulator to the hold, the loss of the Blue/B Hyd system in climb, the pack trip off at FL 280, the CiC calling to tell me that a passenger has a heart attack and we need to land asap, the decent and approach to my home base followed by a reverser failing to deploy on landing? And all this in a very expensive machine designed to instruct and test, at great expense, my ability as a Captain/Co-pilot.
All of the above could be covered perfectly adequately on the line with a TRI/TRE/Trng Captain on board. LOFT should be done where it says it is, on the Line.
I would like to use the simulator to learn how to recover form the inevitable 'worst-case-scenario' which is just around the corner. High altitude recovery from the stall, handling in severe CAT, approach/landing config stalls, climb out stalls when clean and so on; these are the things that kill people, not Hydraulic system failures.
And can someone please tell me just how often a modern engine has failed at V1? We slavishly practice just this one 'w-c-s' to the exclusion of so many other killers; why?
Time for a radical rethink in the Training Depts I feel.
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at least United Airlines crews see "advanced maneuvers" training every 18 months. This puts the simulator in an unusual attitude and then the crew has to recover back to stable flight.
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Hmmm, the so-called 'upset training' was tried by the 'new guard' in the training department at American Airlines.
The result?
The First Officer, on AA587, followed such 'training', and promptly bicycle peddled the rudder...until the vertical fin departed.
Such fools do not belong at the pointy end of a jet transport airplane, and as for the training department at AA (advanced maneuvering program)...should be expunged therefrom, forthwith.
They are fools, personified.
The result?
The First Officer, on AA587, followed such 'training', and promptly bicycle peddled the rudder...until the vertical fin departed.
Such fools do not belong at the pointy end of a jet transport airplane, and as for the training department at AA (advanced maneuvering program)...should be expunged therefrom, forthwith.
They are fools, personified.
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I understand that JAA approved courses no longer include aerobatics and full spin recovery. Once again the authorities have placed the airlines' wish to reduce the cost of training ahead of the safety/skills required.
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CAMEL,
QF do it as part of the endorsement sims and I believe as part of the recurrent training program, but I can't say exactly how often.
Of interest the cadet program they run includes 20 hrs of basic aerobatics, and besides being good fun is supposedly designed to give a basic level of upset recovery training.
My personal opinion is all pilots should be exposed at some level to this kind of "basic aeros" course. If nothing else it gives a good understanding that the aircraft does work in strange attitudes, and hopefully means that you are somewhat less "surprised" if it ever happens, and have at least a fighting chance of getting yourself upright again, having previously experienced the sensations of unusual attitude flight.
Its a shame they've even removed spinning from the requirements of a PPL.
QF do it as part of the endorsement sims and I believe as part of the recurrent training program, but I can't say exactly how often.
Of interest the cadet program they run includes 20 hrs of basic aerobatics, and besides being good fun is supposedly designed to give a basic level of upset recovery training.
My personal opinion is all pilots should be exposed at some level to this kind of "basic aeros" course. If nothing else it gives a good understanding that the aircraft does work in strange attitudes, and hopefully means that you are somewhat less "surprised" if it ever happens, and have at least a fighting chance of getting yourself upright again, having previously experienced the sensations of unusual attitude flight.
Its a shame they've even removed spinning from the requirements of a PPL.
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Hmmm, the so-called 'upset training' was tried by the 'new guard' in the training department at American Airlines.
The result?
The First Officer, on AA587, followed such 'training', and promptly bicycle peddled the rudder...until the vertical fin departed
The result?
The First Officer, on AA587, followed such 'training', and promptly bicycle peddled the rudder...until the vertical fin departed
The subject of unusual attitude training in the simulator has been discussed many times on Pprune and there are always for and against among readers and responders. Some may recall the Boeing test pilot that demonstrated a aileron roll or barrel roll, in the first 707. There is anecdotal evidence that test pilots and others have rolled an HS 748. Presumably both types displayed normal roll characteristics. What's more, I wouldn't be surprised if the Boeing test pilot had done a few barrel rolls earlier in the 707 simulator and had enough technical knowledge to know that the real 707 would be reasonably close to the simulator characteristics -or is it vice verca?
Where aircraft have gone in after entering an unusual attitude (Adam Air B737 Indonesia, for example), the apparent lack of proper upset training meant the pilot probably applied incorrect recovery procedure and the aircraft broke up in the ensuing spiral dive (it's FDR indicated this, I believe). In fact, it would be a fair bet to assume that many accidents involving IMC unusual attitude situations, may not have occured if the pilot had been trained how to recover on instruments.
Forget for the purpose of this discussion that control forces cannot be replicated in the simulator throughout extreme manoeuvres - although an emergency descent is obviously within acceptable simulator fidelity tolerances and that is the nearest to an unusual attitude most pilots get to in a simulator. But, faulty interpretation of flight instrument indications have been major factors in fatal accidents involving jet upset/unusual attitude situations. If not, the crews presumably would have always recovered safely.
Most ADI's in today's low cost synthetic trainers, offer full 360 degrees of roll and a pilot can practice unusual attitude recoveries on an el cheapo machine and be a safer pilot for it. Pull through from inverted and any aeroplane will lose considerable altitude in an attempted recovery. A pilot never having been taught to recover from that manoeuvre - or any other extreme attitude - would surely crash if faced with the real event - particularly in IMC.
So, whether you practice recovery on instruments in a 737 flight simulator or an Elite synthetic trainer; or even under the hood in a Cessna 150, the instrument indications would most probably be the same. Better a little knowledge of unusual attitude recovery technique than none at all. And certainly a lot better than reading all about it in a text book, and expecting that to get you out of trouble if you are upside down in the real thing..
Last edited by Tee Emm; 3rd Jul 2009 at 12:25.
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The Belgian Aviation School (BAS), Nowadays Sabena Flight Academy (SFA) had a Aerobatic course which had to be passed to get a Belgian CPL.
All too often, we see accidents where the crew is unable to recover correctly from an offset, induced by crew, weather or mechanical failure.
Stick-and-Rudder competency is still the best insurance of avoiding an accident.
All too often, we see accidents where the crew is unable to recover correctly from an offset, induced by crew, weather or mechanical failure.
Stick-and-Rudder competency is still the best insurance of avoiding an accident.
Thread Starter
Back to the original question
Firstly thanks to all who have contributed, much of what has been said is not unexpected based on my personal contact with flight crew, but if I can redirect a little...
Is it fair to say that the new standard (ICAO 9625 rev 3 link per original post) does not address unusual attitude recovery and similar, and as such "we" (meaning anyone who contributed to the creation of that document - myself included, but admittedly only for a small slice constrained by my expertise) missed an opportunity to move this issue forward.
Personally it seems logical that any training in this area is better than no training, but one mantra that is relevant is the need to avoid negative training. What I suspect is the case here is over-protectionism at work - in other words, since we cannot get real aircraft data to base our modeling on (since that is inherently dangerous) then we can't train it, and/or don't want to, and by the way there are very few living pilots to verify what the simulator might do anyway. This of course is ignoring the fact that we CAN develop VERY REALISTIC engineering models for aircraft in all flight attitudes/conditions (remember computing power and indeed engineers to program them are relatively cheap).
May flight simulators are developed for aircraft that have not flown one NM - there were A380 FFS long before the first aircraft flew, and the same is true for the 787 currently. True enough that those sims are updated with revised aero packages once the aircraft are in the air, but having seen this from the inside, these updates are very minor - the original engineering models are very, very good.
So I would venture it is possible to get representative data to use as the modeling basis.
It is unavoidable that the motion system cannot replicate the full experience; at best it provides cues as to what happens, but again, given we can't have you hanging off the straps, wouldn't it be better to have some idea of what will/might happen in an upset situation, versus none?
I'd venture as a frequent flyer, I'd prefer the folks at the pointy end to have some training, since not having any at all seems rather like rolling dice... and just recently I experienced a roller-coaster ride in the pan-handle region of Northern Florida, that had me hoping the flight deck crew were ex-military, since having worked with many such folk, I am pretty confident they would have likely the right experience AND training to handle what we flew through. Not that many/most of the non-military flight deck crews couldn't have handled themselves just fine, but I KNOW this is not part of the normal training syllabus, and that was pretty much front and center in my mind as we bounced our way to a (fortunately) very safe landing. And please understand I absolutely want to be clear this paragraph is not intended to denigrate the flying skills of the very many non ex-military crews - it is the training basis for those skills I am focused on here.
- GY
Is it fair to say that the new standard (ICAO 9625 rev 3 link per original post) does not address unusual attitude recovery and similar, and as such "we" (meaning anyone who contributed to the creation of that document - myself included, but admittedly only for a small slice constrained by my expertise) missed an opportunity to move this issue forward.
Personally it seems logical that any training in this area is better than no training, but one mantra that is relevant is the need to avoid negative training. What I suspect is the case here is over-protectionism at work - in other words, since we cannot get real aircraft data to base our modeling on (since that is inherently dangerous) then we can't train it, and/or don't want to, and by the way there are very few living pilots to verify what the simulator might do anyway. This of course is ignoring the fact that we CAN develop VERY REALISTIC engineering models for aircraft in all flight attitudes/conditions (remember computing power and indeed engineers to program them are relatively cheap).
May flight simulators are developed for aircraft that have not flown one NM - there were A380 FFS long before the first aircraft flew, and the same is true for the 787 currently. True enough that those sims are updated with revised aero packages once the aircraft are in the air, but having seen this from the inside, these updates are very minor - the original engineering models are very, very good.
So I would venture it is possible to get representative data to use as the modeling basis.
It is unavoidable that the motion system cannot replicate the full experience; at best it provides cues as to what happens, but again, given we can't have you hanging off the straps, wouldn't it be better to have some idea of what will/might happen in an upset situation, versus none?
I'd venture as a frequent flyer, I'd prefer the folks at the pointy end to have some training, since not having any at all seems rather like rolling dice... and just recently I experienced a roller-coaster ride in the pan-handle region of Northern Florida, that had me hoping the flight deck crew were ex-military, since having worked with many such folk, I am pretty confident they would have likely the right experience AND training to handle what we flew through. Not that many/most of the non-military flight deck crews couldn't have handled themselves just fine, but I KNOW this is not part of the normal training syllabus, and that was pretty much front and center in my mind as we bounced our way to a (fortunately) very safe landing. And please understand I absolutely want to be clear this paragraph is not intended to denigrate the flying skills of the very many non ex-military crews - it is the training basis for those skills I am focused on here.
- GY
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The ICAO document doesn't replace existing NAA documents such as FAA Part 60 or EASA JAR-FSTD. I'm sure the goal of harmonised simulator design standards is a fine one, but the industry has come close to this before but diverged again. It also throws a few curve balls into the process.
Confusingly it introduces a new set of device types without clearly identifying what they are (Types I-VII). From what I can see Type VII is a full flight simulator, so the document ignores the existence of Levels A thru D devices. It also sets some criteria which are in excess of existing (for example minimum lateral visual FOV is put at 200 degrees when many operators are struggling to meet the existing 180 degree standard set out in JAR-FSTD). That is 50 degrees more than most existing simulators. How much training in simulators requires such a FOV anyway?
So the simulator world isn't going to change overnight.
As has been stated above, unusual attitude and jet upset training requires data which doesn't exist at present. Incomplete data could well result in negative training. Even stall behaviour is not adequately presented in current airliner aero models, nor does it have to be.
UA and jet upset scenarios have been programmed into simulators for decades, but risk negative training due to lack of data and the unrealistic way such upsets must be introduced. An early set of UA scenarios I recall simply put the simulator in a particular condition, frozen, then required the crew to recover when freeze was released. Some ramp in the attitude and the crew are requested to be hands off during this process. You can subtly induce a UA by failing attitude indications, but if the failure is identified the UA is never reached and so no recovery is taught.
Tee Emm
411A is correct. The NTSB report on this accident certainly mentions the AA unusual attitude training as a possible contributor. It wasn't an unusual attitude of course, but it appears that the F/O may have learned to use the rudder to pick up the wing at high AOA and applied this technique to regaining wings level in the wake turbulence, when a wheel input would have been more appropriate.
Confusingly it introduces a new set of device types without clearly identifying what they are (Types I-VII). From what I can see Type VII is a full flight simulator, so the document ignores the existence of Levels A thru D devices. It also sets some criteria which are in excess of existing (for example minimum lateral visual FOV is put at 200 degrees when many operators are struggling to meet the existing 180 degree standard set out in JAR-FSTD). That is 50 degrees more than most existing simulators. How much training in simulators requires such a FOV anyway?
So the simulator world isn't going to change overnight.
As has been stated above, unusual attitude and jet upset training requires data which doesn't exist at present. Incomplete data could well result in negative training. Even stall behaviour is not adequately presented in current airliner aero models, nor does it have to be.
UA and jet upset scenarios have been programmed into simulators for decades, but risk negative training due to lack of data and the unrealistic way such upsets must be introduced. An early set of UA scenarios I recall simply put the simulator in a particular condition, frozen, then required the crew to recover when freeze was released. Some ramp in the attitude and the crew are requested to be hands off during this process. You can subtly induce a UA by failing attitude indications, but if the failure is identified the UA is never reached and so no recovery is taught.
Tee Emm
From what I read the aircraft was not in an unusual attitude. It simply hit wake turbulence and it is drawing a long bow to claim that American Airlines actually taught the pilot concerned to apply full rudder to and fro.
N4790P
It also sets some criteria which are in excess of existing (for example minimum lateral visual FOV is put at 200 degrees when many operators are struggling to meet the existing 180 degree standard set out in JAR-FSTD). That is 50 degrees more than most existing simulators. How much training in simulators requires such a FOV anyway?