AF447 [Archive] - PPRuNe Forums

pattern_is_full

4th Jun 2009, 19:41

Fine! I'll start with some thoughful advice:

Just a reminder that this was a real aircraft carrying real people which really crashed in a real ocean due to some real cause - while flying in the vicinity of real weather. Winning points of logic or quoting more unnamed sources than the other guy does not - in the long run - count for anything in the face of the tragic reality. We aren't a Talmudic debating society, there is no jury to persuade, and a "convincing" argument will still carry no water if, in the end, it does not match up with the real event. Which, we hope, will eventually become clear(er).

"No Captain is going to go through thunderstorms to stay...". = "No Captain is going to let his airliner stall while talking to other cockpit personnel while the speed decays" (Schipol, Buffalo) = "No Captain is going to land downwind on a short, high-altitude, rainslick runway" (Toncontin) = "No Captain is going to take off on an unlighted runway less than 1/2 the required length for his aircraft." (Lexington). Never say never....

At this point, almost anything is "possible", far fewer things are "probable" consistent with the limited evidence, and only one is "correct".

BTW, as a sometime reporter (yes, I confess) I find most of the press accounts quoted so far dismally below standard. We'd never quote someone else's "unnamed" source because there is no direct way to determine that source's credibility. We'd rarely even quote another publication's report, because we'd have no idea how competent - or lazy - that publication's reporters were.

RiverCity

4th Jun 2009, 20:21

>>>one more to close raise ur hand<<<

[journo raises hand.]

I want facts. I read nearly all the speculation on the original post. Now we wait. Some people contributed wise information, but it's time to go for coffee and check AF every so often for solid info.

PJ2

4th Jun 2009, 20:32

While I never subscribed to the notion that some threads in PPRuNe should be limited to "experts", I think it is time to require some kind of qualifying standards just like Bluecoat, AVSIG. The reputation of PPRuNe is on the line here and something has to be done to retain the level of expertise and intelligent, thoughtful discourse.

The focus should be on learning and enquiry as opposed to the diarhea that followed the re-opening of the thread. I think it is time to find some way to qualify participants for certain threads. Not most, but some - qualifying is a least another layer of entry which may assist in raising the level of the dialogue.

In a world that has flattened all experience, training and "time in" and which permits an unbridled, automatic disrespect of the thoughts, opinions and offerings of those who do this work including those who fly transport aircraft safely thousands of times every day without result, thanks to all the other unsung professionals, it is time to take back what Sully and others have shown to those who have no clue that they have no clue, what aviation itself has lost.

The internet experience and presence of "instant experts" have done a lot of serious damage, not to aviation but to society. They have neutered and otherwise destroyed through anonymity, the ability to feel, think and sense as a human being. In this, "pattern_is_full" is absolutely correct but then goes on to break his/her own rule. There were people, families, "our" families, on every accident we choose to discuss here and because we are anonymous and because we have been digitally separated from our humanity, we can proceed as if we are discussing an ordinary, everyday occurence. We are not.

We are not discussing dinner or when to pick up the kids from school, but it is absolutely plain from the nature of most contributions that many simply never read these threads beyond the page they're on and instead shove an oar in without the slightest bit of thought or feeling. In a thread and a forum which is serious about aviation and it's issues, that kind of discourse is simply unacceptable and at times, shameful. It is certainly not what I joined PPRuNe for.

From day one, the AF thread was and is, deeply embarrassing for those who are experienced professionals in aviation, engineering and human factors. It is time to come up with a fix that helps us retain the great value that has been PPRuNe.

PJ2

PPRuNe Pop

4th Jun 2009, 20:56

I think I agree but, it has to be said, a new thread will appear after each exorcism 'cos that's the nature of the beast.

PJ2 is a much respected trainer and is fed upness is understandable but even that doesn't change the basic reason of PPRuNe.

zekettledrum

4th Jun 2009, 20:59

By the way, French Air Force has just reported that most of the debris found by SAR didn't belong to AF 447. Fuel patch most probably comes from some ship dumping tank residue. Doesn't help.

Do you have a source for this at all? Who did they report this to?

Tim Hamilton

4th Jun 2009, 21:05

Has everyone now discounted the Meteorite theory now ?

Clearly you are aware how much work these threads are causing for the mods yet you still chose to create a new persona and post this idiotic comment. Take a forum ban for a week, perhaps the temptation of this thread will have dissipated by the time you come back.

Duck

Danny

4th Jun 2009, 21:09

No one has discounted a meteorite theory... or a bomb... or a fire... or aliens for that matter! What we will be discussing is known facts based on reliable sources and educated theorising. :ugh:

ZuluKilo66

4th Jun 2009, 21:21

PJ2, as a one-time PPL but full-time scholar of public discourse, I absolutely understand the frustration of informed professionals like you, but no amount of 'cleansing' is going to stop this. From my experience across many media, and from my observations of PPruNe, you can't legislate for quality. Instead, IMHO, what works is the public availability of information sources that do not have a vested interest, such that competing views get fed into forums like this.

Compare this thread with the Buffalo Q400 thread, or the Hudson ditching. What characterises those threads is not that the people commenting were any less fallibly human, but that many of those fallible fellow-creatures who did leap in had instantaneous access to high quality, publicly-available tracking, ATC and other data direct from the sources. While even the Buffalo thread, nonetheless, descended at times into ill-informed nonsense about tail-stalls etc, the base level quality information was there.

Now look at things like the EK tailstrike incident at MEL. No publicly available data sources -- the only source was EK themselves and the Australian authorities, plus some quick-thinking MEL groundcrew -- and the quality there is likewise poor. The same is panning out in the AF447 case - little publicly available alternative sources of data with the notable exception of some fantastic meteo analysis. It is not surprising that the quality discussion is on the meteo facts, on which there is good, alternative-source data; the crap is based on information drip fed without alternatives by AF and the Brazilian military.

Given all that, we should either be lobbying for flight data to be publicly available worldwide; or we should give up and have some sort of professional pilots only forum. How you would get that is something I can't tell you; whether that would be a good thing, given the excellent meteo, engineering and retired pilot contributions made every day, is another matter entirely.

The short-term lesson -- if you're going to have a good quality discussion forum, pray no-one in the media finds it. Once they do, you not only attract them, you attract all the goons have made the AF447 discussion the mess it is today.

Grunf

4th Jun 2009, 21:26

I assume the probability of all these "theories" is the same as the case of 3 (three) ADIRUs failing, close to 10exp-9 (for those of you better versed in the terminology). For others - 10exp-9 is close to 0. In general, reliability and maintainability analysis usually treats this as a non-existent case, only theoretically possible.

In addition, for all the speculations regarding structural capability of A330-200, documentation on certification of that article is widely available. Simply said this airplane was tested (and proven airworthy) as per relevant transport aircraft category requirements (Part 25). Everything outside of the tested envelope is purely theoretical and can be covered with additional documentation from delegated authority (EASA in this case).

Everything else is unfounded speculation.

Just 2p from the structural/certification side.

Cheers

Tail Chase

4th Jun 2009, 21:28

At roughly 1300LT the first Brazilian Navy vessel to arrive at one of the debris fields (patrol ship NPa Grajau) began collecting items found floating in the water. Regrettably, none of the items could positively be identified as coming from AF447.

Among other items retrieved were a 1.2m x 1.2m wooden bed for pallets and two buoys - and none of these carried any sort of inscription, stencilled data or a mfg. plate indicating its origin.

Unfortunately, the Brazilian Navy press release does not clearly indicate which of the three debris fields was being surveyed by the NPa Grajau.

Cheers

steamchicken

4th Jun 2009, 21:29

I think Danny was right about the first thread. I think that's the first time I've said he was right about anything.

For the record, (http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2009/06/04/l-airbus-d-air-france-volait-a-une-vitesse-erronee_1202293_3224.html#ens_id=1200707&xtor=RSS-3208) the "speed" story in Le Monde says ONLY that Airbus and BEA are going to issue a bulletin today (4th June) that Airbus crew should maintain thrust - conserver la poussée des réacteurs - during difficult weather conditions - en cas de conditions météorologiques difficiles.

That's the first paragraph. Everything else in the story is Brazilian newspapers quoting each other reporting the same bloody ACARS sequence everyone reported days ago. They also say that Alternate Law is an emergency power supply. :suspect: Further, they say that the various Brazilian papers involved have really good sources in AF.

Well, I'd be stunned if anyone had better sources in AF or indeed in any other big French seminationalised industry than Le Monde, which is after all a Gaullist postwar national project itself, and like most of them does a damn good job.

22 Degree Halo

4th Jun 2009, 21:50

I find post #2 by huskerdu very interesting indeed.

In other words, the oil spill has nothing to do with AF-447 :confused:

daikilo

4th Jun 2009, 21:54

Has Airbus Industrie issued anything yet, and if so, is it in line with what Le Monde etc. is claimed to have published? If the theory is a reasonable explanation, I guess pilots understand what it implies, and it is exactly the sort of post-analysis theorising that Danny wants.

Gerard13

4th Jun 2009, 22:11

From a first-time (and probably last-time) poster:
While I earned an Aeronautical Engineering in France in the early 70's and saw lots of friends go work in the industry (Airbus, Boeing and all their subcontractors), I chose a different professional path (IT) and therefore would NOT dare to contribute any opinions or comments to this forum, as I have no working experience on most of the topics.
However, I have kept a fond interest in anything related to aviation, and while I have not kept up with all the technological progress of aviation, I have enough educational background on it to understand and learn, and I enjoy immensely the information, debates and arguments presented by the true professionals, even the barbs thrown at the French, the friendly rivalry between US and Europe, etc.
My plea is to not close the forum to non-professionals, but if you need to establish some type of credentials to allow posting and eliminate all the nonsense, to let the "rest of us" read the posts only, rather than exclude us altogether.
Thank you,
Gérard :ok:

HeathrowAirport

4th Jun 2009, 22:22

Has everyone now discounted the Meteorite theory now ?The best way to find out, is email nasa @ NASA - Contact NASA (http://www.nasa.gov/about/contact/index.html) as they near enougth keep track of anything bigger than a golf ball, so surely if somebody types them an email and asks if they tracked anything orbiting in the direction at LEO for a Re-Entry that would reach earths surface near enougth were AFR447 was, there might be a chance to prove that theory.

As I say NASA keep track of anything like this, with radars to help keep the ISS on its LEO out of the way, becuase at 25,000mph a golf ball could destroy the whole thing.

Just to add, something such as debris from the recent Sattelites de-orbitting, there trajectories place them in either the atlantic or pacific from there LEO to Re-entry to final phase.

What-ho Squiffy!

4th Jun 2009, 22:25

Grunf, I think you are referring to the design criteria of a failure per 10^9 operational hours. You also mention probability. The probability of all three ADIRU's failing at once is more like 10^9*10^9*10^9!

zekettledrum

4th Jun 2009, 22:27

Brings to mind a report I read last year of trash collecting in ocean current eddies. Perhaps that's what these debris spots are turning out to be.

That was probably about "Garbage Island" which is located in the Pacific. There have been a lot of articles on that recently as well as a few documentaries. If a plane went down there they would have a lot of trouble figuring out what is from the accident and what is just garbage floating out there.

Just a quick search shows that there are a few similar "oceanic gyres" in the Atlantic, though as yet there do not seem to be reports of garbage islands forming there - Oceanic Gyres (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oceanic_gyre) - of course that does not mean they are not there.

Litebulbs

4th Jun 2009, 22:29

Accident Information Telex - Accident Information Telex

Subject: A330-200 AF447 accident

Airbus regrets to inform that an A330-200 aircraft operated by Air France has been involved lost over the Atlantic during flight AF447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, CDG on June 1st 2009.

The missing aircraft, registration number F-GZCP bearing MSN 660 was delivered to Air France in April 2005 and had logged over 18800 flight hours and 2500 flight cycles. It was powered by General Electric CF6-80E1 engines.

Preliminary report indicates that communication with the aircraft was lost over the Atlantic after approximately 3.5 hours since departure.
Further information is not available at this time. In particular the exact location of the aircraft has still to be identified.

According to available information, there were 216 passengers and 12 crew members on board.

In line with international ICAO Annex 13 convention, Airbus has offered full technical assistance to the investigation board which should be the French BEA (Bureau Enquêtes et Analyses) as the aircraft is registered in France and has been presumably lost over international waters.

The concerns and sympathy of Airbus go to the families, friends and loved ones affected by the accident.

Further update will be provided as soon as reliable information is available and Airbus is authorised to release them.

----------------------------------------------

ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX

SUBJECT: AF447 ACCIDENT INTO THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

This AIT is an update of the previous AIT n°1 concerning the AF447 accident into the Atlantic ocean on June 1st, 2009.

In line with the ICAO Annex 13 recommendations, the French investigation Board - BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses) is leading the technical investigation, with accredited representatives from the Brazilian Investigation Board and US NTSB, with Airbus providing technical support.

The following data have been approved for release by the French BEA.

The route of the aircraft was crossing a tropical multicell convective area at the time of the accident.

Failure/ maintenance messages have been transmitted automatically from the aircraft to the airline maintenance center.

The above mentionned messages indicate that there was inconsistency between the different measured airspeeds. Therefore and without prejudging the final outcome of the investigation, the data available leads Airbus to remind operators what are the applicable operational recommendations in case of unreliable airspeed indication.

The following operational procedures are available for the Airbus

Aircraft Type :

-A300: QRH 13.01 thru 13.03, FCOM 8.05.10;
-A310: QRH 13.01 thru 13.03, FCOM 2.05.80;
-A300-600: QRH 13.01 thru 13.03, FCOM 2.05.80;
-A318/A318/A320/A321 family: QRH 2.15 thru 2.18A, FCOM 3.02.34;
-A330/A340 Family: QRH 2.21 thru 2.23B , FCOM 3.02.34;
-A380: ECAM not-sensed procedures, FCOM - Procedures / ECAM

Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / 34 Navigation.

An update on the accident data will be provided as soon as further valuable information is approved for release by the Investigation Board.
-A300: QRH 13.01 thru 13.03, FCOM 8.05.10;
-A310: QRH 13.01 thru 13.03, FCOM 2.05.80;
-A300-600: QRH 13.01 thru 13.03, FCOM 2.05.80;
-A318/A318/A320/A321 family: QRH 2.15 thru 2.18A, FCOM 3.02.34;
-A330/A340 Family: QRH 2.21 thru 2.23B , FCOM 3.02.34;
-A380: ECAM not-sensed procedures, FCOM - Procedures / ECAM

Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / 34 Navigation.

An update on the accident data will be provided as soon as further valuable information is approved for release by the Investigation Board.

PJ2

4th Jun 2009, 22:29

ZuluKilo66;

A thoughtful and welcome post, thanks.

I don't advocate exclusion, nor do I think that "cleansing" is the right thing. The most important aspect of discourse of any kind is a willing suspension of judgement and ego in favour of thought-full curiosity. Implied in that stance is a wholesome respect for those that know more than one, (I very much include myself in the latter category because I have learned a great deal from others about my own profession - I even include non-specialists who ask intelligent, seeking questions without pronouncing from afar).

I realize the job of creating another layer of qualification is a headache and another layer of rules. It can be done and has been but the sad thing is, a lot of very good learning is lost to those who may benefit the most when a thread is locked away from them. How does one judge while keeping the prole-factor down?

The key here, and it cannot be controlled (nor should it) but it can be engendered in an air of expectant reserve, is a modicum of self-discipline and plain old manners; - but we live in an age when such personal, human qualities are not only eschewed but intentionally trampled upon because, it is perceived, that "in-yer-face" trumps courtesy in a badly mistaken notion that "loud and rude is right". Take a look at the model that all television and not just public atrocities like Fox, offer as examples of attention-getting, argument-for-the-sake-of-it. Geraldo is calm by today's standards, but we see such qualities right here and I think it is unacceptable behaviour, (that someone would even express this is, in itself, a foreign and even "controlling" notion to many).

The agenda, as I perceive it, is a serious discussion for aviation people of all backgrounds and for those with a serious interest which they nurture and not just shove out into the public sphere for the sake of filling silence. Such a discussion should welcome disagreement but not ego.

Such a change would go a long way to re-civilizing the public discourse, (fascinating topic in it's own right).

Gerard13;
My plea is to not close the forum to non-professionals, but if you need to establish some type of credentials to allow posting and eliminate all the nonsense, to let the "rest of us" read the posts only, rather than exclude us altogether.
I have no say but that would be exactly my plea as well - perhaps even looser than that to keep the administration reasonable. For me there are no "the rest of us"; it's a subtle difference, a shift rather than a rule, that I would advocate.

Danny

4th Jun 2009, 22:50

I'll post this one more time only...

This thread is about the AF447 crash. If you want to debate the pro's and con's of closed forums/threads or limiting them to whoever, then there are plenty of threads on this website where those debates have taken place. Use the search function.

The points have been made and now, any more posts that are not about the thread subject or are outside the guidelines I specified in the old thread then you are wasting your time posting on here.

The rest of the mods and I need a break from continual monitoring of this thread. There may be periods when there is no one monitoring it and hence some posts will be made that deserve to be deleted but won't be until a mod gets a chance to review it. Either report the post using the 'report a post' link (bottom left corner of every post) or else ignore it and it will be dealt with eventually. If you post a response about a post you think shouldn't be here we only have to go and delete that too and it makes extra work for us. So, if you find you've been banned from posting on a thread, you'll have some idea why.

Diver-BR

4th Jun 2009, 22:52

Quote:
By the way, French Air Force has just reported that most of the debris found by SAR didn't belong to AF 447. Fuel patch most probably comes from some ship dumping tank residue. Doesn't help.
Do you have a source for this at all? Who did they report this to?

A high-ranked FAB official just confirmed on TV that those debris did not belong to AF 447, including the fuel patch. And the pallets used by that flight where made of aluminum, not wood.

Lemurian

4th Jun 2009, 23:00

I didn't want to participate in the rather ghoulish and idiotic mass of speculations by an awful number of self-appointed armchair accident investigation experts but as Danny changed the rules, here is some interesting factual information given by the French France2 channel.

Somehow, they managed to get the ACARS summary print-outs and had someone very briefly comment on them.

Here is how to get it :
france2.fr
then click on the "INFO" tab
then on the very small "JT" tab underneath (meaning journal televise)
then chose the 20 H - that's the eight o'clock news.
The two pages are quite clearly readable on time frames 5.50 and 6.45.and you don't need to understand French !
But they don't seem to have the complete list of faults.
What these messages show, however, is that events happened quickly, so people who know the 330 can now have a better picture of the events preceding the disappearance of flight 447.

Litebulbs

4th Jun 2009, 23:03

" there was inconsistency between the different measured airspeeds. Therefore and without prejudging the final outcome of the investigation, the data available leads Airbus to remind operators what are the applicable operational recommendations in case of unreliable airspeed indication. "

Discuss

CaptLoko

4th Jun 2009, 23:08

Dear all !
Just to understand I think quite reasonable that they experienced a "Doble flame out" during the severe turbulence. Since they were flying on FL 330/350 they were unable to start the APU ( Elec Emergency ) and must fly with Stand-by instruments without Radar. Is this correct ? If so it sounds quite mandatory do Descent in order to start the APU. At night, with stand-by instruments and without Radar and flying inside the CB it seems a reasonable explanation of what happened. It makes sense ?
Thanks

Danny

4th Jun 2009, 23:20

Brief screengrab from above mentioned article. Sorry about quality but I'm sure someone with better skils will post it all eventually:

http://www.freeimagehosting.net/uploads/19d08b3cb8.gif (http://www.freeimagehosting.net/)

http://www.freeimagehosting.net/uploads/67a469dac1.gif (http://www.freeimagehosting.net/)

http://www.freeimagehosting.net/uploads/acdb559ad4.gif (http://www.freeimagehosting.net/)

http://www.freeimagehosting.net/uploads/e2635fe88c.gif (http://www.freeimagehosting.net/)

http://www.freeimagehosting.net/uploads/8569ff6b66.gif (http://www.freeimagehosting.net/)

mm43

4th Jun 2009, 23:25

AF447 reported INTOL at 0133z, next TASIL ETA 0223z, FL350 GS 543KT.

If the above is accepted as matter of record, then the ACARS 0214z position at 3 34 40N 30 33 28W placed the a/c on track at 331nm past INTOL at an average speed made good of 484KT. The much mentioned ACARS crew report at 0200z indicating heavy turbulence was 27min past INTOL, and assuming that 540KT had been maintained to this point, then over the next 14 minutes the average GS was 385KT.

Without speculation as to what may or may not have happened after 0214, the a/c was at that point most likely still heading 028T (046M) and should structural damage have resulted in the break-up of the a/c, debris would normally be found in an arc +/- 30 degrees of the final heading and at point from the last known position based on the expected trajectory of individual items (if more than one).

No one seems to have asked why the original debris reports were in positions that didn't follow any of the basic rules mentioned above.

It would seem that for those reported debris position(s) to be correct, the a/c would need to have made a right 180 degree turn - something I doubt would have happened in the circumstances. A 5 - 15 degree bank would seem not to be a controllable option in what may have been CB cell shear.

mm43

Re-Heat

4th Jun 2009, 23:35

On marine debris, and the difficulty in finding debris related to AF447 - to gauge the task facing those trying to find the aircraft, the following link may be of interest:

Great Pacific Garbage Patch - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Pacific_Garbage_Patch)

The location of the 0214 message, as compared to the closest "island" - the rocks of St Peter & St Paul, 322km away - from: 3 34 40N 30 33 28W to: St Peter and St Paul Rocks - Google Maps (http://maps.google.com/maps?f=d&source=s_d&saddr=3+34+40N+30+33+28W&daddr=St+Peter+and+St+Paul+Rocks&hl=en&geocode=&mra=ls&doflg=ptk&sll=0.307616,-27.597656&sspn=20.067208,43.330078&ie=UTF8&ll=3.162456,-26.71875&spn=39.476306,86.660156&t=h&z=4)

A slightly higher-quality screen-grab (click):

http://www.freeimagehosting.net/uploads/th.d46500191c.png (http://www.freeimagehosting.net/image.php?d46500191c.png)

Curious to hear from an Airbus engineer (ie without speculation) what they all mean.

(I have to say that this thread is refreshing, having actually read the previous one from the Quest school of journalism.)

ST27

4th Jun 2009, 23:45

...the a/c was at that point most likely still heading 028T (046M) and should structural damage have resulted in the break-up of the a/c, debris would normally be found in an arc +/- 30 degrees of the final heading ... For what it's worth, I've been watching the ship tracker site, and there was a cluster of ships that lingered around the equator at 30W. That is where the news reports have said debris was found, and it is to the right and back of the flight path projected by your suggestion.

Ship locations (http://www.sailwx.info/shiptrack/shiplocations.phtml?lat=-0.1&lon=-29.4&radius=300)

If they have in fact found debris at that location, then the aircraft would have diverted from its projected course.

agusaleale

4th Jun 2009, 23:57

This is an opinion extracted from a captain of Iberia who flies A346 usually routing EZE-MAD.
pilotosdeiberia.com :: Ver tema - Pedida contacto radar Airbus 330 de Air France en Brasil (http://www.pilotosdeiberia.com/foro/viewtopic.php?t=7555&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=60)
The A330/340 hash two independent radar systems that share the plate of the antenna, so the failure of one does not imply a loss of another. The radome is partly protected by metal bands that are just to attract lightnings.

Moreover, in the latest versions of both A340 radar can operate simultaneously and independently, each sweeping a different portion of space in AUTO TILT.

Radar failure is unlikely. Also, if you have the misfortune of having a radar failure at night you turn back as close as possible and go back from where you came or by where you know for sure that there are no clouds, you can optionally launch fuel to climb and evade CB, but that does not guarantee you will not hit any of the great CB, or you can ask for help to other aircrafts and follow them visually or with the TCAS. Anything but get deeper into the unknown.

The plane may have entered the storm because they didn´t see it, and I think the radar worked well.

The options for this are two. Or both drivers had their eyes closed, something unlikely and almost suicidal to cross the ITCZ, or otherwise information of Wx did not appear on screen, which is more logical and normal to say, because it happened to me several times.

Lemurian

5th Jun 2009, 00:01

This is what I could gather :
at 0210Z : from bottom to top :
- AUTO FLT AP OFF
-F/CTL ALTN LAW
- FlAG ON Capt PFD
- FLAG ON F/O PFD
- AUTO FLT ATHR OFF
- NAV TCAS FAULT
- FLAG ON CAPT PFD
- FLAG ON F/O PFD
- F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT
- EFCS2...1..EFCS1...AFS
- EFCS1...X2..EFCS2X

at 0211Z :
- FLAG ON CAPT PFD
- FLAG ON F/O PFD

at 0212z:
- NAV ADR DISAGREE
- ISIS ....ISIS
- IR2...1,EFCS1X, IR1, IR3

at 0213Z :
- F/CTL PRIM1 FAULT
- F/CTL SEC1 FAULT
- AFS 1 FMGEC1

at 0214z:
- MAINTENANCE STATUS
- ADVISORY.../...
Is this a chain of events (meaning related ? ) ?
Is it indicative of a major electrical fault ? of crew manipulation ? a fire ? or a structural failure ?
If the order of the faults is accurate, is the A/P disconnect from the pilots or is it an indication of an extreme upset or one or several sensors ?
Your opinions, please.

vapilot2004

5th Jun 2009, 00:21

MAINTENANCE STATUS
MAINTENANCE STATUS
1,EFCS1,AFS,
X2,EFCSX,,,,,
FLAG ON CAPT PFD
FLAG ON F/O PFD
NAV ADR Disagree
1,,,,,,,ISIS (22F??
1,EFCS1X,IR1,IR3
CTL PRIM 1 Fault
CTL SEC 1 Fault

MAINTENANCE STATUS
1,,,,,,,FMGS????
ADVISORY

MAINTENANCE STATUS
VSC X2,,,,,,,LAV CONF
AUTO FLT AP OFF
AUTO FLT
CTL ALTN LAW
FLAG ON CAPT PFD
FLAG ON F/O PFD
AUTO FLT A/THR OFF
NAV TCAS FAULT
FLAG ON CAPT PFD
FLAG ON F/O PFD
CTL RDO TRV LIM FAULT

The last group appears to be page 2 of 3

Mad (Flt) Scientist

5th Jun 2009, 00:23

Is this a chain of events (meaning related ? ) ?
Is it indicative of a major electrical fault ? of crew manipulation ? a fire ? or a structural failure ?
If the order of the faults is accurate, is the A/P disconnect from the pilots or is it an indication of an extreme upset or one or several sensors ?
Your opinions, please.

I would say, yes, related faults. I'd also not put any great store by the precise sequencing within each 'group' - ACARS may be reporting them in its own order, not necessarily the order that they actually occurred in. (If two systems were to fail simultaneously, for example, ACARS still has to send one first.)

I wouldn't be surprised if a common cause for the 0210Z "group" was found to be an airspeed system malfunction. I believe that airspeed miscompares will drop the aircraft into Alt Law, kick the AT and AP off and would not be surprised if the rudder limiter posts a fault when it loses the airspeed data needed to schedule the limit with speed (I know of a case where that would happen on another type).
That only leaves the various 'FLAG' messages - and I'd imagine that faulty/failing air data sources would be flagged on the PFDs, so that could be the source too - and the TCAS message. I would not be at all surprised to find that an airdata error could trigger a TCAS fault of some kind.

Machaca

5th Jun 2009, 00:26

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AF447-ACARS_1.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AF447-ACARS_2.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AF447-ACARS_3.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AF447-ACARS_4.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AF447-ACARS_5.jpg

Lemurian

5th Jun 2009, 00:26

you have to start from the bottom of the page and the time flags are on the left of the messages with the dates and the zulu times .
The two bottom messages are from the previous flight.

Gary Brown

5th Jun 2009, 00:37

Diver BR wrote:

Quote:
Quote:
By the way, French Air Force has just reported that most of the debris found by SAR didn't belong to AF 447. Fuel patch most probably comes from some ship dumping tank residue. Doesn't help.
Do you have a source for this at all? Who did they report this to?
A high-ranked FAB official just confirmed on TV that those debris did not belong to AF 447, including the fuel patch. And the pallets used by that flight where made of aluminum, not wood.

Without links to sources, this is still confusing. Here:

DISPARITION DE L'AF 447 : Les avions français n'ont toujours rien découvert, actualité Défense ouverte : Le Point (http://tinyurl.com/q6lwqt)

a French airforce officer involved in the search is directly quoted as saying that *in the sector allocated to French SAR*, what little has been found does not come from any aircraft. He emphasises that the French and Brazilian forces, though co-ordinated, are searching different sectors.

Earlier today there were French and Brazilian newspaper reports (which, true to form, just referenced each other as sources....) that some aircraft wreckage had been recovered by Brazilian SAR from its sector, wreckage including a part of a baggage container:

AIRBUS A330 : Le Brésil annonce la récupération d'un morceau de soute, actualité Société : Le Point (http://tinyurl.com/rcnu4c)

So, is there a *link to a source* clarifying whether both French and Brazilian SAR now say they have have found nothing, or whether it's just the French who have found nothing, with the Brazilians having made a potential find of part of AF 447?

AGB
[just adding, as a French language note, that in an earlier post on the other AF 447 thread, I mis-translated French "assiette" as "attitude", whereas I'm now told that, for aviation, it means precisely "angle of pitch".]

SLFinAZ

5th Jun 2009, 01:03

Looking at the posted faults i'm curious...

I know (from 411 here) that the 330 has various safeguards built in to protect the airframe in normal law. Not fully understanding the complexities or variation when switched to alternate law I have 2 questions.

1) Can you tell if its abnormal alternate law (unusual attitude) or ALTLAW:PROT Lost (computer issues if my understanding is correct). From what I gather the flight control modifications are a bit different in each. It would also seem to indicate if an upset was the trigger for the AP disconnect or came later....

2) the last fault is the CTL RUD TRV LMT FAULT, is this an indicator that the control limit has faulted out or an indication of excessive rudder travel. I know that rudder use at high speeds is a very delicate undertaking and that the software normally dampens inputs. From what I read on the locked post under abnormal alt yaw is mechanical and controlled by direct law...is that correct?

dicksorchard

5th Jun 2009, 01:15

BBC NEWS | World | Americas | Debris 'not from Air France jet' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/8083474.stm)

Debris recovered from the Atlantic by Brazilian search teams does not come from a lost Air France jet, a Brazilian air force official has said.
Brig Ramon Borges Cardoso contradicted earlier reports that debris had been found, saying "no material from the plane has been recovered".
A wooden cargo pallet was taken from the sea, but the Airbus A330 had no wooden pallets on board.

The above has just been released by the Bbc .

Can i ask What would happen if the aircraft or black box's are not recovered or ever traced in relation to the investigation into this accident ?

I mean do the Air accident investigators still proceed with their investigation when they have no actual physical evidence ?

Could they actually issue a report ?

Im no expert but surely there are legal ramifications for things like familys getting death certificates etc

Lemurian

5th Jun 2009, 01:41

For the time being, we only have a few factual informations :
- The flight was at FL 350
- Just after 0200z, the captain informs base that he's experiencing some serious turbulence (we don't know the exact terms)
- A weather study confirms some active convection and flight 447 is in the middle of a "bad" zone.
- A summary of the maintenance messages has been released.

Now, these messages (and I stress that they're only the "title" of the actual message ) can be expanded as they could give us , if not the detailed fault, the faulty component, and for that we have to use the ATA list of chapters appearing on the left of the title :For instance, 2283....FLAG on CAPT PFD points toward a warning linked with ATA 22, i.e AUTO FLIGHT. and the ...213100206 ADVISORY message on top of the last picture provided by Machaca relates to ATA 21 Air Conditioning and pressurization, item 31 : Pressurization control... 00206 should be the exact value of the code.
That is very probably the origin of the CAB Vertical Speed that some papers have reported.

As you see, quite a lot of information could be derived from thse sheets.
Problem is, as a pilot I don't have access to the maintenance manuals and the complete ATA listings.
Furthermore, it could be interesting to go back to each item and plot its power source from the electrical chapter and see whether there is one Bus that could be identified...
With the sort of FCOM we have been provided, it's going to be rather long.

etesting2000

5th Jun 2009, 02:57

I'll provide my credentials to any moderator on request.

Does the ACARS line item ISIS at 0211 indicate a fault in the Integrated Standby Instrument System, or that it is what is remaining? I suspect the former, please confirm.

selfin

5th Jun 2009, 03:09

The following list is a reproduction of a document displayed originally on France2 television (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/376433-af447-90.html#post5002718) (Edition 20H (http://jt.france2.fr/20h/) du Jeudi 4 Juin 2009). It has been checked for accuracy against the original facsimile issued to France2 and is believed to be correct. While this document has not been officially released by Air France its authenticity is not disputed by the airline.

http://img229.imageshack.us/img229/715/acarsaf447.png

When this reproduction was originally posted to this forum (June 5th, 04:09 BST) it contained a number of typographical inaccuracies. The most significant error was in copying the ATA section code for the 0211Z "ISIS" report. The inaccuracy was brought to my attention during the late afternoon on 5th and a replacement posted at approximately 20:00. A further typographical inaccuracy existed in the 0213Z "FMGEC1" report where "FMGKC1" had been typed.

On June 18th a copy of the facsimile presented by France2 was made available. On further comparing the reproduction, the following corrections were made:

Page "29" changed to "14" on the second page.
"REG" changed to "MSG" in two places (header field)
"DEN" changed to "DBN" in the previous flight report line
"??OT ENT" changed to "SECT.ENT" in two places (header field)
A single digit, originally characterised by a question mark to denote uncertainty, was identified in the previous flight report as the number "8"
A forward slash was added above the words "Libelle succint" in two places
A zero was removed from the sequence code in the 0210Z "FLAG ON CAPT PFD" report.

See related posting (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/376433-af447-90.html#post5002718) addressing queries about the document's authenticity on June 17th.

jauh

5th Jun 2009, 03:09

Does the ACARS line item ISIS at 0211 indicate a fault in the Integrated Standby Instrument System, or that it is what is remaining? I suspect the former, please confirm.

Type=FLR (Fault Report)

GE90115BL2

5th Jun 2009, 03:14

I'm not an Airbus Pilot but.

The fault in the ISIS doesn't mean the whole display was inop? surely the attitude info would have been ok?
Might the fault mean that the IAS or ALT info on the ISIS was faulty?

If so then the crew should still have had attitude info at the very least. ( all be it on a small ****ty display )

PJ2

5th Jun 2009, 03:36

Lemurian, superb sleuthing work; Machaca, superb postings. I'll take a look in the AOM and other resources I have regarding these messages.

Some preliminary information on these messages:

I believe these are all ECAM warnings or cautions. Maintenance messages are termed "Category 3" and are not displayed to the crew but are sent to the airline maintenance group. All these messages would have been displayed on the lower ECAM.

The ATA System Chapter numbers are on the far left and also at the beginning of the text under the label "Libelle succint du message".

The following is a specific A330-200 MEL ATA Chapter list for referencing the systems from which these messages are generated. This is not the Master MEL but may be tailored to one or another airline. Some chapters are missing. However, no chapters referenced in the ACARS document under discussion are missing.

The first message for the flight is second from the bottom, (as Lemurian points out, the bottom two are from the previous flight, AF 444):

Example:
22 10/06 WRN WN0906010210 221002006AUTO FLT AP OFF 09-06-01 AF 447

This is an ECAM warning indicating that the autopilot is off. It is a red warning. It is standard that red warnings require immediate crew attention but the warning in and of itself does not indicate a serious problem.

Of immediate interest is the absence of any ATA Chapter 24, Electrical System messages.

For ATA 34 and ATA 27 items at 0210Z, "EFCS" is Electronic Flight Control System, and "AFS" is Auto Flight System. ATA "3411", as far as I can determine, is "AOA sensor" but I cannot determine what the numbers following "3411" mean - perhaps further details in the AF MEL, (since clarified below, thank you).

With reference to ATA 3410 "ADR Disagree" caution. The aircraft AOM states that:

...this caution is triggered by the PRIMs, when they only use 2 ADRs, and these 2 ADRs disagree. This may occur, when :
– One ADR has already been selected OFF by the pilot, or

– One ADR has been eliminated by the PRIM, without any caution, because it deviated from the others.

The procedure then is to check the airspeed on both PFDs, and on the standby airspeed indicator. If there is NO disagreement, there is an AOA discrepancy and if there is a discrepancy the ADR Check procedure is applied. The aircraft is in Alternate Law at this point.

Note: Following an ADR DISAGREE, detected by the PRIMs, ALTN law is latched. Resetting the PRIMs by using the pushbutton does not allow normal law recovery.

The ATA 34 message concerning the ISIS is followed by two zeros which generally means the fault is not specified, too general to specify or too numerous to specify. We cannot conclude anything from this information but the fact that there was a fault with the ISIS system. The same holds true with any ATA message where the fifth and sixth digits are zeros.

At times, the second to sixth digits do not match the documents I have referenced. Each airline may have it's own MEL sub-references, I don't know.

ATA 21 is the Air Conditioning Chapter. This last message is indicated as an ADVISORY level message, (appropriate text is pulsing bright/dim green on the lower ECAM. However, the "Typ" (type) of message is "WRN", (Warn). I have no means to interpret this. There is no indication of cabin pressure loss. That is all this message means - that there is no message.

There are no "Stall" warnings in the available messages.

WARNING:
While this information is more than has been available to date, it is not sufficient to surmise or conclude events. It is what it is and nothing more. Because this information was taken off a television news program and not the source documents themselves as provided by any authority, it may be incomplete, or partially or wholly incorrect.

ATA Chapters:

AIRCRAFT GENERAL
05 Time limits/Maintenance chks
06 Dimensions and areas
07 Lifting and shoring
08 Levelling and weighing
09 Towing and taxing
10 Parking and mooring, Storage and Return to Service
11 Placards and Markings
12 Servicing

AIRFRAME SYSTEMS
20 Std. practices-airframe
21 Air conditioning
22 Auto flight
23 Communications
24 Electrical power
25 Equip/furnishings
26 Fire protection
27 Flight controls
28 Fuel
29 Hydraulic power
30 Ice and rain protection
31 Indicating/Recording Systems
32 Landing gear
33 Lights
34 Navigation
35 Oxygen
36 Pneumatic
37 Vacuum
38 Water/waste
45 Onboard Maintenance Systems
46 Information Systems
49 Airbourne Auxiliary Power

STRUCTURE
51 Standard Practices and Structures
52 Doors
53 Fuselage
54 Nacelles/pylons
55 Stabilizers
56 Windows
57 Wings

POWER PLANT
70 Std. practices-engine
71 Power plant
72 Engine
73 Eng. fuel and control
74 Ignition
75 Air
76 Engine controls
77 Engine indicating
78 Exhaust
79 Oil
80 Starter

greenspinner

5th Jun 2009, 03:52

3411 is sub chapter ATA i.e. 34-11= SENSORS, POWER SUPPLY & SWITCHING
Beware that messages are not in chronologicaly display on this display.
The last one is in fact Advisory at 0214 ATA 2131 PRESSURE CTL & MONITORING, Identifier ATA 21 Air CONDITIONING.

jauh

5th Jun 2009, 04:05

ATA "3411", as far as I can determine, is "AOA sensor" but I cannot determine what the numbers following "3411" mean - perhaps further details in the AF MEL.

2131 Cabin Pressure Controller
3410 Environmental Conditions
3411 Pitot-Static System
3412 Outside Air Temp
3422 Directional Gyro & Ind.
3443 Doppler

(JASC Standard Codes)

Captain-Crunch

5th Jun 2009, 04:26

Machaca, great image work as always.

PJ2, I presume your source for ATA section codes is the pilot's MEL? If so, did you type that from the onboard MEL?

That's the POI approved version specific to a particular airline, is it not?; an abbreviation of the Airbus Master MEL. If so, it's a legal dispatch reference, and not a maintenance trouble shooting reference. Unless I am mistaken, it only addresses dispatch concerns, such as Air conditioning that your POI permitted you to defer, whereas, the full volume derived from the type certificate data sheets in France may be very different and the same numbered section may include both air conditioning and pressurization items (just as an example) even though the section is called "Air Conditioning" on both.

Your posts are extremely good, but your list starts at section 5, and omits sec 13-19, 33-44, 50, 58-70 etc if those sections exist.

To draw conclusions from your list seems wrong to me. We should be using the specific ATA section and item number from the actual maintenance volume. (As an A&P) this is what I was taught.

For example you said:
ATA 21 is the Air Conditioning Chapter. This last message is indicated as an ADVISORY level message, (appropriate text is pulsing bright/dim green on the lower ECAM. However, the "Typ" (type) of message is "WRN", (Warn). I have no means to interpret this. There is no indication of cabin pressure loss. That is all this message means - that there is no message.

I'm not convinced yet that "there is no message" as you said.

Cheers,

Crunch

PJ2

5th Jun 2009, 04:46

Captain-Crunch;
PJ2, I presume your source for ATA section codes is the pilot's MEL? If so, did you type that from the onboard MEL?

That's the POI approved version specific to a particular airline, is it not?; an abbreviation of the Airbus Master MEL. If so, it's a legal dispatch reference, and not a maintenance trouble shooting reference. Unless I am mistaken, it only addresses dispatch concerns, such as Air conditioning that your POI permitted you to defer, whereas, the full volume derived from the type certificate data sheets in France may be very different and the same numbered section may include both air conditioning and pressurization (just as an example.)

Your posts are extremely good, but your list starts at section 5, and omits sec 13-19, 33-44, 50, 58-70 etc if those sections exist.

To draw conclusions from your list seems wrong to me. We should be using the specific ATA section and item number from the actual maintenance volume. (As an A&P) this is what I was taught.
Many thanks - yes, you are correct up to a point but the MEL I have always referenced and the different MEL I now reference provides for both pilot and maintenance actions. Perhaps a bit of a disconnect in understanding but to me, the MEL on board the aircraft should differ only in appropriate references for the airline's specific aircraft but should not include information that is only available to Maintenance. Not sure if this is what you meant.

I agree that drawing conclusions from the list is wrong. The comments I include after the PRIM 1 fault are from the AOM. I should have mentioned that and will edit the post to do so. For the others I specify that no conclusions may be drawn and warn against same.

Thanks for your comments. We now have a bit to work with.

PJ2

lomapaseo

5th Jun 2009, 04:57

Now with two separate threads running (R&N and Technical Questions) I'm not sure where to post repsonses. If I were reporting News or Rumor I would have thought here. However I were to respond to an technical analysis and discussion of this news I would have thought in the thread running in the technical section.

Perhaps the moderators can sort this out.

The ACARs is not a crash recording device and its useful information is appropriate mainly to post flight maintenance actions. Somewhat akin to the FADECs on engines. However those that design and configure the particular device (AF & Airbus) may be able to work the design configuration logic tree way beyond our simple guestimates.

Significant to me is the suggestion that ACARs confirms a change in flying logic that would compel the pilot to read his base instruments and fly the aircraft in a controled manner while in turbulence.

I believe that most pilots would have preferred that the aircraft fly itself while in turbulence.

If the reversion in flight control law was turbulence alone (no initial structural failures) then it is important to consider whether the aircraft was allowed to operate outside its design envelope (flight speed). If the airspeed was not controlled sufficiently this could have led to upset and flutter failures and ultimate beakup over a time period.

Unfortunately investigations along this line will require more than the recovery of a few bits of debris.

Captain-Crunch

5th Jun 2009, 05:04

Thanks for clarifying PJ2,

Sorry to be so picky. But this is a great example of why nobody should be excluded from a rumour site such as PPRUNE imho. I see now, that a kind mtc guy has provided confirmation that the last message 2131 is indeed a Cabin Pressure Controller issue.

You appear to be correct however, PJ2, that it seems there are no electrical bus faults in this list so far. So, exercising good CRM, I defer to you, and will abandon my lighting bolt theory [causing electrical grief] (at least from now.) :-)

Please forgive my interruption with your train of thought.

Crunch

(As an aside, I think the Mod's here do a fantastic job, imho. Thanks guys.)

etesting2000

5th Jun 2009, 05:13

machacka, jauh, captain crunch, pj2, excellent information. Thank you. Those of us no longer on the inside count on viable information from here. Please don't cut us out. I'll research my questions in advance and make them relavent. Question, are faults to this degree taught in simulator or is this an extraordinary event? What I read in that transcript sounds like real bad doodoo.

Nero1352

5th Jun 2009, 05:18

The sequence of ACARS messages shows at 0212 an ADR disagree message.
This massage does not say anything about the number of ADRs that disagreed. Under many conditions the system cannot isolate the faulty ADR. The consequences would be that many systems that rely on inputs from the ADR will show faults (TCAS, Cabin Pressurization Control)) or disengage (AP,ATHR) and the F/CTL system would revert to a degraded mode.
The crew has to find out which indication they can trust and what action to follow. The Airbus 330 OM-B gives an extensiv description of the problems under the title "MISC Unreliable speed indication/ADR Check"

Posible reason for the ADR disagree: damage to the radom by lightning or hail.

PJ2

5th Jun 2009, 05:30

Captain-Crunch;
The intervention's always welcome, thanks; ya gotta be picky and then take it from there.

I'm still trying to reconcile ATA 341115; my MEL has 341101 with the AOA item as described, (thus the loud-and-clear caution about interpretation), but I don't have a "341115" and can't find "pitot/static" systems, ergo, they are all "no-go" I must assume.

grimmrad

5th Jun 2009, 05:33

No one seems to have asked why the original debris reports were in positions that didn't follow any of the basic rules mentioned above.

---------------------------------------

I allowed myself to ask in the earlier forum without getting a response - couldn't the crew have decided upon failure of systems (e.g. the WX radar) and given their current environment to turn back to the nearest airfields, i.e. in Southamerica? Someone mentioned this as a wise choice in this case and good airmanship. Thus the latest indicated (transmitted) position would indeed be somewhere else than the actual crash side if a malfunction occurred...?

Disclaimer: Not part of your industry, interested SLF (=annoyance)

PJ2

5th Jun 2009, 05:37

etesting2000;
Question, are faults to this degree taught in simulator or is this an extraordinary event?
In routine, recurrent training, no, they are not. They can show up on the final ride for a brand new captain being promoted but there is no pass-fail, only the experience.

The sim rides which establish both aircraft and instrument flying competency and have full pass-fail outcomes, are, in my experience, heavily scripted and known and prepared for in advance with advance workbooks and so on. The process is, in my view, very good and appropriate. One simply cannot train for what are extremely rare moments when ultimately one must utilize every ounce of one's experience, training, skill and intuition. Al Haynes and his crew were in such a situation as I'm sure we all know. These issues are front and center in our industry right now with Madrid, Colgan and a few others.

'nuff drift.

fqis

5th Jun 2009, 06:18

from the warning list , all the systems listed requires an input from ADRIUS ,i dont understand why all the media talking about electrical problem while i dont see any warning related NO ATA CHAPTER 24 , from experience , i ve never seen so many messages in one POST FLIGHT REPORT , but some of them are triggered from time to time , and most of the time we reset the related ADIRU to solve the pblm .

bubbers44

5th Jun 2009, 06:28

AF would not have flown into this large cell if they had an opperable radar. Maybe the radar lost sensitivity and made that cell look benign. I had an MD80 flight one day with a radome with a lot of cracks and delamination that was worthless in bad weather. I finally gave up and asked the controller for a suggested course. He said it doesn't really matter because you are in the middle of it. Thank God that is not the norm but I can see AF having the same situation.

vapilot2004

5th Jun 2009, 06:48

ACARS maintenance messages are timed stamped according to the event and have nothing to do with the transmission time.

Said engineer will have a look at the ACARS report tomorrow.

Captain-Crunch

5th Jun 2009, 06:54

Good point Bubbers44,

The acars messages seem consistent with what you might expect to see with cell penetration and heavy icing covering up all the pitot probes, and ports, causing the loss of data to nav systems and to flt control systems, followed by upset, followed by loss of cabin pressure control (down low)

BREAK

PJ2, I don't have the maintenance ATA fault manual in front of me, but I would guess acars code 341115 would likely decode this way: 34=Nav ATA section, 11=subsection (item) pitot static, 15 = specific status condition or report.

Just a guess.

Any mtc guys wanna tell us what piece of equipment this is and what it's status is?

PJ2

5th Jun 2009, 07:00

Thanks Capt'C - it's important, relatively speaking, as 3411 specifies the AOA sensor in my document but in the JASC document it's "pitot-static".

Captain-Crunch

5th Jun 2009, 07:21

PJ2,

yeah, your document is good until t/o roll begins. So it's tailored to only address no-go items, or alternatively items that the POI (Principle Operations Inspector) or his equivalent in France has determined that you deserve to get relief on.....your ETOPs inventory audits, etc, etc, qualify you to have that item put in your document. (defered mtc items.) For example, ETOPs was denied us because our spare parts inventory sucked, so our MEL was way different than other airbus operators.

After t/o roll ATA mtc books take over which are much amplified. However, mtc still references Master MELs en route in the interest of having parts and people prepared at the next through stop to continue, if necessary with deferred equipment for x days. Since at that point they know the MEL will take over at block in.

That's how I understand it. I know that MEL interpretation is one of the most disputed aspects of airline life. :-)

But that's why they pay us the big bucks, huh?

C

Fargoo

5th Jun 2009, 07:46

Captain-Crunch

5th Jun 2009, 08:07

34-11-15

34 = Navigation
11 = Sensors,Power Supply and Switching
15 = Pitot Probe

ATA decode from the Airbus AMM.

Ahh,

thanks Fargoo.

So, "15" is the pitot probe. Does this mean the pitot probe signal is lost to the nav computers?

Next question: What number is AOA probe?

greenspinner

5th Jun 2009, 08:14

You're right Fargo, and I carried out trouble shooting starting from the fault message (and not the Wrng which are the result of the fault) and guess what.
341115 lost of all pitots probe (to make it short) not duplicable faulf on Gnd
341234 lost of all ADIRU'S, not duplicable on Gnd, and digging a little bit further, lost of ADIRU pwr (to make it short also),
and all these events occurs within 1 minute....

Safety Concerns

5th Jun 2009, 08:18

analyzing the report now. It will take time to ensure an accurate factual statement is posted as sequence and consequence must first be accurately determined.

One point for you to think about however. Under normal circumstances the ADR (air data) part of an ADIRU is suceptible to external influence. The IR (attitude) part however is a completely self contained unit that requires nothing more than power for it to operate and is not susceptible to external influence.

34-11 covers all air data sensors but one interesting aspect is that pitot probes 1 + 3 are close together on the fwd left hand side of the aircraft near the radome. Pitot probe feeding ADIRU 2 system is on the right hand side and I couldn't find any warnings for ADR2. However damage to these probes should only result in ADR faults and not IR faults.

Fargoo

5th Jun 2009, 08:19

Ahh,

thanks Fargoo.

So, "15" is the pitot probe. Does this mean the pitot probe signal is lost to the nav computers?

Next question: What number is AOA probe?

On the small Airbus we operate normally Probe anti-ice failure (be it probe element, probe heat computer or wiring between the two) would bring up a message in that Chapter. Could quite easily be a different case on the A330 though.

34-11-16 is Static ports.
34-11-17 is Air Data Modules.
34-11-18 is TAT sensor.
34-11-19 is AOA sensor.

To decode the messages and their possible causes you need someone with access to the A330 Troubleshooting Manual (TSM).

Hope this helps a bit.

Fargoo.

greenspinner

5th Jun 2009, 08:20

Captain, AOA 34-11-19

Captain-Crunch

5th Jun 2009, 08:21

Fargoo and Greenspinner,

Great work.

Greenspinner (or another 330 tech,) is your troubleshooting manual from the A330? If so, please decode all the following six digit fault and warning codes, so we may achieve a measure of confirmation:

(please give us the long version with as much detail as possible; and your interpretation of what it tells you.)

Note: a reader has discovered an typo by Selfin below: The ISIS fault line code should start 3422 not 3412

http://img32.imageshack.us/img32/7547/acarsaf447d.png

Yours Truly,

Captain Crunch

Octopussy2

5th Jun 2009, 08:36

greenspinner

5th Jun 2009, 08:42

Captain,
At this stage describe all the messages would be little bit useless, as what we need is the fault message from CMS related to these Wrn. In fact we need the full Current flight Report rather that the current leg report provided here.
Nevertheless, as I got the A330 AFR TSM in front of me, I do try to understand ,as you, what’s occurs during this flight, and despite my 17 years of experience (as line engineer) on this type of machine (A340/A330), I’ve still have difficulties to sort it out.
However for your perusal
228334 – FMGC
341234 – ADIRU
279334 – EFCS
341115 – PROBE – PITOT
That’s all the data, which could be helpful with what we have right now
The WRn messages are only 4 digits exploitable and the sixth one are mainly 00

Cheers

SLF3b

5th Jun 2009, 08:43

Not of your industry, but:

Where the time stamps are very close together please don't read too much into the sequence of events. It is very difficult to get an accurate sequence for events happening close together because of the time scan of the data logger and (if multiple systems are involved) the difficulty of synchronising the various clocks.

This thread is fascinating and informative, but I suspect (in the absence of anything else) you are using ACARS output for something other than its intended function.

Safety Concerns

5th Jun 2009, 08:57

slf3b you are spot on which is why I posted that analyzing will take tíme. Some faults hopefully can be dismissed as "a consequence of" but no guarantees.

First one needs to look at all the data.

Enkidelaplaya

5th Jun 2009, 09:02

Just keep to facts:

- the BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses, the french agency that make the investigation) stated that, at this point, the investigation showed the "incoherence of the different speeds mesured".
Le Figaro - Flash actu : Vol AF 447: ''incohérence'' des vitesses (http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2009/06/05/01011-20090605FILWWW00364-vol-af-447-incoherence-des-vitesses.php)

- the Air Comet pilot who said he saw a bright light wasn't on his normal path to Madrid but had to re-rout and go east (closer to the AF 447) due to bad weather. Yet, it is unsure if he was close enough to the missing Airbus. The Air Comet flight was 7° north and 49° west while the AF 447 was something like 30° west.
Un piloto dice que vio caer un 'destello de luz blanca' donde desapareció el avión francés | Mundo | elmundo.es (http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2009/06/04/internacional/1244097992.html)

jauh

5th Jun 2009, 09:08

There is no ECAM warning for a triple ADR failure, only dual, hence the ADR DISAGREE message.

I thought ADR DISAGREE was triggered once after one ADR failed, the other two ADR disagreed?..

Lantirn

5th Jun 2009, 09:08

3 - Flaps fail

Is there any indication for flaps failure in the ACARS report?

Starbear

5th Jun 2009, 09:09

Many, many years ago an A340 (I believe AF) entered the very top of an undetected CB and experienced ice crystals of a perfect size to block all pitot tubes and so "faulted" all ADIRUS simultaneously. This immediately "tripped" the a/c into ALTN Law (or would it have even been Direct Law?-long time back).

It was night time and in the cruise with Captain as PF. As he struggled to control the a/c in the turbulence with degraded flt. laws, the PNF (F/O) became very concerned at the various attitudes on PFD and with the tables down, he believed the Capt was not trying to correct the flight path and became directly involved leading to dual inputs which prevailed for some time.

It was this incident, amongst others, which directly led to the modification for "Dual Input" warnings. The source of this information was a magazine published by Airbus for a number of years called "Hangar Flying". I think it was discontinued but not sure. But I could pinpoint the year more accurately with a little research but don't imagine that's necessary here.

I mention all of this to remind that a single external source could affect all ADIRUs and also of course because it occurred in quite similar circumstancesto this latest incident. Incidentally, the only radar return at the time of the first incident was a very small speck of green.

Like one or two others, I am also rather concerned at the some of the statements issued by the French Authorities. Whilst they are quite correct to play down the chances of finding the recorders, I would still expect positive statements along the lines of "whilst recovery may prove imposible, rest assured we will do absolutely everything within our power to find and salvage them"

jauh

5th Jun 2009, 09:16

Captain Crunch,

The transcript is wrong - FR0906010211 re: ISIS should start with 3422 not 3412

Interflug

5th Jun 2009, 09:18

Just a quick point on the "oil slick/fuel" that has apparently been spotted - it should be easy to determine (certainly by taking a sample and analysing, and possibly just by looking) whether the fuel oil seen in the water is kerosene (and thus possibly from the aircraft) or comes from some other source (eg. a ship dumping tank residues).

There's a huge difference between jet A1 and oily ballast, and IMHO it wouldn't be difficult for someone who knew what they were doing to tell the two apart.First, jet fuel is very close to diesel in its physical and chemical properties. So it might need sophisticated analysis to make sure it is indeed jet fuel. If that is even possible after several days of exposure to open water and evaporation of the lighter parts of it I don't know.

Second, even if it was jet fuel, it is no positive proof, that is is from AF447. It could be a tank ship carrying jet fuel or cleaning its tanks...

Positive proof would be only unique debris.
-Aircraft parts of an A330
-unique Cargo consistent with the manifest.
-Human remains after DNA or other identification

The oceans are full of trash.

CharlieBrem

5th Jun 2009, 09:22

The French accident investigators (Bureau d'enquêtes et d'analyses) have just announced that, working from the ACARS data, they have been able to establish "incoherence in the various speeds" registered by the aircraft. The BEA also "confirms the presence of convective cells characteristic of equatorial regions in proximity to the planned route of the aircraft."

Here, in French, is the Agence France Presse summary:
L'enquête a permis d'établir "à partir de l’exploitation des messages automatiques transmis par l’avion, l’incohérence des différentes vitesses mesurées".... L'enquête a aussi permis de confirmer "la présence à proximité de la route prévue de l’avion au-dessus de l’Atlantique d’importantes cellules convectives caractéristiques des régions équatoriales".

Mercenary Pilot

5th Jun 2009, 09:23

Air France plane: debris 'is not from lost aircraft'

None of the debris found so far in the Atlantic Ocean was from the Air France Airbus that disappeared on Sunday night, Brazilian military officials have said.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/telegraph/multimedia/archive/01414/Airbus-A330_1414139c.jpg

"We have not recovered any parts of the aeroplane so far," Ramon Borges Cardoso, the director of the Air Space Control Department, was quoted as saying on the Terra website.
An Air Force official confirmed Mr Cardoso's statement and said a detailed communique would be released later.

Mr Cardoso also said the fuel slicks were not caused by jet fuel but by oil believed to have come from a passing ship.

Earlier on Thursday, Mr Cardoso had told reporters that navy ships 600 miles off Brazil's shore had pulled aboard debris from the Air France plane, including a pallet from its cargo hold and two buoys.

But after inspection it was determined the pallet could not have come from the plane.
"We confirm that the pallet found is not part of the debris of the plane. It's a pallet that was in the area, but considered more to be trash," he said.

The pallet found was made of wood, he said, and the Air France Airbus A330 that vanished Monday did not have any wooden pallets on board.

"That's how we can confirm that the pallet isn't part of the remains of the aircraft."

He added that the Brazilian navy crews were pulling any item out of the water and inspecting it. Anything not belonging to the Air France plane was being put aside.

Telegraph
Published: 2:00AM BST 05 Jun 2009

Safety Concerns

5th Jun 2009, 09:30

Press release 5 June 2009
Flight AF 447 on 31 May 2009
The BEA will hold a second press conference on its premises at Le Bourget on Saturday 6 June from 10 h to 12h. Journalists who wish to attend are asked to confirm their intentions with Martine Del Bono.

A large quantity of more or less accurate information and attempts at explanations concerning the accident are currently being circulated. The BEA reminds those concerned that in such circumstances, it is advisable to avoid all hasty interpretations and speculation on the basis of partial or non-validated information.

At this stage of the investigation, the only established facts are:

the presence near the airplane’s planned route over the Atlantic of significant convective cells typical of the equatorial regions;
based on the analysis of the automatic messages broadcast by the plane, there are inconsistencies between the various speeds measured.

backseatjock

5th Jun 2009, 09:30

Article from today's New York Times, which links to above threads.

Investigators are pursuing a theory that excessive air speed -- potentially spurred by ice building up on electronic airspeed sensors -- contributed to the ocean crash of an Air France Airbus A330 amid heavy storms Monday, according to two industry officials familiar with the details.

The developments helped lead Airbus late Thursday to remind all airlines to follow certain backup procedures any time that pilots suspect their airspeed indicators are malfunctioning, according to the officials.

The Airbus announcement doesn't provide new details of the crash of Air France Flight 447. But it reflects the investigators' suspicion that the sensors -- also implicated in at least two other fatal airline crashes and numerous other incidents -- were involved, possibly as the first stage of a series of electrical and mechanical malfunctions aboard the jetliner. The reminder advises pilots to use backup devices including GPS systems to check their airspeed if readings from the primary indicators seem awry.

Investigators believe that the so-called pitot tubes may have iced up as the Air France plane with 228 people on board flew through a ferocious thunderstorm that could have included hail and violent updrafts, the two industry officials said.

Industry officials stressed it is too early to draw definitive conclusions from the scant data available, and theories of the crash could change in coming days. Investigators, for example, haven't ruled out the possibility of a fire or other electrical problems that could have led to the emergency. They also don't know what other actions the crew may have taken during roughly four minutes during which the plane apparently was going through a major storm.

The pitot devices have backup systems and are supposed to be heated to avoid icing. But tropical thunderstorms that develop in the area the plane was flying are full of ice at high altitudes, and air temperature at the plane's altitude is well below zero. A theory is that ice from the storm built up quickly on the tubes and could have led to the malfunction whether or not the heat was working properly.

If the tubes iced up, the pilots could have quickly seen sharp and rapid drops in their airspeed indicators, according to industry officials.

At this point, according to people familiar with the details, an international team of crash investigators as well as safety experts at Airbus are focused on a theory that malfunctioning airspeed indicators touched off a series of events that apparently made some flight controls, onboard computers and electrical systems go haywire.

According to people familiar with the thinking of the investigators, the potentially faulty readings could have prompted the crew of the Air France flight to mistakenly boost thrust from the plane's engines and increase speed as they went through what may have been extreme turbulence. As a result, the pilots may inadvertently have subjected the plane to increased structural stress.

It isn't known why other planes flying through such storms haven't suffered from such severe problems, but airline crashes often result from a chain of unusual events, not just a single trigger. Brazilian Air Force officials say three other jetliners flew in the general region around the same time; other airlines have reported no abnormalities in their planes' flights.

Investigators also are struggling to understand another big mystery: how the aircraft, equipped with its own weather-scanning radar, ended up engulfed in what is believed to be such extreme weather. The storm's exact force remains unclear, because the mid-Atlantic region isn't covered by precise ground-based weather radar.

Problems with pitot tubes have been implicated in many air accidents, and ice blockage wouldn't be unprecedented in commercial aviation.

Pitot-tube icing was suspected in the October 1997 crash of an Austral Lineas Aereas DC-9 in Uruguay that killed all 74 people onboard. Flight-data recorder readings showed anomalous airspeed readings and that the crew had adjusted settings in ways suggesting they thought they were flying much slower than the plane, built by McDonnell Douglas, was actually moving. Investigators concluded those settings caused the pilots to lose control of the plane, which plunged into swamps, according to the Aviation Safety Network, a crash database.

A Continental Airlines MD-82, also built by McDonnell-Douglas, skidded off the runway at New York's La Guardia Airport in March 1994 after the crew aborted their takeoff due to strange airspeed readings. Investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board later found the crew had failed to comply with checklist procedures to activate the pitot tub- heating system, allowing them to get clogged with ice or snow. Nobody was killed in the incident.

The NTSB cited similar issues with incidents during two flights of Boeing 717 jetliners in 2002 and 2005. Nobody was killed in those events, in which the planes encountered problems when the pitot tube heating system were temporarily inactive for reasons that were never determined.

In February 1996, a Boeing 757 crashed shortly after takeoff from the Dominican Republic, killing all 189 people onboard. Flight-data and cockpit recordings showed the crew got confused by conflicting speed readings and stalled the plane, which plunged into the ocean, according to Aviation Safety Network.

Investigators later concluded that wasps may have nested in the pitot tubes as the plane, operated by Turkish carrier Birgenair, sat grounded for several days. The tubes are supposed to be kept covered when a plane is parked, but a witness recalled seeing them exposed.

Wasp-nesting in pitot tubes was again cited in a March 2006 incident, where the crew of a Qantas Airways Ltd. Airbus A330 slammed on the brakes during takeoff from Brisbane, Australia. Nobody was injured, according to the Australian Transport Safety Board. Airbus is a unit of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co.

The Air France jetliner was equipped with its own radar system, which normally suffices for letting pilots navigate through bad weather. But it doesn't always detect trouble, specialists say, or accurately depict the worst areas of turbulence. The signals can get absorbed by heavy rain or end up showing ground clutter, for example, preventing pilots from getting a clear picture of conditions in front of them.

Captain-Crunch

5th Jun 2009, 09:30

greenspinner

5th Jun 2009, 09:42

Furthermore, JAUH is right, ISIS it's 3422, but this kind of error exist sometime in the CMS.
However, starting again from this fault messasge,ISIS (22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION, with the red flag on the ISIS (I assume) it's lead me again to check the Stby Pitot Probe failure (9DA1, 9DA2, 9DA3)!
As the first fault recorded its also Pitot probe (341115), I would suspect severe icing (this only engage myself). When I mean Severe, I mean really severe, kind of Iceberg flying at FL 350 :sad:

Captain-Crunch

5th Jun 2009, 09:45

Captain Crunch,

The transcript is wrong - FR0906010211 re: ISIS should start with 3422 not 3412

Thanks Jauh,

I've added a typo note. I'll PM selfin to try to correct it; but it may be too late.

CC

grebllaw123d

5th Jun 2009, 09:46

As you have the TSM manual in front of you, I wonder if you are able to decode the failure codes associated with the flag warnings displayed on the CAPT and F/O PFDs related to ATA 34?

341200106
341201106

thks

jauh

5th Jun 2009, 10:02

greenspinner

However, starting again from this fault messasge,ISIS (22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION, with the red flag on the ISIS (I assume) it's lead me again to check the Stby Pitot Probe failure (9DA1, 9DA2, 9DA3)!

I've posted JASC codes for some of the prefixes earlier (http://www.pprune.org/4975436-post46.html), 3422 is directional gyro.

Mercenary Pilot

5th Jun 2009, 10:08

Investigators are pursuing a theory that excessive air speed -- potentially spurred by ice building up on electronic airspeed sensors

Speaking as someone who has flown in severe icing conditions, if this was possible on the Airbus (and I still find it total unbelievable!) then it should never have been certified for flight in icing conditions.

If this is the best theory that BEA can come up with then I fully understand why people are already questioning their ability to solve this accident and their neutrality.

Shaka Zulu

5th Jun 2009, 10:13

This thread has a lot of relevance to me as a professional aviator. And fwiw I do try and learn from accidents/incidents. Also gaining a little more background info on some of the a/c subsystems & design can be relevant when the time comes to analyze what is going on with aircraft systems. (if there is any time).

I for one wish I had known about TAT Probe Icing (AND: possible EICAS messages) at high altitudes last year when we flew through high Cirrus upwind of a line squall south of Indonesia. St Elmo's fire was unreal.
The Thrust Lim/ Opt Crz & Max Crz / EPR ratings / TAT disappeared of the screens and FMC's, shortly followed by A/T disconnect.
Man Thrust for the next 3 minutes. No Engine Anti-Ice On cycling at this stage. So we related the A/T failure due to static around the EEC's.

After 3 minutes exited the high Cirrus et voila, A/T was able to be re-engaged and after checking Maint Page etc confirmed A/T was deemed satis for the remainder of the flight.

In hindsight it was confirmed to have been port icing.
And this was clear of an actual cell at 39000'

MLT

5th Jun 2009, 10:16

Firstly, I am not a pilot, I am an aircraft engineer (without Airbus experience):confused:.

Secondly, I am not an ACARS expert and would be interested to find out the order of the faults:confused:.

What I can tell you is that the Rudder Travel Limiter, shown with a fault on the ACARS printout is designed to prevent excessive loading on the tail structure at high speeds.

As airspeed increases the amount of rudder travel permitted is limited. This is usually computed using inputs from the air data system to the flight control units.

I would be interested to find out from an Airbus Engineer exactly how this particular system works, and in particular how does the system fail safe if the RTL system was to fail at high speed/altitude?

Could it be possible that probe icing led to a lower computed airspeed which allowed the rudder travel limiting system to provide greater than necessary rudder travel?

MLT

LEVEL600

5th Jun 2009, 10:23

Nice job!
I am not 330 guy, but for decoding mesages is TSM (CFDS) right way only. If somebody put these mes. numbers into TSM "start troubleshooting" part of Airn@v software, get lot of information and possible causes immediately, includig power sources.Unfortunately my acces is limited to 320 only.
ISIS - not sure with this, but ISIS is connected to IRUs to provide optional heading information (compass scale on bottom of LCD display). If data bus or multiple IRUs fail, ISIS fault can be generated too.
Searching problems in ADR/sensor part of ADIRU system looks better for me.

Lemurian

5th Jun 2009, 10:24

I just don't get it. What is the point of all this speculation, when basically, no-one knows what happened to this flight?
The big difference is that now the posters are having a discussion over some hard facts.
With the modest means they have (MEL, TSM, MM...) and a painful identification of a still broad spectrum of data, a better picture is beginning to reveal itself.
I'm hopeful that most of the ACARS data would be identified, we'll have a set of faults / failures that could at the very least eliminate a lot of the wild - or wise ass - guesses we saw too often on the previous thread.
As a matter of fact, I'm sure that quite a few already have a picture of the events.

Swedish Steve

5th Jun 2009, 10:47

Looking at all the Messages the first thing that struck me was that except for the two 38 Vacuum Lav messages, all the others are to do with A/P and Nav. There are no other messages. No 24 or 29 failures. No 71 series.
At least this dismisses a lot of the theories running around.

24 Electrical
29 Hydraulic
71 Engines

CAT1

5th Jun 2009, 10:49

V1 ....oops: I also work in this profession, as a long-haul captain with 30 years of flying experience. So I well know the need to study the causes of accidents. The fact is, no-one knows yet what happened to AF447, and until we do, none of us is in any position to come to any conclusions as to how to avoid a repeat, save to perhaps treat cb's with a bit more respect in case this was the prime cause.

etabubu

5th Jun 2009, 11:07

Hi,
just few questions for the professionals from a humble PPL owner.
This message might well be deleted, but anyway no speculation intended here.

I find REALLY weird (and disturbing) that after more than 4 days they couldn't find any debris yet. I know that it's a vast area and the currents are probably strong and everything, but I'm also sure that the people involved in the search are professionals and know how to take into account all these factors.

So, my question is:
if the aircraft (or any debris) is not gonna be found, what is the most likely scenario then? I'm not talking about the cause of the accident, but the last serie of events.
A ditching followed by sinking? An extraordinarly powerful explosion that actually "disintegrated" the aircraft?

I repeat: no speculation or conspiracy intended here. Just probing alternative scenarios!

Thank you,
Marco

Safety Concerns

5th Jun 2009, 11:17

just one point as many seem to believe that the thread is now becoming factual.

The released acars information appears not to be the actual information from the flight but from a search function performed on the ground. Unless my eyes are deceiving me the released pages are 28 + 29 from over 250 produced after performing a search from the 12/05 - 01/06.

That means information could be missing and that also means that this thread is actually no different from the original which has been closed. We may be witnessing a more professional response but the basic underlying information is not complete and that means we are speculating.

Lost in Saigon

5th Jun 2009, 11:39

Just keep to facts:

- the Air Comet pilot who said he saw a bright light wasn't on his normal path to Madrid but had to re-rout and go east (closer to the AF 447) due to bad weather. Yet, it is unsure if he was close enough to the missing Airbus. The Air Comet flight was 7° north and 49° west while the AF 447 was something like 30° west.
Un piloto dice que vio caer un 'destello de luz blanca' donde desapareció el avión francés | Mundo | elmundo.es (http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2009/06/04/internacional/1244097992.html)

The Air Comet flight was over 2,000 km away. They could not have seen AF447. This is from the closed thread: http://www.pprune.org/4974157-post912.html

Great Circle Mapper (http://gc.kls2.com/cgi-bin/gc?PATH=lim-n7w49-lis%0D%0Ario-cdg%0D%0An7w49-n3.29w30.4%0D%0A&RANGE=&PATH-COLOR=red&PATH-UNITS=nm&PATH-MINIMUM=&MARKER=1&SPEED-GROUND=&SPEED-UNITS=kts&RANGE-STYLE=best&RANGE-COLOR=navy&MAP-STYLE=)

http://gc.kls2.com/cgi-bin/gcmap?PATH=lim-n7w49-lis,rio-cdg,n7w49-n3.29w30.4&PATH-COLOR=red&MARKER=1

LIM (12°01'19"S 77°06'52"W) 07°00'00"N 49°00'00"W 2028 nm
07°00'00"N 49°00'00"W LIS (38°46'53"N 09°08'09"W) 2875 nm

RIO (22°54'S 43°14'W) CDG (49°00'35"N 02°32'52"E) 4950 nm

07°00'00"N 49°00'00"W 03°17'24"N 30°24'00"W 100° 1135 nm

That is too far to see anything other than a metor. (probably was a very big exploding meteor)

(with text added)
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/AF447-AirComet.gif

Mad (Flt) Scientist

5th Jun 2009, 11:41

While agreeing we don't know the real provenance of the ACARS message list, it appears to be in time sequence order, and people who routinely deal with ACARS stuff have suggested that the number of messages on these two pages is already large for a single flight. I see no evidence that it is, say, an ATA-restricted list and while it is an assumption, I think it is fair to assume that this is the complete list for AF447.

greenspinner

5th Jun 2009, 11:46

Sorry, I was out off sight for a while, and I’ve got planes falling down here, but rather “smooth as Silk…”

Nevertheless, here after a breakdown of all the ATA messages related to the Current Leg Report provided.

34-22-25 - INDICATOR - ISIS (INTEGRATED STANDBY INSTRUMENT SYSTEM)

34-43-00 - TRAFFIC AND TERRAIN COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM
34-12-00 - AIR DATA/INERTIAL REFERENCE SYSTEM (ADIRS) ((ADIRU & CDU))
34-10-00 - AIR DATA/INERTIAL REFERENCE SYSTEM (ADIRS)
27-90-00 - ELECTRICAL FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM (EFCS)
22-83-34 - FMGEC (FLIGHT MANAGEMENT, GUIDANCE AND ENVELOPE COMPUTER)
22-62-00 - FLIGHT ENVELOPE COMPUTATION
22-30-00 – AUTOTHRUST
27-23-00 - RUDDER AND PEDAL TRAVEL LIMITING ACTUATION
27-93-00 - FLIGHT CONTROL PRIMARY COMPUTER (FCPC)
34-11-15 - PROBE – PITOT
27-93-34 - FCPC (FLIGHT CONTROL PRIMARY COMPUTER)
21-31-00 - PRESSURE CONTROL AND MONITORING
27-91-00 - OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION (F/Ctl Altn law)

for Grebllaw, 341200106 it’s ADIRU and last 2 digits 06 mean phase 06 (Cruise)
Trusting this will be of some interest
Cheers

MoateAir

5th Jun 2009, 12:00

Air France Flight 447 'may have stalled at 35,000ft' - Times Online (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6430398.ece)

The Air France jet that crashed into the Atlantic killing 228 may have stalled after pilots slowed down too much as they encountered turbulence, new information suggests.

Airbus is to send advice on flying in storms to operators of its A330 jets, Le Monde reported today. It would remind crews of the need to maintain adequate thrust from the engines and the correct attitude, or angle of flight, when entering heavy turbulence.

Pilots slow down aircraft when entering stormy zones of the type encountered by Air France Flight 447 early on Monday as it was flying from Rio to Paris.

The fact that the manufacturer of the aircraft is issuing new advice indicates that investigators have evidence that the aircraft slowed down too much, causing a high-altitude aerodynamic stall. This would explain why the aircraft apparently broke up at altitude over the Atlantic.

Airbus declined to comment on the report. A company official said: "Each time there is an accident, it is imperative for the manufacturer to inform all operators of the type of aircraft concerned of any specific procedures to put in place or any checks to carry out."

Jean Serrat, a retired airline pilot, told Agence-France Presse: "If the BEA [accident investigation bureau] is making a recommendation so early, it is because they know very well what happened. If they know what happened, they have a duty to make a recommendation, for safety reasons ... The first thing you do when you fly into turbulence is to reduce speed to counter its effects. If you reduce speed too much you stall."

Captain-Crunch

5th Jun 2009, 12:04

So, my question is:
if the aircraft (or any debris) is not gonna be found, what is the most likely scenario then? I'm not talking about the cause of the accident, but the last serie of events.
A ditching followed by sinking? An extraordinarly powerful explosion that actually "disintegrated" the aircraft?

Until the flight data recorder and CAM recording is found and played back, and decoded nobody can answer you. But we can make educated guesses. There is no evidence right now of an explosion. The pressurization message was the last received at 14 past the hour. In an explosion, you most likely would loose the pressure vessel immediately like UAL747 HNL, like TWA800. If the airplane fell off it's knifepoint (and at FL350 with that much fuel and pax aboard; it is sitting on a knifepoint), it isn't likely to come apart at high altitude. What most reporters in the press don't understand is that you can have a high speed stall above MMO that will drop you tens of thousands of feet, just as bad as a low speed stall will. (PJ2's Coffin Corner weight/alt point) You might not recover, if ever, until say (example only) 8,000 feet. At this point, "Lost in Saigon" and my theory goes, you are close to the cabin altitude of say 6,000 feet and will have pressurization problems when the two meet, "Catching the Cabin" (and that might be reported by acars.) That's if the wings or tail didn't come off already and rupture the pressure vessel from exceeding design limits in the dive. Many jet upsets have resulted in major structural damage. Recently an Adam Air 737 came apart in the dive in Indonesia (coincidentally near the equator also and as a result of the autopilot letting go, and the crew's inability to fly partial panel.)

But to answer CAT I, most of us don't want to wait years for the accident report which may or may not be revealing. When the ORD AA DC-10 facts came out, most of us didn't wait for the report. We V2 plus a bunch right after lift off. The government training to yank it back to V2 was dangerous and unnecessary and the pilot population deduced this for themselves: for all we know it saved someone somewhere.

Maybe as a result of our discussion, pilots will start clicking the autopilot off at altitude and get an idea of how it feels in the real airplane on a nice day. It's absurd, imho, for your first experience hand flying at FL350 to be on a dark and stormy night with half of the instruments not working and a flashlight clamped in your teeth.

Or, Maybe as a result of these postings, Air France will take note of crewmembers complaints of no dispatchers and no graphical weather updates available to the crew enroute and do something about it.

Stranger things have happened in Aviation.

greenspinner

5th Jun 2009, 12:09

To MoateAir
QUOTE
FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT TOULOUSE
ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX
SUBJECT: AF447 ACCIDENT INTO THE ATLANTIC OCEAN
OUR REF: AF447 AIT 2 June 4th 2009
PREVIOUS REF:
- Ref 1: AF447 AIT 1 dated June 1st 2009

This AIT is an update of the previous AIT n°1 concerning the AF447
accident into the Atlantic ocean on June 1st, 2009.
In line with the ICAO Annex 13 recommendations, the French
investigation Board - BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses) is
leading the technical investigation, with accredited representatives
from the Brazilian Investigation Board and US NTSB, with Airbus
providing technical support.
The following data have been approved for release by the French BEA.
The route of the aircraft was crossing a tropical multicell
convective area at the time of the accident.
Failure/ maintenance messages have been transmitted automatically
from the aircraft to the airline maintenance center.
The above mentionned messages indicate that there was inconsistency
between the different measured airspeeds. Therefore and without
prejudging the final outcome of the investigation, the data available
leads Airbus to remind operators what are the applicable operational
recommendations in case of unreliable airspeed indication.
The following operational procedures are available for the Airbus
Aircraft Type :
-A300: QRH 13.01 thru 13.03, FCOM 8.05.10;
-A310: QRH 13.01 thru 13.03, FCOM 2.05.80;
-A300-600: QRH 13.01 thru 13.03, FCOM 2.05.80;
-A318/A318/A320/A321 family: QRH 2.15 thru 2.18A, FCOM 3.02.34;
-A330/A340 Family: QRH 2.21 thru 2.23B , FCOM 3.02.34;
-A380: ECAM not-sensed procedures, FCOM - Procedures / ECAM
Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / 34 Navigation.
An update on the accident data will be provided as soon as further
valuable information is approved for release by the Investigation
Board.

UNQUOTE

Flight Safety

5th Jun 2009, 12:12

Many thanks to all for the ACARS data and interpretation. Sounds like probe icing or perhaps hail damage to the probes to me.

MR8

5th Jun 2009, 12:13

Gentlemen,

The FACTS we got from the ACARS messages clearly point to one possible cause: Unreliable Airspeed Indication/ADR check procedure. This is one of the most difficult failures you can have in an A330/A340 since you loose ALL air data. No speed or altitude info, not even on the stand-by system until you recover the 'right' ADR if any. The checklist asks to switch off the faulty ADR if known.
Anyway, the procedure is to fly pitch/power. Then troubleshooting can be done by using e.g. GPS speed against predicted wind (the wind on the ND is wrong), GPS altitude, etc... This is extremely difficult to accomplish, so I imagine barely impossible in the reported heavy turbulence at high altitudes with changing winds because of TS's.

Rests the question how such a failure can occur: given the flight conditions: either the pitots froze up because of severe icing, or the radome disintegrated due to hail impact (remember the pictures of that easyJet B737 in GVA that entered a CB? And that was just a 'European' CB, not a tropical one.)

How is it possible that this aircraft with experienced pilots fly through a dangerous CB? (This is pure speculation from my side!!)

First of all, not all CB's go with associated lightning, so if the radar is not on, they might be quite hard to spot on a dark night. (At the time of the events, the moon at present position was setting in the west while the aircraft was flying north east bound. No moonlight must be considered)
Why might the radar not be on? Ask ANY A330/A340 pilot and they will all agree that at some stage in their career they were caught out with the previous crew dimming the radar. For the non-Airbus guys: the ND 'control' knob is twofold. The inner knob is the dim for the ND display itself, while the outer ring is the dim function for the WX radar/Terrain information. If the outer knob is turned in the dim position, no WX/Terrain information will be visible on the ND. The WX radar with the tilt info (not the actual WX info) will be in bright since that is ND info, not WX info.
Looking at the SIGMET chart for that day, it seems that the route was basically clear of weather until they reached that wall of CB's around the ITCZ. So maybe they didn't have a chance to pick up that the radar was dimmed until it was too late.

Again, the last part is complete speculation and I would like to have input on my thoughts by experiences Airbus pilots.

MR8

Note: I do not believe the crew lost pressurization. Unreliable Airspeed Indication/ADR Check Procedure Checklist asks to switch off 2 ADR's if the affected ADR's can not be identified or if all ADR's are affected. If the ADR's that feed the active Cabin Pressure Controller are switched off, this will give a 'soft' warning (Amber Caution with no 'ding' - sorry, forgot the actual name of such a warning). Hence in my opinion it is just an ADVISORY on the ACARS and not a failure. Can someone please confirm the ACARS message regarding ATA21?

Lemurian

5th Jun 2009, 12:17

From greespinner, post #73 :
341234 – ADIRU
279334 – EFCS
341115 – PROBE – PITOT
If one looks at all the ATA, we basically have a majority of 34xxxxxx and 22xxxxxx.
The maintenance status 341115 refers to pitot probe (-s ?).
Then what is common to ADIRUS, ISIS, 34xx flags on PFDs, rudder travel limiter ?
Bar a major electrics break-down, I can only see air data inputs.
Then the ADRs Disagree point towards the same origin : differing input data to the ADRs, which again puts the finger in the direction of faulty air data sensors.
So what can cause these faults ?
Icing.
Pitot probe icing.
Although unlikely and far-fetched, that's my only explanation, fwiw.

14:18
the Airbus telex greenspinner quotes confirms "unreliable airspeeds", and he posted it while I was typing.
Any thoughts ?

grebllaw123d

5th Jun 2009, 12:18

Thank you very much for your valuable information in your last post!:ok:

- Do you know which failure flag/flags might have been displayed in the PFDs with the mentioned failure codes (341200106/341201106)?

- Which information would be missing on the PFDs in case of this failure - do you have an idea? Airspeed? Altitude? Vertical speed etc....

Thks

Wossname

5th Jun 2009, 12:27

Forgive me, a couple of dumb questions for my own edification. Firstly, if we don't know what caused AF to go down until the report comes out, what steps should crew take to avoid the same fate? Secondly, is it really the case that there are so many commercial pilots so unused to high-FL hand flying that doing so in less than optimal conditions might result in an upset?

Regards

md-100

5th Jun 2009, 12:35

Does anyone know the upper and lower speed limit for FL350 and the "weight" at that time of flight?

just wondering... a total pitot-static failure (ice) then all data went off then a hand flying in the middle of CBs?? and too close to coffin corner.. then stall or maybe exceed the max speed and overstressed the aircraft..

just wondering..

Feathers McGraw

5th Jun 2009, 12:40

Reading about the A330 pitot icing comments that have been made, is it being suggested that the problem is caused by setting probe heat to 'auto' and the ice detection then not being sensitive enough to prevent rapid icing when conditions make that likely?

I got an impression from one post that even with probe heat set to 'on' rapid icing could happen, which clearly would raise questions about the certification tests done on this system.

It seems that there is some concern about the A330 in this regard, is it justified?

clivewatson

5th Jun 2009, 12:42

p51guy

5th Jun 2009, 12:42

Wossname, I think most professional pilots could fly at altitude using attitude and power to hand fly through turbulence. All airliners have charts for unreliable airspeed showing attitude and power settings for the altitude and weight.

evergreek

5th Jun 2009, 12:55

"just one point as many seem to believe that the thread is now becoming factual.

The released acars information appears not to be the actual information from the flight but from a search function performed on the ground. Unless my eyes are deceiving me the released pages are 28 + 29 from over 250 produced after performing a search from the 12/05 - 01/06.

That means information could be missing and that also means that this thread is actually no different from the original which has been closed. We may be witnessing a more professional response but the basic underlying information is not complete and that means we are speculating."Note that on the right hand side of the ACARS where it says NOVO, they all came from AF447 :ok: Thats how we know its from that flight, not others.

Captain-Crunch

5th Jun 2009, 12:56

Cap'n Crunch
Forgive me, a couple of dumb questions for my own edification. Firstly, if we don't know what caused AF to go down until the report comes out, what steps should crew take to avoid the same fate? Secondly, is it really the case that there are so many commercial pilots so unused to high-FL hand flying that doing so in less than optimal conditions might result in an upset?

Regards

Wossname,

Clearly airbus has some idea of what might of happened. Our big clue, is that they have already released an accident alert to all operators with the focus on "Flight with unreliable airspeed". As my astute colleague has pointed out, this emergency is one of the worst. When it happened to me, I just set 90% power, held about x degrees pitch and waited to come into the clear. The ice was loud. The airplane felt loaded. After we regained everything minutes later, even MCT (abv climb power) was barely holding altitude. We picked up a buttload of ice. It temporarily took out all the pitots and all the static ports. The autopilot let go right in the buildups.

Luckily, I had an earlier job on junk jets with unreliable autopilots for months. I did a lot of hand flying for hours at altitude in severe weather. And at the time we iced up on the bus, I had been hand flying up and down from FL180 despite the SOP's to always stay coupled.

Yeah, it's true. Most airline pilots have never hand flown at altitude all night. But they should do it. Even if it scares everybody in the back.

The simulator is just not the same thing imho.

CC

Rananim

5th Jun 2009, 13:04

MR8,
Excellent.Either they had dual ADR failure and didnt fly the correct IAS on the standby ASI(or whatever Airbus call it) or they had all 3 go down and had to fly pitch/N1 using GPS-generated GS(which as you say would be suicidal given the conditions).
How does an Airbus pilot set the thrust for best turb-penetration speed?On a Boeing with moving thrust levers,we simply disengage and set FMC-generated TURB N1 and leave it there.Would the overspeed warning be on continuously in the assumed scenario?
The question though is how/why they flew into such weather.Shouldnt this be the subject of the first advisory from Airbus?

parabellum

5th Jun 2009, 13:05

Wossname - I assume the first part of your question is rhetorical? If we don't know what caused the incident then there is nothing we can do to avoid it happening again, all we can do is to try and avoid similar known conditions.

As the air is very thin at altitude the auto pilot does a much better job of anticipating and correcting deviations from a required flight path, it works in milli second whereas the human is much slower. Hand flying at altitude is usually demonstrated in training just to show how clumsy it really is and how uncomfortable for the passengers too, (the pilots up front often have no idea how uncomfortable hand flying is for the people down the back where the resultant effect of every move of the controls is magnified many times over in the passenger cabin), I have been on flights when the auto pilot has failed and even between the two of us we could not deliver a really smooth flight at altitude.

Bridge Builder

5th Jun 2009, 13:06

Is it possible the plane went a bit too high, in order to to fly over the storm? I remember seeing a post last year from a fighter pilot, who said that at maximum ceiling, the difference between a slow speed stall on the one hand. and going too fast for the airframe to cope, can be very tiny.

MR8

5th Jun 2009, 13:09

p51guy - I think you are mistaken. The pitch/power tables are very rudimentary. When flying close to the coffin corner at altitude and in HEAVY turbulence, you don't stand a chance, not even if you're a stick & rudder ace.

clivewatson - as I mentioned before, the ND control know has an inner knob and an outer ring. The outer ring is to dim the Weather RETURN. The inner knob is to display the rest of the ND info, INCLUDING the WX radar mode and tilt angle.

It is Airbus procedure to check the WX radar return on taxi out when switching on the WX radar. However - and I am guilty of that as well - this is almost never done on a clear day at the departure field since there is no immediate weather threat. For TO the WX radar is set up at about 5 degrees and adjusted during climb. The adjustment is quite easy since we have a very accurate tilt indication on the ND (which - again - is NOT dimmed as it is part of the ND). After level off, the WX radar is set to -0.25 degrees to have a good look ahead and slightly below. At this setting, you won't get those annoying ground returns. So, if you forget to check for returns on the ground, you might not get returns at all until it's too late.

I personally found out the 'hard' way as a young FO when I questioned the Capt. why my Radar didn't work. The only thing I lost was my pride on that day and a beer to the Capt. and I gained a lifesaving experience.

Maybe both guys had their radar dimmed and since there was no weather out of Rio, they just didn't notice before it was too late. It is not that hard to do...

MR8

greenspinner

5th Jun 2009, 13:11

Clivewatson,
The dim of the Radar display is located (for Airbus of course) on the button of the In/Off ND display (double button) on the left hand side of the Pilot (right for the F/o), whereas the radar Ctl panel is located on the pedestal, with no command for the dim function on the display at all.
I do have one time a captain reported to me that is WR was not working at all.... I just shown him how to adjust the brighness of WR ( hopfully F/o was working, means not dimmed). To be meditate .....

Swedish Steve

5th Jun 2009, 13:12

people who routinely deal with ACARS stuff have suggested that the number of messages on these two pages is already large for a single flight.

Yes the average is Zero or One. More than 3 would be very unusual.

Reading about the A330 pitot icing comments that have been made, is it being suggested that the problem is caused by setting probe heat to 'auto' and the ice detection then not being sensitive enough to prevent rapid icing when conditions make that likely?

The setting of probe heat AUTO means that it comes on during the start procedure and is always ON in flight. All Auto does it turn it off automatically when you are parked at the gate.

Safety Concerns

5th Jun 2009, 13:13

Note that on the right hand side of the ACARS where it says NOVO, they all came from AF447 http://static.pprune.org/images/smilies/thumbs.gif Thats how we know its from that flight, not others.

I am not disputing that the info relates to AF447. I am just raising the possibility that the information is not complete because the supplied report is NOT the actual aircraft report. The report is a ground report produced by someone performing a search. We do not know what filters were applied, if any at all or what was on page 27 or page 30.

Also interesting for example would be to see the information produced for the leg into Rio.

Southernboy

5th Jun 2009, 13:14

The posts from Airbus pilots regarding conflicting airspeed indications is very interesting. The Australian A330 upset in October 2008 (VH-QPA) also featured differing airspeed data between Capt & FO.

I've not flown one of these electronic marvels but would welcome comments by Airbus pilots in trying to understand this. Is this - shall we say - not uncommon? How likely are the crew to have practiced such a scenario in the sim?

There do seems to have been a lot of QRH items to resolve.

greenspinner

5th Jun 2009, 13:18

Lemurian,
With the only data we have right now, and as per these data the only concrete things we can say now is that Icing is the most probable cause.
But as I said in my previous threads, it must be really severe Icing condition, like an Iceberg at FL 350 :sad:

FlyingCroc

5th Jun 2009, 13:22

A hell of a storm! :eek: Check this out on Tim's webpage.
Air France 447 - AFR447 - A detailed meteorological analysis - Satellite and weather data (http://www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/)

http://www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/af447-cloudsat.jpg

Boxkite Montgolfier

5th Jun 2009, 13:22

MR8

It is inconceivable to me that experienced pilots would not have searched exhaustively for wx returns at extreme radar range when approaching the notified presence of ITCZ activity. It is reported that a turbulence report was made 10 minutes prior to the ACARs download.
Pitot probe failures, if true, will have have made safe penetration and control very problematic. Thanks to many for a very informed debate, finally!

MR8

5th Jun 2009, 13:26

Wytnucls - I'm sorry, but you are wrong! If you do that in the current scenario, you will STALL.

The 5 degrees nose up is when you are in CLIMB above THRUST RED ALT and above FL100.

The checklist clearly states further:

When at, or above MSA or Circuit Altitude - level off for trouble shooting.

Initial pitch/thrust for FL200 - FL 350 above 190t is 3.5degrees/70.9%N1 - and that is NOT a MEMORY item.

If you would go to 5 degrees, you will fall out of the air before you clear the weather.

MR8

Wossname

5th Jun 2009, 13:37

P51Guy & Parabellum - My questions were in response to Captain Crunch's assertions that seemed to suggest that a) aircrew should not wait years until an enquiry reaches a conclusion, but should act more proactively (his V2 example). Secondly, in his experience, it seems that pilots are less able/experienced in hand flying at altitude, therefore, less prepared to deal with hazardous, low-frequency conditions.

While I realize that sims can only throw so much into the mix, the idea that perhaps increased automation along with enhanced safety envelopes is also bringing a concurrent degradation in 'real' flying skills, is a worrying one.

I'm sure that Airbus don't know what brought down the AF lads, even if they have narrowed down the possibilities, but perhaps they felt it prudent to remind operators and crews of previous directives.

Cap'n Crunch, thanks for your candor.

Regards,

SaturnV

5th Jun 2009, 13:44

MD100,

In the closed thread, Snaproll posted these speeds:
http://www.pprune.org/4969395-post571.html

According to the QRH and based on a weight around 210t:

(speeds are approximate)

Green Dot (minimum clean speed): 245 kts

Turbulence penetration speed: 260 kts

Vls w/ 0.3g buffett margin: 235 kts

Speeds are all indicated so no ISA deviation necessary.

Not much margin.

c130jbloke

5th Jun 2009, 13:49

Sorry to shunt this one onto a new aspect, but does anybody know if the crash site and / or a floating debris field has been located and confirmed yet ?

I have tried the usual news sites, but I cannot make it out and the area in question is pretty big for a search which is just adding to the mystery of what happened.

Apologies if this is a bone question.

C130JB

ChristySweet

5th Jun 2009, 13:51

Please excuse this layman's intrusion and posting mainstream media but this article has some info on the weather that is pertinent and seems to have been sourced to knowledgeable persons who are on the same page as the discussion here.

Air France jet's flight-control system under scrutiny - Los Angeles Times (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-brazil-crash5-2009jun05,0,6741218.story)

>>>>>>>>>>>

"...Meanwhile, new analysis of the weather in the vicinity at the time of the crash appears to cast doubt on earlier reports that the plane encountered severe thunderstorms, lightning and wind gusts. Though there were storms, they were almost certainly less intense than those sometimes encountered above the United States, and lightning was at least 150 miles away, said Greg Forbes, severe-weather expert for the Weather Channel.

Forbes said an examination of weather data for Sunday, including satellite images, indicated updrafts of perhaps 20 mph, far from the initial reports of 100 mph.

"I wouldn't expect it to be enough to break apart the plane," Forbes said.

.....

"Air France executives said the plane had sent out a series of messages indicating technical failures, confirming news reports in Brazil and data that U.S. aviation experts had already gained access to.

A series of serious electronic breakdowns occurred on the Airbus over a four-minute period before the jet plunged into the sea, said Robert Ditchey, an aeronautical engineer, pilot and former airline executive.

The sequence started with an autopilot failure and a loss of the air data inertial reference unit, a system of gyroscopes and electronics that provides information on speed, direction and position. That system has been involved in two previous incidents that caused Airbus jetliners to plunge out of control, though the pilots were able to recover.

The automated messages then indicate that a fault occurred in one of the computers for the major control surfaces on the rear of the plane. Such a failure would have compounded the problems, particularly if the pilots were flying through even moderate turbulence.

The last message indicates that multiple failures were occurring, including pressurization of the cabin. Such a message would have reflected either a loss of the plane's pressurization equipment or a breach of the fuselage, resulting in rapid decompression."

>>>>>>>>>>

Blacksheep

5th Jun 2009, 13:54

From reading the ACARS data and discussions with others in our unit, it certainly does seem that Cb penetration followed by sensor failures and loss of control is the most likely scenario.

Rather worryingly, from a number of comments, it appears that many pilots do not use their Wx radar properly.

Radar is not simply something that you switch on in the hope that significant returns will pop up - the display must be seen to even test and start using it Spot on!

The radar detects water droplets only. It does not, indeed cannot, detect ice. The turbulence mode only detects turbulence that contains water droplets; if there is no rain in the turbulent air, the turbulence remains invisible. On a dark night, if there is no rain in the top of a Cb it is invisible. The Wx radar must be operated in pitch to scan various altitudes ahead: the beam covers a taller column at greater range than at close range and you can pick up the rain that appears lower down in the column that may indicate the presence of a Cb full of ice towering up above it.

Forgive me, a couple of dumb questions for my own edification. Firstly, if we don't know what caused AF to go down until the report comes out, what steps should crew take to avoid the same fate? Cbs may sprout up in your face very quickly - while working in equatorial climes for decades I have regularly observed Cbs build up from virtually nothing to monsters towering up to 30,000+ feet in the space of fifteen to twenty minutes. This makes it especially important to actively manipulate the Wx radar tilt when flying in known areas of Cb activity and learn to interpret what you see. Do not imagine that what you see is what you get with Wx radar; the truth is, you have to work it and interpret. Honeywell and Rockwell Collins both produce useful pocket sized pilot guides on the subject.

Contact the Flight Ops Support people through these links and since you're pilots, try asking for a freebie:

Honeywell (http://www.honeywelltraining.com/ats/about_customer_flight.asp)
Rockwell Collins (http://www.rockwellcollins.com/service/index.html)

Lost in Saigon

5th Jun 2009, 13:56

AS of Friday June 05/09 the official stance seems to be that NONE of the debris found belongs to AF447. It is entirely possible that they are not even in the right area. They were only searching that area because the last ACARS message was received at the approximate time they would have been in that area.

I would imagine that they are now re-thinking their search. It is possible the aircraft flew in some direction for a considerable time before being lost.

theamrad

5th Jun 2009, 13:57

Maybe as a result of our discussion, pilots will start clicking the autopilot off at altitude and get an idea of how it feels in the real airplane on a nice day. It's absurd, imho, for your first experience hand flying at FL350 to be on a dark and stormy night with half of the instruments not working and a flashlight clamped in your teeth.
I concur.

Thanks to the more Airbus avionics orientated guys for trying to make more sense of the ACARS messages for everyone.

If all speed displays are off by more than 16 kts and reliable ADR cannot be identified, switch ADR 1 and 2 off and fly pitch and N1 setting as per the 'Unreliable Speed Indication' paper checklist.

Question concerning Airbus FADEC:
Notwithstanding Safety Concerns warning, and given the earlier posts trying to explain the ACARS messages. I presume with no sign of degraded engine performance and no loss of engine indications, and that PFD flags concerned only airspeed (and possibly alt) – attitude reference was still available. I presume with A/TH disconnected – the throttles allow the setting of a specific n1(from the unreliable speed chart etc), subject to FADEC derived limits??
Also – do the FADEC units derive their main sensed data from their own dedicated sensors – or is some derived externally (ADIRU’s etc)?

p51guy - I think you are mistaken. The pitch/power tables are very rudimentary. When flying close to the coffin corner at altitude and in HEAVY turbulence, you don't stand a chance, not even if you're a stick & rudder ace.

With an unknown airspeed teetering between or exceeding beyond the upper and lower bounds of MMO and min manoeuvring !! And not everyone has the comparitive luxury of even a GPS derived ground speed which isn't dependent on a primary display.

clivewatson

5th Jun 2009, 14:25

Blacksheep - it's clear that you understand the point I was trying to make!

MR8 and greenspinner - thanks for the clarification. Yes, I accept that the radar may have been left in a dimmed condition, but I am surprised that several Airbus drivers have complained that this can easily be missed by crew.

Even if you skip the radar taxi check on a cavok day (which I can understand), there is no excuse for not carrying out a function test when you decide to use the equipment to detect weather (one falcon written off after flight into CB due to crew being unaware that the radar red did not paint).

Even if you skip this test, how on earth do you start to scan for weather if you can't see a screen because it happens to be dimmed? Surely you don't simply set a tilt angle and hope for the best? Please tell me that you don't!

Blacksheep

5th Jun 2009, 14:35

The only way anyone will know for sure what happened is when the FDR and the CVR are brought up from the bottom of the ocean. They might tell us waht happened but they won't tell us why. Even the best accident investigations rely heavily on data "interpretation" - another word for speculation. For the time being we have ACARS Data that tells us a great deal of what system failures occurred and these data at least permit our speculation to point towards a reasonable conclusion concerning the root cause.

Regarding the difference between Mmo and stall speed at high altitude, Mmo is set low in certification to ensure that the aircraft is kept clear of the edge of the envelope. There is disagreement between the authorities as to where it should properly be set - for example, the B767 Mmo is 0.84 by UKCAA rules and 0.86 by the FAA rules. The book figures are not clearly defined knife-edges.

Caudillo

5th Jun 2009, 14:38

I have no intention of speculating of the possible cause/s of this tragic accident, but I would like to ask a question that relates to the Airbus radar.

Several posters have mentioned that it is possible to have the radar "dimmed" and that this may not be noticed by the crew.

What I don't understand is how it is possible to select, test, tilt and operate the radar if it is dimmed to an extent that it prevents seeing any image or returns. Surely, in order to start any kind of scan using the radar, the image must be visible so that tilt and intensity scans can be seen and set up for the phase of flight.

Radar is not simply something that you switch on in the hope that significant returns will pop up - the display must be seen to even test and start using it - unless Airbus have some fancy system that I have not yet come accross.

Can Airbus pilots please explain the "dimming" problem that several have mentioned

Clive you're quite right. To try to give you an idea of how it works (or doesn't) In front is your ND - Nav Display, which is to the side of the PFD - Primary Flight Display, which contains horizon, altitude, speed, mode annunciators (FMAs) etc. On the ND you can toggle between overlays of weather, of GPWS terrain data, or nothing.

The dimming function doesn't refer to the operation of the weather radar itself, it simply changes the brightness of the selected overlay on your ND. So if you have is pointed right down, and turned to full brightness you be presented with a huge swathe of primary colours, mainly red. Much like the contrast of brightness on your TV you can then adjust the brightness of that colour to what is the most comfortable or least distracting. The actual functions of the weather radar itself are as I'm sure you can imagine, controlled on the weather radar panel elsewhere.

In my own experience I have found the weather radar on my Airbus fallible. A day or two before the Air France accident I flew through an area of numberous isolated CBs. All well defined in daylight in an otherwise clear blue sky and easy to spot and count by eye. Try as I might, scanning up and down with the radar for my own amusement, by my reckoning only 50% produced a return. When it did come, it was very good but for some reason others produced not a sausage. Not a problem on a day like that, but it gave me pause for thought should the same scenario be repeated with the addition of turbulence, night and embedded CBs. I do not think that a weather radar need be inoperative in order for you to fly into something.

AMF

5th Jun 2009, 14:48

backseatjock Article from today's New York Times, which links to above threads.

Investigators are pursuing a theory that excessive air speed -- potentially spurred by ice building up on electronic airspeed sensors -- contributed to the ocean crash of an Air France Airbus A330 amid heavy storms Monday, according to two industry officials familiar with the details............
.........................
If the tubes iced up, the pilots could have quickly seen sharp and rapid drops in their airspeed indicators, according to industry officials.

I'm not sure why anyone has to presuppose iced-up pitot tubes or that the cockpit airpeed indications were erroneous. Sharp and rapid decreases or increases in airspeed while within or above a CB that produces violent atmospheric shearing and/or updrafts/downdrafts are going to occur. All the cockpit indications may have been absolutely correct and shown the true picture of the situation if they were in one of the magnitude the weather picture indicates they may have been; that any aircraft's capablity to counter such very real and extremely dynamic atmospheric forces may not be enough (especially at high altitude and heavy weight where aerodynamic and performance are seriously degraded compared to even 10,000 feet lower).

To me the most telling and glaring ACARS message is the first one...Autopilot Disengament....not the flurry of messages that come a few minutes later. Something caused this. The autopilot's inability to hold altitude or being buffeted past it's pitch or roll limits will cause the AP to disengage. Given the context of where they were and the pilot's own message to his company a few minutes prior regarding turbulence, this has to be considered and from this moment the pilots were hand-flying with various flight control limiting protections against aerodymamic excesses removed.

If an aircraft also enters into an extreme updraft (such as those found inside or above a rapidly developing CB) the Autothrottle would begin to close when the airspeed rapidly rose, or the pilots might disengage it if the ATs aren't reacting as swiftly as the pilots need or want.

And if, while in an extreme updraft, the A/P disengages due to the inability to hold the selected altitude and the pilots do what we're normally trained and told to do in that abnormal situation...attempt to maintain pitch and wings level in order not to exceed AOA and load factor limits and control the speed if with thrust while letting the aircraft ride the updraft to a higher altitude (or to a lower one in the case of a downdraft)...that aircraft is going up.

But if the aircraft is already flying at it's maximum enroute altitude near the top of it's operating envelope for that loaded weight when an extreme updraft encounter begins, it could suddenly find itself higher than it should be...a thousand feet higher?...higher still?.... and therefore in a very perilous situation when it exits the updraft. If it's still being buffeted while at that higher altitude, engines spooled back due to the A/T or pilot's prior attempt to counter the indicated (and very real, not "erroneous") acceleration towards overspeed due to the shear accompanying the updraft, but now suddenly the airspeed is rapidly decaying and excess available engine thrust to stop and reverse decaying trend even more limited becaue of altitude, the situation is downright hairy.

Did this happen to this particular flight? Only the FDR will tell. But what can be said is that it's a very real and possible scenario for any heavily-loaded aircraft near to top of it's current operating envelope if it enters or flies just above a quickly developing CB.

Recovering or attempting to recover from this scenario while descending (and you MUST descend to recover) through the severe or extreme conditions inside or around the CB itself could easily result in a cascade of failures and/or failures of electronic self-monitors and sensors within the aircraft, especially if one or more engines flame out.

That "aerodynamics lost" situation is a KNOWN and ALWAYS-present threat in high-altitude flying that we mitigate through choice of crusing altitudes, routes, and actions to get ourselves away from near the edge of the performance envelope if conditions change or develop that could put us outside what was previously comfortable. It's present even with no thunderstorms within 1000 miles. If you pass into or are pushed by extreme and sudden atmospheric forces (like are found in or around CBs) into an aerodynamically unviable situation/jet upset, very few air data indications in the cockpit will be reading correctly even on a clear, sunny day after that occurs.

There's no need to pre-suppose any pitot or probe heat failures or erroneous readings as a cause for the worst happening, and icing severe enough to overcome working pitot heat would normally be found at lower levels (which would of course hamper recovery, assuming other essential structures and powerplants are still working).

And similarily, there's no need to presume a worst-possible-moment, made-for-a-disaster movie script lightning strike that coincidentally knocks out the one component you really need in a CB-avoidance situation...the radar. What can't be seen can't be avoided, and radar still has limitations even while in good working order, especially when it comes to painting the kind of young, developing cell that creates severe-to-extreme updrafts within itself up to thousands of feet above it's visible (by eye or radar) top.

Once again, mitigating the chance of encountering airborne threats is what we do, but the smaller the eye of the needle you thread while picking your way through CBs...especially in a very dynamic steady-state or developing area...the smaller the chance of mitigating it at all. The small or "soft-looking" as-seen-on-radar area you believe is the best route can quickly close up, especially if you're also seeking to avoid being directly over developing cells where the worst turb can be found. And at FL350 and heavy, any pilot should be avoiding that particular spot for that reason, because if a cell is buildng at 10,000 fpm it's a trap for envelopement. Get closed-in, and it's guaranteed your world is going to be rocked, so perhaps the only way to mitigate the threat is to quit worrying about deviating around individual cells and take the 200 or 300-mile deviation around the whole, cursed area.

To me, combined with the pilot's earlier message, the A/P disengaging first with no coinciding source/power failure messages is the biggest red flag of all. What are the possible reasons for it to do so while it's still powered and functioning? Just because it's not controlling the airplane anymore doesn't mean it isn't functioning, or that it only thinks it's being asked to do something it can't due to erroneous Air Data, iced-up sensor input. It's disengament was probably the exact thing it was designed to do under certain conditions, and unfortunately there's the very real possibility that atmospheric conditions outside the aircraft could have been dictating the show into an entenable position from that point on, or perhaps it was even at that point already.

I truly believe many are overcomplicating this. Not every aircraft accident is an overly-complicated series of many technical-issue, swiss-cheese holes. The Laws of Aerodynamics represent one, rather large one when you're mixing it with CBs.

Blacksheep

5th Jun 2009, 14:50

When it did come, it was very good but for some reason others produced not a sausage. Most likely there was no rain in them. Weather radar can only detect water droplets. If there's no water droplets in a cloud pattern, there's no return. Wx Radar isn't magic, it has to be used actively and the results interpreted, but sometimes you just don't get the data you expect.

On one occasion I was called to an aircraft departing in heavy tropical rain that returned to the stand with a weather radar defect. The pilot complained that his display was completely red. I turned the range up to 130 miles and it showed the presence of a heavy rain cell extending out to about 60 miles from the coast.

After he'd been gone the regulation thirty minutes I was able to go home for a change of clothes. :ugh:

clearedtocross

5th Jun 2009, 14:51

Does anyone know if the timestamps shown on the list are transmitted (e.g. originated in the aircraft) or added at the receiver? It might make a whole difference to the timeing of the events.
Generally fault lists are time-stamped at the originator. However, in a low bandwith situation like transmission of data on a HF-link, time and date might not be transmitted as they are not crucial for maintenance purposes. Then, serialized and delayed, the string of events in the list might be stretched or even out of order of occurence.

blackmail

5th Jun 2009, 15:00

c.tocross,

4 minutes.
bm.

incontrol6

5th Jun 2009, 15:03

Re: FADEC question. With A/TH disconnect, FADEC will command N1 based on throttle, per pre-defined power curves for flight condition (altitude, TAT, Mach). ADC is prime input for inlet TAT/Mach, but local engine sensors exist as backup.

Dysag

5th Jun 2009, 15:04

Your question was already answered in post 61: "ACARS maintenance messages are time stamped according to the event and have nothing to do with the transmission time". You must be getting old.

TripleBravo

5th Jun 2009, 15:07

P2J, thanks for your insights.

Here is (partly) the actual ATA chapters from the AMM A330 of AF (actually and currently valid for MSN660, April 1, 2009):

34-10 Air Data / Inertial Reference System (ADIRS)
34-11 Sensors, Power Supply and Switching
34-11-00 Sensors, Power Supply and Switching
34-11-15 Probe - Pitot
34-11-16 Probe - Static
34-11-17 ADM (Air Data Module)
34-11-18 Sensor - Total Temperature
34-11-19 Sensor - Angle of Attack
34-12 Air Data / Inertial Reference System (ADIRS)

And yes,
21 Air Conditioning
21-31 Pressure Control and Monitoring

Rockhound

5th Jun 2009, 15:13

Blacksheep,
But what do clouds consist of, if not of water or ice particles? OK, the wx radar will not pick up up/downdrafts or other forms of CAT inside them, but surely it would detect dense cloud. Or am I missing something?
Rockhound

Will Fraser

5th Jun 2009, 15:15

There is a pattern to AF and ABI press releases (warnings). Without the boxes, they initially (AF) reported the cause as 'Lightning'. Then the PR was 'maintain airspeed', (this interesting because the implication is the pilots were 'behind'). Now the investigators are reporting 'no 447 debris', just other 'junk'.

It doesn't take a genius to conclude that the line is not only hoping for, but trying to lay the foundation for, pilot error.

How convenient, predictable, and deceitful.

For an aircraft that makes much of its automation, to the exclusion of the necessity for brilliant airmanship, only to see such aircraft dump the flight on the humans when it can't keep up seems, what, ironic??

A33Zab

5th Jun 2009, 15:19

theamrad:

Question concerning Airbus FADEC:
Notwithstanding Safety Concerns warning, and given the earlier posts trying to explain the ACARS messages. I presume with no sign of degraded engine performance and no loss of engine indications, and that PFD flags concerned only airspeed (and possibly alt) – attitude reference was still available. I presume with A/TH disconnected – the throttles allow the setting of a specific n1(from the unreliable speed chart etc), subject to FADEC derived limits??
Also – do the FADEC units derive their main sensed data from their own dedicated sensors – or is some derived externally (ADIRU’s etc)?

GE CF6-80E1 - FADEC (ECU) is selfpowered by engine alternator when N2 > 12%.

As far as I know:
ADIRU input is used for N1 Limiting / Thrustsetting.
When A/THR is off,
Fuel Metering is proportional to T(hrust) L(ever) A(ngle)
with structural and thermal protections from its own ' Engine mounted' sensors.

A330 GE Engine Testrunner.

Admiral346

5th Jun 2009, 15:23

Rockhound,

the radar will not show "dense clouds".

Radar reflects best of water in the liquid state, very lightly of ice (hardly detectable) and not at all off of vapour.

As stated above, you need to actively scan the sky by moving tilt up and down, to hit the part of the cloud that contains the liquid water.

And the airbus I flew had a Turbulence mode on the radar, a rather unreliable gadget that was supposed to indicate areas of turbulence (in magenta), but usually did so inside a cell. And as one doesn't fly into the cell knowing that turbulence exists inside, the information was generally useless.
Don't ask me how the technical part of that radar worked, I have forgotten and don't have access to the manuals anymore...

Nic

PS: And, Rockhound, there is no CAT inside a cloud - ever. CAT stands for CLEAR air turbulence and is the term for turbulence OUTSIDE of clouds. Everybody who flies knows it is ALWAYS turbulent inside cumuliform clouds, it's just the nature of these things, it is how they are created...

Rockhound

5th Jun 2009, 15:34

Thanks, Nic. I shall now retreat back under my rock.
Rockhound

Boxkite Montgolfier

5th Jun 2009, 15:36

AMF

I am struggling a little with your concept.
If the Ap disconnect was inadvertent, would the pilots not re-engage immedietly to preserve protection integrity?
If deliberate, which I am doubtful, attention scan and workload is necessarily more demanding. Not recommended and of very doubtful assistance in a very hostile environment. I am still inclined to problems with AD sensors, for whatever reason, being causative .
I am very grateful to the many informative posts which appear to be managed in a more enlightened manner. Downloaded Weather actuals for AF447 are particularly revealing together with ACARS intepretation.
Thanks to all.
Clearly we are all hopeful that search mechanisms are reliable and successful not only for possible debris but also ultimately for FDR and CVR.

Will Fraser

5th Jun 2009, 15:48

Boxkite Montgolfier- If your language is French, would you explain your comment re a/p 'inadvertent disconnect'. Because to me that implies 'accidental'. Please tell me you didn't mean 'accidental.'

CaptJ

5th Jun 2009, 15:49

Given the sensitivity on this forum I hesitate to ask this question (Sensitivity I don't agree with BTW, there are always idiots and you can't sanction for them)

We have much discussion about the fact the A330 was likely to have been operating out of it's comfort zone at FL350 at this point in the flight. Pretty much in Coffin corner.

So the question is "Given the same route and passenger/freight loading would the A340-300 be operating with a greater speed margin at FL350"?.
I sort of expect it would, being a longer range aircraft, but hard information has been surprisingly hard to find.
(This question is prompted by the IB flight going through at FL370)

regards

Futura Rider

5th Jun 2009, 15:49

It seems as though Airbus is suggesting, through their "airspeed" warning to pilots, that they think one of the links in the chain of events that led to the loss of AF447 is the pilots flying in severe/extreme turb. with the autothrottles engaged instead of flying the recommended turbulence power setting with the A/T off?

clearedtocross

5th Jun 2009, 15:51

If you know for sure that events on ACARS are timestamped and transmitted with the message, then that answers my question nicely.
If you just quote what others have heard, said or posted, then your remark is not really helpful. I am might be getting older, yes, however a career in computer engineering has left me to take nothing for granted, most certainly not a sequence of fault messages created by a cluster of dying computers and then transmitted serially through a small bandwith expensive communication line.
cheers, oldie

zekettledrum

5th Jun 2009, 15:51

Will Fraser

5th Jun 2009, 15:52

Futura Rider- This is a blunder by ABI. In attempting to finger the crew, they forget that the a/p was flying the a/c, and that after the disengage, the pilots goofed by not maintaining proper speeds. AS IF. Any release by AF or ABI will have this complexion: 'Airbus cupable? mais non'

Starbear

5th Jun 2009, 15:54

Hopefully, this might be the first bit of good news. Just surprised it hadn't been mentioned or suggested by authorities before now. BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/8085539.stm)

Lost in Saigon

5th Jun 2009, 15:55

(This question is prompted by the IB flight going through at FL370)

Aircraft flying at higher altitudes can simply mean they are carrying fewer passengers and cargo.

avspook

5th Jun 2009, 16:01

The weather radar system will collect returns from precipitation to activate and acquire a paint the precipitation has to be moving and measurable by Doppler Effect. The higher the Doppler Effect the faster the precip is moving allowing the different colours to be displayed.

It will not pick up hail very well as it is a 'stealthy' circular shape allowing only a single point on the spherical hail to provide a return.

The radar range is affected by the time the radar beam travels out to target & returns so for the same measurable display the radar gain has to be increased as the returning signal is weaker. (STC Sensitivity Time Control)

IF the beam is entirely reflected by Extreme precipitation the backside display of the weather Can look clear (Black) the crew temptation would be to cut across the thin line of 'bad' weather to reach the calm beyond.

What is actually beyond is Hell.
Updated radars detect this as A PAC alert (Path attenuation Compensation) Along with The TURB Mode & PWS these are calculated figures within the radar.

They are best guess logic only but best guess based on years of experience and engineering & meteorological calculation.

The radar pic presented to the crew Has to be interpreted; the same display in Iowa has to be treated differently than in Hong Kong.

As a side note this is the second Airbus down with what pre investigation appears to be erroneous sensor data (ANZ A320 AOA - admittedly with apparent crew contribution)

theamrad

5th Jun 2009, 16:01

Incontrol6 and A33ZAB - thanks for confirming/clarifying that point

Although I don't to speculate in AF447's case specifically - wouldn't failure of a FADEC sensed value, from an AD source for example, causing 'reversion' to an alternate/backup mode generate an ECAM and/or ACARS message. (Such as 744 ÉICAS message ENG 1 EEC MODE, for example).

AMF

5th Jun 2009, 16:01

Boxkite Montgolfier AMF

I am struggling a little with your concept.
If the Ap disconnect was inadvertent, would the pilots not re-engage immedietly to preserve protection integrity?

Boxkite,

Among other ways, most autopilots will disengage themselves if the aircraft begins rolling or pitching due to outside forces to outside pre-defined limit built into the autopilot itself.

The same is true if it's set to hold a particular altitude but outside forces or decaying airspeed/high AOA approaching a stall exceeds the autopilot's ability to maintain that altitude. Therefore, it's set to disengage by design, accompanied by a warning to the pilots that essentially tells them "you're flying the airplane now".

It should also be mentioned that most generic procedures for inadvertent CB penetration call for de-selecting the Altitude Hold function of the Autopilot even if it remains engaged to allow variations in altitude occur due to extreme updrafts and downdrafts. This is so the AP doesn't keep running pitch control/trim servos to max limits in the futile attempt of trying to maintain a selected altitude which could result in overstress and/or far out-of-trim situations. Perhaps someone here could post what the A330 QRH/AFM procedure calls for with regard to Alt Hold if encountering a CB/Severe Turb?

These limits are designed into autopilots so it doesn't try and overstress the aircraft or keep trying to fly it when the wing stops flying, so through engineering they limit how far it can respond with control surface deflections. In the closed thread, others have posted what those particular pitch, roll, etc. limits are for the Airbus 330-200 aircraft. In severe or extreme turbulence, it's very possible the aircraft was pitching or rolling up to, and beyond, one or more of these internal trip points.

And an autopilot will lock-out engagement (or re-engagement) if you're handflying flying outside of these built-in parameters. So if violent pitching or rolling was/is occuring, you can select engagement as many times as you want but it won't because it needs to see all the parameters met for its engagement first.

Hope that clears up your question, and explains my line of thinking as to why it's the big, red flag of this event.

avspook

5th Jun 2009, 16:05

G- Switch or manually activated 121.5/243/406 MHZ type

Lost in Saigon

5th Jun 2009, 16:06

The reports regarding debris seem to be completely contradicting each other. The Brazilian Air Force has been quoted as saying they have not collected anything which belonged to AF447, yet the French Air Force are quoted as saying that life vests and chunks of the plane and baggage containers have been collected.

I believe it was the Brazilians who found life vests and a WOODEN cargo pallet. Two things that boats usually carry. They are now saying that they don't belong to AF447.

Unless you can provide an official press release from The French Air Force saying otherwise, it appears that nothing has been found yet.

TripleBravo

5th Jun 2009, 16:09

One extra bit, which I cannot remember to have been posted yet. With these prerequisites
sea surface temperature was reported to be 27 - 28 degC, that is ISA+13.
cruise speed M.82 (my assumption, to be corrected)
weight approx. 210 t (took the same like snaproll3480)the actual AF A330 QRM says for ISA+15

MAX AND OPT ALT FL357

ENGINE ANTI ICE ON -1100 FT
TOTAL ANTI ICE ON -1300 FT

Now, go figure what might happen when they had to
manually fly with alternate law (hence without stall protection) in turbulent air
tried to fix the assumed possible sensor icing (whichever) with total anti ice on...MAX ALT would be reduced to FL344 (in clean air, that is), which means it was near impossible to keep the plane from stalling. Even if my numbers are slightly incorrect for the actual flight, the turbulences they encountered surely would have taken away every margin they might have had.

To me, this would be enough to draw the deadly picture.

avspook

5th Jun 2009, 16:27

theamrad (http://www.pprune.org/members/132354-theamrad)
Both Aircraft B744 & A330 FADEC (EEC’s) Units separately develop their own independent air data information for use in engine parameter calculations.

They are not tied into the navigation air data system

theamrad

5th Jun 2009, 16:48

Ok avspook - I knew that in the case of the 744 - just using the EICAS message as an example. So with A330 - loss of AD means no effect on FADEC and therefore no messages generated :ok:.

Starbear

5th Jun 2009, 16:54

There is much talk of this aeroplane possibly being operated above optimum altitude or in "coffin corner" but so far I have not seen any reference to the obvious remedy.

I refer only to a serviceable aeroplane here but if anyone finds themselves with insufficient thrust to maintain speed through turbulence when above optimum altitude or above severe turbulence recommended levels, there is always the option of descent.

If it is serious and immediate enough such that speed is decaying even with max thrust, forget clearances, forget everything except getting that nose pointing downwards, with appropriate max thrust, to recover speed. Turn off track; use TCAS; anything but get that speed margin back, pronto but by definition the margin to MMO will be very small initially.

If significant unserviceabilities are added to the equation, the problems will magnify hugely but the basic principle remains.

Question: Does anyone advocate or ever been taught to use speedbrake to recover from MMO exceedances? I have found conflicting information in certain manufacturer's training manuals. I see a benefit in using a rapid application of speedbrake against thrust in certain conditions and perhaps avoid speed then reducing too far with consequent lag in thrust application again.

Broomstick Flier

5th Jun 2009, 17:01

BBB,

According to the ATC flight plan retreived from CFMU files, and which I have seen on another website, the filed speed was indeed M82.

I found the link to the image, here is it:

http://www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/flightplan.gif

Tree

5th Jun 2009, 17:12

One question.
Will an excessively high G load during flight trigger an ACARS maint. message?
Thank you.

Safety Concerns

5th Jun 2009, 17:18

I don't think anybody has gone directly after the crew. However after going back over all the officially/unofficially (acars info) released information it does seem that the press at least are being driven in one direction.

I cannot remember any accident where acars data was released so quickly even if as a supposed unofficial leak which has greatly upset Air France.
Even then the data is supplied from a search function in a company software database and clips off anything prior to the flight.

Considering maintenance performed prior to the tragic Helios, Spanair and Excel flights was made openly public I do wonder what maintenance if any was performed on this aircraft prior to the RIO-CDG leg and why nothing has been mentioned?

You normally get some sort of statement.

Futura Rider

5th Jun 2009, 17:21

Will Fraiser-

Understood. (my earlier reply seems to have been deleted so I'll leave the commentary out.)

Would the A/P being on make any difference in the recommended use of A/T in sev/extr turb?
I seem to recall that the A/T systems in airbus' have an advanced algorithm for dealing with windshear & turb.?
Did/does AB and/or AF recommend leaving the A/T engaged for sev. or extr. turb.?

hellsbrink

5th Jun 2009, 17:29

Safety Concerns

If I remember right, the original statements from Air France said that the last maintainence AF447 had was back in April. Nothing about anything done in Rio before the ill-fated flight.

carolosm

5th Jun 2009, 17:47

hi all i have a question. i fly the 727 and when i am down to battery power the pitot are not heated . is this the same for the 330???? if so no wonder the computers got wrong information.

thanks

Mark in CA

5th Jun 2009, 18:02

AP is reporting a memo from AF to pilots saying the airline is replacing pitot tubes on all medium- and long-haul AirBus aircraft with newer models within the next few weeks:

Air France says it's replacing flight instruments - Yahoo! News (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090605/ap_on_re_la_am_ca/brazil_plane_142)

wes_wall

5th Jun 2009, 18:06

Could there be a good possibility that the airplane may have gone down intact. I suggest this on the thus far slow or lack of discovery of a debris footprint. Had the airplane failed at altitude, given the altitude, speed, and winds aloft, then one could reasonably expect an extended area of debris which would track with the airplane as it descended. It would therefore be quite large, and I doubt it would have been difficult to locate.

To compare, I recall all too well the Lockerbie situation with the inflight breakup of PA and the area that was affected. The heavy portion fell in the village, and nearby area, but countless other items extended for miles. Some large, some small.

On the other hand, MS990 created only two relatively small debris field in the Atlantic. One 62 X 66 meters, and the other 83 X 73. This airplane entered the water mostly intact. Radar coverage made it quickly discovered.

vapilot2004

5th Jun 2009, 18:17

It would be helpful to the readability and usefulness of this thread if posters would kindly refrain from quoting "newspaper", "news media", "Network XYZ aviation experts", etc theories on what happened to AF447. These articles and posits are highly speculative and authored by people that most likely have less knowledge of transport category aircraft operations than our cabin crew.

Your cooperation will assist in keeping this thread on at least a soft focus.

Reports of new information are of course most welcome.

forget

5th Jun 2009, 18:19

AP is reporting a memo from AF to pilots saying the airline is replacing pitot tubes on all medium- and long-haul AirBus aircraft with newer models within the next few weeks:

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes
AD/A330/1 Pitot Probes 12/2002

Background: The French Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile has advised that operators have reported loss or fluctuation of airspeed when flying through extreme meteorological conditions. Further to an investigation, the presence of ice crystals and/or water exceeding the current limits of the initial specification of Rosemount pitot probes P/N 0851GR is considered the most probable cause of these airspeed discrepancies.

This Directive requires the installation of pitot probes meeting more stringent
qualification requirements.

Barry James Reid McKay

Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
17 October 2002

http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_assets/main/airworth/airwd/adfiles/over/a330/a330-001.pdf

Safety Concerns

5th Jun 2009, 18:23

@vapilot2004 you are probably correct but replacement of all pitot probes and confirmed by Air France is relevant.

The article says the process has been "ongoing" and should be complete within a few weeks.

Therefore I expect one of the first questions tomorrow by a journalist to be "have they been replaced on AF447 and if so when?"

I will refrain from speculation until that question has been answered. However the manner and format of the acars messages is lets say non conventional.

skytrax

5th Jun 2009, 18:42

Forgive if Im wrong but this directive regarding the pitot tubes is from 2002 and this plane we are talking about left Tolouse in 2005.

DCrefugee

5th Jun 2009, 18:43

One item I've not seen enter the discussion:

Based on the flight plan posted on Tim Vasquez' excellent discussion (http://www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/), the following jumped at me:

"INTOL/M082F350 UN873 SALPU/M082F370 UN873..."

Decoded, this means the flight intended to cross INTOL at Mach 0.82 and FL350, proceed along the UN873 airway and cross SALPU at Mach 0.82 and FL370. In other words, the canned flight plan called for a cruise climb from FL350 to FL370 between INTOL and SALPU and before disappearing.

Do we know if this cruise-climb was performed? If it was, would not the A330 have been even more deeply embedded into its "coffin corner?"

DCr

forget

5th Jun 2009, 18:47

........ directive regarding the pitot tubes is from 2002 and this plane we are talking about left Tolouse in 2005.

Correct, but perhaps the fix wasn't ...... a fix.

Airbubba

5th Jun 2009, 18:56

Precise digital presentations of max and min speeds were first available on the 320 have made the term redundant.

Actually, these presentations were available on the A306/A310 years before the A320 flew, right?

skytrax

5th Jun 2009, 18:57

Well, by the time this plane was made that fix should hv been fixed. Airbus had three years to start using the new pitot tubes.

Interflug

5th Jun 2009, 19:09

Is there a possibility, that the actual ZFW of the plane was substantially higher than calculated and entered in the FMC?

Putt

5th Jun 2009, 19:10

I'm an old radar guy (not a pilot) and I'd like to offer the following.
Display Color Rainfall Density
RED 12mm/hr or greater (about 1/2 inch/hr)
YELLOW 4 - 12mm/hr
GREEN 1 -4mm/hr

The Doppler mode detects the mezzo-cyclones within a cell by measuring the horizontal motion of the raindrops. The RDR-4A used a dual pulse signal for doppler. It measured the change in spacing (time) between the transmitted pulse pair and its reflected pulse pair. It could detect anything greater than 6 meters per second and display that in MAGENTA.
For those of you who like to play with GAIN control (if you have one) should know that when you change gain your display colors are no longer CALIBRATED!!
Regarding AF447, if they did encounter ice, it's possible that ice may have accumulated on the radome, and potentially may have attenuated the radar signal. That could explain how the radar could become inaffective without an actual failure.
I flew with a DC-10 Captain some years ago who asked me why the radar quit just when he needed it the most. He had attempted to land at IAH and hit what he said was a solid wall of water. He told me that the radar displayed a narrow band of noise and nothing beyond. Well, a solid wall of water would certainly attenuate the radar's signal, hence no returns beyond.
Hope this helps a little.

latetonite

5th Jun 2009, 19:17

To Starbear:

I would not hesitate to use speedbrakes in order to slow down from an "speed going in the zipper" condition. I stand to be corrected.

golfyankee

5th Jun 2009, 19:21

Being meanwhile retired after more then 35 years of service in an european ATC / UAC centre I have a question to the professionals posting & reading here : a/c sending problem reports like AF about electric things, pressure loss etc., do they not transmit same time coordinates lat/lon where things happen ? kind rgds, golfyankee

poison

5th Jun 2009, 19:21

Ladies and Gentlemen,

According to some of the data that Air France maintenance received in the last 4 minutes of AF447, I believe that the first ECAM that the crew may have received was NAV ADR Disagree. This would have been a level 2 warning. This particular ECAM warning would have had serious implications and would have been followed by a series of warnings.

When you have a NAV ADR Disagree, the ECAM action will ask you to check your airspeed and if it is erroneous then you should proceed with the ADR Check Procedure. But more ECAM warnings will now follow.

The next ECAM should have been Flt CTRL Alternate Law (Prot Lost). This would have been picked up by one of the Prims and the result of this now is that the Autopilot will disconnect. With the disconnection of the autopilot the priority of the ECAM will place Auto Flight AP OFF at the top and in red. Note that that the ACARS sent back Rudder Travel Limiter Fault, well this is one of the inop systems in the Alternate Law which follows the ADR Disagree.

If this was the sequence that the ECAM presented itself to the crew, the situation would have been very confusing and even for the most experienced of Airbus Pilots it would be difficult to handle correctly.

Assuming that this was the sequence, the Auto pilot was now disconnected and not recoverable at this time. Applying the ECAM action correctly is critical. After the auto pilot is cleared from the ECAM the next would be the NAV ADR disagree. But you would now have to check to see which ADR or ADRS are causing the problem. Remember the ECAM does not tell you Unreliable Airspeed so if there is a discrepancy then the next thing to apply is the memory item for unreliable airspeed.

AP/FD OFF
Auto Thr OFF

They were in level flight so the rest of the items need not be mentioned. Next would be to check what the GPS is showing as speed and altitude. Now you can proceed with the ADR Check procedure.

With the Alternate Law situation which resulted in the NAV ADR Disagree, Alternate Law is latched and resetting the Prims will not change the aircraft back to Normal Law.

Did ice cause this? Let us look at a case which only happend a year ago to QR somewhere in Asia. Airbus was well aware of a phenomenon of supercooled water droplets which exists in CBs and in areas around the CBs. These supercooled water droplets can adhere to an airframe/engine even at temperatures below -40C. QR suffered a dual engine flameout as a result of this. And Airbus has now mapped out particular areas of the world where this phenomenon is known to occur. It lies along the ITCZ, Sri Lanka and near the Philipines. Heavy icing is known to exist in these parts of the world.

The action of the crew with the erroneous airspeed is the most important thing that everyone needs to know. In the memory items the auto thrust would have been OFF and now the real speed of the aircraft would increase and be well beyond the turbulence penetration speed of .80. The MMO is .86 and the MD would be at .90. Did the crew set the correct N1 on the engines as indicated in the unreliable airspeed tables? Did they retard the thrust and stall when they were in Alternate Law? There are too many variables here to pinpoint exactly what occurred. But I do believe that Airbus is now on the right track.

vapilot2004

5th Jun 2009, 19:28

@GY

Lat/Lon data is generally not part of automated maintenance type messages, although the equipment can be programmed to append such data for dispatch purposes.

@Safety Concerns

Yes of course, new information is always welcome.

My request was aimed at eliminating the mass media's spewing of speculative garbage that was getting copied and pasted into our discussion.

grizzled

5th Jun 2009, 19:31

To be found, or not to be found . . .

If not located in the next few weeks, finding the aircraft -- and the FDR and CVR -- will become a function of the will to do so (time, money, political input). The required technology and equipment exist and will be made available as long as the will exists to continue location and recovery efforts.

PPRuNe Radar

5th Jun 2009, 19:34

"INTOL/M082F350 UN873 SALPU/M082F370 UN873..."

Decoded, this means the flight intended to cross INTOL at Mach 0.82 and FL350, proceed along the UN873 airway and cross SALPU at Mach 0.82 and FL370. In other words, the canned flight plan called for a cruise climb from FL350 to FL370 between INTOL and SALPU and before disappearing.

Do we know if this cruise-climb was performed? If it was, would not the A330 have been even more deeply embedded into its "coffin corner?"

Nope, it means that after SALPU the flight is requesting a level change to FL370. Any change in level would be issued by ATC (whether a cruise climb or not) and would be dependent on other traffic and whether the pilot actually wanted a level change or not from his current level. The pilot wouldn't change level on his own initiative, unless complying with Loss of Communications procedures. In that case there are criteria for making the level change, and based on the filed FPL, it would not occur until after passing SALPU.

connector

5th Jun 2009, 19:56

It looks like, all pitot tubes on 320,330, 340
have to be replaced to another type
within 2 weeks.

llagonne66

5th Jun 2009, 19:59

Connector,
Alert TD on all Airbusses
It looks like, all pitot tubes on 320,330, 340
have to be replaced to another type
within 2 weeks.

Any reliable source (EASA / FAA / Airbus) for such a stringent action ?

safetypee

5th Jun 2009, 20:02

Many people are using the ACARs data at ‘face value’ without considering what precisely is indicated. What does the pitot readout mean; e.g. is it an indication of pressure mismatch or a failure of the anti icing heater system, etc?
Depending on what and how a problem is detected by the fault system, the specific problem could range from an electrical failure (heater), a leak, or icing (data mismatch). Speculation might then be based on the better understanding of these aspects .

I am familiar with icing problems with TAT probes. Some probe types suffered from ice ingestion in similar met conditions to those reported. These probes did not fail, but because the airflow path was restricted by micro ice crystals the probe erroneously measured ‘0’ deg C – the temperature of the static ice, opposed to the dynamic airflow flow. Presumably, without knowledge of a comparison or memory value, this would not trigger a ACARs fault.
Thus in these rare conditions, TAT can change value significantly (-50 to 0) without change in aircraft condition; whereas ‘Classic’ pitot icing normally traps pressure and a problem is not identified until there is a change in the aircraft state – speed / altitude.

Aircraft with multiple TAT probes could encounter either single or multiple problems. Systems using TAT information (e.g. ADC) might be able to identify a difference in TAT values and thus ‘flag’ a fault, but often (with single systems) the erroneous TAT is used by the aircraft systems.
It may be of interest to understand where and how TAT is used in the A330 and, together with the pitot system, how faults are generated. e.g. does the ADC use TAT for Mach / Alt correction? Would a mismatch of erroneous TAT cause the ADC’s to ‘miscompare’ – the resulting fault leading to the reported FGC, rudder limiting, and control ‘faults’?

The conditions for TAT probe icing can be encountered at considerable distances from a Cb; they are not easily identifiable with WXR, simultaneous aircraft icing is unlikely. The very fine ice particles (occasionally mixed with water) can be found in and below the anvil of large storms, hence a deviation of 20-30nm from the Cb core might not be sufficient to minimise the icing risks.

LYKA

5th Jun 2009, 20:10

Someone mentioned earlier in the thread about AFR dispatch route planning and Briefing material given to crews. I am curious to learn about say an FAA co-authority dispatch method on this type of route vs. say the EU driven (or lack thereof) approach. Under the FAA system is the route more likely to be 'modified' due to FCST ENRTE WX? I believe that the EU system is most likely 'company route' driven with little or no consideration as to potential SVR ENRTE WX.

connector

5th Jun 2009, 20:15

LLAGONNE66

Its on Yahoo-news.

vapilot2004

5th Jun 2009, 20:21

@ vapilot2004
but wouldn´t it be worth an idea to think about ? rgds, gy

In this case, yessir, last known Lat/Lon info would have been very helpful for SAR. :ok:

Tail Chase

5th Jun 2009, 20:25

Gentlemen,
In view of the somewhat contradicting information released so far in the media, I think that it would not be a bad idea to provide a brief re-cap regarding the AF447 SAR effort. Most of the information was collected from Brazilian AF and Brazilian Navy press releases, with some B/C work with local contacts

June 1
a) At 0230LT/01062009 a C-130H staging through SBRF and an Embraer P-95 maritime patrol acft based at SBSV were enlisted to perform the initial SAR effort;
b) At 1908LT/01062009, the following additional SAR assets were called-up:
- 01 x Sikorsky UH-60L Black Hawk to SBNT;
- 01 x SC-95C (SAR version of the EMB-110P2) to SBNT;
- 01 x CASA C-295M SAR-configured acft to SBNT;
- 01 x Eurocopter AS332M SAR-configured helicopter to SBNT;
- 01 x C-130E to SBNT with SAR rescue teams;
- 01 x C-130H to SBFN, backtracking along AF447s flight path from GCLP to SBFN;
c) At 1930LT/01062009 Embraer R-99B 6751 SIGINT/ELINT acft was enlisted to aid in the AF447 SAR effort;
d) On 01062009 During the day the Brazilian Navy deployed the ocean patrol vessel NPa Grajau, the corvette Cv Caboclo and the frigate Constituição to assist in the search effort. The last mentioned ship was deployed with a Super Lynx ASu/ASW helicopter configured for SAR work.

June 2
a) At 0029LT/02062009 The Brazilian AF stated that the crew of a TAM flight inbound to Brazil spotted "luminous points" on the ocean's surface within the boundaries of the Dakar ACC
b) At 0100LT/02062009 Brazilian AF R-99B 6751's synthetic aperture radar plotted metallic and non-metallic debris floating on the ocean surface roughly 650km NE of SBFN;
c) At 0649LT/02062009 Brazilian AF C-130H 2466 and C-130H 2474 made visual contact with debris plotted by R-99B 6751's SAR. The debris fields were approximately 59km apart and roughly south of AF447's flight path. The debris fields contained an aircraft passenger seat, an orange float or buoy, a drum or cylinder, several small unidentified white-colored items and oil/jet fuel slicks.
d) At 1220LT/02062009 Brazilian AF SAR acft sighted small white parts and wiring roughly 700 km NE of SBFN, as well as patches of oil along a 5-km long strip.
d) On 02062009 In the morning, of the five merchant vessels called to assist in the SAR effort (MV Lexa Maersk, MV Jo Cedar, MV UAL MTEXAS, MV Douce France and Stolt Inspiration) two had arrived at the general area where the two initial debris fields were spotted
e) On 02062009 The Brazilian Navy deployed a second frigate - the Bosisio - as well as a tanker ship.
f) At 2100LT/02062009 A KC-130H 2462 departed SBGL to SBNT to join the SAR effort.
g) At 2140LT/02062009 A C-130H departed SBAF to SBNT to join the SAR effort.
h) On 02062009 A USN P-3C Orion detached to Costa Rica was deployed to SBNT to join the SAR effort
i) On 02062009 A AdlA Dassault Falcon 50MER was deployed, from Dakar to SBNT to join the search effort.
j) On 02062009 Brazilian AF R-99B 6751 ELINT/SIGINT acft and an Embraer P-95C 7100 maritime patrol aircraft were deployed to SBFN

June 3
a) At 0340LT/03062009 Brazilian AF R-99B 6751 ELINT/SIGINT acft plotted four small debris fields approximately 90 km South of the other debris fields located the previous day. One of these debris fields, approximately 5-km in diameter, contained several unidentifiable objects. Other items that were plotted included a 7-meter long object, 10 smaller metallic objects and a 20-km long oil slick;
b) As of sunrise/03062009 Three Brazilian AF C-130Hs, one USN P-3C and an AdlA Dassault Falcon MER departed SBNT to perform search patterns over and adjacent to the debris fields plotted over the preceding 36-hours, as well as continuing with planned search patterns;
c) Morning/03062009 Brazilian Navy patrol ship NPa Grajau arrived at the search area, initiating a “toothcomb” search pattern over a 120-km area centered on the 5-km debris field plotted earlier by R-99B 6751.
d) Afternoon/03062009 Brazilian Navy corvette Cv Caboclo arrived at the search area
e) Evening/03062009 The six aircraft directly engaged in SAR tasks had covered 176.984 sq km
f) Late Afternoon/03062009 The three MVs engaged in SAR work departed the search area.

June 4
a) Early morning/04062009 Brazilian AF R-99B plotted new debris fields SE of the St.Paul & St. Peter Rocks
b) As of sunrise/04062009 Three Brazilian AF C-130Hs, one USN P-3C and an AdlA Dassault Falcon MER departed SBNT to perform search patterns over and adjacent to the debris fields plotted over the preceding 36-hours, as well as continuing with planned search patterns;
c) As of sunrise/04062009 Brazilian AF UH-60L Black Hawk executed a search pattern 110-km NE of SBFN
d) 1140LT/04062009 A Brazilian AF C-130H sighted a new debris field some 550 km from SBFN, vectoring Brazilian Navy frigate Constituição to the area. That ship’s Super Lynx was launched to retrieve items from that debris field, which included a wood pallet bed and buoys. It was ascertained that neither were linked to AF447.
e) Afternoon/04062009 Brazilian Navy Frigate Constituição sighted a large oil slick some 80km from the site it had earlier been vectored to, the ship collecting oil samples for later analysis.
f) Evening/03062009 Aircraft directly engaged in SAR tasks had covered 185.349 sq km

June 5
a) Morning/05062009 An AdlA Breguet Atlantic joined the SAR effort
b) Morning/05062009 Degenerating weather conditions (thunder showers, sea state 3 and visibility of 4km ) were expected to hinder scheduled aircraft search missions

Cheers

wes_wall

5th Jun 2009, 20:29

TV CNN press reporting BEA to hold 2 hour briefing tomorrow (Saturday)

aguadalte

5th Jun 2009, 20:48

Quote:
"INTOL/M082F350 UN873 SALPU/M082F370 UN873..."

Decoded, this means the flight intended to cross INTOL at Mach 0.82 and FL350, proceed along the UN873 airway and cross SALPU at Mach 0.82 and FL370. In other words, the canned flight plan called for a cruise climb from FL350 to FL370 between INTOL and SALPU and before disappearing.

Do we know if this cruise-climb was performed? If it was, would not the A330 have been even more deeply embedded into its "coffin corner?"

Nope, it means that after SALPU the flight is requesting a level change to FL370. Any change in level would be issued by ATC (whether a cruise climb or not) and would be dependent on other traffic and whether the pilot actually wanted a level change or not from his current level. The pilot wouldn't change level on his own initiative, unless complying with Loss of Communications procedures. In that case there are criteria for making the level change, and based on the filed FPL, it would not occur until after passing SALPU.
(my underlining)

PPRUNE Radar:
The pilot shall proceed in accordance with the last received and acknowledged oceanic
clearance, including level and speed, to the last specified oceanic route point, normally
landfall, then continue on the filed flight plan route. The pilot shall maintain the last assigned
oceanic level and speed to landfall and, after passing the last specified oceanic route point;
the pilot shall conform with the relevant State procedures/regulations.

patrickal

5th Jun 2009, 20:48

Alert TD on all Airbusses
It looks like, all pitot tubes on 320,330, 340
have to be replaced to another type
within 2 weeks.

From a manufacturing point of view, is this possible? Are these common interchangable parts? Are they common stock items available in such quantities?

Lyman Zerga

5th Jun 2009, 20:56

My outfit has retrofitted all 330/340 machines with Backup Speed Scale function. In a nutshell, if unsure which ADR(s) is/are faulty, switch them all off and- voila! Keep the "speed" out of red by using power and attitude (note: two red bands, one above, one below the speed reference line on speed tape). Altitude displayed is derived from GPS.

I'm just curious whether this particular MSN had the same retrofit done or not.

connector

5th Jun 2009, 21:17

Patrickal:)

Its no big deal to replace a couple of pitot/tubes
on an AiRBUS.
Lets say, 4-5 hours, including test.
But like you say, are there spares?
In situations like this, the manufactor is not able,
to follow the demand.
Maybe, they are not even finished, to design the probe.
But they have "talked" to Airbus about it.
I like EASA, but its like a "postoffice",
Things take time.:ugh:

TripleBravo

5th Jun 2009, 21:25

Sure, the MAX ALT given by QRH incorporates some margin.

http://img189.imageshack.us/img189/9929/qrh409.th.png (http://img189.imageshack.us/my.php?image=qrh409.png)http://img190.imageshack.us/img190/8923/qrh501.th.png (http://img190.imageshack.us/my.php?image=qrh501.png)

What I wanted to point out is that they were most probably at the limit for normal ops. In my mind I do add some turbulence, AP loss including stall protection loss and some techincal problems to take care for (and to subtract attention) during a stormy night. I think every pilot would be at his / her utter limits.

As a probable cause I don't need any lightning or bomb, just too less margin with unexpected trouble, causing distraction.

Danimal

5th Jun 2009, 21:26

News reg ADIRU from AF: in a message to all pilots they informed that they will replace all ADIRUS in the A330 fleet with another make.
Interesting, since we know that those ones are not the same make as the QF ones.
Message is from 2200 MET via AP.

Danny

aguadalte

5th Jun 2009, 21:30

I'm sure AF447 was ADS equipped. We do know that CPDLC and ADS are only on test in the Atlantico and Dakar FIR. We have being using CPDLC with Dakar on a test basis for quite a long time now, and one logs-in 45 to 15 minutes before the entry point. Would it be possible to know if Atlantico or at least Senegalese ATC have had any ADS reports from the AF447? That would help...

fred bloggs

5th Jun 2009, 21:37

AP/FD OFF
Auto Thr OFF

They were in level flight so the rest of the items need not be mentioned. Next would be to check what the GPS is showing as speed and altitude. Now you can proceed with the ADR Check procedure.
Poison a very good post IMHO but what do you mean by the underlined section please?

As I read the Unreliable A/S C/L even in crz you are obliged to set CLB detent power and 5 degree pitch after the initial actions above but before any diagnosis. This ensures that the A/C is safe surely? Yes it will climb but you will not stall and not overspeed. The C/L will next lead into approx 80% N1 & 2.5 degree pitch NU. (On a 320 )

TripleBravo

5th Jun 2009, 21:40

Thanks Broomstick for the flight plan.

Starbear:
I refer only to a serviceable aeroplane here but if anyone finds themselves with insufficient thrust to maintain speed through turbulence when above optimum altitude or above severe turbulence recommended levels, there is always the option of descent.
In that case that could have meant into the real soup.

fykar

5th Jun 2009, 21:41

Quote:
So the question is "Given the same route and passenger/freight loading would the A340-300 be operating with a greater speed margin at FL350"?.

The answer is NO

Ex Cargo Clown

5th Jun 2009, 21:42

set CLB detent power and 5 degree pitch after the initial actions above but before any diagnosis. This ensures that the A/C is safe surely? Yes it will climb but you will not stall and not overspeed.

Are you sure about that ? At Max Alt ???

:ugh: :ugh:

Mad (Flt) Scientist

5th Jun 2009, 21:47

Regarding claims for impending ADs:

EASA AD List in date order (http://ad.easa.europa.eu/)

As of time off posting (which is after EOB in Europe today of course) NO EASA ADs issued in the last several days regarding A330. If any are issued they will end up here pretty quickly.

fred bloggs

5th Jun 2009, 22:06

Are you sure about that ? At Max Alt ???

At max alt no it will probably not climb a lot but what are the options?

The important thing to remember with unreliable airspeed is to carry out the initial actions before any diagnosis. If you get bogged down in fault finding you will almost certainly lose control of the a/c. The C/L does not (IMHO) specify phase of flight for the memory items.

vento0

5th Jun 2009, 22:07

IMHO very good post from Poison, he knows the bus well.

for fredd blogs... he probably meant that the rest of the memory items did not apply for that portion of the flight, if I am not mistaking are:
FLAPS MANTAIN CONFIGURATION, SPEED BRAKES CHECK RETRACTED, L/G UP WHEN AIRBORNE....

5 degrees pitch and CLB THRUST is a memory item if you are above thrust reduction altitude and FL100, but if you are in cruise you have to check the QRH for the correct values. For the 320 are btw 1.5 and 2.5 pitch up and 83 to 87% N1

fred bloggs

5th Jun 2009, 22:14

5 degrees pitch and CLB THRUST is a memory item if you are above thrust reduction altitude and FL100, but if you are in cruise you have to check the QRH for the correct values. For the 320 are btw 1.5 and 2.5 pitch up and 83 to 87% N1

Vent0 thanks but my point is where does it say NOT to do the memory items when in CRZ?

I ask as I am trying to find out as opposed to arguing with you or Poison.

(Your figures are of course weight dependent so mine were approx)

TripleBravo

5th Jun 2009, 22:22

I do not see / understand
TCAS antenna fault (I do not see any reasoning from the actual message.)
all three inertial references fault (just speaking about IR2, no?)
all static ports (understood at least one 341115, but all?)
how it is derived that the gyro of ISIS is brokenCould somebody enlighten my knowledge about ACARS messages please?

aguadalte

5th Jun 2009, 22:24

I´m not an bus-driver, but isn´t pitch and power performance?
Back to basics? Or doesn´t it work that way in an airbus.....?

testpanel:

02:11Z:
Failure of all three ADIRUs
Failure of gyros of ISIS (attitude information lost)

...and where will you get the pitch attitude?

Starbear

5th Jun 2009, 22:25

In that case that could have meant into the real soup.

Yes indeed, that is possible but if you don't recover that speed then you are going into that soup one way or another.

My original comments were intended as genera,l when "caught out" above optimum altitude, rather than specific to this case as I am determined to avoid personal speculation.

But one would hope/assume that in taking action to recover the speed by descent then due attention would also be given to try and avoid the worst of any CB activity and yes I am aware that if speed was so slow, then any turning manoeuvre is going to exacerbate the problem or at least delay the sped recovery. In such circumstances one can only try to strike the best balance and at that moment speed is king. I believe.

vento0

5th Jun 2009, 22:25

sorry fredd I did not mean to argue just to help.

I meant that memory items on the bus fleets are not many, and in the case of UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION/ADR CHECK PROC apart from the common ones that Poison gave the attitudes and thrust settings are MEMORY only for the first part of the flight (take off and climb).

I guess Airbus thinks that in cruise you will be able to pull out the QRH and check. In my case I remember the values for the cruise as well... but may be I am from the old school

ByteJockey

5th Jun 2009, 22:30

Search Results for Air France Flight 447 Lead to Rogue Antivirus (http://blog.trendmicro.com/search-results-for-air-france-flight-447-lead-to-rogue-antivirus/)

Issues surrounding the crash of Air France Flight 447 have not been fully resolved up to now but, it didn’t need be for cybercriminals; they’re already taking advantage of this tragedy too.

Through SEO poisoning, searches for reports related to the plane crash yield links that when opened trigger multiple redirections to various sites, which ultimately lead to download of rogue antivirus software.Be careful which links you click on when searching for information...

AMF

5th Jun 2009, 22:31

fred bloggs Quote:
5 degrees pitch and CLB THRUST is a memory item if you are above thrust reduction altitude and FL100, but if you are in cruise you have to check the QRH for the correct values. For the 320 are btw 1.5 and 2.5 pitch up and 83 to 87% N1

Vent0 thanks but my point is where does it say NOT to do the memory items when in CRZ?

I ask as I am trying to find out as opposed to arguing with you or Poison.

As it pertains to this AF thread, the ability to hold any kind of pitch to within a degree or 2 at FL350 is nullfied by the presence of severe or extreme turbulence, the definition of which is the aircraft is at least sometimes "impossible to control", especially in a sluggish, wallowing aircraft. That means your pitch may be at least partially controlled not by you, but by outside forces you're merely fighting to counteract.

Throw in being knocked around on the roll axis with the corresponding sudden rises in wing loading (which will further serve to degrade speed and raise the low-speed buffet margin) threatening to stall one or both wings because you're high, and the only answer arises....pitch for a descent if possible to help maintain and increase aerodynamic control, and keep it right side up.

And if you're caught in a CB-produced severe updraft that lets go while you're still in a nose-up, level flight attitude based on FL350 numbers, at FL370 that same attitude puts you in a world of hurt. What works as an answer for the single problem of erroneous airspeed readings at 10000' or FL350 in smooth air isn't necassarily the best answer or what should be applied to what the AF likely found itself in.

PJ2

5th Jun 2009, 22:32

Mad_Scientist;
As of time off posting (which is after EOB in Europe today of course) NO EASA ADs issued in the last several days regarding A330.
Correct. I think somebody didn't read very carefully the 2002 AD on pitot probes posted here a few pages ago and the story now has a life of it's own which is completely unfounded. There are no mass pitot tube changes about to take place on the 330. Nobody knows anything that detailed yet so on what basis would such an AD be issued? It is Air France that is replacing pitot tubes and they say the note is "to their pilots" so it isn't an AD or even an AB. That said, I wonder if it's related to the 2002 AD?...

aquadalte;
Notwithstanding greenspinner's excellent work, the list of ACARS messages you've quoted from the AvHerald differs in the details from the ones posted and examined here:

02:10Z:
Autothrust off
Autopilot off
FBW alternate law
Rudder Travel Limiter Fault
TCAS fault due to antenna fault - do we know this is an antenna fault by the ATA #? If not, how is the comment "due to antenna fault" established?
Flight Envelope Computation warning
All pitot static ports lost - again, do we know that "all" sensors were lost from the ATA code? Also, what are "pitot static ports"? - the term refers to two separate systems - the pitot system and the static system - "ports" usually refers to the static system but not to the pitot system.
02:11Z:
Failure of all three ADIRUs - is this confirmed by the ATA code beyond greenspinner's research, (see earlier post)?
Failure of gyros of ISIS (attitude information lost) - again, is this specified in the ATA code?
02:12Z:
ADIRUs Air Data disagree
02:13Z:
Flight Management, Guidance and Envelope Computer fault
PRIM 1 fault
SEC 1 fault
02:14Z:
Cabin Pressure Controller fault (cabin vertical speed) - the ACARS message reads, WRN . . . . "2131000206ADVISORY" only - though it is a warning, does the ATA code specify the "cabin pressure controller fault" and "cabin vertical speed"? messages?

I would like to know if this is the media at work again quoting posts here, (even given the credibility of the specific source), or if there is more information that has been derived from the ATA codes presented earlier in the thread such as greenspinner's. Obviously something serious occurred but I wouldn't want to conclude that, based upon just the original messages and these above, the sources of which I have either missed or have been "supplied", the aircraft as a flying brick until more was known.

Thanks kindly, - PJ2

connector

5th Jun 2009, 22:35

Thanks Mad(flt),

for your EASA - AD list.
But thats not how the system works.
Maybe it shows up next week.
You have to do an RVSM check on aircrafts every year,
where you look into pitot-tubes with instruments ,
in connection with an ATC-TEST.
That should avoid Airpeed- failures.
But, what, if the guys , washing the airplane,
forget to remove the "blanking tape"
after finnishing their work.
Happens before, a couple of times.

Starbear

5th Jun 2009, 22:36

Its interesting that prior to the Malaysian B777 upset near Perth in Aug 2005, Boeing did not provide a QRH item for this, as due to design features,it was deemed that it was impossible for this to happen. They do now apparently.

Did Airbus always provide this guidance? Perhaps their design differs.

Ex Cargo Clown

5th Jun 2009, 22:36

Looking at the FCTM, following the QRH and then doing nothing may put you deep in the do-do.

"Apply the initial actions of the UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION QRH procedure from memory as they quickly provide a safe flight condition in all phases of flight and aircraft configuration."

"After applying the QRH procedure, and when the aircraft flight path is stabilised, attempt to identify the faulty ADR(s). Once the faulty ADR(s) has/have been positively identified, it/they should be switched OFF. This will trigger the corresponding ECAM procedure, which should be applied."

CL thrust and 5 degrees at say 2000ft below Max Alt in convective WX, that does not leave you long to troubleshoot ! :o

This may be one of those situations where blindly following the QRH may have caused more trouble than good.

jauh

5th Jun 2009, 22:45

aguadalte

how it is derived that the gyro of ISIS is broken

JASC CODE 3422:

"The unit operating by gyroscopic principle and driven by airflow or an electric motor, which provides heading (direction) references relative to a preset heading in degrees of the compass. Also for the flux unit detector which senses the earth's magnetic field and uses this data to correct for gyro drift. Typical parts are gyro, rotor, bearing, etc."

- FAA JASC Code Table & Def'ns

aguadalte and PJ2 read my earlier post (http://www.pprune.org/4975436-post49.html)

It would be nice if people actually read stuff instead of just posting - we've gone over the same points here at least three to four times already!

theamrad

5th Jun 2009, 22:45

WRT elucidation of what the ACARS messages meant in detail from our esteemed colleagues earlier. I gather the ISIS fault may have resulted in loss of ATTitude information from the standby instruments. Someone said they would try to work out exactly what would have been lost from the PFD - but I haven’t seen any post in relation to it since. I believe that IRU’s continue to send valid data if faults only lie with AD part of ADIRU’s. Presuming that main displays loose airspeed , possibly ALTitude also. But would they still have had ATTitude cues on main displays?

aguadalte

5th Jun 2009, 22:50

PJ2,
I do share your concerns, but unfortunately I do not have an answer to your rightly pointed doubts.
I hope someone in this forum may enlighten us, because I see no point on discussing unreliable airspeed procedures, without any kind of attitude display...if that was the case.

PJ2

5th Jun 2009, 22:54

theamrad;
Unless there is more to the ATA codes than those who have already done some translating here we may be stretching the limits of available information.

I am certain that there are many more Class 3 maintenance messages available but so far we have not seen any.

In short, you ask good questions (as many here have) but given the information we have, the questions can't be answered with any accuracy.

aquadalte;
I see no point on discussing unreliable airspeed procedures
Precisely. While we have some tiny specifics, everything remains possible, despite Mr. Occam.

jauh;
It would be nice if people actually read stuff instead of just posting - we've gone over the same points here at least three to four times already
Doh!..My constant complaint! - can you believe people don't read previous posts?, sorry! :) I got greenspinners but missed yours, thank you. I think that clarifies the unit referenced - did it clarify the "cabin vertical speed" message too? Tx...

Mad (Flt) Scientist

5th Jun 2009, 23:02

aquadalte;
Notwithstanding greenspinner's excellent work, the list of ACARS messages you've quoted from the AvHerald differs in the details from the ones posted and examined here:

02:10Z:
Autothrust off
Autopilot off
FBW alternate law
Rudder Travel Limiter Fault
TCAS fault due to antenna fault
Flight Envelope Computation warning
All pitot static ports lost
02:11Z:
Failure of all three ADIRUs
Failure of gyros of ISIS (attitude information lost)
02:12Z:
ADIRUs Air Data disagree
02:13Z:
Flight Management, Guidance and Envelope Computer fault
PRIM 1 fault
SEC 1 fault
02:14Z:
Cabin Pressure Controller fault (cabin vertical speed)

I tend to share your scepticism over the AvHerald interpretation. It appears not to be a logical as that presented by greenspinner (Occam's Razor here) but also it is not internally consistent.

Why would an ADR disagree message come after failure of all three ADIRUs? They can hardly be disagreeing (a less severe kind of failure) after they have failed (which generally means a 'hard' failure), I also don't see how they could take two minutes to "disagree" after "all ports were lost".

How can anyone rule out a bomb in this day and age? ... other forms of breakup/fire/explosion theories

Again, I am not saying this is the case. Is there a reason why it can not be the case? Rule it out please!

The main way to "rule it out" right now, based on the limited information confirmed, is that the sequence of ACARS messages which appears to correspond to the progressive event(s) which resulted in the loss of the aircraft are dominated by systems connected with flight controls, auto-flight and navigation.

The only message which could be even tangentially related to a bomb or catastrophic structural event appears to be the last one - the cabin vertical speed one - which could be related to explosive decompression or to loss of cabin structural integrity.

that implies that any structural failure occured as a consequence of the preceding event, and was thus a symptom and not a (primary) cause.

PJ2

5th Jun 2009, 23:09

theamrad

5th Jun 2009, 23:13

Ok PJ2 – not being totally familiar with the airbus I had thought it might be possible to pull more detail out – but looking back over your second last post and this mornings posts again – I understand the situation re available codes exactly now. Sorry for hashing over the same stuff again. :O

TripleBravo

5th Jun 2009, 23:15

jauh,

it is known and agreed that ISIS consists of a gyro system among other sub-systems. That's why it is sorted at 34-22 Directional Gyro & Indication. But there is an Air Data part as well. And an AP interconnect. And GPS, ....

To me, the actual message does not indicate that the gyro of ISIS is broken, which in turn means that its Attitude Indicator would be lost.

The ATA code just tells that there is some problem with ISIS, but not which one. Could have been the ISIS display or the air probe inlet clogged or... except we can decipher
1,,,,,,,ISIS(22FNwhich I am not sure about, hence my questions which I am sharing with PJ2.

Unfortunately my next access to AMM / TSM has to wait until Monday. And yes, I do read almost every single post, including yours. :-)

connector

5th Jun 2009, 23:16

PJ2

So, pitot/static are two complete different systems?
And you are a pilot?
Or a "couchpilot"?
When discussing a tragedy like this
"down to basic"!
20 computers are controlling an airplane!
But the "basic" is the pitot/static-system!:)

Mad (Flt) Scientist

5th Jun 2009, 23:20

MS;

I think it is very important to disagree with any and all presented information until we know it is from the primary source and the primary documents, (the Airbus 330 TSM, MMEL, etc) or has been established as irrefutable. The ACARS documents are good but we dont' have the originals.

I think it is wise to reserve judgement on an "expert's" interpretation and prefer a "college of experts" such as reside here, all disagreeing until "what is" is no longer disputable. I think because of the circumstances, any evidence must meet particularly high standards and theories/conclusions wholly avoided. Hind-sight bias is still an operating factor.

Concur, but in addition to hind-sght bias the thread inevitably suffers from recentism, especially when a recent post appears to be more readily understood than an earlier, or when the earlier information is distributed over several pages.

This may indeed be a case where the forum format is weak - in that good information gets ignored by even the most well-meaning poster, who reads (or remembers) inevitably the more recent data preferentially. A wiki-type format - where the information is more of a living document - would have strengths in a case like this (after all, the "real" investigators use report drafts, not emails back and forth, to arrive at a final agree and reviewed version...)

One question I have - there has been some discussion of the A330 (specifically) and other Airbus (due to the all-operators telex AB sent out) unreliable airspeed procedures. Does anyone have access to a public domain source for these (obviously the A330 is the ideal case there). I will confess to an ulterior motive, not entirely related to this thread, but I think such items would be of value here as well.

FlyingOW

5th Jun 2009, 23:29

Starbear,

I think it was the AeroPeru B752 accident in '96 that led to Boeing introducing the Unreliable Airspeed Memory Items & checklist (the checklist already existed when I did my initial back in 2004)

Airbus is recommending/reminding operators and crews of the Unreliable airspeed checklist based on their preliminary findings.............

OW

PJ2

5th Jun 2009, 23:33

connector;
a "couchpilot"?
What my wife calls me is strictly between she and I.

Again, my writing confuses. I'm well aware of the systems you describe and have used those "20 computers" and the 330's hundreds more many times - but, (and it's a very small, fussy point), one cannot use, (as the AvHerald apparently did), the term "pitot static port" meaningfully, especially with reference to ATA numbers - there are no such things; - they should know better, frankly but there it is. There are pitot tubes or probes, and there are static ports, which are separate inputs which comprise the pitot-static system into the 3 ADIRS as I'm sure you know. That's all I meant.

gilot

5th Jun 2009, 23:39

i joined this forum because of the catastrophy we re going trough.i m a former B747 100/200/300 AF captain.i flew many times from DKR to EZE with our s cargo planes.at that time we had only AVQ 10 radar WX.monochrome of course.
so to say that we were experienced enough to do the job ..
as a senior captain,i trained a lot of F/O not to care about the position report in case of WX deviation.who cares?you are on your own.there s no radar coverage.what you need is common sense.............enough fuel .
for the rest you can easily deal with your T CAS.
and if you have any delay for your next position dakar control don t bother
what you said in a trhead above is terrific.
quote.......................................
It doesn't take a genius to conclude that the line is not only hoping for, but trying to lay the foundation for, pilot error.

How convenient, predictable, and deceitful.

For an aircraft that makes much of its automation, to the exclusion of the necessity for brilliant airmanship, only to see such aircraft dump the flight on the humans when it can't keep up seems, what, ironic??
............................................................ ..................................
i said the same things; in a french forum.i was kicked out.whathever
fortunetly the NTSB seems to be in
best regards

connector

5th Jun 2009, 23:49

Hope your wife is well!:)

In a way you are right.
The B-747 and the Sikorsky-S:)61
have combined pitot-tubes.
Therefor the confusion.
Pitot+static in on tube.
Thats what Clinton+Obama flies around with.
Lower than 50000 ft.

PJ2

5th Jun 2009, 23:50

MS;
in that good information gets ignored by even the most well-meaning poster
Touché. We've all had both sides of that experience - we work hard to put something together we think is pretty and helpful, and voilà, 3 pages later it virtually doesn't exist for someone not reading back. BTDT.

On the Airbus AB, I know of no sites; only the AD's I think are available.

I note that very quickly after the TAM A320 accident at Congonhas, Airbus issued a Telex AB cautioning crews to ensure that the thrust levers were both set to IDLE even if one reverser was locked out. I wonder what the present Telex AB means? Perhaps that question has already been answered somewhere but we'll have to wait a bit longer.

connector;
She's well thank you and very tolerant...has to be - married a pilot.

You're right - I had forgotten about the combined pitot-static tube, thanks.

Grunf

6th Jun 2009, 00:05

PJ2: Nobody knows anything that detailed yet so on what basis would such an AD be issued?

Digging might get you amazing results if you have time and patience. Background section of the related DGAC AD (2001-354) might be the right way.

Connector: Thanks Mad(flt), for your EASA - AD list. But thats not how the system works. Maybe it shows up next week.

In terms of how the system works, it is easy to explain to those fortunate enough not to deal with regulatory bodies - an SB from Airbus is already in the works and that triggers an AD from DGAC. If DGAC is in hurry they can issue an AD very quickly but I strongly doubt in this happening ahead of Airbus . That IS how it works, with any regulatory body (FAA, EASA members, TC, CASA and the others).

Besides, compliance date for that AD was 6 years ago (in 2003) so AF already replaced all the pitot tubes, at least once. Second replacement, mentioned today, might require more info - like a new urgent SB from Airbus or an even faster AD from DGAC.

By the way, EASA is still just a "traffic cop".

Cheers

WNcommuter

6th Jun 2009, 00:16

Has AF revealed whether or not the crew requested and received extra fuel for weather contingencies, as the Iberia crew reportedly did? I've read both long threads completely, but if this answer was posted I didn't see it.

aguadalte

6th Jun 2009, 00:26

http://www.eurocockpit.com/images/acars447.php

IMHO, the failure of IR1, IR2, IR3 and ISIS was at 02H11m. Jauh, If you're a pilot, you should know that, that is enough to turn an A330 (or any other heavy aircraft at night, in clouds and without a clue of what is going wrong with your aircraft), into a flying brick.
In those message reports there are warnings (WRN) and there are failures (FLR), and the above said components were allegedly failed on that report.
I also think that the Cabine pressure V/S advisory, means both CPC's were off and that message was a warning that Cabine Pressure could only be Manually Controlled.
To look for the reason (or reasons) of those failures is just another discussion, because for me, what this failures mean is that there is no reason to be discussing unreliable air speed indications once you have no ATTitude to grab to.
I must tell you that it is very disturbing to imagine the failure of all ADIRU plus ISIS. I never though this would be possible. Pitot and Static failures would only fail the ADR part of the ADIRU's, therefore one would still be capable of maintaining unreliable speed procedures (and attitude). There must have been something very disturbing and very grave to breack all of those components. Even the Emmergency Electrical Configuration status would leave you with one AP operational...

Aerochti

6th Jun 2009, 00:44

Messages from Airbus :

FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT TOULOUSE

ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX

SUBJECT: AF447 ACCIDENT INTO THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

OUR REF: AF447 AIT 2 June 4th 2009

PREVIOUS REF:
- Ref 1: AF447 AIT 1 dated June 1st 2009

This AIT is an update of the previous AIT n°1 concerning the AF447
accident into the Atlantic ocean on June 1st, 2009.

In line with the ICAO Annex 13 recommendations, the French
investigation Board - BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses) is
leading the technical investigation, with accredited representatives
from the Brazilian Investigation Board and US NTSB, with Airbus
providing technical support.

The following data have been approved for release by the French BEA.

The route of the aircraft was crossing a tropical multicell
convective area at the time of the accident.

Failure/ maintenance messages have been transmitted automatically
from the aircraft to the airline maintenance center.

The above mentionned messages indicate that there was inconsistency
between the different measured airspeeds. Therefore and without
prejudging the final outcome of the investigation, the data available
leads Airbus to remind operators what are the applicable operational
recommendations in case of unreliable airspeed indication.

The following operational procedures are available for the Airbus
Aircraft Type :

-A300: QRH 13.01 thru 13.03, FCOM 8.05.10;
-A310: QRH 13.01 thru 13.03, FCOM 2.05.80;
-A300-600: QRH 13.01 thru 13.03, FCOM 2.05.80;
-A318/A318/A320/A321 family: QRH 2.15 thru 2.18A, FCOM 3.02.34;
-A330/A340 Family: QRH 2.21 thru 2.23B , FCOM 3.02.34;
-A380: ECAM not-sensed procedures, FCOM - Procedures / ECAM
Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / 34 Navigation.

An update on the accident data will be provided as soon as further
valuable information is approved for release by the Investigation
Board.

Yannick Malinge
Vice-president Flight Safety
Airbus

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT TOULOUSE
ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX
SUBJECT: AF447 ACCIDENT INTO THE ATLANTIC OCEAN
OUR REF: AF447 AIT 2 June 4th 2009

This AIT is an update of the previous AIT n°1 concerning the AF447
accident into the Atlantic ocean on June 1st, 2009.

In line with the ICAO Annex 13 recommendations, the French
investigation Board - BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses) is
leading the technical investigation, with accredited representatives
from the Brazilian Investigation Board and US NTSB, with Airbus
providing technical support.

The following data have been approved for release by the French BEA.

The route of the aircraft was crossing a tropical multicell
convective area at the time of the accident.

Failure/ maintenance messages have been transmitted automatically
from the aircraft to the airline maintenance center.

The above mentionned messages indicate that there was inconsistency
between the different measured airspeeds. Therefore and without
prejudging the final outcome of the investigation, the data available
leads Airbus to remind operators what are the applicable operational
recommendations in case of unreliable airspeed indication.

The following operational procedures are available for the Airbus
Aircraft Type : A318/A318/A320/A321 family: QRH 2.15 thru 2.18A, FCOM 3.02.34;
An update on the accident data will be provided as soon as further
valuable information is approved for release by the Investigation
Board.

Flight Safety
Airbus

delta092b

6th Jun 2009, 01:08

In line with keeping this forum "free from speculation", especially from a non professional I just wanted to include another link to a UK AAIB official report in to an A330 & A340 incident. The A340 section and synopsis surrounding turbulance made for an interesting read.

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources/dft_avsafety_pdf_501275.pdf

CAPTDOUG

6th Jun 2009, 01:32

Aviation Weekly is a periodical for the Aviation world. Just the facts as currently known. The report as follows:

Data from Air France flight 447's automatic ACARS message indicates the pilots may not have had access to the correct speed information during the final minutes of the flight.

The list of fault messages sent to Air France's operations headquarters in Paris includes a sequence of notes that hints at the three Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) computers to show diverging information. ADIRU compiles data delivered by the pitot tubes and process it to the aircraft's other computers.

The list, obtained by AviationWeek among others, gives an insight into the sequence of computer and system failures on the Airbus A330-200. During the last four minutes the situation worsened. At 2:10 a.m. zulu, the autopilot was either switched off by the pilots or automatically. The function is switched off automatically if speed drops by some margin below a previously defined minimum. The aircraft subsequently flew in "alternate law" conditions that do not provide full automatic envelope protection. Other functions, such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) or the rudder travel limiter failed at the same time. Shortly after the ADIRU notices (2:11 and 2:12 a.m.), the ACARS alerts show a "F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT" and a "F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT" indicating malfunctions of the first primary and secondary flight control computers. Shortly thereafter, the string of messages ends.

In an "Accident Information Telex" to operators, Airbus writes that the ACARS content indicates that "there was inconsistency between the different measured airspeeds. Therefore and without prejudging the final outcome of the investigation, the data available leads Airbus to remind operators what are the applicable operational recommendations in case of unreliable airspeed information."

The diverging speed inputs could come from icing of the pitot tubes, industry sources indicate - a phenomenon not uncommon when flying in weather conditions that prevailed at the time of the accident. In its telex, Airbus points out that "the aircraft was crossing a tropical multicell convective area at the time of the accident."

The ACARS content only shows what systems and computers malfunctioned, but there's no information yet available about what actually happened to important parameters such as airspeed, altitude or pitch angle during the last few minutes of the flight. It also is still unclear if the loss of control happened as a result of a multiple system failure and subsequent stall or because of the severe turbulence that is likely to have hit the aircraft during its 75 mile (or 12 min.) travel through the storm front.

Brazil's Defence Ministry had to admit on Friday that wreckage found floating on the Atlantic on Tuesday does not belong to the aircraft. A senior French government official pointed out that French search troops have not found a single piece of the aircraft yet. While there appears to be no hope for survivors among the 228 on board, finding the accident site quickly could turn out to be crucial to find out more about what caused AF448 to crash. The black box's batteries last for around 30 days, and the French air accident investigation branch BEA has indicated it is not optimistic it can find the piece in deep sea.

Separately, a Spanish newspaper quotes the crew of an Iberia Airbus A340 that flew seven minutes behind AF447 on the same track. According to the crew, air traffic control failed to contact the Air France jet after 1:33 a.m. zulu in spite of trying several times. The Iberia pilots - who deviated 30 miles east from the track to circumnavigate thick clowds - then tried to get in touch with their French colleagues, too, but did not succeed either. The pilot of a Lufthansa Boeing 747-400 that had passed the region 30 minutes earlier said that he had to fly several detours to avoid heavy weather, but otherwise described the flight as routine.

pointingdog

6th Jun 2009, 01:33

Something to chew on....

There is a similar pitot icing event which happened in the US, back in 2005....

NYC05MA083 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20050523X00653&ntsbno=NYC05MA083&akey=1)

Here is synopsis and probable cause statement,

After departure, the incident airplane was climbing toward its cruising altitude in a stratified region of precipitation within a convective system, and in conditions which were favorable for the accumulation of structural icing. At some point, the pitot/static system began accumulating ice because the air data heat system had not been activated or was not functioning. The condition first manifested itself as a "RUDDER LIMIT FAULT" warning due to icing of the rudder limiting system pitot tube. The icing continued to accumulate on the other probes of the air data system, degrading its ability to reliably determine the airplane's airspeed. About 19,000 feet, the flight crew disengaged the autopilot and pushed the pitch control column forward, and the airplane entered a descent. The flight crew initially applied uncoordinated control inputs, in the process reaching nearly 100 pounds of differential force on the pitch control column, while attempting to recover the airplane. During this period, airplane's pitch continued to oscillate through 5 cycles, for duration of 8 minutes, reaching altitudes as low as 10,600 feet and as high as 23,300 feet. During the oscillations the airplane's indicated airspeed varied greatly, between 54 and 460 knots; however, the airplane systems tests and aircraft performance data show that the recorded, as well as the displayed, airspeed indications were adversely affected by the icing conditions. Once regaining control of the airplane, the crew diverted and made an uneventful landing. Post-incident testing of the airplane's mechanical and electronic systems revealed no abnormalities that would have accounted for the unreliable airspeed indications or the loss of control reported by the flight crew. Post-incident computer modeling also confirmed that the airplane performed in a manner consistent with all deviations from normal flight having been initiated or exacerbated by the control inputs of the flight crew. Review of flight data recorder, cockpit voice recorder, and flight crew interviews revealed that the flight crew's actions during the event were in part contradictory with operator's training and operational procedures. Specifically, the crew initially failed to properly identify and respond to the erroneous airspeed indications that were presented and failed to coordinate their recovery of the airplane to controlled flight.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:

A loss of reliable airspeed indication due to an accumulation of ice on the air data/pitot sensors. Contributing to the incident was the flight crew's improper response to the erroneous airspeed indications, their lack of coordination during the initial recovery of the airplane to controlled flight, and icing conditions.