AF447

[BOAC]

SPAF? Le Journal du Dimanche article?

[Duck Rogers]

Conspiracy!!

Thread was deleted because frankly it didn't have any 'meat'. Maybe if there'd been a link to an article? Some basis? Something.............?

[HectorusRex]

Air France crash 'could have been avoided'
The recent Air France crash over the Atlantic could have been avoided if the crew had access to more recent weather maps, an investigation by two of the airline's senior pilots has concluded.

Air France crash 'could have been avoided' - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/6259648/Air-France-crash-could-have-been-avoided.html)

By Henry Samuel in Paris
Published: 6:03PM BST 04 Oct 2009

The pilots of Flight 447, which crashed off the coast of Brazil on June 1, killing 288 people, would almost certainly have steered round storm clouds clearly visible on satellite maps available shortly before take-off, according to the Air France pilot's union, Spaf – whose president co-wrote the report.
Instead, they plotted their route using a map based on data compiled 24 hours before take off. At that stage, the coast looked relatively clear. It was only later that dangerous clouds gathered in the zone the Airbus A330 went down. A calmer route was possible further west.
"All means should have been given to the crew to avoid entering such a zone," the report suggests. Air France has insisted they had respected all weather procedures and other companies took the same flight path.
Although weather was a factor, the report squarely blames defective air speed sensors for the crash. This contradicts the findings of the French agency leading the investigation, the BEA, which has said that such "pitot probes" were a factor, but not the leading cause of the disaster.
The report criticises Airbus, Air France, civil aviation authorities and the European Aviation Safety Agency among others for underestimating the problems with the sensors.
It argues that all of them knew of problems with the pitot tubes over the past 14 years and that, had they moved to correct them, the crash "would have probably been avoided", in extracts published by the newspaper Le Journal du Dimanche.
"Such an event cannot be reduced to a single cause," said Gerard Arnoux, president of the Spaf union.
"But there is an unchallengeable truth that we must insist on: without the breakdown of the pitot tubes, the accident wouldn't have happened," Mr Arnoux told the newspaper.
The report, which will be sent to BEA investigators this week, also concludes that Airbus' recommended emergency manoeuvres were "at best confusing, at worst dangerous". At the time of the crash, Airbus recommended increasing thrust if air sensors failed. The report said at high altitude, this can send the plane into free fall.

[ArthurBorges]

Only 51 bodies were recovered from the crash site off Brazil's northeast coast in Atlantic. Autopsies carried out by Brazilian experts said the injuries suggest that the plane broke up in the air. Meanwhile, Brazil has failed to provide France with the autopsy reports due to lengthy legal procedures.

Pasted from <Air France pilots claim speed sensors caused A330 crash in June | Top Russian news and analysis online | 'RIA Novosti' newswire (http://en.rian.ru/world/20091005/156348577.html)>

[VR-HFX]

Duck pitot's can kill you ...and then it will be up to the manufacturers of the pitots, the a/c and the airline to prove the pilots were at fault...and they generally do, especially when there is no longer a right of reply:yuk:

[STBYRUD]

What is the Telegraph article suggesting? I'm quite sure the crew was aware they would pass through the ITCZ which inevitably brings CB and TCU into the game, no matter what the chart says. WXR overlay on and dodge the yellows, reds and magentas - isn't that the regular game when crossing the equator (or more accurately he ITCZ)? What is the deal with the extended search, are they still looking for whatever evidence they can find?

[BJ-ENG]

Avionews (http://www.avionews.com/index.php?corpo=see_news_home.php&news_id=1109829&pagina_chiamante=index.php)

Quote: BEA is planning to publish a further interim report before the end of the year.

[PJ2]

VR-HFX;
pitot's will kill you all
At the risk of resurrecting old themes in this thread, pitots (loss of), in and of themselves will NOT kill you.

It is the response to loss of pitot or static information which can either keep you alive or kill.

Since the Birgenair and Aeroperu B757 accidents, it is standard for QRHs to have Unreliable Airspeed memory items and drills to cope with this loss. Aircraft with GPS have an added advantage but GPS is not necessary to survive such a loss of data.

As long as the QRH memory items and follow-up drills are followed and cockpit discipline is maintained and leadership executed, (someone flying, someone reading/doing/supporting), there is a very good chance that neither the failure nor the outcome will be a serious one and will instead provide time to sort out the failure. I have had such a failure, (B767, captain's pitot, dark winter night over the mountains, turbulent, low departure vis precluding a return) and at the time we had no drill but sorted out who was correct and flew pitch and power and the reliable data until descending into warmer air at destination.

I fully acknowledge the challenging environment in which the AF447 crew may have found themselves. Cascading failures in any aircraft, due to loss of flight information, is extremely challenging, made much worse by moderate or heavier turbulence, a dark, moonless night, surprise, system warnings and perhaps calls from the back.

Loss of control does not follow from loss of pitot information, however.

To me, the SPAF "report" may be more of a legal and strategic "placeholder", perhaps wisely placed, perhaps not - we will see. Regardless, it is impossible to state what the crew did or did not do at this point of the investigation and so nothing may be said about their performance or response until more is known. While it is trite to say it, the desperate need for answers does not provide answers.

[BOAC]

I thought I posted a note saying that I saw a French newspaper this morning blaming the pilots.

Which is it?

What is aDuck pitotanyway?

[Will Fraser]

BOAC

I think poster meant 'duff' (fubar to yanks).

Duck works though.

[PJ2]

FWIW, I think he was addressing the mod', "Duck", and didn't put in the comma...no big thing.

[CONF iture]

Loss of control does not follow from loss of pitot information, however
I don't know how you can affirm that ...
Just curious, how many times did you train for that specific malfunction ... at cruise FL ?

[STBYRUD]

PJ2 is right - one thing doesn't necessarily follow from another, even if you get erratic speed and altitude information that doesn't mean the aircraft will spiral out of control instantly if you are able to fly pitch and power?! Naturally the media will try to find the easiest solution to the mystery, but as we all know there is never a single cause for a disaster, but the famous chain of errors leading to one...

[CONF iture]

PJ2 is right - one thing doesn't necessarily follow from another, even if you get erratic speed and altitude information that doesn't mean the aircraft will spiral out of control instantly if you are able to fly pitch and power?!
You are correct, but one loss of pitot information, or even worse, one false pitot information, may well lead to a loss of control, especially when the malfunctions are not trained at high altitude in the flight simulators.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

In 2007, EASA has described the risk of blocking probes pitot "at least hazardous" I remember the definition, according to EASA, from "hazardous"



CS-25 BOOK 2 page 2-F-7

(4) Hazardous: Failure Conditions, Which would Reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating, conditions to the extent that there would be:

(i) A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities

(ii) Physical distress or excessive workload such that the flight crew can not be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely

(iii) Serious or fatal injury to a relatively small number of the occupants other than the flight crewLes dossiers noirs du transport aérien (http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-blogs.fr/)

[BJ-ENG]

At last...

Brazil gives France data from doomed Air France flight (http://www.asd-network.com/press_detail/23805/Brazil_gives_France_data_from_doomed_Air_France_flight.htm)

[CONF iture]

I think it is worth translating your link jcjeant.
Les dossiers noirs du transport aérien (http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-blogs.fr/)

Complexity

The blockage of the Pitot probes is a defect (not a failure) linked to the architecture of these probes and their obsolete certification standards. After the drama of flight AF 447, Airbus, EASA and all others have reminded pilots that in the case of inconsistency in the airspeed indications, they must follow procedures QRH 2.21 thru 2.23b, FCOM 3.02.34. This gives a false idea of the complexity of the problem. In fact, induced failures which succeed in cascade lead to the execution of 9 ECAM procedures (screen), 1 QRH procedure (check list) and 2 paper procedures (Annex 5 of the BEA report). This is not a simulator session and this kind of event does not always happen during a smooth flight in a blue sky. As Murphy would say, it can also happen during the crossing of an active ITCZ (inter tropical convergence zone), in turbulence, during CB avoidance manoeuvres. From memory, the PF will apply CLB thrust and 5 degrees up of attitude, approximate values that will be corrected on page 4 of the procedure in question if we are lucky to get that far, while the Christmas tree lights (alarms in all types) accompanied by the sweet music of different horns. To make it, there may be also a false STALL alarm, which must be obeyed by following the instructions in force, a not so comfortable situation but dealt at Air France by a complementary abnormal procedure that will require additional feverish research. Previously, the average pilot, who is neither a test driver or Buck Danny, will have, in an extremely busy working "atmosphere", applied max thrust and an forward pressure on the side stick. How, in this "atmosphere" to distinguish between buffeting and turbulence? To the complexity of the systems, you add the complexity of the procedures!
It is very easy to leave the flight envelop in these conditions ...

(This is not the scenario in the final minutes of flight AF447. No one knows what happened)

[lomapaseo]

Thanks for the translation.:ok:

Any idea what organization or who wrote it?

To me it's an adquate justification for the proposed airworthiness directive to bring the aircraft back into compliance under the Contuned Airworthiness norms.

My interpretation of this is that the initial design certication usinig historical norms would have treated the Pitots malfunction as a defect presumably accomodated by procedures and the use of other systems to control the aircraft.

The "What-if" scenario based on other similar pitot malfunctions now raises the issue that it should no longer be treated as a "defect", easily accomodated, in all likely scenarios thus requiring a more robust/reliable accomodation (unique pilot training?) or a decrease in the liklihood of the combinations.

[CONF iture]

He must be Henri Marnet-Cornus, former fighter and airline pilot.
His latest assignment was on the A340.
He is involved in aviation safety, has written two books on the subject and is the editor of that blog.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

AFAIK Mr Henri Marnet-Cornus (former pilot of Air Liberté) is part of the team (with Mr Arnoux ... chairman of the S.P.A.F "Syndicat Des Pilotes D'Air France"
SPAF :: Syndicat des pilotes d'Air France :: SPAF - actualite (http://www.spaf.aero/index.php?ac=view&i=57&b=actualite)) of pilots involved there:

Air France pilots claim speed sensors caused A330 crash in June | Top Russian news and analysis online | 'RIA Novosti' newswire (http://en.rian.ru/world/20091005/156348577.html)

[mermoz92]

It seems that a riot is starting with AF (true) professional pilots:

PETITION POUR UN VERITABLE AUDIT EXTERNE (auditexterneaf) (http://sites.google.com/site/auditexterneaf/Home)

:D

[wes_wall]

This from AirWise today.

A US lawyer filed suit against Airbus and many aerospace suppliers on Monday seeking unspecified compensation on behalf of relatives of eight of the 228 passengers who died when an Air France flight crashed off the coast of Brazil in June.
Details: Airbus, Others Sued In US Over Crash Off Brazil (http://news.airwise.com/story/view/1256033146.html)

[armchairpilot94116]

Manuel Garca, Jr.: The New Crisis in Aviation (http://www.counterpunch.org/garcia07012009.html)

[Pugilistic Animus]

Pprune knows how to get an Air accident discussion percolating while we're waiting:\

[wes_wall]

Why am I not surprised. This from AirWise today.


"Our current knowledge of the accident does not allow us to put together a scenario," -- Jean-Paul Troadec, BEA.

More at:

Air France Crash Report Due In December (http://news.airwise.com/story/view/1256587132.html)

Don't hold your breath.

[PJ2]

France to Renew Search for Plane’s Data Recorders



By NICOLA CLARK

Published: October 26, 2009

PARIS — France (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/france/index.html?inline=nyt-geo) is preparing to spend as much as €20 million next year on a renewed search for the flight data recorders and undersea wreckage of the Air France A330 jetliner that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean in June, killing all 228 people aboard, the new head of the French agency charged with investigating the accident said Monday.

The news comes amid mounting tension within Air France as the airline prepares for an external audit of its flight safety procedures next month.
The agency, the Bureau of Investigations and Analyses, has begun preparing for a third attempt to locate the black boxes of Air France Flight 447 (http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/a/airplane_accidents_and_incidents/air_france_flight_447/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier) that it expects will begin early next year, with the support of experts and specialized equipment from the United States, Britain, Brazil (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/brazil/index.html?inline=nyt-geo) and Russia, said Jean-Paul Troadec, who took over as head of the agency this month.

The agency, which has already spent roughly €10 million, or $15 million, scouring the ocean floor for clues to what caused the accident, plans to spend an additional €10 million to €20 million for the next phase of the search, Mr. Troadec said.

Air France Flight 447 left Rio de Janeiro and was en route to Paris when it went down on June 1 during strong thunderstorms in an area about 960 kilometers, or 600 miles, off northern Brazil. Search teams recovered over 600 pieces of debris from the ocean, representing about 5 percent of the airframe, investigators have said. The bulk of the wreckage has not been found and is presumed to be lying on the mountainous seabed, deep below the ocean surface.

Investigators have yet to pinpoint the cause of the disaster, although they suspect that a malfunction of the aircraft’s speed sensors may have contributed to the crash. A preliminary report published in July said an examination of the floating debris indicated that the plane had hit the water intact.

“We still don’t know what happened in the cockpit, and we will need to find and analyze the recorders to understand,” Mr. Troadec said at the agency’s offices in Le Bourget, near Paris. “Our knowledge of this accident does not allow us to develop a scenario.”

But he did say that autopsy reports recently received from Brazilian medical examiners appeared to confirm that the crash victims died “on impact with the water.”

In December, the agency plans to publish a second intermediate report that will include detailed analysis of the evidence gathered so far as well as some recommendations about how to improve the storage and transmission of flight data to aid future crash investigations, Mr. Troadec said.

Investigators in July abandoned an audio search for the flight recorders’ “pingers,” which are designed to emit a signal for 30 to 40 days. A second phase of the hunt, using diving equipment and sonar scanners towed by a French frigate, ended in September without success. Mr. Troadec there had been no further search activity.

[STBYRUD]

Huh - I wonder what they plan on doing to find it - now that there is absolutely no chance on earth that the pinger still operates... Are they going to sonar scan the entire ocean floor and just look for a rectangular 14*13*32cm box? Beats me :confused:

[promani]

Thanks PJ2 for posting that update report. I hope that the third search will last longer than the previous ones. Unless the fuselage disintegrated into small pieces upon impact, I would think that they must find more of the missing 95% which lies at the bottom of the ocean, especially the tail. Has nobody attempted to do computer simulations at BEA? Is that not possible in this day and age of high tech? How about NASA?

[lomapaseo]

Huh - I wonder what they plan on doing to find it - now that there is absolutely no chance on earth that the pinger still operates... Are they going to sonar scan the entire ocean floor and just look for a rectangular 14*13*32cm box? Beats me

They look for the big stuff and hope for the small things like black (orange. & white) boxes.

Even with some of the big stuff an awful lot can be discerned from photos on the seabed so at least it's progress.

patience

[Tyres O'Flaherty]

It was either Air India, or SAA 'Helderberg' (feel free to correct me anyone) boxes, I think, that was pulled from deep (though not remotely as mountainous) water after about a year's search.

So yes, it may be possible if the will is there

[BJ-ENG]

In Johan Strümpfer's DEEP OCEAN SEARCH PLANNING - the search for the Boeing 747 of South African Airways Flight 295, he reported that ocean depth was in places over 5 km deep and very mountainous. The wreckage was located at a depth of 4.4 kilometres.

Three debris fields were found: 19°10'30?S 59°38'0?E? / ?19.175°S 59.633333°E? / -19.175; 59.633333? (SA Helderberg Debris Site1).

19°9'53?S 59°38'32?E? / ?19.16472°S 59.64222°E? / -19.16472; 59.64222? (SA Helderberg Debris Site2)

and 19°9'15?S 59°37'25?E? / ?19.15417°S 59.62361°E? / -19.15417; 59.62361? (SA Helderberg Debris Site3).

These locations are 1.5, 2.3 and 2.5 km apart, which indicates that the aircraft broke up before crashing into the Ocean. The extent of the wreckage field was attributed to dispersion of the wreckage during the estimated 80 or more minutes the wreckage took to sink. The aircraft wreckage was found some two months after the accident during the sonar search phase. A further photographic survey and recorder search phase was conducted one year later, at which time the CVR was located.

[rgbrock1]

Then perhaps the French should be talking to whomever it was that undertook the search for wreckage of Flt 295 ie, what equipment did they use, the methodology used, etc. I can't imagine it would hurt asking someone who has successfully undertaken such an endeavor, and succeeded.

[SLFguy]

"Then perhaps the French should be talking to whomever it was that undertook the search for wreckage of Flt 295 ie, what equipment did they use, the methodology used, etc. I can't imagine it would hurt asking someone who has successfully undertaken such an endeavor, and succeeded."

The team undertaking the search is not the same group as the Flt 295.

[Unusual Attitude]

There are meetings currently ongoing regarding the search methodology, technology & timescales etc however I can assure you there is a deep tow sonar system capable of locating very small objects at depths down to 6000m, this search will require no more than 4000m.

Again at this stage I cant say any more but rest assured a new phase of the search using appropriate technology is currently being worked on.

[wes_wall]

Again at this stage I cant say any more but rest assured a new phase of the search using appropriate technology is currently being worked on.

Interesting. Begs the question however, why wasn't ths done initially? Keep rocking the baby, sooner or later it will go to sleep and all can relax. I fear very little will be forth coming, and some mondane position will be taken with a comparable statement from the BEA closing the issue.

Has anything official (other than ABC) been issued relative to the medical exams of the victums? The news indicated some may have been alive after the accident.

[SaturnV]

On AI182, they located the pingers within two weeks of the accident. The pingers led to recovery of both boxes, and both boxes were ashore within three weeks of the accident.

[SaturnV]

wes wall, IIRC, one of the countries now involved was not involved in the first two searches. And I rather suspect the side-scan sonar being used this time was not available previously, and its deployment and use required approval at a fairly high government level.

[rgbrock1]

@SLFguy,

Yes, I know the team searching for AF447 is not the same as that which recovered flt 295. That's why I wrote that the former should be talking to the latter. :ugh:

[SLFguy]

Sorry rgb... badly phrased by me - I was just clarifying that it was a different team.

[JD-EE]

SaturnV remarked
On AI182, they located the pingers within two weeks of the accident. The pingers led to recovery of both boxes, and both boxes were ashore within three weeks of the accident.


Unless I miss my guess the depth was considerably less and the terrain considerably smoother where AI182 went down near 51N 15W. That makes location a whole lot easier. I seem to remember reading here that the pinger receivers used were limited to something above the tops of the underwater mountains. The debris is probably down in a canyon somewhere and will be hard to find.

The numbers for depth of pinger receiver, its expected range, and the depth of the mountainous ocean floor where AF447 went down left me wondering, "Why bother except to put on a good show?"

JD-EE

[mm43]

JD-EE remarked:-

The numbers for depth of pinger receiver, its expected range, and the depth of the mountainous ocean floor where AF447 went down left me wondering, "Why bother except to put on a good show?"Yes, agreed for the following reasons -

The effectiveness of the 'pingers' in very deep water has always been questionable. Diverse currents and abrupt water temperature changes with depth create inversion layers. 37.5kHz propogation in water behaves in a similar manner to that which results in anomylous propogation in the VHF/UHF and higher spectrum, ie "ducting". High surface water temperatures, depth and bathymetry in an area of the equatorial North Atlantic reknowned for strong currents, effectively reduced the faint possibility that the DFDR or CVR would be located in the available time to something close to zero.

Moving on; the effectivenes of multibeam sonar in detecting specific parts of the debris is not doubted. C & C Technologies, Inc. Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) can operate at a depth of 4,500m and the resolution of the multibeam sonar in 2002 produced the following for the BBC of wreckage of a Fairey Swordfish Mk1 and a Hangar Lift Deck which parted company with HMS "Ark Royal" when it sunk in 1066m of water in 1941.

http://i846.photobucket.com/albums/ab27/mm43_af447/ark-royal-debris.jpg

The yellow and cyan description/text has been added by me.

For good measure, here is a photo of a Fairey Swordfish ("Stringbag") on a Royal Navy carrier deck.

http://i846.photobucket.com/albums/ab27/mm43_af447/fairey-swordfish.jpg

The problem with AF447, is where to start looking using sidescan sonar initially.

mm43

[Unusual Attitude]

Just to point out, Multibeam and Sidescan are 2 different things. Multibeam is genearally mounted to an AUV or WROV and tends to give a Hi-res image but a very small focal area. Sidescan is generally a 'towed fish' arrangement with a much wider swath but lower res. For this type of search a deepwater sidescan would be required with the fish flown at low alt above the sea floor behind a depressor weight for stability.

[mm43]

Unusual Attitude wrote:-
Just to point out, Multibeam and Sidescan are 2 different things.Duh! You're absolutely right, and I will amend the previous post.:O

mm43

[BJ-ENG]

BEA Preliminary Report Expected December | AVIATION WEEK (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=aviationdaily&id=news/BEA102709.xml&headline=BEA%20Preliminary%20Report%20Expected%20December)

A few more clues about where the focus will be in December's report.

[LandIT]

A Jetstar Airways A330-200 with 209 passengers and crew onboard suffered momentary erratic speed data indications from its computers in apparent bad weather and possible icing conditions on an Oct. 29 flight from Tokyo Narita to Gold Coast. (Australia)
ATW Daily News (http://www.atwonline.com/news/story.html?storyID=18361)

[rik Sound]

hi there. I tried to post this on 2nd of july as I think it makes an invaluable contribution. You deleted my post, or rather did not post it; now you post the article, 4 months later. Just wondering why.... made me give up trying to post to help solve this tricky puzzle of AF447...

[NeoFit]

Don't worry!
" I tried to post this on 2nd of july .... or rather did not post it"
Probably you never sent the link.

This is my first post, as yours.

[John47]

New technology could revolutionize the black box

Calgary firm's data-streaming system would enhance safety. But what's really caught the airlines' attention is the cost-saving properties


New technology could revolutionize the black box - The Globe and Mail (http://tinyurl.com/yb64uxg)

[PJ2]

John47;
. . .
Jacques Kavafian, vice-president of Research Capital Inc., is also impressed by AeroMechanical. He owns stock in the company and Research Capital has a relationship with the company as an investment banker. "[The technology] is attractive because it helps airlines save a lot of money by tracking fuel consumption and by also tracking maintenance occurrences and alerting the airlines in real time of any problems that occur. No one else really can do that in a way that is economical like AeroMechanical does. Their technology is essentially the cheaper way to transmit the data in real time from the airplane to the ground. ..."

"That $50,000 [installation cost] will save airlines anywhere from $100,000 per plane per year up to $500,000 per plane per year. It's a savings amount that no one can ignore."

AeroMechanical, which has about 50 employees, already has the appropriate supplemental-type certificates for their equipment to be used on a number of Boeing and Airbus aircraft, and Mr. Bradley says it is compatible with all major aircraft manufacturers. Mr. Kavafian says AeroMechanical has installed 180 AFIRS units on aircraft at various airlines.

"We see ourselves as being in the right place at the right time, with the right product," he says.
If I were marketing this product, (and I have no opinion on it because I have no information on it), I would not be using Jacques Kavafian.

Mr. Kavafian is speaking as an investor and a businessman, not as a safety or data specialist. He is known as a controversial commentator on the commercial aspects of the airline business in Canada. He knows nothing about flight data analysis, about installations, about how this work is really done and how the data is used and handled.

Any flight data analysis product faces the same challenges of buy-in and competing for limited resources. I think the concept is a good one but as "FLYHT"'s website states up front, data security guarantees by users including flight crews is a requirement. However, no information is provided by FLYHT as to how those problems are addressed. With others, I've been doing flight data analysis for a long time and these issues are not easily resolved, either procedurally, technically or politically.

PJ2

[John47]

PJ12
data security guarantees ... are not easily resolved, either procedurally, technically or politically.

Good point but perhaps one day

[PJ2]

John47;
but perhaps one day
No, I don't think so.

I have seen no reason to be the least bit optimistic about the protection of safety data and information even though under SMS the collection and use of this data is mandated under SMS in Canada.

CVRs and DFDRs as well as QARs and when they are eventually installed, Cockpit Video Recorders, will, under rubric of "the public interest" or, more realistically, the power of the highest bidder (in the US media), always be subject to the possibility that narrow legal interests or prurient media interests, both of which are focussed on money instead of the improvement of the whole system will force court-directed appropriation of safety data in discovery.

Permit me a sidebar...
While some claim that such processes lead to changes and improvements in safety, the process is inefficient and very narrowly focussed on specific items and is largely a collateral result, often with unintended consquences. Witness the latest, where the entire Congress of the United States is collectively setting their hair on fire, (or playing solitaire) over some laptops, intent on a wholesale ban without the slightest input or study from the industry so affected.

Two weeks after two guys got distracted (and never hurt anyone and weren't in any immediate danger), we have Congress making laws to "protect" the flying public from this new, nefarious, insidiosity. It reminds one slightly, of the widespread panic over H1N1 vaccinations.

Good god, we in the profession can only imagine in our wildest dreams, such a keen response from Congress to all the science and now the accident reports concerning crew fatigue. But you will never see it because it costs the airlines too much. Banning laptops is attaboys-for-free.

To those who understand flight safety and how our system got so safe, a bunch of publicity-seeking congresspeople banning laptops is a joke and the fools are the lawmakers themselves. This is a clear, obvious example of why individual industry incidents cannot, in and of themselves, form a basis upon which policy and law are made.

The case for the protection of flight safety data of all kinds is abundant and clear - it improves the level of safety of an entire industry.

Sorry for the sidebar, but it is an important and relevant understanding in this conversation, and are matters which must be addressed in practical terms if one is going to market one's organization as the answer to irretrievable flight data of the kind under discussion, (447).

[mm43]

@John47,

The staff of AeroMechanical Services Ltd. watched the fruitless search for flight-data recorders of Air France Flight 447 in the South Atlantic from afar earlier this year knowing that their technology could have helped to reconstruct the tragedy.Of course the search was fruitless in the South Atlantic!:ugh:

mm43

[BJ-ENG]

No link between Qantas A330 problems and Air France crash | The Australian (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/aviation/no-link-between-qantas-a330-problems-and-air-france-crash/story-e6frg95x-1225799255688)



A second interim report into a Qantas A330-300 that nosedived twice 154km west of the West Australian town of Learmonth last October said investigators had yet to find a reason for erroneous data provided by a component known as an air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU).

The report said there several important differences between the Qantas and Air France accident, including the fact that the ADIRUs were made by different manufacturers, cockpit messages followed a different sequence and pattern and the airspeed sensors (pitot probes) on the two aircraft were different models made by different manufacturers.

A European airworthiness directive that pitot probes made by Thales Avionics be replaced with units manufactured by Goodrich also did not apply to Qantas aircraft.


An Australian Transport Safety Bureau report released today emphasised the importance of seatbelts and said new procedures and software modifications on A330s were aimed at preventing further nosedives.

The investigation team is continuing to evaluate a problem with ADIRU’s called "dozing", where the units stop outputting data during a flight, and are looking at the possibility that cosmic rays or solar radiation may have affected the unit.

A test plane equipped with sensors was also flown near the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications station near Learmonth while it was transmitting but an analysis did not reveal any anomalous results.

[TvB]

CVRs and DFDRs as well as QARs and when they are eventually installed, Cockpit Video Recorders, will, under rubric of "the public interest" or, more realistically, the power of the highest bidder (in the US media), always be subject to the possibility that narrow legal interests or prurient media interests, both of which are focussed on money instead of the improvement of the whole system will force court-directed appropriation of safety data in discovery.

PJ2:

could you please tell me in which recent accident CVR, DFDR or QAR became "in the public interest" the power of the highest bidder in the US or anywhere on this planet?

I think you would have to agree that it is and hopefully will continue to be common practize that DFDR data, once transfered out of the box and AFTER (!) it got analyzed by the pro's in charge with this job, will become published in the official accident investigation report under ICAO Annex 13? Anything wrong with that?

Now in regards to CVR transcripts I think you would have to admit that they may be published by some countries and other won't publish them. Nevertheless
this information is vital for the understanding and thereby to required prevention of similar incidents and accidents or did I get something wrong here?

Again, please correct me if I'm wrong.
Otherwise please come on and enlighten me.

rgds

TvB

[steamchicken]

The USN lent sonar equipment and personnel the first time out. There are 4 deepwater navies - the French are obviously involved, the USN was as well, that leaves two.

Which would be more problematic diplomatically, Russian or British sonar? :rolleyes:

[rogerrapoport]

According to your analysis this is similar to the Air France 447 analysis. Are you basing this on specifics in the BEA report?

[BJ-ENG]

The French air accident investigation agency, the Bureau d’Enquetes et d’Analyses (BEA) is examining the incident involving an Air France A330-200 airliner over the South Atlantic on December 1......




Accident experts seek clues into Air France Airbus disaster from recent S Atlantic incident (http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/accident-investigators-hope-for-clues-into-air-france-airbus-disaster-from-recent-airbus-incident-over-south-atlantic-2009-12-08)

[24victor]

The Daily Telegraph is reporting an incident to AF445 on the Rio to CDG run in the same area as AF447 disappeared. According to the report the aircraft lost 5,000 ft in severe turbulence.
Air France jet plunges 5,000ft in same spot as doomed flight from Brazil - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/6779058/Air-France-jet-plunges-5000ft-in-same-spot-as-doomed-flight-from-Brazil.html)

Rgds.
24V

[BJ-ENG]

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e2.en/pdf/f-cp090601e2.en.pdf

[Tokyo Geoff]

The summary indicates:

The aircraft was probably intact on impact
The aircraft struck the the surface of the water with a positive attitude, a low bank and a high rate of descent
There was no depressurisation

[Graybeard]

Characteristic of flat spin.

Rotation isn't required for a flat spin.

GB

[GlueBall]

One theory would have to include the probability of a stall. A situation where moderate or severe turbulence had disconnected A/P and A/T, and the PF had instinctively reduced thrust, with or without correct airspeed indications. In case of inoperative stall warning, the resultant airframe vibration or buffeting was masked by turbulence. Since the airplane remained intact and impacted the water in a pitch-up, low bank and little sideslip attitude, it's conceivable that the airplane remained stalled during the entire descent. The crew subsequently may also have tried to re engage the automatics, but without first lowering the nose to effect stall recovery.

Such a stall event had played out on 22 Dec 1996 when an ABX DC-8-63F on a test flight encountered a full stall with severe buffet in night IMC without the benefit of a working stick shaker. Upon recognition of the stall, the crew had added thrust, but had failed to lower the nose.

[john_tullamarine]

Rotation isn't required for a flat spin.

Now, that's something I've never considered. Perhaps you can cite some references for my study ?

[henry crun]

John: You missed your vocation, you should have been a diplomat. :)

[john_tullamarine]

You missed your vocation

.. I always try to be circumspect .. on far too many occasions over the years, after shooting off my mouth .. I have had to eat umble pie when I find that I was wrong ... as they say "often it is better to keep one's peace and forever be thought a fool ... than to open one's mouth and remove all doubt ... "

Graybeard's commentaries generally run to wisdom .. so I prefer to seek his guidance .. I may well learn something useful along the way.

[Hyperveloce]

Hi there,
Here is a short summary of the report:
-From the visual inspection of the varied debris (toilet doors, partitions, galleys, cabin crew rest module, spoiler, aileron, vertical stabiliser):
The aircraft was probably intact on impact.
The aircraft struck the surface of the water with a positive attitude, a low bank and a high rate of descent.
There was no depressurisation
The report does not put forward any descent rate, deceleration figure (except the 36 g /120 000 N for the VS) or other figures resulting for exemple from an accurate metallographic analysis of well chosen debris.

-The medical and pathological Information drawn from the autopsy reports does not add so much, and does not enable to know whether the Captain was in the flight deck at the time of the crash.

-The ACARS analysis is refined, 21 of the 24 can be related to a failure of the anemometric loop, at least one more ACARS message (a class 2 fault message about the ADR2) should have been transmitted between the last ACARS (02:14:26Z) and 02:15:14Z.

-The meteorological analysis is slightly refined (surface to mid altitude convection cells using the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission / Cloudsat data): it suggests the presence of strong condensation towards AF447’s flight level (10 000 m) probably associated with convection towers.

-The BEA studied thirteen events on Airbus A330 / A340, losses of or temporary anomalies in indicated speeds occurring for which it had both crew reports, parameter recordings the PFR: Air France (4 cases); TAM (2 cases); Qatar Airways (4 cases); Northwest (1 case); Air Caraïbes Atlantique (2 cases).
It can be noted from this analysis that:
In seven cases, the autopilot was reconnected during the event. In two of them, the re-connection occurred when the two speeds were consistent with each other but were erroneous;
The autothrust disconnected in ten cases, leading to the activation of the Thrust Lock function. In five of them, this function remained connected for over one minute;
In 2 cases, the autothrust did not disconnect and the flight directors did not disappear. The recording of the engine RPM parameters shows fluctuations in thrust with N1 values of between 48% & 100% ;
Nine cases of triggering of the stall warning were observed.
With regard to crew reactions, the following points are notable:
Five cases of a voluntary descent were observed, of which one was of 3,500 feet. These descents followed a stall warning;
Four crews did not identify an unreliable airspeed situation.
The duration of the engagement of the Thrust Lock function indicates that there was no rapid autothrust disconnection actions then manual adjustment on the thrust to the recommended thrust;

To explain the exiting of the flight enveloppe, the BEA thinks to the risk of an attitude/thrust mismatch, when the A/THR disconnection occurs with a low N1 value. Woudn't the greatest danger be when the A/THR goes off with a high N1 index (or full thrust), this being maintained "several dozens seconds" or "over a minute", the plane being put in descent following a stall warning ?
Jeff
PS) Nowhere in the report, it is said that the false alarms may have played a major role in the accident but in a paragraph about "Operator training for the Unreliable IAS / ADR check emergency / backup procedure", it is concluded that the key points for a correct management of the situation are: detection of the problems, interpretation of the alarms and coordination in processing.

[mm43]

The Annex to the report outlines the difficulties that the various organisations participating in the phase 1 and 2 searches had in backtracking the drift (set & leeway) for the Vertical Stabilizer. As I have indicated in previous posts, the onset of the North Atlantic Equatorial Counter Current in the suspected crash area has had a major bearing on the position from where the surface debris may have originated.

Notwithstanding, the following organisations calculated debris positions:-
Météo France, Brazilian Meteorological Service, US Navy, and US Coast Guard.

No methodology has been revealed (except that computer modeling was used), but there is obviously major differences in the vectors used. From the BEA report I have reproduced a chart showing the calculated positions, and have overlaid it with data I previously posted to this forum http://www.pprune.org/5216571-post4476.html

Data in red or yellow has been added by me.

http://i846.photobucket.com/albums/ab27/mm43_af447/af447-point-sm.gif

Mine and the Météo France positions are further to the west than the others and outside the prime area of interest. There is 89NM between the most eastern and western positions, but only 7NM in the north / south distribution. An initial investigation was made in the area of the Météo France position to remove any doubts, and the current concentration is centered on 3°10'N 30°25W.

Time will of course reveal how valid any of the positions are.

mm43

[Reimers]

Rotation isn't required for a flat spin.


Isn't a flat spin without the spinning called a "deep stall"? (Elevator as well as wing are stalled?)
Whereas a normal spin has the spinning in addition to the stalled wing of the stall?

[Milt]

john tullamarine

Cannot accept that an aircraft can spin without spin. Let's call it a deep stall instead.

Know of several deep stall losses in the UK during which many attempts were made to recover. Ossie Hawkins couldn't recover a Vulcan even after releasing the braking parachute. He survived the ejection.

John Baker did recover a HP Victor using the braking chute which was torn off in the process. He had entered a deep stall and some spinning after losing airspeed reference.

[john_tullamarine]

Cannot accept that an aircraft can spin without spin

That has been my conventional understanding .. that a spin is an autorotating stalled mode of flight.

However, I am always open to new ideas ..

Planning to be driving through Canberra mid next week .. are you about for a coffee ?

[mm43]

1.3 Reverse drift calculations

The knowledge of currents and winds in the area of the accident can provide a theoretical estimate of the previous positions of each body and debris identified by calculating a trajectory in reverse. An estimate of a possible impact zone at the time of the accident on 1 June 2009 at about 2 h 15 UTC, can be had by taking this route. This calculation is called retro-drift or reverse drift.

A team of experts from Météo-France, SHOM, IFREMER, Mercator Ocean and CROSS Gris-Nez worked on the calculations of drift. The U.S. Navy, Brazilian Navy and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) also provided the results of their calculations.

The different points of retro-drift were calculated from the positions of Debris and bodies found on 6 and 7 June, and especially from the position of the vertical stabilizer found on 7 June 2009.

Calculations by the USCG for an estimated position of the vertical stabilizer on 1 June at 2 h 15 placed it at 30 NM south-east of its position on 7 June. Furthermore, an estimated position for the bodies on 1 June was also calculated, assuming that they drifted to the surface from the scene of the accident.

Calculations by the Brazilian Meteorological Service and the U.S. NAVY results approximate the USCG position. These simulations used the same NCOM model (1), and the results are in the Alpha area that was explored by TPLs (US Navy's Towed Pinger Locators).

Calculated retro-drift of the vertical stabilizer made by Météo - France has in turn provided an estimated impact position on 1 June at 2 h 15 approximately 50NM to the south-west of its position on 7 June. This zone extends about 25NM depending on an assumed vertical immersion of the tail of between 80 and 100%. These results differ from those provided by other simulations of backward drift.

Calculations by Météo France were based in particular on the current model developed by Mercator (2). As the results from Météo France were in a relatively remote part of the Alpha area, this area to the west was explored by the SNA (Nuclear Attack Submarine "Emerald") with the main objective to remove any doubts. (1) NCOM model (Navy Coastal Ocean Model) is based on a 1/8° resolution grid (ie approximately 15 km). It is fed by the Air NOGAPS model (resolution 50 km) and receives daily U.S. Navy Data observations and data forecasts at hourly intervals. This data is regularly assimilated and compared internally, along with data returned by drift buoys.
(2) The Mercator model comprises two sub models, PSY2 and PSY3. - Mercator PSY2 is an Atlantic and Mediterranean High resolution model on a 1/12° (or 9 km) grid and with fifty vertical levels. The surface wind model is the ECMWF (European Center for Medium - Range Weather Forecasts) at 25 km resolution. It produces current fields daily. - Mercator PSY3 gives an over all Oceans average resolution of 1/4°, i.e. approximately a 25 km grid.I'll try and translate other parts of the Annex when I get time.

http://i846.photobucket.com/albums/ab27/mm43_af447/currents-med.png

I created the graphic above last August to give a general idea of how the currents were behaving at the time of the crash. The reverse drift positions for the vertical stabilizer provided in the BEA Interim Report No.2 have been added in magenta.

mm43

[ECAM_Actions]

Just curious - if the tail failed, why no messages of hydraulic low system pressure (any system) or control faults?

ECAM Actions.

[JD-EE]

Perhaps it failed after the aircraft attempted to become a submarine regardless of the crew's intentions?

Seriously, the failure mode for the tail is not possible to create in the air unless God reached down and swatted it on the nose. It can fail in that mode upon hitting the water with some forward motion and a pretty stiff downward motion. By then the plane is breaking up very rapidly and no more messages of any kind are leaving the debris field.

{o.o}

[unclemohammed]

What a perplexing case to unravel. Would anyone care to postulate any assumptions on the missing 'MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR2' message that not been transmitted, on a plane that:

1. Was assumed (by the BEA report) to have full hull integrity, until it hit the water.
2. Remained in a 'pitch-up (attitude), with a slight bank and at a high vertical speed'

With possible non-transmission of this message, put down to (copied from the report):

'loss of one or more system(s) essential for the generation and routing of
messages in the aircraft:


ATSU / SDU / antenna: none of the maintenance messages sent is
related in any way whatsoever with the functioning of these systems. A
malfunction of this type should have occurred after the transmission of
the last message and without forewarning.


loss of electrical power supply: this would imply the simultaneous loss of
the two main sources of electrical power generation.


loss of satellite communication:


loss of data during transmission: the satellite’s quality follow-up does
not show any malfunction in the time slot concerned.


loss of contact between the aircraft and the satellite:
•

unusual attitudes: given the relative position of the satellite with respect
to the aircraft and the aircraft’s tracking capability, the antenna would
have to be masked by the aircraft’s fuselage or wings. Examination of
the debris showed that the aircraft hit the water with a bank angle close
to zero and a positive pitch angle. The aircraft would therefore have
been able, in the last seconds at least, to transmit an ACARS message.
• end of the flight between 2 h 14 min 26 and 2 h 15 min 14.'

BEA also noted that the flaps were retracted on track 3 upon impact. This states in my mind that the flaps were retracted at some stage by the crew, or forced there by aerodynamic loads - with the former being highly likely. If that was the case, the crew had time to retract the flaps, in plane that at some point before the blue stuff, was relatively flat, with ACARS working until a certain point. I cannot believe a plane that was maybe (please dont kill me, it is a basic assumption from the scant evidence given) in a stall scenario, did not have time to electronically send a message? (unless a complete power loss was present)...

UM

[mm43]

@UM
end of the flight between 2 h 14 min 26 and 2 h 15 min 14
The 2:14:26 time was the aircraft / satellite handshake time of the last message transmitted and received in Paris. The 2:15:14 time was the latest time that the fault message believed to be in the system would have been sent and received.

There may have been other ACARS messages waiting for transmission, but we do not know. I suspect the actual impact time was seconds after the handshake time at 2:14:26.

mm43

[unclemohammed]

Thank you and agreed. Assuming that the FCPC1 (PRIM 1) message was picked up at 2h 13min 45 (assuming a 1 min transmission for the fault message), then i reckon the impact time was in between 2h 14 min 26 - 2h 14 min 45.

UM

[HazelNuts39]

The BEA 2nd Interim Report describes the calculation of the Stall Warning threshold as follows (in paragraph 1.6.11.4 on page 46, english version):
In alternate or direct law, the angle-of-attack protections are no longer
available but a stall warning is triggered when the greatest of the valid angle-of
-attack values exceeds a certain threshold. In clean configuration, this threshold
depends,in particular, on the Mach value in such a way that it decreases when the
Mach increases. It is the highest of the valid Mach values that is used to
determine the threshold. If none of the three Mach values is valid, a Mach value
close to zero is used. For example, it is of the order of 10° at Mach 0.3 and of 4°
at Mach 0.8.

This information leaves me with several questions -

Firstly, the Stall Warning should occur when the AOA exceeds 4 deg at Mach=0.8, but does not occur until AOA exceeds 10 deg when airspeed is invalid. In that case, is the Stall Warning still timely enough to permit the pilot to avoid stalling?

Secondly, in the Air Caraibes incident in october 2008 Stall Warning occurred at AOAs of 4.48 deg and 4.31 deg, while the calculated threshold was 4.2 deg. This would correspond to the actual Machnunber around 0.8, but how could 0.8 have been the 'valid' Machnumber for the system while both PFDs were displaying Mach=0.3, in ALTERNATE law, ADR DISAGREE, FD 1&2 lost, etc.?

Finally, the A330 FCOM procedure UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION / ADR CHECK PROC states:
Rely on the stall warning that could be triggered in alternate or direct
law. It is not affected by unreliable speeds, because it is based on angle of
attack.
Was the author of this procedure unaware of how the system works as described by BEA?

Regards,
HN39

[mm43]

@HN39
Was the author of this procedure unaware of how the system works as described by BEA?The BEA version and the A330 FCOM procedure do seem to be in conflict.

Perhaps an email to BEA with a CC to Airbus may result in a clarification

mm43

[Hyperveloce]

Hi there,
I have just emailed to the BEA to ask further informations about the stall warnings triggering conditions (and more precisely how the Air Caraïbe incidents could have generated stall warnings if we follow the principles described in the 2nd BEA report).
Low probability to get an answer but...
Merry Christmas to all of you
http://img705.imageshack.us/img705/9125/santaboum.jpg
Jeff

[mm43]

Thanks Hyper.:ok:

Hopefully other operators and jurisdictions will have noted the anomaly and queried the BEA and Airbus.

Merry Christmas

mm43

[bearfoil]

Stall warnings with UAS.

This revisits the Qantas flight, and Stall warning confusion. Has a paper re: unreliable Stall warning been issued by AB? BEA?

[Skybeds]

this crash is really frustrating. god knows what happened to the plane

[Mr Optimistic]

I have just read through as much of this thread as I could but I couldn't find an 'end point' for a couple of the many hypotheses raised. If anyone has the patient could they remind me of the general conclusion/most probable situation regarding,

a) the availability of attitude information to the crew
b)the time taken for a 'deep stalled' descent to gl from 37k ft
c) whether a stable configuration in stall for such a period is likely in very turbulent conditions and with an aware crew ?

[JD-EE]

Mr Optimistic, for a quick stab at B I believe that many objects share a common terminal velocity free-falling in air of about 100-140 MPH. That's about 176 feet per second. That means it's about 3.5 minutes from 37k' to surface. It'll likely be faster at really high altitudes than at sea level. So even a plane in a dead stall condition falling like a leaf MIGHT go down at about that rate.

Are you volunteering to give it a try of somebody pays for the airplane in which to try it?

{^_-} At least that's a bogey number to play around with. The real question is what might make the plane stay in such a stall given its wing configuration?

[Mr Optimistic]

a) thanks
b) no !

Was interested in what had been deduced from the stated impact configuration which I understood to be an attitude consistent with flight except of course for the velocity vector (downwards with small fwd component) which, I believe (no expert), implies well into a stall and no usable flow to engines.

Couldn't find a scenario in this thread which, given the awful situation, explained to a non-pilot how this configuration could be achieved (eg avoiding structural breakup) considering the elapsing time to 'try something' even if perhaps hopeless and eventually unsuccessful.

There was a whole string of posts on the availability of attitude data to the crew. I presumed that the impact configuration means that there must have been information to the crew otherwise such a configuration is unlikely if by chance/uncontrollable events, alone ?

[HazelNuts39]

Mr Optimistic (5th january):
a) the availability of attitude information to the crewJust in case you have missed this 'Finding' in BEA's 2nd Interim Report:
None of the messages present in the CFR indicate loss of displays or inertial information (attitudes);b)the time taken for a 'deep stalled' descent to gl from 37k ftAlthough not 'deep stalled', it may be of interest that D.P.Davies' excellent book 'Handling the big jets' contains an emergency descent profile for (an early model of) the B747 from 30k ft to 15k ft in 2min10sec. Elsewhere in his book (dated 1967) he writes : "some aeroplanes will achieve descent rates of up to 14,000 ft. per minute, and 9,000 ft. per minute is quite common". Mr. Davies was Chief Test Pilot for the ARB, the predecessor of CAA, the U.K. civil aviation regulatory agency.

Regards,
HN39

[mm43]

A few days ago when searching the BEA site for information on the Phase 3 search, I found an animation showing the tracks of a number of aircraft that flew northbound on either UN873 or UN866 between 0000z and 0300z. The animation was designed as a web application and for those using Firefox 3.5+ it can be found at -

Flight Paths of Flight AF 447 and of the flights that crossed the zone around the same time (http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/trajectoires/trajectoires010609.html)

The above animation shows a/c positions every 2.5 minutes (except AF447 - every 10 minutes), and uses Scalable Vector Graphics which allow the integration of 12 satellite images taken over the same 3 hour period. Individual aircraft/tracks can be selected, and the animation can be paused at any time.

Unfortunately, the application doesn't work in Internet Explorer, Chrome, Safari or Opera. All is not lost, as further trawling of the BEA website revealed that a video had been made of the above, and though it doesn't provide the user interaction mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it can be paused. The video will play in the Windows Media Player and is at -

http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/trajectoires/trajectoires010609.avi

This post is duplicated on the AF447 and AF447 Search to Resume threads as a matter of record.

mm43

[barrymah]

Interesting, the AF449 path is the most significant, IMO, same track with lots of deviations.... presumably weather...??

Bye, Barry

[AntiCrash]

I am beginning to wonder if the flight crew became incapacitated. How truly sad this is.
I pray they can somehow find the CVR and FDR soon and lav to rest this terrible mystery.:(

[LandIT]

paraphrased from the "Flight" article...

French investigators have detailed initial plans for a third attempt to find the wreckage and flight recorders

additional data, better estimates of currents and drift effects

zone will be optimised and revised once the operation starts in mid-March

two search vessels - one from Norway's Seabed Group and the other from US underwater engineering specialist Phoenix International - have been recruited for the attempt

So, they have not given up.

ref: Ocean models refined to aid new AF447 wreckage search (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/02/23/338721/ocean-models-refined-to-aid-new-af447-wreckage-search.html)

[Graybeard]

I removed this from R&N to post here. This follows my prior post that spinning is not required for a flat spin, for which I was humiliated. That's an oxymoron, of course.
-------

Ever Seen a Flat Spin?

I'd wager not many people have been eyewitness to a flat spin. This tale is about an F-106 Delta Dart that was in a practice dogfight:

... I took them straight up at about 38,000 ft. We got into a vertical rolling scissors. I gave him a high G rudder reversal. He tried to stay with me, that's when he lost it. He got into a post stall gyration. This happens just prior to a stall. The aircraft violently rolls left and right and sometimes swaps ends, a very violent maneuver. His recovery attempt was unsuccessful and the aircraft stalled and went into a flat spin which is usually unrecoverable.

The aircraft looked like the pitot tube was stationary with the aircraft rotating around it. Very flat and rotating quite slowly. Well,. Gary rode it down to about 15,000 feet...

This seems to describe the circumstance of AF447.

In the F-106 case, the pilot set the controls per procedure and bailed out. The plane then recovered from the flat spin and landed itself. It was repaired and returned to service, forever after known as the "Cornfield Bomber."

F-106 Delta Dart - 58-0787 Pilotless Landing (http://www.f-106deltadart.com/71fis_PilotlessLanding_580787.htm)

[AN1944]

Just Reading A News Item Says Boxes Are In Acertain Area Pings Were Heard By Sub Last Year Updated Equipt Has Located The Area Hpe They Can Recover

[747 forever]

Hey guys check this out, Sea search ops : wreckage images (http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/images.du.site.php)
sorry if it has been posted before

[john_tullamarine]

I really don't think we need two large threads on this subject.

It would be too difficult to merge the two threads so I'll lock this one and put a link in the other thread.