CRM Conundrum

[jolly girl]

Background: I received my leadership training in a strategic military environment. In this environment, leaders (Colonels and above) would gather to determine appropriate goals, how available resources would be managed to execute those goals, potential threats to these plans and how these threats would be countered to ensure the mission succeeded. In this environment the unusual was important, the unknown the biggest threat and it was important to keep lines of communication open, to make it possible for individuals with critical information, no matter how low their rank, to get this information to the leaders who required it in a timely manner.

Fast forward to recent years, I work in an aviation-related domain in a position that requires me to lead teams of subject-matter experts as they resolve high-impact, short-notice, time-critical, dynamic events. I have found the strategic style of leadership I had previously learned to be effective; my role as leader it to make sure my teams are composed of the right people, have the resources they need to accomplish the task, keeping members on task and on schedule, putting out fires and clearing any hurdles or roadblocks they encounter, a "how can I help you help me" form of guidance. (Just so you don't think it's all cookies and punch, YES there are time I must assert my authority and the cost of not meeting goals can be very high.)

I recently had the opportunity to sit in on some CRM classes, aimed at undergraduates aspiring to work for the airlines. The professor stated that his objective to reduce the number of accidents where the FO is heard to say "I'm not comfortable with this" or "I knew this would happen." The CRM model taught in this class was "authority with participation, assertiveness with respect." But I noticed that the focus was not really on increasing communication but rather maintaining a heirarchical, more tactical (task, rather than goal focussed)"the Captain is the center of the universe" form of leadership. The students were taught communication strategies such as "never correct a captain in front of others" which are known to increase power distance and reduce communication. Over time it became clear the students were being taught to support and protect the Captain's ego at the cost of the free flow of communication. As I continue to read accident reports containing CVR transcripts where FOs make these statements, it appears to me this is a failed model.

Question: Are we asking too much of CRM training in it's current form? With the technological advances in the cockpit since the origin of CRM, which has shifted the role of the pilot from monitor/controller to system/resource manager, is the current CRM model still valid?

I'd appreciate your thoughts.

[Non-PC Plod]

Jolly,

When you speak of "CRM training in its current form", you are giving an impression that you are applying a massive broadbrush generalisation to what "CRM training" is.
There are many different trainers out there, carrying out classroom training, line training, and simulator training for many different operators and training organisations. They will all have different methods and ideas. What is very apparent from reading this forum regularly is that there are good trainers and bad trainers. Unfortunately, the bad trainers seem to have a disproportionately negative effect on their trainees, to the extent that bad training is worse than no training at all. This is because people feel patronised, that they are being made to indulge some airy-fairy politically-correct nonsense in place of straightforward common sense. This isnt because the CRM concept is wrong, it is because the trainer's methods are failing to reinforce the basic principles of CRM, which are, largely, commonsense, leadership, management, decision-making. People get very bogged down in the niceties of communication, which ,though important, are really part and parcel of the other skills.
I have trained CRM in each of the current disciplines, and have found that by far the most straightforward is in the simulator. You can stop the simulation as the aircraft is plunging in its death roll towards the earth, and ask the crew to just look again at what they have done to get it there, and how and why it has happened. Usually, they very quickly see for themselves what they have done, and there is a "Eureka" moment. You dont need to state the obvious. The crew can take the experience away as a self-taught lesson.
In the classroom, it is much more difficult to reinforce safety-centered behaviours without stating the bleeding obvious, patronising the experienced people present, and showing them a load of stuff they have seen before. It takes work and effort to be original and challenging and interesting. That is why it often doesnt produce the desired result.
If the training you witnessed was based on how to speak to each other nicely on the flight deck I think the trainer was missing issues which are more relevant today, such as automation complacency, mode awareness, or for helicopter operations situational awareness and decision-making in degraded visual environments.
Perhaps the professor you saw has spent too much time in the classroom, and not much on the flight deck recently.

[alf5071h]

Are we asking too much of CRM training in it's current form?
Yes; assuming that ‘current’ CRM implies focus on TEM.
CRM is often seen as the panacea for human error related accidents, whereas in reality it must be part of a larger package, e.g. design, regulation, and organisational issues.

With the technological advances in the cockpit since the origin of CRM, which has shifted the role of the pilot from monitor/controller to system/resource manager, is the current CRM model still valid?
Probably not, but has there ever been a consistent model of CRM?
A major problem with CRM is that the concept has not been well explained and even more so, not well applied. In particular, most effort has been placed on the soft interpersonal and social skills to the detriment of cognitive skills. A wider view of HF training (CRM is the application of HF) would include individuals’ thinking skills – awareness and decision making. The latter are more difficult to teach and apply and thus are often deferred to LOFT or elsewhere, if taught at all.
CRM is like a bidet; everyone knows what it is for, but no one knows what it is, - a reversal of a British myth about French culture!
There isn’t really a world standard for CRM. The guidance materials from regulators are diverse and often reflect the social view above.
ICAO publishes a standard position in their HF Training Manual, but this document is not readily available. Furthermore, ICAO adds complexity with new initiatives, many based on academic principles which may still have a research bias, or are too culturally or operationally specific (LOSA, TEM model, SMS).

In accepting that error is unavoidable, training concentrates on avoidance, detection, and correction, with crosschecking / monitoring central to all operations. However, reviewing ‘HF’ accidents, in many cases the crosschecking/monitoring failed. Just as both crew can suffer disorienting illusions simultaneously, so too can their mental models fail simultaneously, their awareness of the developing situation is flawed, thus there is no independence for monitoring, interjection, or advocacy.
The solution, if there is a human one, should start with the individual and teach thinking skills to build on knowledge and help develop know-how from practical experience to enable improved awareness (understanding). The latter being a critical item; experience is in short supply in the modern industry, and rarely developed within the crew – how many Captains participate in helping to ‘train’ - pass on experience to First Officers?
Are these problems of the confrontational cockpit? Possibly; more so where newly qualified pilots arrive with frozen ‘captain’ qualifications and a belief that there is nothing more to learn, only to sit back and get the hours. If this is the case then the weakness in CRM training (and the model) starts with initial training.

For inf see ‘Teaching and Assessing Single-Pilot Human Factors and Threat and Error Management’ ( http://www.casa.gov.au/download/CAAPs/ops/5_59_1.pdf); this is a recent document which I rate highly for its basic common sense approach to the subject.
Although aimed at single pilot operations, the content applies to everyone – a good team starts with individuals. Also, the instructor aspects can be adapted for self-analysis - self questioning, an important aspect in safety thinking.

[jolly girl]

Thank you for your posts they provide some good insight.
However, I keep coming back to this:
CRM was developed (in part) in response to the UAL DC8 at Portland where the FO kept reminiding the CA of their low fiel condition to no avail. But I continue to read accident reports with FO statements such as "I'm not confortable with this." Since it has been 30 years since the advent of CRM I can only assume it is a failed exercise, at least in the aviation realm.
I have a friend who does CRM research (not the professor in question), but in the medical field rather than aviation. Her current research is focussing on "communication bottlenecks," their structure and mechanics and what strategies can be developed/utilized to counter/reduce thir occurance and impact. It has me thinking that perhaps we (aviation) have been getting a bit complacent about CRM, that we got to a certain point and just stopped.
Thoughts?

[BelArgUSA]

Hola Jolly -
xxx
CRM - a conundrum - is it an understatement...?
I got thrown into the CRM zoology in its early days, the mid-1970s, as I was an instructor for PanAm during a layoff as line pilot. While I was happily making an idiot of myself in classrooms, CPT and simulators, teaching the knowledge of the 707s and 727s to flight crews (who often knew much more than I did myself), a pilot training manager threw a booklet on my desk, called CRM. He asked me to teach something along the lines of that subject. The booklet had been stolen from UAL, apparently they were the precursors of CRM among the USA airlines to try to analyse CRM. I also received a 16mm movie reel coming from Finnair, who apparently were the first in Europe with early forms of the CRM.
xxx
Back then, we dealt with recurrent training of god-captains and cockpit-nazis. PanAm had, being the "world's most experienced airline" was also the "world's most experienced" in notorious crashes of 707s. Most accidents were actually more because of lack of situation awareness, inexistant ATC, and number of CFIT circumstances, not necessarily a lack of CRM.
xxx
CRM came in full bloom with, you cited, the UAL DC8 crash, when running out of fuel and ideas in PDX. Then the FAA started to require actual CRM training. I became "CRM Facilitator" (the instructors do not instruct CRM...!). Parallel to that, the wording SOP became in fashion as well, where crews follow blind, a certain procedure of an emergency check-list failing to understand the consequence of what becomes "inoperative" when i.e. you pull a certain CB, or shut down a valve in the fuel or hydraulic system...
xxx
There are crews whose only concern in life, is to call any sentence in a cockpit as a form of CRM, who sneeze with strict (and blind) SOP, and disregard limitations in name of "superior" airmanship. All that started in the 1980s, got fully implemented in the 1990s, and what do we have now in this new century...? Shall I volunteer to say a lack of certain piloting skills...?
xxx
Being now an outsider, in South America, and ending my pilot career, I laugh or cry to see what happens with the airline crews of the first world. Pardon me to say, I can put a tag on the origin of each crew groups, by their concepts of CRM, SOP and pilot skills or airmanship. And I am personally not exempt of such.
xxx
You do not give a prescription of CRM to pilots. They are born, or not with the CRM aptitudes. An "Initial" CRM course is valid up to a point. CRM should not be a subject of "recurrent classroom training" but merely be a part of simulator training, combined with intelligent use of SOPs tailored to circumstances.
xxx
You will not see South American pilots having CFIT in Colombian mountains, it is the place where North Americans (or Europeans) will run into troubles. African airline pilots know how to handle an airspace devoid of ATC, and the Japanese or other Asians try to figure how to say to their captain that they are "too low" on the ILS without being required to commit hara-kiri.
xxx
The old PanAmigos like myself kept in touch with each other for long when we went to other airlines and we exchanged notes of "how it was like" to give dual of oceanic flights to the Delta "professional" captains, or explaining to a Korean first officer how to make a position report in... is it Engliche...?
xxx
Yes, Jolly Girl, we need some CRM, some amount of SOP, above average aircraft system knowledge (too bad, but I had plenty of that when I learned to fly airlines as a flight engineer prior to be a first officer) and we need, above all good "common sense". Like I mention to many friends, I had to survive captains ex-DC6 who had no idea how to handle a 727 jet, and now my first officer had to give me dual on the FMS while they zap entries on a keyboard that is not "Qwerty" (while I pilot an old 747 which they occasionally fail to do).
xxx
In other terms, my retirement was definitely warranted. I miss my old days with real pilots. By chance, I was able to maintain much of these concepts as a training manager... but now, since they will be an "all Airbus" fleet soon, I can only pass along the good words of wisdom to the few who still respect the past "steam power gages", manual ILS approach and full length runways for takeoff, even flying into MNPS airspace...! I know I will be missed at my airline. At least I made them laugh in the classrooms or simulators. Must be the reason they will keep me as a "training consultant"...
xxx
If you fly, Jolly Lady, read some of my posts. They will get you asleep. Yet, all are meant for one purpose only... avoid accidents. When you line up on that runway, repeat after me - trims, flaps, spoilers. I guarantee the plane will get into the air safely. The rest is up to you.
xxx
:ok:
Happy contrails

[turbocharged]

JG

It's maybe wrong to conclude that CRM has failed just because we hear the same things being said on CVR transcripts - each generation has to repeat the faults of its fathers.

And maybe your friend needs to look at all the research that has been done on communications in aviation. Medicine came late to 'crm' despite the fact they more people die in iatragenic events than ever die in aircraft losses.

Amazingly, medicine seems to want to repeat all the mistakes made in CRM,


I suspect that you maybe expect more from CRM than it has been able to deliver. The same frustration has given rise to TEM ... another false dawn if ever there was one.

:-)

[jolly girl]

BelArgUSA -
Excellent post. I will need some time to ponder it.

Turbocharged -
If you read my post you will see I stated she is "doing research" which means (at least in domains where valid research is performed) hypothoses with observation. What amazes me about her work is she is gathering data in the OR prior to developing any remedy - as far as I can tell naturalistic observation in the cockpit (at least by impartial researchers) has never been performed in aviation, and aviation seems to follow a "propose treatment, apply treatment, then see if treatment is even relevant" protocol.
And if you read my original post closely, I had been specifically taught in the class that CRM had been designed to preclude this one specific type of accident. Am I incorrect to assume that a treatment which has been designed and applied to remedy a specific ailment, and then after 30 years has been demonstrated not to have the desired effect has failed? Would you have the same attitude/response if this was en engineering/metallurgy issue?

-Jolly

[turbocharged]

Jolly Girl,

I did read both posts - closely.

[jolly girl]

Turbocharged –
I owe you an apology. I was having a bad day, and was snappy as a result.

BelArgUSA (and others) -
Your post confirms my worst suspicions – that the implementation of CRM was not based on science but was rather a subjective, haphazard exercise. I know I will take some flack for this perception, but before you beat me up, yes, I have gone through the U of T research that was the basis of CRM. If I recall correctly, it was all based on survey data (self-reporting is notoriously unreliable) and was followed up by observations of volunteers in the simulator (low n, and volunteers are known to behave differently than the general population). The initial work focused on the correlation between low power distance and lower accident rates, and hung its’ hat on the hypothesis better communication models, rather than other traits of individualistic societies would improve safety. When the initial model did not prove as effective as desired, it was tweeked, and tweeked again until, despite the fact that high uncertainty avoidance (and it’s rule based structures) are correlated with higher accident rates, TEM and its’ strict, rule-based structure were touted as the new solution. It reminds me of early astronomers who insisted the sun and planets revolved around the Earth, and kept revising their theory to accommodate this belief. My thought is maybe it’s not the communication that is the issue in these accidents, maybe it is, as you suggest, a situational awareness issue.

The accident that has me torqued up at the moment is a CFIT in San Diego. A Lear came off Brown Field at night, towards the hills, not on the SID as would be prudent but VFR at night, under the Class Bravo, towards steeply rising terrain.. The (young) copilot was heard to say “I don’t think this is a good idea” but the (seasoned) captain disregarded him. Is the issue here that the copilot didn’t speak up more assertively or rather that the captain was operating with a faulty mental model? And then I read through threads like “Border between assertive or arrogant/rude” and see language such as “little snots,” “incompetent losers,” “prima donnas” and “pillock” used to describe FOs and I ask, in times of trouble how is an FO supposed to break through something like that? What I admire about my friend’s research is the initial segment is designed to observe, to just watch how information is transferred during times of uncertainty, I have not been able to locate a similar effort in the aviation realm. Perhaps in time we will be able to learn from her.

Or maybe it’s not that at all. As I read through the “Assertive/Rude” I was struck by the number of captains who admitted to abdicating their responsibilities and playing the victim (such as the captain who let the FO get behind the aircraft on approach or the other who accepted his FOs decision to only divert 15 miles around CBs instead of 30) saying nothing and justifying their actions by labeling them as effective CRM. I think bucket and spade and simmy are on to something – perhaps we need to rethink this whole thing, recognize that every one and every act in the system is interrelated, that every FO is a captain-in-training, and that every captain is a training captain, that every communication affects the integrity of the system, and that no one person (or position) is more integral to the system than any other.

Fire away.

[ITCZ]

When you line up on that runway, repeat after me - trims, flaps, spoilers (snip) The rest is up to you.
:D:D:D:D

Mate, that is a ripper. I have followed some of your earlier posts and thought, incipient old fart --- but I take that back. Well said.

For me, you have summed up what Tony Kern took several thousand words to say in his Flight Discipline texts.

We have a responsibility. Every day, hundreds of people put their safety in our hands. We can choose not to fly, but once we push those throttles forward ...... It is up to us.

"Repeat after me - trims, flaps, spoilers. The rest is up to you"
With your permission, I shall use that line in the future. Gen Y need to hear it.

Fire away.
Bravo, JG. You passed the most important test in real CRM. Strong advocate for your position, yet invited criticism. Seriously, bravo :D

I cant help but think if you and BelArgUSA should find yourself working the same flight deck/same layover, that you would find yourselves in 'violent agreement' with each other. I detect the same seriousness of purpose in both your posts.

To take you to task on one matter...

.... many years ago, in another discipline, I was privileged to be invited to hear one of the worlds leading businessmen discuss what he believed to be the essential element in being a true entrepreneur. Not an asset stripper, but an entrepreneur. He believed that the essential element was in building small teams, each member bringing a high level of specialist knowledge, and imagination, to the team.

As he described the ideal profile of such a teammember, he remarked that university education was useful, but that one should be careful of selecting anyone that had any degree or award higher than an MBA. In particular, PhD's should be avoided!

The conference convenor, himself a PhD in applied psych, could not hold back -- 'but that excludes so much expertise and thinking, why not a PhD?'

The answer -- PhD are great contributors to society, but most have worked within rules too long, and no longer think from first principles.

That really resonated with me. At the time, because I was not nearly disciplined enough to complete a university degree of any kind, and I had not considered that perhaps being 'educated' also equated to being captured by a style of thinking, to some extent.

What is my point?

As pilots, we work with elemental forces, everyday. If we delve too far into intellectual constructs, and move away from first principles of the world around us and the people we work with, we invite trouble.

For many pilots, CRM training and instruction is fertile ground on which to make a contribution and to exercise some intellectual capacity outside the daily grind of line flying.

It is important to acquire and develop NOTECH skills. However, one should not lose sight of their place as being alongside systems knowledge, procedural knowledge, meteorology, principles of flight, etc. Another tool to be kept sharp and ready for use in the professional pilot 'toolkit.' Not a new religion or doctrine by which all aspects of our profession is ruled and measured.

A tool, an essential component of flight discipline and a professional skill to be honed, along with others. Not valued above, or less than, other skills. Equal in importance.
:ok:

[jolly girl]

ITCZ,

Interesting you should bring up “avoid PhD’s.” Lately I’ve been exposed to some very interesting cutting-edge aviation projects seeking team members. When I ask whether I can share these opportunities with students, more and more frequently I am hearing “Yes, please do, in fact we are deliberately seeking participants without a lot of aviation experience,” the thought being that those who are entrenched in the current systems can only see the issues through the lens of the current structure and do not have the imagination to solve these new puzzles. I think we are at the point where we have to seriously consider the “we can’t get ourselves out of trouble using the same thinking/logic that got us in to trouble,” and “the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over expecting different results” points of view.

But at the same time I work with subject matter experts and have come to value what they bring to the table. They know what worked in the past, what was tried and did not work, and what shouldn’t have worked but did. I think a big part of it is ego – I always say there are two types of pilots, pilots who learned to fly because they loved flying, those who seek out anything and everything they can on the subject because they love it and want to know more, who love to just go up and fly the wing and feel the wind in their hair, and then there are pilots who learn to fly to pick up chicks – and I can see this with PhDs and other SMEs as well. Did they get the PhD out of curiosity and love of the subject, or did they get it for the status the credential will bring? Do they view interactions with their students and/or other team members as opportunities to further explore a subject or issue, or opportunities to assert the dominance of their knowledge or position? Does someone feel they or their thinking is “better” than someone else’s because of their education, job title or work experience? This is something I struggle with as I acquire additional credentials – how can I retain open-mindness and flexibility of thought as I gain further exposure to systems with very rigid procedural and hierarchical structures? How can I retain “beginner’s mind” (always looking at things as if seeing them for the first time) in the light of new knowledge? And how can I help others cultivate and retain this frame-of-mind as well?

But back to CRM – thank you to all who sent me references to study; I am already familiar with most who were cited. Perhaps it would be helpful if I put it this way: During my studies of the social aspects of commercial flying, I was dismayed to see the same pattern over and over again: someone in a position of authority (normally a senior captain) would define an issue and then offer their opinion as to what the solution should be. Since this person was perceived as the group as a 9the?) master, this subjective response was implemented as a solution without question. Follow-up was spotty at best. It would be much easier for me to see CRM in a more beneficial light if someone could direct me to the following: The research describing the original observations and how the CRM protocols were developed; descriptions of the initial trials where a strict protocol was applied to a randomly-selected group of participants and quantitative measurements of their effectiveness were gathered; and the subsequent studies performed by other researchers/bodies (using the original/modified protocol) that replicated the initial findings and followed the participants longitudinally (over time) to determine the long-term efficacy of the CRM treatment. I have been looking for it for some time with no luck.

Happy Flying!

[turbocharged]

"It would be much easier for me to see CRM in a more beneficial light if someone could direct me to the following: The research describing the original observations and how the CRM protocols were developed; descriptions of the initial trials where a strict protocol was applied to a randomly-selected group of participants and quantitative measurements of their effectiveness were gathered; and the subsequent studies performed by other researchers/bodies (using the original/modified protocol) that replicated the initial findings and followed the participants longitudinally (over time) to determine the long-term efficacy of the CRM treatment. I have been looking for it for some time with no luck".

And, of course, you know you are not going to find it. You assume 'crm' is a treatment or intervention and a comparative trial could then be set up to compare the subject group against a control. But CRM is nothing of the sort. CRM is no more than a recognition that there is more to safe commercial flying than simply being competent at manipulating aircraft controls. The weakness with CRM is that it has tried to be reductionist - but humans are too variable and the domain too broad.

[alf5071h]

jg, ‘looking for the original research on CRM’ … I doubt that there is anything specific; thus there may be little scientific justification for CRM or the means of checking the effectiveness of training. Many references point back to NASA/NTSB.
However, the document Crew Resource Management: An Introductory Handbook (FAA 1992) (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA257441&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf), and its references (CRM aspects from the 80s, but supported with psychology) might help your quest.
Note that this differentiates between the philosophy and the application of CRM – an often overlooked and confusing aspect.
Also note the balance between the team and individual. It’s the individuals who require the skills. Most of these skills have a cognitive basis (page 10); thus we need to teach the skills of ‘thinking’ – if for no other reason, to avoid ‘the thinking/logic that got us into this trouble’.

[jolly girl]

Turbocharged,

Now it is you who disappoint me, is “ridicule” one of the tools you hand out in your CRM kits?
I have to be honest, your statement “CRM is no more than a recognition that there is more to safe commercial flying than simply being competent at manipulating aircraft controls” threw me. Every CRM instructor I’ve had (academic, service provider and airline captain) has touted CRM as an accident reduction tool, that if I used the “assertiveness communication model” it would save my life. Which raises the question, have I been receiving “bad” CRM training for the last 16 years? And with the apparently “bad” CRM training I have received, am I better or worse off than if I had received none at all? Unfortunately (as you well know) the data to answer this question was never collected and by now the participant pool is too tainted to do a valid study.

And what is it that makes me not serious? That I question the status quo? That I want a little scientific method behind behavioral interventions in the cockpit? That I don’t agree with you? Because trust me, I have been to enough funerals to be deadly serious about anything to do with accident prevention. Please know I appreciate this open discourse. But also know that I am worried that, perhaps out of fear of setting the bar too high and failing, we set the bar too low and have become complacent with the results.

[turbocharged]

Not so-JG

e-mail and forum posts are great ways to guarantee miscommunication. Just as you did not mean to offend, I certainly did not mean to ridicule.... or maybe you did. Just joking. Anyway...

CRM is really a default safety improvement device. If HF/CRM/whatever was implicated in unsafe practices, then by tackling the topic directly, through ground training, we must ipso facto be 'safer'. There is little tangible evidence that this is the case and it is probably fair to say that TEM has its roots in the failure of the previous CRM to deliver a return on investment. Interestingly, despite TEM being around now for 15 years, I haven't seen any attempts to demonstrate any step change in safety arising from this shift in acronyms.

Have you been receiving 'bad' CRM? Well I cannot tell. What I can say is that you seem to have been exposed to a subset of possible CRM themes and one that is rooted in the earliest attempts to deliver groundschool. The simple prescription approach and the idea that CRM is a 'toolkit' is too simplistic to accommodate the variability of the operational world.

Why did I say you were not serious? Because I assumed your question was rhetorical and that you'd taken such a stance to throw the futility of much CRM training into stark relief. I have often said to clients that if they do not let me attempt to measure the benefits of the training I deliver on their behalf, then their investment is little more than an act of faith. In which case, it would be cheaper to pay me not to turn up. Simply pay me and I will stay away. The effect will be the same and it will be cheaper in the long run as crew will not need to be off-line to attend class. However, show me a crew training manager who even understands the concept of evaluation. Compliance at least cost is the watchword of most airline training.

[BOAC]

(such as the captain who let the FO get behind the aircraft on approach or the other who accepted his FOs decision to only divert 15 miles around CBs instead of 30) saying nothing and justifying their actions by labeling them as effective CRM - not having the benefit of being able to look at these posts to which you refer I'm not sure how much 'scorn' you are effectvely pouring on these events. As many have said, CRM is not a scientific/quantifiable value. Sometimes good CRM can result in the examples you quote where the Captain has judged the error by the F/O to be of sufficiently small risk as to benefit the F/O by allowing the error as a remarkably efficient learning curve, rather than one alternative which is the 'No! Don't do that - I have control, lad!' technique of old.

I welcome your arrival on the scene and the questions you are asking. I have to say, however, that as I said earlier, CRM will never, in my opinion, eliminate human error accidents and it is incorrect to anticipate that. Look only at the 'Darwin' awards for proof of human frailty in self-preservation. It has resulted in a dramatic change in cockpit managenent (in the western world anyway) in the last 30 years or so, and as such can, I think, be quantified in a subjective way (if that is not a non-sequitor).

Keep us posted please!.

[beerdrinker]

The best definition of CRM I have ever heard is "airmanship with communication"

Simple effective and true. Cuts all the bullsh*t waffle about CRM to which we have been inflicted. (Not the concept but the stuff that is meant to describe what we do eg DODAR)

[BOAC]

Jolly - something you may wish to consider in your deliberation is that 'CRM' is not JUST about being warm, fluffy, Mr/Mrs Nice Guy/Girl and holding forums on decisions. It is about RESOURCE management, and sometimes things need to be done, particularly in the aviation timeframe, without the 'let's have your inputs here' ideal.

I first came across 'CRM' after leaving the military (where it was just basic good leadership:ugh:) when it was Cockpit RM, then it became Crew RM. What about extending your project to Company Resource Management which is where I'm sure a lot of benefit would be gained? One sees daily horrendous mis-use of good resources and consultation in companies and there can be big safety issues in that.

[alf5071h]

In general, factual accuracy in our society is science based; an aspect can be tested and the result observed. Yet with CRM there is an underlying reluctance to involve science (avoid PhDs).
CRM and many CRM related safety programmes are supposedly based on research, but few, if any of these are testable in a way that provides material to support a proactive safety programme.

jg, you would like data to conduct a scientific test of CRM; yet with a sufficiently large data-set, almost any conclusion could be reached. Isn’t this the basis of our reluctance to involve PhD’s, - because of the many differing points of view in HF science, or their failure to produce practical material for use in training, or both?

CRM training may have contributed to safety; the industry’s accident rate has fallen and remains low. However, the HF content of accidents appears to be constant, possibly from before the advent of CRM.
Is this because the limit of HF training has been reached, or alternatively CRM has been successful and is now squeezing other HF problems into the open; I suspect that the real position is somewhere in between the two.
The main problem is with ‘us’ – humans. Behaviour is a highly complex, chaotic interaction with the world, which is difficult to observe, let alone analyse. To some observers much of the behaviour is irrational, but it is what we do every day.
Given this, then how can we expect to teach those aspects which will ‘cure’ our ‘errant’ behaviour? At best we might minimise the occurrence, detect error, and recover from adverse outcomes (TEM).
We should not stop what we are doing or continue to seek improvement as errant behaviour might resurface very quickly, and we need to identify and address the emerging HF problems anyway.

This small effort (CRM/HF training), in conjunction with other safety initiatives, should provide a continuing margin of safety above that required by public opinion. The main concern for the CRM practitioners might be the status of the other, complementary safety programs. Where is the HF training for senior management, the regulators (operational and certification), or the wider range of HF training in the design process?

[BOAC]

Where is the HF training for senior management - exactly! I cannot recall your position in the Gruyere 'food chain monitoring process', but are YOU in a position to 'get this baby off the ground? I can see no reason why this cannot be done, although I doubt the practicality of extending to 'regulators' and 'design'.

[jolly girl]

Thanks again to all for the great discussion.

First off, no I do not think the purpose of CRM is to create a warm and fluffy environment. I do agree with you that it should be a RESOURCE MANAGEMENT tool. To clarify, when in the military I participated in critical incident response management; these teams were convened only when serious threat/actual harm events occurred. Usually there had already been one or more deaths, and occasionally we were in the position where no matter the course of action selected, more would be harmed or killed. (Talk about resource management!) As I indicated, in these situations what is not known is as or more important than what is known; decisions are very time pressured and information is limited at best. In these situations (as in many flight events), it was often the lowest-ranking personnel who held key knowledge and it was imperative for our success that these communications be made. So it was in this environment that I observed/acquired leadership behaviors; my commanders had an impressive combination of low power distance and decisiveness. So I look at CRM programs/aircrew behavior through this lens.

I’ve been quiet the last few days because TC (and later others) brought up two words that got me thinking: measurement and compliance. First measurement: as my peers and I explore the social, behavioral and cognitive aspects of aviation, we keep returning to the same question: what are the traits/behaviors/definition of a good pilot/crew and how can they be measured? I was sitting in the class partly to clarify this, but all I heard was very squishy. Any thoughts? Especially you, TC, how would you (if your customers would let you) define and measure CRM objectives and outcomes?

[turbocharged]

just picking up on something BOAC said, the UK RAeS HF CRM WG (phew) did discuss a few years back, at the behest of the CAA, the possibility of CRM for post-holders - so the recognition is there, just not the mechanism, yet.

As for measuring, from the little work that has been done, we know that current attempts to assess CRM are little better than random. However, the problem is that we lack a clearly-defined set of observable behaviours that are linked to safe performance; we lack a robust set of course design skills across the industry that allow facilitators to develop meaningful training events that change behaviour and, finally, we lack a culture within most organizations that recognise the frailty of human behaviour. To wax lyrical, while Rome burns, we are simply wondering if Nero's fiddle is in tune.

So, first, we need the right atmosphere in an organization. Metric 1 would be a measure of staff attitudes. Next, we need a more realistic and valid training curriculum. Metrics 2 and 3 would be training transfer and organizational benefit from CRM. Finally, we need better tools to evaluate performance in training situations in order to provide developmental feedback. Metric 4.

Problem. I did, once, run a fairly substantial attempt to look at training transfer in a big flag carrier. We surveyed nearly 5000 staff across the airline pre-training. We then did a repeat measure after passing an agreed milestone in terms of course roll-out and again a year later. It was logistic nightmare. What did we find? Well, quite a bit about attitudes to safety in different populations within the airline. We saw the impact of things like disputes between management and specific groups(pilots). Did I demonstrate that my course was the best thing ever? Well, the happy sheets were great. But was there a return on the investment? Hmmmmm...

We can all agree that it is the right thing to ask if CRM works and people have been doing that for years. The apparent failure of CRM spawned TEM. But getting data to demonstrate clear benefit is a problem. In my book on CRM Course Development (ouch! hideous commercial exploitation!) I cite some work done in Australia. The authors commented that "evaluation of training is not difficult; it's just not easy''

[jolly girl]

I was hoping for something a little more specific than “attitudes”….

I gave it some thought last night when I was out on trail… one thing that may have made it easy for the young airmen in my military example to break through was there was a certain amount of information management structure in place. In these situations we were concerned with change from OPSNormal (okay, if we were even talking we were well outside OPSNormal): values that were lower/higher than normal (threshold data), values that were fluctuating rapidly (abnormal rate data), and especially absent, intermittent or re-established communications. Personnel in the field were required to report when events exceeded certain pre-determined criteria; these reports were assessed and added to the ‘big picture’ with regular reports (or exception reports, as necessary) then forwarded to HHQ. During these events it was the DATA that was important, not the rank of the person delivering it, or the person receiving it. I think part of what made our ops so effective was the recognition that if certain conditions were in place, they needed to be reported and if these communications were present, they were important and evaluation/action needed to be taken. Also, certain events had to be reported to HHQ regardless of whether the CC thought they were of importance or not. It has me wondering how a similar system could be adapted to flight ops.

I’ve gotten off on this tangent because of this: During my flight training I was taught that though I have responsibility for the flight, I am not the most important person on the aircraft. Rather it is the passengers (or payload) was the reason I and my flight team-mates were there, and that each team member (fueler, load, maintenance, ATC, etc.) was there to help me deliver them safely. But in the CRM class I attended recently was there seemed to be a caste structure in play; pilots were of supreme importance, with cabin crew, dispatch, baggage handlers, fuelers, etc viewed as second-class citizens to be tolerated as the flight progressed. The students came into the class with these attitudes, and I watched as they were re-enforced and became entreanched over the course of a few weeks. For some reason I thought the complexity of the system had forced us to acknowledge our interconnectedness so it disturbed me to see these (caste-based) perceptions transferred to another generation.

On to measurement: yes, we do need to measure the whole organization, but what exactly? “Attitudes” seems so general and non-descriptive, what traits exactly are we looking for? Looking back, the commanders I worked for were decisive, but they also demonstrated creativity, flexibility, humility, patience and a sense of justice and much more. I think what separated the best from the average was that the high-performers remained present, not superficially taking things in but truly paying attention to the details of what was going on and recognizing how they fit together. (One of the best leaders I ever worked for recognized me in a civilian setting when he had previously only heard my voice over a landline.) So which of these and other traits should we measure? Cultivate? Seek to extinguish? How do I quantify “awareness”? “Decision-making”? “common sense”? “elemental forces”? And what outcomes are we seeking with these measurements? Reduced number of accidents? Deviations? Or is there something we can measure on a day-to-day basis?

Thoughts please.

PS -
BOAC: The posts I referenced earlier are in the “Border between being assertive or arrogant/rude” thread under the CRM/Safety header, posts 30 and 44 if I recall correctly.

[BOAC]

Thanks JG - I have looked at the thread and the posts. Granted that the 'Command management' was not apparently effective, they certainly did trigger some harmonics in following posts.

There is, as said on that thread, a danger that if CRM goes too 'warm and fluffy' (your point noted;)) it has the risk of engendering such attitudes in F/Os. Basically as with any 'rank' structure, it is encumbent on the subordinate to obey the orders of the superior, and for the superior to issue orders quote "Clear, concise and capable of being understood.' unquote (British military 'gospel'). The way you and I like things is for inputs as you describe.

I would suggest that wherever you experienced the 'CRM training' you described in para 3 of Post #23, that organisation should change their training system PDQ. I am not accustomed to the encouragement of the scenario of "second-class citizens to be tolerated as the flight progressed" you describe, although I have come across it in some individuals. However, the F/O and the rest of the crew MUST obey the Captain's commands with the proviso that he/she/they can challenge them if they are or appear dangerous, question them if they seem uneconomic or 'outwith' company procedures, or contradictory to good service delivery and of course ask questions at any time about them if they are not fully understood. That is what 'Command' means.

In the post #30 situation I would have simply taken control and discussed it on the ground. Post #44 MAY have fitted into the 'worth a learning curve' if it was not affecting safety. Always the option, as SNS3Guppy said, to over-ride. As always, almost impossible to draw real conclusions from one-side posted views.

I think comparing your military experience is not particularly relevant in our world. My experience has always been that we are swimming in a totally different fish tank, in which delegation and taking advice by a 'senior' can easily be interpreted by others as a weakness or 'inability to do the job'. Back to CompanyRM perhaps....? My common comment is that in my military (piloting) days, our 'managers' were actually trained as leaders, which faculty is so often sadly missing in this world and there is NO incentive to attempt to train our managers as leaders. I sometimes say to my F/O's how in the military you simply do not 'put on' respect in the morning when you don your 'respect' stripes, and also that in my miltary experience I followed my 'managers' out of respect and not as now sometimes to see when or how badly they were going to screw things up.:).

Interesting stuff and good to see your interest.

[alf5071h]

“…the UK RAeS HF CRM WG did discuss a few years back, at the behest of the CAA, the possibility of CRM for post-holders - so the recognition is there, just not the mechanism, yet.” (#22)
A problem here; the responsibility for action in Europe is now with EASA, who may not have the same interest in RAeS. Furthermore, if EASA’s attitude towards HF is indicated by the vacancy listing EASA/AD/2008/046 for a ‘Human Factors Expert’ we might be very disappointed – it’s a part time job! (application now closed)

”The apparent failure of CRM spawned TEM. But getting data to demonstrate clear benefit is a problem.”
The apparent failure could be debatable, but this should not detract from the need to improve aspects of human performance.
It’s possible that the origins of CRM stemmed from an academic view of Airmanship, and the researches still had difficulty in defining the constituents and the training required. There were similar problems in defining the means of validating CRM, instead they look to the overall safety statistics. CRM was a convenient and refreshing acronym; we like to focus on new and shiny aspects, so it caught on.

The problem with the originating CRM concept, like airmanship, was that the means of teaching and assessing it were glossed over… similarly nowadays with TEM.
TEM is a rehash of an aspect of basic human behaviour, but has been launched on the industry as a refresh of CRM rather than a replacement – another ‘new and shiny’ aspect of safety training.

If we return to Airmanship to seek measures of behavioural traits, we might similarly be disappointed. At least one reference comments that we should not judge the outcome of an observable event, instead seek to understand the process being used; what, how, or why something is being “thought”.

“How do I quantify “awareness”? “Decision-making”? “common sense”? “elemental forces”? And what outcomes are we seeking with these measurements? Reduced number of accidents? Deviations? Or is there something we can measure on a day-to-day basis?”
How do we quantify a thinking processes; if the academics cannot provide answers or agree on a theme, then perhaps we should revert to intuition … isn’t that similar to the old-style judgement of crew performance associated with Airmanship?

Reason for the failure of CRM. (www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/crm/)
Airmanship training for modern aircrew. (www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA428471&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)
Critical Thinking For The Military Professional. (www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/guillot.html)

[turbocharged]

Attitudes have been described as 'proto-behaviours' in that holding an attitude towards a object in your world might indicate a disposition to act in a particular way. You only have to look at attempts to influence the attitudes of particular groups of voters in the recent US election. Why was Sarah Palin chosen as McCain's running mate? Because she was the best person for the job and would be able to step in should anything happen to the President? Possibly. But more likely, they gambled that in so doing they would change attitudes in certain voters and, as a result, change voting behaviour.

However, there is a huge gap between declared beliefs about something and then actually taking action. Look at smoking behaviour ( and set aside addictive properties). Lots of people declare their intention to quit smoking, knowing the harmful effects, but many of these still smoke.

In our work we came across some data for maintenance audit pick-ups out on the ramp. A quality manager had noticed a pattern. If a shift manager failed to attend the morning briefing, then his shift was usually significantly over-represented in quality failures. So, now I have a measure - quality failures - and an action by an individual. The reason given for late showing was usually traffic. However, I could investigate attitudes. So, I can ask about the importance of attending morning brief, the value of the brief, its usefulness etc. Although traffic is my reason for no-show, the actual explanation might lie in my attitude to the morning briefing ritual.

Our project was to improve the effectiveness of teamwork. We hypothesized that effective teams worked efficiently. This might be reflected in attitudes towards workload, cooperation etc. So, I could ask questions such as 'we always seem to be fighting one another'. 'I'm always having to pick up after other people', 'My day always goes according to plan', 'I am always thinking about the needs of others'. Our measure of efficiency might be minutes of delay. Through teamwork training, hopefully, attitudes would show a positive shift between pre- and post measures and this would be reflected in a reduction in lost time due to delay.

The problem with attitudes is finding the correct dependent variable and to accurately frame the attitude measure. But that doesn't mean that it cannot be done.

I'm not in a position to discuss the traits of leaders you have worked for JG; I don't know them. The old trait approach, though, has fallen out of favour as we have tried to move to trainability rather than emergence as ways of developing leaders. But one little story. When I took command of a field unit, my predecessor kept an album of all 250 staff with pics, personal details etc. He liked to be able to ask after wives and children by name as he moved around the unit. The guys were always impressed that he seemed to know children's birthdays. He left me a ton of operational problems to deal with but the guys loved his little party trick.

Alf - I'm happy to state categorically that LOSA/TEM is the product of an initiative that was prompted by a dissatisfaction with CRM training which had been deemed to have failed to deliver. Got it from the horses mouth. I personally didn't say that CRM had failed although I do question it's effectiveness - which is why I advocate attempting to measure, one such way being outlined above.

[jolly girl]

BOAC -
(Please note I am asking this out of curiousity and a desire to better understand your point of view)
What characteristics of the flight deck make it different than the war room? Isn't leadership leadership, no matter where it is applied?

TC-
(again, curiousity)
I haven't had a chance to fully go through your post yet. Also, I have one of your books on request at the library so i am behind that power curve as well.
But it stikes me as interesting you use a maintenance reference in response to a flight deck question. But this really gets at what I am interested in: How do we define desired performance? an optimum flight? What is the flight deck equivalent of a quality failure? What other behaviors should we be looking at? Curiosity? Persistance at task? Creativity? Compliance? (That word again, more on that later...)

I appreciate your patience with my young, impressionable mind.

-Jolly

[turbocharged]

JG

The maintenance example was useful to illustrate the concept. Alas, the pilot one I could have used, while relevant, did not show the pilot cadre in a good light. We asked groups to suggest ways that their non-specialist collaborative team members (cabin crew, maintenance, dispatch etc) could act in ways that made their jobs easier (i.e. team work across organizational boundaries). All groups except the pilots offered task-related activities, 'inform me of changes', 'communicate early', 'give me as much time as possible to meet your needs'. The pilots proposals were all ego-related 'treat me with respect', 'bring me things', 'do non-task related things for me to make my life easier'.

However, it does go to something you mentioned earlier. You said that your passengers (or payload) are the important thing and everyone else acts to support you to meet the needs of the customer. This still places you at the top of the hierarchy. However, the tasks of the other team members are actually equally directed at the goal of moving payload (pulsed and/or pulse-free). They are not there to help you; you are there to work with them to meet a collaborative goal. I'm sure in your case it was slip of the tongue, but in the case of the pilot group I studied it was a strongly-held attitude which was translated into observable behaviour. Importantly, I can measure that attitude, I can observe manifestations of it and I can evaluate it's impact on overall team effectiveness.

I didn't see yours as a 'flight deck' question (although that is what you clearly asked). I saw it as a 'behaviour in critical teams' question. I can point to exactly the same issues with consultants in hospitals, midwives, dispatcher/ops in some bizjets, specific nationalities in multi-cultural organizations. One of the reasons CRM fails to deliver is because we have framed the problem in a pilot-centric manner. Even though we have recognised that the same skills apply to other groups (maintenance, ATC, cabin) we have actually done little more that try to invent a different acronym (HF, TRM). What we haven't done is step back and look at the bigger picture. TEM is no different.

[GlueBall]

"Your post confirms my worst suspicions – that the implementation of CRM was not based on science but was rather a subjective, haphazard exercise. . . "

Primarily, CRM is about accommodating different personalities in a fast moving claustrophobic space for long hours with the objective of arriving alive.

You can be a philosopher, but it's pretty hard to get into people's minds, so I don't think that individual behavior is capable of being made into a science.

CRM is about ensuring the collective adherence to SOPs, common sense and basic survival instinct. . . . Because you may be having to share this claustrophobic space with people who chew with their mouths open, with people who you would never associate with on the street, with people who have nothing in common with you, except that of being a pilot. In this worst case scenario, it's only about tolerating each other for 14 hours from LAX to HKG, because we all want to be save and to live another day.

On the other hand, CRM is of less importance when one is flying with people whose flying skills are known and whose interests and personalities are compatible. But rostering does not include personality traits or individual preferences when pairing crews.

CRM is like a speed limit on a road; it's to protect the worst driver, driving the worst car under the worst conditions.

[turbocharged]

JG, I noticed that I didn't cover some of your questions. By 'quality failure' I am referring to any performance that does not meet a defined specification. In the case of maintenance we used things like sticking to cooling times before replenishment, using the correct grades of lubricant, making sure lifed items were checked.

LOSA is only a flight deck quality audit so that would show up some things that might be used as measures.

Curiosity, persistence, creativity and compliance are all characteristics that have a place in critical-task management. First, though, I'd like to see the terms elaborated as a set of observable, trainable behaviours (accepting that some component of each might well be genetic and then distributed variably across the population). I'd also like to see the risks attached to each cluster identified. Compliance, especially, is not universally 'good'.

[BOAC]

What characteristics of the flight deck make it different than the war room? Isn't leadership leadership, no matter where it is applied? - I have no knowledge of what a 'war room' is, so I cannot say. If you refer to an 'Ops Room' then I see quite different requirements to the flight deck in terms of time to take inputs and input options. Most 'Ops Rooms' have a significant amount of info coming in and resources to tap. 9/10 in the flight deck one is left with only the resources on board and quite limited info from outside. It would indeed be good to be able to 'stop our involvement in the war', knowing that others will keep on running it for us and have a quick conference about things, take inputs from lots of people etc, but we have a different time frame most of the time, and a lot of the time our 'war room' is humming along at 500mph+ and running out of options as it does. As I said in my penultimate paragraph, it is a different world, I think and I would be wary of the drawing of too close comparisons and procedures. Perhaps you could explain the 'war room'?

[jolly girl]

Sorry for the silence. I had a project due today.

BOAC –
I am not familiar with the term “Ops Room,” other than as the flight-following desk at a squadron. The best I can explain it (other than the description in my original post) is this: While you are triaging/managing your unprogrammed compound emergency in the air, we are the team on the ground providing you support. It is up to us to get you access to data you need, not only providing real-time access to in-house maintenance (sub-system experts) or even the component/platform designer/team at the manufacturer if necessary, but also managing the ground response – what equipment/capabilities are available at what ground facilities, weather/conditions at these locations, hazmat requirements, crowd/media control, PR response, logistics (transfer of pax to primary destination/hospital) – so you can focus on flying the aircraft. For us the critical situation proceeds at the same speed as you – or the bullet, the toxic spill or (in a mass casualty event) the speed of blood – in short, at the speed of life. Thus it surprises me to read your perception that you have limited resources on the flight deck in the event of an emergency – it has been my experience that even a pan-pan will have the world rush to your aid. Perhaps CRM training needs to expand to include descriptions of available resources and exercises that include accessing these off-aircraft supports.

TC – Your latest (2005?) has arrived. More soon.

All – I had an interesting conversation with a friend yesterday. By luck, it was a ride on the way-back machine, to when we were both in a location and he was a pilot occasional assisting with the critical incident response team I was a part of. He noted that he had always been impressed that while we had incredible amounts of information coming at us we were able to differentiate between important cues and noise. Over the course of the discussion we arrived at the idea that my communication style is a result of being part of high-impact time-critical decisions several times a week over the course of years. It got me thinking, maybe it’s not the elements of communication/behaviors during normal everyday ops that are important, but rather that we need to be focusing on critical decision-making skills instead.

Thoughts?

[BOAC]

even a pan-pan will have the world rush to your aid - hmm! I do not know of any such 'war room' in my experience of civil aviation so I do not see the 'read across'. I think perhaps we should focus on Crew CRM on this thread?

I'm not sure of your flying experience, JG, but I do think that is a 'rose-tinted spectacles' view. In my experience, in the few minutes I have to action an emergency and land safely, I am very much 'alone' with my crew. I appreciate that the well-known Nimrod with 22 hrs endurance and a jammed u/c who requested the board of enquiry be convened to reach an intial finding before any drills were actioned by the crew might well fit your scenario, however.:) CRM in the limited world of the cockpit means 'crew'. Of course there are 'resources' outside, but timescales often override their usefulness. The only experience I have of any of that 'support' was a possible bomb threat during which we gave up waiting for 'war room' to get started.

[point8six]

JollyGirl - you seem to have a very cynical view towards civil aviation operations. Your supposition that CRM is a failed model, has no statistical evidence. CRM is an ongoing programme of loose definition, designed to enhance safety. It was introduced to reduce the accidents caused by the steep authority gradient in the cockpit (many pilots having been military trained and taken their rank into civil operations).
To state that all F/Os are "captains-in-training" and all captains are training captains is incorrect and somewhat naive.
I started my career at a time when Captains assumed they had god-like status and only to be spoken to through the No. 2 in command. When I retired even the most junior cabin crew member or ramp staff felt at ease in pointing out something that they felt could be important to the flight at that time.
Rather than disparage an evolving system, why not work with it to improve it's concept? Or would you rather rename it and push paper?

[Capt Pit Bull]

As I read this thread I wonder if I'm working in the same industry as some of you.

As far as I'm concerned, the skills, knowledge and attitudes required to operate an aircraft safely are all trainable. To suggest that CRM is a failed model is to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Failures of communication between crew members are major risk factors, and CRM training has the potential to improve that.

The fact that such programs may not be conducted effectively is a training standardisation issue. There is no doubt in my mind that not all operators adequately train to a standard that meets regulatory requirements or recommendations. I've certainly had a "you want a half day in the class room? Preposterous!" conversation with management.

As an industry, we have the knowledge to provide 'best practice' training in a number of areas, yet on a worldwide basis it has not been deseminated. Ueberlingen being the classic case in point.

JG, I'm with BOAC on the emergency handling side of things. When it's time critical we triage our own priority list and the majority of our informational needs will already be catered for via ATC, datalinking or good old fashioned forwards planning. Most of the things in the later half of your list wouldn't even figure on our radar. e.g. We do not fly along thinking 'oh, what about the PR implications of this - never mind, ops will take care of that'.

pb

[jolly girl]

point8six – Yes, I will concede that I am cynical about aviation operations. But I am cynical about everything. Please try not to take it personally. Also, you would be surprised how many hours of my day are spent trying to make the system better. Pushing paper is the unfortunate price for my vice.

BOAC – I have to be honest, my experiences with aircraft assistance (which has been from both sides of the scope, in the US and East Asia) has been vastly different than yours. I’m sorry to hear the ground handlers you encountered in the past have not been up to the challenge of your situation(s) and hope that action was taken following your event(s) to improve their performance.

GlueBall, BOAC and others - Some of your comments have given me the feeling you are trying to tell me that being a pilot makes you so special that nothing anyone else does has any application in the cockpit… is this an accurate perception?

So back to CRM. Turbocharged, as I read your book (still reading) I see several definitions for the term CRM that have been proposed over the years: to reduce accidents, to reduce human error, to make aviation safer. We will skip my first thought for now (and yes, I will make it back to compliance one day), my second being this: Regulatory agencies set out guidelines for CRM/HF training. Operators must then take this guidance, interpret it and develop curricula. This curricula is then used by trainers, who may modify it as well. Doesn’t this result in an unlimited df regarding the trajectory and objectives of training?

-Jolly

[BOAC]

I’m sorry to hear the ground handlers you encountered in the past have not been up to the challenge of your situation(s) and hope that action was taken following your event(s) to improve their performance. - there is actually very little that 'ground handlers' can offer in these situations. Needless to say, however, ATC, in most places - especially the UK - are always superb. We do not have 'war rooms' and by the time any commercial company has assembled your team for "real-time access to in-house maintenance (sub-system experts) or even the component/platform designer/team at the manufacturer if necessary, but also managing the ground response – what equipment/capabilities are available at what ground facilities, weather/conditions at these locations, hazmat requirements, crowd/media control, PR response, logistics (transfer of pax to primary destination/hospital)" I and my crew would (hopefully) be checking in to our 'ad hoc' hotel. On the ground, my mobile phone is invaluable and I have time normally to seek those resources. In the air, it is the crew and ATC that are invaluable.

No, I (and, I trust, the other 2) do not think "that being a pilot makes you so special that nothing anyone else does has any application in the cockpit" - it is just that being the Captain makes me the team leader on the spot.

I find myself wondering, as we exchange here, exactly what your flying experience is, both mil and civil, and, for example, how long your "head has been in the clouds"? I'm sure we would all benefit from a brief resume of your aviation experience so we can focus our responses. As a gesture, mine, for you, is 17 years mil fast jet and 26 years civil flying.

[jolly girl]

So continuing with the df thought, doesn’t this variability make measurement of efficacy almost impossible? Am I correct to understand that the regulations set out what is essentially a wish list of objectives with no quantitative measurement guidelines; doesn’t this set up an issue with validation/repeatability?

When I add a little Reason to my thinking (along with some Weigman and Shappell) I get this: deviations on the flight deck fall into four categories: skill-based errors, decision-based errors, perceptual errors and violations. Now skill-based errors arise from simple lack of practice – the remedy here is additional training, whether it be self-study or in a more formal setting. Decision-based errors are the aviation equivalent of turning off the highway to go to work rather than the mall as you intended; these are attention based and can be reduced by reducing the number/frequency/intensity of distractions in the cockpit and increasing focus on task. Perception errors are the result of incorrect detection and/or interpretation of cues; here the fix is to increase the quality and integrity of cues/data/information displayed on the flight deck. Violations are, well, violations; routine violations can be checked with the enforcement of standards, with not much to be done about the exceptional ones.

Now, looking at this with my view of CRM (which has apparently been distorted with training that emphasized it is a communication model designed to reduce errors/accidents): There is not much communication models can do to reduce the frequency of skill-based errors. Control over this variable is a result of management providing sufficient training to allow pilots to demonstrate inert knowledge as opposed to rote recitation of system architecture, EPs and system functionality (or an individual making the effort to accomplish these on their own). Now there are occasions where captain/copilot intervention can forestall a decision error; when communication flows captain to copilot these actions are classified as training. But really, to reduce this number we need work flows that support a variable range of workload (with a minimum of distractions and that allow for breaks) that does not allow (or at least reduces the potential for) channeling of attention and/or periods of excessive workload, especially during critical stages of flight. Perception errors are based on the quality of information presented to crews; here again a word here and there can assist in comprehension but the underlying issue is the layout of both display screens/pages/cues/architecture/feedback and that of the physical cockpit. As for violations, again, an in-flight admonition may have some effect, but in the long-term they are reduced by management practice.

So here we go – of the four conditions CRM seeks to mitigate/eliminate, three have underlying causes which can be only slightly affected by flight crew interactions, with the fourth entirely out of their hands (at least at the time of occurrence). While I am all for pilots receiving all the HF training they can get, and I agree that a reduced cockpit authority gradient is a good thing, I wonder whether CRM is the correct remedy for our ills? Are we spending more time/money/effort on a band-aid than we would on a cure? Turbocharged – I have to admit that my first thought as I read through your book was that a perhaps the explanation for the reduction in fuel exhaustion events (such as Portland) is not that we have this improved cockpit communication/HF model but rather that the newer advanced automation cockpits (which normally include a LOW FUEL caution) are a more salient authority than other (liveware) crewmembers.

As always, let ‘er rip.

[jolly girl]

BOAC:
If there is one thing you take away from this thread I hope it is this:
(In my neck of the woods and I’m assuming yours is the same) Aircraft operators have a dedicated factory service (maintenance) representative assigned to them by both the airframer and the engine manufacturer. These representatives provide on-site and on-call assistance with the troubleshooting of maintenance issues. In addition, both the airframer and engine manufacturer have a 24-hour help desk, accessed by a 1-800 number or international equivalent. I would hope that, in the event of an issue outside the LASA Possible/Practicable /other programmed criteria, your dispatch function woud be able to (once you ask them) get in-house maintenance, a factory service representative or the factory help desk on the line to begin triaging your (in-flight) issue within a reasonable amount of time (3-5 minutes?) of your request. If your experience(s) during your event(s) was different than this, I sincerely hope the operator/union involved initiated an investigation to determine what could have been done differently to increase the likelihood the next crew who needs this level of assistance has ready access to these resources.
With sincere respect,
Jolly

[alf5071h]

Some hard views earlier in the thread. CRM historically is a diverse subject, often misrepresented or couched in cultural terms best fitting ‘the way we do things here’.

”Doesn’t this result in an unlimited df regarding the trajectory and objectives of training?” Unfortunately yes; these aspects are often seen as weakness or failure. It is equally difficult to find or prove the successes of CRM – thus the quest for assessment, but is it necessary to assess this form of training?
If CRM is viewed as an insurance (difficulty in selling it to management), something which has to be embedded in the operation as opposed to biannual training, then whilst it is important to renewed an insurance policy and not ‘call it in’, likewise, CRM’s effectiveness might only be seen during an incident or event.
Thus evaluate your incidents and events for aspects of CRM – human factors – determine what aspects are done well and contribute to safety; there should be more of these than there are failures.

Returning to the issue of communication (#1 and within the thread), the following from New Scientist (5 Oct) may be relevant.
“Our interpretations determine what we do. Some of them we reveal to other people, but we do not pass on information, ideas or memes in a kind of "pass the parcel". Someone speaks to us and we create a personal version of what was said.
These interpretations can come from only one place: past experience. Since everyone's past experience is different, no two people can ever interpret anything in exactly the same way. There will be as many interpretations of this Comment and Analysis as there are readers of it.
There will be as many interpretations of this article as there are readers of it
The wealth and complexity of the scientific study of meaning, via the discipline of psychology, is immense. It should be relished, not run from. As yet we do not know how brain activity becomes meaning, how the firings of neurons translate into subjective experience. So the only fantasies we need right now are the kind that turn into testable hypotheses.
"Ask better questions," as my mentor would still say.”

Concerns over CRM failure also highlight a problem associated with accident investigation - what do the statements of ‘CRM failure’ in accident reports actually mean? What aspect of human performance, mental activity, behaviour, etc, failed? This question is rarely answered, even if it were possible to do so.
In the CFIT example (#9), there appears to be a failure in the communication process – but not necessarily that of the Captain disregarding the message, as presumable this could not be determined.
Thus the alternatives might be:-
That the message was poorly constructed – “I don’t think this is a good idea” - is an ambiguous statement, it fails to state what ‘it’ is, or the degree of concern, i.e. the message fails to convey ‘information’.
It’s difficult to infer the tone of the message from text, but there could have been lack urgency and the need for action.
The message may not have been ‘received’ due to cognitive overload – the focus of attention was elsewhere
The Captain really did disregard the message - he thought he knew better (attitude), or had a ‘strong but wrong’ mental model.
Most of the above should be included in ‘classic’ CRM communication training. However, it may be debatable if this can be taught in a classroom which is often the expectation of CRM training.
Pilots require both the theoretical knowledge of communication, and the practical ability (experience) of being able to relate their understanding of the situation to a style of communication required – it all depends on context.

Inter crew communication could be an inquiry about knowledge (what) or about the likely outcome (how/why). In the first instance (knowledge) the least experience crewmember could be making a knowledgeable statement – “have you seen …” or be asking a question to enhance an apparent lack of knowledge (mental model mismatch). The second instance (know how) could state an appreciation of outcome – ‘high ground 5nm ahead’, or question the apparent outcome – ‘why are we flying this route’, again because there is a mismatch between the crew’s mental models.
The corresponding alternatives, where the more experienced pilot initiates the communication, often occurs with an educational or commanding manner, either of which may result in the failure to appreciate the other crew’s mental model (perception) by lack of enquiry.
In parallel with CRM training we should require continued learning/enquiry routines amongst crews. All Captains should continue to teach – pass on experience; First Officers must continue to enquire, be this to learn or correct an erroneous mental model (either Capt’s or F/O’s) – or as part of the process of monitoring.

So why do we use accident reports for our examples in CRM training? Either because the regulatory authorities (mis)use the reports – ‘CRM’ failure’, and thus demand more training, or because the (better) CRM instructors can build up a scenario from the report to make a training point; what ever the reason we are still in reactive mode.

[turbocharged]

JG,

I'd echo some of alf's responses to your post. First, CRM is not an 'object' or defined property of the operational environment. It's a broad spread of themes drawn from the social analysis of the conduct of work. The only attempt to define it (Lauber's) is plausible but unworkable. Training is driven by some recognition that something more than simple 'stick-and-rudder' and systems knowledge is needed. Because airlines, first, typically lack the skills of training analysis to work out their own solution and, second, do not want to do anything more than their competitors in order to meet a regulation we end up with the loose guidance we currently have in place. It is not the role of the regulator to tell an airline what the lesson objectives for a CRM class should be. The net result is as many trajectories and flavours as there are CRM facilitators. And you have to then think about local experience. The initial trigger for CRM was an aspect of civil aviation in the US (dominant captains, typically ex-military, who could not work as part of a team). In the early 1980's part of the debate was whether CRM was peculiar to the US experience and might not export. We can trace the problem right back to the failure to step back and take a broad view of the nature of aviation as a workplace. So, the CRM you have been exposed to is simply a product of the development of ideas.

As for measuring CRM, the problem here is that 'behaviour' is not a unit of output from a production process which can be checked against a standard. I can train and I can observe and I can give developmental feedback but we need to careful about expecting too much. So validation and repeatability are concepts that need to be handled with care in this context.

Your analysis of flight deck deviations merits more discussion than could be achieved in a single post but I'd take issue with your analysis. Skill-based errors might be increased through practice as I then place less attention on the task in question. I can execute the wrong skill because of a perceptual failure. Your decision-based error example is, in fact, a skill-based error. Decisions are all about selecting which skill sequence to use to get a job done. Violations are typically trade-offs between effort and risk. Interestingly, communication underpins all of this in that verbalisation of plans, current status, actual parameter values against expected values all can reduce deviations.

[BOAC]

JG - I note that by PM you have declined to offer any idea of your 'experience' in our field, so respectfully I will bow out of this line of the current line of discussion. It might help if you could outline one or two examples where "to begin triaging your (in-flight) issue within a reasonable amount of time (3-5 minutes?) of your request. If your experience(s) during your event(s) was different than this, I sincerely hope the operator/union involved initiated an investigation to determine what could have been done differently to increase the likelihood the next crew who needs this level of assistance has ready access to these resources." would help me in the air with a problem. I am looking at situations which normally require fairly rapid decisions and there is no time or facility to gather those gems. Longer term problems can of course be resolved this way, mostly on the ground, although the BA 747 engine out from west coast USA bound for UK was a case where there was time to take all advice available, but again the IMMEDIATE actions (and decisions) were taken without that luxury. It is very rare for a short/medium haul crew to have this opportunity so until cockpit-ground comms improve dramatically I suspect your focus needs to be on long-haul?.

Like others here, I started in the "Captain is God" era and like others I see very little of that now - so, yes, all this 'CRM stuff' has been successful if that helps. Perhaps the answer to you is "you should have seen it all earlier".:)

[Dunbar]

Interesting to see no mention of NOTECHs in these pages (apologies if I've missed it...) NOTECHs (observable behaviours that enhance flight safety) are a powerful debriefing tool for line crews, are accessible and pragmatic.

Part of the problem for a perceived 'failure' in CRM training is instructors who are so bogged down in theory and TLAs that they cannot impart the practical skills to flight crew who need practical tools, not pseudo-science.

I'm a CRM instructor and Training Captain - sorry to say that I have seen a few CRM trainers who are a nightmare to fly with because they miss the point entirely.

[Non-PC Plod]

Dunbar - Not just for line trainers either. I find that probably 90% of all safety-critical errors (or crashes) I see in the simulator can be traced back neatly to one of the NOTECHS categories: cooperation, leadership & management, decision-making or situational awareness. I continually find myself going back to NOTECHS to debrief these effors.
Fortunately, the majority of us on this thread at least have the luxury of some level of company SOPs, and crew who are trained and constituted to work together as a team. It is quite scary to find myself training so many crews from around the world who are out there flying every day, who have no SOPs, and little concept of MCC! Although I do my best with the crews I see to sow the seeds of CRM, :eek:I am continually updating my list of "operators never to fly with as a passenger"!!!

[turbocharged]

Although not specifically mentioned, I did talk about observable, trainable skills in an earlier post. I didn't mention NOTECHS because it's not a perfect solution ... but it is a start. However, the real point comes back to Dunbar's comments about the gap between classroom theory and action. We have probably got things wrong in that we set the curriculum (JAR-OPS and the CAA Pink before that) and then set the exam (NOTECHS). Unfortunately, the 2 are not in synch. Add to that the fact that a significant number of facilitators cannot develop classroom events that generate changes in the behaviours captured through NOTECHS and you can see why there is some disillusionment. I've sometimes referred to CRM training as a cottage industry; lots of people beavering away in their own small world, happy with what they do. It can also be seen as the last refuge of the ungifted amateur ... but that is maybe too harsh in this season of goodwill.

[zalt]

On CRM as cottage-industry resource management:

And also is there not enougth emphasis in using the target audience to facilitate change themseleves at the espense of officially trained facilitators? I've seen several carriers where HR issues belong to the HF or CRM specialists who almost prefer to be seen as black-art gurus set apart from the rest of training and ops.

[jolly girl]

BOAC-
You had asked for an example of a telecon between crew and the factory. Here's an open source example:
FTW00LA153 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20001212X21000&ntsbno=FTW00LA153&akey=1)
The pilot further reported that... he was in contact with representatives from American Eurocopter during the flight to PTN.
Prior to the accident occurring, a local representative from American Eurocopter arrived at PTN to assist in trouble shooting a maintenance discrepancy on another aircraft. The local representative upon learning of the situation with N350JG, telephoned a test pilot at the American Eurocopter facility in Grand Prairie, Texas. The test pilot requested that the pilot conduct the emergency procedure for hydraulic failure of the tail rotor servo.
Jolly

[BOAC]

Not really relevant to airline ops, JG. Fortunate conjunctions of test pilot 'presence', location and time etc make this a no-go. I'm not sure where you are 'working' but if it is in a commercial airline try reviewing the procedure for your crews to get rapid responses to emergencies from company resources. Ask THEM how confident they are that they will get an acceptable real-time answer from the company as to where to go/what to do with a hydraulic problem (for example) anywhere on their route structure before they have set off to their chosen airport. I am aware that sometimes there are opportunities - and gave you one example - but is NOT normal on short-haul ops and cannot be assumed to be part of any realistic process. Improve comms and company staffing levels (24/7 troubleshooters on instant voice) and now we can start looking at it.