FlyGlobeSpan fined over ANO breach

[Phil Space]

From the BBC website
BBC NEWS | England | Merseyside | Airline fined over faulty plane (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/merseyside/7540921.stm)

Airline fined over faulty plane

Budget airline FlyGlobeSpan, which flew a faulty jet 3,000 miles from Liverpool to New York after it had been struck by lightning, has been fined £5,000.

Despite knowing two engine pressure radio indicators (EPRs) were out of action, Globespan Airways Ltd allowed the Boeing 757 to take off last June.

The crew found the failure on an earlier flight, but the plane was cleared to fly later the same day.

The company admitted two summonses under the Air Navigation Order 2005.

It admitted flying the plane without a valid certificate of air worthiness or a valid operator's certificate and was fined at London's Southwark Crown Court.

The Edinburgh-based airline Globespan Airways Ltd, which trades as FlyGlobeSpan, had breached Civil Aviation regulations by declaring the aircraft "serviceable" to fly later that day on a flight returning to the United States via Knock in Ireland.

The prosecution was brought by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).

Passing sentence, Recorder James Curtis QC said the EPRs allowed a pilot to monitor the thrust of each engine.

Although not "core" instrumentation - such data could be gleaned by using another type of gauge - it nevertheless provided an "extra layer of information" for the pilot.

He said: "I am told and I am satisfied that the failure of the EPRs on this flight did not render the aircraft unsafe and did not in any way endanger the public who were flying on that aircraft.

"In the event... that flight continued for some hours perfectly safely from JFK to Liverpool without any incident or difficulty.

"It rather placed extra burdens and pressures on the pilot and co-pilot to calculate manually the performance of the engines."

That meant "they were stretched more than ideally than they could have been in flying the plane safely, and fly safely they did".
Liverpool Airport
The plane took off from Liverpool Airport

The recorder said, on landing, a "proper and in-depth" investigation was carried out by the airline's contract engineers, Storm Aviation.

They could neither identify the cause of the failure nor correct it.

He said the responsible officer inspected the plane but "optimistically interpreted" the requirements needed to allow the plane to fly.

The recorder continued: "That was clearly a wrong decision."

The engineer, who in this case was the flight operations director, "reported to the new pilot, who was taking the plane over, that the aircraft complied with the air worthiness certificate and could be accepted for the flight."

The pilot also decided the plane could be flown safely, and the flight took off, breaking the law.

Mistake 'accepted'

Once in New York, the aircraft was again examined and, this time, the problem was rectified.

The recorder said that, since then, the plane had flown thousands of hours and millions of kilometres "perfectly safely and perfectly soundly".

He said he was satisfied that the airline had "shown every sign of unreserved acceptance of its mistake through its employees and to keep its operations beyond reproach."

In addition to a £2,500 fine on each breach, the company was ordered to pay £4,280 prosecution costs.

Speaking outside court, Rick Green, chief executive officer of the airline's parent company, Globespan Group, said: "Clearly, we are pleased with the outcome and empathetic that the judge saw it in the manner that we always believed it to be."

[fireflybob]

Speaking outside court, Rick Green, chief executive officer of the airline's parent company, Globespan Group, said: "Clearly, we are pleased with the outcome and empathetic that the judge saw it in the manner that we always believed it to be."

I find this an amazing statement that the CEO of an Air Undertaking is "pleased" when the company has been FINED for breach of the regulations!! Is that really what he meant?

[Phil Space]

I wonder what pressure the flight crew were under to accept the fault?

[iranair777]

I'm suprised that there was only 20 people on this flight!

*waits for greenpeace to come over* :rolleyes:

[itwilldoatrip]

The engineer, who in this case was the flight operations director, "reported to the new pilot, who was taking the plane over, that the aircraft complied with the air worthiness certificate and could be accepted for the flight."

How can this guy pass himself off as an engineer.

[Rollingthunder]

" engine pressure radio indicators (EPRs)"

Engine Pressure Ratio

Sighs

I see the beeb have since corrected this.

[londonmet]

Only £5,000? Sigh. Should have been alot more. Shows how much backbone the CAA really has.

[yowie]

Are the EPR guages MELable on the 75? Just trying to put it into perspective:confused:

[boaclhryul]

I wonder what pressure the flight crew were under to accept the fault?

Couldn't tell, due to faulty pressure gauges...

[smudgethecat]

How can he pass himself of as a engineer itwilldoatrip? he was employed by storm aviation so anythings possible, i believe Monarch now have the contract to maintain the globespan 757/767,s which should be a relief for all concerned.

[Dirty Mach]

Sheesh- only £5K? I wonder how much they saved in Hotels for delayed passengers at either end/ crew disruption/ Airport fees etc?
Looks like a very commercially expedient decision to ignore the MEL and ANO...
do you think I would get away with it? :confused:

[Litebulbs]

Will this show up on the accountable managers CRC?!

[hatters united]

Rainbow;
There is a differance between a one off dispensation for a maintenance flight and a commercial revenue earning flight.
What is the point of a MEL if you don't follow it ?

[smudgethecat]

Problem was as i understand it no one gave anyone any dispensation to fly outside the scope of the MEL, nor was the aircraft returning to a main base, therefore the a/c was operating illegally, the MEL is there for very sound reasons

[ReallyAnnoyed]

Today 17:09boaclhryulQuote:
I wonder what pressure the flight crew were under to accept the fault?
Couldn't tell, due to faulty pressure gauges...

He he that was funny :}

[Alwaysairbus]

Rainboe,
I'm amazed at your attitude. The MEL is there not just to help aircraft to continue service without disrupting schedules but also to ensure safe and legal operation of the aircraft.

From memory one of the provisors for inop EPR ind on one engine is that the EPR / N1 is compared with the other operable engine aswell as having to trawl through performance charts for power/N1/altitude figures. The fact that the aircraft had no EPR and was ETOPs also add's to how bad the scenario was.

If Boeing, the FAA and the CAA thought flying with no EPR was acceptible on a twin EPR controlled aircraft/engine then they would have agreed to have this is the MEL. Other aircraft/engine combinations do use only N1 (in fact i believe the original DC10's were EPR controlled then this was removed with several mods) but they are designed to control to N1 settings aka A320/CFM and A320/V2500 (which has EPR but can revert to N1 control which the FADEC software looks after.

And what's this about the flight ops director also being the departing engineer... i would call that a clash of responsibilities... probably find he was the magistrate too. Most strange.

[Skyhigh-Ulster]

What a joke £5000 :mad:

[BAe146s make me cry]

The reality is there are numerous and hidden non-compliances
in daily aircraft maintenance & operations. Audits and reports
only catch the tip of these non-compliances.

The acceptance of all aircraft following maintenance has to be
from the aircraft commander in consultation with the AFM's
limitations, base or downroute.

Additionally, is the Flight Operations Director a B757/RB211
type rated EASA Part 66 B1.1 Engineer. Can anyone confirm?

[The Real Slim Shady]

They may have operated outside of the provisions of the MEL, but, the MEL is a company document approved by the Authority.

The MMEL may allow operation without EPR indications if N1 indications etc are available to the flightcrew.

In that case all they had to do was request approval to operate to the MMEL limitations and not the MEL to recover the aircraft to base, or, submit an amendment for approval by the Authority.

[Scimitar]

I am assuming, Rainboe, that you worked for BA. I worked for a UK Charter airline for 27 years and never once either felt the need, nor was put under any pressure to operate outside the terms of the MEL.

The MEL is provided by the manufacturer for soundly considered reasons. To consider yourself technically clever enough to ignore it seems somewhat foolhardy - perhaps even downright stupid!

[mercurydancer]

No risk? thats certainly not what the recorder thought. Thats why the company was gound gulity. I can understand minimal risk but no risk? The recorder did say, quite sensibly, that it added another layer of complexity, which is a hole in the cheese. Fortunately there were no other holes which lined up. In itself the violating of the MEL is not overtly significant but control measures are there for good reasons and shoud not be eroded. Piper Alpha's permit to work papers were one such measure but got eroded to the point where they meant little. If MEL is going to be thought of as effective then they must be policed, and although 5000 quid is nether here nor there for an airline, I bet the adverse publicity is costing them more than that by a long way, and so it should.

[Check Mags On]

"I am told and I am satisfied that the failure of the EPRs on this flight did not render the aircraft unsafe
and did not in any way endanger the public who were flying on that aircraft."


MD.

The quote above whilst it does not say the words "no risk", certainly conveys that meaning.
GSM where found guilty of two breaches of the ANO.
Not of putting the public at risk.

To say that the breaches of the ANO put the public at risk is subjective.
And the recorder under guidance from the CAA I presume
did not think there was any danger at all.

CMO

[mercurydancer]

"It rather placed extra burdens and pressures on the pilot and co-pilot to calculate manually the performance of the engines."
"they were stretched more than ideally than they could have been in flying the plane safely, and fly safely they did". These are risk factors if ever I heard them. I did say that the holes didnt line up in this case, but if the recorder meant anything it was that the possibility was opened. How far the risk stretched with the extra burdens is subjective but not absent.

The recorder's words may be considered contradictory in this case as No Risk means no risk... minimal risk should be stated as such. My reading of his comments are different, and context is everything. In this case the violation of MEL did not cause any subsequent safety issues on that flight (past tense...it didnt cause any on that flight...) but violations of MEL could be a factor in future flights, which is why they are there.

[oscarh]

londonmet

The fine was awarded by the Court, not the CAA, so your comment about the CAA and it's supposed lack of backbone is a bit short on merit!

The CAA doubtless reported the company to the DPP or whoever prosecutes these cases.

[winglit]

It's very easy to say that there was no risk to the public flying on board, once the aircraft has arrived safely at it's destination.

But to all you pilots like Rainboe who think they know better than the MEL have you considered these scenarios before making your reckless decision?:

How sure can you be that it is just an EPR indication fault?
The EECs may be working in N1 revision mode which is it secondary mode.
The RB211 is not the most bleed stable of jet engines, hence the amount of bleed valves placed all over it.
The reason why you might be allowed one U/S EPR gauge, would be to fly to the known EPR then match N1 on the other one. With them both U/S you are flying on N1 alone which is not as efficient and not the preferred method of thrust production. How accurately can you calculate your fuel burn in N1 mode, especially on an ETOPS sector?
Let's consider a go-around on finals.
If you had to firewall the throttles of a flight idle engine in N1 mode, the risks of a compressor stall / surge are significantly higher.

The MEL is a Go / No-Go reference. Admittedly some are written rather ambiguously but most are clear enough when safety is at stake. If you blatantly go against it, then you deserve everything you get.

[Bruce Wayne]

By the summation the situation is readily apparent and have to semi-agree with Rainboe on this one.

In accordance with the Air Navigation Order (http://www.caa.co.uk/application.aspx?catid=33&pagetype=65&appid=11&mode=detail&id=226) and EU-OPS 1.030 (http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?catid=1404&pagetype=90&pageid=9308)/JAR-OPS 3.030 (http://www.jaa.nl/publications/publications.html), a UK registered aircraft shall not commence flight if any of the required equipment is missing or inoperable unless a Permission/Approval to do so has been issued by the CAA.
An MEL is based upon the relevant Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) and requires approval from the CAA.

The Approval of an operator's MEL forms the Permission required for flight in these circumstances.

Operations outside of the procedures detailed in the MEL are prohibited unless permission is granted by the CAA. Permissions will not be granted for operations outside of the constraints of the MMEL.

James Curtis QC's comments are telling...

"I am told and I am satisfied that the failure of the EPRs on this flight did not render the aircraft unsafe and did not in any way endanger the public who were flying on that aircraft."

"they were stretched more than ideally than they could have been in flying the plane safely, and fly safely they did".

The fine of 5,000 also indicates that this was more of a slap on the wrists for GlobeSpan. The legal fees they incurred alone would have been vastly greater than the fine.

What the problem appears to be is that GlobeSpan did not obtain approval for operating outside of the MEL prior and received a legal address of "you didn't compromise safety by this action, but you should have got approval to it."

one thing to note is that James Curtis QC is at 6 King’s Bench Walk chambers, which is in the field of criminal law.

So this reverts back to the thread and question of criminalization!

[Terraplaneblues]

The MEL reasoning is based on probability and looks to the next significant failure eroding the margin of safety beyond acceptable levels.
Next significant in this case could be N1 indication or anything that would require additional monitoring by the flightcrew.

[Artifical Horizon]

As usual Rainboe has placed himself in a position of what he believes to be unimpeachable authority since he is a long haul pilot. He says he would be happy to have operated the aircraft in its technical circumstances if he had been given dispensation. It seems that the problem in this case is that the dispensation was not sought or granted. So in these circumstances presumably Rainboe you would not have operated the flight. Globespan did and hence the prosecution.

To casually dipense with the opinions of others because they are not pilots or worse if they are short haul pilots does not do this profession any credit. Reassuring the nervous passengers who pay at least a portion of our wages is both kindly and professional. To assume that your experience as a long haul pilot sets you apart from other professionals in this wide ranging industry is demeaning to all.

[bvcu]

2 issues here , MEL and MMEL dont allow dispatch with both EPR'S inop. 757,767 and A330. All these types are also fitted with N1 controlled engines as well so surely there must be a reason for it not being permitted ?? Also look back at accident history with EPR problems i.e 737-200 with EPR probe icing . Since that accident i have seen RR powered 757's arrive with one engine at idle because a sense line leak gave a very high reading so crew throttled back thinking they could be overboosting the engine !!! Easy to dismiss but i guess if all your ops , autothrottle etc is based on EPR figures you tend to work to them .
2nd issue here is if you are to operate outside MEL then you need a dispensation , which they didnt have. I would suggest that they wouldnt have got one for a commercial flight.
Be interested if anyone has any theory as to why only one inop EPR is permitted on all the above types ?

[Artifical Horizon]

Rainboe.

I am most flattered that you have taken the trouble of researching my past writings. Enjoy!

[Basil]

Without wishing to enter into dispute, may I suggest that it would be most unwise for a commander to depart with a defect which was not approved in the MEL, especially if there was evidence that said commander was aware of the defect.
The FO & (if fitted :)) FE could also be held culpable.
If things go wrong, many companies will throw you to the wolves.
I was once told by a very eminent trainer to always check the MEL if there is any defect on the aircraft and not to assume that, because the previous captain had accepted the fault, it was OK to go.

[WHBM]

I'm suprised that there was only 20 people on this flight!
As I understand it the flight was operating Liverpool-Knock-JFK. There appear to have been 20 passengers boarded at Liverpool, but an unstated number then boarded at Knock for the transatlantic sector; possibly it was full, possibly not. The initial issue was before departure from Liverpool. Somehow the point that there were two sectors involved seems to have been missed in the reporting.

[winglit]

Winglit, I don't agree with your comments. Why are you trying to imply there may be more than an EPR indication fault? Are we supposed to accept that there may be something else? There was just an EPR indicating fault. Many planes don't even have EPRs. The pilots can look up go-around N1s, so what is the problem?

Because the EPR indication is taken from the EPR transducer inside the EEC and fed to both EICAS computers and the SEI. If all three indications are not working then it would be prudent to assume that the fault lies within the EPR sensing / transducer system and that therefore the engine is operating in N1 mode.

That's why.

So you obviously don't know as much as you think you do, which even more worrying when you think you can circumvent the MEL.

You're one of the swiss cheese holes mate!

[winglit]

I'm mainly concerned about this statement

One needs to be technically aware to review combinations of defects and what would be a bad combination to fly with, even though individual faults in themselves are not serious.

You have managed to convince me in this thread that you are not technically aware. You seem to think that the EPR indication on an RB211 is just another instrument for your reference. You don't seem to know that it uses EPR for target thrust calculation and that the EEC computes all data on valid EPR settings. If it doesn't receive EPR signals, then it reverts to N1 mode which employs a cruder fuel scheduling to reach a target N1 rather than thrust.

The risks of engine surge are greatly increased when in N1 mode as the BVCU also uses EPR for it's calculations. You argued my statement about the RB211 being bleed unstable. The only reason it is now stable is because of the sophisticated bleed management controlling the numerous bleed valves. When the engine is in it's secondary mode, many of these protections are inoperative.

I agree with you that it was the engineer who signed it off was at fault. In my opinion he should be hung out to dry. But I don't agree with you, that you think that this was a harsh penalty for Flyglobespan to pay. It also concerns me that you don't think there was anything wrong with the operation of this aircraft, and that you would have done the same.

[sky9]

Rainboe
I am a little confused at your view of the MEL. Yes alleviations can be given and recorded but if my memory is correct (I retired 5 years ago) those alleviations are given by the CAA not by the OPS Director or Chief Pilot and are generally for a return to Engineering Base not dispatch from it. You generally find that when someone in a "senior position" is asked to back up his verbal "it'll be OK" "alleviation" in writing you can hear the gears going into reverse.

I am a little concerned that the EPR failures were apparently caused by a lightening strike. I presume that the lightening strike engineering checklist was carried out so wonder why the reason for the EPR failure wasn't established.

I think that the wool was pulled over the eyes of the Judge on this one. After all if it was OK to operate with 2 EPR's U/S it would be in the MEL. Patently the CAA Rolls or Boeing had reservations.

[itwilldoatrip]

Rainboe as an engineer it is very worrying regarding your replies. I for one would NOT be happy flying in the back behind you. Firstly your interpretations of the MEL are way off the mark.
One EPR inop full stop.
Two requires a dispensation, in Writing. I would not sign off without one. Secondly on your MEL preamble quote 'continue a flight to an airport where repairs can be made'. This I think would refer to a remote island in the middle of the Atlantic/Pacific NOT Liverpool airport where you could fly down the road to Manchester, Taxi spares to Lpool.
Next we have the problem of the Ops director making engineering decisions. This is where I agree with you the engineer screwed up. As an experienced engineer I would have profferred the Tech Log to said Ops director and said sign it.

[winglit]

I don't have a 757 MEL to hand, so I can't comment on your statement about allowing BOTH inop EEC's.

The reason you have become so reliant on modern electronic systems is because you no longer have a flight engineer behind you looking after your systems.

The last thing I would want as your passenger, is a pilot too engrossed in manually operating his systems rather than handling his aeroplane.

Also I might add that it is not your decision to operate outside of the MEL even with dispensation. The responsibility lies with the engineer who signs the CRS. Even with dispensation it is ultimately his responsibility. You cannot legally dispatch with an open defect so it either has to be deferred or rectified. Some pilots when down-route, can defer items allowable in the MEL with approval from Maintrol. But not even a licensed engineer would dare defer anything outside of MEL boundaries. Once the engineer has handed over the aircraft to the Captain, it is then his prerogative to accept it. Even if something is deferred within the MEL, he may elect to refuse the aircraft, but it doesn't work the other way around. The Captain should not accept an aircraft with an open defect, or with a deferral outside of MEL limits. That is why you should always check deferred item with their MEL references before each dispatch. This is something I always do before a flight. I do a technical brief going through all deferred defects with the MEL page open so that the Captain can see for himself and ask any relevant questions.

[AEUENG]

Rainboe,Have you been working for Sri Lankan recently?? Just trying to lighten the thread somewhat!!

[AEUENG]

Glad to see it was taken in the full jest in which it was meant! Keep Smiling.

[winglit]

Who are you calling a rottweiller?

Can you seriously justify this previous statement?

I find it difficult to believe that this prosecution was necessary. As a 757 pilot, if I were to be given a dispensation to operate with both EPR indicators u/s, I cannot see what the problem is and would be happy to accept. I am saying the level of risk was actually zero. All power information was present. I have been given dispensation many times to operate beyond the terms of the MEL in order to return to a maintenance base. It comes down to the pilot to judge as a professional for himself and do what he is paid to do- make a sensible judgement of safety, which he did. I fly the thing. I see nothing wrong.

Even though you acknowledge the fact that there had been an engineering error, you still consider that there was nothing wrong? You would have accepted the aircraft.

Your ego has got in the way of rational thinking. Yes you may be an experienced pilot with gazillions of hours. But to undermine the role of engineers and flight engineers is reducing your capacity for effective CRM. This pompous attitude does nothing other than narrow your ability to operate safely.

[sky9]

Rainboe

I really am a little concerned, is that the sorry word I heard you meantion?

[glad rag]

Rules are for the guidance of wise men etc..............:ok:

[Pontious]

The consolation is a little late in the day, however the DFO at the time of the incident retired on the grounds of ill health & the Director of Engineering resigned BEFORE this matter was brought before the courts.

:ok:

[itwilldoatrip]

Well thank you for that vote of confidence (and totally stupid remark- that has earned you an ignore)!

Given this statement time to kiss ass

Please let us not have engineers deciding what we can do onboard!

Forgive me there are two signatures in the tech log for flight release, the Captain and the other who is certainly not the purser.

Now an engineer is trying to decide how much the pilots can handle? Funny it was a double engineering failure, yet 2 engineers start accusing me of not being safe? Gross!

Engineering failure of the A/C yes. now tell us where the spares were this is the real problem. Regarding engineers telling you how to operate if you know more about the system than me go ahead and certify yourself. Loose count the number of times am called back to an A/C to 'Explain' a system defect.Regarding not being safe think your posts and lack of knowledge proves that.

Rainboe looks like your the smoking hole in the ground at the moment. Don't know you but I can visulize walking into the cockpit and you're the obiqutous dinosoar sitting in the left hand seat ruling over all you survey with the new junior S/O and chums hanging on every word because they don't want to have a bad report. Even more worrying is your lack of CRM. Can't even admit your wrong very bad karma. Mr Boeing has shown you for what you are a very dangerous pilot. I must say I love your type of guy in the left hand seat can have great fun with you, bring it on!!!!!!!!!!!!

Moderators can we have his 'warning toxic' handle altered to add 'and very arrogant and stupid also'. :D

[Facelookbovvered]

1 was it safe? well it wasn't unsafe because (on this occasion) it didn't crash..............

2 Was it legal....NO it wasn't and that why they have been fined (not enough in my view)

There is a world of difference between flying back to base with a nav light out (that might under the MEL) deck the aircraft and setting off accross the pond with the aircraft in this state, the pilots might have had to work a little harder (what a joke) what would have happened if they had lost a donk mid pond, and Globespam and their sub lease have had a few donks die.

Xyears and 20k hours puts you nearer the one that will kill you, after that amount of time you ought to know better, but who am i with only half that time!!!

[AMEandPPL]

We now have a complete and utter buffoon (Rainboe) making it quite clear . . . . . . . .

Oh no, here we go AGAIN ! Can't something be done about these two ?



20 mins later - above comment now deleted ! Who knows, there might now just be a wholesale outbreak of COMMON SENSE !

[tested satis]

Rainboe,

Ple tell me that you are acting like this just to wind the other guy up!
If not then you are acting as if being a pilot ( and a LONG HAUL pilot at that !)gives you and only you the divine right to decide what is safe or not.

The MEL/MMEL is not a document that you are qualified to discuss. You act within it until you are told in writing that you can act outside it. You have no say! Only the CAA can decide that for you , and unless you have a part time job that you hav'nt told us about then that does not mean YOU! As Captain you can choose not to fly an aircraft that has been granted an exemption but not the other way around.

And the 'My plane is bigger then your plane' attitude is a tad childish don't you think!

[AMEandPPL]

the 'My plane is bigger then your plane' attitude is a tad childish don't you think!

Thanks.

Now then, about those "Engine Pressure Radio" gauges . . . . as most of the mass media have called them ! That's where the debate should really be.

[Wee Willy McGorbals]

This sorry case is just a symptom of the loco culture in the UK where the imperative to get the job done at all costs is more important than anything else, including flight crew/engineering licences. £5 000 for breach of the ANO, what was the judge smoking?:ugh:

[fireflybob]

This sorry case is just a symptom of the loco culture in the UK where the imperative to get the job done at all costs is more important than anything else, including flight crew/engineering licences.

Wee Willy McGorbals, that statement is totally untrue (I could use much stronger words).

[Terraplaneblues]

Earlier in this thread I eluded to additional crew workload taking MEL items beyond acceptable risk category (promptly shot down in flames by somebody???), but a good example is (757/767) one auto cabin pressurisation controller u/s. Obvious one is manual control operates normally and the crew workload control item - one autopilot must be operative.

[Say again s l o w l y]

Wheelbarrow, surely life is better since the break up of the Joe show? Or is that just wishful thinking?

[fireflybob]

This sorry case is just a symptom of the loco culture in the UK where the imperative to get the job done at all costs is more important than anything else, including flight crew/engineering licences.

I took this as a generalised comment of ALL locos in the UK! In which case I still assert that this is not true. There might be the occasional bad apple but please do not apply this to all locos in the UK.

[AerospaceAce]

I agree with Skyhigh-Ulster, a couple more zero's on the fine might make Globespan realise that rules are not there to be broken, 5K is pathetic.:ugh:

[Pontious]

Say again slowly

Things are a lot better & slowly getting a little better & more stable every roster issue.

Wheelbarrow

If you don't like it then go somewhere else because I'm sure the door is always is open to people who don't want to be at GSM. It's a pretty bouyant job market out there for 737 skippers.


What would a larger fine have achieved?
The CAA would have known that the individuals concerned were no longer in the company & that the new team had their full backing. People further up the food chain had their knuckles rapped & tea leaves read by the Authority. So I ask again, what would a larger fine have achieved?
:ok:

[mach79]

You mention "New Team".I've heard thus far the DFO and the Director of Engineering have gone.
What about the Chief Pilot-is he new as well?

[Pontious]

Mach79

No, it's still the same CP & he's a very good one. What is your point?

[Pontious]

Have I read some inference into your question that is unintended? If so I apologise, I thought your question was 'loaded'. It's just hard to spot the anti-GSM snipers in the trees sometimes.
:ok:

[wheelbarrow]

Come on Pontious RTFQ! At least brush up on our sops! Not a shed now ya know he he.

Cya during the week mate :p LOL

:rolleyes::rolleyes: