Hurry Up Syndrome

[jetopa]

Does anybody have suggestions / examples / statistics / scenarios for an oral presentation about this topic? A good report about a mishap as a result to perceived or actual time pressure (other than the classical Pan Am / KLM accident in Tenerife Norte in '77) would do as well.

Many thanks in advance!:ok:

[Non-PC Plod]

Try the flight safety foundation website, look through back issues of "Accident Prevention" journal. They have an easily-readable analysis of many incidents over the past decade or two.
Otherwise, I would suggest American Airlines 1420 at Little Rock 1999. There is a National Geographic "Crash Investigation" video on this one too, which is quite usable.

[Spitoon]

There was a serious incident to a Ryanair a few years back - I seem to recall a contributory factor was rushing a departure and missing some checks. End result was potentially similar to the helios - aircraft did not pressurise. There's a report on the Irish AAIB website, I think. I'll see if I can dig out any more info if it is of interest - drop me a PM if you want.

[HZ123]

I fear that often the hurry up factor is also ill served by the cutting corners a little bit. We have always got away with it in the past and it is put into use daily in many forms i.e. leaving later from home thus speeding.

[adverse-bump]

what about the 757 that hit the granite in south america, i think it was a us airways so similar big american airline.

still had the spoilers up when it hit.

[411A]

what about the 757 that hit the granite in south america, i think it was a us airways so similar big american airline.

still had the spoilers up when it hit.

It was American Airlines with a 757, at Cali, Colombia.
A very nasty accident.
Change of runways, hurried descent, no proper approach briefing for the new runway and, to top it all off, incorrect data in the FMC....or rather incorrectly read by the flight crew.

A classic example of a hurried approach.

[low n' slow]

This is a very good issue to talk about!
May I suggest you also look into what ATC are doing to help?
A bloke from Swedish ATC told me that, in their runway incursion programme, they had a portion that was about reducing crew workload during taxi out for departure. For example, the whole thing about getting clearance on stand, encouraging crews to be fully ready before pushing etc and thereby also reducing the risk of making a rushed departure.
In their view, they're trying to reduce the risk of RWY incursions, but the result in our end is a more relaxed cockpit environment in which we're able to pick up on mistakes and faults that are prone to go unnoticed in a hurried cockpit.
It might provide an interesting angle to the topic.

/Low

[411A]

Heard on the KLAX ground frequency years ago when the first B747's were operational....

LAX ground:

Clipper One, can you expedite taxi?

Clipper One:

No we can NOT, we are all new to this big airplane and are still learning what all the levers and switches do.

LAX ground:

We understand Clipper One, we are still learning about all the switches in the tower cab also.

Unknown voice:

Clipper would be hard pressed to find their a** with both hands, even if the lights were on.

Silence followed.

A true story.

[john_tullamarine]

... sometimes a put down ... which should be deleted in our PC world ... is just so funny that it has to stay ....:}

reminds me of another, which Centaurus related to me years ago, along the lines of "... how's them apples ?" but I guess that can wait for another day ...

[ernest gann]

try this SmartCockpit - Airline training guides, Aviation, Operations, Safety (http://www.smartcockpit.com/pdf/flightops/humanfactors/11)

[jolly girl]

Try this:
http://www.pprune.org/forums/rotorheads/333313-us-hems-ops.html#post4219151"]http://www.pprune.org/forums/rotorheads/333313-us-hems-ops.html#post4219151
It's heli examples that may be of use.

[Centaurus]

reminds me of another, which Centaurus related to me years ago

Well, seeing as you asked....

It goes roughly like this:

Queues of aircraft taxiing out for take off after delays due fog. Last in queue is DC8 bound for short distance destination but faced with 30 minute wait to line up and go. Pilot decides to cheat and asks tower for permission to take an intersection departure ahead of the heavies at the head of the conga line.

ATC see a gap in departures and authorises DC8 to enter runway at intersection ahead of the mob at the far end. DC8 expedites but instead of lining up proceeds to back track to the main threshold of departure runway. Much anger displayed by waiting aircraft and especially as first officer of DC8 gives a finger to others on taxiway and then boasts "How's thems apples?" over the radio.

ATC annoyed but clears DC8 for take off now at the start of runway. As the DC 8 accelerates, some one among all the other aircraft presses a fire warning test switch and opens his microphone so the warning bell noise goes over the air. The DC8 is seen to make a high speed abort on hearing the warning bell over the radio. Too late the DC 8 pilot realises it wasn't from his aircraft. Then came the drawl over the radio of "And how's THEM apples...."from the real culprit whoever he was.

DC8 now back to end of queue but with hot brakes..

Probably some truth in the story but even if not, it is a lovely tale.

[john_tullamarine]

.. that's the one ...

[FougaMagister]

Great story! :ok:

My company's SOPs include the following (in the bit about taxiing for departure, but equally applicable to other aspects of the flight):

"Fast taxi speeds are dangerous - do not allow yourself to be rushed."

Better take a delay than cut corners.

Cheers :cool:

[Pugilistic Animus]

"Fast taxi speeds are dangerous - do not allow yourself to be rushed."I agree!---people are taxiing way to fast these days---and I don't like--the chances of runway incursions is too high:=---Sometimes I think they're gonna try to drive to the destination via the NJ Tpke:}

Also, I hope that the the pre-taxi/taxi flows are very simple irrespective of type---i.e {breiks chequed}:}

[I]edited to add--- planes are awkward on the ground and you all will go a bit faster than a car!! {limited stupid slow device for personal ground transit} soon enough---so don't get caught up in the ground and taxi slow



Re: pressure as a pilot---You can't just sway in every little 25 knot breeze that blow a along you must hold your resolve and resist the machismo that could lead to an accident don't allow any form of chiding, teasing or threatening to interfere with safety---Focus inside [yourself] yet carefully observe what's out---an {Ehrporte}:} is not a drag strip, an amusement park, or the NY stock exchange-----an personally I've found the fastest way to get through all the preflight stuff is to go methodically and patiently through the flows I'm decently quick {whatever type I'm flying at the time} due to my experience with the ship and systems knowledge {after a good methodical review the AFM/POH:}}---aka cramming for my checks:cool:---but not because I rush:=-----------------------------


And every body is different and works at different paces you don't have to be the fastest--it's not a race,...and every body has limitations--the trick is not to fight them but learn to work around them---every good pilot does it this way {for instance personally I love night flight---I'm a night person---very helpful at times---so for early morning flights--I go slower---talk on the the radio slower---write more stuff down---mess up on frequency more:O---you all understand ----enough!:)


PA

[411A]

Probably some truth in the story but even if not, it is a lovely tale.

Oh, it's true, alright.
The DC-8 in question?
Operated by Universal Airlines, one of the original thirteen US supplemental air carriers.
Location, KLAX, circa 1966.

Universal still exists, but not as an airline.
It is now known as Universal Weather.

[john_tullamarine]

411A .. then Centaurus and I shall toast your continued good health when next we have a coffee .. often have I pondered that tale's verisimilitude ...

[Centaurus]

verisimilitude ...

Jeez! John @ Tulla...are you going all Kevin 07 Rudd on us?:ok:

[john_tullamarine]

...JT pulls head in and exits stage right ...

[Old Smokey]

Oh go on Centaurus, give him a fair go! JT's just bought a new Thesaurus, and getting his money's worth in trying out all of his new words on us unedjercated heathens:}

What does "verisimilitude" mean anyway JT?

Just wondering, might be useful in scrabble:ok:

Regards,

Old Smokey

[point8six]

Hurry up J-T! Have you been Googling again?

[john_tullamarine]

.. I think I'll go hide in the corner and sulk for a while .... :O

[IGh]

Request from top slot:"... Hurry Up Syndrome... suggestions / examples ... scenarios ... about this topic? A good report ..."
I checked a few books, seems that there's no agreed nomenclature: other writers employed the term "time pressure". The jointly chartered CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT) was charged with developing common taxonomies and definitions, but I don't see "hurry-up" nor "time-pressure" among their list.

Another CASE (hurry/time-pressure) often cited is the Air Ontario 1363 / 10Mar89 T/O from Dryden.

Then I began scrolling through my own mishap-dB. I see that in some cases the Board's P.C. (nor "Conclusions") never explicitly mentions the words "time-pressure" or "hurry-up" -- even though time-pressured omission was the main factor leading to the later mishap.

Maybe the hurry-up factor is most easily recognized when it occurs in the pre-flight or taxi phase: -- Ramp mishap, snow, de-icing, communication mix-up; at Montreal/Mirabel Airport, Saturday 21Jan95; Royal Air Maroc Boeing 747 collided with a de-icing truck, knocking men off the platform killing three ... Deicing crew still working at the rear of B747, when the aircraft's captain requested permission to taxi. Apron control, which controls aircraft for servicing, gave him this permission. ... Two elevated cherry- pickers used, while the plane's four engines were idling. Confusion in communications caused the plane's pilot, Boubker Cherradi, to mistakenly release the aircraft's brakes and a/c began to move forward -- before the de-icing operation was complete. Jet's tailplane struck the two cherry-pickers, causing the three victims to fall 50 feet to their deaths. ... [from press] rpt very critical of cockpit crew, saying they acted "carelessly" and seemed in a hurry to depart. Rpt blamed de-ice- Crew Leader Michel Milcik, whose job it was to ensure clear communications between the flight deck and ground crew. \\ Canadian Airlines spokeswoman France Poulin said the company no longer de-ices wide-body jets with engines running, but that the procedure is universally approved for narrow-body aircraft. "We've also instituted changes in our communication procedures," she added. \\ Testimony revealed that de-ice contractors (ALs & contract-Mx) allowed jumbo jet engines to run during de-icing, saving the 10 minutes it would take to shut down and then re-start, even though the practice is considered unsafe. ... Killed were Canadian Airlines employees: Jean-Pierre Massie, 37; Giovanni Forgione, 48; and Marc Tremblay, 32. ... TSB/c’s web site: ... Report Number A95Q0015 //// Collision with Vehicle Royal Air Maroc // Boeing 747-400 CN-RGA Montreal (Mirabel) International Airport, Quebec // 21 January 1995 // Report Number A95Q0015 //\\ Synopsis -- The Royal Air Maroc Boeing 747-400 was parked in the de-icing centre of Montreal (Mirabel)... The four engines were running during the de-icing operation. The crew heard "dégivrage terminé" (de-icing completed), and the captain asked the co-pilot to inform the apron controller that the aircraft was ready to taxi. Taxi instructions were issued. The aircraft started to move forward and overturned the two de-icing vehicles that were still in front of the aircraft's horizontal stabilizers. The two vehicle drivers sustained minor injuries; the three occupants of the cherry-pickers received fatal injuries. // The Board determined that the flight crew started to taxi the aircraft before its perimeter was clear, following confusion in the radio communications. The following factors contributed to the accident: a lack of de-icing procedures within Royal Air Maroc; non-compliance with procedures on the part of the Canadian Airlines International Ltd. de-icing crew; inadequate or inappropriate communications equipment; incomplete training of Snowman 1 (the chief de-icing attendant); a regulatory framework less demanding of foreign air carriers than of Canadian carriers; a lack of operational supervision; and a lack of adherence to radio protocol.
Here's an example (below), where the Captain's time-pressured short-cuts occur during the pre-taxi phase [electing to omit the verbal "all secure below" report from ground-worker while CHOCKS were still installed at his NLG], resulting in NLG-damaged Spray Deflector, NLG failed to extend during approach phase. Note that the Safety Board's investigators never explicitly mentioned the "hurry-up" or "time-pressure" as factors: -- B717-200, reg N2417F / 09Aug01 diverted to Springfield, Illinois due to destination weather. [Factors not stated: divert-miscommunication, time-pressure.] The diverted flight departed from Capital Airport (SPI), near Springfield, Illinois at 1820. ...

One of the ground personnel stated,"There was no ground crew free at the time to flag out FLT 519 as I was busy and the other two agents were getting FLT 7637 boarded ... After flagging out FLT 533 I went over to where FLT 519 had been sitting and discovered the chocks lying on the ramp."
[Capt's description] "... After beginning taxi roll a slight bump was felt that was compatible with a rough ramp area."

A passenger stated, "At this point with engines running it seemed that it took a great deal of thrust to get the aircraft moving. I heard the hydraulics when breaks were released, but thought it unusual to use such thrust to get moving on a level ramp ... There were then two sharp jolts."

The ramp where flight 519 was parked during its diversion was examined. A piece of cast metal debris was found on the ramp. That metal was similar in color to the broken spray deflector assembly...

TWA519 from Nashville ... to Saint Louis ... sustained substantial damage on contact with BLV RWY 14L ... during an emergency landing, at Scott .../ Midamerica ... (BLV). The nose gear did NOT extend, an emergency was declared, and the airplane made an emergency landing coming to rest on its nose and main landing gear....
From NTSB site: "... The ... Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:The malfunction of the nose gear extension system, which resulted from a previous ground collision with a wheel chock. A factor was the wheel chock.
Neither the words "hurry-up" nor "time-pressure" are explicitly mentioned in the Board's rpt.

Also found a case where AFTER a fatal injury (during push-back), RAMP CONTROLLER's time-pressured actions (to get aircraft moving by use of illegal tug-ops near victim's body) forced other problems.

[Miles Gustaph]

Do you really need to look any further than Tenerife for a hurry up accident?

[IGh]

Here are more suggestions for research on better documentation of factors which contributed to HURRY-UP Syndrome, and listing examples of incident-mishaps related to “time-pressure” factors.

The ASRS dB doesn’t offer any prepackaged data-set categorized under the label of “HURRY-UP Syndrome”.

ASRS dB --- Initially searched on:
“Primary Problem Flight Crew Human Performance”
http://akama.arc.nasa.gov/ASRSDBOnline/QueryWizard_Results.aspx
... query returned 63170 ASRS rpts.

= = = =

Then I searched this pattern:

Reporter Affiliation “Air Carrier”
and Primary Problem “Flight Crew Human Performance”
and Text rush%, quick%, hurry%
Query Results: query returned 3903 ASRS reports

= = ==

Here are some of the limited ASRS labels:
“Assessments”
“Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance”
“Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance”
“Primary Problem : Flight Crew Human Performance”

The ASRS cases offer the researcher an ambiguity about the source of the HURRY-UP pressure:
-- pilot’s own induced time-pressure?
-- controller-induced?
-- management-induced?
-- co-worker induced?
-- repeat distractions during Lax Arrivals and TEB Departures;

In some cases maybe it was the PILOT’s role to recognize HURRY-UP factors motivating omissions/actions in a ground-worker, or forced by a manager.

If a researcher (writer /CRM pro’) were to accept the pilot’s own descriptors relating to cause, especially linked to “hurry-up”, among the ASRS cases the research finds words such as:

Hustled, ... rushed, ... busy preflight, ... QUICKLY REPROGRAMMED,

Here are some examples (excerpts from ASRS rpts) of HURRY-UP factors that pilots might consider:

... CAUGHT OFF GUARD BY THE RAPID FIRE NATURE OF THE ... DEPARTURE,

... THE HOLDING AND NOTAMS ... GIVE AN IDEA OF OUR WORKLOAD....

... A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG. IMMEDIATELY AFTER TOUCHDOWN THE TWR CTLR WAS YELLING AT US TO GET OFF THE RWY IMMEDIATELY.... THE ARPT DIAGRAM IT APPEARED THAT TXWYS ... CONNECTED AT THE RWY (WE HAVE SINCE LOOKED AT A BLOWN UP PICTURE WITH OUR COMPANY AND SEE THAT THIS IS ACTUALLY NOT THE CASE).... IT WAS DUSK AND WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE ANY DIFFERENCE BTWN THE PAVEMENT AND GRASS AS IT WAS GETTING DARK.... PILOT FELT RUSHED BY LOCAL CTLR TO EXIT THE RWY. NOT BEING NIGHT VISION ADJUSTED AND RUSHED, HE PICKED A NON TXWY TO EXIT THE RWY AND HIT MUD....

... I BEGAN THINKING ABOUT HOW WE WOULD HAVE TO HURRY AND BRIEF AND LOAD THE NEW RWY ...

... SHE GAVE THE INSTRUCTIONS VERY QUICKLY AND IN SUCH A WAY THAT... IT SEEMED CLEAR TO US THAT ... HER DELAY ... HAD CAUSED US TO OVERSHOOT.... I WAS WORRIED ABOUT CONFLICTS WITH RWY 28 TFC, SO I FOLLOWED HER INSTRUCTIONS BY TURNING R AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO CORRECT BACK TOWARDS THE COURSE ...

... DURING TAXI OUT, CAPT'S BRIEF WAS INTERRUPTED BY THE CALL FROM GND CTL, REQUIRING THAT WE CONTACT THE COMPANY TO RE-FILE OUR TIMED OUT FLT PLAN. THIS WAS DONE NEAR THE END OF THE RWY ... TWR CONTACTED US QUICKLY THEREAFTER WITH A NEW CLRNC (SQUAWK CODE) ... THIS LEFT US WITH LITTLE TIME TO START THE REMAINING ENG.... JUST COMPLETING THE TAXI CHKLIST AS TWR ISSUED OUR TKOF CLRNC. THINGS WERE PROGRESSING QUICKLY AND I NEVER COMPLETED ... WE WERE RUNNING ABOUT 2 HRS BEHIND SCHEDULE DUE TO OUR RECEIVING A LATE INBOUND ACFT.... HOLD SHORT LINE, FINISHED THE TAXI CHKLIST, TALKED TO THE FLT ATTENDANT, SWITCHED TO TWR, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR TKOF CLRNC, ALL WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. THE TKOF PROCEEDED NORMALLY WITH THE FO AS PF, UNTIL AROUND 100 KIAS WE GOT A TRIPLE CHIME ... REJECTED TKOF FOR A WARNING ASSOCIATED WITH A KNOWN MEL ITEM.

... WE PICKED UP THE ACFT ... HAD NO APU ... MEL'ED ON THE RELEASE. SO AFTER DOING AN EXTERNAL AIR START OF THE R ENG, WE PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE, ... WE WOULD DO A XBLEED START WHILE WE WAITED FOR ... CALL ... TO TAXI.... INFORMED HIM NOT TO SET FLAPS FOR TKOF TILL AFTER WE STARTED THE SECOND ENG. SHORTLY AFTER THE SECOND ENG WAS RUNNING, GND CALLED US TO TAXI AND ON THE TAXI OUT I HAD THE FO COMPLETE THE DELAYED ENG START CHKLIST.... NO LINE UP ... CALLED FOR THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. ... TWR ADVISED US TO POS ... CLRED US FOR TKOF. AS THE THRUST LEVERS WERE BEING ADVANCED FOR TKOF THRUST, WE GOT A CONFIGN FLAPS WARNING, AND PROCEEDED TO REJECT THE TKOF.... CREW OMITS TAXI CHECK AFTER DELAYED ENGINE START AND ATTEMPTS FLAPS UP TKOF. CONFIGURATION WARNING

... REPORTER STATED ... GOT TO THE END OF THE RUNWAY AND DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME TO COMPLETE THE QUICK ALIGN PROCEDURE ... SINCE THEY KNEW THEY WERE SHORT ON TIME, THEY REVERTED TO THE OLD PROCEDURE OF SIMPLY CYCLING THE IRU SWITCHES TO ALIGN AND BACK TO NAV. THEY WERE CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF WITHIN A FEW SECONDS AND LOST ALL NAV AND ATT DATA ON INITIAL CLIMB ...


[The above excerpts are from the first two pages of SEVENTY-NINE pages returned (50 rpts per pg).] A researcher/CRM-instructor could sort through the ASRS cases for examples aboard his own fleets.

[DozyWannabe]

Miles Gustaph:
Do you really need to look any further than Tenerife for a hurry up accident?
I reckon we do. Van Zanten's error and behaviour in Tenerife were so aberrant that it's tempting for one to say "well, I'm not that kind of pilot" and leave it at that.

But the fact is that there are probably thousands upon thousands of 'hurry up' incidents that didn't kill nearly six hundred people, but are just as dangerous to the lives of passengers and crew if we treat them complacently.

Tenerife is your worst case scenario, but your seventy-nine pages of lesser incidents mentioned above should be the truly notable part of any presentation on 'Hurry-up' syndrome, 'Get-there-itis', or whatever you wish to call it.