Pilot Incap at 80/100 - what to do?

[Screwballs]

I thought this was fairly clear cut but I have discovered a differing opinion and the ops manuals and FTCM's are both rather vague.

Here is the scenario: Captain PF, at the 80/100 knots call there is no response. What should the FO do? Both for the Boeing and Airbus fleets.

Company restrictions are that only the Captain decides to stop and does it himself, FO can only alert him/her to what he/she sees.

Screwballs

[fantom]

You repeat the SOP call and, if there's still no response, you stop the aircraft - provided you have been trained to close the thrust levers and apply the brakes.

Or, you could take control, fly off (single crew) and continue the flight.

Are you serious?

[tcas1]

In the absence of the commander,the first officer takes command.STOP for heavens sakes!!!!!!

[glad rag]

"80/100 knots call"

So that is actually two unanswered "calls" now........:hmm:.....and you and your pax are still accelerating to a fiery oblivion in the overshoot.......:suspect:....is this a secret CRM session??

I think after no response at 80 a more robust form of communication would be the first choice!

[ssg]

Here are the popular choices, based on past experience:

- Do nothing, and let the captain crash the plane
- Do something, and you crash the plane
- Start reading your SOPS manual
- Call OPS, ask them what to do
- Ask the stewardess to find a capt deadheading in back

----------------------------------

Forget the call outs...did you see the capt slump over?

The scary part about this, is that most of you opt for this guy to stop...in reality, how many of these airliners are overloaded, don't have balanced fiield numbers, and the capt knew he HAD to go...didn't tell anyone ofcourse....

Don't believe me? Go out today to the airport and see plane after plane use up 80% -90% of the runway just to rotate.

This kills me...one poster: 'you can stop the aircraft, provided your trained to do so'

So when does the FO, not get ' pull the levers back and put your feet on the brakes training'? No joke, but are FOs that weak these days...are airlines literaly putting in people that can't stop a plane? Or rotate it and get around the pattern?

This has got to be a wind up, and not for real....

But it's good for laugh.....

[Screwballs]

I see from the different responses that it seems there is not such an obvious answer to this question. A look through the FCTM of both types does not cover it and neither does the ops manual.

Thanks everyone for your responses, it's good to have a think about these not so clear cut areas somtimes.

Screwballs

[AKAAB]

If the CA doesn't respond to the 100knot call, speak up! The geezer probably has his hearing aid turned down.

[Mark1234]

I'll grant I only fly little cessnas (well, pipers too, and even the odd other light thing, but...)

Surely that's the answer by definition: if, when you take over, v<v1 - abort. if v>v1 - keep going.

I seem to have the idea from somewhere that v1 is calculated with reference to AUW, rwy length, density alt and other such stuff before it's needed?

[1Way2Live]

As posted by monkeyflight:

Just imagine:
"100"
(no response)
"110"
(still no response)
you glance over to your left and see the old guy collapsed in his seat...
Now you're at 120.
By the time you have made your decision to reject you're gonna be very close to decision speed if not already past it, especially on the small iron (A320/737 and the likes) Things happen so fast during an RTO that I wouldn't want to do it as a single pilot show on a machine and with procedures designed for two.

for me that would mean:
Hand on the thrust levers, a clear "I have control!" and "continue", fly a nice radar vectored pattern for the ILS to have the whole length of the runway in front you to land on.
The difference is, once you're airborne you've got TIME!

On the other hand, 4000m dry RWY, VCTS, mountains and a light A319 would get me tinking again.

An excellent reply and these are my thoughts exactly.

One of the good things about being a professional pilot is having a good old discussion about these sorts of things.

:ok:

[ford cortina]

I am a F/O in a company where I cannot all Reject!!! (737) Insane .
Still I happen to think that Monkeyflight's idea is a good one, I ould add to it to use the automatics as much as posible even a twin A/P Approach and Autoland. Safety is paramount.
Also give time for ATC to sort out a tug etc... as once you stop you are not going anywhere

[Pugilistic Animus]

You only have a few short moments to work it out---and a few less seconds thereafter to know if you made the right choice---You gotta get right:eek:

[D&M]

I'd never reject...

"I have control", priority push-button, continue with take-off, assess situation in the air and then make a decision... most likely to return, depending on what kind of Captain Incap we're talking about.

[Maude Charlee]

If he's still on the mobile to his wife/girlfriend/builder/lawyer, or deep in the Times crossword, then I'll leave him be.

Other than that, lean close to the CVR and yell "Captain!!! What are you doing???" :E

[point8six]

Screwballs:- if you ever want to make Captain, you will have to learn to make decisions, so make one and STOP! Don't think that you will be better off getting airborne and sorting it out; this is a good time to use your initiative and do the "safe thing". The workload will be so much easier for you.

[SNS3Guppy]

Surely that's the answer by definition: if, when you take over, v<v1 - abort. if v>v1 - keep going.


Many firms, my own included, subdivide the region below V1 into considerations based on what's going on. A general rule, used by us and many others, is any malfunction or problem up to 80 knots will be considered for a rejected takeoff, but above that speed, only for engine fire, engine failure, loss of directional control, or an outward opening door. So it's not quite so simple as rejecting for anything less than V1.

Incapacitation can take many forms. I've had a lack of response due to an ICS failure, lack of response due to me choking on an errant popcorn kernel. That's why there's a second challenge. On two occasions in my career I've had reason to take control from the other pilot, only one on a takeoff, and in that case I didn't actually take control. It was in a small transport category airplane, a Learjet, and involved a non-responsive pilot during a takeoff.

In that case, I was first officer, and in the right seat (I say that because in corporate and charter operations, the F/O may be in either seat, depending on the company policy and practice). The captain was new, inexperienced, and a direct hire captain. He had a track record of poor decisions and problems with other crews, each of whom had reported him to the chief pilot. In this case, I was assigned to fly with him because I was the most experienced F/O at the time.

We flew into LAX, and he was visibly nervous, intimidated by the size and business of the airport. When we departed, he was very hesitant in taxiing, seemed to be confused. On the takeoff roll we developed a door open light. It was relatively early in the takeoff, and I loudly announced the problem, pointed to the annunciator, and stated "Door light, reject, reject, reject." per the company SOP. No response. I stated again, and when I looked over at him, he was hunkered down, had a death grip on the yoke, one on the thrust levers, and showed no signs of doing anything but being intensely focused on taking off.

I knew a false door signal wasn't unheard of, and visually checked the door over my shoulder, and noted the handle positions. I determined that while clearly the door was closed, the indication didn't warrant trying to wrestle the airplane away from the captain who was off in la-la land and still apparently scared out of his whits. He wasn't unconscious, but more catatonic, overwhelmed from the look of it. I quickly determined a high speed rejected takeoff coupled with attempting to take control would do more harm than good.

When the captain didn't respond to further calls, but did rotate, I took care of gear and flaps. After we were cleaned up I tackled the checlist myself and then loudly anounced "You ARE aware we have a door light, correct?" He snapped out of it, and had a fit, stating that we needed to turn around, declare an emergency, and land the other way. He nearly had a panic attack. I left him physically manipulating the controls, but took control from that point on, telling him what to do, and talking him through the remainder of the trip.

When we got home I shared the experience with the Chief Pilot, who had grown to be good friends with that captain, and didn't want to hear it. I added my name to the list of pilots who wouldn't fly with him again, making it a full house; nobody would fly with that captain...and for the remainder of his time they called him a captain, and he was paid as a captain, but flew only with the chief pilot and only in the capacity of first officer.

I don't think the call is as simple as taking the airplane away, SOP notwithstanding. One must look at the circumstances and make the call.

[SoundBarrier]

Screwballs:- if you ever want to make Captain, you will have to learn to make decisions, so make one and STOP! Don't think that you will be better off getting airborne and sorting it out; this is a good time to use your initiative and do the "safe thing". The workload will be so much easier for you.

I seriously wonder if a blanket STOP decision is the right one, surely it is circumstantial as stated in the many posts above? Runway length, Density Alt, loading etc.

I suggest the key is to make a decision, based on the circumstances - and work it through. Indecision is what will make an accident out of an incident.

And small caveat on that comment is to obviously make the right decision! :}

[ssg]

Re-read my post...if V1 or VR are predicated on 'BS' numbers then the decision to go or not go, should have happend about 3000 feet ago...

Again, go to your local airport, watch an airliner burn up 80-90% of the runway to get to VR and try to convince yourself that right before V1 or VR he would have had enough runway to stop.

Still not convinced...watch the Concorde video and ask yourself why it couldn't climb on half it's engines, if not 3/4.

Anyone in here hear of the 60/40 rule?

[Hand Solo]

watch the Concorde video and ask yourself why it couldn't climb on half it's engines, if not 3/4.

It could climb quite adequately on 3/4 of it's engines. It couldn't climb on half it's engines and with the gear stuck down, which is probably the case for most heavy four engined jets.

[rjay259]

We have a derate and use the assumed temp reduction method. That is probably why you are seeing aircraft use 70 to 90% of the runway.

It does not detract from the fact that the DECISION SPEED at which you must decide to go or stop. it has nothing to do with how long the runway is as those calculations have already been made.

I have used 4500' on a 6500' runway and 8000' on a 10500' runway the power produced on those occasions was a little different due to the different derate but the principle is the same.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

Re-read my post...if V1 or VR are predicated on 'BS' numbers then the decision to go or not go, should have happend about 3000 feet ago...

Again, go to your local airport, watch an airliner burn up 80-90% of the runway to get to VR and try to convince yourself that right before V1 or VR he would have had enough runway to stop.

Still not convinced...watch the Concorde video and ask yourself why it couldn't climb on half it's engines, if not 3/4.

Anyone in here hear of the 60/40 rule?

If V1<Vr there is no requirement and no need to be able to stop at Vr, so I don't understand your point.

If using balanced field, and reduced thrust/FLEX why fiddle the figures ?? You still have the performance to take more weight out of the field ??

[411A]

At my present carrier, the 80 knot call is normally acknowledged by the Captain, but if it is not, we have a second call at 100 knots (mainly to varify/compare indicated airspeeds) to which the Captain would normally reply (check)...if no reply received, F/O presumes incapacitation, and either continues (preferred, except if rather light), or stops.

Works well, and eliminates much drama.
Keep it simple, for best results.

[Screwballs]

What would a typical V1 speed be on the L-1011? On the 737/A319 it can be around 125 to 150. That gives an FO a few seconds to initiate action to stop. Remembering that the decision should already have been made by no response to the second call.

If it was me, and I called out 80 knots and no response, my first action would definitely involve a glance over at El Capitan, immediately, and at least raising my voice a large amount for the next call - however if he/she is doing the whole slumping over/frothing at the mouth/red-faced (usual for the 5th early:}) then I'm stopping.

But this is an interesting area, up until very recently I thought it was clear cut, but now seeing some different points of view it appears that FO's should be also making assesment when they line up on what to do if you are about to get some unexpected command time....

Screwballs

[Ashling]

The QRH for the 737 allows for an abort above 80kts for engine failure, fire, predictive windshear warning or if the aircraft is unsafe/unable to fly. I'm guessing the wording will be pretty similar for most Boeing types.

So if the F/O realises his Capt is incapacitated above 80kts but prior to V1 he must make a judgement against the above criteria. The only one that might fit is that the aircraft is unsafe to fly which is perhaps stretching it a bit unless you take into consideration that if the Capt is PF that may be because the weather is outside the F/Os limits (cloudbase,LVPs,wind, contaminated runway etc) in which case you could make a very good case for stopping.

In my company we are very rarely field length limited and often fly off runways with a huge surplus of length so in reality most of the time a high speed abort would involve a relatively small risk. Certainly if I was ever unfortunate enough to fall over on the flight deck on such a runway I would be gratefull if my oppo stopped and got me help asap I wouldn't be berating him for doing it from 110kts as I breathed my last.

The key thing is that the scenario is thought about and trained for and that we appreciate that circumstances will change from aircraft type to the runway in use and the prevailing weather.

[bleedfail]

Well....in every airlines i have flown with, it was very clear...if ANY pilot was to become incapacitated during T.O , means no answer at 80 kts from PF (or PNF do not make the call out ), do another LOUD call . If still no answer ,expect the other pilot being incapacitated. The take-off must be aborted before V1.This was trained in sim.
Now imagine you have bad weather + a major failure at, or after V1....single pilot:\ ....what do you think it would have been safest course of action ?

[ssg]

Without getting into a discussion of balanced field...accelerate stop, ect ect..

Let me ask you guys a very simple question so there is no confusion.

If a plane accelerates to V1, and pilot decides to abort, pilot needs to have enough runway to stop the aircraft,(right?) or should he decide to go, and lose an engine right at V1, the plane should acelerate to VR and climb on one engine, (or half the engines) (right?)and clear all obsticles along the initial route or land back at the starting airport.(right?)

There is no excuse for a plane to not have enough runway after a V1 abort to stop, or why the plane shouldn't climb out, engine out, and climb on course. The numbers are verified.there is no fudge factor here. If you put in the CORRECT weight for the aircraft, the CORRECT temp, ect, then you should have the right numbers and be assured that which ever way you go...abort or climb, the aircraft won't crash.

Can we agree on this much?

So if you guys are trying to convince me that an airliner that burns up 90% of runway to rotate, would have had enough runway at V1 to safely stop the aircraft...your totaly full of boloney. It's just that simple.

Why the FAA doesn't deal with this is a chronic problem is probably why they didn't deal with SouthWest. All they have to do is go sit at the airport with a cup of coffee, watch airplanes take off, and take down some N numbers.

737jock...BS numbers means you put in 100,000 lbs instead of 120,000 lbs to make balanced field...you put in 75 degrees instead of 96...to make balanced field, you put everyone at 170 lbs, instead of 250 because your carrying the Dallas Cowboys that day...I know it's a pain to take reduced fuel, fly higher, back off on the power..so lazy pilots don't do it...pros do.

Given your numbers...if you have V1 at 60% on a ten thousand foot field, and accelerated 3000 more thousand feet to 90% (9000 feet) to VR...so you rotate with only 1000 feet left. Uh huh. So if you blow a tire, lose and engine at 8000 ft, you won't accelerate to VR without hitting the fence, and you won't climb...you just killed everyone on board. Who got schooled that day? The passengers...

Then V1 to VR is 3000 feet?...your kidding right? Are you out of Machu Pichu, with one engine and flat tires?

737jock.....feel free to post your balanced field numbers right here and try to explain how you have legal safe numbers rotatiing with a thousand feet left in your airliner..we are all ears...

The fact is you won't...and futhermore you won't be able to come up with VR runway lengths...feel free to ask me how I know this.

Back to the thread....737jock, just passed out at the 100kt callout...the FO looks over...737jock is out cold, FO look forward and sees 1000 feet of runway ahead...yeah, he's going...and let's hope Jesus is there to make sure that the FO doesn't have a blown tire or engine problem..

[Screwballs]

ssg, what are you talking about putting in BS numbers? Who, when, where, why and how please so I can never fly with them and advise everyone I know not to fly with them.

As for your last example, I'd love to know an airline that flies a 73/A32X that calls 80/100 with 1000 feet of runway to go. Because the above would again apply.

Another sensible post and you're going on the ignore list! ;)

Screwballs

[potkettleblack]

Maybe its different in the G4 world of small corporate jets. Perhaps you just stand em up and go for it on each runway. But here in Europe its balanced field all the way. Nice long runways such as in places like Madrid have high V speeds. Go into somewhere tight with a 70t jet and the numbers get smaller. Using the least amount of thrust keeps the shareholders happy and hopefully the engines going for longer. It also keeps the tree huggers happy with a lower noise footprint and climb performance is greatly improved. Now how much tarmac we chew up after V1 to get to VR I have no idea. Why don't you get your calculator out and see what you come up with. Point is V1 is stop or go time. After that your committed to getting airborne.

[ssg]

Hand Solo : The Concorde was grossly over weight. The program is done and that's why.

Rjay: Your decision speeds are based on runway length and ability to clear obsticles. I can't speak for your ops, but if you burn up 9000 ft on a 10,000 ft runway to get to VR, something is rotten in Denmark

Ashling: Always nice to have surplus runway, and opens up the conversation for stopping an aircraft after a V1 go,...if on fire...ect...but that's another thread.

Screwballs: there isn't any point of view, you go or you don't. I didn't mention callouts at 1000ft left, but VR. Read the post.

737jock: If your in an airliner and need 9000ft of a 10000 ft runway to hit VR...something is wrong in Denmark...get a new calculator

ExCargo: If you got enough power, to use reduced power for the given runway...terrific...but again...I don't think you will be rotating at the last thousand feet of runway.

Soundbarrier: Nice job...you made my point for me....

D&M: "I'd never reject" .....wow.....you do this for a living?

Interesting thread...

SSG...over and out......

[Empty Cruise]

Call 1: "Eighty"

Call 2: "Ninety"

If no response - STOP! (or "abandon" as my not-for-much-longer current lot prefers).

That should mean that the stop is initiated at no more than 100 kt. - and I sure hope that none of our FO's get through the training system without being able to acomplish this safely.

Look at it this way - if they cannot manage a stop from 100 kt. - what do you think their chances are on a single-pilot circuit? Or a diversion, for the matter? Or surviving another bad decision they make while on their own?

Even if we do a 40-kt overrun, we'll in all likelihood all walk away from it (with the captain being the only possible exception to that rule).

If everybody is so worried about FOs handling a 100-kt.-abort, we shouldn't confuse these poor, feeble individuals :ugh::ugh::ugh: any further and simply stay the party line: "Follow your operators SOPs".

Sometimes I really wonder...

[helen-damnation]

So if you guys are trying to convince me that an airliner that burns up 90% of runway to rotate, would have had enough runway at V1 to safely stop the aircraft...your totaly full of boloney. It's just that simple.

ssg,

You need to re-think that :hmm:

V1 is the speed at which the calculations allow for you to reject and stop in the remaining distance.

Vr is not always the same as V1. It's the speed at which you rotate.

Next time you see a heavy take off, remember that there can be 30 kts difference between the V1 and Vr, especially somewhere like JNB with an elevation of 5000+ feet.

Your decision speeds are based on runway length and ability to clear obsticles. I can't speak for your ops, but if you burn up 9000 ft on a 10,000 ft runway to get to VR, something is rotten in Denmark

A heavy 747/340 etc will often not rotate until the last 1000 feet, especially in high/hot operations. If you use Flex/Derate, you could easily use this much runway (provided the V1 gives you sufficient space to stop :eek:) as the reduced thrust will use the extra distance to attain Vr.

To my limited knowledge, no 4 or 3 engine aircraft is certified below 1,500 feet with 2 engines out. They will only give you figures from 1,500' with a clean aircraft.

[Ashling]

You beat me to it helen. No 4 engined aircraft is certified to survive a loss of thrust on 2 engines during take off.

Some thread creep I'm afraid but SSG is annoying me somewhat by stating things as fact when they are not so clear cut.

Re the Concorde crash my understanding is that there is evidence the aircraft was about 1 tonne over structural MTOW (due to loading extra taxi fuel and some bags that the crew did not know about). Illegal but not an outrageous risk in itself and certainly not grossly overweight. Plus the crew were unaware that some of that weight was on board. What changed was the wind from calm to 8 tail which put them about 6 tonnes over RTOW. The crew did not pick up on this for some reason. The loading of fuel and bags may also have been suspect and may have put the C of G too far aft.

There is also evidence that a spacer was not fitted to the gear causing it to lose tracking when the tyre burst and cause the aircraft to veer and possably hit a runway light which may have contributed to the failure of the second engine.

The crew were forced to rotate well below VR and never made it to V2 due to the loss of 2 engines, the tailwind and the poor tracking caused by the missing spacer.

Even with the weight if they'd just lost the one engine they would probably have got away with it, sadly they lost 2 and some evidence suggests that was because of the missing spacer causing poor tracking after the tyre burst restricting accelaration and causing them to hit a runway light that may have caused/contributed to the second engine failing. If they had been at the correct weight for the conditions that failure on the second engine would still have downed them so my view would be the spacer (or whatever else led to the loss of the second engine) was the more critical secondary factor not the weight. The main factor remains that damned metal strip that caused the original tyre burst.

So SSG carefull when you say it was down to the aircraft being overweight as if that is a fact especially as much of the above is speculation to a greater or lesser extent.

[Screwballs]

Back to the thread....737jock, just passed out at the 100kt callout...the FO looks over...737jock is out cold, FO look forward and sees 1000 feet of runway ahead...yeah, he's going...and let's hope Jesus is there to make sure that the FO doesn't have a blown tire or engine problem..

I have re-read it. Where did you mention VR? Simple answer please, as in based on fact, logic, reasoning.

[SIDSTAR]

In our outfit the FOs carry out an RTO during each sim check. Due to only Capts handling the thrust levers on takeoff, it's always based on Capt incapacitation (not necessarily obviously slumped over the controls) to simulate a realistic scenario that just might happen in the real world. Strangely, the FOs don't appear to have any difficulty in closing the TLs, selecting reverse and stopping the a/c. Probably because they're good professional pilots.

[parabellum]

The split between V1 and Vr on a heavy B744 out of, say, Singapore on a hot humid night will be in the order of 27 knots. (V1 153kts Vr 180kts. Flaps 20). I'll leave the mathematicians to work out the distance covered between V1 and Vr, suffice to say I could see the end of the runway very clearly at rotation!

[411A]

What would a typical V1 speed be on the L-1011?

Depends on the takeoff flap setting.
At max weight, from a sea level airport, flaps 10, 157 knots.
At JNB, flaps 4, 168.
The latter for a -500 model, which has very powerful brakes., best if auto-brakes selected.

[warmkiter]

hi empty Cruise

from what kind of a company do you guys come from, if you think that an F/O should always go for STOP because he cant fly the plane? If the guy next to you has a valid licence he should be able to do a circuit by him self.:ugh:

Or if he gets another malfunction on the top. None of the scenarious trained, exept two engines out on a 3 or 4 engine A/C are considering double malfunctions as mandatory in a syllabus. So why the heck should it happen now. Ofcourse the remaining RWY is sufficient for STOP before V1, but getting close to it this option is fading fast.

I would consider following items relevant for a GO/STOP decision

1. Are controls free, the CM1 not blocking them
2. Stopmargin

Tendency in low speed would be STOP but if the situation is not clear, because speed increases rapidly, a GO will become more lucrative.

just my thoughts

L

[Empty Cruise]

Hi Warmkiter,

We normally operate with V1s in the region of 130-145 kts. - so a stop initiated at 100 kts is really childs play.

I have absolute confidence that our FOs can handle both a "stop" and a "go"-decision - I just protested against those who seemed to imply that they would be pressed to handle a 100-kt. stop ;) I've yet to see an FO bungle one of those in the sim.

In my mind, the only question is which is safer - stop or go? I sense that over the last couple of years the industry has gone from go-minded to stop-averse, and that's not necessarily a healthy development.

Some situations clearly dictate a stop - some clearly dictate a go - and some fall in the gray area in between. An incap verified passing 100 kts. clearly falls in the latter area - but in my mind, the stop side of the coin comes up every time on this one.

From a TEM point of view - the longer one of us operates single-pilot, the greater the chance of problems. A stop requires you to close the TLs, disengage the AT, deploy the reversers and monitor the autobrake. So 4 actions to be acomplished within 5 seconds vs. 100-odd actions to be taken over 15 min. in a return scenario... The thing is that even if the FO bungles the stop, we only run over at 60-odd knots and have the cabin-crew to direct an evac from the smouldering wreckage - whereas if he/she bungles the return, we end up as a LOC/CFIT statistic, and ATC and the CC are but helpless spectators.

There is a difference between being go-minded and stop-averse - and this is one such case.

Best,
Empty

PS Edited to tell you that present lot try to tell us all that we're overpaid bus drivers and try to create so many procedures that there is a procedure for everything. Thinking is dangerous and must be discouraged at any cost. However, a good training department tries to counter that, and succeed in doing so. AO'S - I salute thee :ok: So - that kind of airline!

[Happydays]

What a bargain, Take off ! kick the captain out of his seat and you will get to be captain for a flight !

[A-Z]

In my previous company we routinely trained PF incapacitation at 80kts, and just before V1, and what a useful exercise it was too. It taught me to consider (before line up) what my actions would be at each case, based on the prevailing conditions and terrain. After much thought I now find that my usual thought process leads me to conclude that up to and including no response at 80kt and then louder at 90kt (including verification glance), I’ll smartly STOP.

Between there and V1 I tend to conclude it would be better to go for a little flight, get a hostie to read me the landing checks as per their training, and make a nice landing with an ambulance in attendance. HOWEVER, if the departure is a particularly challenging one with close mountains and very bad weather etc, I tend to be very stop minded indeed, and the briefing will reflect this.

Great posts* by the way, it certainly doesn’t hurt to be made to think about it.

*(With probably one exception, and by the way “over and out” isn’t correct RT either - you know who you are.)

[ssg]

737

Yes the planes are certified for these events...engine out, TR deployments, ect ect...but you knew that right?

A pilot that just throws the levers forward and waits for V1 and VR without looking outside to see how much runway he's burning up in the process should be serving tacos somewhere...

What if your flaps are set wrong, pitot tube blockage, flat tire on take off, engine doesn't produce enough thrust, TR deployment, Spoilers accidentaly deployed...whatever...all will increase runway distance....so if your just looking at your AS indicator with a flat tire, waiting for V1, not looking outside...your gonna crash....

Eitherway, I don't think every scenario is on the checklist or SOPS manual either...so that requires a pilot to look outside once in a while and say 'gee whiz we aren't at V1 yet and 85% of the runway is behind us....hmmmm"

But hey...what do I know? :)

I can't tell you how many pilots never got to V1/VR having crashed at the end of the runway because they had a locked brake solonoid, flat tire, engine wasn't generating power, fuel issues...on and on..but they just kept looking at the AS indicator. How about the guys that put it in to the Potomic? Slats in, but they just kept going...never got off the ground...flew it to the fence, pulled up, crashed....

The concept that you run the numbers, then fly it to the fence, then pull up, should get atleast a couple of people in here wondering if that makes sense. Hope springs eternal.

You seem to miss the concept that the V speeds are based initialy on runway length...your at a particular speed at a particualar place on the runway...hence should you abort, at that particular speed at that particular place on the runway, then you have enough runway to stop, from that particular place and given speed to stop before the end of the runway, if the numbers are correct.

You understand that right? Your V speeds are related to your position on the runway?

So if your at V1 and burned up 85% of the runway, you see that as a problem right? You get that right?

So when I see an airliner burning up 90% of the runway to get to VR. I know he didn't have the right numbers. Given on normal days, V1 and VR are pretty close to each other, I know you cant stop an airliner in 1500 feet at 125kts, even with super pilot at the wheel.

737...if your just sitting there waiting for the airspeed to tell you what you want to hear, regardless of where you acutaly should be on the runway, then you will have an accident. But hey...Taco Bell is hiring!

The fact is...737...if your not looking outside to see how much runway your burning up to get a read on whether the plane is performing, that you are in the right place at the right time....I honestly doubt you will catch you capt between V1 and VR having a silent stroke....this thread is moot for you...

Am I the only one in here that undestands the 60/40 rule and what it means?

[Empty Cruise]

...thought we were on the subject of an abort well below V1... or is poor old Empty missing something here???

No-one seems to disagree on what kind of % runway length should be consumed to reach V1 and Vr respectively. And yes, with de-rate & everything, we normally rotate within the first 65% of TODA on a runway limited departure.

The q still is - do people think it's wise to stop or to go when the incap has been confirmed at V1-30?

[ssg]

Ah the voice of reason.....

[helen-damnation]

ssg,

So if your at V1 and burned up 85% of the runway, you see that as a problem right? Yes :).

So when I see an airliner burning up 90% of the runway to get to VR. I know he didn't have the right numbers. NO :ugh: :=

These are 2 very different things. Have you ever flown a heavy? I see your profile shows you're on the G-IV. Twins usually get airborne earlier than the tri/quad engine aircraft but not always. Look it up!

As for the stop/go - every time is different with too many variables to list, but here are some (in no particular order):-
Day/Night, Dry/Wet/Contaminated, Calm/X-wind, Alert/Tired, Circadian time, Experince total, Time on type, Training, Company policy, SOP, Area weather (CB's), Local terrain, Area familiarity, Control restriction/obstruction, 2 crew/Flt Engineer or augmented, Shock etc, etc.

[bucket_and_spade]

A pilot that just throws the levers forward and waits for V1 and VR without looking outside to see how much runway he's burning up in the process should be serving tacos somewhere...


PF's looking out, PM's looking in.

What if your flaps are set wrong, pitot tube blockage, flat tire on take off, engine doesn't produce enough thrust, TR deployment, Spoilers accidentaly deployed...whatever...all will increase runway distance....so if your just looking at your AS indicator with a flat tire, waiting for V1, not looking outside...your gonna crash....


PF's looking out, PM's looking in.

Flaps? Config warning sounds and why there's a pre-takeoff checklist. Blockage? One reason for the airspeed callout on TO. Not enough thrust? PM will notice. TR/spoilers? PM notices, config warning sounds. Tyre burst? Actions covered in the takeoff brief.

So when I see an airliner burning up 90% of the runway to get to VR. I know he didn't have the right numbers.


You can't know the numbers were bad. The situation you describe is perfectly possible. In these cases, V1 will be less than Vr.

The fact is...737...if your not looking outside to see how much runway your burning up to get a read on whether the plane is performing, that you are in the right place at the right time....I honestly doubt you will catch you capt between V1 and VR having a silent stroke....this thread is moot for you...


Someone is looking outside and both pilots are monitoring performance.

Am I the only one in here that undestands the 60/40 rule and what it means?

Haven't come across that. Or if I have, it's by a different name.

Rgds,

B&S

[john_tullamarine]

I think that we could be a little more reserved in the discussion, folks ... no need to get hot under the collar ..

[st nicholas]

Above 80 knots and prior to V1, the takeoff should be rejected for any of the
following:
• fire or fire warning
• engine failure
• predictive windshear warning
• if the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly.

from 737 QRH.

controls free and safe -continue if not and before V1 -stop

[ssg]

You got me Helen....I don't fly for the airlines....Dual Rated, 10,600 hours and 7 type ratings wasn't enough to convince the chief pilot of Alaska Airlines,(two months ago) that I could be an airline pilot....I remember him asking me this right off..

'Why now?' and the HR lady saying....'What would you do if you were offered a better job?....that's how the interview went for about an hour....

But hey I guess the good news is...they liked my resume, the line pilots interview went good, the hotel was nice, and I passed all the psyche quizes....

Sorry for the thread creep...but I think what posters in here are trying to convince me of is this very simple concept.

Airliners burn up 65-75% of the runway to get to V1, and it might take another 3-4000ft to accelerate to VR with a thousand ft to go...

So be it...but honestly guys, accelerating another 3000+ ft trying to get to VR(were going no matter what!!!), with the fence coming up, knowing that I could suck a bird, blow a tire, and just not make it, doesn't seem like a safe way to spend the next 30 years of my life....

Call me silly....

[A-Z]

With the correct numbers, if you call stop before the V1 call you will definitely stop.

If you call continue after V1 and you ingest a pheasant into number four, as long as the FADECS or you ensure that flex thrust goes to max, you'll make it.

Keep using the correct figures, and all 30 years on a heavy will be safe.

[Ashling]

If you useing assumed temp/flex you do not need to go to full power to mack it. You may well feel its a good move and I wouldn't disagree but the numbers assume you leave the thrust levers were they are.

If you've used a fixed derate (ie go into the FMC and derate the engines from 22k to 20k of thrust) and then flex on top of that then I think you can run into snags with VMCG if you go to max chat. I'm not 100% on that as we don't do it but dim and distant and all that.

While the discussion started off around the 80kt call there is no reason why the Capt might not fall over with a heart rending plea for help just prior to V1 so its as well to think about the high speed case too.

[helen-damnation]

ssg,
Nothing wrong with not being in the bigger iron, sorry it didn't work out for you so far (keep trying?).

could suck a bird, blow a tire, and just not make it, doesn't seem like a safe way to spend the next 30 years of my life....


Life is risk management. A tire or a bird by themselves shouldn't cause the carnage you seem to worry about.

Back to the thread..........

[BraceBrace]

If you have pilot incapacitation high speed rejects should not pose a problem because you're not going high speed. 80kts is a first check. If there is no response, you are in your mind already stop minded. If he doesn't answer your second inquiry (100kts ie), you stop. In most aircraft you are even below Vmc at this point. 1...2 seconds reaction time gives an extra 7-8kts acceleration. Let's say 110kts max at the point of reject. On the 737 Vmc is around 110kts. This means you're at the edge of its "controlled flight" envelope, and since you were stop-minded from the very first 80kts call, in most cases you will not even be at 110 upon initiation of the reject. Stopping at this point should not pose any problem at all. You are FAR FAR away from a high speed reject which, I agree, isn't the most fun thing to do with an airliner.

At high speeds it's designed to fly, you are go minded, at low speeds it cannot even control it on the runway if you were to continue and have an engine failure. There is indeed the "grey" area in between low and high speeds, but that's why the 80kts check IS a pilot incapacitation check as well, to PREVENT you go into the grey zone. So simply be ready for it.

SSG, V-speeds are not all based on runway numbers. Vr and V2 are weight based and because V1 cannot be greater than Vr, it is in a lot of cases weight based as well. It's not because you have a balanced takeoff performance, you're using all the runway available. It fits "into" the runway, yes, but you'll have extra room. If the runway in it's current state doesn't fit, you need to change something (bleeds off, higher flap setting, another runway for better wind conditions or longer length,...). V1 is something you can play around with, and runway length can be a factor.

There are some exceptions, ie improved takeoff where you use as much runway as possible (keeping in mind tire limits etc) to have a better climb performance when you are ie obstacle limited. It's the only case where I don't like the V1 numbers (sometimes very high on long runways), but I trust a very high speed reject can be done. With all the consequences: hot melting tires, probably a fire, maybe you block the runway, maybe you end up in the grass because life is not perfect (or the water). I've talked to people who have rejected takeoffs, and they all say: "the braking is hell, nothing you've ever experienced before". And RTO tests were performed with degraded brakes during testing, so in the end I presume it will work although some V1 values don't really give me a comfortable feeling.

Wet or contaminated runways? Well, V1 is reduced as well, and on contaminated runways pretty much based on Vmc. Things can be tricky because controllability is an issue for every speed. But 100kts is still a reject because it's below Vmc. You really need to be prepared for it in these cases.

Cheerz...

Ps: the 60/40 rule is a guideline for small single engine props where you simply have no decisions speeds. If you encounter a problem before using 60% of the runway, stop. Don't try to stop a little prop on less than 40% of the runway available. Funny someone claims a "PPL-we-have-no-rule-for-it-so-use-this-guideline" to be used on commercial jets as a governing rule...

ps2: heavies are usually runway or even "braking" limited, but the story remains the same: pilot incapacitation and high speed rejects should not come together. Either you reject low speed, or next calls are V1 and Vr, and it's a go anyway if he doesn't respond.

[ford cortina]

Thought about this last night, I was flying out and the Capt back. I fly a 738. So we get to 80kts, he calls, our SOP's require I look inside call 'Cross Checked' then back to the action, still below 90kts, even with a light load. If there is no response pnf has time to call 100kts, and still has time to reject quite safely. no drama, same on the return leg, fully loaded, no problems stopping if needed.
As to using up 75% of the runway, sorry not sure where that comes from, we don't.

[ssg]

Brace - Its all about putting the plane in the particular place on runway, at a particular speed...to either stop, or go...

If you find yourself at 75% of the runway, still chasing V1...remember this thread...

Something to read...

-----------------------------

LEXINGTON, Kentucky (CNN) -- Why would an experienced pilot take off on a runway too short to accommodate his commercial jet -- rather than the longer one he told air traffic controllers he planned to use?

That's one of the questions federal investigators are trying to answer Monday as they dig into the data on Comair Flight 5191, which crashed Sunday morning about half a mile past the end of a runway at the Lexington airport, killing 49 of the 50 people onboard.

The Delta Air Lines commuter flight to Atlanta, Georgia, had been cleared to take off from the 7,000-foot Runway 22 at Lexington's Blue Grass Airport, said Debbie Hersman, a member of the National Transportation Safety Board. (Watch the NTSB describe the evidence found -- 1:27)

Based on the cockpit voice recorder and tapes from the control tower, "there were planning discussions, both by the air traffic controllers and the crew, conversations with each other, about using Runway 22 for departure," Hersman told CNN on Monday.

"We do know from the information that we have obtained on scene, gathered evidence, documentation and from the flight data recorder, that the runway that the crew used was Runway 26," which is about half as long as Runway 22.

Hersman would not say whether the Canadian-built Bombardier CRJ-100 would have been able to take off successfully from a 3,500-foot runway. (Watch the results of an early NTSB review -- 3:27)

But former NTSB Vice Chairman Bob Francis said that the twin-engine jet would have needed about 5,000 feet of runway for a successful takeoff.

"It sounds like it got barely airborne and came back down, but there isn't really enough evidence yet to draw that conclusion," Francis said. "I can speculate; they cannot."

The Associated Press reported that the short runway had less lighting than the one the plane should have used, and severely cracked concrete -- not the type of surface typically found on runways for commercial routes.

Hersman said the NTSB probe will look at recent construction work at the Lexington airport, the lighting and the markings on the taxiways and runways.

Investigators also will study what went on in the tower, how many controllers were on duty and whether they saw Flight 5191 head down the wrong runway.

It's rare for a plane to get on the wrong runway, but "sometimes with the intersecting runways, pilots go down the wrong one," St. Louis University aerospace professor emeritus Paul Czysz told the AP.

The sole survivor of the crash, first officer James Polehinke, was in critical condition at a Lexington hospital, and was not able to be interviewed at this point, Hersman said.

The plane was carrying 47 passengers and three crew members. One of the passengers was an off-duty crew member sitting in the plane's jump seat, Blue Grass Airport Director Michael Gobb said. (Honeymooners among victims)

------------------------

Enough Said.....

[Old Fella]

The original question. What will the F/O do if he gets no response to an 80 Kt and 100 Kt call when he is the PNF. Seems pretty darn simple to me, regardless of what the company SOP says regarding who can call for an ABORT. Any Company which dictates that only the Captain may command an ABORT and that he must conduct the ABORT, would surely do so on the assumption that the Captain is not incapacitated. What any F/O should be aware of is that his/her backside is as precious as any other on the aircraft and if he/she determines that the handling pilot has become incapacitated then he/she has no option but to assume command. That is why there are two pilots, each qualified to fly the aircraft. All the rest of the myriad of postings are academic. Obviously, if the handling pilot becomes incapacitated well below V1, as I would believe the original question indicates, the F/O should ABORT. If above V1, GO. Any pilot who thinks otherwise should think seriously about another career path.

[BraceBrace]

Even if you want to go into this case, you don't know the reason why they used that runway, or what they saw and experienced, when they realised something was wrong.

737, between 80 and V1, you only stop for any fire or smoke, engine failure, predictive windshear or aircraft unable to fly. Here you have to consider the last item, this would depend on your speed primarily as stated before. Low speed it's better to stop, high speed you better continue. If I were to be at 85%, not knowing if I'm going to make it but in the high speed region, I would still continue (firewall the engines if necessary). Because this would be an indication my performance calculations were wrong, making my V1 doubtfull as well. If I'm high speed, I should be pretty close to the flying envelope. And probably far away from the required stopping distance as well. If I would be around 80-100kts, yes I would stop. Both cases will take some sweat though... but I don't see why you should doubt current airline procedures.

There are plenty of other situations where you need to decide quickly and most airlines train the pilots to slowly become go-minded above 80kts, and the higher the speed, the more go-minded you should be. All because the airplane will fly even at speeds slightly lower than Vr/V2, and is hard to stop. This training does not rule out the stop option at low speeds. A nice example is the pilot incapacitation check at 80kts (to stay on-topic).

In the past there were a lot more RTO's that went wrong, than cases like the one you mentioned. Don't make the past come back please.

[Screwballs]

SSG, because I'm polite I won't say what every is thinking about you. What if they used the wrong runway? What if they input the BS figures you're so keen on? What if they burst a tire, lack of thrust, etc etc?

Here in the professional world, we work with the facts. Not making stuff up and then just crossing our fingers hoping it all works out - which seems to resemble a take-off roll on your G4.

[Jetjock330]

So if no communication, challenge and response by 100kts:

In A340-600 at 380 tons, the F/O will take control and stop by 100kts. The problem getting airborne and flying it around again and dumping 115 tons. MLW 265 tons The complications gather at a rapid rate of knots once airborne and even then, the incapacitated pilots needs urgent medical attention.

However, at 380 tons, there would be a double crew (leg distance is ULR), but the other captain from crew B, sitting in first observers seat, (an Airbus term) is not at the controls and I am sure he would also tell the F/O to stop by 100 kts. Autobrake is working so don't touch the brake, unless autobrake is not working. Reverse thrust is not considered for rejected take-off anyway, incase the engine had failed and was the reason for the rejection. The F/O is welcome to use what he needs and what he has at his diposal, but thrust reducton is a must, in line with directional control.

The rest will be history and remember "PARK BRAKE SET", otherwise nothing like doing 15 kts in cirlces while you're trying to pay attention to other things in the cockpit. Work load has to be at it's highest form on this one, for a single crew.

[Flagon]

I think overall it best in any aeroplane to stop in that situation at that sort of speed.

It is, of course, possible SSG does not ACTUALLY fly, let alone fly a GIV, and even if he/she does, then presumably has never been onto a short strip where less than 1000' to go is not unusual with the nosewheel still on the ground.:mad:

[sudden Winds]

what´s so hard about this scenario...
u call 80 kts..or let´s say 100..no reply....call it out loud...100 kts still no response? grab the throttles before those already 115 kts become 135. bring them back and then continue the takeoff rejection depending on the a/c u fly...is there any doubt about this?

[SNS3Guppy]

We routinely see red lights at the end of the runway on takeoff. Late in the takeoff, I'm not sure that I want to be attempting to get stopped while looking at the red lights. whatever lays beyond them isn't in my favor, though returning to land with the full runway ahead of me certainly is.

Can I fly it around and get it landed by myself? Without question. There's no question I'd much rather do that, than attempt to do a high speed rejected takeoff.

The original question involves an incapacitation at 80 or 100 knots. We generally brief such that any problem up to 80 knots merits the rejected takeoff. After that, it's controllability issues or clear safety of flight issues; the other pilot incapacitated isn't one we brief, or one I'd consider necessarily significant enough to perform a high speed reject. Does the other pilot being unavailable preclude the airplane getting into the air or affect directional control? No. We're probably going flying.

When asking if the takeoff should be rejected at that point for an incapacitated pilot, one may be asking the wrong question. Perhaps a better question is who is going to take the airplane into the air. If the other pilot is truly incapacitated, then clearly the takeoff (and subsequent return for landing) will be performed by the one who isn't incapacitated. However, if it's a matter of a full-functioning pilot who didn't hear the challenge, or wasn't heard (I've had ICS failure at that inopportune time...we were both talking, yelling even, but couldn't hear each other over the increadibly loud radial engines)...book says if no response the second time, take control. Nobody was incapacitated. Just deaf.

High speed rejected takeoffs present a multitude of hazards, often far less than continuing the takeoff.

Simply because the performance data says the airplane can be stopped aproaching V1 doesn't mean that one should without just cause; an aircraft under control and accelerating properly is not necessarily just cause to reject the takeoff.

[ssg]

I guess these guys thought they had the numbers too...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wj8UPEfO1Oo

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHqz43Z2Ry4&feature=related

[Flagon]

Try reading the original question - and then post

[ssg]

Here are some more examples of pilots not looking outside who also did thier 'numbers'

At least 75 people were killed in an April 26 Indian Airlines crash that occurred near Aurangabad in western India when the pilot failed to get an overloaded Boeing 737 into the air and hit a truck loaded with bales of cotton.

20 MAR 2004 UTA B727 crash possibly caused by overloading [to table of contents]
Preliminary investigation results indicate that the UTA Boeing 727 that crashed on takeoff from Cotonou, Benin last year may have been caused by overloading. The plane was carrying about 10 tonnes of excess cargo and the weight was badly distributed. (BBC)

--------------------

The Point: The captain is out, the FO is trying to take over, and he see's 1000 feet of runway left...ect ect ect....

Personaly I see three major points that came out of this thread...

- There seems to be a total lack of understanding on how much runway a plane should use up getting to thier V speeds.

- There seems to be major disagreement on what an FO should do when the Capt is out.

- And probably most disturbing...many posters in here, seem to have an aversion to a high speed take off rejection, regardless of the numbers, and will just go...

Anyway...it's all educational....I will take the bus on my next trip....:)

[SNS3Guppy]

Ssg,

After reading your posts throughout this thread, I see your name by a post and it only brings question marks. Put down the helium, man, and come back to earth.

If an aircraft is ten tonnes overweight, then the performance numbers for that aircraft aren't valid. Neither are the stopping parameters, distances, or even the brake energy potential. Taking off that overweight is a train wreck already in motion, whether the aircraft gets off the ground or not. It's an idiotic argument.

One might debate the merits of lighting the airplane on fire and then attempting to takeoff, departing with spoilers deployed, flat tires, or any other wild scenario.

Yes, one needs to be aware of one's stopping distance, but when one throws the numbers so far out as to make them entirely meaningless (ten tonnes over may not fly, but may not be stoppable, either...the flight is doomed regardless of what they do), then all bets are off.

This is entirely meaningless in the face of the present topic; pilot incapacitation in a multi-pilot crew. You've come up with illuminating, but entirely irrelevant examples of departing the wrong runway using a crew that isn't incapacitated, and departing grossly overweight with a crew that isn't incapacitated to help address the topic of rejecting a takeoff for a crewmember incapacitation? Exactly why?

The Comair example used an airplane which departed an unlighted runway which was too short, for which they were not cleared, and which wasn't even parallel with or aligned with the cleared runway; numerous mistakes made before ever pushing up the thrust levers. Same for the Cotonou mishap.

Your assertion here is that the crew should be keeping track of their progress down the runway and make a decision to reject based on the percentage of the runway flow. You've even introduced a Part 135 guideline to emphasize the point. No doubt events such as the infamous Air Florida trip into the Potomac River wouldn't have occured if the crew had been better aware of their progress on the runway and acted accordingly. Are you suggesting that at the moment of pilot incapacitation the monitoring pilot evaluate the remaining runway and make a decision based on his evaluation on the fly to either continue or reject?

This is established before departure. Crews know and understand that high speed rejected takeoffs have a very high potential to end badly. During a high speed rejected takeoff, much, if not most of the runway is behind. Continuing the takeoff, especially when the aircraft is functioning well and has the performance and capability to do so, makes a lot of sense...particularly when returning to land will magically put the entire runway in front of the airplane for stopping distance.

Throw out all sorts of wild and irrelevant scenarios if you like...these only serve to cloud the topic under discussion, which is rejecting a takeoff for an incapacitated pilot. Departing unlighted, closed, wrong runways in the dark, taking off grossly overweight, or any other irrelevant example doesn't help address the question at hand, and it's really starting to make you sound rather foolish. Let's try to keep on track.

There seems to be a total lack of understanding on how much runway a plane should use up getting to thier V speeds.


Our performance calculation system, the ONLY data we are authorized to use, does not provide distance information to V1, and doesn't even tell us what the distance is to stop from V1 or go...what it does do is tell us what distance will be remaining if we elect to reject. Even if the data we have popped out a number that told us at V1 we had 63.3% of the runway behind, there just isn't any data alongside the runway (say, a big square black sign with a white border that says "63.3%) on it to use...nor would we be authorized to use it, nor does Boeing provide it, nor does Part 121 authorize it, nor does...anybody use it.

We see red lights during a normal takeoff, regularly. Aversion to high-speed rejected takeoff? You bet. You should educate yourself a little on the subject, but suffice it to say, a high speed reject is a risky endevor. As the size of the aircraft increases and along with it the mass, reduced stopping power, and rapidly rising brake temperatures and reduced stopping ability, control ability, etc...high speed rejects are far more risky than simply going airborne and coming back to put the entire runway ahead of you...with the situation under control and planned in advance.

[Junkflyer]

Our fo's are trained to take over to make decisions and fly the a/c in case of emergency. If an fo can not be trusted to take off, dump fuel in emergency and then return, perhaps he shouldn't be in the seat.

[ssg]

Congo plane crashes at end of runway; 85 aboard
Charles Ntirycha / Associated Press
GOMA, Congo -- A Congolese jetliner carrying around 85 people failed to take off Tuesday from an airport in this eastern town, crashing at high speed into a busy market neighborhood at the end of the runway, officials said.

Government officials initially said there were only six known survivors but later in the day an airline official said 60 people had survived. Local officials said dozens of bodies were pulled from the wreckage, though it was unclear if they had been passengers.

Smoke and flames engulfed the charred ruins of the aircraft, which appeared to have broken in two when it slammed into the rooftops of about 10 cement homes just outside the airport, destroying them instantly. Soldiers kept onlookers away after U.N. peacekeepers helped douse flames at the crash site.

"Smoke was rising from the plane," said Christian Kilundu, a spokesman for the Goma office of World Vision, an international aid group that has an office less than half a mile from the crash site. "As fire extinguishers were trying to put out the flames, I spoke to a priest who had been pulled from the wreckage. He was disorientated and had no idea what had happened."

Officials said they had no information on casualties among residents of the area.

The plane was operated by the private Congolese company, Hewa Bora, and was headed to the central city of Kisangani, then the capital, Kinshasa. Hewa Bora's Dirk Cramers said 53 passengers and seven crew were taken from the site and were at local hospitals.

Julien Mpaluku, the governor of the province, said there were 79 passengers on board and six crew members.

"We have already picked up many bodies -- dozens of bodies. There are a lot of flames, which makes it difficult to know if the bodies we are picking up are those of passengers of the plane or else passers-by or people that lived in the area where the plane crashed," Mpaluku said.

Employees at World Vision said the plane "failed to leave the ground," plowing instead "through wooden houses and shops in the highly populated Birere market."

The plane appeared to have been "totally flattened" by the impact, said Rachel Wolff, a U.S.-based spokeswoman for the organization who has been in contact with her colleagues in Congo.

World Vision employees who visited the scene of the crash said they saw at least eight bodies. Hours afterward, the market stalls where women had been selling their wares earlier in the day were still in flames, said Wolff.

A former pilot who survived the crash, Dunia Sindani, gave a similar account in an interview broadcast over a local U.N. radio station. The plane suffered a problem in one of its wheels -- possibly a flat tire -- and did not gain the strength to lift off, Sindani said.

-------

Just fly it to the fence and go...right guys....

[p_bakes]

I'm a long time reader of pprune and rarely get as tempted to post as this thread has made me, so I gave in.

SSG, it is obvious from your rantings that the only experience of operating big jets is that which you have gained from watching them take off from your own flight deck, or spotters fence.

I will confess to not knowing much about Gulfstreams, but I will hazard a guess that they are overpowered for their size, hence have reasonable acceleration even at high weights, and if operated from long runways will have not very many knots between V1 and VR. Well the larger jets operate differently, and you need to just accept this as fact!

There is no problem in rotating towards the end of a runway. The fact you seem to be missing (or deliberately ignoring) is that V1 could/would have been passed a long distance prior to the aircraft rotating. Therefore your points about the aircraft not having room to stop are irrelevant as a reject would not be attempted at this point unless the crew like going cross country on the deck!

Also, I'm wondering how the second youtube link you posted is in any way an example to prove your point? :ugh::ugh:

This talk of flying to the fence and pulling back the stick is pure nonsense. If you have that little faith in how the larger jets are operated I am inclined to think you are not a pilot at all.

Back to the topic, I have been flying single aisle Airbus for nearly 2 years, so as an FO feel qualified to comment on what I would do in such a scenario.

If after a second, loud, speed callout there was no reponse, and we were on a short runway, V1 being close (time wise) to our standard 100kts call due to quick acceleration, then I would definitely continue. Assuming CAT1 or better weather then a quick radar vectored circuit would give time for the cabin crew to aid the Captain, the paramedics to be called to a stand, the situation to be thought through, and a nice long runway ahead of me. Another important consideration is that after a high speed abort on a short runway, the brakes will be very hot. Fuse plugs could melt etc and being stranded on the runway will just increase the amount of time it takes to get medical treatment to the capt. If an evacuation is required due to a brake fire then getting a heavy captain out of his/her seat in a hurry is not a task I would relish!

If, however, I was on a ridiculously long runway, Munich for example, where a typical V1 would be in the 140-150 region even at max flex, then by the time incap had been diagnosed the speed would still be way below V1 with maybe 2/3's of the runway remaining. In this case an RTO would not cook the brakes too badly, assuming I would have the awareness to disconnect the autobrakes and reduce the deceleration.

Of course being in a bus with a tiller on the RHS makes this scenario better for an incap captain and definitely leads to a better outcome in the eyes of the airport operater who doesn't have inconvenience of a blocked runway.

[BraceBrace]

SSG, I can't believe you just posted an FS movie and mentioned Hewa Bora...

[SNS3Guppy]

Blank acceptance of V speeds and thier veracity, is simple faith in your airdata computer, your engines performing...your tires aren't deflated...ect ect. Guppy, let's say your FO puts in the wrong numbers, simple mistake...so your barreling down the runway, waiting for V1....


Do you know what an air data computer is? Clearly not. FO "puts in the wrong numbers?" You play microsoft flight simulator, don't you? It would appear any student pilot would have a better idea on this than you.

Your use of the DC-9 overrun at Goma is another example of introducing irrelevant but dramatic material in an effort to cloud the issue. What you left out is that the runway is in poor condition, six years after being damaged and shortened by a volcanic erruption...and still unrepaired. The runway was wet. No details are provided beyond laymans descriptions of blood and carnage, regarding what actually occured...so it's use in a technical discussion contributes nothing at all. I think you used google and listed the first aircraft mishap you found in the hopes it might prove the unfounded and clouded point you're hoping to make.

Did the crew attempt to reject the takeoff or continue? Do you know? Reports vary, some claiming a blown tire, some claiming an explosion, nobody having an useful information on that event, least of all yourself. And of all the environments you could have picked, you chose Africa, where aviation safety is roughly on par with the price of tea in china, and also just as relevant. You picked the Congo, where fire fatal mishaps have occured in the last year. And where airline flights to the EU have been banned for safety violations. This is what you use to demonstrate a safe operation or make a point?

If he has enough runway to stop, he stops, if he doesn't, and he's got enough speed he goes. If he's too far down the runway, too slow..then maybe the numbers are wrong, configuration was wrong, who knows, but it should have been caught 8000 ft ago, not at the end of runway, where the firetrucks are...

That's called 'being ahead of the arcraft"


Perhaps in your microsoft flight simulator.

The videos are clear cut examples of people putting in the numbers, wrong or not, thinking they could make it, and not making it when they either reject or go. Overloaded or not...blown tires or not, the plane didn't act right and the take off should have been rejected early. They weren't ahead of the aircraft.


The videos are clear cut examples? One is a rejected takeoff...which overran the end. You assert that the crew should have rejected the takeoff earlier? Earlier such as when the engine hadn't failed? The crew should have simply elected to reject the takeoff for no good reason? You have no credibility here. Clearly just looking for an arguement that doesn't exist.

The other clear cut example you use...the microsoft flight simulation of a crash that never occured, is imaginary, and cartoonish. Clear cut? No. Example? No. It's a clip from a computer game showing an imaginary airplane and nothing more.

Thus far you've used dramatized examples regarding mishaps for which no information is available, cartoons of imaginary wrecks, and while trying to support the notion of rejecting rather than continuing the takeoff, you provide footage of a 747 that rejects and overruns anyway. Brilliant...you couldn't make a worse case if you tried...and one can't be sure you're not trying hard.

[ssg]

If you want to rotate with 9000 ft of runway left, on fire, into the soup...go for it...

if you want to burn up 10000ft slowly accelerating to V1, eyes glued to your AS ind. oblivious to what is happening outside...go for it...

If you want to live in a world where go or no go V speeds will fit just nicely into all take off scenarios without thinking, adapting, or having any concept of being ahead of the aircraft or situational awareness...go for it,..just don't have any passengers that day...

I did a little research...using flex and reduced power, anyone can extend his take distance and V speeds so far down the runway to make a ten thousand foot runway feel like a nail bitter. So I wanna know, using max power, max payload, you guys burning up 8-9000 ft to get to VR..??

[p_bakes]

SSG,
PBakes...the brake energy argument is a tired old excuse to say 'let's go'
You have no clue if your brakes will fail on landing, much less on an RTO...and you use your brakes on both...

If my brakes did fail I'd much prefer it to be on landing than at the beginning of an RTO, for reasons that any sane pilot will not require explaining.

A heavy aircraft, using 9000ft of a 10000ft runway to rotate? I don't see anything wrong with that. Maybe his V1 was at 6000ft? You will never know unless you are in that flight deck, This might interest you....

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=feGZ4l5fk4Q

please note, this is a real video, not flightsim.

So the pilots in that clip had poor or no situational awareness?

SNS3Guppy, I think the phrase "flogging a dead horse" has never been more fitting.

[Flagon]

... only trying to keep a lid on the inflammatory ... JT

[A37575]

I am a F/O in a company where I cannot all Reject!!! (737) Insane

Why is that policy insane? In fact it makes cold hard commonsense.

Your responsibility as second in command is to advise the pilot in command of the problem and in turn he is entirely responsible for the decision to reject or continue. Any captain who blindly aborts a take off on a "reject" call from the first officer is either supremely over-confident of his first officers uncanny ability to instantly diagnose a serious event during take off -or - he is incompetent. Probably both..

[Screwballs]

ssg, why are you so adamant about using 8000ft or 9000ft or runway? Can't you use percentages please? It makes no sense to say that using 9000ft of runway to rotate if you don't tell us how long the runway is. What it is 12,000ft? Or 15,000ft? Where is the problem of using 75% of a runway to get airborne? Where is the problem of using the full legal amount? Granted not ideal, but a runway is there to be used and so is an aircraft to its legal and sensible limits.

[ssg]

Screwball,

Some posters, on this forum kept making the case that airliners routinely hit Vr with a thousand to go...in response to my observation of 737s on my home field, doing just that on a 10,000 ft field.

As I came to become acquanted with Flex power, and those that abuse it, I realized that some guys are pretty much flying it to the fence, under reduced power...and just waiting and waiting on the take off roll, watching he AS indicator, pretty much hoping the take off would go ok...not much room for error...in the confidence that should something go wrong with one engine, they can throw the power up on the last remaining good one...

So when one poster, mentioned hitting V1 at 75% of the runway, on a 10,000 ft field, with Vr another 2000+ ft down, calling it legal...I had a hard to time thinking that was safe..I still don't

It's just guys using Flex power to take it to the edge....

[Flagon]

I take it he's still banging on? This 'ignore' is great. Yup, Alaskan have gone up in my estimation. Any more African overruns popped up?

[Ashling]

SSG

When will you get it into your thick head that, on a flex takeoff, should you lose 1 engine you do not have to increase power on the remaining engines. You can if you so desire but there is no necessity to do so. You stupid or something?

Still waiting for your answer to my question about the performance rules you follow on Biz Jets that I asked on another thread.

[ssg]

Part 25 aircraft...adhere to mininum runway and climb requirements, standard stuff...

[Ashling]

Thankyou SSG

[FlightDirector7]

Hi D&M

"I have control", priority push-button, continue with take-off.

We follow the same procedure close to V1. We guys are trained for low speed as well as high speed RTO's in the sim, if I have the guy, or the lady, on my left quitting on me, the first thing on my mind is get off the ground at high speeds, give a MAYDAY call, and plan for an arrival. My question is, why is the priority push button so important if you're gonna sit there for 40 seconds keeping that button pushed when you have better things to do when you're airborne ?? All he/she's gotta do while falling over is touch the AP disconnect and the priority's lost again ?? We are told the same thing in the sim or otherwise, BUT WHY IS THIS NOT IN THE SOP (FCOM 3) ??

[SNS3Guppy]

What are you talking about?

[FlightDirector7]

Guppy,

Why is keeping the take-over push button pressed incase of incapacitation not mentioned in the abnormals in FCOM 3 (Crew Incapacitation), if it is so important ?

[SNS3Guppy]

Guppy,

Why is keeping the take-over push button pressed incase of incapacitation not mentioned in the abnormals in FCOM 3 (Crew Incapacitation), if it is so important ?


Even in English that didn't make much sense.

What exactly is a take-over button, and what are you talking about?

This is why companies need to stop putting 300 hour pilots in positions of responsibility.

[Pugilistic Animus]

Guppy--I think that all that is Airbus operational speak--I believe Airbus includes some sort of 'priority switch' in the stick

and FCOM is a cheap AFM/POH replacement if wording such as "In a dire emergency land as soon as possible" aren't included, half of them--well, they'd just burn/fall outta the freakin' sky:*


--- I agree, Guppy---- but worst of all not only is experience and judgment/decision making capability--- lacking---but so is knowledge --if they tried to at least "wash out the delicates in ground school":}--if MAY be a Just bit better:\---folks may think it's a mean sentiment---but so are crashes:E

[757jetjockey]

I had an interesting debate recently with a colleague. My leg from XXX to YYY (longhaul), carrying about 63t of gas in a 767-300. so hevy weight, and overweight landing if immediate return in a hurry..

Briefed the standard stuff, then went on to mention if he were to drop dead or words to that effect....

As a reasonably experienced F/O I would feel quite happy carrying out an RTO upto a point, I make a point of asking to do one from RHS at every LPC/OPC as a training element. I usually decide on this arbitrary 'in my head' figure on the day based on a number of points, such as weather/weights/wind/runway length etc etc..

When mentioning this, my colleague insisted that once the 80kts call was made and responded to, we were going into the air unless he stopped the a/c for whatever reason....prior to V1 of course!

I questioned his logic and was somewhat beaten into submission, especially as we had 2 log sectors ahead of us in the next 2 days....

[Pugilistic Animus]

757jetjockey ----

if the captain's incapacitation occurs concurrently with EFATO before V1 stop after Go----35' vertically and 200'/300/ horizontally is all you may have---IFF {IFF= if and only if} the RTO/OEI--ops- are done to certificated air carrier standards--that you've briefed--

if there was no EFATO just incapacitation then 80 knots is a good number---still in the low speed regime---pilot incapacitation to me is no reason to risk an RTO--in the high speed regime past 80 knots--of course in such a situation--you'd be PIC and it would therefore be incumbent upon you to carry out whatever action in your view are required to ensure safety of flight---For instance you don't want to make a overweight landing [for whatever reason] and and decide to stretch it to 100knots--as long as you do it safely and with a good reason--but 80 knot is a more reasonable number in most events---


Edited to add: Good reasoning:ok:

[757jetjockey]

the problem is as an F/O on a PM sector, you would never reject at 80kts because the first incapacitation call of 80?.........followed by 90?........ then think oh dear and decide to 'Reject' as we now say... you are going to be up around the 100-110kt mark anyway at that stage and fast approaching the V1 in most cases.....

plus theres RTO above 84kts i think which is always a good help at bringing things to a halt as well....

My main point was that I try to be sensible and practical about it, and weigh up all the pro'/cons on the day, most of the time debating it with the skipper either on turn around or in the briefing...

I dont think it should be set in stone as it often is with some people..

[Pugilistic Animus]

I see nothing wrong with you thought processes, but I think unless there are circumscribing conditions CIG 0 RVR-3 and you require a long flight to the alternate [require a TO alternate] I may stop a little past 80 up to 100--or you're on a contaminated RWY--I'd GO---what ever entails the lesser risk at the time in your judgment--bases on outside factors and circumscribing conditions--not clear cut answer--but you'd then be the commander---and as with all PICs--you'll have the final authority, but then they'll blame YOU for anything that goes wrong ---that's the responsibility:\!!!


PA

[Stan Woolley]

757 jetjockey

I agree with your views on this. I think you have to consider each take-off and have a look at the conditions on the day.I understand the Go minded view and generally agree with it.

Taking an airliner into the air single crew is not something I would take lightly,if this 'failure' was a QRH drill it would definitely say land at the nearest suitable airport.The incapacitated pilot may be restricting controls or about to jump on the rudder?

You may well save their life by getting them medical attention sooner.If you went from 80 kts (call it 95 after the calls) out of say Heathrow and the guy died while you were dumping (in every way:ooh:)you may even find yourself in court defending your decision.

Chances are very good IMO that if you're not on the limit for takeoff and less than say V1-20 you would successfully stop the aircraft. On the Boeings all you really have to do is close the thrust levers and you'll get RTO braking for starters, then reverse will deploy the speedbrakes - it may not be textbook but it would do the job.

That having been said I'm now based at Luton and I would be much more inclined to be go minded there with its aircraft carrier type geography.

Glad to see that you are giving it serious thought - good stuff.

[FlightDirector7]

Dear Guppy,

I guess guys with a lot of experience such as yourself certainly lack the knowledge that the A/P disconnect p/b on the sidestick is also the priority take-over push button. Keeping it held for 40 secs isolates inputs from the other side. I would suggest some more reading and application my friend. Its quite evident you're lacking what is neccessary. I certainly hope this post puts it in simple english for you. :ok:

Happy Landings