Cloud blamed in fatal plane crash [Archive]

BackPacker

27th Nov 2007, 20:39

I was once told that a pilot with no IMC experience would loose control in about 40 seconds if s/he entered cloud.

I have done the 180 on instruments, under the hood, during PPL training, and quite a lot more, but I do not have an IMC or IR rating. I also have a lot of experience flying MSFS on instruments, so I thought that I would be able to keep the plane sunny side up for a minute or so at least if I inadvertently would enter IMC.

With an (IR rated) instructor on board, I recently entered cloud while climbing. It took all of my brain capacity and mental will to trust the instruments, to keep the plane more or less level and in the minute that this lasted we still went off-course about 30 degrees, because I had enough trouble believing the AH to check the DI. And looking back I think I'm glad I got the plane properly trimmed 'cause I don't remember checking the ASI or Alt either. It scared the willies out of me.

Practice under the hood or MSFS is NOT the same as actual IMC. Vertigo and spatial disorientation is real but can't be simulated other than by flying in actual clouds.
So I doubt whether the advice

I got a bit more than this and the advice that if I ever did get lost in cloud to ascend to my safe altitude on instruments, trust the instruments and talk to someone who could get me back on the ground in one piece using radar vectors.

will actually work for a PPL with just the minimum simulated instrument time and no actual IMC experience.

ShyTorque

27th Nov 2007, 20:45

they never taught me this in the IR

IO540, I think its's relevant to think what you did or didn't know BEFORE the IR. Presumably, if the pilot of this aircraft had an IR himself he wouldn't have been there because he would have the experience and situational awareness to know how much danger he was putting himself in.

I think the clouds should be exonerated. :(

Contacttower

27th Nov 2007, 20:54

will actually work for a PPL with just the minimum simulated instrument time and no actual IMC experience.

For the PPL IF time I did do some in real cloud. It's interesting that in the US they have a concept of logging actual time in real IMC, perhaps we need that in JAR land?

I can't say for real what I would have done in the situation that this poor guy found himself in...but I'm not sure I'd have climbed...reason being if I'd turned 180 degrees away from the mountains the risk of hitting anything would be low, often if you enter cloud while flying VFR there is more cloud above you then below you and climbing further into it opens the possibility of stalling. Once on top you'd have to come back down through it as well.

So with that in mind what I would probably have done is try and hold straight and level...and after calling ATC descended under their guidance.

By the way I'd highly recommend the IMC rating!

ShyTorque

27th Nov 2007, 21:07

VFR only aircraft, cloud and rising ground have always been one of the most lethal combinations in aviation; I can't see this ever changing.

"If in doubt, chicken out" is a phrase that springs readily to mind.

gcolyer

27th Nov 2007, 21:10

I would not wish such an accident on my worst enemy, however......

1) Not knowing that there is high ground on your route (diversion or not) and being in Wales!!
2) Entering IMC with no IMCr or IR

is a recipe for a disaster. IO540 was merely pointing out that he was not aware that a cloud will make you crash!

IO540

27th Nov 2007, 21:11

I am happy to delete the thread, but from the replies so far I don't see a clear cut case for doing so.

I think its's relevant to think what you did or didn't know BEFORE the IR

Agreed; I was just taking the micky out of the stupid journalist who wrote that headline.

There was no intention to pass comment on the pilot.

Contacttower

27th Nov 2007, 21:14

I wouldn't delete the thread. It's generated good discussion which is a positive thing :ok:.

DFC

27th Nov 2007, 21:44

I would like to back-up IO540's posting and add that the pilot is very lucky that they have not been charged with manslaughter........do similar in your car or on the railway and you will!

"Inadvertent" entry into cloud is practically total bo11ox. Considering modern met data availability and the mobile telephone etc etc not to mention those nice big windows fitted to the aircraft.

You see a cloud, you decide if you want to fly into it or not.

OK the only alternative may be a precautionary landing but the fact is that forced landings poorly executed under control are far more surviveable than CFIT.

The departure climb must end at an altitude that provides 1000ft separation vertically from terrain within whatever navigational accuracy each side of track you can manage and this must be maintained as well as full VMC during the flight. The only exceptions being clearances in controlled airspace and low level corridors where operation at minimum level can be normal.

If you can not maintain 1000ft above terrain within Xnm each side of track then you divert.

Sods law says that during the diversion the weather gets worse so you may end up being forced to operate a level between the 1000ft minium and a 500ft minimum level.

If that is hard then simply a precautionary landing with power is the safer option.

Basic training!

I remember a rather heated debate some time back about turn back in a valley or go IMC or make a precautionary landing. Perhaps this pilot did not read that debate.

Having operated from Mona before, I can say that everyone with a map in that area recognises the coastal route to the river Dee.

Regards,

DFC

Gertrude the Wombat

27th Nov 2007, 21:55

I was once told that a pilot with no IMC experience would loose control in about 40 seconds if s/he entered cloud. I don't know how true that really is, certainly instrument flight has never seemed that hard to me.
I think I've more commonly heard 180 seconds, but that's life expectancy, not time-to-loss-of-control.

Personally with only the PPL instrument training I never had any trouble flying on instruments ... with an instrument rated instructor sitting next to me, ie no risk, no pressure, I could always chicken out and say "you have control". But ... I suspect that the same is true of every non-instrument pilot who has lost control in IMC, so I don't think that proves much. It's what you do when it's unexpected and you're on your own that matters.

I'm now on an IMCR course. The other day I completely lost it, pitch all over the place, overcontrolling up and down and sideways ... brought it back under control, at which point the instructor, who sat there calmly watching throughout with his hands in his lap, said "look at the localiser needle, your heading is wrong". I have no idea what would have happened without the instructor sitting there, even though he didn't do anything - I knew he would take control if necessary, so I was only at risk of looking silly, not at risk of ending up dead.

ShyTorque

27th Nov 2007, 22:02

The departure climb must end at an altitude that provides 1000ft separation vertically from terrain within whatever navigational accuracy each side of track you can manage and this must be maintained as well as full VMC during the flight. The only exceptions being clearances in controlled airspace and low level corridors where operation at minimum level can be normal.

If you can not maintain 1000ft above terrain within Xnm each side of track then you divert.

Why, where is this laid down?

DFC

27th Nov 2007, 22:13

Why, where is this laid down?

In the "I have not had a CFIT in more hours than you can shake a stick at" book.

I hope you get to read it some day.

Following that advice will help.

Common sense is Law.

Try doing something that you know is stupid. Kill someone doing it and await the court case.

Regards,

DFC

ShyTorque

27th Nov 2007, 22:30

DFC,

Thanks for the insult; rather an arrogant reply simply because I asked a question; especially as you have no real idea of my experience or my attitude. :ouch:

Your use of the word "must" makes your post sound like you are quoting from the ANO, which you are not. You are applying IFR minima for VFR flights. If you choose to do that you will be safe enough but it's not mandatory to do so.

scooter boy

27th Nov 2007, 22:47

This morning I checked the TAFs and METARs at 0600.
The Wx looked really crap (fog at destination) so I decided to drive from my home in Cornwall to Gloucester instead of flying.
I have an IR and am current.
Lots of pressure on to get the plane to its annual etc... which was booked to start today.
As it happens the weather would have been OK but I had no way of being certain at my decision time.
But I drove.

It appears that the guy mentioned in the thread took a chance, not only with his own life but with the lives of others and a passenger died.
He now has to live with that (as well as being wheelchairbound).

SB

Fuji Abound

27th Nov 2007, 23:27

Every pilot is made abundantly aware of the dangers of inadvertent flight into IMC.

I guess a very small percentage continue into IMC because they are arrogant or stupid.

I suspect far more do so because they commit a cardinal error of judgment - the greatest reason for any pilot induced accident.

It is constructive to consider the events that lead to such a cardinal error. I suspect we can all construct more than one scenario.

However the point comes at which events over take the pilot. For example, the aircraft has been forced low, giving the pilot little time to assess and position for a forced landing, compounded by the lack of attractive sites if the aircraft is over inhospitable mountainous terrain.

In these circumstances rapid and decisive decisions are required to avoid CFIT or inadvertent entry into IMC.

The ability to take these decisions in these circumstances should not be under estimated.

The maturity and experience that hopefully enables us to break the string of events earlier in the sequence comes with time.

The true cause of the accident is not the inadvertent flight into clouds but the failure of the pilot to recognise that he was being overtaken by events which would lead him to believe he had run out of alternatives.

To that extent, each to our own level of experience, do we all dance on the head of a pin.

Contacttower

28th Nov 2007, 07:00

"Inadvertent" entry into cloud is practically total bo11ox. Considering modern met data availability and the mobile telephone etc etc not to mention those nice big windows fitted to the aircraft.

In the "I have not had a CFIT in more hours than you can shake a stick at" book.

DFC you are of course right....but personally I would stop short of saying what you've said. Reason being that it sounds to much like saying "this will never happen to me".

Call me superstitious but I can just see it now...I say on PPRuNe this guy's an idiot, how could he have been so stupid and then I go and do something equally stupid. Not because I'm a bad pilot but because we are all human and can't assume that our judgement will always be good and that our decisions will be rational.

All we can do is learn from the misfortune of others (or think a bit more about safety, we don't need accidents to make us safer) and hope that will make us safer pilots.

ShyTorque

28th Nov 2007, 07:47

CT, I agree - that's why there is an investigation after air accidents.

Unfortunately, human factors will always play a part in accidents to humans. This pilot has learned a very severe lesson, one that has been learned many times before.

Having said that, flight from VMC to IMC and back to VMC can be safely managed but the time to plan it is on the ground, with a chart on a desk, not halfway up a rising valley in an aircraft not well equipped for the job.

drauk

28th Nov 2007, 08:10

waldopepper42

28th Nov 2007, 08:12

Hmm, 1700' cloudbase, informed that the Menai was negotiable underneath the cloud until Bangor where the cloudbase rose to 3000' and no IMC rating.

Yet still a direct track drawn from Caernarfon to Colwyn Bay.

Accident waiting to happen?

S-Works

28th Nov 2007, 08:17

Classic case of get home-itus. The cloud is not to blame, the pilot in command is clearly to blame and his stupidity cost the life of his passenger.

Common sense should have dictated that in the conditions a VFR only pilot should have sat it out when he stopped for fuel. Instead he chose to push on with the inevitable consequences.

IO is quite right in highlighting the outcome as cold hard pointer to us all.

I have no idea what he learnt on his IR had to do with it unless it was just an opportunity to slip in the point that he has one (even if it is of the "foreign" variety) :p:p:p:p:p:p:p

radicalrabit

28th Nov 2007, 09:24

In Diving we would call this a spiral of disaster. As many of you have acknowledged, he chose to put himself in danger. "Being late in this world is better than being early in the next" is something I learned a long time ago, and I hope when I am qualified to fly over mountains in marginal weather Ill remember to think again and stay on the ground. Just as a matter of interest a friend of mine and I watched a helicopter going up Glossop in Longdondale last week in light drizzle and found the clouds had rolled down off Crowden and Kinder and boxed him in. But he was in a helicopter and could find a field to set down in. A Cessna OR ANYTHING ELSE at that altitude would have been in a hopeless situation other than to risk climbing into the traffic inbound to Manchester and calling for assistance.
Sad for the loss of life but really was this the best choice given the wx at the time? How ever well qualified he might have been, even 15000 hour pilots have been known to make bad decisions.
Thanks for the continued insight into GA . I find learning from other peoples mistakes coldly effective.

Kirstey

28th Nov 2007, 09:39

"It is very easy in cloud to lose sight of the ground.

Was my favourite part of the BBC article!

All this talk of a "proper" pilots only forum.. how about a "w@nkers only" forum for the likes of *** to strut their stuff?

QDMQDMQDM

28th Nov 2007, 10:10

IO540

28th Nov 2007, 11:00

There is nothing wrong with departing (unless departing into obviously daft conditions, like OVC002 with embedded CBs and no radar :) ).

The key is to keep escape options open and execute them before they run out.

Once airborne, weather forecasts are not really useful - if one staked one's life on a weather forecast one would be dead within the first year, without any doubt whatsoever.

scooter boy

28th Nov 2007, 11:09

Lots of pressure on to get the plane to its annual etc... which was booked to start today.
As it happens the weather would have been OK but I had no way of being certain at my decision time.
But I drove.
"I agree that driving instead when the weather is bad is sometimes a wise choice, but generally less so if you're going for an annual, don't you find?"

I have another month of legal flying before the annual runs out so will try to get it done at next opportunity. It is very typical though that the minute I decide to drive I can almost guarantee the destination will be clear (and vice-versa).
Sod's law,

SB

drauk

28th Nov 2007, 11:30

Bose-X wrote:
IO is quite right in highlighting the outcome as cold hard pointer to us all.
I have no idea what he learnt on his IR had to do with it unless it was just an opportunity to slip in the point that he has one (even if it is of the "foreign" variety)
hahahahha. The moderators of PPRuNe have a "quote of the week" thread to keep them amused. If they had a "Pot/kettle incident" thread this would be pinned permanently to the top of it!!!
Excellent! :ok: :ok: :ok:

IO540

28th Nov 2007, 11:40

One of the most difficult flights I've ever done was trying to get the plane back to the dealer for an Annual scheduled before the two year warranty ran out.

Had I missed the deadline by even 1 day, any defects discovered would have not been covered by the warranty. So it was critically important. The autopilot alone was a £20,000 repair job.

It was a low level IFR flight in Class G, in something like OVC006, solid IMC, turbulence, rain, the whole lot.

It had been delayed by about a week due to poor weather every single day, but in the end I decided to go as the weather was technically flyable.

It was uneventful but quite busy, no autopilot.

In the end, the plane sat at the dealer for a couple of weeks before they started on it because all their staff was off to some exhibition or training...

I don't like the "get home itis" concept. People should be trained to make go/no-go decisions based on technical data before them, and continue making the decisions when in the air.

Instead, we have the PPL sausage machine which uses stupid sayings like "better to be on the ground wishing you were in the air than the other way around" to excuse what is a very limited training relative to the privileges. The limited training concept is supported by many people who never want to go anywhere to start with e.g. aerobatic pilots who currently do the same PPL but really they should do a different course entirely.

Fuji Abound

28th Nov 2007, 12:15

It seems to me some are very quick to dismiss the actions of this pilot.

In Flying each month they write a usually interesting analysis of a recent AAIB report.

I have assisted the AAIB in an accident report (I was not involved in the accident). It is noteworthy the lengths to which their investigators go. It is also noteworthy how difficult it is to distinguish between provable factual evidence and conjecture. Understandably they are very careful to exclude as much conjecture as possible.

American bulletins often take the form - “the aircraft impacted the ground causing the death of the pilot. A factor may have been inadvertent flight in IMC”. In one sense this tells us the obvious, but little about the factors that led to the accident.

This report tells us the pilot was 60 years old and had 116 hours flying experience. We do not know when he passed his PPL. Nor do we know if he had an IMC rating, but we can assume he did not. We do know that he appeared to have flown regularly - after all he had 6 hours in the last 28 days and 12 hours in the last 90 days. It is possible on that basis that he had recently qualified as a PPL. We also know he was 60 years old. That might suggest that he was a man of maturity that comes with age.

We do know he had prepared a proper PLOG and had checked the weather before leaving, including noting the MSA. We also know that the pilot had decided to route via Colwyn Bay following his assessment of the weather. He was therefore visually familiar with the exact same route by which he chose to return. The pilot reported the weather on their our bound leg as good at 2,500 feet. It would seem they had flown the sector from Colwyn Bay to Caernarfon at 2,500 feet.

In fact if you draw a direct line between the two at 2,500 feet they would have been below the highest ground for a very short section of the route. If the route were to be adjusted very slightly to the north the margin would have been considerably greater. For example a very small deviation and the highest ground is less than 1,500 feet.

This would suggest to me that either they had climbed to a higher altitude on the out bound route or they had indeed flown a course that took them a little further north of the high ground than the direct track.

When they decided to return the fact that the pilot aborted the first attempt would suggest to me that he was more than prepared to turn back due to poor weather. We don’t know if he refueled because he needed to, but this is possible otherwise he might well have flown back to the overhead and then resumed on the northerly route. We know he departed at around 1605 and he received a weather report immediately before departure suggesting a cloudbase of 3,000 feet at Bangor. It would seem the report was very current as the aircraft concerned “had recently departed”. We also know that 6 minutes after take off the pilot was in VMC at 1,800 feet.

So at that point in time the pilot knew the cloudbase to the NNW was at least better than 1,800 feet and also believed that further north west (at Bangor) it was 3,000 feet.

He had successfully flown the same route earlier that date at 2,500 feet maintaining VMC.

A close look at the chart would suggest that literally a few miles to the north of the crash site the ground sharply fell with peaks of 1,000 feet or even 500 feet. The contour lines also suggest an outcrop that extended out over the lower ground.

The report suggests the base was 1,700 feet in the immediate vicinity of the crash site.

In short had the pilot deviated only to a very small degree further north he would have been able to maintain VMC with at least 700 feet if not more separation from the ground.

Only a very few further miles north and he would have been over the sea.

So, in attempting that route to Colwyn Bay was his judgement so poor in the first place? How many of us based on the very current weather reports that he had would have considered making that journey given that we knew we had a very good out to the north?

To me what is far more interesting is why he ended up hitting the ground.

The visibility it would seem was very good - the report suggests better than 10K. Hardly conditions in which a pilot might think this all looks a bit iffy - I had better re-consider my route. A person at the scene at the time reported the cloudbase at 2,000 feet . The site of impact was at 1,970 feet. This would suggest the pilot was very close to the base. We don’t really know whether the aircraft had entered IMC a while before the accident but it would seem this was unlikely and the suggestion is the aircraft was still in level flight at the point of impact. We don’t know how the pilot was navigating and there is no mention of a GPS. Often the AAIB will attempt to recover the route from a GPS if found so this would suggest that he was relying on DR and visual navigation. This would seem to be supported by the radar track which deviates about the actual track perhaps more than you might expect some one hand flying with a moving map GPS.

So it would seem somewhere just SSW of Bangor the aircraft continued into an obscured mountain side that rose up immediately in front of his track with obscured ground rising to maybe 700 feet above his cruising level and then falling away again sharply, and with ground to the north well below his cruising height.

Why did he plough on at that point when there would appear to have been no need to do so?

I cant help feeling it might be revealing to fly the track on MSFS with the cloudbase and wind set to the conditions we know existed at the time.

Personally I don’t see any obvious explanation for what seems to me to be a case of CFIT which falls outside the usual scenario.

englishal

28th Nov 2007, 13:03

Pilot error contributed to by weather ( as we can't blame the weather) is the biggest single killer of SEP pilots....But some PPLs just don't seem to learn (or they learn the hard way).

My get-out route is climb to a safe altitude and continue IFR. If you can't do that and the weather is marginal, stay on the ground.

Pilots have a responsibility to their passengers, it is ok say me taking a risk on my own life but I would not expect my life to be risked by someone else if I were a passenger unless I fully understood the risks.....I would never scud run just below cloud without a get out plan, it is asking for trouble. Add some mountains in there.......

Fuji Abound

28th Nov 2007, 13:45

Englishal

I fully appreciate your comment but have you read the report and considered the circumstances fully?

The reason I wrote a lengthy post is that I dont think this is justified criticism of this pilot.

On balance, the actual weather reports seemed more than good enough for the planned trip. He was very familair with the route as he had flown exactly the same route earlier that day. There is no evidence to suggest he was "valley flying". He almost certainly had very good vis. below the base and ground immediatley to the north of his track that would have given him a healthy margin between the base and the ground. Even on the track he took there was only one short section were he was below the terrain which he should have seen coming well in advance. Most importantly he had a very safe out to the north, unless the weather reports were totally inaccurate.

I think there is moe to this than some suggest.

Come on chaps - give the pilot a break - if you can see a genuine flaw in his planning or why things went wrong in an informed way that would be revealing but I dont think this was such a simple case of CFIT due to poor planning and poor airmanship - although I appreciate that was the ultimate cause.

Contacttower

28th Nov 2007, 14:05

I think there is moe to this than some suggest.

There almost always is isn't there?

Thats for the post Fuji, I can't seem to get onto the AAIB website at the moment :ugh:.

IO540

28th Nov 2007, 14:45

- head down tracking a GPS (I'm running for cover)
- head down tracking a chart (I'm running the other way for cover)
- looking the wrong way

None of those possibilities would make you fly into terrain, at ~ 100kt. At 700kt perhaps.

The maximum head down time due to a GPS is of the order of some seconds.

Maybe much longer with a chart, but somebody with no autopilot (is that a correct assumption in this case?) would instinctively know that he can't do that for very long.

Unless the terrain is a canyon, or something bizzare was going on in the cockpit, the answer must be that he was in IMC at the time.

englishal

28th Nov 2007, 14:52

Fuji,

It would probably be safe to assume though that had it been a gin clear day that this accident would not have happened? So the weather "contiributed" and the pilot may have been flying outside of his experience envelope.

People don't just fly into a mountain in crystal clear vis unless they have a serious problem somewhere else.....

QDMQDMQDM

28th Nov 2007, 15:26

[QUOTE]What can we learn from it? Not a lot, in my opinion. Accidents happen! QUOTE]

I disagree.

We can learn that it is a poor idea to track high ground at just below the cloud base when low ground / the coast lies just a few miles away and parallel to your track. Cloud does not always sit evenly on mountains and you can find yourself in it in a trice if you're not careful. Mountain scud-running is best left to experienced pilots who know the particular mountains like the back of their hand and they are still taking a large calculated risk.

The big problem with being inexperienced is that you don't know when to be afraid and when not to be afraid. Until you know that, it is best to play things quite conservatively.

Fuji Abound

28th Nov 2007, 15:48

It would probably be safe to assume though that had it been a gin clear day that this accident would not have happened?

Yes, you would have thought so.

However I would also have thought the the eye witness account from the fell runner provides unusually accurate information on the weather at the time (unusually accurate because it is rare to have some one so close to the accidetn site).

I have looked on the map and clearly she was very close to the accident site. The reports tells us she also heard the aircraft. She was apparently at 1,700 feet amsl which I would have thought could be reasonably accurately checked and reported the cloudbase at 2,000 feet. Once again I would guess this was a pretty reliable estimate. She does say she could "just" see the other side of the valley - which I had missed earlier so the viz was around 4K or 6,000 metres and had "dropped significantly" over the preceding two hours. Her report might be very significant. Another aircraft at around the same time reported the mountains of Snowdonia were obscured by cloud. This you would expect but it is indicative that the vis from the Menai Straits was pretty good.

Conflictingly the report also says the surface viz at the time of the accident was "estimated to be 15 to 20km". This seems very much at odds with the report from the Fell walker.

If the pilot was at 2,000 amsl just below the base with 4k of vis he had a reasonable chance of seeing the cloud clad peak and no obvious reason to enter it, unless he was so close to the base that the viz was much worse than had he given himself a few hundred feet better seperation.

Personally I dont think he flew the direct route on the way out, I think he went further north, which would have avoided all the high ground. Why did he not do so on the way back. After all it only represented a very small deviation from track. In fact from his last radar position to the accidetn site he gradually drifted south of track. Was there some feature of the terrain that might have been involved or was it more simply an error in navigation - the amount by which he was south of track was enough to have put him over much lower ground had he been north of track to the same degree.

I can fully understand pilots flying up a dead end valley, I can understand pilots entering IMC and some time a little after losign control or impacting, I can understand pilots trying to didge peaks in mountaineous terrain with no obvious escape route but none of these seem to fit. Something more fundamental seems to have taken place?

Wrong Stuff

28th Nov 2007, 16:03

Unless the terrain is a canyon, or something bizzare was going on in the cockpit, the answer must be that he was in IMC at the time.
I'd agree that's by far the most likely reason. There is also the less likely possibility that he flew into a downdraft which he couldn't outclimb. Of course, if he was already close to the ground to keep below the cloud, that would have exacerbated the problem.

QDMQDMQDM

28th Nov 2007, 16:13

Quote:
The big problem with being inexperienced is that you don't know when to be afraid and when not to be afraid. Until you know that, it is best to play things quite conservatively.

This is a contradictory statement.

Not at all! It applies just as much in medicine, my other interest. When you are inexperienced, you simply do not know when you have to take extra care and when it is permissible to take shortcuts. This is patently obvious and could be used as the definition of 'experience'.

I think if you studied the AAIB report perhaps you may not be of that opinion. Using remarks like "mountain scud running" suggest he was in a valley, whereas in this case to get out any trouble he merely had to decend to his left and he'd be over the sea. Nowhere does the report imply he was in IMC. The flight should have been simple, and the kind of flight you or I would make without a fraction of his planning, and without hesitation. I don't think I'm being wreckless in forming the opinion that I can learn nothing from this accident - except not to fly. Why he flew inot the mountain is a mystery.

I would call skirting mountains just underneath the cloud base in questionable vis 'scud running'. Just because the report doesn't say he was in IMC doesn't mean he wasn't. It's very easy to do. Choosing the route he took was not the most sensible option. More sensible would have been to choose the absolutely safe route, which he knew was safe. I think we can learn that.

Fuji Abound

28th Nov 2007, 16:17

Out of interest I have just had a look at Google Earth. I think there might be a reasonably obvious valley in the topography leading towards the accident site with high ground at the end. I wonder if I am in the right place.

If you look at Google earth it is interesting that the photo was taken on a day with the cloud stacking in from the north exactly as might be expected with the wind at 330.

If I am in the correct place this would have meant the lower cloud might have been to the north of track along the windward side of the northern valley. The valley was therefore tempting when in fact a very short diversion north from Bethesda would have taken the aircraft away from the funnel into the valley and along the northern edge of the higher ground.

Perhaps it was a case of the pilot being deceived into funneling up the valley and the cloud spilling over towards the top of the valley as the ground rose when if only he had gone a few miles further north at Bethesda the flight might have been conducted in complete safety.

Interesting if I have the topography correct.

I am more convinced now that the pilot might have made a major error of judgement when he reached Bethesda and that is really what ultimately lead to the impact. I still believe based on all the met evidence and the low ground just to the north his decision to go was not at all unreasonable.

Given that I dont think he went that route on the way there I still wonder why he went up that valley if that was really the case. It looks like he must have flown over Bethesda, whereas his track line should have placed Bethesda to his south - and up until then he had been doing a pretty good job of following the track line.
I do know that low level mountain flying is a skill that requirees honing and as importantly an understanding of the effect topography has on the met. I have done a little in the Highlands and Wales at very low level which was most revealing.

QDMQDMQDM

28th Nov 2007, 16:37

If I am in the correct place this would have meant the lower cloud might have been to the north of track along the windward side of the northern valley. The valley was therefore tempting when in fact a very short diversion north from Bethesda would have taken the aircraft away from the funnel into the valley and along the northern edge of the higher ground.

Perhaps it was a case of the pilot being deceived into funneling up the valley and the cloud spilling over towards the top of the valley as the ground rose when if only he had gone a few miles further north at Bethesda the flight might have been conducted in complete safety.

Interesting if I have the topography correct.

I am more convinced now that the pilot might have made a major error of judgement when he reached Bethesda and that is really what ultimately lead to the impact. I still believe based on all the met evidence and the low ground just to the north his decision to go was not at all unreasonable.

Given that I dont think he went that route on the way there I still wonder why he went up that valley if that was really the case. It looks like he must have flown over Bethesda, whereas his track line should have placed Bethesda to his south - and up until then he had been doing a pretty good job of following the track line.

Perhaps we can agree, then, with the uncontroversial assertion that this accident suggests that mountain scud running may not be a good idea, especially for inexperienced pilots who do not know the terrain?

172driver

28th Nov 2007, 18:27

Joshwilson10

28th Nov 2007, 18:32

I think this is dragging on a bit! At the end of the day he could have turned back at any time, he should have been aware of the terrain and at least could have climbed to his sector msa...he messed up! Learn a lesson from him!

Fuji Abound

28th Nov 2007, 19:39

After having read most of the thread and all of the AAIB report, I remain puzzled: what possessed the man to fly through the mountains when low terrain and sea lay just a few miles off intended track ?? It cannot have been get-home-itis, as the safe track would have added only a few minutes to the flight. Frankly, this is a decision making process I simply don't get.

Eloquently put and that was exactly what troubled me.

It is very easy to dismiss any CFIT as oh well, he was scud running, poor planning etc. IMHO that teaches us absolutely nothing other than to repeat the bl**ding obvious. Of course sadly IF the evidence clearly points in that direction so be it. I dont think it does in this case and at least I have said why I have reached that conclusion. The danger is every case is so quickly dismissed in which case we might as well not bother to investigate any CFIT.

As for Fuji's last post, I think (and hope) he was exploring a hypothesis that cannot be proved.

Of course.

Moreover I could be wrong. I am no expert. Nor am I challenging in any way what the AAIB have said. They do a superb job. As I said at the outset they have to draw a line between evidence and conjecture. Sometimes I think we have far more to learn from analysing the events that may have lead to the accident - the holes that began to line up.

Also, I know from first hand experience how the family and friends react. No one wants to hear there Dad, son daughter whatever was negligent or stupid. Sometimes unfortunately the pilot was - but I dont think so in this case. I think he set off in weather that was good enough for the sector being flown given the escape routes he had. Personally if I had had to fly that route VFR in those conditions GIVEN the height of the terrain just to the north of my track line I would not have hesitated to have gone. The fact is I would have been further north and I think there is a reason why the pilot wasnt - I think it has to do with his being lulled into going up that valley.

Whirlybird

28th Nov 2007, 20:24

I've just read this whole thread and the AAIB report....been away for a couple of days. I know that area well; I learned to fly at Welshpool, and over the years visited Caernarfon several times in different aircraft by a variety of routes in varying weather conditions. I've also done a helicopter mountain flying course up there. A few thoughts come to mind....

1) Weather conditions can change incredibly fast in Snowdonia, and I don't think we can be sure what the weather was like just before the crash.

2) Effects of wind? The wind wasn't that strong apparently, but even so you can get some strange things happening when you're flying close to the hills. A friend of mine, who knows those mountains well and flies in them a lot, scared himself silly during one flight, due to unexpected wind conditions which he almost couldn't outfly...sorry, can't remember details.

3) The obvious route home would have been to follow the coast to Colwyn Bay. However, a familiar route can feel very safe, far safer than an unfamiliar one, especially to a relatively inexperienced pilot. Perhaps that's why he used his earlier route.

4) I flew into a teeny weeny cloud once in Snowdonia. Trying to do a 180 in cloud over mountains, with up and down draughts from those hills, is nothing at all like flying over flat ground with foggles on. I never did it again! But you don't know that till you've done it.

5) Some unlucky combination of all of the above.

I don't suppose anyone will ever really know what happened. Clearly, the pilot made a mistake. But it might well have been a very small mistake, allied to an awful lot of bad luck. :(

DFC

28th Nov 2007, 20:33

Shytorque,

It was not sent as an insult. It was simply saying that it came from the book of common sense and I hoped that you will someday look back on a flying history that would not be the case if a pilot CFIT'ed due to lack of common sense.

I dont care what your experience is - it is irelevant.

---------

Contacttower,

Yes it is very harsh. However what can we do to deter others from killing their freiends and families with aircraft. Everyone knows that an unqualified pilot entering IMC without suficient planning or terrain clearance is an acident about to happen and only chance will save them.

EnglishAl said People don't just fly into a mountain in crystal clear vis unless they have a serious problem somewhere else.....

That is true and should apply to cloud also in the case of unqualified pilots and /or unequipped aircraft.

Question.......Would it be true to say that pilots with no instrument qualifications in aircraft equipped for IMC flight i.e. appropriate instruments are more likely to enter cloud (and become a statistic) than pilots with no instrument qualifications in aircraft with less instrument equipment eg simply ASI, Altimeter and ball such as a microlight?

In other words how do microlight pilots manage to keep clear of clouds better than pilots (of similar experience) flying better equipped aircraft?

Don't forget that microlight pilots do not have any instrument training during the PPL course.

-------

The JAA PPL sylabus requires the pilot to be able to establish the aircraft in S+L flight on instruments, complete a level 180 degree turn and then maintain straight and level flight.

There is no climbing or descending involved because it is expected that the pilot will be at a safe level entering IMC and have entered from an area of VMC to which they wish to return.

Simply put if below the safe level enroute and enter IMC your screMed.

The pilot may have planned a safe level on a PLOG but they could have not bothered if they are going to continue to fly when the weather prevents them from maintaining that minimum planned level.

Unfortunately, many training organisations teach pilots to plan a safe level but say it is normal to fly below that level......well perhaps this pilot was flying normally (according to whoever trained them)?

Regards,

DFC

QDMQDMQDM

28th Nov 2007, 20:46

In other words how do microlight pilots manage to keep clear of clouds better than pilots (of similar experience) flying better equipped aircraft?

Because they fly far more slowly.

Chuck Ellsworth

28th Nov 2007, 20:53

The JAA PPL sylabus requires the pilot to be able to establish the aircraft in S+L flight on instruments, complete a level 180 degree turn and then maintain straight and level flight.

Have the loss of control accidents in IMC gone down since that became part of the training?
Or is a little bit of knowledge / skill seducing these pilots into something they can't handle?

Contacttower

28th Nov 2007, 20:59

Or is a little bit of knowledge / skill seducing these pilots into something they can't handle?

Someone with a PPL(H) can surely correct me on this but I seem to remember reading in Today's Pilot a while ago about helicopters in IMC...it would appear that the little bit covered in the PPL course was indeed creating a 'moral hazard' effect. Can someone verify that this resulted in the IMC training being cut from the helicopter PPL?

Contacttower

28th Nov 2007, 21:07

I wanted to say the same thing but expected a flaming.

An awful lot of flying would be cancelled in this country if the 'add one thousand to the box' height was also stuck to. Most instructors do indeed seem happy to ignore it in the predominantly flat UK when flying VFR.

I've found that doing a '5/10nm either side of track plus 1000ft' is actually more practical...partly because it actually makes you look at your track more closely and also because in some countries (like South Africa where I am at the moment) you get silly figures that a light single would actually struggle to reach if you add 1000ft to the box figure.

Chuck Ellsworth

28th Nov 2007, 21:14

In Canada the requirement for the PPL is 5 hours training on instruments.

Is 5 hours enough to ensure a PPL can keep the thing under control in cloud if they may never have flown in cloud...hell a lot of the instructors have never been in cloud.

Wearing a hood or foggles is not giving the true picture of flight in cloud....period...

How many PPL's take the minimum amount of training to fly on instruments and then never even practice it until the day they fly into cloud and crash?

I would suggest a little bit of knowledge and a marginal skills level on instruments is a recipe for disaster.

Contacttower

28th Nov 2007, 21:16

In Canada the requirement for the PPL is 5 hours training on instruments.

Chuck does Canada recognise actual IMC flying?

Chuck Ellsworth

28th Nov 2007, 21:24

Chuck does Canada recognise actual IMC flying?

In what context?

I am not a certified flight instructor in Canada and do not really know what they may or may not recognize.

( Judging by the apparent IQ of some of our Transport Canada Inspectors they might have trouble trying to figure out how to pour piss out of a rubber boot.)

Whirlybird

28th Nov 2007, 21:42

Can someone verify that this resulted in the IMC training being cut from the helicopter PPL?
No, it hasn't been cut. But many people think it should.

ShyTorque

28th Nov 2007, 23:05

DFC, I can't understand your rather wooly reply. Are you claiming I lack common sense? I don't need patronising simply because I "dared" to question something you posted, as if it were a mandatory requirement. I'm looking back on a history of some thirty years flying for a living, much of it in poor weather below MSA and another five years of other aviation before that, so I do already understand the causes of CFIT to some extent.

The term "must", in CAA talk, means "mandatory", i.e. a legal requirement. You obviously apply weather limits well in advance of the legal requirements to your own VFR flights; your choice, and I can only say good for you.

However, it is important that folk don't read a post such as yours and think this pilot breached legal requirements in a major way by not applying "your" personal cautious VFR limits.

IO540

29th Nov 2007, 07:29

I think most light GA CFITs don't make sense.

There was that Seneca (discussed here c. Feb 07) which piled into the Vercours mountains s. of Lyon killing 3 including a 7 year old child. What a total waste. That one didn't make sense either - except it is known the pilot didn't have oxygen so cut off all his escape options (other than a 180) even before he departed, and looking at the TAFs/METARs it must be assumed he didn't get the weather either. That flight could not have been made, without oxygen, over that terrain, in that weather. I have spoken to a number of people who knew him personally, as a pilot. But he was a high-hour IR pilot - does this make sense??

Whirlybird

29th Nov 2007, 07:45

I can think of a a possible reason why the pilot took that route. Flying round that coast can be a bit of a palaver. You have high cliffs at one point, and you sometimes need to be either well above them or quite a bit out to sea to avoid turbulence. If you cut across to Colwyn Bay, it's shorter, and in halfway decent weather you're so near the coast that you always have an escape route.

They had already left Caernarfon and returned and refuelled. They now faced a long detour home. And the weather wasn't that bad. Maybe cutting off that corner and saving a little time just seemed like a sensible thing to do, and the pilot figured he'd head for the coast if the weather worsened. I've done that in those mountains, and it usually works. But this time, it didn't. :(:(:(

It doesn't look sensible to us now. But hindsight is always an exact science.

172driver

29th Nov 2007, 07:53

I think we are discussing the wrong thing here. While IMC certainly was the killer, the underlying cause was the decision making process that led this poor chap into the mountains in the first place.

On the face of it, this is puzzling: low terrain and indeed the sea lay just off the track this pilot chose to fly. So why did he elect to plough on into the clouds and then into a mountainside?

The only explanation (if indeed there is one), I can come up with is that the guy got so totally fixated on a pre-planned route that he did not even entertain any deviation from it.

Experience comes into play here. He was a rather low-hour pilot and probably spent quite some time planning this flight. We know he got all the relevant briefings, even made the correct decision to abandon his first attempt. He then had the luxury of a 'scout' (the a/c that flew the Menai Straights route), yet didn't heed any of the information available to him. Why? Could it be that he felt too insecure to deviate from his planned route which was marked up on his chart? Perhaps he felt it would take too much time to plan the new route? I am not familiar with the area, but following the coastline should have been a piece of cake in terms of navigation.

Still baffled......:confused:

Fuji Abound

29th Nov 2007, 11:13

http://i233.photobucket.com/albums/ee112/fujiabound/bathesda2.jpg

This gives you an idea of the topography of the area. We know the aircraft was either a little north or south of Bathesda.

http://i233.photobucket.com/albums/ee112/fujiabound/bathesda.jpg

Something like this might have been what the pilot could see looking forward along his track line as he approached Bathesda perhaps 15 minutes or so before the accident.

http://i233.photobucket.com/albums/ee112/fujiabound/bathesda1.jpg

.. .. .. and this is what he might have seen looking north out of his left hand window.

Visualising the topography I am now more convinced that it was as he approached Bathesda the "mistakes" were made.

It seems to me there were some attractive valleys ahead which almost certainly would have been clear of cloud - and one in particluar stands out.
I am not certain exactly where the accident site was on this map but none of the valleys are particularly attractive once you get to the top of them (with possibly one exception if you really knew the area well.)

At Bathesda the more northern route was still clearly visible and the pilot may well have been able to see the sea in the distance. However it is also interesting as he passed Bathesda the ground would have risen steeply to his north and the ridge may well have been covered in cloud. His only escape was now a 180 turn and route back to Bathesda and turn north.

However you can clearly see in the first image how the cloud would have accumulated on the prevailing northern escarpment (with the wind from the north) so that the further towards Bathesda the aircraft went the less attractive turning north might have seemed.

QDMQDMQDM

29th Nov 2007, 12:05

FA,
You have done some terrific analysis, but you are failing to see the wood for the trees. The message from this accident is very clear and very valuable: don't press on in dodgy weather towards and through mountains. Even if it looks like it might be OK, it also might not and unless you are an experienced mountain pilot who knows these particular mountains very well then the Plan B which you think you can depend on may not turn out so dependable after all.

We can speculate and speculate as to why he chose this route, but the fact remains that it was a very basic error. Any mountain pilot (any pilot!) will tell you that pressing on into unknown mountains in uncertain weather at low level is a very silly thing to do. End of story. How much analysis do you need to do here?!

QDM

Whirlybird

29th Nov 2007, 12:20

I know quite a few people who've nearly come to grief in those mountains. I was one of them - as a very, very new PPL(A) I flew over the tops from Welshpool to Caernarfon, scared myself trying to fly through a teeny weeny cloud on the way back, did a 180 and began the long trek round the North coast, eventually getting home safely. A friend mentioned in an earlier post who knows Snowdonia well hit unexpected turbulence which he almost couldn't outclimb. Another low hours pilot friend tried to follow a valley, and the cloud got thicker and thicker and lower and lower...he made it, luckily.

If you learn to fly in the South you treat mountains with the respect they deserve. If you fly out of Caernarfon, Welshpool, Shobdon and similar airfields....you learn to fly in mountains very early on. Except...you don't, not really! You get used to flying in lowish hills in good weather. You understand a bit about winds in mountains, and where to aim for in the event of engine failure. But you don't really know what you don't know...and realise just how much that encompasses. Mountain flying is a very definite skill.

In the case of me and the friends mentioned, we thought we knew the mountains and how to fly in them. We were over-confident, basically.

If G-EMMA had been caught out in bad weather at Caernarfon, she'd have followed the coast. So would I - I've scared myself too often, and I might have more hours these days, but I don't take risks now I know the extent of the risks. But a lowish hours pilot who feels comfortable in those fairly familiar hills????

We'll never know, but over-confidence COULD have been what did it. :(

Fuji Abound

29th Nov 2007, 12:54

You have done some terrific analysis, but you are failing to see the wood for the trees. The message from this accident is very clear and very valuable: don't press on in dodgy weather towards and through mountains. Even if it looks like it might be OK, it also might not and unless you are an experienced mountain pilot who knows these particular mountains very well then the Plan B which you think you can depend on may not turn out so dependable after all.

I do hope I am not!

I wanted to understand better why this pilot did what he did and where it all went wrong.

I dont agree it was a case of pressing on in dodgy weather - that is far two simple - although that was obviously what ultimately lead to the accident.

I think the weather in which he departed was more than good enough for the sector proposed - although perhaps not for his level of experience.

What I couldnt understand is why he pressed on at Bathesda over the mountains when he could so easily have turned north without adding hardly any time to his journey. Pilots usually make those sort of decisions for a reason and particularly one who had already demonstrated he was prepared to turn back as he did earlier in the day. Remember he wasnt in a rush it would seem, he was prepared to turn back, he had flown the same route earlier that day and I am sure he knew he could track along the coast over low ground and in reasonable weather.

I could be wrong, but I now think he saw a clear route through the valley - maybe the same way as he had come. That was poor judgement but at least I can understand why he did it.

That is a subtely different message becasue it illustrates how easy it is even when there is a very simple alternative for pilots to be attracted into flying up a valley.

I suspect this pilot really believed that he could continue up one of the valleys shown in the graphic and over, otherwise I dont think he would have done so. Had the valleys not been there, or had they presented in a different way, I believe he would have "diverted" to the north.

.. .. .. so in short there are lots of message in aviation that are clear and most pilots could resite them till the cows come home, but accidents like this continue to happen. Understanding why the pilot decided to ignore something he knew well I think is equally as important. For me at least this accident illustrates just how enticing on that day flying up the valley must have seemed and that in spite of your message how many other pilots might have been tempted, unless they had read this thread.

FullyFlapped

29th Nov 2007, 13:03

Anyone know what the QNH was at the time of the crash (actual, not regional) ?

FF :ok:

QDMQDMQDM

29th Nov 2007, 13:47

I could be wrong, but I now think he saw a clear route through the valley - maybe the same way as he had come. That was poor judgement but at least I can understand why he did it.

That is a subtely different message becasue it illustrates how easy it is even when there is a very simple alternative for pilots to be attracted into flying up a valley.

I suspect this pilot really believed that he could continue up one of the valleys shown in the graphic and over, otherwise I dont think he would have done so. Had the valleys not been there, or had they presented in a different way, I believe he would have "diverted" to the north.

This thread has gone on far too long, but you keep missing a very important point that should be noted. It is not easy and should not be easy to be enticed into flying up a valley towards high ground in poor weather, even if it looks like you might be able to squeak through. You shouldn't go up any valley, especially in uncertain weather and wind conditions, without at least 1,000 feet in hand at the start to clear the saddle at the top and a clear plan of escape if it doesn't work out.

He made a very basic error in flying towards high ground in dodgy weather and you are complicating things too much. This is an easy and useful lesson to learn from this accident.

Beware paralysis by analysis.

Fuji Abound

29th Nov 2007, 14:23

He made a very basic error in flying towards high ground in dodgy weather and you are complicating things too much. This is an easy and useful lesson to learn from this accident.

It has gone on faaaar to long, so this is my last on the matter.

However, I can assure you I have got to grips with your comment. I dont know why you feel the need to keep repeating yourself.

If you cant understand the difference between someone making "a very basic error" and wanting to understand why (particularly given the less than usual circumstances) we best leave it at that.

Clearly the correct anaylsis is: "the accident was caused by controlled flight in terrain, a factor was the pilot made a basic error".

RIP

QDMQDMQDM

29th Nov 2007, 14:27

My point is there is no point trying to understand too deeply 'why'.

Agree -- finished now.

DFC

29th Nov 2007, 21:05

Shy Torque,

As a recent recruit to the aviation industry, you may learn in time that not everything you must do to be safe is written down.

Simply read the highlighted words to find the legal backing for the word must.

Regards,

DFC

ShyTorque

29th Nov 2007, 21:45

DFC, Thanks for confirming my suspicion that you are merely a poor wind-up merchant. Fly IFR limits on all VFR flights? Some of us would get no work done. I suggest you stick to your Flight Simulator gaming console. :rolleyes:

Noted: Just ignore all after the word DFC from now on.

bookworm

30th Nov 2007, 13:24

After having read most of the thread and all of the AAIB report, I remain puzzled: what possessed the man to fly through the mountains when low terrain and sea lay just a few miles off intended track ??

The anti-GPS lobby should have a field day with this. The pilot followed the direct-to track right into the side of a mountain. It's proof that pilots get fixated on the magenta line and fail to do proper flight planning...

Just one flaw in the theory, of course: the pilot had no GPS.

DFC

30th Nov 2007, 15:31

Fly IFR limits on all VFR flights

I never said that.

Regards,

DFC

Fuji Abound

30th Nov 2007, 15:45

The AAIB report didn't say whether he had a GPS or not (from which Fuji inferred he didn't).

Only as a point of order - I also said that they usually try to recover the route flown if there was a GPS and will comment (if there was one) that they couldnt.

Agreed it was by inference only though.

IO540

1st Dec 2007, 06:31

If the black line is the radar track, the pilot was doing some huge heading changes, up to 90 degrees, which don't seem to be supported by any terrain requirements. Were they taking pictures?

The AAIB don't miss a trick with a GPS found in the wreckage. If they didn't mention it, one can assume it wasn't there.

Whirlybird

1st Dec 2007, 07:22

He hadn't ever flown the accident route before. The route he had flown early in the day was from Shobdon to Caernarfon.

No, his outward route had been Shobdon to Colwyn Bay, then direct to Caernarfon. In the AAIB report it says that he discussed the route home, and they decided if they couldn't fly the direct route they would fly the reverse of their outward route.

I'm wondering....
Did the pilot perhaps not even think of following the coast? When you do your PPL, many instructors emphasise lines on maps and headings; track crawls and following line features are somewhat frowned upon. I agree it sounds crazy, but is it possible that the idea of following an unfamiliar coastline didn't even occur to him, if he'd never done it before? After all, he only had 116 hours. And with 12 done in the last 90 days, this could well be someone who learned to fly less than two years ago - an average 60 hours to PPL at an airfield well inland, then a year flying alone. And summer 2006 was unusually good, so he might not have been used to nasty weather in the montains, if he'd ever flown in them at all.

It makes as much sense as anything else in this sad episode. I intend to learn from it, and emphasise to my students that they can take any sensible route and plan it any sensible way, especially in bad weather. Though to be honest, in helicopters we do tend to do that anyway.

Tony Hirst

1st Dec 2007, 08:03

I'm not so sure there is much of a mystery. From the report we suspect that the visibility was not much above 4km, that he might have been flying 300' lower than he thought and that they didn't fly the coast route as they said they would.

The crucial point for me is the visibility. 4km visibility, despite being above VMC minima, is bloody awful. In a Cessna there would only be about 80-90 seconds from visual of the hill/mountain to impact. Clearly it is conceivable that some workload issues and the attendant distractions would reduce this time to much less than not very much, conceivably not enough to avoid. Especially considering the potential altimeter error, it is highly likely that the minute required to climb the 500' needed to clear the hill would be insufficient. The runner does say that the engine pitch seemed to increase just before the accident.

Fuji Abound

1st Dec 2007, 08:11

Fuji, I know we are probably boring the pants off some people, but I think your going the wrong way with your understanding, I'm only saying this as I think you are as interested as I am regarding why this pilot made the decisions he did.

Well done EMMA - I love you!

There are some on here who would say - oh well, another CFIT, stupid fella, all he had to do was stick to the basic mantras.

Of course whilst true, that achieves nothing.

A great deal can be learnt by trying to understand what happened and why it happened - what was going on in the mind of the pilot. From that understanding accidents of this type are less likely to occur in the future and (lest we also forget the basic mantras) we are also less likely ourselves to make the same mistakes.

Sure as the day is long despite the basic mantras accidents of this sort continue to happen but I think because of your interest in wanting to understand why you are far les likely for it to ever happen to you.

B twit - yes I agree a more complete understanding of the radar trace would be very interesting. I also wonder if the AAIB looked at the radar trace of the outbound flight to see which route the pilot had taken? I also meant to check what time of day it was - late afternoon I think - but I cant recall the time of year. Where was the sun and what impact might that have had on visibility?

bjornhall

1st Dec 2007, 10:19

There are some on here who would say - oh well, another CFIT, stupid fella, all he had to do was stick to the basic mantras.

Of course whilst true, that achieves nothing.

A great deal can be learnt by trying to understand what happened and why it happened - what was going on in the mind of the pilot. From that understanding accidents of this type are less likely to occur in the future and (lest we also forget the basic mantras) we are also less likely ourselves to make the same mistakes.

Makes good sense.

But on the other hand... Maybe that simplistic "stick with the basic mantras" view is indeed the most important and useful lesson to be learnt, not specifically from this accident, but from the sum total of hundreds of similar accidents that have happened to anything from low-hours PPLs to 20,000+ hour airliner captains?

All prompted by some very bad decisions, taken during circumstances that are conducive to bad decisions.

While there are of course many situations where there may be sufficiently safe (or even safer) to depart from the 'basic mantras', one's ability to pinpoint those situations the course of "tactical decision making", in the air or in a challenging situation just before a flight about to go sour, is seriously limited.

Or in other words: The closer one is to the plane, and especially while in the air, the more important it is to stick with 'rule based' decision making, and stay away from 'knowledge based' behavior, to the largest extent possible.

The realization that 'knowledge based' decision making is a remarkably error prone process, and best undertaken in the safety and stress free behavior of one's home, whereas tactical decision making should be 'rule based' whenever possible; that lesson I find even more useful than trying to understand how and why this particular pilot made his mistakes in this particular case.

pulse1

1st Dec 2007, 11:01

I am particularly interested in this accident because I am planning to go to Caenarfon next year and am keen to learn any lessons I can.

I happened to have the above chart on the screen just now and Mrs p walked in. I explained what I was looking at and she immediately suggested that he was closely following the mountain line and, just where he crashed, that line turns Northwards. If he was looking more to the right, at the mountainside, he might not have seen the change in direction in the poor visibility until it was too late. The radar plot looks as if he turned left just before the crash.

Whether this is the correct explanation or not, the lesson for me is to keep well clear of mountains unless:

1. The visibility is good and likely to stay good. At the first sign of deterioration, turn away.

2. There is no chance of turbulence i.e wind very light. From my gliding days, a change in direction of a hillside is often a site of more severe turbulence.

Tony Hirst

1st Dec 2007, 12:41

It suggests they did know the coastal route existed, as they arrived by it?
Not just that, but according to the report they said they would fly the coast route back, but obviously changed their minds at some point after takeoff.

As per my previous post, I agree with Pulse1 that the visibility is probably the core part of the gotcha. I am surprised to read another previous post suggesting that 4km vis would not have posed any issues though :confused:

IO540

1st Dec 2007, 16:41

would be fascinated to know if radar tracks always look jagged like this due to accuracy of the fix

No, they are supposed to be pretty good. I've seen some and they were straight. Also, if under IFR under a "radar heading" I deviate say 10 degrees from my track (due to the autopilot taking a few tens of seconds to stabilise after a track intercept) ATC are onto me within seconds.

However, radar does not have the absolute position accuracy people think it has. At say 30nm, there can be a 2nm error in azimuth. Less so on the distance to the head. Your GPS is 100x more accurate than ATC radar when it comes to your position. I've been told on a few occassions that I was close to /in some airspace but clearly I wasn't, and confirmed it at the time with a DME reading.

DFC

1st Dec 2007, 17:48

The radar plot is a general guide to the progress of the aircraft.

The first thing one has to remember is that the radar only sees the aircraft once every 4 seconds if an approach radar (15 RPM) and once every 6 seconds for enroute (if I remember correctly) (10 RPM).

The second is that when the return comes back to the radar a bit of electronics decides the exact position of the aircraft and this combined with the accuracy of the radar, reflections from mountains etc can mean that the position plotted hops from side to side of the actual track of the aircraft.

Remember also that the radar provides an indication of track, if the wind speed changes by some 10Kt and heading remains constant then crusiing at 90Kt, there will be a noticeable change in drift.

Thus it would be more helpful to plot the actual radar returns (or responses if SSR was used) and leave the blanks between just that - blank.

Now I don't know a low time VFR pilot that can hold a heading perfectly for any length of time. Even if you glued the heading on the DI to the lubber line, the heading would drift due to the precession of the gyro.

So all we can take from the radar trace is that the pilot paralled track until after passing overhead Caernarfon where it appears a track correction was made until the aircraft regained planned track and then the TMG followed the planned track.

---------------

I wish UK flight instructors would learn that planning to use the coast or another obvious line feature as a handrail during visual navigation is not track crawling. I wish that they would also teach that with such an obvious handrail present, provided one remains on the correct side, one can ignore obstacles on the other side and thus plan a lower minimum level to fly at.

If the pilot recorded their minimum level as 4900 and their planned level as 1800 then where in the training system did they learn that it was OK to fly underground?

4900 - 300 for unknown obstacle = 4600 which is 1000ft above the highest terrain on the chart.

4600 - 500 = 4100 puts the flight potentially operating at the minimum level which is the absolute legal limit according to ICAO and most other countries. In the UK, there is no such limit but if 500ft above terrain and passing over a 4ft 0ins person, the low flying rules are breached by 4ft.

4100 - 500 = 3600 which is potentially ground level.

Planning to fly at half the height of the terrain is criminal............but is it the pilot or the training that is at fault?

The whole idea of calling it a minimum is that it is a minimum. How you calculate the minimum or the margins used do not change the fact the the chosen minimum is the minimum.

One also wonders what factor the incorrect fear of infringing a MATZ that sometimes is seen in the UK forced the pilot to keep as far as possible from the Valley MATZ. Was this a factor which detered the pilot from simply flying north after take-off until the coast was reached?

Regards,

DFC

Gertrude the Wombat

1st Dec 2007, 17:57

provided one remains on the correct side... which is, of course, the wrong side when you're got a RHS passenger you've taken up for sight-seeing.

Which way round the Isle of Wight (or any other island) do people fly then? The obvious desired direction is clockwise, a mile or so out over the sea, so that the passenger gets the view of the island's coast. This is of course against the rules.

llanfairpg

1st Dec 2007, 18:02

It is interesting to see that everyone lays the blaim completely with the pilot. Knowing more than some of you might I would suggest it may be educational to also look in the direction of the school he learnt to fly at, the instructors, the standards and the pilots flying order book.

Give some thought to if you owned a flying school or club would you mark this departure airfield as one that needed an instructor briefing before setting out?

Its no use describing a pilot as a low hour PPL after the accident, describe him as such before the flight and give him the support and help that should go with a tight professionally run operation.

IO540

2nd Dec 2007, 08:30

Knowing more than some of you might I would suggest it may be educational to also look in the direction of the school he learnt to fly at, the instructors, the standards and the pilots flying order book.

I couldn't agree more.

Some of the practices in PPL training are atrocious.

But nothing can be done about that. The best one can hope for is that people will be sufficiently intelligent to identify the problem areas (like the crappy fuel management practices that go on) and either do things differently, or chuck in flying altogether.

The vast majority do the latter, which is another reason why things carry on. Very few people get a chance to really test their training. If everybody with a PPL used it to fly regularly from A to B, there would be mayhem.

Tony Hirst

2nd Dec 2007, 08:54

I can't see anything in the report that could be attributed to training.

May I suggest, if you can still find a copy, "The Pilot in Command" by Martin Cass. It is about incomprehensible and inexplicable decisions by pilots who did know better. A horrible thing to say, but judging by my interpretation of the report, this sadly seems to be the case here too.

bookworm

2nd Dec 2007, 10:06

Give some thought to if you owned a flying school or club would you mark this departure airfield as one that needed an instructor briefing before setting out?

If we were talking about a student pilot, perhaps. But we're not. We're talking about a pilot qualified as a PPL. The day he signs his licence is the day that the responsibility for the safe conduct of any flight passes from a school or club to him. There's nothing to stop him asking for help, but the CAA has deemed him fit to be the commander of an aircraft and the decisions should be his.

llanfairpg

2nd Dec 2007, 12:17

Tony

Thanks but in nearly 20,000 hours of flying from Tipsy Nippers to the Airbus I have many of my own experiences to call upon rather than reading books, although I will at some stage look at this book as I think it is always important to keep an open mind. I would caution everybody to give some thought about that just because something is in print does not mean it is correct or even wise. As a researcher( in another area) I can assure you that the number of factual errors in books are quite alarming.

Bookworm

Thank you, The accident reports over the last 50 years show that virtually all fatal accidents occur with low hour pilot’s after they have signed the licence which slightly invalidates your argument.

Why do you think for instance this particular pilot never killed himself while he was training, here are some clues for you.

Supervision
Authorisation
Familiarity with the destination flown to.

If this doesn’t work for you could reflect on, ‘

‘ A rulebook is a guide to a wise man and a bible for a fool!

Tony Hirst

2nd Dec 2007, 13:00

llanfairpg,

I fear you have the wrong end of the stick. I don't doubt your expertise I didn't intend for my post to suggest otherwise. I just don't see the connection at the moment. Mainly because, according to the report, the pilot seemed to exercise good judgement up until some point shortly after departure of the last flight.
Give some thought to if you owned a flying school or club would you mark this departure airfield as one that needed an instructor briefing before setting out?
Probably yes. But I'm not sure that is really the issue: a) I don't see the specific relevance of the club environment in relation to the accident and b) My earlier comment on judgement indicates this was not born from ignorance.

bookworm

2nd Dec 2007, 13:56

Thank you, The accident reports over the last 50 years show that virtually all fatal accidents occur with low hour pilot’s after they have signed the licence ...

That's nonsense.

If you look at CAP667 covering fatal accidents from 1985-94, the average total hours of pilots involved in fatal GA accidents was 1843. 43% of them had more than 1000 hours. Without details of corresponding hours flown, it's impossible to say if recent PPLs are more or less likely to have a fatal accident. Interestingly, for CFIT, 50% had more than 1000 total hours.

If you look at the US equivalent, the 2006 Nall report, it shows 31% of fatal accident commanders as having less than 500 hours, 19% between 500 and 1000. It adds:

The first 500 hours of a pilot’s flying career
are the most critical, with 34.9 percent of the total and
30.7 percent of fatal accidents occurring within that
timeframe. It should be noted that pilots at this experience
level fly the vast majority of flying hours. As such,
these statistics may not reflect the true safety record of
less experienced pilots, but rather their increased
exposure.

But the accident stats are not really the point. Safety management in general aviation is not about minimizing accidents. That would be easy: ban everything that's not a multi-pilot and multi-engine turbine operation. Against accident rate, you have to balance the operational value and, for want of a better expression, the emotional value of flying. Part of that is about establishing a regulatory environment in which pilots can do what they want to do without nannying. If I hire out an aircraft to a qualified pilot, I don't expect to provide a risk management service for the renter, to tell him or her what is an acceptable level of risk, beyond what is important to me as the owner.

Fuji Abound

2nd Dec 2007, 14:18

Bookworm

There may even be a problem with that analysis.

The drop out put rate is very high, so the population of low hour pilots is far higher that high hour pilots.

If pilots only suffered fatal accidents evey time an engine stopped for example the number of fatal accidents would be higher in the first group just becasue the population is larger.

It would be interesting to plot the cases of CFIT against pilot hours excluding those with an IR.

llanfairpg

2nd Dec 2007, 14:19

Thank you for your replys

Bookworm

My point is that there are more accidents when low hour pilots operate without appropriate guidance.

I believe there is a responsiblity when hiring an aircraft to a club member whether he is a 20,000 hour airline pilot or a student. I believe it to be part of a process which I call professional flying. If me, trying to act as a responsible professional pilot is nonsense to you I apologise.

To Gemma and Tony

First of all please read and understand what I said

It is interesting to see that everyone lays the blaim completely with the pilot. Knowing more than some of you might I would suggest it may be educational to also look in the direction of the school he learnt to fly at, the instructors, the standards and the pilots flying order book.

This is not pointing the finger of blame at the flying club and to suggest such would be defamation, please look again at the underlined text.

Consider that hiring an aircraft from this club would require authorisation. Authorisation, not from a cleaner but a qualfied and experienced pilot most likely a flying instructor. Ask yourselves how you define authorisation and what you would expect from the authoriser? If the pilot had written in Heathrow or Fair Isle would you have just expected a signature and a pat in the back too? Interestingly at the same club (many years ago)I saw the situation where a PPL wanted to go to a grass strip and when the CFI came to authorise it he refused saying, " you might get in with the Regent buy you will only get it out on a lorry!"

Here is another example that may encourage further discussion outside of the blinkered box many of you seem to be in but please remember we are all agreeing this accident was pilot error, its just that I like the phrase ERROR CHAIN better as it encourages less bias and therefore more proactive discussion.

Around 28 years ago I was at the club concerned in the bar having a discusion with someone I knew and liked very much. We were talking about flying in cloud. something this pilot did all the time as a PPL. He was very proud of the fact that he had never had a days instrument training in his life. I still remember his words well he said, " I am happy to sit in cloud all day".
The discussion went into all the training he should have had and the fact he should not be flying in cloud without proper training, I gave him a moderate bollicking I suppose. When I left the club bar and was oustide I put my ear to the door to listen to what he would say next and again I will never forget his words.

"You cannot tell these young instructors anything"

The next year he flew into the Snowdon range while flying from Birmingham to the IOM killing himself and 5 passengers. Ironically just a few miles away from the accident we are discussing

IO540

2nd Dec 2007, 14:57

The drop out put rate is very high, so the population of low hour pilots is far higher that high hour pilots.

Very good point Fuji - however we don't know whether the large majority that give up early (say, within 100hrs or the first 2 years) have actually been anywhere. It's very possible that most of them have done only short local trips on nice days.

I think the whole "pilot experience v. getting killed in a CFIT" picture is complicated.

A CFIT is a very elementary error if flying under IFR.

There are no doubt a few cases where an IFR pilot relied on some piece of technological data for terrain clearance and it turned out to have been wrong - there is a bunch of suspected cases in the USA, connected with a particular piece of avionics displaying terrain data from a particular vendor (who incidentally is well aware of it) which has been unmasked as being wrong by anything up to a few thousand feet, and some unexplained deaths correlate with the usage of it. There is a flight planning program from the same vendor with similar crap terrain data. Admittedly only a fool would fly IFR using such references but "you and I know that" and a pilot would normally assume the data in front of him is correct.

But most IFR CFITs will be very simple errors.

Some will be due to loss of SA when following an IAP of various levels of complexity and I suppose this could happen to any of us. Many airline crews have done it too. This is why I have GPWS.

But this accident was supposedly under VFR. The CAA chart is not defective in that area so I think it must have been an unplanned VMC to IMC transition together with loss of navigation. If he didn't have a GPS, he would have been stuffed in IMC at those low levels among the terrain.

llanfairpg

2nd Dec 2007, 15:21

10540 thanks for reminding us that it a controled flight into terrain

there is a good AIC on the subject

AIC 122/2006

It does apply to private operations too

llanfairpg

2nd Dec 2007, 15:32

GEMMA

You have those privileges now, the ability to make a mistake is an ability we all share. The ability to analyse objectively and comprehensively and to learn from such mistakes is a little rarer and contributes to the explanation of why most high ground in this country usually has bits of aircraft upon it.

You want to learn from this sad accident so you tell me, where do you thiink the error chain began?

Tony Hirst

2nd Dec 2007, 16:06

llanfairpg (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=134530),

I understand what you are saying, so may not be as blinkered as the limited medium of an internet forum might suggest :) Your assertion that the accident may have its roots in the pilot's training is potentially valid but unquantifiable and according the to report as I read it, unidentifiable.

The general notion that somehow PPLs accidents are related to training is really a platitude until it is possible to identify where the training/support is falling short. The utilisation of authorisations to validate a pilot's plan is universal within the bounds of my experience. The idea of specifying mandatory familiarisation training for some airfields as they do in the commercial world is potentially a reasonable one. But I still can't relate the AAIB report to your more generalised views.

llanfairpg

2nd Dec 2007, 16:58

Thanks Tony

I am not really sure what your point is.

The AIB have realy summed up this accident by stating in conclusion

An early climb to MSA which was accurately marked on the pliots flight log or an accuratetely flown track over the Menai Straits would have almost certainly prevented this tragic accident.

My point is that this is one part of the error chain that took place minutes before the accident and that the accidents error chain can be taken back a lot further than this.

By the way at no time have I suggested there shoud be mandatory familiarisation training for difficult airfields in private flying

llanfairpg

2nd Dec 2007, 17:09

A better way to understand what I am saying may be to think along the lines of you are at your airfield, you take off and at 800 feet straight ahead you have a total engine failure in a single.

What do you do

You turn back

You lower the nose and select a field

You freeze and do nothing (this is what you would most likely do without any training)

I suggest you will react in the way you were trained (thats the general idea of course)

Now go back to our accident--how did the pilot react faced with an urgent decision.

My suggestion is to you is he was never put in this position under training either in a simulated training experience or in a briefed situation.

Reacting to flight in reducing visibllity below MSA is not a skill you wake up with one morning its a skill that needs briefing, teaching and simulated practice.

Before you ask, yes I did teach it but I never found another instructor that did!

Should add, worked at 12 flying schools CFI at three of them and owner of one doing FIC training

bookworm

2nd Dec 2007, 17:52

I believe there is a responsiblity when hiring an aircraft to a club member whether he is a 20,000 hour airline pilot or a student.

The responsibility is to provide a serviceable aircraft and check that the pilot is certfied to fly it. Just as when Hertz or Avis hires a car. Beyond that, any assistance offered should be at the request of the commander.

If me, trying to act as a responsible professional pilot is nonsense to you I apologise.

You're trying to act like a nanny. Most of the responsible professional pilots I know respect the authority of the commander of an aircraft to make decisions for themselves.

Tony Hirst

2nd Dec 2007, 17:56

llanfairpg,

My point was that he clearly understood the situation (i.e. training worked), but appeared to cast it aside (if the case, just what can you do about that?).

Now go back to our accident--how did the pilot react faced with an urgent decision...Reacting to flight in reducing visibllity below MSA is not a skill you wake up with one morning its a skill that needs briefing, teaching and simulated practice.
Ah, understood. Difficult one to deal with though. The opportunity to train for this in flight isn't realistically going to present itself. Drawing on my own experience, unless one has experienced marginal VMC one just doesn't appreciate how awful it can be.

Whirlybird

2nd Dec 2007, 19:02

Look, I'm late back and I've only skimmed today's posts on this thread, but one thing I think you all need to bear in mind....

Pilots from Shobdon, Welshpool, Sleap, Liverpool etc fly to Caernarfon on a very, very, very regular basis. It's an extremely popular destination. It doesn't require any special kind of checkout, because you have a coastal route if you can't fly over the mountains - and the majority of the time, you can't. I've flown to Caernarfon more times than I can remember, but I can count on the fingers of one hand how many times I've got over those mountains, and I don't need a whole hand. There's also a southern coastal route with a nice wide valley east from Aberystwyth, but let's not complicate matters.

Now, I've discussed reasons for the pilot in question NOT going via the coast, and I still think they're all possibilities. But unfortunately you can't do very much about poor decision-making, over-confidence, or get-home-itis. I somehow doubt that a reminder not to cross Snowdonia in poor weather would have helped much in this case.

But the point I wanted to make is that flying to Caernarfon is not difficult, not special, not unusual, and absolutely no big deal. It was the very first flight I did, alone, after I got my PPL. It was one of the last I did before I moved to Derbyshire. OK? Got it?

Fuji Abound

2nd Dec 2007, 21:19

Yesterday I would have said it started when they planned the alternative route back the way they came. Now I realise it started in training. Simple as that.

I dont think it is that simple.

The pilot turned back once, almost certainly in conditions no worse and possibly better than on his second flight.

He demonstrated he knew not to push on in poor weather.

There has been much talk about how poor the vis. was. I dont see the evidence for this, other than the comment from the fell walker which is subjective. It may have been poor, it might not. We cant be sure.

paddyav8r

2nd Dec 2007, 21:44

Hey - what a great thread!

Can I add my two cents worth?

The discussion seems to have drifted onto the merits of instrument flying, training, judgement and the like, but perhaps the original post was meant to point out the stupidity of the coroner's statement - go back and read the second last last line of the news report...

QUOTE
Recording his verdict, coroner Dewi Pritchard Jones said over the years he had held a number of inquests involving plane crashes in Snowdonia.
"I want to highlight the dangers of flying in the mountains," he said.

"It is very easy in cloud to lose sight of the ground.

"Unfortunately he wasn't aware of the change in ground level in that area," he added.
END QUOTE

Now I don't know about any of you lot, but I find it real difficult to see the ground when in cloud...

JK

Fuji Abound

2nd Dec 2007, 21:54

I now believe he drew the line on the map, but it wasn't planning, it was just a line because he had been told to draw a line on the map. He set off to do the coastal route, lost track in marginal VMC and hit the first high ground above 1800' they encountered.

How do you explain the numerous course corrections putting him back on track even it would seem to the site of the accident?

DFC

2nd Dec 2007, 22:07

One big training issue highlighted here is the lack of training in how to set yourself some rules and to stick rigidely to those rules.

For example if you decide that you will calculate the minimum level for VFR flight as 1000ft above the MEF on the 1:500,000 chart then you must;

a) Stick to that rule and require VMC at that level; and

b) Accept that there will be very few days when one can fly in the vicinity of Caernarfon.

or

Use 10nm either side of track ot 5nm either side of track or one of those combined with the use of handrails to guarantee lateral separation between the aircraft and the obstacles which can then be ignored.........and find that toy can fly on many more days.

No matter which you use they must be safe and must be stuck to because the day your rule is ignored is the day you may stop flying (suddenly and painfully).

Regards,

DFC

Whirlybird

3rd Dec 2007, 07:10

Accept that there will be very few days when one can fly in the vicinity of Caernarfon.

To be precise, very few days when you can fly ACROSS SNOWDONIA to Caernarfon. You can always fly along the coast, both north and south, just keeping over the sea. Your only issues then will be possible turbulence from the cliffs, and keeping away from the nearly 2000 ft obstacle (TV mast, I think) just to the south.

IO540

3rd Dec 2007, 08:30

I've been going to Welshpool quite a bit and 75% of the time it is not flyable down there, except perhaps scud running in a helicopter. One has to fly high, get a radar letdown from say Shawbury, and then work one's way in there through the valleys. Or, do a DIY letdown with a GPS/VOR/DME fix somewhere flat and proceed through a valley.

Even in perfect VMC the area is not navigable using map reading because the hills all look the same. I could fly the same route 5 times and still turn into the wrong valley because it looks just like half a dozen others. The locals will of course disagree vigorously but that's because they are ..... locals :)

A GPS, proper MSA planning, and instrument flight privileges, are the solution. Or, rigidly sticking to VMC and flying slowly enough to never end up somewhere you can't tun around.

Whirlybird

3rd Dec 2007, 12:07

IO540,

Come on now, that's all a gross exaggeration! I learned to fly FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT at Welshpool, not helicopters. And I didn't do any scud running. To be sure, it gets its share of poor weather, and probably more than the centrally heated southern UK. :) But you really are exaggerating.

As for nav in that area, you're clearly out of practice. There are very simple ways to find Welshpool. From the north-east you can follow the river and/or the railway line to Welshpool town, which is a couple of miles due north of the airfield. From the south-west, there is a valley with a road, river, and railway line - follow it. Follow the railway line all the way from Shrewsbury if you want - that was our marginal weather route in. From other directions it's harder, though you can fly straight down Lake Vyrnwy and keep going, and you'll get there. But with a 04/22 runway, the airfield all but disappears if approaching from the east or west, it's true.

You don't need to be a local to know the above. It's clear enough if you look at the chart, plus Pooleys for the runway direction. That's what VFR pilots do (in case you've forgotten ;)) Unless we're really good at nav, we rarely just draw a line and follow it, at least not in hills. Though I've approached Welshpool from every direction, before I knew the area, and basically, when you get to the aforementioned railway line, work out where you are and follow it. It's not difficult. I once got off track, ended up at Oswestry, and thought it was Newtown, but you have to be almost asleep to do that! But I was a student on my second solo nav in hazy conditions, and anyway, I managed to sort it out.

I've flown all over Wales with nothing but a map and compass; it's easy. Even easier in these days of wind farms. :) I'm sure they put them there to make nav easier for us.

bookworm

3rd Dec 2007, 12:39

Use 10nm either side of track ot 5nm either side of track or one of those combined with the use of handrails to guarantee lateral separation between the aircraft and the obstacles which can then be ignored.........and find that toy can fly on many more days.

I like the idea of "handrails" but even those are prone to error, particularly in poor visibility. One could, for example, use a road or even a line of hills as a "handrail", but if you mis-identify or lose sight of the handrail, you're potentially in just as much trouble. A coastline is nice, but we rarely have that luxury.

The 1000 ft margin seems excessive for VFR. If you can see the obstacles to avoid them laterally, which is the whole point of VFR, you don't need to be 1000 ft above. We wonder why a pilot wrote down "4900" as a minimum safe altitude and then planned to fly at 1800 ft. Perhaps it's because by using the grid MEF + 1000, he had flown below that MSA figure many times before without incident, so that 4900 seemed irrelevant?

llanfairpg

3rd Dec 2007, 15:41

Strange that so many of you do not seem to be able to read past the fact that the aircraft went into a cloud with a hard centre.

The accident was caused by a series(eror chain) of very poor command decisions possibly which started with the commanders poor training. Its difficult for some pilots to have the knowledge and capability that some on here feel they were born with. What may be common sense and obvious to one person is not necessary that to an other person especialy when they are faced with unusual circumstances and a pressing need to get home.

You may well have flown to this airfield when you first got your PPL but that dosnt mean everyone else can. PPLs have a very broad range of abilitty hence the need for supervision. I know quite a few PPLs who are not safe outside of the circuit and as foir navigation, well thank god for GPS thats all I can say!

llanfairpg

3rd Dec 2007, 15:54

Gemma, just as a matter of interest where would you have routed from and to if you had have been there on the day and took the decision to fly back to Shobdon.

By the way DFC-- there are very few days when you can fly in the vacinity of Caernarfon! What in a 747!? I think you meant Snowdon!

gasax

3rd Dec 2007, 16:02

I would not disagree that flying into cumulo-granite is a dumb move. Training was the root cause - I cannot see how.

It is apparent to all lay people that flying in cloud amongst high ground is potentially fatal. To any pilot it is a little too obvious to say that we need to be trained to avoid it!

I do the majority of my flying amongst high ground and flying below the MSA is almost mandatory if you want to go somewhere. There are things that can mislead you but being suckered into cloud is not a mistake you can be unaware of.

However people do routinely enter cloud amongst high ground, in the UK it might be because 'high ground' is comparatively uncommon but 'training' people to read the height from the chart is probably not going to achieve much.

A couple of years ago a Danish pilot survived a CFIT a few miles from the house - he ran into the lower slopes of the nearest Munro - almost 1000 foot below the summit. The weather was poor and he convinced himself it was OK - yet he was crossing a ridge line that at its lowest was 1300ft and he was barely above that (at its highest it is over 3500ft).

High workload and lack of familiarity with high ground would be my guess as to why it happened, those little numbers on the chart are not seen to be that important. But it is blinding obvious that if the ground is higher than your height bad things are likely to happen. However if all of your capability is focussed on flying the aircraft, keeping a track, then maybe popping through the odd bit of cloud that is in the way doies n't set the alarms bells ringing.....

llanfairpg

3rd Dec 2007, 17:28

Funny cannot see any mountains on the route I would have flown--have a look at the map and work out from the legend what the white area is.

You may find its a similar height in East Anglia!

llanfairpg

3rd Dec 2007, 17:32

Training was the root cause - I cannot see how.

No one said training was the root cause(apart from you)

llanfairpg

3rd Dec 2007, 17:56

TONY

Ah, understood. Difficult one to deal with though. The opportunity to train for this in flight isn't realistically going to present itself. Drawing on my own experience, unless one has experienced marginal VMC one just doesn't appreciate how awful it can be.

You misunderstand again(with respect)
When i give someone and engine fire do i actually make the engine burn?I have been training students for years by taking them into an area in VMC below the MSA and suddenly saying, " we are now IMC(hood goes on or screen goes up) what are you going to do?"

This not only teaches a climb to MSA on instruments or a turn back but it teaches making a quick command decision. Obviously there is a lot more than this but it occupies a complete lesson and we always finished with a PAR at Shawbury.

My point all along(and its been hilarious seeing no one being able to get anywhere near understanding it) is that not only do we need to teach instrument flying on the PPL we need to teach making command decisions based on training. Being able to come to the correct decison is more important tham flying on limited panel!!!

This pilot made a multitude of incorrect decisions but he more than likely had never been faced with a flying day in his life before like this.

By the way I have seen many experienced commanders of public transport aircraft make poor decisions(you would not belive some of them) again decison making is a skill that most people on here feel they wake up with one morning. Its not,it needs to be taught, understood and practiced.

Think of any life threatening situation in an aircraft, its making the right decison that will save the day. You may not be an accurate pilot, you may be very inexperienced but if you make the correct decision you will survive.

llanfairpg

3rd Dec 2007, 18:19

Gemma yes and thats why I would have not authorised this PPL to fly to Caernarfon on that day.(remember the return flight needed authorisation too)

There was SC on the mountains from a moist SW airflow. i would have expected the Cheshire gap to have been clear so would have expected Hawarden -- Shrewsbury to be OK but the AIB have not supplied weather for that side.

Its the exit from Caernarfon that intersts me as I believe the pilot did not know where he was soon after leaving Caernarfon.

Consider this--why draw a line on the map, there is a better and safer one on the ground--The Menai Straits

gasax

3rd Dec 2007, 19:13

The accident was caused by a series(eror chain) of very poor command decisions possibly which started with the commanders poor training. Its difficult for some pilots to have the knowledge and capability that some on here feel they were born with. What may be common sense and obvious to one person is not necessary that to an other person especialy when they are faced with unusual circumstances and a pressing need to get home.

Looks like you're blaming training to me.....

If you want to ensure everybody always knows the answer and reacts te right way none of us would get off the ground.

Not authorising the flight? I think some decent advice might be more useful. If people are never exposed to 'difficult' conditions they will never develop any worthwhile skills.

The influence that other people in a similar position can have on other peoples thinking and actions is amazing. I've been there a few times either waiting for things to improve or deciding to go. It's very easy to set a trend.

DFC

3rd Dec 2007, 20:13

You still need to negotiate several squares with terrain that rises above the planned altitude at 1800' in 4KM visibility. Not for me thanks.

G-EMMA,

If you are using the MEF from the squares you cross on the map then I must point out a few things that your instructor has not;

It is very inefficient and unless you combine it with another rule is dangerous.

Imagine a 5000ft hill with a 3000ft mast on top just north of the southern line of latitude defining your box. The MEF is 8000ft making a minimum altitude of 8000ft + 2000ft = 10,000ft. Your airfield is just south of the northern line of lattitude some 28nm from the mast and there is no other obstacles in the box above 500ft.

You are setting yourself a criteria of minimum level VFR of 10,000ft. You are not going to do much flying without breaking your own safety limits!

Because of the lack of flying, you move to another airfield. This airfield is only 2nm south of the obstacle described above but because it is in the next "box" and few obstacles, the MEF here is 500ft making a minimum level of 1500ft.

So using your system, you can be 28nm from an obstacle but have to keep safely above it but only 2nm and be happy some 6500ft below it!

--------

Far better to use some distance each side of planned track and beyond a fix that represents you navigation accuracy. eg 5nm or 10nm each side of track. That will be more efficient and will based on the above be safer.

You can get some clear plastic and cut it to form a corridor of the desired size and a line down the middle that you place over the track.

If faced with such a departure from caernarfon and the weather described, you know how high the highest obstacle can be and thus you simply anchor your plastic track line on Caernarfon and rotate the track round until your plastic corridor gives you a route with the required obstacle clearance........probably to the north or northwest towards the coast.

Please note that the CAA in the navigation exam use the MEF figures to base the safe level on (add 1000 or 2000 as appropriate) simply because in a multiple choice exam there can not be a paragraph for justification of using 10nm each side of track or 5nm or 3nm or 60nm.

However, from a practical training and testing point of view ther are plenty of safe systems in use.

Regards,

DFC

Contacttower

3rd Dec 2007, 20:17

Far better to use some distance each side of planned track and beyond a fix that represents you navigation accuracy. eg 5nm or 10nm each side of track. That will be more efficient and will based on the above be safer.

I agree DFC, that method actually makes you look closely at your track when you plan it, which just adding 1000ft to the box doesn't.

DFC

3rd Dec 2007, 20:17

I should also point out that using the 5nm or 10nm or whatever corridor as described above helps you spot airspace and restrictions that since the corridor is based on your ability to navigate accurately will be of interest.

Regards,

DFC

bookworm

3rd Dec 2007, 21:22

If you are using the MEF from the squares you cross on the map then I must point out a few things that your instructor has not;

You reminded me of an IFR arrival at Baden some time ago. I had the Jepp ED-2 chart out, with EDSB 10 miles north of its southern boundary. Strasbourg vectored us at 6000 east of the field to the south-west over the Black Forest on a right hand circuit for the 03 ILS. A 3291 ft hill was prominently displayed on that downwind in a white box -- highest terrain on the entire chart. As we passed the hill, I assumed we had passed the limiting obstacle and requested further descent. "Negative, maintain 6000".

The next day we climbed the hill with the tower on top comprising the 4371 ft obstacle we were flying over at the moment I requested descent. It was about 2 miles south of the southern boundary of the ED-2 chart.

To Jepp's credit, the grid square MSA was 5500 even on the ED-2 chart, but it was a salient reminder that even if you use a highest-obstacle-in-square shortcut, there can be a higher obstacle lurking just beyond the boundary of the square.

IO540

3rd Dec 2007, 21:42

The MEF is supposed to include obstacles from just outside the square too. I can't remember how far out they go but there is some spec for it. Probably one spec for CAA charts and another for Jepp VFR charts...

I think the MEF is OK for an emergency situation but I never use it for flight planning.

Fuji Abound

3rd Dec 2007, 21:55

How different things might have been with a GPS with terrain awareness.

llanfairpg

3rd Dec 2007, 22:07

Or a pilot with terrain awareness

Fuji Abound

3rd Dec 2007, 22:13

Do cars come fitted with anti skid devices because drivers do not know how to control a skid, and in an ideal world if they did would they still be a good idea.

llanfairpg

3rd Dec 2007, 22:26

Cars come with ABS to prevent skidding not to control it.

In an ideal world car drivers would not have to brake hard enough to lock a wheel, Thinking ahead and hazard awareness is the key, much like flying!

Whirlybird

3rd Dec 2007, 22:33

G-EMMA,

I flew into a cloud and scared myself - a wrong decision. I never did it again.

I also flew to Caernarfon as a low hours pilot, over the tops when it was CAVOK, back via the coast...sea level, just like in East Anglia.

Please tell me where I said flying to Caernarfon was OK for students.

I responded to IO540's comment that you could rarely fly in the vicinity of Caernarfon. The coastal route is the same as flying in East Anglia, but nav is a whole lot easier. :ok: Hawarden to Shobdon is pretty low level too.

I may have contradicted myself in places; I've been working very hard recently and posting very late. But you (and others) appear - with very little real knowledge - to be turning a flight to Caernarfon into a major mountain expedition, and it doesn't have to be.

Fuji Abound

3rd Dec 2007, 22:39

All true.

My point is we dont live in an ideal world.

That is why ABS is a good idea and so is terrain aware GPS.

I wasnt suggesting it is an alternative to good planning, but it may prevent the worst outcome of poor planning. The scenery ahead turning yellow and then red well before you become part of it has a way of grabing attention.

llanfairpg

3rd Dec 2007, 22:45

It dosnt have to be, correct but for one pliot it was and it lead to him being in a wheelchair for the rest of his life and his passenger is dead.

I have flown from Fort Chimo to Sondestrom, DR with a map, it was the easiest flight I have ever done but that dosnt mean it is an easy flight. I just went on the right day in the right weather.

To suggest that Caernarfon is suitable for all PPLs to fly into or it is an airfield without the need for more care than say Wellesborne is in my opinion an irresponsible statement

llanfairpg

3rd Dec 2007, 22:50

I wasnt suggesting it is an alternative to good planning, but it may prevent the worst outcome of poor planning. The scenery ahead turning yellow and then red well before you become part of it has a way of grabing attention.

The scenery ahead not being visible due to a reduction in visibility and the flight continuing in IMC should produce the same reaction. An alert is no good to a pilot who dosnt know what to do with that alert.

when I was a FO I was with a captain over the Cleveland Hills in cloud when the GPWS went off "Terrain Terrain" he never even reacted.

I am glad to say he lost his command.

(It was the mast on the way into Teeside)

IO540

4th Dec 2007, 06:37

A Garmin 496, wired to the intercom, would have most likely prevented this. I have one yoke mounted, and have tested it with a few hills in Wales. Pretty impressive... the European terrain database (derived from the space shuttle radar imagery) is accurate to something like 200ft.

Of course this assumes the pilot knows what he is doing, can fly in IMC, and can turn in the direction suggested by the display which pops up.

Whirlybird

4th Dec 2007, 09:15

To suggest that Caernarfon is suitable for all PPLs to fly into or it is an airfield without the need for more care than say Wellesborne is in my opinion an irresponsible statement

Why???

If you're going to fly to Wellesbourne, especially from the North, you need to know about your proximity to controlled airspace, and how not to bust it. You also need to know about avoiding other aircraft in a somewhat crowded area of the country. You also have Long Marston, a fairly busy microlight site, closeby. You have three runways, one at least of which is fairly short, and often a lot of GA traffic, particularly at weekends. There's a lot to think about, so you can quite easily get overloaded, especially as a low hours pilot.

If you fly to Caernarfon, you need to know to treat mountains with respect (as I believe I said in my very first post on this thread) and to use the coastal route unless you KNOW that flying over the mountains is safe at that time. But that's virtually the ONLY thing you need to be careful of. Flying around the coast is very easy, very safe, and involves almost no navigation. You are unlikely to bust either Liverpool's or Valley's airspace, as you can hardly miss a coastline! But you have them closeby for help or diversions if required. Caernarfon is easy to find, and has a long, wide runway, with no obstacles. And it's rarely crowded. So you are unlikely to get overloaded under normal conditions.

Of course, in bad weather or similar difficult conditions, either airfield can present problems....and so can anywhere else There was a fatal helicopter accident out of Wellesbourne a couple of years ago - a solo student in marginal weather. But no-one suggests not letting low hours pilots fly there, do they? Unfortunately it happens, everywhere.

To suggest that a flight to Caernarfon is somehow special just because there are mountains closeby that you can fly over IF you choose to is in my opinion a ridiculous statement.

llanfairpg

4th Dec 2007, 11:22

Yes OK then flying to Caernarfon, with its non standard circuiit height beneath the approach to RAF Valley with the highest mountain range in England and Wales within 10 miles of it to an airfield on an exposed coast which is within 10 miles from one of the busiest MATZs in the country and has a mast 2000 feet above sea level within 10 miles to the south east of it with a circuit pattern and approach or take off over the sea is just the same as flying into Wellesbourne--

I can guarantee you one thing I bet the Herefordshire Aero Club wouldnt agree

Fuji Abound

4th Dec 2007, 11:40

The scenery ahead not being visible due to a reduction in visibility and the flight continuing in IMC should produce the same reaction.

It should, but it didnt.

GPWS might - if it had the accident need never have happened.

It is just another layer of protection.

.. .. .. and as an aside semantics I guess but doesnt the skid occur and ABS immediately react to ensure the wheels keeping turning - in other words it doesnt know a skid is about to occur but it reacts very very quickly when it has occurred?

Whirlybird

4th Dec 2007, 12:17

flying to Caernarfon.......just the same as flying into Wellesbourne

No, very different. But no more difficult.

Caernarfon's circuits are 800 ft. So are lots of airfields. Is that a problem?

Caernarfon's shortest runway is 938m. Wellesbourne's is 587m. I know where I'd be happier to send a low hours pilot who wasn't totally current with short field take-offs and landings.

Caernarfon is indeed very close to Valley...who incidentally are closed at weekends. Wellesbourne is 3nm from the southern boundary of Birmingham CTA (base 1500') and below CTA (base 3500'). This is the CTA of an extremely busy regional airport.

Caernarfon's 2000 ft obstacle is clearly marked on charts, and doesn't move. OTOH, microlights out of Long Marston, and gliders out of Snitterfield, both very close to Wellesbourne, have an annoying habit of moving around and not telling anyone as they're often non-radio.

Taking off over the sea is no different to over land unless you have an engine failure. I can't remember, but I don't think the land around Wellesbourne is that great for an EFATO landing. And emergencies are thankfully rare.

The mountains are 10 miles away from Caernarfon. So what? 10 miles or 100 miles - you don't need to fly in them unless you choose to.

So - two very different airfields, both needing care and attention to fly to them safely. But don't all airfields need this? Isn't that why we have pilot training.

Ye Olde Pilot

4th Dec 2007, 15:31

Whirly,
I am afraid you are so right and yet the know-alls will not believe you until they experience the cloud, high ground and very often severe turbulence of Snowdonia.
As you so rightly point out the North Wales coast route is benign but you omit one driving force that propels novice or arrogant pilots to take the short cut. In a word...cost!
They are trying to save 30-45 minutes flying time and rental of the aircraft.
They often pay with their life!

Whirlybird

5th Dec 2007, 09:56

One thing we haven't considered though - the effects of fatigue and stress on decision making. Perhaps that played a part in this. :(

DX Wombat

5th Dec 2007, 10:11

I am afraid you are so right and yet the know-alls will not believe you until they experience the cloud, high ground and very often severe turbulence of SnowdoniaIt isn't just in Snowdonia it can happen anywhere where there are hills. My first trip after passing my skills test was to be from Halfpenny Green to Sleap. The cloud was at about 3,000' but it was also a bit dull and miserable. I set off and could see cloud a bit lower just past The Wrekin but all still appeared clear. I spoke to Halfpenny Green and requested the frequency change to Shawbury, looked down to change the setting on the radio - a matter of no more than a quarter of a minute at the VERY most, looked up again and promptly changed back to Halfpenny Green's frequency. In that short space of time the cloud had descended onto the top of The Wrekin which also happens to have a (unmarked on the chart) communications mast perched on top, it was descending rapidly and moving in my direction. I returned to Halfpenny Green immediately. It can be that fast. :eek: Anyone who has been walking in the Welsh Mountains or the Lake District will tell you that you can be looking at clear, blue skies ahead of you one minute and see thick, grey cloud rolling down the mountainside the next. Cloud in mountainous, or hilly areas can be extremely unpredictable. I live almost 1,000' up in the Pennines and see it on a very regular basis.
I still haven't made it to Sleap :\ I must have another try sometime.

IO540

5th Dec 2007, 10:42

This is the price we pay for not having an accessible IR (which would enable comfortable VMC-on-top flight at levels which are currently Class A) and not having GPS approaches.

mm_flynn

5th Dec 2007, 10:53

Also an airspace structure that means even IMCrs need to workout their MEAs by hand (and potentially for several different routes to cater for CAS clearances not being available) rather than fly a nice network of low level airways.

llanfairpg

5th Dec 2007, 11:00

High ground and aircraft are a bad companions you will find more bits of aircraft in the Snowdon range than you will around Wellesbourne or Sleap.

Two members of the same flying club in different accidents in the Snowdon range!

Stress and fatigue as a cause, look more in the direction that this pilot had had one shot at getting back already, this was his second attempt to turn back a second time would involve many irrational emotions it is better to suffer from when on the ground.

The law requires a commander of an aircraft to check to see if IMC conditions exist on the route he is about to fly, quite clearly on this occassion IMC conditions did exist on that route. The commander took off, I believe, knowing this on the common undisclipined basis of 'having a go'.

It is my belief that possibly with better training and better supervision this accident could have avoided.

Wombat --- Cloud in mountainous, or hilly areas can be extremely unpredictable as you say but the airstream or frontal systym that gives rise to those conditions are quite predicatable.

You mentioned the mast on the Wrekin, did you hire the a/c from HG?

ShyTorque

5th Dec 2007, 11:05

But having that ability is still no use unless the pilot is trained to do it safely in an aircraft suitably equipped for it. A low hours pilot is still very vulnerable to the vagaries of the weather, especially in the UK. Perhaps no pilot should be allowed out of the circuit by himself until he has an IR? No, I'm not being serious.

An IR or any other rating doesn't make a pilot invulnerable to basic mistakes such as flying in cloud to high ground with insufficient altitude to pass over it.

Whirlybird

5th Dec 2007, 11:11

It's not just in hills that weather can do some apparently strange things. I have memories of taking off from Manston, heading for Le Touquet, in haze that everyone said would vanish above 1000 ft. It didn't; instead, little cumulous clouds started forming all around us. At 5000 ft we realised climbing wasn't working, descended through a hole, and diverted to Lydd. And you can't get a lot closer to sea level than Manston.

This is aviation. Anywhere in the UK, and probably in a similar fashion anywhere in the world. You learn to understand weather, and/or get suitably equipped aircraft and relevant ratings so that maybe you don't have to. And you hope you fill your bag of experience before your bag of luck runs out.

Or else you only go flying when it's CAVOK; your choice.

llanfairpg

5th Dec 2007, 11:25

Some people should not be allowed out of the circuit without an IR--I like it, but I have known IR Pilots make pretty awful mistakes too.

One in particular to one very senior airline pilot who stayed too long on site doing aerial photography realised he couldnt make it back to base at BHX, diverted to Manchester and hit Kinder Scout in cloud, they all survived.

At the end of the day its not just about the qualification you have its about your attitude to flying (as you can see from the postings on this forum).

If you follow the rules and procedures and use caution rather than bravado you only have the journey home in the car to worry about. (Just think if everyone drove around as they did on test how many more road users would be still alive today!)

DX Wombat

5th Dec 2007, 20:18

You mentioned the mast on the Wrekin, did you hire the a/c from HG?I did my PPL there and am a member of HGFC so I suppose the answer has to be yes I did :) I knew about the mast because I have spent a fair amount of time flying around there and in and out of the AIAA and Shawbury MATZ. Actually, I think it's about time Shawbury gave me a season ticket for flying through. ;) :ok:
They will probably be VERY relieved to hear I am no longer flying a certain C152. :)

llanfairpg

5th Dec 2007, 21:16

The reason I asked is did the FTO at HG have a briefing sheet describing that mast. for a flight to Sleap or Hawarden

Getting back to our ideal club/school there should be briefing sheets for the local and most popular destinations, best to find out about hazards on the ground rather than in the air!

DX Wombat

5th Dec 2007, 22:55

The reason I asked is did the FTO at HG have a briefing sheet describing that mast. for a flight to Sleap or Hawarden Not that I'm aware of but as I had done all my PPL at HGFC I was well aware of the existence of the mast as not only had my FI made me aware of it, but I had flown past it on many occasions including my QXC. The same applies to the masts (there are at least three of them including the radar) on top of the Clee Hills. None of these is marked as all of them are under the limit but they remain dangerous nonetheless. All the more reason for adding on that extra 300' safety height to accomodate them.

IO540

6th Dec 2007, 07:20

Not so sure about adding 300ft.

There are exactly two ways to do flight planning:

VFR or IFR.

There is no halfway. It's people that fly "halfway" that have by far the most CFITs.

If you plan for VFR then you have to remain VMC 100% of the time, and unless the vis is poor you should not fly into anything. (I know that "100% VMC" is impractical for actually going anywhere, and they don't tell you this when you start your £8000 PPL, but that isn't the point).

If you plan for IFR then you plan the MSA properly, and plan for an instrument approach (or some other safe form of descent, e.g. over the sea) at the destination. The flight may or may not be in cloud for some or all of the time, but that's irrelevant.

Nowadays, with a really good big moving map GPS running the actual topo chart (say, the CAA VFR chart), one could just fly around Wales, in cloud, below MSA, in the valleys, but 99% of pilots don't have such equipment and also if that one unit packed up what do you do? An immediate climb may not be good enough.

One has to be clear - there is no halfway stage in flight planning. It has to be all-VMC or fully IFR.

Whirlybird

6th Dec 2007, 07:34

Getting back to our ideal club/school there should be briefing sheets for the local and most popular destinations, best to find out about hazards on the ground rather than in the air!

Really good idea! :ok: I've never seen such a thing, and I've had several home airfields. My substitute has been asking other pilots, but that only works on the right day with the right people!

Such briefing sheets could not only tell you about hazards, but also the best routes, bad weather alternatives etc. Perhaps they could even tell you about nice things to see on the way and what the restaurant is like on arrival...might mean more pilots would actually read them.

In fact, if some of us reading this wrote up a few for our home airfields, I can't see many places refusing to have them. Would be useful. Might even prevent a few accidents.

Tony Hirst

6th Dec 2007, 08:26

The briefing sheets already exist as a combination of the chart, NOTAM, AIS, Pooleys/AFE/Botthing/etc, airfield website and telephone. Expecting somebody to bring all this together in to a more ergonomic form will probably be asking for trouble as it will soon be out of date but yet won't be reliably updated!

In my humble opinion, Drauk's DSC free to use web application (http://fly.dsc.net/u/Home) is the best effort to bring as much of this together in as easy to use package as possible.

Whirlybird

6th Dec 2007, 08:42

Yes, of course all the information is available. But a newish PPL, even if he/she reads all that, isn't going to remember it easily. Plus it doesn't give the stuff you specifically need if flying from your home airfield. Such as a reminder to be careful of the UNMARKED mast on the Wrekin, clearly visible, but not if the cloud comes down. A reminder that if you fly from Welshpool or Shobdon to Caernarfon and the weather changes, the coastal route is the only safe one but it's a long way....so don't go if the days are short or you're tired. Which way round Birmingham, east or west, is easiest if you're going from an airfield north of it to Wellesbourne. Which regional airports are actually likely to give you zone transit, and which will tell you to get lost. (I mean remain outside controlled airspace ;)). There are loads of these sort of things, no big deal if you're experienced, but gotchas for low hours pilots.

I'd have liked it when I started anyway. And it might have prevented a few narrow escapes....for another time on another thread. ;)

Tony Hirst

6th Dec 2007, 10:26

Maybe it is my writing style that failed to communicate that I agree it could be easier and I would have liked a sort of "Popham for Dummies" (or whatever) when I started too :)

What we need is a GA wiki for UK pilots. For those not in the know, a wiki is a information web site that is freely updatable by the users, the most famous is www.wikipedia.org. If such a thing existed, perhaps Drauk could place a link on the airfield information page where he already shows other airfield data and related NOTAM that is access from the the generated PLOG. Perhaps Drauk could host the wiki too?

Just a thought...

llanfairpg

6th Dec 2007, 10:30

Completly agree Whirley.

Get 10 different pilots in the bar who have been somewhere and you may get 10 different bits of information that are not in Pooleys etc (Tony!) but may make your flight more enjoyable and even safer.

Only problem is when you come to fly to XXX airfield those 10 pilots are generally not in the bar waiting to inform you!

I believe and it is a systym we operated, it actually encorages pilots to visit other airfields other than sticking to just the qualifying cross country airfilelds after PPL.

It dosnt take that long to put together and is s good project for a ground day. The big plus these days is you can very easily put some photos in as well. In fact you can encorage members to supply photos and information.

Forgotten by many is that PPL flying is a service industry and those who provide the best service usually have the best businesses.

llanfairpg

6th Dec 2007, 10:57

Tony

Just looked at that link, its just the basic information which really any pilot is obliged by law to check before flight. You cannot beat advice from reliable pilots who have flown a route into a place several times, in my opinion.

You may for instance want to consider carrying life jackets for a Caernarfon flight you will not find that info in notams and Pooleys.

You may like to know that the RAF low fly in the valleys around the Snowdon range especially to the SE.

You may want to try and have a look at the Dinorwig power station buried in the side of the mountain.

You may want to see some advice on standing wave and how to fly over high ground safely.

You may want to fly up Lake Vynwry at low level (one of the best safest inland places to try it apart from Mon-Fri)

You may want some information on flying within the Llanberis pass.

You may be suprised to see a steam train climbing up Snowdon.

And finally you might want to know (before you go) that two pilots from the same flying club have flown into the Snowdon range along with countless RAF aircraft.

llanfairpg

6th Dec 2007, 11:07

Just spotted 10540 post

There are exactly two ways to do flight planning:

VFR or IFR.

This is the hub of the main problem that caused the accident. The commander planned a VFR flight in IMC conditions or with the likelyhood of IMC conditions on a small section of the intended route.

Its a common trap for the unwary and poorly trained

Tony Hirst

6th Dec 2007, 11:20

llanfairpg,

I'm on board!

What I'm saying is that the problem is that each club will be relying on somebody to produce and update this information in a reliable and timely fashion. Each club would be producing the same information at not inconsiderable effort.

In the spirit of solutions not problems I've added a starter for 10. The point of setting up a wiki (see above) is to allow anybody to provide coherent information to one source. It think it would (theoretically) deal with 95% of your needs.

DX Wombat

6th Dec 2007, 11:26

Not so sure about adding 300ftWhy not? It's added to the 1,000' above the highest point either side of your route and is to help take into account the masts and other obstructions under 300' in height and adds a little more safety margin. From the moment I started the Navigation part of my PPL I was reminded about unmarked obstacles in particular any lurking near the route we were about to fly. It sounds as if I have been luckier than most in that I was reminded about this so often that I am highly unlikely ever to forget that mast on top of The Wrekin, or the three on the Clee Hills. If I spot an unmarked obstacle on my way somewhere and know I shall be returning by the same route I make a note of it.

llanfairpg

7th Dec 2007, 09:41

Of course he was IMC the high ground he flew into was in cloud (fell runner)

Tony Hirst

7th Dec 2007, 10:02

That is an assumption. I think the report better suggests he was VMC when he started avoiding action transitioning him into IMC. I also disagree that it would have been "easy" to maintain VMC with the alluded 3000m-4000m+ visibility (if that was the case).

llanfairpg

7th Dec 2007, 10:11

IMC starts with a reduction in visibillity if you are the PIC and you are experiencing a reduction in visibility you take the appropraite action.

Its not a chicken and egg situation this pilot must have experienced a reduction of in flight vis before entering cloud.

Tony with regard to updating information. It is just the same as making sure the bowser always has fuel,-- management assigned task.

llanfairpg

7th Dec 2007, 10:58

And nowhere does it say that the pilot was a ixxxxxxxxxxxxx , but we can all fill the xs in cant we?

The form 215 report quoted by the AIB shows that IMC could be expected between 1400 --2300

llanfairpg

7th Dec 2007, 13:03

The AIB report states the facts as presented and known--forums are for speculation. I cannot help you with your understanding of my point any further than saying that IMC existed in the area of impact and was forecast to exist. The ANO requires a commander to determine whether IMC exists BEFORE flight and to take the approriate action based on his licence,rating and the aircraft and its equipment.

My suggestion is that the pilot either;

Did not take any of the above into consideration.

Ignored some of the above

Ignored all of the above.

I am also suggesting that I suspect that better training and beter preperation and supervision EG Authorisation may have prevented this accident.

Based on the WX information the AIB report describes and the pilots experience I would not have authorised this PPL to fly to Caernarfon (or more importantly) back to Shobdon.

The above is based on my experience of instructing at the same club. Flying in the same area, including operating three formation fly ins to Caenarfon.

I appreciate you do not agree but I have nothing further to add to this.

radicalrabit

7th Dec 2007, 13:46

AND THE FELL RUNNER SAID IT HAD DETERIORATED OVER THE LAST 2 HOURS , PRESUMABLY BEFORE THE FLIGHT LEFT THE GROUND...hence the hill was imc even if the flight wasnt (en route)
Not going to say much here as it has been covered ad nauseum, other than to state as someone mentioned having details of routes and obstructions flying to other airfields, apart from the notams board, both at Leeming and Coltishall we had a nav room and plots to and from other airfields or targets and details of hazards fixed along the way and highlighting issues such as the sudden drop in viz when the cloud rolls up one side of a hill and then cascades down the other side. More important maybe at 250 kts 300 ft or 300kts and 250 ft...:oh:

DFC

7th Dec 2007, 21:20

Bookworm,

The 1000 ft margin seems excessive for VFR. If you can see the obstacles to avoid them laterally, which is the whole point of VFR, you don't need to be 1000 ft above

From my personal point of view and my own personal rules, I agree. I use 1000ft above the terrain and expect to see and avoid obstacles such as masts. However, I never fly VFR in less than 5K visibility and prefer to have 8K plus cruise a minimum 500ft below the cloud ceiling and since I have an IR and equipped aircraft, I am not under any pressure as if the weather does not look good enough at the planning stage I can often (but not always) go IFR.

I do not like unplanned pull-ups into IMC and consequently, the 1000ft is the absolute lowest before diversion and allows for further deterioration during the diversion.

When teaching, I expect the student to use 1000ft above all obstacles within an appropriate distance of track. I insist on all obstacles being cleared because of the issues such as lookout being less due to over looking at map and most importantly, they should not hit a mast during the 180 degree turn. I do stress the reasons behind the "self imposed operating rules" and try to get them to justift their own rules.

The handrail system relies on positive identification of the start and end points i.e. they will be check points on the PLOG. If you can not identify the start of the handrail then .........well you are unsure of position and must apply the lost procedure in the same way as failing to identify any other checkpoint. Selection of handrail is also important and I would not often recomend a line of hills........after all if using them as a handrail, you can not ignore them as obstacles.

VFR flight is very liberal compared to IFR and rightly so. However, new PPLs must be better equipped in setting personal limits or operating rules and most importantly sticking to them. This is best done when they are realistic.

Regards,

DFC

dublinpilot

8th Dec 2007, 08:39

This is best done when they are realistic.

This is very true.

When teaching, I expect the student to use 1000ft above all obstacles within an appropriate distance of track. I insist on all obstacles being cleared

Unfortunately this isn't very realistic, for VFR flights in our climate. You'll just result in people not telling you what they are really doing.

dp

DFC

8th Dec 2007, 09:57

You'll just result in people not telling you what they are really doing

Very hard to get an authorisation for a solo PPL student crosscountry where you are obliged according to the training manual to plan the flight at a minimum of 1000ft above the highest obstacle within 5nm of track but the weather is not going to be 1500ft or more above that obstacle.......The CPL requirement is 10nm each side of track!

Very hard to pass a skill test (PPL or CPL) where you state that time minimum safe level is xxx but you plan to fly at a lower level because the cloud prevents you from reaching that level.

It is the training system that provides primacy i.e. good primary training and good example leads to good pilot operators.

The "we will not get to fly very much if we have that rule" argument can be easily translated into "we have to reduce safety margins to fly". Thus it is important to set realistic and legal margins. That is why I never use the MEF as a basis for a safe level even IFR and is why I do not expect students to do so either (except to pass the CAA written Nav exam - and I explain the reason for that).

Please do not confuse all that with flying at a lower level to comply with ATC clearance for example to leave the zone........if the minimum level is say 2000ft because of some hills but the standard route out of the zone keeps you clear and is "not above 1000ft" then 1000ft to the boundary VFR is OK provided that it meets the 500ft etc legal requirements i.e. you operate at minimum level but the weather has to be suitable for climb to 2000ft VFR because a) ATC may let you climb to that if they are quiet or b)You will be climbing to that at the zone boundary.

This long thred has disturbed me because it shows that there is a clear misunderstanding as to what the word safe really means and what the implications of being at anything less than safe says about one's planning and decision making.

Every PPL or CPL must accept that there are plenty of days that they can not fly on. That must not be an excuse for cutting safety margins. It can only be used as a reason for moving to a better climate.

Regards,

DFC

Andy_RR

8th Dec 2007, 10:24

Very hard to pass a skill test (PPL or CPL) where you state that time minimum safe level is xxx but you plan to fly at a lower level because the cloud prevents you from reaching that level.

DFC, if you are flying VFR (presumably because you're doing a PPL skills test) then what is a minimum safe level? Forgive me, but I thought that was what the V part in VFR was about?

500ft, 1000ft, glide clear, clear of cloud etc. - these are the legal limits, but where is the definition of minimum safe level? It surely is a matter of pilot judgement, is it not?

A

dublinpilot

8th Dec 2007, 10:27

Very hard to pass a skill test (PPL or CPL) where you state that time minimum safe level is xxx but you plan to fly at a lower level because the cloud prevents you from reaching that level.

Well, my examiner had the totally opposite view. He made a point of making sure that I understood that just becuase the cloudbase could be lower than the calculated min safe altitude, it would not ground a VFR flight.

Most of us rearly fly at or above our MSA's for the whole duration of a VFR flight. It's perfectly safe to fly below MSA's; it just means that you have to manage your navigation so that you don't hit anything. Above the MSA, there's nothing to hit other than other aircraft.

dp

DFC

8th Dec 2007, 11:24

I admit that for the PPL then much is left up to the pilot to decide what is safe provided the legal requirements are met. However, most schools specify how to calculate the minimum level for VFR flight. Added to that there is the definition of operation at minimum level - between 500 ft MSD (Minimum separation distance) and 999ft MSD. Very few examiners would be happy with a crosscountry plan from a student that expected to fly a crosscountry route all at minimum level.........if they cut it that fine before they get their licence what will they do after?

Often such a student fails the test because they mess up a PFL they they are given while operating at such a low level - often with absolutley nowhere to go that is if they don't get lost because of the problems with trying to navigate at low level.

For the CPL, the requirements are more set in stone because is it a simulated commercial passenger carrying VFR flight and there are the legal requirements including performance that requires the aircraft enroute to always be in a position to route to a point 1000ft above a suitable landing area.......very hard to do if over water beyond glide distance and just as hard if you are already at 700ft. Ops generally require fixed wing VFR enroute Commercial flights to comply with IFR obstacle clearance requirements. There is also higher VMC requirements for commercial VFR flights - see JAR-OPS.

----------
Dublin Pilot,

Your examminer was thus happy to pass you for less than safe operation. i.e. you can not operate at a level that you say is minimum safe and call it safe....if the lower level is safe then your minimum safe is not a minimum and is over safe. Get the idea?

In this case the pilot logged a minimum safe of over 4000ft but hit the hill while flying below that level...........he recorded his eventual mistake pre-flight!

Regards,

DFC

Andy_RR

8th Dec 2007, 12:01

Your examminer was thus happy to pass you for less than safe operation. i.e. you can not operate at a level that you say is minimum safe and call it safe....if the lower level is safe then your minimum safe is not a minimum and is over safe. Get the idea?

It's only minimum safe altitude for when you can't see where you are or where you're going (i.e. non-VMC). If you are VMC, then it's a meaningless number in terms of safety because your method for avoiding hitting things is by use of the eyeball situation indicator.

Even if you are non-VMC, the MSA is only as good as you knowing where your position is (within 5nm or whatever).

A

Ye Olde Pilot

8th Dec 2007, 12:30

Quote:
Originally Posted by DFC http://www.pprune.org/forums/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?p=3757618#post3757618)
Your examminer was thus happy to pass you for less than safe operation. i.e. you can not operate at a level that you say is minimum safe and call it safe....if the lower level is safe then your minimum safe is not a minimum and is over safe. Get the idea?

It's only minimum safe altitude for when you can't see where you are or where you're going (i.e. non-VMC). If you are VMC, then it's a meaningless number in terms of safety because your method for avoiding hitting things is by use of the eyeball situation indicator.

Even if you are non-VMC, the MSA is only as good as you knowing where your position is (within 5nm or whatever).

Andy,
The problem is that this is not just a case of MSA. Like you I have lived and flown in Perth,Western Australia and there you will never in a million years experience the rapid change of weather that occurs in Snowdonia or western Scotland. Pilots who fly from the low lying east midlands and southern England are not trained to adapt to the multitude of problems that can occur flying over the higher and moister bits of the UK. The fact that there were two separate accidents from the same organisation underlines this. Mountain flying requires a seperate training course. I would suggest that certain high remote areas of the UK be declared 'remote areas' and require a separate rating in the same way as in Australia.

dublinpilot

8th Dec 2007, 12:41

It's only minimum safe altitude for when you can't see where you are or where you're going (i.e. non-VMC).

Andy has it exactly. It's only relvant if you loose your required VMC.

To take it to it's absolute absurity, try plan a flight off-shore, but along a coast line, with a mountain range that ends around five miles in from the coast. This produces rather high MSA's, which are totally unnecessary on a nice VFR day. You are not likely to fly into the side of a mountain when your track takes you only within a few miles of it, and you can see it clearly in perfect viz, and your altitude is 500ft above it's peek, simply because your MSA is 500ft higher. CFIT is a very common problem. It's not so common in good VMC, irrespective of the cloud base v's obstacle height.;)

I think DFC is getting hung up on the word safe. Nothing in GA is safe. It's all a matter of differing risks. Flying below your MSA is not unsafe. Flying above it, is not safe either. Flying above a MSA only REDUCES your risk of hitting a ground based obstacle. You can still hit other aircraft, and you can still wander off track and hit ground based obstacles....so it's not safe, just less dangerous.

dp

dublinpilot

8th Dec 2007, 12:52

Ye Old Pilot,

I don't think anyone disputes that. Mountain flying is something different and carrys it's own uniques risks. But that doesn't mean that flying when the cloudbase is below MSA is inherently unsafe. If may mean that you can't cross a mountain range that day, at least across it's heighest parts. There is of course nothing to stop you going around it.

DFC's method would require you to go around it by a very long way to get the MSA down low enough. In fact most flights in the UK would have at least one leg where the MSA exceeded 2500ft. Does that really mean it's not safe to fly with the cloud base at 2400ft??

In fact, taking a quick look at my chart for a moment, I see a mast just to the west of Rochester and east of Biggin Hill, with an AMSL of 1310. MSA rounds that up to 1400, and adds 1000ft. That gives a Min Safe Altitude around Biggin Hill and Rochester of 2400ft! Anyone ever flown around there below 2400ft? Were you wreckless in doing so? Did you fail your skills test for doing so? I think now ;)

Do the clubs at these places, cancel all VFR flight when the cloudbase is at 2350ft??? I doubt that too ;)

dp

Tony Hirst

8th Dec 2007, 15:49

I don't know why it is called MSA. As IO540 suggests, it just confuses the issue. If somebody wanted to call it an MCB (min cloud base) but calculated the same way, then I would suggest that was quite sensible as the flying below it would not be an issue as you have the option to fly above it too.

It would also serve as a good black and white metric for an enroute divert or turnback decision.

ShyTorque

8th Dec 2007, 20:19

The thread appeared to begin by discussing the sad aftermath of a tragic accident where a pilot pressed on into conditions beyond his experience and not suitable for his flight.

The issue has become somewhat "clouded" by personal interpretations of the requirements of the ANO regarding VFR and extra safety margins that "must" be applied.

1000 ft above the nearest obstacle within 5nm of track is the minimum altitude for IFR in UK, not VFR! VFR flights can, and do, both legally (and safely) operate lower than that, obviously taking into consideration the requirements of Rule 5.

Most of my flights require VFR at both ends but this time of year are very often flown under IFR en route where necessary. This does require careful advance thought, training, planning and a properly equipped aircraft. Not forgetting the correct outlook to the task in hand. Where necessary, a flight might have to be cancelled or postponed; thankfully this doesn't need to be done very often, even in the UK.

DX Wombat

8th Dec 2007, 21:25

there were two separate accidents from the same organisation YOP, you are making quite an assumption there. Nowhere does LLanfairpg say that the person he was talking to was either a member of, or trained by HAC.I was at the club concerned in the bar having a discusion with someone I knew and liked very much.Plenty of people from other clubs, FTOs and even the Military visit Shobdon, some even stay overnight. The discussion went into all the training he should have had and the fact he should not be flying in cloud without proper training, The sensible facts were presented to this pilot in that there was a discussion about training requirements and LlanfairpgI gave him a moderate bollicking I suppose. In spite of this his apparent attitude was that he was perfectly safe and correct in his practice"You cannot tell these young instructors anything"
and lead eventually to the deaths of himself and five others. He was flying from Birmingham to the IOM He was NOT flying from Shobdon. Who is to say he wasn't taught at a FTO in Birmingham (or anywhere else for that matter) or that he was a member of a different club? I am a member of HAC, having joined within the last six months, but I didn't do my PPL there. Would you then blame HAC's FIs and level of instruction if I were to make a stupid mistake? Have you never come across a pigheadedly stupid student who knows everything and most certainly knows better than the FIs? I have, and he frightened me, he even questioned the findings of the AAIB (the report was the one for G-DELS if you wish to read it). In the words of one FI I know, "I forsee a starring role for him in an AAIB report." I am NOT suggesting this is what happened in the case of G-BHAC, I wasn't there, I didn't see it happen nor do I know the people concerned, so I can only look at the AAIB report and see what is written there.

Tony Hirst

8th Dec 2007, 21:46

ST,
The issue has become somewhat "clouded" by personal interpretations of the requirements of the ANO regarding VFR and extra safety margins that "must" be applied.
Quite! Which is why it should not be called MSA, because it isn't. I get the impression that DFC seems to prefers his students to call it and treat it as such, that must be terribly confusing.

I'm thinking now that students need to be told clearly what is legal and secondly what and how to gather the required information to determine what is sensible, not be told what is sensible. Misunderstandings, misaprehensions and old wives tales must surely otherwise be the result.

ShyTorque

8th Dec 2007, 23:01

Tony,

Correct, the CAA made some comment about the "blurring" of the rules and confusion possibly thus caused to students by some FIs, here in this document:

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/1_2004.PDF

DFC

9th Dec 2007, 10:09

Dublin Pilot,

For a student or a PPL who does not have a valid IR (or IMC if UK), there is absolutely no option of ever flying "if you loose your required VMC".

Never ever ever think that you can fly untrained in IMC and survive. Thus the I only need to have that level in case I fly into cloud is utter tosh.

You really need to read my previous posts properly. Please pay particular attention to the one where I explained handrailing as a method of ignoring obstacles (or airspace) that could be even less than a mile away.

I never ever said that you can not fly below the minimum level that is safe or minimum VFR level or whatever you want to call it. I did say that operating below that level puts one in the operation at minimum level type of operation and all that goes with that.

The term "Minimum Cloud Base" sounds good but if there is 1/8 cloud at 500ft then the cloud base is 500ft - very restricting. Changing the term to "ceiling" unfortunately does not work either because;

a) if the ceiling is 1000ft i.e. the bottom of the cloud is 1000ft then you will be in the base at 1000ft and not VMC; and more importantly,

b) It only works below 3000ft because if you are at 4000ft then the 1000ft vertical from cloud comes into play.

However, it is in general a very very good idea to turn back or divert if the cloud lowers to the level that you planned as minimum safe, minimum cruise, minimum VFR or minimum prior to diversion/turn back.

Everyone needs to have a think about how accurately they can navigate using visual means.......some pilots can keep within 3nm of track in the UK especially when familiar with the route. If that is the case why not use 3nm each side of track as a safe area?..........however, remember that if you complete an unplanned diversion to one side you leave your safe area very quickly and thus need to very quickly assess obstacles on the new track.

ShyTorque,

Your argument is useless because IFR flights do not have to fly above the MSA either during the cruise so you can not say that makes IFR different from VFR in the respect of having a safe operation.

-------

Once again an important note - the option of ever being in cloud is simply not there for the VFR only pilot so never think of any level you set as being OK if in cloud because you will be just as dead after going into cloud at 10,000ft unqualified as as 50ft. Don't fly VFR into cloud.

-----------

Going back to the original debate. This pilot it seems failed to observe the important bit of info I have highlighted just above. However, yesterday, on a flight I noticed something that may have been an issue.........

If the visibility is poor (as it often is just below the cloud) and you are approaching a relatively wide area of terrain sloping up in front with few defining features i.e. moorland then it is actually quite hard to detect a gradual rise in the terrain and with a lack of experience coupled with concentration on navigation, the ground could get very close before the pilot realises how low he is. Perhaps the automatic full power, pitch up reaction for low flight then put the aircraft in cloud only seconds before the CFIT.

There is one more issue that I noticed also...........an instructor I was checking was asked to brief operation at minimum level. He stated that "it is bess to trim the aircraft nose up so that one does not tend to descend lower due to a lapse in concentration or lack of visual cuse"........he said that was what the FIC had told him to do! I pointed out that operating at minimum level just below the cloud ceiling with a nose up trim could cause the aircraft to enter cloud if the pressure on the control column was relaxed for any reason........he unfortunately (for him) said that he thought that preferable to descending towards the ground in VMC!............Did this unfortunate pilot have a poorly trained instructor like that I wonder?

Regards,

DFC

IO540

9th Dec 2007, 10:45

Interesting CAA document, ShyTorque. Fun comments about fuel planning.

bookworm

9th Dec 2007, 12:14

For a student or a PPL who does not have a valid IR (or IMC if UK), there is absolutely no option of ever flying "if you loose your required VMC".

Never ever ever think that you can fly untrained in IMC and survive. Thus the I only need to have that level in case I fly into cloud is utter tosh.

...

Once again an important note - the option of ever being in cloud is simply not there for the VFR only pilot so never think of any level you set as being OK if in cloud because you will be just as dead after going into cloud at 10,000ft unqualified as as 50ft. Don't fly VFR into cloud.

I can't agree with that. Flying in cloud when not qualified to do so is risky, and is certainly something to be avoided if you want a long flying career. However, unqualified pilots who fly into cloud tend to survive more often than not. Flying below the level of the local terrain in cloud is disastrous every time, as the pilot at the centre of thread found out. It is useful for every pilot to know an emergency safe altitude at which CFIT is not going to be an issue.

ShyTorque

9th Dec 2007, 18:17

ShyTorque,
Your argument is useless because IFR flights do not have to fly above the MSA either during the cruise so you can not say that makes IFR different from VFR in the respect of having a safe operation.

DFC,

Which argument are you referring to? I don't have an argument; I merely fly in accordance with the requirements of the ANO. Did you not read that TrainingCom?

Which parts of that document regarding minimum heights for VFR and IFR don't you understand? You initially stated that VFR flights must operate at a minimum of 1000' above terrain but now state that IFR flights don't have to do so. There are a couple of exceptions to the minimum height rules for IFR flight but neither are relevant with regard to this accident.

I have just gone back over all my posts on this. I haven't mentioned MSA once. I therefore can only conclude that you are confusing what I have written with that of someone else.

Fuji Abound

9th Dec 2007, 18:40

I can't agree with that. Flying in cloud when not qualified to do so is risky, and is certainly something to be avoided if you want a long flying career. However, unqualified pilots who fly into cloud tend to survive more often than not. Flying below the level of the local terrain in cloud is disastrous every time, as the pilot at the centre of thread found out. It is useful for every pilot to know an emergency safe altitude at which CFIT is not going to be an issue.

Bookworm

Very interesting.

The knee jerk reaction about going IMC without training is that you will be dead in short shrift. Reliance is usually placed on the study conducted in the States.

I have always wondered how accurate the knee jerk reaction is for a UK PPL given the sprinkling of instrument training they do.

I did my PPL a very long time ago well before there was any instrument content. I recall towards the end of the course one of the instructors asking if I would like to deliver an aircraft to Redhill. Of course I jumped at th eopportunity. He sat me in the P1 seat and it was IMC most of the way. He gave me a few tips but got there we did. I wouldnt have managed it had he not been there probably more due to the navigation than the flying. I am certainly no sky God by a long margin.

So how well would a PPL today who has been well instructed so far as the instrument content is concerned get on? Add in a decent moving map GPS so he doesnt have to worry about the navigation perhaps.

Contacttower

9th Dec 2007, 18:42

I think the important point to take away from ShyTorque's link is the difference between MSA and the minimum level that is safe VFR for that leg. I believe it is important to have the two seperate figures noted.

Contacttower

9th Dec 2007, 18:48

So how well would a PPL today who has been well instructed so far as the instrument content is concerned get on? Add in a decent moving map GPS so he doesnt have to worry about the navigation perhaps.

I have to say it does seem rather hit and miss....personally I remember my first instrument lesson which was in real cloud, I didn't have any problems and alone would probably have been able to contol things. Having said that though you read stuff like this: (from the Flying Instructor's forum)

In the otherwise lovely clear sky there was this one big cloud so popped him in there, his first taste of REAL IMC. Handed him the aircraft straight and level in TRIM and gave him control to do the bog standard 180 deg turn. Seconds later we are 10 deg nose up and 30 deg AOB. Speed now decaying RAPIDLY instead of taking control I just shouted DO SOMETHING!!!!!!!! Big mistake, we now pitch up more while sticking the aeroplane on its SIDE :eek: No time for the standard I have Control, just F:mad:K and recovering before we stall spin with not enough height to recover after popping out of the cloud base!

So who knows how a non-instrument pilot will react?

DFC

9th Dec 2007, 19:03

ShyTorque,

No I have not mixed up the poster who said that a minimum level like the one I say must be planned pre-flight was only appropriate to IFR flights and not to VFR flights.

There is a big difference between what is legal and what is safe. Much of what is legal can be unsafe............how safe is it to fly at 250Kt, at 50ft AGL down a well known low flying route in 1500m visibility and with the cloud just 1ft above your head.....all with only a JAR-PPL and some 50 hours total experience............perfectly legal but probably not what one would expect a passenger carrying operation described as safe to be now is it?

As I previously said, people new to the industry regardless of their experience or background often set unrealistic limits to their flying...sometimes to lax, sometimes over restrictive. In both cases, they end up (at best) frightening themselves silly at some stage and learn their lesson.

Just as one can say if you don't want to risk having to land on water then don't fly single engine beyond glide distance from land.........probably a bit overrestrictive for some but not for others.........then to guarantee no CFIT there must be a level chosen as a minimum that provides some margin for error and acheives the aim of no CFIT.

For the PPL, it is a personal issue. For the CPL it is cast in stone.

This pilot chose an unrealistic minimum level, continued to fly well below that level and had a CFIT, there is a lesson there for everyone.

Not only have I read the document you describe but I and others discussed the at all matter. One opinion was that there should be no such level on a VFR plog because one could by definition see terrain and obstacles far better than one can see aircraft coming the other way. The CAA note was very much a middle of the road position.

However, as soon as the word minimum is used then there is a limit set call it minimum VFR, minimum safe, minimum cruise or whatever the word minimum is the important one.

Regards,

DFC

Gertrude the Wombat

9th Dec 2007, 19:34

I have always wondered how accurate the knee jerk reaction is for a UK PPL given the sprinkling of instrument training they do.
I'm part way through an IMCR course at the moment, so rather more instrument training than a straight PPL and rather more current ... and I completely lost it the other day.

OK so I recovered, and the instructor's hands remained in his lap throughout, but who knows what would have happened had I been on my own.

As to a straight PPL "flying through cloud and surviving": yes, I've done this several times, in the following two circumstances only:

(1) "If you can see through it you can fly through it."
(2) Scraping along the cloud base, head down for a while for some nav paperwork, look up and find myself in cloud, although I can vaguely see the ground directly below. Power off, pop out of the bottom after a couple of seconds.

If you count these episodes as "straight PPLs usually survive entering cloud" then it's probably true. The "178 seconds to live" study wasn't talking about these sort of circumstances.

ShyTorque

9th Dec 2007, 20:28

DFC,

Perhaps you would have then been better to use the term "should" rather than "must", to avoid confusion. My original question asked where this "must" of yours was laid down, because it isn't laid down - it's your personal interpretation of perceived risk and what altitude/height pilots should fly at.

The ANO lays down the minimum altitude/heights below which pilots must not fly.

Although I don't disagree with most of your main sentiments, it is sometimes important not to confuse the issue with false terminology; you are no doubt aware of the meanings of the CAA's use of the terms "should" and "must".

Your extreme quote about a pilot flying at 250 kts, 50 ft etc 1 foot below cloud is totally irrelevant, not even military low flying jet pilots do that (well, I didn't). Having said that, in a previous civilian employment, the CAA rules for visual flight were 50 feet vertically from cloud by day and 100 feet clear by night; this is the one reference I know of that gives guidance on what is officially seen as "clear of cloud".

Our other differences appear to be ones of opinion and experience of flying below MSA/Safety Altitude (call it what you will) and there is no point trying to argue who is correct. I've been obliged to spend most of my career routinely operating at low altitude, often down to the ANO limits because without doing so my job would not infrequently be impossible; you obviously have not and therefore appear to prefer another option, namely staying well above all terrain, which you perceive as safer. This doesn't mean to say you are correct and I am wrong, or vice versa.

I'll leave it there.

Regards, ShyTorque.