Mid-air collision over Brasil [Archive] - Page 2

lenstrad

3rd Oct 2006, 17:32

The wing and tail of the Embraer Legacy 600 were damaged in what seems to have been a collision with a Boeing 737 in Brazil on Friday

J. SHARKEY
Published: October 3, 2006

With the window shade drawn, I was relaxing in my leather seat aboard a $25 million corporate jet that was flying 37,000 feet above the vast Amazon rainforest. The 7 of us on board the 13-passenger jet were keeping to ourselves.

Without warning, I felt a terrific jolt and heard a loud bang, followed by an eerie silence, save for the hum of the engines.

And then the three words I will never forget. “We’ve been hit,” said Henry Yandle, a fellow passenger standing in the aisle near the cockpit of the Embraer Legacy 600 jet.

“Hit? By what?” I wondered. I lifted the shade. The sky was clear; the sun low in the sky. The rainforest went on forever. But there, at the end of the wing, was a jagged ridge, perhaps a foot high, where the five-foot-tall winglet was supposed to be.

And so began the most harrowing 30 minutes of my life. I would be told time and again in the next few days that nobody ever survives a midair collision. I was lucky to be alive — and only later would I learn that the 155 people aboard the Boeing 737 on a domestic flight that seems to have clipped us were not.

Investigators are still trying to sort out what happened, and how — our smaller jet managed to stay aloft while a 737 that is longer, wider and more than three times as heavy, fell from the sky nose first.

But at 3:59 last Friday afternoon, all I could see, all I knew, was that part of the wing was gone. And it was clear that the situation was worsening in a hurry. The leading edge of the wing was losing rivets, and starting to peel back.

Amazingly, no one panicked. The pilots calmly starting scanning their controls and maps for signs of a nearby airport, or, out their window, a place to come down.

But as the minutes passed, the plane kept losing speed. By now we all knew how bad this was. I wondered how badly ditching — an optimistic term for crashing — was going to hurt.

I thought of my family. There was no point reaching for my cellphone to try a call — there was no signal. And as our hopes sank with the sun, some of us jotted notes to spouses and loved ones and placed them in our wallets, hoping the notes would later be found.

I was focused on a different set of notes when the flight began. I’ve contributed the “On the Road”column for The New York Times business-travel section every week for the last seven years. But I was on the Embraer 600 for a freelance assignment for Business Jet Traveler magazine.

My fellow passengers included executives from Embraer and a charter company called ExcelAire, the new owner of the jet. David Rimmer, the senior vice president of Excel Aire, had invited me to ride home on the jet his company had just taken possession of at Embraer’s headquarters here.

And it had been a nice ride. Minutes before we were hit, I had wandered up to the cockpit to chat with the pilots, who said the plane was flying beautifully. I saw the readout that showed our altitude: 37,000 feet.

I returned to my seat. Minutes later came the strike (it sheared off part of the plane’s tail, too, we later learned).

Immediately afterward, there wasn’t much conversation.

Mr. Rimmer, a large man, was hunched in the aisle in front of me staring out the window at the newly damaged wing.

“How bad is it?” I asked.

He fixed me with a steady look and said, "I don’t know."

I saw the body language of the two pilots. They were like infantrymen working together in a jam, just as they had been trained to do.

For the next 25 minutes, the pilots, Joe Lepore and Jan Paladino, were scanning their instruments, looking for an airport. Nothing turned up.

They sent out a Mayday signal, which was acknowledged by a cargo plane somewhere in the region. There had been no contact with any other plane, and certainly not with a 737 in the same airspace.

Mr. Lepore then spotted a runway through the darkening canopy of trees.

“I can see an airport,” he said.

They tried to contact the control tower at what turned out to be a military base hidden deep in the Amazon. They steered the plane through a big wide sweep to avoid putting too much stress on the wing.

As they approached the runway, they had the first contact with air traffic control.

“We didn’t know how much runway we had or what was on it,” Mr. Paladino would say later that night at the base in the jungle at Cachimbo.

We came down hard and fast. I watched the pilots wrestle the aircraft because so many of their automatic controls were blown. They brought us to a halt with plenty of runway left. We staggered to the exit.

“Nice flying,” I told the pilots as I passed them. Actually, I inserted an unprintable word between “nice” and “flying.”

“Any time,” Mr. Paladino, said with an anxious smile.

Later that night they gave us cold beer and food at the military base. We speculated endlessly about what had caused the impact. A wayward weather balloon? A hot-dogging military fighter jet whose pilot had bailed? An airliner somewhere nearby that had blown up, and rained debris on us?

Whatever the cause, it had become clear that we had been involved in an actual midair crash that none of us should have survived.
In a moment of gallows humor at the dormlike barracks where we were to sleep, I said, “Maybe we are all actually dead, and this is hell — reliving college bull sessions with a can of beer for eternity.”

About 7.30 p.m. Dan Bachmann, an Embraer executive and the only one among us who spoke Portuguese, came to the table in the mess hall with news from the commander’s office. A Boeing 737 with 155 people on board was reported missing right where we had been hit.

Before that moment, we had all been bonding, joking about our close call. We were the Amazon Seven, living now on precious time that no longer belonged to us but somehow we had acquired. We would have a reunion each year and report on how we used our time.

Instead we now bowed our heads in a long moment of silence, with the sound of muffled tears.

Both pilots, experienced corporate jet pilots, were shaken by the ordeal. “If anybody should have gone down it should have been us,” Mr. Lepore, 42, of Bay Shore, N.Y., kept saying.

Mr. Paladino, 34, of Westhampton, N.Y., was barely able to speak. “I’m just trying to settle in with the loss of all those people. It is really starting to hurt,” he said.

Mr. Yandle told them: “You guys are heroes. You saved our lives.” They smiled wanly. It was clear the weight of all this would remain with them forever.

The next day, the base was swarming with Brazilian authorities investigating the accident and directing search operations for the downed 737, which an officer told me lay in an area less than 100 miles south of us that could be reached only by whacking away by hand at dense jungle.

We also got access to our plane, which was being pored over by inspectors. Ralph Michielli, vice president for maintenance at ExcelAire and a fellow passenger on the flight, took me up on a lift to see the damage to the wing near the sheared-off winglet.

A panel near the leading edge of the wing had separated by a foot or more. Dark stains closer to the fuselage showed that fuel had leaked out. Parts of the horizontal stabilizer on the tail had been smashed, and a small chunk was missing off the left elevator.

A Brazilian military inspector standing by surprised me by his willingness to talk, although the conversation was limited by his weak English and my nonexistent Portuguese.

He was speculating on what happened, but this is what he said: Both planes were, inexplicably, at the same altitude in the same space in the sky. The southeast-bound 737 pilots spotted our Legacy 600, which was flying northwest to Manaus, and made a frantic evasive bank. The 737 wing, swooping into the space between our wing and the high tail, clipped us twice, and the bigger plane then went into its death spiral.

It sounded like an impossible situation, the inspector acknowledged. “But I think this happened,” he said. Though no one can say for certain yet how the accident occurred, three other Brazilian officers told me they had been informed that both planes were at the same altitude.

Why did I — the closest passenger to the impact — hear no sound, no roar of a big 737?

I asked Jeirgem Prust, a test pilot for Embraer. This was the following day, when we had been transferred from the base by military aircraft to a police headquarters in Cuiaba. That’s where authorities had laid claim to jurisdiction and where the pilots and passengers of the Legacy 600, including me, would be questioned until dawn by an intense police commander and his translators.

Mr. Prust took out a calculator and tapped away, figuring the time that would be available to hear the roar of a jet coming at another jet, each flying at over 500 miles an hour in opposite directions. He showed me the numbers. “It’s far less than a split second,” he said. We both looked at the pilots slouched on couches across the room.

“These guys and that plane saved our lives,” I said.

“By my calculations,” he agreed.

I later thought that perhaps the pilot of the Brazilian airliner had also saved our lives because of his quick reactions. If only his own passengers could say the same.

At the police headquarters, we were required to write on a sheet of paper our names, addresses, birthdates, occupations and levels of education, plus the names of our parents. We were all also required to submit to an examination by a physician with long hair who wore a white gown that draped almost to his shins. We were required to strip to the waists for photographs front and back.

This, explained the physician, whose name I did not get but who described himself to me as a “forensic doctor,” was to prove that we had not been tortured “in any way.”

Again gallows humor rose despite our attempts to discourage it.

“This guy’s the coroner,” Mr. Yandle explained later, and then added, “I think that means we are actually dead.”

But laughs, such as they were, died out by now as we thought again and again of the bodies still unclaimed in the jungle, and how their lives and ours had intersected, literally and metaphorically, for one horrible split second.

international hog driver

3rd Oct 2006, 18:14

As someone who has watched an aircraft disintegrate around them and lived to tell the tale all I can say as more and more details become available the greater my sense of loss becomes.

Those poor guys in the front of the 737 rode it all the way to the ground. The report for this one will be one of the most chilling stories we will ever see.

Multiple layers of safety redundancy have been eroded to let the “Golden BB” through the Swiss cheese. It appears that no matter how many safety devices can be installed we are still only human.

jondc9

3rd Oct 2006, 19:19

international hog driver

speaks for many of us.

from the reporters account and the early speculation by the inspector , it would seem that the GOL 737 may have taken evasive action at the last microsecond

it is also apparent that it was head on, that an offset would have saved them, that being 100' up or down might have saved them.

The question now is: why were two planes on IFR clearances not seperated by customary altitude/direction of flight rules?

Is it a mechanical problem, an altimeter miss set? it does happen

an improper clearance, no radar monitoring of altitude?

a misunderstood clearance?

as I mentioned before, a movie of the 50's or 60's, called, "THE CROWDED SKY" aslo a book by the same name, covered exactly this type of collision and how altimetry, communication and human factors resulted in a mid air.

RiverCity

3rd Oct 2006, 19:28

hog driver... Multiple layers of safety redundancy have been eroded to let the “Golden BB” through the Swiss cheese. It appears that no matter how many safety devices can be installed we are still only human. When I began in radio news nearly 50 years ago, MAC's were not that all uncommon. Look at it now: how often do they happen? The holes aren't lining up as often anymore, not nearly as much as when I began.

(Note: I have never used anything on PPRUNE in my job; I'm here solely because I lived next to an airport, my father worked in the Corsair plant, I worked in the Sikorsky plant, and two of my neighbors were pilots.)

flash8

3rd Oct 2006, 19:38

Now navigation system on new aircrafts are so accurate, that aircrafts fly always excactly on the centerline of the airway With a few inches precision, at the exact altitude.
So if by misunderstanding both aircrafts fly the same airways at the same alt but in opposite directions (providing tcas doesn't work) there is a 100% chance they will touch each other.
I heard that on new airbus when flying to remote aeras such Africa, the navigation system is randomly selecting a track not exactly on the airways centerline but within a few Nm offset to reduce the risk of such collisions.
I am exact or wrong, someone could confirm what i said.
You know this debate has been going on for years, at least since the 90's when I were a PPL!
Randomised Minor route offsets (not just using the OFFSET function) should be inbuilt into the FMC.. I don't know one person who disagrees with this (except perhaps the engineers)

jondc9

3rd Oct 2006, 19:39

read the following from the reporters article...consider if the 737 pilots reacted so quickly, as any of us might have, and the amount of control input, saving the Legacy, may have caused an accelerated stall/upset further dooming the flight.

do not misread this as anything against the 737 pilots or anyone else...high altitude flying with massive control inputs can be tricky.

head on, we are trained to both turn right.

fighter pilots are taught to turn and to keep enemy in sight

whatever the backgrounds, I think we can all understand why TCAS gives vertical escape maneuvers and not horizontal maneuvers (though TCAS 3 may have that).

if the 737 had pulled up, the belly might have hit the legacy, the 737 might have survived, dooming the legacy.

It is also time to revist recognition lights in cruise flight and not just at low altitudes ( landing lights on, a redesign of non retractable types).

again, do not consider this an attack on pilots, just a method for starting a debate on collision avoidance.

READ on:

A Brazilian military inspector standing by surprised me by his willingness to talk, although the conversation was limited by his weak English and my nonexistent Portuguese.

He was speculating on what happened, but this is what he said: Both planes were, inexplicably, at the same altitude in the same space in the sky. The southeast-bound 737 pilots spotted our Legacy 600, which was flying northwest to Manaus, and made a frantic evasive bank. The 737 wing, swooping into the space between our wing and the high tail, clipped us twice, and the bigger plane then went into its death spiral.

It sounded like an impossible situation, the inspector acknowledged.

threemiles

3rd Oct 2006, 20:24

RVSM or not, 370 is certainly not the altitude to go Northwest.

Given the collision site is "100 miles" north of SBCC which rounds up to S08 W56 this is 675 NM or 90 minutes flying Northwest of BRS where the changeover from 370 to 360 should have taken place. (UW2 to UZ6)

jondc9

3rd Oct 2006, 21:54

Dear Aviators:

PLEASE HELP ME OUT.

I hope to further the cause of aviation safety, and any thoughts you might have on this collision over and above what has already been written might help me.

I am to be on Paula Zahn's CNN show wednesday evening to talk about this amazing event. In the typical way that modern television is done, I will be asked questions for half an hour and perhaps 2 seconds will be used on tv.

It is my hope to stir a proper debate to influence an improvement in air safety.

One question that might be asked is why the Legacy crew heard nothing according to the reporters article. The reporter might be on the show too.

I've considered this question, my initial response is that modern planes are insulted against sound from the outside. also, the air is much thinner and less able to transmit the sounds at the altitude involved. That the relative speeds of the planes were so high, there was little chance for the sound to register to a listener.

Any thoughts?

And are there any other thoughts that you as fellow aviation professionals might like expressed.

There are some on this forum who don't care for what I do. Fine. But this is your chance to have a fellow pilot speak about things that should interest you and you get some input at this forum.

regards

jon regas

perhaps 12 hours to comment, prior to my studio time, which is different than show time.

ATC Watcher

3rd Oct 2006, 21:55

3miles, the answer lays in the Folha article ( asuming what is reported is correct of course): if my understanding of Portugese is correct , basically the flight was indeed planned at 360 but ATC lost contact with the legacy and it stays at 370.
If ATC did warn the other unit ( which had the 738 in contact) is still not known. The article mention some ATC errors ( to be taken with caution )

The article mention a loss of transponder ( which could explain the non-RAs) and some " delivery tests" done during that flight by the Legacy, " without informing ATC" but that comes from "rumours" from the military.

The direction of the FL according semi circular rule is not the key factor here ( We modify this all the time ad-hoc to ensure separation or expedite traffic ) The coordination between the 2 ATC centres is .
I would bet this is where ly one of the main cause of this collision.

jondc9

3rd Oct 2006, 22:07

atc watcher

you make some fine points. if indeed the legacy was to be at a lower altitude and somehow lost contact with ATC, what happened to the "expected" portion of the clearance.

like:

maintain FL370 expect clearance to FL360 in blank minutes?

one of the hallmarks of modern flying is communications...radios are so reliable now perhaps the backup of EXPECTED was over looked.

and ATC watcher, sadly I think you are right on about what caused this crash

j

Shuttleworth

3rd Oct 2006, 22:48

Such a sad day for the families and relatives,
What an absolute tragedy.
the Legacy had switched off the transponder in order to go up
If there is any truth in that; then someone needs to go to prison for a lifetime.

SM4 Pirate

3rd Oct 2006, 23:55

Ventus,

The quality of an offset is equally and proportionately useless to the equipment of the other airframe involved in the conflict; Big sky theory has more knobs than ever before with increasing accuracy of GPS based nav etc.

Remember direct tracking, User preferred routes, flex tracks etc not flying 'on the airway'. An offset may out you directly nose to nose with someone going to a waypoint early off a SID etc.

Take a 90 degree crossing event, an offset may help, but equally might put you it, when 'on track' might, repeat might work when all the other holes in the cheese line up.

Would you want to be the one on a self initiated offset (without advising ATC) that actually 'casued, the last hole' and the impact?

Cheers

Shore Guy

3rd Oct 2006, 23:58

Ventus45 said "Where to from here?”

ADS-B.

The issues of equipment redundancy still apply, but a collision avoidance system based on ADS-B would be infinitely superior. The accuracy is such one could do lateral escape maneuvers.

As we all know, TCAS is far from a clean sheet of paper design. It is a (for lack of a better word) bastardized system added on to a transponder design not envisioned to be an in-flight collision avoidance system.

With a CDTI (cockpit display of traffic information) and ADS-B, each aircraft would have "seen" each other over 100 miles away.

Capt Pit Bull

4th Oct 2006, 00:10

Ventus,

We'll have to wait and see, but...

In addition, where most aircraft have multiple redundancy for most systems, this is not so for TCAS, most aircraft only have ONE transponder fitted. If that transponder fails in flight, that aircraft, and all others around it, are in a much higher (statistically) state of potential - or actual danger of collision.

Not really. Most aircraft have 1 TCAS unit and 2 mode S SSR transponders.

But since you have 2 aircraft involved in the collision, and either TCAS can provide adequate safety as long as the other aircraft still has at least 1 SSR transponder working.

The "system" is the kit in both aircraft, not the kit in one aircraft. So in fact, there quite a lot of redundancy there. e.g. you could lose a TCAS unit in one aircraft, along with a transponder, and lose a transponder in the other aircraft, and still get a safe outcome.

pb

p.s. Before we start throwing money at more redudancy we ought to be making sure we are getting the best out of the kit we have. I remain convinced many TCAS training programs pay only lip service to the overall issues. I can think of many really nasty TCAS incidents caused by lack of crew knowledge / training (see note below) but far fewer (and certainly far fewer recently) caused by technical malfunction.

note: lack of crew knowledge / training is not equivalent to lack of professionalism, so don't go all defensive on me. But making sure there is robust training in place is a regulatory flight ops function, and I am not convinced it is happening globally. Just look at the misconceptions that crop up every time a TCAS related thread happens here for example.

night all

pb

broadreach

4th Oct 2006, 01:30

More news in Portuguese this afternoon (3 Oct) from the Correio Brasiliense, a Brasilia newspaper not noted for sensationalism: http://www2.correioweb.com.br/cbonline/brasil/pri_bra_193.htm

The article seems more accurate in terminology. It begins by focussing on the lack of timely communication between Brasilia ATC (Cindacta 1) and Manaus (Cindacta 4) and between these centres and the aircraft themselves, based on radar and comms recordings in the respective centres.

It then moves to actions on the part of the Legacy crew whose CVR and FDR began being analysed on Friday. The Legacy crew were interviewed in Rio on Monday by the aeronautical authorities who, by that time, had heard the CVR and conducted at least a superficial analysis of the FDR. Details not revealed but the article states that at some point after passing Brasilia the Legacy’s transponder was switched off, thus rendering the secondary radar returns that rely on the transponder and which would have more precisely established altitude, virtually useless (primary radar being able to track course accurately but altitude only to ±1,500’). Then, that the Legacy began a series of brusque manoevers up and down, left and right, descending at one point to FL 320 before resuming FL 370, those manoeuvers further complicating interpretation of radar signals.

Around that time Brasilia, unable to make radio contact with the Legacy, transferred control to Manaus, who then failed to take into account their own 738 and did not avail themselves of the Cachimbo mountain range radar assembly to more accurately track the Legacy.

At one point the article states that the accident committee believe the Legacy crew did see the 738 and attempted evasive action, too late. “Proof” offered of this being the transponder’s being switched back on shortly after the collision and, simultaneously, an emergency landing at Cachimbo AF base being requested.

The article contains a list of errors on the part of ATC and the Legacy, free translation:

ATC
- The Legacy was not alerted when it maintained FL 370 after passing Brasilia.
- ATC should have tried to alert the Legacy via any other aircraft.
- Manaus ATC alerted neithter of the aircraft of the possibility of collision

Legacy
- Did not follow the flight plan filed at Sao Jose dos Campos which included descent to FL 360 on passing Brasilia.
- Switched off transponder and performed dangerous maneouvers blinding the radar and making Cindacta 1 (Brasilia) and 4 (Manaus) work more difficult.
- Ignored repeated alerts from Brasilia ATC whilst varying altitude by up to 3,000 feet.

There is also a bit about standard commercial flight procedures ex Manaus, from which the Gol 738 was cleared to FL 410 normally to be accomplished in steps, on autopilot.

There are contradictions just about everywhere. Reports of “100 bodies in the tail section” yesterday have been adjusted to 50. The Gol 738’s recorders were recovered from the tail yesterday or today and the investigation team have been given 40 days to deliver a report. “Official” news is being delivered through daily press conferences by ANAC but reporters are getting more information and, of course, contradictory leads, from contacts on the accident site and in the investigation group.

PJ2

4th Oct 2006, 02:20

broadreach;

A thorough, balanced if not disturbing post, thank you.

20driver

4th Oct 2006, 02:39

Is there anything to stop an airline from incorporating a track offset - say .5 nm, right between 0 and 180 heading, left 180 to 360, in their SOPs?
A simple solution that requires no rule making. Still keeps you on the airway width.
20driver

OVERTALK

4th Oct 2006, 04:19

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=107060&highlight=Delhi+Collision
.

further query

Anybody know whether these articles are still accessible anywhere (links appear dead)?

Long time Ppruners will be familiar with these threads from the very early days of Pprune.
.
http://www.pprune.org/pub/tech/MidAir2.html
.

http://www.pprune.org/pub/tech/MidAir.html

bubbers44

4th Oct 2006, 05:22

20, won't that put an east/west offset on the exact same line of flight? I am talking heading. How about .5 right for everybody and emergency descents always turn right. Kind of like a Texas road. Nobody crosses the center line. Or touches it. The Brits can just go to the head on rule of deviating right and forget the highway stuff.

Bangkokeasy

4th Oct 2006, 07:09

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061003/ap_on_re_la_am_ca/brazil_plane_crash;_ylt=AkJO.xcIjVrwBfHv0n8OJ7tvaA8F;_ylu=X3 oDMTA0cDJlYmhvBHNlYwM-

Contains some relevant translations of Brazilian sources, for those non-Portuguese speakers among us.

ORAC

4th Oct 2006, 07:32

- Switched off transponder and performed dangerous maneouvers blinding the radar and making Cindacta 1 (Brasilia) and 4 (Manaus) work more difficult.
- Ignored repeated alerts from Brasilia ATC whilst varying altitude by up to 3,000 feet.

Primary 3D radar is only accurate to within +/- 5000ft except when used for comparative heights between 2 aircraft in close proximity. Digital radars exhibit track weave, which is why separation criteria is normally increased to 10nm laterally when more than 100nm away from the radar head.

The military "rumours" would therefore seem to be based on an ignorance of basic radar performance. I would suggest they be discounted and that the suggestion to exercise caution be implemented concerning all reports until more detailed FDR information is released.

410

4th Oct 2006, 07:35

20driver, think about what you've just suggested. It's the equivalent of two aero club aces deciding to do an opposing beatup of their local aeroclub. "I'll come in from the north, you come in from the south. I'll fly down the right side of the runway and fly down the left side."

1 mile right offset inbuilt into ALL systems when LNAV is selected when above F150 wouldn't be a panacea - ie, it wouldn't solve crossing conflicts, but it would have opposite direction traffic no longer on EXACTLY the same track for hours on end.

jondc9

4th Oct 2006, 07:50

controllers have a term for Wrong Altitude/Flight Level (for) Direction of Flight-WafDof (woff doff).

many years ago when given a WAFDAF, I would question it to get it on the tape...but it has become quite commonplace. Something like "CONFIRM WAFDAF".

I wonder if the TCAS installation on Legacy is like most in that turning your tansponder to TCAS or R/A etc is the only way to get your tcas on...perhaps when turning off transponder ( still unproven) they did not realize theyhad turned off TCAS.

j

threemiles

4th Oct 2006, 08:38

The direction of the FL according semi circular rule is not the key factor here ( We modify this all the time ad-hoc to ensure separation or expedite traffic )

There is always a danger in this thinking when not anticipating that loss of radar contact or comm failure may occur at some point. Exactly the same thinking was bringing the TU-154 and C-141 down.

Away from high dense airspaces and with the exception of the oceanic rush routes it is good practice to stick to semi circular rules over long thin traffic routes. No reason to not do so.

Pom Pax

4th Oct 2006, 08:40

Huck

4th Oct 2006, 10:34

A corporate pilot never forgets who he's got in back.

This flight was loaded with big guns from both the owner corporation and Embraer - plus a travel reporter from an influential paper.

As a former corporate guy I can say this: I doubt seriously that they flew any maneuvers, other than straight and level and as smoothly as possible.

410

4th Oct 2006, 11:10

Yes Huck, I have to say a similar thought crossed my mind. I thought it sounded awfully like someone in officialdom preparing the ground for a "It wasn't our system that was at fault" defence.

alemaobaiano

4th Oct 2006, 11:47

Yes Huck, I have to say a similar thought crossed my mind. I thought it sounded awfully like someone in officialdom preparing the ground for a "It wasn't our system that was at fault" defence.

Right, and they are doing that by acknowledging the real possibilty of a lack of ATC coordination between two centres as one of the contributing factors?

Despite what you may think, Brazil follows all of the ICAO norms of accident investigation and the causes of this tragic event will come out at or before the end of the 90 period originally stated. Nobody will hide anything and nobody will cover up anything.

As for a corporate pilot not forgetting who's in the back, who knows where the idea for the alleged test profile came from? If it happened, the idea is unlikely to have originated from the front seats.

weasil

4th Oct 2006, 12:09

RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil (AP) -- Two American executive jet pilots were ordered by a judge to stay in Brazil while authorities investigate whether they caused a midair collision with an airliner that crashed into the Amazon, killing all 155 people aboard.

A Brazilian newspaper reported that the pilots' Legacy jet, which was carrying seven Americans, disobeyed an order by the control tower to descend to a lower altitude just before coming into contact with Gol airlines Flight 1907.

http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/americas/10/04/brazil.crash.ap/index.html

PlatinumFlyer

4th Oct 2006, 13:48

Joe Sharkey was interviewed by Matt Lauer on the Today show about an hour ago. He added nothing to what was in earlier interviews. He mentioned that he was "sure" something hit them and that they did not hit anything. Also, that "we need to be careful in judgement as the two guys down there are in some peril".

There was a graphic display of the accident showing the Legacy approacing form the bottom and to the left of the 737 (when viewed from the 737). Both planes banked (Legacy to the right, 737 to the right, and the Legacy winglet then hits the 737 left wing and the 737 goes into a spin around its center axis and continues that spin all the way to the ground. There was no mention of where this diaplay came from.

Sky Wave

4th Oct 2006, 14:05

Question from a wannabie

You are under positive radar control within Controlled Airspace at FL370. You've filed a flight plan that says you will descend to FL360 at a set point in order to comply with the airway altitude routing requirements.

Is it your responsibility as the commander to request that descent to FL360 or can you assume that ATC is happy for you to maintain FL370 if they do not request that you descend?

Secondly if this is a case of a radio failure, does Brazil have any local instructions which amend the ICAO requirement to maintain your last assigned heading and altitude for 20 minutes before resuming your flight planned altitude and route?

If ATC could not contact the Legacy should they have assumed an RT failure and assumed he would continue at FL370 for 20 minutes and therefore vectored the 737 out of the Legacy's way.

Surely in CAS the commander of the Legacy cannot descend to FL360 without authority from ATC so if they had RT difficulties it's seems perfectly reasonable that the Legacy would maintain FL370.

Is it possible then that the Legacy had some kind of intermittent avionics problem which was switching off the transponder and disabling the radios? Teething problems on new aircraft are not unheard of.

I’d be interested in any positive feedback to the above questions (I may be missing something in my interpretation of the requirements following an RT failure.)

Cheers SW

lomapaseo

4th Oct 2006, 14:11

I suggest that there does not have to have been any actual physical contact to have caused this accident.
On the road you meet a large lorry at a closing speed of 150 knots. As you pass your car experiences a severe buffet. Now consider 2 aircraft of similiar comparatives sizes closing at 6 times that speed. V squared has become much much greater. The winglet is subjected to this sudden force in the opposite sense (direction) to which it is designed to work, it fails strikes a glancing blow to the tail plane.
Back to the motoring comparison, Ranger One much earlier in the thread (post #178) made some calculations, that winglet now has as much energy as a very large car traveling at 40 mph. The winglet now strikes the the 738. Now refer to the Lockerbie (Pan Am) report to see how damage to 1 panel of the skin leads to the failure of others.

The Pan Am Lockerbie was not just the one panel of damage that led to its destruction nor even the rapid decompression following. The critical ingredient was the same as TWA800 and that was structural damage in the pressence of reverberating overpressure

I believe that large transport aircraft can easily sustain large sections of skin damage as well as decompression, but not overpressures

20driver

4th Oct 2006, 14:16

410 and others
I got the geometry wrong and I did read the other discussions. My question is it seems this could be done by the airlines with no official ICAO action required by adding the offset to their SOP's. Not knocking ICAO but it will take years. So back to the question, is there a reason the airlines cannot do this on their own?
With the growth in air travel all over the world and the increased Nav precision this sort of event will happen again. Interesting that this event and the one off Africa took place in the 'empty quarters" of aviation.

20driver

RiverCity

4th Oct 2006, 15:44

A corporate pilot never forgets who he's got in back. Let me bring up an admittedly ancient, but perhaps relevant, example of just this situation. You have a new owner, plus a Big Wheel from the manufacturer flying over Nowhere and one, or both, want to see what the machine will do and perhaps impress the journo. So they order the pilot who says, "NO!" and then put enough pressure on him so he says, "This is definitely against my better judgement," and gives in for a few fateful minutes.

Let's go back to the Titanic. Excellent captain; owner on board, who wants to show off the ship. Captain tells him there is ice ahead; owner says, keep 'er going. Ship rolls over iceberg, slices bottom open. Captain wants to stop so pumps can keep it afloat longer; owner says, "Keep going." Prevails on captain and causes the ship to take more water and sink faster.

The people in back could have had some bearing.

Ranger One

4th Oct 2006, 15:57

I believe that large transport aircraft can easily sustain large sections of skin damage as well as decompression, but not overpressures

Aloha 243

R1

st2en

4th Oct 2006, 16:07

I have read with great interest the many postings regarding this tragic event.
There seems to be general agreement that the two aircraft, which were flying in exactly opposite directions, either collided or passed each other very closely.
I am "just" a PPL, but I do think that there is one aspect of the above collision or near-miss theories that is left out... wake turbulence
Assuming that the EMB passed right underneath the 73 on an opposite course, it would have been flying right in the wake turbulence of the 73, which I believe must be rather considerate. Wouldn't that have caused significant problems for the EMB or at least made an impression on the journalist, who does not mention anything along the lines of violent turbulence.

lenstrad

4th Oct 2006, 16:17

but black boxes and flight data recorders do not fail , lets wait , please

172driver

4th Oct 2006, 16:35

Let me bring up an admittedly ancient, but perhaps relevant, example of just this situation. You have a new owner, plus a Big Wheel from the manufacturer flying over Nowhere and one, or both, want to see what the machine will do and perhaps impress the journo. So they order the pilot who says, "NO!" and then put enough pressure on him so he says, "This is definitely against my better judgement," and gives in for a few fateful minutes.

Assuming for a minute he did that (which, I hasten to add, I do not believe) - would he be doing so on an airway ?? :confused:

RiverCity

4th Oct 2006, 17:08

Assuming for a minute he did that (which, I hasten to add, I do not believe) - would he be doing so on an airway ?? Since we're all theorizing here (see lenstrad's comments), I thought I'd toss that in. I assume the box will indicate if either altimeter had been set correctly, thus perhaps making either pilot assume incorrectly there was no traffic ahead of them (and the bizjet assume a little demonstration could be carried on quite safely at his altitude). You are dealing with what I assume are two flight decks full of very professional pilots who aren't going to take chances unless their instrumentation gives them false readings.

I keep wondering about that "shadow," that "thing" the bizjet saw above him.

KC135777

4th Oct 2006, 17:28

I hope these two pilots get a fair shake. From the excerpts of this article, it looks like they're already looking for a scapegoat....Tag, you're it ! :-(
What a bunch of crap.
____________________________________________________________ _

Brazilian authorities believe two pilots may have shut off the transponder in their business jet, rendering its anti-collision system useless,
"We know that the transponder was turned off," said Jose Carlos Pereira, the head of Brazil's airports authority, the Estado De Sao Paulo newspaper reported on Wednesday...."A pilot only turns it off when he doesn't want to be identified. The Legacy could have turned it off to try some air tricks far from the eyes of the air traffic controllers," Pereira said.

Pereira of Brazil's airport authority, who was also a military pilot, told Estado that Gol's Boeing 737-800 was probably being flown on automatic pilot and closely adhering to its set altitude.

"The Boeing is like a bus. It never leaves its route," Pereira said. "With the automatic pilot its altitude varies at most by one meter."

RiverCity

4th Oct 2006, 17:32

There was no maneuvering by the legacy bizjet. Here's the journalist's article. I'm willing to believe that; as I said, we're all speculating, even the most experienced of us are coming up with scenarios that the black boxes will affirm or negate. However, if your admission of such were to result in someone's offing, would you say anything? I'd leave all witnessing to the black box and the pilots. I'd say nothing but praiseworthy statements. They got the CVR and the FDR.

BOAC

4th Oct 2006, 17:46

PLEASE do not keep on reposting the NY Times article. It is at Post #256.

chuks

4th Oct 2006, 17:56

I find it amazing how much wild speculation goes on here over crashes when a bit of patience should see all the questions answered.

Just think how you would feel if you were being held, under suspicion, with your fellows here mulling over what you might have got up to that would cause the deaths of over 150 citizens of the country that was holding you.

When I read that the crew admitted doing something illegal all I could think was, 'Oh, sure.' You think someone would be unprofessional enough to do something like turn off the transponder and play around on an airway but then ADMIT to that? That doesn't make sense on the face of it. Either you play it straight and tell the truth or else you screw around and lie about it. To first screw around and then play it straight is not normal behaviour, so that quote seems unbelievable on the face of it.

It sure is strange to see this relatively small, lightly damaged Embraer and the relatively large, crashed 737; a logical explanation is hard to come up with and that makes all the more reason to just wait for the official report, when they can use the CVRs and FDRs to tell us what really happened.

We went through this once before in Nigeria when that 727 was sent out of control in response to a TCAS RA. We had eyewitness reports of the aircraft 'hovering' at Murtala Muhammed Airport, from a man of the cloth, no less, 'inside' information that the previous crew had refused to fly the accident aircraft because it was unsafe, that an engineer had been seen working on the hydraulic flight controls just before it departed on its ill-fated flight and so on. The final report was a real anti-climax; who would have guessed that the crew could have lost control in such a way? But there it was. This one might be like that, something we wouldn't have thought of initially.

I find the reports from Brazil to be useful. The speculation less so!

westhawk

4th Oct 2006, 20:00

I find the reports from Brazil to be useful. The speculation less so!

I found the rest of your post to be reasonable and pertinent. But considering the unsubstantiated and speculative statements in the Brazillian "reports" thus far quoted, the above statement might merit re-consideration.

Perhaps if you meant to convey that the reports from Brazil were useful in demonstrating the pure folly of treating initial press reports of any tragic event as fact, I might agree!

Objective data does exist, and will eventually become available to us. Your advice regarding patience is well founded, difficult as it may be to follow.

Best regards,

Westhawk

ATC Watcher

4th Oct 2006, 20:30

There is always a danger in this thinking when not anticipating that loss of radar contact or comm failure may occur at some point. Exactly the same thinking was bringing the TU-154 and C-141 down.
Away from high dense airspaces and with the exception of the oceanic rush routes it is good practice to stick to semi circular rules over long thin traffic routes. No reason to not do so.

Things have evolved a little since introduction of radar in 1960. ATC radar Clearances today do not anticipate loss of radar . If that comes , emergency procedures, like 500 ft emergency separation, will try to save the day.

The 154/141 Namib collision you are refering to was outside radar coverage and the 154 was not talking to anyone , outside his original flight plan route , and probably ( we will never know) did not dare to change Altitude on his own initiative. There was no ATC intervention there.

In long thin procedurally controlled routes, semi circular makes a great deal of sense, I fully agree, but in our case here in Brazil, both aircraft were under radar control.
The reasons for (radar) ATC to deviate are many, the most common are intermediate level off ( in climb and descent), expediting other traffic thru a level, turbulence avoidance, complying with a local flight allocation scheme or an adjacent centre requirement to name a few.

Just think of 2 airways converging /crossing with 30 degr Westward , possibly even coming from 2 different units. You are of course going to use all levels at your disposal to solve the cruising conflicts , not only the even ones.

jondc9

4th Oct 2006, 22:19

I saw a report quoting a brazillian official (reuters report) that the transponder was off.
anyone with data on that?
jon

meatball

5th Oct 2006, 00:09

Heard from 2 northwest pilots today in montreal that the american pilots have not only had their passports retained, but that they are under arrest. Why ? Because they were flying at the wrong flight level for the direction of flight, off the airways and DID NOT HAVE THEIR TRANSPONDER ON, meaning that they had no TCAS availability. It could be baloney, could be true,but THEY clipped the GOL 737, not the other way around.......:confused:

jondc9

5th Oct 2006, 00:16

does everyone remember the Swissair/Athens manslaughter trial, conducted in 1983 for a crash in '79?
with modern fdr/cvr and a hopefully impartial member of the 4th estate on board the plane, perhaps we will find some degree of truth.
j

jondc9

5th Oct 2006, 00:25

these words, written more than 40 years ago, seem even more prophetic today:

Hank Searls says in his prologue(the crowded sky): "The airway is not a highway, but an invisible alley, sometimes of infinite height. Day or night, its traveler depends for safety not as the motorist does on keeping right or left of a center line, but on holding a promised speed and an assigned altitude. If he speeds up, he will overtake his predecessor; if he climbs or descends inad-vertently, he is suddenly in an opposite stream of traffic approaching with the speed of sound."

FlyVMO

5th Oct 2006, 00:38

Not to jump the gun, but where could this lead for the crew of the Legacy?
Hypothetically, how would Brasil's justice system handle any forthcoming case? Are there any precedents for foriegn air crew being actually charged and convicted after an accident, as opposed to simply being held for questioning?

Don't mean to hijack the thread, but the speculation seems to be getting a bit repetitive. So, until more facts are forthcoming....

vapilot2004

5th Oct 2006, 01:29

CBS News Coverage (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/04/world/main2061814.shtml)

It said the Legacy flew at 37,000 feet to the capital Brasilia, but then ignored an order to descend to 36,000 feet to continue its flight to the Amazon city of Manaus. The Gol jetliner was flying at 37,000 feet from Manaus to Brasilia en route to Rio de Janeiro.

U.S. journalist Joe Sharkey, who was on the smaller plane, wrote in The New York Times that he visited the pilots shortly before the crash. He said they told him "the plane was flying beautifully" and he noted a display of the altitude read 37,000 feet............

Link to NBC video of Joe Sharkey talking about the MAC on the Today Show here (http://msnbc.msn.com/id/15129201/)

Johnbr

5th Oct 2006, 01:32

broadreach

5th Oct 2006, 01:55

Meatball and FlyVMO,

I haven't heard of their being arrested. Yet. The AirForce say officially and quite prudently there are no grounds for laying blame yet, although individuals therein and connected thereto have given the press their personal opinions which weigh pretty heavily against the Legacy crew.

I won't begin to try to explain the legal system in Brazil other than to say that an accident of this magnitude allows magistrates in a broad range of jurisdictions to issue court orders based on incomplete information.

That doesn't mean the two Legacy guys will be put behind bars. They'll have to wait out the investigation period and probably a good part of the ensuing legal battle in a hotel. Given the widely published "evidence" (yes, that too could be baloney) that they took some liberties prior to the collision, they'll be the targets of considerable public hostility for some time.

tucunare

5th Oct 2006, 03:45

Do you agree that flying the incorrect FL, with the transponder OFF or inoperative the aircraft should be intercepted by military ACFT to check what is going on? :eek:

jondc9

5th Oct 2006, 05:52

even if legacy ignored clearance to descend and radar and radio contact were adequate with 737, a heading change or altitude change for 737 could have solved the problem.

there will be room enough for blame...a bit for ATC, a bit for legacy, a bit for unknowns.

the rate things are going, I expect to hear something within 1 week, definitive tapes from ATC, CVR's from both planes, and perhaps most importantly, the FDR from legacy...if making many maneuvers, 5000' altitude changes as has been suggested, coupled with loss of transponder on ATC radar tapes...we may have a cause.

mentioning early posts about offsets, maybe it is time to go to "one way " airways...with gps, we no longer need to go over the top of a VOR.

aimscabinet

5th Oct 2006, 06:37

Are you guys aware that teams from Boeing and NTSB have been sent to Brazil,to cooperate in the investigation?So I guess there will be no cover up for any mistake form anybody in this accident...Furthermore,I ask you people,what do you think the Brazilian authoirities should do,when there is a suspicion that those Legacy pilots could have been responsible for the death of 165 people?Give them a slap in the wrist and wave'em goodbye?

Certainly the Boeing folks will be there; not sure about the NTSB guys.
Accidents in Brazil were investigated by the Air Force teams following international procedures and often, asked for assistance from other international agencies, if that was the case.
Never heard of anybody being jailed for causing an air crash; however, if I am not mistaken (I am not an attorney), the Brazilian Penal Code caters for two types of homicides: "Culposo" (intention to cause someone's death), and "Doloso" (there was no intention, such as negligence or something).
The civilian authorities could use the Penal Code to charge the crew with the second option above, if they were to be found guilty in a court of law. Justice is tradionally slow in that part of the world and it could take years to get things done.
The Air Force investigators would just issue the results of their findings and it would be up to the civilians to take any action.

(note my past tense ... I can only talk about how things were twenty years ago, when I lived there).

ORAC

5th Oct 2006, 06:53

First sensible statement I´ve heard in a couple of days.....

Premature to lay blame over plane crash (http://rawstory.com/news/2006/premature_to_lay_blame_over_plane_c_10042006.html), dpa German Press Agency.

Cuiaba, Brazil- The Brazilian Air Force (FAB) on Wednesday warned that it was "premature" to assign responsibility for the worst plane crash in the country's history, after state police earlier in the day said they were investigating two US pilots. FAB said in a statement that investigations into Saturday's mid- air collision were ongoing, and that it was too early "to establish any judgement or make comments" about the case.......

Profit Max

5th Oct 2006, 06:57

Certainly the Boeing folks will be there; not sure about the NTSB guys.The US National Transportation Safety Board has sent three investigators to assist in the probe, and representatives of the US Federal Aviation Administration and Boeing Aircraft Company were also heading to the accident scene, a NTSB official said on Tuesday.
Profit Max.

Blues&twos

5th Oct 2006, 07:05

"Never heard of anybody being jailed for causing an air crash; however, if I am not mistaken (I am not an attorney)" (Originally posted by aimscabinet)

As I recall, an ATCO (Tasic I think his name was) was jailed in 1977 following a MAC over Zagreb between a DC9 and a Trident 3 but was released on appeal after 2 years in prison. It was a very complex case as I remember.

410

5th Oct 2006, 07:31

Wasn't a Dash 8 pilot gaoled for manslaughter (or at least charged) over a crash in New Zealand a year or two ago, using cockpit voice recorder transcripts as evidence?

*****
I see that the moderators have resurrected the two links on offsetting mentioned a few pages back.

Worth reading, if only to see that this topic was covered in depth ten years ago on PPrune.

http://www.pprune.org/pub/tech/MidAir2.html

http://www.pprune.org/pub/tech/MidAir.html

BOAC

5th Oct 2006, 07:45

Worth looking at http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=2951 from the archives, too.

the_hawk

5th Oct 2006, 07:59

http://www.asigroup.com/HOTSPOTS.asp#129029

Local media reports on 4 October 2006 state that the pilots of an Embraer Legacy jet that collided with a Boeing 737 operated by Gol on 29 September remain detained in Brazil and that their U.S. passports have been seized. Reports indicate that while representatives of ExcelAire (the U.S.-based company that bought the Legacy) claim that the pilots onboard the flight were commercial pilots who are licensed to fly Embraer aircraft, the U.S. Federal Administration Agency (FAA) indicated that the pilot of the executive jet does not have the required license to fly this type of aircraft. The co-pilot does have this certification, according to the registries.

The U.S. pilots’ situation has become more complicated, as Brazilian aviation authorities have alleged that the radar registries revealed that they were flying with the transponder turned off and that they did not respond to the call of the Cindacta 1 control tower in Brasilia. After the collision, however, the pilots allegedly turned on the transponder and contacted the control tower, announcing they had hit an unidentified object. Brazilian aviation authorities are considering the possibility that the new aircraft developed technical difficulties with the transponder and that human error may have also played a role in the collision. The Federal Police force is also involved in the investigation. ASI Group will continue to update as information becomes available.

Has the (possible) lack of license been mentioned yet?

ATC Watcher

5th Oct 2006, 08:23

Worth looking at http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=2951 from the archives, too.

Thanks for that one ! it is both amazing and frightening to see that what we have ourselves written 6 years ago , a few Mid airs laters, we are still at the same point with the same arguments.
Enbedded 0.1 NM off set to the right still makes a lot of sense, and will continue to do so for a long time.

westhawk

5th Oct 2006, 10:12

The matter of Mr Lepore's type rating not showing up on the FAA registry is meaningless. It often takes about 60 days (or more) from the time that the temporary certificate is issued for this to be reflected on FAA.gov. How does anyone know that he didn't recently complete training. Sloppy, lazy reporting. As with so many other aspects of this accident, there appears to be no shortage of unsubstantiated ill-informed and possibly biased reporting going on in the Brazillian press. Conviction by innuendo. One might even call it a smear campaign. All the reports I have read from their press regarding the Legacy crew have been slanted toward a presumption of guilt without basis in verifiable fact. I guess if the officials involved know Mr. Lepore's certifications, they either don't care to tell the press, or the press simply can't let facts get in the way of a good story. In the US, what they are doing is known as a hatchet job. On the good side, it makes the US and british press look a little better in comparison.:ugh:

Best,

Westhawk

alemaobaiano

5th Oct 2006, 11:57

Westhawk

Smear campaign? Conviction by innuendo? Sloppy, lazy reporting? Hatchet job?

The press here are doing what the press do anywhere, reporting what has been released in press conferences and bulletins, calling on talking head specialists and speculating about the causes of this accident. You don't have to go back very far to see the same happening in the US (Comair), and Europe (Helios).

The press (and us on Pprune !!) speculate on the causes of the accident, and the most likely outcome of any inquiry. They (and us) have only the currently available information to go on, therefore they (and us) may not even be on the right track. That does not make them (or us) biased in our views.

Mr Lepore's type rating is relevant, whether you like it or not. It could indicate that he is not an experienced pilot on the Legacy and quite likely had not explored the full flight envelope. Do you see where that leads? This information, BTW is attributed to the FAA, not ANAC.

The only hatchet job so far has come from Joe Sharkey, with his innuendo and smears against Brazil, claiming that the pilots are in peril down here. His attitude reeks of sloppy and sensationalist reporting and looks very like someone preparing the ground for a campaign against this country in the event that the Legacy crew did something wrong and have to face the legal process here.

The investigation will be thorough and competent and will reach it's conclusions based on fact. The investigation team has representatives from Boeing, the FAA and the NTSB, and I doubt that these organisations would be party to a cover-up or an attempt to frame two US pilots.

The press here is no different to the press anywhere. There's good and bad, sensible and sensational and we choose our press sources to match our own preconceptions.

captjns

5th Oct 2006, 12:16

Heard from 2 northwest pilots today in montreal that the american pilots have not only had their passports retained, but that they are under arrest.

The two pilots have been "detained" by the Brazilian Authorites pending an investigation which may lead to charges of manslaughter. Their passports have also been confiscated too. The boxes have been recovered from the crash sight of the 738. So the jury is still out on the actual cause of this tragic accident.

Flight Safety

5th Oct 2006, 13:07

Interesting article.

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u126678.shtml

To summarize, the investigating authorities are working on a theory that as a brand new airplane, the transponder may have had a "bad electrical contact" with a switch or wiring, meaning that the transponder was on and off (intermittent) without the pilots knowing about it (a possible "infant mortality" issue I suggested earlier). In the article, the sources did not indicate why they were looking at this theory, or what lead them to pursue this theory.

In their "combination of causal events" hypothesis, the pilot did not descend to FL360 from FL370 as per the flight plan, and since the transponder was not working properly due to the "bad contact" problem, the TCAS warning failed. Then after the impact, the "bad contact" corrected due to the impact and turned the transponder back on again. In the article there's some discussion about ATC response to the transponder disappearing prior to the collision, but the computer translation leaves the grammer and exact meaing of that paragraph in doubt (at least for me). I can't tell if ATC tried to contact the Legacy pilots about the loss of the transponder or failed to do so.

In any event according to the article, the authorities are not sure if this is a good theory or not, but are working it as part of the investigation. At least it's nice to know the Aeronautical Authorities are trying to give the pilots the benefit of the doubt about the operation of the transponder.

jondc9

5th Oct 2006, 13:15

Flight Safety:

Interesting thoughts...

all the planes I have flown with TCAS require that the transponder be selected to the TCAS/TA/TA position...if something goes wrong with the transponder, the TCAS drops out and a warning message occurs.

So, in this case, did the Legacy crew notice any TCAS problems? Which might have indicated transponder problems.

also, why didn't ATC notify Legacy of intermittent transponder?

In the USA, if radar contact is lost with a flight, ATC is duty bound to inform said flight: RADAR CONTACT LOST

I do think there may be a "mechanical" component to the collision, and mentioned earlier there might be an intermittent fault in the cable between transponder and antenna...a good transponder and a bad antenna= no transponder for practical purposes.

bobusse

5th Oct 2006, 13:31

Regarding the "infant mortality or deficiency", factories or plant assemblies usually take care of it. Statistically,it has been found that around one hundred hours operating on the bench will reveal "nearly" all these infant deseases.
I'd be surprised,concerning such security equipment, if nothing was done in that matter.

Sky Wave

5th Oct 2006, 13:40

Does anyone care to offer an opinion on my previous post #287?

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=246031&page=15

I suggested that the TCAS could have an intermittent fault and now it seems other information may support that theory. I am wondering if I was off the mark with any of my other comments and am still curious about the RT failure procedures over Brazil?

Cheers

SW

Mercenary Pilot

5th Oct 2006, 14:16

I suggested that the TCAS could have an intermittent fault and now it seems other information may support that theory.

That would mean TCAS would have to have an intermittent fault on both aircraft at the same time, the odds of that happening...at least a 100000000 to 1 I would have thought?

the_hawk

5th Oct 2006, 14:42

he means transponder not TCAS, see his original post on p.15

Sky Wave

5th Oct 2006, 14:48

Sorry

As the_hawk said, I meant Transponder.

SW

lfbb

5th Oct 2006, 17:07

Maybe this could help..
http://www.skyguide.ch/en/Dossiers/Dossier_Safety/Downloadables_dossier_safety/safety_bulletin_11_sept05_internet.pdf

And if I'm not wrong Embraer has issued an operation bulletin talking about that. Any ERJ pilot care to share that informaton with us?

westhawk

5th Oct 2006, 21:06

alemaobaiano:

My comments regarding the quality and nature of the press reports coming out of Brasil are not intended as indictment of your country, it's culture or it's people. I critisize these press accounts upon the same basis as I would any reporting anywhere. Perhaps something gets lost in the translation, but the stories I've read started off with a presumption of some malfeasance and culpability on the part of the Legacy crew from the outset and has continued unbroken since. As far as I am aware, none of the accusations made against them by the press have been verified by any independant objective source to date. Their representations of technical matters concerning the operation of aircraft, the ATC system and the rules pertaining to same are poorly researched, and in some instances, wrong. Go back and read the stories and you may come to see my point.

If any similar suspicion has been cast on the GOL crew by the press, or by any statements attributed to any government official, I have not seen it. From my perspective, this indicates an editorial bias intended to create certain impressions in the minds of the readers. My initial impression of the objectivity and ethical fidelity of the press reports I refer to is based upon these observations.

To the credit of government officials involved with the investigation, they have been very careful not to make public statements which might later reflect poorly upon their credibility. This is as it should be. I agree with you that the behavior of the press is consistent with what is expected in a great many places around the world, including the USA. As to Mr. Sharkey's impressions of the safety and security of the Legacy crew as they remain in the country by court order, it seemed to me to be somewhat melodramatic too. I get the impression that the whole affair was rather a shock to his psyche. Given the manner in which the occupants of the Legacy learned of the scale of the tragedy after surviving the event, this is understandable. More of a first hand personal acount than a journalistic report. Perhaps his words should be taken with this in mind.

I too have confidence that the official investigation will be be properly conducted according to internationaly recognized standards for aviation accident investigation. No reason to believe otherwise.

Now, a few words as to the applicabilty and importance of Mr. Lepore's pilot credentials. Of course the matter of whether he has recieved the EMB type rating and associated training bears upon his qualification to act as a required crewmember. An FAA airmen registry search does not necessarily reflect recently issued airman certificates. Updates to the registry are performed periodically. It can take 60-120 days to process newly issued certificates and they may not be reflected on the FAA website until processing and issuance of the new permanent certificate has been completed. I have not seen any reports indicating what certificates have been shown to investigating officials. Just the report regarding the lack of a certificate being reflected on the FAA website accessible registry search utility. BIG difference.

This is just one of many cases of press reports which display a lack of care and concern with truth as a central goal in the reporting. These stories appear to be filled with assertations made which are based on half-truths, hearsay and yes, innuendo. Is there any reason why the press may prefer to cover this event in a way that creates certain perceptions? I leave that for each person to decide for themselves. I am niether shocked by this, nor do I think it is limitied to the Brasillian press. Rather, the news media of all countries appear to have their own editorial agendas. In general, it is my belief that they are self serving.

If the facts, once established, point to improper behavior on the part of the Legacy crew being causal in the accident, I will accept it. Like it or not. I do reject the notion that the press has acted responsibly in their reporting of this matter and I stand by the critical meaning of my statements, provocative as they might be. As a living, thinking human being, you are entitled to believe otherwise and to offer any opinion you wish. There is no requirement that we all agree!

The truth of this matter will emerge over time, Like it or not!

Best regards,

Westhawk

aimscabinet

5th Oct 2006, 22:20

"Never heard of anybody being jailed for causing an air crash; however, if I am not mistaken (I am not an attorney)" (Originally posted by aimscabinet)

As I recall, an ATC (Tasic I think his name was) was jailed in 1977 following a MAC over Zagreb between a DC9 and a Trident 3 but was released on appeal after 2 years in prison. It was a very complex case as I remember.

Sorry; I meant that I have never heard anyone being jailed over there ... in Brazil.
Apparently, there was a case in Venezuela or Colombia as well, when one or two pilots were sentenced to a prison term.

broadreach

5th Oct 2006, 22:25

Westhawk, your most recent post would indicate that most of us agree on the basics. Like Alemaobaiano I live in Brazil, speak Portuguese and understand certain nuances in the language which might not be immediately apparent in a babelfish translation. He and others on Pprune, and I, have tried to present what we glean from the press without prejudice.

I may have contributed to your annoyance at the press by providing free translations of some of the press reports. Without bias and, I hope, without editorialising. If I have, though, I apologise to you and to all and will take greater care in future.

We all know press coverage quality varies tremendously; you see good and awful coverage in the same newspaper. That's not just in Brazil, it's anywhere. Xenophobia appears in some of the coverage just as it would had the geographic location and nationalities been reversed. But right now it's all you have to go on. Live with it; filter it out as you would had the accident occurred in the US, or you run the risk of applying the same blanket condemnation you might appear to be accusing others of.

Having said that, your ire against the press pales in comparison with that on local aviation fora!

Back to basics and a few things I think you can count on:
a) a fair investigation and no coverup.
b) the Legacy crew will be hotel-bound here until their role in the accident is established OR the US embassy can guarantee their return for further depositions.
c) press coverage will quickly disappear; there is plenty of other excitement going on including a presidential election in its second round. Whatever press coverage does appear is likely to be less sensational, based on accident investigation releases or leaks if any.

Golf Charlie Charlie

5th Oct 2006, 22:28

jondc9

5th Oct 2006, 22:42

Westhawk:

you mention: <Rather, the news media of all countries appear to have their own editorial agendas. In general, it is my belief that they are self serving.>

I would like to understand the above better.

To those in Brazil:

I appreciate your efforts to send out the information you are getting and can fully understand how difficulties and nuances in translation can be misunderstood.

Thank you again for trying to keep us informed.

I do think some of us remember the 1979 Swissair/Athens thing .

for those who would like a briefing on the SWISSAIR situation:
http://yarchive.net/air/airliners/greek_courts.html

I know of very few honorable press members who don't want to find out the truth. In the very fast paced world of broadcast journalism, one can go up the wrong path quite visibly to the viewer in a rush to the truth. To just report that two planes collided and 155 died is not enough, one must offer speculation as to how something could happen...always indicating that speculation is just what it is...

I recall the seaplane accident in Miami and I speculated on structural failure...within 5 days that type of plane was grounded for inspection of metal fatigue. Sometimes putting stuff out quickly, makes the whole aviation/govt. community at least think.

Perhaps by talking of transponder problems, whether mechanical or intentional, will alert even one pilot or controller to monitor things a bit closer.

Coverage will drop off , usually a story is good for 5 days and that is it. I hope our fellow aviators in Brazil will keep us posted.

jon

westhawk

6th Oct 2006, 00:02

broadreach:

Thank you for you post. I intend to follow your advice to "live with it", since there is little choice but to do so in any case!:)

I just had to express my disappointment with the quality of the reporting as I see it. I should probably know better... :ugh:

I do look forward to learning more about the objective facts surrounding this accident so that the speculation has a basis upon which to become more informed and rely less on loosely compiled supposition and hearsay.

I am confident that this will happen over a period of time, sensational reporting notwithstanding.

Best regards,

Westhawk

Flight Safety

6th Oct 2006, 00:25

Regarding possible problems with the transponder in the Honeywell Primus equipped Legacy, here are some links discussing the issue.

http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/public/news/stop_press.html

http://www.easa.eu.int/doc/Certification/Airwor_Directives/AD_05_021_Honey_XPDR.pdf

link (http://www.eurocontrol.int/safety/gallery/content/public/library/SWM%20%2013%20April%202005.pdf)

To summarize, it appears this rather serious problem has been corrected with a software upgrade, and since this particular Legacy was brand new (i.e. the latest software), I doubt that it had this particular problem.

barit1

6th Oct 2006, 01:30

Ernest Gann wrote his novel "Band of Brothers" based on this accident (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19680216-1&lang=en) in Taiwan. In the novel, the captain was jailed for "intentionally crashing" his 727. I cannot say whether that was true in the real case.

But we imprison motorists, lorry drivers etc. for negligent homicide when their action/inaction causes a fatal accident. Should pilots be exempt? :confused:

JanetFlight

6th Oct 2006, 02:22

Closer to home, what of the case of the pilot(s) of the Swissair DC-8 overrun at Athens ? I forget exactly, but either one pilot was jailed by the Greeks, or only escaped jail via a diplomatic solution, despite a ditch in the overrun area which had never been filled. Willing to be corrected here if wrong.
And also those Unfortunate Korean Guys wich were arrested as Criminals by Lybian Authorities back in 89!
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19890727-0&lang=en
However returning to the Brazilian recent Crash, Yesterday some Brazilian Media was reporting a very disturbing new(Wich to be honest i cannot affirm if its still a rumour, or not).
Some said those Black Boxes were in such horrible state, that cannot be used, read, heard, etc...:hmm: (they didnt refer if was both, only CVR or FDR)
But here is the Pic, and take your conclusions »»»
http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/foto/0,,6220013,00.jpg
http://www.dac.gov.br/salanoticias/vooGol15.asp
And now a much more damaged one, from another crash, but wich worked perfectly »»»
http://static.howstuffworks.com/gif/black-box-ntsb-990a.jpg
Could be the fact that ANAC(Brazilian Civil Aviation) are trying to Hidden Something...!!!???:confused:
Cheers:)

vapilot2004

6th Oct 2006, 03:25

Friend that knows Mr. Paladino, tells me the guy used to fly A300s for AA and that he was always a good man to work along side of.

Now, not that commercial operators are any less responsible, but I highly doubt that a former AA pilot would even think about changing FL or turning off the transponder. I think that spotty radar coverage is what they should be looking at.

Doesn't the FDR on an Embraer record the transponder's status ?

onetrack

6th Oct 2006, 04:27

I have never seen so much lurid speculation, and use of "media reports", to try to come to a conclusion about this collision, in a long time.

The news media, report news, in a manner that sells their paper or website .. the accuracy of their reports is on the bottom of the list of their requirements .. and at the top,is the use of lurid wording, and extreme speculation, without any basis in fact-finding or accurate research ..

Re the "black boxes" .. or flight data recorders, and cockpit voice recorders .. as they should be more precisely termed ..
They are designed to withstand virtually all aspects of potential destruction in even the worst type of severe crash .. and since tape devices have given way to solid state devices, the info is even more recoverable ..

A pic of a dented outer casing, is enough to send the media into a feeding frenzy of speculation, that the "black boxes" are damaged to the point of not yielding adequate info .. when the pic shows a "black box" in relatively pristine condition.

They are designed to withstand salt water for 30 days .. extreme pressures .. and extreme temperatures .. that are beyond the maximum found in any known aircraft crash.

Definitive description of FDR's and CVR's .. note the CSMU design parameters!!! .. http://travel.howstuffworks.com/black-box6.htm

The recovery of the info from these recorders will reveal everything that is needed to come to a satisfactory conclusion of the collision causes .. but it is a painstaking process that takes months.

I will however, hazard, a moderately-educated guess, at this point, on the collision causes .. remembering that all those involved, are/were professionals .. and we owe it to them, the recognition that they carried out their jobs with commensurate skill ..

1. It is highly likely, that a simple, faulty wiring connection, or installation, caused the transponder to fail intermittently. Despite testing, intermittent electrical faults are always likely to appear, even in new equipment ..
They are the most difficult to find .. and that which causes the greatest fury amongst electricians .. are intermittent faults - usually associated with connectors.
I am not aware of any back-up systems in transponder wiring.

2. The incorrect flight level may have been due to an intermittent radio fault, associated with the transponder wiring. This would lead to missed communications, and failure to adjust FL's accordingly.

3. There is little doubt that contact between the aircraft took place, and that pilots of both planes sighted each other, and took evasive action at the last few seconds.

At a closing speed of 240 m/sec, even in clear conditions, you don't have a lot of decision time up your sleeve .. by the time you sight a shape headed your way .. put the brain in gear .. weigh up evasive action (up, down, or bank?) .. and action that evasive move ..
That shape, headed your way, increases in size and closeness, at an astonishing rate .. when the closing speed is supersonic speed.

4. It appears that both pilots banked, causing wing to wing contact .. and the critical point, is just what was hit on the 737-800, to make it spiral out of control and break up in mid air .. as the wreckage pics clearly indicate.

As previously pointed out, even a small portion of winglet can cause enormous destruction to a critical control component, due to the impact speed.

It's not unlikely that any one of a dozen wing components was damaged enough, to render control impossible .. and once that point is passed, we all know the inevitable result.

I would suggest that all of these pilots are/were professionals, and carried out their duties in that manner .. but a sequence of minor mechanical failures compounded to create damage that resulted in a horrendous result.

Such are the frailties of our human-based engineering .. that we can build many fail-safe devices .. but minor errors can still creep in .. compound .. and result in major disaster.

lenstrad

6th Oct 2006, 04:45

because of the photograph , the wing section is in pretty good shape compare to the austral fall in 1997 in uruguay that the biggest piece found was of 2 inches , the similarity of both is the fall from almost same flight levels , its my opinion, as you can apreciate the ldg gear is also down, but as i said before please do not judge , lets wait fot the cvr and the fdr best regards , have safe flights

jondc9

6th Oct 2006, 04:51

reports indicate that the pilots of legacy jet DENY turning off transponder.

and FWIW

in january of 2002, a Delta airlines MD88 had a transponder failure which triggered interception by F16s.

...

interesting note mentioning EKG's "BAnd of brothers". To spoil the ending, it was later found out that the crash was caused by a radio signal interfering with an NDB station, showing station passage prior to actual passage.

---

etrang

6th Oct 2006, 05:27

If an intermitent electrical fault did affect the Legacy's transponder, would it also be expected to affect the operation of the Legacy's TACS?

742

6th Oct 2006, 05:34

If an intermitent electrical fault did affect the Legacy's transponder, would it also be expected to affect the operation of the Legacy's TACS?

Yes, it would inop the TCAS system.

punkalouver

6th Oct 2006, 10:33

They are designed to withstand virtually all aspects of potential destruction in even the worst type of severe crash .. and since tape devices have given way to solid state devices, the info is even more recoverable ..
They are designed to withstand salt water for 30 days .. extreme pressures .. and extreme temperatures .. that are beyond the maximum found in any known aircraft crash.

Not true at all. Two accidents at least in Canada have had CVR tapes destroyed by being in heat for too long. Air Ontario F28 in Dryden and MK Airlines 747 in Halifax.

Clandestino

6th Oct 2006, 11:19

I would suggest that all of these pilots are/were professionals, and carried out their duties in that manner ..
I would rather follow your suggestion from the first part of your post and not suggest anything untill CVRs, FDRs and ATC tapes are read out. I'm not pointing my finger at anyone and I really hope this was just some freak electronic failure that brought these two airplanes together, and not someone fooling around, but this is just hope that's not based on facts. As I see it, all hard facts we have so far could be put into 20-30 words long post.

@ Lenstrad
It is indeed possible that GOL crew had some control after collision but, sadly, there are two more common causes for finding large pieces of airframe at crash site: 1) hitting the ground in flat spin, 2) inflight airframe failure. But let's not speculate, it's better to wait for black boxes to tell their story.

cesar

6th Oct 2006, 14:11

Since most people here isn´t familiar with the secret code we call language (Portuguese), and that those automatic translators at times get to provide results that are a bit scary, to say the least, I´ve tried to summarize one of "O Globo"´s articles from today.
O Globo is the major newspaper in Rio de Janeiro state and one of the most influential in the country. It is part of a media conglomerate by the same name.
The article says the investigators´ team has crossed the data between Cindacta 1 (Brasilia) and the Legacy´s black box. According to the newspaper the flight controllers made seven attempts to contact the Legacy and those attempts were recorded by the box. Investigation has found that Cindacta 1 lost contact with the Legacy for almost one hour. There was normal communication between the controllers and the aircraft until Brasilia. Roughly ten minutes after that, the controllers noticed that Legacy´s transponder was innoperative. The equipment went back on only after the collision, around 5 p.m. The pilot then issued an alert and contacted Cindacta 4 (Manaus) asking for instructions for an emergency landing which took place at Serra do Cachimbo´s Air Force base.
It is mentioned that the authorities came to the conclusion that Legacy´s pilot would have turned off the transponder and remained at 37,000 feet in disaccordance with the flight plan. However, the Air Force will not issue any statement until the contents of Gol´s black boxes are analysed. No malfunction in the jet´s equipment was found.
The article goes on describing the Legacy´s transponder device, saying it has a backup system that should automatically become operational, had the main system failed, but that the transponder has to be turned on for it to happen. The innocurance of a back up system activation would reinforce the possibility of the equipment being turned off at the time of the collision.
One question that remains to be answered, according to the reporter is why Gol´s pilot wasn´t warned of the presence of another aircraft in the vicinity that wasn´t asnwering Cindacta´s calls. The Cindacta 1 controllers are to be heard by the police this monday.
The pilots lawyer, former Ministry of Justice José Carlos Dias (as a former lawyer myself, I´d say it´s about the best money can buy) denies the pilots were conducting in flight tests and that both pilots had previously flown on that type of aircraft in the US. He says that, according to the pilots, the transponder was on at the time of the impact and didn´t want to comment at what flight level they were, saying that it was a controversial issue. The pilots reamain in Rio de Janeiro on an unknown place under the American Consulate assistance.
Hope this has been useful to some.
Hugs.
Cesar.

F900EX

6th Oct 2006, 14:57

Thanks for that learned post Cesar..

sikalia

6th Oct 2006, 15:28

what if any TXPDR was accidenly set to TA instead to TA/RA ?

Flight Safety

6th Oct 2006, 15:29

There's still the possiblity that the pilots thought they had the transponder turned on, but there was a switch problem etc, as mentioned previously.

However it would be interesting to know why ATC tried 7 times to contact the Legacy and failed, even though the black box (CVR I assume) recorded the attempts. I don't know how accurate the article is in discribing the events, but the circumstances as discribed don't sound very good. If ATC calls are on the CVR and the pilots failed to respond, that would not be good at all. We'll have to wait for more authoritative details.

Does anyone know if radio communications are problematic in this area (sorry if this has already been discussed, I'm in a hurry to post this, I have a flight to catch)?

ironbutt57

6th Oct 2006, 15:32

if the tx in the legacy were set to TA only...if indeed such a mode exists on that equipment, then i would have recieved a TA, but the 737 would still have recieved an RA

PaperTiger

6th Oct 2006, 15:47

According to the newspaper the flight controllers made seven attempts to contact the Legacy and those attempts were recorded by the box.Which box ? Whose box ? Or do they mean ATC tapes (sic) ?

ExSimGuy

6th Oct 2006, 16:17

All through the last few days, reading these 17 pages, I keep thinking of the pax on the 73 and the terror they must have experienced in an aircraft breaking/broken up and heading for the ground. How long would they have been conscious after decompression? Must have been horrible for them - hopefully not for too long.

God be with them.

(Mods, if you think this post is not appropriate on a "public" forum, I understand)

ironbutt57

6th Oct 2006, 16:22

Kinda wonder if the 737 didnt experience an upset and breakup resulting from overloading during the attempted recovery while performing an evasive manuever..kind of hard to imagine that winglet inflicting enough damage to render the aircraft unflyable..

hetfield

6th Oct 2006, 16:43

ironbutt57

6th Oct 2006, 17:25

think a jet upset can occur in any type of airplane, although in theory I would imagine it could not be pilot-induced.. might be impossible to overstress the airframe during recovery guess if the wingtip did strike a "soft spot" could have caused airframe failure to the 737...time will tell...

ManaAdaSystem

6th Oct 2006, 17:51

A wannabie asked some good questions regarding cleared vs filed flight levels a few pages back.
If your filed flight plan called for a level change, would you do so without clearance if you had lost contact with ATC?
I wouldn't. Not if I thought the loss of contact was due to poor coverage.
I would change altitude without a clearance if I was sure I had suffered a comm failure, but that is a different issue than a loss of contact. In most cases, anyway.
As for switching the transponder off/on, what if they did have an intermittent transponder? Poor connection? The mid air could have fixed that. Just a different version of "a technical knock".
Regarding offsets, I'm sure it's buried somewhere in the Jepps text (ATC) manual, that we are allowed to offset 2 NM to the right in areas with limited radio/radar coverage.
Maybe somebody can confirm or deny this?

ironbutt57

6th Oct 2006, 18:03

without it in front of me cant state the details, but yes the track-offset procedure is detailed in the atc section of the supplemental text section...

ATC Watcher

6th Oct 2006, 18:38

An animation video of one of the hypothesis of the collision :

http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/0,,IIF661-5598,00.html

Blues&twos

6th Oct 2006, 18:41

4. It appears that both pilots banked, causing wing to wing contact

Just curious - has this been reported anywhere? I thought the Legacy crew had said they didn't see the 737 at all, just "a shadow". The report released by the journalist on board the Legacy also doesn't mention any evasive manoeuvers, just a "terrific jolt".

blackmail

6th Oct 2006, 18:59

hello every one,

let's make some more hypothesis of this catastrophic event
1) the legacy crew: was well aware of a required flightlevel change after brasilia vor/dme. unable to contact atc for whatever reason: unknown temporary blackhole effect,fingertrouble with their comm radio(s), wrong frequency, intermittent elec failure, anything... . INITIALLY, rightfully maintained their last cleared & acknowledged flightlevel. they were defacto in a commfailure situation for about an hour until the collision & there is indeed an icao procedure to cover this event( in simplified version) : maintain your last acknowledged fl FOR 7 MINUTES(to allow time for atc to coordinate other traffic)THEN ADJUST LEVEL ACCORDING TO YOUR FILED FLIGHT PLAN & follow your filed flightplanned route until over your destination, then land within 30minutes.
the legacy crew instinctively followed this procedure(you dont change fl without atc authorisation), but maybe lacked the situational awareness that they were in a full blown emergency comm. failure situation. and here we come to the heart of the matter: if no radiocontact can be established: put your transponder on 7600(radiofail code) & X CHECK IF THE BLOODY THING IS WORKING/REPLYING(no amber fail/caution light on). then check your comm radios/audioboxes,mikes,boommikes circuitbreakers, qrh commfailure etc.
then, if you are satisfied your equipment is ok, start tranmitting blind on the worldwide emergency frequency 121.5 in order to raise someone on the frequency. all atc centers monitor this & most airline companies have it as a policy to monitor 121.5 on their comm n°2, during cruise. as a last resort, although not an official procedure, go 1nmRight offset of the awy. look up your jeppesen emergency radio comm. section to check what else you can do.( the 7 minutes period is mentioned in this section).& yes, put the mark one eyeball in full alert.
but, i am the first to admit, with hindsight it is easier said than done.

now brasilian atc: complete inadequate behavior. after one hour & about seven unsuccessfull calls to the legacy, plus transponder returns off screen, should have realised the legacy had some major technical problems with all their radios & should have taken emergency measures to redirect all possible conflicting traffic e.g the gol 737,away from the legacy. even scramble some fighters to go up & have a look.

conclusion: here we have, as always in such cases, a chain of human/procedural errors, coupled with an electronic box(transponder), that, at a critical time, didn't work as advertised, resulting in the fatal collision.
everyone involved in this tragic accident share some degree of responsibility.
i hope the trial will be fair, but i am afraid that might be wishfull thinking.

ps. about that legacy transponder AD(going in sby if tuned for more than 5secs), this being a brand new aircraft leaving the factory on a delivery flight, one may think this was complied with by the manufacturer.

Mercenary Pilot

6th Oct 2006, 19:23

The Associated Press

Pilots Involved in Brazil Air Disaster Deny Turning off Communications Device

The American pilots of an executive jet involved in a deadly high-altitude collision with a Boeing 737 have denied they turned off the transponder that signaled their location, authorities said Thursday.

Pilots Joseph Lepore, of Bay Shore, N.Y., and Jan Paladino, of Westhampton Beach, N.Y., repeatedly told investigators they never turned off the device that transmits a plane's location and believed that it was working just before the collision, said Denise Niederauer, a spokeswoman for the Mato Grosso do Sul State Public Safety Department.

Brazilian authorities suggested a day earlier that the pilots may have turned off the device.

Authorities did not say why they believed that may have happened, but said a nonfunctioning transponder was a possible cause of the collision with Gol Airlines Flight 1907, which plunged into the Amazon jungle Friday, killing all 154 aboard in Brazil's worst air disaster. Gol initially had said there were 155 aboard, but on Thursday changed it to 154, blaming a mistake on the passenger list. The airline said a name had appeared twice on the list.

"They didn't turn anything off," Jose Carlos Dias, the pilots' lawyer, told Globo TV. "It's nonsense to say something like this ... They had no reason to do that."

The Brazilian-made Embraer Legacy 600 executive jet was damaged, but landed safely at an air force base.

The air force said both jets were equipped with a modern traffic collision avoidance system that monitors other planes and sets off an alarm if they get too close, but the system only works if the transponders are working properly.

If the American pilots are found to be responsible for turning off the transponder, which is illegal under Brazilian law, prosecutors said they could be charged with involuntary manslaughter. Authorities said, however, that there was not enough evidence to accuse anybody.

"We don't have elements to talk about that," Federal Police Investigator Renato Sayao told the official government news service Agencia Brasil.

The pilots' passports were seized Wednesday, but they were not arrested.

Authorities also were investigating why the small plane apparently was not flying at its authorized altitude of 36,000 feet. The collision took place at 37,000, where the Boeing 737-800 was authorized to be, Defense Minister Waldir Pires said.

"Why was this jet taken to that altitude? Was it a voluntary act by the pilot? Was it because of wrong information he received?" Sayao said. "That's the key question: What made the plane fly at 37,000 feet when it was supposed to be at 36,000 feet."

U.S. journalist Joe Sharkey, who was on the Legacy, wrote in The New York Times that shortly before the crash he saw an altitude display reading 37,000 feet.

The reporter also criticized air traffic control in Brazil, prompting an irate response from local authorities.

"It was an affirmation absolutely unfair and insane," Jose Carlos Pereira, the president of Brazil's airport authority, told GloboNews.

Pires called it "irresponsible to say something like that."

Brazil's air force said it investigated air traffic controllers' procedures on the day of the crash and found no irregularities.

The Legacy was making its inaugural flight from the southern Brazilian city of Sao Jose dos Campos to the United States, where it had been purchased by ExcelAire Service Inc., based in Ronkonkoma, N.Y.

ExcelAire issued a statement Thursday night saying it "believes the results of the investigation will show the rumors and speculation about its pilots are false."

The New York newspaper Newsday quoted ExcelAire chief executive Bob Sherry earlier in the day as saying he was seeking the return home of Lepore and Paladino.

He declined to comment on the crash, but said, "Our pilots have been treated well."

Nearly 40 bodies had been recovered from the crash site by Thursday, but federal authorities were having difficulties identifying the bodies and said that DNA testing may be needed to complete a process that could take weeks.

Some 250 troops were helping in the operation.

westhawk

6th Oct 2006, 19:47

A wannabie asked some good questions regarding cleared vs filed flight levels a few pages back.
If your filed flight plan called for a level change, would you do so without clearance if you had lost contact with ATC?

That's a good question indeed. Particularily if the flight plan calls for a descent to a lower flight level, under which rule would one descend according to lost comm procedures?

As for switching the transponder off/on, what if they did have an intermittent transponder? Poor connection? The mid air could have fixed that. Just a different version of "a technical knock".

This is undoubtedly a major focal point of investigation. Both to determine the cause(s) of the accident, and for legal reasons related to the many matters to be settled in courtrooms. I sure hope some form of conclusive evidence exists.

Best regards,

Westhawk

PS

Just read Blackmail's post and wonder if the lost comm situation demanded the actions stated in his post. Intersting...

Wiley

6th Oct 2006, 20:18

Two points.

First,an attempt to answer kind of hard to imagine that winglet inflicting enough damage to render the aircraft unflyable.Think of the damage a piece of ultra lightweight foam insulation is capable of inflicting on the extra hard surface of a tile on the space shuttle. It's the "V squared" part of the "1/2MVsquared" equation that causes that.

If the winglet hit something aerodynamicaly critical on the 737, like a main spar, the "1/2MV squared" calculated around a "V" of approximately M1.5 to 1.6 (~850 knots?) wouldn't require a much of an "M" to result in an horrendous, destructive impact, certainly enough to cause massive damage to the other aircraft if it hit something critical.

The Legacy crew and pax were incredibly lucky that the parts of their aircraft that made contact were lightweight and frangible.

Second: offset tracking is allowed only in certain areas, namely NATS airspace (the oceanic part of a trans Atlantic route) and some remote airspace with less than RNP5 navigation accuracy requirments (In RNP5 airspace, it is strictly forbidden.)

However, in my experience, from observation, only an extremely small percentage of pilots bother to make use of it, while quite a few ATC people seem to think it is an insult to their professionalism.

blackmail

6th Oct 2006, 20:43

hello westhawk,

yes, sir. i looked up the procedure for lost comm's from the jeppesen emergency section, radiocomm failure & it clearly says amongst other things:sq 7600 & after 7 mins adjust(in this case descent to) flightlevel & route to FILED flightplan.
but i still think the legacy crew didn't realize they were in such a dire situation, that is before the collision of course. couple that with flimsy atc not knowing/realising what to do for one hour, a blackbox(transponder) that decides to quit at the wrong moment, so no tcas warning & disaster was set.
this is one of the situation i fear the most: you fly happily around, no shatter on the freq. see the testimony of the journo on board, visiting the flightdeck & one of the pilots commenting:"the thing flies beautyfully", while infact a terrible emergency & diabolic chain of events is building up against you & you don't see it & also you don't hear it(sometimes we say: your ears are your eyes), in short: SA(situational awareness).
as for the gol crew, i don't know if they heard the several(7) attempts of atc to contact the legacy, because , if they did, that should have alerted them too. but here maybe blackholes &/or different freq. were involved. anyway, here again murphy had its tragic day.

westhawk

6th Oct 2006, 20:59

but i still think the legacy crew didn't realize they were in such a dire situation,

That's what I'm wondering...

The CVR may provide some clue as to the the thought process. Stay tuned! :hmm:

Thanks for the info.

Best,

Westhawk

jovica

6th Oct 2006, 21:29

Might be helpful
ICAO Doc 7030
Supplementary procedures to PANS ATM (Doc 4444) and PANS OPS (Doc 8168)
5.1 As soon as it is known that two-way communication has failed, ATC shall maintain separation between the aircraft having the communication failure and other aircraft based on the assumption that the aircraft will operate in accordance with 5.2 or 5.3. (5.2-VMC, 5.3-IMC)
5.3.1 A controlled IFR flight experiencing communication failure in IMC, or where it does not appear feasible to continue in accordance with 5.2 shall:
a) set transponder to Code 7600;
b) maintain for a period of 7 minutes the last assigned speed and level or the minimum flight altitude, if the minimum flight altitude is higher than the last assigned level.
The period of 7 minutes commences:
1) if operating on a route without compulsory reporting points or if instructions have been received to omit position reports:
i) at the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached, or
ii) at the time the transponder is set to Code 7600,
whichever is later; or
2) if operating on a route with compulsory reporting points and no instruction to omit position reports has been received:
i) at the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached, or
ii) at the previously reported pilot estimate for the compulsory reporting point, or
iii) at the time of a failed report of position over a compulsory reporting point,
whichever is later;
Note.— The period of 7 minutes is to allow the necessary air traffic control and coordination measures.
c) thereafter, adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
Note.— With regard to changes to levels and speed, the filed flight plan, which is the flight plan as filed with an ATS unit by the pilot or a designated representative without any subsequent changes, will be used.

blackmail

6th Oct 2006, 21:58

hello jovica,
exactly. the legacy crew did not comply with above procedure, because they were not aware they were in that dreadfull commfail situation.
on the otherhand, atc was fully aware of the problem & called the legacy 7 times, but failed to act for about one full hour & then to read in the newspapers, amongst other crap, something like :" airforce officials stated that they found no irregularities with atc procedures, there are no blackholes etc".while all the locals testify the contrary, leaves me & probably others, speechless!

broadreach

6th Oct 2006, 22:01

Aircraft wing leading edges are built to withstand impact by birds and hailstones, the speed at which those objects impact being approximately that of the aircraft's speed at the the time.

I think I'm right in saying that when the aircraft has leading edge slats, they are not loadbearing themselves. Same going for flaps, ailerons and other movable parts.

All the wingloading, presumably, is then borne by the main spar and the surrounding fixed structure. I'm not sure if the "wing box" includes the skin; perhaps someone can clarify this. I would imagine the wing skin contributes quite a lot to the wing's loadbearing characteristics.

If so, having watched the graphic linked to by ATC Watcher in post #360 and harking back to ProfitMax's post (#141) with a schematic of the two aircraft, I wonder what the effect of slicing open the stressed lower skin of a highly loaded aircraft wing would be. Would the wing spar alone bear the strain? Is it imaginable that it would have been designed to do so?

The graphic in ATC Watcher's link suggests it might not, and that the Legacy's winglet struck the 738's wing about 2/3rds from the root; the 738 wing then failing and taking the left elevator with it.

There's been a lot of speculation about the Legacy's winglet striking "vital" components such as hydraulic lines or cabling. Have we ignored one just as vital?

jondc9

6th Oct 2006, 22:13

earlier on I posted the concept of "EXPECTED ALTITUDE"...does anyone know what the actual clearance for legacy was?

had the pilots read back; maintain FL370, expect FL360 crossing Brazillia or something like that?

to the structural discussion, I can imagine what you say, slice the leading edge devices, they get ripped apart by aero loads and start a chain of events leading to disaster.

I can only imagine that the 737 was not on same frequency as legacy for ATC calls.

I can imagine the legacy crew might have not flipped the right audio selector, or turned down the ATC volume while chatting up the reporter.

j

jovica

6th Oct 2006, 22:26

blackmail,
I can't agree more. Unfortunately, in my opinion, the blame game have started, so you cannot expect nothing better then that. Anyway, I don't know what could be more clear than: Note.— The period of 7 minutes is to allow the necessary air traffic control and coordination measures.
As an ATCO, I had such a situations so many times, that is almost imposible to except given statement, even in the blame game context. However, I can't judge 'cause I wasn't there and I don't know what was happening in the center, at the sector, at the time.

barit1

7th Oct 2006, 00:20

...
All the wingloading, presumably, is then borne by the main spar and the surrounding fixed structure. I'm not sure if the "wing box" includes the skin; perhaps someone can clarify this. I would imagine the wing skin contributes quite a lot to the wing's loadbearing characteristics...

In virtually all modern transports the upper and lower wing skins are primary structure, and the spar webs are relatively light, carrying shear loads only. This practice dates back to Jack Northrop's Alpha (http://www.airminded.net/alpha/alphaarticle.html) of 1930, and later in the DC-3.

If the 737 lower skin were substantially damaged by the Embraer winglet, I'd expect it to fail sooner or later. If there were no distress call from the Gol 737, IMHO it failed immediately. (OPINION ONLY!)

onetrack

7th Oct 2006, 02:53

One of the latest, and less-speculative press reports from Newsday, via AP ..

At this point, Brazilian ATC is not looking too good .. attempts to contact the Legacy 7 times .. without result .. failure to note a non-operational transponder .. and failure to warn the GOL pilots of an aircraft heading on a possible collision course with them, with a non-operational transponder .. look very much like poor quality ATC to me ..

Top that, with a collision point, where ATC control transferred to a different region .. and the circumstances that led to the collision seem to be coming together rapidly ..

The only other major area of investigation that is critical, is whether the Legacy pilots followed correct procedures, or whether they realised that crucial communications were being missed. It certainly appears that that 7 minutes loss-of-communications allowance, is going to be a crucial factor in the collision causes.

Communication failures a possible factor in crash
BY BILL BLEYER

Newsday Staff Writers

October 6, 2006, 9:01 PM EDT

The preliminary investigation into the cause of a deadly midair collision over the Amazon jungle eight days ago could be completed next week, Brazilian authorities said Friday.
Federal police investigator Renato Sayao said Friday he was heading to Brasilia, the capital, to interview air traffic controllers to wrap up the initial phase of the probe.
The announcement came as Brazilian media reported new details of communications and electronics problems that seem to have played a factor in the crash that killed 154.
On Thursday, attorney Jose Carlos Dias -- a former Brazilian national justice minister hired to represent the ExcelAire of Ronkonkoma and its two Long Island pilots who were flying the executive jet that who survived the collision -- broke the silence maintained by the company and its pilots about specifics of the collision.
Dias responded to Brazilian officials who contended that Joseph Lepore, 42, of Bay Shore, and Jan Paladino, 34, of Westhampton Beach, had turned off the transponder that gave the position of their Embraer Legacy 600 jet, possibly to try stunt maneuvers with the plane on its maiden flight. Dias told Globo TV, "They had no reason to do that." He called the allegation "nonsense."
Brazilian officials previously have said the pilots had told investigators that they had not disabled the system and it was working before impact.
Dias elaborated in a story in the O Globo newspaper, saying the pilots had already flown the same kind of airplane in the United States. "It is inconceivable that they would behave so mischievously in the air. ... This doesn't match their character, because they are very serious and competent."
A judge earlier this week ordered the pilots to turn over their passports while authorities investigate whether they flew at the wrong altitude, causing the collision with Gol Airlines Flight 1907 at 37,000 feet. Officials said the Legacy plane should have been at 36,000. Everyone on Flight 1907 died and all seven people on the Legacy were uninjured.
Dias addressed that issue as well. "The altitude question is controversial," he said. "They [the pilots] said that they were on the correct flight-plan altitude."
The lawyer was quoted by the O Estado de Sao Paulo newspaper as saying, "They were following the flight plan strictly. When approaching Brasilia, they contacted the control tower, to make sure that they should lower their altitude, but they couldn't communicate. But I don't want to attribute responsibility to anybody." He didn't elaborate on whether they changed altitude anyway.
O Globo reported that Lt. Brigadier General Paulo Roberto Cardoso Vilarinho, director of the air traffic control system, said that investigators had stated that controllers in Brasilia tried to contact the Legacy seven times in more than one hour and only made contact after the impact. He added that shortly after the executive jet passed Brasilia, controllers noticed the transponder on the jet was not operating, and it began to operate again after the collision.
Vilarinho stated that the Brazilian airliner was never notified that the smaller plane was in the area with a transponder that was not operating but did not explain why. "I don't want to speculate because I don't have the data," he said.
Vilarinho also said tests so far had ruled out any malfunction of Brazil's air traffic control system. He said that after flight controllers lost transponder and radio contact with the Legacy, they were still able to track the plane's course but not its altitude by radar.
Burson-Marsteller, an international public relations firm hired by ExcelAire, said the pilots were staying at an undisclosed location in Rio de Janeiro and would not be publicly commenting on the case.

onetrack

7th Oct 2006, 03:23

The Brazilian DAC appears to be a competent body, and their Accident Investigation Commissions are presided over by a top-ranking AF Officer .. and the countrys aviation process appears to be largely tied in with Defence and the Brazilian AF ..

Note, that the Commissions job is purely to ascertain accident causes, and not apportion blame .. that process is handed over to Brazilian Police, if criminal activity is found .. or Administrative sanctions are applied under the Brazilian Aviation Code, (CBAer) if infractions of the BAC are found ..

They release three levels of reporting, in line with global standards ..

1. The Preliminary Report, which only summarises the initial data collected .. and which outlines the factors and lines of enquiry that the main report is to follow ..

2. The Aviation Accident Investigation Report, contains more detailed information, analyses and conclusions, that lead to Flight Safety Recommendations ..

3. The Final Report is THE definitive document, covering every single factor, causes, results, and recommendations resulting from the AA.

The Preliminary Report appears likely to appear in the next week or 10 days .. the AAIR will likely be 6-12 months down the track, and the Final Report could be up to 2 years away ..

http://www.dac.gov.br/segurancaing/seguranca1.asp

ManaAdaSystem

7th Oct 2006, 04:29

The alleged transponder failure would also render the Legacy non RVSM capable, so ATC would need to separate according to non RVSM rules. It would mean 2000 ft separation above FL 290. GOL should have been descended to FL 350 (or even 330 if they thought the Legacy had a comm failure and would go down to FL 360) to acheive this.

It further complicates the picture as we (pilots) have procedures to avoid RVSM airspace when the transponder fails. They are fairly detailed as far as Oceanic airspace is concerned, but in other areas they generally tell you to inform ATC. If not able, follow regional contingency procedures. I have no idea what those are in Brasil.

I still think the Legacy crew was blissfully unaware of any transponder problems, and thought they were flying in a "black hole" as far as communications was concerned. Hence, no need to take any actions.

ATC (if the reports are correct), on the other hand, was aware of this problem for more than 1 hour...

Shore Guy

7th Oct 2006, 04:49

For any Legacy qualified folks out there....

If the transponder fails, and you are in "air" mode, does an EICAS message annunciate the failure?

ManaAdaSystem

7th Oct 2006, 05:01

Technically, it doesn't matter if it failed or was swithced off, the correct separation should have been provided anyway.

Don't know about the Legacy, but the NG will only give you a local transponder "fail" light, but you do get a "TCAS FAIL" annunciation on your Map Display. I'm sure the Legacy will give you at least that.

Profit Max

7th Oct 2006, 06:55

An animation video of one of the hypothesis of the collision :
http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/0,,IIF661-5598,00.html
They must have seen my post:
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=2882996
I still believe that this is the most likely scenario, especially if the Legacy was in level flight as reported by Joe Sharkey. I am not quite sure whether part of the wing of the 737 would have actually been ripped off by the Legacy's winglet, or just been seriously damaged.
Profit Max.

piombo

7th Oct 2006, 09:16

Dear all,

-Have any of you ever had a communication problem over a most radar controlled area of a place with a dozen different frequencys in a country that has a large number of aircrafts flying at any time, call once and behave as nothing happen for an our or so? (It seems to me that Brazil has the second largest fleet of aircrafts, after US, for a single country)
-Does your airplanes have more than one radio equipment?

Do you know:

-That, as reported by the press there, it is said that the recordings do not have any call from the Legacy over Brasilia, but have the calls from the ATC to it.
-That the Legacy and the B737 were in different sectors so they could not hear the communications made to one another by the ATC?
- The radar recordings shows the Legacy as a primary target as "floating" from 35500 to 36500 feet? (According to reports from the local press quoting officials)
-That when the Transponder of the Legacy diseppeared, the Legacy and the 737 were 300 Km appart.
- That immediately when there was the collision, the Legacy transponder started "miracoulously" working with a 7700 code?

Profit Max

7th Oct 2006, 09:42

- The radar recordings shows the Legacy as a primary target as "floating" from 35500 to 36500 feet? (According to reports from the local press quoting officials)Radar is not very accurate for giving the altitude, especially at altitudes like these.

Profit Max.

threemiles

7th Oct 2006, 09:42

Brazil's air force said it investigated air traffic controllers' procedures on the day of the crash and found no irregularities

So is that here on the tape that recorded Brasilia/Manaus ATC intercom?

"Hey, Manaus, this is Brasilia, we've got Legacy N600XL here at 370 or 360, maybe 350 as primary radar only, also lost vhf comm. Presently xxx NM northwest BRS on UZ6 centerline inbound NABOL. If there is opposite traffic advise we better need lateral separation and it should stay at least 10 NM right of track. OK?"

"Brasilia from Manaus, thanks, we have GOL1907 at 370, NABOL at xxx, BRS at xxx, will advise to fly right of track."

I doubt. But exactly this would have been ATC's duty.

Whatever the reason for comm and xpdr failure was (actually it is fully irrelevant) ATC was not doing its duty when this sequence is not found on the tape.

I wonder when the first ATC controller will be suspended and held in custody.

piombo

7th Oct 2006, 09:47

Radar is not very accurate for giving the altitude, especially at altitudes like these.
Profit Max.

That is exactly why I used "" and the ATC's rely on transponder.

blackmail

7th Oct 2006, 10:12

hello 3 miles,

you are spot on.

another reflexion i never thought about until now & i think neither did the designer of the winglets(dr withcomb): if the collision scenario was as the embraerfolks reproduced in their animation : then those fancy wingletdesigns on all those beautiful new aeroplanes, apart from their aerodynamic benefits, are also so many new potential jigsaw hazards in case of collision scenario's. add to that, as mention in many other posts, the new diabolic precision of GPS & voilà, the stage for disaster is 2 steps closer.

Scurvy.D.Dog

7th Oct 2006, 11:20

The radar recordings shows the Legacy as a primary target as "floating" from 35500 to 36500 feet? (According to reports from the local press quoting officials) … can someone explain to me how modern Primary (skin return only) Radar can calculate altitude?!? … I have never seen nor heard of it in a civil sense … as I understand it, there were some older mil systems that used slant range and ‘known’ distance to calculate alt … surely you are not suggesting that in this case!?! …. SSR is the only civil means of detecting Alt and that depends on the output of the TXPDR’s!
.
.. does the DFDR on the Embraer record TXPDR/TCAS setting/serviceability?? …. repeatedly told investigators they never turned off the device that transmits a plane's location and believed that it was working just before the collision, said Denise Niederauer, a spokeswoman for the Mato Grosso do Sul State Public Safety Department... I am assuming that if a failure/fault occured, an EICAS message is generated and would be recorded?!?
.
.. the Comm's/Electrical issue is intriguing ...
.
.. how much stored data (time) is on the CVR??
.
.. truly amazing that a brand new aeroplane can have apparently no problems .. then ... coincidental Comm and TXPDR/TCAS faults that both correct immediately after a bump!
.
.. I am still not clear on wether that report of the ATC calls were found on the Embraer recorders or just the ATC tapes??
.
.. did the Embraer pilots make any attempt to contact ATC during that hour (CVR)?? an hour that included a turn on to a new airway that included a flight plan descent requirement??Brazil's air force said it investigated air traffic controllers' procedures on the day of the crash and found no irregularities... if ATC had not had confirmation that the Embraer was going to be at FL360 before entering conflict with the B738 ... that B738 would have been recleared pronto! …. From the little bits we have heard from the authorities, ATC were obviously satisfied the Embraer was at FL360 prior to conflict … ask yourselves WHY they might have thought that??
.
.... was the descent instruction read back before TXPDR and Comm loss??
.
.. does anyone know for sure that the Embraer pilots had not reported at FL360??? Authorities said, however, that there was not enough evidence to accuse anybody.
.
"We don't have elements to talk about that," Federal Police Investigator Renato Sayao told the official government news service Agencia Brasil... what will be interesting is the content of the two way communications before the Comm/Elec outage?

threemiles

7th Oct 2006, 11:32

can someone explain to me how modern Primary (skin return only) Radar can calculate altitude?!? … I have never seen nor heard of it in a civil sense

Brazilian ATCs are joint military/civil. This explains many of the oddities here.

hobie

7th Oct 2006, 11:35

clearing all traffic from, at least a 1,000 ft above his last know height and a 1,000 feet below approaching flight plan level, upon reflection, would have been a good idea ....

..... and send up a couple of 'fast jets' to locate and guide him to the nearest field (bearing in mind the 1 hour loss of contact) ..... I would have thought the Mil guys would have jumped at the opportunity .... :confused:

ExSimGuy

7th Oct 2006, 13:01

. truly amazing that a brand new aeroplane can have apparently no problems .. then ... coincidental Comm and TXPDR/TCAS faults that both correct immediately after a bump!

Many electrical faults can be cleared (albeit sometimes only temporarily) by a "shock".

(In the computer and control systems worlds) a sharp tap on the top of a circuit board to "reseat it" can do it, or plugging and unplugging a connector. All it takes is a bit of muck, corrosion (not on a new machine admittedly) or dust/grit, which can be shifted by a "bump" - or a "calibrated thump".

As was mentioned earlier, "intermitent" electrical faults can be a real bugger to find - they always disappear just when the engineer arrives to fix them.

onetrack

7th Oct 2006, 13:57

FolhaOnline has revealed, in a current news item, that at least one of the ATC's involved in this incident, has been removed from his position and taken for "psychological treatment" .. indicating a possible realisation of his ATC error/s, and an accompanying nervous breakdown.

The item continues that the ATC had 6 years in the job, and was regarded as experienced .. however, the article also goes on, to discuss the work load on the ATC's and the likely possibility of overwork with this particular ATC, with inadequate breaks.

The article states that the ATC's are supposed to work 2 hrs and then have 2 hrs break .. but this rarely happens, due to the work pressure from the Military heirarchy that controls Brazilian airspace (around 2500 civilian and 10,469 military employees) .. the relatively poor pay, and the threat of job loss, if they don't put in more hours than laid down.

Another item on the same site, states that the ATC people, know of a communications 'Black hole' in the region of the Cachimbo Mtn Range, between Manaus and Brasilia .. in precisely the region where the planes collided .. and that .. (quote) "Pilots tell, that there, they count only on the equipment of the airplanes" .. :(

Of course, the biggest single question is why the Legacy was at FL37, when it should have been at FL36, in line with the odd/even separation of the Nth/Sth air routes. This odd/even separation of FL's has been in place for a couple of years, according to reports, so it's not that unfamiliarity could be brought up as a contributing factor ..

Scurvy.D.Dog

7th Oct 2006, 14:11

threemiles .... are you saying (with certainty) that ATC in this area can use slant range primary radar??? ... some one correct me if I am wrong …. it is useless and impossible to calculate from a single Primary head source… to have even a remotely accurate guesstimate of alt based on slant range you have to have a mosaic (from multiple primary head positions) from which to calculate slant angle and therefore estimate alt?
.
The other thing that seems odd to me is the seemingly (implied) cool collected demeanour of the Embraer crew during Mr Starkey’s visit to the flight deck minutes before the collision … an hour out of comm’s … TXPDR and TCAS U/S …. Flying at a non standard level … Yet no ‘apparent’ problems up front ….. in a multi-million dollar Jet??? …. are we seriously suggesting that these failures could occur without the crew knowing something was amiss?? .. if so, Embraer, the avionics and systems folks need to have a serious rethink about crew alerting and fail safe modes in their aircraft systems!
.
… how many other Embraer 135 aircraft have suffered these single or multiple failure modes?? … how many comms are in those machines?? .. how many Microphones sources??
.
Comon folks this is getting ridiculous! :hmm:
.
.. and lets be fair to ATC, those 7 calls may have happened in quick succession close to or after the turning point ….. the sector boundaries (from what I could glean from the H4) is just before the airway junction prior to the collision point ..that is at best 125nmish’ to run (more like 100nm or less based on collision point and then flight to the mil base) nose to nose … at 850+kts closing … in all probability less than 10 minutes …. Comm. checks, coordination blah blah, all the while thinking that the aircraft had vert sep …. then whamo …
.
….. like they said early on in the piece …. INEXPLICABLE!
.
… it is possible that the frequency transfer point is relevant!! :ooh:
.
.. regarding the ATC/s and surviving pilots .... christ, imagine the stress, the self doubt, the 'what if I had done X or Y' syndrome ..
.
.... bloody hell, anyone in that situation would 'pack-up' ... I sure as **** would, even if I had done everything within my power to avoid the accident!
.
... what seems reasonable, even normal before such events never is after the fact ... makes me sick in the guts just thinking about it!!!!
.
... support them well ... they will never get over this!!

threemiles

7th Oct 2006, 14:20

threemiles .... are you saying (with certainty) that ATC in this area can use slant range primary radar??? ...

I was saying that even if this is usable only military can think this is a valid measure of air traffic control. Any civilian would not and change to procedural control as laid down in ICAO rules.

jondc9

7th Oct 2006, 14:33

One of the hallmarks of safety of all IFR flight is the lost communications procedure ... IF ATC had given an expected clearance to a different altitude as part of the original or any ammendments to the clearance the pilots of LEGACY would be duty bound to follow it.

If while attempting to contact ATC to make sure of the descent and NOT hearing any communication from ATC, the sequence of events should have been standard including

7600 in transponder

and trying multiple methods of communications, including all radios, all mics and as this is a super duper biz jet, any air to ground phone system ( sat phone for example) if installed.

And after all of this, which would have checked transponder, and all audio panels, the pilots should have looked at their TCAS display ( in an effor to check for traffic in descent path), which would also confirm TCAS working)and then descended in accordance with "EXPECTED" altitude clearance. Additionally turning on all exterior lights and being more vigilante for all traffic would be reasonable precautions.

Let me add: if this all happened in VMC (VFR conditions) and the legacy crew had lost all comm, landing at the first suitable airport under VMC is also part of the procedure.

Scurvy.D.Dog

7th Oct 2006, 14:35

.. fair enough!
.
.. are these sectors mil or civil controllers??

Shore Guy

7th Oct 2006, 14:47

Has anyone heard if there was usable data from the Legacy CVR?

My assumption is that is has a digital CVR, and that after 30-120 minutes,, depending on model, all data is lost (with the old loop tape recorders, enhancement could sometimes get the taped over portion - not so with digital units).

If the CB was not pulled shortly after touchdown and the aircraft was powered, the CVR would continue to operate, using up the memory also.

BOAC

7th Oct 2006, 15:55

Regarding the serviceability/usability of the Legacy's CVR:
I am still not clear on wether that report of the ATC calls were found on the Embraer recorders or just the ATC tapes??

Has anyone heard if there was usable data from the Legacy CVR? My assumption is that is has a digital CVR, and that after 30-120 minutes,, depending on model, all data is lost (with the old loop tape recorders, enhancement could sometimes get the taped over portion - not so with digital units). If the CB was not pulled shortly after touchdown and the aircraft was powered, the CVR would continue to operate, using up the memory also.

From post #348

"O Globo is the major newspaper in Rio de Janeiro state and one of the most influential in the country. It is part of a media conglomerate by the same name.
The article says the investigators´ team has crossed the data between Cindacta 1 (Brasilia) and the Legacy´s black box. According to the newspaper the flight controllers made seven attempts to contact the Legacy and those attempts were recorded by the box."

ASSUMING this paper's report is accurate, there is the answer to that.

PaperTiger

7th Oct 2006, 16:41

If the 737 lower skin were substantially damaged by the Embraer winglet, I'd expect it to fail sooner or later. If there were no distress call from the Gol 737, IMHO it failed immediately. (OPINION ONLY!)If the GOL crew sighted the Legacy at the last moment they would likely have made a violent evasive manoeuvre. Perhaps enough to depart controlled flight - what we used to call 'jet upset'. Should they have been able to recover from FL370 ? Possibly not - COPA and Silkair come to mind.
There will be witness marks on the 737 wreck which should indicate the nature and severity of the damage.

blackmail

7th Oct 2006, 16:48

maybe the comm/transponder off, was just "fingertrouble". with these push/flip-flop button cockpits, it is easy to dial in a frequency(in the sby window) & then forget to push the "activate" button. i understand one of the crew had only 5 hours on type? so it could very well be they were not aware
there was a comm/tpd problem. audioboxes can have the volume knob closed, so radio = ok, but no audio. by changing freq. again, tpd unintentionnally switched to sby etc... . when you are new/unfamiliar with a full glasscockpit, initially the information is so overwhelming, you are just saturated & don't see anything, then with experience things become more clear & meaningfull. it's like adapting to nightvision, in the beginning you see nothing & then your eyes adapt & you start seeing more & more details.

bobusse

7th Oct 2006, 17:08

nooluv

7th Oct 2006, 19:24

Can the CVR and the FDR be accessed from an aircraft which landed safely
after a midair incident, ie the legacy? If so surely the investigators will be able to establish the flight path, transponder settings, manoeuvres, etc of the surviving aircraft involved?

Or does the the aircraft have to crash before the removal of the FDR?

11Fan

7th Oct 2006, 19:41

Nooluv,

Can the CVR and the FDR be accessed from an aircraft which landed safely after a midair incident, i.e. the legacy?

Yes, designed for easy removal and replacement (typically for maintenance purposes).

If so surely the investigators will be able to establish the flight path, transponder settings, maneuvers, etc of the surviving aircraft involved?

Read through the thread. I believe that you will see that it is already in process. See Cesar's post # 348.

Or does the aircraft have to crash before the removal of the FDR?

That would probably be the worst case scenario.

westhawk

7th Oct 2006, 19:53

What are you exactly up to ? doesn't sound very professional...forget...not aware...unfamiliar...dont see anything.

The "adaptation" blackmail refers to is not unknown to anyone who has had significant experience in "steam guage" cockpits before transitioning to a modern "glass" version. The development of new habits typically occurs relatively quickly, but there is a certain adjustment period during which "finger trouble" errors are more likely for most transitioning pilots.

There is no indication yet that this was a factor here. Just informed speculation on his part. In fact, there is really very little reliable information on which to base any conclusions at this early date. If anything useful is gained from such speculation, then IMHO, it is probably the questions which are generated by the discussion.

Best regards,

Westhawk

AeroBoero

7th Oct 2006, 20:18

Just for curiosity there is an AD issued by the FAA in August to be effective on October on the transponder that ALSO equipped the Legacy.

The problem? It can go to STBY mode without the crew knowing.

ATC Watcher

7th Oct 2006, 20:24

So is that here on the tape that recorded Brasilia/Manaus ATC intercom?
"Hey, Manaus, this is Brasilia, we've got Legacy N600XL here at 370 or 360, maybe 350 as primary radar only, also lost vhf comm. Presently xxx NM northwest BRS on UZ6 centerline inbound NABOL. If there is opposite traffic advise we better need lateral separation and it should stay at least 10 NM right of track. OK?"
"Brasilia from Manaus, thanks, we have GOL1907 at 370, NABOL at xxx, BRS at xxx, will advise to fly right of track."
I doubt. But exactly this would have been ATC's duty.
Whatever the reason for comm and xpdr failure was (actually it is fully irrelevant) ATC was not doing its duty when this sequence is not found on the tape.
I wonder when the first ATC controller will be suspended and held in custody.

Are you in this forum to write a sensational novel or to contribute to the debate ?
What do you know more than we do ? Before blaming individuals and wishing them in jail ( being the Legacy pilots or now the controller ) wait a bit for the CVR/FDR and ATC tapes transcripts .The lawers are going to have a ball with this anyway.
In any case Aviation professionals are not interesting in blaming individuals, we like to know what happenned to prevent it from hapenning again, not to fall in the same trap.

If ATC malfunctionned we will know it pretty soon, as both R/T and telephone interactions between the Manaus and Brasilia ACCs are recorded together with a time stamp.
I would bet this case is a combination of many factors, but then it always is, isn't it ?

Be nice to those involved, it could be you next time.

FW-190

7th Oct 2006, 21:53

PaperTiger

7th Oct 2006, 23:32

evidences indicate that it was their mistake that caused the disaster.
...Also, Legacy transponder suddenly started working after the crash, what leads me to conclude that it was turned off by the pilots before.No evidences so far, just quotes from people before the investigation has barely begun. People who may have a particular agenda.
See the AD regarding Honeywell transponders going to SBY uncommanded: http://www.tdatacorp.com/iaprch/06-19-04.htm - your "conclusion" is at best premature.

flash8

7th Oct 2006, 23:39

But Brasilia and Manaus tried to contact them seven times - it's registered and proved - but got no response. Also, Legacy transponder suddenly started working after the crash, what leads me to conclude that it was turned off by the pilots before.
This isn't the first time that u/s electronics have been "jolted" back into action after a midair. It has happened before, if I recall correctly the JAT DC9's CVR (Zagreb 1976) started functioning only after the collision with the BA Trident. It took the impact to put it back in action.

westhawk

7th Oct 2006, 23:47

Well... That was quite a first post FW-190!

Kindly post your proven facts. Media coverage does not qualify as proven. If you care to offer your opinion, that's fine. Some modicum of effort directed toward the goal of distinguishing fact from supposition and edited remarks from "officials" in your posts would serve you well and be appreciated by thoughtful forum participants.

Best regards,

Westhawk

blackmail

8th Oct 2006, 00:08

westhawk, hello,

from your previous posts, i can see you have good judgement & analysis capability.
i jump on the roof, when i read hysterical posts as fw190 above.
as many professionnals, i ' m not interested in blame games, that's for the justice departement to decide.
i am more interested in possible causes & remedial actions, as to prevent as much as possible future similar tragedies. hence until the final report we can only speculate & compare/modify possible scenarios as more & more details become available.

best regards,
bm

barit1

8th Oct 2006, 00:21

FW-190 takes the forum "Rumors & News" to mean just that - with little distinction between the two.

He surely cannot provide any substantiation at this stage of the investigation. Why bother to ask him? :rolleyes:

onetrack

8th Oct 2006, 02:19

I see that some people are trying, in all possible ways, to blame someone else instead of the Legacy pilots, although evidences indicate that it was their mistake that caused the disaster. Brazil is among the biggest countries in the world in number of civil planes, but it has one of the lowest rates of air accidents and crashes. We have skilled pilots, atc controllers, and a solid and trustable system of air control that covers all the very big brazilian territory.
The most relevant thing is that the Legacy pilots were FL37, when they had to be FL36. They were not flying in accordance with their flight plan, and they didn't get authorization to change it either. Even if they were flying without the help of transponders, TCAS and radios they would not crash if the were within their flight plan. The rule is universal and followed in all countries: if you can not contact the tower, just follow your flight plan.
But Brasilia and Manaus tried to contact them seven times - it's registered and proved - but got no response. Also, Legacy transponder suddenly started working after the crash, what leads me to conclude that it was turned off by the pilots before.
FW190 - You, and a section of the Brazilian ATC, are indulging in unacceptable slurs by stating outright, without back-up evidence, that these pilots turned off their transponder. These guys are pro's, with many hours on their logs, they were certified to fly the Legacy, and they were approved by the owners and the builders of the BRAND NEW aircraft.
There is NOTHING that they were doing, in the aeroplane that could could be regarded as suspect .. as in drug-running .. unauthorised aerobatics, or any other illegal activity.
The American reporter has not reported that any loops, dives, or unauthorised activities took place .. as he surely would have, if they took place. Passengers would certainly have been warned, that aerobatics were going to take place, if the pilots were going to indulge in such antics ..

A filed flight level, is just what a flight initially proposes and this goes into planning by ATC for anticipated air traffic. However .. the filed level can be .. and frequently is .. changed, once the aircraft is en route .. according to other traffic that has be accommodated, weather, and also according to what the pilot may request.

Bottom line is .. ATC is responsible for guidance of aircraft, no matter where. Pilots have input, but the final responsibility lies wholly with ATC.
The critical factors in this case .. are that there was a change of level, coinciding with a change of ATC unit. Although the flightplan will show a change of level, the crew will not do this, until cleared by ATC.
Now, add in communication problems .. a possible transponder electrical fault (which you and some Brazilian sources, choose to ignore as a possible factor) .. and you have the stage set for disaster.

No-one has yet clarified what, if any attempts were made, to contact the 737-800, and warn of possible collision danger. Reports state, that panic set in, in the Brasilia ATC centre, when it was suddenly realised that the Legacy transponder was inoperative, and all eight people in that centre, were concentrating on trying to contact and track the Legacy.
In the resulting panic, it appears that the 737-800 was forgotten about, for long enough, for the collision to happen.
An AT controller removed from duty, with psychological problems, is an ominous sign that they realise, they are the primary responsible party, for the collision.

Scurvy.D.Dog

8th Oct 2006, 03:11

onetrack FW190 - You, and a section of the Brazilian ATC, are indulging in unacceptable slurs by stating outright, without back-up evidence, that these pilots turned off their transponder. … whilst I may not wholly agree with what FW190 has written … what they actually said was Also, Legacy transponder suddenly started working after the crash, what leads me to conclude that it was turned off by the pilots before. … sounds like an opinion (which they are entitled to) rather than stating outright fact as you imply!!
.
.. could you point to the ‘unacceptable slurs' by a section of the Brazilian ATC’
.
.. now compare that to your words A filed flight level, is just what a flight initially proposes and this goes into planning by ATC for anticipated air traffic. However .. the filed level can be .. and frequently is .. changed, once the aircraft is en route .. according to other traffic that has be accommodated, weather, and also according to what the pilot may request.
.
Bottom line is .. ATC is responsible for guidance of aircraft, no matter where. .. are you aware (as any certified pilot would/should be) that radio fail procedures REQUIRE following planned level and route as per fight plan in the event of comm failure!! .. tis a FACT! Pilots have input, but the final responsibility lies wholly with ATC. .. who is writing unacceptable slurs??The critical factors in this case .. are that there was a change of level, coinciding with a change of ATC unit. Although the flightplan will show a change of level, the crew will not do this, until cleared by ATC.
.
Now, add in communication problems .. a possible transponder electrical fault (which you and some Brazilian sources, choose to ignore as a possible factor) .. and you have the stage set for disaster. .. no one is ignoring the TXPDR fault possibility!!
.
.. perhaps you might explain to us (from regulation) why the crew would not follow the hemispherical and flight planned level change during comm’s outage??
.
.. what else is a required item following comm outage?? .... TXPDR to 7600 .... would that have cleared the possible 'STBY fault' by selecting the radio fail code?? ... who knows, just more questions for the investigation!No-one has yet clarified what, if any attempts were made, to contact the 737-800, and warn of possible collision danger. … yes so lets wait and see what was said by whom to whom and why!! Reports state, that panic set in, in the Brasilia ATC centre, when it was suddenly realised that the Legacy transponder was inoperative, and all eight people in that centre, were concentrating on trying to contact and track the Legacy.
In the resulting panic, it appears that the 737-800 was forgotten about, for long enough, for the collision to happen. …. Unacceptable slurs .. you sir have it down to an art form … disgraceful!An AT controller removed from duty, with psychological problems, is an ominous sign that they realise, they are the primary responsible party, for the collision. … another 'unacceptable slur' based on no real knowledge of why this controller has been stood down from duty ….
.
.. if you had done everything right (lets assume), yet 154 people died after an ‘inexplicable’ mid-air collision on your sector ….. would you feel OK to go back to work as if nothing had happed??
.
…. Insensitive, hypocritical and unfair IMHO!! :suspect:

Loose rivets

8th Oct 2006, 04:15

There has to be a specific threshold of signal-strength that will cause the transponder to ‘fire back' its response. What is known of the functioning range in this case?

I have always assumed that if a primary return could be seen, there would be plenty of signal to activate the transponder, but is this always the case?

I have assumed that the radar head was behind the smaller aircraft, but I'm not sure. Were they in line or at some other angle to the head?

FW-190

8th Oct 2006, 05:02

It seems that american press is not giving its readers too many informations. I'm not making a personal investigation about what happenened. I'm not talking about "rumours". A guy above said the "investigation barely begun". I suppose he's joking. Everything I said was reported in the last days by brazilian authorities, that, if you don't know, are having their work followed by members of Embraer, Boeing and american FAA. And, obviously, since the investigations are not concluded, we can only have opinions and conclusions about some aspects of the accident.

But yes, brazilian authorities are convinced that Legacy pilots were responsible for the crash. Here is a yesterday link to Estadao, probably Brazil's most trustable and respected newspaper (sorry, it is in portuguese): http://www.estadao.com.br/ultimas/cidades/noticias/2006/out/07/93.htm

Another guy on this page said that "Media coverage does not qualify as proven". He's right. And when we hear from serious media, they make it clear that they are talking about hypothesis, but when the hypothesis are proven after investigation, it becomes a fact - for example, the Legacy on FL37 instead of FL36. Also, the seven occasions Brasília and Manaus tried to contact the Legacy but got no replies, it's there on the records, proved as well!

Unfortunately, it is clear to me after some agressive posts - a guy even called me "hysterical", how great, first time I'm called that way in my whole life - that, in fact, most of you do not want to debate and clarify things. You just want to believe and make sure to deny the possibility of an american pilot making a stupid mistake and killing 154 people in another country skies.

I don't have anything to add here anymore. Sorry to disturb your factual discussion. :(

Oceanz

8th Oct 2006, 05:03

westhawk

8th Oct 2006, 07:15

i ' m not interested in blame games

Agreed! I prefer to think anyone reading this entire thread from beginning to end would agree that the majority of posters share in this view.

Why bother to ask him? :rolleyes:

Just a hope that it will inspire some standards pertaining to the quality of information used to support his conclusions I suppose. And a challenge to the guy that he do better with his second post. This is a tough room and we must try to be at our best! :)

Best,

Westhawk

ATC Watcher

8th Oct 2006, 08:08

In the resulting panic, .......
An AT controller removed from duty, with psychological problems, is an ominous sign that they realise, they are the primary responsible party, for the collision.
Onetrack , you obviously are not an aviation professional, I hope you are not working in the Governement or Justice department, because with pre set opinions like this :hmm:

You obviously have no idea how ATC works.

blackmail

8th Oct 2006, 08:38

sorry, if i called fw190 "hysterical", but his first post was so provocative in the first place.but, ok, so i take that back & lets remain civilized.
but fw190 seems to believe what's in the newspapers, maybe not realizing that those journo's are only out on sensationalism for their own benefit of selling more copys.
i hope, the authorities, except maybe some highranking military brass, will be more factual in their methods & conclusions.

onetrack

8th Oct 2006, 09:46

ATC watcher - I know precisely how ATC works .. and maybe you should repeat slowly to yourself ... Air ... Traffic ... Control ..
Maybe I'm missing something here .. but I understood that essentially, ATC's job is to provide guidance to, and separation between aircraft, to prevent collision between them, or terra firma. There has been a MAC, which indicates a failure of ATC. How much simpler do you want it?

http://travel.howstuffworks.com/air-traffic-control.htm

A simple schematic of the flights, showing the Cindacta coverage .. for those who enquired .. http://www.estadao.com.br/ext/especial/extraonline/infograficos/acidente2909/index.htm

The main area under question, of course, is the reason the pilots flew North on the Manaus leg at FL370. They reported that they believed they did this with Cindacta 1 approval. The fact that this does not jell with the flight plan lodged, is puzzling, and I am not going to speculate on the reason, or reasons. No doubt, this week will provide that answer, or answers.
One source claims that an airplane over Brazil CAN fly at the "wrong" FL if there is no conflicting traffic and if cleared by ATC. I cannot verify this, but this seems like a contradiction to the recent Nth/Sth, odd/even, FL separation that Brazil introduced.

Scurvy Dawg - The Brazilian media produced this report .. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N04331952.htm .. in which this quote is found .. "We know that the transponder was turned off," said Jose Carlos Pereira, the head of Brazil's airports authority, the Estado De Sao Paulo newspaper reported on Wednesday ..

So .. who's casting the slurs here?? .. this guy (head of the Brazil AA, note) KNOWS for sure, the transponder was TURNED OFF .. long before even any preliminary investigation is completed ..

The haste to judge the pilots as totally at fault, has transferred to the prosecutor as well .. perhaps he sees some personal glory in this .. http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/world/4243652.html

I am neither insensitive, nor hypocritical, nor unfair. The AT Controller has been removed, and I feel for that person. However, the fact that they have been removed surely indicates that overwhelming guilt and the usually resultant depression set in on this person.
That only happens, once someone realises that they have failed in the proper execution of their highly-responsible job, and people have died as a result. It has happened with ATC's before, and no doubt it will happen again. Seems pretty clear-cut to me.

Maybe the factor that will never be investigated .. but needs to be .. is the military control of civil airspace in Brazil. As has been noted before, military people are trained to push everything to the limit, and take extreme risks. Civilian trainees, particularly where pax are concerned, are trained, to never take risks. Whether this conflict comes up, in Brazilian ATC, is a point that maybe needs serious examination.

Despite FW190's reassurances .. ATC in Brazil has failed, this time .. in the worst possible way. Careful examination of all features of Brazilian ATC is now warranted to find the weak points.
As is noted in construction and mining industries .. despite extreme safety cultures being instigated .. there is a "risk-taking" mentality, that still exists amongst a small section of employees and managers .. which leads to fatalities. Whether that same mentality exists in Brazilian ATC needs to be examined as part of the accident investigation process.

Tarq57

8th Oct 2006, 10:01

Originally posted by onetrack
I am neither insensitive, nor hypocritical, nor unfair. The AT Controller has been removed, and I feel for that person. However, the fact that they have been removed surely indicates that overwhelming guilt and the usually resultant depression set in on this person

Removal, or being stood down from duty, following a major incident is normal, indeed, desirable. For an incident of this magnitude, essential. It does not indicate guilt or otherwise. It is a recognition that the person involved is likely to be too upset to objectively assess whether they are capable of working or not, even if they wanted to.
You obviously do not realize "precisely how ATC works.."
If you did, you wouldn't write that.

Flagon

8th Oct 2006, 10:01

However, the fact that they have been removed surely indicates that overwhelming guilt and the usually resultant depression set in on this person. - you display a gross lack of knowledge of human reaction to tragedy. Whether or not the ATC system was at fault, to be 'in the seat' when 155 human beings are killed in a mid-air collision REQUIRES the removal of the controller to allow the shock, horror and any understandable self-doubt to be dealt with away from a work environment.

westhawk

8th Oct 2006, 10:08

I have been following this thread as a non-pro and the (non-judgemental) question I would like to ask:

Wouldn't the Legacy at some stage prior to the MAC have expected to have had some contact with ATC about the FL change? And if so, wouldn't they have become aware at this stage if there was a comms failure/blackspot problem?

That's one of the big questions, Oceanz. We await the release of information from the investigating authorities regarding the CVR, FDR and ATC data records. No word yet on how long before they are prepared to do so.

I would presume that they would wish to time-correlate all the recorded data and attempt to re-construct events from there. That is just my supposition based upon my understanding of investigative techniques used in past investigations.

One might also suppose that extensive testing would be required on any aircraft and ATC equipment related to the performance of communication and RADAR identification functions.

In the end, it must be hoped that enough objective data exist to re-construct the complete chain of events that day. How completely will of course depend upon the quality and quantity of recoverable objective data. Participant recollections are generally considered non-objective, but may be useful to the investigation nonetheless.

Determination of criminal liability is a separate matter which is dependant on much of the same data as the accident investigation. I have very little idea how the rules of evidence and standard of proof might be applied under Brazillian law to determine whether charges are filed against individuals involved in an air accident. Not my forte!

Not only do I have the same interest and curiosity as most people here do regarding the factors related to accident chain from the standpoint of an aviator, I am also concerned about the legal process as it relates to the status and disposition of the Legacy flightcrew. I make no suppositions on that subject. We'll just have wait and watch how that goes. I hope enough data quickly become available to justice officials for them to make a timely determination regarding any potential charges.

Best regards,

Westhawk

fyrefli

8th Oct 2006, 10:14

The American reporter has not reported that any loops, dives, or unauthorised activities took place .. as he surely would have, if they took place. Passengers would certainly have been warned, that aerobatics were going to take place, if the pilots were going to indulge in such antics.

Considering the s**tstorm that would have broken out if he had said these things, I hardly think his failure to do so can be taken as evidence in support or denial of anything.

Cheers,

Rich.

Blues&twos

8th Oct 2006, 10:21

There has been a MAC, which indicates a failure of ATC. How much simpler do you want it?

"We know that the transponder was turned off," said Jose Carlos Pereira, the head of Brazil's airports authority, the Estado De Sao Paulo newspaper reported on Wednesday .. ...this guy (head of the Brazil AA, note) KNOWS for sure, the transponder was TURNED OFF .. long before even any preliminary investigation is completed ..

I have a few questions about these statements - in a hypothetical situation if ATC have followed their protocols, attempted to contact both aircraft, or were unaware fully of a/c positions owing to xpdr(s) being off would that be a "failure of ATC"? Or am I interpreting what you mean by ATC incorrectly? (I.e. you mean ATC as a description for what happens rather than the guys who make it happen, if you get my drift).

Do we know the xpdr was TURNED off implying deliberate action by the Legacy crew, or do we just know it was inoperative as has been suggested? There is a world of difference between the two and that difference is very important.

How would anyone know the xpdr was turned off before the preliminary investigation??? Isn't that normally called a guess?

piombo

8th Oct 2006, 11:02

... Air ... Traffic ... Control ..
Maybe I'm missing something here .. but I understood that essentially, ATC's job is to provide guidance to, and separation between aircraft, to prevent collision between them, or terra firma. There has been a MAC, which indicates a failure of ATC. How much simpler do you want it?

The ultimate responsibility relies on the pilot! That Simple.

[The main area under question, of course, is the reason the pilots flew North on the Manaus leg at FL370. They reported that they believed they did this with Cindacta 1 approval.

Thats right , BELIEVED, that seven calls were probably the confirmation of an authorization.

I am neither insensitive, nor hypocritical, nor unfair. The AT Controller has been removed, and I feel for that person. However, the fact that they have been removed surely indicates that overwhelming guilt and the usually resultant depression set in on this person.

That does not indicate anything, investigation pending in certain points, there is an enourmous psicological effect.

That only happens, once someone realises that they have failed in the proper execution of their highly-responsible job, and people have died as a result. It has happened with ATC's before, and no doubt it will happen again. Seems pretty clear-cut to me.

Since people do not realise errors, they can just continue working. Is that correct what you are saying?

Maybe the factor that will never be investigated .. but needs to be .. is the military control of civil airspace in Brazil. As has been noted before, military people are trained to push everything to the limit, and take extreme risks. Civilian trainees, particularly where pax are concerned, are trained, to never take risks. Whether this conflict comes up, in Brazilian ATC, is a point that maybe needs serious examination.

The controler was replaced in the screen after (recorded) 1hour and 59 minutes.

Despite FW190's reassurances .. ATC in Brazil has failed, this time .. in the worst possible way. Careful examination of all features of Brazilian ATC is now warranted to find the weak points.
As is noted in construction and mining industries .. despite extreme safety cultures being instigated .. there is a "risk-taking" mentality, that still exists amongst a small section of employees and managers .. which leads to fatalities. Whether that same mentality exists in Brazilian ATC needs to be examined as part of the accident investigation process.

Yes ATC is being investigated as well., even with the presence of the FAA and the NTSB, someone forgot to mention, you concluded that the seven calls were not enough, that the tapes showing the legacy desapearing as secondary target were deceiving and there was a "blackhole" in the area were the radar traces show everybody else but the N600XL as it should.

Besides:

UNSAFE CONDITION

(d) This AD results from the transponder erroneously going into standby
mode if the flightcrew takes longer than five seconds when using the
rotary knob of the radio management unit to change the air traffic
control code. We are issuing this AD to prevent the transponder of
the COM unit from going into standby mode, which could increase the
workload on the flightcrew and result in improper functioning of the
traffic alert and collision avoidance system.

Was he after 40 minutes or so instructed to change code and he did not do so in 5 s? Was this aircraft equipped with the "rotary knobs" transponder? Is that why the transponder "went" on stby? But, how come, if he was in comms failure, being instructed to do so and stating that he was in that situation only on ground after landing? By chance, they never stated changing any code that we know.

Scurvy.D.Dog

8th Oct 2006, 13:27

westhawk, ATC Watcher, markjoy, Flagon et al … sage words!
.
onetrack .. I dislike having to dissect a persons musing in this place, however given the sensitivities (both state and those directly affected) of this ‘accident’, and the number of people around the world watching this discussion, it would be remise not to address some of the statements you have made!ATC watcher - I know precisely how ATC works .. and maybe you should repeat slowly to yourself ... Air ... Traffic ... Control .. … with respect, you do not know precisely how air traffic control works! .. your musings indicate a simplistic penchant to blame ATC whenever two aircraft are not separated .. yet anyone with half a clue would understand the myriad of circumstances that could lead to an Airprox or MAC that could have zero to do with the Air Traffic Controllers on duty i.e.
.
- Aircraft encoder errors (would also likely include miscommunication)
- Aircraft malfunction
- Aircrew miscommunication (primary radar or procedural airspaces)
- Air traffic control equipment failure (surveillance and/or comm)
- Weather related unforseen upsets
- There are others but lets not go there in the current global climate for fear of the un-informed assuming it might apply in this case!Maybe I'm missing something here .. but I understood that essentially, ATC's job is to provide guidance to, and separation between aircraft, to prevent collision between them, or terra firma. …. as far as is practicable! There has been a MAC, which indicates a failure of ATC. How much simpler do you want it? …again, from a simplistic un-informed point of view, you might draw that conclusion … in reality, do you think ATC are responsible in the above sorts of scenarios … because that is what you have erroneously implied! ...… how much simpler do you want it?? Scurvy Dawg - The Brazilian media produced this report .. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N04331952.htm .. in which this quote is found .. "We know that the transponder was turned off," said Jose Carlos Pereira, the head of Brazil's airports authority, the Estado De Sao Paulo newspaper reported on Wednesday .. … yes, we have all read that!
.
Lets assume :rolleyes: for the sake of argument that Mr Pereira was referring to the TXPDR being ‘off’ in the raw sense of the word, not necessarily saying the crew physically turned it off! .. could this have been his intended context?! …. if it was, it would be an accurate statement as it is clear the TXPDR was OFF! … or;
.
… the other being your implied/assumed context of his statement that the crew turned it off for some reason!!
.
If that is indeed what he meant … there has been no follow-up statement to corroborate it, in fact, that context is being actively debunked by the lawyers for the Embraer crew (not suprisingly)!
.
….that may mean one of three things:-
.
1. Mr Pereira is not saying anything else until the report is out.
2. It may have been said without witness or corroborating evidence (DFDR/CVR) and can no longer be substantiated.
3. It was hearsay in the first place (in which case he will have his empennage sued off).So .. who's casting the slurs here?? .. this guy (head of the Brazil AA, note) KNOWS for sure, the transponder was TURNED OFF .. long before even any preliminary investigation is completed .. …. do you see the point? .. it is not too difficult to grasp I would have thought!I am neither insensitive, nor hypocritical, nor unfair. .. I would beg to differ := The AT Controller has been removed, and I feel for that person. However, the fact that they have been removed surely indicates that overwhelming guilt and the usually resultant depression set in on this person. … as has been eloquently stated by others, you have no empathy for or understanding of the responsibilities and seriousness with which the provision of air traffic control services is taken by those who hold that responsibility every day around the globe moving thousands of aircraft!
.
… an air traffic controller (irrespective of the role he or she may have played in any given incident or accident) involved in an incident is/should be removed from operational duties as soon as safely practicable to ensure service safety and continuity!That only happens, once someone realises that they have failed in the proper execution of their highly-responsible job, and people have died as a result.…. a dramatic example of crisis management of this type (post accident ATC ‘distraction’) is to be found in the actions of Sky Guide following the horrific MAC over Lake Constance in Europe! … very serious consideration was given to the likely ‘psychological’ effect on all of the staff in that centre and surrounds! … traffic metering and other measures were promulgated to allow the controllers (ALL of them first class professionals) time to reacquire their focus, absorb and adjust to the horror of what had occurred to the passengers and crew of both aircraft as well as their colleague! …. to do otherwise would have been irresponsible and unthinkable!
.
.. following your logic …… do you consider all of them guilty because they were stood-down??Seems pretty clear-cut to me. .. well it might ... from a position of ignorance!!Maybe the factor that will never be investigated .. but needs to be .. is the military control of civil airspace in Brazil. As has been noted before, military people are trained to push everything to the limit, and take extreme risks. .. that is a hideous slur against Brazilian ATC’s! … provide some factual basis for this or do the decent thing and retract your statement! Civilian trainees, particularly where pax are concerned, are trained, to never take risks. Whether this conflict comes up, in Brazilian ATC, is a point that maybe needs serious examination. … again, provide us with something other than a motherhood statement to support this contention!Despite FW190's reassurances .. ATC in Brazil has failed, this time .. in the worst possible way. … that has not been inferred or established on public record! := Careful examination of all features of Brazilian ATC is now warranted to find the weak points. I am sure if any ‘systemic’ deficiencies are identified, they will be recorded and corrected!!As is noted in construction and mining industries .. despite extreme safety cultures being instigated .. there is a "risk-taking" mentality, that still exists amongst a small section of employees and managers .. which leads to fatalities. Whether that same mentality exists in Brazilian ATC needs to be examined as part of the accident investigation process. .. mate, you may well be a competent miner and knowledgeable regarding wilful risk taking in that industry, but I am certain beyond doubt that air traffic controllers (no matter their location) would never wilfully place the travelling public in jeopardy!
… anyone that displayed even the slightest inclination to unreasonable ‘risk taking’ would not pass first base .. that is why we have psych testing, training, simulators, supervision and recurrent check and standards systems!
.
.. now it might be fair to say that commercial pressures are apparent in ATS in certain areas around the world ... if it is found that these 'systemic' issues play any part in an accident .. is it then reasonable to apportion blame to individual air traffic controllers??
.
… even if by some stretch of the imagination an operator did err unresonably or intentionally, multi-layered system defences come into play! .. and they would not last long in operations!
.
.. we do not muck about with other peoples lives FULL STOP!!!
.
… good day to you! :suspect:

jondc9

8th Oct 2006, 13:52

i think the reporter in question is faced with a conflict of interest...to tell the truth, and to somehow protect those who managed to get him on the ground safely.

the trouble is, if it was the LEGACY's crew's fault, he wouldn't be faced with this conflict of interest.

I think speculation is fine, it brings out a wealth of knowledge and anti-knowledge.

in time it will all be sorted out.

onetrack

8th Oct 2006, 14:18

Hmmm .. seems like I've poked a raw nerve here .... :uhoh:

This following Princeton/Rochlin publication is an excellent read .. see paragraph 37 for the point I previously made about military vs civilian training ..

http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/books/rochlin/chapter_07.html

This is not an article that I've just found to satisfy your regular need for irrefutable proof .. its an issue that has been raised previously, as a matter of possible concern .. and the issue was .. the large number of RAAF trained pilots, who left the RAAF, to join Qantas. It was a regular joke that the RAAF was known as the Qantas flying school.

Note that the Princeton/Rochlin article goes on at length about the workload on AT Controllers possibly being subtly increased by extensive computerisation.
Seeing as Brazil is reputed to have spent $122M on ATC upgrades in the last couple of years, one has to ponder the possibilities of too much of that money going into technology, and not enough into training, and the human factor.

Despite you trying to savage me over every single one of my comments, there can be no doubt that ATC failed in this case in at least two areas. No doubt other contributing factors will be found .. but Brazilian ATC will in no way come out of this, squeaky clean.

In the case of communications failure during the IFR flight, pilots will follow the exact route in the IFR clearance, and ATC will anticipate their path, altitudes, and times along the route, based upon a combination of the IFR flight plan and the IFR clearance issued by ATC to the pilot.

Scurvy.D.Dog

8th Oct 2006, 14:27

, there can be no doubt that ATC failed in this case in at least two areas. No doubt other contributing factors will be found .. but Brazilian ATC will in no way come out of this, squeaky clean. ... really??.... perhaps you know something the rest of us do not!
.
.. come on ... out with it!

ManaAdaSystem

8th Oct 2006, 14:28

And now, can we please get back to discussing the case?

jondc9

8th Oct 2006, 14:29

onetrack

I have been savaged many times on pprune. I offer my support and will take some flack for you if I may.

That a collision happened with two IFR planes means ATC failed somewhere.

Now if the controller has a tape of him shouting at both planes to do something and both planes didn't hear, there might be a technical problem...manmade or otherwise.

Including someone not having the audio panel set up properly.

ATC , when giving a clearance, must assume loss of radio communication from the moment of takeoff all the way to landing, there should be a watchful eye on the progression of all flights to make sure things are working as planned...and if not fix it up somehow.

I agree with you, I would prefer moeny to be spent on the human side of ATC rather than all the fancy computers.

In the US, you may certainly recall the comair crash...the one controller on duty was doing paperwork rather than watching out the window. While possibly within regs, possibly not, I would prefer regs and policies to be changed to have more HUMAN eyes and minds involved with ATC. I would also like to see reduced vertical seperation minimums removed and the 2000' spacing above FL290 resumed.

Add to that, the concept of one way airways, so planes are never head on.

People make mistakes, people make computer systems, people deal with computer systems/automation, and it is time to make sure the people side is cared for!

j

Austrian Simon

8th Oct 2006, 14:37

In my opinion it will be highly interesting to see the actions of Air Traffic Control of Brasilia and Manaus and the communication between the two control centers indeed. In the light, that Brasil officials maintain, that Brasilia Center did try to contact the Legacy for 7 times (over a period of about one hour), but did not receive a reply, and at the same time states, that the transponder of the Legacy was off, what would have been sensible for ATC to do indeed, and what was ATC required to do? Should they leave it at that - and do nothing, trusting that the pilots would follow proper procedures? Or should they have done something?

From my point of view it would have been logical to block both FL360 (their flight planned level in case they followed loss of communication procedures) as well as FL370 (the last known level they were on and that they were cleared to, in case they didn't notice the loss of communication) for all other traffic. At the same time, with loss of voice communication and transponder signal, it would seem prudent to no longer assume RVSM, so at least separate aircraft by 2000 feet minimum, as has been suggested before in this thread already. That would mean, that the B737 could have been assigned to FL390 (if able) or to FL330, perhaps as an additional safety margin asking her to track parallel (and not on) the centerline of the airway at say 5 or 10 nm deviation.

Now add the picture, that the Legacy was seen turning, climbing and descending without clearance on radar, which led to the conclusion by officials, that the pilots had turned their transponder off to "show off the airplane to the new owners". Would that not set off all alarm bells with Air Traffic Controllers? Would that, in an unexpected loss of communication scenario, not trigger suspicions, that the airplane may be in an emergency and the pilots just not able to communicate (following the principle aviate, navigate, communicate), and invoke according ATC emergency procedures?

So this is why I have this hot burning question: what did Brasilia Center do indeed? Did they talk to Manaus and tell them, that there is a likelihood of an airplane approaching the intersection at (the wrong) FL370 or FL360, and then coordinate a level change for the oncoming B737? Did they indeed (attempt to) clear the airspace around the Legacy? What is the procedure for an air traffic controller, who cannot ascertain, that an airplane under his control approaches the boundaries of his sector at the correct altitudes/flight levels, that have been assigned for transferring the airplane into the responsibility of the next sector?

So far, the lack of any information on that topic as well as the facts, that the Boeing was still on flight level 370 (the last level the Legacy was known on too) and the collision occured close to the section boundary, seems to suggest, that there was no such coordination between the two centers. Such a coordination would however have broken this link in the chain to disaster.

Don't get me wrong here - if the Legacy crew indeed did turn off the transponder or did wrong as is being alleged, then they should face the consequences. The actions of ATC (or the lack thereof) may however well have contributed to the collision. Within that hour between the loss of communication and the collision ATC did have a significant chance to break one of the links in this chain to disaster. BTW, I am aware of the AD, which may also explain the loss of transponder signal, but would not explain why their CVR recorded the 7 attempts by Brasilia ATC to contact the airplane (which prompts me to be very suspicious regarding the Legacy crew, although there may be another technical reason not yet discussed, why the CVR could read Brasilia, but the crew would not - but that's not the purpose of my posting).

What's the implication, BTW, with the automatic descent or climb to flight level according to flight plan, if the airplane looses communication at quite some different flight level or perhaps altitude (e.g. cleared to FL120, flight plan at FL330)? Would that automatic climb/descend not create a lot of havoc and risk of midair collisions with planes on flight levels in between, especially in a busy airspace? While I might see, how air traffic control could handle such a scenario with working transponder signals by knowing exactly, what altitude the losscom airplane is at, without a working transponder and thus without knowing exactly what the losscom airplane is doing, that seems to be an impossible task, except clearing the entire airspace around that airplane ... Any insight?

Servus, Simon

jondc9

8th Oct 2006, 14:58

simon

while clearing all altitudes for NORDO (no radio) plane with an expected altitude change will cause havoc, it will not cause a collision...controllers will have to do more work, pilots and planes will have to use more fuel, people will be delayed, but they will not die.

I do THINK, SPECULATE, conjecture, that the LEGACY crew may have turned down their radio volume in one of a number of ways in order to chat up the guests in back as they came to the cockpit to look around. It happens.

And for the legacy crew to NOT hear a radio transmission would make me suspicious as a pilot and I would key the MIC and ask for a radio check.

1 hour of flying is more than 400 nautical miles...that is a long way to go without a how do you do?

j

barit1

8th Oct 2006, 15:28

You'll forgive, perhaps, my insolance in asserting that "Air Traffic Control" is a misnomer. Obviously ATC has no mechanical or electronic control of an aircraft, but has the responsibility to provide a path clear of hazards to the aircraft's destination, and provide appropriate communication.

ATC also has alternate procedures for loss of contact with an aircraft. If a flight "goes dark" for whatever reason--intentional or not--it becomes a hazard to other aircraft, and ATC must follow those contingency procedures.

Do I have it right?

threemiles

8th Oct 2006, 15:56

You'll forgive, perhaps, my insolance in asserting that "Air Traffic Control" is a misnomer. Obviously ATC has no mechanical or electronic control of an aircraft, but has the responsibility to provide a path clear of hazards to the aircraft's destination, and provide appropriate communication.
ATC also has alternate procedures for loss of contact with an aircraft. If a flight "goes dark" for whatever reason--intentional or not--it becomes a hazard to other aircraft, and ATC must follow those contingency procedures.
Do I have it right?

Absolutely. I couldn't agree more.

PaperTiger

8th Oct 2006, 16:09

A guy above said the "investigation barely begun". I suppose he's joking.I'll be charitable and put it down to there being no Portuguese equivalent to barely begun in the sense of being in the very early stages of investigation. Officals everywhere have no business releasing "facts" until the investigation is complete; which will be months. Uninvolved parties speculating in an anonymous forum is one thing, authorities doing so to the press is something quite different :mad:
But yes, brazilian authorities are convinced that Legacy pilots were responsible for the crash.ibid.when the hypothesis are proven after investigationMore language differences presumably. The investigation continues, nothing yet is after it.just want to ... deny the possibility of an american pilot making a stupid mistake and killing 154 people in another country skies.Hyperbole aside, I don't think anybody has come out and stated unequivocally that the Legacy pilots did everything 100% correctly. It certainly appears their guard was down (SA), there were pax on the flight deck on at least one occasion - were they distracted, showing off the 'bells and whistles' and twiddled the wrong knobs ? Wait and see.

And most of us are not trying to crucify ATC either. But IMO it appears their performance left something to be desired. You have two converging targets, one of which is not squawking and not responding to calls at a last known alt. of 370. The other is both squawking and responding and climbing 350-390. What do you do ?

Hint: simply watching the blips merge should not be an option.

jondc9

8th Oct 2006, 17:14

barit 1

yes, air traffic control is a misnomer, but has been around for about 70 years or so.

your summing up is just about right.

It seems that things are repeating themselves in aviation history...collisions etc

j

flyboy2

8th Oct 2006, 18:05

October 4, 2006
Brazilian authorities confiscated the passports of two American pilots on Tuesday who were flying a business jet that apparently collided with a Gol commercial airliner that crashed last week deep in the Amazon jungle, killing all 155 people on board.

Judge Tiago de Abril in Mato Grosso state, where the plane went down, said police had seized the passports of Joe Lepore and Jan Paladino on his orders for the duration of the investigation.

"That's a cautionary measure. If they returned to the United States it would require a lot of time and effort for us to collect their testimony," the judge said, adding that the investigation should not take long.

The two pilots, who were flying a newly built executive jet that authorities believe clipped the Boeing 737-800 in midair, arrived on Tuesday in Rio de Janeiro for medical and psychological tests as part of the investigation.

They face more questioning on Wednesday.

"They are being interviewed by the authorities and are giving their total cooperation with the investigation," said Glauco Paiva, a US consulate official in Rio.

The business jet, a Legacy 600 made by Brazilian manufacturer Embraer, was recently purchased by ExcelAire Service, a charter company based in Ronkonkoma, New York. The pilots were flying it to the United States when it apparently hit the airliner flown by low-cost Brazilian carrier Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes.

The business jet was able to land safely at a military base in the jungle. None of the seven people on board were hurt.

Air Force commander Luiz Carlos Bueno said on Monday both planes were flying at 37,000 feet, which means that one of them had strayed from its flight plan.

Investigators want to know why modern collision avoidance equipment installed on both planes did not prevent the accident, local aviation authorities said.

Brazilian news reports have offered a range of conflicting theories about the accident's cause, some speculating that the Legacy jet may have deviated from its flight plan.

Christine Negroni, with US law firm Kreindler & Kreindler which is not involved in the investigation, said all planes heading west in Brazil fly at even multiples of 1,000 feet, and those heading east at odd multiples.

"Since the American pilots were flying northwest, they should not have been at 37,000 (feet). That's very odd," she said.

At the crash site in a dense, remote area in the rain forest, salvage crews had recovered the remains of about 50 victims by Tuesday, including the airliner's two pilots.

"Parts of the plane and many bodies are scattered over an area of some 20 square kilometres in the forest and searchers have to scare away wild animals, especially at night, by burning large fires," an air force spokesman said.

A badly damaged black box from the Boeing will probably be taken for analysis to the United States or Canada, after which it will be compared with the data from the business jet, aviation authorities said.

As it often does, the US National Transportation Safety Board sent investigators to help with the probe in Brazil.

Grieving relatives were asked to provide dental records or descriptions that could help identify the bodies, as well as blood samples for DNA tests.

(Reuters) http://news.airwise.com/story/view/1159921223.html

wrench1

8th Oct 2006, 18:15

Not being from the “big iron” side of the fence, I was hesitant to post. However, curiosity got the best of me as I did not see any discussion about the cockpit displays.

What kind of visual references / information (route, traffic, terrain, etc.) would the pilots have seen on their respective PFD’s and MFD’s?

We have been interfacing Sky Watch (TCAS system) data to Garmin 430’s which allow for a visual, layered digital reference to the “outside” space around the aircraft.

What really sticks out to me, aside from all the other issues, is that 2 modern, independent TCAS / XPNDR systems failed to “see” the threat. I don’t know what TCAS range settings are used at FL370, however, it just seems unfathomable that someone didn’t see something at one point in time.

This brings me to another question…

Can a TCAS / XPNDR signal be interfered with by an outside source?

We have to perform a number of EMI tests anytime a new type of equipment is installed to ensure there is no adverse interference with critical systems. However, these tests are only required for items installed on that particular aircraft, with no checks performed using outside signal sources. I can recall back when digital controls were entering the civilian market and one particular engine mfg. used a digital overspeed controller that worked great except when you flew by a high power tension line which put out enough EMI to trip the overspeed control and decel the engine to idle.

As stated previously, the aircraft were in a military control zone, and the Legacy did land on a hidden air force base. I am not a “spark chaser” so maybe I am off track, but I have seen where some simple outside signals played hell on equipment displays, and caused a lot of grief to the mechanics troubleshooting the problem.

Astra driver

8th Oct 2006, 18:34

RiverCity

8th Oct 2006, 18:41

Joe Sharkey, the reporter for the NY Times, has revised his blog and his comments on it might prove educational. There are two entries; the one I reference is wayyyyy down the bottom of his blog site. The top blog is an AD.

www.joesharkey.com

Hokie Nation

8th Oct 2006, 19:12

I find it interesting that certain media sources are implying that the Legacy, flying at FL370 was at the incorrect altitude, when, in fact, following correct lost com procedures they were doing exactly the right thing, namely flying their last assigned route and flight level.

We also need to acknowledge that it is your last CLEARANCE that determines your route and altitude of flight, not your flight plan.

In the event of lost communications, you are expected to do the following in regards to your route of flight in the following order;
1.)Last Assigned route,
2.)Last assigned Heading if you were on radar vectors,
3.)What you were told to expect (ie, "in the event of lost comm, fly direct XXX and hold")
4.)Your Filed route.

In regards to Altitude you are expected to fly the HIGHEST of the following altitudes;
1.) The MEA for the airway
2.) The altitude you were told to Expect in your Last CLEARANCE.
3.) The last Assigned altitude given in your last communication.

Apply this to the lost comm situation the Legacy crew was allegedly experiencing and you do the following;

Fly your assigned route as per your last ATC Clearance
Fly your last assigned Altitude.

You DO NOT change altitudes after passing Brasilia, even though this was in your flight plan, as your last assigned altitude takes priority. The only exception to this would be if, in their last recieved ATC clearance they were told to,
"Maintain FL 370, at Brasilia VOR descend and maintain FL 360".
To my knowledge no such clearance was given.

Given the circumstances the Legacy crew were flying the correct altitude.
Finally someone has stated something that is correct. The Legacy crew did exactly as they should have. Ive known one of the pilots for six years and trained with him at two different airlines, and I know that he was trying to communicate with anyone on many differnet freqs, including Guard. The CVR has this on tape, and no, there was not seven attempts on the CVR from Cindacta-1 (Brasilia), that is innacurate. Both of us are type rated on the Legacy, and the NORDO procedure is to STAY at your last assigned altitude...370...and squawk 7600. The Legacy has a rotary transponder and the AD applies to this transponder unfortunately. If they changed the squawk to 7600, and it does sometimes take at least 5 secs to get there, esp if its a bumpy ride, that would explain 'turning off the xpndr'. Nonetheless, it doesnt seem that Brazil even KNOWS their procedures, much less follows any. Consider this, IF they thought the xpndr was 'turned off', then the Legacy no longer qualifies as an RVSM, and now needs 2,000 alt separation, so why did Cindacta-1 even try to clear them to FL360? By their own admission, the Legacy was a non RVSM aircraft so that is NOT legal separation criteria. FL360 doesnt even make sense as the 737 would need to go through FL360 en route to Brasilia where they were landing and they would have AGAIN been nose to nose, coaltitude at some point. The only logical altitude to clear the Legacy would be FL390, so their own response indicates their incompetence. One phone call to Cindacta-4 (Amazonica) would have avoided all of this in reality. Why was the 737 even cleared to FL370 when the Legacy was already there on an overlapping airway (UZ6) before the 737 took off? So much easier to blame US citizens than your own banana republic military buffoons. This situation will happen AGAIN if they dont learn procedures and buy some new equipment. Hopefully those guys will be home and exonerated soon.

PPRuNe Radar

8th Oct 2006, 20:13

Astra Driver and Hokie Nation

Can you provide a reference document to your RT Failure 'procedures' ?

Assuming Brasil uses the ICAO standard procedure, then you are both simply (and possibly dangerously) wrong with the assertion the pilot should not change level from that last assigned.

From ICAO Annex 2:

3.6.5.2 Communication failure.

If a communication failure precludes compliance with 3.6.5.1, the aircraft shall comply with the voice communication failure procedures of Annex 10,
Volume II, and with such of the following procedures as are appropriate.

The aircraft shall attempt to establish communications with the appropriate air traffic control unit using all other available means. In addition, the aircraft, when forming part of the aerodrome traffic at a controlled aerodrome, shall keep a watch for such instructions as may be issued by visual signals.

3.6.5.2.1 If in visual meteorological conditions, the aircraft shall:

a) continue to fly in visual meteorological conditions; land at the nearest suitable aerodrome; and report its arrival by the most expeditious means to the appropriate air traffic control unit;

b) if considered advisable, complete an IFR flight in accordance with 3.6.5.2.2.

3.6.5.2.2 If in instrument meteorological conditions or when the pilot of an IFR flight considers it inadvisable to complete the flight in accordance with 3.6.5.2.1 a), the aircraft shall:

a) unless otherwise prescribed on the basis of regional air navigation agreement, in airspace where radar is not used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude
if higher, for a period of 20 minutes following the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;

b) in airspace where radar is used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude if higher, for a period of 7 minutes following:

1) the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached; or

2) the time the transponder is set to Code 7600; or

3) the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point;

whichever is later, and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;

c) when being radar vectored or having been directed by ATC to proceed offset using RNAV without a specified limit, rejoin the current flight plan route no later than the next significant point, taking into consideration the
applicable minimum flight altitude.

The questions this then would raise for any investigator would be;

What was the aircraft's filed level (in other words, was it already at FPL level or was a change required to comply with the ICAO procedures) ?

and if a level change was required;

How many minutes was it between the collision taking place and the later of the the conditions specified in 3.6.5.2.2 Para b) ?

Hokie Nation

You are right about the lack of a transponder removing the RVSM capability, and the need for 2000' separation to be applied. Forcing the aircraft to leave RVSM airspace would of course be the preferred course of action, but then no one was in contact with the aircraft (for whatever reason). Perhaps the investigation will reveal that the Brasilian ATC guys were basing the separation on the Legacy filing a FPL level at least 2000' away from that of the B737, and ICAO time parameters had been met such that they expected the Legacy to now be at that level having followed published RT Failure procedures in an ICAO contracting States airspace ??

Before you start 'banana republic' smears, consider that scenario.

jondc9

8th Oct 2006, 20:19

so much being said about this

does anyone know the wx conditions at the time of the crash...complete loss of comm does, as stated above, require a plane to maintain VMC, land as soon as practicable.

I imagine brazillia has a nice airport and if LEGACY WAS truly out of touch for an hour, it might have been an option.

as far as expected altitudes, until we actually have a copy of the clearance we simply don't know if the legacy was told to expect a different altitude crossing a certain fix...HOWEVER if this was part of the clearance it factors into the equation. It will also be of interest whether the LEGACy crew questioned the wrong altitude for direction of flight.

Rippa

8th Oct 2006, 20:46

The critical factors in this case .. are that there was a change of level, coinciding with a change of ATC unit. Although the flightplan will show a change of level, the crew will not do this, until cleared by ATC.
.

Onetrack,

If I am not mistaken, the Legacy was supposed to clear FL370 to 360 over BRS VOR. As an airline pilot in Brazil for the past 6 years, I have never had a communication problem in that area (200NM radius from BRS VOR). However, I have had some trouble with the ATC when flying outbound from BRS to MAO or BEL, when aprox 200NM from Brasilia...In fact I had this problem today, when flying inbound from BEL TO BSB (delay on getting first comm contact, and poor audio return from Brasilia....3/3). But communications work very well when you are "near" Brasilia. Agree that ATC has responsibility on this matter (A class airspace). Disregard the news on the paper...it is clear that the media is trying to drive public opinion against the Legacy pilots, giving unfounded info. The problem is that the majority of population takes this kind of news as a fact. If the ATC had any responsibility on this accident, believe me, they will have their "share of guilt" on the final report...this already happened once, with a Lufthansa in Rio de Janeiro.

Regards

PS: Regarding airspace: This area is a SIVAM area, that means that the radars are not on the ground, but built in airforce airplanes that keep flying 24-7 (Brasilian airforce uses EMB Legacy airplanes on this...ironic). This kind of equipment (onboard radar) is used to intercept unknown traffic, and I am not sure, but do not doubt, of the capability of getting altitude info even with the xpndr off. ATC in that area is Military ONLY.:rolleyes:

Scurvy.D.Dog

8th Oct 2006, 22:16

.. now we are back on track (so to speak)
.
.. some of the reasonable questions and opinions in the last few postings (such as those from Austrian Simon) are why most of us bother with these discussions .. it is to ‘understand’ an share relevant hypothesis and factual information such as the ICAO quote from PPRuNe Radar, to heighten awareness and avoid similar error scenarios from occurring in the future (such as the incorrect assumptions regarding comm Loss and flight progression thereafter) … NOT APORTION INDIVIDUAL BLAME!
.
.. that said .. it is clear there are some .. well … lets call them potential anomalies to this accident sequence that will only really be clarified by thorough investigation. RVSM, TXPDR/TCAS, ATC procedures etc will likely all be in there and so they should be!! .. in the meantime it is important to look at the what if’s even if they in the end have no relevance to this accident .. everyone reading will be thinking of the ‘what if’s’ not matter what they are .. that must be a positive thing for air safety generally!
.
My issue is with some of our contributions is that we MUST not accuse individuals without factual basis, rather ask the questions of how and why the events occurred!
.
. I get very hot under the collar when ‘individuals’ (be they pilots or air traffic controllers) are besmirched without basis for doing so!
.
Clearly, as with all these types of events, the system defences broke! … individuals may or may not have played roles in that!
.
.. my point again is that most always the errors are inadvertent and unintentional and it is neither fair nor reasonable to blame individuals when on any given day, given the same set of fault tree components .. ANY INDIVIDUAL could fall into the same holes!!
.
.. aside from anything else that might come out of this horrific accident … ICAO mandating of track offsets outside SID/STAR/terminal areas MUST be defined and promulgated globally A.S.A.P! … any argument about tolerances applied on lateral crossing points is mute compared to the safety enhancement gained!!
.
Rippa .. that is most interesting regarding the airborne radar .. I will be very interested to see what is said in the wash-up re that system and its operating rules!! :ooh:

jondc9

8th Oct 2006, 22:57

<my point again is that most always the errors are inadvertent and unintentiona>

or due to a lack of resources or trying to fix a problem and later causing a problem...

consider the transponder AD...going to standby after 5 seconds etc...obviously well intentioned so as not to trigger a 7700 alarm etc...but better the transponder be on with the wrong code than off with the code improperly set...

at least TCAS would work with the wrong code.

AS with the COMAIR thread, swiss cheese lining up...just one thing...if you want more slices of swiss cheese with the same amount of milk, you have to have more holes...

Rippa

9th Oct 2006, 00:43

So much easier to blame US citizens than your own banana republic military buffoons.

Hokie,

As an experienced pilot that I believe you are, you should know that the media news, when the topic is avaition, cannot be considerated at all ! Lots of BS going on at this time. I havent seen anyone blaming US citizens IN A OFFICIAL DOCUMENT YET !!!! So lets give the investigators (the team includes US citizens) some time and stick to a more grown up discution.

Regards

alemaobaiano

9th Oct 2006, 12:19

and buy some new equipment

Hokie, I would guess that Brazil has a more modern ATC infrastructure than many countries, quite possibly including the USA. Their radar systems have been provided by Thomson CSF, Raytheon and Lockheed Martin and the oldest of these dates from 1994. Most systems have been delivered and installed since 2001. They don't need to buy new equipment, they already have it.

ZOA ATC

9th Oct 2006, 15:58

piombo

9th Oct 2006, 16:31

The NYT reports that the Legacy transponder is not included in the AD and that is confirmed by Honeywell themselves.
Now...?

jondc9

9th Oct 2006, 16:50

I think there may be some confusion about RVSM and loss of transponder...I indicated that I thought RVSM should be discontinued , but meant it in the sense that it should be discontinued in general and not neccessarily in this one case due to xpndr failure. I was quite happy with 2000' spacing at higher altitude, but do not want to see the thread get too off course.

As to the honeywell bit about xpndr AD...

I think that there will be plenty of blame to go around, though for the life of me, not too much on the GOL crew.

While looking out the window is still a way not to hit someone else, it cannot really work that well at a 1000mph closing speed. A first you see a spot smaller than a bug on your windshield, then you shudder in delayed fear when you realize its a plane.

Seperation is ATC business

Visual scanning for other planes is a pilot's job, both sides here.

if there was any monkey business with transponder/ etc...we will have to wait and see...but anyone who doesn't think monkey business doesn't happen hasn't been around that much.

j

PPRuNe Radar

9th Oct 2006, 18:47

I read with interest the posts about RVSM being discontinued due to in-flight transponder failure. The US does not discontinue RVSM due to transponder failure. I'm curious about ICAO. Is is country specific? I've searched the online ICAO resources and cannot find a concrete answer on in-flight failures.

It will depend on what is in the ICAO Regional Supplementary for the airspace involved. Most have adopted the European procedures, but I can't confirm if that is also the case for Brasil. Some States in Europe allow continued RVSM flight without a transponder, some don't. I'd imagine it is a similar story in other ICAO regions.

European MELs for RVSM flight are in JAA TGL 6, with further clarification on the Eurocontrol RVSM FAQ page.

8.1 Equipment for RVSM Operations

The minimum equipment fit is:

8.1.1 Two independent altitude measurement systems.
8.1.2 One secondary surveillance radar transponder with an altitude reporting system that can be connected to the altitude measurement system in use for altitude keeping.
8.1.3 An altitude alerting system.
8.1.4 An automatic altitude control system.

Source: TGL6

The ICAO RVSM requirements do not preclude ATC clearance into European RVSM airspace for RVSM-approved aircraft and non-RVSM approved State aircraft that experience Mode C transponder failure (or if the Mode C readout is misreading by more than 200 feet) prior to intended entry into RVSM airspace.

However, the specific requirement for the carriage and operation of transponders is a "State" responsibility, in accordance with �Annex 11 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation�, Chapter 2, paragraph 2.25, which reads as follows:

"States shall establish requirements for carriage and operation of pressure-altitude reporting transponders within defined portions of airspace".

Please refer to relevant National Aeronautical Information Publications (AIPs) for information on transponder requirements.

Source: Eurocontrol

Johnbr

9th Oct 2006, 19:15

Hi everybody,
Being busy these last few days,I came to this forum in the hopes of learning of something new on this accident,which I think,we all in this trade should be doing.Many of us are genuinely concerned about the facts and more important,the lessons to be learned form this and a bit of speculation is in order,I guess.But,nonetheless,I read a few posts here,that really sadden me.Let's see....
The "Banana Republic"airline was operating a brand new 737/800(they have a fleet of 60+ 737's NG,of which they've ordered 100+)in his correct FL/Airway.
The "Äll Mighty" american pilots were flying a "Banana Republic"made brand new EMB145 corporate version Legacy,of which I've seen plenty in "Äll Mighty"places like MIA,JFK,CDG,LHR,you name it....
They were both operating in radar covered area equipped with state-of-the-art radar provided by "All Mighty"makers such as Raytheon,Thomson and Lockheed-Martin , and recently installed.
These are facts.
The 738,was at Fl370 as for his Flight plan,operating a scheduled flight when it was hit by the Legacy,who should be at FL360.Fact!
What remains to be uncovered is:Why was the Legacy at FL370?????
Comm fail? We do have procedures to cover that,published by ICAO,to which Brasil complies with,as have been posted here in this very same forum before...
Transponder fail?? Who knows,the thing went back on,right after the MAC,right?
Maybe someone got too distracted showing off the knew toy to a reporter who shouldn't be at the cockpit,and missed the calls from ATC,or did not realize the seriousness of the situation,or did not see,at the nav chart that he was supposed to change level....Who knows...
Maybe someone got too worried with a blip with no sqwak in his/her screen and lost SA,thus preventing him/her from taking precautionary measures to avoid this MAC.Who knows....
One thing's for sure:The "Banana Republic"Capt on the 738 is out of this "blame game"as someone put it before..
Anyway,I do not believe that this whole thing it's going to come down as a blame game,at all.Brasil has a very good record in aviation safety(not perfect though,like every other "All Mighty"countrys in the world) and I'm pretty confident that the people from NTSB,Boeing,Anac and Brazil's Air Force are all eager to find the answers for all the questions every one of us are waiting for.The whole world is watching!
P.S. I'm not,in any way,trying to get back at anybody with the "Banana Republic"stuff...Just trying to add some sense to the discussion.:rolleyes:

ATC Watcher

9th Oct 2006, 20:52

I know that he was trying to communicate with anyone on many differnet freqs, including Guard The CVR has this on tape, and no, there was not seven attempts on the CVR from Cindacta-1 (Brasilia), that is innacurate. Both of us are type rated on the Legacy, and the NORDO procedure is to STAY at your last assigned altitude...370...and squawk 7600. The Legacy has a rotary transponder and the AD applies to this transponder unfortunately.

Hokie Nation , your post indicates that you have either seen the CVR transcript of the Legacy or talked to someone who had.

If the Legacy pilot had tried to call on guard, surely that has been noted and recorded by others, as every ATC unit monitor and records 121,5 .

If the 7 attempts from Brasilia are not on the Legacy CVR, it would indicate they were not on the same frequency , the most common ,and by far, reason for the Comm failures. But normal procedure is to revert to previous Frequency, but if not immediately dedected, by that time you might be out of range .

The NORDO procedures you refer to are the FAA AIM procedures, (i.e in IFR conditions, the pilot is expected to follow the last instructions given by ATC ) which are only valid inside the USA and differ significantly from the ICAO ones .( see the excellent post of PPRuNe Radar on this )
If Brazil follows ICAO rules, the latter will apply unfortunately.That could be one of the discussion points. But if your friend is an ex AA ( as reported elsewhere ) he surely would know the diffrence .

The AD should not normally apply to the Legacy transponder , as this is a brand new unit and Honeywell has fixed the problem already some time ago.
Unless of course the avionic fitted on the aircrfat were not new.

On the other hand if indeed the investigation finds out that the transponder went AGAIN into stand by mode uncommanded, and this is on a brand new unit, then Honeywell, and owners of many 145's are going to loose a lot of money.

As to ATC, I am waiting to read the Telephone coordination transcripts between ACC Brasilia and Manaus to make a judgement, as I believe, here lies one of the main causes of the collision. (regardless of the transponder/ comm failure or not issue )

I will not comment on the " Banana republics" words, other to say that for a first post, you could perhaps be a bit more polite and respecful of other cultures when talking to other professionals.

Rippa

9th Oct 2006, 20:59

.. .
Rippa .. that is most interesting regarding the airborne radar .. :

Just to illustrate

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0905637/M/

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0905601/M/

Regards

barit1

9th Oct 2006, 21:46

...
These are facts.
The 738,was at Fl370 as for his Flight plan,operating a scheduled flight when it was hit by the Legacy,who should be at FL360.Fact!
What remains to be uncovered is:Why was the Legacy at FL370?????...
...Just trying to add some sense to the discussion.:rolleyes:

The further fact is that the Legacy had lost contact with ATC, and had become a known hazard at an unknown altitude to ATC. ATC didn't know, and we do not yet know the reason for the lost contact, but per ICAO, ATC should have required an altitude change, and perhaps a track offset, for the Gol 737 to provide positive (or at least a statistically safe) separation.

For all the allegedly knowledgable quotes from the Embraer CVR, ATC tapes, etc. no one seems to know when or if ATC revised its clearance to the 737.
That seems to be the open issue now.

fepate

9th Oct 2006, 22:45

From ICAO Annex 2:
b) in airspace where radar is used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude if higher, for a period of 7 minutes following:
1) the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached; or
2) the time the transponder is set to Code 7600; or
3) the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point;
whichever is later, and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
I don't understand how this works. How would ATC and the airplane crew start their 7 minute clocks simultaneously? Especially if the transponder doesn't work.
Hypothetically, if the crew realized they had radio communications failure, squawked 7600 and then, 7 minutes later, changed to their flight planned altitude, wouldn't that be extremely dangerous if ATC didn't receive the transponder and didn't realize there was a radio problem?
Its ambiguous the other way as well. What altitude is ATC to think the plane is flying if they realize that there is communications failure but they don't know whether the crew knows this or not?

gen3

9th Oct 2006, 22:47

As reported on flightglobal's website... (http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles/2006/10/10/Navigation/185/209727/Was+Legacy+at+fault+in+737+crash.html) today.

vapilot2004

9th Oct 2006, 22:50

Military radar surveillance systems, whether ground-based or airborne can easily determine the altitude of a target without mode C data or with no transponder signal at all.

Typical is a 3D system where 2 antennas handle the azimuth and bearing detection individually. The bearing/distance antenna axis is horizontal and the azimuth antenna axis is vertical.

The newest digital 3D systems can detect a target's azimuth position by ramping the pulse frequencies and correlating small changes in the returning beam angle which can then be used to compute altitude. Only one antenna rotating in the horizontal plane is needed.

fepate

9th Oct 2006, 22:59

Military radar surveillance systems, whether ground-based or airborne can easily determine the altitude of a target without mode C data or with no transponder signal at all.
Typical is a 3D system where 2 antennas handle the azimuth and bearing detection individually. The bearing/distance antenna axis is horizontal and the azimuth antenna axis is vertical.
The newest digital 3D systems can detect a target's azimuth position by ramping the pulse frequencies and correlating small changes in the returning beam angle which can then be used to compute altitude. Only one antenna rotating in the horizontal plane is needed.Fine. But can you deduce pressure altitude to within 300 feet with such a system?

Carnage Matey!

10th Oct 2006, 00:31

Fine. But can you deduce pressure altitude to within 300 feet with such a system?

Probably not, what with it being an airborne radar system measuring relative altitude. But if you know the actual altitude of the airborne platform and the local pressure conditions based on recorded met data it doesn't take a genius to do some sums. Either way its fairly irrelevant as the 737s CVR will have recorded its altitude which was obviously the same as the Legacys.

Johnbr

10th Oct 2006, 01:53

Barit1:

I guess you've seen the maybes I've writen in that post...I really don't know,man...Few facts we have so far led me to those big maybes...I do think (speculating obviously)that someone screwd up big time here...MAYBE,just a BIG maybe,both the Legacy and ATC are in the chain of events that led to this catastrphic episode.That Legacy should not be at 370....BRS is a compulsory report point...There's level change indicated in the Jeppesen enroute chart,very clearly marked there...Thats right overhead Brasília center headquartes...no comm failure there...Transponder not working,then all of a sudden working again????Very odd to say the least...ATC MAYBE losing precious time trying to figure out what the hell was wrong with that Legacy,and not taking apropriate action...Again...WHO THE HELL KNOWS??? Let's wait and see...As I pointed out before:THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING,don't you think?:confused:

Johnbr

10th Oct 2006, 02:02

BTW,I'd like to apologise to everybody if my previous post(the one with the Oh Mightys) if It felt offensive...No intention ...I was just a bit upset with what I felt as a lack of respect for the 155 "Banana Republic" lives lost...Sorry again..:cool:

jondc9

10th Oct 2006, 10:36

first off, I don't think that Brazil was or could have ever been considered a Banana Republic...typically this term was used for more central american countries whose fates seemed controled by those who "DOLED" out decisions based on the price of bananas.

now, back to the crash...a US newspaper is saying that the flight plan was not prepared by the crew, but by Embraer...also that the captain had left the cockpit to use the bathroom and had just come back to the cockpit.

WITH THIS INFO, is it possible that the alleged altitude change was part of the flight plan but not fully understood by the pilots...indeed, reading this article indicates that the LEGACY crew had twice asked about the altitude assignment.

While Aviation is an international enterprise, it is obvious to me that there are many differences country to country.

I post the following from New York Newsday:

Long Island
LI pilots did not prepare Brazil flight plan
BY BILL BLEYER
Newsday Staff Writer

October 9, 2006, 7:49 PM EDT

The controversial flight plan for an American corporate jet that collided with an airliner over the Amazon jungle 11 days ago was prepared not by the two Long Island pilots but by the plane's Brazilian manufacturer, according to the pilots' statements to authorities.

Joseph Lepore, 42, of Bay Shore, and Jan Paladino, 34, of Westhampton Beach also insisted in their depositions that they had authorization from air traffic controllers in two locations to fly at 37,000 feet, the altitude at which the collision occurred.

Click here to find out more!
Those details, reported in the Brazilian press and confirmed by aviation sources in this country, could bolster the the contention of some aviation experts in the U.S. and Brazil that the pilots may not be the only ones at fault. They say a series of errors by various participants, including the pilots, led to the crash of Gol Airlines Flight 1907 and the loss of all 154 aboard.

Prominent among these experts is Milton Zuanazzi, director-president of ANAC, the national agency for civil aviation.

But many officials in Brazil continue to blame the pilots for the country's worst air disaster. They say it might have made sense for the Embraer, the Brazilian company that was familiar with the local airspace and that built the Legacy executive jet and had just turned it over to its new owner, ExcelAire of Ronkonkoma, to prepare the flight plan.

They insisted that it was still the pilots' responsibility to make sure it did not conflict with other air traffic.

José Carlos Pereira, president of Empresa Brasileira de InfraEstrutura Aeroportuária (Infraero), the agency that handles logistics and meteorology for air transport in Brazil, told The State of Sao Paulo newspaper that the "the pilot, the highest authority in a plane, knows very well when he is on the right way in a two-way aeroway."

Pereira said the traffic corridors north of Brasilia where the impact occurred are set up so that planes flying north, such as the Legacy, are routed at at even-numbered altitudes such 36,000 feet. Aircraft heading south, such the Gol Boeing, would be at odd-numbered altitudes.

"Every pilot knows that," Pereira said, so the Legacy should have descended to 36,000 feet hundreds of miles before the site of the impact.

Embraer spokesman Pedro Ferraz declined to comment on the flight plan. "The company is providing full support to the aeronautical authorities for the investigations," he said. "We do comment on any other rumor or report."

The Folha newspaper, of Sao Paolo, on Sunday printed more details from the depositions of the American pilot, whose plane was damaged but landed without injury to the seven aboard.

It said Lepore said he left the cockpit a few minutes before the impact to go the bathroom and then came back and saw Paladino trying to reach controllers without success. Then he heard a noise but felt no impact. The jet veered to the left and a passenger came to the cockpit to report damage to a wing.

Lepore also said that during the emergency landing at a military airfield, they tried to use an emergency radio frequency and couldn't make contact, so a freight plane relayed the information, the newspaper said.

Lepore also told investigators he had trained for 20 hours in a Legacy simulator and five hours flying a Legacy before the flight, the Folha story said.Lepore said he never saw the Gol Boeing jet and that his vision was impaired by the position of the sun. He said there was no alert from the anti-collision system, the paper said.

Paladino said the jet's location transponder seemed to be working properly before and after the impact, the newspaper said.

While the investigation continues, the pilots, who were ordered by a judge to surrender their passports, have remained secluded after being joined by their wives in a suite on a secure floor at the five-star Marriot hotel in Rio de Janeiro's Copacabana Beach section. They are being shielded from the media and the public by security personnel organized by the U.S. general consulate and have not left their rooms, the local media reported.

Also Monday, a Brazilian Air Force officer told Newsday that the military has increased the number of personnel working to recover the bodies of the airliner passengers at the urging of an organization of victims' families. But that the crash site's remote location, dense vegetation and high temperatures has slowed progress, said Lt. Col. Fagundes.

The officer, said 85 recovery workers had been sent into the dense forest to look for bodies. He said eight Air Force helicopters and an Army helicopter were assisting in the search and recovery effort. "The difficulty is the access to the area because the jungle is so tight and the temperature is so high," Fagundes said.

Staff writer Martin C. Evans contributed to this story

Subscribe to Newsday home delivery | Article licensing and reprint options

MTOW

10th Oct 2006, 12:16

Trying to get away from the name calling and blame game for a moment: has it occurred to anyone else that if offset tracking was MANDATORY for all aircraft (or even better, as some have suggested earlier, inbuilt into our FMSs), this thread would be be about a half page long and titled something like "Close call in Brazil?"

And 154 people would still be alive.

As someone else has already said, I can't understand the ongoing resistance to this idea.

forget

10th Oct 2006, 12:41

piombo

10th Oct 2006, 13:12

Why automatic off-sets, above a certain altitude, are not built into FMS is a complete mystery to me; and an industry disgrace. The people who designed these things must surely have known how accurate they would be in service – together with altimeters to the nearest inch. Surely they had the combined wit to consider this. In fact, why didn’t the airlines query the likelihood of a combined bull’s eye at 35,000 feet?
And what about the certification people? Didn’t anyone ever ask ‘What happens if........?’ Astonishing!
Anyone care to reveal if their own airline insists on offsets in the cruise?

Sorry, but I think Offset in radar coverage is no sense, never heard of it Think if everybody fly offset in the New York area!
This is done in remote, non radar, non controlled areas and in the RVSM if you are following another aircraft, same direction with altitudes different 1000 feet, to avoid wake turbulence.

BOAC

10th Oct 2006, 13:22

Profit Max

10th Oct 2006, 13:26

Sorry, but I think Offset in radar coverage is no sense, never heard of it Think if everybody fly offset in the New York area!Why would this be a problem? An offset of slightly more than half the wingspan of the airplane + GPS uncertainty would be enough. If you want to introduce this unilaterally, go for the wingspan of the A380. So we are talking about an offset of less than 300 feet. This shouldn't be a problem even over New York.

Profit Max.

Bertie Bonkers

10th Oct 2006, 13:49

Ranger One

10th Oct 2006, 14:05

This was touched on indirectly up the thread, but going back to the original incident - one thing is confusing me. Joe Sharkey described the moment of collision thus:

"Without warning, I felt a terrific jolt and heard a loud bang, followed by an eerie silence, save for the hum of the engines."

No mention of any pressure wave or turbulence from the larger aircraft, which I would have expected to severely affect the Legacy's handling immediately following the contact given the apparent angle of collision (head-on).

I think you show a lack of appreciation for the sheer speed/timescale issues involved in such an incident - it would have happened and been 1/4 mile astern in the time it takes you to say BANG! The physical impact would be indistinguisable from the shock wave. If you're a pilot you'll know there can be a few bumps from wake turbulence if you're following another aircraft in cruise - but not very noticeable if you've just experienced a mid-air, and depending on the jetstream they might not have got much at all...

There might also be a little journalistic licence going on here.

R1

clicker

10th Oct 2006, 14:05

Given the speeds aircraft travel at I would have thought that the pressure wave or turbulence would have all been part of the "jolt" he reported.

ORAC

10th Oct 2006, 14:21

Typical is a 3D system where 2 antennas handle the azimuth and bearing detection individually. The bearing/distance antenna axis is horizontal and the azimuth antenna axis is vertical. The newest digital 3D systems can detect a target's azimuth position by ramping the pulse frequencies and correlating small changes in the returning beam angle which can then be used to compute altitude. Only one antenna rotating in the horizontal plane is needed.

Well, if you count 30 years as new, perhaps.

3D planar array radars work by generating multiple height stacked beams; older types would use 4-10 transmitters and be relatively inaccurate, later modules use hundreds of Tx modules in the actual array, but the basic principle is the same.

An aircraft is painted by only some beams, using trigonometry the height is calculated for each beam and averaged. Radar beams bend up or down, hence anaprop; an aircraft can also fail to paint in a higher or lower beam, pushing the average up or down. Suffice it to say that the average accuracy is about +/- 5000ft. When 2 aircraft are in close proximity, obviously the comparative height is much more accurate, perhaps 1-2000ft, but for safety a minimum of 5000ft should be used for separation, and the blips should never be allowed to merge.

FlyVMO

10th Oct 2006, 14:33

Have they found that "missing component" from the 737 CVR yet?

Astra driver

10th Oct 2006, 16:53

ATC Watcher

10th Oct 2006, 18:15

"I wouldn't take any chances guessing what altitude you might maintain, I would just get everybody out of your way"

That is the correct answer and what we train our controllers here to do in this case.
Today, ( i.e since 2001) with simultaneous loss of comm and mode C , you can asume the worst.
Remember , if you find yourself in that situation, and for those of you that have ACARS or SATCOM to use it to contact ATC either direct or via your OPS.

piombo

10th Oct 2006, 18:50

Well, I'd vote for 'automatic' offsets - the 737 has a 'default' 0.1NM right offset available at all times with a couple of button presses. I cannot see how that could adversly affect any traffic anywhere, as it is only 600ft, but it is enough.

The problem is, piombo, these aircraft WERE in 'radar coverage' and would almost certainly have missed each other with a 0.1R.

But this is not an air traffic regulation. Offsets can be inserted at any time right or left in any FMC, but if you are talking of default offset, the one always present. what if your GPS or FMC or IRS or INS have an error of 0.1 to the other side? It seems to me that there is always a small error present in all of these modern navigation systems and that is why there are no "precision approaches" based on airborne navigation sys. And this apply to the one just bellow your post.:suspect:

jondc9

10th Oct 2006, 18:55

offsets...good idea

one way air ways is even better...easier to avoid a collision on an overtake than a head on.

its all resources.

forget

10th Oct 2006, 20:24

Fact. If either aircraft had flown a parallel offset then they would not have collided. As BOAC says, ‘the 737 has a 'default' 0.1NM right offset available at all times with a couple of button presses’.

This raises, to me, a very interesting question. Why did the designers of every Long Range Nav, from Delco/Litton INS to all current equipment, include the ability to fly offset with ‘a couple of button presses’.

This is a genuine question to which I’d appreciate knowledgeable answers.

I can only think that this feature was included to help prevent two 500 Knot radomes meeting up. Am I wrong? Was there another reason?

If I’m right, then surely the designers/manufacturers/authorities had an obligation to insist on this being automatic on later equipment.

Am I missing something?

Bertie Bonkers

10th Oct 2006, 21:48

there can be a few bumps from wake turbulence if you're following another aircraft in cruise - but not very noticeable if you've just experienced a mid-air
R1

Thankfully something of which I cannot claim any experience.

barit1

10th Oct 2006, 22:11

Given the fact that terrestrial traffic has used an offset for the better part of a century, one cannot help but wonder why aeronautical practice has not caught on to this safety feature. :hmm:

barit1
Accustomed to a starboard offset, but able to switch to port

broadreach

10th Oct 2006, 22:48

Forget,

"If I’m right, then surely the designers/manufacturers/authorities had an obligation to insist on this being automatic on later equipment."

Would that not simply be a case of manufacturers designing in a function which was expected to become a requirement at a later date. Or that was generally requested by users?

broadreach

10th Oct 2006, 23:14

FlyVMO,

The latest news (http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/2006/10/10/286044858.asp) has it that the "component" has not yet been found. Not sure whether it's from the CVR or FDR but the major in charge of the search describes it as a small (about the size of a 600ml bottle) orange cylinder.

The search area, as I'm sure you've seen from photos, is dense forest, quite dark on the floor, pretty exhausting to try to move through. Very much a needle in the haystack search.

Of the 154 on board, 9 bodies had not been found as at today.

fepate

10th Oct 2006, 23:37

This brings up an interesting question; what if we had also experienced a loss of communications as well as a loss of mode C capability? Lost comm procedures dictate maintaining altitude as per clearance or flight plan to the FAF at the destination, but loss of RVSM capablity dicatates exiting RVSM airspace and changing altitude.Actually, to monkey things up further, step #1 in lost comm procedures is that if you're in VMC then you maintain VFR and land.

FlyVMO

11th Oct 2006, 00:24

broadreach-
Thanks for the update. I realize the odds may be against finding such a small object on a scene like this, lets hope they do though. Every bit of insight into this is worth so much.

Glad to see tempers seem to have cooled a bit in here.

Flyvmo

G4G5

11th Oct 2006, 03:04

Ive known one of the pilots for six years and trained with him at two different airlines, and I know that he was trying to communicate with anyone on many differnet freqs, including Guard.

Just curious how this is possible, the captain has been with Excelair for quite sometime. The FO was hired by AA as an MD80 FO in early 2000. Then in Mar of 2004 he went onto AA Eagle as a Captain.

Were you a captain at American and an FO at Eagle? That would make in 28 when he was hired at AA, and you worked with him at 2 airlines prior to that?

Not trying to be sarcastic, it's just that the math doesn't work. He's been with AA for the past 6 years.

bubbers44

11th Oct 2006, 03:40

.1 R seems like a logical method to avoid head on conflicts. I always thought messing with the primary nav was dangerous because of possibility of error. I think a simple mode to offset would be beneficial. Forgetting a decimal point or an error could cause more conflict. Maybe having an enroute mode would make it simple and automatic so no possible operator errors would be a problem.

bubbers44

11th Oct 2006, 04:56

The FO probably worked at other airlines before AA. Hope he comes home soon. Happy I don't fly any more. He doesn't deserve this. He was probably doing everything in his power to reestablish com with Brazil and couldn't. Their ATC failed and that is where the blame should lie.

Wino

11th Oct 2006, 05:16

G4G5
Yes, the FO worked at other airlines before he was hired at AA.

Cheers
Wino

bubbers44

11th Oct 2006, 05:33

fepate

Where would you land VFR in the middle of a country that has little civilization? I have been there. I am very happy I didn't have to diivert.

jondc9

11th Oct 2006, 05:38

so, now that the thread is repeating itself:

what was the wx at the time of communiations failure?(to remain VMC and land) had the legacy crew been warned to expect an area of no vhf com? (notam, chart marking, previous com?)

If brazil uses airborne radar, and radio waves being line of sight at radar and radio freqs being used, how come LEGACy could be seen on skin paint radar but not heard by airborne radar plane? Don't they monitor 121.5 (G)

if the f/o on legacy was trying to contact anyone and failing, how come the captain left the flight deck?

does the CVR show that the f/o was trying to contact anyone including another plane for relay? did he try to "listen" on a vor while transmitting on another freq? (note, it appears that brazilia VOR does not have voice capability, chart I am using, downloaded, is hard to read, but underline on freq = no voice)

does the Legacy in question have a sat phone?

why didn't the legacy try squawking 7600?

quite a few inconsistencies? you be the judge.

and if f/o was hired by american airlines in 2000 and says he has been with them for 6 years, he is counting his furlough time, no big deal there, especially as he was bounced into Eagle.

jon

fepate

11th Oct 2006, 07:06

fepate
Where would you land VFR in the middle of a country that has little civilization? I have been there. I am very happy I didn't have to diivert.First of all, I was responding to someone's hypothetical scenario over the USA. But, since you brought it up, wasn't it reported that the Legacy pilots spotted the air force base at which they landed visually? Whether or not that's true it doesn't matter. VFR is just a set of rules to help you see and avoid IFR traffic, it says nothing about how you navigate to your intended point of landing.

Scurvy.D.Dog

11th Oct 2006, 07:28

bubbers44He was probably doing everything in his power to reestablish com with Brazil and couldn't. .. quite possibly .. do we know that yet though?? …. And if so, isn’t that a comm./radio fail condition?? … which invokes what requirements on the crew?? Their ATC failed and that is where the blame should lie. … care to explain why only ATC might be to blame :hmm: ??!
.
Tis all very easy in hindsight ... eh … !! :rolleyes:

vapilot2004

11th Oct 2006, 07:30

The FO was hired by AA as an MD80 FO in early 2000. Then in Mar of 2004 he went onto AA Eagle as a Captain.
.........................it's just that the math doesn't work. He's been with AA for the past 6 years.

Why did I hear (from a former co-worker of his) that the guy was typed in the A300 and flew them for AA ?

Nice to see some reason starting to settle in. Brazil is not such an unsophisticated place as some of us are discovering. While here in the states we are beholden to the Middle East and elsewhere for 60% of our oil needs, just this year Brazil became energy independant thanks to a decades old commitment to ethanol. :ok:

Kleer4tkof

11th Oct 2006, 12:59

Does anyone know why Embraer did not supply qualified and experienced crew to transport this aircraft to New York?
Please advise.
Thank you.:bored:

Bamse01

11th Oct 2006, 17:38

bubbers44 .. quite possibly .. do we know that yet though?? …. And if so, isn’t that a comm./radio fail condition?? … which invokes what requirements on the crew?? … care to explain why only ATC might be to blame :hmm: ??!
.
Tis all very easy in hindsight ... eh … !! :rolleyes:
If you lose contact with ATC over Brasil, I would be more inclined to
believe equipment/range problems on the ground than aircraft equipment.
I certainly wouldn't descend VFR looking to land rather then waiting
to be in range of the next center controller or trying to relay through
other flights.

threemiles

11th Oct 2006, 17:46

I certainly wouldn't descend VFR looking to land rather then waiting
to be in range of the next center controller or trying to relay through
other flights.

...and after seven successful minutes of trying get out of my flight level where I might expect opposite same level traffic, is that what you mean?

Bamse01

11th Oct 2006, 18:44

...and after seven successful minutes of trying get out of my flight level where I might expect opposite same level traffic, is that what you mean?

Offset 1/2 mile off track might help.

S. Dumont

11th Oct 2006, 19:31

Finally someone has stated something that is correct. The Legacy crew did exactly as they should have. Ive known one of the pilots for six years and trained with him at two different airlines, and I know that he was trying to communicate with anyone on many differnet freqs, including Guard. The CVR has this on tape, and no, there was not seven attempts on the CVR from Cindacta-1 (Brasilia), that is innacurate. Both of us are type rated on the Legacy, and the NORDO procedure is to STAY at your last assigned altitude...370...and squawk 7600. The Legacy has a rotary transponder and the AD applies to this transponder unfortunately. If they changed the squawk to 7600, and it does sometimes take at least 5 secs to get there, esp if its a bumpy ride, that would explain 'turning off the xpndr'. Nonetheless, it doesnt seem that Brazil even KNOWS their procedures, much less follows any. Consider this, IF they thought the xpndr was 'turned off', then the Legacy no longer qualifies as an RVSM, and now needs 2,000 alt separation, so why did Cindacta-1 even try to clear them to FL360? By their own admission, the Legacy was a non RVSM aircraft so that is NOT legal separation criteria. FL360 doesnt even make sense as the 737 would need to go through FL360 en route to Brasilia where they were landing and they would have AGAIN been nose to nose, coaltitude at some point. The only logical altitude to clear the Legacy would be FL390, so their own response indicates their incompetence. One phone call to Cindacta-4 (Amazonica) would have avoided all of this in reality. Why was the 737 even cleared to FL370 when the Legacy was already there on an overlapping airway (UZ6) before the 737 took off? So much easier to blame US citizens than your own banana republic military buffoons. This situation will happen AGAIN if they dont learn procedures and buy some new equipment. Hopefully those guys will be home and exonerated soon.

Hookie Nation,

I'm a pilot from Brazil, but I lived in the US for quite a while. Unfortunately your post shows exactly the attitude that makes people don't like Americans. When my countrymates said bad things about the US, I tell them not to generalize just because of a "few bad apples".

I would expect a little bit more respect from you in regard to the "Banana Republic" or the military involved in the situation. You claimed to very updated with the actual facts of the event. So if you don't mind, I would like to draw a few notes.

1. The American pilots are in no way arrested. They are staying with their wives in a 5-Star JW Marriott hotel in front of Copacabana beach. They have the freedom to go wherever they want and do whatever they feel like as long as they remain in the country. I'm sure they would rather be home, but this becomes necessary when there is a CHANCE (again, a chance, not a fact) of negligence in their action. I would expect the same if this (God forbid) happened in the US. I'm just not sure if the pilots would be in a decent conditions like the Americans are.

2. DCT PCL UW2 BRS/N0450F360 UZ6 TERES/N0449F380 UZ6 MAN DCT. That is what their FPL (http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/foto/0,,6245521,00.jpg) says on route. The MAC point is close to 400NM from BRS. Let's speculate (again, speculate) that the aircraft Legacy (and not "the Americans" per se as a lot of people refer, since they are being held regardless of being US citizens or citizens from Ghana or even Brazil) after passing BRS were instructed to descent to FL360. So according to your claim, they were not instructed to descent to FL360 over BRS, right? OK. Moving on.
After TERES, and before the MAC location, they were supposed to climb to FL380.
Let me quote our friend "PPRuNe Radar" on the ICAO (and not FAA, since they are only valid for the US of A) instructions.
>
b) in airspace where radar is used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude if higher, for a period of 7 minutes following:
1) the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached; or
2) the time the transponder is set to Code 7600; or
3) the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point;
whichever is later, and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
<
Even in my speculations, I find it hard to put it together what the aircraft was doing on FL370 if 400NM before they were supposed to have descended to FL360. Let's then suppose that they were out of communications in BRS and have not received that instructions to descent to FL360. Then 7 minutes later, they would proceed as on the FPL, which instructed them to descent to FL360 and then later on to 380. I find a little hard for the aircraft to have gone 400nm in 7 minutes. Please correct me I'm wrong. I don't claim a COMM failure is impossible. And I'm not claiming that ATC did try contact, unlike you are stating. What I am questioning is my normal sense, what was the ACFT doing on FL370. Perhaps I'm just missing something in here. Enlighten me.

3. The XPDR was not on the batch directed by the AD. It has been stated by several sources that the transponder fitted on N600XL was not in the batch directed by the AD, or in other words, it was suposedly (again.. suposedly. avionics malfunction can happen regardless of ADs) working ok. In any way, right after the collision the transponder went on, surprisingly. After landing, it was concluded that both XPDR and TCAS were working ok. My sources (indeed I have sources) indicate (indicate is different than state) that the Legacy XPDR turned C mode off 15 minutes before the collision.

4. CVRs and FDRs don't lie. Both the Legacy's CVR & FDR and the 738 FDR are in Canada for evaluation. If indeed the Legacy pilots did not do anything wrong, then there is no need to worry. In Brazil we have a saying that poorly translated says: "If you don't owe anything to anyone, there is no reason to worry". If the pilots are so aware that they did everythign right, then just rest assured that nothing is going to happen to them because they have the FDR and CVRs on their side. Just enjoy Copacabana beach. Brazil is a democratic country and nobody is going to arrest those pilots if the FDR/CVRs show that they were not wrong. If it is perhaps concluded that it was ATC error, than that is going to come up. CVR/FDRs and ATC recordings don't lie.

5. UZ6 outbound from Brasilia is westbound. According to basic ICAO rules, the proper flight level for the Legacy would be either 360 or 380, as it was stated on the FPL. If ATC indeed cleared them to FL370 on UZ6, then it will come up and appropriate measures will be taken to the responsible person.

6. I have a flight safety and accident investigation course made by CENIPA, the military flight safety and investigation institute. In the course ethics code it clearly state that their role is not to determine blame, but to point contributing factors to the accident so it does not happen again. The so-called "Banana Republic military buffons" are the ones that are doing everything possible not to blame anyone, at least until more details are official. If you are able to find any active duty military involved in the accident investigation blaming the US pilot, please let me know. If the press is blaming X or Y, I trust your judgment to filter what information if to be used and what is not.

7. I do agree that this could've been avoidable by a simple ATC alert to the 738 to offset or to change FL. But as you might now, an accident is a chain of events. Unfortunetly.

I understand one of the involved pilots was your friend and that emotions play a role in this situation. But please think twice before making such comments because you might offend a lot of people. Instead blaming, thank God that your friend is alive. And pray for the 154 souls that perished that day for God knows why.

I'll be glad to move this discussion forward, with a healthy and educated tone.

Fly safe and have a good day.