Mid-air collision over Brasil [Archive] - Page 3

Scurvy.D.Dog

12th Oct 2006, 14:24

threemilesS. Dumont, excellent post, but here's were it hangs:My sources (indeed I have sources) indicate (indicate is different than state) that the Legacy XPDR turned C mode off 15 minutes before the collision.
If that is true: until 100 NM before the collision, i.e. 300 NM or 45 minutes after BRS and the planned level change ATC would have seen Legacy 600XL still being at FL370 without taking any protective action. And: knowing opposite same level traffic coming in from Manaus. …. Most interesting posts!
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The odd shaped piece in this jigsaw may well be summarised in this one musing (assuming it is even remotely accurate) XPDR turned C mode off … a mode change rather than a TXPDR U/S is a very different scenario … perhaps one of our technical experts can advise us if the Honeywell TXPDR in question could fail C only, and what would that system then do i.e. shut it all down or just the alt; and would TCAS continue to function in the Embraer??? … obviously without Mode C the B738 might only get a TA … anyone?? ….. it might explain why the B738 was ‘apparently’ banking …. Crew may have been looking as a result of a TA …. only to realise too late that there was indeed traffic closing at 900+kts at the same level  .. remembering TCAS rules .. on track and vertical resolution!!
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….. what Embraer Flight deck indications would result from Mode C fail??…. 15 minutes before the collision Squarking Mode C and FL370 in Radar airspace until 100 NM before the collision … hmmm
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.. didn’t someone earlier suggest the B738 was FL350 climbing FL390
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.. from what I have seen of the H4 chart and the supposed information on MAC position, and the timings of loss of TXPDR (mode C apparently) … I am lead to ponder what ATC instructions were likely to have occurred, read backs that would likely have been required and perhaps received, and how they (time) correlate to the loss of Mode C??
… from the information (accurate or not) posted here I would think (logically based on normal ATC distance buffers for achieving vert in radar airspace) they could be almost coincidental …..very very interesting!!
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…. to me the only thing that would make this thing ‘inexplicable’ is if ATC had some reason to believe N600XL was at FL360 and the Mode C on the climbing B738 had reached FL370 .. all well prior (distance) to conflict proximity in radar airspace nose to nose yet only a short period of time before passing due closing speed!!
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.. radio fail procedures may be academic in this case, and of little significance to ATC reasoning and/or decision making!!
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.. the other issue that may be relevant is the ATC boundary proximity! Brasilia may have coordinated FL360 based on the intended level of N600XL at the boundary, Manaus may have coordinated FL390 for the B738 based on expected time to climb prior to the boundary ....
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.. from memory (do not have the H4 with me) the distance from the Brasilia VOR to the ATC boundary was around 157nm, then another 125nm to abeam the military base that N600XL landed at! ... I might be wrong, but given the NW'ly track of N600XL, the MAC would have occured somewhere within 120nm NW of the boundary waypoint NABOL (between the mil base and the ATC boundary) .. which if the '15min prior' is correct, mode C loss occured just prior to NABOL .. stand to be corrected though
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.. neither sector may have had initial 'trigger' prompts to consider all was not as it should be ... it depends largely where the mode C loss occured in relation to the boundary .. if you follow my reasoning ..... and by saying that I am not for one moment suggesting that an ATC error occured .....if you get my drift!!
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Here is where it hangs indeed! ….. the plot thickens or thins as the case may be!! :ooh:
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Tis late, so I hope you all can see what I am getting at!! :\

PPRuNe Radar

12th Oct 2006, 14:26

Try that on an Oceanic Clearance (ICAO) - you are cleared as filed with an altitiude change right on your Flight Plan - you never - never - never - change altitude (lets hear from the NAT track folks) without further cleraance from ATC - (unless you loose comm - wherein you stay at the highest altitude) - so what is different about Brazil?

Oceanic airspace is a different ballgame. Your clearance is valid (and conflict free) from entry point to land fall, therefore there is no need to change levels within that airspace if you lose comms. The published procedure (and expectation) is you maintain the assigned clearance until landfall. Once there, you enter 'domestic' airspace and the 'national' rules (usually, but not always, ICAO based) then apply.

The main reasons for the difference are that communications difficulties are potentially part and parcel of oceanic operations, not just for an individual flight but also for all others around it, and that there is a long time period for any reaction to a comms loss to be dealt with. So it makes more sense for everyone to stay where they are at separated levels until they reach the other side as ATC may not be able to get in contact with affected traffic to move them out of the way, and the domestic agency will be primed and ready to deal with it in good time.

Domestic airspace operations are much more dynamic and the cleared area ahead of the aircraft is much smaller and has less predictability. Indeed, depending on the data transfer rules between centres, ATC may only get around 10 minutes warning of an aircraft entering it's airspace in the first place. The higher degree of interraction and flight profile changes and opportunites, better surveillance, and more immediate communcations channels makes it much easier for a NORDO aircraft adjusting to a known flight planned profile to be dealt with in this environment.

Horses for courses.

satpak77

12th Oct 2006, 15:06

my basic question is why TCAS did not warn anybody. Of course, we officially per the investigation do not know that yet, but if it is indeed the case, what caused it to malfunction?

Del Prado

12th Oct 2006, 15:57

Satpak, the mode C on the Legacy wasn't being transmited. If you read the thread or even the last 3 posts you could find that out.

S. Dumont

12th Oct 2006, 16:25

I've been discussing with other people around here and as I have listened to a different version of the story, regardless if it is right or not, I thought I should point it out, even though it contradicts my previous post a little.

This version basically claims that:

- Legacy was cleared to remain on FL370 after BRS until TERES (where on their FPL they should've climbed to FL380)
- There was a comm failure near TERES, but the Legacy proceeded according to FAA Lost Comm procedures, remained on the last cleared FL (instead of following ICAO procedures of following FPL levels).
- As the Legacy set the XPDR to 7600, the XPDR went unnoticed to STBY (aparently it wasn't fixed by the AD (http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/1BDDC176AC629452862571E70059100D?OpenDocument)).
- There was a Lost Comm freq given by Brasilia, but that frequency was aparently copied wrong.
- After the MAC, Legacy pilots realized XPDR was on STBY and turned it on 7700.

This is by no means an official version. It's just a different version that I heard.

- Suposedly Contributing factors

- ALTN Comm freq being copied wrong;
- XPDR going to STBY after 7600 was set
- FAA Lost Comm procedure being executed instead of ICAO Standard (the later directs the lost comm aircraft to follow the FPL)

:uhoh:

fox niner

12th Oct 2006, 16:36

All right, so the transponder wasn't transponding. That is very, very unfortunate. Apparently the model/make of the transponder on board the legacy has a design flaw. And by that I do NOT mean the fact that it breaks down, as one can expect that all mechanical things go bust.
For some reason the bloody gadget can malfunction, and also not give some kind of warning that it is broken!!

If this is true, the manufacturer of this particular transponder must be feeling a bit uneasy by now, right?

What model/make of transponder is installed in the Legacy?

Profit Max

12th Oct 2006, 16:38

What model/make of transponder is installed in the Legacy?If you had read this thread you would know the answer (Honeywell).

Profit Max.

Scurvy.D.Dog

12th Oct 2006, 16:51

.. it is probably worth noting at this point that non-standard levels are often used, particularly in radar airspace! ... this is not an unusual procedure!
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.... the 'filed' levels must be standard for no-radio contingencies!

ATC Watcher

12th Oct 2006, 18:18

Now we are getting close to a a pausible ATC scenario.

Santos Dumont : By "lost comm " you mean LAST frequency, it makes more sense . The vast majority of comm failures toiday ( if not all ) are ears or finger trouble on a frequency change .
What is missing is the coordination level on the 738 with Brasilia. If the estimate (or the auto ACT if they have one ) was a stable level but the a/c was still climbing instead then you have it.

As I said earlier , if indeed it is true that the Legacy Xponder went on SBY on its own AGAIN and on a new set, then Honeywell and many E145 operators are going to be in sh.... very soon.

ICAO versus FAA rules , the problem is old and has no solution. There are so many FAA procedures completely at odds with ICAO that it was only a matter of time before they kill someone.

Another chain of unprobable events and Murphy's law active again.

duwde

12th Oct 2006, 18:55

I'm Brazilian and the only thing I pilot is Flight Simulator 2004, I've found this forum days ago as I was looking for more precise "rumors" than what we found in general media. If I may add my 1 cent contribution...

Looking to this whole accident in a objective viewpoint I couldn't care less wheter the american pilots did or didn't something wrong, what I really care is that 154 Brazilian lives where taken off because ATC didn't advise the 737-800 about the legacy being acting "strange" (to say the least)

I personally believe that the american pilots did something wrong (confusion between ICAO/FAA rules, shutting down transponder, acrobatics, negligence, it doesn't matter), but ATC must have contacted the 737-800 and told about it, or am I missing something here ?

Our "banana republic" (as someone said) cannot accept 154 deaths, and we must blame ATC too, why ? Because their lives were in the hands of the skilled pilots on the 737 (that didn't do anything wrong), and the ATC. They weren't in the hands of those american pilots.

And please, I'm not trying to save those american pilots, what I'm saying is that even if they are really wrong (what I personally believe they are), isn't ATC duty to alert other aircrafts about crazy pilots ? or even try to shut them down ?

Even if they are guilt, that won't take back those 154 deaths... What I'd like to have seen on the news was the legacy shut down for no obeying orders from ATC, not the 737 from Gol airlines.

Rippa

12th Oct 2006, 19:54

Well, since you say so, I guess we can tell those investigating the accident we won't be requiring their services any longer! You've got it all figured out based on???k

Westhawk,

Calm down my friend...no need to get hostile…we are all grown ups here, so lets act like one. Well, happens that this is a RUMUROUS forum, and as suggested, we are all SPECULATING. But one thing is for sure: someone was on the wrong FL, don’t you agree? We all know that an accident is a chain of events, bla, bla, bla...What I meant on my previous post is that ONE of that events was that the legacy didn’t comply with the ICAO standard rules, I am not blaming anyone alone, or specifically...In fact, I was replying to the previous post that said "don't think these pilots did anything out of the ordinary"...Saying that it is normal to lose comm and do nothing about that is absurdly wrong...Sure the ATC has a part on this terrible accident, I have never suggested otherwise. Agree with you in one point: lets wait and see the final report.

threemiles

12th Oct 2006, 21:05

.. from memory (do not have the H4 with me) the distance from the Brasilia VOR to the ATC boundary was around 157nm, then another 125nm to abeam the military base that N600XL landed at! ... I might be wrong, but given the NW'ly track of N600XL, the MAC would have occured somewhere within 120nm NW of the boundary waypoint NABOL (between the mil base and the ATC boundary) .. which if the '15min prior' is correct, mode C loss occured just prior to NABOL .. stand to be corrected though[/COLOR]

Distances:

BRS - 282 - TERES - 157 - NABOL (UIR BDRY) -18 - ISTAR - 107 - TAROP

TAROP is abm Cachimbo where 600XL landed.
Total distance BRS-TAROP: 564 NM, MAC in the vicinity

Assuming the flight plan is true

DCT PCL UW2 BRS/N0450F360 UZ6 TERES/N0449F380 UZ6 MAN

There was a level change expected at TERES to FL380. Contrary what was assumed until now 600XL should have been in FL380 (not 360) after TERES in case of loss of comm.

The new note from above that SBBR ATC allowed 600XL to stay at 370 is common practice in order to avoid a descent before climbing again.

However in all fairness: a loss of comm in sparsely populated airspace would
a) be hardly realized by a pilot who is not familiar with the average sector loads in this airspace
b) not be realized by ATC at all before a compulsary waypoint is missed, if ever this report was expected ("position reports not required when in radar contact" is usual procedure)

A usual point in time where ATC would realize a comm loss would be a frequency transfer at a sector boundary - or - when calling a flight because of a loss of radar contact.

A hypothetical but possible scenario would be:
- Pilots realizing loss of comm over TERES as position report is not acknowledged
- Pilots switching to 7600 and xpdr goes stby
- ATC watching target disappearing and calling flight, realizing loss of comm

Certainly still no reason for ATC not to get GOL1907 out of the path immediately after loss of comm was realized.

aardvark2zz

12th Oct 2006, 22:15

Here is a map of the route from Manaus to Brasilia.

XINGU (not visible here due to scale) is in the exact center of the map.

You can see course numbers over various legs.

http://www.airdisaster.com/user-uploads/000zImage1.gif

Scurvy.D.Dog

13th Oct 2006, 00:31

threemiles... thanks ... omitted the BRS - 282 - TERES, and yes, I think frequency transfer/boundary position might be relevant DCT PCL UW2 BRS/N0450F360 UZ6 TERES/N0449F380 UZ6 MAN .. I wonder how a 'mid-route' change of FPL LVL is recorded on flight progress strips in Brazil ... might be relevant if the operators were not readily aware of the FPL change at TERES, particularly in radar airspace!
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.. do they use electronic systems like Oz or paper strips?? :(
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duwdeLooking to this whole accident in a objective viewpoint I couldn't care less wheter the american pilots did or didn't something wrong, what I really care is that 154 Brazilian lives where taken off because ATC didn't advise the 737-800 about the legacy being acting "strange" (to say the least) .. with respect that is the key! unless ATC had cause to believe N600XL was not conforming to normal operations/procedures (for whatever reason) i.e. some sort of track divergence or excursion in altitude (neither has been indicated or confirmed), . despite the huge discussion here, it is still not clear if there was any 'unusual' activity on the part of anyone .... in fact I would be suprised if there was!!
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.... NO RADIO/mode C would not in itself be a reason to take another aircraft off track!
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.. as I indicated earlier, part of that ATC decision making may have been workload or other factors of which we know little (if you vector an aircraft there is more to watch/do particualrly near an ATC boundary)!
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I am a little suprised that you would be prepared to blame your country's ATC's with little knowledge or understanding, of what really happened .... neither do we mind you, but we do this for a living so have some idea of the sorts of things that may have been at play!
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.. regarding the GOL crew, It seems reasonably clear they are not at fault ... if your media is saying differently, I would like to know why!
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Cheers!

broadreach

13th Oct 2006, 01:43

Update from O Globo

http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/2006/10/12/286082347.asp

The first link in the article opens a photo gallery of the crash area. Which should give people a better idea of the difficulties involved in tracking the wreckage pattern. All but four or five bodies have been recovered and most identified. The missing CVR part hasn't. Portable hydraulic and inflatable jacks lent by Varig are being used to lift/shift large wreckage in search of both.

A comment, presumably recorded by Globo in an unguarded moment; the commentator was Secretary General of ICAO from 1997 to 2003, Brigadier Renato Claudio Costa Pereira. (free translation from another article (http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/2006/10/12/286076178.asp):

"What's the use of seven attempts to contact the Legacy? If you can't get through to the aircraft, contact others in the area and get everyone out of their way. That's the way it was done before, without radar..."

I think you can assume he means before the Brazilian Amazon had radar coverage via Sivam.

As comments like these and others filter in and hard knowlege from the more informed local sources spreads, one can feel the initial anger at the Legacy crew diminishing in the press and in aviation websites. The government, via the Minister of Defense, have said "we have no reason to hold the crew during the course of the investigation but neither can we countermand a court order". The court order to ensure the crew stay in Brazil having been issued by a judge in the state of Mato Grosso. You might compare that to a judge in Iowa impounding a foreign crews' passports during the first stages of a similar investigation into a midair over the cornfields.

My reading re the Legacy crew situation is that they should be home within the week or fortnight, on call for further depositions but unlikely to have to return to Brazil for same.

bubbers44

13th Oct 2006, 01:59

When we hear the ATC tapes we should know how this happened. Why haven't them been released?

Ex Cargo Clown

13th Oct 2006, 02:29

Why didn't Radar especially with aircraft airbourne, try and contact on 121.5 ??

broadreach

13th Oct 2006, 02:33

Bubbers, would ATC tapes be publicised anywhere in advance of the final report?

jondc9

13th Oct 2006, 14:41

does anyone actually have a copy of the clearance that the legacy originally acknowledged?

and

why would the captain leave the flight deck with a loss of communication?

and even if the frequency for "lost com" was copied down wrong, wouldn't the chart have some frequencies listed to try?

agusaleale

13th Oct 2006, 19:33

I am really disturbed just know. I´ve read posts and posts, from ATC, pilots, etc, etc, and nobody agrees with what are the applying rules in Brazilian airspace.

I think I will no longer fly through that airspace in my trips to Argentina, as the pilots do not know what they are supossed to do in such a situation...

Please!, someone be so kind to inform us, common mortals, of the real situation of the rules, as I´m really afraid just now, that everybody out there just rebate each other´s opinion.

THAT´S THE REAL POINT !!!

caos

14th Oct 2006, 00:58

http://www.skyguide.ch/en/Dossiers/Dossier_Safety/Downloadables_dossier_safety/safety_bulletin_11_sept05_internet.pdf

http://www.ifatca.org/safetyalert/CRD.pdf

GlueBall

14th Oct 2006, 05:32

Austrian Simon

14th Oct 2006, 06:09

Irrespective of filed flight plan en route altitude changes, ....Without ATC clearance a pilot is not at liberty to change Flight Level; it is not authorized, unless there is a necessity to clear high terrain. In case of lost communications, the pilot must maintain last assigned Flight Level. Under the circumstances of this collision, ATC was responsible to have contacted the 737 and orded it to vacate FL370, pending communications contact with the Legacy.
:ooh:

I think, the following post addresses the theme of altitude changes in a lost communication scenario:

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=2896940&postcount=442

If an airplane looses radio communication in flight, say at FL370, how is it going to come down for a safe landing in the scenario you describe? Or would a radio failure mean, that the airplane will have to come down uncontrolled after fuel is exhausted?

You might also check my own post:

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpost.php?p=2896940&postcount=431

in which I raise quite some questions about ATC procedures in this case of lost radio and lost xpdr as well, as I too feel, it would have been prudent, if the B737 was vacated from FL370 and perhaps vectored around the Legacy.

Servus, Simon

ATC Watcher

14th Oct 2006, 06:09

misd-agin

14th Oct 2006, 14:04

Coworker had TCAS failure. Had to descend below RSVM altitudes to continue flight. Talked with controller - "what if I had a radio failure and you had no transponder data from me. What would you expect me to do(ie follow lost comm or loss of transponder rules)?

"I'd get everyone out of your way just in case."

********************************************************

Regardless of which altitude they should have been at I find it disturbing that ATC allowed an aircraft last known to be at FL370 to head directly at an aircraft flying the opposite direction at FL370.

"Is he still at FL370?"

"I don't know, let's find out."

Is that the way we want to run the ATC system? (not saying it happened this way, just trying to make the point)

I've had a similar event. VFR Traffic at unknown altitude but suspected to be close to ours. I asked for vector away from traffic. Why head towards a bad situation when a slight turn precludes any possibility of danger?

ATC Watcher

14th Oct 2006, 16:11

"Is he still at FL370?"

"I don't know, let's find out."

Is that the way we want to run the ATC system? (not saying it happened this way, just trying to make the point)

misd-agin , do not jump to conclusions and put words in the mouth of people you do not know . It is offensive.
I doubt any Controller in his right mind would do such a thing," my guess ( and it is only a guess ) is that someone beleived the 737 was a 390 .
Why it was maintaining 37 or passing 37 climbing to 390 , or whatever , is one of the key points the ATC tapes/CVR/FDR will reveal .
I would also not be surprised if more holes in the cheese pop up, like a guy alone on the position ( like in Ueberlingen) or a bad shift change, or a system outage ot some kind, or a system decorrolation, or a wong ACT/estimate passed/received , that sort of things.

And unless I know more of the facts, and one or the other scenario is confirmed, I will not put words on the mouth of anyone and certainly presume blame .

Even if ATC did fail, it could even be the system ( similar to the Honeywell Xponder going to SBY on its own.. ) and not necessarily people.

caos

14th Oct 2006, 17:41

Glueball you are adding to the confusion or the poor pax above . as far as we have heard Brazil fllows ICAO Comm loss procedure and not the FAA ( or Hong Kong) ones. That is one of the points. ( if indeed that played a role in the collision, we are still speculating here remember )
Something else, just saw that this morning :
http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/2006/10/13/286099733.asp
Overworked ATC staff ? another hole in the Reason's cheese .

Add an interesting interview to a former Controller of flight of the FAB, where he says that it is not usual to deviate a flight in these circumstances. The measure in this case is to maintain the first flight in route and to be guided by the flight plan of the second. A controller doesn't imagine that a pilot doesn't complete the flight plan without warning them.
But, the Commission of Investigation of the accident would have concluded that the controllers should have deviated the 737.
Source: http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/2006/10/14/286105679.asp

About the Honeywell, 3 interesting links.

http://www.skyguide.ch/en/Dossiers/Dossier_Safety/Downloadables_dossier_safety/safety_bulletin_11_sept05_internet.pdf

http://www.ifatca.org/safetyalert/CRD.pdf

http://www.easa.eu.int/doc/Certification/Airwor_Directives/AD_05_021_Honey_XPDR.pdf

AES

14th Oct 2006, 22:51

Good evening from Rio,

Having been out here on and off on biz for the last few months I have naturally been taking an interest in this thread right from the start - especially as I don't speak Portuguese and as local English newspapers & TV are thin on the ground here.

But I have not posted thus far (being an engineer not a pilot; and having no "inside info") I've not had anything worthwhile to say. But like many of you I too have been concerned by some of the more, shall we say "from the hip" posts here, especially as we're all professionals (of one sort or another) on here.

Anyway, to cut to the chase, quite by chance I got the following newspaper article through an Internet trigger function today. It's from "Newsday" of Long Island NY. I repeat it in full here WITHOUT any comments of my own except to say that to me, the tone seems remarkably restrained for a journalistic piece, QUOTE:

Gaps exist in Amazon communications
BY MARTIN C. EVANS
Newsday Staff Correspondent

October 12, 2006, 9:46 PM EDT
RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil -- Elnio Borges, who flies jets for Brazil's Varig Airlines, says he becomes uncomfortable when he hears government officials here insist that there are no problems with the country's air traffic control system.

He is one of a number of commercial airline pilots, both American and Brazilian, who say the air traffic control system over the vast, remote Amazon River basin remains riddled with communication gaps that leave pilots unable to ask for warning information from controllers on the ground.

”The guys who fly expect to lose contact on routes between Brasilia and northwest Brazil,” said Borges, 53, who has flown for Varig since 1980. “It’s amazing that they are trying to establish that these spots are not there. That’s what worries us, because it’s not in the interest of safety.”

Statements like his support depositions made by the American pilots -- Joseph Lepore of Bay Shore and Jan Paladino of Westhampton Beach -- that they were unable to make potentially life-saving contact with air traffic controllers in the minutes before their Sept. 29 collision with a Gol Airlines Boeing 737-800 airliner. The pilots have not been charged, but their passports were confiscated. All 154 people aboard the Brazilian jet were killed.

An American pilot said controllers sometimes can he heard over the air speaking in Portuguese, rather than in English, the standard language used by controllers worldwide, making it difficult to determine whom the controller is talking to.

The contention that Brazil's air traffic control is lacking has been strongly contradicted by Brazilian authorities, as well as by pilots who have said equipment introduced three years ago has made the system as good as any elsewhere in the world.

"At normal flight levels for commercial aircraft we have full radar and radio communications everywhere," said Brig. Gen. Alvaro Pinheiro Costa, who led the construction of the Amazon's new air traffic control system. He said tests by an inspection aircraft that flew the fatal route shortly after the crash confirmed that radio and navigational aids along the way were operating normally.

Brazil unveiled its upgraded system as part of a $1.4 billion array of ground and air sensors designed to allow radar monitors to track aircraft over all of Brazil -- a giant, often roadless expanse of forests and rivers slightly arger than the lower 48 United States. The ambitious project, much of which was developed by the American aerospace technology firm Raytheon, was completed in July 2005.

But some pilots have said areas of radio quiet still exist, which can leave them out of contact with controllers for harrowing minutes at a time.

Doug Churchill, vice president of the Federation of Air Traffic Controllers Associations, said commercial aircraft routinely fly though areas without radio contact -- including the North Atlantic route between New York and Europe, one of the world's busiest.

But to do so safely, he said, pilots must follow specific flight plans, holding to agreed-upon speeds and altitudes.

Quoted in the Brazilian newspaper O Globo, Defense Minister Waldir Pires said the American pilots, who were able to land their damaged Embraer Legacy 600 executive jet, had been flying at an altitude reserved for traffic heading in the opposite direction. The U.S. pilots maintained in their depositions that they were given clearance by controllers to be at that altitude.

The Legacy lost contact with controllers shortly after passing Brasilia, the nation's capital, and heading northwest over the Amazon basin toward Manaus. It also was not sending signals from its transponder, an electronic device that broadcasts the plane's location to traffic controllers and to oncoming planes.

The crash occurred over a remote rainforest near the Chachimbo mountains, an area that according to the British aerospace magazine Flight International is near the limit of radar coverage between Manaus and Brasilia. The area is one in which radio communication can be especially unreliable, according to pilots who fly the region.

The Legacy pilots reportedly told Brazilian investigators that that they had tried but failed to make radio contact with Brasilia in the 10 minutes before their aircraft is believed to have gone under the Boeing, breaking off part of its wing and sending it into a 21/2-minute plunge to the ground.
UNQUOTE.

Whether or not this piece adds anything to our overall "knowledge" of this particular tragedy I'm not really sure, but like many others, my concern, to put it at it's simplest, is "how can this happen with all the marvellous stuff we've got in modern aircraft - and on the ground - today?"

AES

Like us all, finding out the "how" should/will go a long way to preventing such accidents again.

caos

15th Oct 2006, 00:11

ICA 100-12
RULES OF THE AIR AND SERVICES OF AIR TRAFFIC 2006
(Brazilian Rules)

7.14 FLAW OF LAND AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS
7.14.1 when the organs ATC could not maintain bilateral communication with an aircraft in flight, they should take the following measures:
a) to verify the aircraft can receive the transmissions of the organ, asking him/her that it executes specific maneuvers that you/they can be observed in the presentation radar or that it transmits, if possible, a specified sign with the purpose of accusing the reception of the message; and
b) if the aircraft nothing to accuse, the controller should maintain the separation among the aircraft with communication flaw and the others, supposing that the aircraft will adopt the established procedures for flaw of communications.
Source: http://www.clubeceu.com.br/download/ICA_100-12.pdf in portuguese.

Unfortunately the web site of the DAC (Address of Civil Aeronautics) it is "under construction" and the rules cannot be obtained in English.

bubbers44

15th Oct 2006, 02:37

Maybe just being given a wrong frequency could cause the communications problem. Being familiar with normal freqs and expected clearances would help out but these guys didn't normally fly there. Flying over Cuba was a hassle for a while but once you figured it out it was easy. When they gave you the wrong freq, you just tried the normal one and it worked.

misd-agin

15th Oct 2006, 03:18

misd-agin , do not jump to conclusions and put words in the mouth of people you do not know . It is offensive.
I doubt any Controller in his right mind would do such a thing," my guess ( and it is only a guess ) is that someone beleived the 737 was a 390 .
Why it was maintaining 37 or passing 37 climbing to 390 , or whatever , is one of the key points the ATC tapes/CVR/FDR will reveal .
I would also not be surprised if more holes in the cheese pop up, like a guy alone on the position ( like in Ueberlingen) or a bad shift change, or a system outage ot some kind, or a system decorrolation, or a wong ACT/estimate passed/received , that sort of things.

And unless I know more of the facts, and one or the other scenario is confirmed, I will not put words on the mouth of anyone and certainly presume blame .

Even if ATC did fail, it could even be the system ( similar to the Honeywell Xponder going to SBY on its own.. ) and not necessarily people.

The officials have been quick to say the Legacy a/c was in the wrong spot and have made no negative comments about the ATC problems that might have contributed to the crash.

I said "I'm not saying it happened this way"... The officials are declaring that there is evidence of altitude deviations and lost communication problems. IF true why would they allow the flights to come anywhere near each other?

Yes, we should await the investigation. But the remarks by officials seem pretty pointed towards the Legacy pilots. Let's pretend the allegations are true. Why in the world would you let another flight near an erratically moving aircraft that you believe has suffered comm failure?

westhawk

15th Oct 2006, 03:30

Westhawk,

Calm down my friend...no need to get hostile…

I don't know where you get the idea I'm not perfectly calm. Believe me, I am. And happy. :) However, I refuse to become a "grownup"! :eek:

My critisism of your statement had nothing to do with hostility. It was intended to ask you not to make suppositions which are based upon unfounded and possibly spurious information. Nothing more. My use of sarcasm may have left you with a different impression than that which was intended by me. As one who claims to be a grownup, I'm sure you have gotten over it by now.

Referring to the rest of your post addressed to me, I have nothing else I wish to disagree with concerning the accident. I have not taken up the issue of who is to blame, nor will I do so until such time as some investigatory findings are released. This may or may not be before the final report. I have no way to know.

Until there IS something factual to discuss, there is very little which can be stated with certainty, yet many people wish to do so for some reason. That's all I wished to point out. Once again, I have no animosity toward you or anyone else here, whether I agree with all of your, or anyone else's contentions or not. So relax and have a cold one! :)

Best regards,

Westhawk

172driver

15th Oct 2006, 17:47

]An American pilot said controllers sometimes can he heard over the air speaking in Portuguese, rather than in English, the standard language used by controllers worldwide, making it difficult to determine whom the controller is talking to.[/COLOR]

This has been my bugbear for a long time. Why is it not possible for ALL R/T to be in English - worldwide :ugh: I do a lot (actually most) of my flying in non-English speaking countries and am always appalled by calls being made in Spanish, French, Italian.... thankfully I speak a few languages, and this has already saved my - and others' - bacon a couple of times. Do these crews and controllers not realize that they deprive non-native speakers of situational awareness ??

Rippa

15th Oct 2006, 18:14

I don't know where you get the idea I'm not perfectly calm. Believe me, I am. And happy. :) However, I refuse to become a "grownup"! :eek:

My critisism of your statement had nothing to do with hostility. It was intended to ask you not to make suppositions which are based upon unfounded and possibly spurious information. Nothing more. My use of sarcasm may have left you with a different impression than that which was intended by me. As one who claims to be a grownup, I'm sure you have gotten over it by now.

Referring to the rest of your post addressed to me, I have nothing else I wish to disagree with concerning the accident. I have not taken up the issue of who is to blame, nor will I do so until such time as some investigatory findings are released. This may or may not be before the final report. I have no way to know.

Until there IS something factual to discuss, there is very little which can be stated with certainty, yet many people wish to do so for some reason. That's all I wished to point out. Once again, I have no animosity toward you or anyone else here, whether I agree with all of your, or anyone else's contentions or not. So relax and have a cold one! :)

Best regards,

Westhawk

Ok,

Sometimes the language can be a problem...English is not my native language, so...sorry about that.:ok:

Regards

agusaleale

16th Oct 2006, 08:59

This has been my bugbear for a long time. Why is it not possible for ALL R/T to be in English - worldwide :ugh: I do a lot (actually most) of my flying in non-English speaking countries and am always appalled by calls being made in Spanish, French, Italian.... thankfully I speak a few languages, and this has already saved my - and others' - bacon a couple of times. Do these crews and controllers not realize that they deprive non-native speakers of situational awareness ??

I suposse that the thing is that if you´re over a country that has 300 local flights, i.e. in Brazil, they sure are going to speak brazilian between ATC and pilots, and if there is one or more foreign flights over, they are going to inform to this flights surely in english whenever the situation has to do with them. It´s nosense to speak all them in english, Can you imagine the chaos?, as they are non native to this language.

Mork

16th Oct 2006, 12:07

jumbodrvr7

16th Oct 2006, 14:21

misd-agin , do not jump to conclusions and put words in the mouth of people you do not know . It is offensive.
I doubt any Controller in his right mind would do such a thing," my guess ( and it is only a guess ) is that someone beleived the 737 was a 390 .
Why it was maintaining 37 or passing 37 climbing to 390 , or whatever , is one of the key points the ATC tapes/CVR/FDR will reveal .
I would also not be surprised if more holes in the cheese pop up, like a guy alone on the position ( like in Ueberlingen) or a bad shift change, or a system outage ot some kind, or a system decorrolation, or a wong ACT/estimate passed/received , that sort of things.
And unless I know more of the facts, and one or the other scenario is confirmed, I will not put words on the mouth of anyone and certainly presume blame .
Even if ATC did fail, it could even be the system ( similar to the Honeywell Xponder going to SBY on its own.. ) and not necessarily people.
It looks like you might be spot on with the shift change theory.
http://www.airliners.net/discussions/general_aviation/read.main/3041736/
reply 3 reads:
According to an article in Veja magazine published this weekend and entitled "Did ATC fail?" this is what happened over BSB based on [disclaimer] unnamed sources:
The Legacy transponder failed for the first time before crossing BSB. The data block displayed to the controller was: "3?0 = 370", where the "?" indicates loss of info, "=" cruise, and the right "370" what was in the flight plan. A little later it was working again "370 = 370". Unfortunately, there was an ATC shift change at the same time the Legacy was crossing BSB. The controller being relieved informed his substitute about the transponder problem. However, by the time this new controller got to his or her station, the transponder wasn't working again and the data block read "3?0 = 360", since the flight plan called for this altitude after BSB. And apparently, he or she wasn't informed that the Legacy was flying at FL370 a few minutes before.
Moreover, after losing radio contact with the Legacy soo after, Cindacta 1 FAILED to warn Cindacta 4 about the possible conflict. All primary radar returns were good and no lateral separation was provided between the aircraft.

Astra driver

16th Oct 2006, 17:00

My two cents:
No matter under which rules you are flying (FAR or ICA 100-12) if you lose comm under VMC, you shall maintain visual flight and land as soon as practicable. In other words, the see and avoid rule applies.
I believe VMC prevailed at the time.
Mork

"I believe VMC prevailed at the time", Precisely and the aircraft hit each other anyway.

We all know that the first statement in any lost comm procedure is to maintain VFR if practical and land. Unfortunately the key statement here is; "If Practical". Considering that in the flight levels we are experiencing closure rates of over 900 knots, not to mention a blind spot that covers approximately 90% of our surrounding enviroment, is using a "see and avoid" procedure ever really "Practical"?

Further more, consider this, virtually every Mid Air Collision has occured in VMC. (I'm sure there are some exceptions). In fact, the event that caused the creation of the US domestic air traffic control program was a mid air collision in visual conditions between two transcontinental airliners over the Grand Canyon.

787FOCAL

16th Oct 2006, 17:27

Potential Reason Legacy made it and 737 did not

Legacy (http://home.comcast.net/~aeroman2/ALAcidente_da_GOL_Uma_Versao1.pps)

jondc9

16th Oct 2006, 18:37

astra driver

"and land"

everything you say about closure rates etc is right on. but if the LEGACy crew didn't land, why not? out of com , over the capital of Brazil...hmmm

and if they changed transponder to 7600 and it went to stby, and this took out their onboard TCAS (while blinding themselves to others), why didn't they notice?

Every time i've had a tcas failure or change of status, some sort of warning is issued.(granted I've never flown a legacy)

by the way, that grand canyon collision story may be made into a movie, according to some trade publications.

until then, I think we could all be well served by either reading or viewing the movie version of "the crowded sky". timely 45 years ago, timely now.

ATC Watcher

16th Oct 2006, 20:45

"I believe VMC prevailed at the time", Precisely and the aircraft hit each other anyway.
We all know that the first statement in any lost comm procedure is to maintain VFR if practical and land. Unfortunately the key statement here is; "If Practical". Considering that in the flight levels we are experiencing closure rates of over 900 knots, not to mention a blind spot that covers approximately 90% of our surrounding enviroment, is using a "see and avoid" procedure ever really "Practical"?
Further more, consider this, virtually every Mid Air Collision has occured in VMC. (I'm sure there are some exceptions). In fact, the event that caused the creation of the US domestic air traffic control program was a mid air collision in visual conditions between two transcontinental airliners over the Grand Canyon.

I personally think that using VMC in today en-route high altitude environment is a nonsense. The " see and avoid " comes from the " seen and be seen " procedure dating back from 1910 and was never meant to be applicable to 2 aircraft flying at 0.8Mach opposite to each other.
Visual climbs and descent are being abolished in more and more countries in Europe above FL195 and rightly so.

Your statement that almost every mid air collison occurred in VMC is probably correct. I never realised it and it even proves my point even more.

jondc9

16th Oct 2006, 21:58

I know ATC Watcher must know the difference between VFR and VMC.

Being in VM conditions and losing com would preclude staying at an IFR altitude wouldnt it?

Lose com, in VMC, proceed VFR...doesn't mean stay at IFR altitude and NOT land.

Certainly look out the window and try not to hit anythig is a good idea...but if you are VMC and can land using VFR why not? just for the convenience of getting to your destination? I hope not.

Andu

17th Oct 2006, 05:25

FACT: the laws that govern our airways use were drafted in a time when tracking was done with VAR/radio range, ADF or VORs.

FACT: the vast majority of jet aircraft using today's airways are equipped ith some form of precision tracking aid like INS, IRS or GPS.

FACT: the human element is still in there somewhere, and humans, even the most professional, make mistakes.

FACT: in the days of VAR and ADFs, two aircraft flying on reciprocal tracks at the same level on the same airway had a better chance of BOTH being struck by lightning at the same instant in time than of hitting (or even seeing!) each other.

FACT: with GPS navigation, the same no longer applies. Two aircraft flying at the same level on opposite tracks will fly within a wingspan of each other and their altimeters now HAVE to be so accurate (to be allowed to fly within RVSM airspace) that they WILL be within 50' of each other (ie, they won't miss vertically either). They WILL hit each other unless timely (ie, very rapid and juts as importantly, CORRECT) avoiding action is taken by BOTH pilots. The tragic midair between the DHL freighter and the CIS passenger aircraft over southern Germany some years ago proved that that cannot be relied upon.

These lead me to a final FACT: it's well past the time that someone in authority bit the bullet and accepted that technology has overtaken the rules we work under. We simply HAVE to accept that even with all the high tech safeguards that have been introduced, all the holes in the cheese can still tragically align, as they seem to have done so in this case.

It's time we re-design our airways to accommodate a small right offset, at least in the cruise phase.

... and 'someone in authority' will only act after there's an outcry from the professional pilot group that is so loud and long lasting it cannot be ignored.

broadreach

17th Oct 2006, 11:30

In 'Estado de Sao Paulo' today

http://www.estado.com.br/editorias/2006/10/17/cid-1.93.3.20061017.31.1.xml

Free translation:
"Four minutes prior to the point at which the Legacy was to [descend to 36,000 ft], Legacy pilot Joe Lepore contacted Cindacta 1 and asked, in English, "Confirm if I can descend or maintain altitude".

With 30 miles to go to the point at which the aircraft would have to descend, the controller's reply was

"OK, maintain".

-------------
Note wording will not be exact, being based on a transcript allegedly seen by the reporters, translated from English to Portuguese and, above, back to English.

caos

18th Oct 2006, 00:43

agusaleale

18th Oct 2006, 09:34

Today, the defense minister W. Pires denied this dialogue.
http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/0,,AA1314425-5598,00.html
Free translation of the same article:
These are official words:
The defense minister W. Pires told that the Legay pilot should have followed the flight plan, even if there was no contact. "if the pilot didn´t reach the tower, more than ever he should have followed rigurously the flight plan. There is a non fulfilment of the flight plan.."
According with the minister, the primary radar of the Legacy indicated that the airplane was at 36 thousand feet when approaching from Brasilia.

jondc9

18th Oct 2006, 12:42

and if "OK MAINTAIN" was the real response, how much clearer would the words:

Legacy xxx MAINTAIN FL370

or LEGACY xxx descend and maintain FL360

DownIn3Green

19th Oct 2006, 02:19

Food for thought:

Just because you have a ton of hours and are type rated in a jet, does that mean you are qualified to fly across Africa, or for that matter, ferry an aircraft North to the US from S. America?

I'm not saying that's what happened here, but it's just my "food for thought"...

broadreach

19th Oct 2006, 02:48

D3G,

Don't think that's the case; at least one of the Legacy crew had been there before. What's filtering in from flight crew with experience in that area is a) there are occasional comms blackouts and b) atc quality seems to vary.

What's happening now is a flutter of bits of news seeping out, some corporative back-covering, conflicting objectives between the judiciary (a prosecutor intent on establishing blame and, perhaps, a name for himself) and aeronautical authorities who, in this case, are primarily Brazilian airforce and who combine accident investigation responsibility with that of overseeing ATC.

Not easy to discern fact from fabrication.

In the meantime, 737 CVR bits haven't been found and hopes for doing so appear to be fading.

DownIn3Green

19th Oct 2006, 02:58

Broadreach,

I hope that's the case (re:crew experienced in the theater) because you know how the finger pointing can go...

If it's true that their passports were surrendered, then they probably need to head to the nearest consulate, be it US, Aus, GB, or whatever is available.

Accidents are accidents, not criminal acts....no matter who is to blame...

vapilot2004

19th Oct 2006, 06:20

I know that the 737 will have TCAS data and messages on the FDR.

Does the Legacy FDR have TCAS inputs and would the OFF alert be recorded ?

Also as an aside, RT data from the Legacy would confirm the crews recollections of attempts at transmissions to ATC.

HyFlyer

19th Oct 2006, 06:33

FACT: it's well past the time that someone in authority bit the bullet and accepted that technology has overtaken the rules we work under. We simply HAVE to accept that even with all the high tech safeguards that have been introduced, all the holes in the cheese can still tragically align, as they seem to have done so in this case.
It's time we re-design our airways to accommodate a small right offset, at least in the cruise phase.
... and 'someone in authority' will only act after there's an outcry from the professional pilot group that is so loud and long lasting it cannot be ignored.

I do agree with the concept described of achieving an offest on airways to accomodate the fact that todays navigation equipement is so accurate that they have achieved a decrease in safety in this circumstance....however....could anybody explain how such an offset could be achieved in reality...and flown...?

I just don't see how such parallel tracks could be established in the real world with the equipement installed today.

forget

19th Oct 2006, 08:28

Great deal of current information here;

http://www.newsday.com/news/local/longisland/ny-brazil-crash-sg,0,5254827.storygallery?coll=ny-top-headlines

vapilot2004

19th Oct 2006, 08:44

New evidence in Brazil crash probe
MARTIN C. EVANS

October 19, 2006

BRASÍLIA, Brazil - In a move that may speed the investigation of the fatal plane crash involving a pair of Long Island pilots detained in Brazil, federal police here have gained access to critical evidence that had been withheld by the Brazilian Department of Defense.

Renato Sayão, director of Brazil's equivalent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, yesterday received radar images and voice recordings from the air traffic control center that was monitoring the pilots' corporate jet that clipped a Boeing 737 over the Amazon jungle, killing 154 people.

Earlier this week, Sayão had expressed frustration that air traffic officials were slow in granting him access to evidence relating to the Sept. 29 crash that will help determine whether the pilots will face criminal charges here in Brazil related to the midair collision.

But the logjam was apparently broken after Sayão appealed to Waldir Pires, chief of Brazil's Department of Defense, which oversees the country's air traffic control system.

Lincoln Cerqueira, a spokesman for Brazil's Federal Police, said Sayão was briefed yesterday on the operations of the air traffic control center, and was assured he would be allowed to question the more than 10 air traffic control personnel who were responsible for safely guiding the two planes.

A resolution of the investigation is key to the fate of the two pilots, Jan Paladino, 34, of Westhampton Beach, and Joseph Lepore, 42, of Bay Shore. They were ferrying a newly purchased Embraer Legacy jet to the United States for Ronkonkoma-based aviation company ExcelAire when they collided with a Boeing 737 about an hour after the Legacy flew past the capital Brasília.

The pilots have been prohibited by a judge from leaving the country while investigators look into whether negligence on their part merit criminal charges, or whether controller error or equipment failure is to blame.

Progress....

agusaleale

19th Oct 2006, 09:10

http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/2006/10/18/286145985.asp

Flight 1907: transcriptions of recordings of black boxes of the airplanes arrive to Rio.
The article points out that the recordings of the two airplanes arrived from Canada and that the information is in good condition. They are not going to be revealed, as they first have to confront them with other information.
The Defense Minister Pires told that he heard the recordings of the ATC and that there was no dialog between Joe Lepore and Cindacta1 (ATC) in order to maintain the airplane´s altitude at 37 thousand.
He also insisted that the radar registered near Brasilia that the altitude of the Legacy was 36 thousand, and that demonstrates that they followed the flight plan at least for some time.

Thor Nogson

19th Oct 2006, 09:10

Accidents are accidents, not criminal acts....no matter who is to blame...

Not neccessarily. Just because you didn't intend or expect something to happen, doesn't mean it isn't criminal.

If it is reckless endangerment, then surely it is criminal. As a (non aviation) example, if a car driver went round a corner too fast, went off the road and killed a dozen people at a bus stop, that would clearly be an accident, but I dare say they would get charged with a crime.

Now, I'm not in any way saying the same kind of thing applies here, but surely accidents can (and should) lead to criminal charges where appropriate?

TN

brain fade

19th Oct 2006, 12:46

Thor

You're on thin ice here.

It's all a matter of intent.

Beanbag

19th Oct 2006, 13:05

Brain, skating very carefully on said ice, it's not just about intent. Speaking entirely in general terms, if you deliberately do something that a reasonable person would know was likely to have bad consequences, you are culpable even if you didn't personally intend the consequences - as in Thor's example.

Absolutely no comment on whether this is applicable in the current case.

London Mil

19th Oct 2006, 13:43

Is it just me, or does this particular tragedy have more 'leaks', many eminating from officials, than a sieve?

PaperTiger

19th Oct 2006, 15:08

Is it just me, or does this particular tragedy have more 'leaks', many eminating from officials, than a sieve?No, it's not just you. Previous attempts to discuss this particular aspect were immediately greeted with strident accusations of xenophobia; and it went downhill from there :ouch: !

I know what you're saying though :hmm: .

Cosmo

19th Oct 2006, 15:11

Thor

You're on thin ice here.

It's all a matter of intent.

Actually I would venture as far as to say he/she isn't. Speaking in general terms and from a criminal law perspective, an act does not always require intent. Negligence can suffice.

Cosmo

PaperTiger

19th Oct 2006, 15:12

...Lincoln Cerqueira, a spokesman for Brazil's Federal Police, said Sayão was briefed yesterday on the operations of the air traffic control center, and was assured he would be allowed to question the more than 10 air traffic control personnel who were responsible for safely guiding the two planes....
Jolly nice of them. Confirms this tidbit in another report:Brazilian aviation officials are said to be seeking interviews with two air traffic controllers who were monitoring radar equipment in the moments before the Sept. 29 collision.Like there was some doubt ? Or did they just need to be asked pretty please ? :ooh:

flash8

19th Oct 2006, 19:41

It's time we re-design our airways to accommodate a small right offset, at least in the cruise phase.

You know I have mentioned this numerous times, and this action was vocalized by a few pilots way back in the late 80's and the 90's, a small built in error (independent of the OFFSET function) is something I never understand why it hasn't been implemented. As those flying Afrika (and other certain places) know, route offsets are mandatory!

My have saved the day in this accident.... and its something we've known about for years.

bubbers44

20th Oct 2006, 01:54

With the accuracy of GPS after this accident showing how an altitude deviation almost guaranties a midair or near miss when the INS would give enough lateral separation. We need to put a cruise mode into the software to prevent this from happening again. .5 NM offset right should not be hard to accomplish without added cockpit workload. Once starting the approach go back to normal mode.

DownIn3Green

20th Oct 2006, 03:10

Flash...

Although no where near as accurate as today's GPS systems, we had "offset" capability 25 yrs ago with the old Omega systems....and used them in South America...

the_hawk

20th Oct 2006, 10:31

http://aviation-safety.net/news/newsitem.php?id=1710

19 OCT 2006 Joint industry resolution regarding criminalization of aviation accidents
The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF), the Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO), the Royal Aeronautical Society in England (RAeS) and the Academie Nationale de L’Air et de L’Espace (ANAE) in France jointly signed a resolution noting the increased criminalization of aviation accidents. The resolution makes 5 recommendations to the aviation industry as a whole. (Flight Safety Foundation)

the entire resolution (http://www.flightsafety.org/pdf/resolution_10-06.pdf)

...
2. Declare that, absent acts of sabotage and willful or particularly egregious reckless
misconduct (including misuse of alcohol or substance abuse), criminalization of aviation
accidents is not an effective deterrent or in the public interest.

...

3. Urge States to exercise far greater restraint and adopt stricter guidelines before
officials initiate criminal investigations or bring criminal prosecutions in the wake of aviation
disasters. ...

I couldn't agree more, and guess why I am posting it in this thread :hmm:

Mercenary Pilot

21st Oct 2006, 01:09

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Private Jet's Transponder Not Signaling Before Deadly Air Crash

Michael Astor
The Associated Press

Early analysis of the flight data recorders from two planes that collided in Brazil's deadliest air disaster indicated the smaller jet's transponder was not signaling its location at the time of the accident, Brazil's defense minister said.

All 154 people aboard Gol Airlines flight 1907 were killed on Sept. 29 when the Boeing 737 crashed into Brazil's dense jungle after clipping an executive jet.

Defense Minister Waldir Pires told reporters Thursday that initial analysis by the International Organization of Civil Aviation in Canada showed the transponder aboard the Embraer Legacy 600 executive jet was not broadcasting the aircraft's location.

"There is still no confirmation if the transponder was turned off or if there was an interruption because of equipment failure," Pires said. "That we don't know."

The Legacy, on its maiden flight to U.S. purchaser ExcelAire Service Inc., landed safely at a Brazilian military base with none of the seven people aboard harmed.

Pires also said the Legacy's data recorder showed the pilots told air traffic controllers in the nation's capital Brasilia they were flying at 37,000 feet (11,300 meters) as they approached the city.

"The position of 37,000 feet (11,300 meters) until Brasilia was the normal position," Pires said. "After Brasilia (the plane) should have dropped to 36,000 feet (11,000 meters)."

The crash occurred after the plane passed Brasilia and air traffic controllers lost contact with the Legacy.

The Legacy apparently collided with the Boeing at 37,000 feet (11,300 meters), an altitude reserved for planes traveling in the opposite direction. Investigators were trying to determine how the smaller jet came to return to the higher altitude, and were considering possible error by the pilots or controllers.

Earlier this week, Pires said the Legacy appeared to be following its flight plan after it passed Brasilia, the first time since the accident that a Brazilian official acknowledged that radar had tracked the Legacy's altitude.

Controllers previously said they were unable to track the plane's altitude because its transponder stopped transmitting shortly before the crash.

Air force officials said they had completed the recovery of the victims' remains, but said troops would remain at the jungle crash sight to continue investigations.

"The investigating commission has been (at the crash site) since the first day," air force commander Gen. Luiz Carlos Bueno told reporters in Brasilia. Bueno said it was unclear how long the investigation would take.

The two Legacy pilots, Joseph Lepore, of Bay Shore, New York, and Jan Paladino, of Westhampton Beach, New York, have had their passports seized to prevent them from leaving the country. While they have not been arrested, they remain holed up in a Rio de Janeiro hotel as the investigation proceeds.

vapilot2004

21st Oct 2006, 01:54

The Legacy apparently collided with the Boeing at 37,000 feet (11,300 meters), an altitude reserved for planes traveling in the opposite direction.........

Earlier this week, Pires said the Legacy appeared to be following its flight plan after it passed Brasilia, the first time since the accident that a Brazilian official acknowledged that radar had tracked the Legacy's altitude.

Controllers previously said they were unable to track the plane's altitude because its transponder stopped transmitting shortly before the crash.

So the Brazilian Air Force/ATC were using the mil-spec 3D radar and knew exactly where and how high the Legacy was. They would have also known exactly where and how high the Gol flight was.

EDIT: Perhaps my assumptions are misguided. See ORACs post below.

Irrespective of the Legacy crews actions, ATC negligence for not having notified the GOL 737 of traffic is obvious.

Investigators were trying to determine how the smaller jet came to return to the higher altitude, and were considering possible error by the pilots or controllers.

ATC request or crew confusion after Comm blackout ?

caos

21st Oct 2006, 03:25

So the Brazilian Air Force/ATC were using the mil-spec 3D radar and knew exactly where and how high the Legacy was. They would have also known exactly where and how high the Gol flight was.

Irrespective of the Legacy crews actions, ATC negligence for not having notified the GOL 737 of traffic is obvious.

ATC request or crew confusion after Comm blackout ?

vapilot, I think was not so easy, really there are a lot of information in Brazilian media.
Pires said that Legacy/ATC last COM was before Brasilia and they were at 37,000, then after Brasilia ATC saw them in radar at 36,000 (but this is not a confirmed fact).
The most confirmed fact is nobody believed that someone will not follow flight plan (overalls if it is a route of two roads).
Now, Legacy was under Cindacta1 radar and Gol was under Cindacta4 radar, the collision was inside the exchange area (there is no information about any COM Gol/ATC).
The Legacy had to change transponder code 2 times, one at Brasilia and the second at Teres (a virtual point near collision), but it started working only after crash when Legacy turned it to 7700.
I hope Pires is telling the true because he gave the interview after of the analysis of the black boxes and up to now nothing was said about the mil-spec 3D radar.
Really here we should wait full investigation.

caos

21st Oct 2006, 03:51

http://www.forest.cl/gol/secuencia.gif

source: http://www.estadao.com.br/ext/especial/extraonline/infograficos/acidente2909/index.htm

ORAC

21st Oct 2006, 07:20

vapilot2004

21st Oct 2006, 07:28

ORAC, I withdraw my earlier supposition regarding the radar data.

Thank you for posting the airspace graphics Caos.

Between Cindacta 1 and 4 the handoff area radar data should be visible by both ATC centers 1 and 4. Perhaps ATC contact was indeed made with the Gol flight regarding the out of communication Legacy and there just was not enough time for the crew to react.

Without the CVR data, we may never know if this was the case, however the recovered FDR can tell us when the Gol crew made radio transmissions and could point to an ATC warning if there was one.

You are of course correct - it is too early to tell with the data available to the us. This speculative discussion is part of human nature.

One thing that is troubling: The military-run ATCs reported lack of disclosure and process of discovery delays with the public investigating authority is a questionable tactic at best.

Scurvy.D.Dog

21st Oct 2006, 12:25

jumbodrvr7 According to an article in Veja magazine published this weekend and entitled "Did ATC fail?" this is what happened over BSB based on [disclaimer] unnamed sources:
The Legacy transponder failed for the first time before crossing BSB. The data block displayed to the controller was: "3?0 = 370", where the "?" indicates loss of info, "=" cruise, and the right "370" what was in the flight plan. A little later it was working again "370 = 370". Unfortunately, there was an ATC shift change at the same time the Legacy was crossing BSB. The controller being relieved informed his substitute about the transponder problem. However, by the time this new controller got to his or her station, the transponder wasn't working again and the data block read "3?0 = 360", since the flight plan called for this altitude after BSB. …. We have nothing to be assured this is accurate or even close to the mark …. What is relevant is the classic HMI (human/machine interface) issues this coughs up if true!
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Data blocks (labels) that include actual level, cleared and planned levels have the potential to mislead at a glance!
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Someone may be able to shed some light of the “3?0 = 360” label issues as I am not familiar with the Brazilian displays!
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Some of the questions that come to my mind are:-
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.. in normal conditions, is the data clear and unambiguous?
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.. in abnormal conditions (loss of actual height data etc) is the remaining data clear and unambiguous?
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.. are the data processors set up with sufficient algorithms and visual and aural clues that alert ATC’s to data anomalies?
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.. is the addition of inaccurate Primary altitude estimate potentially misleading?
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.. are momentary or short periods of loss of mode C a common event in certain areas or with certain equipment (normalised deviation)?
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Seems to me that it would be reasonable to assume the mode C data was N/A for a distance before the ATC boundary, the receiving controller may only have seen "3?0 = 360" for the period before entering their airspace! :uhoh:
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.. from an HMI point of view, very ordinary! :ooh:
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.. text book stuff IMHO!
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.. anyhow, carry on!

ATC Watcher

21st Oct 2006, 14:12

You are of course correct - it is too early to tell with the data available to the us. This speculative discussion is part of human nature.
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How true !

just my 2 bits :

ORAC : Precision depends on the distance between the Airborne radar and the target no ?
Current AWACS airborne sensors are able to detect height ( and distance ) pretty accurately I was told.
But I think that in our case the " 36.000 feet" , if ever it was measured/ detected , was established AFTER the event and not displayed to the radar controller in the Cindacta OPS Room controlling civil traffic.

Scurvy.D.Dog : I doubt very much the label display 3?0=360 on the data block of the Cindacta controller controlling the Gol 737 , which is wat is important in this case.
I would also love to see the Gol 737 altitude data block before the collision.

agusaleale

21st Oct 2006, 18:04

GotTheTshirt

21st Oct 2006, 19:05

Just a point but if the transponder had failed or been switched off would the data block not read ???= 360

caos

21st Oct 2006, 19:33

Last comunication between Legacy and Cindacta 1 was 20 minutes before Brasilia.

Legacy - Brasília, N600 transfering.
Controlador - N600 squalk identification, maintaining flight level 370, under radar surveillance.
Legacy - Roger.

source: http://noticias.terra.com.br/brasil/interna/0,,OI1204278-EI7792,00.html

caos

21st Oct 2006, 19:56

Austrian Simon

21st Oct 2006, 19:58

As I posted before:
"The Defense Minister Pires told that he heard the recordings of the ATC and that there was no dialog between Joe Lepore and Cindacta1 (ATC) in order to maintain the airplane´s altitude at 37 thousand.
He also insisted that the radar registered near Brasilia that the altitude of the Legacy was 36 thousand, and that demonstrates that they followed the flight plan at least for some time."
These are official words. And as these words are doing some favour to the Legacy pilots, we´d assume that they are damn right.

First of all, Defense Minister Pires is involved party into the accident and obviously has an interest to protect his (military) Air Traffic Controllers and the ATC system that he quite obviously overlooks. So his words need to be taken with great care and can not be taken as impartial. His words do not carry any more weight than those words by the Legacy pilots or their lawyers. I'd prefer statements by independent accident investigators ...

I do not think, his words do any favour to the Legacy pilots, but quite the opposite. If true, they would be very damaging to the Legacy pilots, as those words would imply, they climbed back to FL370 without clearance and opposed to the flight plan despite recognizing the loss of communication. However, such a descent followed by a climb back to 370 does not sound logical or plausible to me, and seems to stand in contradiction to the reports by that NYT reporter on board. But I readily admit, it's not impossible, that this was the case (also taking into account, that the US system for loss of communication is different and there was quite some confusion over regulations even here in this thread) - we simply don't know.

I still do not see my concern addressed, that there is an airplane not squawking anymore and without radio contact ... Why did the air traffic controllers not assume this airplane as an emergency and clear the space around it, especially as earlier exactly this Defense Minister Pires told the press, that the airplane was seen turning, climbing, descending etc, so completely unpredictable by his own earlier words (not repeated anymore, as an interesting observation, why actually have these reports disappeared)? That would, in my opinion, clearly warrant the status of an airplane in an emergency and should have immediately triggered actions by ATC to clear the space around the aircraft at all levels.

Apart from that, as Pires still insists, that the airplane should have descended according to its flight plan: All the ICAO procedures used in Brasil quoted in this thread however require, that the crew switched to transponder code 7600 as soon as they notice the loss of radio contact, then wait for 7 minutes maintaining their previously cleared altitude and then climb/descend to the flight level according to flight plan. So, from this point, Air Traffic controllers could not assume at all at all, that the crew spotted the loss of radio contact before seeing the 7600, and therefore had to assume, the Legacy would maintain their last assigned altitude. Only after seeing the squark 7600 they could have started their stopwatches and only after those 7 minutes could have assumed, that the Legacy would now descend to FL 360. As they never saw the 7600 according to Mr. Pires' very own statements, they could never have assumed, the Legacy descended to FL360 and should instead at least have assumed the Legacy still at FL370.

Now, with both radio and transponder failed, when did the Legacy crew really notice the loss of radio contact? Why would media reports indicate such radar readings and (quite obviously misleading) altitude tags? Why would media even get the idea of reporting, that the Legacy was cleared to maintain FL370 (forcing the minister to deny, that such a communication ever took place)? What's about other reports (even in this thread) stating, that it is was quite common to not force the descend, if the next step climb was about to happen shortly? How could ATC ever assume without seeing 7600, that the Legacy noticed the loss of radio and did follow the flight plan at all? Would it not have been prudent to block both FL360 and 370 at minimum (I'd think, with what is known so far, it would have been necessary to clear all altitudes around the Legacy indeed).

I do not jump to any conclusions, whether or not the Legacy pilots may indeed have done wrong, and if they indeed were the first link in the chain of events, then they should face the consequences. However, they should not be blamed for any wrong doing in public opinion without backing by clearly established facts. The same applies for ATC of course. It may be possible, that there is an explanation of the events which really clears the involved Air Traffic Controllers from all suspicions of mistakes. At the same time, as burning as the question is, why the Legacy was at FL370, the question why ATC did not clear the airspace around the Legacy is equally burning and may well form the second link in the chain to this accident. There are still a lot of questions open, which we don't have any replies and facts for ...

Unfortunately, at the moment I get the feeling, that Mr. Pires is trying to manipulate public opinion in Brasil and around the planet against the Legacy pilots. That's at least my personal impression as an impartial, but interested bystander, an impression that purely arose from the way how the Ministry of Defense of Brasil acted and argued after this tragedy.

Hopefully we'll get some clear and impartial answers by the independent investigators very soon.

Servus, Simon

threemiles

21st Oct 2006, 20:04

Between Cindacta 1 and 4 the handoff area radar data should be visible by both ATC centers 1 and 4. Perhaps ATC contact was indeed made with the Gol flight regarding the out of communication Legacy and there just was not enough time for the crew to react.

Without the CVR data, we may never know if this was the case, however the recovered FDR can tell us when the Gol crew made radio transmissions and could point to an ATC warning if there was one.

ATC has tapes running 24/7 for all their internal and external phone and comm lines.

There are no "transition areas" between Cindactas. They have telephone lines to talk to each other as human beings. There is no reason to make an assumption that a border between Cindactas is a piece of unsafe airspace. Besides all the EDP stuff that announces a flight with its estimates to reporting points automatically on a screen (assuming this is a std silent handover proc here) a verbal announcement by phone can always be made, if anything is unclear.

Legacy - Brasília, N600 transfering.
Controlador - N600 squalk identification, maintaining flight level 370, under radar surveillance.
Legacy - Roger.

Even if mistranslated (from English?) this is far from any standard comm phrases and speculation only.

Guys, stick to your businesses and wait for the transscripts --

Unfortunately, at the moment I get the feeling, that Mr. Pires is trying to manipulate public opinion in Brasil and around the planet against the Legacy pilots. That's at least my personal impression as an impartial, but interested bystander, an impression that purely arose from the way how the Ministry of Defense of Brasil acted and argued after this tragedy.

Thanks for the clear address, Simon, your professional post says what I am exactly thinking

Austrian Simon

21st Oct 2006, 20:20

agusaleale,
The last interview of Pires was on Aug 20th ...

As this accident happened on September 30th, I guess, that date is mistaken, and should probably read October 20th (so yesterday)?

Servus, Simon

caos

21st Oct 2006, 20:36

As this accident happened on September 30th, I guess, that date is mistaken, and should probably read October 20th (so yesterday)?

Servus, Simon
Ops, sorry and thank you, edited.

caos

21st Oct 2006, 21:41

First of all, Defense Minister Pires is involved party into the accident and obviously has an interest to protect his (military) Air Traffic Controllers and the ATC system that he quite obviously overlooks. So his words need to be taken with great care and can not be taken as impartial. His words do not carry any more weight than those words by the Legacy pilots or their lawyers. I'd prefer statements by independent accident investigators ...

Unfortunately, at the moment I get the feeling, that Mr. Pires is trying to manipulate public opinion in Brasil and around the planet against the Legacy pilots. That's at least my personal impression as an impartial, but interested bystander, an impression that purely arose from the way how the Ministry of Defense of Brasil acted and argued after this tragedy.

Hopefully we'll get some clear and impartial answers by the independent investigators very soon.

Servus, Simon

Right, look at this please:

Oct 18 2006
Pires said that there was "absolute noncompliance of the flight plan (of Legacy) after Brasília":ugh: . According to the minister, "if, by chance, him (the pilot) didn't get more to enter in contact, more than never his duty is to follow the flight plan and to go down for 36 thousand feet in Brasília, and to arise for 38 thousand feet in Teres (before the place of the accident), as it was foreseen". And he insisted: "He should accomplish the plan of same flight without getting authorization to change (of altitude) ".

According to the minister, when Legacy went by Brasília, the primary radar indicated in the screen that the jet was at 36 thousand feet.:ugh: The control didn't have the data of the secondary radar, that it indicates the altitude with larger precision, because the transponder, apparel that supplies 'ID' of the airplane in the flight, was inoperative. The presumption of all was that he was accomplishing the flight plan, in spite of there not being contact."
source: http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/0,,AA1314914-5598,00.html

Oct 20 2006
"Waldir Pires also affirmed that the pilot of Legacy should have followed the flight plan, that it foresaw altitude change after the aircraft went by Brasília, same if it had not gotten contact. “If the pilot didn't get to enter in contact with the tower then he should follow strictly the flight plan. There is an absolute noncompliance of the flight plan. There was not capacity of any interpretation because there was not dialogue. There are successive times that the tower called Legacy.”

According to the minister, the primary radar of the aircraft indicated that Legacy was to 36 thousand feet altitude:= when it approximated of Brasília. And that, then, there was not more contact. “Well before arriving to Brasília, already had lost contact. Since then, there is a succession of requests to enter in contact without success”, he informed. "
source: http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/...5-5598,00.html

A clearing trying to protect the controllers.

caos

21st Oct 2006, 22:09

Last News from today
Oct 21 2006
"The flight control asked the executive jet Legacy that keep in the altitude of 37 thousand feet twenty minutes before they passes for Brasília. It was the last time that there was a contact among the pilots of Legacy, Joe Lepore and Jan Paladino, and the control tower before the aerial collision that killed all the 154 occupants of the Gol Boeing. The information are from the edition of this week of the magazine "Veja", that reproduces the last dialogue between the control tower and Legacy.

According to the publication, the conversation also shows that the executive jet was spared of informing to the aerial control his position. The dismissal happened because, in the dialogue, the controller would have statement that Legacy was under regime of "surveillance radar". In that situation, says Veja, the controllers' of the Aeronautics manual says that the pilot doesn't need to inform to the aerial control in wthat place is, therefore the aircraft is monitored the whole time in earth. The pilot of Legacy, in agreement with the magazine, probably, understood that he didn't need more to enter in contact with the tower because if his altitude was inadequate, he would be alerted immediately by the radio.

After passing for Brasília, Legacy lost contact with the aerial control. There are two hypotheses for what happened of that moment according to Veja. The first says that the pilots of Legacy reduced the volume of the radio and they didn't hear the insistent calls of the tower. The other sustains that the communication in the located area between Brasília and Manaus presents flaws in the Amazonian area, mentioning pilots and controllers that know the skies of the Amazonian.

Also after passing for Brasília, the transponder of Legacy became inoperative. To leave of that moment, the earth control didn't see more the altitude in that Legacy flew. According to Veja, it happened a misunderstanding in Cindacta I computers, the control of Brasília. It corrected the indication of altitude of the airplane automatically in the controller's monitor, informing the 36 thousand feet foreseen in the flight plan for that passage; and the controllers, even without the confirmation of the position by the transponder, they believed in the information. About forty minutes later, there was the collision that dropped the Boeing in Mato Grosso. Legacy got to land in safety in a base of the air force in spite of the mishaps in the wing and in the stabilizer."
source: http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/0,,AA1319966-5598-295,00.html

agusaleale

21st Oct 2006, 23:07

I have a couple of questions.
First I´d like to know is if there is a common use to fly with that minimal separation (36k vs 37k). If you are in the Amazonas, why not seting greater distances instead only 1000 feet

And also I´d like to hear from a pilot that usually flies over Brazil what are the real applying rules in that countryl (not the theoretical).

All I´ve heard are supositions, but I´d like to get an answer from a real pilot who really flies over Brazil; what are the rules?????.

The thing is that Brazil authorities told that the pilots should have followed their flight plan, but what I hear from pilots and ATC´s (which I supose are from every country but Brazil) is that they have to follow the last assigned altitude given by ATC.
So please, could somebody clarify this situation?

misd-agin

21st Oct 2006, 23:31

broadreach

22nd Oct 2006, 01:15

From an article in Terra's online news site today, what purports to be the last or one of the last exchanges between the Legacy and BSB:
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Legacy - Brasília, N600 transferring.

Controller - N600 squalk identification, maintaining flight level 370, under radar surveillance.

Legacy - Roger.
--------
for the full article in Portuguese, http://noticias.terra.com.br/brasil/interna/0,,OI1204278-EI7792,00.html

In a separate article linked from the above, a federal judge is said to have requested orientation from the Supreme Court as to whose jurisdiction the accident investigation should fall under. This sounds like good news, i.e. a diplomatic way of easing the Federal Police (with a remit to establish culpability) out, at least until a later date, and leaving the investigation to the appropriate parties.

caos

22nd Oct 2006, 02:08

I'll repeated it a third time, primary radar - even a dedicated height finder as opposed to 3rd radar, is not accurate to more than about +/- 2000-5000ft at the best of times except when used for comparative heights.

If someone is claiming they "tracked" the Legacy at 36,000ft as opposed to 37,000ft they either have been inadequately briefed, or are deliberately making misleading and prejudicial statements.

(My background is a retired UK Fighter Controller with over 15 years operational experience using military 3D radars and before that HF200 & FPS6 height finders
ORAC, yes, this was confirmed by some Brazilian Air Force Official today in an article at O Estado de S.Paulo news.
There was a variation from 34200 to 42000 at the records in Cindacta-1 between Brasilia and Teres ( 34200, 35000, 35800, 36000 and up to 42000 ).
Also article confirmed that the Legacy stayed in 37000 from San Jose do Santos until the collision, and it never made a change of height (information got from Flight Data Recorder).
Another information says that the Legacy (an option of Embraer) didn't have connected the transponder to the FDR, for what there won't be form of knowing if the transponder failed or it was disconnected.
source: http://www.estado.com.br/editorias/2006/10/21/cid-1.93.3.20061021.10.1.xml

pax2908

22nd Oct 2006, 08:57

primary radar - even a dedicated height finder as opposed to 3rd radar, is not accurate to more than about +/- 2000-5000ft at the best of times except when used for comparative heights.

Out of curiosity (not that it is relevant for what happened here) would primary radar be capable of detecting that the two aircraft where at the "same" flight level?

ORAC

22nd Oct 2006, 09:32

I posted a long technical explanation but it is not necessary or germane to the discussion, the answer is no.

Our rules required us to take a minimum of 5000ft height separation, using the same radar/height finder, and we were taught to never let the responses merge.

Bedder believeit

22nd Oct 2006, 09:33

P2908
In a word, "No". Ground operated Primary radar only works in a two dimmensional sense, to the extent, that if an aircraft is flying (at height - say FL350) directly towards a primary radar site, as it nears (say 20 to 30 NM away) the primary target will gradually displace to one side of the real track of the aircraft, until the aircraft enters the cone of silence overhead the radar site. At this point the primary target will disappear. It is a bit like "slant range error" with a DME. As the aircraft approaches over the radar site, the Primary radar equipment perceives that the target is about 7NM away, (when in fact it may be only 2NM laterally away) and the only way that it can diplay this, is to displace the aircraft "Paint". If the aircraft is being simultaneously tracked by SecondaryRadar, then at height (say FL350) a discrepancy will start to occur until about 3NM from the radar site, the primary target will be displaced by up to 6NM from the secondary target. The secondary target is a computer generated display using a number of sensors (usually) to interrogate and track an airborne transponder, and then the Radar Data Processing Display System(RDPDS) will effectively generate a 4 dimensional synthetic return for the secondary target. I say 4 dimensional, as there is also a time element involved in creating a synthetic return. When aircraft are at lower levels ie below 10,000' in terminal areas, then there will not be much of an error displacement. Funnily enough many agencies still consider the Primary Target to be the more accurate, to the extent that lower separation mimima's can be applied between aircraft, as long as Primary Radar is being jointly used with Secondary as a separation tool.

Bedder believeit

22nd Oct 2006, 09:47

I see that ORAC has answered to the extent that a "height finder" is used in conjunction with the two dimensional primary radar. My answer was just based on a Primary Radar display only, with Secondary Radar used in conjunction. I have never used "height finders" so am not entitled to speak on that one. All I know is that I have seen hundred of thousands (probably millions) of targets overflying Primary/Secondary radar sites, and my description above is what happens!!

ORAC

22nd Oct 2006, 10:03

Bedder Believeit, a digression, my apologies to wandering off subject.

Trigonometry does indeed come increasingly into the equation at short slant ranges, a 2D radar assumes either no height, or a consistent height, for returns, so most aircraft will show at an incorrect range. The error being minute at long range but more serious when nearer the overhead.

This is usually not a risk as when they are in the same height block, the ranges will be out to the same degree, and if they are in different height blocks the two ranges may be incorrect to a differing degree, but height separation exists. This does, however, make the fusion of different radar pictures difficult, unless you discard the data from near a radar overhead as inaccurate.

3D radars use their derived 3D heights to correctly generate an accurate position.

In my youth the way a Lightning seemed to drift away from or towards the radar overhead when doing a high speed/high level intercept parallel to the overhead was never adequately explained to me for many years....

Bedder believeit

22nd Oct 2006, 10:27

Hi Orac, we are both saying the same thing, though me in a long winded way. When I was a young controller on the East coast of Australia, many years ago, and Secondary radar had just been introduced, it took me some time to figure out why, just what I described above, was happening. The penny finally dropped. Now, many years later, I am in Hong Kong and see exactly the same thing happening. High level overflyers from China South (and North) have coincidental Pri and Sec returns, to about 30NM from the Sha Chau radar site (just near position TAMOT), and then as the aircraft nears overhead, an increasing displacement to one side occurs, with max displacement being about 6NM. However, low level departures out of Macau that fly over exactly the same area, are not affected due to height (they are between 6 and 9 thousand feet). So there you go!!

agusaleale

22nd Oct 2006, 14:11

Read Austrian Simon's post. IMO he does an excellent job of discussing the issue.
Thanks, but I´ve alread read that post and it doesn´t answer my question.
I need a real answer, not a suposition such as "in my opinion", or "I think". We deserve that answer, it´d clarify the question.

threemiles

22nd Oct 2006, 14:39

Thanks, but I´ve alread read that post and it doesn´t answer my question.
I need a real answer, not a suposition such as "in my opinion", or "I think". We deserve that answer, it´d clarify the question.

Read the other posts on the 29 pages before Simon's post, if you are not satisfied. It is all answered there. As you are not doing your business in aviation you should know that HERE is no room to differ between theoretical and practical rules. That's called safety.

agusaleale

22nd Oct 2006, 15:56

Read the other posts on the 29 pages before Simon's post, if you are not satisfied. It is all answered there. As you are not doing your business in aviation you should know that HERE is no room to differ between theoretical and practical rules. That's called safety.

I really followed every post, not only here but also at the airdisaster forum.
And the thing is that I´m really a bit concerned as you, business professionals, disagree with each others continuously. One says one thing and the other one says another thing in oposed direction.

What I call safety is when everybody agrees about a matter, and I really can´t find it in this thread and in the airdisaster´s.

Rippa

22nd Oct 2006, 16:12

I really followed every post, not only here but also at the airdisaster forum.
And the thing is that I´m really a bit concerned as you, business professionals, disagree with each others continuously. One says one thing and the other one says another thing in oposed direction.

What I call safety is when everybody agrees about a matter, and I really can´t find it in this thread and in the airdisaster´s.

ICAO rules apply in Brasil. :ok:

ironbutt57

22nd Oct 2006, 16:55

any differences to icao procedures can be found in jepps supplemental text atc section or emerg as applicable

Rippa

22nd Oct 2006, 17:10

any differences to icao procedures can be found in jepps supplemental text atc section or emerg as applicable

:ok: ...on the CAR/SAM volume.

barit1

22nd Oct 2006, 17:35

I've said this before, but:

The air transport industry is built on redundancy: multiple engines, multiple nav, multi crew etc. Every essential system has additional layers to fall back on, often providing three or four layers of protection. But the insidious nature of some failures is that they go undetected, and thus the backups fail to engage.

It appears this may have happened with the Gol accident. If the aircraft were equipped with 1960's vintage NAV, the loss of communication and transponder might have been less critical, because the two aircraft would have passed each other with a random miss distance of a kilometer or more. The improvement in NAV accuracy means that what might have been a not-so-near miss has become a high probability of collision.

In other words, the primary system failure (Embraer "went dark") plus a possible secondary failure (poor ATC recognition and positive warning action) resulted in unsafe lack of separation; whereas, forty years ago the poor NAV accuracy would have added a (partial) third level of redundancy.

There are ways to regain some tertiary redundant layer; airway offsets are one possibility.

misd-agin

22nd Oct 2006, 19:20

Thanks, but I´ve alread read that post and it doesn´t answer my question.
I need a real answer, not a suposition such as "in my opinion", or "I think". We deserve that answer, it´d clarify the question.

ICAO rules apply. But that starts when lost comm is identified. Then the 7600 squawk followed by the 7 minute timer. After 7 minutes you follow the ICAO procedure which is to fly the flight plan filed altitude.

If the Legacy pilots never realize they've lost comm how can they be expected to use the lost comm procedure? Shouldn't ATC make the cautious decision and ensure the targets stay seperated?

How often do folks lose comm with controllers in S. America or other ICAO nations? How often do they descend vs. maintain their present altitude?

There are many 'holes' in ATC communication in less developed regions. How are the pilots to decide between a 'hole' vs lost comm procedures?

To me the FAA rules make more sense.

agusaleale

22nd Oct 2006, 21:38

ICAO rules apply. But that starts when lost comm is identified. Then the 7600 squawk followed by the 7 minute timer. After 7 minutes you follow the ICAO procedure which is to fly the flight plan filed altitude.

If the Legacy pilots never realize they've lost comm how can they be expected to use the lost comm procedure? Shouldn't ATC make the cautious decision and ensure the targets stay seperated?

How often do folks lose comm with controllers in S. America or other ICAO nations? How often do they descend vs. maintain their present altitude?

There are many 'holes' in ATC communication in less developed regions. How are the pilots to decide between a 'hole' vs lost comm procedures?

To me the FAA rules make more sense.

Thank you for your clear and concise answer..

ATC Watcher

23rd Oct 2006, 14:24

1-If the Legacy pilots never realize they've lost comm how can they be expected to use the lost comm procedure?

2-Shouldn't ATC make the cautious decision and ensure the targets stay seperated?

3 -To me the FAA rules make more sense.

Answers to 3 of your points :

1- The crew said they tuned 7600 as soon as they realised they lost contact ( their deposition )

2- Yes , and they probably will have done so . Therefore there must be something else , additional factors to explain why they did not.
ATC, like life, is not that simple.

3- Not really , how are you going to land if you are on an IFR PLN in IMC in dense congested airspace ? that why ICAO changed the rules.

jondc9

23rd Oct 2006, 14:36

but if they were VMC, why not land if true lost communications?

what did someone call it? swisscheese?

atc failed, legacy failed, and funny thing, I think the 737 crew may (keyword may)have over controlled in an attempt to avoid collision (who could blame them?)

I imagine the official findings will be released soon.

j

atakacs

23rd Oct 2006, 15:12

caos

23rd Oct 2006, 22:49

Sorry to chime in but does anyone have further info regarding the 737 "black boxes" ? I have read conflicting reports mentioning “missing pieces” (what could that be ?!) from the CVR but nothing about the FDR. Also what about the engines control system ?

Regards

alex
alex, transcription of FDR was done but it has not been published, CVR it is still lost in the forest (collision site).
There is no info about the engines control system.

broadreach

23rd Oct 2006, 23:23

atakacs/alex,

The only part that hasn't been read is the Gol 738 CVR. The base of which has been found but the "cylinder" with the recording itself, not. The temporary military base on the farm near where the aircraft went down is still active and there is said to be a team of 150 army personnel still searching for it, some with metal detectors. As at 17:00 LT today, without results.

caos

23rd Oct 2006, 23:26

PILOT OF ANOTHER AIRCRAFT HELPED LEGACY TO LAND

The pilot's airplane that it helped the jet Legacy to land in the base of the Serra do Cachimbo flew in the same route of Gol Boeing. He was the first to receive the request of help of the executive jet, in agreement with the Rede Record.

Alexander Cortez flew from Miami (USA) to São Paulo (SP) and he doesn't believe that Legacy has caused the fall of Boeing. After the collision, it was him who helped the pilot of the executive jet to land in safety in the middle of the forest. He heard the request of help done in English, that it happened four minutes after Legacy collides with Boeing.

The jet Legacy and Gol Boeing collided in the afternoon of September 29. The airplane of the Brazilian aerial company fell in an area of closed forest in Mato Grosso and the 154 people that were on board died. Legacy made an emergency landing in Pará and none of the seven occupants was wounded.

We "listened in the emergency frequency Legacy asking for help. He spoke November, 600 Tree Lima, he declares an emergency. Him (the pilot of the jet) knew about an airport, but he didn't know the name and the frequencies of Cachimbo to land", explained Cortez.

The pilots of Legacy didn't get contact with the control tower, told Cortez. Without exact information on the airport, the occupants of the small airplane could fall in the middle of the forest. In the cabin of his Boeing, Cortez made the request of help. I "declared that it was emergency. Finally I got, through other aircraft, a Brazilian airplane, that he listened that it was passing to emergency."

Cortez got to put the pilot of Legacy in contact with the control tower. But the pilot of the jet, Joe Lepore, and the flight controller didn't get understands. One didn't speak Portuguese and the other didn't speak English. "They wanted to ask how many meters has the track. I reminded for them: asks to him how many meters has the track. He asked, but the controller of Cachimbo didn't get to understand. I entered in the conversation speaking in Portuguese for the controller that he was asking how many meters had the track."

Legacy got to land in safety. Only later Cortez was knowing about the tragedy. He found strange not to have received any request of help of Gol Boeing and he criticized the system of aerial communication of Brazil. "Manaus center has plenty echo in the frequency, it is difficult to understand what the controllers are passing. There are situations that has to ask three, four times wthat they are speaking to understand the authorization. Has a lot of noise."

He was summoned by the American government to tell what heard in the tense minutes after the collision of the airplanes, but it was not heard by any Brazilian authority. The pilot says that it is in disposition to speak and he hopes to help to explain the tragedy of the flight 1907. It is "strange that a jet as small as Legacy will collide and to do Boeing to fall. Don't give. Something is wrong. The black boxes of Boeing, the Brazilian and American government's researches will give the answers."
source: http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/0,,AA1321090-5598-295,00.html

Mercenary Pilot

24th Oct 2006, 11:38

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mystery Surrounds Brazilian Jetliner Crash

Jack Chang, Kevin G. Hall
The Star Tribune

On a warm afternoon three weeks ago, a Boeing 737 passenger jet was cruising 37,000 feet above the Amazon jungle when, seemingly out of nowhere, a U.S.-owned corporate jet flying in the opposite direction clipped the passenger jet's right wing and tail. The Boeing went into a free fall that killed all 154 people aboard. It was the deadliest plane crash in Brazilian history.

Brazilian investigators still haven't figured out how the accident Sept. 29 happened. Experts said the odds against such an incident were upward of 200 million to 1.

But U.S. experts are worried that Brazilian officials are trying to absolve themselves of blame by focusing on the corporate jet's American pilots, who managed to land their plane safely. Both are under house arrest in a Brazilian hotel and have had their passports seized.

Brazilian Defense Minister Waldir Pires has said air-traffic controllers weren't at fault and has speculated that the American pilots may have turned off the jet's transponder, a device that would've announced the plane's altitude to controllers and possibly helped prevent the accident.
There's been no evidence released officially that would support suggestions that the pilots did anything to place their plane or the Boeing 737 in jeopardy.

But the stakes are high, not just for the New York-based pilots, Joseph Lepore and Jan Paladino but also for the Brazilian air traffic-control system.
With lawyers from around the world flocking to Brazil to represent the victims' families, the fate of the corporate jet's owner, ExcelAire, also hangs in the balance.

Peter Goeltz, a former managing director of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, which investigates air disasters in the United States and often abroad, has noted what he thinks is the irregular nature so far of the Brazilian investigation. "I would say there was a considerable amount of what sounded like official speculation early on, which was unusual."

The investigation also has drawn attention to what many experts say are flaws in Brazil's protocol for investigating air crashes. Not only does the military run the air traffic-control system, it also investigates plane accidents, meaning air force officials are asked to monitor themselves. Investigations are conducted behind closed doors.

barit1

24th Oct 2006, 15:03

(quoting the media) "Experts said the odds against such an incident were upward of 200 million to 1."

We need to speak to these "experts".

WhatsaLizad?

24th Oct 2006, 15:17

Originally Posted by Mercenary Pilot http://www.pprune.org/forums/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?p=2925671#post2925671)
(quoting the media) "Experts said the odds against such an incident were upward of 200 million to 1."

We need to speak to these "experts".

Agreed barit1,

Although my airline is a large carrier in South America, we have had something like 2 or 3 planes take evasive action in the middle of the night for conflicting traffic at the wrong altitude. I know TCAS saved one double widebody collision, another saw another A/C at night sans lights at the same altitude.

We've operated many flights down there, there but I don't think we've had 600 million flights in the 75 year history of our airline worldwide if we use the "experts" methodology.:ugh:

Mercenary Pilot

24th Oct 2006, 16:40

Whatever thier sources are, I think the chances of losing comms, radar contact, having a total transponder failure AND THEN actually having a mid-air collision must be extremly low. Maybe thats what they are getting at?

I made the post to highlight the growing concern of how the Brazilian Air Force are handling the investigation.

October 24th, 2006 10:30 AM PDT

Embraer Asked to Provide Records for Legacy Aircraft

Airline Industry Information

Brazil's aircraft maker Embraer has been asked by the country's federal police to provide records of test flights and the flight data recorder for an executive jet that collided with a Boeing 737.

According to a federal police press officer, investigator Renato Sayao wants to examine the records of the four test flights and three acceptance flights, The Associated Press reported.

The Legacy aircraft was on its maiden flight to purchaser ExcelAire Service Inc in the United States when it collided mid-air with GOL Flight 1907 on 29 September. All the 154 people on board the GOL flight were killed while the Legacy landed safely at an air force base.

Embraer Testing Department director Mauro Costa told police that the seven test flights occurred without incident and that there was no failure in the transponder that provides the aircraft's location or in the TCAS anti-collision system.

It has been reported that early analysis of the flight data recorders indicated that the Legacy's transponder was not providing its location at the time of the accident.

misd-agin

24th Oct 2006, 21:25

Originally Posted by Mercenary Pilot http://www.pprune.org/forums/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?p=2925671#post2925671)
(quoting the media) "Experts said the odds against such an incident were upward of 200 million to 1."

Agreed barit1,

Although my airline is a large carrier in South America, we have had something like 2 or 3 planes take evasive action in the middle of the night for conflicting traffic at the wrong altitude. I know TCAS saved one double widebody collision, another saw another A/C at night sans lights at the same altitude.

We've operated many flights down there, there but I don't think we've had 600 million flights in the 75 year history of our airline worldwide if we use the "experts" methodology.:ugh:

Those were misses. The hit rate was 'speculated' to be 1:200 million.

misd-agin

24th Oct 2006, 21:30

It had to have been the pilots. Get the flight test mx records. If the transponder didn't fault on those flights it has to be proof that the pilots turned it off....(please note author's sacrasm while reading...)

I like the Defense Minister's public announcements. Could we get Don Rumsfield to comment on U.S. crashes while the investigation is still ongoing?

Yes, I know he's responsible for the investigation. Even more reason, as the former NTSB official indicates, to be very careful in his statements.

caos

24th Oct 2006, 23:12

" The ministry of the Defense and the Aeronautics informed on this Tuesday (24) that was found the box of recording of voice of Boeing 737-800 of the Gol. "
source: http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/0,,AA1323575-5598-295,00.html

Also in today's news...

The Center of Investigation and Aeronautical Prevention of Accident (Cenipa), linked organ to the Command of the Aeronautics, informed the Federal Police officially on this Tuesday (24) that won't review the data contained in the black boxes of the airplanes Boeing and Legacy involved in the accident of the flight 1907 of the Gol, that killed 154 people.

Cenipa won't also review the police officer Renato Sayão, responsible for the inquiry of PF (Federal Police), the information on the expertise in the equipments of the two airplanes. PF received an occupation signed by the juridical consultantship of the Command of the Aeronautics mentioning safety's numbers 3-6 and 3-12 norms. For the military legislation "the information cannot be used in processes that can take to the punishment of having involved in accidents."
source: http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/0,,AA1323541-5598,00.html

There they go, all in "family".

misd-agin

25th Oct 2006, 00:27

caos

25th Oct 2006, 00:35

Huh? Are they saying they won't use the CVR? Because it would be used in a punishment case?
They said they will not give the info of the CVR to the Federal Police, Aeronautic will keep the info only for themselves.

CENIPA is member of Flight Safety Foundation; they signed a resolution noting the increased criminalization of aviation accidents.
Here is the resolution: http://www.flightsafety.org/pdf/resolution_10-06.pdf

caos

25th Oct 2006, 01:15

Here you can see more related to this point.

US Flight Safety Foundation Urges Brazilian Police to Keep Off the Boeing's Inquiry
Written by Newsroom Friday, 06 October 2006

The American NGO Flight Safety Foundation has released a note in which it calls Brazilian aviation authorities a "shining example" on how to investigate aviation accidents and incidents.
At the same time they suggest that the police should not interfere in the work of the aviation experts. Brazil should resist any public pressure and should not rush to judge all those involved in the case, says the Foundation.
The note reminds that traditionally the Cenipa, Brazil's Center for Investigation of Aeronautical Accidents has been able to conduct its job without outside interference and urges that once again the organ be allowed to act independently.

On Wednesday, October 4, the Brazilian Federal Police opened an inquiry to find out whether the pilot and the copilot of the Legacy jet that collided with Gol's Boeing 737, killing 154 people, in the Brazil's worst air accident ever, should be blamed for the tragedy.

Here's the Flight Safety Foundation note:

The Flight Safety Foundation today encouraged Brazilian authorities so continue in their long-standing tradition of thorough aviation accident investigation with minimal interference from law enforcement in the case of the recent tragic accident involving a Gol Airlines aircraft.

"Brazil has always been a shining example of how to investigate an aviation accident or incident," commented Foundation president and CEO Bill Voss. "Traditionally, the Center for Investigation of Aeronautical Accidents (Cenipa) has conducted investigations with no interference from law enforcement.
"This allows an efficient investigation to proceed and answers to be found. In the case of clear negligence, appropriate civil and administrative remedies exist to deal with this tragedy after all the facts are in."

The Brazilian government is a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council and was part of the global consensus supporting the amendment Annex 13, to protect accident investigations from prosecutorial involvement until the investigation is concluded.

"We call on the Brazilian government to stay strong in the face of immense public pressure and continue to respect the integrity of the investigation and not rush to judge the various players in this accident," Voss continued. "We join all of Brazil in mourning this terrible loss, but strongly urge that the Cenipa be allowed to do its job without interference so that accidents like this can be avoided in the future."
http://www.brazzilmag.com/content/view/7343/53/

Shore Guy

25th Oct 2006, 04:43

desmotronic

25th Oct 2006, 07:10

fepate

25th Oct 2006, 09:15

Lost comm procedures in Australia:
- if clearance route or altitude limit applies then maintain alt or route for 3 minutes then proceed as per flight plan.
- if receiving vectors then maintain last vector for 2 minutes then proceed as per flight plan.
- if holding then make 1 ful pattern then proceed as per flight plan.When you write "as per flight plan" do you mean the route as well as the altitudes? If so, what do you do if you get a full-route clearance prior to takeoff? [Edit: for your first item, you mean three minutes after passing the clearance limit? If so, what is the procedure for when the clearance limit is the destination airport?]

I still don't like the time limits. Two or Three minutes is even worse than what was stated to be the procedure in Brazil. What if ATC loses their radios for 10 minutes? Certainly everybody is at an altitude that would maintain separation for 10 minutes. But, if after 3 minutes all airplanes in that sector start changing altitudes, it seems more dangerous to me than just sitting tight on course and altitude.

jondc9

25th Oct 2006, 12:13

changing altitude might be required for obstacle clearance

face it, when an ARTCC loses its full com, there is a good chance things will fall apart in a few minutes

desmotronic

25th Oct 2006, 12:55

http://www.airservicesaustralia.com.au/publications/current/ersa/GUID_ersa-fac-2-14_31-Aug-2006.pdf

Expectation as per the main text is that you would follow flight planned route and alt. However see note 2 appended to the main text also indicates that last clearance alt could be appropriate... The regulator seems to have a bit of 2 bob each way on this crucial issue. The way i read it though is that following the cleared alt is referring to terminal area ops on descent where the cleared alt is less than flight planned alt and resuming flight planned alt is not practicable.

If it were me after a planned waypoint and planned alt change with lost comm i would be at flight planned alt tracking to flight planned destination conforming to appropriate hemispherical alt. Having said that the purpose of the procedure is, explicitly, to make ATC and other traffic aware of the pilots most likley actions.

misd-agin

25th Oct 2006, 13:45

I’ve spent most of my career “domestic” in the states. One of the more interesting aspects of this investigation is the differences between the FAA and ICAO on lost Com procedures.

For you international folks, how many different protocols are there for loss of Com?

Jepps pages for each country spell out changes from ICAO standards. If things go wrong a quick read of those pages should be included.

172driver

26th Oct 2006, 08:24

According to this (http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/americas/10/24/brazil.plane.ap/index.html) story by CNN, the GOL CVR has now been found....

broadreach

26th Oct 2006, 23:50

Yes, found and apparently intact, buried nearly a foot underground. Enroute to Canada either tomorrow (Friday 27 Oct) or the day after.

With all the recorders together, with the accident now fading from headlines and perhaps less attractive to publicity-conscious prosecutors, sit back and wait for the reports; there will be little between now and then.

jondc9

27th Oct 2006, 04:47

new info is coming out saying that ATC had an hour to notice transponder failure on legacy according to one controller at center...should be out in media soon

the_hawk

27th Oct 2006, 11:55

sit back and wait

Speaking of, any news how long the Legacy pilots will have to "sit back and wait" in the Brazilian hotel? See post #581, after all checking the evidence for "acts of sabotage or willful or particularly egregious reckless misconduct" should not take until the final report is out - or should it?

Mercenary Pilot

27th Oct 2006, 12:32

I think America will remain interested in this incident seeing as two of its citizens remain under house arrest in a foreign country.

Infact, heres some more news now.....

Flight Data from Brazil Plane Crash Denied to Police

Hellen Berger
The Associated Press

Aviation investigators have denied federal police access to the flight data recorders from a Boeing 737 and an executive jet that collided Sept. 29 in Brazil's deadliest air disaster, an air force official said Wednesday.

All 154 people aboard Gol Airlines flight 1907 were killed when it crashed in the dense Amazon jungle of Mato Grosso state following the midair collision. The Embraer Legacy 600 jet landed safely at a nearby air force base with all seven people aboard unharmed.

The Center for Investigation and Prevention of Flight Accidents, or Cenipa, said it was refusing to give police access to the recorders based on rules under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, also known as the Chicago Convention, designed to protect information given voluntarily to investigators.

"We cannot release the data directly to Brazil's federal police," said an air force communications officer who gave his name only as Lt. Silva, following official policy. "The federal police may retrieve it through legal means, though, which is normal in such cases."

Fagner Santos, a spokesman for the federal police, said they have filed a court petition requesting access to the data for their investigation which could result in criminal indictments.

The flight data recorders of both planes were analyzed in Canada but the cause of the accident has not yet been announced. The Defense Ministry said the voice recorder of the Boeing 737 was found on Tuesday and would be sent to the International Organization of Civil Aviation in Canada for analysis.

Police expect the recorders will help them determine the cause of the collision by revealing the communications between the pilots and traffic controllers.

ATC Watcher

27th Oct 2006, 15:28

For me there is only one thing left " against " the legacy pilots : did one of them swich the Xponder off voluntarily , or did the Xponder went automativcally on stand by as did some of the little brothers of the Honeywell Primus in Europe recently ?
The problem as I understand it ( and someone correct me if I am wrong ) , is that the Legacy FDR does not record the Xponder inputs , just the fact that it is ON , SBY or OFF. And that info is in the hands of the FAB / CENIPA since quite a while.

If nothing can be proven then , in my opinion,the doubt should benefit the defendants, and the 2 guys should be left alone and allowed to return to their homes.

The other suggestions/ claims that they did not follow the valid comm failure procedure in force is vague ,and is in any case not a voluntary act, not even gross negligence, just ignorance, and does not justify their further retention , again in my opinion..

I am also surprised at USALPA silence in this case.

broadreach

27th Oct 2006, 19:15

Link to photo of Gol CVR
http://www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/media/imagens/2006/10/25/1245fab06321.jpg/view

widgeon

27th Oct 2006, 22:19

Probably a stoopid question , Why does an american built plane delivered to a Brazilian customer have a CVR with French markings ?.

broadreach

27th Oct 2006, 23:06

Hawk, yes, and of course I wasn't suggesting the Legacy crew should "sit back and wait". I still tend to think their passports will be returned soon and that a face-saving way will be found for the prosecutor to back off now that he's been told Cindacta will not be releasing any further "evidence" without a Supreme Court order.

The automatic withdrawal from duty of all the ATC staff (eight or eleven, not sure) involved in this accident is having a knock-on effect, with flights being delayed or cancelled in BSB and other airports. In BSB, "to avoid overload" as one controller can handle max 14 aircraft. In pretty much the same breath, Infraero president complaining of budget restraints and of "too many GA aircraft".

ATC reps (there's no union) have circulated a long overworked/underpaid/danger-in-the-skies letter. Very little is being decided in Brasilia right now, all attention on election Sunday 29th, so the atmosphere in that part of government is probably pretty poisonous at present.

Just to forstall any conspiracy theorists who might surface on seeing the pristine nature of the 738 CVR after three weeks buried in the undergrowth, it is said to have been wiped off and replaced in the hole for the photo. For Widgeon, one assumes that printed on the other side would be "Do not open".

caos

27th Oct 2006, 23:11

I am also surprised at USALPA silence in this case.

IFALPA urges use of ICAO best practices in Brazilian
mid-air collision investigation

CHERTSEY 27 October: The International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) extends its condolences to the families of the victims of the recent collision involving a Gol Airlines B737 and an
Embraer Legacy.
The Federation urges the Brazilian authorities to conduct a full accident investigation, unhindered by the prospect of judicial interference. “Global best practice, as reflected in ICAO Standards, requires considerable autonomy for the investigative process” stated IFALPA President, Captain Dennis Dolan.
Dolan goes on to state: “This is a high visibility accident, and the global aviation community will be watching closely to see that all possible safety lessons are gleaned from this tragedy.”
Notes to Editors
The International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations represents in excess of 100,000 pilots in more than 95 countries world-wide. The mission of IFALPA is to be the global voice of airline pilots, promoting
the highest level of aviation safety and security world-wide and providing services, support and representation to all of its Member Associations. See the Federation website www.ifalpa.org (http://www.ifalpa.org)
For more information contact Gideon Ewers, IFALPA Media Communications Officer +44 1932 579041 or on [email protected]

source: http://www.ifalpa.org/Press%20Release/07PRL09-Brazilian%20Mid%20Air%20Investigation.pdf

agusaleale

28th Oct 2006, 18:46

http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/2006/10/27/286434191.asp
The defense minister said this friday that there is a project of increasing greatly the number of ATCs. According to him, the flight congestion that happened in Brasilia doesn´t have to be with the fact that 8 ATC working the day of the GOL accidente, were moved away.
...the ATCs will continue being militars, as he says that the control of air space is a matter or national security.

I think it´s possible that they noticed that the lack of ATC´s may have caused the accident.

broadreach

28th Oct 2006, 23:38

Well he would, wouldn't he. One ATC representative said on Globo TV this afternoon that on their own initiative the controllers are limiting the aircraft they handle to no more than 14 whereas "before" they were handling up to 20, sometimes 22. Which creates a pretty embarassing situation for the aeronautical authorities and an interesting one from the insurance viewpoint.

agusaleale

29th Oct 2006, 09:21

loveJet

29th Oct 2006, 09:34

2 things: 1) Is there a pic of the Legacy that sustained damage? Then anyone would be able to reach a conclusion as to how/most likely place it smashed into the 737

2) That pic of the CVR doesn't look genuine. It looks perfectly in tack, no damage to the writing, and in French? How bizarre.

Avman

29th Oct 2006, 10:05

Lovejet, I realise that there are now 33 plus pages. However, if you look back near the start you'll find pictures of the damaged Legacy and also diagrams of the possible points of impact. With regard to the CVR, it may well be that the same is written in English on the side which is facing down.

forget

29th Oct 2006, 10:40

.........and in French? How bizarre.

I thought all CVR's FDR's had 'Do Not Open' placards in English and French --- for some reason.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_data_recorder

iskandra

29th Oct 2006, 12:06

@lovejet: Ahem, from post #650 slightly above yours:

Just to forstall any conspiracy theorists who might surface on seeing the pristine nature of the 738 CVR after three weeks buried in the undergrowth, it is said to have been wiped off and replaced in the hole for the photo. For Widgeon, one assumes that printed on the other side would be "Do not open".

caos

29th Oct 2006, 12:54

Oct 28 2006

LEGACY WAS AT 37 THOUSAND FEET WITH AUTHORIZATION, LAWYER SAYS

It was the control of flight of São José dos Campos that authorized the executive jet Legacy, that was shocked with a Gol Boeing on September 29, to be in the altitude of 37 thousand feet to Manaus. The information belongs to the American Robert Torricella, lawyer of ExcelAire (company owner of Legacy) in the United States and who coordinates the pilots' defense, in interview to the magazine “Veja” of this week. It was the first time that one of the pilots' lawyers showed openly on the case, according to the magazine "Veja". According to Torricella, the authorization was given by the tower a little before Legacy to take off.

"In the deposition to the Civil Police, the pilots had statement exactly that: they flew to 37 thousand feet, with authorization of the air traffic control", told to G1 Theodomiro Dias Neto, pled responsible criminologist lawyer by the case in Brazil. The pilots' version given to the Civil Police was shown by the "Fantastic" on October 8 (reads the text of the report of the "Fantastic" here (http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/0,,AA1303266-5598,00.html)).

The statement of Torricella confirms the theory shown already by G1 that the one that is worth is the plan of authorized flight for the control tower a little before the takeoff, and not the flight plan that is in the paper.

Note: G1 is O'Globo news.
Source: http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/0,,AA1329150-5598-295,00.html

caos

1st Nov 2006, 01:44

At CNN today

Brazil air controllers decline crash questions

POSTED: 12:00 p.m. EST, October 31, 2006

RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil (AP) -- Ten flight controllers have said they are under psychiatric treatment and declined to be questioned by federal police about a September 29 midair collision that killed 154 people in Brazil's worst air disaster, the government news service reported Tuesday.
A Boeing 737-800 of Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA, Brazil's No. 2 airline, collided with a Brazilian-made Legacy 600 executive jet over the Amazon jungle of Mato Grosso state. All 154 people aboard the Boeing were killed, while the Legacy landed safely at a nearby air force base.
Federal police inspector Renato Sayao had planned to question the flight controllers, who were assigned to airports in Manaus, in the western Amazon jungle, and Brasilia, the central capital, but the Brazilian Air Force said they were flight controllers were under psychiatric treatment until November 13, Agencia Brasil reported.
The flight data recorders of both planes were analyzed in Canada but the cause of the collision has not yet been announced.
The temporary suspension of the flight controllers forced the Air Force and the National Agency of Civil Aviation led to personnel shortages and delays of up to seven hours in flights from the cities of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte and Brasilia.
According to the Estado news agency, small planes and executive jets could not take off, land or fly over those cities during peak traffic hours. The ban does not cover emergency medical flights or military or presidential flights, the agency said.
Air travel is expected to increase this week because of Brazil's Memorial Day holiday on Thursday.
Source: http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/americas/10/31/brazil.plane.ap/index.html

Zilbert Patolino

1st Nov 2006, 11:26

Answers to 3 of your points :

1- The crew said they tuned 7600 as soon as they realised they lost contact ( their deposition )

2- Yes , and they probably will have done so . Therefore there must be something else , additional factors to explain why they did not.
ATC, like life, is not that simple.

3- Not really , how are you going to land if you are on an IFR PLN in IMC in dense congested airspace ? that why ICAO changed the rules.

Where did you read about (1) that they tuned 7600?? Never read it before!!

broadreach

1st Nov 2006, 23:49

Zilbert, you'll have to go back through the thirty-odd pages. Just about everything imaginable has been said.

Re the ATC work-to-rule, it's now is an absolute shambles that will provide lawyers with oodles of work for many years to come. The Gol/Legacy accident has unleashed all the resentment of allegedly underpaid and overworked ATCers, mostly military (and without a public voice) but partly civilian (with, now, a banner under which to protest).

Delays and cancellations are the order of the day; a "Crisis Room" in Rio, on TV this evening, where reps from all involved try to decide collectively who has priority; retirees being called up; president Lula in his first port-re-election crisis demanding "I want a solution"; defense minister Pires saying "'Aeronautica' never informed me of the ATC shortage..."; north-south flights being rerouted over the ocean to alleviate the load on Brasilia which is said to handle 3/4ths of Brazil's flights, and so forth.

Somebody pinch me - didn't I see something similar in the US during the Reagan administration, and then in Europe twenty years ago?

caos

2nd Nov 2006, 01:06

Zilbert Patolino

2nd Nov 2006, 11:09

Today in brazilian press they are saying that the ATC in São José dos Campos, during take off clearence, said " cleared at 37,000 to MANAUS", so that would overcome the flight plan and pilots should do all trip at 37,000.

Because of that the first controller should be blamed for most of the responsability in the accident. Many other things would have contributed to the accident, including pilots.

All this delay in brazilian ATC is now an "answer" from other controlers showing how traffic would be if they would follow all instructions and regulatios. They wanna prove that their coleague mistake was due to overworking.

Those are the rumors!

KC135777

2nd Nov 2006, 16:22

hmmm, check out these two articles.
things are starting to look good for the legacy pilots.

========================================================

Tower Error Led To Brazil Jet Air Collision - Report

DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
November 2, 2006 9:59 a.m.

RIO DE JANEIRO (AP)--The flight recorder transcript from the executive jet involved in Brazil's worst air disaster shows that the jet's American pilots were told by Brazilian air traffic control to fly at the same altitude as a Boeing 737 before the planes collided over the Amazon rainforest, the Folha de S. Paulo newspaper reported Thursday.

According to Folha, the flight recorder shows American pilot Joseph Lepore receiving instructions from the tower in Sao Jose dos Campos to fly northwest at 37,000 feet (11,277 meters) "until Eduardo Gomes," the airport in Manaus. That altitude contradicted the pilots' filed flight plan and as an odd-numbered altitude should be reserved for southbound flights.

Folha did not reveal how it had obtained the transcript, which the air force has not yet released to federal police investigating the Sept. 29 crash. All 154 people on board the Gol airline's 737 were killed. The badly damaged executive jet managed to land safely, and the American pilots have been ordered to stay in Brazil during the investigation.

=======================================================

http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/americas/10/31/brazil.plane.ap/index.html

Brazil air controllers decline crash questions

RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil (AP) -- Ten flight controllers have said they are under psychiatric treatment and declined to be questioned by federal police about a September 29 midair collision that killed 154 people in Brazil's worst air disaster, the government news service reported Tuesday.

A Boeing 737-800 of Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA, Brazil's No. 2 airline, collided with a Brazilian-made Legacy 600 executive jet over the Amazon jungle of Mato Grosso state. All 154 people aboard the Boeing were killed, while the Legacy landed safely at a nearby air force base.

Federal police inspector Renato Sayao had planned to question the flight controllers, who were assigned to airports in Manaus, in the western Amazon jungle, and Brasilia, the central capital, but the Brazilian Air Force said they were flight controllers were under psychiatric treatment until November 13, Agencia Brasil reported.

The flight data recorders of both planes were analyzed in Canada but the cause of the collision has not yet been announced.

The temporary suspension of the flight controllers forced the Air Force and the National Agency of Civil Aviation led to personnel shortages and delays of up to seven hours in flights from the cities of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte and Brasilia.

According to the Estado news agency, small planes and executive jets could not take off, land or fly over those cities during peak traffic hours. The ban does not cover emergency medical flights or military or presidential flights, the agency said.

Air travel is expected to increase this week because of Brazil's Memorial Day holiday on Thursday.

caos

2nd Nov 2006, 22:09

Complete transcription of today's Folha of S.Paulo article:

02/11/2006 - 09:40
Black box of Legacy reveals that tower mistook

ELIANE CANTANHÊDE
Columnist of the Folha of S.Paulo

The control tower of flights of São José dos Campos (SP) authorized the pilots of Legacy, Joe Lepore and Jan Paladino, to fly in the altitude of 37 thousand feet to the airport Eduardo Gomes, in Manaus, in spite of that altitude turned "wrong way" in the route after Brasília--and where was the Gol Boeing-737 reached and dropped in the shock with the jet of Embraer.

That was the first of a succession of mistakes that generated the shock, on September 29, killing 154 people. After that, there was flaw in the communication between Legacy and Cindacta-1 (center of control of the air traffic of Brasília), the transponder (that would alert the system anti-collision of Boeing) it was not working in Legacy and the Gol airplane was not alerted for the risk.

The plan of original flight of Legacy foresaw three altitudes: 37 thousand feet between São José dos Campos and Brasília, passing for 36 thousand feet starting from the capital and for 38 thousand feet starting from the point Teres of the aeronautical letter (to 480 km of Brasília, in Mato Grosso) until Manaus. Legacy, however, it flew the whole time in 37 thousand feet.

For the black box of Legacy, that is under the responsibility of Cenipa (National Center of Investigation and Prevention of Aeronautical Accidents), the controller of the tower of São José dos Campos communicated in English with the Americans Lepore and Paladino during the "clearence" procedure--in other words, of authorization for the takeoff.

In that dialogue, recording, Lepore asks to take off, the tower authorizes and says, clearly, that he should arise for 37 thousand feet "until the airport Eduardo Gomes", of Manaus, contradicting what specified the flight plan--in hands of the pilots and the aeronautical authorities.

The version obtained by Folha confirms what the pilots' lawyers, the Brazilian Theo Dias and the American Robert Torricelli say, that they would have authorization to fly in 37 thousand feet, in spite of being "wrong-way" in the direction Brasília-Manaus.

In the registrations of Cindacta-1, the last contact of Legacy was when the aircraft was to 52 miles--or near to seven minutes--of Brasília, for a common procedure: the pilots communicated to the control center that they had reached the altitude of 37 thousand feet.

Pilot Lepore gave the registration of the airplane, Legacy N600XL, informed that it was in the level 370, that it corresponds to 37 thousand feet, and he wished "good afternoon" in English.

The plant controller answered, he asked that the pilot pressed the button of identification of the flight and he wished good trip. The button that he referred is the transponder--that didn't work. The pilots confirm that they activated it to register the identification of the flight, but Cindacta-1 says that the equipment was not working starting from Brasília and that the controllers tried several times, without success, to alert the crew. The pilots react saying that they also tried, without success, to communicate with Cindacta-1 when they flew over Brasília. Without that contact, they decided to follow the original orientation, according to lawyers and representatives of the company ExcelAire that talked with Folha.

According to Aeronautics, one of the American pilots' mistakes was not to activate the code 7600 in the transponder, registering the communication loss. The apparel was out of the air for about two minutes after the shock with Boeing, in the area of Mato Grosso, when it worked already with the code 7700 again, of emergency.

Already according to the pilots' lawyers and the representatives of the American company, Cindacta-1 also mistook, when noticing that there was something wrong with the flight and not to immediately alert Boeing that came in contrary way and in the same altitude. The allegation of Cindacta-1, annulled by Aeronautics, it is that the center didn't identify accurately that Legacy was in the altitude of 37 thousand feet, what could only be made case the transponder was working. Without it, the altitude is checked in the radar by safety's primary equipment, that is imprecise. In that case, there is a variation in the radar that can arrive even to 1,500 feet.

Everything added, there is a succession of mistakes. Original was the authorization of the tower of São José dos Campos for the flight if it accomplishes in 37 thousand feet, but that have been correct with the communication between the airplane and Cindacta-1, for the transponder and the system anti-collision and, finally, for the determination that Boeing deviated, or upward or sidelong, as they determine flight safety's international and national norms.
Source: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/cotidiano/ult95u127743.shtml

ExSimGuy

3rd Nov 2006, 06:25

According to Folha, the flight recorder shows American pilot Joseph Lepore receiving instructions from the tower in Sao Jose dos Campos to fly northwest at 37,000 feet (11,277 meters) "until Eduardo Gomes," the airport in Manaus.

Just how over-worked would an ATCO have to be to issue a 370 altitude to a Northward-departing aircraft? Or would that be a normal flight level in some circumstances?

Would a pilot not normally ask for confirmation if givea "wrong" flight level for the direction he was flying?

(apologies if this is a "silly question" but, as you can see from my handle,I'm not a Professional Pilot, just someone with a sim-eng history who has read every page of this one and trying to grasp "what went wrong" on this horrendous tragid accident - and yes, I do appreciate the concept of the holes in a bit of cheese, remembering the L1011 in the Everglades)

NigelOnDraft

3rd Nov 2006, 06:29

Just how over-worked would an ATCO have to be to issue a 370 altitude to a Northward-departing aircraft? Or would that be a normal flight level in some circumstances?
Would a pilot not normally ask for confirmation if givea "wrong" flight level for the direction he was flying?In the modern, complex ATC environment, we often are cleared and fly "non-standard" FLs. I would not necessarily query a non-standard level, although might make even more effort in the acknowledgement / readback to ensure it had been heard and readback correctly, both in and out of the cockpit...

NoD

ExSimGuy

3rd Nov 2006, 07:37

Thanks, NoD - helps to get things in perspective

Del Prado

3rd Nov 2006, 08:34

threemiles

3rd Nov 2006, 08:44

[COLOR=Blue]

Just how over-worked would an ATCO have to be to issue a 370 altitude to a Northward-departing aircraft? Or would that be a normal flight level in some circumstances?

Would a pilot not normally ask for confirmation if givea "wrong" flight level for the direction he was flying?

No overwork, all normal procedures, no sensation.

Looking to the airways chart: 370 was the correct flight level between SJC and Brasilia. Though ground track of the airway is North North West, magnetic course is slightly Northeast due to magnetic variation. Semi circular rules are applied after magnetic courses not ground tracks.

Therefore 370 (odd=East) was correctly filed until Brasilia, where a change to 360 (even=West) was correctly planned, because a left turn makes the magnetic course to become Northwestbound.

380 was filed for climb an hour after passing BRS, probably because as of burnt fuel a ceiling restriction due to weight was lifted.

Consequently 370 was correctly cleared by ATC in the en-route clearance for the initial segment of the flight until BRS. The wording "Cleared to Manaus via bla bla, FL370, squawk bla bla" is normal. There is no ICAO procedure that calls for subsequently filed level changes to be included in the en-route clearance. Only the first filed altitude is part of the clearance (climb to 4000, expect FLxxx 10 minutes after departure), not even that one in most countries any more. If a comm failure occurs along the route and at a position of a filed level change ICAO comm failure procedures apply.

Remark: I doubt this "information" about the ground controller at SJC being responsible is taken from the Legacy CVR as recording is limited to 30 minutes and the en-route clearance was issued more than 90 minutes before the emergency landing. Here is a different agenda going on.

Zilbert Patolino

3rd Nov 2006, 09:33

No overwork, all normal procedures, no sensation.
Remark: I doubt this "information" about the ground controller at SJC being responsible is taken from the Legacy CVR as recording is limited to 30 minutes and the en-route clearance was issued more than 90 minutes before the emergency landing. Here is a different agenda going on.

legacy records up to 2 hours. Old ones record only 30 minutes.
There is also the recordingo from SJC ATC.

The press in Brazil say they said: “N600XL. Clear, 370, Manaus.”

Is that enought to cancel the proposed/approved original flight plan?
or is it just lawyer talk?

caos

3rd Nov 2006, 13:25

Remark: I doubt this "information" about the ground controller at SJC being responsible is taken from the Legacy CVR as recording is limited to 30 minutes and the en-route clearance was issued more than 90 minutes before the emergency landing. Here is a different agenda going on.
Right, only backup record of SJC have this information, Legacy was on air for more than 2 hours.
But it seems a maneuver of the lawyers to try to share responsibilities.

chuks

3rd Nov 2006, 17:29

So what has happened to all the folks who posted here demanding that the pilots of the Embraer be taken out and hanged for 'switching off their transponder and doing aerobatics'? Do you suppose they learned not to be too hasty to judge? Probably not!

I always liked the idea that I will be heavily second-guessed whenever it goes pear-shaped. I guess that goes with the job.

I guess the idea was to stay at FL370 and then be better situated to climb to FL390 when light enough, but a chain of errors made that work out really badly. It will be very interesting to learn what went on with the transponder. Of course, no transponder, no TCAS but probably with TCAS, no accident!

One thing I find a bit scary is the way we all go wazzing along right down the centreline of the airways nowadays. With the reduced vertical separation being used there's not much margin for error. The system needs to work darn near perfectly where it used to be you were just on the airway but probably not right in the middle of it as is the case today.

ExSimGuy

3rd Nov 2006, 18:07

For interest, I have spent part of today recording GPS readings from a stationary location to check variation, for a project that I am working on (no WAAS available here, so less precision, which would have made things better - or worse!)

(I wasn't looking for "absolute accuracy" for this purpose, just repeatability - I don't know the absolute coordinates of this location)

Mostly the variation was within about 6 metres, and the maximum variation was around 12m. Didn't note the height difference (sorry - wasn't part of my requirements), but the horizontal "error" was way less than the wingspan of most aircraft. "Lines up the cheese holes" very nicely!

If we can't rely on TCAS (with no redundancy) a whole 100%, then track offset really seems to make sense to me. Am I naive? or are our "regulatory authorities" slow to respond?

I'm not the first to suggest that, whatever other lessons are learned from this tragic acident, our nav-aids these days are, in some ways, too accurate.

(From the opinion of a "frequent flyer" who would prefer to remain flying frequently!)

SEAN911

3rd Nov 2006, 19:12

ExSimGuy;
"track offset really seems to make sense to me. Am I naive? or are our "regulatory authorities" slow to respond?"

After 35 years of flying heavy metal world-wide I endorse track offset.
Regulatory authorities are slow to change the status quo, but after this I'm sure it will be studied for unexpected, undesirable side-effects. If I were flying today, requesting track-offset would be standard procedure for me.

pls8xx

3rd Nov 2006, 21:10

The variations in GPS readings was noted. But this is not the whole story. Where two gps units are not far apart, at any given instant they will both have the same direction and magnitude of error.

Thus two planes following the same tract guided by GPS will have compensating errors. If one is "on tract" but in fact 100 ft to the side, so too will the other plane show "on tract' when it is also 100ft to the same side.

The same will also be true for the vertical element. If both are tracking the same elevation, say FL370, they will both be at the same elevation when they meet, though it might be at 36,900.

Green Guard

4th Nov 2006, 04:04

Who in this world can notice or complain
if a crew selects TK OFFset R.33 NM
which means zero decimal thirty three NM = 2000 feet right of track,
any time when on an AIRWAY?
Direct vectors are random anyway

Zilbert Patolino

4th Nov 2006, 05:30

So what has happened to all the folks who posted here demanding that the pilots of the Embraer be taken out and hanged for 'switching off their transponder and doing aerobatics'? Do you suppose they learned not to be too hasty to judge? Probably not!

Legacy transponder is hard to operate and they may had change to stand by by mistake.
Aerobatics? I doubt, but black box can tell.

Question now is if ATC saying “N600XL. Clear, 370, Manaus.” during clearence should overcome the flight plans.

Another question is about Radio comm. Why didn´t they answer BSB ATC? They were called 7 times. Was volume tunned down?

BOAC

4th Nov 2006, 07:57

KC - and makes the maths which determine whether airspace procedures contain a collision risk - much more complicated. - is it not MORE significant that the risk from a navigation system which places two aircraft in almost exactly the same piece of sky is incredibly simple to determine?

Lon More

4th Nov 2006, 08:36

As mentioned earlier ODLs are commonly used in today's busy airspace, even sometimes requested by pilots to optimise fuel burn. Aircraft may also be requested at an ODL by an adjacent sector in order to solve a traffic conflict.
Although not acquainted with the ATC system there I would query the statement that the Tower cleared him to FL370 as i feel this is Journalist Speak / lost in translation for ATC in general.

ODL = Opposite Direction Level

410

4th Nov 2006, 13:02

Offsetting might appear to be a no-brainer when certain events are studied individually.It certainly does. (to me at least)!

No one is advocating offsetting in high density terminal areas. It's out there in the cruise/enroute that concerns most of us and it is in that area that some of us have been calling for offsetting for quite some years now.

I accept that offsetting is not a panacea - you'd have to permanently park and chain down every aircraft in the world to ensure no midairs could occur in any circumstances. However, the chance of two aircraft on crossing tracks hitting each other must be to a factor of ‘n’ millions more unlikely than the odds of two aircraft on reciprocal tracks on the same air route – which, thanks to GPS, means they are on EXACTLY the same line across the earth’s surface for hours on end.

I can't understand the arguments that ATCOs and regulators always trot out saying enroute airways would have to be re-designed if an offset of under a mile was inbuilt into aircraft FMSs (or crews were allowed to insert one manually). Surely such airways are still designed to tolerances that allow for navigation systems less accurate than GPS, and therefore current tolerances in computing crossing traffic clearances must allow for errors of more than 1 mile left or right of track?

I can remember years ago flying an Omega-equipped 727 between Perth and Melbourne, when the opposition flew the same routes at the same time in the same type but without Omega. (Omega was pretty cutting edge technology at the time.) Mt Hope VOR was the first ground aid for quite some time after crossing the Great Australian Bite eastbound and it wasn’t uncommon to see the other 727 approaching the aid at damn near 90 degrees to the airway. Somewhere along the way, it was certainly more than 10 miles off track – off the airway, in fact – but the ATC system seemed to cope with these gross inaccuracies.

What we’re asking for with an offset would still leave the aircraft well within the confines of the existing airway – and would be a life-saver should all the other safety systems ever break down, as they so tragically did over Brazil, for whatever reason, last month.

I hope I’m not misunderstood when I say I don’t give a tuppeny **** who’s to blame for the recent tragedy in Brazil – I’d just like to ensure another one never occurs in similar circumstances because someone – I don’t care who – makes another mistake at some time in the future. I think I could say with quite a high degree of safety that the grieving families of the 154 dead in the Brazil tragedy would share my feelings.

*****

TCAS is a life saver, and in 99.9% of cases, will give timely warning. However, what I don’t like about it is that you’re relying on the other pilot, as well as yourself, to take the right avoiding action. The midair between the DHL 757 and the Russian Tupolev a year or two over southern Germany proves that you can’t always rely on that.

broadreach

4th Nov 2006, 15:23

Lon More,

Journospeak, slanted news and translation losses based on partial leaks have been rampant throughout the coverage of this accident. So one might take with a pinch of salt the "Folha de Sao Paulo" item last night stating that FAB (Brazilian Air Force) sources confirmed that, a) based on tower transcripts, he Sao Jose dos Campos controller had cleared the Legacy to FL 370 straight through to Manaus, thus overriding the original flight plan; b) SBSJ/SJK clearances are pre-approved by Brasilia; c) on reaching FL370 the Legacy contacted Brasilia and had a short exchange in which no change other than setting the transponder was requested. After that, no transponder signal nor radio contact although both BSB and the Legacy repeatedly tried to contact each other.

"Looking good for the Legacy crew"? In the legal sense, probably, but one wonders at the scar all this will leave on them. Some might remember it’s good to get back on the horse as quickly as possible after a fall. No news on the return of their passports yet and I confess to over-optimism on that score. The prosecutor who asked for their detention must be keeping his head down.

Earlier this week the ATC situation deteriorated into a free-for-all with everyone blaming everyone else and culminating in almost total paralisation of all air traffic on Thursday 2 Nov, first day of a long weekend. It’s improved since then but, despite official promises to the contrary, is expected to descend into chaos again tomorrow. An ATC collapse has been predicted since 2003 and there were official alerts to the need for doubling the number of controllers as early as 2001. Defense minister Pires, who’s been the government spokesman throughout, is now being accused of caving in to civil ATC demands; airforce are saying this is “contaminating” airforce controllers who make up more than three quarters of the staff. Controllers themselves are talking about greatly increased stress due to the conflicting pressures. Airlines have said they will be suing the government for, so far, losses approaching US$20 mio; hotels and travelers will not be far behind.

formulaben

4th Nov 2006, 16:04

ExSimGuy:

You're not naive, but it's not quite as simple as it seems. Offsetting changes the traffic distribution. It might lower the risk for traffic travelling in opposite directions but you have to consider how the offset affects (among other things) the airspace collision-risk safety case in relation to other traffic, on other airways. If you think about it, flying offset by a mile takes you a mile out of the way of opposing traffic - but brings you a mile closer to whatever traffic patterns or airway structures happen to be on your right (and can bring other offsetting traffic closer to you). The paradox is that offsetting would be easiest to implement in airspace where airway interference would be minimal - and of course, if the airway interference is already minimal, then there's probably little genuine need to offset in the first place.

Have the rules changed? It was my understanding that airways or jet routes were 4 miles wide. Offsetting by 1/4 or 1/2 (.2-.5) mile not only seem acceptable, but a prudent operating procedure.

formulaben

4th Nov 2006, 17:32

The odds of two aircraft being at the same height on a reciprocal track is also deemed to be an extreme uncertainty - it still happens.

...and yet you're more comfortable with them being on the exact same course?

Sorry to sound so simplistic, but I'll take my chances with an offset, sir. I've seen far too many jets at my 12 with only 1000 feet of separation. While it was a mathematical certainty that an accident such as this Brazilian accident would eventually occur, it's obvious to this simpleton that a lateral offset would have prevented it, TCAS or no. The bigger question here is why there was no TA/RA.

kansasw

4th Nov 2006, 17:37

But small probabilities become virtual certainties
Fairly said. Let me try this.
If there is a 1 in a million chance that some event will happen to you, what does that mean?
A) It does mean that it is unlikely to happen to you.
B) It also means that of the million people to whom it might happen, it will happen to one of them.
Probabilities work both ways, they say there is a small chance of something, but that small chance is going to happen to somebody.

clicker

4th Nov 2006, 18:07

Regarding offsets, I know some ATC centres will often position aircraft one side of an airway or another for traffic flow to assist with the flow between sectors.

One I can think of is one near Southampton to/from Lands End, north side for traffic to Lands End, south for traffic from Lands End.

barit1

5th Nov 2006, 00:29

misd-agin

5th Nov 2006, 02:26

Good gosh, how more conservative can we be? The offset capability's here, the need is real, we have a good bit of real experience with it, and now we need to have another study?

How about implementing enroute offset NOW in certain countries, wait a few decades in other countries, and compare body counts? :sad:

A half mile offset is going to cause significant problems? I highly doubt it.

It is amazing to watch how close opposite direction traffic passes by us. Often times within our wingspan, even while making turns over navigation fixes.

Father visited Monkton center years ago. Controller was just checking in one of the first flights westbound from Europe. Realized the a/c was an FMC equipped a/c and put a grease pencil mark on his screen.

My father asked, "what's that for?"
"Watch, every FMC equipped a/c will fly over the same spot. Non-FMC a/c won't."

The risk of a midair will go up when everyone flies the exact centerline.

chuks

5th Nov 2006, 08:32

I had an absolutely fascinating encounter one day about 15 years ago while inbound to the Lagos VOR from Abuja. The approach handling was procedural, since the radar hadn't been working for a long time.

I was at FL60 with an HS125 above me at FL70 and we were both close to the fix. I was cleared to 2 000' and then the HS was cleared to 3 500'. I noticed that he wasn't given a rate restriction but I assumed that he had heard me and knew I was underneath him not too far away. I knew the pilot was a pretty sharp guy so I assumed we were reading from the same page there.

I had already sort of eased over towards the final inbound track for Runway 19L, thinking to get lined up at about five miles so that I could just get a straight-in. That meant a track change from 247 degrees to 186 degrees close to the fix. Sloppy airmanship or just local knowledge? There was no one beneath me in the stack so that I was anticipating a clearance for the approach close to the fix. Otherwise I would have had to hold on the 006 anyway so that it wasn't as if I was infringing with this slight lateral shift.

The next call was from the HS125 crew, levelling at 3 500'! I was just passing FL50 with a fairly brisk rate of descent so that they must have done some monster rate without noticing that there was traffic beneath them. I climbed back up to FL50 and sorted out the immediate problem by letting them go first.

Later I went over to talk to the Captain. It was an amicable discussion, snce we were both simply happy to be alive. From what we could figure out he had been on that normal track when I had been moving over but we still must have passed very close abeam given that we were about the same distance from the VOR, close enough that even 61 degrees would only have been something like a half-mile or so. We were solid IMC so that keeping a lookout was not a factor.

It was just one of those things; the controller should have given a rate restriction, the Captain should have noticed my traffic and not used the very high rate he did and I should have queried the lack of a rate restriction. The whole scenario played out in less time than it took to read this, I guess.

RobertS975

5th Nov 2006, 21:40

Can we simply look at offset as similar to painting a yellow line down the middle of the road and everybody stays on their side of the road? By then again, which side of the road is the correct side?

Dick Smith

5th Nov 2006, 22:11

Chuks, you state:
One thing I find a bit scary is the way we all go wazzing along right down the centreline of the airways nowadays. With the reduced vertical separation being used there's not much margin for error. Chuks, I couldn’t agree more. As Chairman of the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority in 1998 I attempted to introduce as part of the Airspace 2000 changes a recommendation that all aircraft fly 0.1 nautical mile to the right of track when on a two way airway using GPS.

I was howled down by the professional pilots and professional air traffic controllers. They told me that no “professional” would intentionally fly off the centre of the track, and also pointed out some 1950s ICAO requirement to stay in the centre of the track as far as possible. Of course, this was when we were tracking around using VORs and NDBs, not highly accurate GPS.

I still have the Airspace 2000 publication with the 0.1 mile recommendation. I wondered whether a major airline accident would have to occur before the changes were made. It looks as if this is what will happen.

A previous poster on this thread compared the resistance to change of many airline pilots with the resistance to change of the Vatican. I couldn’t agree more.

barit1

5th Nov 2006, 23:02

Can we simply look at offset as similar to painting a yellow line down the middle of the road and everybody stays on their side of the road? By then again, which side of the road is the correct side?

Now now be careful. Just because we have a century of terrestrial background in this radical concept, don't jump to the wild conclusion that it works way up in the sky! :eek:

Smurfjet

6th Nov 2006, 03:08

Did the Legacy get a TCAS alert?

ATCO1962

6th Nov 2006, 03:32

A quarter mile offset works for me. At the scale we use on our radar, you wouldn't even notice that kind of distance and I can't, for the life of me, think of a scenario where it would make the kind of difference that would result in a near miss or worse. Of course, that kind of bold assertion is just ripe for proving wrong when all the holes in the cheese line up.

I'm not at work at the moment, but I think that we have something about offsets in our manuals. I can't remember if it's a "be aware that some aircraft may be doing this" type of warning or if it's suggested as an ATC tool to keep aircraft apart when radar's down or whatever. I'll have to check.

Anyway, it's been well known in ATC circles that greater accuracy in navigation leads to aircraft on same tracks being much closer than the old days. An official OK to offsetting would be timely, IMHO.

PantLoad

6th Nov 2006, 04:12

Dick Smith is totally correct. With the introduction of GPS navigation, we are no longer trying to center swaying needles. Coupled to the autopilot, GPS nav provides for course accuracy generally within ten or so meters.

However, with RVSM, this creates a problem. Many times when a heavy overflies by 1000 feet...and, with light winds aloft, we get our #$^% kicked by the wake. This is because he is dead-nuts-on centerline...as are we. We just hope and pray that no one was hurt in the back.

It's easy to program 'the box' to do a slight offset. Unfortunately, doing so is not in our company's SOP, thereby prohibiting such a prudent action. In my opinion, there is nothing wrong with doing up to and including a two-mile offset (all offsets always to the right). With GPS, you're still much closer to course centerline than in the old days. (In the old days, even with the needle centered, you still probably were not exactly on course centerline.)

This two-mile offset can be reduced as desired, the decision based, perhaps, on the winds aloft. (For example, with a left crosswind, offsetting to the right might put you in wake that, normally centerline flying might avoid.)

In any event, operators should consider the course offset as SOP and encourage the use. A mile or two off centerline allows you to remain well within the boundaries of the airway, while providing a safety margin for both collision and wake turbulence avoidance.

PantLoad

nnc0

6th Nov 2006, 04:41

How does the Offset idea hold up in terms of long range airspace issues. I haven't followed developments in that arena for a good long while, and I could be totally out to lunch on this, but wasn't there talk some while ago of narrowing airways to free up airspace.

I'm also puzzled about the TCAS failure. This was a relatively new design. Shouldn't there have been A TCAS FAIL alert in the EMBRAER warning systems somewhere.

arcniz

6th Nov 2006, 05:36

I wondered whether a major airline accident would have to occur before the changes were made. It looks as if this is what will happen.

Seems like it just did.

Maybe some good can come from this unfortunate collision if it gives some backbone to the airlines and the administrators for near-term (sooner rather than later) adoption of moderate lateral offsets on enroute airways as the baseline SOP.

Tarq57

6th Nov 2006, 06:00

Smurfjet and nnc0
Save you reading the whole thread, The legacy's transponder was temporarily inop at the time, for reason/s as yet unknown (I think.) Transponder off means TCAS - on either aircraft - will not produce an alert.

It would be good if there is someone reading this who is involved at the ATS OPS level of airway and separation design. I can't imagine a small offset will invalidate the separations applicable to airways. Say, up to half a mile or so. Airway separation incorporates a degree of Nav tolerance, plus a fixed buffer, plus (finally) the spacing required, usually 5nm. As an example, an ancient airway defined by NDB's at either end might require about 35nm space away from another similar airway at the midpoint - depending on the length, of course, because the Nav tolerance is so high. For an airway defined exclusively by GPS, that space is obviously a lot less.
And if including an offset invalidates that, well maybe it's time to redesign them a little further apart. An extra mile or so surely isn't going to result in reduced capacity because of reduced space available to fit the airways in?
I'm a tower controller, but when I was an area controller I wouldn't have cared in the slightest if someone was offset. Wouldn't have even been able to discern it.

4Greens

6th Nov 2006, 06:12

Have flown in a major airline. In certain airspace, outside radar coverage, an offset right of track was officially authorised.

This was before GPS. GPS is a bigger problem because of its increased accuracy and hence an offset is even more vital.

aardvark2zz

6th Nov 2006, 06:56

Did the Legacy get a TCAS alert?

Good point !! I missed that one :ugh:

Any takers ??

Would Legacy with a transponder off also deactivate Legacy's TCAS ??

vapilot2004

6th Nov 2006, 09:54

Would Legacy with a transponder off also deactivate Legacy's TCAS ??

Unfortunately, yes.

410

6th Nov 2006, 11:13

A quick question: is there equipment out there that allows offsetting to less than 1 mile? I've fown a variety of equipment and have never come across an FMS that will accept less than 1 mile in its offset function.

***

Again, I'm amazed at how many people within the industry continue to resist offsetting, even after the 747/IL76 midair near Delhi almost ten years ago, the C141/Tu154 midair off West Africa a few year later, and now the midair that's the subject of this thread. In round figures, that's almost 500 people dead who'd still be alive if this simple, life saving, last ditch safety measure was accepted and allowed to be used.

These three accidents prove that even with the most sophisticated high tech anti collision systems and (supposedly) ‘best practice’ ATC procedures it's possible to introduce, all the holes in the cheese STILL can line up.

It seems to me the only way this will ever be introduced is if pilots demand it. Maybe it’s a job for the tech committees of ALPA, BALPA and IFALPA?

What’s the name of the new guy in ALPA? Maybe he could cut his industrial teeth on this before he starts organising strikes to regain pilot pay and conditions. Surely keeping his members alive might be considered even more important than keeping them well paid?

BOAC

6th Nov 2006, 11:16

410 - Way back somewhere in this thread I mentioned that the 'default' offset on the 737 is 0.1nm Right. That would put 2 'offsetting' 737s about 1200 ft apart (less half-span, of course) - which is more than enough, but not too much?

Scurvy.D.Dog

6th Nov 2006, 12:03

Dick SmithAs Chairman of the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority in 1998 I attempted to introduce as part of the Airspace 2000 changes a recommendation that all aircraft fly 0.1 nautical mile to the right of track when on a two way airway using GPS. … yes well, like so many things in aviation (particularly Oz), the ‘whole’ is often the issue, then, as is the case since, the good bits often do not make it past first base because they are ‘part’ of demonstrably bad packages that do not stand up to overall ‘safety positive’ assessment (such as changing CTA C to G or E) …. That was, and still is repeatedly pointed out to those who would promote change without process!I was howled down by the professional pilots and professional air traffic controllers. … not on the subject of offsets They told me that no “professional” would intentionally fly off the centre of the track, and also pointed out some 1950s ICAO requirement to stay in the centre of the track as far as possible. … that ICAO requirement was/is due to ‘ground based’ navigation tolerances and lateral separation calculation 'requirements'.
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There is no doubt that even shallow angle crossing track lateral separation points can be calculated using an additional .5-1nm lateral buffer to all intercept angles (taking procedural latsep conflict points further away from the crossing points), making them more restrictive that they currently are. However, unless and until ICAO states (most countries) reconcile to reduce Latsep buffers for RNP aircraft, the problem remains.
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.. are you aware of which countries permit track offset (if asked)?? … are you aware of why some companies do not permit crew initiated track offset??
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In a general sense, the problem is/will always be the simplicity for ATS operators to be able to apply tolerances to ‘all’ IFR aircraft! … it is simply asking for trouble if a range of latsep distances are available for any given procedural crossing point which must be looked up (because there are so many different tolerances to be applied) by the ATC dependent on the nav gear of the conflict pair!
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Additionally, (as has been discussed here already) is the FMS issue of offset being ‘confirmed cancelled’ during phases of flight other than en-route. .5-1nm might get real interesting in the approach phase (however unlikely) such as GPS tracking to the ARP! …
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The answer may be to apply different latsep procedures above FL280 (which would more than likely nowadays capture only aircraft with RNP Nav)Of course, this was when we were tracking around using VORs and NDBs, not highly accurate GPS. … not really, GPS was around then, then as now, the issue is those aircraft that still do not carry GPS RNP equipment!I still have the Airspace 2000 publication with the 0.1 mile recommendation. .. you presumably also then have the rest of the reasons why Airspace 2000 was not progressed! I wondered whether a major airline accident would have to occur before the changes were made. It looks as if this is what will happen. … in this case, it is clear the multi-layered defences ‘failed’. Why is still at question, and it would be inappropriate to ‘assume’ that we understand the ‘how and why’, it is fair to say, that given the number of flights over a reasonable number of years that pass directly over or under or past by TCAS resolution, the ‘normal’ defences are robust …. Would offsets add another layer .. I think so! …. However, all of the risk inputs must be considered with this change … such as:-
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.. would ATC become less vigilant knowing that offsets might save the day?
.. would Pilots become less vigilant knowing that offsets might save the day?
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.. could a different fault tree be lurking as a result of this change? such as:-
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… how might TCAS respond to a traffic conflict that will pass 1nm+ abeam?
… how might automated ATS systems respond to traffic that does not cross a waypoint?
… how might automated ATS conflict alarm systems be affected by offset?
... what effects could occur with FMS selection and management?
... do 'all' FMS systems support offset modes that do not present confusion/misunderstanding senarios to crews (display and auto cancellation etc)?
... could all current operators fly '.5 right offsets'?
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…. Might all be innocuous, may be not, however ‘careful’ analysis is needed from both airborne and ground based view points! …. Should it be looked at … absolutely and ASAP … haste should not be allowed to 'cause' other issues though!!!
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... another issue is of course single way route structures ... great thing they are too .. are they possible in all en-route environments ...no ... simply because it effectively doubles the number of crossing points for ATC operators to watch in any given area (particularly with lots of crossing tracks mid continent) ... it all comes down to 'resources' I guess ... oh no not that dirty word!:rolleyes:
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The fact remains, had existing defences not failed, the accident likley would not have happened! One of those last line defences is TCAS (and TXPDRS) … perhaps this is also a timely ‘reminder’ of the folly of airspace design that relies only on TCAS and TXPDR operation as a ‘last line of defence’ i.e. Non radar E airspace (remember AusNAS2b)A previous poster on this thread compared the resistance to change of many airline pilots with the resistance to change of the Vatican. I couldn’t agree more. … resistance to change? … perhaps resistance to the type and mode of change!
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Rather than seemingly besmirching RPT Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers (who in any common sense definition of the word have only one objective ‘SAFETY’ and its ongoing improvement) and looking for ‘I told you so’ headlines …. Lobby ICAO and systems manufacturers for automatic track offset ability/approval outside terminal areas!. .... did you lobby ICAO states for 'uniform' cross-border offsets back in 1998- or since???

DA50driver

6th Nov 2006, 13:41

The Honeywell FMS will offset as little as .1nm.

illusion

6th Nov 2006, 14:20

The GNSXLS will do a 0.1 nm offset but from memory it will self cancel as you overfly/flyby the next waypoint and revert to ontrack???

Dick Smith

6th Nov 2006, 21:58

Scurvy.D.Dog, you state:

That was, and still is repeatedly pointed out to those who would promote change without process!

I’ve never promoted change without process. Look at the AMATS changes, for which I was responsible in 1991. It all came in superbly and still remains.

In fact you are incorrect. I was howled down by professional pilots and air traffic controllers in relation to the 0.1 nautical mile offset. The balance of Airspace 2000 was almost identical to the current NAS.

Yes, it was undermined in every way by people who resist change, but gradually we are moving ahead and eventually in Australia we will have a well disciplined radar based airspace where jet airline aircraft remain in controlled airspace not in some form of “do it yourself” uncontrolled airspace.

The remainder of your post makes something which is very simple - and just requires commonsense - incredibly complicated. This is what has happened in Australia and in many parts of the world. More and more studies are done – which no doubt earn the consultants a fortune and delay any rational decision making.

You only have to read this thread to know that all of the pilots with lateral thinking abilities know that a small offset will substantially improve safety.

Isn’t it interesting that we have had to have a major accident (or a number of them) to bring this to a head? I’m absolutely confident that in the next 12 months or so, changes will be made to reduce the chance of this type of accident happening in the future.

con-pilot

6th Nov 2006, 22:29

Well don't try offsetting in China. I did once, lasted about 30 seconds before they started yelling at me.:uhoh:

Tarq57

6th Nov 2006, 22:32

The remainder of you post makes something which is very simple and just requires commonsense incredibly complicated. This is what has happened in Australia and in many parts of the world. More and more studies are done – which no doubt earn the consultants a fortune and delay any rational decision making.

I'm with ScurvyDog on this one. It actually isn't incredibly complicated, just requires some research in the areas mentioned. As a controller, I've seen quite a few procedure changes that were apparently well thought out have potentially dire consequences down the track because, in fact, they weren't, or the appropriate expertise was not sought, or taken into account. This does not have to represent high paid consultants. In fact, better if it were not to involve same, but rather a group of volunteers from the professions they work within, such as, pilots, controllers, avionics experts etc.

This is not to say I'm against an offset; I'm all for it, it just needs to be properly analysed.

Unfortunately some quite good ideas are sometimes presented as part of an unpopular package. The good ideas tend to be consigned to the scrap heap together with the bad, human nature being what it is.

ExSimGuy

7th Nov 2006, 03:36

I guess it was only a matter of time, but the lawyers (vultures?) have moved in. Honeywell (TCAS maker) and ExcelAire are being sued, by families of 10 of the victims, for "Gross Negligence"

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6123030.stm

In the lawsuit, the families allege that the ExcelAire jet's pilots were flying at an incorrect altitude and the transponder - a piece of equipment used for gauging an aircraft's position - was not working at the time of the crash. Honeywell, the firm that manufactured the transponder, has said that it is not aware of any evidence to show that was the case. ExcelAire is yet to comment.
The lawsuit, which seeks unspecified damages, accuses both companies of gross negligence.
"The negligent acts and omissions of ExcelAire and its pilots... were a substantial contributing factor to the mid-air collision," said Robert Lieff, whose law firm is representing the families.
"Honeywell shares responsibility for the collision and the wrongful deaths of the plaintiff's decedents because it defectively designed the transponder," he said

Funny how they already know what happened and who was responsible - and how it's the corporations from "rich" USA and not the Air Traffic orgnisation from "poor" Brazil:(

And Robert Leif is an attorney who specialises in "Class Actions" etc, from corporate-rich San Fransisco

Just hope that the ensuing circus does not drown out the lessson(s) that might be learned and actions that might be taken to reduce the chance of repetition (offset? dual TCAS?)

Mercenary Pilot

7th Nov 2006, 07:26

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. Pilots Involved in Deadly Brazil Air Collision Stuck in Legal, Emotional Limbo

The Associated Press

Two American pilots involved in Brazil's worst air disaster have been virtual prisoners since the crash, isolating themselves in their hotel rooms just steps from Copacabana beach, their lawyer said Friday.

The two men face possible criminal charges in the accident and remain in the odd emotional limbo reserved for the few people lucky enough to survive a collision in the sky and live to talk about it.

Not that they talk much - Joseph Lepore, 42, of Bay Shore, N.Y., and Jan Paladino, 34, of Westhampton Beach, N.Y., have tried to avoid discussing their feelings about the Sept. 29 collision, their lawyer said Friday.

The accident killed all 154 people on board Gol Airlines Flight 1907 when the jet crashed into the Amazon rainforest. Despite damage to the wing and tail of a smaller jet the Americans were piloting, they managed to land safely, and all seven on board survived.

"The one and only time where there was even a hint toward an emotional direction is when one of the guys said 'why did God pick seven and not 154?'" said attorney Robert Torricela, who has holed up with the pilots in a hotel suite for more than a month.

Lepore and Paladino - employees of ExcelAire Service Inc. of Ronkonkoma, N.Y. - had been flying the new Embraer Legacy 600 executive jet back to New York when it collided with the Brazilian passenger jet.

Early speculation in Brazil pointed to errors by the U.S. pilots, but the Folha de Sao Paulo newspaper reported this week that air traffic controllers were recorded putting them on a collision course with the bigger jet according to a leaked flight recorder transcript.

Brazil's Defense Minister Waldir Pires earlier labeled "irresponsible" the pilots' statements to investigators that they had been flying at the correct altitude.

Brazilians speculated in the media that the pilots had ignored their flight plan and even switched off the new jet's transponder to avoid being tracked as they tested its performance - allegations denied by the pilots.

Now, the probe into the accident has stalled.

The Brazilian Air Force, citing international conventions, has not turned over control tower transcripts to federal police, nor let criminal investigators interview the 10 air traffic controllers working that day. All 10 controllers have been put on paid leave and offered psychological care.

The American pilots have tried to cooperate, and initially did not contest the seizure of their passports, which their Brazilian lawyer said was illegal. Now they are considering legal action to retrieve their passports and leave Brazil, Torricela said.

"These guys were near death and are confined in a foreign country for no valid legal or factual reason," he said.

Torricella said the pilots will not talk publicly until they have returned to the United States, for fear of stirring up another media frenzy and out of respect for the victims' relatives. They understand how images of them enjoying Rio's beaches would be seen in Brazil, and so have avoided even leaving the hotel.

"They follow the news reports and see what people have said about them. They felt like powerful forces were aligned against them and it scared them," he said.

Scurvy.D.Dog

7th Nov 2006, 10:25

Folks,
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I apologise in advance for this slight diversion, I do so in the hope of putting an end to un-related content in this important discussion!
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Dick Smith
That was, and still is repeatedly pointed out to those who would promote change without process!
I’ve never promoted change without process. .. AusNAS2b!? .. was it not the ARG (Airspace Reform Group.. of which you were a principle member) that insisted US procedures were a ‘reference system’ and on that basis design aeronautical studies were not required, in fact the record would suggest you actively discouraged such assessments.
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The fact that the US system was not the system being introduced with AusNAS2b is fact, it is demonstrable, and was reversed at great expense as the changes to existing CTA meant a tangible and demonstrable (incident type data both in Oz and the US) reduction in safety in some terminal areas and surrounds! .. the industry was telling you that the whole way along!Look at the AMATS changes, for which I was responsible in 1991. It all came in superbly and still remains. … AMATS changes were subject to change processes that were insisted on by those responsible for change oversight at the time … it is arguable whether those changes were on balance valuable or otherwise … certainly not overwhelmingly lauded!In fact you are incorrect. I was howled down by professional pilots and air traffic controllers in relation to the 0.1 nautical mile offset. … ‘howled down’ … seems emotive, almost churlish .. perhaps a ‘contrary view’ in your language is being howled down, I would suggest that those responsible for safety oversight raised questions for which you had few answers! … I repeat my previous question .... did you lobby ICAO states for 'uniform' cross-border offsets back in 1998- or since??? … otherwise, how do you suppose different states might mitigate against different rules on track offset?? .. Hmm .. remember being asked that?? The balance of Airspace 2000 was almost identical to the current NAS. … I rest my case! Yes, it was undermined in every way by people who resist change, … no … resistance to untested/increased risk for no cost or safety benefit! but gradually we are moving ahead and eventually in Australia we will have a well disciplined radar based airspace where jet airline aircraft remain in controlled airspace not in some form of “do it yourself” uncontrolled airspace. … ‘Uncontrolled airspace’ such as non-radar E airspace (50% uncontrolled) where VFR are invisible to ATS and IFR as well as other VFR! … lets not forget that unless a VFR TXPDR is ON and mode C is ACCURATE .. ICAO non-radar class E will provide un-alerted see-and-hope to avoid ! ….. moving ahead … are you the one driving further change, are you accepting responsibility for the safety outcomes of such changes??? ….. if you say so!The remainder of your post makes something which is very simple - and just requires commonsense - incredibly complicated. … there is the key, an enthusiastic amateur would understandably consider Airspace and ATS safety assessments issues as 'complicated' :ugh: … in reality, if you know what you are talking about, they are not, they do require careful handling to ensure they are not creating other potential problems! := This is what has happened in Australia and in many parts of the world. More and more studies are done – which no doubt earn the consultants a fortune … such as Wes Willoughby? ..and delay any rational decision making. … ‘rational’ … to a broad section of industry (both professional and recreational), or to an individual?You only have to read this thread to know that all of the pilots with lateral thinking abilities know that a small offset will substantially improve safety. …. Know …. Will … perhaps you might support that statement with the appropriate data that confirms your contention ….. what I read from this thread is a continuing discussion (one that has occurred from time to time in recent years) regarding the merits of ‘Offset’ … and it seems clear to me that many pilots and air traffic controllers agree, that if it can be done safely without creating other issues then it should … which brings me back to those responsible for stewardship of ‘international coordination and standards liaison’ with ICAOIsn’t it interesting that we have had to have a major accident (or a number of them) to bring this to a head? … yes very sad!
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… perhaps if those ICAO states 'representative leaders' (of ANSP’s such as, for instance, the former Civil Aviation Authority of Australia and Flight Operations Regulators such as for instance, the former head of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia) had organised ICAO representations/states with the view to draw consensus, this may not have happened!
.... quite obviously, unless and until the states representative leaders can get their collective acts in to gear, the design and risk managers both ground based and airborne are basically powerless to act in a single state/manufacturer (political approval) context!
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…. It is pale after the event to be seemingly blaming operations staff (pilots and air traffic controllers) who pointed out (years ago) that ICAO (and its member states) would have to study and sanction ‘standard’ offsets before we could introduce them across borders and around the globe! .... blame shifting perhaps?? I’m absolutely confident that in the next 12 months or so, changes will be made to reduce the chance of this type of accident happening in the future. …. Yes it is a shame that important safety standards were not coordinated more efficiently in a representative global sense!
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.. an appeal to your common decency:-
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.. discussion relating to Australian airspace (half way around the world from Brazil) and one mans rehash of who said what in the past is not really relevant … is it!
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The offset issue is one thing, and should be discussed thoroughly, but let us not detract from this discussion with A political grandstanding regarding unrelated Australian Airspace arguments. It is neither helpful, nor appropriate in this important thread discussion!
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.. I am more than happy to continue this in D&G …. If you must get it off your chest … AGAIN!
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… To the rest of you,
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Once again, I sincerely apologise for my part in this digression, however, in an international forum such as this one, certain ‘rose coloured’ statements cannot be left unaddressed! :hmm:

Wiley

7th Nov 2006, 14:20

Dear moderator, can I suggest poll on whether enroute offsetting should be introduced worldwide?

jondc9

7th Nov 2006, 18:43

dear wiley

instead of an offset, which I do understand...simply make all airways/jetroutes ONE WAY

while overtake collisions might still happen, head ons wouldn't.

with GPS, phantom vors ( boy am I old) could allow for one way airways.

broadreach

7th Nov 2006, 21:35

The Brasilia newspaper Correio Brasiliense said today that an airforce source close to the investigation and who has seen/heard the FDR and CVR data, confirmed that the Legacy’s FDR indicates the transponder “jammed” (literal translation from the Portuguese word “travou” which can cover several other meanings including “went to standby”) shortly after overflying Brasilia and that this “impeded all radio transmission or reception” (see note below).

The FDR also confirms the flight was stable at FL370 and not, as Cindacta primary radar recordings showed, varying between FL 320 and FL 420.

The Legacy’s CVR recorded five attempts to contact Cindacta 1 by radio and that they were tuned to the correct Brasilia frequency. At the same time Cindacta were attempting to contact the Legacy, first requesting it to switch the transponder on and, when primary radar began showing the altitude variations, to follow its flight plan - equally without success. Shortly before the collision Cindacta asked on an open frequency that any other aircraft in the vicinity contact the Legacy. There was no reply until after the collision, when the Legacy switched to emergency frequency and both radio and transponder resumed functioning.

End of very free synopsis of the Correio Brasiliense article.
Nothing yet re passports being returned.

ATC returned to “normal” on Sunday with few delays attributable to traffic control. Anyone who wishes to check current status can go to http://www.infraero.gov.br/ and click on “Voos on line”. There were rumours during the weekend that the head of the airforce would resign but, since it’s the airforce personnel who’ve got the planes back in the air that no longer seems to be an issue.

Note: is it conceivable that a defect in the transponder could affect radio communication?

Wino

7th Nov 2006, 21:48

Brand new aircraft....

How about a loose rack? Everything would go on and off...

Cheers
Wino

RobertS975

7th Nov 2006, 23:50

Scurvy.D.Dog

8th Nov 2006, 00:30

.. didn't someone report earlier that personnel from O/S agencies were to be part of the investigation??
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.. if not, they are asking for trouble (perceived and real)!
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.. one would assume it would be an issue raised in any subsequent legal proceedings :ooh:

alemaobaiano

8th Nov 2006, 09:34

Again, we are faced with the folllowing dangerous scenario: The Brazilian Air Force is in charge of the investigation of itself. It handles the investigation of Brazilian aircraft incidents and it also is in charge of ATC. And unlike the openess of an NTSB investigation and hearing, it sounds like much of the proceedings are behind closed doors.

Please take the trouble to read through the thread before making comments like this. If you had actually done that you would know that this investigation has representatives from the FAA, NTSB, and Boeing as an integral part of the investigation team.

NTSB investigations are not open either, at least during the actual investigation process. Apart from press releases there is no official word from the NTSB until the investigation is finished. At that point the hearing will take place and the results and conclusions made public. That is the process in almost all countries, and strangely enough, that is exactly the process going on here. Once the investigation is completed the details will be released, until then there will be mostly uninformed speculation based on press comments.

lomapaseo

8th Nov 2006, 12:56

Please take the trouble to read through the thread before making comments like this. If you had actually done that you would know that this investigation has representatives from the FAA, NTSB, and Boeing as an integral part of the investigation team.
NTSB investigations are not open either, at least during the actual investigation process. Apart from press releases there is no official word from the NTSB until the investigation is finished. At that point the hearing will take place and the results and conclusions made public. That is the process in almost all countries, and strangely enough, that is exactly the process going on here. Once the investigation is completed the details will be released, until then there will be mostly uninformed speculation based on press comments.
Not entirely correct.
Most investigations are open and credible updates and status are released by the single agency in charge. Other participants may openly discuss the potential impact of such releases on their organization. The greater industry itself can not afford to await a final report before adjusting to lessons learned in flight safety.
As an outsider to the investigation I can only express my own dismay at the overwheming mis information released by pseudo official sources in this accident only to be contradicted later.
And as so called members of the investigative team, NTSB & Boeing, my understanding is that they act only as advisors and as such speak only when asked. For this reason we have no ability to receive a public comment from them.
I suspect that there will be more surprises coming later as well as a lingering distrust.

alemaobaiano

8th Nov 2006, 14:43

lomapaseo
You're right, I wasn't entirely correct with my statement. I should have specified that information is not released to the public until the end of the investigation, whereas relevant facts will be circulated within the aviation industry as soon as they are known.

However, the misinformation that you refer to is not something that happens only in Brazil. It happens everywhere, including in the US and Europe, as the recent Helios and Comair accidents clearly show.

Why do you think that the "black boxes" were sent to Canada for evaluation? The Brazilian authorities were aware very early of the potential for distrust, especially as the crew and most of the passengers from the US registered Legacy are US citizens. They were also well aware that many US citizens regard Brazil as a corrupt and lawless society which would only be interested in blaming a couple of US pilots to cover up inadequacies in the ATC system here. A perception that has been well illustrated by some posts on this thread.

It's not quite like that in reality and this accident will be properly investigated and reported. The presence, even as observers, of the NTSB and Boeing will see to that. Do you really think that the NTSB would not speak out, even in the US, if they thought something was wrong?

The buffoon in charge of the FAB has been muzzled, and not a moment too soon. It was largely his comments that led to a heated environment and now the investigation team can get on with the task of finding out why TCAS didn't work. That will be the most important flight safety lesson to come out of this tragedy.

Belgique

9th Nov 2006, 01:47

RIO DE JANEIRO: A Brazilian judge Wednesday impounded a private US business jet involved in a September mid-air collision that sent a Brazilian Gol Airline jet crashing into the Amazon jungle, killing 154 people on board.
The Legacy jet, built by Brazilian aircraft maker Embraer, is owned by US company ExcelAire and is currently parked at the Serra do Cachimbo air base in Mato Grosso, where it landed after the collision with all five people on board unhurt.
The order to seize the 24-million-dollar jet came in response to a request by families of the GOL Airlines crash victims. It will be used as collateral for possible compensation.
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The Legacy jets American pilots, Joseph Lepore and Jan Paul Palladino, have been detained by Brazilian authorities to face possible criminal charges.
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Meanwhile, Brazilian Defense Minister Waldir Pires on Wednesday branded as "totally inappropriate" the reported statements of ExcelAire officials who blamed the accident on flight controllers.
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"The control tower doesn't decide the altitudes. That's determined by the flight plan," he said, inventively.
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from link (http://www.thenews.com.pk/update_detail.asp?id=12589)

poorwanderingwun

9th Nov 2006, 03:03

My thoughts have to go out to the Legacy flight crew whose future may depend on the influence held by this cretin Pires who does not only have no understanding of aeronautical proceedures but does'nt know enough to keep his mouth shut so as not to look a complete bloody fool.

threemiles

9th Nov 2006, 09:14

"The control tower doesn't decide the altitudes."

Flying in/out Brazil should be suspended asap if that's the opinion of the head of ATC.

ATC Watcher

12th Nov 2006, 15:09

Be careful, this citation is a translation of technical terms into jargon understandable by the public ( media language ) and then it is further translated into English from Portuguese.

What it could be initally meant is that the ground TWR controller , when isuing a pre departure clarance is not effectively clearing the aircraft to climb to the altitue mentionned in that clearance.

The altitudes to follow in case of Radio comm failure ( acoording ICAO procedures ) are those writen on the flight plan, ( known to every ATC unit en route ) and not that given in the initial pre departure clearance , ( known only to the first 2 ATS Units at best )

And that would be perfecrly correct.

Now, if the PLN has been properly modified by ATC after it was filed, this is another matter of course.

It has been mentioned earlier here that the original PLN was not filed and signed by the pilots but filed by Embraer Ops .

I am sure the investigation will look into that and it could well be that this turn out to be another large hole in the cheese that day .

punkalouver

12th Nov 2006, 16:12

They were also well aware that many US citizens regard Brazil as a corrupt and lawless society which would only be interested in blaming a couple of US pilots to cover up inadequacies in the ATC system here. A perception that has been well illustrated by some posts on this thread.

I would say that perception has been well illustrated by the statement of some of your top officials. Need those quotes be stated again to prove my point.

ICT_SLB

12th Nov 2006, 22:48

Brand new aircraft....
How about a loose rack? Everything would go on and off...
Cheers
Wino

Wino,
An AD & Service Bulletin has been issued on the Honeywell Transponder (beleive it's a card or assembly within the NAV Receiver). An interim FCOM has been issued by other manufacturers for crews to verify that the XPDR hasn't gone into Standby whenever they select Mode A or any other change.

Belgique

13th Nov 2006, 02:52

ICT_SLB said:
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An AD & Service Bulletin has been issued on the Honeywell Transponder (beleive it's a card or assembly within the NAV Receiver). An interim FCOM has been issued by other manufacturers for crews to verify that the XPDR hasn't gone into Standby whenever they select Mode A or any other change.
a. If you're referring to an AD or SB raised since the collision, the that's very interesting.
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b. If you're referring to the pre-existing AD and SB, then Honeywell has already said the the Legacy 600's transponder wasn't a serial number within the affected batch.
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<<"has been issued by other manufacturers">> ????
other than Honeywell?
Please clarify (all of the above).

Wino

13th Nov 2006, 07:45

Actually I was referring to the rack that ALL the radios are placed in. If COM1 and Transponder 1 are in the same rack (not familiar with embraers...) then the potential exists for a common fault... Radio and transponder go at same time... impact re jarrs it back into place...

This aircraft was BRAND new. a small error in manufacture or assembly could easily cause problems like this. it would be unremarkable normally and part of the normal shakedown as an aircraft enters service and its bugs are ironed out. In this case it would be remarkable because of the accident. But I have flown several aircraft in their first week of service and they aren't always exactly perfect.

Cheers
Wino

Wino

13th Nov 2006, 17:41

Joe Sharkey posted this on his website www.joesharkey.com.

Just to recap. Two Pilots are still being held in Brazil for no reason at all now. Joe is absolutely right. These two pilots need to be home for Thanksgiving.

The Brazilians were understandable for holding the pilots initially (I do NOT agree with it, however) But now they are just proving every bigoted thing said about Brazil earlier in this thread by holding the pilots.

Cheers
Wno

broadreach

14th Nov 2006, 21:45

Wino, first of all thanks for your input on how transponder AND radio contact might have gone awol simultaneously. The more that emerges from this accident, the more it appears to offer a field day for lawyers.

The scenario the two Legacy pilots are now caught up in is increasingly nightmarish.

The problem in this case, Punkalouver, is not corruption, though there’s plenty of that to go around in Brazil; it's more a combination of beaurocracy and politics which, for what the analysis is worth, I’ll try to thumbnail here.

The ramifications of the Gol/Legacy collision have highlighted ATC as one more area in which Brazil’s infrastructure is having serious difficulties keeping up with the country’s growth. As they were in other areas, eg power generation, ports, roads, fisosanitary control, you name it, the warning signs were there years ago. In most of these areas the country (I say country rather than government because it’s an elected government) has been winging it and surviving. Real planning is at the very back of the bus.

As mentioned before, the last bastion of the military dictatorship that ended over 20 years ago is aviation. ATC and airports are controlled by the airforce, although they employ civilians as well. The airforce have guarded that little niche jealously because boarding and landing fees are their main source of income.

Change has been slow. First, a civilian defense minister, Waldir Pires. Then, a few months ago, ANAC, a regulatory agency to replace the airforce-controlled DAC. Neither one was ever given the power to actually tell the airforce what to do.

The collision happened in the middle of this and in a period when the country’s politicians were focussed on presidential/gubernatorial elections.

The judiciary, meanwhile, and that includes the Federal Police, trying to appear neutral and at least in theory focussed impartially on investigating pre-election accusations by presidential and gubernatorial contenders. The judiciary’s independence is a great way for “delegados” who might aspire to more profitable political careers, to gain visibility. Remember Eliott Spitzer in New York? I’d venture there are hundreds of clones of Spitzer in any society and Mr Sayao, the “delegado” from the state of Mato Grosso, is one of them. The longer he can keep a leash on Messrs Lepore and Paladino of the Legacy, the longer his own name will be mentioned in the newspapers.

Couldn’t someone with clout whisper a few words in Mr Sayao’s or a few others’ ears? Well, yes, they could, and that may be happening, but it seems that for the time being most of them are embroiled in tossing blame for the aftermath of the collision at each other and waiting for the president to return from his visit to Venezuela in support of Mr Chavez’s election campaign, to hammer the desk and say “I want a solution in 48 hours”, his wont when the cameras are rolling.

Apologies for the length and for the possible political bias. Frankly I’m surprised ALPA and IFALPA haven’t (publicly at least) involved themselves on behalf of the Legacy crew. The preliminary accident report is to be published on Thursday 16 Nov. Perhaps we’ll see something more positive then.

ICT_SLB

16th Nov 2006, 03:52

a. If you're referring to an AD or SB raised since the collision, the that's very interesting.
.
b. If you're referring to the pre-existing AD and SB, then Honeywell has already said the the Legacy 600's transponder wasn't a serial number within the affected batch.
.
<<"has been issued by other manufacturers">> ????
other than Honeywell?
Please clarify (all of the above).

I was refering to this FAA AD released on 17 October:
http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/1bddc176ac629452862571e70059100d!OpenDocument

By other manufacturers I meant other airframers not Brand H.

PaperTiger

16th Nov 2006, 15:55

I was refering to this FAA AD released on 17 October:
http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/1bddc176ac629452862571e70059100d!OpenDocumentEmpresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER) requests that we extend the compliance time for the AFM revision from 5 to 30 days. EMBRAER asserts that the loss of the transponder does not pose so great of a hazard to justify such an urgent compliance time.(emphasis mine) :confused: :ooh:

ATC Watcher

16th Nov 2006, 21:11

Yes, that shows the great divide that exists between operational ATC and policy makers in some areas, aircraft manufacturers included.

Some States (e.g. : Switserland, Portugal to name only 2 ) have decided some years ago to eliminate Primaty radar and replace it by SSR only, meaning that if today you loose your transponder you become invisible to ATC , and as a bonus to other TCAS.
The result being that you loose in one go your primary anticollison system (ATC) ande your last minute back up (TCAS).

We raised this issue at the time, but were told that Xponders were so reliable that a double failure was considered impossible.
The same reasoning was used for ETOPS by the way..

caos

16th Nov 2006, 23:00

Preliminary Report from O Globo, - plain translation -

16/11/2006
report of the investigation on the accident with the flight 1907

Data preliminaries on the collision between Gol Boeing and the jet Legacy
published by the Center of Investigation and Prevention of Accidents (Cenipa)

Investigation should last ten months
Phase 1: Collection of Data (45 days)
Phase 2: Analysis (90 days)
Phase 3: Preliminary conclusions and Drafts (120 days)
Phase 4: Final conclusions and Recommendations (30 days)
Phase 5: Final report (30 days)

The facts
1. the plan of presented flight, for the aircraft N600XL (the jet Legacy), leaving of São José dos Campos for Manaus, requested the level of flight 370, until the vertical of Brasília. Of Brasília to the fixed Teres, it was requested the level of flight 360. Of the fixed Teres to Manaus, it was requested the level of flight 380.
N600XL took off at 14:51 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) and at 15:33 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) it reached the level of flight 370, foreseen in the plan of presented flight, for the first stage until Brasília.
This flight level was maintained to the moment of the collision.

2. the flight 1907, leaving of Manaus, requested the level of flight 370. It took off at 15:35 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) and it reached the level of flight 370, at 15:58 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), in the airway UZ6, conditions maintained until the moment of the collision. They didn't happen communication problems between the flight 1907 and the control organs during all the operation.
It didn't happen any type of loss of contact radar for the Amazonian Center with the flight 1907, until it transfer for the Brasília Center.

Control of Air traffic
At 15:51 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), there was the last bilateral contact of N600XL with the Brasília Center. (Freq. 125.05 MHz)
At 15:55 o'clock, N600XL flew over the vertical of VOR of Brasília, maintaining the level of flight 370 and entering in the airway UZ6, without to request or to receive any instruction of the Brasília Center.
At 16:02 o'clock, there was the loss of information of the secondary radar with N600XL, that introduces to the controller, accurately, the altitude information.
Among 15:51 (schedule of Brasília) and 16:26 (schedule of Brasília), there was not any contact attempt, nor on the part of N600XL, nor on the part of the Brasília Center.
At 16:30 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) there was momentary loss (2 minutes) of the contact primary radar with N600XL, that transmits to the controller the geographical position of the aircraft.

Starting from the 16:26 (schedule of Brasília), the BR Center accomplished seven calls:
16:26
16:27
16h30min40
16h30min56
16:32
16:34
16h53min39

At 16:38 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) the Brasília Center lost the contact primary radar definitively with N600XL, until it transfer for the Amazonian Center.
At 16h53min39 (schedule of Brasília), the Brasília Center made the last call, blindly, informing N600XL to call the Amazonian Center, supplying two frequencies: 123.32Mhz and alternative 126.45Mhz.

Flight of N600XL
N600XL, at 16h48min16 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), it began a series of 12 calls to the Brasília Center:
16h48min16
16h48min40
16h49min33
16h50min08
16h50min28
16h50min48
16h51min08
16h51min24
16h51min41
16h52min10
16h52min42
16h52min59

At 16h53min39 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), N600XL got to hear Brasília's Center last call, blindly, guiding to call the Amazonian Center, without getting to copy the frequencies.
At 16h53min57 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), N600XL answered to the Brasília Center asking so that they were repeated the decimals of the first informed frequency, because he didn't get to copy them. The Center didn't receive this message.
After this moment, N600XL accomplished more seven calls to the Brasília Center:
16h54min16
16h54min40
16h55min00
16h55min43
16h56min41
16h56min53
16h55min16
At 16h56min54 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) it happens the collision.

General Considerations
Not happened any loss of contact radar for the Amazonian Center with the flight 1907, until it transfer for the Brasília Center.
There are no request registrations of N600XL to the control organs, to accomplish level change, after having reached the level of flight 370.
There are no registrations of any instruction of the control to N600XL, in the sense that level changes were accomplished, after the last contact bilateral good happened between that aircraft and the Brasília Center.
The aircrafts were, in the airway UZ6, in opposite directions, in the level of flight 370.

The system TCAS (System embarked to avoid Collision in Flight), existent in both aircrafts, it didn't emit any warning of alert of traffic or of instruction for evasive action, for the respective crews, in the sense of avoiding the collision.
There was not manifestation, for none of the crews, regarding a possible previous visual perception of the approach of the aircrafts.
It didn't happen any action attempt or it maneuvers evasive, in agreement with the existent data in the flight tape recorders.
At 16h56min54 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) there was a COLLISION, possibly, between the left wing of N600XL and the left wing of the flight 1907.
The flight 1907, after the collision, was uncontrollable to the pilots, beginning immediate dive until the soil.
The tape recorders of flight data (CVR and DFDR) of the flight 1907 had it operation interrupted to 7887ft of altitude.
After this moment, N600XL accomplished 09 (nine) calls to the Brasília Center:
16h57min47
16h58min09
16h58min47
17h02min40
17h03min11
17h03min41
17h03min50
17h04min03

At 16h59min50 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), approximately three minutes after the collision, the Amazonian Center started to receive information of the secondary radar, with precise altitude needs and identification code allocated N600XL.
At 17h00min30 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), the Amazonian Center accomplished a call to N600XL, without obtaining answer.
At 17h01min22 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) N600XL tried to establish communication with the Amazonian Center, through the Polar 71, requesting coordination to accomplish a landing in Test Field Brig. Veloso.
At 17h02min10 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), the Amazonian Center started to receive information of the secondary radar, originating from of the change of the code transponder of N600XL, for 7700 (EMERGENCY).
At 17h03min11 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) N600XL, after the collision, declared EMERGENCY, without getting communication with the Brasília Center, and it began procedures to accomplish an emergency landing.
The Amazonian Center accomplished more four calls to N600XL, without obtaining answer:
17h10min41
17h10min50
17h11min00
17h12min44

At 17h13min16 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) the Polar 71 established communication with the Amazonian Center declaring the situation of EMERGENCY of N600XL.

Accomplished actions
Recovery of the data of the registrars of flight of N600XL and of the flight 1907.
Interviews and medical examinations with the crew members of Legacy. (02/10)
All requested the data registered by the Control of Air traffic, relative the occurrence. (02/10)
Tests preliminaries of equipments in the Legacy (07/10/06).
Verification of the wreckage of the 737-800, in the place of the accident.
Reading and processing of the data of the flight registrars, of both aircrafts, except the voice registrar (CVR), of the flight 1907, in TSB Ottawa, Canada.
Preliminary analysis of the recordings and transcriptions of the communications between the aircrafts and control organs.
Verification of the equipments of the wreckage of the flight 1907.
Send of the voice registrar (CVR) of the flight 1907 for the Laboratory of TSB, Ottawa, Canada.
Verification of the data, relative the visualization radar, registered by the organs of control of the air space, with works accomplished in the dependences of CINDACTA 1, in Brasília, and in the dependences of CINDACTA 4, in Manaus.

Next actions
Analyses of the equipments of radio and navigation, communication, transponder and TCAS, of the aircrafts, they be accomplished at laboratory.
Interviews with the controllers of Air traffic.
Relative works to the air traffic, they be accomplished in the USA, to invitation of FAA, for analysis, among other subjects, of the norms and prerequisites for American pilots fly in the exterior.
Works and interviews with the operators.

Summarize of the current situation
Collects of data still given no completed and initiate analyses for focal points, among other, related the:
Operation of Transponder and equipments of radio and navigation of the aircraft N600XL;
Knowledge and preparation foreseen the pilots of N600XL, for the accomplishment of the flight in Brazil;
Relative aspects to norms and procedures of the Control of Air traffic, now in use in Brazil and in the world;
Systems and equipments of communications and system of surveillance of the Control of Air traffic.
In the moment, any conclusion will be premature
Recommendations can be emitted, before the final conclusion of the investigation process.
Data factuals and recommendations of flight safety, will be informed to the public.

Source: http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Colunas/0,,7272,00.html
(some pics at this link, not posted here)

vapilot2004

17th Nov 2006, 06:12

Joe Sharkey posted this on his website www.joesharkey.com.

More today where our intrepid reporter goes on the attack with serious accusations. :eek:

Ace Rimmer

17th Nov 2006, 07:19

Broadreach: Have a look at the IFALPA and ALPA websites under press releases...

.....;) tip of the iceberg....

threemiles

17th Nov 2006, 13:52

At 16:02 o'clock, there was the loss of information of the secondary radar with N600XL, that introduces to the controller, accurately, the altitude information.
Among 15:51 (schedule of Brasília) and 16:26 (schedule of Brasília), there was not any contact attempt, nor on the part of N600XL, nor on the part of the Brasília Center.
At 16:30 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) there was momentary loss (2 minutes) of the contact primary radar with N600XL, that transmits to the controller the geographical position of the aircraft.

Starting from the 16:26 (schedule of Brasília), the BR Center accomplished seven calls:
16:26

It took 24 minutes for Brasilia ATC to realize that it had lost (secondary) radar contact with 600XL.

There were another 33 minutes of time left to take action in order to avoid the collision, if there was any doubt about the flight level of 600XL.

ATC Watcher

17th Nov 2006, 16:57

The 24 minutes have to be relative to the size of the sector. Possibly ( I have not seen the radar recording) the Legacy was not in conflict with anybody, at cruising altitude, so there might not have been any reason for both Brasilia and the Legacy crew to call each other .

For ATC, if you lose the Xpondr and keep corrolation ( via PRI radar ) and you do not need to talk to the aircraft , then it is not uncommon to notice that you lost Mode C accuracy , especially if you are busy with other traffic.
So that does not shock me per se.

This preliminary report does not bring much info from the ATC side to draw a definite conclusion .
What it does tell us however is that the Legacy crew did not do anything criminal, " gross negligence" cannot be proven. therefore I fully support the IFALPA position that they should be allowed to go home asap.

Last, on the Joe Sharkey blog , the arguments he uses are not going to help the guys much . He no aviation specialist , and maybe he should take expert advice if he really want to help.

For info Brazilian Portuguese is the oficial language for R/T communications, English is provided for international operations , in a similar manner that it is done in the rest of South and Central america with Spanish/English.

That perhaps does not make much operational sense to many , but it is the actual official ICAO standard and legally Brazil is correct.

I also doubt that dual language use played any role in this accident , but time will tell.

mm_flynn

17th Nov 2006, 17:35

Is my summary of the preliminary report correct?

At 15:55 o'clock, N600XL passes Brasília unto UZ6 and maintains FL370 and no communication attempt is made by ATC or legacy.

From 15:55 to 16:02 Legacy proceeds on UZ6 squawking mode C FL370
This two fact imply that both ATC and Legacy believe the flight is cleared to maintain FL370 on UZ6?

At 15:58 Flight 1907 is level FL370 in UZ6 opposite direction

At 16:02 transponder signal is lost
But based on lack of communication (and ATC WATCHER's post) can we assume that Brasilia still has correlation via primary radar?

At 16:26 Brasilia starts trying to contact Legacy
My speculation - to coordinate handover to Amazonian based on their final blind transmission - I am assuming that opposite direction same level traffic wouldn't ordinarily be separated 30 minutes and say 600 miles away from each other?

At 16:30 there is a momentary loss (2 minutes) of the contact primary radar with the Legacy

At 16:38 Brasília Center looses primary contact

At 16:48 Legacy tries to contact Brasilia

At 16h53min39 Brasília makes a blind transmission for legacy to change frequency to Amazonian. The legacy crew hears this transmission but does not copy the frequency.

We are now 5 minutes after the first possible moment the legacy crew could be aware of a comms problem, without secondary for 51 minutes, without primary radar for 15 minutes, with opposite direction same level traffic 3 minutes away.

From 16:53 - 16:55 Legacy tries to get the Amazonian frequency retransmitted.

16:57 impact occurs.
----------------
Even with perfect radio failure procedure, There seems to be only 1 minute of time available for Legacy crew to have concluded they had a radio failure before starting to count 7 minutes.

There is also a notable lack of data on the ground coordination between Brasilia and Amazonian on these two flights and what the plan was for separation as the passed.

broadreach

17th Nov 2006, 22:35

Mr. Sharkey’s sneering prose style may keep readers coming but I doubt if it helps the Legacy crew much. His job no doubt but the emotional approach only gets backs up. Without his help, in Brazil, media speculation over apparent ATC failures and the impact of the continuing ATC go-slow on thousands of travelers, is swinging public opprobrium away from the Legacy crew and onto ATC and the airforce; the IFALPA release may nudge it in the direction of the Justice department and Mr Sayao, the Federal Police “delegado”. Hope Ace Rimmer is right and that’s just the tip of the iceberg.

The Powerpoint prelim report yesterday made no mention of contact between Manaus ATC and the Gol 738. Colonel Rufino, heading the investigation, admitted the oversight and promised to include it.

Latest emergency measures to relieve the ATC workload include routing flights over the ocean. Debate over “demilitarisation” of ATC continues, “Pro” seems to be gaining support.

caos

18th Nov 2006, 02:24

In addition to broadreach, mm_flynn and ATC posts, I note some :suspect: points at the recent report,

1.- "After this moment, N600XL accomplished 09 (nine) calls to the Brasília Center:"
_time____|__ gap___
16:57:47
16:58:09__|__ 0:00:22
16:58:47__|__ 0:00:38
17:02:40__|__ 0:03:53 <------:confused:
17:03:11__|__ 0:00:31
17:03:41__|__ 0:00:30
17:03:50__|__ 0:00:09
17:04:03__|__ 0:00:13

What happened between 16:58:47 and 17:02:40 ?-"At 16h59min50 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), approximately three minutes after the collision, the Amazonian Center started to receive information of the secondary radar, with precise altitude needs and identification code allocated N600XL."
If the transponder was faulty and it was activated with the collision, it could not have been activated 3 minutes after the impact.

2.- Also note from report:-"There was not manifestation, for none of the crews, regarding a possible previous visual perception of the approach of the aircrafts."
but, in Accomplished actions report say:

-"Reading and processing of the data of the flight registrars, of both aircrafts, except the voice registrar (CVR), of the flight 1907, in TSB Ottawa, Canada."

3.- Another one:-"There are no registrations of any instruction of the control to N600XL, in the sense that level changes were accomplished, after the last contact bilateral good happened between that aircraft and the Brasília Center."
And between Legacy and São José dos Campos ?

threemiles

18th Nov 2006, 05:25

Oldiemeister

18th Nov 2006, 12:19

Good morning from São Paulo,

I am not a pilot or an ATC expert (although I have some background, however years back in Germany), but I would like some answers to the flwg questions that bother me for some time now regarding this unfortunate midair collision:

1) Why did the Legacy pilots not stick to their own Flight Plan (although apparently elaborated and filed by Embraer Op), especially when they could not contact any ATC en route anymore. I am not trying to find excuses for Brasilia ATC, just an explanation, as I find it hard to believe that a pilot really relies on the first - and only - instruction to rise to and maintain FL370, given by the tower in São José dos Campos, even some hundreds of miles later.

2) Why does a pilot not inform himself before a flight of all the radio frequencies possibly needed on his flight? That would have helped a lot when the radio communication with Cindacta-1 finally returned.

3) Does a "jammed" (Portuguese for "travou") transponder have any influence on the radio and the TCAS, i.e., do they stop working at the same time, if the transponder has a problem? And if this is correct, why was the radio communication with Cindacta-1 working again, all of a sudden and at this far away transition point, shortly before the accident?

4) As far as I understand, there are several airways between Manaus and Brasilia. Now, why use an opposite direction FL, such as UZ6, at all, especially as there are only very few flights between these areas?

5) I do not have any flight maps of the airways between Brasilia and Manaus, but I am sure that these mention that any air traffic from Brasilia to Manaus would have to be on even numbered FLs and that the traffic between Manaus and Brasilia would have to on odd numbered FLs, right?

Thanks in advance for some insight on this.

vapilot2004

19th Nov 2006, 01:35

1.) Flight plan is only a plan when in controlled airspace. While routing can be autonomous, ATC must approve altitude changes. When we have known lost commumications, follow the ICAO 7 min rule. They were at less than 5min when this accident occurred.

2.) Frequencies are not always the same. Each controller needs a channel. If you have 5 ATCOS in a center, there are five different working frequencies. Also, there is nothing in the cockpit that goes 'bing bong' when you move from sector to sector. We rely on the controllers to hand us off to the next one at the transition point. It is their ball game. Help here comes in the form of the guard channel.

3.) TCAS requires a working transponder. A malfunctioning transponder would not affect radios unless there is some unlikely data bus or power issue.

4.) The route they were on is an established and direct flow pattern.

5.) Back a few pages this is covered. (magnetic variation)

Much of the above has been covered in this long thread, but may require some distillation.

threemiles

19th Nov 2006, 07:49

They were at less than 5min when this accident occurred.

It can't be emphasized enough to those who blame the pilots that there is no alert on the flight deck that rings or an iron lady that yells when communications to ATC is lost.

When you fly on a long thin route where your own compulsary reporting points are scattered over 200 or 300 NM distance, it is not unlikely that you hear nothing from ATC or another aircraft for 30 or 40 minutes. Depending on time of the day. As a foreign pilot you have no idea whether this is normal or not.

In a radar environment (when radar contact is confirmed) by local rules (I don't know about Brazil, but certainly U.S.) even compulsary reporting points may be omitted to report. How can a pilot then realize that a loss of communication has occurred?

I know those long VHF extended range comm routes from a portion of the South Atlantic. You hear nothing for an hour, you trust ATC that they put you to the right level and the right distance to your neighbours.

Unlike the pilots ATC does know that an abnormal condition exists when radar contact is lost and appropriate action is required to verify the current circumstances of flight. Despite any primary target that still may be visible this is done by immediately picking up the mike and asking to recycle the transponder. This is a standard procedure. You simply don't sleep for 24 minutes and forget about the target. Only when ATC calls and there is no reply the problem becomes apparent.

Still and even when working on the uncertainty about the flight status there is the one primary duty for ATC NEVER to be forgotten: SEPARATION. Horizontally or vertically, here: totally neglected over more than 20 minutes, from notice of communication loss until collision. A clearance for a simple level change to a level on the safe side (below 360) plus a 20 NM track deviation for GOL would have done. There was enough time.

Here you find an example how ATC normally works:
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?p=2894664&highlight=manaus#post2894664

Who is reponsible?

agusaleale

19th Nov 2006, 09:00

Wouldn´t have been declared an emergency if the Legay disappeared from the radars?
And if the Legacy didn´t disappeared from the primary radar, Didn´t they know by the crt that both planes where pretty much closer and that if they maintained fl370 they where going to collide?
Please, could somebody explain this?

ATC Watcher

19th Nov 2006, 09:57

I don’t know Mr ATCWatcher where you have all your knowledge from that you carry to market here but it has nothing to do with reality. Read ICAO manuals .
Oh Dear ,oh Dear ! where to start ?
I do not know who you are but there are enough people on this site who know who I am. I make no secret of it, and I do not have to market anything .
If you knew a bit how modern ATC Centres works you would not write in such a way. It also always frighten me to see people using ICAO as some do with a holy book , while they have not understood what is behind.
You also write :Here you find an example how ATC normally works:
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...#post2894 664
the link is referring to one of your earlier posts giving a very good indication that you do not understand much about ATC .
Let me try to educate you If you allow me :
The system used in Brasilia is a standard Thales system well known all over the world.
It has a good Flight Plan processing system and when coupled to a primary/SSR radar, correlates a/c ID ( the call sign) with BOTH a Primary radar track and an SSR code.
If you lose the transponder signal, (A+C) the correlation is not lost but kept in the Primary signal the only thing that you lose is Altitude reporting.
That is visualized on Thales systems in various ways as the display of information shown to controllers is customized , but generally what you have normally under the call sign is something like 360 - 36 . 360 being the mode C and 36 the coordinated level ( i.e the level at which the a/c should be now of in the near future ) .
If you loose Mode C you can have --- - 36 or something else, as probably in Brasilia (*)
That is all you will notice on the label . There are no bells ringing or alerts coming on , as loosing C is not that uncommon.
My point was that if the controller was busy with other traffic, there was no reason for him to concentrate on the Legacy label and notice the loss of Mode C. And even if he noticed during his normal screen scanning, he might have thought this as temporary or garbling, etc..
Loosing Primary is basically the same, the flight plan processing continues to display the label, but now it is updated by the PLN and not by the radar tracker, in most systems you would have a clear indication ( like a symbol change or letter popping up on the label )
But unless you lose your radar head of trackers, you would not be that much alerted.
Now if you put this in the context of the Amazon where known interferences and other factors are causing temporary losses of radar returns and VHF coverage, and this on a daily basis, you would not “ ring the bells and call SAR every time you lose a return. .
Also if one look at the MAP, the first airway crossing on UZ6 ,is nearly 300 NM away from Brasilia , so nothing is very time critical , we are not in the US East Cost here.
Therefore I said the facts as reported in the preliminary report do not shock me per se.
An advice : Do not throw stones to the controllers there without knowing , and in your case, understanding , what happened .
Finally by concluding “ Who is responsible ? you show that primary instinct of “ blaming someone “ for an accident before knowing all the facts . An accident is never one responsibility, or one person, or one cause, but ,often more than 10 put together ( 13 in Ueberlingen for instance ).
I bet you this will be the case here. Sure Brazilian ATC will get its errors pointed out, but the key issue , the ONLY key issue is what the Brazilian Government will do to make sure those errors do not happen again .
Most of us in this Forum are not interested in the blame or responsibilities game,
In the meantime let’s campaign for the release of the 2 Legacy pilots , who have done nothing criminal here . That much the meager preliminary report is telling us .
(*)Before somebody asks what do I mean by the " as probably in Brasilia " above , we know that Brazil is using 3 D radars ( see previous posts here ) and we know that the vertical component is imprecise . How this vertical component is integrated on the label and how this is visualized when mode C is lost would be interesting to watch.
If one reads the terminology used in the preliminary report (i.e. “ precise altitude” ) this could indicate that the mode C ( i.e “ precise altitude” ) could be replaced on the label by the Vertical primary return ( i.e : imprecise altitude )
If that imprecise altitude would be around the same value of the expected altitude , then there will be very little or no difference on the label ,( perhaps a symbol, or a letter ) reducing the chances to spot the altitude difference.
Just a thought.
I Would also be very interested to know at which FL the 737 was coordinated with Brasilia, and what the 737 label looked like in Brasilia a couple of minutes before the collision .

Oldiemeister

19th Nov 2006, 10:03

Thanks to VAPILOT2004 for trying to answer my questions.

I am not really satisfied, though, as I am sure most of you are not either. This has, of course, something to do with the preliminary report, which appears to me like the "Swiss cheese type", with lots of holes in it.

Question 1 re the original flight plan - "While routing can be autonomous, ATC must approve altitude changes". I agree 100%, but why did the Legacy then stay on FL370 for the whole flight, while their plan said FL370 until Brasilia, then FL360 and FL380 from Teres). They did not even contact ATC when they changed airways.

threemiles wrote: "In a radar environment (when radar contact is confirmed) by local rules (I don't know about Brazil, but certainly U.S.) even compulsary reporting points may be omitted to report. How can a pilot then realize that a loss of communication has occurred?"

If I would be flying over unknown territory, some of it dense rain forest or otherwise unknow terrain, I would not omit any reporting point...just to be on the safe side. Or do you think, ATC would tell me to "get lost...don't bother us..."?

Question 2) OK, frequencies are not always the same...granted..., but don't you think that it would have been a good idea to also try some of the Cindacta-4 (Manaus) frequencies, when there is not communication with the other ATC? And what about the Emergency channel.

All this does not - in any way - exempt Cindacta-1 (Brasilia) from their obligations to react as soon as they have loss of communication, secondary radar or any other abnormal occurrences. 24 minutes is clearly not acceptable...

Nothing goes bing-bong - Sure, but why is this still so in the 21st Century? Is it impossible to create a system that, once you pass, e.g. an VOR, gives you all the relevant information on a screen, such as

- Information on airway/FL etc.
- Possibly even information on traffic on the same airway/FL
- Frequency nos. of ATCs behind and ahead of you
- Your own transponder reading, sent back to you for verification and to let you know that it is working fine
etc.

I hope, you know what I mean. From what it looks like, it appears that most new cars are probably better equipped (with GPS navi systems etc.) than modern aircraft or ATCs. My cell knows when I enter a new provider area and sends me a welcome message...in my cell's language , even when I am in China...

3) I still find it strange that the radio started to work again only near the transition point. And the transponder "healed" himself, but only 3 minutes after the accident?

4) Let me rephrase the question - If there are only a few flights between Brasilia and Manaus, why use only UZ6 for both south and north traffic? Why not use always only one-directional airways, e.g., UZ6 for traffic to Manaus and any other airway for the traffic going to Brasilia?

5) I did not find the thread with "magnetic variation", but found other threads that are also asking the same thing: Why was FL370 authorized, confirmed and maintained, knowing that normally an odd numbered FL is only used for the north-south traffic?

I always understood that the main issue in air traffic is to keep the aircrafts as safely as possible apart - horizontal and vertical separation. If this some works most of the time in much more crowded air space, such as e.g. ORD, why was it possible that 2 planes were authorized to use the same airway, the same FL...and neither any ATC on the way nor any of the pilots questioned this. The immediate reaction of a neighbour of mine, a commercial pilot for more than 15 years (now out of work due to the recent "problems" in Brazilian commercial aviation - Vasp, Transbrasil, Varig...), some minutes after the basic accident facts were known, was: What was he (the legacy) doing on FL370, that level is only used for southgoing traffic...". As the keyword in ATC

Thanks again and btw: Buenos dias is Spanish, the language in Brazil is Portuguese - BOM DIA (Good morning), BOA TARDE (Good afternoon), BOA NOITE (Good evening and Good Night)...

Bom dia, good luck and always happy landings !!

threemiles

19th Nov 2006, 13:09

that you do not understand much about ATC

I am not here to argue with you. You are kind enough to explain the radar and technical side of the incident. This is all taken for granted and you may be right about a lack of reliability of the SSR returns in the area and the primary keeping the tracker up-to-date. But ATC as flying is over procedures, procedures and procedures. Yes, these procedures are a bible. After an incident asherence to procedures is the first thing to be investigated.

Especially when a flight is let flown at a non semicircular flight level in a critical surveillance environment with the obvious risk of comm loss, radar loss and heads-on traffic. This requires continuous alertness, watching the flight label, proper coordination with adjacent sectors and centers. I hope you don't doubt. 4 compulsary reporting points along the way BRS, TERES, NABOL, ISTAR, none of them reported by 600XL and nobody cared about it.

I don't know much about Thales systems but about P1 and Madap. When --- 36 appears in your label example it must have been entered manually as the assigned flight level by a controller. (Unless the Thales system fills in the planned FL, which I really cannot believe, but you will tell me).

There is one aspect that leads to my view that ATC simply forgot that 600XL was still at 370 and never ever cleared to or maintained 360:
At 16:53, i.e. 3 minutes before the collision, they asked for a frequency change to Manaus. Despite the fact that there was opposite traffic 3 minutes out and communication was critical, they did not say: "Immediate descend to FL360 due to opposite traffic". Believe me this is first ATC duty. SEPARATION.

Also: FL380 was filed for TERES. With the lack of a Mode-C readout there MUST have been some doubt about the actual FL of 600XL at the handover to Manaus. Did they climb to 380? Where they still at 370 or 360?

You are right, there is nobody to blame until all circumstances have been uncovered. But don't forget the two innocent pilots who still cannot leave their hotel in Rio. As it becomes apparent that ATC acted with negligence it is time to let the pilots go.

Belgique

19th Nov 2006, 13:47

Non-evident critical system’s status lights strike again
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While air traffic control errors seem to be more likely as the primary cause for the Sept. 29 midair collision in Brazil that killed 154, it is beginning to look as if the avionics trend for centralized control and bland advisories in lieu of warnings may be a villain in the supporting cast. A centralized control unit called an RMU (Radio Management Unit) allows pilots to control their communications with the pressing of a few buttons and the turn of a tuning knob. Typically an RMU allows pilots to change frequency, squawk IDENT, change transponder codes or put the transponder into a standby mode, tune into and listen to NAVAID idents or select Public Address and intercom channels. The RMU can store and display up to 12 communication and 12 navigation frequencies. Some variants called communications controllers include hookups to SATCOM (satellite communications), ACARS printers (Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System) or digital telephones. It's thought the Honeywell Unit used in the Legacy was the Honeywell Primus 1000’s Dual RMU-850 or 855B. The RMU control panel’s been narrowed down as the likely cause for the Legacy transponder and TCAS dropping off line – due to crew error (switchology).
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The RMU has six keys on the side of the digital screen, along with a tuning knob. Two keys are used to program the plane's VHF comms radio, two are for the transponder, and two are for the collision avoidance system, or TCAS. Investigators are looking at whether the American pilots of the Legacy may have hit the wrong combination of keys, which would place the transponder in standby mode. It is known that the transponder on the Legacy was not operating before the collision but began working just afterward. That re-awakening is accepted as having been due to the pilots selecting the international distress code of 7700 after their collision.
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The American pilots were experienced and have used this model and similar RMUs for years, making a keying mistake unlikely unless they were distracted and mashing RMU buttons while urgently trying to re-establish radio contact with controllers. It should be noted that the RMU's are usually in a dual configuration (i.e. one for each pilot). It's not known whether mutual interference is possible – if being simultaneously addressed by both pilots. Families of some of the GOL victims are alleging in a lawsuit filed in New York that the ExcelAire pilots improperly operated the RMU, accidentally placing the transponder in standby mode, and then compounded that error by "failing to take note of a warning light." If the transponder is ineptly switched to standby, the only warning of that to the pilots is a green light that reads "TCAS OFF". The lawsuit is also directed against Honeywell and argues that the key that puts the transponder into standby is located too close to another button pilots use to IDENT the aircraft for controllers (i.e. identify via a magnified blip). If a line key is inadvertently hit twice, instead of once, for a function, then the transponder will revert to standby mode.
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Non-evident Failure Modes
When a weather radar fails, its malfunctioning is obvious, i.e. you lose the picture or it distorts. When a TCAS collision avoidance system is inadvertently switched off due to placing to standby a system upon which it's dependent for its functionality (i.e. the ATC transponder), then the warning system should annunciate (i.e. either flash very visibly or orally announce the inappropriate status or condition for an aural alert). But this doesn’t happen. Why? Avionics designers have concentrated on building in redundancy and fool-proof BITE functionality (Built-in Test Equipment) to advise of actual systems failure - however they have been allowed to get away with NOT designing against (or adequately advising of) human input failures (i.e. an inadvertent switch-off). Provision of a mere steady green status light, rather than an attention-getting flashing amber annunciator was what directly led to the Helios 737 crew failing to notice the MANUAL pressurization caption amongst a sea of captions, indicators and lights above their heads. The sounding of a "rarely heard airborne" pressurization horn alarm merely reminded the Helios 737 crew of the scenario where it had its other completely different meaning (i.e. as a configuration warning alert on the ground, pre-takeoff). That led to confusion and ultimately to the Helios pilots passing out due to lack of oxygen as the 737 climbed on autopilot.
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The Honeywell RMU was included in a September FAA airworthiness directive (AD) requiring changes by 18 Oct 2006 in the Primus software because the unit would go into standby if code-changing was not completed within 5 seconds. A separate series of Honeywell Primus AD's called for integrity checks of the aviation standard communications bus (ASCB) and the installation of avionics software updates due to screen failures. Honeywell says the replacement software had already been installed in the Legacy before ExcelAire bought the Legacy 600 jet. The earlier software version had contributed to two midair near-misses in Europe, but we are not aware of any incidents caused by pilots pushing the wrong keys on a RMU. That's possibly because in most instances an inadvertent condition will not be a prelude to an ATC-constructed head-on collision..... and will soon be sorted by either/both the pilots and controllers. Such a glitch wouldn’t come to Honeywell’s attention as something needing rectification. Unfortunately in the GOL versus Legacy case, that “sorting out” time wasn't available and, courtesy of an apparently lax ATC, the lack of TCAS made the head-on collision inevitable.
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It's noteworthy and ironic that Embraer's comments upon that Notice of Proposed Rule-making (introducing the Primus AD) had requested a lengthier time interval for implementation, saying: "Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER) is requesting that we (the FAA) should extend the compliance time for the AFM revision from 5 to 30 days. EMBRAER asserts that the loss of the transponder does not pose so great of a hazard to justify such an urgent compliance time."
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The Brazilian investigators have published their preliminary report and an English translation is available at this link: http://tinyurl.com/y2vubt