Early Config change

[darksecrets]

Can anyone shed any light here........ recently a B737, during initail climb, apparently retracted the flaps instead of the gear causing a low altitude stall, the pilot(s) managed to climb out but rumour is it was close. :rolleyes:

[AEUENG]

Well without any evidence on the matter, I'd say it's probably hear say.:)

[J.O.]

I know of a similar incident that happened many years ago on an A320 that certainly got a crew's attention. :eek:

[useless]

i think there is some protection on a320 (slats will lock if retracted to early)

[ElNino]

It happened to an RJ recently The report is on the UK AAIB website.

[darksecrets]

http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/april_2006/avro_146_rj100__g_cfaf.cfm

This happened in 2004, i'm sure it was B737, and i don't think it would have made it to the AAIB website yet! unless i've got the wrong one on the AAIB website.

[Reds Blues Greens]

I very much doubt that this occured.

The flap and gear leaver on the 737 are in completely different places, look completely different and move in different directions. The action of reaching forward to raise the gear, shortly after "positive climb" is called, is a very strong motor-programme; it is unimaginable that someone would reach down down to the centre pedstal instead and try and move the flap leaver.

Incidentally, there is a detent at the flap 1 position (for single engine go-arounds) and therefore it is impossible to raise the flaps from 5 to up in one smooth action.

Cheers,

RBG.

[Cough]

A similar event has occured in the past when operating a mixture of (mostly) flap 5 takeoffs with the odd flap 1 departure (for perf reasons) thrown in for luck.

The result is the crews become used to retracting the flaps to 1 at AA. So if you depart flap 1 (and don't think about it-distraction etc) then the flap lever gets moved at AA...

[Reds Blues Greens]

Cough, I can see how that could occur. I presume you are talking about a type other than a 737 though? (as there is no such thing as a flap 1 departure)
Also, I think the original post was about raising the flaps after take-off as supposed to the gear, rather than inadvertantly raising all the flap at Aa.
I still think this sounds completely unlikely on a 737, anyone else?
RBG

[Cough]

RBG. I fly 737 classics and have taken off using flap1.

Dunno about the NG, (I haven't flown it) but this chart, page 44 and on (http://www.boeing.com/commercial/airports/acaps/737sec3.pdf) suggests the 737 NG can depart flap 1 as well.

[TDK mk2]

I don't know if it's brave or foolish to admit this, but I've done it - some years ago now. I was most terribly shocked by my actions and couldn't begin to explain (to myself least of all anyone else) how I could make such a mistake. What Reds Blues Greens says should be right, but I guess sometimes people do things that nobody, including themselves could have predicted. Fortuitously in my case I was flying a type in which it would only have been critical in a single engined climb situation. But I was and still am well aware of the potential implications of what I did. It was a character building experience, but not one I would like to repeat...

[Reds Blues Greens]

Thanks Cough, didn't know that.

I fly the 3/4/500 and the TO flap is strictly 5 - 15 (other wise you get the Config horn).

So is there a speed that you are meant to raise the flaps from 1 to up rather than just at Aa?

Cheers

[BOAC]

RBG - Normally:-

737-300 Config for Flaps not 1-15

400/500 Config for Flaps not 5-15

700 Config for Flaps not 1-25

I believe both of ASFKAP's 'events' have happened.

[Pilot Pete]

I don't know if it's brave or foolish to admit this, but I've done it - some years ago now. I take my hat off to you sir for highlighting a personal error for the greater good of us all.

If I remember correctly, these 'motor programs' can be fouled up when one hears the stimulus, but executes the wrong motor program in response. It's a bit like making a cup of tea, turning the kettle on and then opening the fridge to get the tea bags.......:=

We've all done similar things where we cannot believe we did what we just did, usually caused by a slight distraction and not applying as much thought as necessary to the task in hand.

On my conversion course to the 737 I turned the right hydraulic pumps off instead of the engine anti-ice......taught me a good lesson in the sim and highlighted a possible design failure in one of Mr Boeings finest. I then started to apply what a wise old trainer had told me many moons before; "think which switch you want to move. Put your fingers on it. Check that it is the right one and then move it." Wombling wise words...:ok:

PP

[misd-agin]

Check out your clean stall speeds. Typically very close to your flaps 15, V2+15 initial climb speed.

You can takeoff with a clean wing, do a slightly slower rotation, think "accelerate" instead of "climb" and it's a fairly benign event.

Pull back (increase angle of attack) or fly out of ground effect to soon and it loses it's benigness very quickly.

Accomplished several times in the sim during the 'anything you want to do?' phase.

[J.O.]

This is why the Airbus SOPs use the call "Gear Up", but to retract flaps it's "Flaps Zero". This helps to delineate the two distinct actions.

[Roidelstein]

Pilot Pete - this is definately a bit of a design flaw on the 737 - I have come close to doing this myself at least once!

[Agaricus bisporus]

Perfectly possible, and as the law of Sod has it, if it can be done sooner or later someone will...

Let us not forget that a very similar event killed well over 100 people in a Trident back in the '70s.

[oakland]

I called to my colleague, positive climb----gear up, and then i heard the wrong sound, flap lever moving. I reached over and he realised his error.Flaps had barely moved. A 737-400, flap 5 take off.The leading edges dont move 'til you go from 1 to up so no big deal but i told him the trident story later on.
As an aside , i once got the stall warning on rotation. leading edge sensor that talks to the stall warning computer was dickie, looked up and saw amber light on leading edge indication panel, (they'd been all green earlier, sop to check)

[xetroV]

On my conversion course to the 737 I turned the right hydraulic pumps off instead of the engine anti-ice......taught me a good lesson in the sim and highlighted a possible design failure in one of Mr Boeings finest.
You're not the only one: I have been about 0.00001 seconds from making that same mistake myself, however not in a simulator. This certainly is a pretty serious design flaw in the 737. In the sim I also once switched Bus Transfer i.s.o. Standby Power; put a smile on my instructors face, as he'd witnessed that one before too.

Yeah, airplane ergonomics... Reminds me of this nicety: on the MD-11 glareshield there are two round buttons to set the QNH and the minimums on the PFD. The BAROSET button is on top, the MINIMUMS button below. Nice, except on the PFD itself the QNH figure is shown below, and the minimums figure is displayed on top. :ugh: Now imagine this: you're flying into Quito, trying to dial in an MDA of about 9600 feet, knowing you'll have to give a huge swirl to the MINIMUMS button if you want to have it set before touchdown. So doing just that... you inadvertently reset the barometer to a QNH of 1281 millibar. :}

[Roadrunner]

Oakland.

You beat me to it.

I had an occurrence with a very experienced captain in RHS moving the flaps from 5 to 1 when I had called one to go (SOP call) missed by the PNF. He had been busy with the radio at the time and came back with an instantaneous movement of the flap lever. No hand on lever, think, then move as mentioned above. Very sound advice. I agree, no problem with rectifying the problem immediately as you mentioned.

Another good bit of advice concerns the Boeing gear lever from up to off after TO. I inadvertently from LHS moved the lever a gnats pubic past the off detent and was amazed to hear the scream from the gear doors as they opened. The ginger beers said that in future simply move the lever back to the up position as only the doors would have moved and bobs your uncle, no problems.

[RAT 5]

B733's 4's, 737's & 738's can all do Flap 1 takeoffs. I've not flown 5's or 6's.

What has happened on a F1 takeoff is at the call "bug up", (to accelerate the a/c for flap retraction) the RHS pilot, who might nave been changing frequency and chatting to ATC during departure, has heard the word UP and selected Flaps UP. Scary, but true.

[Agaricus bisporus]

Sadly the 737 has it's full share of ergonomic pitfalls.
Helios got caught out by the config/cabin altitude horn, and how many of us didn't say in amazement on our conversions, "That is going to kill people one day" yet the regulators have let it exist for decades.

Hydraulics and Anti ice are another, and many of us will have stopped their hand heading for the flap lever instead of the gear. The point is, most of us do stop short.

A rather fierce and unpleasant instructor used to drill into my comversion course the perils of being a multi-fingered switch-flicker. He'd bawl you out, military style, if you didn't grasp the switch with finger and thumb, pause, then move it, not flick it or push it with one finger, but pick it up move it deliberately to its new position, even the taxi light! - (oly exception is the landing lights gang bar). Seemed pedantic at the time but now I know he was right. Likewise with gear and flaps, reach out to the lever, grasp it and pause, think, is this what I want to do? then select accordingly. Takes a split second, but that little pause tells me and the other guy that a thought process is going on and is very comforting. And if you think you don't have time for all that, well, you're rushing things so SLOW DOWN! There is virtually nothing that needs doing instantaneously in aviation, there is always time for a pause - check - act sequence.

The gear lever never selects down inadvertently if you lift it out of the Up detent and put a little positive pressure on it as you slide it towards Off, the pressure ensures it drops in and doesn't skip marginally to Down. Made me jump, it did, before I remembered how that screaming skull would have done it!

[jondc9]

Now this is the type of subject that is really worthwhile speaking about. Of course I believe this incident happened. It has probably happened more often than we have all heard about. And yes, I have done flaps 1 takeoff in 737-200.

I agree with all of the previous posts about taking your time to manipulate a switch and being SURE that you are doing the correct one.

Someone mentioned the trident and retracting the droops as I think British pilots call them. This ended in disaster with an apology on the CVR if I am not mistaken.

Some will remember the MD80 operated by northwest airlines in the USA. It took off with no flaps or slats extended and crashed killing all but one child in Detroit.

Stall recovery on the DC9 series at one time was: FIREWALL POWER, FLAPS 15! ( low altitude stall of course)

This would give you the best of both worlds, power and increased flaps/slats. They came out really fast! (bam)


Fatigue, carelessness, inherent design flaw, the human condition and a good measure of MURPHY's Law played a part I am sure in your described incident.

j

[Bengerman]

Pilot Pete, been there, done that! I knew the instant I moved the hyd. switch that I had f****d up. The flash of the amber warning alerted the skipper to my error as well. He was cool as crazy and quietly asked what the flashing caution was......I said that it was me turning off the Hyd pump instead of the eng anti-ice.......he said he had done that as well!!

[QNH1013]

Me too, I've done it...flown with someone that has done it. All will be well though as you'll quickly realise and after an expletive you'll turn off the real anti ice. Unless you're flying with autopilot B engaged then there is the added excitment when it disengages after loss of B hydraulic pressure;)

BTW, the 737 does do flap 1 departures for normal operations if performance requires and it will not sound the config horn. Unless a particular airline askes for it to be designed that way with I higly doubt.

[Capt Claret]

I would be surprised if most operators haven't had some experience of this type of thing. When I first joined PPRuNe there were vociferous comments about a BAe146 operator in Australia who had such an incident. Our largest airline has had several. A troll through the relevant Accident Board will reveal that whilst it's not common it's not unheard of either.

[Denti]

Pilotpete, yes, i did that thing as well, not in the simulator, in climbout during my supervision. As soon as the lights flashed amber (finger still on the switch wonderin if it was the right one) i knew what i'd done, switching them back on was not a biggie.

We had the flaps up case in our outfit lately although not instead of gear up but instead of N1 - speed 210 at AA. Apparently there was some mix up with an atc call and a minor deviation from SOPs that led to flaps being up well below flaps 1 manouvering speed. Oh, and we do flaps 1 departures on -300 and -500 as standard procedure, moved there from the flaps 5 we did previously since it is said to save a few kgs of fuel. Flaps 15 is something i should probably do sometimes to at least train it but unfortunately we dont have any performance data for that so it's been a few years since i did that.

Friend of mine in another outfit once moved flaps from landing configuration to up instead of his checklist marker on the yoke-checklist. Flying the CRJ and not the 737 so i have no idea if they have any stop gates like in the 737.

[banana head]

jondc9:
Someone mentioned the trident and retracting the droops as I think British pilots call them. This ended in disaster with an apology on the CVR if I am not mistaken


You are mistaken.:=

The loss of trident 'PI' resulted in the carraige of CVR's being mandated in the UK. 'PI' did not have a CVR, which is why although we know that the inadvertant retraction of the 'droops' was a primary cause of the accident, we do not know the exact circumstances of the retraction or what was going on in the cockpit at the time, let alone why someone activated the stick shake dump.

As for 'British' pilots refering to 'them' as droops - you'll find American trident pilots would have called them the same thing (had they flown a trident), as that is the term the aircrafter producer used...

[jondc9]

banana head:

my sincere thanks for the correction. and yes, I am sure that if tridents were flown in the US by US pilots , they too would have called "them" droops.

I must be thinking of a similiar episode in an airplane with CVR as the pilot pulling up the high lift devices was apologizing right into the ground. cannot remember what type of aircraft.


thanks again. by the way, do you favor cockpit video recorders as an accident investigation tool?

regards

jon

[bushbolox]

Kenya Airways Abijan.Allegedly.Not the fiirst time for the F/o either allegedly.
Lots of dead people allegedy, erm no that bits definite :(

[Few Cloudy]

A Canberra pilot once wrote a report after returning from a mission and instead of retracting flaps after landing, jettisoning a weapon onto the taxyway!

He wrote a very thoughtful report saying that he was very experienced on the type and that although he could remember performing this action, he had no explanation for what he did.

A certain Swiss airline - now bust, did have one very good procedure. Instead of repeating the command and performing the action, Boeing style, the PNF (or assisting pilot as he was called) would check minimum or maximum speed for the configuration, call out "speed checked", perform the action and then report back "flaps are 5, or gear is up etc" thus closing the communication / action loop. This had amongst other things, the effect of slowing down manipulations by putting some thinking first.

The thing is, as fortunately has so far happened on this thread, not to condemn the pilot at fault but to look for ways to avoid this type of finger trouble in future.

FC.

[Phil Hudson]

jondc9:
You are mistaken.:=
The loss of trident 'PI' resulted in the carraige of CVR's being mandated in the UK. 'PI' did not have a CVR, which is why although we know that the inadvertant retraction of the 'droops' was a primary cause of the accident, we do not know the exact circumstances of the retraction or what was going on in the cockpit at the time, let alone why someone activated the stick shake dump.
As for 'British' pilots refering to 'them' as droops - you'll find American trident pilots would have called them the same thing (had they flown a trident), as that is the term the aircrafter producer used...
http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=06181972&reg=G-ARPI&airline=British+European+Airways

[hambleoldboy]

You youngsters don't know how lucky you are - my first aircraft was the Boeing 707-400, which had such poor performance that we made the first configuration change on leaving the second segment and retracted the flaps at 400ft. The airline also operated the 707-300 which was quite similar except that it had leading edge flaps; if an inadvertent config. change was made on this aircraft at 400ft it would have gone down, so the fleets were segregated. I believe that this policy was implemented after some incidents and the loss of an SAA 707-300. I think the point is that we are creatures of habit; usually nothing needs to be done in a hurry so take time and think about it before manipulating something, like I now have to do when driving my wife's automatic, but I still manage to stamp on the brake thinking it's the clutch!

[Cosmo]

jondc9,

Maybe you're thinking of either of these:

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19700705-0&lang=en


http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19730623-0&lang=en

[jondc9]

thanks cosmo, I will check them out.

here is a good URL on the trident question:

http://www.super70s.com/Super70s/Tech/Aviation/Disasters/72-06-18(Trident).asp

I do think a human being can easily flip the wrong switch, or retract flaps at the wrong time and we must chalk it up to being human.

I flew a very nice plane at one time called the North American -Rockwell Sabreliner (40). The leading edge devices would automatically extend or retract based on the aerodynamic forces on the wing. Fancy springs calibrated for a certain relative wind/airspeed. The pilot could only control them by changing speed (aoa I suppose really). Right on the cusp of the right speed they could sort of bounce from extended to retracted and back.


I think the idea of slowing things down by calling out speed, manipulation, result and all is excellent. Sadly the chumps in charge have seen fit to do otherwise. Their rationale is that it couldn't happen that way here. Yeah, right!

fly safe

jon

[banana head]

Phil Hudson,

I've just read the link you posted from Airdisaster.com regarding Trident PI and am amazed. It is complete tosh. How have they derived what any of the crew said at any point in the accident, (aside from comms transcripts) or who specifically moved what when this aircraft WAS NOT FITTED WITH A CVR. The UK AAIB were unable to determine the exact sequence of events in 1973, but AirDisaster.com can do it today?? Sorry, but their 'special report' is a journalistic work of fiction.

For anybody interested the link below will take you to the full and final AAIB report into this accident. See in particular section 6, 'cockpit voice recorders'

UK AAIB Report into the loss of Trident PI (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/sites/aaib/cms_resources/dft_avsafety_pdf_502559.pdf)

The recomendation of the AAIB, embodied in the ANO shortly thereafter mandated the carraige of this essential piece of kit.

Jondc9, you ask if I favor cockpit video recorders as an accident investigation tool

In an ideal world yes, every little helps - but within our litigation hungry industry no - we are able to gather sufficient data from FDAP/ SESMA, DCVR, DFDR and comms transcripts.
I dread the day when the last actions of a crew are broadcast accross the web in HD clarity for sick individuals to get a cheap thrill. It's bad enough the FCC and FAA have ignored 'official' leaks of CVR recordings into the media....:yuk:

[411A]

The later HS.121 Trident models did indeed have DROOPS.
These were not slats, nor were they leading edge devices, ala Boeing.

They were DROOPS.

And, yes there is a difference.

Now, as to the reference to the B707-400, yes it was indeed true, flaps up at 400agl.
This was also true for the B707-300 straight-pipe engine equipped aircraft as well.

Sterling performers these were...NOT.
How about...climbing at V2, at heavy weights, and achieving just 300-400 feet/min, with all 4 turning?
Never mind one inop.

The younger guys would be absolutely shocked.:oh: :oh:

[Final 3 Greens]

411a

Just for the sake of correctness, I believe that the Trident 1 had droops (actually a combination of droops and Krueger flaps) and that later models had slats.

You must have had some "puckering" moments on the 707-400 :-)

[jondc9]

thanks cosmo, that canada dc8 thing was the one I was thinking of.

all the little gadgets that make flying work, spoilers, droops, water injection on engines all to make things work....when what really would help would be super long runways, less payload, more power, and higher pay for pilots ;-)

j

[411A]

You may indeed be correct about some models of the HS.121, Final 3 Greens.

And, as for excitement with the older straight-pipe 707's...ah, yes, 'tis true.

Rolling for 11,500 feet on a 12,000 foot runway, and then finding the climb not what I expected, hmmm, yes interesting indeed.
Having said this, once you got the aeroplane cleaned up, and accelerated, it did quite well, even if it did suck up fuel like a big Hoover.
Hey, it was old and I was a brand new Captain...an interesting combination, to say the least.:E

Also, on another subject, some new(er) pilots might be surprised that some companies only use a couple of the approved flap setting for takeoff, altho the manufacturer may indeed provide a rather wide range of flap configurations for takeoff.
One size does not fit all...

[hambleoldboy]

Or in the case of the MD11 with 'Dial-a-flap' an infinite number of flap settings for takeoff...

[Few Cloudy]

Jondc9,

What I should also have written, just to round off the procedure on the last page, is that the Flying Pilot (PF) then checked the indication to be sure the manipulation had been correctly carried out and came back with "checked".

It sounds unwieldy but we soon got the hang of it and it worked well.

FC.

[jondc9]

few cloudy

thanks. I am totally in favor of making the cockpit way more professional.

instead of saying gear up and that 's that for example, I believe in something like:

PF: Gear Up

PNF: positive rate of climb confirmed, gear selected up, gear in transit, gear up and locked, uplatch check complete, gear selected "off" .pressure checked and quantitiy checked ok

or something like that.


less is no more in the cockpit for intelligent disciplined pilots. for morons, well better just hope for the best!


all the best and bombs away!

jon

[Smudger]

What? Are you drunk?

[jondc9]

no smudger, I'm not drunk

you must not fall in the first catagory of pilots I listed

there is quite a bit of slop in many cockpits and I for one am against it.

j

[Oh that's super!]

I am totally in favor of making the cockpit way more professional.

instead of saying gear up and that 's that for example, I believe in something like:

PF: Gear Up

PNF: positive rate of climb confirmed, gear selected up, gear in transit, gear up and locked, uplatch check complete, gear selected "off" .pressure checked and quantitiy checked ok

or something like that.



:eek: That seems like a lot of effort! Think WORKLOAD MANAGEMENT... Surely you are trying to wind us up?

[Junkflyer]

Why would anyone want more useless drivel immediately after take off? Our co procedures has the pnf call positive climb then pf asks for gear up. It seems to work reasonably well.

[jondc9]

workload management, drivel. ha!

if your airline is not taking on new people and there is a long time for promotion (seniority wise) less can be more...but if you are taking on new people, having people upgrade on new types right along with brand new copilots who are new to the line and the type, more discipline and professionalism in the cockpit pays off.

workload management, more like: limited ability to process information? or tunnel vision?


cheer up! whoops

jon

[Pilot Pete]

I am totally in favor of making the cockpit way more professional.

instead of saying gear up and that 's that for example, I believe in something like:

PF: Gear Up

PNF: positive rate of climb confirmed, gear selected up, gear in transit, gear up and locked, uplatch check complete, gear selected "off" .pressure checked and quantitiy checked ok

or something like that.

less is no more in the cockpit for intelligent disciplined pilots. for morons, well better just hope for the best! You'd better get on to Boeing and Airbus and tell them to remove all their warning systems because it will make pilots more professional.:rolleyes: The whole reason they put them in place is to REDUCE your workload and do the monitoring for you, only warning you when there is a problem.

Your idea of upping the PNF workload into the stratosphere just after takeoff if completely flawed. I would assume you are advocating similar complex drills for movement of every lever and switch, otherwise you are not being consistent? As for it making a pilot more professional, I think you will find it would do the opposite. As others have pointed out, it's about workload management. The PNF is primarily moving the levers for the PF at this stage, but equally important is MONITORING the PF. Your system would have the PNF over-worked, especially if the PF is hand-flying the aircraft. Your idea is a naive opinion about 'professionalism' in the flight-deck. To have any credibility you should have suggested checking of these system functions at a more appropriate time, oh, just like my SOPs tell me to do with the After Take-off Checklist.:rolleyes:

PP

[omnidirectional737]

I would like to add my name to the list of people who have turned the hydralic pumps off instead of the engine anti-ice, distracted talking to ATC at the same time. Luckily I was looking at the lights and noticed the amber instead of the blue :mad: and immeadiately turned them back on. Embarassing and the other guy said he had done it before aswell. I am extra vigilent now and also echo everybody who says take that extra bit of time to think.

[jondc9]

Pilot Pete:

using the warning systems to reduce your workload...you are just asking for trouble.

recall the MD80 (northwest airlines) at KDTW. took off with incorrect flap/slat setting crashed killing all but one miracle child (purple fingernail polish was the only identifiying mark).

In that case the warning system failed.



you see, warning systems CAN and do fail.

The PNF of course monitors the PF...but can and should do more.

j

[AerocatS2A]

I flew a very nice plane at one time called the North American -Rockwell Sabreliner (40). The leading edge devices would automatically extend or retract based on the aerodynamic forces on the wing. Fancy springs calibrated for a certain relative wind/airspeed. The pilot could only control them by changing speed (aoa I suppose really).
I've also flown an aircraft that had automatic slats, though the pilot could also lock them in the retracted position if they desired.

It was called a Tiger Moth :).

[Pilot Pete]

Pilot Pete:recall the MD80 (northwest airlines) at KDTW. took off with incorrect flap/slat setting crashed killing all but one miracle child

What's that got to do with increasing your workload just after take-off by using the method you discribed? I agree you shouldn't 'blindly' rely on warning systems, but your idea is rediculous and potentially DECREASING flight safety, certainly not improving it.

As I pointed out, my company SOPs already get the PNF to check the system you mentioned (landing gear) at a more appropriate time (when doing the After Take-off Checklist), not at the point of calling for it to go up.:rolleyes:

I would like to add that my company SOPs also call for the PNF (always right seat occupant whilst taxiing) to challenge me with "Flaps" in the Before Take-off Checks. The workload is not high when I reach over, grasp the flap handle, ensure the handle is gated correctly, check the flap guage to ensure that the needles agree with the selected position and I have the 'green light' illuminated (737), which I have just mentioned in my Before Take-off Review, ensuring we have everything set correctly and it is still appropriate to the conditions.......

See, someone put a lot of thought into producing APPROPRIATE checks at APPROPRIATE times, backing up configs and performance in order to ENHANCE flight safety. You sir, have apparently not put the same amount of thought into your procedure and if you have, then you are deluded to think it enhances safety, because it doesn't, which is probably why no airline that I can think of has adopted it.

PP

[jondc9]

ppand mike jenev


interesting thoughts from closed minds!

you indicate:

PNF: positive rate

PF: gear up


what happens when due to human error:

PNF: V1/Rotate...oh bugger ENGINE FAILURE

PF: max power!


max power!


and there is no cue for gear up since PNF has forgotten to say "positive rate"?



you believe in the less is more theory. I disagree with it. I've seen what happens in procedures developed when this theory is used...not good.


I believe in strict procedures that work in all situation and pilots capable of doing them while monitoring basic airmanship.

with the verbal diahreah as you call it, the systems are really checked, memory engrams are etched and deviations easily observed.


Do you recall a continental airlines dc9 that landed gear up in houston awhile ago? great procedures there!


have fun

jon

[Pilot Pete]

what happens when due to human error:

PNF: V1/Rotate...oh bugger ENGINE FAILURE

PF: max power!


max power!


and there is no cue for gear up since PNF has forgotten to say "positive rate"? What ARE you talking about? So where in your procedure PF: Gear Up

PNF: positive rate of climb confirmed, gear selected up, gear in transit, gear up and locked, uplatch check complete, gear selected "off" .pressure checked and quantitiy checked ok

or something like that. is HUMAN ERROR prevented? The shock effect of the engine failure is just as likely (if not more likely) to affect the PF, who is now concentrating hard on flying the aircraft. Why do you put faith in the PF remembering to call "gear up", when you have no faith in the PNF remembering to call "positive rate"? Your thinking is flawed. I'm not 'closed' to good suggestions, but yours patently isn't.

you believe in the less is more theory. I disagree with it. I've seen what happens in procedures developed when this theory is used...not good.
Do enlighten us.

I've worked for a company that advocated calling EVERY FMA change. This wasn't better than the Boeing philosophy of ONLY calling them when they are NOT what you expect. I'm not advocating not using system knowledge and monitoring what you are doing, but giving a running commentary during high workload times is NOT beneficial.

So I ask you again to expand on your theory. Do you advocate similar callouts every time a switch is moved? If not, why not? From my experience, the more you have to say in SOPs, the more pilots slip into paying lip service to the words.

Your cause is admirable, but your process is flawed. Why can't a PNF put the gear up when called for, check what he is doing and only mention a malfunction if he sees one? Why recite all the things he is checking? Should I recite all the switches I am moving and their effect during scan flows? Your theory moves into the absurd when taken beyond your one example.

We already monitor what happens when we move switches/ levers/ press buttons to ensure they have the desired effect. There is no need to recite all that if the effect is as expected. Call it if it DOESN'T HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT.

I don't know the specific incident you refer to regarding a gear up landing, but I bet you the landing checklist called for a check that the gear was down. If pilots don't action checklists thoroughly then it doesn't matter what you write in them. So, tell me the incident details and show me a copy of the 'great procedures' you mention and then perhaps we would be in a position to make a judgement. You haven't convinced me yet that a diatribe would be better, nor the major manufacturers..........

PP

[jondc9]

PP

I am not trying to convince you of anything. but let me put it to you this way:

suppose every day you took the stairs to your place of business. 10 flights every day. on all vacations at hotels you always took the elevator 3 stories to your room.

if the elevator failed in the hotel, you would be well equipped to handle the stairs.


so too in flying. if you are always doing the minimum and haven't forced your brain capacity to expand by doing more all the time you won't have the reserve to handle the unexpected.


the system I described also mentioned the scenario in which new types of planes are introduced to new pilots. This also allows for a more thorough learning of systems and procedures and sets you up to be able to study and understand even newer planes as they are introduced.


as to trying to convince the manufacturers, a friend just showed me the official BOEING checklist for takeoff in the B767... he commented that it didn't even metnion turning on the transponder. why? well you don't NEED the transponder to fly now do you?


to the builder of the planes, the less you put on the checklist, the less you are liable for.


I do hope you will look up the DC9 incident mentioned. Make out of it what you will.

[Pilot Pete]

if you are always doing the minimum and haven't forced your brain capacity to expand by doing more all the time you won't have the reserve to handle the unexpected. Sorry, what on earth has making protracted, unnecessary calls regarding the gear being put up during a critical phase of flight got to do with having 'more reserve to handle the unexpected'? It is part of being a professional pilot to know your aircraft systems. I don't need to make a diatribe about what I am checking to have enough reserve to handle the gear not going up when the lever is placed up!:rolleyes: I say again, that I think what you are trying to achieve is admirable; i.e. pilots having better knowledge of the aircraft systems, but making long winded SOP calls is, in my opinion, not the way to go about it.

As for the manufacturers SOPs, I agree, some of it is based around litigation, but I am talking SOP philosophy, not single items that one airline does but another, or the manufacturer doesn't. You are advocating a philosophy of constant chatter about every switch that is being moved, I would advocate no chatter unless something doesn't happen as expected, but that doesn't stop the individual pilot from silently monitoring what he is doing and what occurs as a result, incorporating your ideas about this.

I think we are going to have to agree to disagree, because I still don't see the merits of increased 'spoken words' when everything is occuring as expected and the workload is already high between the crew members.

PP

[jondc9]

dear tiger moth guy...very cool, also cool is: a friend is going to the UK to participate in a tiger moth fly in this summer.

but I digress,


Dear PP:


I do think we want the same thing. I have seen too many times in the cockpit when a pilot, especially a new copilot aiming to please goes through the motions of doing something and it doesn't really get done.

For example.While "hand flying" climbing out of BWI, I was watching traffic on the left side and I called for climb thrust/power. The f/o just said it was set thinking the autothrottles had done their job, but had not really monitored the situation.

When the traffic had passed clear, I looked down and takeoff thrust was still set. The copilot was more interested in watching the traffic even though I had divided the workload, me watching traffic, him to watch engine gauges.

I have found that when pilots are new to a plane or a company, reinforcing the training process (which is all too short these days) with the extra verbiage as I described may have long term benefits.


There is also the rare scenarios of subtle incapacitation . In your philosophy (which i admit is the prevailing one) a no callout of deviation can also mean the pilot is incapacitated. Even a short episode of microsleep could cause something to be missed with nothing to check on it.


In my philosophy, the lack of a callout and the verbal diahrea as you call it, would be an alert to incapacitation.



AS the pilot population ages, incapacitation may become more and more prevelent, especially with the age 65 possibilities (us / europe seems to have gone that way).

As new pilots/types are added, the additional verbiage strengthens the training.



regards

jon

[jondc9]

Regarding sim training and "reserve for the unexpected". Did you know that in the US, sim training is now once a year instead of every 6 months?

it is also quite possible for a pilot with some incapacitation to not recognize the problem and continue to report for duty...this lack of reserve for the unexpected might not be found out in a "quiet cockpit".

[Pilot Pete]

Sorry Jon

I still don't see the link between 'speaking your thought processes' as SOPs and reserve capacity?

I agree that not going in the sim every six months will be detrimental to building experience (compared to going in there every six months).

I still haven't seen the DC9 incident you mentioned, but from what Mike Jenvey has posted it appears clear that they didn't follow their SOPs, so as I said earlier, it's got nothing to do with how much or little they said, its about NOT CARRYING OUT THE REQUIRED ACTIONS AT ALL! If they landed gear up, I would still bet my bottom dollar on their checklist requiring them to check that it was down and locked. So I am afraid I still can't see the relevance of this incident to your philosophy:hmm:

PP