Armenian A320 crash whilst attempting to land in bad weather [Archive]

angels

3rd May 2006, 05:42

Here's the latest from Reuters. Sorry I can't reduce the size via a URL since this is directly from my dealing screen.

06:36 03May2006 RTRS-UPDATE 3-Armenian jet crashes off Russia, 113 presumed dead

(Adds passengers presumed dead, relatives' comments)
By Oliver Bullough
MOSCOW, May 3 (Reuters) - An Armenian airliner crashed into the Black Sea off the Russian coast in heavy rain on Wednesday, and all 113 passengers and crew on board were presumed killed, the Russian emergencies ministry said.
The plane, an Airbus A-320, was trying to land at Sochi, a popular seaside holiday spot in southern Russia, in bad weather when it slammed into the sea.
A spokesman for the Russian emergencies ministry said rescue workers had found baggage, life jackets, body parts, pieces of the shattered plane and a patch of oil floating on the surface of the sea at the crash site.
At least 16 bodies had been found by 0425 GMT.
"According to preliminary information, all people on board are dead," a ministry spokeswoman said.
The plane had been making a short flight of about an hour from the Armenian capital Yerevan, and most of the passengers were Armenian nationals.
"The fragments were found six km (4 miles) from the shore near the airport of Adler. The search operation continues," ministry spokesman Viktor Beltsov said.
Stunned relatives sat quietly waiting for news at Adler airport just outside Sochi, a resort town that became popular with Russians in the Soviet era.
Relatives also gathered at the airport in Yerevan. A list of passengers showed 26 had Russian passports and almost all the rest were Armenians.
"I was waiting for a call from my mother that she had arrived okay. But she did not phone, so I phoned myself and heard that this accident had happened," Khapet Tadevosyan, 32, told Reuters as he stood in the Yerevan airport building.
"She flew to Sochi to see her sisters, whom she hadn't seen for 15 years," he said.
Beltsov said the plane, operated by Armavia, had vanished from radar screens at 2.15 a.m. (2215 GMT Tuesday) near Sochi, which lies close to the Georgian border.
An Armavia official said the aircraft had initially been refused permission to land because of the heavy rain. But then the airport officials changed their mind and said the landing could go ahead.
"The plane was in an ideal technical condition, the crew was well qualified," said Andrei Aghajanov, deputy commercial director of the airline.
The plane had failed at its first attempt to land, and crashed into the sea at a very steep angle on its second approach. Its fuselage was lying on the seabed.
"The rescue workers are searching for the black boxes (flight recorders)," Beltsov said. "The main parts of the plane are located at around 400 metres (yards) depth."
Armavia is the largest airline in the former Soviet Republic of Armenia and has three Airbus 320s of the kind that crashed.
The plane was carrying at least five children and eight crew members. Heavy rain and poor visibility were complicating the search, initially for survivors and later for clues to the cause of the crash.
(Additional reporting by Hasmik Mkrtchyan in Yerevan)
((Editing by Tim Pearce, [email protected], +7 095 775 1242, RM: [email protected]))

AN2 Driver

3rd May 2006, 05:46

WX at the time:

C05
URSS 022300Z VRB01MPS 6000 -SHRA BR BKN005 OVC028CB 11/11 Q1017 TEMRO 1500 BR VV005 RMK QBB160 G/~Z QFE762 SC05
URSS 022200Z VRB01MPS 4000 -SHRA BR BKN006 OVC027CB 11/11 Q1018 TEMRO 1500 BR VV005 RMK G/?Z QFE762 SC05
URSS 022200Z VRB01MPS 4000 -SHRA BR BKN006 OVC027CB 11/11 Q1018 temro 1500 BR VV005 RMK g/~z QFE762 SC05
URSS 022200Z VRB01MPS 4000 -SHRA BR BKN006 OVC027CB 11/11 Q1018 TEMRO 1500 BR VV005 RMK G/~Z QFE762 SC05
URSS 022100Z 00000MPS 2000 -SHRA BR BKN005 OVC023CB 11/11 Q1018 NOSIG RMK g/~z QFE762 SC05

Rather weird that they report OVC CB but no TS.

UNCTUOUS

3rd May 2006, 05:51

Sounds like a similar general scenario to GulfAir 072
.
PITCH-UP Illusion strikes again?
.
"The plane had failed at its first attempt to land, and crashed into the sea at a very steep angle on its second approach."

Few Cloudy

3rd May 2006, 07:51

Slow down Unctious...

RoyHudd

3rd May 2006, 08:43

I wonder which type of approach was being performed....non-precision? And whether suitable alternates were within range? Fuel on board? Standard issues, no tentative conclusions. The weather didn't look too bright, that's for sure.

Very sad. Condolences to Armenian colleagues.

ilbizza

3rd May 2006, 08:59

an important thing that would make the difference is if there was an ils available, at sochi airport in that condition would make the difference let's see ,they crash 4 miles out the rwy, so at that distance supposing an ils approach they schould be at more or less 1800 agl, my question; is possible that a microburst make the a320 lose that altitde in short final with the engine spooling fast in landing config, and since how long ago this company is operating an airbus fleet because to me this disaster smell of airbus mismatch for the pilots.
Condolences to all the affected

WHBM

3rd May 2006, 09:10

..... since how long ago this company is operating an airbus fleet .......
Armavia have been operating the A320 for 3.5 years now, since October 2002, and have five in their fleet, with one being leased out. Most, including the accident aircraft, are from the onetime Ansett operation. It's the principal type in their fleet.

CargoOne

3rd May 2006, 09:27

Chief of Armenian CAA told to the media that there was 10t of fuel on departure which is more than enough for 1 hour sector. There are several suitable alternates in Russia, Georgia, Turkey, all within 30-60 min from Sochi.

URSS is usually classified at cat B or cat C airport (depending on airline), approach minima is quite high there.

WHBM

3rd May 2006, 11:24

From the current BBC news page

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4967464.stm

"The Russian prosecutor general's office announced it had launched criminal proceedings for violation of air traffic procedures leading to loss of life, according to the AFP news agency."

This does seem extraordinary, that within 12 hours of the ditching and with few facts available criminal proceedings are being started.

VP8

3rd May 2006, 11:58

Latest just received from Airbus Industries

FROM : AIRBUS CUSTOMER SERVICES TOULOUSE TX530526F

TO : ALL
A300/A310/A300-600/A319/A320/A321/A330/A340/A318/A340-500/A340-6
00 OPERATORS

ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX

SUBJECT: ARMAVIA FLIGHT RNV 967 ACCIDENT IN SOCHI (RUSSIA)
OUR REF.: U8 967 AIT 1 DATED MAY 3, 2006

AIRBUS REGRETS TO CONFIRM THAT AN A320 AIRCRAFT OPERATED BY
ARMAVIA WAS INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT VERY EARLY IN THE MORNING
WHEN APPROACHING SOCHI AIRPORT AT THE RUSSIAN BLACK SEA COAST
UNDER REPORTED POOR WEATHER CONDITIONS.

AIRCRAFT WAS OPERATING ARMAVIA FLIGHT RNV 967 FROM EREVAN,
ARMENIA, TO SOCHI.

THE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT, REGISTRATION NUMBER EK-
32009 BEARING MSN 547 WAS DELIVERED TO ARMANIA IN FEBRUARY 2004
AND HAD LOGGED OVER 28,200 FLIGHT HOURS AND 14,400 LANDINGS. IT
WAS POWERED BY CFM56-5A ENGINES.

ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE INFORMATION, THERE WERE 105 PASSENGERS
AND 8 CREW MEMBERS ON BOARD. AT THE TIME OF ISSUANCE OF THIS
TELEX, THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF 113 FATALITIES.

IN LINE WITH INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION, AIRBUS HAS OFFERED FULL
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE INVESTIGATION AUTHORITIES. FOR THIS
PURPOSE, AIRBUS IS PRESENTLY DISPATCHING A TEAM OF 5 TECHNICAL
ADVISORS TO ASSIST THE AUTHORITIES.

FURTHER UPDATE WILL BE PROVIDED AS SOON AS RELIABLE INFORMATION
IS AVAILABLE AND NOT LATER THAN 05 MAY 06.

YANNICK MALINGE
VICE PRESIDENT FLIGHT SAFETY
AIRBUS

CargoOne

3rd May 2006, 11:59

WHBM
I belive this is a standart practice in CIS countries.

flyboyike

3rd May 2006, 12:14

an important thing that would make the difference is if there was an ils available at sochi airport...

There is not.

H.Finn

3rd May 2006, 13:00

There is not.

Has it been decommissioned or NOTAMed out? Used to be ILS on RWY 02 and 06.

Belowclouds

3rd May 2006, 18:01

Used to work with Armavia for 3 years. Lot of dearest friends lost. Beautiful place, sweet memories. Have absolutely no idea what it was and why it happened. Just made a phone call to Yerevan. Tears and sorrow are the only reply for the time being. My condolences.....

UA320Cap

3rd May 2006, 18:27

CNN.com - Weather blamed for Black Sea crash - May 3, 2006 (http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/05/02/russia.plane/index.html)

A330AV8R

3rd May 2006, 19:10

First of all My condolences to all those effected from this tragedy .
Would like to know what type of approach she was making ? fuel scenario . . . I read somewhere they had 10 tons on T/O , making a calculated guess then I don't think they were short of fuel , however correct me if im wrong on this ....
I believe this was the second attempt to land after initating a go around , what was the cause of this ?
all the press sites are claiming wx was the reason for the crash , was there shear and or microburst activity in the area ?
Anyone :confused:
:(

FIRESYSOK

4th May 2006, 04:14

Weather most 'certainly' the cause? Sounds like a bad Hollywood script...

Stubenfliege 2

4th May 2006, 06:29

Weather most 'certainly' the cause? Sounds like a bad Hollywood script...

Must be a new trend in the media. In the older days, the first gues for the cause after severe aircraft accidents were "lightning strikes", then bombs (the infamous farmer, who heard always "two explosions") and after that, "cell phones".

With regards,

Stubenfliege

Jinkster

4th May 2006, 07:44

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/05/04/001.html

FROM THE MOSCOW TIMES.

The plane made its first approach toward Adler airport around 3 a.m. local time but was unable to land due to poor visibility. The plane circled and made a second approach, during which visibility again dropped below minimum acceptable levels. Air traffic controllers advised the pilot to climb to 600 meters.

It was during the climb, at 3:15 a.m., that the plane made a sharp turn and dropped off Adler airport's radar, a member of the airport's technical staff said, Interfax reported.

"The A320's speed was about 250 kilometers per hour, which may not have been enough for it to gain altitude," the source said.

The plane hit the water at a steep angle, Beltsov said.

Is there much chance the aircraft stalled?

panda-k-bear

4th May 2006, 07:48

Not with the hard envelope protection of the A320, no. It won't stall no matter what you do to it. It would just fail to gain height, not stall. That's a part of the fly-by-wire system as basic on the A320.

Evening Star

4th May 2006, 07:58

was there shear and or microburst activity in the area

As SLF I am wary of making a contribution in R&N. However, I have been to Adler and the place (please understand that I am speaking as a scientist, not an aviator) did strike me as being more challenging then average with regard to the weather. Behind the airport, which is almost at sea level, is the western edge of the Caucasus Mountains, rising quickly to in excess of 1000m.

To give some background, at the moment I am working on a paper looking at some unusual characteristics of storms in Black Sea area. Specifically, I am looking at the Rostov Region area, where the topography does not complicate the issue. One factor I note is the very localised intense downdraughts that are not necessarily coincident with an active cell. It is reasonable to hypothesize that this characteristic will equally apply in Krasnador Region, and that the mountains may even exacerbate this characteristic.

As a non-aviator I can offer no opinion on cause of this tragedy, and note the previous comments about how easy it is to quickly use weather as a thoughtless and 'media friendly' cause. However, if this information is helpful in any way I trust you will forgive my visit to R&N!

Suffice to say, I feel great sadness at this accident and also wish to add my condolences.

OVERTALK

4th May 2006, 15:30

OTOLITH ORGANS
.
The Otolith Organs work like a caterpillar oriented from the front to the back of the head. When you move your head the multiple legs of the caterpillar (hairs) are stimulated by gravitational forces enabling you to have positional awareness. Due to inertia, linear acceleration cannot be distinguished from the force of gravity. If an adequate horizon is not visible, forward acceleration will result in backward displacement of the caterpillar, giving the forceful illusion of a pitchup in attitude. An adequate horizon may not be available outside of the aircraft when you are looking into the sun such as might exist at dawn or dusk.
Despite being in level flight or shallow climb, upon acceleration in such a situation a pilot might strongly perceive that the aircraft is pitching up and respond by pushing the nose down steeply.

WHBM

4th May 2006, 15:49

Despite being in level flight or shallow climb, upon acceleration in such a situation a pilot might strongly perceive that the aircraft is pitching up and respond by pushing the nose down steeply.
Overtalk, not certain if you are qualified, but for I think all of us with IR training our instructors dinned into us from day 1 to work on instruments, not bodily awareness.

My own guy had a good basic technique. On the first IR lesson he just got me to put head down and close eyes, and comment on what I felt was the attitude of the aircraft while he had control. When I was saying "straight and level" he would say "look up" and I would find he had gently put us in a spiral dive (which I then had to get us out of). Did it a couple of times. Never forgot it.

OVERTALK

4th May 2006, 16:28

Overtalk, not certain if you are qualified, but for I think all of us with IR training our instructors dinned into us from day 1 to work on instruments, not bodily awareness.
7000hrs multi and jet instruction and ME Inst Rating Examiner [14.5K hrs total].
.
Pitch-up Illusion was the cause of GulfAir 072 in Bahrein. It can be a very overpowering illusion. It's lost many USN airplanes.
.
Somatogravic Illusion and the GF072 accident - LINK (http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/others/GF072Final.html)

fyrefli

4th May 2006, 16:41

It was during the climb, at 3:15 a.m., that the plane made a sharp turn and dropped off Adler airport's radar, a member of the airport's technical staff said, Interfax reported.

"The A320's speed was about 250 kilometers per hour, which may not have been enough for it to gain altitude," the source said.

The plane hit the water at a steep angle, Beltsov said.

Do we have anything on the history of the crew? Bearing in mind the location of the incident, are Unctuous and Overtalk also intimating that the difference between Soviet-style and Western (for want of better descriptions) artificial horizon displays might come into play here?

Cheers,

Rich.

John Farley

4th May 2006, 17:13

I am NOT suggesting that it had anything to do with the accident, but my newspaper quoted one young lady waiting at the destination airport as saying "Mum rang me and said she had got a signal on her mobile so they would be landing soon"

Loose rivets

4th May 2006, 17:17

7000hrs multi and jet instruction and ME Inst Rating Examiner [14.5K hrs total].
.
Pitch-up Illusion was the cause of GulfAir 072 in Bahrein. It can be a very overpowering illusion. It's lost many USN airplanes.

The last exchanges are a good reason why a ‘professionals only forum' might help in this type of discussion. Both comments are valid. Certainly we have ‘believe your instruments' drummed into us at an early stage...and certainly accidents have happened as a result of human physiology making us not do so–if only for a moment.

Perhaps if the posters had been clearly labeled with their qualifications, more thought would have gone into why they had introduced their post.

Anyway, this kind of discussion gives reminders, and interesting new details, that may be vital to us one dark and stormy night. I wish I had such a forum in the bad old days of ‘shut the hanger door!' outside duty hours.

Agaricus bisporus

4th May 2006, 17:33

From The Times, today;

“Mum called ten minutes before the expected landing time to say the plane was about to land — she already had a phone signal,” said Akop Akopyan, as he awaited news of his mother,

:uhoh:

How dumb can you get?

Stubenfliege 2

4th May 2006, 17:42

Do we have anything on the history of the crew? Bearing in mind the location of the incident, are Unctuous and Overtalk also intimating that the difference between Soviet-style and Western (for want of better descriptions) artificial horizon displays might come into play here?
Cheers,
Rich.

According to the Novosti, the "crew commander (-> Captain?) was one of the most experienced pilots and had flown Airbus airliners for years". Name of the crew commander sounds armenian for me. -> Quoted from airline press release.

AN2 Driver

4th May 2006, 21:20

As SLF I am wary of making a contribution in R&N. However, I have been to Adler and the place (please understand that I am speaking as a scientist, not an aviator) did strike me as being more challenging then average with regard to the weather. Behind the airport, which is almost at sea level, is the western edge of the Caucasus Mountains, rising quickly to in excess of 1000m.
To give some background, at the moment I am working on a paper looking at some unusual characteristics of storms in Black Sea area. Specifically, I am looking at the Rostov Region area, where the topography does not complicate the issue. One factor I note is the very localised intense downdraughts that are not necessarily coincident with an active cell. It is reasonable to hypothesize that this characteristic will equally apply in Krasnador Region, and that the mountains may even exacerbate this characteristic.
As a non-aviator I can offer no opinion on cause of this tragedy, and note the previous comments about how easy it is to quickly use weather as a thoughtless and 'media friendly' cause. However, if this information is helpful in any way I trust you will forgive my visit to R&N!
Suffice to say, I feel great sadness at this accident and also wish to add my condolences.

Hi,

interesting to hear from someone involved with the weather there. I was and am a tad confused by the METAR's coming out of there, going something like BKN006 OVC027CB. Any OVC -- CB condition is something that will catch attention, but a broken layer below that, and the overcast is a bit on the unusual side for this central european met observer.

Can you give a bit more information on this? How would you rate the met conditions as they were reported there with what your experience shows?

The last exchanges are a good reason why a ‘professionals only forum' might help in this type of discussion.

And miss stuff like this? Your loss, but I prefer hearing from people who seem to go pretty deep into the met side, even if they are "only" SLF.

Best regards
AN2 Driver

RoyHudd

4th May 2006, 21:45

Mobile phones should be confiscated from pax before flight, nicely of course, then tagged, receipted, and returned after flight. Possession and use during flight should then become 2 levels of criminal offence. Worldwide. Action ICAO. And IATA. Now.

This is not to implicate mobile messages directly with this sad accident

BUT I have experienced circumstantial evidence of FCU inputs bringing erratic outcomes in terms of the a/c obeying inputs, commensurate with mobile ringtones received in out headphones. Requires swift intervention.

LatviaCalling

4th May 2006, 22:29

[QUOTE=RoyHudd]Mobile phones should be confiscated from pax before flight,

So, what do you propose to do? Name tag all 150 or so phones on a short flight or all 400+ on a jumbo. I can just see the departure procedure.

GMEDX

4th May 2006, 22:31

You'll find that most pilots have left their mobiles on in their flight bag. I don't think it matters a monkeys, no one has been able to prove under controlled conditions that they interfere.

ukwannabe

4th May 2006, 22:36

On my flight a couple of days ago I (once again) forgot to switch my mobile off. So realising this I switched it off and simultaneously the autopilot disconnected. Not fiction but fact from a 20+year airline captain.
And this was on a clasic B737. So beware, there's always something waiting to surprise you.:eek:

LatviaCalling

4th May 2006, 22:50

This is a story of a sorry Armenian flight and not mobile phones. We've had threads up the hilt about cell/mobile phones and this thred should not start to wander toward that.

Loose rivets

5th May 2006, 05:05

This was in response to Evening Star's post

Hi,
interesting to hear from someone involved with the weather there. I was and am a tad confused by the METAR's coming out of there, going something like BKN006 OVC027CB. Any OVC -- CB condition is something that will catch attention, but a broken layer below that, and the overcast is a bit on the unusual side for this central european met observer.
Can you give a bit more information on this? How would you rate the met conditions as they were reported there with what your experience shows?
And miss stuff like this? Your loss, but I prefer hearing from people who seem to go pretty deep into the met side, even if they are "only" SLF.
Best regards
AN2 Driver

I agree entirely that this type of contributor would be a valuable asset, and indeed spells out why the qualifying ‘Professionals', should include people of a scientific and engineering background.

A330AV8R

5th May 2006, 08:55

Guys

Do not mean to step on anyones toes here but instead of going on about mobile phones and such lets try and keep the tragedy in full focus shall we .

113 people are dead , thats someones mother , father child brother . . . .

someone said it was flying at 250 kmph . . . your average speed on final approach after full configuration is 140 knots + - 10

In the event of going around they would have applied TOGA power asked for Go around flaps which is 1 knotch up , retract the gear on +ve climb and away you go . . . . engine spool up depending upon type is anywhere between 8 - 10 secs .... and NO you WONT STALL

Thats why I was asking earlier if there was shear and or burst actuvity . . . . in that event even with TOGA power you just sink like rock !

I read somewhere the aircraft made a sharp turn . . . why was this ? apparantely wx was below minima in that case why didnt he divert in the first place ? which leads me to speculate that they had a fuel issue .

Any more info welcome .

CargoOne

5th May 2006, 09:18

airfranz

Ref fuel. Now I have seen another quote from Armenian CAA saying 10.2t fuel on departure. This is not a kind of round number so I think we can take this as a fact for a while.

TheShadow

5th May 2006, 12:08

LINK (http://www.bahrainairport.com/arabic/caa/civil_gf072.htm)
Page 56 - Spatial Disorientation Studies (Somatogravic Illusions)
.
Not sure that the lengthy Pprune thread on GF072 is still available on Pprune.

Austrian Simon

5th May 2006, 12:15

Such idiotic speculation is not only irresponsible but dangerous.

You might be interested in the notes of Russian Interfax News Agency telling the astonished reader, that bodies and part of the wreckage have been found 250-300 meters off the shore, not 4nm off the shore at the crash site.

http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/28.html?id_issue=11510864

The text (just in case the link deactivates):

More bodies found at A-320 crash site
ROSTOV-ON-DON. May 5 (Interfax) - Another two bodies - presumably victims of the Armenian Armavia A-320 airliner crash on May 3 - have been found off the coast of Sochi's Adler district, a spokesman for the search operation headquarters told Interfax.

A part of the plane, presumably its fuselage, has been found at some distance from the crash site, the spokesman said. The bodies were found 250-300 meters off the coast.

An Emergency Situations Ministry motorboat will recover the bodies and take them to the shore.

The bodies of 50 people from the A-320 plane have been found. Of them, 41 have been identified.

About an hour earlier Interfax reports:

http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/28.html?id_issue=11510826

A-320 crash site located - Levitin
SOCHI. May 5 (Interfax) - The site of the May 3 crash of Armenia's Airbus A-320 passenger airplane has been located, Russian Transport Minister Igor Levitin told journalists on Thursday.

"The exact crash site has been located. Its coordinates have been defined. The signals received by French services and the Emergency Situations Ministry's data suggest that this is the exact area," Levitin, who is also overseeing the investigation into the crash, said.

No large parts of the plane have been found at the site, the minister said. "There were a lot of them. But they were not large," he said.

The crashed plane had three flight data recorders, he said.

While I don't want to take any conclusions at this point, it is certainly interesting to note the distance, the wreckage is apparently spread over.

Simon

Dr Dave

5th May 2006, 12:42

Dani

The photo to which you are referring is I think an AP image. The caption that accompanies it is:

"The tail fin of an Armenian passenger plane, which crashed off Russia's Black Sea coast, is seen in the harbor at Sochi Wednesday, May 3, 2006, after it was found at sea and brought ashore. The Airbus A-320, which belonged to the Armenian airline Armavia, carrying 113 people crashed in stormy weather early Wednesday off Russia's Black Sea coast as it was headed in for landing, killing everyone on board, emergency officials said. It was the worst air disaster in Armenia's recent history. (AP Photo/Sergey Ponomarev).

It appears to me that it was not found amongst the houses. Note that the rudder is defintely attached.

Dr Dave

Evening Star

5th May 2006, 21:46

First of all I am grateful for the supportive reception given to comments by a non-aviator. I should stress, in considering what I write, that I am a hydrologist and normally meteorology is merely a means of producing rain for the rivers I study. However, the disciplines are linked, my first degree involved a dissertation on thunderstorms and I am an observer for the Tornado and Storm Research Organisation. Therefore, while it is not directly my discipline, I have a strong scientific interest/responsibility in at least recording anything in this field that I view as significant.

interesting to hear from someone involved with the weather there. I was and am a tad confused by the METAR's coming out of there, going something like BKN006 OVC027CB. Any OVC -- CB condition is something that will catch attention, but a broken layer below that, and the overcast is a bit on the unusual side for this central european met observer.

Can you give a bit more information on this? How would you rate the met conditions as they were reported there with what your experience shows?

If I read the METAR correctly, the most interesting things that I note are the variability of the wind, the number of temporary changes over a short time and presence of cumulonimbus. This accords rather well with my observations during July 2004 and August 2005 in Rostov Region. In each case, there was evidence, or it was possible to infer, electrical activity in the vicinity but not close to my observations. The wind suddenly became sharply variable with, in two cases, a significant downward component.

Work in the USA on tornado formation shows a similar, but seemingly not identical, pattern. In particular, Lemon and Doswell III (1979) report "observations reveal the existence of a downdraft (originating at 7–10 km AGL) on the relative upwind side of the updraft". In Russia, Kochin (2001) ties downdraft activity to changes in electrical charge within the thundercloud (also interestingly, but in noting the METAR temperature seemingly not relevant in this case, commenting that this occurs in the 20C zone "where lightning strokes to aircraft are observed most frequently").

One additional observation from my time in Adler, and in particular one trip into the mountains, is how the mountains appear to have a strong localising effect on thunderstorm activity. It seems that a storm in one valley will remain isolated from neighbouring valleys. However, using the work by Lemon and Doswell III, there is strong reason to believe that the winds associated with a storm will not remain quite so isolated. I do wonder if the variable wind in the METAR might also include, or even mask, a similar downdraft component.

Once again, I stress that I am not qualified to make any specific suggestion as to what went wrong with Flight 967, and I note a number of alternative ideas are under discussion. All I can do is give what scientific facts that are available to me and appear useful in the hope that it contributes, in a positive manner, to the discussion.

As you will appreciate, I have spent a considerable time in Russia and find great sadness in this tragedy. Today was a day of mourning in Russia and Armenia.

ant1

6th May 2006, 08:51

NOVOSTI (http://en.rian.ru/world/20060505/47412004.html): World at a glance: where pilots face difficulties landing.

Pilot Pete

6th May 2006, 09:05

From the Novosti site link posted about the most difficult airports to land at;
Landing in London's Heathrow airport is complicated by side gushes of wind. Doesn't make their evaluation of 'difficult' airports that acurate in my mind.

PP

glekichi

6th May 2006, 14:32

P Pete>
My guess is that the translator of the article had even less aviation knowledge than the author.

Harrywho

7th May 2006, 01:25

Not fiction but fact from a 20+year airline captain.
And this was on a clasic B737. So beware, there's always something waiting to surprise you.:eek:

Words of wisdom

Centaurus

7th May 2006, 10:51

While there is no shortage of articles concerning the dangers of Somatogravic Illusions during a GA or take off, I sometimes wonder if crashes blamed on this phenomena are really due to lack of instrument cross-reference skills. High performance fighters being catapulted at night from aircraft carriers seldom crash after take off even though this illusion may be present. This suggests current basic instrument flying skills play a significant part in reducing the effect of the illusion

With 90 percent of flying in airliners being on automatic pilot it is well documented that pure flying skills requiring reversion to basic instrument flying are degraded. A GA around on a black wet night followed by a circling approach is a difficult manoeuvre at the best of times. Depite furious button pushing by the crew, it may be the automatics simply cannot keep up thereby forcing the pilot to revert to manual instrument flying skills for which he is not fully competent. It takes just a few seconds to get into an unusual attitude under these conditions and if the pilot is not competent at low altitude raw data UA recoveries then likely it is curtains for all aboard.

SIDSTAR

7th May 2006, 12:19

Centaurus,

Agree! That's why many 'bus companies expect their pilots to fly xx number of hand flown approaches per week/month and many also require the pilots to hand fly the approaches during their sim checks.

Basic IF skills are never a load to carry. Lose them at your peril.

cringe

7th May 2006, 15:28

According to the Novosti, the "crew commander (-> Captain?) was one of the most experienced pilots and had flown Airbus airliners for years". Media quoting the chief of Armavia's A320 fleet: the 40-year-old pilot in question had 5,700 hours of pilot flight time, of which 1,200 were on Airbuses.

TyroPicard

8th May 2006, 09:09

Centaurus...
"A GA around on a black wet night followed by a circling approach is a difficult manoeuvre at the best of times. Depite furious button pushing by the crew, it may be the automatics simply cannot keep up thereby forcing the pilot to revert to manual instrument flying skills for which he is not fully competent. It takes just a few seconds to get into an unusual attitude"
A Go-around on an A320 does not require furious button pushing.
The automatics keep up very well.
Of the five airliners in my logbook the A320 is the easiest to fly manually on instruments - especially on black wet nights.
It takes a sustained deliberate action to put an A320 into an unusual attitude - and even then it won't be very unusual.
Cheers
TP

Centaurus

8th May 2006, 09:54

Tyro Picard. Thanks for your info. I must admit I have never had the pleasure of flying an A320 but from all reports from colleagues who fly the type it is a delight to fly. Perhaps my wording of "unusual attitudes" was at fault. Except to make the point a significant uncorrected nose low attitude below the horizon is enough to cause a crash in IMC at low altitude in most jet airliners, including the foolproof A320 maybe? The A320 Gulf Air Bahrein crash comes to mind.

Man Flex

8th May 2006, 11:37

So it doesn't stall eh?

Well what happens if one of the crew on passing "F" speed at acceleration altitude selects "Flap zero" instead of "Flap one"? Easily done.

Schnowzer

8th May 2006, 12:01

Centaurus,

First the cause is all still conjecture!

High performance fighters being catapulted at night from aircraft carriers seldom crash after take off even though this illusion may be present. This suggests current basic instrument flying skills play a significant part in reducing the effect of the illusion

But they do crash and over the years a significant number of fast jets have been lost both at sea and overland in IMC. I agree that basic instrument skills are vital.

It doesn't matter how good your instrument cross check is, you will be effected by samatographic illusion if you accelerate without visual cues. As I am sure you know, the rate of perceived pitch up is directly proportional to the rate of acceleration.

Even looking at a modern generation Head Up Display, which gives far more useful flightpath information than the average PFD, it is easy to be seduced by the illusion. If you are doing 300kts, IMC in a turn and then plug the burners in, I know of few pilots that will keep the aircraft absolutely level. Most guys are initially seduced by the illusion and then make adjustments to recover level flight. The extent of the excursion depends on how rapidly you scan.

We all get distracted and a go-around is one of the highest workload events carried out by most airline crews. I have seen numerous errors during go-arounds both in the sim and on the line. These errors sometimes lead to a breakdown in cross-cockpit duties which lead to distraction and a reduced instrument scan rate. Old chestnuts like 'ANC' are all well and good but the fact is people still screw up even without seductive illusions.

In an ideal world, there would be no illusions and no one would get distracted leading to a mistake. Sadly, it aint an ideal world and the death of a few of my friends over the years illustrates the point!

Schnowzer

Dream Land

8th May 2006, 12:33

Well what happens if one of the crew on passing "F" speed at acceleration altitude selects "Flap zero" instead of "Flap one"? Easily done I believe that would lead to "alpha lock", when the aircraft is below a specific speed or when a specific AOA is exceeded, slats will not retract from 1 to 0. Correct me if I'm wrong.

8th May 2006, 13:31

Dreamland,

Alpha lock function is active if AoA >8.5° or speed is lower than 148 knots.

The alpha lock function is only active with the flap lever at position 1. i.e. if you select flap zero they will not move if AoA is too high. However, if the lever HAS BEEN moved to zero, and AoA subsequently becomes excessive - THE SLATS WILL NOT BE LOCKED - they will continue to retract to zero .......

Man Flex

There is a "gate" at positions 1 and 3 to prevent excessive selections. Seems to work - I've been on the Bus for nearly 6,000 hours and have never gone from 2 or 3 to zero in one move.

A4

TyroPicard

8th May 2006, 14:08

Centaurus, you are correct; if you point an airliner at the ground it will hit it, especially if you start at a height of "around 920 ft" (Flight magazine reporting the Russian transport ministry). Mind you, I don't recall saying that the A320 is "foolproof" - any fool can crash an aircraft and several fools have proved it in A320's...
A4 ..
"The alpha lock function is only active with the flap lever at position 1".
Not quite.. that would mean that if you move the lever Alpha Lock does not apply! When the fool moves the lever, that's when we need alpha lock...
TP

8th May 2006, 16:38

OK Tyro...semantics. The point I was trying to get across is that once the slats are travelling (from 1 to 0), the Alpha lock function WILL NOT stop them if you pitch up sharply and exceed the AoA parameter. Once the flap lever is at 0 and you are below the trigger parameters, you will not get alpha lock back if you re-exceed those parameters.

A4 :ok:

Gnadenburg

9th May 2006, 12:50

Centaurus

Keep barking up that tree!

I've flown the aircraft involved in the crash and I don't believe it was originally kitted out with the Flight Director upgrade that has them automatically reinstated on go around.

Somato gravic illusion, PFD speed tape confusion, an inability to confidently reinstate automatics after taking them out to correct an 'ugly' approach and a nose low TOGA go around due poor IF skills- can be a problem combined and I suspect are, the very reason Airbus modified the FD's in the first.

I have seen it twice. I have also watched the GF crash in QAR style presentation and suspect similar.

Can anybody confirm if the aircraft had the CPIP Flight Director upgrade post-Ansett?

TyroPicard

11th May 2006, 11:09

“The airbus did not fuel, to be more precise, it fuelled only on paper. As it is usually done, they put it done that they filled in 10 tons, but took less,” representative of the Armenian Community of Sochi Grach Makeyan is quoted as saying by Yerevan Aravot newspaper. According to him, the official version about bad weather conditions is unfounded. “We were standing near the air traffic controller, when he was in touch with the crew, who informed that they were having problems with fuel. The air traffic controller said ‘the crew started landing, its time to prey’.”

Found this on the Russian news agency REGNUM website. Interesting rumour - anyone have an idea why a crew would do that?
TP

Founder

16th May 2006, 18:42

After reading the article in Flight International (on 16-22 May 2006) about the A320 that crashed in to the black Sea at Sochi airport near the Russian-Georgian border, the first thing that came to mind was the tight right hand turn which the aircraft had made after the pilots were told by ATC to abort approach.

Looking at the flightpath you get a view of the normal missed approach procedure as a comparisson to the tight turn which the aircraft made.

Normal approach speed for an A320 is about 180-200 knots and the aircraft probably was within 10 miles of the airport since he was etasblished on the ILS...

Back to the turn, it's more than twice as tight as a normal missed approach procedure turn is, and here's my question, could the aircraft have made a too tight turn and stalled?

It was already flying at a dangerously low speed and a turn slows aircrafts down and stall speed increases with reduced lift, the tighter the turn the less lift the wings produce as the airspeed drops...

What do you think?

Ex Cargo Clown

16th May 2006, 19:00

Errrm no....

Journo alert....

ZBMAN

16th May 2006, 19:01

Founder

16th May 2006, 19:12

In normal law it is physically impossible to stall an a320, even with full back stick applied. However it is still an aeroplane so in certain conditions it may fail to gain height - but that's more the case in an engine out situation.

How about the weather conditions, they were reported to be very bad that day, could the aircraft have stalled because of turning into a strong enough tail wind? or by heavy turbulence? Windshear?

hetfield

16th May 2006, 19:17

How about the weather conditions, they were reported to be very bad that day, could the aircraft have stalled because of turning into a strong enough tail wind? or by heavy turbulence? Windshear?

Not at all!

E.G. systems running normal.

FlyUK

16th May 2006, 20:10

I'm not going to say your wrong by any means, but if the 'bus encountered windshear close to Vls, then the alpha floor will apply power but this takes a bit of time. It would be possible to stall but the aircraft would then pitch down to get out of it....ie, it will not stall but it may well sink. Or have I got the wrong end of the stick? :confused: :confused:

Founder

16th May 2006, 20:59

Pilot Pete

16th May 2006, 21:14

What I'm thinking of is that the aircraft was already at low altitude, (less then 1000 ft) and sinking -300 ft/min in bad weather at low speed, needing to abort an approach and do a hard right turn which looks by the graphics as at least 30° bankangle... this is a tough manouver to do for any pilot...
I'm not that familiar with the A320 but I've done some reading about it and seen a lot of information videos but is the aircraft really so good as to survive a manouver like that? at such a low speed and at such a low altitude in those conditions?

Founder, with all due respect the technical points you raise show your complete lack of knowledge and I suggest you refrain from such unfounded speculation.

Sinking at 300fpm is not enough to be following a glideslope. A turn of 30° bankangle is a normal turn in a commercial airliner and hardly constitutes a 'tough' manoeuvre for ANY airline pilot, even in bad weather. as already pointed out, an A320 would be doing considerably less than 180kts below 1000'.

PP

Felix Saddler

16th May 2006, 21:16

:sad: i offer my sorrows to all personal on board. may they rest in peace. :)

FlapsOne

16th May 2006, 21:21

Founder

16th May 2006, 22:30

So what do you think happened?

arn3696

16th May 2006, 22:55

What I'm thinking of is that the aircraft was already at low altitude, (less then 1000 ft) and sinking -300 ft/min in bad weather at low speed, needing to abort an approach and do a hard right turn which looks by the graphics as at least 30° bankangle... this is a tough manouver to do for any pilot...?

Founder...
Im not entirely sure whether im on the right track here, nor do I know what graphics you refer to, but I think you may be slightly confused about this procedure.

A missed approach procedure is published to direct pilots after an approach is aborted for whatever reason. The turns depicted on the plates however have no scale as quite obviously different aircraft travelling at different speeds have a different turn radius. All turns on instrument procedures should be rate 1 (ie 3 degrees a second). On a seneca for example this may be about 20 degrees of bank but on an aircraft travelling much faster this will be increased to maybe 30 degrees which, as said in a previous post, is quite normal for an airliner. I think its safe to say that the angle of bank wasnt the only cause of the trouble encountered.

Chris

Kalium Chloride

16th May 2006, 23:05

So what do you think happened?

It's going to be tough to work that out with so little evidence, Founder, and I'm not going to pre-empt official findings, particularly given that the flight recorders have yet to be dragged from the depths.

There are presently no conclusions - there is no indication of the technical condition of the aircraft and its engines, there is no solid flight data from the aircraft itself, and only basic information acquired from radar data, communication records, and interviews with air traffic controllers and airport authorities.

But regarding the circumstances of the accident, I'll echo other posters' points regarding the similarity of those circumstances to the Gulf Air accident, also involving an A320, of August 2000.

Both involved the aircraft making a coastal approach, in darkness, and under testing conditions - the Armavia flight owing to the weather and the Gulf Air flight owing to an unstable approach.

Both attempts at landing were aborted with the crews turning the aircraft away from the approach centreline in a direction which took them over a expansive body of water - featureless terrain at the best of times, and in the dark especially difficult to use as a visual reference.

Without a visual reference, the ability to retain situational awareness of the aircraft's attitude, movement and position by ordinary sensory perception is seriously impeded - hence the importance of pilots' closely monitoring and trusting the information relayed by the aircraft's instrument panel.

Nothing above is intended as a conclusion, by any means, but the circumstances provide a timely reminder to a simple fact which has been demonstrated in aviation time and again: if the aircraft isn't doing what you think it's doing, or isn't where you think it is, then sooner or later there's going to be trouble.

Gnadenburg

17th May 2006, 02:44

Disorientation on go around, will be reinforced if we know as to whether the aircraft had been modified with the upgraded Flight Directors. Minor point- not all ex-AN 320's were equiped with predictive winshear.

I must add, if you have watched the GF crash reproduced with FDR data, you will note the aircraft should have crashed on it's first orbit- I recall it went from 700' to 200'! Below average piloting skills the major factor and not the convenient somato gravic illusion Gulf Air likes to run with!

In my experience, spatial disorientation on G/A in A320 aircraft is exascerbated or a combination of the following factors:

1) Poor raw data & I/F skills which Airbus operations can hide.

2) An inability to confidently reinstate automatics after a 'botched' approach where correction initially involved disengaging them.

3) A nose low TOGA go around. Hesident and under confidence from crews in point 1 above can be prone to this.

4) A combination of somato gravic illusion, speed tape confusion and mode confusion has a further nose over on Go Around. The Airbus now rapidly lights up like a Christmas tree with visual and aural overspeed warnings, distracting crew further. Mode confusion and distraction can lead to a crash - GF for example.

I need to elaborate here. Speed tape confusion on Airbus PFD's is sensory and I have observed it in two ways amongst crews. Demonstration of speed brake to ab initios- VLS physically appears to run up the PFD and the nose is pulled up to 'escape' the illusion ( quickly countered and just a minor stepping stone in a glass upgrade ).

But the problem area is the other way and in it's extremity is a nose low Go Around. As speed rapidly increases, the red barbers pole for the flaps can have the illusion of running down the PFD; a further nose over to escape the illusion will put your PFD well into the barbers pole. Somato gravic illusion may exascerbate the confusion.

So here we now are- nose lowering further, TOGA thrust, distracted by overspeed warnings and GPWS, but the PFD speed tape is confusingly completely red and you have no concept of power plus attitude.

Airbus was probably well aware of the problem. It made sense to upgrade the Flight Directors so the Go Around manoeuvre was simplified. I don't believe Ansett aircraft had been upgraded. So it is likely the Armenian aircraft were without the function.

jackbauer

17th May 2006, 05:33

Gnadenburg, why must you speculate on the cause of this crash, and why must you point the finger at the crew at this early stage? I am quite sure that if you are ever involved in an accident/incident the last thing you want is a bunch of pseudo experts coming on here and blaming you. The facts are not fully known and its very unprofessional of you and others to behave like you have all the answers. There is a system of accident investigation for all crashes and as a professional you should respect that and wait for it to happen. Anything before that is totally unfair, even on a RUMOUR forum. This goes beyond the bounds of gossiping as people lost their lives. Have the decency to show some patience and stop showing how little you know about the A320.

Gnadenburg

17th May 2006, 06:07

There is a system of accident investigation for all crashes and as a professional you should respect that and wait for it to happen.

An odd outburst Jack. So I take it you were completely satisfied with the GF 72 report?

Mode confusion is the precedent for all 320 crashes. So don't silence the discussion. That would be unprofessional in itself.

jackbauer

17th May 2006, 06:14

Why are you trying to compare the 072 with a crash about which we know almost nothing? The investigation team can go home now that you have done their job for them!!!! When the findings are published then its time to compare and draw conclusions. Show respect for gods sake and stop this stupid schoolboy behaviour. You sound like you are sitting there with the FCOM's open just waiting to showoff. Once again WAIT till the FACTS are known and stop feeding the rumour mill. People died here and you are using it to pump up your ego! Shameful.

Founder

17th May 2006, 06:24

Here are the graphics to which I refered to earlier...

http://www.flightglobal.com/assets/getAsset.aspx?ItemID=12750

And here is the link to the story:
http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles/2006/05/16/Navigation/177/206615/Russian+crash+investigators+detail+sequence+of+events+in+Arm avia+A320+Black+Sea.html

Do the a320 have any obvious weaknesses that makes it vulnerable in these kinds of situations?

/Tim

Watchdog

17th May 2006, 06:32

No it doesn't ............................

Gnadenburg

17th May 2006, 06:33

Shameful.

I assume you are Gulf Air and I can understand your professional silence. You would be well practiced! Perhaps your courteous silence has cost lives previously?

Nobody should discuss the accident until the report is out eh Jack? Then take it on face value with no questions asked? Just like GF 72 ? Now there is aviation safety progress. :mad:

jackbauer

17th May 2006, 06:49

I have said enough on this topic and you have already said too much! Any further comment from me is to draw me down to your level and I refuse to do that, too much respect for myself and those involved in this tragic accident.

HotelGym

17th May 2006, 06:55

Gnadenburg

17th May 2006, 07:10

Gnadenburg, give it a break, you are tripping over yourself with a load of tech hogwash. Let the investigation decide what happened and as JB suggested put you FCOM and your ego away somewhere safe eh!

There would be credence in that if you weren't Gulf Air too.

If this accident was spatial disorientation on G/A, I'm sorry to upset your 'comfortable silence', but GF 72 will be talked about again.

OK. I will zip up til the prelim' report.

lomapaseo

17th May 2006, 12:26

Gnadenburg

Please continue to put forth scenarios (plural) that could be involved in this accident as well as any other similar situation facing pilots.

Some of us have come here to understand the challenges to be faced in an investigation. Only in that way may we be thorough in our examinations and considerations and better reflect needed changes , in equipment, procedures or training.

TyroPicard

22nd May 2006, 21:59

Apparently one of the flight data recorders has been recovered from the sea this evening.
TP

Flight Safety

23rd May 2006, 01:21

The data (whether CVR or FDR) should be very enlightening.

CargoOne

23rd May 2006, 01:51

They have recovered CVR and they are pretty much sure the FDR is nearby and would be recovered soon. From Russian media the guys have formed a 3 shifts (each represented with someone from Airbus team) working all toghter 24 hours with unmanned sub-vehicle in order to find and lift recorders. The CVR recover is a good sign so I hope they will get FDR out very soon.

dizzyhytes

23rd May 2006, 06:00

IMHO, a few questions in mind came up after reading this thread:

1. Were there any other aircraft that landed in that time period, what was their report, if any?
2. My idea of circling approaches is , its usually done in "special VFR" conditions, and wouldn't it be prudent to circle to land from another direction, instead of repositioning into the **** you just came out of a few seconds ago?
3. Is it wise to seek landing conditions reports from the Ground controller? Or was it the ground Company ops controller?
4. Seems like a shortage of fuel situation leading to "Press Syndrome"
5. To me, this would be a good situation to use auto-pilot , instead of hand flying it, I think the work-load in poor conditions and turbulence seems "hairy"
5. I think its not caused by any isolated reason, all that has contributed points are valid,and more so when consolidated together, plus fatigue, plus personal issues etc...

...oh, the questions will go on and on, I'll stop here for now, thanks for this thread, I've learnt much.

vapilot2004

25th May 2006, 07:57

Latest news release on CVR recovery:

SOCHI, Southern Russia, May 24 (RIA Novosti) - Experts may face problems deciphering flight data from an Armenian Airbus that crashed into the Black Sea May 3 as the magnetic tape of its cockpit flight recorder was seriously damaged, an official said Wednesday.

Tatiana Anodina, head of the Interstate Aviation Committee, said: "The cockpit voice recorder has a magnetic tape and, therefore, is more affected by the marine environment and serious mechanical effects."

She said experts might have to decipher each fragment of the tape separately, and that they may not be able to do this within the 15-day timeframe announced earlier.

The recovery operation at the scene of the tragedy, which left 113 people dead, was officially declared over earlier Wednesday.

The airliner, operated by Armenia's Armavia, crashed while flying from the Armenian capital, Yerevan, in stormy weather 6 kilometers (3.7 miles) from Russia's Adler airport, which services the popular resort of Sochi.

captjns

25th May 2006, 10:49

I was under the impression that the Airbus had digital CVRs as normal equipment on their aircraft.

Cockpit Voice RecorderTime recorded 30 min continuous, 2 hours for solid state digital units
Number of channels - 4
Impact tolerance 3400Gs / 6.5 ms Fire resistance1100 deg C / 30 min Water pressure resistancesubmerged 20,000 ft Underwater locator beacon 37.5 KHz; battery has shelf life of 6 years or more, with 30-day operation capability upon activation.

The US required that aircraft manufactured after October 11, 1991 be equipped with DCVRs. I would imagine that Airbus would have followed this requirement for all aircraft manufactured after this date. Does anyone know the manufacture date of this particular aircraft?

CargoOne

25th May 2006, 11:32

Yesterday they have also recovered FDR which is in good condition (as per media reports).

Belgique

15th Jun 2006, 14:29

15.06.2006 13:15 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The Armenian authorities have been advised of the causes of the crash of the Armenian plane but they are not empowered to make the information public yet, RA Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan told reporters yesterday. In his words, the authorities will keep the information secret until the official decision of experts in announced.
.
To remind, On May 3 night Airbus-320 owned by Armavia national carrier crashed in the Black Sea 6 km away from Adler airport killing all 113 people aboard, including 6 children and 8 crewmembers. Among them were 26 Russian citizens, one Ukrainian and one Georgian citizen, while the rest were Armenian citizens.
.
Meanwhile, an anonymous source in the investigating committee said that errors by the crew have become obvious as the reason for the A-320 jet crash in the Black Sea. The decoding of the flight recorders showed that the pilots “had lost spatial orientation” in bad weather conditions. It was also ascertained that the pilots had overbanked when making the second turn by order of the flying control officer. These factors, specialists say, led to the catastrophe.

threemiles

15th Jun 2006, 14:42

overbanked A320?

Gnadenburg

17th Jun 2006, 05:06

overbanked A320?

I recall from an Airbus Jet Upset Recovery course, just how effective roll is in 'slicing the nose' through the vertical in a nose high recovery. The bank angle used was 60 degrees and within Flight Envelope Protections.

Conversely, any nose low, high bank scenario I vaguely recall, required unloading prior to recovery, with rapid speed onset and altitude loss- no time close to the ground in TOGA thrust.

The point I'm trying to make, if bank was involved even if within the envelope, it would certainly have rapidly complicated disorentation in a Go Around.

In Jet Upset Recovery, Airbus never saw the need for training in recovery from a messed up GA. It never thought it possible. If this was spatial disorientation, the solution will be simple, mandatory CPIP upgrade of all Airbus aircraft to include the reinstatement of Flight Diretors on go around.

Dani

17th Jun 2006, 05:34

...instead of asking more and more automatic fool proof protection (well, that's what it's for - for fools) it might be necessary to work on basic flying skills and proper pilot selection.

If you look at the current discussion in the Middle East forum ("should it be allowed to hand fly an aircraft?") it's clear were the present development goes. And that's why these Airbusses are so pretty liked in the less developped countries - you can put any pilot in it.

So far, every Airbus crash had been "impossible". But still some "spatial disoriented" pilots were able to drive it into the ground...

when will they ever learn... :rolleyes:
Dani

jackbauer

17th Jun 2006, 10:20

Hey Gnadenburg, whatever happened to I will zip up til the prelim' report. Couldn't resist the chance to pass judgement again.

Gnadenburg

17th Jun 2006, 15:48

I have said enough on this topic and you have already said too much!

Obviously, your sanctimonious murmurs persist Jack. Despite your promises to the contrary!

Re-read my post. There was no judgement at all, but a clarification that Airbus protections can be a fools paradise- from evolved training and having flown the aircraft that crashed.

And your contribution? :ugh:

Dani

You have opened a can of worms. Worthy of a seperate post. Airbus FCTM coaches raw data skills with the use of the FPA on approach. But no coaching on a possibly, disorientating raw data GA. Where the FPA can have a crew incorrectly following this reference (if the standard CPIP modification of FD reinstatement on GA not installed). And it wasn't on this aircraft when I flew it last.

Did Armavia upgrade?

darksecrets

19th Jun 2006, 08:32

I will zip up til the prelim' report.

Originally Posted by jackbauer
I have said enough on this topic and you have already said too much!
Why don't you both give it a rest we are trying to discuss the possible causes to a fatal accident, and all your pot shots are becoming a pain in my tail fin, how about you guys make your personal insults into positive comments so we can all benifit from reading the posts. If you want to beat each other up then go and start your own forum.
DS

Kalium Chloride

19th Jun 2006, 19:38

Not fuel exhaustion, or a few other things, according to Flight Int'l:

http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles/2006/06/19/Navigation/195/207312/Initial+Armavia+Airbus+A320+crash+probe+rules+out+fuel+and+e ngine.html

OVERTALK

20th Jun 2006, 05:09

......and the significance of this finding is????
.
"Russia’s Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) has also disclosed that, during the last minute, the aircraft was switched into flight mode in which the flight director was active but the autopilot was disengaged."

Gnadenburg

20th Jun 2006, 07:37

So a possibly, if nose low, disorientating HDG & V/S is reinstated on the FD's. If the aircraft had been through the CPIP, the FD's would have self-reinstated with GA Mode, enabling a simple and non-disorientating GA procedure to be flown.

Pretty obvious, one of the major recommendations that will come out of this accident.

Dagger Dirk

20th Jun 2006, 09:19

Can Gnadenburg (or somebody else familiar with the A320) please reduce Gnadenburg's post to a crystal clarity for someone unfamiliar with a Flight Director's vagaries and their relevance in the unmodified A320 in a go-round in this sort of circumstance.
.
i.e. What is the precise hazard?
.
.....and what have some A320 operators done about it?

FlightDetent

20th Jun 2006, 15:06

Cross hair directors show pitch/roll (attitude) commands. These commands are followed by positioning the att.indicator's fixed aircraft symbol (which inidcates present aircraft attitude over the artif. horizon) over them (mechanically, it is the other way around, of course). The autopilot follows the commands precisely or the manual pilot with a tiny delay. It is very clear and very precise. The display is sort of classical ILS presentation - up/down, left/right.

Airbus does provide the pilot with Flight Path Vector indication ("bird") and associated Flight Path Director ("moustache"). This indication is pilot selectable.

The bird appears as a "winged circle" less than 1 cm in size, the moustache as a barette with triangles at sides, hence the term. When displayed ontop of each other, the moustaches forms what looks like feathers to the little wings of FPV.

The Bird provides aircraft reference display by means of real velocity vector (trajectory) in PFD. In level flight, for instance, the attitude reference is 3 deg up, the bird's wings would be placed exactly on the horizon line (level flight) and the whole thing could be shifted to a side - indicating a drift. Wind from left -> bird on the right side (you're being blown to the right).

The moustache to bird is just as the flight director is to aircraft reference symbol on attitude indicator.

As you select FPV/D on, director bars are removed from view and aircraft reference symbol is dimmed somewhat. Your reference is now flight path, not aircraft attitude. But also, your FCU (MCP) guidance changes from V/S to degrees pitch and form heading to track.

This is a great way to fly non-precision approaches. With autopilot on, at FAF you select appropriate descent angle and final approach track. The flight guidance computer will provide guidance via FPD - the moustache to command the trajectory chosen. The autopilot will follow and aircraft will remain on profile and track regardless of speed, thrust, configuration and wind changes.

(rated prooners: Trying to keep it simple, I know when you deselect FDs you keep bird and AP stays on and you still can steer using FCU).

Now, comes the tricky part. Imagine it is not the autopilot that follows the "moustache" it is you, using trajectory as flying reference. It is not what humans are built for. We survive flying planes by using attitude as a reference. Airbus aircraft are flown like any other aircraft. Not only is this true, but it is also "the airbus golden rule #1" (basically A-N-C expanded to six items).

Today, Airbus say that for manual flight, FPD (moustache) is not used. The symbols are to small to follow, the indication si too confusing. You should switch the director part off (just like you could with normal FDs) and use the bird only which is very comfortable.

For dynamic manouvres like a go-around, the bird is of little use because it shows real trajectory with great precision when you need pitch/power settings.

I believe that Gnadenburg says that on some early manufactured models if crew had FPV/D for approach, during go-around it remained the reference system in PFD. Which, I agree, is totally incomprehensible and in IMC potentially deadly. Latter models have modification that automatically reselect classical FD bars for go around.

Imagine G/A with FPD/V :ugh: :ugh: :ugh:

FD

Edited for VERY silly typos and some stupid grammar.

Dani

20th Jun 2006, 17:32

Gnadenburg

21st Jun 2006, 02:18

Basically:

New Airbus- On GA, Flight Directors automatically reinstate, providing the pilot with a simple presentation on how to fly the manoeuvre. The presentation is super imposed on the attitude indicator. It relaxes the need for a solid foundation of IF skills on face value; but also probably takes away any risk whatsover of spatial disorientation of aircrew on GA.

Old Airbus- On GA your Flight Directors present GA Mode in whatever current function you are in-

a) simple conventional cross bar presentation as above.

b) flight path vector which can disorientate crew if they pitch the vector to a GA attitude instead of GA angle ( conventional Airbus protections protect against the gross error of over pitching; with the exception of a single engine GA and altitude capture or degraded situations common in abnormals ).

c) Raw Data presentation where the GA procedure is now flown on instruments soley.

"IF" Armavia is spatial disorientation on GA, Old Airbus presentations have been partially or fully responsible for a number of accidents IMO. It will probably never happen again with a compulsory upgrade of Airbus aircraft to new standard of Flight Directors.

Gnadenburg

21st Jun 2006, 02:54

The loss of FD during go around is not a special problem of some old A320 but also other aircraft, some aircraft are even not ment to be flown with the FD during GA. This is perfectly safe, as long as crew is trained for it, aware of it and does it correctly.
Other aircraft have to be flown manually (autopilot off during go around) or have to use raw data (no FMS, navigation computer).
Automatics never replace good airmanship, proper procedures and their adherence.
Dani

Dani

I concur. But consider the following.

Airbus endorsement conducted on 'upgraded' simulator. Everytime you do a GA FD's are introduced.

Now, you are flying a 'legacy' Airbus without FD upgrade. GA in anger is now surprisingly, a raw data manoeuvre if FD's earlier turned off. GA is a 180 degree turn. Introduce somato gravic and somato gyral illusions, TOGA thrust and unexpected raw data presentation. Do you see any CFIT risks?

Ignition Override

21st Jun 2006, 03:32

Founder, although I fly airplanes and have never trained on any Airbus, it is very difficult to imagine a "normal approach speed" (on final?) at about 180-200 knots (from page 4), unless a plane must somehow be landed with no slats and no flaps. If somebody told you that such a speed is normal for final approach, you might want to determine whether the person is a pilot on similar turbofan transports.

In the most stretched version of a (swept-wing) transport jet which we fly, final approach speed can be as low as 135 knots or so. Our lowest clean speed (Vzf) might be as low as 190-195 with a small number of passengers and about 6,000# of fuel.

Dani

21st Jun 2006, 06:08

Airbus without FD upgrade. GA in anger is now surprisingly, a raw data manoeuvre if FD's earlier turned off. GA is a 180 degree turn. Introduce somato gravic and somato gyral illusions, TOGA thrust and unexpected raw data presentation. Do you see any CFIT risks?

Fully agree. If it's unexpected then it's most dangerous. But if you have one or more aircraft with this behaviour, crew has to be told and trained for that. You cannot let someone fly an aircraft if this someone doesn't know how it works. The flight ops department has to blamed for in such a case, not the pilots!

Remember the Überlingen Crash TU-154 vs DHL 757 Germany? Russian pilots were trained to follow the ATC orders, not the TCAS. This is wrong wrong very wrong. The chief pilots stated even months after the accident that this is correct procedure!

An A320 without this FD modification is also doing exactly what its ment to do, it remains in the same mode. There was no technical problem at all. It's just another behaviour of the FMGS. It's easily predictable if the crew KNOWS whats coming next.

Dani

FlightDetent

21st Jun 2006, 11:41

Founder, although I fly airplanes and have never trained on any Airbus, it is very difficult to imagine a "normal approach speed" (on final?) at about 180-200 knots (from page 4)

Everything you say is true. I just like to add that if you decide to fly a deccelerated ILS approach on an 320, the first stage of final approach (approximately down to 1700' AAL) is per manufacturer SOP flown at manouvering speed for flaps in "configuration 1". With given pax numbers and fuel figures, this would be in the vicinity of 185 kt. The final approach speed however, is about 130 kt.

For ILS approach there is no need neither SOP to select FPV/D. For non-precision apch, the speed should naturally be 130.

Gnadenburg:

Never in your posts I saw that you suggested what happened to THE lost Armavia ship. What I did read is that you speculate (which is not a dirty word!) over scenarios that could or could have developed into similar, disasterous endings.

Namely the FPD/V display on G/A is something I never heard of or imagined before. I fly newer hulls but if I change company, or there is leased older one without the modification, I would not even know. I am not trained to deselec FPV/D for G/A although I have the technical knowledge how it is done. But would I? :eek: I should hope so.

Not anymore. Now I know I would. Now I know I would ask abut the modification. Please keep sharing your ideas and observations.:D :D :D

Thank you, PPRuNe!
FD.
(the un-real)

ORAC

26th Jul 2006, 14:44

BBC: Armenia air crash blamed on crew

Investigators examining what caused an Armenian airliner to crash with the loss of all 113 people on board have blamed pilot error. The Armavia A320 Airbus plunged into the Black Sea on 3 May as it tried to land near the Russian city of Sochi.

"The human factor in bad weather played a role," Russian Transport Minister Igor Levitin said...... Mr Levitin was speaking in Moscow to announce the results of an enquiry into the crash held by the Russian government and investigators from Armenia and France.

Tatyana Anodina, head of the inter-governmental committee that took part in the enquiry, said that during the descent the captain "did not ensure control of the plane as far as angle and altitude were concerned," according to Russia's Itar-Tass news agency. Ms Anodina said that the co-pilot also failed to "ensure necessary control".

She added that an alarm system had gone off as the plane was plunging but it was too late to regain altitude.

The investigators said that there had been no engine failure or fuel shortage.

The A320 crashed at about 0215 (2215 GMT) as it made a second attempt to land at Adler airport, just outside Sochi. It was initially refused permission to land because of poor weather.

The plane reportedly hit the sea at an angle of 60 degrees, six kilometres (four miles) from the coast.

Armavia said the plane was in good condition and that the crew were experienced. The Airbus was manufactured in 1995.

alf5071h

26th Jul 2006, 16:22

ORAC your post of the BBC report verbatim failed to take the opportunity to clarify the vital point that human factors do not consist entirely of ‘pilot error’ as suggested by the reporter.
The Russian statement accurately sets the scene for what we hope will be more enlightening information than that the crew did not control / lost control of the aircraft.

We should also remember that ‘error’ is a classification of the events applied in retrospect; of greater interest will be an understanding of the conditions and circumstances preceding the event, and how the issue of blame or responsibility is presented.

Kalium Chloride

26th Jul 2006, 17:01

That BBC report is very simplistic and doesn't really portray the situation as accurately as it might (the stuff about a 60-degree angle is, I believe, a mistake carried over from when the investigators were originally explaining the aircraft's heading of 060, the direction of the runway).

The investigators said it was down to a combination of loss of situational awareness and poor crew co-ordination. This is paraphrased from reports in Air Transport Intelligence and Flight International:

- Aircraft was instructed to go around at just above 1,100ft because of wx minima
- Made a climbing right turn heading for 2,000ft as per missed approach
- Captain switched off autopilot, subsequently lost awareness over the attitude of the aircraft, made pitch and roll inputs and put the aircraft into a descent
- First officer did not maintain adequate control over instrument readings, did not co-ordinate recovery of aircraft
- Despite EGPWS alert, crew did not apply sufficient nose-up input

Sounds an awful lot like GF back in 2000.

OVERTALK

27th Jul 2006, 03:12

113 people died when an Armenian A320 airliner crashed into the Black Sea on 03 May during a missed approach at Sochi. "The human factor in bad weather played a role," Russian Transport Minister Igor Levitin said. Levitin was speaking in Moscow to announce the results of an enquiry into the crash held by the Russian government and investigators from Armenia and France.
Tatyana Anodina, the head of a civil aviation agency that links Russia with 11 other ex-Soviet republics, said an automated system warned the two pilots that the plane was flying dangerously low, but that a last-ditch effort to gain altitude failed to head off the crash into the Black Sea. The plane reportedly hit the sea at a nose-down angle of 60 degrees, six kilometres (four miles) from the coast. Safety analysts have drawn comparisons between this crash and that of a GulfAir A320 in identical circumstances off Bahrein in August 2000.
.
Airbus might not be keen to have any such comparisons drawn as it could reflect unfairly upon the A320. It's not therefore expected that any such conclusions will emerge in the official report into the Armavia A320 accident. Western experts have however ventured that a form of disorientation called a somatogravic illusion is likely to have played a role. This form of spatial disorientation is caused by changes in linear acceleration/deceleration that stimulate the ears’ otolith organs, resulting in a strong false perception of a pitching dynamic. The pitch-up illusion is normally experienced by a pilot under strong longitudinal acceleration – such as a go-round or missed approach with early level-off. It can be reinforced by a simultaneous turn, as was the case at Sochi.
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The acceleration can cause the illusion that any pitch attitude change is much more severe than it actually is – in fact the pitch-up illusion can occur during level accelerated flight. A pilot experiencing the pitch up illusion whilst without any contrary external visual references is induced to respond by making what he perceives as a necessary nose-down correction. Unloading the aircraft to less than one g allows the rate of acceleration to increase and so induces an even stronger pilot nose-down input. Because of this it is said to be a self exacerbating phenomenon. Unfortunately it is not something that can be induced in the simulator. All such crashes have been, like at Sochi and Bahrein, characterised by impact in a steeply nose-down attitude.
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There are two aspects of desperately needed physiological training that have emerged from recent crashes. The message from the Helios crash is that pilots need aeromedical theory refreshers including hypobaric chamber runs and personalized hypoxia experiences. The Armenian and GulfAir A320 crashes point to a need for a somatogravic and somatogyral illusions simulator.

SIDSTAR

27th Jul 2006, 23:46

Has nobody noticed that airbus has stated that the aircraft was being flown in Config full with flaps down in level flight. Then it went in after "inputs from the Capt's side."

After a G/A the procedure is to raise flaps by one level and get the gear up. This does not appear to have been done. The rest appears to have been disorientation and inputs from the Capt's sidestick. The FPV/FD may have been an issue in confusing the pilots but the basic G/A doesn't appear to have been flown correctly - level flight with flaps full and gear down is a no-no for any transport category aircraft. Rule 1 fly the aircraft, Rule 2 fly the aircraft!! Golden Rules since the dawn of aviation.

Airbus also states that there was no defect with the aircraft. In this case it seems they may be right. There's no substitute for basic airmanship. Unfortunately, Airbus constantly teaches pilots to almost blindly believe in their technology while bleating on about how the 320 "can be flown just like any other aircraft" while spending all their training time doing just the opposite.

The best safety aid in any cockpit is a well-trained pilot. The next best safety aid is a second well-trained pilot. I wonder what kind of training these poor guys got? If it was in Toulouse it won't surprise anyone.

145qrh

28th Jul 2006, 07:46

"Has nobody noticed that airbus has stated that the aircraft was being flown in Config full with flaps down in level flight" "level flight with flaps full and gear down is a no-no for any transport category aircraft"....

I'm pretty sure that Airbus knows how to investigate an accident, as for not flying level in Config full with the gear down???? don't remember reading that as a limitation on any transport airplane I have flown.

The crash does bear all the hallmarks of GF072, which as we know was also a 320, how much bearing the type has in the accident is purely speculation. My guess would be that there have been crashes where crew have been disorientated on non-fly by wire plane too....Sharm-el-Sheik 737 is one that springs to mind.

Looks like PF disorientated, and PNF was either the same or ...well it's not to criticise the dead, but for some reason the PNF failed to take over, who knows why? I don't think anyone will ever know for sure, but accident investigation is pretty thorough and goes very deep into training history, personal life ,etc,etc

GearDown&Locked

28th Jul 2006, 09:33

Looks like PF disorientated, and PNF was either the same or ...well it's not to criticise the dead, but for some reason the PNF failed to take over, who knows why? I don't think anyone will ever know for sure, but accident investigation is pretty thorough and goes very deep into training history, personal life ,etc,etc

Maybe there are some cultural issues to be addressed. The Bashkirian Airlines - DHL accident comes to mind. In some cultures it maybe possible that a Capt. is master and commander and for the FO to takeover the plane it may be considered almost like a mutiny. It also happens in western parts of the world in a soft sort of way, you just have to look at those pprune threads starting with "If my Capt busts minima/level etc.." there's always that doubt in what to do when things go wrong, although they're trained to exhaustion on how to cope with a bad scenario before it goes worse.

GD&L

SIDSTAR

6th Aug 2006, 09:40

145,

My comment about not flying a transport category aircraft in full flap, gear down configuration, level flight is based on 25 years of flying both Airbus and Boeing aircraft for 8 different operators across the globe. Not one of them would ever consider that level flight in such a configuration was an acceptable situation to be in, due to the very high drag involved. Of course you are correct in stating that it's not a limitation, but responsible operators and pilots will not allow such manoeuvres. Imagine the problem when you lose an engine in this config.

Unfortunately, after many years of sim instructing, I have also seen the best and worst of pilot abilities, and worse still, attitudes. There is still no substitute for basic IF skills regardless of which aircraft you may be flying. Every aircraft I've flown flies fine, even on one engine, in a go-around, provided the configuration is changed and the gear is retracted as per the manufacturer's recommendations. Try to do it some other way and you're simply asking for trouble. Just about every jet aircraft needs to have Takeoff/TOGA thrust applied, be rotated to approx 15 deg N/U, have the gear retracted and it'll fly just dandy - it may not be exactly as the FD would command for a given weight but it'll get you climbing away from the ground in a safe configuration. Get any of these basics wrong and you're asking for trouble. This applies in a 320 same as in a 747. All the other bleating about illusions etc only become relevant when the basics have already been well and truly f*cked up. Keep up your basic IF skills and handfly your aircraft on a regular basis. If your company's SOPs do not permit this, get out, because sooner or later, either yourself or one of your colleagues will kill you.

Belgique

6th Aug 2006, 14:41

Looks like PF disorientated, and PNF was either the same or ...well it's not to criticise the dead, but for some reason the PNF failed to take over, who knows why?Somatogravic illusions (such as the pitch-up illusion) are proven in a US Navy study to affect both pilots simultaneously and that's why it's such a dangerous illusion. If the conditions are there, it will manifest itself equally to both. As a mass illusion, it's a ready-made explanation of why pilots never rescue each other from such situations.
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The USN has lost scores of airplanes accelerating off cat-shots. The catapult's acceleration is very powerful and the phenomenon has caused there to be built-in safeguards in modern carrier-borne aircraft.