Air France crash at YYZ (Merged)

[GrahamCurry]

From page 28:-
"If the rain had just moved in, the runway surface could well have been more oily than wet.

The top part of pavement is full of petroleum-based products, mostly microscopic bits of tyres. When it first rains after a dry spell, those oily bits of petroleum float on the surface of the just-fallen rain, and that is when a paved surface is the most slippery. This is particularly true on those areas where the tyres are accelerating, decelerating, or turning (because thet's where they shed the most rubber). After it has been raining for a few minutes, the water/oil ratio grows large enough to eliminate the oil surface, and it's just a question of a wet surface."

The above situation is 'normal' (given the conditions) and shouldn't be a surprise to any transport driver. What isn't normal is a sudden reversal of wind direction or a sudden cloudburst. An earlier posting by a jockey described extra flaps and a 'determined' touch-down, which sounded good initiative (and common sense). Maybe a combination of that jockey's technique and a better touch-down location towards the runway threshold would have saved the aircraft, though there is still the combination of possible deep water causing aquaplaning (on a non-grooved surface) and the aberration whereby aerodynamic retardation devices might not deploy due to the dynamic parameters of the undercarriage. I believe passengers reported a reduction in deceleration after the initial braking phase.
It might not ALL be driver error . . .

[punkalouver]

What isn't normal is a sudden reversal of wind direction or a sudden cloudburst.

Actually if you make an approach to an airport during a thunderstorm, such a situation is not unexpected.

[Yaw String]

Pprune forums, like events/mistakes discussed over a pint of beer at the bar have become a useful aid to flight safety. We learn from the experience of others and try not to go down the same road of no return.
Our working environment as professional pilots - the atmosphere -is an ever changing one. No two clouds produce the same amount of turbulence. No two approaches will experience the same amounts of wind shift,shear etc.
Reliance on reported met conditions during the approach in order to predict a successful outcome are the norm but....a recent NTSB report expressed amazement at the number of flights continuing to approach and land at a large US airfield in close proximity to large, active CB cells.
Just because the aircraft ahead manages to land we predict that we will be able to do the same.
When the aircraft ahead experiences severe windshear and performs a go around, or crashes....then we predict the unsuccessful outcome and discontinue the approach.

The question....should we have ever been on the approach at all.

The answer....well, nobody has gone around yet!
..... this aircraft is not full, so will be able to successfully go around at any point in the approach with good performance margins!
......I know storms of this size never produce microbursts!
......Company fuel policy put me in this low fuel situation!
...... Jesus...we are so tired, having operated 1 longhaul and 2 shorthaul sectors in one 22 hour duty day, with new f/o and one cruise relief co/pilot, with no adequate inflight rest facility!(Italian operator...God-ENAC help them)... a go-around would be more dangerous than to continue
.....The CEO sacked the last captain that diverted.( Italian operator).
...... I NEVER go-around!!!!

Which one of the above has been your motive for continuing in the past with less than CAVOK!

Let us ALL learn from the experience of others and try to keep ourselves out of Pprune.

P.S. I personally spoke with the Cuban authority about the rubber deposits on the threshold of runway 06 at Havana. In wet conditions the touchdown area is like a skating rink. Be warned that your performance tables would not help you on a reject at max RTOW, on runway 24, in slick conditions. How many other runways around the world suffer the same. Beware predictions based on assumed conditions!!!!!

[Grandpa]

In many parts of this world, the danger of slippery runways is enhanced when the first rain comes at the end of dry season, when dry earth powder deposed in a thin layer on the runway is aggregated and melted to form a film destroying aircraft's braking performance on the whole runway length.

[catchup]

How true!

regards

[SR71]

Great posts alf5071h.

At the risk of simplification, IMHO this accident will find many of its origins in mis-judged visual cues. What little we know about the time history of the speeds on final approach seems to discount violent weather phenomena being a source of difficulty between the R/W THD and TDZ.

Statistically, perhaps the average headwind component I might land with is +10kts? On a 73 series a/c my app Vref 30/40 lies anything between 115 and 140kts. Its not a big jet so the spread is small as the weight change over the course of a flight is small. But its enough to make a difference as to how you put it on the deck.

Our FDR monitoring system gives rise to a monthly report that is issued to the flightdeck community. One month last year, an observation was made in the bulletin on a flight into AMS which showed a flare in excess of 18 secs. I believe the company response was that whilst such antics might reduce the length of your taxi-time to the terminal, it really wasn't SOP and they'd prefer it if, regardless of the length of the runway, pilots did not get into the habit of adjusting their landing technique depending on the length of the runway.

We've all done it - sat in ground effect with a trickle of power on watching the runway go by.

In this instance, you have an a/c flying an approach with a tailwind component approaching 20kts, which means the ground speed is, perhaps, 30kts higher than usual? I'm not sure whether they were at normal weights but for the purposes of the discussion it doesn't really matter...

It looks all wrong out the window and thats without any of the complicating factors that relate to the change in refractive index due to rain on the screen. The pitch attitude is lower, the power is lower, the ROD appears higher, the ground effect is more pronounced.

You check the perceived high ROD the way you normally do in this instance (and you would do because the pitch attitude suggests that you're headed towards the ground faster), and coupled with the more pronounced ground effect (and the fact you may have put some power on because generally you don't like being at idle below 200RA), I can quite conceivably imagine that in an a/c as big as a A340, you could stay in ground effect for 15 secs. You've just upped the lift 30% again...

With the vis down at the level suggested, if you've not shifted your point of reference down the runway, its perhaps only the lights that are going to start giving the game away.

I am lucky that at my home-base the most expeditious exit from the runway favoured by the prevailing winds is 4600ft from the threshold and this requires that, at all but the lightest weights, you have no margin for error if you want to vacate at that taxi-way. It forces you to be disciplined in the last 200ft.

I hope I'm wrong on all of the above.

[jayemm]

I've heard a rumour (not necessarily reliable) that there is a video of the landing doing the rounds. Has anyone seen or heard of this?

[alert5]

Airbus says there was no technical problem with the Air France Airbus A340-300 that overran the runway at Toronto Pearson Airport earlier this month.

The pilots flew a manual short-finals to land, disconnecting the auto-thrust and autopilot at a height of about 300ft.

Full flap and slat configuration was selected while the auto-brake was set to ‘MED’ as recommended for landings on short or contaminated runways.

http://www.radarvector.com/2005/08/no-technical-problem-during-a340.html

[Konkordski]

In this instance, you have an a/c flying an approach with a tailwind component approaching 20kts, which means the ground speed is, perhaps, 30kts higher than usual?



If you're still talking about AF358, from what I understand it's the crosswind which was 20kts, the tailwind was much lower.

Approach speed 143kts, touchdown 148kts.

[vapilot2004]

There were reports of lightning in the area - and some passengers were saying that the cabin lights went out before a rougher than normal touchdown.

I have not heard anything further on this - but it would seem that the French claim that all systems were go doesn't jive with a dark cabin during a lightning storm.

Anyone know of a follow-up on the lights out claims ?

Good Job AF cabin crew !

[SR71]

Konkordski,

Re tailwind components, my apologies.

Garbage in, garbage out.

Edited to say that in light of NOD's posts further on, I knew I'd seen the 164kts app speed figure somewhere and that therefore my analysis has a little merit.

:ok:

[HotDog]

it would seem that the French claim that all systems were go doesn't jive with a dark cabin during a lightning storm.

It's not at all unusual to dim or switch off the cabin lights for landing after sunset. It was SOP in my airline.

[Sensible Garage]

dumb question deleted

[Rumet]

To try to summarise so far, at the risk of oversimplifying ...

Speed at threshold not absurdly high, altitude at threshold not absurdly high. Touchdown speed not absurdly high, touchdown itself smooth, but 4000 ft from threshold. No attempt made to go-around. Speed at runway end not that absurdly high given touchdown point and wx.

Aircraft technically perfectly ok, spoilers deploy, autobrake activates & reverse selected all work fine.

Highly experienced crew (both captain & FO).

Early on after touchdown full manual braking overrides autobrake, and maintained till the end.

Obviously something caused the 4000-ft loss in runway, but to me this is now almost looking as bearing little relevance.

More interesting has to be what caused the landing to be continued after the long touchdown:

- lack of visual cues ? but rapid autobrake override would seem to deny this.
- "impossible" wx just ahead ? but then what if any "standard" reason to trigger a go-around even earlier eg runway not vacated and/or ATC order had occurred ? Any odd reason like this would then have caused an automatic crash ? KL behind did go-around ok.

There has to be some more compelling reason, otherwise this crash looks like it could well happen again, doesn't it ?

[RESA]

Rumet,

I agree with your summary.

How did that 4000' disappear?

Yes, a crew “knowledgeable of the locale” probably should have done a go-around.

But the peculiar thing is that on airports with certain topography, some types of glide-slope guidance equipment might suck you in. I wish I knew how the “voting rationale” on an FMS works . . . and when it decides to tell you, “You-take-it”!

If this flight was “slotted in” on a shot-final (5 nM?) . . . and if the altitude was a little too high . . . what does the FMS do when it never receives a “fly-down” from the glide-slope transmissions?

RESA

[NigelOnDraft]

From earlier posts:
(posted 8 Aug)Monday TSB Briefing
Again caveat phone quality.

Height above Threshold 50-100'
Threshold a/s 146 kt; gs 164kt
a/s at touchdown 148kt.(posted 18 Aug)FROM : AIRBUS CUSTOMER SERVICES TOULOUSE TX530526F

The short final and landing were performed manually with the autopilot (AP) and autothrust (ATHR) disconnected at about 300 feet AGL. The aircraft was in configuration FULL with auto-brake selected to MED.

There was a right variable crosswind of about 20 kts and a tail wind component during the final stage of the approach.

At the time of touchdown, the airspeed was 143 kts and the ground speed 148 kts. Visibility was reported to be 0.5 to 0.25NM in heavy rain.

The touchdown zone is located approximately 4000 feet from the threshold of the 9000-foot runway.There is one point that I have not yet seen mentioned. I do not want to "speculate", and will confine myself to using the TSB and Airbus quotes above and will (bravely) assume the figures they give as facts.

1. Over threshold, IAS roughly correct, but an 18Kt tailwind.
2. Touchdown - IAS of same (correct I assume) magnitude, but now only a 5K tailwind.
3. Poor vis due heavy rain => (significantly) contaminated runway.

Nobody seems to mention the effect of the decreasing tailwind... It is the same as an increasing headwind. Effectively, from the threshold, the aircraft had to "lose" about another 15K of IAS... whilst at a groundspeed of ~160K. For the few posters here who have flown real aircraft, and particularly Airbuses (I have flown A340s and A32x series) will know that Airbuses are "slippery", quite happy to add a few knots here and there (GS Mini, not a precise ATHR), and have a damn good wing, which all => float. Until you get the thing on the ground, the deceleration is poor, especially in ground effect.

Of course, having got the thing on the ground, with a contaminated runway, deceleration will still be poor... and from the posts / TSB (?) / Airbus, it seems that once landed everything went as expected.

Like all accidents, I suspect there will be a number of factors that all added up. No doubt the performance manual said it was OK to land on this Runway, Wet, at this weight. But to what tailwind? A wild guess that the A340 (like A320) is limited to 10K tailwind in the calcs. Very difficult for a crew, flying in poor conditions, to notice the gust veering in the latter approach stages to exceed the 10K (?) figure. Probably still OK, until the tailwind now unfairly disappears (!) in the flare / float, and this will not be factored into the Perf Manual calcs. And again, the immediate Perf Manual will probably have allowed for Wet, but not "Flooded" runway...

Go-Around in flare / after touchdown. Not really trained for... I have done one for real (ABZ), but it is purely a personal instinctive decision by one or other of the Flt Crew. Whilst with 20:20 hindsight, and maybe the Inquiry will confirm, the GA option seems a good one; I reckon a Sim exercise with this scenario (unbriefed) would see the majority doing what happened here...

Lessons: well, some obvious immediate ones for those who do fly, and take advantage of this unfortunate crew. The real / precise lessons will come out in due course from the TSB.

[BOAC]

NOD - for an Airbus non-believer:D, can you explain how it would handle that? Eg. a 737 in a/throttle would probably detect the increasing IAS and reduce power, if not already flaring.

(Not understanding the AB GSMini function), would the AB detect reducing GS and APPLY power, or re-apply power having taken it off for the -18kts?

[NigelOnDraft]

Hi Mr BOAC - how goes it :)NOD - for an Airbus non-believer, can you explain how it would handle that? Eg. a 737 in a/throttle would probably detect the increasing IAS and reduce power, if not already flaring.
(Not understanding the AB GSMini function), would the AB detect reducing GS and APPLY power, or re-apply power having taken it off for the -18kts? GS Mini in this instance should not be a factor - it tends to "add" target IAS when the actual Headwind is greater than wot you typed in the machine. So unless they "entered" a huge tailwind, GS Mini will not take off IAS to get GS to target. My comment was in general that the Airbus is sometimes, let us say a bit too clever, and combined with a poor / lazy ATHR, you often end up with a few knots more than ideal... usually not a problem.

As the tailwind presumably increased approaching the threshold, the ATHR would just add power to maintain target IAS. If it was "lazy" (as it sometimes is) it might have left the power on longer than necessary. As the tailwind reduced it should have taken the power off again... As you flare, and earlier if you see it is "hot", you manually close the TLs, and command idle. However, I would suggest here, these seem like minor factors...

The point I am trying to make is that Airbuses are slippery and easier to float than a Boeing, and can be hard to "get on the ground". Even at idle, with 160K GS and 15K IAS+ to lose (they almost certainly added IAS as well in the conditions), the attitude will be flatter than normal, drag less, and if you could see through the rain (!), the runway will be being eaten up quickly :(

The details we are guessing at will be well known to the BOI, and best left to them... I am just trying to make big picture stuff from what we know, and point out the factor of increasing headwind which seems factual from what we know, and maybe made a "tight" situation impossible :(

[facelac]

Hey NOD

Being Bus driver myself, even its A320, I think your analysis is spot on.

X wind turning into X-tail gust at short final (incresed trust to maintain IAS), and then back to almost calm wind at touchdown produces relative increasing headwind (here +15). Crew were on manual thrust from 300'agl and maybe realised the sudden +15 IAS over threshold and need for idle thrust a little late.

Same concerns on A/THR and GS-mini interaction as you touch. Also the reliability of towerwind is a factor. Speed awareness on Airbus easily gets low, which influences flare directly. Problem both ways, but certainly you often feel that threshold speed was 5-10 knots high for the flare.

Never trained go around due long land ! And agree that unprepared most would, given the situation over threshold, end doing the same as happened here.

[Few Cloudy]

Hi Facelac,

I don't agree that most people would try to land out of a long land situation rather than go around.

The following happened to me once in CDG - Copilot flying - wind light cross - dark clouds to the south.

About 100 ft after a pretty good ILS approach, we go high - Copilot (very new) makes a brusque correction nose down and gets my full attention.

At 50 feet we are on slope but ROD high - I am about to take over when Copilot makes a hard pull on the yoke. ATS is on and not quite in retard mode, so adds thrust.

An extremely soft touchdown occurs - spoilers do not come - we get airborne again.

Copilot freezes on the controls - X wind drifts us towards the lights. I grab it and start a standard GA procedure. During the rotate we again touch the RW and this time the spoilers do come, but are retracted by the advancing thrust levers.

We clear the ground as advertised and live to make another approach, which I fly. This time there is an extremely gusty crosswind - the first gust of which must have hit us at 100ft on the first approach.

Point of this is to show that a GA will almost always save you - although like you, we never practised it so late in the sequence.

FC.

[NigelOnDraft]

Never trained go around due long land ! And agree that unprepared most would, given the situation over threshold, end doing the same as happened here.I don't agree that most people would try to land out of a long land situation rather than go aroundFC - your situation was more typical of being trained for - a poor outcome to the landing, a bounce, drifting to edge of runway....

We did actually do some training in this area a few sims back. Came after the QF BKK accident... and an incident a little closer to home. The key was a comment made in both cases along the lines of "get it down", and trying to impress that maybe the correct response to this was "GA....". As I said, I have subsequently had the (mis)fortune to put this into practice, only at the cost of my Pax's nerves, and the subsequent PA "Welcome to ABZ for the second time this evening..." :)

NB this crew may have had the following factors to add to this:
1. High App Speed anyway due full aircraft
2. May have added a few knots for the weather - in fact, almost certainly did...
3. Tailwind may have spoilt their day in the very late stages, and Thrust response added a few more knots...
4. All the above leads to a very high groundspeed...
5. The (localised) poor vis will have removed many of the visual cues of a long flare / float...
6. And that's before we get into fatigue / LH lack of handling etc.

The lack of visual cues, and high GS, could mean that the float did not necessarily seem excessive...

All I am saying is that there is no definitive measure we have, or are trained for, as to what constitutes an excessively long float that demands a GA. As with most accidents, suspect we'll find a lot of "a few % here" and "a few % there" led to a situation that got out of hand...

There are various technological solutions thay could help. One of the more complex (!) would be those boards they have at Mil Airfields... you know the ones that have a single digit every 1000' e.g. '5' means 5000' LDA left. Not difficult to brief "if we have not touched down by 6000' to go, we must GA..."

NoD

PS I have always maintained it is easier to stop, then land, than v-v :)

[BOAC]

And that's before we get into fatigue - NOD - Paris -Toronto - Air France - are you serious:confused:

[411A]

<<Point of this is to show that a GA will almost always save you - although like you, we never practised it so late in the sequence>>

A very similar situation to yours, Few Cloudy, only in my case, the First Officer never allowed the aircraft to actually touch...just kept on trying to land, half way down the 11,000 foot runway.

Accelerating (never mind not decelerating) in ground effect ain't good for ones health.

This was a very unfortunate accident, and a lot I suspect will truly be learned from the final report.

And, certainly the cabin crew did an outstanding job.

PS: the possible 'fatigue' issue is a red herring, at best.:hmm:

[Doors to Automatic]

FC - just out of interest what did you say to the passengers after this incident?

I would have been sh*tting myself down the back even as a seasoned traveller.

NigelonDraft - those distance-to-go boards that you mention exist at all US civil airports - I'm not sure about Canada/YYZ though.

[exeng]

Never trained go around due long land ! And agree that unprepared most would, given the situation over threshold, end doing the same as happened here.

I've folowed this thread with great interest from a safety perspective.

Your comment concerns me. Are there other Pilots out there who would continue with a 'long land' because they have never been 'trained go around due long land'.

I disagree with facelac's statement that unprepared most would etc, etc.

I'm sure training departments do teach the importance of landing within the touchdown zone. I'm also sure that most training departments will also train a 'go-around' if a touchdown has not been achieved in the zone.

A go-around from the touch down is something I have experienced in the sim and real life.

Please note that my comments here are in respect to 'facelac' comments and are not in relation to the incdident where we await the outcome.


Kind regards
Exeng

[604guy]

those distance-to-go boards that you mention exist at all US civil airports



Are you sure about that? I frequent many US civil airports and I guess they must be really small because they sure aren't noticible. Yes, I have seen them at the odd couple of places but they certainly aren't everywhere as you suggest.

The only places in Canada that I have see them in recent years are at military fields.

[av8boy]

those distance-to-go boards that you mention exist at all US civil airports

Are you sure about that? I frequent many US civil airports and I guess they must be really small because they sure aren't noticible.

They're optional (and therefore not nearly at "ALL" of them), but not uncommon...


KFJK 31L (http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=893906&WxsIERv=Nveohf%20N320-211&Wm=0&WdsYXMg=Abegujrfg%20Nveyvarf&QtODMg=Arj%20Lbex%20-%20Wbua%20S.%20Xraarql%20Vagreangvbany%20%28Vqyrjvyq%29%20%2 8WSX%20%2F%20XWSX%29&ERDLTkt=HFN%20-%20Arj%20Lbex&ktODMp=Whyl%2015%2C%202005&BP=1&WNEb25u=Nagubal%20Ehffb&xsIERvdWdsY=A314HF&MgTUQtODMgKE=Avpr%20ivrj%20bs%2031Y%20nf%20jr%20qrcneg%2022E %20ng%20XWSX%20urnqvat%20sbe%20XZFC&YXMgTUQtODMgKERD=2272&NEb25uZWxs=2005-08-05%2013%3A53%3A36&ODJ9dvCE=&O89Dcjdg=160&static=yes&width=1024&height=693&sok=JURER%20%20%28cynpr%20%3D%20%27Arj%20Lbex%20-%20Wbua%20S.%20Xraarql%20Vagreangvbany%20%28Vqyrjvyq%29%20%2 8WSX%20%2F%20XWSX%29%27%29%20%20beqre%20ol%20cubgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=61&prev_id=&next_id=893350&size=L) (on the left side, starting with 11 at the threshold)

KLAX (http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=892869&WxsIERv=Obrvat%20747-409&Wm=0&WdsYXMg=Puvan%20Nveyvarf&QtODMg=Ybf%20Natryrf%20-%20Vagreangvbany%20%28YNK%20%2F%20XYNK%29&ERDLTkt=HFN%20-%20Pnyvsbeavn&ktODMp=Ncevy%2023%2C%202005&BP=0&WNEb25u=Fnz%20Puhv&xsIERvdWdsY=O-18212&MgTUQtODMgKE=N%20oenaq%20arj%20O747-400%20qryvirerq%20va%20Ncevy%202005%2C%20cbffvoyl%20brcengva t%20vgf%20svefg%20erirahr%20ebhaq-gevc%21%20Fur%20vf%20gur%20yngrfg%20nqqvgvba%20va%20Puvan%20 Nveyvarf%20fgebat%20O747%20syrrg.%20Ebgngr%20nf%20Qlanfgl%20 5%20urnil%21%20%5BAvxba%20Q100%5D&YXMgTUQtODMgKERD=1790&NEb25uZWxs=2005-08-04%2000%3A09%3A25&ODJ9dvCE=&O89Dcjdg=&static=yes&width=1000&height=678&sok=JURER%20%20%28cynpr%20%3D%20%27Ybf%20Natryrf%20-%20Vagreangvbany%20%28YNK%20%2F%20XYNK%29%27%29%20%20beqre%2 0ol%20cubgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=167&prev_id=892883&next_id=892762&size=L)

KORD (http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=839796&WxsIERv=Nveohf%20N330-203&Wm=0&WdsYXMg=Nve%20Senapr&QtODMg=Puvpntb%20-%20B%27Uner%20Vagreangvbany%20%28BEQ%20%2F%20XBEQ%29&ERDLTkt=HFN%20-%20Vyyvabvf&ktODMp=Znepu%2012%2C%202005&BP=1&WNEb25u=Zvpuny%20Ohpvnx%20%5Brcjn_fcbggref%5D&xsIERvdWdsY=S-TMPY&MgTUQtODMgKE=&YXMgTUQtODMgKERD=1413&NEb25uZWxs=2005-05-16%2014%3A39%3A22&ODJ9dvCE=&O89Dcjdg=519&static=yes&width=1024&height=665&sok=JURER%20%20%28cynpr%20%3D%20%27Puvpntb%20-%20B%5C%27Uner%20Vagreangvbany%20%28BEQ%20%2F%20XBEQ%29%27%2 9%20%20beqre%20ol%20cubgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=137&prev_id=839797&next_id=837893&size=L) (Hey! They've got radar! Can anybody telll me, is that an ASR9 on a new tower sitting next to the old ASR7 tower in the background? I have not been keeping up...)

KBOS 27 (http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=416555&WxsIERv=Nveohf%20N330-223&Wm=0&WdsYXMg=Yhsgunafn&QtODMg=Obfgba%20-%20Trareny%20Rqjneq%20Ynjerapr%20Ybtna%20Vagreangvbany%20%28 OBF%20%2F%20XOBF%29&ERDLTkt=HFN%20-%20Znffnpuhfrggf&ktODMp=Frcgrzore%201%2C%202003&BP=0&WNEb25u=Gbz%20Crgrenaqrey&xsIERvdWdsY=Q-NVZO&MgTUQtODMgKE=%28qry.%20ba%20Abi%2029%2C%201999%29%20Avpr%20i vrj%20ba%20ehajnl%2027%20jvgu%20qbjagbja%20Obfgba%20va%20gur %20onpx.%20Guvf%20jnf%20npghnyyl%20gur%20svefg%20syvtug%20jv gu%20guvf%20Nveohf%20N330%20sebz%20Zhavpu%20ba%20qhgl.%20Fri reny%20cynarf%20unir%20orra%20gnxra%20bire%20sebz%20Fnoran%2 0naq%20Fjvff.%20Guvf%20bar%20jnf%20va%20gur%20syrrg%20bs%20F jvff%20Nve%20jvgu%20gur%20ertvfgel%20UO-VDZ&YXMgTUQtODMgKERD=3872&NEb25uZWxs=2003-09-04%2000%3A00%3A00&ODJ9dvCE=&O89Dcjdg=308&static=yes&width=1024&height=780&sok=JURER%20%20%28cynpr%20%3D%20%27Obfgba%20-%20Trareny%20Rqjneq%20Ynjerapr%20Ybtna%20Vagreangvbany%20%28 OBF%20%2F%20XOBF%29%27%29%20NAQ%20%28ZNGPU%20%28nvepensg%2Cn veyvar%2Ccynpr%2Ccubgb_qngr%2Cpbhagel%2Cerznex%2Ccubgbtencur e%2Crznvy%2Clrne%2Cert%2Cnvepensg_trarevp%2Cpa%2Cpbqr%29%20N TNVAFG%20%28%27%2B%22ehajnl%22%27%20VA%20OBBYRNA%20ZBQR%29%2 9%20%20beqre%20ol%20cubgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=164&prev_id=450248&next_id=411096&size=L) (I prefer to see the numbers start larger than six though...)

KSFO (http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=849826&WxsIERv=Obrvat%20767-383%2FRE&Wm=0&WdsYXMg=Vprynaqnve&QtODMg=Fna%20Senapvfpb%20-%20Vagreangvbany%20%28FSB%20%2F%20XFSB%29&ERDLTkt=HFN%20-%20Pnyvsbeavn&ktODMp=Znl%2021%2C%202005&BP=1&WNEb25u=Wnpx%20Unaara&xsIERvdWdsY=GS-SVO&MgTUQtODMgKE=Whfg%20neevirq%20sebz%20Erlxwnivx%2C%20Vprynaq% 20%28OVXS%29.%20Syvtug%20671%20vf%20ba%20gnkvjnl%20Oenib%20n aq%20urnqrq%20sbe%20Vagreangvbany%20Grezvany%20tngr%20N4.%20 Gur%20vanhtheny%20syvtug%20gb%20FSB%20jnf%203%20qnlf%20ntb.% 20Ybir%20gur%20oevtug%20pbybe%20bs%20gur%20ratvar%20pbjyvat. %20N%20Fxl%20Jrfg%20%28Havgrq%20Nveyvarf%29%20Rzoenre%20Oenf vyvn%20RZO-120%20vf%20nveobear%20irel%20rneyl%20ba%20sebz%20ehajnl%2028 Y%20nf%20urnqjvaqf%20oybj%2027%20naq%20thfg%2031%20xabgf.&YXMgTUQtODMgKERD=1956&NEb25uZWxs=2005-06-01%2011%3A19%3A43&ODJ9dvCE=&O89Dcjdg=25365%2F395&static=yes&width=1024&height=781&sok=JURER%20%20%28cynpr%20%3D%20%27Fna%20Senapvfpb%20-%20Vagreangvbany%20%28FSB%20%2F%20XFSB%29%27%29%20NAQ%20%28Z NGPU%20%28nvepensg%2Cnveyvar%2Ccynpr%2Ccubgb_qngr%2Cpbhagel% 2Cerznex%2Ccubgbtencure%2Crznvy%2Clrne%2Cert%2Cnvepensg_trar evp%2Cpa%2Cpbqr%29%20NTNVAFG%20%28%27%2B%22ehajnl%22%27%20VA %20OBBYRNA%20ZBQR%29%29%20%20BEQRE%20OL%20cubgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=8&prev_id=851952&next_id=845029&size=L)

KDFW (http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=756558&size=L&width=1024&height=695&sok=JURER%20%20%28cynpr%20%3D%20%27Qnyynf%20%2F%20Sbeg%20Jbe gu%20-%20Vagreangvbany%20%28QSJ%20%2F%20XQSJ%29%27%29%20NAQ%20%28Z NGPU%20%28nvepensg%2Cnveyvar%2Ccynpr%2Ccubgb_qngr%2Cpbhagel% 2Cerznex%2Ccubgbtencure%2Crznvy%2Clrne%2Cert%2Cnvepensg_trar evp%2Cpa%2Cpbqr%29%20NTNVAFG%20%28%27%2B%22ehajnl%22%27%20VA %20OBBYRNA%20ZBQR%29%29%20%20BEQRE%20OL%20cubgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=9&prev_id=768152&next_id=747613)

KDCA (http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=784504&WxsIERv=Obrvat%20737-524&Wm=0&WdsYXMg=Pbagvaragny%20Nveyvarf&QtODMg=Jnfuvatgba%20-%20Ebanyq%20Erntna%20Angvbany%20%28QPN%20%2F%20XQPN%29&ERDLTkt=HFN%20-%20Ivetvavn&ktODMp=Sroehnel%2013%2C%202005&BP=1&WNEb25u=Whfgva%20Vqyr&xsIERvdWdsY=A46625&MgTUQtODMgKE=Guvf%20cynar%20qvq%20fbzr%20jrveq%20guvatf%20gu vf%20qnl.%20Chfuvat%20onpx%20gura%20pbzvat%20onpx%2C%20gnkvv at%20gura%20pbzvat%20onpx%2C%20gnxvat%20bss%20gur%20bccbfvgr %20fvqr%20bs%20gur%20ehajnl%21%20Jrveq.%20Pnaba%20300Q&YXMgTUQtODMgKERD=299&NEb25uZWxs=2005-02-26%2002%3A03%3A16&ODJ9dvCE=&O89Dcjdg=27529%2F2683&static=yes&width=1024&height=691&sok=JURER%20%20%28cynpr%20%3D%20%27Jnfuvatgba%20-%20Ebanyq%20Erntna%20Angvbany%20%28QPN%20%2F%20XQPN%29%27%29 %20NAQ%20%28ZNGPU%20%28nvepensg%2Cnveyvar%2Ccynpr%2Ccubgb_qn gr%2Cpbhagel%2Cerznex%2Ccubgbtencure%2Crznvy%2Clrne%2Cert%2C nvepensg_trarevp%2Cpa%2Cpbqr%29%20NTNVAFG%20%28%27%2B%22ehaj nl%22%27%20VA%20OBBYRNA%20ZBQR%29%29%20%20beqre%20ol%20cubgb _vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=42&prev_id=785991&next_id=776570&size=L)

KSMO 21 (http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=778126&WxsIERv=-&Wm=0&WdsYXMg=-&QtODMg=Fnagn%20Zbavpn%20-%20Zhavpvcny%20%28FZB%29&ERDLTkt=HFN%20-%20Pnyvsbeavn&ktODMp=Sroehnel%201%2C%202005&BP=1&WNEb25u=Qna%20Cvnaryyv&xsIERvdWdsY=&MgTUQtODMgKE=Ba%20svany%20nccebnpu%20vagb%20Fnagn%20Zbavpn.% 20Gunaxf%20gb%20Pncg.%20Pbevfu%20sbe%20n%20ornhgvshy%20qnl.&YXMgTUQtODMgKERD=1565&NEb25uZWxs=2005-02-15%2001%3A52%3A54&ODJ9dvCE=&O89Dcjdg=&static=yes&width=1024&height=780&sok=JURER%20%20%28ZNGPU%20%28nvepensg%2Cnveyvar%2Ccynpr%2Ccu bgb_qngr%2Cpbhagel%2Cerznex%2Ccubgbtencure%2Crznvy%2Clrne%2C ert%2Cnvepensg_trarevp%2Cpa%2Cpbqr%29%20NTNVAFG%20%28%27%2B% 22fzb%22%27%20VA%20OBBYRNA%20ZBQR%29%29%20%20BEQRE%20OL%20cu bgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=5&prev_id=778195&next_id=773405&size=L) (Santa Monica, California)

Dave

[nyt]

New unverified facts published by Le Figaro (in french at http://www.lefigaro.fr/france/20050915.FIG0005.html):
-reversers have been deployed 12s (700m) after touchdown, possibly because of a disagreement on the flight deck (CVR transcripts to be published on oct 4th)
-ILS on the longer runway (24R) just had been fried, leaving the crew with no choice as per SOP (favour ILS).
-windshear detector and speed measures also fried, the FDR reported 23K at touchdown instead of 10K indicated by ATC

[ATC Watcher]

Watch out for that "Figaro report". This newspaper is well known for " his master's voice " links.

An AF Captain that spoke to both crew on the Toronto A340 strongly refutes what the newspaper reported; According to him , there was no disagreement at all between the 2, and if the 12 seconds are factual, the suggestion given by the newspaper that it is crew indecision is also not correct according that same source.

Let's wait for the CVR transcript ( due Oct 4th if one beleives the BEA) and most interestingly the FDR for the correct timing and position / activation of the various items..

[PanPanYourself]

They're saying its pilot error.

http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/09/15/toronto.crash.ap/index.html

This doesn't really constitute pilot error as the cause of the accident does it? How long is an acceptable time to wait before deploying thrust reversers? It usually seems like it takes about 5 or 6 seconds after touchdown. But hey, what the hell do I know? I'm just a lowly, miserable, economy class passenger, so somebody please shut me up and put me in my place. But let me ask one more stupid question... If the pilot had deployed thrust reversers immediately after landing would that have prevented the accident? Thrust reversers only help with the deceleration process right? The brakes do most of the work? No? :confused:

[RoyHudd]

Just a rumour, peut-etre, but do AF have an SOP which recmmends the use of manual thrust on landing an Airbus?

Frankly difficult to imagine, but this rumour is hard.

[Idle Thrust]

posted 15th September 2005 18:30
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

"Let's wait for the CVR transcript ( due Oct 4th if one beleives the BEA)"

ATC Watcher,

Are you sure about that? The Canadian TSB has a record of not releasing even a transcript of the CVR, citing privacy laws. The SR111 CVR is an example. Only the TSB knows what really went on in that cockpit.

[Doors to Automatic]

PanPan

On the Airbus an autobrake setting gives a set decceleration rate so reverse only helps in taking work off the brakes. On a wet runway this would probably help in bringing the plane to a stop quicker so yes, applying reverse quicker would have brough the plane to a halt quicker.

Also didn't the pilot override the autobrakes? If so, again the reverse would have added to the decceleration progress.

[ATC Watcher]

Idle, Only the TSB knows what really went on in that cockpit.
The 2 recorders were received by the BEA in le Bourget on August 2nd , decripted and the results sent to TSB on August 8.
So at least 2 agencies know the contents ( and I suspect also Airbus Industrie ) but the BEA will not publish nor comment on those.

As to the date theCVR contents will be revealed ( Oct 4th) that info comes from Canada , and is confirmed by the BEA.

Let's wait. You might be right and it might not be a word for word transcipt but an indication of what and when based on the CVR.

[Flight Safety]

At the touchdown speed of the aircraft, it woud have used about 2900 feet of the remaining runway before thrust reverser deployment 12 second later. However the aircraft would have slowed to some degree within 12 seconds (by how much will have to come from the FDR), so it actually would have used somewhat less runway than this before reverser deployment.

I'm sorry if I missed this (if it was posted earlier), but has anyone posted the braking performance of this aircraft, at the landing weight used, in those conditions? Since there doesn't seem to have been any anomilies with the aircraft systems or the landing configuration, was it actually possible to stop the aircraft after it touched down 4000 feet from the threshold?

[atakacs]

was it actually possible to stop the aircraft after it touched down 4000 feet from the threshold? Given the friction available the answer is NO.

I would try to avoid any "arm chair investigation" but it seems quite clear that the pilots landed WAY too long and somewhat over speed. The only mystery, if any, is why did they fail to realize it in due time…

[Zeke]

CYYZ Runway 24L
Surface : ASPHALT
True Heading : 227.0
Latitude 43.675292 : 43° 40' 31.05" N
Longitude -79.597236 : 079° 35' 50.05" W
Elevation 547.0 feet : 167 meters
Slope -0.2°
Landing Distance 9000 feet : 2743 meters
Takeoff Distance 9000 feet : 2743 meters
Lighting System CL : HIRL : A3 : PAPI


A340-300 Landing performance ...

From the A340 FCOM 2 :

LANDING RECOMMENDATIONS
For most cases of abnormal landing configuration the increased Actual Landing Distance does not exceed the Required Landing Distance in normal configuration. However, the addition of several of these factors can very quickly lead to an overrun. Special notice should be taken of the runway condition. A slippery runway is the most common reason for overrun at landing. The combination of a slippery runway with any other factor such as tailwind, or increase in approach speed, without reason, should be avoided. As far as possible, the combination of any failure affecting the braking capability of the aircraft (spoilers, reversers) with landing on a contaminated runway should either be avoided or carefully prepared, with a check of the available runway length against the forecasted landing distance. During a visual approach, all means of monitoring the flight path should be used : first of all use the ILS together with available visual aids such as VASI or PAPI. Approach speed must also be carefully monitored, along with the wind and ground speed in particular during final approach.


VLS: is 1.23 VS1g in config 3 or full. It is the same as VREF for config full in the QRH.

VAPP : When the tower wind has been inserted in the Landing Performance Page of the FMGS VAPP becomes VLS plus one third of the headwind component within the limits of VLS + 5 to +15 KTS.
When strong downbursts or windshear is expected up to VLS + 15 KTS.

Dry (Landing Mass x1000 kg - ACTUAL LANDING DISTANCE (METERS)) (autobrake MED)
170-1450
190-1580
210-1700
230-1830

Wet (Landing Mass x1000 kg - ACTUAL LANDING DISTANCE (METERS)) (autobrake MED)
170-1510
190-1690
210-1880
230-2050

6.3 MM (1/4 INCH) WATER (Landing Mass x1000 kg - ACTUAL LANDING DISTANCE (METERS)) (autobrake MED)
170-1820
190-2070
210-2330
230-2570

12.7 MM (1/2 INCH) (Landing Mass x1000 kg - ACTUAL LANDING DISTANCE (METERS)) (autobrake MED)
170-1710
190-1920
210-2150
230-2370

Elevation correction : per 1000 ft above SL (autobrake MED) (autobrake MED)

Dry : +3%
Wet : +4%
6.3 MM (1/4 INCH) WATER : +4%
12.7 MM (1/2 INCH) WATER :+4%

Headwind correction : per 10 kt headwind (autobrake MED)

All conditions : No correction for headwind due to wind correction on approach speed

Tailwind correction : per 10 kt tailwind (autobrake MED)

Dry : +17%
Wet : + 21%
6.3 MM (1/4 INCH) WATER : + 26%
12.7 MM (1/2 INCH) WATER : +24%

Reversers correction - 4 operative reversers (autobrake MED)

Dry : 0 %
Wet : 0 %
6.3 MM (1/4 INCH) WATER : − 13%
12.7 MM (1/2 INCH) WATER :− 10%


Speed correction - Per 5 kt speed increment (and no failure)

All conditions : add 8 % (all runways)

FLUID CONTAMINATED RUNWAY LANDING PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CONSIDER

— Avoid landing on contaminated runways if the antiskid is not functioning. Use manual braking and maximum reverse. However, although manual braking is recommended,there is no constraint preventing the selection of autobrake LOW or MED on approach to ensure early brake initiation.
— Approach at the normal speed.
— Make a positive touchdown after a brief flare.
— As soon as the aircraft has touched down, lower the nose wheel onto the runway and select maximum reverse thrust.
Do not hold the nose wheel off the ground.
— If necessary, the maximum reverse thrust can be used until the aircraft is fully stopped.
— If the runway length is limiting, apply the brakes before lowering the nose gear onto the runway, but be prepared to apply back stick to counter the nose down pitch produced by the brakes application. (The strength of this pitching moment will depend on the brake torque attainable on the slippery runway).
— Maintain directional control with the rudder as long as possible, use nose wheel steering with care.

[Flight Safety]

Thanks Zeke, that was the information I was looking for. It's interesting that the braking performance is better with 1/2 inch of water on the runway compared to 1/4 inch of water. I guess the extra water helps to slow the aircraft down.

So we know the following facts about this accident, as they relate to braking performance:

1. All systems were working normally, including reversers and anti-skid.
2. The landing configuration was set to FULL, the autobrake was set to MED.
3. The touchdown airspeed was 143K, the ground speed at touchdown was 148K, indicating a 5K tailwind component at touchdown.
4. The investigators have said the touchdown speed was close to normal (I can't find what the exact VRef should have been).
5. The touchdown point was approximately 4000ft (1219m) down the runway from the threshhold, leaving 5000ft (1524m) to stop (oops, from Zeke's data, we're probably already going off the end of the runway aren't we).
6. The spoilers deployed normally when the MLG touched down.
7. The pilots applied full brake pressure almost immediately after touchdown, thus overiding the autobrake. However the anti-skide worked normally.
8. The pilot didn't deploy the thrust reversers until 12 seconds after MLG touchdown.

For braking performance, the main piece of information that's still missing, is the landing weight of the aircraft. I scanned all 538 posts from this thread, and no one has posted this data. This information will tell us what braking performance should have been expected, how tight the stopping conditions actually were on this runway under these conditions, and perhaps if the pilots should have even attempted the landing.

[Zeke]

Flight Safety,

The actual landing distance is from 50 ft, not the touchdown point.

Based upon the speeds, I would have an educated guess the weight was around the 200t mark, Vref at 200t is 141 kts.

Without autobrake, the actual landing distance is
190t - 1160 dry / 1510 wet
210t - 1280 dry / 1710 wet

I would expect the corrected landing distance from 50 ft onto a the wet runway at CYYZ to be
180t - 1515 m
190t - 1610 m
200t - 1718 m
210t - 1825 m

[Flight Safety]

The actual landing distance is from 50 ft, not the touchdown point.
That's a bit grey isn't it, given that you could float before touchdown, etc. How do know if your touchdown point will be too long?

[BOAC]

The Captain normally screams or takes control:D :D

[luc]

To Royhuudd,

No AF hasn't.
But very interresting question. To all Airbus pilots. What do you think of the A/Thr on a turbulent final approach?
Let's say from one to ten ( ten being very good)
myself : 4

[hart744]

The Captain normally screams or takes control

Did she?

[Hand Solo]

all Airbus pilots. What do you think of the A/Thr on a turbulent final approach?

3

[oicur12]

Athrust

A320 3-4 out of 10.

A330 1 out of ten. Lags too much on a gusty day.

[MarkD]

We're getting a preview of how AF358 pax lawyers are going to try and screw the GTAA for money - no wonder the Libs don't want to reduce airport rents, they probably fear any savings will go to the lawyers:

No grooved runway
No EMAS
TC runway overruns "not to ICAO standards"
No Doppler radar

http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1128204610920&call_pageid=968332188492&StarSource=RSS

[MarkD]

Follow-up article:
http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1128289811008&call_pageid=968332188492&col=968705899037&t=TS_Home

An investigation by the Toronto Star, published yesterday, found that the accident could have been avoided if simple safety measures used at many U.S. airports were implemented.

Experts concluded the Pearson runway involved in the accident — runway 24L — should be longer and have special grooves that give better traction during wet conditions.

The Star also concluded the multi-million-dollar Air France jet could have been saved had the runway been built with "crushable concrete" that significantly slows runaway planes.

TC can stop the investigation now, "the Star has concluded" so no need for further study. :hmm:

[foxmoth]

How do know if your touchdown point will be too long?

If you are on the glidepath at the correct speed as you pass the 50 ft point and carry out a normal landing, your touchdown point should be pretty much in the correct place. You will only float significantly if your speed is too high. It looks as though at least one of those parameters may have been a little high in this case:bored:

[Bokkenrijder]

Performance on the A319: a lousy 3/10!

Overal I´m NOT impressed with the Airbus Auto Thrust!

Even on a relatively calm but sunny day (with a bit of thermal up/downdrafts) it lets the speed drop below Vref and even into the orange Vls range before it wakes up and shoves a shed load of thrust to compensate. Sure, above 100´ RA you can quickly click the TL´s into the MCT detent and right back again, but that´s a bit too drastic in most cases.

Moving thrustlevers (ala Boeing) would have been a LOT better as you can then override and ´help´ the A/T deal with a little gust or a bit of thermal.

Better yet: switch the stupid thing off, but unfortunately that leaves you in a bit of a grey area with some SOP´s.

[RESA]

FOXMOTH


Maybe you can aswer my question from Page-35 of this post?

________________________________________________

Rumet,

I agree with your summary.

How did that 4000' disappear?

Yes, a crew “knowledgeable of the locale” probably should have done a go-around.

But the peculiar thing is that on airports with certain topography, some types of glide-slope guidance equipment might suck you in. I wish I knew how the “voting rationale” on an FMS works . . . and when it decides to tell you, “You-take-it”!

If this flight was “slotted in” on a short-final (5 nM?) . . . and if the altitude was a little too high . . . what does the FMS do when it never receives a “fly-down” from the glide-slope transmissions?

RESA
_________________________________________________

YYZ does appear to have that "certain topography" infront of its glideslope antenna.

RESA

[Farrell]

Funny that, only from my experience of talking with them, there are lots of Air France pilots who would gladly bin their 'buses for Boeings or anything else for that matter.

[foxmoth]

FOXMOTH Maybe you can aswer my question from Page-35 of this post?

I can only find up to page 28 at present, if you mean the ?s on page 25, sorry, but I do not have any more info on what the aircraft was actually doing - that is what the accident investigators will be looking at and is best left to them to find what was wrong in this instance - probably a combination of factors as is often the case in accidents. However from the Airbus report there was no "aborted autocouple",the pilot simply took the automatics out on short final for the manual landing, this was done at 300' which would normaly equate to 1nml out, taking the autopilot out is a normal procedure, taking the autothrust out is less so, but not unreasonable if it was having problems with the conditions.:suspect:

[nxmember]

I can not believe there is a 28+ page debate on this and it is still going on.

This accident was because they landed half way down the runway and for no other apparent reaon.

If the crew followed the stabilised approach philosophy which most of the time requires the aircraft to be fully configured on speed and on the correct glidepath by 1000ft or 500ft and then touchdown within the touch down zone none of this would have happened.

If your aircraft is flying you instead of you flying it you shouldn't be there. Simple as that.

[Tan]

nxmember

What a foolish comment, folks who mistakenly believe that they are perfect scare me..

[Rockhound]

Tan,
Where in his post does nxmember claim he is perfect?
Rockhound

[electricjetjock]

I am with you NXMEMBER and ROCKHOUND.

I have been flying the buses (330 / 340 / 346) for the last 10 years and they are great. They are like any other aeroplane (I have also flown Boeing's) if you do not do things correctly they will bite!

RESA Nothing wrong with being fed in at 5 miles if it is flown properly, topography does not come into play, he was not doing an auto land. The FMS will not do anything unless you make it, as it will not have captured the glideslope in your scenario.

Nothing wrong with disconnecting the AP at 300' on finals, however airbus recommend not disconnecting A/THR in normal circumstances below 1000'. Why? Because you have to give some attention inside to the ECAM as you match the little blue O (donut) to the reguired N1, then use the instinctive disconnect buttons on the thrust levers. If you just use the disconnect buttons then N1 goes to the demanded position i.e. CLIMB thrust. Not what you want at 300' on glideslope and centreline at Vref. You have now got a shed load of thrust above what is required and a lot more energy to get rid of and you will not touchdown at 1500' unless you do a carrier landing, even then you will be destabilised in the last critical 300'. Or if you have given it your full attention and you now look outside you could have gone high from that point in. They should have carried out a rejected landing, taught at my airline, always assuming they have NOT selected reverse!!! Reverse selected you are committed. Going ahead into a big one, then you have to ask for an immediate turn at 400' or just do it and inform them of your intentions. You are flying the aircraft.

Just in case anyone asks deselecting reverse and applying TOGA is not recommended for any airliner. Many years ago a 737 tried it and one stayed in reverse with dire consequences. :uhoh:

[MarkD]

TSB of Canada responds to Toronto Star articles:

http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1128462610611&call_pageid=968332189003&col=968350116895

[RatherBeFlying]

TSB Fact Sheet (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/media/fact_sheets/a05h0002/chronology_a05h0002.asp)

The Fact Sheet links to TSB's own photos (all 3 of them).

Bureaucracy has a stately pace.

[armada]

Sounds like a journo witch hunt.. :suspect:


New Questions in Air France Crash

Oct, 22 2005 - 12:20 PM


An aviation lawyer says pictures of the Air France fight that crash landed in Toronto last August suggest the plane may have been short on fuel.
The Transportation Safety Board pictures show that while the fuselage if the Airbus was almost entirely burned, the wings were virtually untouched by flames.
And, there doesn't appear to have been a major explosion.
Mary Schiavo says a lack of fuel may answer the question of why the pilot chose to land in such rainy, windy conditions.
But others say if the plane had been low on fuel, the pilot would have notified the control tower.


- AM 640 Toronto 24 Hour Newscentre

[archae86]

from news story quoted above:
while the fuselage if the Airbus was almost entirely burned, the wings were virtually untouched by flames.
That is quite common--needs no low fuel explanation.

[Bigmouth]

If Mary says it, it must be wrong.

[Flight Safety]

Armada, that actually sounds less like a journo witch hunt and more like a tort lawyer trying to make a case.

[SaturnV]

Armada, a speakers bureau website that acts as a booking agent for Mary Schiavo describes her as having the nickname "Scary Mary".

In any event, she is currently a lawyer for a US law firm that has joined with several Canadian firms to sue Air France on behalf of the passengers. This same law firm (Mobley Rice) has also joined with a Canadian firm suing MK Airlines on behalf of the crew in that Halifax crash.

You can fairly question what Mobley Rice's motives might be in particpating in law suits seeking damages for accidents in other countries when there is no tie to an interest in the United States. Maybe they will now sign up for the Nigerian crash as well, though I doubt it.

[RatherBeFlying]

TSB Investigation Update (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/2005/a05h0002/a05h0002_update_20051116.asp)

[HowlingWind]

The headline probably isn't a great surprise to anyone, but good news at least for Airbus, perhaps -- they may not be sued as is Boeing for the recent crash in Indonesia...

OTTAWA, Ontario (Reuters) -- The crash of an Air France jet in Toronto on August 2 does not appear to have been caused by problems with the Airbus A340 itself, Canada's Transport Safety Board said Wednesday.

All 309 people on board survived the crash in which the plane ran off the end of the runway as it landed during a severe thunderstorm.

"To date, investigators have not found significant anomalies of the aircraft systems," the agency said in a preliminary report. "Review of digital flight data recorder data has not revealed any system troubles or malfunctions."

"No problems were detected with the flight controls, spoilers, tires and brakes, or thrust reversers," the report said.

It described the events as follows: "After landing long, the aircraft overran the end of the runway and came to rest in a ravine just outside the airport perimeter."

Some aviation analysts have said the ravine, about 200 meters (650 feet) beyond the end of the tarmac, should be filled in or covered to extend the runway's safety zone. The ravine was the site of an Air Canada crash in 1978 that killed two people.

The Air Line Pilots Association has complained about the ravine, saying obstacle-free safety areas are needed beyond the runway.

Passengers have filed a class-action lawsuit against Air France, the Greater Toronto Airports Authority and air-traffic control agency Nav Canada, alleging negligence.

The suit, filed in Ontario Superior Court on behalf of the 297 passengers, is seeking C$325 million ($273 million) in general and special damages.


From: http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/americas/11/16/canada.crash.reut/index.html

[CaptW5]

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/media/communiques/air/2005/comm_a05h0002.asp

Full report (update):
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/2005/a05h0002/a05h0002_update_20051116.asp

[aardvark2zz]

What does the bolded text mean ? Did they delay commiting the full stop to do a Go-Around !?? Too late 4 that !

....The aircraft touched down approximately 4000 feet down the 9000-foot runway. The spoilers deployed automatically after touchdown and the DFDR recorded that the crew applied maximum pressure to the aircraft's brake pedals. The pressure remained constant until the aircraft departed the end of the runway surface.

The DFDR data show that the thrust resolver angle on the throttles' angular position began to change at 12.8 seconds after touchdown, and that the thrust reversers were fully deployed by 14 seconds. Maximum reverse thrust was observed on the engines 17 seconds after touchdown. ....

[aardvark2zz]

Nobody here commenting on the

"...throttles' angular position began to change at 12.8 seconds after touchdown,...."

:confused: :confused: :confused:

Wakey, wakey ...

The DFDR data show that the thrust resolver angle on the throttles' angular position began to change at 12.8 seconds after touchdown, and that the thrust reversers were fully deployed by 14 seconds.

[nnc0]

I don't think any comments are neccessary other than to say the 12.8 sec interval was likely deliberate and judicious.

The reports don’t do justice to the weather at the scene. I spoke with two seasoned Toronto based vets on the scene and they said the weather conditions at the time were beyond anything they've ever experienced there. I also spoke with a acquaintance who driving home moments before on the roadway adjacent to 24 had to pull of the road because the rain was so intense.

Some relevant points from the TSB report:
- The crews of two previous aircraft that landed just before AF358 reported that braking action was poor, and one crew estimated that the surface wind near the runway was from 290 degrees magnetic at 15 knots, with gusts to 20 knots. This information was passed to AF358 by the tower controller.

- At about the time that AF358 landed, a sharp boundary of rain associated with the thunderstorm moved approximately north to south over Runway 24L, accompanied by wind gusts and a change in surface wind strength and direction. Severe lightning and lightning strikes were also reported during this period. At 1604, the conditions observed at the weather site to the south of Runway 24L were winds 340 degrees true at 24 knots with gusts to 33 knots, severe thunderstorm activity over the airfield with a visibility of 1 sm in heavy rain,

- During the flare, the aircraft entered a heavy shower area, and the crew's forward visibility was significantly reduced as they entered the downpour. The digital flight data recorder (DFDR) recorded wind veered to 330 degrees true, causing a tailwind component of approximately 5 knots. The runway became contaminated with at least ¼ inch of standing water.

So put yourself in their shoes at flare - throttles retarded, visibilty virtually nil, contaminated runway, significant change in wind direction/strength, weather cocking, excess spd(?) etc ......I think their priority was probably getting the brakes on and making sure they had confirmed directional control before applying reverse.

[Thor Nogson]

So put yourself in their shoes at flare - throttles retarded, visibilty virtually nil, contaminated runway, significant change in wind direction/strength, weather cocking, excess spd(?) etc ......I think their priority was probably getting the brakes on and making sure they had confirmed directional control before applying reverse.

I'm only SLF, but shouldn't their priority have been to go around? Or am I missing something?

[alf5071h]

“Or am I missing something?”
Only the human factor; humans often act in irrational ways, particularly in error provoking situations.
In this respect I doubt that either pilot was thinking about the relative priorities of brakes vs reverse, more likely the delay is a typical time lag induced by stressful circumstances that reduce the attentional reserves available for thinking, assessing, deciding, etc. The First Officer (flying) lowering the nose and keeping straight in the sudden change of wind, the Captain monitoring and checking – recalling the duties of the NFP.

“shouldn't their priority have been to go around?” Yes, the option should have been considered much earlier in the approach, but without knowing the circumstances of the situation at the time of their decision, the crew’s action to continue may have been justifiable. The go around option should have remained open until touchdown, but then humans often discard sensible options believing that the current situation is under control right up to the very last moment . . . when it isn’t.
Error can only be recognized with hindsight.

[TyroPicard]

aardvark2zz

I hear you! Does it mean that the thrust levers remained in the CLB gate for 12.8 seconds after touchdown? 17 seconds to full reverse is a lot of runway.

The questions is whether it would have made any difference to the outcome...

TP

[BOAC]

for 12.8 seconds after touchdown - I guess around 2500' on top of the ?4000'? touchdown offset. How much was left of the runway? I guess we can assume negligible braking effect from wheelbrakes for those 12.8 (?14/17?) secs

[bubbers44]

Mary S. always gets into the news with a crash and she is almost always wrong. Why people consult her is a mystery to me. I heard her rediculous analysis of the MIA DC8 crash years ago and couldn't believe anyone would print what she said. Of course it was all wrong and she continues to be the expert. In that accident the bear claws holding the freight in place were not set and all of the freight shifted aft causing the ac to stall shortly after take off but she had this rediculous scenario that aired about the multiple failures which were really just aft CG shift and compresser stall as engines reached high angle of attack before it stalled and crashed off of 27R at MIA.

[RatherBeFlying]

I agree that they got too close to too nasty a thunderstorm.

There are several thunderstorm induced windshear accidents where a succession of aircraft land until it becomes too much for the last one. This is a tough call to make before it's too late as has been demonstrated a number of times -- of course we do not hear about the crews who chicken out in time:ok:

Then there's the 727 in New Orleans back in Reagan's time that took off but was unable to climb:(

Happily AF358 did not end up in a crater.

[Thor Nogson]

alf5071h,

Yes, I understand about the human factors, but I was just commenting on the nightmarish combination of conditions from the previous post. I would have hoped that while on approach and with things apparently going to hell in a handbasket, someone in the cockpit would have said "Er, let's go around and think about this a bit more".

Regarding your comment about the continuation of the approach being justifiable. I would concede that would be possible, but only if a factor unknown to the flight crew led to the overrun.
If, given the information they had available, a safe landing wasn't reasonably certain, then surely it wasn't justifiable?

As SLF, I'm just an interested observer, but I'm concerned about your view of the scenario where the stress factors and workload lead to an incorrect decision. I'd far rather that situation was avoided in the first place.

[Raas767]

I certainly have not read every post on this thread so someone probably already brought this up. We all know how it is when you are actually there focusing on landing in poor weather, especially after a long flight. There is a tendency not to see the forest despite the tree's. We want to complete the mission as it where. This, of course, is nothing new. There have been countless similar accidents, most of them fatal. The most recent in Little Rock in 1999.
The bottom line is they should have gone around or better yet not attempted the approach until the weather improved or, if they had insufficient fuel, flown to the alternate. If you try to land a heavy airplane fast and long on a wet runway odds are pretty good you will sail off the other end. We could debate this until the end of time but it will not change the fact that the captain of that jet made a bad decision in continuing that approach and definitely the landing once it became apparent how far beyond the touchdown zone they were. Why is it sometimes so hard to say the simple words "Go around".

[alf5071h]

Thor
We would all like to avoid such situations, but occasionally all the holes line up.
Your views are most reasonable. I cannot answer the questions surrounding the event, but they should at least be part of any judgement of what is justifiable or not.

I am not pursuing a totally no blame theme, pilots have to take responsibility as much as the ‘system’ does, the difficult problem is where to draw the dividing line.

A quote from Lord Denning’s report on the Herald of Free Enterprise accident provides one view:- “There are activities in which the degree of professional skill which must be required is so high, and the potential consequences of the smallest departure from that high standard are so serious, that one failure to perform in accordance with those standards is enough to justify dismissal.”

But that too was a ‘judgement’ after the fact.

Re stress see the following quote that is taken from The Limits of Expertise (http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/ihs/flightcognition/Publications/KD_ICAO3_05.ppt). Dismukes, Berman, & Loukopoulos NASA.

“Although we cannot be sure of the extent, we suspect that stress played a role in many of these accidents by interfering with the crews’ cognitive processes.
Stress hampers skilled performance by narrowing attention and reducing working memory capacity required to execute even highly practiced tasks. In particular, the combination of stress and surprise with requirements to respond rapidly and to manage several tasks concurrently, as occurred in several of these accidents, is a lethal setup”.

Perhaps we all need to change our mind set to reduce stress – ‘A landing is an approach without a go around.’

Crew should be go around minded, ATC should accommodate go arounds, our managers and peers must accept go arounds without prejudice, and the SLF be encouraged by a positive safety attitude as indicated by a go around.
Just a few of these for Christmas please!

More here: Managing Threats and Errors During Approach and Landing. (www.flightsafety.org/ppt/managing_threat.ppt)

[Thor Nogson]

alf5071h,

I agree totally. I guess my point is that there should be some way crews can be trained to see the holes lining up and take the appropriate action.

In effect, to be able to say, although things are under control now, at the moment of decision we'll be pretty busy, and there is a reasonable possibility that our workload might impair our decision making.

It's at that point that, as SLF, I'd like the guys up front to take a bit more time to look at the holes and make sure they can't see through...

[Joetom]

I don't know soe much, but would guess.

1. Airports know approx the conditions at the airfield.

2. Airlines like to arrive at target airfield about on time.

3. Crew are advised to arrive at target airfield about on-time.

As a previous reply says, first crew to chichen-out/reject landing at airport during these times is often mentioned. well my hat off to them. and would ask previous landing aircraft/crew to have a cold look at conditions when they landed their aircraft and view the Flt Data Rec Info. Am sure it will help in the future.!!!

Like all operations, Landing in conditions that are on the edge of limits will make many press reports when all is not perfect.

Better being at another airfield than off the run/taxiway at target airfield, AF340 evac worked very well, well done to all.

My understanding is operations put so much pressure on pilots and others in the airlline world we should not be surprised at what will happon.

Reep what you soe they call it.!!!!

[broadreach]

RBF has, I think, said it in a nutshell.

20/20 hindsight is a bit like Kamm's theory, double the speed and you cube the drag. In this and other accidents that happened in iffy conditions, double the paxcount/US$/visibility and you cube the hindsight.

Trouble is that, in many ways, hindsight training serves more to bureaucratically circumscribe the right reactions. In any activity. One hopes it doesn't in this one.

[172driver]

alf

Downloaded and perused the presentation about Managing Threats on Approaches with great interest. However, one omission strikes me: nowhere in this document is crew fatigue mentioned. Couldn't it be that after a long flight, the 'get-her-on-the-ground-and-go-home' feeling becomes a bit too strong ? If so, what can be done about it ?

[alf5071h]

172driver Fatigue is another parameter that is more easily seen after an event rather than at the time, we have very little self awareness of fatigue. Do not confuse fatigue with tiredness especially after a long flight as I understand that they are very different issues. See the thread on fatigue in this section.
For background info see Getting to grips with fatigue and alertness management (www.wingfiles.com/files/crm/fatigue.pdf ), an excellent Airbus reference, but beware it is a very large file 12.1mb.
Also see the complementary guide Coping with long-range flying (www.wingfiles.com/files/crm/copingwithlongrangeflying.pdf), 3.28mb.

Re “the 'get-her-on-the-ground-and-go-home' feeling, what can be done about it ?”
Self discipline. CRM training should have greater focus on thinking skills involving self awareness and self monitoring, the ability to question what you see or what you are told, and question your decision / choice of action. Airmanship consists of Discipline (self discipline), Skill and Proficiency (self monitoring is a skill), Knowledge (in this instance of human weakness), Situation Awareness (as discussed in previous posts), and Judgment – that final overview of a situation and choice of action, deciding where the line between success and failure is.

Joetom re your point - “would ask previous landing aircraft/crew to have a cold look at conditions when they landed their aircraft”. Take care, remember that every aircraft type has its own unique landing and stopping capability. It is most unwise to base your landing on a previous landing report. By all means use all of the available information in your assessment, but don’t bet your life on someone else stating ‘it will be OK’.

[Joetom]

alf5071h

My point was more general, say 7 aircrafts land on same runway inside 15mins during very bad weather, last one has problem and gets stuck in the mud.

Aircraft waiting to land will review plans, but I guess the six aircraft that landed before stuck in the mud will review what they did.

I understand the different aircrafts point.

One big question I often ask when reading about aircraft in problems. why was aircraft at that location when other choices were open, like use another runway or airport.

Just of interest, I notice in recent times pilots are younger as an average, even with two well trained pilots things go wrong, but I like having an older pilot with lots of hours fly me about.

Remember the saying "you can't put an old head on young shoulders" ?

[172driver]

alf

Thanks for these links - that'll take care of reading matter for a while :ok:

Seriously - very well said re self discipline and CRM. It can just be damn hard to tear yourself away from a preconceived idea. Something to work on. Perhaps approaching every landing mentally as half a go-around might help. Although in this particular case it appears the mistake was made earlier, i.e. deciding to attempt the landing at all. But, as has been said here many times, hindsight is always 20:20 :(

[punkalouver]

For those that are interested in the last overrun down this dropoff, look at...

http://www.avsaf.org/reports/CANADA/1978.06.26_AirCanada_189.pdf

The DC-9 was taking off with slats extende but zero flap with a high rotation speed. A main wheel tire tread came off at high speed but below V1 leading to vibration, along with a main gear unsafe light from tire debris and a decrease in engine power due to tire ingestion. After rejecting the takeoff, not nearly enough braking was used possibly due to distraction from difficulty in spoiler operation and the aircraft went over the embankment but at a high enough speed to actually get airborne leading to high vertical G-load on impact. The report only briefly discusses the overrun area staing that it was within accepted international standards.

[Perseverando88]

Excellent posts and links Alf.

As part of the chain and a contributing factor .....

Autothrust and autopilot were disconnected at 350ft.
Correct under

How often does a A-340 pilot FO perform and practise approaches with Autothrust off ? I bet you the Air France FO had not done too many approaches with the Autothrust off.

[luc]

I don't know everything about the crash but I can tell you that performing the approach without the autothrust is not uncommon at AF. One sure thing though is that the F/O hadn't done many approaches in those conditions but from what I heard about that day not many pilots have . About fuel, they had enough fuel to divert! Another thing, someone earlier said that the crew was aware of the comments made by the 2 previous landing aircraft ( Breaking action poor). Is that a fact? Because one thing I know is that no one from ATC told them ( did they even know?) what the runway was like. Wet for sure, but how much water? Because that has a big impact on the decision, landing or going around.
Happy flights

[EK Shadow]

If possible you avoid to land with a tailwind unless landing performance is sure to be adequate. A runway into the wind was available.
Runway conditions are reported, but ATC can not be expected to check them every 5 min.
If you see that you will have a significant lateral drift during the flare,land deep or too much speed to control touchdownpoint accurately......you make a go-around. Being in slot at 500 feet is not always a guarantee.
If conditions are difficult the fittest and most experienced pilot should land.
Pull speedbrakes manually on contaminated runways…. Waiting for auto deployment takes too much time.
Know your performance based on reversers only, to bring her under 100 kts, all the rest is a bonus when landing on contaminated.
If you fly an Airbus, remember the Lufthasa going off the Runway in WarshawEt pour les Francais la meme chose

[gwillie]

"One year after the Air France flight 358 accident at the Toronto Lester B. Pearson International Airport, the team of Transportation Safety Board (TSB) investigators has produced an initial draft investigation report (A05H0002) that will be reviewed by the Board for approval or amendments.
Once the draft report is approved, a confidential draft report will be sent to persons and corporations whose interests may be affected by the report and who are most qualified to comment on its accuracy. This process is intended to ensure procedural fairness and the accuracy of the Board's final report. The Board will consider all representations and comments, amend the report if required, and may make recommendations to address any safety deficiencies. Once the final report is approved by the Board, it will be released to the public."
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/media/communiques/air/2006/comm_a05h0002_20060801.asp

[MarkD]

Today's Toronto Star: (http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&call_pageid=971358637177&c=Article&cid=1154382609809)
According to published reports, there were some irregularities, including a civilian passenger in the cockpit, who was a relative of an Air France employee. That's against the rules.
Questions remain:
Why was the co-pilot, not the more-experienced captain, landing the plane?

[Dushan]

Weather conditions today almost identical to those of a year ago. Bet you two check captains are at the controls of AF358, today (that would be two French check :) captains).

[punkalouver]

Today's Toronto Star: (http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&call_pageid=971358637177&c=Article&cid=1154382609809)


Really....does anyone remember this thread I started?

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=194867

And this was after the Toronto accident. By the way, I flew on them again on the upper deck and this time I noticed that purses and handbags were allowed on the floor but not under the seats. Is this normal?