Air France crash at YYZ (Merged)

[Oscar Juliet]

This photo clearly shows that the speedbrakes aren't extended, so that must be an important factor: (unless they were retracted for the evacuation)

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/893221/L/

[BOAC]

Oscar - I know it infuriates people to say it, but we have to wait for the investigation team. If are you saying you KNOW the speedbrakes were not used during landing, please contact the investigation team immediately! On the 737, and PROBABLY (NB I do not know) on the 340, the speedbrakes are selected down for an evacuation.

[admiral ackbar]

Interesting interview with Air Canada Captain Marc Antoine Plourde from the CBC's The National, Real Player needed.



here (http://www.cbc.ca/clips/ram-newsworld/pilot_invu050802.ram)

This photo clearly shows that the speedbrakes aren't extended, so that must be an important factor:

The photo also shows that the plane is missing its tail, that might have contributed to it as well. :rolleyes:

[catchup]

This photo clearly shows that the speedbrakes aren't extended, so that must be an important factor:


The beacon light is also off, ehmm engines are not running....

regards

[MadsDad]

ehmm engines are not running....

That's because there's no fuel left in the tanks.

Oh my God, I can see tomorrows headline right now.... "Crash Jet ran out of fuel"

[G-SP0T]

erm, i didnt know the a340 had speed brakes! but from that picture it is clear that the spoilers are down.

I have never flown the airbus, but i know in general terms, 70 - 80 % of braking action is from the wheels, and a large percent from the rev. thrust - which appears too have been used...

[yyzbuff]

Quote:

In worst case contamination cases (dry snow on ice) we factor LDA by 0.65 - ie 10,000ft becomes 6500ft for planning purposes and max landing weight considerations.

And that's for a C-130 - we have sh1t-hot reversers and brakes that can make your eyeballs bleed. Afraid I've no idea what factors an A340 operator may use, but imagine it's something similar, since the calculations are based on loss of braking action. As a comparison, a factor of 0.9 applies for water.

16 Blades

Hmm ... so the 9000 ft. actual runway length might have been effectively less than 6000 ft. if the water caused hydroplaning equivalent to icy conditions. As noted earlier, at max. weight, the Aircraft Characteristics for Airport Planning Manual for the A340-200/300 shows min. landing field length between (about) 6200 and 6800 ft. -- so if the surface was effectively 'icy', the pilot could have touched down at the earliest possible point, applied spoilers, brakes, and thrust reversers, and still ended up off the runway.

Facts from the TSB press conference (just concluded; covered live on local radio stations):

Both cockpit recorders recovered; some fire damage, but appeared to be in good shape; sent to Ottawa for analysis.

No evidence of any malfunctions prior to departure from runway (i.e., no parts found on the runway!); no reports of problems from flight crew prior to touchdown.

Aircraft speed approx. 140 knots at touchdown (normal);
approx. 80 knots at time of departure from runway(!).

Three thrust reversers confirmed as deployed (confirmation of #3 engine reverser will have to wait for flight recorder analysis).

There were some remarks on braking conditions, but they were in French and I missed 'em ...

Another press conference will be held at about 3 PM EDT today.

yyzbuff

[Ontariotech]

Regarding KLM go-around and then declaring a low fuel emergency after the crash........


The KLM pilot was clearly heard stating they want a turn direct to Syracuse. ATC tried to get them to an airport closer if the runway length was sufficient. KLM declined, they have planned for Syracuse, they have enough fuel to make Syracuse, with 30 minutes remaining.

[JP4]

Oscar - I know it infuriates people to say it, but we have to wait for the investigation team. If are you saying you KNOW the speedbrakes were not used during landing, please contact the investigation team immediately! On the 737, and PROBABLY (NB I do not know) on the 340, the speedbrakes are selected down for an evacuation

Well BOAC, you're right, but the reversers are still out...

[Ranger One]

Pegasus77:

You don't switch "the autoland" on for landing, there is no such switch. In low visiblity ops, you leave the autopilot on untill after landing. This is done in FOG, that means hardly any wind and low visiblity.

I know what you mean, but don't over-generalize; I could take you to some lovely islands where you can experience the seasonal delights of high-speed (30kt+) fog... :uhoh:

Back on-topic, could someone familiar with the way the Candian TSB operates take a guess at when they'll release preliminary data from the FDR readout?

R1

[PAXboy]

Let's move the speculation onwards and away, until the report comes out in a couple of years time. WHAT IF ... the a/c involved in this had been an A380. Would going into the ravine have complicated matters somewhat? Perhaps an arrester bed, that keeps the a/c on the horizontal would help? (Having attempted to hijack this thread, stands back to await incoming)

[Tiger]

UK press have give this a couple of pages in their editions. While nearly all the paxs have praised the crew, one rather vocal pax has critisied the them...and amazingly felt that the oxygen masks should have dropped as the cabin was filling with smoke! Perhaps the press should check facts and not prints this Cr*p... lets "fuel" the fire with a bit more O2, and mix the O2 with the smoke filling the cabin for you to breath via the mask. Really shows little info is a dangerous thing!

[404 Titan]

BOAC

Retracting the spoilers prior to an emergency evacuation on the A340-300 is not part of any checklist or mandatory memory recall item. There are no over wing exits so pax shouldn’t end up being on the wing. Without pre-empting the official investigation, I would be very concerned if I were an investigator by the fact that the spoilers don’t appear to have been deployed, especially on a contaminated runway. That would be one of the first things I look at once the FDR and the CVR are decoded. Conversely once hydraulic pressure is lost to the spoiler servos, like most A330/340 flight controls they tend to go where gravity takes them, down.

[fireflybob]

Just because the weather appeared to be "challenging" it does not necessarily follow that the decision to make an approach was incorrect - until all the FACTS are established it quite improper to make such assumptions.

[aardvark2zz]

The lead investigator just ended his press briefing and mentioned the following:

- The airplane left the runway at 84 knots (*1).
- The airplane landed at 140 knots.
- 3 of the 4 reverse thrusters were functional.
- 4th reverse thrusters unknown.
- Captain in hospital bed with back pains and will not be interviewed today until cleared by medical team.
- Copilot will be interviewed today.
- Most engines are in "good" shape and were producing thrust.
- Several "journalists" asked several questions about the JBI (James Brake Index). He replied Canada uses a different index CxBI (???).
- Refused to mention the distanced used.
- Reverse thrusters only reduce landing distance by 5-10% (*2).

- Elsewhere, the president (!?) of Air France said that the plane had enough fuel for another airport.

(*1): That's fast !!
(*2): I guess he means on a dry runway.

[Ranger One]

404 Titan:

Exactly what I was thinking about spoilers. For those of us unfamiliar with the type, could someone briefly describe the spoiler system on the 340-300 please? Is there a config warning if you attempt to land with spoilers not armed?

R1

[9gmax]

For what it's worth...
on this picture one can clearly see 3x2 tire-marks in the grass, leaving the runway...
If I'm correct, the A340 has left/center/right bogey with each two wheels, and double nose-wheel...
shouldn't there be 4x2 marks then? I guess that the width of the nose-gear is not similar to the center bogey?... thus we would need to see more tire-marks?
Or am I missing something here?...
http://photos.airliners.net/middle/3/9/5/892593.jpg

[PaperTiger]

- The airplane left the runway at 84 knots (*1).

(*1): That's fast !!Indeed. My guess of yesterday was waaay off :O

Either a very late t/d or braking action ~ nil to give 84kts at the end :uhoh:

[Pegasus77]

On the 340 even when the spoilers are not armed (which would be clearly visible and almost not overseeable in a bright blue line in the landing checklist on the ECAM), they would still come out:

Partially if
- RA < 6 ft
- at least two symmetric thrust levers in rev, others in idle
- one MLG strut compressed

Fully if
- at least 2 thrust levers in reverse, others in idle and then one of the two following:
- OR wheel speed > 72kts
- OR RA < 6 ft and both MLG struts compressed

P77

[Aeronautic]

- The airplane left the runway at 84 knots (*1).
- The airplane landed at 140 knots.

Something slowed them down over that distance and I doubt it was just friction from wheels on concrete...

It sure sounds like the spoiler position is unknown until the FDR data comes out.

On the earlier topic in this thread about the power outage, real or imagined, if there is a checklist item to shut down the cabin lighting, and IF they did so, my one flight on an A340 would lead me to believe that from the forward cabin, if engines spooled way down, it might seem to self loading cargo as if they flamed out.

That is a very quiet cabin! Even in flight it is quiet.

However, there would/should be some sound a moment later from the use of reverse - which no passengers, as far as I know, have reported hearing.

Though the photos sure seem to show deployed on at least one engine.

(Waiting on the FDR & CVR....)

[BOAC]

Thanks for the 340 info, 404.

JP4 - I guess I might well have used full reverse to a standstill in the same situation! Getting them 'stowed' might also not have been very high on my priority list either?

[404 Titan]

Ranger One

Unlike for take-off, there is no aural warning triggered if the SPD BRK are not armed prior to landing. If the landing checklist is completed correctly, a blue reminder is written on the landing memo on the ECAM E/WD below 2000 ft AGL which should be picked up by the crew.

9gmax

The nose wheel bogie is about the same width as the centre bogie on an A340-300. I see no problem with the tracks in the grass. It is what I would expect to see with all the wheels in place on an A340-300.

BOAC

No problemo.

[White Knight]

Just a note to Ou Trek dronkie going back a few posts.

The fatal VC-10 accident (only one that I can find) was to 5N-ABD of Nigeria Airways on 20th November 1969, when 87 were killed as the aircraft hit trees short of the runway at Lagos...

[FakePilot]

In regard to the spoilers, I've gotten the idea that spoilers aren't as much a braking system as they are a lift spoiling system, i.e. keep the plane on the ground after it touches down. Sounds the landing was fine anyway.

This topic has been discussed here before I believe.

[Rockhound]

Interesting that, according to Aardvark2zz, the TSB lead investigator at the press briefing refused to divulge the runway distance used by AF358, even though his political master, the transport minister announced publicly, just hours after the accident, that he had been advised the pilot landed long.
Rockhound

[Oscar Juliet]

In regard to the spoilers, I've gotten the idea that spoilers aren't as much a braking system as they are a lift spoiling system, i.e. keep the plane on the ground after it touches down. Sounds the landing was fine anyway.

Please correct me if I'm wrong but I thought that the spoilers kill the lift and put all of the aircraft's weight on the wheels which increases the effect of the wheel brakes.

[404 Titan]

FakePilot

The spoilers are there to kill lift which in turn puts more weight on the wheels and in turn increases the effectiveness of the brakes. I don’t think anyone here has said that the drag produced by the spoilers is the main reason why they are deployed because it isn’t.

[aardvark2zz]

From data from the TSB briefing this morning.

Doing some quick calculations we get a 0.7 m/s/s deceleration for AF358.

As a comparison a 747 gets 1.14 m/s/s deceleration on a wet runway (1.31 on dry).

That is a loss of 37% braking force beyond a "standard" wet runway.

Or, a loss of 47% braking force beyond a "standard" dry runway.

Losing 42% braking force is a lot !!!

Note: I assumed they touched down near the typical touch-down point.

[Ranger One]

Fakepilot:

Precisely correct, it's not a matter of 'keeping the aircraft on the ground' though. In plain language, it's a case of killing the lift which the wings are still producing during the high-speed initial rollout, and so allowing the weight of the aircraft to settle on the wheels - without spoilers the antiskid would activate as soon as you thought of applying the brakes and you would get very little initial braking action, until you slowed down enough that aerodynamic lift was no longer produced. During which time you are eating available runway at a preposterous rate, of course :uhoh:

What can happen if spoilers aren't deployed:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=DCA99MA060&rpt=fi

(edited to make clear I'm not prejudging the present incident, just answering Fakepilots question!)

R1

[172driver]

From The Times (London) online edtion:

Ravine may have saved flight from worse fate


THE 309 passsengers and crew of Air France Flight 358 may have survived the crash landing because of — not despite — the ravine at the end of the runway.........

For full story click here:

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1720252,00.html

Ravines, moats or other gullies around airports, anyone ?? Amazing.....

[rubik101]

200m of pea shingle either end of the runway fanning out to maybe 200m width anyone? Stops the F1 cars well enough.

[aardvark2zz]

Assuming that a "standard" deceleration on a wet runway was achieved then the touchdown point calculates to the half-runway mark.

Or, if a "standard" touch-down point was achieved then that would mean 45% of the braking force was lost compared to on a dry runway !

Hmmmmm

[Aeronautic]

172driver -

No offense intended, but the logic of that story is due to the location of the major roadway at the end of the runway, the ravine kept an airline accident from becoming a car accident.

I keep wondering when it will sink in to the idiots (worldwide) who zone and approve building adjacent to airports that busy highways, roads, large structures, homes, and oh, say, gas stations, do not belong at the end of runways.

Remember the SW Burbank "long landing'" that almost stopped on top of the pumps of a gas (ur, petrol) station?

;)

Of course the self loading cargo wants the airport close by with easy access... just not close enough to disturb their sleep.

We need real sanitized overrun (and undershoot) areas, perhaps with that nifty crushy cement stuff, without gullys or gas stations in the way.

2 cents in. And my comment is directed at the civic planners and media who let them get away with their planning, not you 172driver.

[G-SP0T]

Aeronautic, check a map of the airport - the high way is ALMOST in the same direction as the runway. it would have needed to go MUCH further too make it on to the high way...

[Aeronautic]

Aeronautic, check a map of the airport - the high way is ALMOST in the same direction as the runway. it would have needed to go MUCH further too make it on to the high way...

G-SPOT-

I saw the google aerial image posted earlier in this thread, though did not recall the orientation you describe.

But I'll take you at your word...

Uhmmm.... removing flight boot from mouth on this incident.

:uhoh:

[Sky Wave]

Why do people keep going on about the spoilers? If you look at the ailerons on a bus you'll see they droop without hydraulic power. As has already been said the spoilers will not remain up once hydraulic pressure has been removed, and since the hydraulic fluid has likely been burnt off and the engines are shut down you’re not going to get much hydraulic pressure. It's extremely unlikely that the pilots missed the blue ECAM memo on the landing checklist.

[PaperTiger]

However, Chris Yates, a transport analyst at Jane’s publications, said that if the ravine had been filled in, Flight 358 would have ploughed on, straight on to the busy highway running alongside the airport. (emphasis mine) I'm not going to reiterate my previous posts on this, other than to say it's total bullsh!t.

One soundbite made in haste gets picked up and transmitted round the world as gospel :*

I'll say no more about the meeja, but I would hope posters here might at least look at one of the diagram/aerial picture links which have been supplied.

[Steve Michell]

Nigel OD & others,

1. declaring a low fuel emergency should sound like: "MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY! KLM 691 declaring low fuel emergency request direct Syracuse at 15000ft" (or whatever optimum altitude). A PAN,PAN call is not correct. That's an URGENCY call; ultimately it was treated as such by ATC not giving them their optimum altitude rightaway.
2. Whatever your alternate: you aim to land anywhere with 45min. It might be legal and not unsafe to land with 30 minutes, but far from preferable. SYR was KL691 alternate. If you want to make it all the way to SYR and planning to land with 30'' hoping to get your optimum altitude is flying on fumes in my book.
3. KLM 691 also got stuck in the hold, giving them plenty of time to contemplate options. Going 'in' to an area with +TS and gambling on a expeditious landing & the risk of overshooting or someone blowing a tire on the runway ahead of you and knowing that in that case you will end up in an emegency is STUPID. KLM691 crew had their options and chose to ignore them.

[16 blades]

However, Chris Yates, a transport analyst at Jane’s publications

...that'll be a proffessional spotter, then.

Leave it to those who know what they're talking about to comment, eh?

16B

[In trim]

I agree with all the comments regarding the evacuation....well done to the CC.

One area not been commented is ATC. Have listened to the ATC tapes and once again have only admiration for the professionalism of the ATC guys/gals who, even before the accident, juggled traffic in the midst of bad weather and weather avoidance requests, and after the accident calmly dealt with the go-arounds, fuel emergency etc.

Well done to all concerned.

[RatherBeFlying]

The image showing the tire tracks exiting 24L directly to a downslope makes plain that the GTAA has chosen to maximise runway length with zero allowance for overruns.

An EMAS arrestor bed would likely have made this overrun a near non-event like this one:http://www.panynj.gov/AboutthePortAuthority/PressCenter/images/emas_photo.JPG
But the total runway length would be some 500' shorter which would reduce maximum weights and therefore revenues for the carriers and the GTAA.

Oh Yes, EMAS arrestor beds are not cheap, but somehow I think AF's insurers would find it easier to cough up for rehabilitating an arrestor bed than hull replacement.

Other EMAS Installations (http://www.esco-usa.com/com/instal.html)

[JP4]

Top respect for the Cabin crew performance, and the ATC control.

I hope the pilots will have made the correct choice in their options. This must be a tough time for the captain right now. Certainly, all my toughts are for them. It seems Air France has not been "lucky" those last ten years!
And by the way it's impossible to discuss about that crash on the french forum Eurocockpit (http://www.eurocockpit.com) if you ask question about Air France and it's reliability!
They will just erase your message!!!

[catchup]

Who is behind "Eurocockpit" ?

regards

[Aeronautic]

What, no "liberte" on Eurocockpit, eh?

:D

[catchup]

Those guys/gals at eurocockpit just speak French.

I'm so sorry, "Excuse Madamme/Monsieur".

regards

[Farmer 1]

I've never heard of an arrestor bed like this, but it looks extremely impressive. No indication at what speed the aircraft entered the bed, though.

I reckon a gravel bed might work; I've seen how effective they are with heavy lorries with brake failure going down a steep hill at an incredible rate of knots. You just need a tow truck to pull it out and a bloke with a rake to level out the bed. It doesn't work with Formula 1, though - the cars don't have any ground clearance, so they just bounce over it all into whatever's on the other side.

If you have a road actually running parallel with the runway, there's no way, of course, that an aircraft will run into it. It's absolutely impossible. Unless, of course, the aircraft loses directional control.

[Shore Guy]

A couple of observations and then a comment…..

Every runway constructed should have an arrestor bed as part of its design…..retrofit existing runways wherever feasible.

Regarding the spoiler discussion…..would not retracting the spoilers be on the EVAC checklist?

Perhaps the title of the site should be changed to WPPRUNE, the “W” standing for “Wannabee”…….

And now to the point…..it will be months, if not a year or more until the cause of this accident is fully investigated and reported on. One of the aspects that will/should be discussed is the approach and landing proficiency of long haul pilots. With supplemental crews and the range of current generation aircraft, it is not at all unusual for a crewmember to lose landing currency (U.S. – three landings every 90 days). That is a minimum….not guaranteeing any type of proficiency. Some airlines have reduced time between training events on their long haul fleets to address this issue (some did so voluntarily, some with a nudge from authorities), and some have added some shorter and/or multiple leg flights for crewmember proficiency.

Comments?

[FixedRotaryWing]

Looking at the pictures of the accident, it seems the plane has crossed an elevated road and has not even reached the ravine.

[RatherBeFlying]

The problem with gravel as an airport arrestor bed material is that the jet blast blows it out.

Also gravel in the wrong place is FOD.

[604guy]

- Several "journalists" asked several questions about the JBI (James Brake Index). He replied Canada uses a different index CxBI (???).

It's CRFI, Canadian Runway Friction Index. Scale of 0 - 1 with .8 equating to bare dry concrete. Not used for standing water on the runway. However water up to 1/10 inch equates to approximately .3 and water in excess of 1/10 inch is something less than .1

Need to consult appropriate CRFI tables to see what that does to your landing distance or landing field length.

Above provided as background info only. No opinion/comment intended or inferred.

[safetypee]

See “Managing threats and errors during approach and landing” (http://www.flightsafety.org/ppt/managing_threat.ppt) (2.7 mb download) from the Flight Safety Foundation (http://www.flightsafety.org).

Material in this presentation should add some interest to training sessions as well as provide a timely reminder of the many basic facts that we often overlook.

Pictures of the Toronto runway suggests that it has a concrete surface, is this correct. If so, note the reference to the poor braking performance on wet concrete (grooved or otherwise) in the training material.

[Farrell]

From your friends at Yahoo.....

(It says the plane landed at 160 mph which I work out as about 139 kts.....that's hardly a high airspeed for landing is it?

If the guy chose to make it a positive landing - how would that affect the airspeed? i'm just a PPL at this stage so bear with what might be a dumb question. Thanks :ok: )

Toronto crash probe focuses on speed, runway By Cameron French
36 minutes ago



TORONTO (Reuters) - The Air France jet that crashed in Toronto this week was moving at nearly 100 mph (160 km/h) as it careened off the end of the runway into a ravine, investigators said on Thursday.

Two days after the crash, which miraculously claimed no lives even as fire gutted the Airbus A340, investigators are focusing on why the plane was unable to stop after it touched down during a severe thunderstorm.

They will probe the plane's steering and brake units, as well as the tire tracks left on the runway, in an investigation that could take months.

"Because this was a landing and overrun accident, it's of interest to us where the plane touched down," Real Levasseur, lead investigator with Canada's Transportation Safety Board, told reporters.

The aircraft probably landed at about 160 mph (260 km/h), but had slowed to only 95 mph (150 km/h) by the time it ran off the end of the runway, he said.

However, it may take a few days longer to get concrete information about the plane's final moments, as Canadian investigators said they lack the proper equipment to decode the plane's "black box" flight recorders.

Levasseur said the recorders, one of them blackened and soot covered after the fire, will be sent to France so safety officials there can extract the information, a process that will likely take two or three days.

The plane, which had been en route from Paris to Toronto, was reduced to a burned-out carcass after the accident, with pieces of wing and a gleaming, white nose visible among charred and mangled wreckage.

All 309 passengers and crew were able to make it off the plane before it was consumed. A few dozen received minor injuries, including broken bones, as they left the aircraft.

Levasseur said investigators were braving hot and humid conditions as they probed the still-smoldering wreckage.

"There's a lot of mud, there are pieces that are there that are very sharp. It smells like smoke, so it's not very nice around the site, and it's also very dangerous," he said.

CREW REPORTED NO PROBLEMS.

Investigators say the crew reported no problems as the plane approached Toronto's Pearson International Airport, and the landing appeared normal.

"I have no indication that the aircraft was not functioning properly at the time of landing," Levasseur said.

Attention has focused on weather conditions at time of the landing, and whether a wet runway could have caused aquaplaning. The airport was under a red alert as the plane landed, which means there is a danger of lightning and thunder.

Questions have also surfaced about the position of the runway, which ends just short of a steep ravine. In a similar incident in 1978, an Air Canada DC-9 plunged into the ravine after an aborted takeoff, killing two passengers and injuring 105.

Investigators said they are looking at a coroner's recommendation from the time that the airport install a causeway.

A Toronto law firm will hold a public meeting next week to inform passengers how they should proceed if they want to make a legal claim.

One lawyer at the firm said he had already been in contact with passengers about a possible lawsuit.

"We're looking into it, there's no doubt we're looking into it," said Paul Miller, a lawyer with Will Barristers in Toronto.

Air France has said the Airbus plane had joined its fleet in September 1999 -- making it a relative newcomer compared with the large number of far older planes still flying.

[M.Mouse]

1. declaring a low fuel emergency should sound like: "MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY! KLM 691 declaring low fuel emergency request direct Syracuse at 15000ft" (or whatever optimum altitude). A PAN,PAN call is not correct. That's an URGENCY call; ultimately it was treated as such by ATC not giving them their optimum altitude rightaway.

As you have no idea how much fuel they had or were likely to land with you are making assumptions.

2. Whatever your alternate: you aim to land anywhere with 45min. It might be legal and not unsafe to land with 30 minutes, but far from preferable. SYR was KL691 alternate. If you want to make it all the way to SYR and planning to land with 30'' hoping to get your optimum altitude is flying on fumes in my book.

More assumptions.

3. KLM 691 also got stuck in the hold, giving them plenty of time to contemplate options. Going 'in' to an area with +TS and gambling on a expeditious landing & the risk of overshooting or someone blowing a tire on the runway ahead of you and knowing that in that case you will end up in an emegency is STUPID. KLM691 crew had their options and chose to ignore them.

More assumptions.

Being very familiar with the standards and abilities of KLM crews in general your pompous and unfounded assertions are perhaps the worst example of the multitude of ill-informed, speculative rubbish written on the preceding 20 odd pages.

Too much to hope that we all wait for the facts to be published?

[FunkyMunky]

As you have no idea how much fuel they had or were likely to land with you are making assumptions.

KLM691 mention on the ATC tape that they will be able to make Syracuse with 30 minutes of fuel left.

[El lute]

Let's be thankful it ended as it did. We'll all read about the reasons why it happened etc. sometime in the future and see who did or didn't do what.

172driver,
This Timesonline arcticle you linked to also says:
Quote:
"Under rules enforced by the European Aviation Safety Agency, based in Cologne, airline manufacturers are not given permission-to-fly certificates until they have demonstrated that they can evacuate a passenger-load of at least 44 people in 90 seconds."
Unquote
There must have been cries of joy and the champagne has been flowing in Toulouse, then.
I guess, it's just an out-of-context-quote by the journo.

On passenger/eyewitness reports I have so far accumulated the following:
1- "One minute before the landing there was a power failure in the cabin. . ." Obviously, both a control freak for having the exact time and an expert for knowing it was a power failure and that it was restricted to the cabin.
2- "...I was out in 3 minutes. . ." Another control freak. 'OK, set watch to stopwatch function, press button now, get moving, I'm out, press button again'.
3 - ". . . and then the lights went out. . ." It is standard procedure with a number of airlines (not just European ones), to turn off cabin lights before take-off and landing at night. While this is usually explained by the crew 'to give you a better view of the city' it is really to accustom people's eyes to lower light conditions
in case something goes wrong and they have to get out. Since this was a daylight arrival, I don't know why the lights might have been on (with the weather it could have been dark eough outside), but may it's SOP and then it would be SOP to switch them off before landing.
4 - "... after the landing people started clapping, but then the engines spooled up...". Ever heard of reverse thrust, mister?
5 - "... the oxygen masks never deployed. . ." And why would they?
6 - "... all exits were opened. . ." Yeah, right, you took the time to check them all, you could see them all and the crew would have done that regardless of fumes and fire at the rear.
Just goes to show how much these 'reports' are worth.

But the most shocking thing for me is that there are people in an aircraft that has just crashed (or overshot the runway and got severely damaged), there is smoke in the cabin, maybe visible fire, you are told in no uncertain terms to get out as fast as possible and people take their cameras and TAKE PICTURES.
I assumed there must be a limit to stupidity, but obviously there isn't.

It just occured to me:
What does the \'European Aviation Safety Agency\'? do?
Any connection with the JAA and/or the Luftfahrtbundesamt?
Are they responsible for general aviation?

[cormacshaw]

Hotdog wrote:

Correct path is red line: [ http://www.airdisaster.com/user-uploads/upd.jpg ].
The red line AirDisaster shows is on the taxy way
Is that where the AirDisaster "experts" reckon they should have landed?
The airliner's path super-imposed on the linked image is correct. It is an oblique view apparently taken from the excellent Google Earth application. The satellite image used is old and shows the airport while the runway in question was under construction which is why its appearance is more like a taxiway than an in-service runway. If you don't have Google Earth, you can get a wider view of the same area from above on the Google Maps website (http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=43.672962,-79.616203&spn=0.031376,0.050554&t=k&hl=en)

[gordonroxburgh]

Levasseur said the recorders, one of them blackened and soot covered after the fire, will be sent to France so safety officials there can extract the information, a process that will likely take two or three days.

"two or three days" that just about long enough to read the data, work out that something needs to be covered-up and replace it with data you like.

In all seriousness, shouldn't the FDR/CVR be examined in Canada, they are pretty standard industry wide. Does the A340-300 have a QAR as standard fit?

[PAXboy]

An EMAS arrestor bed would likely have made this overrun a near non-event. But the total runway length would be some 500' shorter which would reduce maximum weights and therefore revenues for the carriers and the GTAA. I take the point about no airport reducing it's runway length. As I suggested earlier, if the ravine had a bridge built over it, then the arrestor bed could lie across it and keep the ravine and the runway length. No, that sounds too simple :hmm:

[HotDog]

Pictures of the Toronto runway suggests that it has a concrete surface,

It isn't concrete.

CYYZ
06R/24L 9000 x 200 feet
2743 x 61 meters ASPHALT

[captplaystation]

Gordon,are you suggesting these lovely people that sounded the death knell for our favorite aircraft would hope to have some data corrupted by a certain government? mmn funny that, that was exactly my first thought;not that it has ever happened before with a product of "AYERBOOS" ? Oh well only once(or twice or?)

[JP4]

Gordon: QAR must be standard in the Air France 340. They are mandatory in France since a long time.
And yes if I would have been the Canadian safety board, I would have kept those "black boxes" in Canada for processing.

If I remember well, a Lufthansa Airbus did almost the same in...Prague(?) and the reason was a problem with the spoilers which didn't deploy. Look at the pics, the spoilers appear to be fully down! Anyone who can recall this?

[rigpiggy]

looking at the picture earlier I think that you will see that there is close to 300m between the runway end, and the gully. plenty of room for an EMAS system. if I remember correctly one of the tests was a 727 leaving the runway at 35 knots. admittedly lower speed than the latest, but I would imagine thaT THERE WOULD BE NO LOSS OF RUNWAY LENGTH AS PREVIOUSLY STATED

[Rollingthunder]

"The black boxes were to be sent to Ottawa and any communication between the pilots and the control tower or other recorded information was to be downloaded at a lab in Ottawa".

There appears to be some conflicting information out there.

[armada]

http://radans.net/jens/planestory.html

:rolleyes: :*

[HotDog]

gordonroxburgh. Captplaystation, JP4; a bit hasty to make judgements, me thinks.

From Associated Press AP news service:

The flight data and voice recorders — the so-called "black boxes" — were recovered Wednesday and sent to TSB headquarters in Quebec.

The information they hold will reveal conversations between the pilots and Pearson's control tower in the moments before the passenger jet skidded off the 1.6-mile runway.

However, Levasseur said his team did not have the proper equipment to download the information on those black boxes, so it would take several days for special computer equipment from France. He said that would delay the investigation and removal of the wreckage by several days.

[MarkD]

So
ALPA have a release (http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/August2005/04/c7414.html) saying YYZ is not to international standards. How interesting. Why have we not seen ALPA call for their members not to fly there before now?

Does ALPA have any recent history of making any waves about this runway, especially considering the GTAA is massively upgrading YYZ at a cost of (literally) billions and could have made improving 24L a part of this?

[broadreach]

The number of red herrings dragged across this thread would make the fishing dock at Mallaig smell like a field of lavender.

The spoilers, reverse thrust from the fourth engine, the KLM go-round, are all side issues.

It would seem perfectly plain that what happened was the aircraft landed normally in a window between fairly fierce but localised cells and that immediately after touchdown the window closed, presenting the flight deck with a split-second choice between a go-round straight into the cell or complete the arrival. In a few seconds they would have passed from a wet, grooved, section of runway to one with little adhesion, "hailstones the size of marbles" and zilch forward vision.

It would also seem reasonable to assume that spoilers and reverse thrust worked as advertised but that brakes didn't have much effect because immediately after touchdown the runway was effectively flooded. It happens and sometimes it happens very fast. I hope that in the final analysis the crew will have been found to have done the right thing.

I'm all for speculation and hindsight but please, perspective and perception of reality.

And blaming ravines and other obstacles has to be the ultimate red herring.

[armada]

broadreach: fine, but the first question to be asked must be WHERE on the runway (distance) did they touch down?

That key variable will put all these other variables into perspective: speed, weather, aircraft performance, etc., to be properly compared with SOP etc.

[Ignition Override]

JP-4:
After an A-320 touched down years ago in Warsaw ( the Lufthansa FO died), the pilots were not able to extend the spoilers or thrust reversers because the main gear were not properly spinning up due to water on the runway (so much for any braking and anti-skid/autobrakes), and so the plane slid off the runway. I have never trained on the Airbus. Along with modifying software on the A-320/319s, was it also modified on the A-340/330, or was it different from the beginning?

somebody referred to a comment such that US ALPA made a negative safety judgement about Toronto Airport and I can not remember anything about YYZ in any safety bulletins, and have flown there a little bit over the years. Except for having some major noise abatement procedures, different words for certain things and slightly different charting details, I have noticed nothing that is worthy of comment up there. Could somebody be trying to "rock the boat" with a pile of "baloney", to put it diplomatically, in order to spread more resentment towards the US (which is quite trendy these days) ;) ? If not, e-mail me about exactly what ALPA said. I've always enjoyed flying up there. Our US ATC and many airports have their own major flaws; enough provincial characteristics and use far too many colloquialisms. Never mind the random and arbitrary manner also among certain US airport TSA personnel towards foreign crewmembers, as happened with many domestic crews about three years ago. How about pilots with freight airlines who travel one-way.

We must be very careful not to "cast the first stone" from an eagle's perch of imagined near-perfection. Find out about various US upper midwestern airports (Grand Forks, Traverse City, somewhere in Wisconsin etc) and how some might have forgotten to use de-icing fluids on runways or report anything realistic (over last two hours) about winter braking actions/conditions...whether by a Saabmeter/Tapley/ pick-up truck or by a jet/turboprop. Runways might be treated but not runway turn-off areas connecting runways to taxiways! One brand-new Captain (in my upgrade class) stated "I got no braking!" :eek: and saw his IOE line check airmen immediately using max reverse thrust for this then waiting the required few hours for both engines to be inspected.

Hydroplaning might not have been a factor in Toronto, but the previous interconnections between Airbus systems used during landing made me curious.:hmm:

[ManchesterMan]

I understand from passenger accounts of the accident
the A340 was on its second approach to the airfield
when it crashed........

It seems quite common to hear that crashed aircraft
who do come to grief on landing have several attempts
before the fatal one.......

Are there any statistics anywhere that would show
this to be the case?

(When I say 'common' - obviously I mean in terms of
relativity)

On the subject of arrester beds I remember
Manchester installing one on runway 24 a good
number of years ago and can recall only one
aircraft using it.

Well done the crew for getting everyone off the
plane in one piece!

[DingerX]

bah. I don't know what kind of statistics would be useful or informative. Statistically, any deviation from the absolutely ordinary sunny day visual approach in perfect metereological conditions with no traffic will increase the likelihood of something going amiss.

Statistically, you'll find that around "Red Alerts", ground stops, whatever due to thunderstorms, you have a higher percentage of go-arounds, and a higher percentage of accidents.

But go-arounds are generally safer than the alternative.

And from what I've seen, when something like this happens to an aircraft, and it happens under meteorological conditions which are universally agreed to be marginal, the investigating authority inevitably faults the pilots' decision. Unfortunately, 411A seems to be on vacation.

Yup, plenty of red herrings here folks. Spoiler non-deployment has been faulted in previous incidents and accidents, so I suppose it's worth discussing, but I don't see how speculation on their position in the wreckage photos is going to prove anything either way.

Ravine location is fairly irrelevant here; although a US jury recently awarded damages against the airport in the Little Rock (non-spoiler deployment in thunderstorm) accident to the positioning of light standards, so, at least for airports handling US passengers, these things are cause for consideration.

KLM 691 is the biggest red herring of them all. Many accusations are flying back and forth, and few of them are based in facts; even more amusing is that the few facts that we have are contested for no good reason. Hell, I suspect if the captain of the flight himself were to come in here, someone would accuse him of not knowing what he was talking about. Here's the basic details: Toronto was hit by a couple of isolated thunderstorm cells. From what I've seen of the radar, there was no huge front across North America that would have suggested to someone in AMS ten hours before that an hour's extra fuel was an excellent idea, since there was a good chance that every suitable airport within 1000 miles would be suffering a rare August blizzard. On the ATC recording, KLM 691 is the aircraft after AF358 to be handed off to YYZ tower for 24L. When KLM 691 comes back on, they called "pan pan pan, fuel emergency". They had fuel for SYR plus 30 minutes. The controller offered to find them something closer with a suitable runway, but they declined. Some people around here get all jumpy around the word "emergency"...

[threemiles]

From what you can hear at liveatc the plane was making a straight-in with hand-off to tower 118.35 at 1600LT which is 3 mins before the overrun. There was no other approach of the same flight number in the hour before (if I haven't overheard it).

There were also no weather related diversions on these frequencies until the following three planes were requested to divert due to airport closure (the KLM to SYR and the others to London). Can't rule out though that there were go-arounds and diversions on the departure frequency.

[rubik101]

Having looked at the pictures in this morning's papers, is anyone else surprised by the amost total destruction of the A340 after the fire service were apparently at the aircraft only minutes after the accident?

[Sheep Guts]

From alot of the TV footage Ive seen on the news it looks like the reversers deployed because they werent stowed at all.
If the A340 is similair to the A320 then the auto brakes wont operate unless there is a groundspoiler deployed signal. And the reversers wont operate unless there is ground signal ie. squat switch. Correct me if Im worng guys. When the Ground spoilers are armed during approach the wont deploy unless there is a ground signal aswell.
So its looking like the spoilers failed to arm for some reason also affecting the AutoBrakes( which are very effective in the A320).

So who kows really what happened but lets all be thankfull there were no fatalities full merits to the Air France Crew.



Sheep

[JP4]

The flight data and voice recorders — the so-called "black boxes" — were recovered Wednesday and sent to TSB headquarters in Quebec.

This morning the french tv annouce that the black boxes will be processed in Paris because Toronto doesn't have the required equipment to do it...Ok I know journalists!!!

If this is true, I will not make "hasty judgment", but I will just notice that the proofs of the accident are in the home country of the crew, the company, and aircraft maker involved in that crash.

Here is what I found on "Le Figaro" web site a few minutes ago:

Retrouvées dès mercredi soir, visiblement en assez bon état, les deux boîtes noires de l'Airbus A 340-300 seront transportées en France pour extraire leurs informations, le bureau de la sécurité des transports au Canada ne disposant pas des équipements nécessaires. Les données seront ensuite renvoyées au Canada, où le groupe d'enquête, constitué d'une cinquantaine d'experts canadiens, français et américains, tentera de les faire «parler».

[Re-Heat]

ALPA have a release saying YYZ is not to international standards. How interesting. Why have we not seen ALPA call for their members not to fly there before now?
Like all those places in the US without CAT III approaches?

[jabird]

Are there any reference sources for the typical installation costs of runway overruns, and variables which would affect their efficacy?

The ones at JFK do seem to have been very effective, but multiplying by 12 for a six runway airport, or applying these on less heavily used or loco "friendly" airfields cannot be cheap.

Is MAN the only place in the UK to have them, or are they elsewhere? The beancounters would presumably have done a CoBA on these, which must surely be more likely to be positive at heavily utilised single runway airfields like LGW?

As for the reference that this event "could have been another Kegworth", iirc there were no ground fatalities due to this incident, weather conditions and runway usage notwithstanding.

[xetroV]

ManchesterMan

I understand from passenger accounts of the accident
the A340 was on its second approach to the airfield
when it crashed........
Passenger accounts should always be taken with more than a grain of salt. When a Martinair DC-10 crashed in Faro about 10 years ago, some surviving passengers declared that the airplane had attempted several landings prior to that accident. Now, the radar plots, data recorders, tower tapes, and CVR all proved otherwise: no go-arounds were made prior to that fatal landing, but that hasn't stopped those passengers from being totally convinced of their "truth" up to this day.

Other passengers in that airplane were convinced an engine had been on fire before the landing. Again: the investigators found no proof whatsoever, but tell that to the passengers.

Unfortunately, witness accounts are unreliable by nature. Not because these people are liars, but because the mind plays strange tricks to humans in stressful situations. (And of course, most people are totally unfamiliar with aircraft operations.)

[Rockhound]

According to this morning's Globe and Mail newspaper, "Data from Pearson airport's ground radar and witnesses suggest Flight 358 was nearly halfway down the [runway] before it touched down. Investigators are puzzled at the high-speed [nearly 150 km/hr] overrun, but one emerging scenario is that the [pilot, after touchdown] momentarily reapplied power, perhaps to initiate a 'go-around'". From the way the article (by Paul Koring, who is more knowledgeable in aviation matters than the average reporter) is worded, it seems that none of the above was gleaned from the TSB investigators' briefing: "Officially, the TSB has released very little information".
Rockhound

[trainer too 2]

xetroV is 100% right! Humans are the worst witnesses specially the once sitting inside a moving tube with limit view out.

Just two weeks ago i was desoriented when positioning in a 767 to my home airport purely by the minds willingness to try to interpretate limited information to create the whole picture.:8

[MarkD]

ignition

there was a link in my original post on the ALPA release if you want to read it. It was not yet on ALPA website, it went to Canada News Wire.

This additionally from Globe and Mail (snippet):

Some pilots, meanwhile, are expressing safety concerns about Pearson. The Air Line Pilots Association, which represents pilots at airlines around the world including Air Canada's regional carrier Jazz, said it has been long concerned about the valley about 200 metres past the end of the runway.

A coroner's jury recommended installing a causeway after a 1978 incident in which an Air Canada DC-9 aborted takeoff and ended up in the ravine, killing two passengers and injuring 105 others.

"They knew there was a problem and we have asked to have that fixed over the years and it has not been addressed," said ALPA spokesman John Mazor.

But Mr. Lavasseur dismissed suggestions that Pearson is unsafe because of the valley 200 metres from the end of the runway.

He said airplanes are designed to require a minimum runway length depending on their gross weight at takeoff and landing.

"I have no reason to believe that this runway doesn't meet criteria -- that Transport Canada would not leave that runway operating if it wasn't suitable and acceptable," Mr. Lavasseur said.

Other pilots are complaining that Pearson has no wind-shear detectors and that the runways are not grooved, which allows them to drain water faster after downpours.

But Kent Wilson, president of the Air Canada Pilots Association, said his union does not have particular safety concerns about Pearson.

He said the union supports any moves that will make the airport safer, but added that it is not realistic to expect that 1,000 feet of overrun at every airport.

[guclu]

There are a lot of issue going on whether the spoilers were extended or not. Some detailed info from FCOM would help you all, in my opinion.

1) The reversers were deployed. (As we all agree)

This means that :

- Engine FADEC was operating.
- at least one LGCIU send the aircraft on ground signal
- TLA to reverse was sent by PRIM
- switch reverse signal from EIU

FADEC = Full Authority Digital Engine Control System
LGCIU = Landing Gear Control Interface Unit
TLA = Thrust Lever Angle
PRIM = Flight Control Primary Computer
EIU = Engine Interface Unit

2) The spoilers were not extended :

Ok firends let us consider that (like some of you not me !) the crew did not arm the ground spoilers then :

Full Extension:
The ground spoilers on the 340 (and 320/330) fully extend during rejected take off (at speeds greater then 72knots) or at landing when both main landing gears have touched down and :

- All thrust levers are set to idle, provided ground spoilers are armed
or
- reverse is selected on at least two symmetrical engines (remaining engines at idle)

Patial Extension:
The ground spoilers parially extend when reverse is selected on at least two symmetric engines (remaining engines at idle) and one main landing gear is compressed. This partial extension, by decreasing lift, will ease the compression of the second main landing gear and consequently will lead to the normal ground spoiler extension.


Ok so as the reversers were open at least one LGCIU felt the landing and according to the spoiler logic they must have been extended although they are not armed but here it comes :

On the introduction of the spoilers the book says :


The system automatically retracts the spoilers to their zero position, if it detects a fault or loses electrical control


So let us wait the end of the investigation and please not try to argue the crew.

Safe Landings to all


:ok:

[BigHitDH]

Re the spoilers not being extended: Could the pilot have "automatically" retracted the spoliers as he came to rest to aid in the evac? With different types having overwing exits this might just be a "instinctive" move?

[er340790]

SURELY THE TIME HAS NOW COME TO HAVE PERMANENT VIDEO RECORDING OF AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE ACTIVE RUNWAY(S), AT ALL MAJOR AIRPORTS.

IT SEEMS ABSOLUTELY INCREDIBLE IN THE 21ST CENTURY THAT INVESTIGATORS ARE STILL TRYING TO DETERMINE (FROM TIRE TRACKS) WHERE THE A/C TOUCHED DOWN.

THIS WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE EXPEDITED INVESTIGATION OF THE YYZ ACCIDENT BUT WOULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR HELP IN THE CDG CONCORDE CRASH.

I APPRECIATE THAT THIS WOULD NOT ALWAYS PROVIDE PERFECT INFORMATION DUE TO METEROLOGICAL FACTORS SUCH AS FOG, BUT IT WOULD SURELY BE A MASSIVE ADVANCE OVER WHERE WE ARE TODAY.

[norodnik]

er340790,

I would tend to agree that in this day an age, having video evidence would be helpful. Of course, having video evidence in the cockpit would also be a massive boon but most pilots wont have it.

In the case of Air Chance, it matters very little. The Concorde investigation was fixed with almost every salient piece of damming evidence against Air Chance omitted.

If the recorders in this accident head off to Paris, the truth will end up somewhere else as well.

Maybe we could save ourselves a lot of bother and check to see if there was a Continental DC10 taking off ahead of the landing A340. If there was, then its an open and shut case.

[PaperTiger]

Transportation Safety Board investigator Réal Levasseur said the recorder is an earlier model type and it would be very expensive to buy the necessary equipment to retrieve the data from the flight recorders.Why would a 1999-build airliner have an "earlier model" FDR ?? Does this mean that TSB Canada can only handle crashes of newer planes :rolleyes: Something fishy :confused:

[Been Accounting]

Why would a 1999-build airliner have an "earlier model" FDR ?

Common spare with aircraft delivered in early 1990s

[TheOddOne]

I must say my confidence level would be boosted if the FDR/CVR went to Farnborough instead.

The Odd One

[ManchesterMan]

DINGERX

I meant statistics of aircraft doing multiple (ie:more than one
approach) in bad weather - later to crash.

Obviously no-one will be concerned about go-arounds involving
runway incursion etc when the aircraft simply lands the next
time round without a problem.

Over the years I have heard of numerous crashes after multiple
(ie more than one) attempt has been made in severe weather.
I'm sure you have too ?

I read in the press an interview with a survivor who stated that
they were on a second attempt to land so naturally accepted
this as fact - not having reason to doubt the journalism.

[Save It]

BBC Radio Five in the UK is just reporting that initial findings point to the plane landing long on the runway, hence the overrun. They apparently got the information from the lead investigator!

[Flight Safety]

I agree with some who may be thinking that this accident is starting to look similar to the MD80 accident in Little Rock on 6/1/99. Here's a link to a NTSB produced video (5MB, and an old avi format which required me to download the file to my desktop to play it) of the landing done by that flight crew in similar weather conditions.

Added: forget that other video, this is a much better version of the same video at 2.2MB and much better quality.

AA Flight 1420 MD80, Little Rock, AR (http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2000/aa1420/1420_anim.asf)

Some of the similar characteristics are the long touchdown, departing the end of the runway at a fairly high speed, similar weather, etc.

One of the more interesting findings of flight 1420, was that the spoilers failed to deploy because the weather conditions during the landing basically fooled the spooler auto-deploy system. Thus wheel braking was ineffective due to continued wing lift and the lack of weight on the wheels.

It's possible that the A340 spoiler auto-deploy system was fooled in this case as well, but we'll see what the investigators have to say.

[aardvark2zz]

aardvark2zz; posted 4th August 2005 17:25. Assuming that a "standard" deceleration on a wet runway was achieved then the touchdown point calculates to the half-runway mark.....

By PAUL KORING
Air France's ill-fated Flight 358 "landed long," far beyond the normal touchdown zone, as the co-pilot struggled to reduce speed and get the big Airbus A-340 on the ground, according to aviation experts familiar with the early stages of the investigation. Data from Pearson airport's ground radar and witnesses suggest Flight 358 was nearly halfway down the 2,800-metre Runway 24L before it touched down......

Actually, the day before today's press briefing, I calculated 50.5% of the runway was used if "standard" wet-runway braking was achieved.

hmmmm, pretty good, if I may say so myself :cool: :ok: :E

[JW411]

This is all beginning to sound just like an afternoon at JFK some 20 years ago. I was, at the time, in the left seat of the DC-10 with a Part 121 Carrier based at JFK.

There were thunderstorms all over Long Island and the weather radar was mostly "red". Needless to say there were big ATC delays.

Eventually we were positioned on to finals to 04R and was it ever wet! I had already very carefully briefed a 50 flap landing (normally we used 35 flap - 50 flap produced an airframe vibration which "The passengers didn't like"). Autothrottle was taken out and I hand- flew the approach with every intention of doing a firm landing on the wet runway. All went well after a very interesting approach.

We eventually got down to the hotel which was right on the edge of JFK, had a quick change, and then met in the bar for a well-deserved cold beer.

"Have you looked out the window" said my excellent American F/E?

There just outside the window was an SAS DC-10-30 off the end of the same runway with its nose in Jamaica Bay!

He had been going round the hold a couple of thousand feet above us in the very unpleasant weather but his flight had not ended as happily as ours.

Later in the bar, one of the local FAA inspectors told us that the other guy had:

a. Used 35 flap for passenger comfort.
b. Kept the autothrottle in (which tended to give a bit of a float).
c. Didn't get it on the ground until halfway down the runway.
d. When the F/O suggested a G/A made the comment that he wasn't going back up into that bloody awful weather.

Once again, nobody got killed but it was a hell of a sad way to end a flight (and probably a career).

Drastic weather requires drastic skills!

PS. The aeroplane was eventually dragged back up onto JFK and was put in the PanAm hangar. Fedex bought it and I presume it is still gainfully employed.

[CM_Falcon]

Norodnik
In the case of Air Chance, it matters very little. The Concorde investigation was fixed with almost every salient piece of damming evidence against Air Chance omitted.

Those are some very serious accusations. Do you have something to back it up? Substance, not conspiracy theory requested.

[swh]

Received this by email ..

Air France's flight 358 landed beyond the normal touchdown zone on runway 24L at Toronto's Pearson international airport before it skidded into a creek bed and exploded into flames, lead investigator Réal Levasseur confirmed at a press conference Friday.

“The information that I have is that the aircraft landed longer than normally or longer than usual for this type of aircraft. How long, exactly, or how far more than usual is what we're trying to determine right now,” Mr. Levasseur said.

He also said there is no indication that the plane was hit by lightning and that the cockpit and engines are fairly well intact.

All 309 passengers and crew escaped the wreckage with little more than scrapes, bruises and strains. Forty three people were taken to seven Toronto-area hospitals where some were treated for broken bones.

Although flight procedures vary from airline to airline, standard practice is to abort a landing and initiate a “go-around” – meaning adding power, climbing away and returning to the landing pattern for a second attempt – if the aircraft is not going to hit the “landing zone” at the right speed.

A runway's landing zone varies but is generally considered to be from about 275 metres to 450 metres from the threshold. Pearson's runway 24L is 2,740 metres long.

Some passengers have said they thought the plane was flying faster than usual before a landing. Aviation sources have confirmed that the co-pilot, a 43-year-old Air France veteran with more than 10,000 flying hours, was flying manually.

That is common among airliner pilots, even though modern, automatic landing systems governed by sophisticated computers and following radio beams can consistently land aircraft even in the worst visibility and foulest weather conditions with greater precision and reliability than highly trained pilots.

Automatic landing systems are usually used in relatively calm, foggy conditions, however, and the systems that can take an aircraft right down require runways with radio and directional beams more sophisticated than those at Pearson's 24L.

A touchdown so far along the runway suggests a difficult and unstable few seconds before touchdown, precisely the sort of situation that can eat up significant chunks of runway length.

“If you are carrying some extra speed and suddenly get a tailwind [a possibility in the gusty conditions that existed when Flight 358 was landing at 4 p.m. on Tuesday] it can carry you down the runway,” one experienced pilot said.

"If that happens, you go-around,” he said.

Another veteran pilot with experience dealing with human factors in aviation mishaps noted that “it's human nature to try and complete what you have started.” Pilots are trained to resist that impulse because aborting a landing is safer.

Praise has been heaped on the co-pilot for his bravery in making a last check of the evacuated and burning wreck of the Airbus A-340, but his handling of the landing will come under intense scrutiny.

Air France chief executive officer Jean-Cyril Spinetta said the “crew, naturally, decided to land” at Toronto when it reopened after being closed because of bad weather. He also confirmed, however, that the flight had enough fuel to reach Montreal and the pilots were “not therefore obliged to touch down.”

The decision to land in difficult weather conditions ultimately rests with the pilots as long as the airport is open.

Mr. Spinetta said that after landing, the crew “activated the thrust reversers normally, which operated as expected.”

Given the interconnections of brakes, spoilers – the flat panels that rise from the wings to destroy lift and keep the aircraft on the runway -and the thrust reversers, all three systems should have been working.

However, if the rain-drenched runway was sufficiently wet and the aircraft was travelling sufficiently fast, it could have aquaplaned – in effect slid on a film of water.

From the photos that were attached to the email which were taken from outside the aircraft during the evacuation, it appears the flames are more noticable at the wing root of the starboard wing.

It was difficult to see if 1L side was deployed, if it was it was not normally inflated at the time of the photos, slide 2L was not deployed.

Photos show captains cockpit window open, no sign of escape rope.

[MilkyWay]

No sign of escape rope ?!?!?! Check that picture : AF358 (http://www.yyznews.com/YYZ03AugAFcrashscene6sv.jpg)

[swh]

MilkyWay,

All I can say is what I saw in the photos I received, the ones I received were taken during the evacuation with passengers still deplanning through 1L and 2L.

The rope may have been used later, I dont know.

I did notice in your photo the wipers are not in the normal stowed position.

[Ontariotech]

A couple of posts back, a few people mentioned having CTV cameras at major airports to capture airport operations.

What about the cameras on board the aircraft? Do these larger aircraft not have cameras in the tail fin? Or on the underbelly that assist with taxi operations on smaller taxiways. These same images appear on the passangers little tv's in the seat backs and on the PFDs in the cockpit. Do these not receord? How hard would it be for these cameras to be connected to a looping recording system that captures the last 60 minutes of flight. Kinda like the looping voice recorder in the cockpit.

[Flyer Flier]

Reference the aircraft cameras in posts above. They are fitted to the longer A340-600 but not to the A340-300 such as the series involved in this case. (Currently on board cameras are not recorded in any case.)
There are runway video cameras fitted at some airports and these have proved useful in analysing incidents such as the Cathay 340 tail strike out of Auckland. I believe they are a good idea and could easily be installed at all major airports on a continuous loop system.
Regarding the FDR, there are different types of recorder around, plus the format (i.e. dataframe) of the recorded parameters varies from airline to airline as long as they have included all the mandatory parameters. This can take time for an investigation team to sort out. Also unless the GPS position is recorded to a sufficient resolution it can still require a fair bit of work to accurately compute the exact touchdown point from the FDR data. Hence the usefulness of ground video.

[LindbergB767]

My question is Anybody know that if those box are send in France for reading I expect that the Canadian TSB would send someboby with the boxes since they are in charge of the investigation ???

[N380UA]

FF

cameras are fitted on the -300 as well.

[Green Guard]

JW411 (hm ...I just wander what is similar with ..411a)

You did a great job, but......
.. and may I here quote my CAA LASORS:

"The superior pilot is the one using his superior knowledge and his superior judgement to avoid those situations that otherwise would require him to display HIS SUPERIOR skill"

[Flyer Flier]

N380UA said

"FF

cameras are fitted on the -300 as well."

That's news to me :hmm:
Which airline has them on their -300s? The taxi camera system (TACS) was introduced on the -600 in the tail-fin and behind the nose leg to aid in the taxi of the much longer airframe. I was not aware that they were offered as an option on new 300s and further more I cannot see why an airline would spend the extra money when they were not required.
Regards
FF

P.S. There is a In-Flight Entertainment system camera that can be fitted to Airbus aircraft showing an external view, but again I do not believe these are recorded due to bandwidth limitations.

[DouglasFlyer]

Our A343s have In-Flight Entertainment system cameras installed but they are not recorded. They can be switched off from the cockpit and our SOPs recommend them be be off in messy weather conditions (xxx x-wind or very gusty) not to frighten the Pax.

df

[lomapaseo]

My question is Anybody know that if those box are send in France for reading I expect that the Canadian TSB would send someboby with the boxes since they are in charge of the investigation ???



Seeing as this is commercial flight, rather than a test flight conducted by the manufacturer, it should come under ICAO Annex 13 which gives rights to parties CTSB, NTSB, BEA, AAIB etc. etc.

The parties decide together what is the best equipment to decode along with the best experience. The parties have a right to participate and no doubt will. There is little way hanki-panky can take place and not be detected by the other parties.

[Rockhound]

This morning's Globe and Mail story by Paul Koring borders on the hilarious. Following the headline " Flight recorders may yield crucial answers" comes the following:
"Although it may take months before the investigation is complete, the flight and cockpit recorders should quickly provide answers to crucial questions about whether the Air France pilots were considering aborting the landing and briefly advanced the throttles to initiate a "go-around" after landing halfway down the runway".
I've just had this brainwave, which might save thousands of dollars and many hours of analysis:

Why not ask the pilots?

Where do I collect my reward?
Rockhound:p

[JW411]

Green Guard:

You are obviously new to these shores. Let me explain that 411a and I have absolutely no connection whatsoever.

He is an American gentleman living in Arizona who is a great fan of the lightweight Lockheed 3-holer otherwise known as the L1011.

I am an old DC-10 man and have never been near an L1011. I have only visited Arizona twice and I am a Brit.

We can both be controversial and I have often considered changing my callsign but I don't see why I should for we were here before they were (unless he turns out to be a native American - in which case I apologise in advance)!

[MilkyWay]

Rockhound,

Why not ask the pilots?
I am sure the investigators already did it and they may know the answer. But you have to rely on facts (FDR in this case) before making a public announcement.

I remember an expression which said : if the pilot survives, you'll never know the truth.

Ok, it may be exaggerated but not completely.

[Rockhound]

Sorry, MilkyWay, I cannot agree. I concede that the recorders should be read by the investigators before they make any public announcement, in case there is any conflict between the evidence from the pilots and that from the recorders, but surely the answer to the question, Was a go-around attempted or not?, can be provided definitively by the pilot(s). The latter know full well that, if they lie, they will be caught out.
Rockhound

[atakacs]

Folks,

Just wondering : anyone with some information as of why the FDR (and CVR) are not fully exploitable by the TSA (regardless of their current location, which is also somewhat mysterious….) ?

Canada is certainly not a third world country and the A340 is definitely a recent and common airplane. They might be some very good reasons for this to happen but it’s really puzzling…

alex

[Rollingthunder]

Captain is still in hospital with undetermined back injury. Still has not been interviewed. One wonders why not?

[Techman]

Of course it hasn't. But could it be because he is in hospital with back injuries?

[broadreach]

Rockhound

Re "ask the pilots", crisis management. All parties in the industry and particularly AF, Airbus and Toronto, will want this accident quickly forgotten by the traveling public. Best way to accomplish that is keep news to the bare minimum of soothing words. Thirty, forty years ago it might have been quite normal for a pilot to talk, get it off his chest, discuss, immediately after the event, with peers or perhaps with anyone who'd listen. Today it seems more the norm to keep those involved "sterile" until they can be interviewed in a formal environment. And to keep the results of those interviews reserved until the final report's issued.

I say this with a little trepidation because it's been a looong time since I've been directly involved in aviation. But I've seen the trend very much first hand in a related area of transport, marine. One thing US style litigation has taught us is to keep our traps tightly shut.

And you can bet your boots the Toronto accident litigation will last for years. Ironically, probably longer because everyone survived.

p.s. edited to note Rockhound's comment below re the FO being interviewed by TSB. I'd expect everything in that interview to have been recorded and signed off by all involved!

p.p.s. edited again to note 747focal's quoting (on a new thread which will probably be merged here) an article that comments on some of the slides not deploying. The article mentions a $62 million lawsuit brought by one of the passengers against AF and the airport for negligence. Here we go...

[Rockhound]

I agree with Rolling Thunder - it is very curious. Of course, Paul Koring of the Globe and Mail might say, what's the point of interviewing the pilots, the answers to the crucial questions will come from the flight recorders.
Actually, to be fair, PK did write that the lead investigator for the TSB stated that the co-pilot had been very frank in his discussions with the TSB team.
Rockhound

[747FOCAL]

http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/americas/08/06/canada.crash.ap/index.html

TORONTO, Ontario (AP) -- Investigators trying to determine why an Air France jet skidded off a runway said Saturday that only four of the aircraft's eight doors and emergency exits were used to escape the burning jetliner, and that two emergency slides malfunctioned.

Real Levasseur of Canada's Transportation Safety Board said one of the four exit doors used by the 309 passengers and crew in their rush to disembark was difficult to open, and that the fire after the crash last Tuesday may have prevented access to the other doors.

Levasseur also said two of the slides used failed to work, even though they are supposed to automatically unfold when the emergency doors are opened.

The discovery confirms comments by many passengers and witnesses who said some of the slides and emergency exists were not functioning, forcing people to jump from as high as 4 or 5 yards.

Some aviation experts have surmised that the impact of the Airbus A340, which slammed into a ravine, might have damaged the exit doors and chutes.

Levasseur said two experts from the U.S. manufacturer of the chutes, Goodrich Corp., and one from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board were on site looking at why the slides and doors failed to work.

Air France Flight 358 landed at Lester B. Pearson International Airport amid heavy thunderstorms, skidding off the east-west runway some 218 yards and then slamming into a ravine.

Remarkably, none of the 309 passengers and crew members died, though at least 43 people were injured and several remained hospitalized Saturday.

Veronique Brachet, an Air France spokeswoman, said the pilot was still hospitalized with compressed vertebrae.

$62 million lawsuit
Meanwhile, a passenger has filed a class-action lawsuit against Air France, Toronto airport authorities and a Canadian private air navigation service, accusing them of negligence, the Toronto Star reported.

The suit, filed Friday, asks for $62 million. An Air France spokesman declined comment on the lawsuit.

The plane's flight data and voice recorders were found intact, and investigators said they should have details within days to help them determine what caused the late afternoon crash. There have been questions about whether the 9,000-foot runway is long enough, and whether it is safe to have the ravine at its end.

Lucie Vignola, a spokeswoman for the federal transportation ministry Transport Canada, said a plan to require clear, nearly flat runway extensions was under consideration before Tuesday's accident.

She said Transport Canada decided to go ahead with the plan after it became clear that international standards are shifting to require additional room at the end of runways. The department has not determined how long the safety areas would be, Vignola said.

The Air Line Pilots Association said Pearson does not have sufficient safe areas at the end of runways, including the one on which Flight 358 attempted to land.

"This runway is not as long as what you find at most international airports, so the important of an adequate overrun is increased, and this accident is an example why," said Capt. Tom Bunn, a retired commercial airline pilot of 30 years for Pan and United Airlines, who now runs fear-of-flying courses.

The gully at the end of the runway has also been a source of contention. A coroner's jury recommended filling in the gully, or extending a causeway over it, after a 1978 incident in which an Air Canada DC9 aborted takeoff and ended up in the gully, killing two passengers.

Steve Shaw, a spokesman for the Greater Toronto Airports Authority, said that after the 1978 accident, the gully was graded so the slope was not so severe, but it was not filled in.

[blueloo]

A disclaimer - all this is second hand info, so maybe someone in the know can verify or shed light on the substance of it:


When QF damaged a door on its A330, it merrily sent the jet to the hangar, took the door off, rang airbus and said how do we fix it. The response "what do you mean you have taken the door off? The door is part of the structure of the aircraft"

The reason I raise this is that if the door is part of the structure then in a moderate aircraft prang, I assume the fuselage will be distorted to some degree, thereby making door operation harder to impossible. Of course if the aircraft is in a smoldering wreck the door design is irrelevant.


is there a difference in design philosphy between Airbus and Boeing in doors (aside from the obvious A vs B differences) or because Airbus (like boeing) has to satisfy the FAA they should have similar standards?......

Does the evacuation aspect consider door and fuselage strength (i know boeing door frames are sigificantly re-enforced) or merely door size, assisted opening operations and escape slides?

[Farmer 1]

Quote:

"Captain is still in hospital with undetermined back injury. Still has not been interviewed. One wonders why not?"

Medical reasons - he has a back injury. At the moment, the hospital authorities are in command, which is as it must be.

Nobody knows the reasons yet, probably not even the crew. The Captain is going through hell, and on top of that he has a back injury.

He's one of us, guys. Let's show a bit of compassion.

[Bearcat]

just my bit...this thing about half the doors not opening.

well when a fuselage is buckled on top of plug type doors, frightening as it is this is to be expected. Certification is done on useable doors not on ones that have stressed from a fusealge that has buckled.

The one frightening thing for me on Airbuses and I'm in the game a long time is there have been numerous incidents of brake failures. Does it mention it in the QRH? No. One is expected to memorise the action of feet off the brakes, select NWS/Anti skid off and then apply alternate brakes. My company had this happen a 321 on a short rwy....the crew were grey post flight.

The smoke checklist is a shambles also.....rant over.

Whatever the outcome of the A340 rwy excursion, there will be lessons for us all to learn.

[SaturnV]

From Canadian Press (CP)::
.....Two experts from the manufacturer of the slide and one from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board were on site looking at why the slides didn't work as advertised, Levasseur said.

As well, one runway expert from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration is working with the Canadian team, looking at tire marks on the runway at Pearson International Airport to determine if the Airbus A-340 hydroplaned in the severe rain storm Tuesday.

But at this point in the investigation, the plane doesn't appear to have hydroplaned, Levasseur said.

"If there was hydroplaning, it didn't last very long."

He reasoned that there wasn't enough damage done to the plane's tires to indicate the four-engine jet skidded along because of the water. Hydroplaning, he said, usually causes the water underneath a plane to boil, melting parts of the tire.

Levasseur also said he didn't think a sudden storm-produced microburst - a very small cell of intense downward wind - caused the plane to crash.

"If an aircraft was close to the ground and passed a microburst it could crash," he said. "But I was told that there was no microburst that day."

Only two members of the crew, the captain of the plane and a flight attendant, remain in Toronto.

I guess the tires didn't burn in the ensuing fire.

From AFP
...Air France chief executive Jean-Cyril Spinetta said the captain was "in excellent physical condition" after visiting him in hospital Thursday, but added the crash may have left some crew and passengers psychologically traumatized.

....Passengers Carla Sbrugnera and her husband Enrico Giacomuzzi Moore suffered the worst injuries in the crash -- she fractured three vertebrae and he fractured one, doctors said.

....The couple were sitting in the first row in first class at the front of the plane when it fell into a gully. Giacomuzzi Moore put his head between his legs and his knee was thrown up and broke his nose, Knipping said.

The couple were still able to exit the aircraft on their own, but Sbrugnera hit other passengers crowded at the bottom of the chute during her escape, he said.

Indeed, it is even more remarkable that passengers and crew were able to safely evacuate the plane so quickly with so many non-functioning exits.

On American television, there were interviews with a civilian who, with a friend, rushed to the plane after the crash. These two individuals managed to hoist themselves into the cabin and apparently did a sweep down both aisles from back to front to be sure everybody was out. If this happened as described, this may suggest a longer time interval before the post-crash fire took hold.

[edited to remove comment on a post by vfenext re: Airbus-Boeing which was subsequently deleted.]

[Longtimer]

Sun, August 7, 2005
Crew of doomed flight returns home
By VERONICA HENRI, Sun Media


Aboard Air France flight 359 -- Peering through the tiny oval windows, crew members tried for one last glimpse of the burned wreckage they walked away from on Tuesday.

They were on their way home to Paris Friday night, the wreckage of Flight 358 still the focus of a meticulous investigation, but their ordeal in Toronto was over.

They sipped champagne and relaxed in luxurious leather seats while scoping out the scene below as they rapidly ascended into the sky.

The crew talked in French about "sadness" and "losing barometric pressure" as they got their last -- and possibly first -- glimpse since amazingly walking away from the crash landing at the end of Runway 24L.

A matronly woman, wearing a conservative skirt and printed blouse, moved from crew member to crew member, looking them in the eyes, and comforting and consoling them throughout the flight.

Wearing their street clothes so they looked like any other passenger, they laughed and used their cellphones to take pictures of each other before getting down to business of filling out endless forms on Air France letterhead.

But afterwards, there was plenty of time to relax on the way home.

They ate meals of duck foie gras terrine, Camembert cheese with baguettes and filet de boeuf as they watched movies on personal screens while sipping wine.

Their uniformed co-workers attended to their every need, often indulging in long conversations, sitting by their sides -- just as they had done to passengers on the flight to Toronto days ago.

After a nap, one male crew member opened the French newspaper Le Parisien.

The headlines read: "Crash de Toronto. Polemique sur l'ouverture de l'aeroport" roughly translated as: Toronto crash: The debate on opening the airport.

A half hour from Paris preparations began for their arrival at Charles de Gaulle airport.

As the gates opened, security forces in bright green jackets filled the plane's exit ramp.

All regular passengers would disembark before Air France's precious cargo -- the crew members of Flight 358 -- were released.

They did not leave with the others. Holding passports in one hand and luggage in the other, they would not be released to face awaiting TV crews, photographers and reporters outside the gate.

Instead, they slipped quietly and unnoticed down a metal stairway directly from the plane to the tarmac, where a bus carried them on the last leg of their journey -- off to waiting families and colleagues who would hail them as heroes, while investigators continue to search for the answers to what happened on that fateful flight to Toronto

[wallabie]

Now folks, how can anyone expect in his own mind that all doors will be operational after such a shock ?? The fuselage as twited and broken as it is I think it a marvel that everyone walked out alive under the circumstances. Forget Airbus / Boeing, it's just a broken airplane twisted and broken in 2 pieces to think that Boeing would have ended up any better is a farce.
By the way, did anyone on this thread praise the cabin crew for their action ?? Cuz at the end of the day, they're the one who did right.

I can't believe the amount of mumbo jumbo and hilarious speculations I have been reading on this site. Like my doctor says, there is always a 99 % chance that the most obvious turns out to be the truth.
Me, I'm just patiently waiting for Mr levasseur statement once he's read the black boxes report. I can already see canadian lawyers druling over it. Like a Xmas present on their practice's doorstep and work for years to come.

[woodpecker]

Now folks, how can anyone expect in his own mind that all doors will be operational after such a shock ?? The fuselage as twited and broken as it is

Hold on a minute wally, stick to the facts. The pictures show two of the exits with the doors fully open but no slides, just passengers jumping. I could understand where you were coming from if the doors had not opened with the fuselage "twited and broken" as you put it, but they were open and the slides had not deployed.

Have a look at the photos Wally. Most of your posts are confrontational, but what more you we expect from a French flying Australian... you have just been included in my "Ignore list".

[16 blades]

only four of the aircraft's eight doors and emergency exits were used to escape the burning jetliner

Kind of proves the worth of the Certification evacuation tests, doesn't it?

16B

[wallabie]

Ouch ! Woddie

So be it; I'll cosily nest in your ignore list; feel comfy already.
Let me then transmit blind from my limbo:
Has it occured to you that the cabin crew, given the proximity of the ground, might have disarmed the chute ?? dunno but what would the exit have looked like with an almost horizontal looking chute ? It could almost have looked like a beach party with people hopping out and about on a trampolino !
Only throwing my 2 pence in.

[jabird]

Hopefully we can leave the Airbus / Boeing and France / UK stuff out of the way and get back to the facts.

I am still trying to work out how two members of the public would have been casually wondering around the crash site. Is this ravine not still within the boundaries of the airport, or am I missing something?

[threemiles]

Scroll up and you will find the two had driven on the airport road inside the fence, so supposingly emplyoees of something on the field.

[shortm]

To comment on Wallabie's query as to whether the cabin crew may have disarmed the doors, I have to say it is highly unlikely. In 8 years as crew, including operating on the A340, the only occassion when we would possibly put a door into manual is in a ditching (and then only certain doors etc).

Having been down to the hangar to blow slides for a C-check on a 737 I can confirm of the 2 doors we opened only 1 slide actually blew. Doesn't suprise me at all that a slide might not blow following an incident such as this.

[Byrna]

I agree with wallabie. Even in everyday political or current events news, the media leaves out so much information-obvious information which should be answered - when they present their so-called "news" that it would be a waste of everyone's time to assume that all the "hoopla" we are hearing from the "news" is either accurate or complete.

These "journalists", whose jobs are supposed to present as complete a picture of the facts as possible, without speculation on complete unknowns like we are facing at this stage of the Air France crash, basically just do this to make money and hardly ever inform anyone of anything. Even these "news analyses" or "detailed" reports are a farce.

So, such a technical and precise matter as an A340 crash is completely beyond the mass media's ability to report or, for that matter, comprehend, without any bias or accuracy in my opinion.

Let's just wait for the true professionals to examine the black boxes and other physical evidence and report back before speculating on open and closed doors, shall we? At least with them, even if they may have their own imperfections, we can be MORE sure of the facts than any jibberish reported by the media.

John

[lomapaseo]

stick to the facts. The pictures show two of the exits with the doors fully open but no slides, just passengers jumping. I could understand where you were coming from if the doors had not opened with the fuselage "twited and broken" as you put it, but they were open and the slides had not deployed.

Facts:confused:

What we have to look at and hear is evidence. For the armchair analysts here the facts do require experience and/or analysis and typically follow an investigation looking at all possibilities.

My cursory review of the photos seem to show that chutes are visible under the open doors although by the time the photos were taken the all the chutes appeared deflated.

So as armchair analysts are we to assume that these visible chutes were not deployed, deployed but unusable, or deployed and usable for a period of time. Thankfully the chute designer and other experts are available to examine this evidence for us and to provide facts via the Safety Board.

[SaturnV]

lomapaseo, from AFP today:

Real Levasseur, the lead investigator for the Canadian transportation safety agency, told reporters that because fire had broken out, just four of eight emergency exits were opened to evacuate the plane.

Out of the four, he added, only two had functioning chutes upon which the passengers could slide down to the ground. Passengers fleeing from the other two exits were forced to leap two metres (six feet) to the ground, resulting in a number of slight injuries.

If one prefers the description en francais, the following is from Liberation.

TORONTO - ....Deux toboggans de l'Airbus d'Air France sorti de piste mardi à Toronto ont mal fonctionné, ont déclaré samedi les enquêteurs, ajoutant qu'ils examinent les traces de pneus pour déterminer pourquoi l'avion a dérapé en fin de piste.

....Ils ont précisé que quatre des portes et des sorties de secours de l'appareil avaient été utilisées pendant l'évacuation d'urgence et que des experts - notamment de Goodrich Corp., fabricant des toboggans - avaient été convoqués pour déterminer pourquoi deux d'entre eux ont mal fonctionné et pourquoi une porte a été difficile à ouvrir.

"Ils sont actuellement sur le site avec l'équipe et ils tentent de voir pourquoi ces toboggans et (la porte) n'ont pas bien fonctionné", a dit Réal Levasseur, du Bureau de sécurité des transports du Canada.

jabird:
The civilians apparently came from the motorway adjacent to the ravine. It is very close. Some passengers also quickly reached this motorway, and were picked up by vehicles that had stopped.

[RatherBeFlying]

Listened in by phone -- caveat poor sound quality Doors 3L - 4L not opened because fire immediately outside. 2L came open by itself while a/c bouncing down slope. 3R had no slide, CC closed it because sharp objects in vicinity. Rwy will be returned to service after studies on skid marks completed. Extinguisher and oxy bottles need to be removed before safe to remove wreckage with backhoes etc. FDR shows touchdown at Vref 143 kt. in quartering tailwind 4000' approx down runway. 5000' remaining sufficient for dry, but not wet. Exited rwy at 79 kt. Question asked about poor deceleration [64 kt. over 5000' ] -- TSB will investigate. PIC interviewed Saturday; confidentiality requirements prevent disclosure.Looks like a very well done for CC:ok:

[EDDNHopper]

The number of poor laymen´s comments and unprofessional and/or unfounded, merely speculative posts in this thread seems to have reached a new all-time high at PPRuNe. The constant quoting of equally ill-informed media sources does not help either...

I have rarely read so much obvious rubbish, except in the Jetblast section of the bulletin board. Gone are the days where professionals discussed rumours and news, and all others just took notice, and learned. :sad:

[BahrainLad]

2L came open by itself while a/c bouncing down slope.

In the interests of teaching this lowly SLF, could anyone with expertise comment?

[innuendo]

From RBF:

FDR shows touchdown at Vref 143 kt. in quartering tailwind 4000' approx down runway. 5000' remaining sufficient for dry, but not wet.
Exited rwy at 79 kt.

"Question asked about poor deceleration [64 kt. over 5000' ] -- TSB will investigate."


Good question, wonder how you would make out rejecting close to V1 at max weight for the conditions if that is all the deceleration available?
Sounds like the investigators still have a lot of work to do.

[Capt.KAOS]

"TORONTO, Aug 7 (AFP) - The Air France Airbus jet which crash landed at Toronto's airport touched down too far along the rain-soaked runway to stop in time before overshooting and bursting into flames in a ravine, a senior investigator said Sunday.
"I am pretty convinced that there was no way that the aircraft was going to be able to stop before the end with the runway condition that we had, the water on the runway, and the braking action which was poor," Canadian Transportation Safety Board lead investigator Real Levasseur told reporters Sunday.
"My preliminary estimate is that there was no way this airplane could have stopped before the end" of the runway, he stressed.
Levasseur is leading the probe into Tuesday's crash landing of the Air France jet during a violent thunder storm.
All 12 crew and the flight's 297 passengers survived the near disaster.
The plane touched down about 4,000 feet (1,219 meters) along the runway -- close to midway -- leaving the co-pilot, who was in control of the jet, only 5,000 feet (1,524 meters) to bring the jet to a halt, Levasseur said.
Under normal conditions, this type of aircraft could have stopped in time, he said.
It was traveling "fairly close" to the correct landing speed -- at 148 knots instead of the typical 140 knots -- pushed along by a slight tailwind, he said.
But, because the runway was slick due to rain, the brakes were less effective and it took longer to decelerate, Levasseur said. Investigators will conduct simulations to confirm this, he added.
By the time it reached the end of the runway, the plane had only slowed to 79 knots before skidding off into a ravine.
Levasseur said investigators must now determine why the aircraft overshot the runway during landing."

Seems my poor laymen´s comments and unprofessional and/or unfounded, merely speculative post (http://pprune.com/forums/showthread.php?threadid=184428&perpage=15&pagenumber=14) 5 days ago wasn't that far from the truth... :hmm:

[16 blades]

Just out of interest, what are the usual mainwheel tyre pressures on the A346? I only ask this because I recall from groundschool many years ago a way to work out an aquaplaning speed from tyre pressure - I think it's 8.7xsqrt P where P is the tyre pressure. I'm not sure of the input or output units for this formula, though. It may be of some interest, it may not.

Just a thought.

16B

[sky330]

8.7xsqrt P where P is the tyre pressure.

P is in psi in this very rough computation of aquaplaning speed.

A343, normal tyre pressure 200-220 psi

[16 blades]

Thanks, Sky. So...gives an aquaplane speed of 123-129kts. (presuming the formula's output is in knots)

A possibility, then? Again, just an (unqualified) thought (I'm a C-130 driver).

Just wondering HOW short the (alleged) remaining 5000ft would've been on LDR for the conditions. Obviously AUM would have to be 'estimated'.

16B

[Rockhound]

Judging from today's press briefing by the TSB, as reported on this thread by Rather B Flying and Capt. KAOS, we are now reasonably sure what happened but exactly why it did is still to be determined.
We Canadians should not lose sight of one highly significant happening in this whole chain of events. Mirabile dictu, for once, a Canadian government minister, a Liberal at that (Jean Lapierre, the transport minister) actually spoke the truth in public (when he announced, just hours after the accident, that he had been given to understand that the pilot landed long) [see my post of 3 Aug on p. 12 of this thread].
Rockhound :rolleyes:

[McGinty]

Regarding the earlier comments about the one (or two??) members of the public who claim to have entered the fuselage of the plane after it crashed, it seems that they claim to have come from the highway, and not from inside the airfield perimeter.

Having heard one of them interviewed on CBC Newsworld, I personally have suspicions about the validity of their claims.

[ExSimGuy]

Interesting point raised a couple of pages back, about possible plans to increase the over-run area at the end of the runway and fill the ravine.

Now I know it's not a great way of stopping an aircraft, but the ravine did stop the Airbus from carrying straight on across a crowded highway.

If the runway over-run area had been extended across the ravine, wouldn't it have been very likely that the aircraft would have gone straight onto the highway, impacting several cars filled with that old-fashioned, dangerous, avaiation fuel called PETROL, resulting in an almost instant inferno in which possibly all pax and crew, as well as a number of car drivers, would have been incinerated?

Just maybe the ravine did everyone (apart from the Airbus hull) a favour???

Is a runway extension designed for over-run constructed specially in some way to add retarding factors into its surface? (like the gravel "escapes" used to help runaway trucks on steep highway hills?)

(I'll just add my "well done" to the crew for the life-saving evac. You're trained for it, but everyone hopes you'll only ever have to serve coffee and tea. Would have lost a lot of souls if the evac had been slower)

[Stick Flying]

With regards aquaplaning speeds, bear in mind these numbers are not to be used in a scientific manner. Merely guidance.

But also to note, these 8.7 times figures (i.e. 9 times as the rough guide) are for a wheel that is already rotating. These speeds can be reduced to, in some cases, around 7.5 times for a stationary wheel. Hence the recommended Boeing technique on a wet/contaminated runway is for a firm touchdown to help increase the friction required to spin the wheel up (also the excuse I use on dry runways for my landings. "Sorry girls, Boeing recommended landing"..... :-) ).

[Doors to Automatic]

If the aircraft only decellerated from 148kts to 79kts in the 5000ft available (69kts speed loss = 13.8kts per 1000ft) then surely it would have still overran if it had landed 3000ft earlier at the correct point?

[catchup]

Good point, assuming an equal deceleration rate. ......

Seems like some heavy work for the investigators.

regards

[DingerX]

Actually, assuming an equal deceleration rate, it would require less runway.

consider: a vehicle decelarating from 200 m/s to 0 m/s at 10 m/s (roughly one G) decelaration.

In twenty seconds, it will stop, having travelled 2000 meters.

After ten seconds it will be going 100 m/s and have covered 1500 meters (average speed 150 m/s)

In ten more seconds, it have stopped. In the last ten seconds, it travels 500 meters.


So, in the example given, assuming an equal decelaration rate (which is probably not the case, since wheels tend to skid and hydroplane at higher speeds), it would need something like 1500 more feet.

[Capt Pit Bull]

If the aircraft only decellerated from 148kts to 79kts in the 5000ft available (69kts speed loss = 13.8kts per 1000ft) then surely it would have still overran if it had landed 3000ft earlier at the correct point?

Nope. Don't forget your basic physics - Kinetic Energy is a square law.

Touch Down 148 Kts.
Overrun at 79 kts.

Back of a fag packet type calculation, assuming contstant braking rate (a big assumption, but good enough for now...)

79^2 / 148^2 = .284

i.e. the a/c had 0.284 of its Kinetic Energy left, or had got rid of .716 of it in 5,000 feet.

5000 / .716 = about 7,000 feet, so it needed about 2,000 feet more.

CPB

[spannerless]

UPDATED REPORT:

Both the BBC & ATI (Source of this article) are reporting the same thing so it seems possibly my concerns and fears may possibly be vidicated after all??

Early days yet!

Yes my congrates to the crew on getting everyone off safely however I hope the flight crew have updated their CV's to not including airline pilot!

ATI's Breaking Industry News Article
Crashed Air France A340 touched down halfway along runway (London)
Air Transport Intelligence news
David Kaminski-Morrow
Sun, 07 Aug 05 21:19:30 GMT
Initial flight-data recorder information has revealed that the Air France Airbus A340-300 destroyed last week after an overrun at Toronto Pearson airport had touched down nearly halfway along the runway.
Canada's Transportation Safety Board says that preliminary information indicates that the A340 landed some 4,000ft (1,220m) from the threshold of the 9,500ft runway 24L.
Chief investigator Real Levasseur, speaking today at a press conference, said given the wet conditions during the landing it would have been virtually impossible to stop the aircraft in the short space available.
"We're talking about nearly halfway down the runway [before the jet touched down]," said Levasseur. "Under those [wet-weather] conditions I'm pretty convinced that there's no way that the aircraft was going to be able to stop before the end of the runway."
He adds that the aircraft had touched down at around 148kts, slightly above the normal landing speed, probably owing to a slight tail-wind. The latest information showed the aircraft was travelling at 79kts when it left the runway.
"The pilots were fairly close to the speed that they should have been [at touchdown]," says Levasseur.
All 309 passengers and crew escaped the 2 August accident which occurred after the aircraft, arriving from Paris as flight 358, attempted to land during a thunderstorm.
After the aircraft came to rest in a ravine at the end of runway 24L, only four of the eight exit doors were used for the evacuation.
Levasseur says that the two left side aft doors - L3 and L4 - were never opened because cabin crew members considered the fire risk at these exits was too high.
"Flight attendants never opened [doors L3 and L4]," says Levasseur. "When they looked outside they saw fire on that side of the aircraft."
Door R3, behind the wing on the right side, was opened but the evacuation slide failed to deploy properly. A flight attendant also noticed a number of "sharp obstacles", says Levasseur, and opted to close the door again rather than use it for evacuation.
A fourth door - L2, just in front of the wing on the left side - popped open as the aircraft's fuselage suffered stresses during the overrun into the ravine. Some passengers left the aircraft through this exit.


:\

[Konkordski]

The number of poor laymen´s comments and unprofessional and/or unfounded, merely speculative posts in this thread seems to have reached a new all-time high at PPRuNe. The constant quoting of equally ill-informed media sources does not help either...


I agree - but since PPRuNe has become a parody of itself, it's now subject to the same criticism which the media have had to (often unfairly) put up with from certain contributors to this forum.

Personally I'm not disappointed - this forum long ago became just a playground for immature schoolboy comments from people who simply spout generalised anti-media and anti-journalistic venom with the sort of unfounded, biased and ill-informed fundamentalism which wouldn't look out of place coming from certain radical clerics.

The more that PPRuNe's genuine, fair and reasonable contributors become engulfed and swamped by the speculative rantings of those who just want to slag off other professionals, the more likely it is that readers will turn away from PPRuNe and towards the aviation press in order to find authoritative, non-sensational information - without the amateurish cr@p.

[Doors to Automatic]

Capt Pit Bull & DingerX - thanks for the explanation - It did cross my mind that it wasn't a linear relationship but good to get some actual numbers.

The worrying thing is that had the aircarft landed well within the 3,000ft touchdown zone (say 2,400ft in) it would have still gone off the end.

[Wee Weasley Welshman]

Doubt it. Anyone reading this thread can learn that the aircraft landed by the FO Deep on a very wet runway with a tailwind. Furthermore we have some figures and reasonable suppositions about braking distance required vs available.

As always you have to wait for the report. But this thread has far more content than I can read today in Flight or any other magazine or press article.

PPRuNe - its not as good as it was from day two. ;)


Cheers

WWW

[RatherBeFlying]

I suspect the deceleration will break down into a number of performance phases.

The major division will be between wheels sliding over water and wheels with grip on pavement. Friction coefficients may not be constant in either case.

Antiskid effects once pavement grip was obtained requires elucidation.

There may be an intermediate phase where the rear axles were on pavement while some of the fronts were not. What kind of braking modulation between axles is available in that case and would the couple tend to lift the rear axle?

Superimposed over that will be reverse and spoiler effects -- a big question being just how much of either was applied in the cockpit and obtained from the machinery.

[jabird]

Still very confused about where these "bystanders" or others may have come in. Is there a detailed boundary map anywhere? Either the a/c landed within the perimeter fence, in which case it should have been tricky for anyone to cut through it in either direction, or it crashed (sorry, can't find better word) through it.

I'm very interested in the discussion about over-runs, and have started a new thread (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=185116) in airports, airlines and routes (hope that's right place), to cover whether these should be applied to all busy airports, not just YYZ?

And lawyers may also be "fellow professionals", but this $62m compensation claim seems a little far fetched. As commented on earlier, it seems almost "cheaper" to have fatalities in these accidents.

Can I now sue this law firm for the stress that I, and millions of other passengers, may now have to experience every time our planes might now get diverted because of a few drops of rain falling on the runway surface?

Can those other 308 passengers and crew, who are presumably extremely grateful to be both alive and uninjured, also sue this law firm for the trauma that they must now suffer by having to potentially replay these events over and over again, presumably under cross examination in a court room?

[cavoknosig]

one of those "bystanders" name is guy ledez, works for a company that rents out cars to the airport / airside and was handed from one tv station to the next after the crash... sounds pretty unbelievable but apparently confirmed by several accounts.

http://fullcoverage.yahoo.com/s/ap/20050804/ap_on_re_ca/canada_plane_crash_hero

kind regards

[lomapaseo]

The more that PPRuNe's genuine, fair and reasonable contributors become engulfed and swamped by the speculative rantings of those who just want to slag off other professionals, the more likely it is that readers will turn away from PPRuNe and towards the aviation press in order to find authoritative, non-sensational information - without the amateurish cr@p.

Not really, the curious among us know that there is no way the press will have more than pure speculative talking heads in the first days follwing an accident. While by reading PPRune you will at least have a chance to sort out some good ideas and investigative considerations from the amatures wanting to be first to guess at the probable cause.

[Konkordski]

Not really, the curious among us know that there is no way the press will have more than pure speculative talking heads in the first days follwing an accident.



That's why I said the "aviation press", not the mass media - who, granted, tend to go overboard with speculation.

[yggorf]

The plot thickens:

"Ledez and the other man met up with the pilot and other passengers and ran to safety by Highway 401, Canada's busiest freeway, where they were met by emergency officials."

OK, maybe Ledez was originally on the service road, but apparently, he, the pilot and other passengers managed to get to Canada's busiest freeway.

So... where was the fence?

[Doors to Automatic]

Mangled in the undercarriage of the aircraft I suspect.

[Plastique]

The word within Airbus suggests that the cause of the event was the knob on the end of the sidestick.

[wideman]

If the rain had just moved in, the runway surface could well have been more oily than wet.

The top part of pavement is full of petroleum-based products, mostly microscopic bits of tyres. When it first rains after a dry spell, those oily bits of petroleum float on the surface of the just-fallen rain, and that is when a paved surface is the most slippery. This is particularly true on those areas where the tyres are accelerating, decelerating, or turning (because thet's where they shed the most rubber). After it has been raining for a few minutes, the water/oil ratio grows large enough to eliminate the oil surface, and it's just a question of a wet surface.

[greek-freak]

Somebody already mentioned it in this thread. The Lufthansa A321 runway overrun in Poland comes to mind considering the circumstances. Approach in rain and relatively strong and gusty winds, touched down pretty late and pretty fast.
Does anybody have the accident report on this, since I do not remember the details.
The only thing I remember is that either thrust-reversers or breaks or both could not be used for a critical perioed of time since with flap setting three (which was used for landing) a necessary precondition for their usage was not fullfilled (not enough weight on the main landing gear if I am not mistaken).

Anyway, would be grateful if somebody could find the report.

[ACL1011]

Report on the Accident to Airbus A320-211 Aircraft in Warsaw (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/ComAndRep/Warsaw/warsaw-report.html)

[cormacshaw]

Now I know it's not a great way of stopping an aircraft, but the ravine did stop the Airbus from carrying straight on across a crowded highway.
No it didn't. As has been pointed out before on this thread, the highway runs almost parallel to the runway. The extended centreline of the runway does not intersect the highway until about 1km away. No over-running airliner is going to plough on that far. ( Overhead picture (http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=43.672962,-79.616203&spn=0.031376,0.050554&t=k&hl=en) )

[greek-freak]

Thanks ACL1011 that helped refresh my memory.

Quote from the report.

"The aircraft automatics comprises, for basic landing configuration if the
aircraft (i.e. with flaps extended to FULL position), the programme which
subjects actuation of all braking devices to some specific conditions. Ground
spoilers, when selected, will extend provided that either shock absorbers are
compressed at both main landing gears (the minimum load to compress one
shock absorber being 6300 kgs), or wheel speed are above 72 kts at both main
landing gears. Engine reversers, when selected, will deploy provided that
shock absorbers are compressed at both main landing gears.
Such a logics result in the lack of possibility of immediate actuation of two
mentioned above aircraft's braking devices without meeting the conditions
described."

Does anybody know if this sytem design has been changed in newer Airbus acft.

I think following this accident Airbus and LH agreed to change the landing gears of the 320s. The new type apparently required reduced load on the shock absorbers, if my memory serves me right.

[PAXboy]

ExSimGuyNow I know it's not a great way of stopping an aircraft, but the ravine did stop the Airbus from carrying straight on across a crowded highway. If you read through the thread, this was discussed in some detail. Both from the point of view of the extended centre line and that if the ravine was covered by a bridge, then that could support an overrun speed reduction system. Links to one manufacturer were posted.

[Tree]

To: greek-freak

From the report (aircraft landed in config full):

" B. Aircraft
1 The aircraft was serviceable and all it's basic documents were up-to-date and valid.
2 The aircraft was loaded within it's operational limits.
3 The aircraft automatics comprises, for basic landing configuration if the
aircraft (i.e. with flaps extended to FULL position), the programme which
subjects actuation of all braking devices to some specific conditions. Ground
spoilers, when selected, will extend provided that either shock absorbers are
compressed at both main landing gears (the minimum load to compress one
shock absorber being 6300 kgs), or wheel speed are above 72 kts at both main
landing gears. Engine reversers, when selected, will deploy provided that
shock absorbers are compressed at both main landing gears.
Such a logics result in the lack of possibility of immediate actuation of two
mentioned above aircraft's braking devices without meeting the conditions
described.
4 In emergency, the crew is unable to override the lock-out and to operate
ground spoilers and engine thrust reversers. "

and

" 4.2 For A320 aircraft manufacturer

4.2.1 Possibility should be analysed to introduce the emergency use of ground spoilers and thrust reversers independently of meeting the criteria imposed by aircraft logics.

4.2.2 The possibility should be considered to modify the thrust reverser system to enable use of more than 71% N1 in the emergency. "

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I believe that in config full manually selecting spoilers on landing will have no effect but in config 3 there will be extension of the flight spoilers.

Caveat emptor.

[yyzbuff]

I have looked at YYZ site maps, and as far as I can tell (some of the maps are a little hard to interpret), the aircraft would have crossed unpaved ground, then the 'South Service Road', then the primary security line fence, then more open ground, then the public road leading to the Infield Cargo Area (and Control Tower and other facilities), then stopped in the ravine.

There would be about 250 m of cross-country travel (i.e., 250 m if the ground were level) required to cross the distance between the freeway (Highway 401) and the crash site, and yes, there should be a chain-link fence at the edge of the airport property -- but this would be a 'non-security fence'. The public road inside the airport property would have been much closer, but would have much less traffic than the 401.

I suppose those people who did cross that outer fence got over it or through it the usual way -- they climbed it. I emphasize again that this would not have been the primary security line fence, since it was separating the highway right-of-way from a publicly-accessible portion of the airport property, so this may not have been too difficult for the physically-fit and adrenaline-charged.

[wallabie]

Could anyone check out this very complicated piece of arithmetic :

2500m-1200m=1500m

How can anyone in his own mind hope to stop a large aircraft on a wet runway with that little concrete left ahead ??
The aircraft was working fine. You put the sucker down on the mark or go around. End of story.

[dicksynormous]

Maybe a good juicy boeing arrival would have helped dissipate the remaining 79 kts and not one of those gay french touchy feely touchdowns that the big airbusses seem to do. Just a thought, and maybe not as daft as it sounds. Other wise no excuse really , probably an ego issue when all is said and one.

[cavortingcheetah]

:) wallabie, old jumper.
That's what you HAD to do at LCY and there could be some really weird winds around those tall buildings.
regards from Absinthium.:ooh:

[ExSimGuy]

Thanks for the update. I frequently have to sufer a p1ss-poor internet connection (would you believe 16.8kb/s with frequent disconnexts!) so with nearly 30 pages I missed that.

When I get a bit of time free at the office I'll look through to find that info,

Cheers

[PAXboy]

Not at all ESG!! VERY sorry to hear about your Net connection.

To recap: it was related that the ravine was still open because environmentalists had required it, even after the last a/c to go into it. Links to that report and pics were posted.

The link to Engineered Materials Arresting System (http://4jda.aero/mall/emas.asp) was posted but no airport would reduce the length of it's available runway to provide such a space. It was moi who then suggested that the ravine could be bridged to maintain it for whatever silly creatures want to live in in and then the EMAS could go across the top.

Overall, the thread gets more interesting from about Page 17 or 18!

[atakacs]

Could anyone check out this very complicated piece of arithmetic :

2500m-1200m=1500m


Just wondering... what kind of space would be required to get airborne again assuming the PIC selects full throtle just after touchdown ? I guess that a 340 should have quite some inertia ? And is this part of SOP ?!

:)


4 In emergency, the crew is unable to override the lock-out and to operate
ground spoilers and engine thrust reversers.

Does it apply to the 340 ? And did Airbus issue a fix for the 320 ?

alex

[Farmer 1]

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Could anyone check out this very complicated piece of arithmetic :

2500m-1200m=1500m

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Could that be why they crashed?

[S2A Pictures]

According to TF1 (French National broadcaster);

- 8th August 2005 -

"the aircraft landed long ... too long to stop before the tarmac ran out ..."

No prizes to all of you clever people who got that right ...

... just imagine the red faces ... thank whichever God you follow, there were no serious injuries ...

[barit1]

Has anyone brought up the subject of ISO 9001 at YYZ? What traction / braking action reporting is available to crews?

[dawgweed]

Maybe this view is better. The a/c didn't quite make it to the ravine. The fence in question would be parallel to, and left of the fuselage.

http://www.yyznews.com/YYZ03AugAFcrashscene5sv.jpg

[RatherBeFlying]

Again caveat phone quality. Transport Canada reviewing standards and emerging technologies (high density foam, arresting beds) to minimise damage/injuries in case of overrun Height above Threshold 50-100' Threshold a/s 146 kt; gs 164kt a/s at touchdown 148kt. engines good; idled at threshold; wheels down max reverse selected and obtained brake pressure to 3000 psi at td spoilers came up exactly as designed and supposed to TSB requesting pictures from pax or people on highway immediately after crash to research initial fire outbreak -- send to [email protected] or is it [email protected] ??? mid to end .07% down slope No attempt to go around was made after touchdown

I'm beginning to think AF358 got a big push from Thor. Assuming a 50' TCH lands you 1000' down the rwy, the maximum extra 50' would put you an extra 1000' down, but they were pushed an extra 3000' down and once down had :mad: for deceleration in spite of spoilers and full reverse. Earlier I was thinking the downburst would give them a headwind, but now it looks more like the inflow before the downburst.

[atakacs]

# Threshold a/s 146 kt; gs 164kt
# a/s at touchdown 148kt.
Any idea of gs at touchdown ?! Can we assume the 20kt tailwind component as more or less constant ?

[aardvark2zz]

I found this interesting read !! Also, Tables 1 and 2 about brake friction reduction. Montreal Runway Excursion, Royal Air Maroc, Boeing 747

.....The test report for November 1999 indicates that the surface of runway 06L/24R had a poor texture and low friction starting about 3 300 feet east of the threshold of runway 06L, near the intersection of taxiway B2, and worsening in the touchdown area between 1 300 and 2 600 feet from the threshold of runway 24R. The test results for May 2000 exceeded the standard prescribed in TP312; the report notes, however, that these tests were conducted after a period of cold and rainy weather, which made for optimum runway surface conditions. According to the report, the average coefficient for the full runway and the coefficient for any 100-metre section degrade as summer approaches. The test results for 16 June 2000 and 21 July 2000 indicate friction coefficients requiring that remedial maintenance action be planned. The 21 July 2000 test results for the other two runways indicated average friction coefficients of 74 for runway 06R/24L and 82 for runway 10/28. These coefficients are 30 per cent and 43 per cent higher, respectively, than for runway 06L/24R......

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/2000/a00q0094/a00q0094.asp

[MilkyWay]

Thanks for the updates RatherBeFlying !

Assuming that the gs from threshold to touchdown was an average of 160 kts and touchdown happened 1200 meters after threshold, it means that the A340 flew over the runway for 15 seconds before touching down !!! Things did not happen in a couple of seconds...

[aardvark2zz]

It is interesting to see the coefficient of friction go down that much ... I wonder if the TSB was effective in communicating with its airports ??

Table 2 Results of Friction Coefficient Tests

57% - Average friction coefficient of full runway
34% - Lowest friction coefficient recorded for any individual 100-metre section

21 July 2000 Test date (Montreal)

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/2000/a00q0094/a00q0094.asp

[Ranger One]

greek-freak:

Does anybody know if this sytem design has been changed in newer Airbus acft.

If you look back to page 19 of this thread, you'll find that Pegasus77 posted a detailed description of the 340-300 autospoiler logic parameters in response to my earlier question.

R1

[atakacs]

If you look back to page 19 of this thread, you'll find that Pegasus77 posted a detailed description of the 340-300 autospoiler logic parameters in response to my earlier question.

Indeed.

But - unless I missed something - there is no mention of manual override should it be called by the crew.

I'm probably completely ignorant but some sort of "max deceleration panic button" (automatically providing the most aggressive settings of anti skid, spoiler and reverser, at the possible expense of their durability) would seem to be a useful option in cases such as this.

[PAXboy]

atakacs But - unless I missed something - there is no mention of manual override should it be called by the crew.
As I recall, one post did state categorically that the flight deck CANNOT override the defaults to obtain breaking unless the OLEOs are depressed. However, a later post reports the TSB as stating (for this flight) that full reverse was requested and obtained. If this is not the answer to your question, please ignore!)

[fireflybob]

It's one thing to say the landing was "long" but quite another to establish why?

18 kts of tailwind is a lot to start off with and we should perhaps bear in mind that, broadly speaking, if you double the touchdown speed you quadruple the landing distance required (ie its a speed squared law due to kinetic energy).

Nobody has mentioned (potentially misleading) visual cues when landing in severe precipitation. I believe that heavy rain on the windscreen can change the refractive index significantly. For this and perhaps other reasons the tendency is to flare high in these conditions which additionally might lead to excessive float prior to touchdown.

Does anybody know the experience levels of the flight deck crew on type and total etc?

[armada]

No surprise that distance emerges as the key issue. :mad:


After a day of being saturated with the news, I posted:


armada
Instead of being 'just another number' I could order a Personal Title and help support PPRuNe
posted 5th August 2005 03:04
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

broadreach: fine, but the first question to be asked must be WHERE on the runway (distance) did they touch down?

That key variable will put all these other variables into perspective: speed, weather, aircraft performance, etc., to be properly compared with SOP etc.




/ends rant. :rolleyes:



An interesting tidbit:


http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19820525-0

"PROBABLE CAUSE: The pilot's misuse of rain repellent, causing an optical illusion"

[cringe]

Does anybody know the experience levels of the flight deck crew on type and total etc?Captain (aged 57): 15000 hours total, 1800 on A340
Co-pilot (43): 10700 hours total, 2500 on type

[Ignition Override]

Although I am NOT suggesting that it was a crew mistake to attempt the approach and landing, there was a tragedy in an MD-82 years ago at Little Rock, where the Captain (who died) was a Chicago Chief Pilot and the FO was on probation (in his first year at the airline). As many of you know, the Captain and some pax died. Thunderstorms were all around the airport, and I doubt that either pilot verbalized the option of just avoiding the destination and waiting a short while nearby-but I can not remember. Their fuel status might have been a factor, and their long duty certainly was a factor.

Men, maybe more than women, find it hard to admit that they find a situation makes them uncomfortable, or factors are outside their "personal limits" and might be competitive with each other, wanting to face a challenge, i.e. a very gusty crosswind with heavy rain very close to the airport.

Again, I have no idea about the c0ckp1t options discussed before the Toronto accident, or whether the FO even stated the possibility of avoiding the airport for a while. But weather can change very fast, to the extent that none of us can realistically guess.:ugh:

[Rumet]

RatherBeFlying,

great info.

If AF358 got this "big push", then its airspeed would have decreased. But it actually increased by 2 knots between threshold and touchdown point (although we do not know how it may have fluctuated in between).

So if there was an increase in tailwind after the threshold, thrust must have been increased for the increase in airspeed to happen. But according to the TSB briefing, engines were idled at the threshold.

So, assuming thrust remained at idle after the threshold (not explicitly said in the TSB briefing ?), 148 knots at touchdown point is not consistent with an increased tailwind all along the 1st 4000 ft of the runway.

What do you think ?

[RatherBeFlying]

Rumet,

I got to the "big push" by elimination since if the engines were idled at threshold on an assumed stablised approach at Vref, what else would extend the touchdown 3000'?

Another poster pointed out that the time from THR to TD (4000') would be 15 seconds at a g/s of 160 kt.

That would make rod between 400 and 200 fpm given a TCH of 100-50'.

Contrast that to the normal rod on an ILS with a g/s of 160 kt. of some 850 fpm.

As to what happens to a/s as the tailwind increases in ground effect, we will have to wait for the FDR plot for that period.

[Rockhound]

In answer to Rumet's query - did the thrust remain at idle after the threshold? - today's Globe and Mail quotes the lead TSB investigator at Monday's briefing as follows: "I'm convinced there was no effort, no attempt was made to get the aircraft back up again. This crew came over the threshold with the idea to land that airplane and that's what they did". The story concludes: Flight 358 landed with only about 1500 m left on a slight down slope, with a modest tailwind and a very wet runway.
Rockhound

[Few Cloudy]

So after the euphoria of the textbook evacuation, we are finally, after quite a few pages, getting to the point of all this, which is as in all accidents, "why did it happen".

I challenge you to find an accident or incident where there have been flooded runways and gusting strong winds, where the crew hasn´t made a mistake. Either a mistake of judgement, or a mistake in handling or both.

It is, sadly just a matter of time before the fellows up front are going to be blamed.

And let´s be honest - we have all imagined how it would be, to cock up a landing and then have to change gear and order an evacuation. It is at times like that, that a good cabin crew and a good relationship with the cabin crew is worth its weight in gold.

As for the gulley - see Athens and the Swissair DC-8 overrun, in very similar circumstances - which would have been surviveable had the gulley not have been there and the ship caught fire. (Yes, it is still there).

[Avman]

As for the gulley - see Athens and the Swissair DC-8 overrun, in very similar circumstances - which would have been surviveable had the gulley not have been there and the ship caught fire. (Yes, it is still there).

:hmm: maybe, but that airport is no longer in use ;)

[yyzbuff]

Few Cloudy (quote)

I challenge you to find an accident or incident where there have been flooded runways and gusting strong winds, where the crew hasn´t made a mistake. Either a mistake of judgement, or a mistake in handling or both.

(end quote)

On the contrary -- there are thousands if not millions of 'incidents' where the plane lands (or takes off) safely in spite of lousy conditions. One might assume that the crew did everything right in those instances, and / or was lucky.

The insistence of some pilots that there must be some external cause for any aviation accident is certainly understandable. However, when all else is said and done, getting a plane down safely always comes down to the instinct and experience (judgment) and skill of the guy holding the yoke, even more so under crappy conditions. And I challenge YOU to find any profession involving judgment where nobody ever makes a mistake. There ain't one.

Pilots are in a nasty position -- when THEY make mistakes, people can die, and multi-million dollar vehicles can be destroyed. Plane crashes can happen when mechanical failures occur, or (yes) external factors like sudden extreme wind conditions, FOD, vehicle incursions, etc., create situations where no matter what the pilot does, he/she is screwed, but SOMETIMES, crashes ARE at least partly due to 'pilot error'. It is, however, an undeniable fact that aircraft manufacturers, airlines, airports, and government agencies all have a vested interest in making the 'little guy' in the cockpit take most if not all the blame ...

(Oddly enough, air traffic controllers -- who often end up on opposite sides of a blame-slinging exercise from pilots -- are in a similar position. Their mistakes can kill -- and the owners of the system that trains 'em, overworks 'em, and forces 'em to use outdated technology or new technology that is full of bugs are likely to say 'It's Joe Blow's fault -- our system is Just Fine.')

So ... the rush to Blame the Pilot is wrong. But the reflexive urge to Blame Anybody But the Pilot is also wrong.

[Few Cloudy]

yyz buff,

Slight misunderstanding of the syntax - I was talking about accidents and incidents - not the lucky guys who got away with pressing on in dangerous conditions - and certainly not about the "thousands or millions" who operate according to the book and with great skill in "lousy" weather, which is what we are paid to do.

Avman,

Gotcha! But let's just say the SR accident was in 1979 and ATH was still not fixed 20 years later. There are plenty of airports with hazards off the runway end ( the hill to the ex-Vauxhall car park in LTN - the sea off many coastal runways) but there are other fixeable ones too - like the stream in the gulley off 28 in ZRH etc.
It is more than annoying, that these don't get fixed.

[Mr Hankey]

It's now reported that the crew did not try a go around at any time.

" Jet probe rules out 'go around'
Réal Levasseur, the lead investigator of Air France's Flight 358 crash, said that pilots didn't attempt a "go around" before or just after touchdown.

The Airbus 340 landed nearly a kilometre too far down the runway.

So far the investigation has found nothing mechanically wrong with the aircraft too."

(from Radar Vectors)

[MarkD]

There are plenty of airports with pretty much zero options after an overshoot - somewhere like Madeira or an undershoot - like St. Maarten!

So what do you do then - require Cat 3B installations and all autoland approaches regardless of weather just in case?

[McGinty]

No doubt one of the outcomes of this crash will be a process of lobbying for some kind of arrestor bed at the end of 24L, assuming that the lobbyists are unable to get the ravine contour changed.

Is anyone able to comment on what would have happened to the cargo 747 at Halifax that over-ran the runway during an underpowered takeoff if it had happened to have entered an arrestor bed at the end of the runway? Its engines would still have been blasting away, presumably.

Most people seem to assume that the arrestor bed would only be used by a landing aircraft that had not stopped before the end of the runway. But what happens to a plane that is trying to takeoff that over-runs the runway and whaps into the arrestor system? Given that it is full of fuel, I presume that there is a high possibility of a flaming end to the journey.

To what extent does one need a clear over-run to enable an underpowered plane to take off versus an arrestor bed to stop a over-run by an overspeed landing plane? There seems to me to be a dilemma here about the use of the space at the end of a runway, assuming there is any such space available.

[Rockhound]

Few Cloudy and YYZbuff,
Exactly right. Humans are involved and humans make mistakes, sometimes involuntarily, sometimes as a result of external circumstances or forces. The worst of it is, immediately the lawyers pounce and try to prove these same humans were negligent, or incompetent, or reckless or somehow deliberately endangered the lives of other people. Now we have the lawsuit against Air France, the GTAA, NavCanada and God knows who else. There should be some law or mechanism to short-circuit these proceedings from the get-go or laugh the lawyers out of court on the first day of the hearing.
Rockhound :*

[TheShadow]

With a commentary by Don Bateman (MR EGPWS)

IMPETUS (http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/RiskManagement/impetus.html)

FAR 25.113 (Takeoff Distance and Takeoff Run) spells out with great precision the exact requirements for performance (screen heights, V1 etc) - however you should know that actual take-off performance "monitoring" in real time is a totally inexact science. That is why a take-off performance monitor would enhance safety by annunciating any acceleration discrepancy. But now the recent accident to an A340-300 at Toronto has highlit a similarly inexact situation in the approach and landing evolution. Is a Landing Performance Monitor technologically feasible? First, we shall examine the problem.

Would this be a practical and useful proposition?

[qsyenroute]

Men, maybe more than women, find it hard to admit that they find a situation makes them uncomfortable, or factors are outside their "personal limits" and might be competitive with each other, wanting to face a challenge, i.e. a very gusty crosswind with heavy rain very close to the airport

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The aircraft's encounter with a downburst associated with a thunderstorm, the effects of which exceeded the performance capability of the aircraft. The encounter resulted from the flight crew's decision to conduct an approach to land without due regard to the prevailing weather conditions."

Narrative from official report to an accident somewhere in the Middle East March 14th 1979........

This type of accident will continue to feature until Air Traffic Controllers are given more authority to deny an approach. ATC has seen more botched approaches from the Tower than pilots will ever see in their lifetime.

[lomapaseo]

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The aircraft's encounter with a downburst associated with a thunderstorm, the effects of which exceeded the performance capability of the aircraft. The encounter resulted from the flight crew's decision to conduct an approach to land without due regard to the prevailing weather conditions."


what in hell is this all about:confused:

Certainly the authorities have not announced such rubbish for the subject accident.

Would the poster please tell us where this statement of cause comes from?

[Dr Dave]

lomapaseo

qsyenroute's post says:

"Narrative from official report to an accident somewhere in the Middle East March 14th 1979........"

It is fairly clear surely that he/she is pointing out that similar accidents have been occurring for a long time, and that in his/her opinion a (partial?) remedy might be to give more authority to ATC?

DrDave

[Gordon Fraser]

Mar 14 1979 accident was B727 - JY ADU - operated by ALIA - at Doha, Qater - crashed on approach in storm

[Doors to Automatic]

Blimey - that has to be the definition of bad luck - Doha gets about 1 storm a decade! :uhoh:

[Basurablanca]

Most people seem to assume that the arrestor bed would only be used by a landing aircraft that had not stopped before the end of the runway. But what happens to a plane that is trying to takeoff that over-runs the runway and whaps into the arrestor system? Given that it is full of fuel, I presume that there is a high possibility of a flaming end to the journey.

To what extent does one need a clear over-run to enable an underpowered plane to take off versus an arrestor bed to stop a over-run by an overspeed landing plane? There seems to me to be a dilemma here about the use of the space at the end of a runway, assuming there is any such space available.

An idea whose time has come?: Dedicated seperate runways for take-offs and landings? :ooh: :rolleyes:

[Rockhound]

Re Dr Dave's and qsyenroute posts: People are becoming seriously confused here. AF 358 received landing clearance from ATC. It appears that, had it touched down at or near the threshhold, none of us would be pontificating on page 31 or whatever of this thread, for the simple reason that the thread would not exist because the aircraft would have stopped well before the end of the runway, as it does 9999 times out of 10000.
Speaking of pontificating, the IMPETUS file that TheShadow brought up is right up there near the front. As I started reading it, my eyes glazed over but I did notice that the recounting of the QF1 @ BKK overrun was highly oversimplified. In that incident, when the FO, who was PF, was about to land long the captain ordered a go-around and the FO began to comply. As the wheels touched, the captain, without announcing that he was taking control, decided to countermand his own order and complete the landing, so retarded the throttles, which had just been advanced to TOGA power by the FO, with the inevitable result that they ran out of runway. It was a total breakdown of CRM. No fancy computer program is going to prevent that.
Rockhound

[Avman]

This type of accident will continue to feature until Air Traffic Controllers are given more authority to deny an approach. ATC has seen more botched approaches from the Tower than pilots will ever see in their lifetime.

What complete and utter tosh! No ATCO wants, or would want, the responsibility of overruling a highly experienced airline captain on whether he can land his airplane or not. That decision is the captain's and the captain's only, based on his experience, company minimas and SOPs.

[Ranger One]

To all the folks theorising over touchdown vs. threshold airspeed, I'd caution them to remember the conditions - don't hang too much significance on two *instantaneous* airspeed numbers.

FWIW, the gossip I'm hearing (not from any especially authoritiative source, I hasten to add) is that the key question to be asked will be: did anyone on the flight deck say 'I have control', and if not, why not?

R1

[RESA]

A Question:

Has anyone heard what the A/C altitude was crossing the threshold?

I recall hearing the TSB "talking-head" stating that there was some discrepencies with the A/C's TCH. I assume this means that the various sources of recorded data, at this point in time, contradict each other?

How could this occur . . . if in fact it did?

I may have heard wrongly . . . any info?

RESA

[Ignition Override]

qsyenroute: Quite true. I can't remember reading about bad weather at an airport where the Approach or Tower Controller told an aircraft not to take off or land. Unless high winds frighten the guys/gals in the tower (as happened at Hartford "Windsor Locks" when they left-just before a large jet on a VOR approach scraped the trees on a hill :uhoh: ), ATC is apparently NOT allowed to stop a takeoff or landing. Is it? Other than a truck or aircraft not sufficiently clear of a runway (or approach interval), this would be new to me.

Again, none of us know all of the facts concerning the accident at Toronto, and have no idea what information was available to the Air France crew. Each situation on departure/arrival which consists of convective weather is unique. Nobody can forecast the rate of increase or anything else. I've never experienced strong thunderstorms anywhere in Canada-although I have flown only a limited number of legs up there.

My previous remarks reflected my observations that years ago, Captains almost never seemed to ask FOs whether he/she did not like a worsening situation, i.e. increasingly uncomfortable turbulence in springtimer cells, or on a long glideslope with a line of weather (and on radar) which is coming towards the localizer. The first time I remember it was with a lady Captain on a Bandeirante and she did not want to return to the departure airport (plenty of fuel with ok weather behind us), I suppose, without asking if I found the chop unpleasant with more small bumpy clouds on radar in front of us. Who knows? Maybe CRM was created because male pilots don't want to admit certain feelings to others, or seek ideas (advice)?? :( They might not get lost as often when driving in a different city, but when it happens, they might around longer, especially seated next to a female.:O

[Bumz_Rush]

Dr Dave:

It is fairly clear surely that he/she is pointing out that similar accidents have been occurring for a long time, and that in his/her opinion a (partial?) remedy might be to give more authority to ATC?

Dont even think it....In Russia for a long time, and perhaps to this day, if you are not exactly on the profile ATC believevs you should be on on the approach they will tell you to G/A, even if the aircraft is exactly within its performance guidelines.
Many times on a slightly high on GS in full VMC I have ordered to G/A.....unfortunately my mic sometimes sticks when i am asking for a current wind check, and confirming that I may be permitted to use taxiway Z...and yes I am ready to land.....

Bumz

[relax737]

It's probably been said earlier, maybe more than a dozen times.

If the aircraft had been on the ground in the TDZ, with tailwind within limits, it would have stopped on the runway.

If it wasn't on the ground in the TDZ, then it should have been a go around.

Even without brakes, or reverse, one or the other, it would have stopped, and the chances of both, all brake systems (three or more) and reverse thrust, failing are so remote it doesn't bear even a thought.

Eye witness reports indicate it didn't crash on the runway; it over ran the runway after a landing.

If QF1 had been on the runway at the correct point, even with the subsequent mishandling, it could have stopped. It landed long.

The only possible scenario is that it was not on the ground where it should have been with tailwind less than the specified maximum.

This is not an over simplification.

Most, or all, of us have done it but without such spectacular consequences.

[RatherBeFlying]

Relax737, as has been reported by myself and others, there was a severe thunderstorm west of rwy 24L heavier than any I can recall for several years. I doubt that a go around straight into that thunderstorm would have been successful.

I regret that I did not save the radar images that I observed in the time before the accident as they were quite impressive, especially how fast they were moving. The TSB did announce that they have engaged meteorological specialists to retrieve this data and will likely present it in the report.

There is a valid question about continuing an approach when there's a nasty, big, black cell sitting in the missed approach path which precludes the option for a go around.

[alf5071h]

Many of the issues questioned (and some answered) by ‘unprofessional’ posters, or by people who still wish to allocate blame; or even those who insist that they have done ‘it’ without undue problems, suggests that they all exhibit lack of knowledge of the situation, the technicalities of landing and stopping, or particularly of human vulnerability to error.

If we are to allocate blame (natural human behaviour), then we should consider blaming ourselves as part of the overall system that, when it fails, can lead to this type of accident.
Probably all of us have transgressed one or more of the landing parameters without problems, but how many realised how close the landing was to becoming a serious incident of even an accident.

1. Statistically we land fast (just check the FDM data); we tend to land long, or accept long landings in proportion to the length of the runway (SEMSA data).

2. We land on wet runways, but how wet is wet? The small difference between 2.5 mm and 3.1 mm of water is probably not detectable during operations, but increasing water depth has a significant effect on braking effectiveness? When does wet become contaminated – ‘wet with water patches ?’ – I have never heard a 'wet contaminated' report broadcast.

3. We have the perception that a grooved runway surface is more effective (JAR-OPS tells us so), but how do we know if the grooves are clear or blocked with rubber etc? Do we really understand the differences in friction between a good porous black top and the often quite low friction on concrete runways? Do we know how well drained the runway is, and even with good drainage it takes time to be effective which could be degraded in crosswinds (damming effect).

4. We often land in tailwinds, but do we actually know what change of wind occurs after the last wind check – and was the last ‘wind’ given on short final or 5 mins ago from ATIS.

5. Do we always know the actual touchdown speed, and where was the point of touchdown with respect to the optimum?

6. We land with Cbs in the vicinity of airports, but how many checks are made on short final to determine storm movement and current position? We may consider the threat of windshear when in the air and carry additional speed, but do we consider loosing that energy before or during landing; and what if the windshear hits when you are on the ground?

I suggest that few pilots actual know what all of the conditions are during a landing, thus it is futile to ask why didn’t a crew do that – because it is most probable that they did not know - no one else knew, no one told them, or the crew/others failed to observe or understand the relevance of the information they had.

Very few pilots actually know what safety margins remain during normal landings; those that do, should have some red annotated experiences in their flying logbook. (i.e. wet landing at LCY in a crosswind at night).

In many cases our lack of basic knowledge about aircraft performance fails to set an appropriate safety line. This can be degraded further by examples of poor operating practices from both our peers and our own behaviour, and a wide range of other human factors.

One of the human problems is that we tend to reset our safety line to the last ‘successful’ landing. Few of us conduct a self-debrief to consider what the actual margin of safety was, and ask ‘what would happen if’ any other parameter approached the limit and what would the consequences be. A debrief, self and with crew, is a powerful means of readjusting positively or reconfirming our personal safety limits on which the industry depends on.
Do we really consider any of the individual transgressions as a threat to safety? What happens if there were simultaneous transgressions - wet runway and tailwind; then what margin is there for error - incorrect wind, misread friction level, incorrect airspeed, long landing, windshear?

If you want blame, then we should blame ourselves.
However, we are able to change how we operate as individuals and we can influence others with positive examples, and if we see an uncontrolled threat then we can report it e.g. slick surface, large quantities of paint / rubber / de-icing fluid on the runway.
For those other, rare circumstances, then we have to respect the weather and be aware of our and others fallibility. With two or more transgressions (amber alerts) do we promote the threat to a red warning level and follow TEM rule 1:- Avoid the threats.
We can and must improve knowledge and thus our own professionalism throughout our career. This is not the forum for the unprofessional or the “I can do’ers”, but for those who wish to learn then let us have an open and educating exchange of information.

Errors in aviation decision making. (http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/seattle_hessd/judithlynne-p.pdf)

How good pilots make bad decisions. (http://www.spatiald.wpafb.af.mil/2003/ISAP_162.pdf)

Managing threats (http://www.flightsafety.org/ppt/managing_threat.ppt)

--------------------
Unless specifically authorized everything else is forbidden.

[hart744]

Follow link to watch AF video showing the cabin evacuation simulator.


cabin evacuation (http://www.airfrance.net/double6/file/Y1/file_Y1.nsf/(Lookup)/PERSO-formation_pnc/$file/simucabine.wmv)


BTW, the captain is back to France but still in a hospital.

[Tan]

alf5071h

What an excellent well thought out post..

[Shore Guy]

What tan said.....kudos.....

[RESA]

To: alf5071h

Question . . . sort of what I asked earlier . . . with no replies.

If, due to technical peculiarities of the guidance equipment, you arrived at visual to threshold and your TCH was going to be ~ 150' instead of the published 58', and given the conditions . . . what is the prudent course of action?

RESA

[Tripper]

alf5071h

I hope Rockhound reads your posting. Most pilots think that they can never make a mistake.

[relax737]

RESA, of all the Ops manuals I've seen, if unstable below 500', then it's a mandatory go around. Unstable means "not in the slot" (a whole lot of parameters, but that's what it means) .

150' over the THR will have you touching down 3000' down the runway. It seems that they may have been higher than 150 if they hit mother earth 4000' down the strip and that is definitely not in the slot.

Rather be flying, I hear what you say, and understand, but if the TS was so close that it precluded a go around, then perhaps the approach should never have been made, and that's [particularly relevant if a turn in away from the TS was not feasible during the MA path. This was an experienced crew, and even a relatively inexperienced crew would have looked at that. See bit on heightened awareness below.

Once again, I've seen manuals that state an aircraft must not approach within5kms-5nm from approaching TS, even further behind receding TS, and that would not prevent a successful go around. The extra couple of thousand feet eaten up in the float was valuable distance that could have been used in the GA.

I think most pilots are the same; when things start to unwind, we move into a level of heightened awareness, and this is one of those situations, surely. It's easy to sit back and relax on a CAVOK day,but with terminal area TS, possible microburst, tailwind landing, wet runway, etc the bells start ringing.

Pilots have enormous authority, but within narrow parameters; does it fit within the box? If not, don't do it and you ll be safe. It's the rules that make it safe.

alf, nice post with good info.

Tripper, you are wrong. Most pilots don't think that they cant make a mistake, but they HOPE they don't make a mistake, and particularly one of these proportions. You're not airline management are you?

[RatherBeFlying]

This was disclosed at the Aug. 9 TSB press conference.

TSB also announced that they would be trying to determine a more precise number, but that 50-100' is the best they were able to determine for TCH at the time.

[Speculation follows]

I can imagine that the approach end was largely VFR with a line of nasty CBs running north-south at what seemed far enough west of the airport at the FAF -- and too :uhoh: close at the threshold.

Back at the FAF the view may have looked within acceptable parameters for a landing and the missed approach path may not have been assessed against the location of the CBs.

I suspect your average CB at that location would likely have allowed a normal landing. This one did not. So how do you tell the difference in time to decide properly?

[Bird On]

In addition the KLM crew and all the other crews sitting in approach trail behind AF had decided it was safe to make an approach/missed approach.
Indeed what missed approach did the KLM aircraft follow when they went around.

Its never nice being the first little guinea-pig to test the water, so to speak, after a period of protracted holding in bad weather.

[PaperTiger]

Don't think the KLM even made an approach, and certainly no go-around. He was in sequence (exactly where not revealed) when ATC advised YYZ closed due to the crash, so KLM immediately issued 'Pan' and diverted to SYR.

Reported that ATC offered YHM (Hamilton) which didn't make a lot of sense given that the worst WX was between YYZ and YHM, unless a wide arc over the lake was flown.

[alf5071h]

RESA
Re your question “If, … you arrived at visual to threshold and your TCH was going to be ~ 150' instead of the published 58', and given the conditions . . . what is the prudent course of action?”

The ‘stock’ safety answer is – go around. However, I suspect that there may be a few doubters and many more “what if’ers”. If so, these views could represent some of the human factors issues that relate to the circumstances, situation awareness, decision making, and importantly the risk assessment of options for action – land or go around.
In this instance I would argue that good background knowledge of the certification rules (and assumptions) would improve the choice of action.

First, continuing to land will involve risk; the key judgment is how much. The certification margins for landing distance contain a small allowance for error; or in UK CAA English “variation in the values of various parameters from those assumed at certification”. Good guidance on these matters is in AIC 11(P164)/98 ‘Landing performance of large transport aeroplanes’ (www.ais.org.uk) (free download, but registration and cookies enabled required, then go to Publications, UKAIC , Pink safety related). Also see AIC 61(P195)/99 ‘Risks and factors associated with operations on runways affected by snow, slush or water’ Note the statement ‘For JAR-OPS performance purposes, runways reported as WATER PATCHES (25% cover) or FLOODED should be considered as CONTAMINATED’.

Thus with ‘all other things being equal’, a landing from a gross error of 100 ft high (150 ft @ threshold) the landing distance could be extended by 2000 ft (AIC11/98). Probably at most airports with long runways this increase would be accommodated and the crew would write-off their error against ‘normal exercising of judgement’ (shrug of shoulder) with increased braking / full reverse. However, if any other physical condition that affects a landing is ‘at variance with the assumptions’ then there could be no margin for any operating error or misjudgement. It is often the case that the misjudgement of the less obvious variables cause the greatest problems (different wind speed / direction from that used in the planned performance, runway surface (baseline mu), runway condition / depth of water). Then there is human skill; in the limiting conditions in the above scenario a landing would require a firm touchdown, prompt selection of spoilers / reverse, and use of MAX brake – at least until assured of stopping (another judgment).

The alternative option of executing a go around at any time during the approach or even from the point of touchdown should involve far less risk.
This might be refuted by some Canadian operators due to the advice given in the poorly worded AC 0141 (13 May 1998), which implies that aircraft ‘may not be able to’ (my words) conduct the manoeuvre from a ‘low energy state’; whereas a better explanation might have been to add ‘without increased risk’ (which can be combated by appropriate crew skills). However the AC does correctly conclude “ … operators should review their operations to ensure that pilots and training personnel are adequately aware of the hazards inherent in and procedures for dealing with low-energy operations”, i.e. late go-arounds.

The fundamental basis of aviation is that all aircraft are safe to operate within the constraints of the flight manual and when flown as per the manufacturer’s operating instructions. Flying a go-around is safe; we must put aside any concerns of conducting an infrequently practiced maneuver, unfounded fears of lack of control, or inadequate performance, the next failure, etc; the flight deck is not the place for these negative personal attitudes that can bias situation awareness, judgment, and decision making.

From the environmental aspect, a go-around into a Cb is not a good option, but if essential, it is still safe; the aircraft will not breakup or be thrown into the ground by a downburst, provided the appropriate action is taken. Normally a Cb hazard is identified and avoided well before starting the approach this requires crews to consider the threat for the approach and landing, and the go–around route.

I would argue that the above supports the ‘stock’ safety answer – go around, it is the lower risk option. To reinforce this we must bias our judgment towards a go around (go around minded) on every approach. Our mind set should consider the definition of a ‘landing’ as “an approach without a go around”.
We have to dispel the subconscious pressures that come from of the routine objective of always landing, the background commercial pressures, peer pressure (fellow pilot or ATC) - ‘the stigma’ of a go around, and the natural human desire to help others – land on time, don’t divert, don’t foul up the traffic pattern, give the pax a smooth ride. We have to focus on the safety aspects of the flying task.

A decision to transition to a landing in marginal conditions constrains the aircraft to a short narrow strip of land without any flexibility in altitude, heading, distance or time; whereas a go-around leaves open reasonable options of heading, altitude, speed, and within fuel constraints distance, time and location, – many more options than for landing. The action or consideration of a go-around may involve more workload or personal delay and disruption, but that’s what we are paid for – too ensure the safe conclusion to the flight.

In reality, if you have decided to start an approach and there is someone ahead, the airfield is ‘open’ and you are visual with both the runway and the weather, and you have done something similar several times before, then it takes very strong willpower to overcome the human fallibility for error … ‘Press-on-itis’. For the aircraft to end up high at the threshold implies that something preceded it, a tailwind shift or gust that is not noticed. The PF may see this as a flight error that s/he attempts to correct, the crew are now suckered in and with the additional attention on the flying task, all of the good thoughts and safety considerations that where planned beforehand are put in the background and the crew continues the landing, after that it’s history.

I suggest that personal flight safety based around good technical knowledge is one way of combating the subconscious biases; there are many others, but if, ‘on that day at that time’ all the weaknesses in the defences come into line then not even the luck that we all use on a daily basis will save us.
Good planning, go-around mindedness, early decisions, zero tolerance to violation of SOPs (stabilised approach limits), and resisting peer pressure will help. But ‘on that day at that time’ it is only you against the aircraft and the elements.

I suspect that the investigation into the accident in Toronto will find that some of the above issues are contributory to the cause, if so I hope that they will be discussed and solutions considered rather than leave them, as many reports do, as just human factors / human error.
--------------------
Unless specifically authorized everything else is forbidden.

[RESA]

alf5071h

Thanks much for the reply!

I am always interested, being on the "earth bound" side of the "Aids", in knowing what is going through the head of the "client". Technical equipment always has some little quirks and we don't like to think we left some traps out there to trick ("suckered in") anybody.

I have been amazed, over the years, how some push the limits well beyond the published capabilities of certain equipment . . .”It’s published as a CAT I, why did you do a coupled CAT III landing . . . got away with it before, let's try it again"?

Anyway . . . thanks again

RESA

[Tan]

RESA

Quote:”It’s published as a CAT I, why did you do a coupled CAT III landing . . . got away with it before, let's try it again"?

I don’t think that you fully understand what we do. The airplane doesn’t know a CAT I from a CAT III, furthermore pilots wouldn’t even plan an approach using CAT III critique on a Cat I approach. That would be sort of irresponsible don’t you think?

There are a few supposedly certified CAT III approaches in the world that I wouldn’t do a real CAT II on let alone a real CAT III due to the poor maintenance of the facility. It’s obvious to me that you’ve never experienced a real CAT III or understand the planning that goes into one; otherwise you would never make such a foolish statement.

[PaperTiger]

alf5071h when evidence of a (very) long t/d for AF658 became clear, I started to suspect some "press-on-itis" at work. The cell(s) to the W. might have been one factor, but has their fuel status been established (I may have missed it) ?

I believe the CVR contains earlier discussion of diverting to YOW - which they eschewed - so is it possible the prospect of a go around to another hold or else reneging on the decision not to divert might have trapped them into a got to make this one work mindset ?

I've been there :O :uhoh:

[ManaAdaSystem]

You could very well be on to something, Paper Tiger.
Now add 2 pilot crew at the end of a rather long flight, a touch of fatigue, and you get???

[fireflybob]

As you say this is all speculation since we dont know the remaining fuel but (and I know I am sticking my neck out here) perhaps, from a strictly decision making point of view, there might be some similarities between this accident and the BY one at GRO where the aicraft exited the side of the runway after an unusual arrival following an approach in not dissimilar weather.

Concerning CAT !/III surely from a pure systems point of view there is no reason why the aircraft could not have done an autoland (yes I know there are crosswind limits, weather limits etc) but if you really running low on fuel it might be better to autoland.

Pith helmet suitably donned!

[Right Way Up]

<<but if you really running low on fuel it might be better to autoland.>>
or at least for the skipper to do the approach especially if the weather is that bad.

[sama]

Does anybody know whether this flight was a checkflight,resp.the captain was a chechcaptain ?

Thanks

sama

[Grandpa]

In severe turbulence, my experience is A/P is not even able to fly along ILS on final approach, so I can't imagine CAT II could be expected to work until landing.

[NG_Kaptain]

Does Air France have diferent minimums for first officers vs captains? In my company captain must be PF if weather is lower than first officer minimus of a landing RVR of 3000 feet/900 meters and a max crosswind component of 23 knots.

[No_Speed_Restriction]

did the following KLM declare a fuel emergency and diverted to syracuse?

[relax737]

alf, I fear that it won't be seen as a human factors invest8igation, rather than with a pilot error slant.

It seems to me that the decision to divert may have been left way too long, and the holes in the swiss cheese started to line up. He seems to have closed off an option early in the event. Couyple that with an approach into conditions which may have prevented a go around (EVERY landing should be considered a potential go around), landing long, landing fast, wet runway, quartering tailwind, possibly a touch of get home-itis, and there are enough holes to give a logical conclusion.

Not saying it will never happen to me, but it looks like a number of cases of pilot error at this stage. Of course I'm relyingon what is reported here to be close to the facts.

[HotDog]

the captain was a chechcaptain ?

No he was a French captain:{

[No_Speed_Restriction]

I highly recommend you listen to the ATC recording via liveatc.net and listen.

[luc]

1- Captain was not an instructor, standard flight
2- Air France rules state that F/O can't perform approach if visibility <800 m ( regardless of wind)

[Flying.Coyote]

FROM : AIRBUS CUSTOMER SERVICES TOULOUSE TX530526F

TO : ALL
A300/A310/A300-600/A319/A320/A321/A330/A340/A318/A340-500

/A340-600 OPERATORS

ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX

SUBJECT: AF358 A340-300 ACCIDENT

OUR REF.: AF358 AIT 3 DATED 17th August 2005

OUR PREVIOUS REF.:
- AF358 AIT 1
- AF358 AIT 2

The preliminary analysis of the DFDR data indicates the
following sequence of events:

The short final and landing were performed manually with the
autopilot (AP) and autothrust (ATHR) disconnected at about 300
feet AGL. The aircraft was in configuration FULL with auto-brake
selected to MED.

There was a right variable crosswind of about 20 kts and a tail
wind component during the final stage of the approach.

At the time of touchdown, the airspeed was 143 kts and the
ground speed 148 kts. Visibility was reported to be 0.5 to 0.25
NM in heavy rain.

The touchdown zone is located approximately 4000 feet from the
threshold of the 9000-foot runway.

Following the MLG touchdown, the ground spoilers normally
extended.

Soon after touchdown, the autobrake was overridden upon pilot
maximum brake pedal inputs which were kept to the end.

Consistent with the tyre marks left on the runway, the DFDR
confirms that brake pressure was normally applied to the brakes
and that the antiskid function operated normally.

Upon activation, the 4 engines thrust reversers fully deployed
and remained in this position until the aircraft came to a stop.

At the end of the runway the aircraft ground speed was 79 kts.

Based on the preliminary DFDR analysis and consistent with on-
site observations:

- the braking performances are consistent with a contaminated
runway condition in line with heavy rain conditions.
- there is no indication that any aircraft systems or engine
anomalies existed at the time of the accident.

The detailed investigation work will continue under the
leadership of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada.

At this stage of the investigation, Airbus has no specific
recommendations to give to operators.

When appropriate and upon Canadian TSB approval, additional
information about this event will be issued through the normal
Airbus to Operators communication channels.


YANNICK MALINGE
VICE PRESIDENT FLIGHT SAFETY
AIRBUS

[cavelino rampante]

based on that, an aquaplane, or a long landing or both

[brain fade]

More like landing on a CONTAMINATED runway using WET runway performance.

[PAXboy]

luc Air France rules state that F/O can't perform approach if visibility <800 m ( regardless of wind)

Flying.Coyote, quoting FROM : AIRBUS CUSTOMER SERVICES TOULOUSE TX530526FVisibility was reported to be 0.5 to 0.25 NM in heavy rain.

Working a conversion from International Nautical Miles to Metres gives:
.25 inm = 463m
.50 inm = 926m

[Ignition Override]

Do Air France and other airlines have different visibility and wind limitations for ALL FOs, even if they are experienced people (who possibly have flown more legs/years in the A-340 than some Captains), or only for those in their first 100 hours or so on a given type?:confused:

Do the FOs fly an equal number of approaches/landings, or does a second Captain fly some of these landings?

Many 747-400 First Officers fly very few legs per month, and due to the fact that Captains "fly" most of the legs, the FOs must maintain currency each year in the simulator.

Although I know almost nothing about the accident at YYZ, a 747-400 almost crashed after takeoff at SFO years ago, which many Pprune members are aware of, with highly-experienced pilots in both seats. Engine vibrations made the EICAS and flight instruments difficult to read. Regulatory requirements for FOs, even for Captains (!) (six simulated approaches/landings each 6 months) do not necessarily equal hands-on proficiency.

[RESA]

Flying.Coyote

Was there any information as to the range for "short-final" (how far before threshold)?

Was there any information as to atltitude at the time of turn-in to intercept localiser?

Was there any information as to range at the time of aborted auto-couple . . . @ 300-ft AGL I believe you said?

RESA

[luc]

To PAXboy
The visibility taken into account to decide whether F/O can or can not perform the approach is not visibility at threshold mentionned in Airbus message but the one at a specified point of the approach.
Refer to all Metar's mentionned in this forum and every where else, you will see that F/O was entitled to land.

[GrahamCurry]

From page 19 (sorry, I'm still catching-up):-
"Ravine may have saved flight from worse fate

THE 309 passsengers and crew of Air France Flight 358 may have survived the crash landing because of — not despite — the ravine at the end of the runway.........

For full story click here:

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/articl...1720252,00.html

Ravines, moats or other gullies around airports, anyone ?? Amazing....."

The Times are SO wrong when suggesting that there could be ANY comparison with Kegworth. Kegworth was NOT an overshoot, but an undershoot (caused by lack of thrust when the FD crew shut down the remaining good engine!). Furthermore, despite landing on (or just after) the M1 motorway, there was NO vehicle involvement. The a/c just failed to make the Airport and was stopped by the motorway embankment.

Back to catching-up (page 20).

[PAXboy]

luc Many thanks for clarifying. Glad to hear it.

[luc]

From the "Los Angeles Times" By Meghan Daum

August 6, 2005
TO ANYONE WHO'S ever smirked, snapped, whined, yelled or (you know who you are) thrown things at a flight attendant, let's consider this: Last Tuesday, the cabin crew of Air France Flight 358 evacuated all 297 passengers after a crash landing in Toronto. They did this in less than two minutes. Moments later, the plane burst into flames.
I know what you're thinking: "If they can get 300 people off in under two minutes, why does it take 45 minutes to board a plane?" As in all things air travel-related, the lame jokes abound. ("I tried to jump down the slide, but they stopped me because the seat-belt sign was on!")
But maybe seeing 10 flight attendants save about 300 lives in less time than it took to watch the safety demonstration will put an end to the jokes. It's been a long time coming. Somehow, passengers have been lulled into thinking that flight attendants are there primarily to serve as waiters and arbiters of luggage space. But accidents have a way of reducing inconveniences like pillow shortages and paltry snacks to shamefully petty concerns.
Several years ago, while researching a magazine article about the "secret world of flight attendants," I spent a week at the flight attendant training school of a major airline. Granted, this was three years before 9/11, back when the combination of dreary mundanity and diminishing leg room had left people with about as much respect for air travel as they had for pre-owned Yugos. "Air rage" was the coinage of the day, and incidents of violence against airline personnel had risen dramatically.
I visited the school because I was a smug young journalist working for a smug glossy magazine and I was hoping for some salacious details about a profession that had fascinated the public since the early days of commercial flight. Since airline industry deregulation in 1978, the archetypal sex-kitten stewardess made famous by books such as the 1960s-era "Coffee, Tea or Me" had devolved into a haggard assortment of short-tempered corporate drones. The heyday of air travel, when flight attendants were required to be female, slim, unmarried and possessed of the uncanny ability to cook eggs to order during turbulence, was long gone.
But my assignment was doomed. The courses I observed had less to do with applying makeup and charming businessmen than with something far less sensational: safety.
The drills went on and on and on. We practiced verbal instructions until we could recite them like Beatles lyrics. We rehearsed procedures until every exit door and window, every inflatable slide and alarm bell felt as familiar as the dashboard controls on a car we'd owned for a decade.
I can still remember the sensation of opening the hatch of the exit window in the cabin simulator. I can still hear the siren and the exact wording of the evacuation commands for the slides. "Keep your feet together, jump into the slide," the students yelled until they were hoarse. I watched as they learned how to inflate rafts. I ran around the simulator with them as they enacted crash after crash, knowing full well that no matter how intensive the training, nothing but focus and sheer guts would see them through the real thing.
Among the other things I learned about flight attendants was that their starting salaries could be as low as $15,000 a year. They regularly have to work 14-hour days but are often paid for only eight hours. Most have to buy their own uniforms for hundreds of dollars. That means they often have only one, which they have to wash out in hotel sinks.
Air France rightfully praised the crew of Flight 358 for its professionalism. But it's the flying public that needs to recognize such contributions. Airline deregulation, which slashed prices along with amenities, legroom and salaries, caused many of us to forget our manners. Then Sept. 11 introduced a narrative that suggested the fates of airliners lay in the hands of passengers, whether terrorists or heroes.
But, as we learned on Tuesday, accidents still occur and we still rely on those who are trained to protect us from potentially tragic outcomes. On airplanes, it so happens that these are the same people who pass out the inedible food and tell us when our bags won't fit overhead. But we've seen they can do a lot more than that. Let's be polite.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-daum6aug06,0,3512842.story?coll=la-news-comment-opinions

[Farmer 1]

I could not have put it much better myself.

Farmer.