FAA & CAA disagree over B747 continued 3 engine flight

[411A]

\\\Seems to me the FAA is more or less disagreeing with itself!!\\\

Really don't see how, 6feetunder.
The FAA's position is rather clear...IE: continued flight with an engine shutdown/failed (on 3/4 engine types) is perfectly OK provided that is at least as safe as a diversion, or return.

Now, while it is quite true that I do not operate for a US carrier, I have spent a rather long time with an overseas carrier that operates to 14CFR121 standards...by the book.
In so doing, I have had two inflight shutdowns with three engine types.
One was enroute, about two hours to destination, and the flight was indeed continued to destination.
The other was 10 minutes after takeoff, and altho I had sufficient fuel to destination (in spades, as we were tankering due to cost considerations), a return was carried out, without further discussion. Altho in this case I would have been quite within my authority to continue, it would not make all that much sense...indeed, I would have considered it quite imprudent.

So, there you have it.
Both aviation regulatory authorties concerned here generally agree with regards to flight continuation, however some Commanders (and perhaps differing company policies) offer a clue as to their thinking.
The Commander concerned makes the call, and provided it is within company and regulatory guidelines, should not be called on the carpet to explain himself.

Others however, with a lot of experience under their belt, might respectfully have different views.

[sky9]

411A
But that surely is the point; it's up the the commander on the day taking into account all factors to make a decision based on the facts in front of him and for his management to support him. That surely is what makes the job worthwhile.

What concerns me is a tendency on PPRuNe for other pilots to take a "black and white" stand on issues which really are shades of grey.
Lets stop slagging our collegues off for doing their jobs, you never see solicitors taking cheap shots at each other. We should learn from them.

[bullshot]

With respect, I don't agree - this thread has been remarkably free from any 'slagging off' or critisism of the crew involved in the incident that precipitated it. Experienced and professional airmen are always reluctant to directly criticise; and I for one have thoroughly enjoyed reading the opinions of most of the contributors.
The few instances of 'slagging off' have come from those defending the wisdom - in principal - of an intercontinental flight with an engine shut down that culminated in an emergency being declared.
Healthy debate is always welcome and I encourage those such as Cargo Boy to persuade the likes of me that, for instance, the absence of 'land at the nearest suitable airport' in a QRH drill automatically means that the best course of action is to press on. There's often a bit more to it than that old son... but please don't take it as a slag off!

[sky9]

Bullshot

I quote one (no names)

"Altho 'legal' under British civil aviation regulations, it was, as someone mentioned some time ago...absolutely, positively
stupid.

Bypassing suitable enroute diversion airports is NEVER a good idea, when flight safety is considered.
And, strangly enough, that is the exact point.
BA threw flight safety straight out the window, in preference to commercial considerations.

Sadly, BA should know better.
Even more sadly....they don't."

I would add that he has since moderated his views slightly.

[411A]

It's called giving the concerned Commander the benefit of the doubt, sky9...although 'not a very bright decision' would fit the situation quite necely...:p

Strangely enough, some seem to agree...:uhoh:

[GotTheTshirt]

411 I am confused (which I agree is not difficult):D


I have spent a rather long time with an overseas carrier that operates to 14CFR121 standards... [I]by the book

Is this the same airline operating 3 engine aircraft that you referred to as absolute cowboys, pencil whipping everything in the log, in other posts or a different one:O

[OldAg84]

Cargo Boy- OK, so I'm an armchair expert, I'll give you that- I was just stating a simple comparision- that I, personally, wouldn't want to continue a long journey when I know a component of the equipment I'm operating, which is normally required, is not functioning. I've got over a million miles on many different airlines- I've never gotten upset when a flight is delayed because of a safety or maintainence issue. It happens.

Apparently, because I'm not an aviator, just a paying customer, I'm not entitled to my opinion or even a perspective. Of course, I get the same condescending attitudes from the staff at most of the airlines I fly. Which is why, in spite of my love for aviation- albiet from my armchair; I'm flying as little as possible and driving as much as I can and as far as I can tolerate. I suppose it's just as well you fly cargo.

That's all I'll say, and I'll try not to post again.

[411A]

The airline in question was SV, Tshirt, and so far as I could see, nothing there was pencil-whipped.
Quite the contrary, in fact, very well maintained aircraft, and well trained crews, from my perspective.

[bugg smasher]

delwy,

Please do not misread me. Many flights, including ones I have operated, have experienced engine failures that resulted in a landing, not at nearest suitable, but at nearest reasonable, all factors being taken into account after the appropriate and well-considered (hopefully) gnashing of crewmember teeth.

What I find so striking about this particular flight is that the financial factor appears to have heavily outweighed all other considerations, a trend I have been concerned about for some years now at the carrier I work for. As 411A so rightly states, the aeroplane may be able to do it, but should it?

BA is a highly respected airline operation, one I would not have the slightest hesitation whatsoever to board my wife and children. I would not wish it upon BA’s pilots, or anyone else’s for that matter, to be strong-armed into ceding cockpit authority to those whose agendas lie elsewhere in the greater scheme of things.

That authority once lost, delwy, how can we honestly lay any further claim to the privileges of the certificates we have fought so hard to hold and to keep; the phrase ‘pilot in command’ loses all real and effective meaning.

As I have previously stated in an earlier post, I do not agree with the decisions made by the commander of BA268. I do, however, support him fully in his personal, and apparently well-informed decision to continue.

It was his call, he brought the metal home in one piece; other than the next round is on me, little else need be said. The BA spin doctors are in charge of the rest.

[SLF3]

Well, I'm just humble SLF, and thus pretty dumb and not entitled to an opinion, though I do pay your wages. However, assuming the pilot has done his sums correctly, I cannot for the life of me see why a 747 on three (once in the air) is inherently more dangerous than a 767 on two.

From my perspective it is significant that the BA pilot called a Mayday and diverted when it was looking marginal and he had no time to figure it out: he kept going when he had the time to think it through and take advice. And his management backed him in both cases. Doesnt sound like a guy under management pressure to me!

One of the reasons I like BA is the strong suspicion that the pilots are there own men (or women) and won't take much crap from anyone. The flip side of being arrogant.......

[NigelOnDraft]

OA84 The engines are what make it go- that's fairly basic Let me offer a slightly contrary point of view. Not 100% accurate, but the principle largely holds.

A 4 Eng Jet e.g. 747 does not have 4 Engines "to make it go". It has 4 Engines to make "it takeoff"... because at any point in time you plan on a single failre.... A 4 Eng Jet at any stage on the TO run can "lose" an engine and everyone should live. A 4 Eng Jet is not certified to lose 2 on takeoff... although instances occur where people have survived losing 2, the time / nature / skill of the failures mean survival happened. But losing 2 on a Max Takeoff Weight 4 Eng aircraft say just after liftoff is essentially end of story :(

Now, having got the 4 Eng ac airborne and cleaned up this principal no longer holds, and they can lose 2 Engines. Not only is this regularly practiced by the crews, more modern 4 Eng types lose very little in the way of ancillaries (Hydraulics, Electrics), and still lose little after a second Eng failure. Also of course, having reduced power and got away from the ground, the chance of Engine failure is much reduced.

As the last 2 posts show, there is much discretion in BA, and thankfully so. The company offer guidelines / options even advice, this was followed that day, and it is all still in place. Opinions differ as this board shows, who can say who is actually right? There are, IMHO, much bigger safety issues in aviation to waste ~20 pages of this BB on :)

[barit1]

Thank you Nigel for saying it very well.

As I (and others) have pointed out, this whole event is far less of a safety issue than an education issue. The armchair aviators don't seem to grasp the essential issue that it's WHEN the donk dies that makes all the difference. Otherwise we'd have none of the "three-engine ferry" nonsense and the like.

There are a lot more, bigger hazards in the average person's life than crossing the pond on three modern engines. The industry's problem is that of educating him of this fact.

[OldAg84]

Nigel and barit- thank you for your kind replies. One reason I like PPrune is I can learn things (that obviously I enjoy, but won't ever use professionally) from professionals. Which I why I don't typically post, but only read, the flight deck forums-as technically, I understand I don't typically add much.

Do I think (again from my perspective only) that the flight crew was reckless? No. But I would of preferred, as SLF, to return or divert. I also understand that a passenger aircraft is far from a democracy and the crew were within their "rights and regulations" to continue.

[overstress]

BEagle: Dust off the globe and have another look for the extended flight over water you mention....

[catchup]

Thx to Nigel. Very good posting.



:ok:
regards

[enicalyth]

As I remember it the mountains, Edwards AFB, China Lake and Tonopah test ranges put in a bit of an initial dogleg KLAX-EGLL. Consequently at Las vegas (if you're on J9) an interesting case may present itself in planning. Good Continental US winds. One correspondent mentioned that Atlantic winds are often favourable around Boston. If however you proceed via the NCA your route very crudely might be KLAX-LAS-YYQ-6660N-MAC-HON-EGLL which Mrs E tells me from past notes is 4885nm or thereabouts. However if you can hitch a lift from wind (and it ain't that much as I hope to show) the other route, equally crudely shortened is KLAX-LAS-HBU (Blue Mesa)-BOS-YYT- N41 30 W30 00 (NATS permitting)-5215N-CRK-STU-CPT-EGLL. Mrs E says that one is logged at about 5140nm. So I made a table thus for a 10hr flight, simple allowances of 250nm total for climb and descent with the rest to be accomplished 487K/M0.85. What nett wind advantage is needed for the USA instead on NCA? It turned out to be 27kts. How often is the jetstream this kind and would it colour what you might have done on the day? Just asking before I retire so please don't poke the old bear. And does anyone remember SSTOY in Greenland?

NCA USA
Dist nm 4885 5140
Climb -110 -110
Descent -150 -150
Cruise 4625 4880

Tot Time hrs 10 10
Cl/Desc hrs -0.7 -0.7
Cruise hrs 9.3 9.3

Speed kts 497.3 524.7
Wind kts 10.3 37.7
Difference 27.4

[Charles Darwin]

I do not doubt the 747 can cross the pond with 3 engines running. Seems to me this is just a question of the number of operating lawyers in the US. The modern aircraft does not fly on it´s wings, but on the paper in the regulations!

(when flying ETOPS you MUST maintain fire suppression in the cargo holds for the entire ETOPS segment. If the aircraft is 3 or 4 engine, thus not ETOPS, we may wery well burn down, for there if no requirement of fire suppression as in ETOPS. Funny thing, regulations).

[JW411]

jtr:

I apologise for taking so long to reply but I have just got back from an 8-day trip.

From my GK notes:

DC-10-30 (CF6-50C2B) DC-!0-10A (CF6-6D1A)

MaxRamp 583000 lbs MaxRamp 458000 lbs
MTOW 580000 lbs MTOW 455000 lbs

Both of which give a maximum taxi fuel of 3000 lbs (which is the figure we used at JFK and ORD).

Normally we allowed 2000 lbs for taxi.

Now then:

3000 lbs at 2.2046 = 1360.79 kgs and
2000 lbs at 2.2046 = 907.19 kgs.

You seem to think that these figures are excessive but you then go on to tell me that the -400 burns (at idle) 50kgs/min for taxi.

I very much doubt that you can get off the tug at idle power when you are heavy, or even move forward in the congo line from static with idle thrust but even then, using your own figures, you are still going to use at least 1000 kgs assuming a 20 minute taxi (which I doubt you seldom achieve).

I agree that your 2 tons per circuit is a more realistic figure.

My record for taxiing was at JFK one particularly foul night. I joined the congo line as No.54 (the highest I heard behind me was No.78). It took us over 4 hours to get airborne and even although we were only using the centre engine and the APU, a hell of a lot of fuel was burned!

[delwy]

Bugg Smasher

Thanks for saying what I thought none of the critics would ever say.

Our opinions differ, particularly as regards the notion the financial considerations played a part in this matter. But the main point of interest to me is that there are a lot of airlines in the world who continue flights on three engines (I even know of one that carries a 3-engined flight plan on its trans-pacific flights so as to quickly assess the options in the event of an engine failure). I simply do not accept the idea that continuing on three is, of itself, inherently dangerous or risky. It might be in certain circumstances, but not in others. All of this is for debate and different opinions, as is abundantly clear from this thread.

What I had noticed was the repeated tendancy of those from North America to keep implying that a different standard of behaviour applied to North American carriers and that the BA crew had committed some kind of clear and obvious transgression. You have at least clarified the facts as I believe them to be.

Nigel

Great post.

[catchup]

(when flying ETOPS you MUST maintain fire suppression in the cargo holds for the entire ETOPS segment. If the aircraft is 3 or 4 engine, thus not ETOPS, we may wery well burn down, for there if no requirement of fire suppression as in ETOPS. Funny thing, regulations).


That's really strange. Can only be topped by EU laws.:O

regards

[L337]

The 747-400 Cargo Fire suppression system is to the same spec as ETOPS.

Well In BA it is. Cannot speak for any other carrier.

L337

[skol]

I would not have continued the flight. The company I work for have 2 major stipulations (and a few minor ones).

Minimum fuel requirement should be the greater of:

Three engine cruise to destination and to alternate if required plus 2% contingency, 30 minutes holding 1500ft, approach and land and PDA%.


Depressurised flight on 3 engines to a suitable airport at any point during the remainder of the flight plus 2% contingency, 15 minutes holding 1500ft, approach and landing and PDA%.

Apart from that it's a long way to go on 3.

(10000 hrs 747-200, 5000hrs 747-400)

[411A]

All perfectly reasonable from my perspective, skol, however BA apparently see it differently.

Twist the tail of the tiger too often, expect to be bitten at some point.
Murphys law applies.:\

[BBT]

skol

I'm not sure of your intentions on making your post. Are you claiming that the flight in question did not have adequate fuel to continue?

... or do you mean that "it is a long way to go on 3" and this is why you would not have continued?

[skol]

BBT,
There is a 9% fuel penalty on 3 and without pretending to know all the details it is almost certain the flight would have had inadequate fuel to make it to its final destination. This means a landing in MAN, PIK, or SNN.

The other factors of the top of my head are that you are beginning the flight in a degraded condition, and there may be unexpected problems such as adverse winds, weather, or unfavourable altitudes or further inflight defects. There is also a paucity of alternates between the west coast and the UK. The ones available are not the kind of places you would want to be and any further complications might mean a diversion to one of these airfields and prohibitive cost. (And a visit to the office).
Depending on the actual route the depressurised case would be an interesting calculation.
There is also the matter of fatigue. Unless these guys were like Gordon Cooper who fell asleep while waiting for the launch of his rocket into orbit it's a good bet they never got any adequate rest on the flight.

Another part of the manuals I have says "For a four engined a/c the failure of one engine, particularly during cruise and with no additional complications, should not be considered an emergency which requires a landing as soon as possible".

Correct me if I am wrong but the way I understand it the engine failed at the commencement of the flight before the a/c was in the cruise.

From a company perspective an engine change in LAX would have been a lot cheaper than one of the'suitable alternates'., and the a/c would have been returned to service a lot quicker.

[maxy101]

From a company perspective an engine change in LAX would have been a lot cheaper than one of the'suitable alternates'., and the a/c would have been returned to service a lot quicker.
Assuming BA had a spare engine iin LAX (or at all of its destinations)
There is a 9% fuel penalty on 3 and without pretending to know all the details it is almost certain the flight would have had inadequate fuel to make it to its final destination. This means a landing in MAN, PIK, or SNN.
Isn't that why we carry Contingency Fuel?

[Rainboe]

411A
Twist the tail of the tiger too often, expect to be bitten at some point.

I think deep down most people would agree setting off across the Pacific with 300 people on two engines with 180min ETOPS is more 'twisting the tail of the tiger' than a 747 on 3 LAX-LHR!

People are saying the same things as in the previous thread! It's all been said! It's just a question of waiting for a positive adjudication from the Licensing Authority that is not vitally concerned with Boeing maximising its 777/787 market above all other interests!

[cargo boy]

On no, not another 'expert' opinion. :rolleyes:"I would not have continued the flight."Talk about stating the bleedin' obvious. We already know that some of the B744 experienced pilots wouldn't have carried on and others would have. The point has already been made, ad nauseum, that this crew didn't break any rules, weighed up their options and decided to continue. OK, so some of you wouldn't and a whole raft of non B744 'experts' have already given us their little gems of wisdom. So why do we now have another 'expert' :rolleyes: telling us what his company tells him he should do?

Maybe ANZ wouldn't continue across the Pacific with a dead donk but please spare us your expertise of crossing the north Atlantic. The fule incident at the end of this flight is a totally separate issue and we don't need another drawn out argument over whether they had enough fuel or not. When they started out they did. When they got closer they didn't. Happens all the time on very long haul operations. :zzz: :hmm:

[BBT]

skol

I cannot but have the impression that you have not read this and the other thread in their entirety - the matter having been well teased out (as you may have noticed some "hints" about this from intervening posts).

You are welcome to your opinion, but it is only an opinion and the "arguments" you have provided to support your opinion don't entirely add up, IMHO.

[skol]

Cargo Boy,
Have operated North Atlantic about 20 times per year since 1981. Maybe 450 atlantic crossings is not enough for your exacting standards.

BBT,
Correct, contingency fuel is for unexpected contingencies. .For most airlines this is around 2%, which leaves a 7% deficit. For a -400 LAX-LHR that adds up to an additional 9000kg burn assuming no dawdling or holding. What doesn''t add up?

[BBT]

skol

I was saying that I felt your argument did not add up, not the fuel figures. Just an opinion. My original question was based on trying to see if you had a new perspective, while avoiding a repeat of issues and argumentation already well rehearsed on the two threads. As I say you are welcome to your opinion, but since you are clearly willing to get into another fuel argurment here let me just say that to do so is to suggest that the crew involved set off with insufficient fuel and that your figures are better. I beg to disagree.

To my mind this suggests that you have not fully read the two threads, and may have missed the topic heading on this thread - which is the perspectival differences between the CAA and FAA on operational decision making, as illustrated by the differing points of view on this particular event.

[M.Mouse]

Correct, contingency fuel is for unexpected contingencies. .For most airlines this is around 2%, which leaves a 7% deficit. For a -400 LAX-LHR that adds up to an additional 9000kg burn assuming no dawdling or holding. What doesn''t add up?

What doesn't add up? Your assumption that most airlines carry around 2% contingency for a start.

Try reading the surfeit of postings on the subject (this and the previous thread). Distill the facts from the speculation and you will quickly realise why many of us groaned when you started pontificating.

Quite what relevance crossing the Atlantic as few as 20 times per year has is also puzzling.

[BusyB]

Skol,
I see you've joined the ranks of the monday morning quarterbacks.

If we use your logic you and your airline must be much more dangerous with a mere 2% contingency when compared with all the others that carry more!

[Salzinger_FOO]

What doesn't add up? Your assumption that most airlines carry around 2% contingency for a start.

I was wondering about that too...
Here we work with 10% and the lowest I have seen was 5% with a JAROPS operator.

Cheers

Salz

[AMF]

This whole thread comes down to, and can be summed up as....

"You have no right to question the actions of a BA pilot because.....it's a BA pilot's action!".

Nothing more...

...and no amount of experience (including in the same type and along those routes) and objectivity put forth in even the most cogent terms will sway those holding this god-complex/hero-worship streak if it's used to support an opinion to the contrary.

Given the same set of circumstances, a U.S. crew making the same decision would be labeled "cowboys", and a third-world airline crew "incompetent", by those defending it now because their assumptions and pre-conceived notions regarding professionalism, conduct, and training would still apply. There is NO doubt...none... that this would be their opinion.

It's not based on objectivity...it's deeply emotional and ingrained, notwithstanding the psuedo-logical facade and feeble attempts at justification....ingrained that contrarian views shan't be considered because there is no right to even air them in the first place. Doing so is exceeding one's Station (if you believe in that sort of thing), so silencing them is a matter of honor and duty, not aviation.

The aeronautical trappings of numbers-swapping and comparing procedural differences doesn't disguise the fact that this whole thread reeks of it.

A BA crew making an inferior choice?.....sorry, but you have about as much chance of persuading them that the queen sucks.

[Dick Deadeye]

BA turn your application down did they, AMF?

Sounds like one of their better decisions.

Or was there some other reason for your petulant little outburst?

[etrang]

AMF seems to have summed the thread up pretty well.

[atse]

As a non-BA pilot who feels that the matter is far from being easy to sort out "objectively" I have to first say that I agree with the decision of the BA captain and crew.

To my mind AMF's post is just a declaration of prejudice on the part of those with whom he disagrees - which declaration he then uses to trot out his own rather self-revealing prejudices.

The post is unwise, unworthy and unsupported by any sign of any effort to assess the evidence or produce an argument. Posting such prejudical drivel itself shows a lack of judgment and says much more about the author that anything else.

[sky9]

I had a quick look on Expedia for flights from LAX to LHR. The airlines that operate it are BA, Virgin, Air New Zealand, American Airlines and United.

Would someone tell me what aircraft type is operated by each airline on the route; it might throw some light on the FAA case.

[skol]

Pilots that undertake missions like this one should ensure they have a watertight family trust. In any airline there seems to be a collection of individuals who are convinced beyond doubt that their employer will go into bat for them if they make a mess of things while trying to help the company out, when quite the opposite is true.

[NigelOnDraft]

AMF This whole thread comes down to, and can be summed up as....
"You have no right to question the actions of a BA pilot because.....it's a BA pilot's action!". A poor reading of the thread I might add...

If you re-read the thread you will see the more intelligent posts state that there is probably no "right" or "wrong", it is the call of guy on the day, who will no doubt be influenced not only by his experience and training, but the various rules & regs under which he operates.

For you to criticise people supporting the crew on the day is as wrong as anybody here who says the crew was definitely wrong.

FYI, what the crew did was 100% iaw a documented company procedure in the regulator's approved manual. It is a procedure that has been used countless times in the past, and has not been altered 1 jot since the incident in question, and has in fact been used since the incident... just didn't generate 30 odd pages of hysteria.

So all I am saying is you have no right to state the crew was "wrong", unless you know the exact circumstances under which the decision was made... and I doubt you know the BA (CAA approved) manuals word for word.

Just my pov...

[AMF]

Well Nigel, if I read your post correctly.....

An inability to make a value judgment on the actions of another crew (if it's a BA crew) is an indicator of "intelligence".

Because someone disagreeing doesn't know the "exact circumstances", they are wrong. However, those supporting the actions of this crew are right, notwithstanding they also don't know "the exact circumstances".

The crew and supporters are "right", because the BA manual apparently flawlessly guides any crew to the best decision in any circumstance in matters of what even you admit is a Judgement Call.

My, my, what a book. I always knew "the book" includes procedures and standards, but now matters of Judgment as well? Of course, can it be "Judgement" if the book, in fact, covers it? You seem to regard it as the same thing.

Are prudence, risk management, and public relations covered with so much completeness as well?

But what do I know?......I'm just a cowboy who figures that 11-hour, degraded performance, 3-engine ferry flights should be operated without paying passengers. The technicality of barely breaking ground before becoming so doesn't really sway my value judgement, given viable alternative, more conservative courses of action.

I must have a yellow streak, and obviously need one of those Books that has all the answers.

[Globaliser]

sky9: I had a quick look on Expedia for flights from LAX to LHR. The airlines that operate it are BA, Virgin, Air New Zealand, American Airlines and United.

Would someone tell me what aircraft type is operated by each airline on the route; it might throw some light on the FAA case.From eskyguide.com (http://www.eskyguide.com):-British Airways 744 (6 x per week)
Air New Zealand 744 (daily)
Virgin Atlantic 744 (daily)
British Airways 744 (daily)
United 777 (daily)
American Airlines 777 (daily)
American Airlines 777 (daily)
Virgin Atlantic 343 (daily)
British Airways 744 (daily)Also, if interesting, flights from SFO:-United 777 (daily)
Virgin Atlantic 744 (daily)
British Airways 744 (daily)
British Airways 744 (daily)
United 777 (daily)

[M.Mouse]

That is a suprise.

The American operators appear to only operate twins from LAX and SFO to London.

Who ever would have thought it?

[sky9]

I wonder whether 411a would prefer to fly with BA or American?

[411A]

\\\I wonder whether 411a would prefer to fly with BA or American?\\\

No need to wonder, sky9, I try to avoid AA like the plague.:yuk:

[NigelOnDraft]

AMF...

I have never said the crew were "right"... I do not think I, nor anyone really, can categorically say they were " right" or "wrong".

What I can say is on the day they took a decision, iaw their Regulator Approved procedures, and followed it through.

What I do have, unlike you (?), is access to those procedures. They (quite correctly) give the crew discretion as to whether they consider the procedure appropriate "on the day". The list of further, and ongoing, checks, is quite comprehensive, and no doubt was complied with.

The events at the other end of the flight were completely separate and not under discussion here...

What I, and others object to, is your ongoing criticism of the crew...

My, my, what a book. I always knew "the book" includes procedures and standards, but now matters of Judgment as well? Of course, can it be "Judgement" if the book, in fact, covers it? You seem to regard it as the same thing. The "book" you refer to is probably 2 pages. The judgement is partially in the drawing up of the "book", ensuring the regulator approves said "book", and then, and most importantly, the crew's judgement on the day as to whether the "book" is appropriate, applicable, and whether they are happy with it.

You OTOH, seem to believe the "book" is wrong (your right), but then go on to repeatedly criticise the crew becuase they do not share your belief that their company/CAA procdures are incorrect in principle.

Assuming you are a commerical pilot (?), would you want me to come in and tell you that your company's and National Authority's procedures were b*llocks, and that any of your company's pilots (including you) following the procedures were therefore incompetent.

Are prudence, risk management, and public relations covered with so much completeness as well? Prudence and Risk Mgmt are inherent of commercial operations - else we would not fly. PR does not come into the pilots remit...

Your concern with the principle of continuing after a single engine failure is a view you are entitled to. My gripe with you is that you (and others) are unable to comprehend others may have alternative viewpoints... but more importantly, please direct your disdain, not to individual crew members, but to the regulator who has repeatedly confirmed they are 100% content with these SOPs.

NoD

[AMF]

Nigel.....

The fact that you try and assert that "The events at the other end of the flight were completely separate and not under discussion here" doesn't change that fact that you cannot separate them in reality when you're actually flying an airplane. Degraded performance/higher fuel burns do indeed have causal relevance as to whether any aircraft arrives at it's destination, with enough fuel, or (as the case was here) short of both.

It's telling that this assertion must be repeated ad naseum by those pretending there was no better course of action to the crew. Trying to frame a debate with this invalid premise...that the decision didn't affect the outcome...is ludicrous. Once again, this is pseudo-logic. Aristotle wouldn't approve, my friend.

Aerodynamic principles and time/fuel/distance constraints are axiomatic, and the increasing chance of forecasts being erroneous the further out you rely on them (say, 11 hours) are givens that any professional pilot is aware of and should consider in any plan of action. The same goes for ATC requirements that may work against you.

It's no wonder you must insist that the outcome isn't relevant, otherwise you're left with.....

The crew purposely choosing a course of action that left them short on distance and fuel.....

or....

The crew making a mistake by ignoring variables that they are paid not to ignore, not planning for the worst, and merely hoping for the best.

Either way it's not good, or what passengers expect. That's what a few decades' worth of cowboying around carrying pax tells me anyway.

As I said, if it weren't a BA crew involved, this would be the critisism and focus of debate. Certainly nobody would be pretending that the decision didn't affect the outcome, or there wasn't a better course of action that could've been taken.

[catchup]

Who is FAA?

regards

[atse]

AMFOnce again, this is pseudo-logic. Aristotle wouldn't approve, my friend. When it comes to putting forward an argument, supported by clarity and logical connections in what it is you have to say, you are hardly a model for the rest of us. After all, you started with a declaration of prejudice which was used as a means of expressing your own prejudices. I see lots of assertions since then, but little elucidation.

Not only do I not see much entitlement to invoke Aristotle, but I think I have to say that Bart Simpson wouldn't approve, my friend.

[punkalouver]

I know I'm not qualified to make statements on this subject because the aircraft I fly is not a 747-400 but I did read an article in the June Aviation International News by John Goglia, a former member of the board of the NTSB. I can't find the article on the net but I'll put a couple of quotes here. I hope it hasnt already been posted here.
"....soon after, the crew was notified that debris had been found on the departure runway."
"There are just too many possible failures caused by the high speed ejection of engine parts to contonue past a suitable landing location. Let's not forget that even if the crew went back into the cabin to look at the engine, not all of the powerplant is visible and the potential for hidden damage is real."
"my concern is that the corporate culture of the airlines has allowed increased risk to become the norm"
"Just because something is legal doesn't mean that it is safe."
I don't think the fact that twins cross the ocean is relevant to his arguments.

[SASless]

Lets look at this argument from a different view point....if the crew had decided to dump fuel and return to LAX...or continue to Lost Wages....or turned north to SFO while dumping fuel and landed.....no matter what the rules, regs, policies, SOP's, Checklist....or the Purser said.....would we be having this discussion.


The aircraft would have been safely on the ground in the minimum amount of time....with some added costs to the airline and some minor inconvenience to the passengers.

But there would have been no fuss....some highly upset management types maybe....but safey would not have been compromised or perceived to have been compromised in any way.

Besides....it would have meant more time by the swimming pool at the hotel at company expense.

[Carnage Matey!]

And had a certain american twin operator not been agitating with its pet senators we wouldn't be hearing about it either. The aircraft got safely on the ground at Manchester. Had the crew had the information BA has now given to its 744 pilots they'd have got it on the ground without the need to declare any sort of emergency and there'd have been no fuss whatsoever. This has been done to death. Now if John Goglia doesn't think continuing on three is safe, did he lobby to revoke the 744s certification to fly on three when he was at the NTSB? If not, why not?

[20driver]

First I've heard of debris on the runway - is this correct.
Also - anyone have any info on the state of the engine when it got to LHR and what servicing was required?
As an aside - NTSB has gotten on some pretty silly horses lately - the video camera in the cockpit being one example.

[punkalouver]

"Now if John Goglia doesn't think continuing on three is safe, did he lobby to revoke the 744s certification to fly on three when he was at the NTSB? If not, why not?"

Perhaps because the NTSB doesn't certify aircraft. The FAA does. The NTSB investigates acciidents and from what I hear they are quite busy so they probably don't run around studying the details of 744 certification unless a specific issue arises.
He never said continueing on three is unsafe. I believe his emphasis is that after leaving debris on the runway, it was unsafe to continue.

He said at the end "I do not believe that the decisions made during this flight are examples of the highest form of inegrity that the travelling public has come to expect"

Perhaps a new question should go out to 744 pilots or really anyone. If after facing a similar situation you were told that 'debris' had been found on the runway that you just took off from, would you continue?

[L337]

As has been noted earlier. First I have heard of Debris on Runway. Also it was my understanding that the engine failed on the climb out. So if that was the case, difficult to leave debris on the runway.

L337

[swh]

I thought the record for the highest number of trans atlantic OEI flights goes to concord....all this fuss over one flight in a 744.

DC8, 707, connie, B52, P3, 747 classic, A340, concord etc all are very happy flying OEI...

How many OEI trans atlantic flights or long haul flights in the past decade ... 100, 200, 300 ? anyone got some real figures to put this into perspective...would not be surprised BA could have one a month with the size of their fleet and the hours they do.

This same aircraft did two OEI long haul flights in the span of a month...

:rolleyes:

[jafa]

I fail utterly to see the problem. You shut one down, then you have to look at continuing on three. Which assumes you will have to accept another degree of failure, e.g. another engine failure. So either it is a beaut day, no high ground coming anywhere near your two engine limit - in a 400 it is going to have to be something pretty spectacular, the Himalayas - and there are aerodromes all the way you can divert into more or less at short notice, and you have fuel to destination plus reserves; or the high ground is above you on two, or another failure will leave you a long way from safety on two, or you don't have the fuel. In the later cases, land somewhere. Soon. In the former, keep going; and if it goes bad, dive into one of the suitable funk holes you had in mind all along. Into the pub, into the bar, and start on the paper work. Stock, standard, normal.

What else is new?

[A340Jock]

Without having read all the previous pages (gosh it'll take me days) I can just mention the following from the A340 FCOM (Engine Shutdown Procedure FCOM3.02.70p4) Flying more than 7 hours with an egine failed may damage it. Now this is only mentioned as an advisory so crew know the effects of windmilling on a shutdown engine. If the engine was lost due damage then obviously this advisory comment does not apply.
Like everything in aviation there is no black or white only shades or gray but personally I fail to see the purpose of not continueing if there are on-route airfields available should something else occure.

[DFC]

Just been discussing the scenario again and it has brought up the point of what the international standards say (Annex 6);

5.2.9 En route — one power-unit inoperative. The
aeroplane shall be able, in the event of the critical power-unit
becoming inoperative at any point along the route or planned
diversions therefrom, to continue the flight to an aerodrome at
which the Standard of 5.2.11 can be met, without flying below
the minimum flight altitude at any point.

5.2.10 En route — two power-units inoperative. In the
case of aeroplanes having three or more power-units, on any
part of a route where the location of en-route alternate
aerodromes and the total duration of the flight are such that the
probability of a second power-unit becoming inoperative must
be allowed for if the general level of safety implied by the
Standards of this chapter is to be maintained, the aeroplane
shall be able, in the event of any two power-units becoming
inoperative, to continue the flight to an en-route alternate
aerodrome and land.

That seem to say that 1 out continue to any aerodrome where a safe landing can be made including the destination but for 2 out go to enroute alternate.

If everyone who had an engine fail early in flight on a 4 engine aircraft diverted asap then why would ICAO have a need for the above paragraph 5.2.10?

------

Debris on the runway?

Ask for clarification of exactly what the debris is.

Why turn back simply cause the fire crew spilled their big macs on the way back to the station? :D

Regards,

DFC

[bermondseya]

That seem to say that 1 out continue to any aerodrome where a safe landing can be made including the destination but for 2 out go to enroute alternate.

With a single post on a rumour bulletin board DFC appears to have invalidated ETOPS! !!

Why turn back simply cause the fire crew spilled their big macs on the way back to the station?

That would be the crew that you can count on risking their lives to pull you out of a fiery inferno?

[Bengerman]

This is a load of fuss about a big zero!

The flight landed safely after the crew had evaluated the situation, made a decision and acted in a thoroughly professional manner.

The American mischief making in the field of aviation has to stop. This is not an argumant about aviation, it is an argument about politics and the sooner the publicity hungry Washington lobbyists get their heads onto another issue the better we will all be.

[lomapaseo]

Bengerman

You must have failed to read the hundreds of posts in this thread from qualified pilots who certainly had differing opinions on the technical merits of the decision making by this crew.

I don't see how americanism and politics are the drivers behind this division of views.

Of course I remain open to new arguments on the subject of this thread but I haven't seen any in the last months.

[Flap62]

Loma,

Having read the numerous posts and being current on the type in question, can you tell me at which point in the flight were safety margins significantly eroded? That is, at which point in the flight did a failure of another system or power plant place the aircraft in a situation where terrain clearance could not be maintained or a diversion to a suitable airfield be made without adequate fuel reserves?

I would ask you to keep your answer within the bounds of fact and away from what you have gleaned from the National Enquirer.

[West Coast]

"were safety margins significantly eroded?"

Just passing through, and only a two holer driver, so its more of a question. With respect to his fuel state, I understand they landed short of the destination with a load that might be considered low. Yes/no?

[L337]

West Coast:

They were not at destination. So not easy to give you a reply of Yes/ No.

22 page thread, and you can't be bothered to even skim the thread, let alone read it.

L337

[Flap62]

They landed at a suitable alternate with a fuel state which was entirely consistent with normal operations. The declaration of an emergency was largely down to a misappreciation of the fuel management needed to land with "balanced tanks"- hardly a life or death situation!

[lomapaseo]

Loma,

Having read the numerous posts and being current on the type in question, can you tell me at which point in the flight were safety margins significantly eroded? That is, at which point in the flight did a failure of another system or power plant place the aircraft in a situation where terrain clearance could not be maintained or a diversion to a suitable airfield be made without adequate fuel reserves?


Flap62
So you mean you didn't even bother to do a search on my name to see where I stand on these arguments.

tch tch

Maybe if you were to do a point by point rebuttal we both wouldn't have to resort to reading only the headlines from National Enquirer.

[Flap62]

It was simply a question which hasn't been answered and is highly relevant.

[West Coast]

L337
Thanks for your input and comment.

[DFC]

bermondseya,

The last time I checked the T in ETOPS was for Twin.

That quote and this discussion is relevant to aircraft with 4 engines.

As for the fire crew, well actually I have experienced a situation where the fire crew on a practice alert to the terminal (across a runway) deposited some nicely rolled hoses just left of the centerline. Note no smiley here!

Regards,

DFC

[bermondseya]

DFC,

You brought them up, so you need to read your ICAO regs again.

5.2.9 says nothing about how many engines are on the plane, it could apply to a twin. But in any case..

5.2.9 says 'en route'. The BA had not yet entered the 'en route' structure, it was comfortably on the SID, i.e in departure phase.

I am sure somebody will now say it's en route as soon as it leaves for London. To which I will ask whether that includes during the taxi to the hold short line. And...

5.2.9 says 'The aeroplane shall be able... to continue'

We all know the plane is 'able' to continue, how do you think ferry flights work. The question is was it wise to do so with pax in the back, and does the FAA have authority to say what foreign carriers can do in it's airspace.

ICAO regs describe the bare minimum standards that international operators are expected to maintain. I like to think of them as being what Bongo Airways might aim for, not a carrier from a technologically advanced nation. Perhaps I am wrong to think this way, but I am sure the travelling public selects British Airways over Bongo Airways because of their perceived higher safety standards.

I'm with West Coast on this. I want to know how much fuel they had when they departed and what their planning was wrt fuel. Should be an interesting report.

[DFC]

Here is a question;

For ETOPS, the system relies on having a diversion runway available within a certain time from anywhere on the planned route.

Lets say that a flight enroute diverts to an enroute aerodrome that everyone in the system at that time is relying on..........does everyone else turn back or re-route straight away because that diversion could (when it gets there) block the single runway they are relying on for ETOPS?

Regards,

DFC