FAA & CAA disagree over B747 continued 3 engine flight

[BEagle]

From today's Sunday Times:

BA accused over flights with one engine down

DIPESH GADHER, TRANSPORT CORRESPONDENT

BRITISH AIRWAYS has allowed jumbo jets to complete long-haul flights on at least seven occasions despite pilots having to shut down an engine.

On each occasion the flight had to be completed on three engines rather than four because of technical problems.

Safety concerns have been raised because the pilots of the Boeing 747s decided to continue with their journeys rather than divert to a nearby airport.

In one recent case this led to an aircraft making an emergency landing at Manchester because pilots feared it was running low on fuel after crossing the Atlantic with one engine down.

America’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has accused British Airways (BA) of “careless and reckless” behaviour although the airline says passenger safety has never been compromised.

The phenomenon is not confined to BA. Since the start of last year 18 British-registered aircraft — including Airbus A340s, BAe146s and jumbos — have been forced to shut down one of four engines in the air, according to Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) records. Several then continued their journeys.

The FAA is investigating one BA flight, carrying 351 passengers, that suffered an engine surge immediately after taking off from Los Angeles airport in February.

The faulty engine was shut down, but after taking advice from BA technicians in London, the captain continued with the 11-hour flight to Heathrow rather than returning to Los Angeles or diverting to another American airport.

Forced to fly at a lower altitude than the flight crew wanted, the plane used up more fuel than expected because of less favourable tailwinds.

By the time the aircraft reached Ireland the captain felt that attempting a landing at Heathrow would be too risky and asked for a diversion to Manchester.

Howard Ramsdale, 47, a passenger on the flight, said: “I was absolutely astounded that we didn’t return to LA. There wasn’t a single person that I spoke to on that plane who wanted to carry on. “As far as I’m concerned my life was put at risk. It was a very stressful flight and I’m not really sure that I’d get on an aircraft again, let alone a BA one.” Ramsdale, a science teacher from Gainsborough, Lincolnshire, has written to the airline, demanding compensation for the trauma he suffered.

BA has backed the actions of the pilot and points out that the 747 is certified to fly on three engines.

Given the circumstances, the CAA also believes that flying with one engine down is “a safe option”, more so if the plane is well into its journey.

This view, however, does not appear to be shared by the FAA, which could fine BA if it concludes that the airline violated American regulations.

Originally posted on the 747 diversion thread, but that appears to have been given the PPRuNe 'sinking' treatment as it didn't reappear at the top of Rumours and News. Those who wish to read more can search under '744 Diversion to MAN' to find the full thread.

[Lou Scannon]

The FAA has no option other than to question the decision as their rules require a diversion to the nearest "suitable". On occasions this is not so strictly followed as the FAA believe.

Our rules do not as they take into account the performance of modern aircraft.

Once again, now that I am reduced to the status of walking freight, I have every support for the BA captain and ops who took that entirely legal and sound decision.

[Telstar]

Howard Ramsdale, 47, a passenger on the flight, said: “I was absolutely astounded that we didn’t return to LA. There wasn’t a single person that I spoke to on that plane who wanted to carry on. “As far as I’m concerned my life was put at risk. It was a very stressful flight and I’m not really sure that I’d get on an aircraft again, let alone a BA one.” Ramsdale, a science teacher from Gainsborough, Lincolnshire, has written to the airline, demanding compensation for the trauma he suffered.

:rolleyes: :yuk: :yuk: :yuk: :yuk: :yuk: :yuk: :yuk: :yuk: :yuk:

[lomapaseo]

Well I know that we have been through all this before (in about 50 pages in the other thread)

but just to stick to this latest topic, The FAA has every right to question the pilots decision according to the regs, however this certainly not proma facia evidence of a bad decision by the pilot.

There is some allowance for allowing the pilot to make decisions like this due to only a minor degrade (subjective as it is based on the previous threads pages of posts) to overall flight risk.

Such overall risk includes consideration of Air-turn-backs, contaminated runways, air traffic, fuel dumps, overweight landings, diversions to unfamiliar (to the crew) airports etc.

In the long run, the FAA questions will likely go beyond this one incident, although it does give them a key to the CAA door. It will likely revolve arround not just this one flight (which was minisule in increased risk) but to the greater fleet risk increase if every crew would perform the same action as an SOP without the threat of being questioned about their specific judgement by a regulator.

[atse]

When it comes to the discussions between the CAA and FAA I'm intrigued by the ironic possibilities to which this matter gives rise.

Would one not wish to be a "fly on the wall" for the various chats and exchanges between the CAA and FAA as they take hours and days to dissect and argue out a decision that normally has to be taken in minutes?

I mean to say, if YOU are up to your ears "in the merde" you are normally told that the regulations and requirements are clear, are you not?

Of course, what you are really being told is that the interpretation being shoved down your throat is the current "conventional wisdom" as to how the regulations should be interpreted. Individual pilots facing "the system" have an uphill battle to explain why what they decided seemed quite reasonable at the time. The system tends to win these arguments.

But what happens when two equally opinionated authorities - here the CAA and FAA - disagree? I, for one, would pay for an observer's seat as they thrash out their points of view. In fact it is the argument, not the published outcome that will be interesting - perhaps a better source of education and enlightenment than your average accident report?

BTW, iomspaseo, I don't think continuing on 3 will ever be "SOP". It is an option, and it should be an option.

[BYOD]

Another engine fails. "Capt of the ship" takes a new meaning.:O

[Dr Zoidberg]

Why dont we all just accept that this has nothing to do with safety and everything to do with politics.

The regulator of one country which now builds mainly twins (777, 787) wanting to make it difficult for the quads (340 series and 380) built by another group of countries. If you make quads obay the same rules as twins after an engine failure then some of the economic advantages of them disappears. And in the same breath if you can allow twins to do unlimited ETOPS then you take away another advantage of quads.

[DA50driver]

I am from the continent that makes quads, living in the country that makes twins, and flying a tri motor.

There is no way I will continue on with one shut down. I have read enough accident reports to know that you need three events to crash an airplane. Having one engine go out is the first event. Running low on fuel is number two. The call to land should have been made long before you get to Manchester.

Lets do our profession a favor and take the most conservative approach. We would look a lot better in the public eyes if we don't gamble with their lives.

[lomapaseo]

But what happens when two equally opinionated authorities - here the CAA and FAA - disagree? I, for one, would pay for an observer's seat as they thrash out their points of view. In fact it is the argument, not the published outcome that will be interesting - perhaps a better source of education and enlightenment than your average accident report?

BTW, iomspaseo, I don't think continuing on 3 will ever be "SOP". It is an option, and it should be an option.

Sorry for the misunderstanding about my use of SOP in my post. All I meant was that the option was to be an allowed?? procedure.

As to the fly-on-the-wall approach, BTDT.

Mostly it is an exchange of views and data supporting such views. If the arguments become subjective than they take a break while collecting industry wide views and data.

Harmonization of views is what is needed without a winners or losers in an argument.

[bizflyer]

...and at the end of the article...shock horror the EAAC flight from Reunion Island arriving on 3 engines with a mere 30 minutes of fuel left. 30 Minutes!!! Crikey is that all? I would have thought they'd have at least 2 or 3 days worth. The irony of the so called article is that it must have been totally cribbed/researched from Pprune. I am not one for bashing journo's as clearly they server a purpose but what utter tosh.

[Mode7]

I'm very curious. What is COMPANY policy within Northwest, United and any other US 4-engined operators with regards to a shut down? Please COMPANY policy not personal belief.

[GotTheTshirt]

Guess I must be cynical being FAA and CAA licenced but FAA holding up the standards- Give me break:confused:

Who pushed the 90 minute rule out and out? and for whose benefit.

180 minutes with 50% of your powerplants AND in some cases system inop. Give me 75% remaining every time.:p

I can guarantee you that if ever you want to push the maintenace envelope out then go to the FAA every time.

[PAXboy]

This has been exercised to the Nth degree on PPRuNe. All the arguments are known but none of us have the knowledge that the Captain and crew had, nor have the technical reports that showed what really happened.

At the risk of starting the whole thing again, I reckon the FAA have had some American carriers whispering in their ear. I would take BA on any day of the year under (just about!) any circumstances. But there is political mileage to be made out of this. If that means more people being delayed for no purpose, then so be it.

I sit to be corrected.

[411A]

<<The FAA is investigating one BA flight, carrying 351 passengers, that suffered an engine surge immediately after taking off from Los Angeles airport in February. >>

As well they might, considering the destination was LHR.

Altho 'legal' under British civil aviation regulations, it was, as someone mentioned some time ago...absolutely, positively
stupid.

Bypassing suitable enroute diversion airports is NEVER a good idea, when flight safety is considered.
And, strangly enough, that is the exact point.
BA threw flight safety straight out the window, in preference to commercial considerations.

Sadly, BA should know better.
Even more sadly....they don't.:yuk: :yuk:

PS:
Let's look at this from a different perspective.
ABC Airlines flies to LHR on a regular basis from southern Africa non-stop, and arrives with an engine shut down (4 engine type)....from time to time, ala BA.
I would expect the CAA would be all over 'em like flies on cr@p for this idea, yet BA seems to get away with it on a (more or less) regular basis.

Double standard city...:yuk: :yuk: :yuk:

[sluggums]

Would someone please do the aviation community a favour and shoot David Learmount

[Ignition Override]

The point about how many modern airliners are designed to operate with only two engines (at ETOPS standards for RATs, APUs etc), and how far they can be (up to three hours, single-engine!) from a suitable alternate, is interesting. But if the 747 suffers a problem with another engine, then it might not be a pleasant day for the flightcrew. How high can they cruise near maximum weight on two engines in August during a diversion over desert mountains? How about from over Greenland?

I just read somewhere that BA, or a European airline must pay quite a chunk of money (i.e. $100,000 ?), if a flight returns to its departure airport. It looked like this is in addition to extra operating costs.

[Hand Solo]

For the umpteenth time Ignition, BA would NOT have to pay compensation for returning to LAX. The rules only apply to cancellations and overbooking.

[BBK]

This is a very contentious issue so I will keep my posting short. I work for a company that also flies quads and I have been discussing this incident with my colleagues. To a man (and woman) they have ALL said: dump fuel, land and let the company sort it out. I am NOT saying the BA Captain made a bad decision but my completely unofficial straw poll would suggest a more cautious approach - no pun intended!

oops!!

this was meant to be in response to the "FAA and CAA conflicting views" started by BEagle.

Sorry...

[Final 3 Greens]

411A

yet BA seems to get away with it on a (more or less) regular basis Would that be because they are operating in compliance with UK law?

Having consulted to BA and therefore seen the company's culture and attitude to safety at first hand, I take considerable exception to your comments that the airline put commercial considerations before safety.

You should at least edit your post to state "In my professional opinion", rather that state it as an apparent fact.

[enicalyth]

Question to 744 pilots:

Did the fact that an engine was shut down have anything to do with the status display of fuel transfer?

I mean after shut down did somone say "I am not sure that all the fuel in the tank(s) dedicated to the engine that shut down has been transferred for consumption by the other engines".

And subsequently did someone dip the tanks and say "You know what, it all transferred tickety-boo but you had no indication of the exact status after xx:xx hrs".

And then did yet a third person say "You were quite right to nip into Manchester in that case".

Four versus two, FAA vs CAA, everybody against BA. Makes a change (not). If putting more and more engines on an aircraft makes less and less sense then the only option is...[fill in blank space].

Makes a change from everybody having a pop at me and my outfit!

[slj]

Surely Mr Learmount has the right to express his opinion that “In my mind, it was simply not best practice. Were the passengers endangered by this? No. Did they have the same level of safety that they’d have had with four engines? Obviously not.”

Seems sensible to state that the same level of safety does not exist if one engine is shut down. What happens if a second engine fails? The failure of the second engine must reduce safety to a greater extent than the failure of the first engine.

[Wee Weasley Welshman]

The statistically unlikely occurence of a second engine failure on a 747 means you become a perfectly flyable twin engine aircraft much like all the other 767 and 777 and 330 aircraft plying the ocean that day.

As all PPRuNers know - aviation IS the calculated balance of risk. Usually with one of our backsides strapped firmly to the final calculation. Its what we are paid for.

Do you - in the final analysis - think that the Captain and the Senior/Junior First Officers aboard this aircraft elected to carry on when they were IN ANY WAY nervous or anxious or mildly concerned for their own safety? They've got their own wife and kids to think about and would have little hesitation in putting it down in say New York. Easy Peasy. But no need.

I find it informative to read, in even the quality press, stories about which I have some personal insight. Makes you realise how everything else you read is largely ignorant summary.

Cheers

WWW

[411A]

<<Having consulted to BA and therefore seen the company's culture and attitude to safety at first hand, I take considerable exception to your comments that the airline put commercial considerations before safety.>>

Oh you would, Final 3 Greens?

Well, in my professional opinion (which spans over 30 years in Command in heavy jets) BA is tweeking the tail of the tiger, and sooner or later, will get bitten.

Badly....:uhoh: :uhoh:

They should positively absolutely know better.
Flight safety...horsefeathers.

[Hand Solo]

Seems that most non american 4 engine operators are tweaking the tale of the tiger, but I don't remember anyone getting bitten by a double unrelated engine failure anytime recently.

[atse]

Surely there really is no need to redo here everything single part of the debate that has already been done on the other thread? Lots of insults got exchanged there and many silly things got said. Here’s the link: Previous Thread: March 30th @ 15:38 (http://www.pprune.org/forums/forumdisplay.php?s=&forumid=13&daysprune=45&sortorder=desc&sortfield=lastpost&perpage=25&pagenumber=7)

However, IMHO there really is an interesting issue to be debated between the CAA and FAA. Essentially it hinges, in my opinion, on the general assumptions (statistical and operational) that underlie ETOPs - set against the level of operational redundancy on the B744. You can swap insults and throw around safety accusations to you hearts content, but there are real issues here to keep the FAA and CAA busy.

********

On a different note, Final 3 Greens, you may not have come across 411A before. The posts you see here are typically modest, un-opinionated and reflective of a deep thinker who has learned a lot from his years in aviation. Such is his authority that most of us mere mortals do not bother getting into a debate with him as it seems to be a waste of our time. 411A is lucky to be able to join any thread and pronounce with certainty on virtually any subject. IMHO you should just concede defeat and give up in the face of such superior knowledge!

[GJB]

It would have been a good article, had AA Gill written it, having been on the flight, half sloshed, reviewing airline food......but in the context it was written, the S.T's have gone down in my expectations.

Why devote so much time to BA?
Humiliate them? Or did some journo not get their upgrade or was served half melted ice in their drink ?

Might as well buy the VIZ.

:yuk:

[slj]

WWW

You miss the point David Learmount was making.

Statistically you are correct about the likely failure of a second engine. All he is saying is that the aircraft does not have the same level of safety as it would have with four engines.

It might well be able to fly on two engines but is the absolute level of safety the same as flying on four engines?

[TheOddOne]

slj

It might well be able to fly on two engines but is the absolute level of safety the same as flying on four engines?

I know it's all been done to death here and elsewhere, but flying on 2 engines isn't the point here.

What IS the point, I believe, is that with one engine out, with a similar level of engine reliability, the 747/A340 is STILL 50% 'safer' than your 777/A330/767 etc etc that everyone is happy to fly over the world's oceans. So what's the point of building 4-engine aircraft in the first place? Is that 4th engine just to get the a/c off the ground? Very possibly!

One famous boss of an aircraft manufacturer was once asked
'Why do you always fly in a/c with 4 engines?'
'Because we don't make any with 5!'.

I'm inclined to GJB's point - conspiracy theories on a wet Bank Holiday. Why not!

Sadly, I find David Learmont's recent pronouncements unhelpful and out of line with safety management thinking. He's done good work in the past but it's time to pack it in, David...

Cheers,
The Odd One

[Jordan D]

The top post is found in .... here (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=164208)

Maybe a mod could deal with the said duplicity?

Jordan

[ojay]

www,you are completely wrong if you think a 4 engine aircraft on 2 is similar to a 2 engine aircraft on 1. A 4 engine jet has most of the performance prescribed for the loss of 1 engine.There is a certain level of flexibility after that which considers the loss of a further engine case,terrain clearance on 2 etc.However to say that the loss of 2 engines is comparable to a twin on one is complete baloney.2 engines out on an A340 or B747 will take you very smartly downhill and dependent on the weight/atmospheric conditions all the way down.Not the case of a twin on 1,I think you would agree.

No way would I get into making commentary on the crew who made their decision in the light of the conditions on the day(night) and they have my respect for that.As I recall the actions they took were not technically wrong,but obviously went a bit pear shaped towards the end.It really boils down to risk management;to continue on 3 is fine(and allowed) but if another engine fails you are in deep doodoo.similarly there would be a performance calculation to make based on 3 engines -all of which they made.

www,I believe you work for a 737 loco with orange colours (same as me,actually) and I know you are an enthusiastic contributor to pprune and there is nothing wrong in that.My take is that you are unlikely to have an encyclopeadic appreciation of either long haul ops or 4 engine performance.I have 16 years worth of jet lag in my log book which does not make me the definitive expert either but I have flown those types and routes and understand the pressures/difficulties that may occur.In summary,authorative statements made on pprune which are downright wrong help noone's case.it is hypocritical to damn journalists for their technical innaccuracies then go ahead and demonstrate the same.

with b/rgds

[Final 3 Greens]

Well, in my professional opinion (which spans over 30 years in Command in heavy jets) BA is tweeking the tail of the tiger, and sooner or later, will get bitten. That's rather more of a professional statement.

Now just to recap, how many of your 30 years and 000s of hours was in command of a 744?

[ShotOne]

It is interesting to see that the regulators are at odds here. divided on national grounds. There must be many examples of US 4 engined airliners with in-flight shutdowns. Did any of them continue? Did the FAA come out with public comments about "recklessness" etc?

[boofhead]

OJAY, that is simply not true; the 747 can maintain altitude (OK, not 35,000 feet) on two engines, so it is not going to fall out of the sky as you suggest, and can easily land at the nearest suitable following a second engine shut down. A two engine out landing approach is well-practiced (in the sim), and the pilots in one well known Asian airline do it on auto pilot!

But surely the argument here rests on regulations; FARs and Ops Specs. Boeing does not require an immediate landing following the shutdown of one engine, no matter where or when it happens . They list those failures that do require a landing at the nearest suitable (which can include factors such as maintenance facilities, passenegr handling etc) and a single engine failure does not appear.

I am not aware of any FAR or CAA regulation that does rule on this matter, and for something as major as this it should not be necessary to "interpret" to find the answer. Either there is a regulation, and the FAA has a case, or there is not, and the FAA can blow it out of the proverbial.

[TheOddOne]

Well said, boofhead.

In a simple world, either the FAA are right and there will be major repercussions, loss of International reputation for British aviation, or there will be no case to answer, in which case we'll probably never hear anything about it.

But the world ain't simple. My guess is that this will rumble on and on, with innuendo and dark mutterings coming from various American and other interests. Pity really. It can only harm the reputation of a fine and very safe aircraft and, despite all their foibles, one of the best large airlines in the world.

Cheers,
The Odd One

[ojay]

I did not say it would fall out of the sky,I referenced weight/ISA conditions and I am well aware of the 2 engine approach on either B747 or A340. however,a 4 engine a/c on 2 is in a less 'flexible' scenario than a twin on 1.The regs are different for 4 engine ops due to the statistical chances of 2 failing
(presumed unlikely).The A340-300 is described by Airbus as 'a well balanced quad' and the V1 cut situation at max weight will give less than sprightly climb performance and a 2 engine failure at V1 -highly unlikely I know-at max weight is only going in one direction(down!)

If one was unfortunate and experienced a double engine failure with a favourable combination of weight/altitude etc I would say that fuel dumping would be a priority after the abnormal checklist.I only wanted to highlight the difference between a 4 engine a/c on 2 and a 2 engine a/c on 1,hence the debate between the regulatory authorities.

Finally,I would not comment on the crew decision making-ultimately everybody walked away and the crew were I am certain v professional -it is not a perfect world out there,

b/rgds

[collinha]

In the 747 checklist, is an engine failure in flight an emergency item, or just abnormal?

In any case, it's a safety issue, and should have been treated as such.

[BBT]

Once upon a time I was travelling as SLF in a B747 with a large well know U.S. carrier that therefore operates according to the FARs. (This was some time ago, perhaps around the mid ‘80’s). Approaching Greenland we had an engine failure and we did not go back to LHR or Iceland. Neither did we land in Goose, or divert to Gander or Montreal. In fact we did not continue to SFO, but we did divert to … Chicago (this being a major maintenance base for the said airline, as the coincidence would have it). I wonder if any of those from the U.S. or elsewhere who have criticised the BA captain’s decision would care to comment upon this decision?

[BEagle]

The purpose of starting this thread was to highlight the differing views of the FAA and CAA, NOT to go over the same well-trodden ground as the previous thread.

The fact that there is still debate over the event means that there is no single correct solution. Perhaps the national regulatory authorities will now agree further guidance? Or is that a somewhat porcovolant thought?

[Mode7]

I'm very curious. What is COMPANY policy within Northwest, United and any other US 4-engined operators with regards to a shut down? Please COMPANY policy not personal belief.

[av8boy]

The regulator of one country which now builds mainly twins (777, 787) wanting to make it difficult for the quads (340 series and 380) built by another group of countries. If you make quads obay the same rules as twins after an engine failure then some of the economic advantages of them disappears.

I don’t think that it IS the case that "quads" are made to obey the same rules as twins after an engine failure. For instance, 121.565 speaks to continuing after engine failure, and says (in part):

Sec. 121.565 Engine inoperative: Landing; reporting.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, whenever an engine of an airplane fails or whenever the rotation of an engine is stopped to prevent possible damage, the pilot in command shall land the airplane at the nearest suitable airport, in point of time, at which a safe landing can be made.
(b) If not more than one engine of an airplane that has three or more engines fails or its rotation is stopped, the pilot in command may proceed to an airport that he selects if, after considering the following, he decides that proceeding to that airport is as safe as landing at the nearest suitable airport:
(1) The nature of the malfunction and the possible mechanical difficulties that may occur if flight is continued.
(2) The altitude, weight, and usable fuel at the time of engine stoppage.
(3) The weather conditions en route and at possible landing points.
(4) The air traffic congestion.
(5) The kind of terrain.
(6) His familiarity with the airport to be used.

The language of 121.565 is nearly identical to the US Civil Aeronautics Regulations, Part 40, dated 31 December 1955. How this could have been written in 1955 to disadvantage Airbus in 2005 is beyond me…

Although I haven’t seen anything from the FAA on this, my guess is that it isn’t going to be a battle fought under the “nearest suitable airport” banner… Of course, I am prepared to be corrected.

[Wino]

Hand solo said

Seems that most non american 4 engine operators are tweaking the tale of the tiger, but I don't remember anyone getting bitten by a double unrelated engine failure anytime recently.

How do you know that other engines aren't effected after you lose one? Could be a maint. error! Eastern had a VERY near miss in Miami when they shut one down and started to continue to their destination when they lost 2 more and managed to get the 1st one shut down restarted and just staggered to the airport. Turned out a maint error had been made that wound up taking out all the engines. That incident lead to the change of regulations that no longer permitted US aircraft to keep going after an engine failure.

Even if it wasn't an engine failure from maint, lets say it was FOD. Well if you fod one engine it is quite possible the adjacent engine is damaged. Maybe you flew through some birds you didn;t see....

The ONLY way you can verify that no other engines are effected is to land and inspect them! AFTER you have inspected them, then you can perform a 3 engine ferry and take the aircraft to your maint. base.

Otherwise you are taking a NEEDLESS risk. This isn't a war. London won't be bombed if you don't get up and intercept the inbounds. Safety first.

Cheers
Wino

[Hand Solo]

Maybe it is a maintenance error, but thats a call to make on the day. If you're losing an engine because of, for example, oil leakage then perhaps you might attribute it to maintenance errors. We had a very near miss in the UK on a 737 not too long ago due to maintenance errors on both engines. If you've lost a single engine to a surge with no unexpected parameters then it is highly likely the problem is a traditional engine surge and confined to a single engine. The chances of FOD occuring to multiple engines on both sides of a wide body with an initial engine surge on one side and absolutely no other abnormal parameters on any other engine are remote. In this instance the crew assessed all the other engines and, with no abnormal indications, correctly assessed the remaining engines were fully servicable. We could all go into panic mode and land a quad immediately after an engine failure, but why not extend that to other systems? Perhaps after a failure of a single hydraulic system we should land ASAP in case a maintenance error deprives us of the remaining systems? What about a generator failure? Where do we draw the line?

[Heilhaavir]

Sorry guys should have read the thread all the way :) My bad!!
(Edited after seeing av8's post)


<<This view, however, does not appear to be shared by the FAA, which could fine BA if it concludes that the airline violated American regulations.>>

Beagle,
where does this violate American regs? FAR Part 121.565 paragraphe b states:

(b) If not more than one engine of an airplane that has three or more engines fails or its rotation is stopped, the pilot in command may proceed to an airport that he selects if, after considering the following, he decides that proceeding to that airport is as safe as landing at the nearest suitable airport:
(1) The nature of the malfunction and the possible mechanical difficulties that may occur if flight is continued.
(2) The altitude, weight, and usable fuel at the time of engine stoppage.
(3) The weather conditions en route and at possible landing points.
(4) The air traffic congestion.
(5) The kind of terrain.
(6) His familiarity with the airport to be used.
(c) The pilot in command shall report each stoppage of engine rotation in flight to the appropriate ground radio station as soon as practicable and shall keep that station fully informed of the progress of the flight.
(d) If the pilot in command lands at an airport other than the nearest suitable airport, in point of time, he or she shall (upon completing the trip) send a written report, in duplicate, to his or her director of operations stating the reasons for determining that the selection of an airport, other than the nearest airport, was as safe a course of action as landing at the nearest suitable airport. The director of operations shall, within 10 days after the pilot returns to his or her home base, send a copy of this report with the director of operation's comments to the certificate-holding district office.

[Dirty Mach]

It seems pretty transparent to me that the problem is not the actions of the crew or BA. Surely the problem here is that since september 11th 2001, American carriers are strugling somewhat (chapter 11 protection etc) whereas BA has been doing pretty well considering the industry climate and low cost cometition. This looks like a political complaint by the FAA to undermine the BA customer base.

Out of interest, how would Virgin have handled this?

[Wino]

heilhavaar,

It would appear that the crew was in violation of B2 and B4.

They wound up short of fuel and landed short. Elegant proof of a violation of B2



The reason that they wound up that way was because of traffic congestion keeping them off their optimum alt, (but they weren't that far off, so I am sceptical that they would have reached london anyway) because of traffic congestion, Ergo a violation of B4.



Dirty Mach, with all due respect, you don't know what you are talking about. An American Airlines crew was violated by the FAA in the mid 80s after an engine dropped off a 727 (number 3, no hydraulics on that engine) and they continued to the destination. They didn't know the engine has seperated, they just thought it quit...

They were cited for violations including the FAA catch all "Careless and reckless"


That does not make it a sept 11 protectionism issue. But interestingly, the outcome of this could be that no state departement travel will be permitted on BA (similar to what was done to Korean Air till they shaped up somewhat)

If you want to operate in America, you have to comply with the Rules. quite simple... Also, have you read ANY of the reports of passenger reactions? Even if there wasn't a single US certificated airline in the world (IOW no competition), the FAA would be FORCED to act.

Cheers
Wino

[slice]

Wino - at the point of deciding to continue the crew would have had no information to indicate air traffic congestion or otherwise. Only when informed that the optimal FL was not available would the crew now have to divert to comply with b(2) & b(4)- and this was as I understand it in Canadian Airspace - are their regulations the same ??

[Wino]

If you don't have the fuel to be 2000 feet off your optimum, you haven't got the fuel to go. International flying requires a 10 percent buffer for that portion of flight 2000 feet low doesn't push up your fuel burn by 10 percent. Not even close. Furthermore, once you are past that portion of the that 10 percent is no longer in the required (IOW's, now its yours to burn....)


Assuming they were doing some sort of rerelease flight plan, they should have gotten over release point and made their decision at that point. But again, that doesn't seam to have happened here.

Now they have to defend themselves from a government beaurocracy that is acting with the benefit of 20 20 hindsite, and they are gonna scrutinize your decisions. On SOOOOO many levels this was a foolish decision, that appears to have been carried out for the very LEAST important reason (Economic)

Cheers
Wino

[exvicar]

Wino

Not strictly true. Fuel planning would require 5% contingency. If an en-route alternate is used, you only require 5% from that alternate or an additional 15 mins holding fuel, which ever is the greater. The en-route alternate would more than likely be the UK side of the pond, so the contingency carried would not necessarily be that great. I for one would side with the CAA. If we are that worried about a 4 engined aircraft crossing the pond on 3, which it is after all certified to do, should the FAA not be taking a closer look at the 3 hours & 9 minute single engine ETOPS diversion on the Pacific. I know which aircraft I would rather be on!

[frangatang]

Ba use a lower contingency figure on most flights these days.

[sky9]

Wino
It would appear to me that the FAA regulations effectively allow a commander to do whatever he wants. I would however point out that the BA does not have an "N" on its tail so is not regulated by the FAA, but the CAA and comply with their regulations (or is it now European regulations through the CAA?).

Furthermore in the UK the CAA FOI’s are designated to each company and all operational notices and policies are copied and approved by the FOI acting in the name of the CAA.

If the FAA don’t like the 747 flying on 3 they shouldn’t have certified it. Meanwhile if they want to criticise the crews decision, produce the risk analysis to back up their view together with the risk analysis of a twin on 1 halfway across the Pacific.

[boofhead]

OJ, I don't know about the Airbus but a 747 (Classic and -400) will fly on two engines, and is not going to be forced to land, even at max auw. This is of course provided the crew keep the airspeed up. There have been a couple of incidents when two engines have failed on takeoff and the flight was able to climb and cruise. The accidents happen when the airplane is on descent to land, when the crew allow the airspeed to fall prematurely (see the El Al accident in the Netherlands). This can happen to a three or two engine airplane as well, ie pilot error.
There are no figures in the manuals for this configuration but there is info in the test pilot gross performance manuals, and I would expect the initial cruise altitude to be around 15,000 feet at gross weight. Hardly a reason to panic.
The secret is to accelerate and remove the drag. With flap greater than 1 (or possibly 5 at lower weights) the airplane will not climb on two engines, and a go-around has to be planned carefully, with acceleration on the descent path until the right speed and flap setting is achieved.
Another way to improve performance is to reduce the fuel (and hence auw), when the 747 on two is just as sprightly as any twin on one. But remember it takes 45 minutes or more to dump the fuel to landing weight, so that will not help if the problem occurs after takeoff, and is not only a waste of time but can cause problems with providing a fire risk.
Getting down to landing weight, or less, is equivalent to flying 500 miles, even while dumping, and a two engine landing above landing weight would not be a good idea. The landing speed would be very high and the brakes would probably catch fire, at the least.
The 747 on three engines is classified as a normal operation, and only when there are two (or more) failed is there a need for a landing at the nearest suitable airport. Take a look at the statistics of accidents in airliners and you will see that they are rarely caused by mechanical failures alone; there is always an element of crew error, and that is more likely to happen when the crew is in panic mode, trying to get back on the ground in a hurry.
More likely to happen now, with everyone afraid of the media spotlight or the agenda-driven FAA.

[blueloo]

exvicar, I'd rather be on an ETOPs aircraft most of the time, its certified to higher standards, the engines have to have higher reliability, and other than the engines, it has to have better fire supression ability, in addition to numerous other additional standards. My understanding is that these redundancies are going to be applied to 4 and 3 holers.


why on earth you would continue with an engine failed for unknown reasons, when you have several perfectly useable, main airports nearby is beyond me. Yes it can fly on 3 engines ok, and yes it can struggle on 2, the fact is you have had some pretty significant malfunction/abnormal indication...and you cant really be certain as to what caused it.

why risk it, for saving some $$$.

[ojay]

b/h -I know and agree with all you say -I flew the classic 747 for 11 years and was LHS with 2 separate airlines.There are some grey areas and the BA 747 case of the engine failing ex LAX falls into that category.I am sure that under JAR regs there would be no reason to 'land at nearest suitable' with the loss of one(out of 4) but am not sure of FARs and indeed whether they are applicable.The original point I wanted to make is that the regs are different between 4 engine ops and twin -the point being a 747/A340 on 2 engines is not the same as a B767/777 !

Many years ago I departed HKG for Rome(FCO);at TOC we lost a hydraulic system.I/we made the decision to continue to destination with the knowledge that the loss of another system put us into the 'land at nearest suitable' category with a plethora of fairly horrible diversion airfields en route.No rules were broken and we landed uneventfully in FCO.With the benefit of hindsight was it wise?I am not sure is the answer,but I am certain that this crew went through similar thought processes and came to a decision they were comfortable with.

Interesting discussion though -cheers o/j

[Mode7]

With regards all the banter about BA continuing to fly to avoid compensation - this should put an end to it.....

EU Passenger Rights- Denied Boarding Compensation

New Denied Boarding Compensation legislation (261/2004) came into effect on the 17th of February this year and updated existing legislation on the rights of payment to air passengers if they are denied boarding. Although now in place, much of the legislation remains in the view of some, ‘ambiguous’ and legal action is being taken by some groups to have the legislation altered.

Airlines need to make their own judgments when implementing aspects of the law, however the legal wording is that airlines are not required to pay compensation if a flight is cancelled because of “extraordinary circumstances, which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken”. The airline must be able to prove that these circumstances exist.

These reasons include those that affect safety and security and may include:

Technical faults

· Technical faults that prevent the safe operation of a flight even though maintenance was performed in accordance with legal requirements and the manufacturers’ recommended practices
· Warnings and other technical faults that would breach legal requirements for operations

Disruptions or subsequent cancellation caused as a result of technical faults.

Weather

· Runway closure or temporary restrictions due to a requirement to change the direction of take-off and landing
· Actual/forecast visibility or winds at origin, destination or nominated diversion, outside legal limits
· Reduced take-off or landing movement rates at origin, destination or diversion due to any adverse weather conditions
· Forecast en-route turbulence or icing beyond limits
· Cancellation of subsequent flights due to disruption caused by weather

Crew

· Sickness of a crew member preventing the operation of a flight within legal limits
· A delay that leads to crew being unable to operate a flight within legal limits
· Strikes among staff (airline and 3rd party) that prevent the operation of a flight
· External factors that prevent essential staff getting to an airport ie weather
· Cancellation of subsequent flights due to disruption caused by personnel difficulties

Failure of third party services (ie ATC)

· Equipment failure/closure or limits that prevent or restrict flight operations (ie unplanned terminal closures or reduction of flights handled by ATC)
· Restrictions due to military or VIP flights
· Closure following an accident or incident involving another aircraft
· Cancellations due to disruption caused by services provided by third parties

[Max Angle]

BA are pretty confident of where they stand, there has been no flight crew order forbiding the practice (or hadn't the last time we spoke about it) and and as far as my BA 747 mate is concerned it is still a legitimate course of action. As someone has already said if the FAA have a problem with the 747 flying around on 3 they should be talking to Boeing about re-writing the type certificate which seems to allow continued flight on 3 engines.

[Hand Solo]

They wound up short of fuel and landed short. Elegant proof of a violation of B2

Incorrect. They had less fuel than necessary to reach LHR but that came as no surprise to anyone and was known about 10 hours prior when the engine failed, further reinforced about 6 hours prior when the lower oceanic level was assigned. Continurine to an en-route alternate is not a problem. It was only when the aircraft approached MAN and the crew became uncertain of the performance of the fuel system that the Mayday was declared as a precaution. As it happened the aircraft landed in MAN with full reserves, all of which was usable. Aircraft land at LHR with little more than full reserve fuel every day and nobody bats an eyelid.

the outcome of this could be that no state departement travel will be permitted on BA

Thanks to the Fly America policy I doubt there's very much State Dept business coming to BA anyway. Hardly a big loss.

Also, have you read ANY of the reports of passenger reactions?
Yes. No panic on board except for those who smell compensation.

Even if there wasn't a single US certificated airline in the world (IOW no competition), the FAA would be FORCED to act.

Fine. Then rewrite the regualtions to state clearly and unambiguously that any foreign registered operator in US airspace must land ASAP at the nearest airfield in the event of a single engine failure. Don't shilly-shally and try to apply domestic regs to international operators retrospectively.

Assuming they were doing some sort of rerelease flight plan, they should have gotten over release point and made their decision at that point. But again, that doesn't seam to have happened here.

I assume by rerelease you mean what we describe as replanning, filing to an enroute destination then continuing when it as apparent fuel is sufficient? Well the aircraft passed Keflavik and Glasgow en-route, how do you know they weren't replanning on that basis? As previously mentioned, the quesionable fuel system problem only emerged later in the flight.

On SOOOOO many levels this was a foolish decision, that appears to have been carried out for the very LEAST important reason (Economic)

In your opinion. The crew involved, BA and the CAA disagree. The decision was technically correct in regard to UK regulations in every respect. As for the LEAST important reason, well I would suggest that after safety, economics is the most important reason for an airline to make any decision. We're a business.

[DFC]

The CAA in this case I expect will await the outcome of whatever investigation(s) the NTSB or FAA make. If the FAA considder this a reportable incident then the normal procedures will apply and the NTSB or FAA may make certain recomendations to operators and to regulatory authorities. Until then, the CAA can simply wait and see.

As for the case under review - This aircraft suffered and engine failure shortly after departure. It then spent several hours crossing a continent and on reaching the eastern shore of that continent one can safely say that the relative reliability of the remaining engines had been proven. At all times over that continent, the aircraft was within easy reach of many alternate airfields should one have been required. Having consulted with operations and the maintenance organisation, the decision was made to cross the Atlantic in an aircraft with 3 serviceable engines and suficient performance. While over the ocean the aircraft was closer in flying time with a further engine failure to the ETOPS alternates than other twin engine aircraft making the same crossing at the same time.

The pilot later declared an emergency and diverted because of uncertainty regarding the actual amount of fuel remaining. The aircraft had the required minimum fuel when it landed. The reasoning behing declaring an emergency is that in the UK, fuel emergency or fuel priority calls are not recognised and the only method of avoiding possible delay in such cases is to declare an emergency. The US however permits pilots to call for a fuel priority thus avoiding having to declare an emergency and to some extent masking the actual circumstances somewhat.

Had this flight departed from an East Coast US airport and continued then we would be correct to point out the dangers and the posibility of all thr engines failing due to say fuel contamination...........however, in this case, the engines put in more hours runing than any engineer would every do on a ground run.

Whay about aircraft in years gone by which shut down engines at cruise to conserve fuel........did the FAA ever have a problem then? - No.

If however the FAA do not follow the standard NTSB investigation scenarios and await findings then perhaps people are justified in saying that this is more political than safety based.

Regards,

DFC

[Wino]

Handsolo said,

As for the LEAST important reason, well I would suggest that after safety, economics is the most important reason for an airline to make any decision.
Well then why are you hauling people? You should be hauling COCAINE! far more profitable. Your second priority after safety is to follow the law. A distant 3rd is economics. Then all other considerations come into effect.


DFC said....

Whay about aircraft in years gone by which shut down engines at cruise to conserve fuel........did the FAA ever have a problem then? - No.

You have to be kidding. I know of no operation where that happens in the civilian world, only P3s on station for the NAVY. I guarantee you if it got out an airline was doing that the FAA would order an emergency revokation of their operating certificate. Maybe you are confusing engine out TAXI on the ground which IS permitted.



Also from handsolo.
In your opinion. The crew involved, BA and the CAA disagree. The decision was technically correct in regard to UK regulations in every respect.

Won't be the first time, but I suspect things are gonna change and in a hurry. (Which is 1,2 years in airline terms) The Insurance company is now aware of this and can you imagine the liability should something have happened? The Insurance company will make this a comercial decision. But this also isn't the first time that BA has been stubbornly on the wrong side of something and then relented. The locked cockpit door comes to mind.

I was arguing for it since my incident over Venice. The Nigel's poopooed it, then the little incident over Africa, and the murder of the JAS captain in flight.... STill poopooed it. Then 9.11 and whadya know, all doors locked....(and much more forcefully, as they should have been done always)

You will come around slowly.

Cheers
Wino

[NigelOnDraft]

It then spent several hours crossing a continent and on reaching the eastern shore of that continent one can safely say that the relative reliability of the remaining engines had been proven. At all times over that continent, the aircraft was within easy reach of many alternate airfields should one have been required. Having consulted with operations and the maintenance organisation, the decision was made to cross the Atlantic in an aircraft with 3 serviceable engines and suficient performance. Just to take some issue with this... since it is a statement reiterated here frequently.

A West Coast - LHR flight, such as this, does not in fact travel as you suggest across the populated N American and then "head out" across a wild and dangerous ocean... It heads a long way north, and the "remotest" area, in terms of Diversions, is probably Canada. Once it gets to the E Coast, it then has the likes of Iqaluit, Iceland and Scotland...

The (old?) "non-ETOPs" route uses this "chain" of airfields...

I am willing to be corrected in details of which is the more remote "area" - and am just attempting to dispel this myth of a "long over water crossing" after "passing over the populated and airfield rich" N American Continent :)

[411A]

<<....when the 747 on two is just as sprightly as any twin on one.>>:uhoh:

Complete and utter nonsense, boofhead.
Certification requirements differ for twins and four engine types, so your statement is totally misguided.
You should know better.

[skyclamp]

What is the ATC call when a quad becomes a trike?
Pan or Mayday?
Could this Pan or Mayday continue all the way to destination - across the pond?

What's traffic to do with it then?

OR - No call at all??

[fiftyfour]

Some statements so far say that UK registered aircraft (CAA Rules) are required to comply with US Law (FAA Rules). Not so.
CAA Rules comply with The ICAO Treaty. FAA Rules also comply with the treaty. Countries that comply with the treaty guarantee rights of flight to participating signatories. The UK lets US aircraft fly in UK, and the US should be letting UK aircraft fly in the US without argument. Thats what international obligations are about.

[Danny]

Having just qualified on the B744 and whilst still very wet behind the ears, I do know that the a/c is certified for flight with only three engines. There is no mention in the QRH of any requirement to land as soon as possible if you shut one down and no doubt the operating crew will take this as well as all other factors into account before deciding whether to continue or not.

There seems to be some confusion, especially by those who have not flown the B744, about what it is certified to do and what not. In this case, the crew elected to shut down the engine. There was no catastrophic failure. All other systems would have operated normally, including all 4 (four) hydraulic systems and 3 (three) packs. I assume their maintrol would have had access to more data than the crew about the health of the engines through the ACARS links.

Criticism of the crew by those who would not have made the same decision to continue is fine if you are not only familiar on the type but also experienced. Anyone else making a comment should first realise that without experience on type (and I mean the B744 and not just other tri-engine types or A340 which have different systems) they are assuming that the crew didn't have any regard to their own or their passengers safety which is most certainly not true.

What is the ATC call when a quad becomes a trike? Pan or Mayday?Neither. As has been mentioned the a/c is certified to fly on three engines should one be shut down after take-off. And before the nit-pickers jump on my case, I know that three-engine ferrying is a separate issue.

All reference to ETOPS and twins is irrelevant to this case and the debate about whether 180 or 207 minutes certification for twins is safe should be carried out elsewhere. The references to the FAR's as pointed out are obviously ambiguous and allow the commander enough discretion to use his or her common sense, experience, training etc. to make the necessary decision. I think the bit that says; "...he decides that proceeding to that airport is as safe as landing at the nearest suitable airport" is the get-out clause and the FAA probably don't have much to stand on. If the a/c is certified to fly on three engines then there is no reason why landing at 'that' airport is less safe than landing at the 'nearest' airport.

[BizJetJock]

FiftyFour,

Sadly I am afraid that you are incorrect. The ICAO convention is purely an agreement to standardise national law, which different countries implement and enforce to varying degrees. All aircraft within the airspace of a country are subject to that country's laws, as well as the law of the country of registration. So effectively whichever is more restrictive applies. An everyday case in point is the planning weather minima in the US as opposed to Europe which can be a headache on transatlantic flights.

BJJ

[sevenforeseven]

The UK CAA will always agree with BA, always have done always will do. Remember they are the biggest contibutors to the agency.
As far as I am concerned a four engined a/c is supposed to fly with four engines. Next BA will want to continue a flight with one engine out on a 777, CAA no problem.

[BEagle]

Aren't all Perf A 4-engined aircraft 'certified to fly' on 3 engines after V1?

Whether it's a wise or sensible move to do so for the next 10 hours or so is what is under discussion, I consider. Aircraft type and operator are wholly irrelevant.

[20driver]

To wander slightly off topic – there is an underlying assumption here that all that matters is safety – or risk – to the passengers. Of course this is not true – Economics and convenience play a very large part in the equation. If it didn’t everyone would travel one to a 747 with a built in crash proof escape pod.

However – returning to LAX contains considerable risk – and when I say considerable – it refers to the risk as opposed to the alternate course – continuing on.

LAX has had two fatal collisions on the runways in the last 10-15 years. Taken in regards to the number of ground movements at LAX over this time period this is a very small risk – but as no one as offered up a single fatality due to any 747’s running out of power and killing some one – over a longer time frame you would have to say LAX has a problem.

It used to be widely considered that take offs and landings were the “riskiest” part of the flight – so by returning to LAX the crew was exposing to passengers to an element of risk that was avoided by heading home.

I’m willing to bet that there is a least one or two murders a year at the hotels around LAX – returning would likely meant an overnight and exposed the passengers to that risk.

What would the vote have being on the aircraft if Stanley Actuary had gotten up and told the passengers – folk’s we have two choices

We continue on – there is no measurable risk in doing so - no one has ever being killed in this scenario – this doesn’t mean no risk – but I can’t tell you how much risk because it is so small.


We return – but I have to tell you there are at least four risks that can be projected based on LAX's history –

1 – An accident on landing – happens but rarely ( Was LAX VFR or IMC – big difference here)

2 – A collision on the taxiway – this has happened twice in recent times with extensive fatalities.

3-You get murdered in your hotel room. Several time more likely than any of the above

4-You get killed in an accident on the shuttle going to the hotel – where you might get murdered.

And – if you do get back on the plane alive – well you are for all I can measure right back where you are at this instant risk wise.

I think the crew would have being in trouble with the Pax if they had turned around after that speech.

Bottom line is overall you can very safely argue there was more risk to the passengers in turning around.

Just something to roil the pot.

[Wino]

Danny,

Good post.
However, let me add

FAR 91.13a

(a) Aircraft operations for the purpose of air navigation. No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.


That's the FAA elastic clause and after they clear you of all other charges they file this against you because beauty is in the eye of the beholder....

Its a long trip through the hearings and what not and will take 2 years to resolve this once and for all. (Just my forecast here)

Cheers
Wino

[TheOddOne]

20driver

Love that stuff!!!

More seriously, from an airport perspective...

Whenever there is an inbound aircraft that declares some operating anomaly, it is up to ATC to decide what, if any, Rescue & Fire Fighting Service response to initiate. In the case of an engine out on a twin, it is invariably a Full Emergency. This not only engages the Airport Fire Service, but also a major turnout by the County Fire Service, Ambulance Service and the Police. It will also alert a number of other agencies to get them to gear up for a possible Major Incident, including the Local Authority, opening survivor reception areas, people to deal with meeters & greeters, a system for contacting next of kin etc etc.

For one engine out on a 4-engine aircraft, the response is usually a Local Standby. The Airport Fire Service come on to the airfield to forward positions, just in case. They might well ask the aircraft, once it's vacated the runway, if all is well and offer to follow it to stand. We will probably inspect the runway, just to make sure the a/c hasn't dropped any bits that might be ingested by the next a/c. That's it. No drama.

I think you'll see there's a world of difference between these two levels of response.

Perhaps, just perhaps, it gives another dimension highlighting the differences between the 2 kinds of anomaly?

Cheers,
The Odd One

[DOVES]

I say again loud and clear:
But they (the cockpit crew) had torn away many pages from the emergency/abnormal check list! In this sense: in case one of such a situation would have arisen at the Non Returning Point,
I try to figure out some:
- A second engine failure
- Smoke/fire on board (electrical, from the air conditioning, in a toilet...)
- Depressurization
- Fuel temperature low
- Cracked Windshield
You name others...
obliging them to descend to a lower altitude (in some cases 10.000 ft) with F/F increasing exponentially.
Would they have been able to divert to the first suitable alternate?
Please Fly Safely
DOVES

[behind_the_second_midland]

Criticism of the crew by those who would not have made the same decision to continue is fine if you are not only familiar on the type but also experienced. Anyone else making a comment should first realise that without experience on type (and I mean the B744 and not just other tri-engine types or A340 which have different systems) they are assuming that the crew didn't have any regard to their own or their passengers safety which is most certainly not true.

Are you reading the above Learmount?

When was the last time you were employed as a 744 Captain?

[GlueBall]

The references to the FAR's as pointed out are obviously ambiguous and allow the commander enough discretion to use his or her common sense, experience, training etc. to make the necessary decision.

:{ Sorry to say, but irrespective of the -400's certified and approved cababilities... the commander lacked basic common sense in his decision to virtually embark on a 10+ hours revenue pax mission across the pond, which as it happened, couldn't be completed to destination anyway due to excessive 3-eng fuel burn.

Obviously, the airplane was built to continue safe flight on three engines, but assuredly it was not built to be intentionally operated for such unreasonably lengthy flight time with revenue payload.

This scenario of testing the interpretation of language and of testing the intent of reasonable regulations and of challenging the expected standards of common carriage of fare paying passengers is most bizzare. It's stupefying.

[BBT]

Nobody from the U.S. replied to my post yesterday. I'll repost it again in the hope that somebody can explain to me how my personal experience can be reconciled with some of the things we are being told here by our americain cousins.

Once upon a time I was travelling as SLF in a B747 with a large well know U.S. carrier that therefore operates according to the FARs. (This was some time ago, perhaps around the mid ‘80’s). Approaching Greenland we had an engine failure and we did not go back to LHR or Iceland. Neither did we land in Goose, or divert to Gander or Montreal. In fact we did not continue to SFO, but we did divert to … Chicago (this being a major maintenance base for the said airline, as the coincidence would have it). I wonder if any of those from the U.S. or elsewhere who have criticised the BA captain’s decision would care to comment upon this decision and how the FAA might be expected to view it?

[barit1]

FAA may try to enforce a 50-year-old rule (which predates the agency's creation), but they are in fact tilting at windmills. Safety is not a binary parameter, and continuing to LHR on 3 (with dozens of enroute alternates) is neither of significant risk nor highly unusual. The fact that one of these alternates was utilized proves the case that safety margin was considered throughout the flight.

I am well familiar with a case of a European captain who refused to land his ship after nighttime engine failure on takeoff from a third-world airfield, and continued toward safer facilities. He unwittingly established an engine-out record, but had the support of his ops and engineering people all the way. This was 27 years ago. I'd fly with him any day.

FAA has a significant NIH (Not Invented Here) factor, and should wake up and smell the coffee (or tea, perchance?)

[Wino]

BBT go back and read my posts. I addressed the change of attitude in the USA.

It USED to be that way. Its not anymore because of the near loss of an Eastern Airlines Aircraft in the 80s.

Cheers
Wino

[DFC]

Nigel,

You are correct, once one passes the coast north east of Winnipeg, one is in a remote area. However, the point I was making is that this was not the same as a similar occurance on a flight from say LAX to Hawaii where the flight is straight into an over water flight.

Regards,

DFC

PS. Anyone fly the VC10 or the IL62?

[20driver]

What were the circumstances of the Eastern event - are they relevant to what happened here?

[Wino]

Eastern flight left Miami


In cruise shortly after level off a engine is shut down for precautionary reasons due to a loss of quantity on oil. FLight continues ontowards destination. Seams reasonable right? Well, soon all the oil departs 2 more engines and they both quit and a widbody is headed into the water. They managed to get the first engine restarted and staggered into Miami.

Turns out that maint on all 3 engines had been performed incorrectly. (This had a VERY large effect on maint procedures for ETOPS as well)

This was one of those world changing near misses, where what used to be considered reasonable was rethought.

(This is AFTER the 747 was certficated, and it is unlikely that any aircraft would be certificated to continue in this day and age.... However a grandfather clause is a wonderfull thing)


Is it relevent? U bet... Plenty of maint items can cause a transient surge as well...
Cheers
Wino

[ShotOne]

Well, Wino a "no state department travel" ban on BA is not likely to hurt too much since under your government's "Fly America" policy, all Federal agencies MUST by law use US carriers.

[Mode7]

Doves

Smoke/fire on board (electrical, from the air conditioning, in a toilet...)
- Depressurization
- Fuel temperature low
- Cracked Windshield
You name others...
obliging them to descend to a lower altitude (in some cases 10.000 ft) with F/F increasing exponentially.
Would they have been able to divert to the first suitable alternate?

Can't see how flying 2/3/4 or even 8 engines would make any difference. Flying New York to SIN/HKG on a twin over the Pole I would say is exponentially more 'dangerous' than fly a -400 on 3 across the Atlantic.

Having Smoke/Fire anywhere that is more than 20 minutes from any airfield - you are dead meat as we all know regardless of how many engines are working or not. Please don't tell me a 777 on 2 engines at 0°N with a fire is any different to a -400 on 3 mid Atlantic. There are plenty of diversion available that a -400 can make on 3 engines at 10'000' crossing the Atlantic. Sure you not going to make LHR but you are spoiled for choice for diversions en-route!

[ShotOne]

The disagreement between the FAA and CAA over the recent LAX BA747 engine surge incident places the spotlight on such agency's impartiality. The language used by the FAA here ;"careless and reckless" is strong stuff. Would they have directed such language at a US carrier? there are plenty of documented cases of US airliners which didn't land immediately after losing an engine.

The US government in particular seems happy to wield the big stick at non-US carriers -example 1. The BA and Air France flights cancelled over the skymarshall issue -example 2, the Latin American airlines pursued by the US tax authorities. Is it perhaps the case that overseas airlines are a soft target for any zealous Federal official?

[SeniorDispatcher]

>>>In cruise shortly after level off a engine is shut down for precautionary reasons due to a loss of quantity on oil. FLight continues ontowards destination.

According to this first-hand account, they turned around about 54nm from NAS with MIA 110nm away. MIA was VMC, and NAS would have been below minimums at their ETA, as it turns out.

http://flytristar.tripod.com/article/art10.html

Additionally, you made the statement in an earlier message on this thread something to the effect that this EAL incident changed the ability to continue after after an engine failure/shutdown. With all due respect, this EAL incident occured in 1983, and the Part 121.565 excerpts several have cited are from present-day (22 years later), and I see nothing in the current 121.565 that has changed anything as far as the crew of a 3- or 4-engined aircraft -not- being able to continue (in lieu of landing at the nearest suitable airport as required of a twin) -assuming- all the items in 121.565(b)(1-6) are considered.

Otherwise, I agree with the points you've made... ;)

[Wino]

Careless and reckless is the standard charge that the FAA follows any other charge with.

Do a google search on "Careless and reckless" and you will be astonished how many times that comes up.

You are charged with violating flight and duty rest regulations, they charge you with the rest reg, and then they charge you with "Careless and reckless" as well. This is how things are done in the US courts.

Fighting with the FAA is so much fun because you fight by THEIR RULES in THEIR ARENA...

Cheers
Wino

[V1 Rotate]

If the CAA can insist that US crews flying US reg aircraft must abide the rule requiring F/Os to be type rated whilst in UK airspace. Surely it is only reasonable to expect the FAA to demand BA stick to the FAA book whilst in US airspace?

V1:confused: :confused: :confused:

[swh]

Wino,

Using the FAR 91.13a argument, dumping of fuel, or overweight, out of trim landing could also lead to a charge under FAR 91.13a.

The aircraft is certified under a UK TCDS, based on a FAA one, UK registered, the UK flight manual states that one (1) engine failure is not an emergency, dumping of fuel for a retrun to LAX could also result in a charge under FAR 91.13a and other environmental laws.

The FAA would have to prove that it would have not been careless and reckless to dump fuel when no emergency exists, given that 8 percent of dumped fuel reaches the ground.

The FAA would have to prove that it would have not been careless and reckless whilst in US airspace (not Canadian or others) the aircraft would not have exceeded UK TCDS/flight manual limits (as that is the state to which it is registered and certified) for maximum landing weight and CofG, again stressing that no emergency existed.

Given that the NTSB file (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20050307X00273&ntsbno=DCA05WA040&akey=1) states "On February 20, 2005, a British Airways Boeing 757-400, registration G-BNLG, experienced an engine failure shortly after takeoff from Los Angeles International Airport, called PAN, and request to divert to Manchester, United Kingdom. The point of intended landing was Heathrow International Airport, London, United Kingdom. There were no injuries to the 370 persons on board and the airplane landed safely.

The incident is being investigated by the United Kingdom's Air Accident Investigation Branch.", the FAA would have to prove how the crew were "careless and reckless" in US airspace, when the NTSB have already said the aircraft landed safely with no injuries.

The PAN was not declared in US airspace, the aircraft is not US flagged, what happened outside US airspace is of no concern to the FAA.

Once the aircraft is out of US airspace, the FAA rules no longer apply.

:ok:

[boofhead]

411A, OK, I pushed it a bit... But it has been a while and I do not have performance figures for the airplane on two engines, indeed I am not aware of any. I am basing my opinion on the sim, which of course might not be accurate since there is no regulatory requirement to even prove a rate of climb etc on two. However if the sim is not too far off, a light 747 on two engines is more than capable of a gradient of climb close to a twin, including a go-around, provided the drag and airspeed are managed properly, and there is no particular handling problem, even when the two failed are on the same side. There is a difference of around 130,000 Kg between max takeoff weight and landing weight after all. Of course I did not claim the twin was also at a light weight!

[Heilhaavir]

<<They wound up short of fuel and landed short. Elegant proof of a violation of B2>> Do you have proof of that Wino? Would you care to tell us what the "Fuel Remaining" was after landing at Manchester? The only thing I've read so far is that the crew decided to land at Manchester because they "feared" it was running low on fuel.... Doesn't mean they "were" low on fuel.... (Also I like the "they landed short" comment)

<<because of traffic congestion, Ergo a violation of B4>> Really? So approx 5 hrs out of entering Oceanic you'd know the requested Flt levels of all flts heading for Europe from the East Coast? So let's say they get their Oceanic now and can't get the Flt level their re-analysis was based on, are you saying they didn't re-evaluate the situation with Dispatch? Do you know what their alternates were along the crossing?

Not taking anybody's side here, but would like to know where you get your facts and numbers. What's the point of just saying they "violated" such or such reg without being able to back it up?

Cheers

[forget]

Careless and Reckless operation of an aircraft is a catch-all idiotic charge that the FAA needs to ditch. Some time ago I supplied USALPA with material to assist a captain who'd been so charged. He'd responded to an altitude clearance meant for someone else, simultaneous transmission, and which caused some loss of separation. The FAA pulled his ticket for 3 months. He appealed but the 'civil' judge agreed with FAA. European pilots ought to be very thankful that, in this neck of the woods, the system allows the filing of a Mandatory Occurrence Report to end the matter - full stop, from which everyone learns. Wake up FAA!

[MarkD]

ShotOne

FlyAmerica policy allows foreign carrier traffic on US airline codeshare IIRC. So if AA has a codeshare on a BA flight, a travel ban applying to BA would have an impact.

[sky9]

It seems pretty "careless and reckless" for the FAA to describe the aircraft as a 757-400. I wonder how many of that type they certified?
Or it could be that the FAA thought that it was a 757 in which case I would fully agree with their reasoning.

"Ready Fire Aim" another toe blown off; nine to go.

[Iron City]

well, sky9, don't know the difference between FAA and NTSB eh?

Amazing the number of gundeck lawyers around here, can't say I'd want any of them defending me.

The decision to continue was a judgement call made by the captain, it started looking a little too close for his taste when he got closer to destination so he decided to go to an alternate. Don't know the crew should be penalized for this but it would not be bad idea to discuss it and learn from it.

Maybe 6 of 10 of us would have made the same choice in the same situation, maybe not, but at least everybody is talking about it, some from a position of some knowledge and experience and maybe some of that will be useful to somebody someday in a similar situation. As I used to say to the beancounters that demanded cost justification through flying hour substitution for buying flight simulators if I use this trainer to teach one pilot one thing one time that allows him to bring the aircraft back in more or less one piece I just paid for the whole life cycle cost of the trainer.

[RRAAMJET]

Ojay's post, page 2, sums it up really. Spot on.

I too have considerable experience on the 744, including continuing once on 3 effectively (oil high temp - normal at idle, continued to HKG....closely watching alternates, etc). Pushing it a bit, yeah, but seemed the right decision at the time, as the motor was still there if we needed it.

With one out completely, yes - still legal to go on if oil press at windmill, etc. But as Ojay said, if you lose another....well, doodoo is right. About 10,000ft stab alt and 10 tonnes per hour at 360 kts true, as I recall for average weights (help me- it's been ten years).

I hope this BA crew are not disciplined in any way - IMHO they broke no rules - best of all they have raised a wonderful discussion item for all. The split on these forums is a good example - about 50/50 for/against.

[411A]

"He appealed but the 'civil' judge agreed with FAA. European pilots ought to be very thankful that, in this neck of the woods, the system allows the filing of a Mandatory Occurrence Report to end the matter - full stop, from which everyone learns. Wake up FAA!"

In the USA we have a similar program, forget, it's called the 'NASA report form'

Serves the same purpose, more or less.
Been around for quite sometime and every professional pilot I know carries one around in his flight kit.

[sky9]

Gunduck,
You are absolutely correct, I shot myself in the foot:ouch:

[FullWings]

Telephone conversation overheard recently at the FAA office:

FAA: "...and we think this was reckless flying and will be taking further measures."

BA: "Oh. Didn't realise operating our 747s as designed was so dangerous. Better swap them for Airbuses."

FAA: "Errm... Right... As you were then. No need to mention this again, really... Oh! Look! A tree!"

BA: ":rolleyes:"

[bep]

Fly the airplane.

Deal with the failure.

Decide on a plan.

Talk to all involved, and:

"LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT."

[28L]

That has to be one of the silliest posts.
Why "decide on a plan" if you have already decided to "LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT"?

[barit1]

Sorry folks, but that is NOT the international standard.

Hasn't been for many decades.

If you're concerned about safety, there are MANY more fruitful areas for your concern.

[Wizofoz]

How about in a 6 engine aircraft (B36, B49), or an 8 engined one (B52)? How many engines do you want? We're allowed to be 217mins from a runway on ONE engine, what's wrong with flying on THREE?

[Otterman]

I have close to 10,000 hours on the Boeing 747 Classic. I am amazed at the simple-mindedness of most of the responses to this topic in other threads and the start of this new one. I am sure a lot of them are made by people who are totally clueless in regards to operating quads and take their bias in operating twins or worse no real aircraft into their opinions on this subject. Currently I fly the Boeing 767-300ER, the decision making process is greatly simplified when it comes to an engine failure on this aircraft (the obvious being land at nearest suitable airport). In a quad your options don’t boil down to only this decision, you can take into account all the complex operating conditions you find yourself in and make a reasonable decision to continue to your destination.

I have no opinion on the BA flight from LAX. I will leave that to all the chair warmers who have an apparent infinite amount of time to consider all the complex issues and combine this with their great experience to come to a reasoned decision. All the factors involved in this case are too varied to even attempt to discuss here and no one on this forum has these facts. I am totally comfortable with the idea that “landing at the nearest suitable airport” is not the only (or even the safest) way to go. On my Africa flights I would love to have some more options on the 767 compared to setting it down in some of the lovely places down there.

Personally I have had to shut down an engine on two occasions on the Boeing 747 Classic. Both happened during cruise. On one occasion we had three hours left on our flight to our original destination (it occurred at 30W), on the other occasion it occurred with six hours left in our flight to our original destination. Both failures were clearly related to only the engine that we shut down, and on both occasions we continued to our planned destination. I was absolutely comfortable with the decisions made on these flights. Of course one of the considerations is the probability of an additional failure but these things also have to be kept in perspective. If you can’t do this simple thing I don’t think you would have a very comfortable existence in our business.

So I will leave the philosophizing to the very knowledgeable chair warmers that I sometimes read on pprune. In the end it might even bring with it more rules and regulations from our civil servants who think they have a winner in this subject (just what this business needs). In the meantime I don’t have any options worth mentioning and will “land at nearest suitable airport”, but only because it says so in the rulebook for my aircraft and for a twin it is a very sensible thing to do. I miss the 747.
Regards O.

[20driver]

I tried to get this info on the other thread. Has there ever being on a 747 (or another 4 burner using turbofans) a case of multiple inflight engine failure. (Volcanic ash excepted)
The sole catch so far has being a Tristar where the problem was bad maintanence causing all three engines to head south. Presumably on a triple engine the one engine down procedure is the same as a twin - land ASAP.

[411A]

I can think offhand of two, 20driver.

1. B747SP ex-JED (2 engines failed on same side) at 800agl, aircraft dumped (ASAP) and returned.

2. B747 ex-BAH enroute ATH
Over Saudi, one engine flamed out, another on final at ATH, and just prior to parking on stand, a third wound down.
Severe fuel contamination...ex-BAH, altho the airport folks there would never admit to same (why are we not surprised?).

Now, I have spent over thirty years in command in 3 and 4 engine heavy jets (same rules for both...ie: continue on, diversion not necessary with an engine failure), but I have to wonder...at what point do you continue to stretch your luck, before Murphys law takes affect.

BA ex-LAX, where the failure occured just after takeoff, for a planned ten hour flight to LHR would seem to me to be stretching your luck to the extreme.
An engine failure over well up over Canada, yes, continue might be prudent.
But, just after takeoff?
Well, not for me, certainly, regardless of aircraft type.

There are those here who think I might be too cautious, after all these aircraft are designed for flight on three.
Yes they certainly are.

BUT, there has to be a point where enough is enough, no matter how reliable the 4 engine aeroplane is.

And, an engine failure/shutdown just after departure seems to me to call for a diversion...or return.

Certainly prudent, in my view.

[moosp]

Initially unwilling to respond to bep's ignorance, I am moved to reply in case it is genuine.

Most countries of the world, working from ICAO guidelines, have legislation in place that allows four engine aircraft that experience a failure of a power plant to continue their flight to destination if certain parameters are met. The parameters are allowed to vary under ICAO doctrine.

The statement, "Land at the nearest suitable airport", is simply Wrong, Wrong, Wrong.

I do not know who has polluted your information with this idea, but rest assured that all the aviation industry know that you are not only wrong, but that in pprune terms, your credibilty as a contributer is equivalent to an Ebay fraudster.

Good day to you

[Big Hilly]

Given that this is bep's first post, I think it's clear that we are dealing with a troll. . . :rolleyes:

BH

[Port Quarter]

My professional mantra that has kept me from doing rug-dances for the past 25 years: "When in doubt, don't." Your career and passengers will thank you.

I could care less what other crews do, unless of course my ass is in one of their cabin seats.

Falcon 109 to the dissers (sp?)

[Earl]

My own view is that it was a really bad judgment call by the whole crew.
Engine shutdown/failure at the beginning of a long leg such as this should have been a return.
If this failure happened after several hours into the flight then yes continue after all other possible problems have been considered.
I have been reading the post for quite some time and even had discussions with the managment of my present company.
I was told that any pilot that did this here would be terminated immediately.
This is stretching the regs too far.
Maybe BA has a different view.

[forget]

411A.

The US NASA report form is light years apart from the UK Mandatory Occurrence Report system. They may well have been intended to 'serve the same purpose' - but cultural differences prevent any chance of that.

Here's a clue to the difference - you tell me how many NASA reports were filed in the month of January 2005 and I'll tell you how many UK MORS were filed.

We'll then correct for the different number of public transport operations, US and UK. If we have 'similar programs', you'd expect the difference to be no more than, say, 5%. I'll put my money on a difference of 90%.

Now why is this? In the US no one files a NASA report unless they know they are 100% blameless, and personally fire proof. In the UK the MORs are full of 'Oops, screw up there, never mind, but I need to file an MOR'.

It's never a problem to the reporter because the UK doesn't (yet) operate on a blame culture.

As I said, NASA Reports and Mandatory Occurrence Reports, light years apart. You find me a UK or European pilot who's had his license pulled because he simply misheard a radio call, and I'll change my mind.

There may be something in this difference which 'allowed' the BA crew to, quite rightly IMO, continue the flight.

[Wino]

Forget,

The NASA ASRS form if filed in a timely manner exempts the filer from punishment. They are filled out any time a crew screws up.

What is interesting is that they have occasionally been used against a pilot when the screwup was "Intentional" If you meant to break the law, you can't use it as a get out of jail free card.

I think you mis understand that a nasa form provides protctions to the filers.

Cheers
Wino

[Earl]

Spoke with a ground technician and was told that even with rotation and windmilling pressures that the engine may have suffered damages on a flight that long.
Thats why when one is shutdown the ground technicians want to know for how long.
Does anyone know the actual logbook entry as to why this engine was shut down?
Will go through the 400 manuals and see what I can find on Saturday.

[Ignition Override]

I don't have time now to read all of the remarks.

If any four-engine jet, now down to three engines continues flight out over the ocean, for example, and then lost a second engine, would the electrical and pneumatic demands (although drifting down to a much lower altitude) then become a likely problem? If the APU starts then maybe the two-engine operation (no hydraulic RAT available-but loads for electric hydraulic pumps also a bit higher?) has about the same level of safety as an ETOPs plane with both engines+APU running well? With less fuel range down low, and possibly with more icing accumulating on the wings and tail, requiring a reduction in available max continuous thrust? I'm curious as to what the divert airports' conditions could be during winter over the Atlantic, even the northwestern or northeastern Pacific with minimum required visibility/ceiling or max crosswinds, even on a dry runway. My only turbofan flying has been in twin-engine domestic planes, but am glad that we don't face diverting into a Siberian, western Canadian or Icelandic airport in January.

These questions might apply to various four-engine operations, whether a BA 744, South African, Cathay, Lufthansa A-340, or a US C-5 Galaxy.

One of my 'comrades' :cool: referred to an incident with a L-1011. The mechanic/engineer had forgotten to put all three oil caps back on the engines.

Nowadays, any mechanic can service the oil on only one engine :\

As Wino stated, a US NASA report is also used if a pilot made a mistake, or was simply involved in some unusual incident. The company or FAA can always find something that does not quite comply with a perfect series of checklists, SOPs, AIM, FARs, "well-memorized" data from the jumble of airport and enroute NOTAMS etc. One of our pilots was caught in a "sporty" (as they would have said at Air America over the Laotian Plain of Jars) microburst event and after diverting, he forgot to check the tiny NASAP box on the safety report. This caused him some serious problems with the FAA. Before his flight even had the cabin door closed during departure, an old lady fell OFF of the jetway! And the dispatch, almost cryptically, had a small printed remark on the Flight Release which only said "call dispatch". There was no remark about possible weather at the destination on his release. Somehow, during the lady's accident etc, he forgot to call-another legal trap. Why did dispatch say nothing about growing bad weather?

[moosp]

Ign O.

Just to keep the story straight, if, "an incident with a L-1011"' is the same incident that I am thinking of, maintenance ommitted the O rings from the three MCD's when they changed them, leading to oil loss. It was not the oil caps that were left off.

New procedures were brought in so that only one per flight was changed, then after a new design such that the O ring could not be removed from the chip detector body, all three could be changed at once.

FWIW

[FullWings]

Earl,My own view is that it was a really bad judgment call by the whole crew.Fair enough, we are all entitled to our opinions.Engine shutdown/failure at the beginning of a long leg such as this should have been a return.
If this failure happened after several hours into the flight then yes continue after all other possible problems have been considered.Why? What's the difference in having several hours elapse? In ultra long range operations, you could still have 13hrs+ to go at that point. What makes you think the crew in question didn't continue "after all other possible [likely] problems have been considered."?I have been reading the post for quite some time and even had discussions with the managment of my present company.
I was told that any pilot that did this here would be terminated immediately.Well, as you seem to be Gulf-based (according to your profile), that comes as no surprise. It sounds like "looking at me in a funny way" could lead to losing your job down there...This is stretching the regs too far.No stretching required, really. "In-flight Continuation" is an approved procedure.Maybe BA has a different view.Yes, they do. The management are fully supportive of the crew in question. The CAA don't seem to have a problem, either.

[Rananim]

Inflight engine shutdown is big news to most passengers and they will not understand or appreciate the decision to continue at the beginning of a long trip.Midway across the pond,its hardly an issue.Bad Pr even if he did meet the regs.Personally,I think he made an unwise decision,although not a particularly unsafe one.Once an engine goes,passengers very quickly lose any thoughts about being inconvenienced by a tech stop.A skipper wears many hats and understanding and appreciating the concerns of his people is certainly one of them.Sounds like he over-borrowed on the true meaning of the regs.

[barit1]

Rananim sez:

Personally,I think he made an unwise decision,although not a particularly unsafe one.

This may be the wisest thing we've heard in a LONG time

[Ignition Override]

MOOSP-True, the o-rings were missing from all three 1011 engines.

As for the 744 Captain, I cannot judge his decision. If, however, he has any second thoughts about the resulting long flight, can we assume that if an engine fails or is shutdown in a future, similar situation, that he will face no punishment from his employer if he then decides to divert within an hour or two following the shutdown? There are numerous cities out in the Rocky Mountains which are "special airports' and into which you do not want to ever divert, unless you have smoke in the cabin etc. Eagle (EGE) Colorado is very hazardous [757 crews train each year specifically for this one airport! LDA, glideslope....]. Unless you are familiar, Jackson Hole (WY), might be another. Missoula and Kalispell (MT) are on my list, possibly Bozeman. Many have no control tower operation late at night and unforecast weather can be quite a surprise, because of lakes nearby. :\

[Earl]

Looking at the maintainece manual for the Rolls Royce engine and also consulting people in that department it looks like may things could have gone wrong.
N1 and N2 would have had sufficent oil pressure but N3 would have been in question.
A borescope and a MCD magnetic chip detector would be required on landing for the engine to be returned to service.
I assume that this is a RR engine here.
My airline runs the G/E on the 400.
But the performance data is not much difference, maint data is.
This may have not neen available for an inflight start if needed.
The N3 could have trashed itself out.
Looking at the 2 engine performance data just opened a bigger can of worms.
I can provide performance numbers if given the weights.
Sorry about the spelling but our ISP here keeps shutting down on us.
Most of the information here is second hand news.
If proper weights and numbers were available then we could run the charts.
But I agree B/A has a different set of rules and the crew operated on the advice given so they should not be penalized.
But if Murphys law has come into the picture which it often does then we would all be commenting on a different angle.
Like why did the crew not return after the first engine failure.
Guess we are damned if we do and also damned if we dont!

[bugg smasher]

Whilst it’s difficult to judge the event when one wasn’t actually there to weigh all of the factors, my biggest concern with the decision to continue is that it sets a questionable precedent within the pilot group. Engine shutdowns on that fleet may now be considered an amber event, as opposed to a red one, to be treated much the same way as, say, the loss of one hydraulic system. The decision to return now stands to be quietly viewed as ‘inexperienced’ or ‘incompetent’, the importance stressed, by high-profile example, that V1 should be equal to destination.

It is a development fraught with the gravest of safety concerns.

Although I can’t help admiring the commander for his really big cohones, in view of the impending oceanic crossing and associated lack of diversion airfields, personally, I would have returned.

[NigelOnDraft]

BS (!)

The Capt set no precedent at all... It is no "secret" at all that for a number of BA 4 Eng ac, and same for other European carriers, equivalent sitations have occured in the last ~5 years: Another LAX -> LHR, Eng Fail before 5000', made LHR South America -> LHR - made LIS, enough for another company ac to be in LIS to take PAX onwards, and had a 3 Eng Ferry crew to get ac to LHR
MUR -> Paris - nearly diverted NCE, but made Dest
There is a section in the Ops Manual exactly covering the Eng Fail situation, and the options available. This crew, as others, followed the options available as they saw fit :) What followed at MAN was "another event", again followed according to conservative "best practice" :)

[bugg smasher]

Nigel (!)

In other words, the precedent has already been set, in the last five years or so (sic), for BA aircraft to operate over long oceanic stretches with 75% of available thrust, as a matter of routine.

Your passengers are paying for four engines, if you insist on using only three, an appropriately discounted fare might be in order.

[barit1]

Among major European airlines, the practice has been (de facto) in effect for MUCH longer than five years. BA may be lagging behind, in fact.

To reiterate: It's NOT a safety issue, at least in any measureable accident rate statistic. Among aircraft that didn't make it to a safe destination because of propulsion issues, NONE have been four donks minus one. Fuel exhaustion (I mean EXHAUSTION) is a more significant statistic, and that's independent of the number of donks. Even so, we haven't seen a ditch for decades (hijacking excepted).

It IS an public expectation issue, however, and some form of education is in order.

[BusyB]

I am stunned that this thread still goes on and on with criticism of the crew who used their training and the best info available to bring this incident to a perfectly safe conclusion.

Perhaps we should continue this thread with nominations for positions in a team of monday morning quarterbacks!!

( 6500 hrs 747-100/200/300/400)

[NigelOnDraft]

BS (!)

In other words, the precedent has already been set, in the last five years or so (sic), for BA aircraft to operate over long oceanic stretches with 75% of available thrust, as a matter of routine Please read my post... I said, BA and other Euopean Carriers i.e. a general precedent has been set, not a BA specific one.

PS What is the "long oceanic" stretch you refer to...? This was a LAX-LHR flight... No long over water bits I know of ;)

PS, on many of our routes the PAX might get a 777 or 744... so are you suggesting when a 744 is used, the PAX pay a 4 eng supplement :)

[cargo boy]

Lots of opinions here, many showing the ignorance of the posters, especially when it comes to those with no experience of the B744 and west coast US to Europe ops. I do wish that those who have expressed a strong opinion about how incompetent or inexperienced they think the BA crew were would let us know their own personal experience on the same type of a/c and routes. It's becoming fairly obvious to many of us when we get opinionated commentators who think that an LAX-LHR flight involves some kind of huge over water crossing! :rolleyes:

You only have to read opinionated stuff such as "Engine shutdowns on that fleet may now be considered an amber event, as opposed to a red one, to be treated much the same way as, say, the loss of one hydraulic system." to realise that the author has absolutely no experience or knowledge of the B744 yet we have to suffer the pontification with such drivel. Had the author the remotest inkling of B744 ops then he/she would know that a single engine shut down is only an 'amber' event and as long as it is not due to catastrophic failure reverts back to a 'green' event. Another thing that shows the authors uneducated opinion with regards to B744 ops is that you don't lose one of the 4 (four) hydraulic systems on the B744 when you shut an engine down (or indeed when you shut two down) but should you lose a single hydraulic system for whatever reason, that is indeed a 'red' even on this type. :rolleyes:

Could we please ask that anyone giving us their opinion at least provide a note as to their experience of the B744 and the type of operations they conduct in it so that the rest of us can form our own opinion and whether to treat it as valid or file it as being of the same category as we would if it had come from one of our beloved tabloid journalists. :yuk: At the end of the day it would seem that the most vociferous critics of this crew have little understanding of the a/c and the type of operation, even though they may be professional pilots themselves. Far better for us to think you are fools than write such rubbish and prove it beyond a doubt! :hmm:

Cargo Boy
Current type: B744
Ops: UK based long haul

[Mentaleena]

Cargo Boy,

You don't seriously expect passengers to be completely technically and operationally aware do you. After all it is their perception of what has happened is partly what we are debating here!

Also just because not every contributor has 744 experience, can you brush them all aside as irrelevant. The world doesn't work quite like that.

Cargo Boy
Current type: B744
Ops: UK based long haul
QUALIFIED TO DEBATE 744 EVENTS!

[atse]

You don't seriously expect passengers to be completely technically and operationally aware do you. After all it is their perception of what has happened is partly what we are debating here! Mentaleena I'll let cargo boy answer for himself, but reading his post I think he will not think too differently from myself. The worst of the nonsence on this thread does not come from passengers, but from other pilots who emphatically state opinions that either betray a complete lack of knowledge of operating the 744, or that they only have ETOPs or tri-jet long haul experience. The problem seems to me that they bring to the discussion notions of operational risk that simply don't apply to the 744 as it is certified.

The other, to my mind more interesting group, come from a different operating/legal culture (such as our U.S. cousins). Which is exactly the original point of the thread, which I thought was to discuss what underlies the CAA and FAA difference of opinion on operational decisions such as was made on this occasion (and by many airline captains on many previous occasions).

(Currently ETOPS, European based).

[Final 3 Greens]

Well I can't speak for all pax, but as a fully qualified frequent traveller, with many atlantic crossings, I am much more reassured by the postings from the experienced 744 pilots, than from others.

I'm with cargo boy on this one.

F3G
about 5K hours in the back of various pax jets
current on all types of IFE

[sky330]

Hello,

As a driver of 4 engines 'bus', I would not have continue that flight not of safety concern but on PR and passenger comfort...of mind.

Imagine the cabin filing with smoke, crew quickly determine it is air conditionning smoke and shutdown the responsible pack. On a lot of airliner flying with one pack off is a non event, even recommended for fuel saving on some type/pax configuration, would you continue a long-haul flight in these conditions?

Safety concern is nihil, except on very special routes, but your pax will be scare as hell for the rest of the flight, whatever PA you come with. Look at what happens with what pax perceived as a fuel leak.....

Another point, I am not familiar with the 744, but on the bus there is a limitation for duration of flight with one engine shut-down, for concern of damage to the engine due to lack of lubrification with cold oil. Is there (or not) such a limitation on 744??

[Globaliser]

Final 3 Greens: Well I can't speak for all pax, but as a fully qualified frequent traveller, with many atlantic crossings, I am much more reassured by the postings from the experienced 744 pilots, than from others.

I'm with cargo boy on this one.As another SLF speaking for himself, may I also be counted together with cargo boy.

If I were on a BA 744 that had shut one down in these circumstances, and the crew said that after conferring with maintrol, they thought it was safe to press on - even if they said that things might have to be reviewed later in the flight - I would happily go back to sleep and be pleased to be woken up on arrival in the UK even if not quite at LHR.

And if a non-744 airline pilot sitting next to me started wittering on about what he'd do on his own aircraft, I'd ignore him on the basis that I'd rather have people making the decisions who are 744 type-rated and in possession of the facts, thank you.

The same goes for the postings on this thread and the other thread. To the 744 crew who've almost unanimously said that they would have done the same thing as the crew on this flight, thank you.

Globaliser: over 3,500 recorded hours back in the cheap seats, about 2/3 of that on 747s, about 1/3 on 744s

[Captain Airclues]

Risk Assessment is something that affects all of us in our daily lives. In aviation it is essential to ensure the safety of our customers while at the same time providing them with an efficient, reliable service at a reasonable cost.
The first level of risk control is made by the regulatory authorities such as the CAA or FAA. They obviously regulate to give a high level of safety, but over-regulation can put their own airlines at a commercial disadvantage. In many ways the JAA has helped to equalise the regulations to form a level playing field at least for the JAA airlines.
The second level of risk assessment comes from the manufacturers. In a competitive world each manufacturer wants to produce an efficient product. However there is often a play-off between cost and risk. As an example, the 747 Vmcg was calculated using only a 7 knot crosswind. To use a higher windspeed would have seriously restricted the payload. Have an upwind engine failure at V1 in a strong crosswind and it could ruin your day, but then, what are the chances of that happening? It’s all about risk assessment.
The third link in the risk assessment chain is the crew. JAR requires an annual refresher in CRM principals, including option generation and risk assessment. Crews are assessed in this during their checks using the NOTECHS marker system. From the CAA Doc29 “Option Generation refers to the ability of a crew member to generate multiple responses to a problem. Risk Assessment and Option Selection refers to the ability of a crew member to successfully assess risks and benefits of different responses to a problem, and to select the best response.”
The crew on this particular flight would have used this training to assess all of the options and their various risks. As has been pointed out already, there are risks involved with dumping fuel and returning at maximum weight. Having made the decision to continue they would have been constantly reviewing all of their options to ensure that any further failure would result in a safe conclusion. These options were covered in detail in the other thread so there’s no need to repeat them.
It would seem that the FAA and the JAA differ in their approach to this, and to the amount of decision-making latitude that they give their crews. However would it not have been better for the two authorities to discuss these differences, rather than make accusations against a crew, possibly for political reasons?
I am saddened by some of the posts on these threads by professional aviators. Just because a crew did not make the decision that you would have made does not mean that they were ‘foolish’ or ‘irresponsible’. By all means discuss the relative merits of the FAA vs the JAA logic, but please don’t insult a fellow aviator who was doing his best under difficult circumstances.

Airclues (over half my life flying 747s)

[overstress]

Any licence-holder on here who goes on about the 'long oceanic sectors' has forgotten everything he ever knew about great circle routes.

(Apologies to professional pilots): For those uninitiated who don't know what a great circle is, it's the shortest distance on the surface of a globe between two points. Take a classroom globe and draw the shortest line between LAX and LHR. You will cross more sea going from Gatwick to Lanzarote.

[barit1]

sky330 sez:

... I am not familiar with the 744, but on the bus there is a limitation for duration of flight with one engine shut-down, for concern of damage to the engine due to lack of lubrification with cold oil. Is there (or not) such a limitation on 744??

What model bus (A330?), & whose donks?

I won't attempt to speak for all engines, but for the ones I have long familiarity with, there is NO windmilling limitation.

And even if there were consequent damage, that is an economic issue, not a safety one; and should not affect the captain's decision. (Anyway, I submit it's probably cheaper to change out a bearing set at main base than to ship engines to&fro the outstation.)

[sky330]

To barit1,

What model bus (A330?),

A340 !, A330 is a twin so one engine-out is a completly different issue.

And even if there were consequent damage, that is an economic issue, not a safety one

Agreed fully and based on the information from this forum, whitch is most probably not all the picture, I would have done the same considering safety issue ONLY.

But economic issue is something you should take into account as a captain, even if obviously safety have priority.
Not quite sure, that the replacement cost of a main bearing at home base is lower than replacing/repairing the engine with lower damage at a main american station.

Agreed that in this situation, you have plenty of time to solve that with your maintenance before taking a decision.

I will check with our maintenance guy, strange that we have a limitation and not Boeing. The design of these engines is not so different.
It is maybe a company restriction.
As it is in limitation chapter of AOM, I assumed it was Airbus (more GE in the case being) limitation, but I may be wrong, and it could be internal company, I will check.

[speedbirdzerozeroone]

Essentially, next time* a 744 / 340 loses an engine immediately* after takeoff so far* from its destination*…….will the pilot* still call their company frequency for ‘advice’* or just take it as red* to land? Surely BA or anyone* else is only going to pull so many stunts* like this* before one of 2* things happens:

1) pax refuse* to fly without ‘guarantees’* (yeah right!)
2) pax learn to lump the obvious truth that it isn’t* a big deal (sigh of relief - keep mooing!)

…….but then, without the pax (and their opinions) the 744 (or any other airframe*) is just scrap metal.*

….Concorde fell victim* to this very mindset*. (unhappy / “non-existent”* pax!)

(And before anyone gets arsy….I’m aware of all the other “factors” (variables / events / contentious issues = *), but thanks for humouring me for a second - how kind of you - and if you can spot any other word worthy of highlighting as ‘contentious’ (=*) then congratulations – I’m addressing you!)


But be warned if you dare to retort……I might suspect you work for Britannia… and how many 4 engine buses do they have?

Just a thought…..

001 (I told 'em....... fabric for the cabin / leather for the drivers but did they listen...? Did they f**K)

“If you can’t laugh, are you sure you’re enjoying the party?”

[Capt.KAOS]

I would happily go back to sleep and be pleased to be woken up on arrival in the UK even if not quite at LHR. Including on Mayday?

[lomapaseo]

Another point, I am not familiar with the 744, but on the bus there is a limitation for duration of flight with one engine shut-down, for concern of damage to the engine due to lack of lubrification with cold oil. Is there (or not) such a limitation on 744??

There is no data that I am aware to support a concern for windmilling without oil be it cold or hot.

The oil is mostly present to carry away the friction heat generated under thrust load conditions. Thus just a minute coating is all that is needed

These engines sometimes sit outside a hangar for days windmilling away in the breeze while not producing a thrust load on the bearings.

[Earl]

An engine windmilling at alttitude will be cold soaked after several hours.
Limitations on the RR are oil temperture of -20 C for starting on the 524 C2
The 524 DX is -40C.
Minnimum Temp for advancing the throttles is -10C.
I am not sure which RR they use but willing to bet these limitations are close.
This engine may have not been available for restart or performed as needed.
Or an engine that could be relied upon.
Who knows what would have happened if they had to start this one.
Ever try to start a cold soaked engine at altittude, not as easy as on the ground even using enrich.

Murphys law?
We all learn from the past actions of others.
As far as everyone slaming this crew, this is not the case.
Just something that happened that we will all gain a little knowledge from.
We are still entitled to our opinions.
I am sure they acted on the information at hand.

[Globaliser]

Capt.KAOS: Including on Mayday?The type of Mayday that this one was, yes - no problems.

As I understand it from reading the other (long) thread), this was basically a precautionary Mayday because there was something which may not have been quite right and the crew were playing safe, not an oh-my-God-half-the-wing's-on-fire Mayday.

[Stelios]

Can the 744 be controlled with a double engine failure on the same side?
Is it similar to a twin losing one?
EL AL in AMS!

[Hand Solo]

1)Yes.
2)No.
3)Totally different scenario and not relevant to this case.

[BEagle]

.....a precautionary Mayday because there was something which may not have been quite right and the crew were playing safe"

Huh? Have another look at CAP413, which states the following for UK-licensed crews in UK airspace:

1.2 States of Emergency

1.2.1 The states of emergency are classified as follows:

a) Distress A condition of being threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and of requiring immediate assistance.

b) Urgency A condition concerning the safety of an aircraft or other vehicle, or of some person on board or within sight, but does not require immediate assistance.

1.2.2 The pilot should make the appropriate emergency call as follows:

a) Distress ‘MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY’
b) Urgency ‘PAN PAN, PAN PAN, PAN PAN’


By that definition, it seems that the ba 744 crew must have considered themselves to be "threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and of requiring immediate assistance" IF they made a Distress call during their diversion to Manchester.

Hardly a 'something's not quite right' scenario.

There has been much discussion of the rights and wrongs of this event; what we are really interested to know is the real views of the CAA and FAA over this type of event - airline, a/c type and crew members are irrelevant to the core issue.

[Stelios]

Hand Solo

The reason I asked is because there COULD possibly be relevance IF the other one on that side also fails!

[redtruck]

I am told that the subject of this discussion made an assymetric landing on two engines.

A Pan call was made when a fuel delivery problem was unresolved ( the diversion decision ) and a Mayday when the second engine ceased on approach.

Am I right?

[sky330]

Earl,
Thanks for info,

To Barit,
After check, the source is Airbus maintenance manual (A340, GE engines)

Max. flight flight time after in flight engine shut-down for windmilling engine
7h if abnormal lubrification
9h if normal lubrification (pressure, quantity,..)

Now as you stated, exceding that is a risk of further engine damage not a safety concern as such.

[policepilot]

Stelios
EL Al in AMS not relevant as Hand Solo says. Their engines fell off. ie 2 on one side and nothing on the other.

[Capt.KAOS]

I remember the EL AL 747 went down because the flaps/hydraulics were damaged when the engines fell off?

[cargo boy]

redtruck, you were 'told' wrong. Another case of 'chinese whispers' with uneducated assumptions being made which result in some of the rubbish that is spouted here. As far as we are aware, the aircraft had ONE engine shut down, by the crew, just after take off. It landed with just ONE engine shut down. FYI, the B744 is certified to continue flight with only three engines operating. In this case, after weighing up all the many different factors, the crew elected to continue to their destination, LHR. However, due to being kept a lower levels than originally planned the crew decided that they would divert into MAN. Whilst approaching MAN they decided to declare a mayday due to the fact that they were unsure whether some of the fuel remaining was useable. By declaring a mayday they made sure that they had a priority approach. The alleged declaration of a mayday as opposed to a pan is debatable.

Others on this thread seem unable to differentiate between 'probabilities' and 'possibilities'. Piloting any aircraft is a balance between probabilities. Of course anything is possible. Of course another engine could possibly fail. Of course there could possibly be an explosive decompression. Of course there could possibly be rupture of a fuel tank and all remaining fuel could possibly drain away. Unfortunately, there is a minority of people posting on here who misinterpret 'possible' as 'probable' and immediately go into uncontrolled spasms of outrage and indignation before typing out some sort of invective against the crew of this flight based on ill-informed or worse, uneducated guesses.

In order to try and help those with the 'possible'/'probable' confusion problem, it may be worth noting that it is 'possible' that any and all engines on an a/c can fail. If you are of that mindset and unable to comprehend the probabilities of that happening then you ought not fly until they have produced a 10 or 20 engined aircraft. On the B744 in question, it was 'possible' that a second engine could either fail or require shutting down. What the crew did was weigh up the 'probability' of this happening and made a decision based on that probability and many other possibility/probability scenarios. Their conclusion was that it was probably OK to continue. At the end of the day they had to divert but their pax continued on to their destination with minimum disruption and after an engine change, the a/c was reusable. No one was hurt and no rules were broken. Someone from the FAA, probably seeking their 15 minutes of fame, entered the debate with misinformed comments and probably is now trying desperately to extricate a foot from their mouth. This is what happens when those without the necessary experience of what they are talking about engage mouth before fully understanding the subject. :rolleyes:

I'm sure tha FAA as well as the CAA and any other aviation administration/authority have their fair share of people who are experts on all and every aspect of aviation... NOT! I think it would be fair to find out who the so called FAA spokesperson who made the comments that are currently at the heart of this debate, is. Is he/she experienced in long range B744 ops? Is he/she maybe just some back-office pen pusher? Is he/she an inspector of some kind? Maybe an inspector of airline, specifically B744 ops? Maybe just an inspector of light aircraft and training? It would help if the relevant experience of the person putting themselves in the limelight was known as it would help an awful lot when we sit here debating and pontificating. :hmm:

[Wino]

Cargo boy

I think redtruck is confusing incidents. In the same general time period a Virgin A340-600 lost an engine, continued and lost another one due to fuel starvation and an architecture problem with the Airbus's auto fuel feed system

Not exactly a case of chinese whispers since they were both G reg aircraft essentially doing the samething (Continuing with a failed engine)

They did eventually get the engine back, but still....

Cheers
Wino

[triple smudge]

Just to address one of the many aspects of this increasingly convoluted debate:

The problem of a second engine failure has been raised by several contributors to this and other threads. I'd like to point out that we wouldn't sit there in three-engine cruise with our fingers crossed, repeating "I hope I hope I hope another one doesn't go".

Sadly, the general public is often given the impression that this is how passenger aircraft are flown on a regular basis.

In this kind of flying, it is essential to keep a running game plan that covers critical failures. Where would you go right now if a passenger suffered a heart attack? If there was an uncontrolled fire onboard? If an engine failed? It's like defensive driving in a way - you don't just wait for a problem to hit you, you prepare for it in case it happens.

If you should find yourself flying a 747 on three engines, you MUST have a game plan that includes a subsequent failure on the same side, however unlikely. This isn't just a bit of theory - it's what pilots really do.

I only mention this because someone asked something like, "what if you were over high ground and had a second failure?".

You wouldn't be there, because you'd have looked at your two-engine performance and decided the Himalayas might be a fine place for Michael Palin, but not for a two-engined jumbo. And therefore you wouldn't fly over them on three.

Smudge

[lomapaseo]

I remember the EL AL 747 went down because the flaps/hydraulics were damaged when the engines fell off?

I remember it well, but from a cause effect standpoint it has nothing to do with the incident under discussion.

[Ignition Override]

Some FAA regional inspectors at what were/are called FSDOs, flew C-141s or C-130s. Others flew the Bandit (Emb-110) and Shorts 360 twin-turboprops, before they either left or decided to avoid the insecure, unstable world of US commercial flying, to search for a secure career with the government. As to how certain individuals reach the upper levels in either Oklahoma City or Wash D.C., I have no idea.

And those people I met briefly, in the 'good old days' long before 9/11.

[Belgique]

On the subject of painting oneself into a corner, didn't the subject crew tool around West of LAX over the water at low level for about 20+ minutes whilst consulting their operating authority back in Heathrow?

Smarter personages would've departed enroute climbing and been making onwards progress (on the basis that you can always turn around and re-land later - if that turned out to be the decision from the BA Headshed). They could've also simultaneously delivered a fait accompli decision along the lines of: "Unless otherwise advised we will be re-routing Kennedy, ETA +4.5 hrs from now. Please organize onwards travel for my pax from there"

Tooling around at low-level over the ocean west of their departure point, burning the equivalent of 30 mins cruise gas, wasn't the brightest start to their day's sojourn. Fait accompli assertive decisions was what I learnt from captaincy. You rarely get overridden when you play it that way.

[frangatang]

Belgique,stop and think ********,you have to climb over the water before heading inland,the MSA is 12000 feet.Its bad enough departing lax on a good day with atc turning you towards the land too early,but they are slowly improving.

[Captain Airclues]

Belgique

Perhaps you might have been assertive enough to set off across mountainous terrain on three engines without the necessary checks. However, this crew decided to "tool around" over the sea while Maintrol inspected all of their engines via the ACMS Datalink (a shutdown engine continues to send some data). Only when they had received confirmation from Maintrol that the three operating engines had no problems, and they had checked all of their safety altitudes and two-engine driftdown altitudes did they decide to continue.
I will leave others to decide who are the "smarter personages".

Airclues

[barit1]

Capt.KAOS sez:

I remember the EL AL 747 went down because the flaps/hydraulics were damaged when the engines fell off?

They didn't just "fall off" - The inboard suffered a massive unbalance which broke the pylon structural fuse (per Boeing design intent), and the departing inboard unfortunately targeted the outboard.

HIGHLY unusual, but not unique. Another 747 freighter in SE Asia suffered a similar fate some years earlier.

But hardly relevant to the current discussion.

[Capt.KAOS]

But hardly relevant to the current discussion. barit1, that was exactly my point when I responded to Stelios who linked this discussion to the EL AL crash. The missing egines had nothing to do with the loss of control of the a/c.

The pylons broke because of corrosion and fatigue cracks and at the end one engine fell off and took the other one with it.

[Globaliser]

BEagle: By that definition, it seems that the ba 744 crew must have considered themselves to be "threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and of requiring immediate assistance" IF they made a Distress call during their diversion to Manchester.

Hardly a 'something's not quite right' scenario.Without debating the ins and outs of what they did, of which others have stated more facts than I can claim truly to comprehend, the fact that they made that call when they did simply reinforces my comfort. In the end, as I understand it, there wasn't a problem and things were as they should have been. But when the crew were unsure at that particular time, they played safe to get a clean runway.

That doesn't sound to me like a cowboy crew who set off from the West Coast heedless of the dangers of the night.

[BEagle]

I don't believe for one moment that they were a 'cowboy crew'. But if they made a MAYDAY call for their diversion, by definition they must have been in a distress situation.

Which is not, as another poster implied, a 'something's not quite right' situation - but something infinitely more serious.

[boofhead]

The El Al accident is not related to this situation, as has been stated already. But it is interesting all the same. The accident finally happened in that case because the crew, who had done a fine job getting the airplane to a point that a landing could have been made, became dissatisfied with the approach (perhaps they did not get the indications of landing gear they expected, or flap extensions, due to the failures in the hydraulic systems and pneumatics after the engine pylons had broken away, or perhaps the flying controls were not working as they usually did due to a loss of hydraulic pressure during landing gear extension) and they attempted a go around. The drag (gear would not retract, flap was slow to move etc) was too much and the technique used was incorrect (they tried to climb out before accelerating and cleaning up) with the result that the airplane entered a classic asymmetric roll and dive. Had they just continued the approach with whatever flap and gear they had, there is a good chance that we would be discussing an incident rather than an accident.
The 747 can be flown on two engines, even when heavy, provided the airspeed is controlled, drag minimized and recommended procedures followed.

[Irish Steve]

But when the crew were unsure at that particular time, they played safe to get a clean runway.

To make absolutely sure that there was no chance of them being caught up in the middle of the sort of scenario that has happened at LHR today.

Two runway airport can't have both closed at the same time? 747 can't have all 4 fail together? Airbus Fly By wire will never fail?

Aviation history is full of things that were not supposed to happen, but did. People (hopefully) learn from the incidents, sometimes not quite fast enough, and the next time, they know how to deal with it.

Landing on 3, with a low but completely legal fuel level was not as such an issue. A late go around, on 3, with low fuel levels was not a good plan, so it was prepared for in accordance with the company procedures.

[4SPOOLED]

In my opinion, its about making a command decision in light of the relevant facts.

The A/C is certified on 3, all guidelines and company policys where met, the captain would have weighed up all likely scenarios before making the jump and was fully supported by BA.

Its the "agenda " orientated individuals that are blowing this one out of proportion. I'm sure that given the same circumstance (and privlidge of a captain on 744 with BA) most pilots would make the same choice.

Im sure prestigous Airlines such as BA are not in the habit of appointing "cowboys" to fly multi million dollar A/C with pax

[BEagle]

Interestingly, I was discussing this incident with 3 extremely experienced ex-ba 744 captains on Tuesday. All agreed upon the course of action they would have taken - a diversion to New York.

Not one of them would have risked crossing the pond on 3.

But let's wait for the FAA v CAA outcome.

[Crash and Burn]

Which part of Article 63 do BA not understand... 'likely'... declaring a fuel shortage so close to an aerodrome without warning ATC prior to that point indicates to me that they were pushing their luck. Further, no doubt they flew close to Belfast International (EGAA), Glasgow International (EGPF) or Prestwick International (EGPK); Manchester is another 20 + minutes beyond any of these, a few more tons of fuel I think.

The forecast Wx they may have had in my opinion would not be sufficient to accurately calculate the fuel on arrival, especially when it is unlikely that ATC had any knowledge of the seriousness of the situation to give them any extra priority: so my opinion is strongly in line with the FAA. A few more errors at the wrong time, then what?

I will not be flying with BA again I do not like people thinking they are God and taking unnecessary risks with my life, the FAA have it right.

[Hand Solo]

Crash and Burn - sadly you are displaying your total ingorance of the 744 in your rather ill advised post. For a start, from Glasgow to Manchester is not 'a few more tons of fuel' in a 747. Given you are very shortly about to start your descent it is probably about 2 tons max, if that. Your comment about the accuracy of the weather forecasts is also rubbish. Never heard of Satcom or ACARS? That crew had the 18 hr forecast for LHR when they left LAX, tied in with the sig wx charts and many years of personal experience. Throughout the flight they had access to METARS for LHR updated every 30 minutes plus the latest TAFs as they were issued. I doubt there was another crew on the North Atlantic that night who were better informed of the weather situation not just at LHR but LGW,BHX,MAN,SNN,PIK,GLA and KEF, plus a few more on the western side of the pond.

For your benefit, let me explain the fuel system of the 744 in very simple terms. When you get to the closing stage of the flight, you have four engines being fed directly by four associated tanks, each balanced with around 3.5T of fuel. Each tank feeds its engine. With number 2 engine out then the number 2 tank can feed the remaining three engines. It was only very late in the flight that it began to appear that the number 2 tank possibly was not working as it should and maybe the fuel might become unavailable, a conclusion reached when the tank contents bgean to reduce at a lower rate than the other tanks (nb the tanks had been working normally for the previous ten hours). At that point the crew took immediate action to divert. Not four hours earlier when everything was under control. Not one hour later when it would transpire the the fuel was usuable at all. They diverted and declared the mayday when the new problem presented itself. Very sensible decision.

[Crash and Burn]

Hand Solo - Thanks for the detailed analysis of the B747 fuel system, however I am not debating how the fuel gets to the engines. As for ignorance, no doubt you are aware that Manchester is not a quiet, sleepy little hollow of an airport the second runway bears testament to the increase in movements and yet holding at Manchester is a common occurrence. It is this to which I draw your attention. Ask any Air Traffic Controller about the risk associated by declaring an emergency too late. I read that the aircraft was at 3000 feet when the declaration was made, which puts the aircraft about 10 mile final approximately. At this point there must have been aircraft ahead on the final approach and aircraft either departing or aircraft crossing for departure. In other words, the scenario presented to ATC was most likely more complicated than the crew may have considered. From what I understand, the crew asked for the approach to be sterile for their approach, but if this was made at 3000 feet, then in my opinion, this is a little late and did they full explain their fuel state to ATC - I think not.

Perhaps you could give me your opinion of the fuel on touch down after completing one visual circuit (close traffic for our American friends) if you had 5000 kgs ( 11,000 lbs) of fuel left, which is what I understand from other posts on this site.

My opinion relates to the number of other factors beyond the control of the crew, not the ability of the crew to get the aircraft down. As you have confirmed 2 tons, is colloquially a 'few tons' (4400 lbs) ask your self the same question, if you had to perform the same exercise at another airport slightly closer, would you not be happier? Why was Manchester so important?

[BusyB]

Another monday morning quarterback.
God, it must be great to know everything and be PERFECT.
You must be infallible C & B!

[Hand Solo]

Indeed Manchester is not a sleepy hollow, but nor does it handle anything like the level of traffic that LHR, LGW, LAX, JFK or other airfields familiar to BA pilots. I have been to Manchester many many times and could count on the fingers of one hand how often I've held, which compares rather favourably to the 90% chance of holding at LHR. I don't recall the exact details of whether a PAN call was made earlier, but sometimes events conspire to prevent one from doing so. It is a fairly regular occurence at LHR for an aircraft to be fine for fuel on the approach but need to declare a PAN or MAYDAY immediately in the event of a go around. Good airmanship dictates you advise them of that fact as early as possible but ATC seem to handle it just fine. As you are aware, there is no fuel priority procedure in the UK and the CAA would no doubt take a dim view if people started shouting PAN then landing with full reserves plus some on a regular basis. This aircraft landed with 5 tons. A typical reserve figure for the 744 is 4.5 tonnes. Technically the aircraft did not need to declare an emergency at all. The cause for concern was late uncertainty as to whether 3 tonnes of that fuel was usable or not. As it happens it was. 5 tonnes - not an emergency. 2 tonnes - very much an emergency. The declaration of a MAYDAY due to fuel state should leave ATC in no doubt as to the severity of the fuel state. Should it not, the request for a sterile runway represents the backstop. Manchester really isn't that hard a place to create a sterile runway and I have no doubt the ATC staff were able to do such rapidly and with much more spare capacity than an over-tired crew contemplating a three engine go around with potentially just two tonnes of usable fuel.

As to the question of would I prefer to perform the same procedure at another airfield with more fuel, yes of course. Perhaps St Johns? Or Keflavik? The aircraft went to Manchester because everything indicated it would get there satisfactorily. If it could only get to Glasgow then they'd have gone there. If they couldn't make it across the pond then they'd probably have gone to New York. The point is that until they were past these airfields there was no indication that continuing to Manchester would present any problems. BA is a commercial organisation and getting to the aircraft as close to London is a consideration once all other factors are considered which is probably why they elected to go to MAN instead of GLA at the planning stage. There is also the consideration that Manchester has two usable runways so that in the event of one being blocked on final approach with critical fuel a switch can be carried out relatively quickly and easily.

[L337]

C&B

Your post typifies the poorly informed self opinionated non aviator that sometimes posts here.

Even when a professional pilot trys to explain some of the complexities you don't want to listen.

L337

[Crash and Burn]

Hand Solo - Interesting although you have not answered my questions and you also make assumptions.

Assumption: ATC can make the runway sterile quickly... I put it to you, if you were the aircraft ahead and you heard the aircraft behind stating a requirement for a sterile runway, which would obviously mean that you would be required by ATC to execute a missed approach; I am sure your opinion would be that the crew behind 'pressed on', left the decision rather late and should have landed earlier (elsewhere) - so I believe you to have a unrealistic bias. If you work for BA, I commend you for your locality! Further, I mentioned 'holding' and the second runway to illustrate the level of traffic at Manchester. You have clearly mentioned your opinion on the traffic at Manchester and that if you were flying an aircraft in a similar situation that you would assume the traffic to be insignificant to have any effect on the outcome. In addition and prior to this point unless the FMC was programmed with the forecast winds (if this were possible with the version of software installed), the estimated fuel on arrival would be based on the actual wind at the time of calculation. Whilst forecasts are normally very accurate, in my experience I have seen some significant differences from that forecasted. I feel very uneasy about assumptions that can have such significant knock-on effects.

As for landing with 5 tons of fuel onboard without declaring an emergency, I cannot believe you would keep this a secret, I cannot imagine what you are saying is SOP. Plus you haven't answered my question. How much fuel would be left in the tanks after a missed approach into a visual circuit? The reason why I think this is important is obvious - what about a second chance if something should go wrong.

You accused me of being ignorant so I have another question for you. It takes a considerable length of time to get into a command position with any long haul operator, which means an incredible wealth of experience. If you have a choice of landing without making a fuss or pressing on and ignore at least what would be my concerns (outlined above), would you label yourself ignorant or arrogant? In my opinion and I do not consider myself as a gambling man; I don’t like the idea of having just one chance left and keeping it a secret for that long, I would not like the finger to be pointed at me asking ‘why did I pass suitable aerodromes and leave yourself with just one chance’ – was it really that necessary?

You mentioned Manchester has two runways and this was an important factor; so does Belfast International which if you answer the question above, you might discover enough fuel for a second chance, if not… I get that uneasy feeling again, why bother pushing it another night stop in Chicago or Toronto (adjacent to the great circle track) would not be that bad – finances don’t come into it.

As a passenger I appreciate a good service but much more than that… I think you can figure out the rest!

This forum is for bouncing opinions around, the job of determining the merits of individual actions is for the courts and it sounds like, the FAA will want their day. The fact is everything worked out fine, I wonder though if they had the chance of doing it all again, would they do the same thing?

Any change in policy will speak volumes.

L337, I am a professional Pilot but if you are alluding to a lack of appreciation on my part on the complexities of a B744, you could not be further from the truth. In simple terms, if you drive down a motorway with little in the way of fuel, you run the risk of not getting to your destination. No matter how anyone dresses up the complexities of the scenario, the same analogy applies. However, if you saying that I don’t take unnecessary risks, well that would be me. Have a look at the Air Navigation Order 2000:

Endangering safety of an aircraft
63 A person shall not recklessly or negligently act in a manner likely to endanger an aircraft, or any person therein.

The debate is not the bias we as Pilots have on the actual events but what unforeseen events could have interfered with the successful outcome and were the actions taken reasonable to insure an entirely safe outcome.

I cannot speak on behalf of the FAA, but I suspect their thinking, which I think is reasonable; how did the PIC know that everything would work out given that he would most likely have only one chance to secure a safe landing at Manchester. I think if, or most likely when the FAA get to question him, his answer will not be entirely convincing, at best he can say it was unlikely that something would interfere, but he could not be sure. At this point it for the judge to decide if this is a reasonable aviation practice bearing in mind other options existed many hours before. Part 121 is black and white and very similar to our ANO, I don't understand why the CAA are not jumping up and down, after all they are responsible for aviation practices within the UK.

BusyB – Thanks for your input, but your comment indicates a distinct lack of understanding of the debate, perhaps you could reiterate your stance in some detail. Do you accept unnecessary risks as routine as your comment appears to be a little caviller; I would like to understand your logic on the concept of danger?

[flash8]

C&B hit the nail right on the head. A very succint post in many ways I might add.

I can't believe some on this thread (BA aircrew?) seem biased to the point of incredulity. Actually I can believe it.


>The debate is not the bias we as Pilots have on the actual events but what unforeseen events could have interfered with the successful outcome and were the actions taken reasonable to insure an entirely safe outcome.

[flt_lt_w_mitty]

Way back (P25 of the original thread) I said I did not have a major issue with the decision to continue. Leaving aside the FAA/CAA ding-dong, it was NOT unsafe, but I DO think it was unwise. Just 'cos the book says you CAN does not mean you MUST. I don't think our dispatch would have allowed it to happen, mind you, but if it had, the Captain would have been with me asap 'helping' me with his report!

This particular question I posed has not been addressed by anyone, in BA or outside:

"2) At some point, it became apparent that the aircraft was short of fuel for its planned destination, LHR. It subsequently became 'short of fuel' for its diversion airfield, MAN, such that a go-round was not possible, and there appeared to be some fuel in the tanks which was not 'easily useable'.


The question is, how and when did this happen? For a MAYDAY to be declared, following a PAN, things must have gone bad fairly quickly, otherwise a MAYDAY would have gone out first. Was the fuel shortage 'unknown' earlier due to -

a failure in the Boeing information system,

in the BA training system,

in the aircraft systems themselves, or

in the crew's lack of understanding of the aircraft system?"



I'm going to crank up the fun and ask -

3) Was the Captain one of those 'BA wonders' I have heard about with a foot in the management career chain?
4) Was the decision to continue unanimous on the flight deck (heavy crew and all)?

[Captain Airclues]

Perhaps you could give me your opinion of the fuel on touchdown after completing one visual circuit

A 744 will use about 1200kg during a visual circuit. This flight actually had 5700kg when it arrived on the gate so probably about 6000kg on landing. It would therefore have had about 4800kg after a circuit. The minimum reserve at this weight would have been about 4300kg.
As was explained on the other thread the crew declared a Mayday because they mistakenly thought, at the last minute, that some of the fuel in #2 tank might have been unusable, which was not actually the case. Diagrams of the fuel system explaining this are on the other thread.
If we are to learn something from this then perhaps we should look at our simulator training. At present an outboard engine is always failed as this is the most difficult to handle and so the crews are well practiced in balancing the fuel after an outboard failure. Perhaps we need to practice inboard failures, with the subsequent fuel balancing, as well.

Airclues

[Crash and Burn]

Flash 8,

Thanks, once people understand the point they see and can identify with the actual threat. My concern is that companies see this and adopt it as SOP in the ignorance that ATC will resolve everything if things go bad, then blame them if it does not. There comes a point in time, when you run out of luck and/or ability then wish you where already on the ground.

As a professional pilot and ex-civil controller (hi guys), I see both sides of the fence. I imagine controllers are thinking, you have an FMC, it tells you that you have ‘X’ amount of fuel and that you will have ‘x’ on arrival. ‘x’ equals one chance to land. The question then becomes how long did you know this for? …. Sorry, did you say ‘H’ hours?… Would you not say you are a little slow to make a decision and have you heard of two tiny little places called Greenland and Iceland (apologises to the inhabitants, I use the terms ‘tiny little’ in the ironic form, no insult intended)?

It sounds like the (US) FAA is the only one willing to speak their mind, perhaps Canada, Greenland, Iceland, possibly Ireland (I wouldn’t want them left out – sometimes they speak the most sense) and the UK should speak up.

It should not be a witch-hunt, merely to say, 'nope not a good idea go here instead because it is the law'. Studies into ‘Human Factors’ clearly indicate something that we already know and that is, we make mistakes, accept it and move on.

If this sort of culture were allowed to continue, I would rather fly with westbound with a North American carrier.

Captain Airclues - Thanks for the information, I didn't see the other thread. The reason why I mention one visual ciruit is becasue it is the minimim anyone could get away with for a second chance, in other words something that ATC can resolve extremely quickly and that weather allowed a visual circuit. I think this is a lot to hope for so many hours in advance if the wind were different if the actual Wx were different to the forecast Wx, ATC vectored them wide or slow them down in the absense of a declaration etc. Whilst they could have responded accordingly, was it necessary. I am sure you would agree.

[BusyB]

C & B,

I seen no reason to further justify the crews actions which were obviously taken with all the information they could get. I would point out that this insistence on criticising their going into MAN, a 2 runway airport, is absurd considering the choice of nearby fields (Liverpool, Birmingham) they had in the event of Manchester becoming unsuitable at a late stage of their descent.

These threads have disgorged an enormous amount of factual information that clearly justifies the actions taken and possible alternatives. What we're down to now is merely personal opinions of what individuals might have done in these circumstances. Everyone is entitled to this but I feel that accusing the crew of any error because you would do it differently is well over the top.

To simplify, its like criticising somebody for having a different favourite colour!

[Crash and Burn]

Busy B

Your contingency does not deal with fire cover between the period of the distress call and the time the aircraft had to land on the second runway at Manchester, if an incident occurred on the first runway - Two many eggs in one basket I think.

Incidentally your first comment directed toward me was aggressive and you now appear to be pointing the finger at me for voicing my opinion which is clearly different to yours - Hypocritical, comes to mind.

Don't take things so seriously, in the words of M.Winner "it is only an" opinion.

[cargo boy]

Oh no! :hmm: Who pulled another pedant out of the hat? Now we have Mr Crash & Burn, professional pilot but very obviously NOT experienced with either the B744 OR obviously LONG HAUL (notice I didn't mention ETOPS) operations giving us the full wisdom of his opinion and then when it is disputed or more likely ignored (except for the few who also have very little real understanding of B744 long haul ops but feel the need to get their "hear hear" in) we get him going on and on and on and on and on... with the usual scenario of the 'less well informed' about winds and the FMC, weather forecasts, choice of alternates and whatever else pops into his non-B744 world. Fer gawds sake, are you really a professional pilot or just a PC Simmer trying to kid us with a few key words? That's what it sounds like! :hmm:

So you won't ever fly BA again! Good riddance and it will give another one of us trying for a standby that bit of an extra chance to get on. Duh! It's one thing voicing your opinion but then it gets quite pathetic when you repeatedly try to justify your weak argument, ad nauseum, with irrelevant tidbits of useless facts. Please read the post about the difference between 'probability' and 'possibility'. The way you are going on it is becoming quite apparent that you are a windbag with very little real knowledge about what you spout. Give us a break, please! :yuk:

Cargo Boy
B747-400
Long Haul

[BusyB]

C & B,

I don't have any problems with peoples opinions of what they would have done in similar circumstances.

Comments like "pushing their luck" and "I do not like people thinking they are God" are judgemental on the crew in an incident that the crew coped with successfully.

Finally, as far as I'm concerned, good luck with M. Winners insurance company if you're going to insure a B744 with them!

[Irish Steve]

If we are to learn something from this then perhaps we should look at our simulator training.

I have heard rumours on the grape vine that it's already happened, and that fuel management has become a higher priority item in the sim sessions over the last few weeks.

When I look at what ACTUALLY happened here, and what has happened in recent weeks with other carriers, I have to wonder why those carriers are not being castigated to the same extent that is happening here.

We've seen that the Dutch have now banned Phuket & Onur Air, and the CAA in the UK have also acted against Phuket.

That suggests that there are operations and incidents out there that are a lot more controversial and unacceptable than this event.

I don't see 20 & 30 page threads about other carriers, and it's clear that they are far more seriously in trouble, and the issues do relate directly to flight safety.

Please people, can we move on?

[Techman]

I don't see 20 & 30 page threads about other carriers
Of course not! They are not BA.

[lomapaseo]

I still don't see any facts that the FAA has truly rulled that the crew excersized faulty judgement in this case and therfore don't understand the paraochial alignment between cheers for the FAA and the crew did nothing wrong

The FAA seems to be just excersising their perogative to examine the crews actions, hopefully impartailly.

As I have said before, the issue is not this crews individual decisons but more likely the unanticipated pervasiveness of one or more operators choosing decisions statistically out of line with the assumptions behind the rule.

I'm not aware that the FAA or the CAA have talked this out and issued an opinion so I am inclined to ignore the 2nd guessing so prevalent in this thread

[L337]

C & B

A professional Pilot.

You fooled me.

L337

[Crash and Burn]

I am amused at the varmint opinion said with such emotion, yet when questioned no logic follows instead just more varmint abuse. I imagine Busy B and L337 have never had the opportunity witness any proceedings in a court of law. Whilst I appreciate you have an opinion and that you feel so emotional about what is correct and what is not, without the under-pinning logic you would last mill-seconds under cross examination.

Busy B, I was going to say you did not answer my question, but on reflection you have in a roundabout way, you said you were not going to answer but shot from the hip anyway in a sophomoric manner. Thank you for your input; you have given an interesting insight into what though I am unsure, you fail to give any reasonable logic, which is actually quite amusing. Thank you once again for making me laugh.

Incidentally, I find any illogical addition funny at best it indicates a level of understanding that encourages the fare paying passenger to seek an alternative mode of transport - Arrogance or ignorance I am sure that is what they are thinking so go on do your best show the public the extremities of your intelligence but give them a chance tell them who you work for.

Whilst the outcome was successful, the decisions taken up to that point I find hard to accept. I asked the question does BA think they are God; of course the crew knew that the actual wind at their level and for the remaining flight was going be advantageous, the traffic at Manchester was not going to cause a problem, that not one item of traffic was going to declare an emergency ahead of them at the most critical point and that the runways were in no way going to be blocked next you will be telling me they have a crystal ball in some compartment in the flight deck or they have satcom direct to God. As I said, at best they could say it was unlikely, but they could not guarantee it, was it worth it... I think the previous post says it all, the authorities have made a decision on this subject.

Thanks Irish Steve.

[overstress]

By jove, I've got it! Crash & Burn is aviation's version of 'Mr Logic' - the well-known VIZ cartoon character who spouts logically correct drivel ad infinitum...then gets lamped in the final frame by his astonished colleagues...

http://www.maxim-magazine.co.uk/latest_issue_viz/images/char_26.gif

[Captain Airclues]

Crash and Burn

If this sort of culture were allowed to continue, I would rather fly westbound with a North American carrier

It would be so sad if you were to arrive in the US with plenty of fuel (although probably only two engines) and then be hurt in a LAHSO incident. (LAHSO are banned for UK airlines by the CAA).

Airclues

[Final 3 Greens]

Jeez, LAHSO :(

In my innocence as a low hour PPL, I accepted a LAHSO at Nantucket, little realising that this meant cross runway ops.

Having managed LAHSO, my suprise at a commuter thundering across my line of sight (albeit well clear) made me realise that it was not a good idea to accept a clearance without total understanding.

All itneeds is a misjudgement, especially with heavy metal :sad:

[Ranger One]

Captain Airclues:

LAHSO are banned for UK airlines by the CAA

I'd forgotten that! Got his middle stump I think. Interestingly the FAA LAHSO webpage is maintained by a Ms. Pontius. Wonder if she has a license? :D

Crash and Burn:

I'm not quite sure why you think the FAA should be sticking its oar in. The problems which lead to the decision to divert occured several hours out of FAA-controlled airspace. The only decision the FAA could possibly examine was the initial one to continue on three, and I (1) haven't heard anything resembling a sensible argument for that being a bad, wrong, or illegal decision, especially considering the backup the crew had from BA management and engineering etc. in the decision-making process.

As far as I can recall it wasn't the Aussies who hung Glen Stewart out to dry...

(1) Disclaimer: I have zero experience of longhaul 747 ops. But I've spoken to several who have.

R1

[Dagger Dirk]

Having agonized about getting to Manchester a little short of gas and then having to achieve instant notoriety by admitting their fuel conundrum, one must still observe that it's all back-plottable to their earlier decision.

Notwithstanding the 3 engine climb gradient and the mountains East of LAX, those lofty heights aren't that tall that the crew couldn't have flown a standard SID, still out-climbed the mountains AND done their MAIN TROLLING and Ops HQ agonizations enroute whilst flying their best climb gradient.

Tooling around West of LAX at low-level with hefty power on the three good donks (for Maintrol's assessment) for in excess of 20 minutes before setting heading still adds up to a large tonnage of fuel wasted (that would have come in handy later).

Asserting otherwise with blusterful dismissal just denies the facts.

[West Coast]

"then be hurt in a LAHSO incident. (LAHSO are banned for UK airlines by the CAA)"


A competent pilot should have no problem executing them day in and day out. If the pilot is not sure of his or the aircrafts ability you always have the option to say no.

[Crash and Burn]

Captain Airclues

I have flown as PIC in the US under various part of the FARs, the LAHSO procedure is discretionary; I agree with you, there is a risk associated with poor judgement and execution. I have never had the situation where I felt that I would arrive at the intersection at the same time as another aircraft – but I agree there is that chance.

In the UK, we have the 'Land-after' procedure, which could also be poorly judged and executed. The difference between this and LAHSO is that with LAHSO, you can easily detect a contant relative bearing and get out of the situation before it develops. Land-after however, if the chap on the ground grinds to a halt and you happen to be close to the ground ATC will be shouting at the chap to expedite his vacation. In addition, there are a number of airfields within the UK that issue a landing clearance when the departuring aircraft is still on the runway but has travelled, I believe 2000 metres. This is based on the assumption that the aircraft departing has actually passed V1, but a declaration for the aircraft in question has not been made.

Ranger One

Thanks for posting, I was under the impression that the FAA did not like the decision made and no doubt believe they are not only acting in the interests of US nationals. From the details I have read the original failure occured within US airspace and this would have the FAA a strong case for arguing their point.

Dagger Dirk

Excellent point.

[Hand Solo]

I beg to differ. With Land After there is only one other aircraft to identify - that which is already on the runway. The clearance is only issued when the leading aircraft is a specified distance down the runway, giving you an initial idea of the minimum landing distance available and advance warning of what you'll be doing if your brakes fail, ie turning off the runway. That minimum distance is in no way contingent upon the performance of the leading aircraft. Now compare with LAHSO, when you are required to identify a single aircraft approaching the intersecting runway, when you are unsure of its exact position, when the visibility may be poor and when it may be on a constant relative bearing, thus even harder to pinpoint. Your landing distance is now contingent upon the performance of the other aircraft and his complete and accurate comprehension of and compliance with the LAHSO instructions. It offers little room for error and provides no formal seperation in the event of both aircraft choosing to go around. Give me Land After anyday.

A competent pilot should have no problem executing them day in and day out

To err is human.

Now to address some of C&Bs points:

if you were the aircraft ahead and you heard the aircraft behind stating a requirement for a sterile runway, which would obviously mean that you would be required by ATC to execute a missed approach; I am sure your opinion would be that the crew behind 'pressed on'

No, I'd be of the opinion that the crew behind had a problem and I did not so I would do my damndest to assist. just like I have been willing to enter the hold at Glasgow to allow an urgent but slower air ambulance ahead of me. One day it might happen to you and you'll be grateful for the help.

you were flying an aircraft in a similar situation that you would assume the traffic to be insignificant to have any effect on the outcome
I don't know where you fly to C&B but you obviously consider MAN a 'busy' airport. I don't think it comes anywhere close being a truly busy airport and would be far more comfortable with the level of traffic there than at LHR or JFK. I am also far more comfortable with traffic levels at airfields with 2 usable runways. Belfast may have two runways, but how big? The difference in fuel between Belfast and MAN is truly negligible rather less than the accuracy of the fuel gauges.

I have seen some significant differences from that forecasted. I feel very uneasy about assumptions that can have such significant knock-on effects
Never assume - check! If you don't trust the flight plan winds get an accurate update from Gander or other traffic. Surely you don't think they just plugged the winds in and sat back for 6 hours waiting to see what happened?
As for landing with 5 tons of fuel onboard without declaring an emergency, I cannot believe you would keep this a secret, I cannot imagine what you are saying is SOP. Plus you haven't answered my question. How much fuel would be left in the tanks after a missed approach into a visual circuit? The reason why I think this is important is obvious - what about a second chance if something should go wrong.

Keep what a secret? Landing with fuel above reserves? Perhaps you did not read my earlier comment? FUEL ABOVE RESERVES. Neither the CAA nor BA require you to declare an emergency if you land with fuel above reserves. 5T is quite likely above reserves on an LAX. After a visual circuit you would probably have 3T left. 5T gives you enough time for a radar circuit and a long talking to ATC to ensure they fully understand the position. Believe me these things happen with reasonable regularity at LHR and the CAA are fully aware of the situation. Sometimes, with the best will in the world, people get caught out.

f you have a choice of landing without making a fuss or pressing on and ignore at least what would be my concerns (outlined above), would you label yourself ignorant or arrogant
Neither. You appear to assume the crew ignored all your concerns. They didn't. They considered them closely and decided they had a different view from you. Three very experienced long haul pilots decided they had a different view from you. Why are you right and they wrong?

‘why did I pass suitable aerodromes and leave yourself with just one chance’ – was it really that necessary?

They didn't. They left themselves with several chances. It was only a late problem that reduced them to what they considered possibly one chance, although in reality it wasn't.

[Crash and Burn]

Hand Solo - Thanks, yep are opinions are different. However, I never said assume, in fact I said exactly the same as you, never assume from that point on I mentioned my particular concerns.

On the subject of keeping the fuel state a secret - someone mentioned there is no policy within the UK and that there is no requirement to say anything to ATC; that is not entirely true. Within the UK the only published way to get priority over anyone else is to make an Urgent or Distress call to ATC. I believe the history behind this relates to cue jumping many years ago. I know of a number of operators, including the one I work for, if we are in a position where we estimate a landing below reserve then SOPs dictates we make an Urgent call (ie Pan). Once through the reserve make a Distress call (ie Mayday).

Similarly to you, I would also get out of the way if the chap behind was in trouble, but that was not what I was getting at; I was getting at what you would be thinking. If the chap behind only made his initial warning, a Distress call at 3000 feet (10 mile final) would you consider that normal aviation practice bearing in mind the length of time the situation had been developing?

Question, was an Urgent call made prior to that point, if not how did the crew know that ATC were in a position to sort out the traffic for them. Manchester International is busy enough without having to compare it with the two busiest airports of the UK. By involving ATC earlier in the scenario, seems a logical idea; you would improve your chances of success – after all a distress call was actually made. After that, it is a debate as to when you make an Urgent or Distress call.

The debate could go on and on into a complete circle. I appreciate Manchester has two runways but a distress call was made. If you concede that Belfast was equally a valid option, then somewhere hours before is just as valid, but would a distress call have been necessary. If a distress call was not made we probably not have heard of it and this interesting debate would not have occurred.

You point out this sort of thing happens regularly and where there is an abundance of options, we could argue a safe stance but only for reasonable alternates. Although try to explain all the complexities of this to a member of public; I am sure they would be speechless for a time then go straight to the most important point, how can you guarantee another aircraft is not doing exactly the same thing and do the people who control them know precisely what is going on? – To a layperson the enigma of diverting.

It is all a matter of opinion.

[speedbirdzerozeroone]

Although I have enjoyed the debate immensely with lots of interesting facts coming to light, could the educated amongst you please answer these 2 questions as succinctly as possible? If a British registered 747 left LAX tomorrow - (in light of the event under discussion), bound for LHR and lost an engine immediately after take-off (isolated incident).

1) Would the crew endeavour to plan for landing at LHR as filed?
a. Have airlines ‘discussed this with you.
2) Have there been any ‘policy’ changes by British airlines in response to this event. (Handling procedures / limits / restrictions, etc.)

(These aren’t trick questions and there is nothing contentious in the scenario)

Many Thanks

001

[spekesoftly]

With Land After ....................................... The clearance is only issued when the leading aircraft is a specified distance down the runway ..........

Hand Solo,

I suggest you are confusing "Land After", with "After the Landed, Cleared to Land", which is only issued when the leading aircraft has passed a specified distance along the runway.

The conditions for "Land After" do not include any 'specified distance' - the responsibility for separation transfers entirely to the accepting pilot.


Sorry if this sounds 'picky', but the two are very different!

[Hand Solo]

Land After Clearance

AIP Gen 3-3-6 Para 6.4 details the special landing procedures that may be used at London Heathrow, London Gatwick (except for Runway 08L/26R at London Gatwick), London Stansted (Land after Departure only) and Manchester (Land after Departure only) when the specific weather, runway surface and other criteria detailed in the AIP are met.

When the runway-in-use is temporarily occupied by other traffic, landing clearance will be issued to an arriving aircraft provided that, at the time the aircraft crosses the threshold of the runway-in-use, specific separation distances will exist:

In the case of London Heathrow and London Gatwick, the separation required is:

(i) Landing following landing - The preceding landing aircraft will be clear of the runway-in-use or will be at least 2,500 m from the threshold of the runway-in-use.

(ii) Landing following departure - The departing aircraft will be airborne and at least 2,000 m from the threshold of the runway-in-use, or if not airborne, will be at least 2,500 m from the threshold of the runway-in-use.

Different criteria apply to the other airports.

http://www.chirp.co.uk/new/Downloads/html/FB59.htm

[Crash and Burn]

BAW001

1- As this incident highlights, unlikely with planned 'destination' fuel; but with any diversion it is, Captain/Crew, Airline and most importantly, fuel dependant.
(a)– That is the job of the UK Civil Aviation Authority as the regulator.
2- As per 1 (a), plus Unsure/Unlikely.

Great questions and I would suggest a chat with the CAA if you want more information on what is actually happening.

Great debate!

[PickyPerkins]

Mode7 posted 3rd May 2005 With regards all the banter about BA continuing to fly to avoid compensation - this should put an end to it

EU Passenger Rights- Denied Boarding Compensation
New Denied Boarding Compensation legislation (261/2004) came into effect on the 17th of February this year and updated existing legislation on the rights of payment to air passengers if they are denied boarding. .......

Denying boarding to all passengers but not canceling the flight seems to be another way that BA is trying to avoid or delay paying compensation for delayed flights under EU 261/2004.

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=174719

Cheers, http://home.infionline.net/~pickyperkins/pi.gif

[JW411]

I have already made my contribution to this subject and I have no wish to make any further comment (for now) on the main topic but I am very interested in the comment made recently that a B747-400 only uses 1200 kgs of fuel making a visual circuit.

Can anyone out there who regularly makes visual circuits in real B747-400s (not the simulator) confirm this figure?

Having once had to make a go-around at JFK in a DC-10 it took 4000 kgs to get back on the ground.

Indeed, the taxi fuel allowed on the loadsheet of the DC-10 just to get to the threshold was normally getting on for 950 kgs (1300 kgs at JFK and ORD) so the notion of doing a G/A, PRGU, leaving the slats out, flaps for circuit, down wind, gear down etc etc and only burning 1200 kgs leaves me full of huge admiration for the efficiency of Mr Rolls Royce's engines.

I would also be interested to know when (if ever) the crew involved actually did a quick visual circuit in the real aeroplane.

Before you start firing back, I DO spend a lot of my time flying visual circuits in the real aeroplane for we do not have a zero-time simulator.

[bugg smasher]

Interestingly, I was discussing this incident with 3 extremely experienced ex-ba 744 captains on Tuesday. All agreed upon the course of action they would have taken - a diversion to New York.
Indeed. The three-engine ferry is a maintenance procedure, to be undertaken only after the failed engine has been inspected and secured by maintenance personnel, performed by an appropriately trained crew, and with NO passengers or non-essential personnel aboard. This, I believe, is the FAA’s view.

Carrying dead engines over twelve hour sectors is a bean-counter’s procedure.

[Joetom]

This has been running a long time time.....

Question.....If same event occured this week with a BA744 outer LAX or similar heading home to LHR. watts the plan now.?

Answers on a postcard please.?

[BusyB]

"The three-engine ferry is a maintenance procedure"

Very misleading. This was not a 3-engine Ferry.

[barit1]

It's so amazing how folks even in the industry (let alone those on the fringes) cannot distinguish what constitutes engine-out ferry, and what constitutes engine failure after V1, and how drastically they differ, and WHY.

Let the flight crews handle this, please. Sometimes 'tis better to remain silent and appear a fool, than to open your mouth and remove all doubt.

[Dream Buster]

Joetom,

I was always taught "If in doubt - don't!" which has served me well over the years.

It's always hard to admit mistakes.

[NigelOnDraft]

If same event occured this week with a BA744 outer LAX or similar heading home to LHR. watts the plan now.? As far as I know, the long established, regulatory approved, and often practiced set of procedures used in this case have not been altered i.e. same again (and just emphasising that said procedures contain numerous safeguards and discretion and seem unknown to 90%+ of the posters here :) )

[DOVES]

quote:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOVES
...in case one of such a situation would have arisen at the Non Returning Point,
I try to figure out some:
- A second engine failure
- Smoke/fire on board (electrical, from the air conditioning, in a toilet...)
- Depressurization
- Fuel temperature low
- Cracked Windshield
You name others...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Line Maintenace Engineer of mine told me to add:
...The same engine ceisure (not impossible due to the engine overtemperature during T.O., and possible bearing/s damage, and/or probable consequences to the lubricating system...
(ZEKE where are You?)
Would they been able to avoid sharks?
Fly safe
DOVE

[DingerX]

Ah yes, I love pprune bicker fests, and, as the two separate threads attest, this little story is the perfect storm for this BBS, with its large UK membership.

So we've got:
FAA vs. CAA
Boeing vs. Airbus
Long-Haul vs. Short-Haul
Simpilots vs. Aviation Professionals
Non-pilots vs. Pilots
Pax vs. Pilots
Pencil-Pushers vs. Cockpit-Monkeys
US vs. UK.
BA vs. other carriers
...just to name a few.


Well, maybe I can do a little janitorial work.

Factually Incorrect

The "20 minutes burning fuel, stooging about": the track posted to the original thread showed that, in fact, the aircraft climbed out over the ocean, and crossed back when it had achieved the minimum altitude to do so. So sure, the decision to continue may have been debated, but every indication so far shows that, even before the decision was made, the aircraft climbed out as if such a decision had been made.

New EU rules: As silly as they may be, they wouldn't have applied in either case.

"Economics never played a factor; safety was the primary concern": If this were true, all flights would be cancelled because of the risk of injury/death incurred in the drive to the airport. Economics always plays a factor.


Now some other fun bits:

US vs. UK military cultures: since the regs involved often derive from military practices, anyone else wonder how much the US "if it ain't in the book, you can't do it" vs. UK "if it isn't prohibited in the book, you can do it" philosophies might affect the different attitudes towards the investigations?

Possibility vs. Probability: this is the "conspiracy theory" fallacy. Conspiracy Theorists argue to possibility, and then claim that is what happened, using accusations of cover ups and self-interest (you BA Nigels protecting yer own) to discard more probable scenarios. As anyone with an interest in aviation knows, Commercial Airliner accidents attract conspiracy theorists, and not just because they are spectacular news items. Commercial Aviation incidents are so frequently the result of a series of improbable and technically bewildering events, that the most probable explanation is itself pretty darn rare. Aviation safety is done such that accidents occur from the most improbable combination of circumstances; then conspiracy theorists come in and cook up even more unlikely ones.
So, sure, anyone can posit a sequence of improbable circumstances that will result in an unsuccessful outcome to a flight.

Manchester: I did some research for the previous thread; Manchester is in the (lower end of the) top thirty busiest airports in the world. It also has by my calculations the most spotters per movement of any major airport. Declaring an emergency into Manchester is a sure way to get press exposure.

Actual vs. Perceived Risk: Many of the arguments here can be boiled down to these two. Actual risk is pretty darn important, but from a Public Relations viewpoint, Perceived Risk is critical. With this flight, BA lost the PR battle, and I'm willing to bet, lost in revenue far more than the cost of a diversion. Whether there was actually any bad airmanship involved can be debated; but the incident definitely created a public impression of perceived risk in the incident, and no amount of arguing can change that.

Unrelated events: the declared emergency and the diversion into MAN were not unrelated to the engine shutdown; while there may have been no actual danger, the suspicion of unusable fuel that triggered the call was caused by the unique condition of flying with an engine shut down.
This sort of phenomenon is not uncommon with complex systems: when you deviate from the normal mode of operation, further unanticipated events are going to occur with increased frequency. That this fact doesn't make operating on backup systems inherently unsafe is not a reason to deny its existence.

So is it inherently unsafe to operate in a non-normal mode for 12 hours? Should the aviation authorities investigate a Mayday call that is related to a situation the crew knew about a continent earlier? In this case, can anything be learned, besides most people are full of hot air, and don't divert to MAN?

[BEagle]

"US vs. UK military cultures: since the regs involved often derive from military practices, anyone else wonder how much the US "if it ain't in the book, you can't do it" vs. UK "if it isn't prohibited in the book, you can do it" philosophies might affect the different attitudes towards the investigations?"

As opposed to the French military culture: "What book?"


As told to me by an Airbus test crew which included both German and French members!

[BrightonGirl]

Just SLF, but I am wondering:

I've looked at the Great Circle for LAX-LHR, and although most of the route isn't over water, much of it would appear to be over some rather inhospitable areas in Northern Canada. Are there many suitable places for a 744 to divert to along that route once a flight has passed a few hundred miles north of the US/Canada border?

[None]

The primary consideration for the route of flight seems to be flight time. I will use the route Rome to New York as an example. I have seen our company's flight planning software take us as far south as 43 degrees North, coasting out of Europe over Santiago, Spain. This was due to very unfavorable winds over the great circle route.

While this was an extreme, it is an example that long distance routes can vary hundreds of miles in an effort to save 15 minutes flight time.

The LAX-LHR route could vary significantly from week to week.

[bermondseya]

To claim, as a few have, that BA is not subject to FAA regulations whilst in FAA airspace is assinine. FAA regulations are very pertinent to G-reg ops when in US airspace. ICAO conventions also accept that regulatory bodies might have their own slant on things, but if there s any difference between "regulation of the aircraft" and "regulation of the airspace" the more restrictive will apply. Just like US planes have to carry an ADF when flying airways in the UK, unless permission not to is granted by the CAA.

BA could reasonably be expected to be a Part 121 carrier, so I draw the attention of the assembled masses to 14CFR121.645

(b) For any certificate holder conducting flag or supplemental
operations outside the 48 contiguous United States and the District of
Columbia, unless authorized by the Administrator in the operations
specifications, no person may release for flight or takeoff a turbine-
engine powered airplane (other than a turbo-propeller powered airplane)
unless, considering wind and other weather conditions expected, it has
enough fuel--
(1) To fly to and land at the airport to which it is released;
(2) After that, to fly for a period of 10 percent of the total time
required to fly from the airport of departure to, and land at, the
airport to which it was released;
(3) After that, to fly to and land at the most distant alternate
airport specified in the flight release, if an alternate is required;
and
(4) After that, to fly for 30 minutes at holding speed at 1,500 feet
above the alternate airport (or the destination airport if no alternate
is required) under standard temperature conditions.
(c) No person may release a turbine-engine powered airplane (other
than a turbo-propeller airplane) to an airport for which an alternate is
not specified under Sec. 121.621(a)(2) or Sec. 121.623(b) unless it has
enough fuel, considering wind and other weather conditions expected, to
fly to that airport and thereafter to fly for at least two hours at
normal cruising fuel consumption.

Do G-reg operations always comply with this FAR when departing an FAA airport? What about the "redispatch" after the engine was shutdown still in FAA airspace? If not, shouldn't the FAA be required to get involved?

(PS It's not uncommon for LAX-LHR flights to be routed as far south as BOS when winds dictate)

[delwy]

bermondseya I operated non-U.S. aircraft to and from the U.S.A. for years and I never read the FARs or took them into direct consideration. What I did take into consideration were the regulations of the state of registry of the aircraft and certain supplementary information relevant to Canadian, U.S., Shanwick, etc. airspace and other issues).

The minimum requirements for most things in aviation are determined by the ICAO Annexes. National regulations meet, or exceed, those requirements. Otherwise "differences are filed" with ICAO. (Hence it is that the FAR fuel requirements you cite bear a considerable similarity to those of many other countries and will be readily recognised by most of us).

You say: To claim, as a few have, that BA is not subject to FAA regulations whilst in FAA airspace is assinine.Does this mean that you have fully infomed yourself about the regulations of all countries over which you have flown?

It is simply incorrect (even assinine) to suggest that: BA could reasonably be expected to be a Part 121 carrier.And as regards the question What about the "redispatch" after the engine was shutdown I was not aware of any "redispatch" - I thought the flight continued to its destination after a decision was made. This comment of your really underlines, once again, the two different operating cultures and philosophies at the heart of this endless debate.

[bermondseya]

delwy,

Forgive me for failing to respond to your points as I don't find them relevant or helpful I suppose the question(s) still stand. Does BA comply with the fuel regulations laid down by the governing authority of a country where BA operates its planes? If it doesn't, then why be surprised if the FAA get involved.

[delwy]

bermonseya, let me put the point more simply:

1. Airlines and their pilots operate according to the rules of the country of registry (and hence of licence issue).

2. You can test this proposition by asking if you have aquainted yourself with the rules and requirements of all countries other than the country(ies) which issued you with your licence(s).

Q. 2 is just my way of trying to point out that you are setting a standard of compliance to the FARs for BA that applies to no other airline (including the one you, presumably, fly for). Put simply, the only relevant Authority for BA is the U.K. CAA. However, like the Authority of any country, the FAA can deal with a foreign counterpart in order to sort out issues such as have arisen in this case, in which there is a difference in operating philosophies.

[Globaliser]

bermondseya: BA could reasonably be expected to be a Part 121 carrier ...Can this really be so, when the NTSB accident database consistently describes BA as a Part 129 carrier, rather than a Part 121 carrier?

[bermondseya]

delwy,

I refer you to Article 11 of the Chicago Convention.

Now, do you know the answer to my question?

[Globaliser]

bermondseya: I refer you to Article 11 of the Chicago Convention.Article 11 says:-Applicability of air regulations
Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the laws and regulations of a contracting State relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of all contracting States without distinction as to nationality, and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing from or while within the territory of that State.I'm sorry, I still don't understand how that applies Part 121 regulations to a Part 129 carrier.

[bermondseya]

Globaliser,


Two issues.

1) Article 12 says foreign aircraft are subject to the regulations of any local airspace they may find themselves in. As BA's regulator, the UK CAA is required to ensure BA complies with the FARS.

2) 14CFR129 covers foreign air carriers, which what BA is within US airspace.

14CFR 121 specifies the regulations which a US regulated 'scheduled air carrier' (like United) must comply with.

My point, probably not exactly stated precisely, is that BA is the equivalent animal to United (a part 121 carrier). Therefore as far as operations and standards are concerned, I am arguing that BA will be held to the same standards as a US part 121 carrier by the FAA.

Hope that helps

[Globaliser]

Your logic suggests that the CAA should require BA to adhere to the FARs which relate to BA. As BA is a Part 129 carrier when it is within US airspace, that means the CAA should, if anything, require BA to adhere to Part 129.

And as BA is a Part 129 carrier, wouldn't Part 129 be what the FAA would require BA to comply with, if the FAA has any jurisdiction at all in the matter?

So wouldn't it be better to have a look to see what Part 129 says?

<still confused>

[plt_aeroeng]

Well then, the relationship between FAR 129, which governs operations by foreign air carriers in the US, and FAR 121 is contained in:

“Sec. 129.19

Air traffic rules and procedures.

(a) Each pilot must be familiar with the applicable rules, the navigational and communications facilities, and the air traffic control and other procedures, of the areas to be traversed by him within the United States.
(b) Each foreign air carrier shall establish procedures to assure that each of its pilots has the knowledge required by paragraph (a) of this section and shall check the ability of each of its pilots to operate safely according to applicable rules and procedures.
(c) Each foreign air carrier shall conform to the practices, procedures, and other requirements prescribed by the Administrator for U.S. air carriers for the areas to be operated in.”


The “practices, procedure, and other requirements prescribed” can be generally considered to be those applicable to US air carriers, which are regulated under FAR 121.

Thus, flight procedures for air carriers’ aircraft while within US airspace are essentially the same for US flag carriers and foreign flag carriers.

To use an analogy, consider a foreign carrier whose home regulations do not deal with prohibited areas. Such a carrier’s aircraft would still be shot down if it aimed for Capital Hill. This may look like a silly example, but the analogy is valid.


Globaliser:
-------------------------------------------
if the FAA has any jurisdiction at all in the matter?
------------------------------------------

That’s really a silly statement. For the FAA not to have jurisdiction in operations within US airspace, there would need to be a bilateral agreement between the US and the UK that the US can exert no influence whatever on operations of BA in the US. Really!

[cargo boy]

Who let the pedants out? Now we have 'barrack room' lawyers arguing over the minutae of FAA regs. I'm sure we're all going to stop and read the FAR's the next time we have to shut down an engine on a B744 before deciding whether we can continue or not. :rolleyes:

We've already had one poster who managed to succinctly put it all into a nutshell. But no, now we have 'bermondseya' digging a hole for himself by placing his own interpretation on the regs. We've already had 'Doves' and 'Crash & Burn' try to enlighten us with their wisdom (NOT) and now here's bermondseay twisting flawed logic. :hmm:

I'll repeat the quote that I beleive defines the difference between the FAA and the CAA attitudes: "US vs. UK military cultures: since the regs involved often derive from military practices, anyone else wonder how much the US "if it ain't in the book, you can't do it" vs. UK "if it isn't prohibited in the book, you can do it" philosophies might affect the different attitudes towards the investigations?"

Some cultures require very strict guidelines and others are allowed to use their common sense. :ooh: Why, oh why, do we have to have all the 'armchair experts' come out of the woodwork with their 'points' that are immediately shown to be flawed. Make your point and then just sit back and let others make theirs instead of trying to defend every comment with a new post, especially when it is proven that you are wrong in the first place.

:hmm:

[bermondseya]

Morning Cargo Boy.

I still wait to be proven wrong, perhaps you can do it by concentrating on the issue and not the individuals?

I think I found the answer to my question, and it's that BA procedures specify less fuel than calculated using 14CFR121.645. Unless you can tell me otherwise that is, I suspect you know the answer to the question. What fuel is on board on entering FAA jurisdiction coming the other way? Don't bother with that one, I'm just thinking out loud.

So, as FAA most certainly has jurisdiction over foreign air carriers operating within FAA airspace, lets see what comes of it.

[GGV]

Bermondseya, if you are correct I figure that all, or the majority, of foreign carriers leaving LAX fail to meet some aspect of the FARs. (Very few utilise dispatchers in the manner familiar to U.S. carriers, with all that this implies).

On the other hand, I suspect that all U.S. carriers fail to meet certain local requirements in many other countries. But, I will bet you that all meet the minimum ICAO requirements and that those have been incorporated in some way into the laws of the country operating the aircraft and licensing the crew. Is that not the fundamental logic that underpins the international aviation system?

[bermondseya]

GGV,

Yes, I agree. I would go further and say ".....that all, or the majority, of US carriers leaving LAX fail to meet some aspect of the FARs" on occasion.

Take a look at the FAA enforcement database; it is full of household names. Of course that doesn't mean to say it's right, and definitely doesn't excuse people from not being au-fait with the regulations of the state they are flying in.

I guess the issue in my head is, if they had loaded fuel as calculated by 14CFR121.645, would they have made London, landing with fuel reserves greater than that required by the CAA.

[GGV]

Bermondseya, you really need to go back over the two threads to assess the range of different responses/answers to the fuel issue. Your assessment seems too trite by far to me. If this was always about the diverson due to the fuel situation you should simply have tackled that matter.

What you chose to discuss was the applicability of the FARs and you now are agreeing that most carriers, including U.S. carriers, don't meet the FARs leaving LAX. We are now into minutiae and the nuance of difference. I really don't think that this is productive a way to go. You also imply that pilots should be familiar with the laws of every state over which they fly - I suggest that this is nonsense.

All I have to say is that any assertion that the FAA have a "slam dunk" case against BA is just plain wrong. This is not quite as "black or white" as some seem to think.

[bermondseya]

GGV,

I agreed with your first post, I disagree with your second.

You mention minutiae, afraid I don't consider fuel calculations minutiae, they are a 'very big thing'. Lets see whether the FAA thinks to too.

I think any foreign airmen operating in US airspace should be 'au fait' with FAR 129, that is not well received here by some, so be it. I suspect the FAA will agree with me. I have several extremely boring books on my shelf which cover regulations in states I do not hold a certificate yet in which I fly, I commend FAR/AIM to you to peruse at your leisure when in the cruise.

I've read the threads on the fuel management in the flight and have no public opinion on that. I merely wonder whether the BA flight would have made London because maybe if it had, we wouldn't have had all this fuss.

[West Coast]

"I'll repeat the quote that I beleive defines the difference between the FAA and the CAA attitudes: "US vs. UK military cultures: since the regs involved often derive from military practices, anyone else wonder how much the US "if it ain't in the book, you can't do it" vs. UK "if it isn't prohibited in the book, you can do it" philosophies might affect the different attitudes towards the investigations?"

This is folly. The US has a number of different arms of the US military that operate with different baseline philosophies as alluded to in the quote. There is no one standard that would allow the author to make the quote with any degree of accuracy.

If the author would like to back the claim up, I be intersted in seeing the argument.

[L337]

bermondseya:

Following your argument to its logical conclusion.

Say I fly from London to Bombay. I fly over probably 10 - 15 different countries. I would need to be au-fait with every countries minutia of there equivalent of the FAA, and comply with each and every countries individual needs.

Well this clearly does not happen. Nor does it happen for US aircraft flying into Europe, or European aircraft flying into the USA.

So if you think when I lose an engine over Kazakhstan, that my first concern is to delve into some mythical library that my Jumbo has, and consider my next action is, according to Kazakhstan regs, you must be living in cloud barking land.

I have regulations that are approved by the CAA. That is whom I am answerable to. If the FAA don't like what the CAA have agreed, then let them talk about it.

To say that "foreign airmen operating in US airspace should be 'au fait' with FAR 129" Is just stupid. If it was correct I would have to be au fait with the regulations of every country in the world that I fly over. And as a BA longhaul pilot that is virtually every country in the world.

L337

[DingerX]

The original truism is mine, West Coast, and I may be dumb, but I ain't dumb enough to try to back that one up with actual evidence. Just repeating bits of conversation I had recently with a chap down at the local RAF base. In any case, I'm sure there's some sort of philosophical HLA or QSTAG or whatnot. If not, there's got to be a good joke based on one, complete with classic caricatures of Americans and those foreigners who think English is their mother tongue.

[411A]

As West Coast above has so aptly pointed out, the various military cultures (US vs UK) has absolutely nothing to do with the differing civil air carrier regulations/operating procedures.
To claim otherwise is to be severly misinformed.

Now then, if we look at the heart of the BA 3-engine diversion, it is quite clear that the BA flight in question was operated by the Commander in conformity with the applicable UK CAA regulations and also in conformity with the laid down BA standard practises.

To state otherwise, and in addition, to insist that while in US airspace, each foreigh air carrier must operate as though they were a 14CFR121 US air carrier, is simply complete and utter nonsense.
14CFR129 notwithstanding.

If I were the concerned BA Commander in question, and I had made the same decision to continue onwards to the UK instead of diverting to a suitable North American airfield, I would likewise expect full and complete support for my decision in the UK, both BA and the CAA.
Full marks for the Brits for supporting the concerned Commander, as clearly, he was in his authority for doing so.

However, from my perspective (a very long time in heavy 3/4 engine jet transports), the idea of continuing a very long intercontinental flight with one engine shut down/failed, when that shut down/failure had occured very close to the departure airport is, in my opinion, unwise.
Even though the regulations under which I was operating might allow me to continue in the above scenario, I would decline to do so in the interests of passenger safety.

Also, if I then decided to continue anyway, and a further situation should develop enroute, which necessitated an off-route diversion, and I stuffed it up and bent the bird, I would find it really hard to justify my decision to 'press on'.
And, so too would the investigation commitee that would surely follow.:}

[ShotOne]

well said, 411a, you've just summed up the last 16 pages in one post.

[boofhead]

An international crew is required to comply with country of registration rules at all times. They are also required to comply with ICAO rules when in international airspace. They are also required to comply with the rules for the territory or state over which they are flying.
How does the average crew do this? From my experience, particularly with Asian airlines, is that they don't (many do not cover this in training nor do they provide copies of relevant regulations (such as in the Jep) for the crew to refer to enroute).
Does this ignorance provide protection for the crew? No it doesn't. How many of you are aware that you will be subject to jail and/or seriously big fines for offences relating to paperwork and skill errors in many countries in Asia particularly? Do you think the argument "hey I did not know that!" will cut you any slack?
When flying to or over other countries, such as the US, Australia, NZ and such, the permission to do so for your airline will have been negotiated and approved, and one of the documents that you, as crew, need to know about and read is the Operations Specifications(s). It should cover the major requirements of routes, aids, airplane registrations and especially fuel requirements. when you have an Ops Spec it overrides the regulations as printed in that country's regs, and might very well be more restricting.
It is up to the carrier to advise their crew of the requirements of the Ops Specs, but as I said, many carriers fail to do that. Does that protect you? ("hey, I wasn't told!"). No, it does not.

If the BA crew was not in conflict with the CAA regs, ICAO, the FARs or their own Ops Specs, they are fireproof. If they had not done as they did, then they might have had to answer to the airline for why they did not, and justify the costs and inconvenience. It is an engine this time, but the same problem could be caused by any mechanical defect and so long as the decision is backed up by procedures, experience, common sense and consultation (CRM) when applicable, why lose any sleep over it? The captain is paid the big bucks for this very reason.

You don't like it? Get the rules changed.

[bugg smasher]

With the exception of the takeoff, BA 268 may be considered a three engine ferry in all of its operational aspects, to suggest otherwise is a puerile attempt at deception.

The FAA defines the three engine ferry as;

“a ferry flight of a four-engine airplane or a turbine-engine-powered airplane equipped with three engines, with one engine inoperative, to a base for the purpose of repairing that engine subject to the following”

The regs go on to list the various conditions, stipulations and limitations under which said flight may be operated. Relevant to this discussion are;

(i) Limiting the operating weight on any ferry flight to the minimum necessary for the flight plus the necessary reserve fuel load;
(ii) Inspection procedures for determining the operating condition of the operative engines.
(iii) Persons other than required flight crewmembers shall not be carried during the flight.

The question that begs to be asked here is, when the rules are so restrictive (with good reason) for a planned three engine operation, why would they then be completely disregarded for an unplanned one. The easy answer is, of course, for the purpose of saving the company money. V1 is a magically productive airspeed.

The 744 is a very capable aeroplane. In this case, however, BA268 has clearly illustrated the extent to which the limits of those capabilities are being exploited by those charged with the financial health of the company, to the detriment of previously established safety margins. This flight represents a quantum leap in that trend, the exclamatory demonstrated by the well-developed error chain, the resultant Mayday call and coasting into Manchester on fumes, short of destination.

The practice of carrying dead engines and live passengers over long distances is, in my opinion, a most unwise one.

[Charles Darwin]

What if it was a B-52?

[Joetom]

Don't know the details of this flight, but.

Belive Boeing and CAA think it was/is reasonable for said flight to continue.

When crew found LHR comprised by fuel or other, they made a fine decision to use another airport and use correct radio calls to ensure aircraft was safe.

A very well done to those pilots/captain......

[banana9999]

With the exception of the takeoff, BA 268 may be considered a three engine ferry

As you've listed the exception to suggest that it was a ferry is a puerile attempt at deception.

If the engine failure had occured over London and landed at LHR then, by your definition, it becomes a ferry flight - puerile.

[delwy]

bugg smasher With the exception of the takeoff, BA 268 may be considered a three engine ferry in all of its operational aspects, to suggest otherwise is a puerile attempt at deception. A peurile attempt at deception .... really?

What you are saying is that any B747 with an engine failure that does not land at the nearest suitable airport is, in consequence, a three-engined ferry. Are you really telling me that there are no U.S. carriers that have failed to land a 747 at the nearest suitable airfield? I suspect that there are U.S. carriers that have indeed been guilty of such operational decisions. In fact, I think it will be easy to find lots of examples. Any comment?

[beerdrinker]

Quote " If the BA crew was not in conflict with the CAA regs, ICAO, the FARs or their own Ops Specs, they are fireproof."

They were just that.

And as BA have a FAR Part 129 Foreign Carrier Certificate, their Operations Manual (which contains procedures for continued flight on the 744 after an engine failure) was submitted to and approved by the FAA.

AS I have just posted the crew carried out a procedure perfectly in compliance with their Operations Manual, which was itself approved by both the CAA and FAA.

End of subject PLEASE.

[lomapaseo]

beerdrinker

I think that the issue between the crew and the FAA is that it is the responsibility of the crew to demonstrate compliance with the specific reg

This may be a simple as answering to the satisfaction of the FAA a few questions about reasoning.

If they were to not answer these questions to the satisfaction of the FAA then they and their employer's published procedures may be found in non-compliance.

I have been saying since day one that it is not for us as mere mortals to judge the issue of compliance.

[beerdrinker]

Lompaseo,

Check PM's

411A

"However, from my perspective (a very long time in heavy 3/4 engine jet transports), the idea of continuing a very long intercontinental flight with one engine shut down/failed, when that shut down/failure had occured very close to the departure airport is, in my opinion, unwise.
Even though the regulations under which I was operating might allow me to continue in the above scenario, I would decline to do so in the interests of passenger safety."

In many respects I would agree with you but a 744 is a different beast compared with a 747 Classic. I have operated both. Remember that the week after the LAX incident the same aircraft had a totally different (in othe words totally unrelated) engine shut down problem ex SIN and the decision to continue was made and the flight operated successfully on 3 engines to LHR.

It is an approved company procedure that works and has worked with no (that is zero) problems for many years. It is not a new policy and BA have completed many continue towards destination flights after an engine failure on their 744\'s.

BUT and a big BUT, on the day it is the responsibility (and this is in the BA procedures) of the Captain and his Flight Crew to be satisfied that the flight may be continued safely bearing in mind all possibilities.
On this occasion the crew did this.

They did have a fuel problem very late in flight (I gather it was a cross feed problem) and dealt with that quite properly by diverting into MAN. It was a problem that was not a issue early in the flight abd only manifested itself virtually within minutes of TOD for LHR. They reacted quite properly.

[411A]

\\\In many respects I would agree with you but a 744 is a different beast compared with a 747 Classic. I have operated both. Remember that the week after the LAX incident the same aircraft had a totally different (in othe words totally unrelated) engine shut down problem ex SIN and the decision to continue was made and the flight operated successfully on 3 engines to LHR.\\\

OK, Beerdrinker, we seem to have found some common ground.
Now, le's examine just a bit more closely.

As all 4-engine jet transports are certificated to the same set of regulations (as indeed are 3-engine jets as well), just what makes the B744 so much better with regards to continuing on three, better than the Classic (as you mentioned) or other 3/4 engine types?

In addition, the SIN-LHR flight you mentioned had far more diversion airports available, so to compare the two referenced operations is apples to oranges, in my opinion.

Thirdly, the original intent of the regulations regarding continued flight (3/4 engine types) with an engine shut down/failed, was the cruise altitude/enroute case...not a shut down/failute on (or just after) departure.

Seems to this old hand that Murphy's law will find a place to strike one day...and the results might well not be pretty.

[jtr]

950kg for taxi sounds a lot in the -10.

As an e.g. the -400 burns (at idle) 50kg/min for taxi.

1200kg for a tight circuit is about right, but that is assuming a 1500' circuit.

2 tons would be a more realistic amount assuming you get good vectors, and #1

[sky9]

Does anyone have the access to the facts as to how American airlines actually operate the 744 in a similar situation. Do they to a man land ASAP or is it as it should be for the commander on the day to make a reasoned decision?

[dazdaz]

I've been doing cargo 747 for the past ten years, South American company, flown the 747 with just two burners, great fun.

There are old pilots, and there are bold pilots, but the thing is....You never get old bold pilots..

Dazdaz

[OldAg84]

I've read this thread since it's inception.

As a passenger, I would be incensed to find a flight continued after an engine failed, whether it was a 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 or other number engined aircraft. Apparently, the regulations don't define the difference between "you can do it, or should you do it?"

I wouldn't embark on a drive across west Texas with one cylinder of my car's engine inoperative, or one tire known to have a slow leak- and the consequences on the road of complete shutdown are a lot less.

I agree with 411A- who has the job experience- it's just plain imprudent.

How much more inconvenient for the passengers was the diversion to MAN vs. returning?

The engines are what make it go- that's fairly basic.

[Ignition Override]

Charles Darwin-

The pilot with whom I just tonight finished a two-day trip, flew the eight-engine B-52, then the MC-130 (special ops), the T-37, T-44 and recently a twin-turbofan 'classic' civilian transport. Now he flies the C-130 J "Hurricane Hunter" as a hobby.

I'll ask him about a flight with seven engines in the B-52. By the way, to practice rapid descents, they rolled into a 90-degree bank (with speedbrakes?) and let the nose fall for quite a descent! Along with the C-130J (in which he is type-rated: L-382), the B-52 has no Flight Engineer, so I will ask him about the decision to continue a very long flight in either plane with one or two engines shutdown (on the "BUFF").

Would a long flight in a three-engine 'classic' 747 have an advantage over a flight in the 747-400, knowing that you have a third crewmember who is highly trained in managing multiple, complex systems? With a compound problem in a two-pilot aircraft, one pilot flies and coordinates with both [1] ATC (for a lower altitude etc?) and [2] Dispatch, while the only other pilot up front must correctly deal with two or more sets of procedures-both having various decision points, at which the problems must be carefully evaluated with no important steps incorrectly followed or forgotten? :\ Let's not forget about coordinating with the [3] Lead Purser or [4] other cabin crewmembers. :ugh: The pilot (brand-new FO or Captain? ) who does these checklists (often not 'cut and dried'.... at all..) should keep about a fourth of his attention on what the flying/'handling' pilot is doing, especially if they are not just flying straight and level.

Would the automation on a 744 or A-340 etc and EICAS/COM/ECAM procedures also quickly tell you your new 3-engine cruise altitude and fuel at destination airport?

[delwy]

Forgive me if I am wrong, but to the best of my knowledge NOBODY has responded to at least three different posts over the past weeks asking for one of the contributors here to indicate what U.S. carriers generally do after an engine failure on the B744.

The reply, it seems to me, is generally fudged on the few occasions that the question is not ignored. So let me try to put it in a different manner. I have the clear and distinct impression that U.S. carriers operating B747 aircraft simply do NOT as a matter of practice land at the nearest suitable airport, but instead go to an airport meeting a wider range of requirements. However, I don't have the time to go look at the raw information and I am simply asking for clarification (as I did some ten posts above).

I presume the reluctance to concede the point is that once it is conceded then we are into "shades of grey" argument that the absolutists don't like.

[sky330]

Would the automation on a 744 or A-340 etc and EICAS/COM/ECAM procedures also quickly tell you your new 3-engine cruise altitude and fuel at destination airport?

In old times, the FE uses to compute 'bracket
(weight, fuel, optimum level, and drift down altitude and speed for engine failure) every 10 t or so.
Today, the 'mighty' computer will gives you the same info. within seconds.

Anyway, you can always take the plain old book and find this information very easily.

Fuel at destination is maybe a little more tricky, with book computing, but you have a lot of time to check two times your computation with the other crewmember before taking the decision.

[Globaliser]

OldAg84: How much more inconvenient for the passengers was the diversion to MAN vs. returning?Much less inconvenient than returning to LAX, I should have thought.

As SLF, I would have remained entirely happy with flying on this aircraft. (Including what seems to me to have been the precautionary and in fact unnecessary Mayday.)

[DOVES]

Oh! It comes to my mind:
Did you ever cross an Atlantic front (we know how long and wide they are) at 28.000' with one engine out?
FLY SAFE
DOVE

[cargo boy]

Delwy, I suspect that you know the answer to your own question, as do the FAA licenced operators of the type. :hmm:

How many times does it have to be repeated to all you non B744 experienced pilots that the QRH for the B744 DOES NOT mention anything about "Land at the nearest suitable airport" for a single engine shut down! :rolleyes: There are other scenarios on the QRH that don't involve a single engine shut down that do mandate a land asap but shutting down a single engine does not!

Why oh why do we still have our opinionated SLF pontificating about this incident with their dumb comparisons between a flat tyre or a non-firing cylinder on their car? It's one thing to have the discussion between people with at least some experience of operating large multi-engined jet turbine aircraft, even if we agree to disagree on some aspects but to have to put up with inane twaddle from 'Mr Angry of (Texas/Purley/add your own)' just demeans the quality of debate. Whilst we had 411A make a reasonable comment a few posts back when it was mentioned that the only real difference of opinion was whether some of us would continue or not for up to 10 hours with an engine shut down, he has gone on to spoil it with his sarcastic tone once again in his last post. Now we have 'Mr Angry' telling us he thinks 411A "has the job experience" whereas we all know it was all gained long before the current generation of modern heavy jets and certainly none of it on the B744.

The point is that the crew had the option of continuing or returning or diverting immediately. I don't think anyone is disputing that. Whichever decision was taken was made after considering the multitude of factors that are inevitably involved. None of the decisions were 'wrong' and they were all allowable under the rules. All we have here is a bunch of opinionated 'armchair experts' voicing off their flawed opinions about a situation they have no experience with. It just bothers me when we have uninformed cr@p being spouted by self opinionated know-it-alls. :ooh:

[6feetunder]

It's interesting that the Jumbo is built in the US and it's initial certifacation is done by the FAA. I believe the operations manuals for each and every operator have to approved by the manufacturer, Boeing and by proxy are also approved by the FAA.

In other cases, the L1011 for example the CAA had some restrictions on operating that type that the FAA didn't have.

Seems to me the FAA is more or less disagreeing with itself!!

[BEagle]

Whilst 'land at nearest aerodrome' would indeed be over the top, perhaps 'review remaining flight time and fuel at destination when operating over uninhabited regions' or similar weasel words might not?

Interesting that the old, experienced and retired folk (411A, 3 experienced ba skippers and others) all say "East coast US, perhaps. Extended over water, not me, sir!"

Which is also my view.

But let's see what the FAA and CAA sort out between them, shall we?