Bombardier Accident at Teterboro [Archive]

Airbubba

2nd Feb 2005, 14:19

Plane Skids Off Runway, Crashes in N.J.

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Published: February 2, 2005

Filed at 9:56 a.m. ET

TETERBORO, N.J. (AP) -- A corporate jet sped off the end of a runway while attempting to take off from Teterboro Airport on Wednesday, hurtling across a highway during the morning rush hour and slamming into a warehouse. At least 11 people were injured and two were missing.

One witness said the pilot crawled out of the wreckage and said the crew lost control of the plane.

State police said two people were missing and 11 were injured in the crash. It was not immediately clear whether all those people were on the plane. The plane appeared to have struck at least one car.

It was headed for Midway Airport in Chicago, said Greg Martin, a spokesman for the Federal Aviation Administration in Washington. Another FAA spokesman, Jim Peters, said the jet was carrying 12 passengers and two crew members.

One witness said the plane never made it off the ground after ``sliding and skidding'' down the runway.

``Usually we see them lift off, but this one just went straight and started scratching the ground. There were sparks shooting out all over the place,'' said Joseph Massaro, a psychologist who lives nearby.

Video from television station helicopters showed wheel tracks, plainly visible in snow, that ran straight off the end of the runway, through a fence and a snow bank and then across six-lane U.S. 46.

Witness Robert Sosa told WNBC-TV he saw the plane crash into the building.

``Two guys came off with their hand cuts,'' Sosa said. ``The pilot said he dragged himself out. He literally crawled out like a baby, and all the other people just walked out normal.''

``He said as they tried to airborne before five minutes past (7 a.m.), they just lost control and they couldn't airborne the plane. They went straight through, 100 miles per hour,'' Sosa said.

Martin said communication between the air traffic control and the aircraft was routine and the aircraft had been cleared for takeoff.

Martin identified the aircraft as a twin-engine Canadair Challenger 600, ``a type of small regional business/charter jet'' that can carry 12 to 15 passengers.

The building that was struck was described as a clothing warehouse, and there were no injuries there, Martin said.

State Police Trooper Stephen Jones said emergency management crews at the warehouse were conducting ``a rescue operation.''

``You act on that assumption until you know otherwise,'' he said.

Brenda Leahy, a spokeswoman at Hackensack University Medical Center, said five people, including the plane's co-pilot, were taken there. She did not know their conditions.

Two people, a flight attendant and a man who had been in a car, were taken to Holy Name Hospital in Teaneck, said hospital spokeswoman Katherine Kakogiannis. The flight attendant had minor injuries and she didn't know the condition of the other person.

The manager of the warehouse, owned by clothing company Strawberry, said he ran inside after the crash and helped firefighters make their way to the plane.

``You couldn't see anything inside. There was so much smoke it looked like fog,'' said Tommy Ficarra.

The FAA Web site says plane was registered to a company called 448 Alliance LLC, and gave an address in Dallas. Directory assistance has no company with that name, but does show a DDH Aviation at the same address. No one answered the phone there.

Nearly a year ago, on Feb. 26, a Gulfstream 3 registered to 448 Alliance rolled off a runway into the mud at Atlanta's Peachtree-DeKalb Airport after a snowstorm. No one was injured.

The airport, in the northern New Jersey suburbs 12 miles from midtown Manhattan, was closed after the crash.

Once used by weekend recreational fliers, Teterboro has grown into one of the nation's busiest small airports, catering to corporate jets looking to avoid the hassles of larger airports.

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Plane-Crash.html

SaturnV

2nd Feb 2005, 14:19

Excerpts from the Associated Press:
It was headed for Midway Airport in Chicago, said Greg Martin, a spokesman for the Federal Aviation Administration in Washington. Another FAA spokesman, Jim Peters, said the jet was carrying 12 passengers and two crew members.

One witness said the plane never made it off the ground after "sliding and skidding" down the runway.

"Usually we see them lift off, but this one just went straight and started scratching the ground. There were sparks shooting out all over the place," said Joseph Massaro, a psychologist who lives nearby.

Video from television station helicopters showed wheel tracks, plainly visible in snow, that ran straight off the end of the runway, through a fence and a snow bank and then across six-lane U.S. 46.

Witness Robert Sosa told WNBC-TV he saw the plane crash into the building.

"Two guys came off with their hand cuts," Sosa said. "The pilot said he dragged himself out. He literally crawled out like a baby, and all the other people just walked out normal."

"He said as they tried to airborne before five minutes past (7 a.m.), they just lost control and they couldn't airborne the plane. They went straight through, 100 miles per hour," Sosa said

BizJetJock

2nd Feb 2005, 14:22

Eyewitness news now reporting everyone accounted for, no fatalities. One car occupant described as critical, copilot serious leg injuries, the rest 'minor'.

Ranger One

2nd Feb 2005, 14:26

KTEB is just about on my doorstep. Last nights METAR (UTC):

00:00 2 February 0.0 (32.0 ) -6.7 (19.9 ) 30.45 (1031) Calm
01:00 2 February -0.6 (30.9 ) -6.7 (19.9 ) 30.47 (1031) Calm
02:00 2 February -1.1 (30.0 ) -5.6 (21.9 ) 30.48 (1032) Calm
03:00 2 February -1.7 (28.9 ) -4.4 (24.1 ) 30.49 (1032) Calm
04:00 2 February -1.7 (28.9 ) -4.4 (24.1 ) 30.49 (1032) Calm
05:00 2 February -2.8 (27.0 ) -5.6 (21.9 ) 30.49 (1032) N 5 (8)
06:00 2 February -3.9 (25.0 ) -5.6 (21.9 ) 30.49 (1032) Calm
07:00 2 February -3.9 (25.0 ) -6.1 (21.0 ) 30.49 (1032) Calm
08:00 2 February -3.9 (25.0 ) -6.1 (21.0 ) 30.49 (1032) Calm
09:00 2 February -5.0 (23.0 ) -7.2 (19.0 ) 30.49 (1032) Calm
10:00 2 February -5.6 (21.9 ) -7.8 (18.0 ) 30.51 (1033) Calm
11:00 2 February -5.0 (23.0 ) -7.2 (19.0 ) 30.52 (1033) Calm
12:00 2 February -5.6 (21.9 ) -8.3 (17.1 ) 30.53 (1033) Calm
13:00 2 February -3.9 (25.0 ) -7.8 (18.0 ) 30.54 (1034) NE 3 (5)
14:00 2 February -1.7 (28.9 ) -7.2 (19.0 ) 30.54 (1034) NNE 8

Talking head on CNN is actually making some sense -speedbrakes/reversers deployed, looks like a high speed RTO. As far as I can make out they're saying 12 POB, 11 accounted for, 2 missing - presumably one of the two missing is on the ground, they took out a car on the way to the warehouse....

R1

Airbubba

2nd Feb 2005, 14:40

From a news conference by Dr. Joseph Feldman of Hackensack University Medical Center, there were two pilots, five pax, two injured in a car and three bystanders taken to his hospital.

Sounds like everyone got out of the aircraft from his account...

Elliot Moose

2nd Feb 2005, 14:48

Is it my imagination or do the Challenger series of bizjets seem to have a history with icing related mishaps on take off

Yes they do--because people keep taking off with ice on the wings!!:mad: I have no idea about this accident yet, I'm just responding to this "less than inspirational or enlightening" post.

It's a very simple concept. DON'T ATTEMPT A TAKEOFF IF THERE IS ANY CONTAMINATION ON YOUR WINGS!! This basic idea applies to ANY aircraft, period. That said, a supercritical wing, with no slats must be respected even more. Canadair has used the same wing on over 600 Challengers and over 1000 CRJ 100/200 aircraft to date (the 700/900 have slats, but the same airfoil), and they aren't exactly falling out of the sky. The accidents/incidents that are known have all been Part 91 ops in the States, or carrier ops in China, where deicing is almost unknown. These largely unregulated types of flying are the cause of these crashes, not the aircraft themselves. People that follow the rules that have been around for 25years and more seem to have no problems. If the FAA would stand up to the rich folks and make them all follow the same rules as everybody else (i.e. Part 121, or even 135) these things likely wouldn't happen.

The next argument of course becomes "well I don't see king airs falling out of the sky, why didn't they build it like that?" The answer of course is that if you want to take these risks :uhoh: for whatever special reason, you'd maybe be better off owning a twin otter and go globe-hopping at 140kts instead of a swept wing jet. (and no I'm not suggesting that it's safe to take off in a twotter with ice on the wings either)

RatherBeFlying

2nd Feb 2005, 15:14

The US has two very different climates in the winter.

Those flying in the South never have to bother with deice because if there's the least bit of snow, nobody can get to the airport because they can't handle it on the roads even if they can get the car started.

Then that good 'ol Southern boy who's never seen a hint of frost on the wings in his entire flying career takes a run up North and early one morning before the sun comes up does not run his hand over the wing:uhoh:

av8boy

2nd Feb 2005, 15:42

This is a group of people who are VERY lucky to be alive. There’s some video here (http://www.nynewsday.com/news/local/ny-stairp0203,0,6221189.story?coll=nyc-homepage-breakingheadlines) of the accident scene (NOT the accident in progress) from a local new helicopter. Click on "Plane crash" under the second picture on the right side of the page. I didn’t bother with the sound, so I can’t say whether or not the voice-over will be irritating…

Looks like there were plenty of opportunities for this to go much more poorly for these folks this morning, including a localizer antenna (yeah, frangible… looks good on paper but I wouldn’t want to drive through one) which appears unscathed, a rather substantial road which might have had much more traffic on it, a smaller, brick building in front of the warehouse, and then the brick warehouse itself.

Amazing.

There’s also a quick shot of the end of the runway which gives the impression that antiskid was doing its job (doesn’t look like any rubber on it). But again—and this goes for all of my observations—I’ve looked at the video only once…

Flight Safety

2nd Feb 2005, 15:54

I agree with Ranger One, this looks like a high speed RTO. With at least one broken wing (and maybe both), and fire from a nearby car, the cabin fire that followed, etc., it's only by the Lord's grace there was no immediate fuel fire (in fact no fuel fire at all it appears), giving everyone time to get out.

Capt. Inop

2nd Feb 2005, 16:21

http://www.vg.no/bilder/bildarkiv/1107362607.15009.jpg
http://www.vg.no/bilder/bildarkiv/1107363050.27662.jpg
http://www.vg.no/bilder/bildarkiv/1107363090.08277.jpg

RESA

3rd Feb 2005, 01:17

Capt. Inop . . .

Excuse my naiveté . . . but please tell me this is an optical illusion?

The middle photo . . . is the runway end really . . . like, 300-ft. away and about 30-ft. above what is essential a strip-mall??

lead zeppelin

3rd Feb 2005, 01:38

Based on posts in this thread, it seems to be a foregone conclusion that icing caused this........do we know that for a fact???

That is one of many possible causes for this accident.....let's get the facts before assiging a cause.

McGinty

3rd Feb 2005, 02:19

Regarding the post from Bingo Bango Bongo above: it is good for once to see a measured, objective and unbiased analysis of an aviation accident that we can all respect and admire.

A classic of its type!

Is there anyone else out there who is suffering from a similar bout of chronic indigestion?

Mad (Flt) Scientist

3rd Feb 2005, 03:34

Well, he seems to think the aircraft has an ejection seat, if I understand the intent of his post. (Otherwise the remark is even more other-worldly than the rest of the post).

Which would certainly be an INNOVATIVE design for a civil transport aircraft.

Airbubba

3rd Feb 2005, 04:24

February 3, 2005

Runaway Jet at Teterboro Rams Warehouse, Injuring 20

By PATRICK McGEEHAN and DAMIEN CAVE

A corporate jet shot off a runway yesterday as it was taking off from Teterboro Airport in New Jersey, ripped through a metal fence and barreled across a six-lane highway - striking cars, even peeling the roof off one - before coming to rest with its nose lodged in the brick wall of a warehouse. The authorities expressed amazement that nobody was killed, though more than 20 people were injured.

The jet slammed two parked cars into the wall of the warehouse, which partly collapsed and then caught fire. Other parked cars burst into flames. Terrified office workers bolted to safety while startled drivers outside, confronted with the surreal image of a broken plane sticking out of the building, screeched traffic to a stop on one of the region's busiest highways during the morning rush.

The plane caught fire but did not explode, even though it was carrying enough fuel for its flight to Chicago. All eight passengers, a group of financial executives, walked or crawled away from the smoking wreck in the building, which is the headquarters of the Strawberry clothing store chain.

There were many close calls. Rohan Foster, who was driving to work at a nearby factory, was stopped at a red light on Route 46 when his passenger shouted, "Watch out, the plane is coming."

The two men ducked, and the plane tore the roof off the green Toyota, then kept going, according to Mr. Foster's father, Lloyd, who related his son's account. Rohan Foster was admitted to Holy Name Hospital in Teaneck with broken facial bones. He and his passenger would have been killed instantly if they hadn't ducked, his father said.

"Thank God," he said. "It's a miracle."

After crossing Route 46, the jet brought terror and confusion to Strawberry's offices. "The plane was inside my friend's office," said Armando Contreras, 22, an employee who was in a hallway when the building shook with the plane's impact. "The pilot opened the door and ran."

The jet, a Canadair CL-600 Challenger, was part of the same series as the one that crashed in Colorado nine weeks ago, killing a son of Dick Ebersol, chairman of NBC Universal Sports, and two crew members.

Of the 20 people injured at Teterboro, including bystanders and firefighters who responded to the scene, four remained hospitalized last night. The most seriously injured was Mr. Foster's passenger, James, whose last name was not released. He was in critical condition at Hackensack University Medical Center with a head wound, a hospital official said.

The co-pilot suffered a broken leg and was in stable condition last night. One victim, a passenger, was admitted to Hackensack University Medical Center with abdominal pains. The plane's pilot was admitted to the hospital for evaluation in the afternoon, a spokeswoman said.

The wreck shut down the small airport, one of the busiest in the nation for private-plane flights. It re-opened at 6:30 p.m., and traffic was allowed to return to Route 46 shortly before 11 p.m.

Investigators for the National Transportation Safety Board were studying the voice and data recorders from the jet, conducting interviews and tests, but had not yet determined a cause for the crash.

Almost immediately after the crash, local officials renewed calls for federal regulators to reduce traffic at Teterboro. And witnesses to the crash and its aftermath said they were amazed that nobody was killed.

"I think everybody at this point is extremely lucky and fortunate," said Acting Gov. Richard J. Codey of New Jersey, who flew over the scene in a helicopter.

With fewer than 50 residents, Teterboro, a borough in northern New Jersey, is too small to have its own police force or fire department. Angelo Roccamo, the assistant fire chief in neighboring Hasbrouck Heights, said he saw a plume of dark smoke as he neared the crash site and called for help from other communities.

When he arrived, the pilot was on the highway and said he was searching for the flight attendant.

Five of the passengers were employees of Kelso & Company, a private investment firm whose offices are on Park Avenue, and three men from other financial companies were with them, said George Matelich, a Kelso managing director. "Our people are fine," he said.

Mr. Contreras said he was walking down a hallway in the Strawberry building near an office where signs are made when he heard the crash. "When I heard the noise, I jumped back," he said. "It felt so close."

He opened a door directly in front of him. There, in the sign room, an office the size of a master bedroom, was the rounded, white nose cone of the private jet. His friend, Diego Vargas, 23, hovered near a destroyed computer, blood gushing from his head.

"I saw a lot of smoke," Mr. Contreras said. Other people in the building were screaming and pointing to jet fuel spewing from the plane.

That was when the pilot pushed open the plane's door and jumped to the ground, Mr. Contreras and other witnesses said. The copilot was visible through the cockpit window.

Flickering flames were also visible near the destroyed jet. Fire alarms screeched and a small crowd that had gathered at the crash site moved quickly away. One man, Claudio Gomez, 32, said that a woman who escaped from the plane was struggling to get past a snow bank, and he helped her.

Near the rear of the building, farthest away from the crash, about 60 employees in the wide-open warehouse were trying to figure out what to do. When the alarms sounded, panic replaced inquiry. "People were running," said one worker, Mario Recinos, 51. "They said there was an explosion. We didn't know what it was."

The building was quickly evacuated. Mr. Recinos found his wife, Vilma, 41, outside. She had been working in an office near the building's eastern corner at the time of the accident. They said the toll could have been worse. If the plane had hit the building an hour earlier, they said, the loading dock just to the left of the sign room would have been teeming with trucks and employees preparing for the day's first distribution run. "But they were already gone," Mrs. Recinos said. "Thank God."

At a news conference last night, Debbie Hersman, a spokeswoman for the National Transportation Safety Board, said a fuel sample was taken from the jet, and investigators were studying the 6,013-foot runway, which showed no signs of debris or fuel, only skid marks on the last 1,000 feet.

She said that the rear thrusters on the engine had been deployed to stop the plane. The board was still trying to determine, however, whether the brakes had been deployed.

As of last night, toxicology tests had not been performed on either the pilot or the co-pilot, she said, and neither man, both of whom were hospitalized, had been interviewed.

The cockpit voice recorder indicated that there had been a decision to discontinue the takeoff, Ms. Hersman said. The flight data recorder, which monitors the plane's operation, was recovered and was being taken to Washington.

"We will not rule anything out in this investigation," she said.

Fred Dressel, the mayor of Moonachie, where the southern end of the airport is situated, said he could not remember another plane emerging onto Route 46 in the last 40 years.

Local residents have become increasingly concerned about safety and noise as traffic at Teterboro has boomed. Representative Steven R. Rothman, a Democrat from Bergen County, has fought a proposal to make changes so that the airport could accommodate jets as big as a Boeing 737.

Yesterday, Mr. Rothman called on the Federal Aviation Administration to lighten Teterboro's load. In October, he said, there were 19,000 takeoffs and landings there, or more than 600 a day.

"Teterboro is operating at capacity and something needs to be done," Mr. Rothman said. "This is a matter of public safety and the quality of life for the people that live here."

The jet involved in yesterday's crash was one of 84 planes of a model built from 1980 to 1983 by Canadair, a company that was acquired by Montreal-based Bombardier Inc. in 1986.

Planes in the same Challenger series have been involved in two fatal crashes within the last three years. Mr. Ebersol was aboard a CL-601 jet in November when it crashed in Montrose, Colo., killing his 14-year-old son, Edward, and two crew members. In January 2002, five people were killed in a crash of a CL-604 jet in Birmingham, England.

British investigators concluded that wind, snow and ice on the wings and tail surfaces may have contributed to the Birmingham crash. The Colorado accident is still under investigation by the safety board, but investigators suspect that ice on the wings was the cause.

The temperature at Teterboro was below freezing, about 22 degrees, when the plane began to taxi at 7:20 a.m. Ms. Hersman declined to comment on whether ice or frost on the wings may have been a factor in the crash. But she said that a check of airport records showed that the plane was not de-iced, and that no request for de-icing been made. Three witnesses - two employees of Atlantic Aviation and a pilot in an adjacent plane - interviewed by investigators reported seeing no frost on the plane, she said.

Leo Knaapen, a spokesman for Bombardier Aerospace, called the Challenger series's safety record of six in-use accidents in 25 years "outstanding," and a corporate-aviation expert supported that view.

"Up through 2003, the accident rate for this airplane has been lower than the overall average for business jets," said the expert, Robert E. Breiling, an aviation consultant in Boca Raton, Fla. The CL-600 had 0.88 nonfatal accidents, and 0.18 fatal accidents, for every 100,000 flying hours, he said, compared with industrywide averages of 1.17 and 0.38.

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/03/nyregion/03crash.html?ei=5094&en=9605f038e128b035&hp=&ex=1107493200&partner=homepage&pagewanted=all&position=

Avman

3rd Feb 2005, 05:57

Reading the above, one would get the impression the Skipper made a run for it leaving the F/O (with the broken leg) to fend for himself! I trust this was NOT the case.

AtlPax

3rd Feb 2005, 08:07

RESA, here's an aerial photo (dated 1995) which shows the area: Terraserver link (http://terraserver.microsoft.com/image.aspx?T=1&S=11&Z=18&X=1449&Y=11308&W=1&qs=%7cteterboro%7cnj%7c)

wideman

3rd Feb 2005, 12:01

Reading the above, one would get the impression the Skipper made a run for it leaving the F/O (with the broken leg) to fend for himself! I trust this was NOT the case.

From today's NY Daily News:

Claudio Gomez, 32, who works in a warehouse next to the Strawberry building, was unloading light bulbs when the plane crashed. He rushed to the emergency exit.

"The pilot stumbled out through the flames and said, 'I have to take care of my passengers and crew,'" the worker said. "The pilot was very disoriented. He kept asking for passengers. He said he did the best he could. He said he didn't get enough lift."

sammypilot

3rd Feb 2005, 12:31

When you look at the aerial photograph taken in 1995 you only just start to comprehend how huge General Aviation is in the States and why AOPA there has such a great influence on decisions relating to aviation.

OldAg84

3rd Feb 2005, 14:53

At the risk of being accused of being a spotter... twenty years ago when selling solvents in the local area I would buy a sandwich and park at the end of runway 6 (or alternatively, the beginning of 24) and watch the aircraft come and go. It was the best location for spottting...er, watching. While it's not 30 feet to the building across the street, it is pretty darn close! I remember two things- you were close to the jets/turboprops, that's what came and went mostly during the work week, and there were lots of 'em! It certainly was a pleasant way to spend one's lunch.

Certainly glad no one was killed in this incident. My thoughts are with the crew.

runawayedge

3rd Feb 2005, 17:18

Heard on radio here in Ireland this morning that one of the passengers, an Irishman Rory O'Connor whose father managed the famous Ashford Castle for many years also escaped from the twin towers on Sept 11. Quite a story! Think I'll stick to him.

Shore Guy

3rd Feb 2005, 19:49

The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a
briefing this evening at 9:00 p.m., EDT, to update the media
on the investigation into the accident involving a corporate
jet aircraft, a Canadair CL-600, at Teterboro Airport in New
Jersey.

Deborah Hersman, the NTSB Member on scene, will conduct the
briefing.

The briefing will be held at the Hilton Hasbrouck Heights
(Salon C), 650 Terrace Avenue, Hasbrouck, NJ.

This will be the only media briefing today.

newarksmells

3rd Feb 2005, 20:50

I happen to live 15 miles south of the airport. The distance between the end of the runway and the fence might be 100 feet tops. From there, you run into route 46, one of the busiest state roads in Jersey. It's a miracle the lights were red yesterday because this plane would have taken out many more cars on this 6 lane highway.

The most serious injured is the passenger in the car that had it's roof sheared off. He has head injuries that are untreatable according to the doctors. In an interview last night with the driver's father, the driver told him the aforementioned passenger told him to duck as he saw the plane coming for them out of his peripheral vision. What a nightmare.

The investigators are looking at icing. They already know from the CVR that one of the pilots tried to abort the TO but that's all they know. no reason for aborting the TO was stated on the CVR. If my car was any indication I had to scrape off a light coat of frost yesterday morning, but not ice by any means. Anybody know if the plane was stationed at Teterboro overnight? With a 7:00am take-off, I pretty much imagine it had to be.

Newarksmells

Badda Bing

3rd Feb 2005, 21:14

from the Washington Post:

The plane yesterday was carrying five employees and three associates of New York investment firm Kelso & Co., which had hired the jet to fly to Chicago's Midway Airport. The plane was built in 1980 by Canadair, owned by Dallas-based DDH Aviation and leased by Fort Lauderdale, Fla.-based charter operator Platinum Jet Management. Platinum Jet did not return phone calls yesterday.

Airbubba

3rd Feb 2005, 21:35

>>Based on posts in this thread, it seems to be a foregone conclusion that icing caused this........do we know that for a fact??? <<

Well, certainly an obvious early suspect, how probable depends on whom you ask:

"...Bill Waldock, aviation safety professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Arizona, said it's unlikely that icing would be a factor if the temperature was 22 degrees. "

http://www.nj.com/news/jjournal/index.ssf?/base/news-2/1107425550264311.xml

"...A 16-member team from the National Transportation Safety Board was examining possible causes, including whether ice formed on the wings or tail of the Bombardier Canadair Challenger CL-600, NTSB spokesman Keith Holloway said. Ice can harm a plane's aerodynamics.

'That's definitely one of the issues we are looking at,' Holloway said. "

http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGBGS5HFR4E.html

breid

3rd Feb 2005, 21:47

>"...Bill Waldock, aviation safety professor >at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in >Arizona, said it's unlikely that icing would >be a factor if the temperature was 22 >degrees. "

That statement proves that he has little knowledge in this field if true. Hopefully just a misquote, otherwise back to the books for him.

Valve Kilmer

3rd Feb 2005, 21:53

It's a very simple concept. DON'T ATTEMPT A TAKEOFF IF THERE IS ANY CONTAMINATION ON YOUR WINGS!! This basic idea applies to ANY aircraft, period.

Don't think Uncle Boeing totally agrees on that statement. At least the 737NG is certified for takeoff, with certain parts of the upper wingsurface covered by a thin layer of rimefrost.:ooh:

Shore Guy

3rd Feb 2005, 22:00

From Aviation Interrnational News...

Accident Challenger Parked Overnight on Ramp
According to Ken Forester, Jr., CEO of Million Air Teterboro, the chartered Challenger 600 (N370V) involved in yesterday morning’s takeoff crash at Teterboro Airport, N.J., arrived at the airfield at approximately midnight the night before the accident and stayed on the ramp until departure the next morning. Million Air Teterboro fueled the aircraft and provided catering but no other services, according to Forester. A spokeswoman for Atlantic Aviation said the Challenger taxied from Million Air to the Atlantic terminal at about 6:15 a.m.—about an hour before the accident–to pick up eight passengers and fly them to Midway Airport, Chicago. The passengers, none of whom was injured, included five employees of New York investment firm Kelso & Co. and three other business associates. The aircraft went off the end of Runway 6 during its unsuccessful takeoff roll, through the airport’s perimeter fence, across a six-lane highway and hit at least two cars, coming to a stop after its forward fuselage penetrated a warehouse wall. One pilot was seriously hurt with broken bones, and a person in one of the cars struck by the aircraft was critically injured. The other pilot and the flight attendant were not seriously hurt. The NTSB’s investigator in charge said the CVR indicated that there was a decision to “discontinue the takeoff” and the thrust reversers were deployed. Three witnesses, including two employees of Atlantic Aviation and a pilot of another airplane, reported seeing no frost on the Challenger, according to the investigator. Weather at the time of the accident was 10 miles visibility, clear sky and temperature of 22 degrees F.

KTEB 020551Z 00000KT 10SM CLR M04/M06 A3049=
KTEB 020651Z 00000KT 10SM CLR M04/M06 A3049=
KTEB 020751Z 00000KT 10SM CLR M04/M06 A3049=
KTEB 020851Z 00000KT 10SM CLR M05/M07 A3049=
KTEB 020951Z 00000KT 10SM CLR M06/M08 A3051=
KTEB 021051Z 00000KT 10SM CLR M05/M07 A3052=
KTEB 021151Z 00000KT 10SM CLR M06/M08 A3053=
KTEB 021251Z 04003KT 10SM CLR M04/M08 A3054=

Accident occurred approximately 1230z

Airbubba

3rd Feb 2005, 23:09

>>Don't think Uncle Boeing totally agrees on that statement. At least the 737NG is certified for takeoff, with certain parts of the upper wingsurface covered by a thin layer of rimefrost.<<

Yep, and in several of the Boeing AFM's you can have up to 3mm frost from cold fuel on the underside of the wing as well.

Of course, the Boeings have leading edge devices which the Canadair's, DC-8's and DC-9-10's don't have.

Quoting from the NTSB advisory:

"...Accident history shows that nonslatted, turbojet, transport-category airplanes have been involved in a disproportionate number of takeoff accidents where undetected upper wing ice contamination has been cited as the probable cause or sole contributing factor."

None

3rd Feb 2005, 23:16

Valve Kilmer wrote: Don't think Uncle Boeing totally agrees on that statement. At least the 737NG is certified for takeoff, with certain parts of the upper wingsurface covered by a thin layer of rimefrost.

This might not be accurately stated. Perhaps a typing error?

I looked into the statement, and found that in Boeing's 737NG Vol I in the Normal Procedures chapter, Section 20, page 20.3 under exterior inspection that there is this note:

"NOTE: Takeoff with light coatings of frost, up to 1/8th inch (3mm) in thickness on lower wing surfaces due to cold fuel, is permissible; however, all leading edge devices, all control surfaces, upper wing surfaces and balance panel cavities must be free of snow or ice."

So, frost, due to cold-soaked fuel, may be up to 1/8th on the LOWER SURFACE, and even then must only appear under the tanks. This was the same guidance for the MD-80 series I previously flew.

I cannot imagine any aircraft manufacturer would permit takeoff with any frost, ice, or snow on the upper surfaces. That's why the FAA developed the idea of the "clean wing" concept.

Airbubba

3rd Feb 2005, 23:53

>>This might not be accurately stated. Perhaps a typing error?

Maybe he was thinking of the boilerplate "thin hoarfrost" statement in Boeing manuals, it actually is acceptable on the upper surface of the fuselage, not the wing, according to Boeing.

RESA

4th Feb 2005, 00:14

AtlPax . . . .

Thanks for the aerial photo.

Wow! Talk about being given a short time to commit?

Mad (Flt) Scientist

4th Feb 2005, 00:31

It's a very simple concept. DON'T ATTEMPT A TAKEOFF IF THERE IS ANY CONTAMINATION ON YOUR WINGS!! This basic idea applies to ANY aircraft, period.

§ 91.527 Operating in icing conditions.

(a) No pilot may take off an airplane that has—

(1) Frost, snow, or ice adhering to any propeller, windshield, or powerplant installation or to an airspeed, altimeter, rate of climb, or flight attitude instrument system;

(2) Snow or ice adhering to the wings or stabilizing or control surfaces; or

(3) Any frost adhering to the wings or stabilizing or control surfaces, unless that frost has been polished to make it smooth.

With the exception of that nonsensical "polished frost" statement that the AAIB has rightly slammed, NO frost, ice or snow. Other Parts have similar stipulations. Note that the regs do NOT refer to slats, country of manufacture or the antecendents of any test pilots.

Airbubba

4th Feb 2005, 01:45

>>Note that the regs do NOT refer to slats, country of manufacture or the antecendents of any test pilots.<<

I guess if you operate your Boeing under Part 91, this would apply...

More on the evacuation:

Claudio Gomez, who unloads trucks at the Strawberry clothing company warehouse that was hit by the plane, struggled through snow, smoke and flames three times to reach the aircraft, and each time he pulled someone to safety.

"I really didn't feel scared when it was happening," Gomez, 32, of West New York, said in newspaper reports published Thursday. "But when I got home and took a shower, that's when it hit me. That's when I started to shake."

When the jet crashed, Gomez thought it was an auto accident until he looked around the corner from the loading dock.

"I saw a woman, she looked like a stewardess," he said. "There was a snowbank along the side of the building and she was sunken into it. She was about two feet away from the plane and was yelling, `Help me! Help me!"'

Gomez pushed through the snow, grabbed her and got her to a parking lot. Then he went back, grabbed a man who had fallen in the snow and carried him away. He went back again and found a man, believed to be the co-pilot, on the ground, his leg badly hurt.

"The plane is going to explode!" Gomez said the man told him in Spanish. "Leave me, save yourself." Gomez said he answered in Spanish, "Be strong," and took the man's arm and dragged him across the parking lot.

Firefighters arrived and began dousing the fire. The plane did not explode.

"What he did was above and beyond the call," said Gomez's boss, Luis Ruiz. "But that's the kind of guy he is. He's like that on the job."

http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/02/03/plane.crash.victims.ap/index.html

Mad (Flt) Scientist

4th Feb 2005, 02:49

Do you need the part 121 or 135 equivalent posted?

Sec. 121.629 Operation in icing conditions.

(a) No person may dispatch or release an aircraft, continue to operate an aircraft en route, or land an aircraft when in the opinion of the pilot in command or aircraft dispatcher (domestic and flag operations only), icing conditions are expected or met that might adversely affect the safety of the flight.
(b) No person may take off an aircraft when frost, ice, or snow is adhering to the wings, control surfaces, propellers, engine inlets, or other critical surfaces of the aircraft or when the takeoff would not be in compliance with paragraph (c) of this section. Takeoffs with frost under the wing in the area of the fuel tanks may be authorized by the Administrator.

Airbubba

4th Feb 2005, 02:50

>>Takeoffs with frost under the wing in the area of the fuel tanks may be authorized by the Administrator.<<

Looks like Boeing was right about this one...

Mad (Flt) Scientist

4th Feb 2005, 02:51

It's also authorised on aircraft with "hard wings" in certain cases, including some of non-American origin, I believe.

aged

4th Feb 2005, 07:46

I believe there was a case some time ago when an aircraft with twin rear mounted engines took off with hoar frost on the wings which came off on take off, went into the engines and caused a double flame out.
Could have happened here?

The Greaser

4th Feb 2005, 08:42

From Boeing Volume 1, B737-700 Supplementary Procedures section 3.

'Takeoff with light coatings of cold soaked fuel frost on upper wing surfaces is permissible, provided the following conditions are met:
The frost is less than 1.5mm thickness
The extent of the frost is similar on both wings
The frost is within the black lines denoted on figure (basically inboard half of the wing, well away from both leading and trailing edges)
Ambient air temp is above freezing
There is no precipitation or visible moisture

If all above criteria are not met, all ice or frost on the wings must be removed.

P.S Our company does not allow us to practice this,

Elliot Moose

4th Feb 2005, 10:35

Thank you Airbubba and Mad flt scientist for holding me up here. Yes, takeoff is permitted even on the CRJ 200 (and I would assume the Challenger as well) with LIMITED quantities of frost/clear ice on the UNDER side of the wing. Specifically, this applies only to areas in contact with the fuel, and definitely well away from the leading edge--which is the most critical part on these wings.

I was completely floored by Bingo's assertion that the aircraft shouldn't have been certified as a business aircraft with this config because time constraints, and blah blah blah mean that people will do it!:rolleyes: I mean, people take off without reading checklists too, but does that mean that we should build them with only one button in the cockpit so the pilots who don't use them can be safe too? What about maintenance? Maybe we should only certify maintenance free aircraft so that if the boss is in a hurry we never delay due to mechanicals. Hell, why not insist on being able to MEL everything on the aircraft, including the wings, so we don't have to worry about that pesky ice thing ever?:rolleyes: :rolleyes:

Come on! If you're going to fly a big business jet with supercritical wings, you need to keep them clean--same as you need to put on fuel. The leading edges must be polished on a schedule on those things to maintain airworthiness, so why would one expect to be able to take off with a big load of frost on them?

Clearly the regs don't allow any contamination and that's for a good reason. I really don't give a rat's behind whether Big Daddy Boeing lets you do it--it still is not legal or safe.

Valve Kilmer

4th Feb 2005, 12:15

None wrote:
cannot imagine any aircraft manufacturer would permit takeoff with any frost, ice, or snow on the upper surfaces

Well, my first post wasn't very accurate, sorry about that. However, The Greaser did post the criterea for departing in a 737NG with certain parts of the UPPER wingsurface covered by frost.

Takeoff with light coatings of cold soaked fuel frost on upper wing surfaces is permissible, provided the following conditions are met:
The frost is less than 1.5mm thickness
The extent of the frost is similar on both wings
The frost is within the black lines denoted on figure (basically inboard half of the wing, well away from both leading and trailing edges)
Ambient air temp is above freezing
There is no precipitation or visible moisture

If all above criteria are not met, all ice or frost on the wings must be removed.

Our company allow us to use this Boeing procedure.

Sorry for highjacking the thread.

Rgrds VK

fougapilot

4th Feb 2005, 12:24

The Challenger CL60 series is also authorized to take off with frost UNDER the wing due to fuel (up to 3mm if my memory serves me right).

D

None

4th Feb 2005, 15:37

I do not have access to a Vol I Supplementary Procedures specifically for the 737-700. Is there a Vol I specifically for that series? The one I am reading is for the 737NG, and perhaps I wrongly assume that it applies to all 737NG aircraft.

I did look through the 737NG Supplementary Procedures section, and found Chapter 16, Adverse Weather, to be relevant. It specifically states there is to be no ice on the upper surfaces. It does talk about hoarfrost, but not on the wings. Here is what it says:

"This hoarfrost is acceptable on the upper surface of the fuselage provided all vents and ports are clear."

A few pages later it states this warning:

"WARNING: ...Close inspection is still required to ensure that no frost, snow or ice is adhering to the wing, leading edge devices, stabilizer, control surfaces, or other critical airplane components for takeoff."

The hoarfrost on the fuselage has been allowed for a long time. Back in the 727 days, I was required to ensure I could see paint lines on the upper fuselage. However, no frost was permitted on the upper wing surfaces, and I believe that may still be true today for all aircraft. I cannot speak with certainty concerning the 737 series aircraft. I am not qualified, nor have I ever flown any 737 aircraft. I do have on-line access to the current 737NG manuals.

Shore Guy

4th Feb 2005, 18:20

"The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a
briefing today at 3:00 p.m., EDT, to update the media on the
investigation into the accident involving a corporate jet
aircraft, a Canadair CL-600, at Teterboro Airport in New
Jersey."

***********************************

Reports last night indicated they (NTSB) were going to try to interview the flight crew today.

I noticed in one of the pictures the flaps appear to be at a takeoff setting, but showing no spoiler deployment (no judgement here...they could have dropped back down with loss of HYD pressure). Reversers in deployed posistion.

broadreach

4th Feb 2005, 20:55

The Tereboro accident certainly helps to put Halifax and the "berm" in perspective.

breid

4th Feb 2005, 22:03

>Clearly the regs don't allow any >contamination and that's for a good >reason. I really don't give a rat's behind >whether Big Daddy Boeing lets you do i>t--it still is not legal or safe.

As has been stated already on this forum, it is legal and safe in some aircraft(including some non-Boeing aircaft) to have certain amounts of frost under the wings during takeoff.

Airbubba

4th Feb 2005, 22:41

Some more reports on the crew with names:

Miramar flier laid up with injuries from crash

Despite the severity of Wednesday's aviation mishap, there was no loss of life.

BY DAVID PORTER

Associated Press

TETERBORO, N.J. - Passengers and crew members of a corporate jet that skidded off a runway and roared across a six-lane highway managed to walk or crawl from the fiery wreckage, and authorities expressed amazement that no one was killed.

About 20 people were taken to hospitals, including copilot Carlos Salavarria and flight attendant Angelica Calad-Gomez, both of Broward County.

Tony Porras, president of Jetmark Aviation Services based at Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport, said Thursday that Salavarria suffered severe leg and shoulder injuries and has undergone several surgeries since the Wednesday morning crash at Teterboro Airport, 12 miles from midtown Manhattan.

The flight, carrying 11 crew and passengers, was bound for Chicago's Midway Airport.

Porras said Salavarria, of Miramar, has flown for his company for the past four years.

''His wife and brothers are by his bedside now,'' he said. ``From what I understand, it's going to take him six months or a year to walk again.''

The Newark Star-Ledger is reporting that the pilot of the private Bombardier Canadair Challenger CL-600 jet is John Kimberling, of South Florida.

Calad-Gomez, 22, of Coconut Creek, helped usher passengers out of the blazing plane, which skidded across six lanes of traffic and smashed into a warehouse after failing to take off.

The day of the crash, Calad-Gomez called her boss at Fort Lauderdale nightclub Voodoo Lounge to say that she would try to come to work as scheduled on Friday, said co-worker and friend Renee Jaquitch.

''That's just her,'' Jaquitch said.

``She's a fighter, a spunky little thing. Of course, you never know how you're going to react in that kind of situation, but I wasn't that surprised to hear how she acted.''...

http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/10811793.htm

Flight Safety

4th Feb 2005, 22:50

From this news report, the pilot claimed that when the aircraft reached VR, he tried to pull back on the yoke, but it would only go back about 1 inch. The report said when he realized that he could not move the elevator enough to rotate, he decided the only course of action he had was to try and stop the aircraft, with 1000 feet of runway left. So the reversers were deployed, and he stood on the brakes so hard that he injured himself.

If this report is true, then why did the yoke fail to go back? Was the elevator frozen from sitting outside in the freezing weather the night before? Did he perform a preflight control check prior to takeoff?

We'll have to wait and see.

Shore Guy

5th Feb 2005, 05:32

Both Captain and F/O are reported to be unable to "rotate" aircraft.....only limited elevator effectiveness.....

Waiting to hear stab setting....what is was/what it should have been....

Another player....aircraft landed after midnight after a flight from KLAS.....taxied to pickup ramp around 6:00 a.m. Not much of a layover.

Fatigue????

Only time will tell......

CallYouBack

5th Feb 2005, 08:08

Admittedly don't know anything about the CL600, but am wondering if this a/c is fitted with control locks.

Wonder also how the control check went in the before t/o check.

Frost is a definite possibility if the a/c didn't want to fly, but if it wouldn't rotate, looks like there is another possible contributing factor.

Check 6

5th Feb 2005, 11:51

Gentlemen, how about stopping all of the speculating? Remember: "But for the grace of God......"

The truth will emerge in time. Let us all be grateful that there were no fatalities.

Just my humble opinion.

Check 6

lomapaseo

5th Feb 2005, 12:41

Please keep up the speculating, that's the only way I learn what's important to know.

I can sort out facts vs fiction for myself

Mad (Flt) Scientist

5th Feb 2005, 14:10

Those of you under the impression that you can takeoff in any aircraft with frost etc on the UPPER surface of the wing. You're in DIRECT contravention of the OPERATIONAL regs for your type of ops. I've already posted part 91 and part 121, the others are the same.

The OEM does not have the authority to override operational regs.

It's also, fundamentally, UNSAFE. Even small amounts of frost on the upper wing - and not even on the Leading Edge - can have dramatic effects on your aircraft's performance (there was some test data from NRC in Canada - using a Fokker model, IIRC) which showed dramatic losses in both lift and roll authority from frost in front of the ailerons.

The only safe and legal approach is to have no contaminants on the upper surface of the wing. In fact, if it were up to me, I'd say nothing on the undersurface either, because the underwing cold-soaked fuel frost alleviation just makes people tempted to "get away with" other instances of frost. A pure CLEAN WING philosophy would leave absolutely no room for confusion or creative misinterpretation.

Sonic Zepplin

5th Feb 2005, 15:06

Years ago, I was flying a Lear 55 that had just come out of maint.

After a 2 hour flight to the D.R. I returned back to the states, so far all operating normally

Approach to land we touched down at airport and again all seemed fine, as the airplane slowed I began to relax yoke and found that the control would not move.

I looked at co pilot to see if he has holding things up and identified he was not. taxied in and later found that a bolt was put in inproperly after work and had jammed the Horiz Stab past landing flair.

Could have been a disastor.

To many variable going on but interesting to see everyones point of view.

Valve Kilmer

5th Feb 2005, 15:38

Mad Scientist wrote:
Those of you under the impression that you can takeoff in any aircraft with frost etc on the UPPER surface of the wing. You're in DIRECT contravention of the OPERATIONAL regs for your type of ops. I've already posted part 91 and part 121, the others are the same.

The OEM does not have the authority to override operational regs.

Mad S. I'm talking about the 737NG, not ANY aircraft. I recommend, that you consult Boeing, FAA and the different European CAA authorities with your concern. They have all approved the procedure.

I'm not a testpilot, nor an aeronautical engineer, so whether you are right, and all the other organizations are wrong, I can't say for sure, although I have my opinion. I just try to follow the regulations, limitations, approved procedures and recomendations I read in my manuals. Add a bit of common sence on top, and I think that creates a perfectly safe and legal operation.

VK signing out of this thread.

Airbubba

5th Feb 2005, 15:50

Pilot pins jet crash on failed controller

Tells investigators cockpit wheel stuck

Saturday, February 05, 2005
BY ANA M. ALAYA
Star-Ledger Staff

The pilot of a corporate jet that sped off a runway at Teterboro Airport and smashed into a warehouse told investigators yesterday that the control wheel malfunctioned, forcing him to abruptly abort takeoff.

But the 58-year-old veteran pilot slammed on the brakes and slowed the plane from 176 mph to 104 mph in 10 seconds, which one aviation expert said made the crash "survivable." He also steered the plane to a less crowded area of Route 46.

"He hit the brakes so hard he has bruises all over his feet," said Michael A. Moulis, a lawyer for pilot John Kimberling and Platinum Jet Management, the company that was operating the Bombardier CL-600 Challenger that rammed into a clothing warehouse Wednesday, injuring 20.

The plane, carrying eight passengers, careened down a 6,000-foot runway, crashed through a fence and slid across busy Route 46, hitting two cars before smacking into the garage door of the warehouse and bursting into flames.

Federal investigators, while declining to pinpoint a control wheel malfunction as the cause of the crash so early in their probe, said they are examining the cockpit controls and other mechanical issues after a 90-minute interview with the pilot yesterday.

"The pilot stated that the flight was uneventful until the moment of liftoff," Debbie Hersman, a spokeswoman for the National Transportation Safety Board, said at a news conference yesterday.

"He got only one inch of movement from the yoke (the control wheel)," Hersman said. "He hit the brakes and the thrust reversers ... and tried to identify a path to steer it to."

Normally a pilot needs to move the control wheel, or yoke, three or four inches back toward himself to sufficiently raise the nose of the plane for takeoff, Hersman said.

"He told our investigators he didn't get the response he needed," Hersman said.

The pilot's account was consistent with some information retrieved from the flight data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder, and video footage of the aircraft on the runway taken from an airport security camera, according to Hersman...

...The NTSB has found no evidence that ice was present on the plane when it crashed. A preliminary review of video footage that shows the airplane on the runway showed there was no signs of frost on the windshield when the plane took off, according to Hersman.

...Moulis said both pilots "pulled and pulled and pulled," on the control wheel at the point they should have taken off, "but it wouldn't go and they realized the plane wasn't going to get off the ground."

After the crash, Kimberling crawled on his hands and knees with a broken leg, touching every seat in the aircraft to make sure no one was left inside, his lawyer said.

...A woman described as a cabin aide, Angelica Calad-Gomez, helped passengers out of the plane. "She was a real hero. She was soaked in fuel and kept going back to make sure everyone was off the plane," Moulis said.

According to FAA records, Kimberling has logged 15,805 flight hours and is licensed to fly five different kinds of jets. Salaverria has logged 4,800 flight hours and is licensed to fly one type of jet. Records show neither pilot has ever been disciplined.

...The plane involved in the crash was originally used by the Canadian military in the 1980s, is one of the original and oldest of the Challenger jets manufactured and has 6,800 flight hours and 4,300 take-offs and landings, according to the NTSB.

Investigators are also struggling to decode the flight data recorder information and determine why it only recorded 10 seconds of the 43 seconds from the time the plane revved up to impact. The information gleaned so far shows the plane was going 176 mph when the recorder was switched on, and 104 mph when it was turned off, sometime after the aborted takeoff...

http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/jersey/index.ssf?/base/news-8/1107585594311120.xml

norodnik

5th Feb 2005, 16:25

Isn't that what the pre-flight checks are for ??

Whilst not wishing to condemn the pilot, who may well have done everything by the book, but surely, testing all flight control surfaces is a basic first principal of operation before attempting to take to the air.

Of course, its possible that the pilot did have full movement, and a few minutes the mech broke/froze etc.

A tad unlucky to say the least if this happened

cwatters

5th Feb 2005, 16:27

Sounds like a "interesting moment". Will be interesting to see what the cause is.

After the crash, Kimberling crawled on his hands and knees with a broken leg, touching every seat in the aircraft to make sure no one was left inside, his lawyer said

Sounds like his lawyer doesn't miss a trick :-)

UNCTUOUS

5th Feb 2005, 16:43

Credibility Check Required on this

Theory

Snow accumulates on horizontal stabilizer overnight

Pilots would need ladder to check on that (stab's top surface). Some operators leave hoz stab in LE fully up posn overnight for wind.

FBO staff brush any snow off wings before crew arrives to man up

Pilots check wings by touch (in accordance with NTSB's recent rec - which doesn't mention tail surfaces anywhere)

Wings are found to be clean by pilots - so pilots agree on no need for de-icing (as did many other a/c that morning)

After start up, idling hot air exhaust rises and gradually melts snow on hoz stab which runs back and collects in elevator hinge area or,

because of dihedral/relative wind, runs in and collects in the hinge-line and on inboard elevator areas, but up against the vert fin.

Pilots check elevator controls on taxi during checks and they're OK. Something as simple as the full and free check could cause water/slush

to flow to areas it wouldn't otherwise access (and there, not exposed to engine idling efflux, re-freeze in the ambient temps).

Water remains liquid until aircraft turns across the surface wind (or downwind) in the hold position, whereupon it re-freezes in 20 deg F temps (no hot air)

Lined up and on take-off roll, any wind would be taking the exhaust further rearwards before rising (i.w. wouldn't re-melt ice)

On take-off pilot detects the ice restriction at rotate and is forced to abort/reject shortly after (understandably)

Theory holds only for the actual ability of the elevator hingeline (or a recess) to hold liquid slush (??)

http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/belfast/cl600/goodun-1.jpg
http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/belfast/cl600/goodun-2.jpg
http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/belfast/cl600/goodun-3.jpg
http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/belfast/cl600/goodun-4.jpg
http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/belfast/cl600/goodun-5.jpg
http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/belfast/cl600/goodun-6.jpg

newarksmells

5th Feb 2005, 17:39

There wasn't any snow on Tuesday night / Wednesday morning, simply a light frost. The snow you see was from January.

Newarksmells

CLDriver

5th Feb 2005, 18:36

Okay folks, here's some food for thought regarding the controls.

After thinking about this (we had a late sn 600 we operated for 11 years, now in the 604), we wondered if the autopilot might have inadvertently been engaged. If so, the airplane would have tracked alright down the runway if the heading bug was aligned, but when he went to rotate he wouldn't have been able to.

In the 600 you taxi, takeoff and land with the yaw damper engaged. Every now and then (in the 600, the 601, and 604 have a different system) the yaw damper will kick off during the taxi, or takeoff roll. Has something to do with what the yaw damper perceives when you hit a bump (on the taxiway or runway) a certain way, can't remember all the details now, it's been awhile since I've been in a 600 (never does this in the air though).

The Master Caution will flash and the Flight Controls light on the 8/10 overhead panel will come on. With experience in the 600 the PNF will just reach down and re-engage the yaw damper which kills the Master Caution.

Unfortunately, the Yaw Damp and Autopilot buttons are right next to each other and are the same size, lighting etc. It would not be too much of a stretch to think that maybe the YD kicked off during the takeoff roll and when the PNF re-engaged he got the AP on instead.

Just stuff we were thinking about yesterday.

CL

Mad (Flt) Scientist

5th Feb 2005, 19:04

Well, we've had two different sets of rules apparently for the B737NG, which are not entirely in agreement. The one VK quotes allows it. the one None quotes does not.

Personally, I would not fly on any aircraft with ice or frost on the upper surface, and if I saw it while seated as a pax would draw crew attention to it.

If they showed no signs of concern I would deplane myself, regardless of how upset the cabin crew or airline got. I have no desire to die as a pax when I know the aircraft is in a fundamentally unsafe condition. I regard my life as worth far more than the cost of a ticket on a different airline.

mutt

5th Feb 2005, 19:40

MFS,

Due to our location, we tanker LOTS of fuel..... (Boeing A/C)

How would you feel about upper wing ice due to fuel???

Mutt.

Airbubba

5th Feb 2005, 19:45

>>If they showed no signs of concern I would deplane myself, regardless of how upset the cabin crew or airline got.

I'm sure you'd be more comfortable on the train...

>>Unfortunately, the Yaw Damp and Autopilot buttons are right next to each other and are the same size, lighting etc. It would not be too much of a stretch to think that maybe the YD kicked off during the takeoff roll and when the PNF re-engaged he got the AP on instead.<<

LNAV and VNAV on the Boeings are implemented the same way, similar buttons next to each other. On a heavyweight takeoff at night with turbulence it is easy to hit the wrong one after takeoff giving you a power reduction when you least need it. Not that I've ever done that...

Will the autopilot engage on the ground in the CL?

ExSimGuy

5th Feb 2005, 19:54

Due to our location, we tanker LOTS of fuel
Mutt, What the @#$% do you know about ice "due to your location":O !!!!!!

Thanks for the "very mini-bash" last summer - seem to have lost your email addy - it sure was a relief!!!

Interesting theory about the slush/ice on the high tail (why do they still put the tail on the top of the fin, with all the problems that has caused in the past?)

Obviously we have to wait for the results of the inquiry, but that sort of thing gets us thinking . . .

West Coast

5th Feb 2005, 21:05

"Gentlemen, how about stopping all of the speculating? Remember: "But for the grace of God......"

Amen.

Mad (Flt) Scientist

5th Feb 2005, 23:20

Upper wing ice due to fuel? Very nervous indeed.

I should go find the NRC report, it's pretty sobering reading for anyone thinking about wing contamination.

If the choice were to fly with a dangerous wing state or take the train, you bet your life I'd take the train. "bet your life" not being a phrase chosen by accident.

There's enough ways to die on an aircraft without adding to them needlessly.

Sawbones

6th Feb 2005, 00:17

Thanks to CL-Driver for posting some intelligent and obviously experienced comments regarding this type. I seriously doubt that critical surface contamination will be an issue in this one.

It will be most interesting to see how the FDR recorded any flight control checks during the pre-take-off checklist, and if this apparent failure to achieve any signifcant elevator movement during rotation is in fact genuine.

Obviously runway 06 at TEB is not overly long for a CL-600 operation so it wouldn't need much of an excursion beyond V! while the crew determined the aircraft was unflyable before an over-run accident was inevitable.

ICT_SLB

6th Feb 2005, 05:21

Without prejudice on cause, just trying to end some wild speculations on CL600 systems.

1. There are no gust locks on any Challenger (or RJ). The Elevators are powered by triplicated hydraulic power drive units.

2. Even if the (Sperry) Autopilot was engaged, it should be possible to manually overpower it - there is a break-out clutch in the mechanical circuit between the AP servo and the cable drum. This is a test that the authorities regularly repeat for themselves during certification.

3. The lack of FDR data is explained by a lot of recorders only being turned on when the logic goes weight off wheels and off when back on ground. Production systems on later CL604s & RJs also turn on when the R Engine starter (604) or any strobe light is switched on (RJ) so that the FDR is running (or should be) during engine start and then for the duration of the flight. The CVR should be on from initial power up but may have only 30 minutes duration before recordings are overwritten.

fougapilot

6th Feb 2005, 12:41

I dont want to speculate here, simply talk systems.

The Autopilot on a CL600 can and will engage on the ground exactly as CLDriver mentionned. As a mather of fact, I have spoke to 3 different crew during my day as a FSI instructor who had a similiar happen. One of the crew had a jammed elevator on take off, the flying pilot could not rotate. For no reason, he looked at his attitude indicator and found his flight director was no longer in "Go Around" mode but came down to match the airplane's level attitude. He press the G/A switch again and flew away. The other 2 crew I spoke to realized the autopilot was engaged before break release. I am not saying this is what happened here, just one of the possibilities. But any 600 and 601-1a driver will tell you, the yaw damper is nautorious for kicking out on the ground.

As for the ice on the stab scenario, the CL60 has hydraulically operated flight controls with 2 PCUs (power control unit) on each side of the elevator. Each PCU is supplied 3000psi of hydraulic pressure, which is certainly sufficient to break any ice that may have formed. There have been "frozen controls" incidents on the CL before, but the freezing happened during prolongue flights which departed from a high humidity area. In most cases (not to say all) the freezing occured in the cables connecting the yoke to the actual PCUs.

A flight control check would find any control freezing, but would not help in finding an auopilot engagement on the ground since it probably occured after the check. A fair amount of CL pilots will keep their left hand on the nose-wheel steering tiler below 80kias, leaving the yoke to the non-flying pilot. If this "theory" of ours hold to be true, this may have been a contributing factor. Personally, I like holding my own yoke and give my own wind input. Nothing wrong with either, simply pilot technique.

Cheers,

D
CL601-3R

Belgique

6th Feb 2005, 12:42

Newarksmells

Maybe ice picked up enroute on the stabilizer that remained there after arrival in the 20 deg F temps (and until their next startup)?

Bellcheek

SeniorDispatcher

7th Feb 2005, 14:20

Apparently another aircraft of the same type had a similar abort back in December 2003...

(-23) N95EB A CANADAIR CL-600 ON AN IFR FLIGHT PLAN, DESTINATION LAS VEGAS, NV. ATTEMPTED A TAKEOFF FROM RUNWAY 24 AT KTEB. DURING THE TAKEOFF RUN PILOT REPORTED A NORMAL ACCELERATION TO ROTATION SPEED. WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO PULL BACK ON CONTROL YOKE AIRCRAFT DID NOT RESPOND. THE PIC ELECTED TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF, RAN OFF END OF RUNWAY 24 IN MUD. EMERGENCY EVACUATION WAS INITIATED, WITH NO INJURIES. ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^

https://www.nasdac.faa.gov/pls/nasdac/STAGE.AIDS_BRIEF_REPORT_PUB?EV_ID=20031216036639G&NARR_VAR=

The NTSB report:

NTSB Identification: NYC04IA054.
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Public Inquiries
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Incident occurred Tuesday, December 16, 2003 in Teterboro, NJ
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/3/2004
Aircraft: Canadair CL-600, registration: N95EB
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
Earlier in the day, a different flightcrew performed a successful aborted takeoff in the incident airplane. The aborted takeoff occurred with seven to nine passengers on board, at 139 knots; when the flightcrew was unable to rotate the airplane. The only difference between that aborted takeoff, and the uneventful previous flight, was the addition of 3,000 to 4,000 pounds of fuel. Following that aborted takeoff, the airplane underwent a maintenance inspection which did not reveal any discrepancies pertaining to the inability to rotate. The airplane was then returned to service. When the incident captain arrived at the airport, he was informed of the previous aborted takeoff. The incident captain attempted a takeoff on a shorter runway at the airport. During rotation, the airplane did not respond to elevator inputs, and the captain aborted the takeoff. The airplane then traveled off the end of the runway and came to rest in mud. Following the overrun, the incident captain failed to produce a weight and balance calculation, or accurate count of passengers on board at the time. The wind was reported as variable at 4 knots. When asked why he chose a shorter runway to attempt the takeoff, the incident captain reported that it was the runway in use at the time. The aircraft manufacturer inspected the airplane, and did not find any discrepancies pertaining to the aborted takeoff. The manufacturer also computed two weight and balance calculations for the incident takeoff. Both calculations revealed that the airplane was above the maximum gross takeoff weight, and outside the forward center-of-gravity envelope. Subsequently, the airplane tookoff with no passengers on board, and flew uneventfully to another airport.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:

The captain's inadequate preflight planning, which resulted in an overrun during an aborted takeoff.
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

Flight Safety

7th Feb 2005, 19:46

SeniorDispatcher, we seem to have an explanation for the second aborted takeoff, but not for the first one earlier in the day. Is that information available?

SeniorDispatcher

7th Feb 2005, 20:20

The only info I had was what I posted, but I think its wording is a little confusing...

>>>The only difference between that aborted takeoff, and the uneventful previous flight, was the addition of 3,000 to 4,000 pounds of fuel. Following that aborted takeoff, the airplane underwent a maintenance inspection which did not reveal any discrepancies pertaining to the inability to rotate. The airplane was then returned to service. When the incident captain arrived at the airport, he was informed of the previous aborted takeoff. The incident captain attempted a takeoff on a shorter runway at the airport. During rotation, the airplane did not respond to elevator inputs, and the captain aborted the takeoff.

The way I interpret it is....

1/ There was a normal flight (#1)

2/ There was another flight (#2) that was 3,000-4,000 lbs heavier than that normal flight, and they aborted. Aircraft checked out mechanically and all supposedly OK.

3/ There was another flight (#3) and it still was 3,000-4,000 lbs. heavier than flight #1. The crew of #2 briefed the crew of #3, and crew #3 had to do their own abort and went off in the mud...

By its absence in the report, once could presume that after flight #2, only the mechanical aspects were checked, and not the W&B figures..

Oilhead

8th Feb 2005, 01:39

"A pure CLEAN WING philosophy would leave absolutely no room for confusion or creative misinterpretation."

Sounds fine in theory - but how can we be sure that we really have a clean airframe? It has been proven (by Canadians) that a visual inspection through a window just prior to t/o means squat. Nothing to do with this particular case, but an aircraft's performance and handling cannot be guaranteed these days in light of new information abot a piltos inability to make a proper visual determination in certain circumstances.

About time someone invented a laser device for figuring how much ice is really remaining on an airframe. The all we have to do is decide how much is acceptable. :E

R8TED THRUST

8th Feb 2005, 01:56

Just hold the aircraft on for an additional 20 Kts and keep R8ted you'll be fine!

Cheers

OVERTALK

8th Feb 2005, 06:03

Statement from the NASA Glenn Icing Research Site at link (http://icebox-esn.grc.nasa.gov/ext/tasks/sld/background.html)

Background of Collaborative SLD Research
Airworthiness authorities are considering the release of an operational rule affecting aircraft operations in Supercooled Large Droplet (SLD) icing conditions. Manufacturers will be required to demonstrate their aircraft can operate in SLD conditions for some period of time to facilitate a safe exit from this hazardous condition.

The Blasering Away Solution to Anti- & De-Ice
Article One
The NTSB alert warns pilots that ice contamination on the upper surface compromises the wing's lift-generating function:

a. "Research results have shown that fine particles of frost or ice, the size of a grain of table salt and distributed as sparsely as one per square centimeter over an airplane wing's upper surface can destroy enough lift to prevent that aircraft from taking off."

b. "It is also possible that many pilots believe ... They can simply 'power through' any performance degradation that might result from almost imperceptible amounts of upper wing surface ice accumulation. However, engine power will not prevent a stall and loss of control at lift off, where the highest angles of attack are normally achieved."

c. "Further, small patches of almost imperceptible ice or frost can result in localized, asymmetrical stalls on the wing, which can result in roll control problems during lift off."

d. "It may be difficult for a pilot to see ice on the upper wing surface from the ground or through the cockpit or other windows. Further, frost, snow, and rime ice can be very difficult to detect on a white upper wing surface and clear ice can be difficult to detect on an upper wing surface of any color. However, it is critically important to ensure, by any means necessary, that the upper wing surface is clear of contamination before takeoff visual and tactile inspections."

To all of these precautionary procedures, a plug for thermal de-icing with lasers bears mention once again (see ASW, Nov. 10, 2003). When one:

1. Considers the cost of de-icing with fluids (on top of which one can stack all the environmental concerns for getting rid of "spent" de-icing fluid and the fumes in the cockpit plus APU problems resulting from de-icing fluid getting where it's not supposed to go), and

2. Hears about these pilots taking a chance, and looks at the hold-over rules (for starting the process all over again), plus

3. Recalls all the accidents caused by failure to de-ice, and inability of inflight anti-icing systems to cope with SLD

4. Notes all the ground accidents caused by de-icing rigs striking aircraft, then .....

[b]Thermal laser de-icing on the ground (and thermal laser anti-icing airborne) might prove to be a real blessing and a big boon to safety.
Article Two
Thermal laser wiping: The theory is that a twin laser unit sits atop the cockpit of a high-wing turboprop (and another under the nose of a low-wing turboprop) in an ice-guarded rear-facing cupola. It is memory-mapped with the airplane's anatomic profile.
The low-power laser continuously measures (via a mensuration mapping software program) the aircraft's profile, until it detects an anomaly associated with ice accretion. With the high-power laser armed by the ice-detector, it then commences thermal lasering of the aircraft's leading edges, engine intakes, propellers, pitots and forward wing sections. The cupola mounted above the flight deck would also handle the empennage.
Such a system might weigh less than the unaerodynamic boots. Electric power demand might not be that great, as heavy-duty capacitors could be charged up over a period of time and then discharged for the periodic phased-array attacks on lodged ice. As per the standard inflation cycle for de-icer boots, the lasers could alternate phase (top cupola/bottom cupola) and run a 30 seconds on/30 seconds off cycle.

Maybe this system could be called the Laissez-faire, a play on the word laser which might appeal to the French manufacturer of the ATR-72 (Laissez-faire = Non- interference in the affairs of others, as in 'ice go away').

Bonuses?
1. Avian Interferometer (bird deflector). When not in use in ice-detect and -destroy mode, both cupolas swing 180 degrees and search the ahead predicted flight-path sector for avian intruders (and zap them - with the thermal laser). Effect would be like focussing a magnifying glass on someone's neck (when they're not looking). Birds predictably dive for speed and clear the flight-path.

2. If the weapons techs feel inspired, maybe they could inbuild a MANPADS "detect and destroy" capability or variant?

Flight Safety

8th Feb 2005, 17:17

Seniordispatcher, the full narrative is located here:

Full Narrative (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20040108X00033&ntsbno=NYC04IA054&akey=1)

It appears as you say, that flight #2 was overweight the same as flight #3. I find it interesting that two separate flight crews failed to determine that the aircraft was overweight.

OVERTALK

9th Feb 2005, 01:05

Slight difference between not being able to get the nose off due to "overweight and too far forward a CofG" and "not being able to get any backstick".

But having said that, in the earlier case temps were 41 degs F and in the warehouse overrun only 20 to 22 degs F (with both having a near full load of pax). Both would have had a similar fuel load (15,000lbs) - from what I can ascertain. So if the 24 overrun was overweight it's likely that the 06 warehousing take-off attempt would have been also.

Mad (Flt) Scientist

9th Feb 2005, 01:19

No, because the issue was "over MTOW" not "over MTOW as limited by WAT". So the old case was over at any temp.

Both calculations revealed that the airplane was above the maximum gross takeoff weight, and outside the forward center-of-gravity envelope.

I don't think you can deduce from the older case that the more recent accident was overweight. There's no evidence I'm aware of that the more recent aircraft was overloaded, which is what the above NTSB quote certainly implies for the earlier case.

All it tells you is that aircraft outside the forward end of the cg envelope may fail to rotate; it doesn't allow the conclusion that all failures to rotate must lie outside the weight/cg envelope.

Flight Safety

9th Feb 2005, 15:02

MFS is correct. In the earlier incidents, the pilots most likely pulled the yoke all the way back and the aircraft failed to rotate due to being overweight and forward of the CG limit. In the current case, the pilots tried to pull the yoke back, and it wouldn't go back more than an inch (thus failng to rotate), so the cause should be quite different from these earlier incidents.

lomapaseo

9th Feb 2005, 15:07

I don't follow the linkage between weight, CG balance, and failure to rotate with the accident which is the subject of this thread where the pilot claimed that the stick mechanically wouldn't even pull back.

Are all these discussions putting aside that report or are we just filling space here waiting for a new fact to emerge?:confused:

Mad (Flt) Scientist

10th Feb 2005, 02:13

The only linkage between the earlier Teterboro incident and the most recent one is that it shows that loading problems can contribute towards a failure to rotate.

As I understand it, the NTSB have stated a speed of 153kts was on the FDR, which is significantly above the nominal Vr. Under otherwise normal circumstances, at that kind of overspeed it's rather difficult to prevent an aircraft from rotating - it's nominally trimmed for V2, after all, and that's pretty much the speed right there. So even with a control restriction (and the pilot implies there was at least some motion) one might expect a normally loaded Challenger to have got airborne. Therefore, what we may well find in due course is that there was a loading issue AS WELL. (It's quite rare that one thing alone shows up as a cause - usually designs are such that several things have to 'go wrong')

What the earlier incident also shows is that the Challenger can be misladen so as to be heavy and forward. Since it sounds like both aircraft were quite similarly loaded (in the sense that both had quite full cabins - of course the fuel loads might not be similar) it IS possible the cg was also quite far forward on the latest flight. Whether it was outside the envelope is pure speculation, but even forward and INSIDE the envelope is of course harder to rotate.

Flight Safety

10th Feb 2005, 13:26

With the apparent flight control (elevator) restriction experienced by these pilots, if the aircraft had somehow managed to become airborne, the outcome could have been disasterous. Far better to hit the warehouse while on the ground, then to hit the ground from any altitude without pitch control.

If this problem was rooted in an accidental activation of the auto-pilot (while correcting a yaw damper trip) as some have suggested, then the implications of a successful liftoff under these circumstances will have to be expanded upon by those who know the systems better than I.

lomapaseo

10th Feb 2005, 16:15

It seems to me we also spent a good deal of time speculating about the contribution of overloading for the USAIR accident. Ultimately it turned out to be 98% mechanical and just a hint of overloading.

Remove the mechanical from the equation and it flies.

fougapilot

10th Feb 2005, 21:01

Effect of CofG on rotation.

The Challenger's stabilizer is quite larger then the elevetor (as shown by UNCTUOUS' pictures on page 5). As with most jet, the Challenger pitch trim system moves the stabilizer.

Consider an airplane loaded at its maximum foreward CofG limit, at Maximum takeoff weight, in a high and hot environement. If the STAB trim is not set properly for the CofG, the airplane will be dificult to rotate. I have seen a few crews run off the runway (in the sim) in these conditions.

But KTEB is almost at sea level, the OAT was below freezing. On my CL, with 11pax and NBAA fuel to do the 700nm to Chicago the T/O weight would have been around 37500lbs. Not to far from the 600 MTOW of 41100lbs (the 3R I fly has a MTOW of 45100lbs), but not that close to the limit. On a CL, fuel affects the CofG much more then pax load. Unless he was tankering fuel, fuel would have been present only in the wings (the first 9800lbs go to the wings) causing a CofG far from the foreward limit.

Just my 2cents

D

411A

12th Feb 2005, 12:49

Just for info...

Does any current (or out of production) business jet use an all-moving stab, for primary pitch control, ala the Lockheed TriStar?

In the tri-motor, that stab is very powerful, and mis-trimmed/mis loaded conditions are handled quite well...according to my experience, and that of prior Lockheed production test pilots.

fougapilot

13th Feb 2005, 12:40

411a,

Not to the best of my knoledge. The only jes I have jeard using "flying stabs" were military fast movers.

D

Belgique

13th Feb 2005, 13:08

Aren't we losing sight of the fact that BOTH pilots claimed directly after the accident (and at their later FAA/NTSB interviews) that they couldn't get any usable backstick. Surely that is a different proposition to no rotation due to CofG too far forward or overweight or stab or trim mis-set?

Being unable to physically pull the yoke back points to something having happened after they did their control checks.

a. A knee-pad fell down between the seat and either yoke?

b. An elevator control restriction caused by something getting pat the stock standard boot at the base of each yoke?

c. A spanner left somewhere adjacent to the control runs that became dislodged and jammed the works.

d. A mechanical connection somewhere in the flight control circuit having jammed/become disconnected.

e. the autopilot having become inadvertently engaged (as described earlier - and being more likely)

safetypee

13th Feb 2005, 16:29

“Being unable to physically pull the yoke back points to something having happened after they did their control checks.”
Following on from Belgique’s list, although not necessarily related to this accident; some aircraft have significant increases in stick force with anti-icing fluid on the control surfaces and / or flowing through the tail plane / elevator gap. In severe cases the manufacture publishes revised trim and take off speed settings for use after de-icing.

CLDriver

13th Feb 2005, 21:48

fougapilot,

Thanks for the input. Sounds about right to me.

For the sake of adding to some of the data on this thread, I ran some numbers out of our previous aircraft data (the 600) and came up with about the same #'s. 37.5 TOW.

We'll just call it 38.0 for the sake of grabbing some quick #'s from the checklist:

V1 = 119
VR = 128
V2 = 138

DIST = 4460

Zero bleed takeoff, no A/I, elevation SL, temp 0C.

Not even close to being out of CG. I doubt that I would have had any fuel in the Aux for that trip.

CL

fougapilot

13th Feb 2005, 23:09

Belgique,

I agree with you. Personally, my money is on the autopilot. As I have mentioned before, I have first hand knowledge of crews to whom an inadvertent autopilot engagement on their CL600 (or 601-1A) happened while taking position on the runway. I was simply providing numbers to disprove the CofG scenario. But the truth is we will all have to wait and see what the NTSB finds.

Cheers,

D

Red Mud

14th Feb 2005, 19:39

411 ... I think that the Falcon family of jets use the flying tail approach to pitch control.

Also, ref the suggestion that the autopilot was ON at the time of take-off thrust application, a review of the Flight Safety manual for the aircraft states in a note that the autopilot cannot be selected ON during ground ops due to a WOW inhibit function.

fougapilot

15th Feb 2005, 12:21

Red,

You must be looking at a 3A/R book. One of the main difference between the 600/601-1A and the 601-3A/3R variant of the CL600 is the autopilot. The 600/601-1A autopilot needs to be engaged on the ground for pre-flight test purposes and was therefore not connected to the WOW system. The 601-3A/R test is totaly internal and needs no engagement, so they connected it to the WOW system and prevented engagement on the ground.

D

Red Mud

15th Feb 2005, 12:37

Fouga,
Good catch. I rechecked my source and found that the reference was the Flight Safety Training manual dated Dec 94, page 16-82 and it does indeed refer to the 601-3R. :O Some folks here still insist on my original response but, until I can quote the source more specifically, I remain uncommitted. Sorry folks for the bad input.

Fouga,
Further to my last, I just reviewed the Flight Safety Training Manual for the 600 dated Aug 86. It does imply that the AP can be engaged on the ground and that, with no modes selected, will lock in the current pitch attitude. It also states that the AP switchlight selector is adjacent to the YD switchlight selector. Not having flown the plane I wonder how difficult it would be to inadvertently select the AP ON vice the YD? In a second scenario, if you were in a hurry and were about to carry out the AP test on the ground (which, as you say, does require the AP to be engaged) it could be possible to be distracted and forget to carry out the test (split check scenario) and continue with the AP engaged. More questions than answers I suppose.

fougapilot

15th Feb 2005, 17:09

Red,

No sweat on the manual.

You are correct on the AP engaging on the ground will automaticaly go to the current pitch attitude, and in our specific case, will prevent the pilot from rotating the airplane for take off. The only indications of an autopilot engagement are: AP green light illuminated (it is located between the 2 pilote and not in the field of view during take off...), the fact that the Vbars are no longer in the Go-Around mode, but rather locked to the current pitch attitude of the airplane. It is very easy to inavertently engage the autopilot while engaging the YD.

One of the possible scenario goes as follow: Non flying pilot (NFP) goes trough the line-up check while the FP taxies on the active runway. Last item on the checklist is an "Annunciator recall" which will illuminate any remaining annunciator lights. Normal operation for the Challenger is to take off with the "Electrical" annunciator simply because we keep the APU running. In this scenario, the NFP noticed a "Flight controls" in addition of the "Electric" annunciator. Looking down, he notices the YD is disangage. Resets and engage it. Inavertently engaging the AP in the process. The FP was busy looking out, initiating the T/O roll to notice the Vbars were no longer in G/A mode and continuing with the AP engaged.

Reality is very few crew actualy complete the AP check and if completed, is quite early in checklist it would be almost impossible to carry the AP engaged for so long.

Cheers,

D

BEagle

16th Feb 2005, 07:48

On a previous a/c type, the yaw dampers keys were identical to those for the autopilots and all were on the centre console. The TPI setting was checked during taxying, but, if I recall correctly, before the yaw dampers were selected on...

I once engaged on yaw damper and the associated autopilot instead of both yaw dampers - as a result the tailplane incidence began to increase and moved way outside the take-off setting. This was only detected when the configuration warning sounded as the throttles were stood up for take-off; the take-off was then abandoned.

This was in the simulator and was quite deliberate to make the point to the trainee crew. Why? Because I knew from previous incident reports that it had actually happened to a crew in Gander whilst distracted. They too were saved by the configuration warning....

Personally I belive that the trim setting should be checked immediately prior to entering the RW - and a 'full and free' check carried out as well. I used to do such a check when I was new on the fleet - but was told that there was no need as it had already been performed during the after start checks.....

Red Mud

16th Feb 2005, 17:19

With no config warning regarding the AP in T/O power on the 600 we may have found a probable scenario. However, with all respect to the crew though I think that I will stop my own speculation and wait for the NTSB results. Some interesting discussion though. Thanks. :ok:

Astra driver

16th Feb 2005, 17:27

I also heard from an unofficial source that this aircraft was on a Charter for a company "A" who brokered it out to a company "B" who in turn brokered it out to a company "C".
Apparently company "C" had completed a trip in the accident aircraft late the previous night and when the request came in for the early morning trip to Chicago the "C" crew was unable due to duty time limits, so company "B" sent their crew (The accident crew) to complete the trip. The problem being that company B's crew was not on the operating certificate for Company "C" and said crew may not have been familiar with the CL 600.

fougapilot

17th Feb 2005, 11:38

Ence the reason why the FAA requires "differences" training for all part 135 operators whom have more then one variant of the CL60.

But I agree with Red, lets wait for the "experts". Thanks for the systems review guys.

D

lead zeppelin

7th Mar 2005, 19:51

http://cbsnewyork.com/topstories/topstoriesny_story_062165731.html

New Twist In Teterboro Plane Crash Investigation
Owner Of Plane Refuses To Hand Over Some Documents

Mar 3, 2005 5:39 pm US/Eastern
(CBS) The owner of the jet that crashed last month at Teterboro Airport won't turn over certain documents pertaining to the investigation, and that has a federal judge taking action. The Federal Aviation Administration has issued a rare emergency cease and desist order grounding the planes of Platinum Jet Management.

The Cl-600 jet crashed during takeoff from Teterboro on a flight bound for Chicago. Twenty people were hurt in the disaster, one critically.

A subpeona by the U.S. Attorney in Newark was issued to the jet's owner to obtain company records as part of the FAA's investigation into the crash. Certain document were turned over, but not all requested by the FAA.

The lawyer for Platinum Jet Management argues the requests are more than necessary for the investigation. The attorney added that the National Transportation Safety Board investigation into the cause of the crash is leaning toward mechanical problems.

The NTSB has refused to comment on the investigation.

(© MMV, CBS Broadcasting Inc., All Rights Reserved.)

Avman

19th Mar 2005, 23:47

Not entirely disimilar:

NTSB Identification: ATL05FA061
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, March 09, 2005 in Tupelo, MS
Aircraft: Canadair CL-600, registration: N660RM
Injuries: 7 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On March 9, 2005, at 1312 central standard time, a Canadair CL-600, N660RM, registered to Romeo Mike Aviation Company Inc., operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 business flight, aborted takeoff from runway 36 and went off the departure end of the runway. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The airplane received substantial damage. The airline transport rated pilot-in-command, (PIC) airline transport rated co-pilot, and five passengers reported no injuries. The flight was departing Tupelo Regional Airport, Tupelo, Mississippi, en route to Teterboro, New Jersey on March 9, 2005.

The PIC stated they were cleared for takeoff from runway 36. The flaps were set at 20-degrees and the trim was set for takeoff. The PIC advanced the thrust levers to 93 percent and started the takeoff roll. The takeoff run and acceleration were normal. The airplane reached V1 (128 knots) and VR (134 knots) and the PIC attempted to rotate the airplane with the control column. The control column would not move aft from the neutral position. The forward movement of the control column was normal. The aft movement beyond the neutral position felt as if it was locked against a stop. The airplane was about 4,000 feet down the runway between 140 to 145 knots. No annunciator's lights were illuminated. The PIC commanded the abort, extended the spoilers, applied maximum braking, and maximum reverse thrust, and maintained centerline down the runway. After the abort was initiated the PIC stated he continued to apply rearward pressure on the control column and he was not sure if he felt or heard a "crunch." He further stated, something may have given and the control column may have moved aft of the neutral position. The PIC stated the "crunch" was felt or heard after or at the abort procedure. The noise or the crunch may have come from below the flight deck. The airplane went off the end of the runway and the nose wheel collapsed in the mud.

Mad (Flt) Scientist

20th Mar 2005, 02:19

And not entirely the same either. That herring is red.

barit1

20th Mar 2005, 13:55

Cease and desist order (http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/publicaffairs/NJ_Press/files/plat0303_r.htm)

Mzee

20th Mar 2005, 16:46

Interesting development - just had a missive from our CAA surveyor to be aware of unofficial local (ie in-house) mods done to control column.
Particularly where the hand mike stowage is mounted either too low or more likely the jack plug mounting is mounted too low and fouls the floor when controls pulled back.
Another good reason to have 'Full and Free' before launch!!

pigboat

20th Mar 2005, 19:12

It would not be the first time a mis-placed microphone (www.planecrashinfo.com/1937/1937-3.htm) caused an accident.

forget

23rd Mar 2005, 20:14

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594 March 23, 2005

UPDATE ON CHALLENGER JET CRASH IN TETERBORO, NEW JERSEY

The National Transportation Safety Board today
released the following update on its investigation into the
crash of a Bombardier Challenger CL-600 corporate jet on
February 2, 2005, in Teterboro, New Jersey. The airplane
overran the departure end of runway 6 during an aborted
takeoff attempt and crashed into a fence, two cars, and a
warehouse. A postcrash fire ensued. The pilot, copilot, and
two automobile occupants received serious injuries, and a
cabin aid and eight passengers received minor injuries.

The accident occurred about 7:17 a.m. The flight was
departing Teterboro Airport for Midway Airport, Chicago,
Illinois. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the
time of the accident.

Preliminary evidence indicated that icing conditions
at Teterboro were minimal or non-existent on the morning of
the accident. Video surveillance recordings were obtained
from the Port Authority. These recordings corroborate
witness accounts and flight data recorder (FDR) data that
indicated that the airplane did not pitch up during takeoff,
even though the airplane was traveling at a high speed.
Upper wing ice contamination has not been associated with
the inability of an airplane to pitch up for takeoff;
rather, upper wing ice is typically associated with the
inability of an airplane to fly after it has pitched up to a
takeoff attitude.

The airplane wreckage was removed from the accident
site and was transferred to a nearby storage facility for
further inspection. The recovered contents of the airplane
were weighed. The center of gravity (CG) was found to be
well forward of the allowable limit. The initial findings
of the investigation have indicated that, the airplane, as
configured, could have a CG well forward of the forward
limit based on its cabin interior configuration combined
with full or nearly full fuel tanks, including the fuselage
tank, and a full or nearly full passenger load and minimum
passenger baggage. In addition, the horizontal stabilizer
trim position was documented in the middle of the green band
(which is the normal takeoff range). The operations and
performance groups have conducted tests using a simulator to
evaluate the airplane's takeoff characteristics based on the
trim settings and weight and balance data. The initial findings of
those simulations indicate the airplane would not rotate for take off
at the defined rotation speed.

The initial examination of the pitch control system
revealed no anomalies. The pitch control system and
autopilot will be further examined. Engine examination, FDR
data, and flight crew and eyewitness reports indicated that
the engines functioned as expected, including thrust
reverser deployment.

The FDR operated for only about 10 seconds, starting
when the airplane was decelerating through 153 knots and
ending when the airplane had slowed to 91 knots. The FDR
and systems groups will examine the FDR wiring and logic to
determine why only 10 seconds of data were recorded.

The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice
recorder (CVR). The CVR group has completed a transcript of
the recording, which will be released at a later date in
accordance with Federal law.

The operations group interviewed the pilot during his
stay in the hospital. The group is performing an extensive
review of flight logs and airplane handbooks. Members of
the operations and maintenance records groups traveled to
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Muscle Shoals, Alabama, to
interview personnel from Platinum Jet Management, the
operator of the airplane.

The investigative team will work with the manufacturer
of the airplane, Bombardier, to perform a detailed
examination of the performance of the airplane.
Documentation defining the relationship between the
operator, the certificate holder, and the FAA is also being
gathered.

lead zeppelin

24th Mar 2005, 16:55

Weight, Balance May Be Factors in NJ Plane Crash

Wed Mar 23, 7:11 PM ET

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A possible miscalculation of aircraft weight and balance may have prevented takeoff and caused a corporate jet to run off a runway and crash through a building in New Jersey, investigators suggested on Wednesday.

The chartered twin-engine aircraft with 11 people on board and bound for Chicago zoomed off the 6,000-foot runway at Teterboro airport on Feb. 2, crossed a six-lane highway and slammed into a warehouse.

While the National Transportation Safety Board (news - web sites) will not reach a conclusion for months on the accident that injured 20 people, preliminary results confirmed eyewitness reports and other information that the Canadian-made Challenger CL-600 never got its nose off the ground.

The safety board said in an update of its investigation that simulator tests based on the plane's actual aircraft weight and balance data and flight control settings would not permit liftoff even though the plane topped 153 mph during its takeoff roll.

Investigators said the plane's load was out of balance -- too far forward -- but that displacement should not have disrupted takeoff if all weight and balance measurements, flight control settings, and the corresponding aircraft speed needed for lift were properly calculated.

Initial examination showed no problems with the autopilot, the flight control system that controls takeoff lift or the engines.

The safety board said more information was necessary to confirm whether the initial findings are accurate and, if so, what prompted any miscalculation.

The Federal Aviation Administration (news - web sites) has grounded the operator of the plane, Florida-based Platinum Jet Management, saying it may not have been certified to operate the Challenger series made by Montreal-based Bombardier Inc.

Investigators have interviewed the crew and are reviewing flight logs and aircraft handbooks.

The safety board discounted icing as a potential cause after strong speculation immediately after the crash.

http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=1896&u=/nm/20050324/us_nm/crash_teterboro_dc_1&printer=1

Belgique

27th Mar 2005, 04:40

I can understand how a forward Center of Gravity might require a much higher speed than rotate to get airborne.

However why would it stop the pilot from pulling back-stick? (this being both his story and that of his copilot). It seems to be also the claim of the 09 Mar 05 N660RM overrun of a Challenger at Tupelo MS.

We've heard the microphone physical interference and the autopilot inadvertently disengaged theory (both viable), but this NTSB explanation is convenient only in the absence of the FDR data.

Bellcheek

UNCTUOUS

19th Apr 2005, 16:49

http://www.wnbc.com/news/4391300/detail.html

See video interview. Pilot and copilot are adamant that NTSB have got it wrong about CL600 crash at Teterboro. NTSB claim that failure to rotate was related to their fouled up CofG.

Captain and copilot say that yoke would not move in pitch (reason for that was given in the ASW coverage - ASW 07 Feb (last two paras)).

I think that the NTSB will have to eat crow on getting this one wrong in their PR and factual release.

The exact same scenario happened to another CL600 on 09 Mar 05 (see below)

NTSB Identification: ATL05FA061
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, March 09, 2005 in Tupelo, MS
Aircraft: Canadair CL-600, registration: N660RM
Injuries: 7 Uninjured.

On March 9, 2005, at 1312 central standard time, a Canadair CL-600, N660RM, registered to Romeo Mike Aviation Company Inc., operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 business flight, aborted takeoff from runway 36 and went off the departure end of the runway. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The airplane received substantial damage. The airline transport rated pilot-in-command, (PIC) airline transport rated co-pilot, and five passengers reported no injuries. The flight was departing Tupelo Regional Airport, Tupelo, Mississippi, en route to Teterboro, New Jersey on March 9, 2005.

The PIC stated they were cleared for takeoff from runway 36. The flaps were set at 20-degrees and the trim was set for takeoff. The PIC advanced the thrust levers to 93 percent and started the takeoff roll. The takeoff run and acceleration were normal. The airplane reached V1 (128 knots) and VR (134 knots) and the PIC attempted to rotate the airplane with the control column. The control column would not move aft from the neutral position. The forward movement of the control column was normal. The aft movement beyond the neutral position felt as if it was locked against a stop. The airplane was about 4,000 feet down the runway between 140 to 145 knots. No annunciator's lights were illuminated. The PIC commanded the abort, extended the spoilers, applied maximum braking, and maximum reverse thrust, and maintained centerline down the runway. After the abort was initiated the PIC stated he continued to apply rearward pressure on the control column and he was not sure if he felt or heard a "crunch." He further stated, something may have given and the control column may have moved aft of the neutral position. The PIC stated the "crunch" was felt or heard after or at the abort procedure. The noise or the crunch may have come from below the flight deck. The airplane went off the end of the runway and the nose wheel collapsed in the mud.

link (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20050317X00322&key=1)