Lost Erebus tape holds vital clues

[SeekingAnswers]

Can anyone think who or what organisation might have a copy of the original? In NZ, UK or US? Note we are looking for the tape, not the transcript.


NZ Herald
09.12.04

One of the last big issues from the 1979 Mt Erebus disaster may never be settled because of the apparent disappearance of the crashed DC10's cockpit voice recorder tape.

Transport Accident Investigation Commission chief executive John Britton said yesterday that modern audio and filtering equipment could produce a clearer playback from the tape - if it could be found.

But the tape's fate is unknown, meaning it cannot be replayed to find out who said what during the aircraft's last minutes.

None of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), Air New Zealand or Archives NZ seems to have the tape, which recorded the last 35 minutes of conversation in the cockpit of flight TE901 before it crashed in Antarctica 25 years ago, killing all 257 passengers and crew.

Only written transcripts remain, but it has emerged that three versions exist, with crucial differences.

The version that appears in chief air accidents inspector Ron Chippindale's 1980 report on the crash, blaming the pilots, has controversial phrases such as "Bit thick here, eh Bert?"

Those do not appear on a transcript produced with American help in Washington DC.

Supporters of the pilot error theory say the "Bert" comments indicate that the aircraft was flying lost in clouds when it hit Mt Erebus.

But retired pilot Arthur Cooper, who helped to transcribe the Washington version days after the crash, said last week that the "Bert" phrase was never uttered.

He also said the Washington transcript supported royal commissioner Justice Peter Mahon's 1981 finding that a navigation computer blunder caused the crash.

The CAA has said it gave the tape back to Air New Zealand after the various inquiries into the disaster were finished.

Air New Zealand says it gave everything it held on the disaster to Archives NZ years ago.

Archives NZ outreach co-ordinator Alison Hadfield, who is responsible for an exhibition on the crash now on at the organisation's head office in Wellington, searched the records yesterday for the tape.

She found a third transcript, made in Britain apparently by Mr Chippindale, though differing from the one in his report, but she could not find the tape itself.

Archives NZ holds scores of documents and other records relating to the crash and investigations, putting many on display in the exhibition.

Mr Britton said cockpit voice recorders now had much better sound quality than in 1979, as they used digital data that produced a clear playback.
NZPA

[HEATHROW DIRECTOR]

I'd sure be interested to hear more. My wife and I were extremely close to being on that plane and the feelings we had as we watched the TV news in NZ that evening will haunt us for ever.

[Taildragger67]

I don't have it in front of me, but my recollection of reading Justice Mahon's book 'Verdict on Erebus' is that the official transcript was made when the NTSB played the tapes in Washington and that at the time, the RAE's equipment at Farnborough was superior. Mahon & Mr Baragwanath (counsel assisting) played the tape there and it apparently gave a different slant on things.

As for the 'Bert' comment, this was apparently unclear on the tape and they were unable to establish anyone named Bert on the flight, especially amongst the flight crew.

Mahon's account is of people sitting listening to the tape, manuallytranscribing what they >>think<< they hear - possibly making what they think they hear, fit what they think they know about the circumstances. I think he also mentions the possibility of some words getting mixed up due to differences in pronunciations between Kiwis and Americans.

I'll try to remember to take a look tonight & maybe edit tomorrow.

TD67.

[GearDown&Locked]

Some relevant related info stated here (http://stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,3117361a1861,00.html) and one of the transcripts (http://aviation-safety.net/cvr/cvr_nz901.shtml) available.

[Wizofoz]

How can anyone read that transcipt, or even the Chippendale version, without two things being blindingly obvious?

1) The crew thought they were no-where near Erebus, obviously based on there nav equipment and the infamous changed waypoint (The Captain even re-engages the nav system, obviously because he is confident his position re it's readout.)

2) The crew believed they were in VMC, albeit marginal. As was established, sector whiteout fooled them into thinking they were looking at a clear sky, and a descent in VMC is just fine as long as terrain clearence can be visualy maintained.

Did the original report even cover the changed nav co-ordinates? If not, what was the subsequent "Official" reason for ANZ not revealing this fact, and why did they think the crew got their position so wrong?

[flash8]

That particular (KSSU configured) DC-10 had a state-of-the-art Area Navigation System for 1979... certainly the most advanced of its time.

I believe that two 8K core (memory in the old days) modules held the final 30 minutes of the flight and were recovered intact.

This was indisputable evidence of the W/P changes.

[Judge A Gen]

A very sad and far reaching tragedy, I can hardly believe its 24 years ago I sat in my car, hearing the passangers and crew members names announced over the radio as all was confirmed :( .

What happened there after, during the enquiry and all surrounding it, really showed how unprepared and naive we where at ANZ and in general in NZL ! Has anything changed?

A few people still live today with the knowledge of who and what caused an unsuspecting crew to fly into a 14000ft high mountain that should not have been there.

The tapes will only show the crew reacted as they should of, nobody needs to lie for them. :suspect:

the JudgeAG.

[SeekingAnswers]

Make sure you don't miss it if you're interested!

Yes Judge AG, the things that happened after were terrible and I think most NZers have no comprehension how bad it was...The pilots stood little chance of coming out unscathed from the attack that was led against them, especially since every shred of evidence on their side kept disappearing.

I think now, current employees do not need to be afraid of the more benevolent Air NZ & government of our era and ex employees now have nothing to lose. And as the victims families expand with time and grow older, and the public becomes more organically aware of what happened, there is a more solid support system for the widows who were left alone to cope with the pressure from above, from those who refused to take any responsibility when there was someone dead to do it for them.

Sorry if thats a bit harsh.

Oh and TD67, in reply to your comment on the accent, the Americans did indeed have a problem with it but to conquer that they flew over two kiwis who joined their team and signed off on everything with them, word by single word.

[prospector]

SeekingAnswers,
To balance your assertion that "the pilots had little chance of coming out unscathed from the attack that was led against them", I would like to post the following views taken from " New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation" by John King.

Bob Thomson was with DSIR Antarctic Division.

"But Thomson had more experience in the Area than almost anybody else. During his 75 trips to Antarctica in the course of a long career with the DSIR Antarctic Division, at least 50 had been on the flight deck of aircraft approaching from the North, observing the ice edge and conditions. He was the commentator on Air New Zealand's inaugaral flight back in February 1977, with Captain Ian Gemmel in command, and also on the last completed trip before the flight 901 on 28 November.
In fact, he was originally scheduled to fly on the fatal flight, but had to change his plans be cause of an expected visit to Scott Base by Prime M inister Rob Muldoon in early December 1979. Instead, mountaineer Peter Mulgrew took his place-and was on the flight deck of ZK-NZP at the moment of impact.
Has Bob Thomson ever felt uneasy that, but for a twist of fate, he might have died that day?. "Not at all. I always insisted on a complete circuit of Ross Island before letting down below 17,000ft. That way I could get an idea of the complete situation and what the weather was like, where any clouds were".

" The captain didn't give attention to problems that he might have around there. These people were taking a Sunday drive. When I heard the transcript of the CVR I fell out of my chair. Most of the times Mulgrew had been there he'd gone in by sea, and all his travel from Scott Base was to the South. Hardly anybody ever went into Lewis Bay."

" Had they orbited Ross Island they would have seen the cloud. If a pilot is unsure he always goes up, never down. The co-pilot on Flight 901 never opened his flight bag to look up the co-ordinates. I always had a chart in the cockpit and checked the Lat and Long readout, but the crew of the fatal flight never referred to it."

Procedures for aircrews of military aircraft flying to Antarctica and landing at Williams Field have always been strictly observed. Full training in whiteout and other weather phenomena is provided, and no pilot is ever in command of a flight until he has already been a part of a flight crew and is thoroughly familiar with the area.

"Nor did Air New Zealand take advantage of the experience gained by members of their aircrews who flew on earlier flights. Apparently the NZALPA saw the Antarctic flights as a "Special perk" for their members and had an agreement with ANZ that flight crews should be spread widely amongst its members.
Therefore aircrews, including aircraft Captains, usually had not any previous experience on these flights, an experience which would have avoided the Erebus Disaster from ever happening."

This from a man, whilst not aircrew, had more experience of Antarctic operations than most, to my mind would put fault on both the Company and the aircrew, and any attack was not only against the crew.

Prospector

[SeekingAnswers]

Prospector, when I speak of the attack of the pilots I do not speak of the myriad reasons they were in the wrong place at the wrong time, and I agree that AIr NZ's policy of sending pilots inexperienced with antartic conditions was unwise, although sector whiteout was still unknown at the time. I also agree they should have had full training on flying in antarctic conditions as do the military. I'm somewhat amazed but encouraged that we agree on this.

However, the attack I speak of came not before, but after. From government and airline the cries of pilot error started early and loudly. Almost every shred of documentation, charts, notes, diaries that the pilots had left behind was stolen, misplaced or shredded. Thus the company was able to say that the pilots were fully informed because there was no information on what exactly had been in their briefing. For a long time they still insisted that the nav co'ordinates had not changed either. I'm not sure exactly what was in those papers, I'm not even a pilot, although I do know that their route was on it. I also vaguely remember that the chart that Captain Collins was given of the Ross Shelf was so small he had to go find a better one in an atlas to do how own research on where he was going.

My point is, there could have been many things in those papers for me to show a man such as yourself to show that they were not well informed, that they were told where to lower down, or that perhaps the importance of going low was stressed to them, perhaps ways to stay in VMC-I'm saying all this off the top of my head, but I'm sure you see my point. We'll never know-the only thing that we do know is that those papers had information that was important enough to be shredded, misplaced, stolen...

I have no idea if Sector Whiteout would apply at 17000 feet. Also I believed they dropped through a high layer of cloud to clear air beneath where they had a look but I have to admit to being a bit hazy on that-as a non-pilot it is hard to follow the transcripts, esp when I only have the Chippendale one at the moment. Bob Thomson mentions going up if you are unsure-if you are going off Chippendales transcript I am not surprised you thing they were unsure. I suggest that if it is published all interested should have a good read of the orginal Washington transcript - believe me, the differences are almost all ones that make the pilots look lost.

But I do agree, it is a tragic shame that the valuable knowledge of an experienced artic pilot like Bob Thomson was not shared with other crew. One does of course hope that airlines around the world have learned from these mistakes.

[Flap40]

his 75 trips to Antarctica in the course of a long career with the DSIR Antarctic Division, at least 50 had been on the flight deck of aircraft approaching from the North

Just how do you approach Antarctica from any other direction??????

[henry crun]

The Dominion Post reports that Archives NZ have found two copies of the tape.

However, the DomPost also say that the tapes are subject to a 70 year restriction imposed by the Transport Accident Investigation Commission, and could not be accessed before 2049 without the commission's approval.

Any request to play the tapes would have to be considered in terms of the law, which is that they can only be used for accident investigation.

I doubt a reopening of the investigation would be considered after all this time

[prospector]

Flap 40,
In the context of the accident report Antarctica was specifically McMurdo Sound, the position of the McMurdo NDB was 7751South 16641East, so it would have been possible to approach from the South. But in general to approach from anywhere but North would be problematical.

Prospector

[SeekingAnswers]

Its always good to retain a sense of humour even during the most serious of subjects! Its hard to imagine anything much more south than that, isn't it!!

I think the best we an do now is rely on comparing the Washinton transcript to Chippendale's. Keep a further out in the news. Believe me, the differences are emphatically important.

[411A]

Hmmm, I would presume the whole idea of flying to that particular location was to have a close look at the terrain, for everyones enjoyment and education.

So, one has to ask, if for any reason the flight crew where in any way unsure of their position and were also unable to keep the terrain clearly in sight, why then did they descend below the safe sector altitude?

Even if the crew were to have clearly trusted their navigation equipment, and felt sure it was correct, why descend below the sector altitude when you cannot clearly see the terrain, if that was the whole idea to begin with?

Sounds to me as though the crew is truly responsible for this very unfortunate accident.

[Rananim]

Twenty five years on,Erebus remains the most perplexing of all commercial aviation accidents.Pilot error,airline dishonnesty and malaise or negligence on the part of the CAA for allowing the flights to continue without the requirement for a previous visit and no whiteout familiarization(USAF had whiteout briefings).Which one was it?Or was it all three combined?

As a professional pilot,if you were briefed on a route a week before a flight,would you then check that the coordinates of the flight plan handed to you on the day of the flight corresponded to the flightplan coordinates that you were briefed on a week earlier?
If you take into account the proximity of Erebus to the route,there are those who say that Collins should have checked.

Fate also played a part.Hewitt,the navigation specialist,would have alerted the crew if he had truly believed he was changing the destination coordinates by 27 miles,knowing the effect it would have had on the approach to the Sound.But he thought he was only changing it by 2 miles so he might be excused for not telling anyone.What are the odds of something like that happening?

Chippendale's report was unfair to the crew as they clearly recognized that conditions were "not actually that good" and decided to climb out but were too late.Did Mahon's report go too far in an effort to redress the balance though?Fly a DC-10 clean at 1500 feet and you'd better know damn well where you are.Using RNAV to fly a valley approach and dip under the weather is also problematical.Only ground-based navigation permits descent below MSA.

As to the CVR,Chippendale's interpretation caused a storm because it reported Collins as ignoring the F/E's mounting alarm.Was it "Bert" or "Bird",as in Cape Bird?CVR analysis is an art and open to interpretation.Very often the greatest tool is not technical enhancement but a listener who knew the crews and their speech patterns well.

[SeekingAnswers]

As I mentioned earlier, hopefully the Washington transcript will shortly be published next to Chippendales so you can see the differences.

The reason this is so important is that in the Washington transcript there is no indication that the crew has any uncertainty of where they are until the last moment. Whole words, phrases and sentences have been added, deleted or changed in the final transcript that Chippendale himself edited. Almost all indicate uncertainty of weather or position. Sometimes just a question mark indicates questioning tone where there was none according to the Washington team (which I have found included at least 4 NZers to help with accents and voice ident).

Also as to 411A's comments, just to clarify, the crew weren't unsure of their position till the very last moments, and did believe they were in clear air - this is also backed up by photos taken by sightseers right up to the last moments. Sector whiteout is not cloud or fog or low visibility. This is something that the public often don't understand and it is a bit frustrating.

I do understand that it if you read the Chippendale transcripts and accept it as correct you would assume these things. That is something I am about to try and change. I believe the Washington transcript should be the official version. You should be aware that there was a representative of the Air Accident Investigation team in that Washington group that signed off on every word, then got overruled by his boss when he got home.

If I cannot get the Washington transcript published in the papers, I will copy it here, and offer it to every other website that has Chippendales version, if it takes me the rest of my life.

Don't judge the pilots without all the evidence, or on skewed evidence. I cannot express how hard the company & government at the time tried to make it look like their fault. This means that there is a limited and skewed amount of information to make your judgement on. I realise no-one can just take my word for it, but all I ask is that you keep an open mind, a seed of doubt in the integrity of some of the information pointing at pilot error. That's all I ask.

I do feel as if I'm dominating this thread - apologies if so...I just can't seem to let these misinterpretations go unreplied...

[mrkenco]

I seem to remember that there was a documentry type film about this accident a long time ago. It was transmitted in two parts.

Does anyone have any drtailes ?

[prospector]

Seeking Answers,
I would like to put forward the following.

It was a CFIT, it happened because Company SOP's were not complied with.

The Company was also at fault having prior knowledge that these SOP,s were being disregarded.

NZCAA is also at fault for not ensuring that their regulatory requirements to carry out these flight to the Antarctica were being complied with.

An inspector from CAA was in fact scheduled to travel on the Accident flight, however a family illness prevented this, if he had of been on the flight would the Company and NZCAA requirements have been so flagrantly disregarded??? who knows, and who will ever know.

The CVR is not really that important in showing the cause of the accident, it is of interest only in trying to explain why they did what they did.

Prospector

[outofsynch]

mr kenco,
i think I may still have a copy of the original documentary. I shall hunt it out and pm you if I find it.

[Rananim]

Its not as cut and dry as a simple CFIT.Not by any means.For many people,the jury remains out and always will.The accident can be interpreted and dissected in so many ways.Collins was PIC and the PIC must know where he is(thats one angle).The Company handed Collins a flightplan that differed considerably to the one he had been briefed on(there's another angle).And the CAA oversaw the whole sorry incident,making only one inspection flight,not demanding that Antarctic survival equipment was carried or whiteout briefings performed,and feebly acquiescing to the company's request to drop the previous-visit requirement(yet another).

[GlueBall]

Notwithstanding the offset flight plan coordinates, Captain Collins, in virtual IMC, had waited to hear three (3) "whoop-whoop-pull up" GPWS warnings before responding: (calling for: "max power, please"), instead of instantly responding with firewall power and simultaneous wings level 15+ degrees rotation to maximum climb angle! :{

[TDK mk2]

which is, of course, what you would have done Glueball - even without the benefit of hindsight.

I suppose the facts that (as was made clear in Peter Mahons report):

1. Captain Collins and his crew were unknowingly experiencing sector whiteout. I.E. They believed they were looking at a flat ice shelf and overcast with 40 miles of vis (as reported to them by MacMurdo). They could see perfectly well ground features to the left and right. They believed this because:

2. The course they had been briefed they would be flying, three weeks earlier, was 27 miles west of where in fact they were, in the middle of a flat ice shelf at sea level.

The mountain that he didn't know was in front of him was invisible to him, even in perfect VMC. He had been given no specific training in how to recognise the conditions which made this so.

So you're saying he should have acted sooner on a warning that ANYONE could have doubted and that's very helpful at this point.

Even if he (or you) had responded immediately in the way you have described the aircraft could not have outclimbed the 13 degree slope on that heading, and due to the unknown whiteout they could not have seen which way to turn anyway.

[twentygrand]

The whole Erebus business was terribly sad. There was hardly anyone in New Zealand who didn't know someone involved.

I have a personal interest as I flew a Starlifter onto the ice at McMurdo a couple of years before the accident. The incident has fascinated me ever since and I have several books on the subject, including a copy of the original accident report. I also have a tape of the TV programme.

If only Air NZ had admitted that mistakes were made and tried to find the cause instead of attempting to blame the crew. There are lessons for us all here.

[prospector]

Rananim,
Why is it not a simple controlled flight into terrain??

The aircraft was completely serviceable, and it was flown into a mountain.

This was the company order for the descent, and as a copy of it was found in the cockpit after the accident the crew must have been aware of its requirements.

Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6000ft as follows.

1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 Grid through 360 Grid to 270 Grid from McMurdo field within 20 nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.

You will note that it states THE ONLY LET DOWN PROCEDURE AVAILABLE.

The weather at Mc Murdo was well below this minima, so does that authorize the crew to invent their own let down procedure?? The sector whiteout explains why they flew into Erebus without seeing it, but does not explain what they were doing down there.

Prospector

[SeekingAnswers]

Prospector, In response to your comment re CVR

"The CVR is not really that important in showing the cause of the accident, it is of interest only in trying to explain why they did what they did."

May I just point out that this comment contradicts itself. The dictionary definition of the word "cause" being "
1) The producer of an effect, result, or consequence.
2) The one, such as a person, event, or condition, that is responsible for an action or result.
3) A basis for an action or response; a reason

Since I am not a pilot, I cannot respond to your statement that that was "THE ONLY LET DOWN PROCEDURE AVAILABLE". I will ask one of several experienced pilots I know who was familiar with the procedures at the time to read your comments, consider and respond. I will get them to call themselves "Seeking Truth". Meanwhile if anyone familiar with the VMC let down procedures at the time would like to comment, pls feel free. I do know that the weather was not below that minima though as they state that they have 40nm vis at one point, and sector whiteout is not show showers, it is reflected light.

Meanwhile question for you Prospector-nice one this time. What does this mean please? "Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79." Does this mean there had previously been another let down policy?

[prospector]

Seeking Answers,
The modification to the descent procedure was because the McMurdo NDB was no longer available, it was still operating but not being maintained so its accuracy could not be guaranteed.

The only let down procedure means just that. VMC or not, this was the only approved let down procedure, it was to avoid any chance of the set of circumstances that ended up in the result that eventuated.

These are the weather conditions that prevailed at the time.
Weather in the McMurdo area at the time of the disaster was reported to be completely overcast at 3500ft with other cloud layers above, and a wind of 10 knots. Mountain tops in the area were covered in cloud and, although the surface visibility was good, surface definition was poor and horizon definition only fair because the sun was obscured and snow surface features could not be readily identified except from close up.

Other aircraft in the area reported Ross Island as being completely obscured by cloud.

TE901 were advised Ross Island under a low overcast base of 2000ft with light snow and a visibility of 40 nautical miles

Scott base advised the flight that the Wright and Taylor dry valleys area was clear and would make a better prospect for sightseeing than Ross Island.

The captain of a USAF C-141 Starlifter following 45 minutes behind the ANZ flight said no terrain was visible and he made a long gradual descent over the water, navigating entirely by inertial navigation system and maintaining 16,000ft until being picked up by McMurdo radar about 38 nm's out. He immediately entered cloud on starting his final descent, passing between layers with good visibility but no sight of the ground until the aircraft broke out at about 5000ft and landed normally at McMurdo.

You will note that this flight maintained FL160 until picked up by McMurdo Radar.

I disagree with your statement re contradiction.

1. The producer of consequence In the wrong place produced the consequence.

2. It was the result of a conscious decision to be at that wrong place that caused the result.

3 The basis for that action was aforementioned conscious decision.

The CVR played no part in that conscious decision.

Prospector

[GotTheTshirt]

Prospector, I am surprised that you say the CVR played no part in this, considering the vast expence in retrieving the data from it.
You give the requirements for the let down which are based on the actual weather conditions the crew experienced.
You have weather from a ground station miles away and an actual from an aircraft 45 minutes later.
Unless you are gifted how could you know what the actual weather was that the crew were experiencing.

I would suggest that the CVR would at least give some insight into what the crew were considering to make their decisions.

There seems to be lots of discussion over what exactly was said on the CVR given your theory that it was irrelevant:)

[GlueBall]

In virtual IMC and close to the ground, the aural GPWS alert must be respected at all costs. It's an extreme emergency that calls for instant, instinctive reaction...without thought.

The CVR tape demonstrated that the commander had hesitated in his response to the warning. Furthermore, the tape suggests that the commander had only "called" for max power, (F/E?, F/O?)rather than shove the throttles to the forward stops himself and simultaneously rotate into an aggressive climb angle.

(.....TDK mk2: The statement has nothing to do with "hindsight," rather it has to do with:
1. Survival instinct, and
2. It has to do with the trained reflexes of extracting ultimate climb performance (right up to the stick shaker)....)
:{

[56P]

GPWS Whoop, whoop. Pull up. Whoop whoop.
FE Five hundred feet.
GPWS Pull up.
FE Four hundred feet.
GPWS Whoop, whoop. Pull up. Whoop whoop. Pull up.
CA Go-around power please.
GPWS Whoop, whoop. Pull -.
---------------------------------------------

[prospector]

Got the T Shirt,
I give the weather at McMurdo as that was the weather given to the crew.

It was below the minima for the only approved let down, by the Company and the NZCAA. Nowhere is there any approval for VMC descent below FL160, so the argument as to whether they were VMC is not relevant.
Sector whiteout only shows why they never saw the mountain.

If the only descent approved for the flight had been complied with there is no way they would have been to the North of Erebus below 16,000ft.

To my mind it is inconceivable that any aircrew could agree that to invent their own descent procedure, in a place like Antarctica, on your first trip to the ice, knowing all the tricks that the weather, visibility etc can play down there, to disregard SOP's that have been established to protect the flight, the only Expert on Antarctica on board, Peter Mulgrew,obviously had not fixed their position beyond doubt, and to blat about at below 1500ft at 260+kts not knowing your exact position in questionable VMC does not leave the crew as blameless as Mahon's findings suggest.

As stated in earlier posts, in my opinion, and many others, the blame for this accident can be shared between NZCAA, Air New Zealand and the crew, the only thing open for discussion would be the percentage blame apportioned to each.

Prospector

[SeekingAnswers]

Well Prospector, I think you and I are going to have to agree to disagree, although I think that your opinion may be fair enough based on the information that is currently available to you.

Therefore I shall have to see what I can do to get the correct info out. Although I have felt some satisfaction in starting and continuing to join in this thread, it is probably not the best use of time to try and change peoples minds one by one, point by point, and I have to face the fact that some people will never feel sure either way. It has however encouraged me to research the answers more thoroughly so I thank you for that.

I know people think the info already available is the sum total but that is not the case. If those reading this thread would continue to read info that comes out regarding Erebus and put that together with the information already available, before making up their minds, that would be most appreciated. Although I may post information from news articles or relevant information in future, I will leave it to others to discuss.

May your fuel be full, your sky clear and your winds steady. Goodbye for now.

[Rananim]

Prospector,
All your comments are correct and the natural conclusion would be to wrap it up as a classic CFIT.The airline's failure to immediately stamp out descent below 16000 and /or 6000 when it first happened was grossly negligent.It created an atmosphere of tacit approval.How can Air NZ jump on the MSA bandwagon when it has overseen a policy of illegal descents for 2 whole years without saying a word.In other words,the MSA is 16000 if you fly into Erebus and whatever you want if you return home safe and sound.
The case for a simple CFIT is further obscured by the coordinates and the mess that was the navigation department.Collins had a right to expect that the flightplan was the one he had been briefed on.When he descended,he kept NAV track,confident that he was over the Sound.Legal?No,unless they were visual and no-one knows that.Pictures taken at impact show good visibility but the merging of the Erebus slope and cloud base would have laid the trap.
Once you factor in the negligence of the CAA(worse than Air NZ in my view),you begin to realise that the trap had been set for 2 years and it just needed the right weather conditions and twists of fate to make the accident inevitable.Collins was just along for the ride in many ways.

[Menen]

I find the reference to the GPWS warning and subsequent actions by the captain as most relevant to today's flight simulator training for type ratings. Specific dual instructional practice at GPWS pull-up recoveries is rarely part of any type rating syllabus - at least not in my experience.

Occasionally a simulator instructor will throw in an unexpected GPWS whoop whoop - pull up pull up, as a "test" but the serious "training" for this situation is rarely practiced. Often the reason is that it is considered a bit of a gimmick manoeuvre and not worthy of serious training. Another excuse for not training for GPWS pull-up's is that if it is not in the syllabus (type rating or LOFT) then it is not CASA approved and you aren't allowed to teach it. It is a vital sequence for training and should be taught during the type rating and then practiced regularly. This includes from descent with speed brakes extended at 250 knots as it is all too easy to forget to retract the speed brakes.

Sorry to hijack the Erebus discussion, but from what I read of the accident, the GPWS pull up manoeuvre at the time was not aggressive.

[Desert Dingo]

Perhaps the instant experts pontificating with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight about how they would respond to the GPWS and done it so much better should actually read some of the bl**dy reports and get their facts straight! :yuk:

I'll help them get started with an extract from Chippindale's report, and he was not exactly biased in favour of the pilots, was he?
(My emphasis in red)
2.18 After the captain’s decision to climb the aircraft out of the area he and the co-pilot were discussing the most suitable climbout path when the ground proximity warning system sounded instructing the crew to “Pull up”.
The crew responded to the alarm without undue hesitation, the flight engineer calling off the heights of 500 and 400 feet indicated on the radio altimeter and the captain calling for “Go-round power”. The warning 6½ seconds before the impact was, however, too late for the crew’s action to make any significant effect on the aircraft’s level flight path. Their reaction time was established as very similar to or better than that of experienced crews placed in a similar situation in the training environment of the flight It is likely however that as a result of a whiteout the go-round attempt was procedural in response to the warning rather than a desperate attempt to avoid a readily apparent obstacle.

Glueball says
The CVR tape demonstrated that the commander had hesitated in his response to the warning. Furthermore, the tape suggests that the commander had only "called" for max power, (F/E?, F/O?)rather than shove the throttles to the forward stops himself and simultaneously rotate into an aggressive climb angle.
Crap. The CVR does not demonstrate anything of the sort. If the extract quoted above is not enough, then there is more in the conclusions.Conclusions
The following conclusions are derived from a detailed study of the DFDR data in conjunction with analysis
of the CVR Tape:
*
*
The GPWS operated within its design parameters and provided 6.5 seconds of warning.
The crew responded expeditiously in the circumstances to the GPWS warning. Simulator trials
proved conclusively that with an unexpected warning such as this, it would have been impossible
to avoid the accident with a normal pilot’s response allowing reasonable identification and reaction
times to the GPWS warning.
The aircraft had barely commenced to respond to the avoidance manoeuvres and power application prior to impact.
The DFDR shows a 1.67g pull up two seconds after the GPWS warning. Two seconds again after that the No. 1 engine recorded 94% N1. (The parameters for the other engines at this time are not known due to the slow sampling rate.) At the same time the call "go-around power please" was made. This indicates to me that the power increase had already been made and the call was to confirm that the power was set correctly. Anyone got SOPs for a ground proximity warning that is not along the lines of:
1. Apply power and rotate to climb attitude.
2. Check configuration (gear flaps speedbrakes etc)
3. Confirm thrust set.
I have never seen any where you request the other crew to apply the power for you.

Is it too much to ask that we debate this issue using the facts that are available, and not go off half-cocked with ill-informed speculation?
Now who is going to be the next one to say Captain Collins did not respond correctly to the GPWS? :yuk:

[Menen]

Desert Dingo. Steady the Buffs DD. You appear to have missed the main point of my post which is the compelling need for specific training at GPWS pull up action - not just random "testing".

[Desert Dingo]

Menen:
Sorry mate,
Not you specifically. Our posts crossed and I hadn't seen yours before I posted mine.
I will have to type faster next time.
:ugh:
Are you saying Collins did it wrong though?

[SeekingAnswers]

There have been several questions/statements on their altitude and letdown procedures so wanted to post this info which I was given by one of the DC10 pilots who testified and was on the transcript team.

Letdown procedures were given verbally at the briefing.
Approval was given for 1500ft
Approval was given to use own initiative on letdown procedure and approach
Testimony at trial was given by briefing pilot John Wilson and AirNZ Operations Manager Doug Keating

[JW411]

Twenty years ago I was invited to fly an ex-ANZ (KSSU)DC-10-30. (For those of you DC-10 pilots out there who are unfamiliar with such animals, even the flightdeck door was hinged on the wrong side).

From my point of view the most significant difference to all other DC-10s that I had ever flown was the Collins AINS 70 navigation system. This basically consisted of three Collins INS platforms which fed two navigation computers located behind the captain. They, in turn, fed the automatics and were controlled by two large alpha-numeric keyboards.

The nav computers could have all of the waypoints for the proposed flight loaded by a rather large (by modern standards) "Jep Tape" (although we distrusted the system so much that we did it the old way).

We were so bothered about this bit of kit that we spent a day with Collins in Los Angeles talking about it. The guy who gave us the course told us that after the Mt Erebus disaster the US Navy picked up everything they could find at the accident site. All the bits were put in plastic bags and flown back to Long Beach.

They were then laid out on benches in a hangar for the manufacturers to identify. He, to his total astonishment, found the carbon discs from inside the nav computers lying there on a bench and they were able to replay the last part of the flight.

I believe that it was as a result of this that the "missing waypoint" that took them through the mountain was identified.

My only question to this day is "What the hell were ANZ doing in Antartica farting around with a full load of punters in a DC-10 at 1,500 feet in the first place"?

[prospector]

SeekingAnswers,
For the sake of accuracy, the Ops Mgr's name was Doug Keesing.

Prospector

[GlueBall]

Desert Dingo: ...This indicates to me that the power increase had already been made and the call was to confirm that the power was set correctly. Anyone got SOPs for a ground proximity warning that is not along the lines of:
1. Apply power and rotate to climb attitude.
2. Check configuration (gear flaps speedbrakes etc)
3. Confirm thrust set.

The setting of "go-around" thrust (94% N1...?) should never be a concern nor a procedure during a GPWS response in IMC. The only correct response is to "firewall" the throttles.
Collins did not do that and he did not get the benefit of the significant overboost capability of the CF6 engines, ...in a very cold climate...probably up to 15%.

[Casper]

There have been several questions/statements on their altitude and letdown procedures so wanted to post this info which I was given by one of the DC10 pilots who testified and was on the transcript team.

Letdown procedures were given verbally at the briefing.

Approval was given for 1500ft

Approval was given to use own initiative on letdown procedure and approach

Testimony at trial was given by briefing pilot John Wilson and AirNZ Operations Manager Doug Keating
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Rananim

When I read the above post from SA, I agree with you - the Kiwi CAA surveillance was awfully inadequate, especially with an operator that had lost two a/c (DC8 & L188) in crew training operations. CAA, ANZ, weather and the crew all contributed to this disaster and I suspect that the crew provided the smallest portion.

[Desert Dingo]

Glueball:
I think that we can agree now that Capt Collins did not "hesitate in his response" or "only *call* for max power".
We are now debating the difference between using go-around power or firewalling the thrust levers. Here I agree with you that the correct response would be to firewall the thust levers. Did Collins do this? We do not know. Probably not, based on his call to check "go around power". The only facts we do know are that just before impact the power was increasing and the aircraft was rotating through 10 degrees nose up. However, the point is that whatever thrust setting was used, it would not have made any difference to the end result.

From Chippindale's report:
The crew responded expeditiously in the circumstances to the GPWS warning. Simulator trials
proved conclusively that with an unexpected warning such as this, it would have been impossible
to avoid the accident with a normal pilot’s response allowing reasonable identification and reaction
times to the GPWS warning.
And in more detail:

1.16.3 The performance of the GPWS was evaluated and it was assessed that the warning was in
accordance with the expected performance in the “terrain closure” and “flight below 500 feet
without flaps and undercarriage extended” modes of the equipment (modes 2A and 4
respectively). The profile of the terrain prior to the impact was reconstructed in Air New
Zealand’s DC 10 simulator and the performance of the aircraft was evaluated to determine if the
collision could have been avoided in response to the warning and that the warning was in fact
given at the maximum time before impact that could be expected.

1.16.4 The flights in the simulator indicated that experienced pilots would not have avoided a collision
and that the warning given was in accordance with the design specifications of the GPWS.
One thing discovered in the simulator was:
With sufficient rehearsal it was possible to fly the aircraft away from the approaching slope
when an extreme manoeuvre was initiated in response to the onset of the GPWS warning.
However, I recall reading somewhere that this required a radical turn away from the slope, and pre-supposed you could see the ground to work out which way to turn.

Collins had six seconds and no chance to get it right. The rest of us have had 25 years to think about how we could have done it better.

I have no problem admitting that if I had been in that situation I would have hit the ground too, and it annoys me when all the armchair experts come up with invalid reasons why it would never have happened to them.

[411A]

Well, I gotta admit, it sure was a set of very tragic circumstances.

One thing that I cannot quite fathom is...what the hell could they have expected to see at fifteen hunderd feet that they could not have just as well seen at 15,000 or ten thousand, or even five thousand?

Can being that low (fifteen hunderd) have really been all that important?

I sure wouldn't think so.

OTOH, I haven't done this rather low sightseeing...except at the outer marker, on an ILS approach.:oh:

[Rollingthunder]

As an aside - Why did Air New Zealand dump all Douglas products immediately after this tragic accident i.e DC-10s?

[flash8]

JW411: Twenty years ago I was invited to fly an ex-ANZ (KSSU)DC-10-30. (For those of you DC-10 pilots out there who are unfamiliar with such animals, even the flightdeck door was hinged on the wrong side).

From my point of view the most significant difference to all other DC-10s that I had ever flown was the Collins AINS 70 navigation system. This basically consisted of three Collins INS platforms which fed two navigation computers located behind the captain. They, in turn, fed the automatics and were controlled by two large alpha-numeric keyboards.

The nav computers could have all of the waypoints for the proposed flight loaded by a rather large (by modern standards) "Jep Tape" (although we distrusted the system so much that we did it the old way).

We were so bothered about this bit of kit that we spent a day with Collins in Los Angeles talking about it. The guy who gave us the course told us that after the Mt Erebus disaster the US Navy picked up everything they could find at the accident site. All the bits were put in plastic bags and flown back to Long Beach.

They were then laid out on benches in a hangar for the manufacturers to identify. He, to his total astonishment, found the carbon discs from inside the nav computers lying there on a bench and they were able to replay the last part of the flight.

I believe that it was as a result of this that the "missing waypoint" that took them through the mountain was identified.


JW411: As I stated in my earlier post (re the KSSU DC-10's having the the most advanced Area Nav System of their time) as I heard it, there were two 8K core modules that were recovered from the crash site - these were non-volatile memory - and thus the flightpath (with the W/P changes) were able to be reconsructed.

Absolutely fascinating.

Cheers!

[Menen]

I recall reading an article some time after the Erebus accident where Boeing and other manufactures changed their GPWS pull-up procedures from a recommended 15 degree pull up to a 20 degree pull up manoeuvre.

The article stated that Sundstrand (it was their GPWS system?) did some research on CFIT accidents and came out with figures that indicated the "average" CFIT hit the hill at 300 ft from the top at 230 knots and the "average hill" which is hit had a 18 degree slope. My figures may be a bit inaccurate but it was close to that.

15 degrees was the usual body angle for go-around in most early jets and by default was the body angle which pilots aimed at during a GPWS pull-up. By going aggressively (meaning real fast) to a minimum of 20 degrees - as well as firewalling the throttles, you played the law of averages and hoped you won on that occasion.

A vital simulator exercise to be practiced until competent, in my opinion.

[Rananim]

Would agree that GPWS escape maneuvers should be practiced more and particularly following descent with speedbrakes extended as already mentioned.The cali crash demonstrates the need for this very clearly.Response must be instinctive,immediate and aggressive.

[GotTheTshirt]

411A,
The reason that they were going so low was that it was
A SIGHTSEEING TRIP
duh:rolleyes:

[Desert Dingo]

I think he has a good point though.
Just how close to the snow do you have to get to see that it is.... errr.....white and featureless ??

Bugger....never thought I would ever be supporting 411A

[RatherBeFlying]

There's been the odd winter whiteout incident where a skiplane in flight begins losing airspeed in spite of full power and comes to an eventual halt in ascending deep powder:\

Don't try this in a jet:uhoh:

[Dr. Red]

For anyone interested, Otago University and the Hocken Archives in Dunedin have a large amount of Erebus crash related material, including books, video recordings, inquiry transcripts, legal reports, etc.

[chuks]

I recall seeing a training video, one of those made using actors speaking lines from the crash CVR transcript, about this crash.

The main point made in the training video was that there were landscape features that looked exactly like what the crew expected to see. But due to poor visibility what they saw were features on a different scale in a different location, one that put them on a collision course with terrain. The crew was held to have reacted to the expected visual cues without checking very exactly their actual lat/long position. Presumably a look at a chart would have showed them what they were actually looking at rather than what they thought they were looking at.

I don't know if this is absolutely correct in the light of all the facts, of course. I saw the video about 4 years ago so that I may well have forgotten many of the points made. That said, it was a very interesting safety presentation about visual illusions and the need to cross-check critical nav data even when what is seen is what one expects to see. I assume most airline crews spend very little time at low level navigating by visual charts and landscape features.

[Halfwayback]

Desert Dingo

If you had actually seen Mt Erebus you would realise that it is not just flat snow but, on a good day, is most spectactular active volcano. On a bad day it is solid cloud

http://www.avweb.com/newspics/187317_qantas_erebus_from_sea.jpg


The surrounding area is also magnificent with the low sun showing fantastic relief as you can see from the photo taken from a QANTAS flight when sightseeing resumed.

http://www.avweb.com/newspics/187317_qantas_erebus_glacier_creep.jpg

Spent two and a half years flying in Antarctica and it is not a place to make a mistake. - it bites back.

HWB

[prospector]

VMC, 16,000ft, and never saw any of that before commencing descent???

One certainly has to wonder as to any advantage of even going down to 6,000ft let alone 1500ft.

Prospector

[compressor stall]

Even though it may not be, but paring back the extraneous issues.

1. Pilots have preflight briefing of route
2. Route is changed. Pilots unaware.
3. On the day pilots think they are flying into an area where they know they can descend to xxx ft.
4. They look out the window. They are clear of cloud, in VMC.
5. There is cloud above that stretches to the horizon. It causes whiteout (NOT IMC), obscuring any surface definition that would otherwise alert them to their being in the wrong spot.
6. The accident.

Yes it was a CFIT.

They could not (through inadequate training perhaps) recognise the dangers and were lulled into a sense of security by being VMC and where they thought they were.