SQ006 Revisited

[0.88M]

Anyone been to Shemya lately, like the past 25years.?
Care to share with us experience diverting to COldBAY or SHEMYA...
Don't think i wish to see that

.88m, there was a fine thread on this very subject in Tech Log recently; Arctic Diversion Airports (http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/Forum3/HTML/002022.html) Check it out...

Sick Squid
Rumours and News Moderator

[This message has been edited by Sick Squid (edited 24 May 2001).]

[747400CA]

Had a friend take an MD11 into Shemya some years ago for a pneumatic duct leak indication - "...land at nearest suitable airport" - nothing else to do.

USAF was quite cooperative in providing communications to company as well as maintenance assistance. After determining that the duct leak indications were erroneous, the aircraft was fixed with some clever manipulations of the center MCDU - not sure how for you techies out there with more knowledge of the CMC than I can claim.

After several hours on the ground, the aircraft was fueled (JP instead of Jet A - bit of a problem later) and continued to destination.

Passengers thought it was a bit of a lark - of course, it was mid-summer with pleasant temperatures and light winds.

The incident compelled a through review of Aleutian ETP divert airports not only for operational suitability but passenger comfort and safety, particularly if the aircraft were not suitable for continued shelter once on the ground.

Folding cots and sleeping bags on the local school gymnasium floor was the likely prospect until a charter aircraft could be found to move all to ANC.

Thanks to all.

[twitchy]

There is no point our discussing here. The 180 minutes ETOP for B777 here in SQ has to come this year. Singapore government, CAAS ans SIA means the same thing here in Singapore. You mean CAAS here can do anything against the interest of SQ. If so the DGCA will be fired the very same day. Can't you guys make out from the ways various aeroplanes' MEL are written. Everything is go a item except an engine failure, when you are home bound to Singapore. Here country and company's interest is paramount than anything else.

[0.88M]

What an insight,twitchy.
Anything else we should know before boarding a SQ 777 trans-pacific?
I'm definitly advising my loveones against
taking SQ if MEL's are written so.

[twitchy]

0.88M, Its no jokes, if few things which are beyond the scope of MEL to come back to Singapore than here in SQ these people have something called Despatch Authorisation which can cover anything and everything except weather at departure station or an engine failing to start.

Regards
Twitchy

[Insider107]

John Barnes

Re my posting of 20 May 2001.Yes, that paragraph was a little impenetrable wasn’t it? Sorry about the clumsiness but I’m afraid that I had to dash it off in rather a hurry and so didn’t have a great amount of time to give it my usual critical appraisal! Anyway, I’ve applied a metaphorical blue pencil to the offending parts, which amendment, I hope, will aid scanning and comprehension.

However, to expand the meaning of the paragraph, perhaps I could draw out the following points:

1. At the time (1986-89) Boeing was very, very worried that it had made a major mistake in moving ahead with the B757 design/production/marketing programme as domestic (USA) sales were sluggish and the type was not finding great airline/passenger favour. Fortunately, it was surprisingly embraced by pioneering European Inclusive Tour (IT) leisure operators and proved a big success, prompting a re-think amongst the US majors and a belated decision to buy in quantity from Boeing. However, following the significant financial investment in the B757, made by the IT operators, to meet the demands of a burgeoning summer European leisure market, a sustainable “Winter Sun” volume market had to be found, to even out the operators’/airlines’ winter/summer cash flows and keep the monthly operating lease payments going during the northern hemisphere dark months. Florida and then later the Caribbean, became the tailor made markets – but how to get the punters there from Europe? Well Boeing came up with the clever idea (which they had been working on quietly for some time) of modifying the essentially short range, domestic US airplane to meet a reasonable statistical reliability target which would allow a compliant regulator (FAA) and then a slightly less compliant one (UK CAA) to approve extended range, over-water (Atlantic) operations by the type. The rest is history, as the saying goes and ETOPS, as it became known, set the seal on the B757’s success.

2. Meanwhile, the B767 sales had become equally moribund and Boeing was beset by similar self doubts – not surprising, having landed its self with an airplane essentially designed for United Airlines and specifically able to operate nation-wide (USA) out of high altitude Denver with non-standard (smaller) baggage containers – the latter to accommodate a narrower fuselage than the European competitor, the A310 and hence give a slippier, low drag cruise performance. Hmm, how to get out of this fine mess? Well why re-invent the wheel, why not use the same old B757 ETOPS formula, cobble together the required technical mods, go the same regulatory route with FAA/CAA as the B757 and market the hell out of the airplane within the existing customer base on the premise of great cost savings and the ability to open “long thin” routes unavailable to the B747? Again we can see that history has been made and that through the power of extraordinarily effective marketing and huge financial muscle, water has been made to flow uphill and the world has become convinced that two specialised, short range, domestic airplanes, produced by a Boeing that got very lucky indeed, are nothing of the kind but are, rather, visionary products which are indispensable to the inventory of any major league international carrier. As a footnote, Airbus was then forced, with some reluctance, to compete in the same market niche, hence the ETOPS A310-300ER.

3. So, we now get back to Lufthansa, who, I suppose, characteristically declined to be swayed by the Boeing marketing hype and did not weaken in the face of sophisticated “smoke and mirrors” performances. With admirable Teutonic thoroughness and eschewing a jump onto a fashionable bandwagon, the airline relied on the old fashioned merits of an in-depth appraisal of both the concept (ETOPS) and the tools (B767/A310-300ER), and found all of them wanting. Hence a decision to go the A340 route, using a type specifically designed for the long range, over-water, intercontinental role.

4. As a final part of this expansion, we now come to the modern day and the progeny of the B757/767 parentage, the B777. Unsurprisingly, the limitations of the previous generation have been bred out of son of 757/767 and a very fine, standard baggage container, multi-role (short haul to ultra long haul) integrated ETOPS equipped airplane results. Notwithstanding, however, the world has been subliminally conditioned to an unquestioning acceptance of the merits and safety of all ETOPS operations and an attitude that says, “well if Boeing say its OK, it must be, huh?” And this latter attitude is the one that the real controllers of airlines world wide – the marketers and the accountants – have inexorably adopted with alacrity, not to say expediency. They are the ones who (correctly) assign the airplane to routes serving, say, SE Asia-Europe (minor ETOPS content over Bay of Bengal/Arabian Sea) but they are also the ones who do not ask the hard questions of routes such as Continental’s B777, Newark-Hong Kong over-the-pole marathon. I certainly do (but who am I?) and I come up with some very bleak answers every time I check the winter weather actuals for the Siberian en-route ETOPS suitable airports required of the polar routes – Irkutsk, Yakutsk, Tiksi, Pevek, Khatanga etc – 400 meters viz, freezing fog, –50C or 500 meters, overcast 100 feet, cross wind 30-40 knots, -38C are fairly representative of the ACARS trawl that I’ve recently made. The thought of a single engine landing in these conditions and the desperate ensuing survival exercise make my blood freeze. Perhaps Continental has been able to get 240 minute approval (4 hours!) from the FAA, to obviate use of these airports but I certainly wouldn’t want to spend this amount of time on one engine flying over the North Pole and Eastern Siberia before happening on a more hospitable suitable airport further south. Nor would I like to spend a similar time “on one” over the Pacific wastes, midway on, say, a SE Asia-LAX sector. Perhaps if I was a marketer or an accountant, I’d be able to see things in a more “realistic” light!

On the matter of your posting of 23 May - thank you very much and I am very flattered by your suggestion. However, I feel that any present move in this direction on my part would be without honour. I have constantly castigated the existing SQ flight ops regime as ego-driven, complacent, ossified, ineffective and authoritarian and, on many occasions, excoriated its architect, Maurice de Vaz as a venal chancer, happy to sell his “friends and colleagues” down the river, on all occasions, to achieve his annual flight ops cost saving bonuses. To now respond to his posted invitation, seeking a management position in the very regime, which most colleagues and I loathe, would smack of the grossest hypocrisy. More especially since this is the first such invitation in some twenty years of his tenure and one, I feel, that is more to do with prodding from General Bey in response to interim findings of the safety survey being carried out by Professor Robert L. Helmreich of the University of Texas, than any genuine desire to have ex-pats on the management team. I consider it more seemly to wait until such time as de Vaz and cronies are forced out of their fiefdom, before considering any such move.

gaunty

As usual, elegantly crystallised! Thank you.

7times7

Thank you for your posting of 23 May 2001. Your inclusion of the accurate Bloomberg piece was a service to us all.

Bloomberg reports 5 IFSD since start of SQ 777 ops in 1997, which I guess are the ones that I am aware of through word of mouth. By similar methodology I am aware that there may have been a sixth but SQ weasel words were used to call it “not an IFSD”, so it never got into the hall of fame – wonderful hey? Of significant note is that the last four events have taken place in what I am told is a 14-month period. Similarly, there have been four “flight idle” situations that I know of, where the offending engine was returned to Station “at idle” rather than be shut down – so that was OK then – no problem!! These situations led me to write in an earlier post that I believed it was possible that engines were being damaged by this practice. I also believe that a similar number of ground problems have been encountered – though I can’t substantiate this as the apocryphal evidence to date does not allow this.

You may be interested to know that I have endeavoured to obtain from CAAS, through a professional intermediary, definitive information on SQ 777 Trent engine reliability performance. What in USA or Western Europe would be a simple exercise (certainly in USA) turns out to be one of extraordinary difficulty in Singapore. Sadly there is no Freedom of Information Act here and requests for information were met with the inevitable barrage of questions as to who was asking for it/why did they want to know/what was it going to be used for – one can only imagine the consequences if the inquirers name was known!

Perhaps Bloomberg should press harder on CAAS. They may even be able to wrestle out the information and they certainly won’t get fired and put in jail for asking the embarrassing questions!

Finally, of course, all the PR mouthpieces of RR, SQ, CAAS and Boeing, as we see, are applying their glossy lacquer and smoothing out the public “misperceptions” of events to date.

[Insider107]

7times7

My last posting of 26 May 2001 was lengthy and involved so I’ve broken up my answer to your post of 23 May 2001 – hence this post (still lengthy!).

You asked “Insider, do you know the SQ B777 IFSD, if it is within certification limits even after the recent shutdown. 5 shutdowns in >4 years is it outside the limit? Maybe I should say over the hours flown.”

To point us all in the right direction, can I draw attention to the ICAO ETOPS Information Leaflet (IL) of 1996, which has appeared on this thread previously?

----------------------------------------------------------------

11 Continuing Surveillance

The fleet average In Flight Shut Down (IFSD) rate for the
specified airframe/engine combination will continue to be monitored in
accordance with Appendices 1 and 4. As with all other operations, the
appropriate Authority should also monitor all aspects of the extended
range operation that it has authorised to ensure that the levels of
reliability achieved in extended range operations remain at the
necessary levels as provided in Appendix 1, and that the operation
continues to be conducted safely. In the event that an acceptable
level of reliability is not maintained, if significant adverse trends
exist, or if significant deficiencies are detected in the type design
or the conduct of the ETOPS operation, then the appropriate Authority
(CAAS in this case) should initiate a special evaluation, impose operational
restrictions, if necessary, and stipulate corrective action for the operator to
adopt in order to resolve the problems in a timely manner. The
appropriate Authority should alert the Certification Authority
(FAA, again in this case) when a special evaluation is initiated
(and provide for their participation).

There are two extremes in the ETOPS process with respect to
maturity; one is the demonstration of a stable reliability by the
accumulation of service experience and the other is by an agreed
design and test program between the manufacturers and authorities. The
extent to which a propulsion system is a derivative of previous
ETOPS-rated systems is also a factor of the level of maturity.

There is justification for the view that modern propulsion systems
achieve a stable reliability level by 100,000 hours for new type and
50,000 hours for derivatives. 3000 to 4000 hours is considered to be
the necessary time in service for a specific unit to indicate problem
areas.

Normally, the service experience will be:

(1) For new propulsion systems: 100,000 hours and 12 months
service. Where experience on another aeroplane is applicable, a
significant portion of the 100,000 hours should normally be obtained
on the candidate aeroplane.

(2) For derivative propulsion systems: 50,000 hours and 12 months
service. These values may vary according to the degree of commonality.
To this end in determining the derivative status of a propulsion
system, consideration should be given to technical criteria referring
to the commonality with previous ETOPS-rated engines. Prime areas of
concern include:

(i) Turbomachinery
(ii) Controls and accessories and control logic
(iii) Configuration hardware (piping, cables etc.)
(iv) Aircraft to engine interfaces and interaction

1 Fire
2 Thrust reverser
3 Avionics
4 etc.

The extent to which the inservice experience might be reduced
would depend upon the degree of commonality with previous ETOPS-rated
engines using the above criteria, and would be decided on a
case-by-case basis.

Also on a case-by-case basis, relevant test and design experience
could be taken into account when arriving at the inservice experience
required.

Thus the required experience to demonstrate propulsion system
reliability should be determined by

(i) The extent to which previous service experience of common
ETOPS-rated propulsion systems can be considered.
(ii) To what extent compensating factors such as design similarity
and test evidence can be used.
(iii) The two preceding considerations would then determine the
amount of service experience needed for a particular propulsion system
proposed for ETOPS.

These considerations would be made on a case-by-case basis and
would need to provide a demonstrated level of propulsion system
reliability in terms of IFSD rate of the order of .05 per 1000 hours,
as is necessary also for new propulsion systems.

b. Data Required for Assessment

(1) A list of all engine shutdown events, both ground and inflight,
for all causes (excluding normal training events) including flameout.
The list should provide the following for each event:

(i) date:
(ii) airline;
(iii) aeroplane and engine identification (model and serial
number);
(iv) power-unit configuration and modification history;
(v) engine position;
(vi) symptoms leading up to the event, phase of flight or ground
operation;
(vii) weather/environmental conditions and reason for shutdown and
any comment regarding engine re-start potential.

--------------------------------------------------------------

It is noteworthy that all current SQ, RR and CAAS talk is of the IFSD rate, whilst really, both common sense and the ICAO Information Leaflet indicate that all engine shutdown events, both ground and inflight, for all causes including flameout should be considered by the relevant Authority (in this case CAAS) when assessing reliability for ETOPS purposes. It would appear that the CAAS is currently deficient in exercising its obligation to consider all of the above.

Similarly, there is no evidence that either SQ or CAAS are paying any attention to the ICAO recommendation that: “3000 to 4000 hours is considered to be the necessary time in service for a specific unit (i.e. each individual engine in the designated ETOPS fleet) to indicate problem areas”.

To long-timers in SQ, of course, all this is par for the course. These self same sages need only cast their minds back to the A310 “ETOPS” operation across the Indian Ocean when the type was occasionally obliged to serve Chennai and Columbo and was/is scheduled for the Mali turn-round service – all of which routes are definitely ETOPS, as a fair segment of each is outside 60 minutes from a suitable airport at single engine flying speed, under standard conditions in still air

All A310 pilots who I have consulted are unaware of any specific ETOPS programme established for this part of the operation, including (from the ICAO IL):

---------------------------------------------------------------

(3) ETOPS Check Programme

The objective of the ETOPS check programme should be to ensure
standardised flight crew practices and procedures and also to
emphasise the special nature of ETOPS operations. Only pilots with a
demonstrated understanding of the unique requirements of ETOPS should
be designated as check pilots for ETOPS.

f. Operational Limitations

(1) Area of Operation

(i) An operator may be authorised to conduct extended range
operations within an area where the diversion time, at any point along
the proposed route on a flight to an adequate airport, is up to a
maximum of 180 minutes in still air at the approved
one-engine-inoperative cruise speed. Appendices 1 and 4 provide
criteria for such operations.

(1) An operator's two-engine aeroplane should not be operated on an
extended range flight unless authorised by the operator certificate
issued by the appropriate Authority (both maintenance and operations).

(2) The operator certificate issued by the appropriate Authority
for extended range operation should specifically include provisions
covering at least the following:

(i) Definition of the particular airframe/engine combinations,
including the current approved CMP standard required for extended
range operation as normally identified in the AFM (Paragraph 8f .);
(ii) authorised area of operation;
(iii) minimum altitudes to be flown along planned and diversionary
routes;
(iv) the maximum diversion time, at the approved
one-engine-inoperative cruise speed (under standard conditions in
still air), at any point on the route that the aeroplane may be from a
suitable airport for landing;
(v) airports nominated for use, including alternates, and
associated instrument approaches and operating minima;
(vi) the approved maintenance and reliability programme (Appendix
4) for extended range operation including those items specified in the
type design approved CMP standard;
(vii) identification of those aeroplanes designated for extended
range operation by make and model as well as serial number and
registration;
(viii) aeroplane performance reference.

h. Validation of Operator ETOPS Maintenance and Operations
Capability

(1) The operator should demonstrate that it has the competence and
capability to conduct safely and support adequately the intended
operation.
(2) Prior to being granted ETOPS authority, the operator should
demonstrate that the ETOPS maintenance checks, servicing, and
programmes called for in Appendix 4 are being properly conducted at
representative departure and destination airports.
(3) The operator should also demonstrate that ETOPS flight release
practices, policies, and procedures are established for operations to
and from representative departure and destination airports.
(4) A validation flight in the aeroplane or an approved simulator
(as determined by the Authority on an individual basis), should also
incorporate demonstration of the following emergency procedures:

(i) total loss of thrust of one engine;
(ii) total loss of normal generated electrical power;
(iii) any other condition considered to be equivalent in
airworthiness, crew work-load, or performance risk.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

So to summarise, SQ had not and still (as far as any of my colleagues are aware) has not established any of the above for (belatedly) the A310 or (latterly) the B777 operations, specifically ETOPS MEL, ETOPS Flight Planning, ETOPS Training/Checking, Engineering tracking of ETOPS engines and critical components nor established a 24 hour flight watch system – all common elements of every other ETOPS airline in the world. Further, the airline appears to have contravened the Air Navigation Order of Singapore (copy of UK ANO) in respect of its A310 operation in that it has not complied with the Authority’s (CAAS) obligation to ensure:

“ An operator's two-engine aeroplane should not be operated on an
extended range flight unless authorised by the operator certificate
issued by the appropriate Authority (both maintenance and operations)”.

Similarly, the Authority appears to have contravened this very Act which forms its “raison d’etre”, by not ensuring the above compliance. Hmm! I guess the lawyers could have a field day in the event of an ETOPS related passenger fatality – I’ve been able to figure this one out all on my own and I’m just a dumb old pilot – so why can’t SQ?

Perhaps a clue can be gained as follows. Back in the mid-80’s, ICAO invited all relevant airlines (of which SQ was amongst the pre-eminent) for consultations to establish operating guidelines for the new fangled concept of ETOPS (resulting in the Information Leaflet subsequently adopted and incorporated into legislation by all ETOPS airlines/authorities except one). All went well in these consultations until it was realised by the DFO at the time (guess who!) that all this was going to mean a lot of expense and bother to the airlines who adopted the recommendations. So, SQ quietly disappeared and was never again seen at an ICAO ETOPS consultative meeting! Neat solution huh?

We as individual captains are charged with the absolute safety of our passengers, crew and aircraft – a trust and obligation we take very seriously. Why does SQ flight ops management not exercise the same seriousness in the execution of its own, identical overall responsibility?

Finally (at last) you say “I sense quite a hangup and interest on SQ getting their 180 etops”.

I’m not sure whether this is to mean that we (the pilots in SQ) do not wish the B777 to achieve ETOPS approval. May I say that personally I feel (along with every SQ pilot I speak with) the B777 is a very fine airplane with a wonderful commercial performance and great passenger appeal, the RR Trent an equally fine power plant at the start of its development life/thrust growth and the combination of the two a winning formula for the future. Events have shown, however, that the Trent requires somewhat more development time than anticipated, before release onto “meaty” ETOPS routes but that this is absolutely no reflection on the worth and great potential of the engine – its just up to RR to get their fingers out and get it fixed ASAP. We are all “four square” behind the B777 and wish it great success. My only reservation being that 180+ minutes is a heck of a long time to be “on one” over either the pole or the pacific.

What we in SQ are very unhappy with (not to say outraged with, in the cases of experienced ETOPS pilots) is the evasion and secrecy of SVPFO (formerly DFO) de Vaz and his nest of mendacious vipers in respect of the current technical status of the B777 and the sweeping assumption that we, as a pilot force, are prepared to set aside our profound distrust of this man and accept that all is well with the airplane’s introduction to ETOPS service, when patently all is not well!

PS. I’ve asked Pprune if the ICAO Information Leaflet, a copy of which I now have, could be placed on the server and hyperlinked to this posting. For all interested in downloading, it’s in the form of a 46 page MS Word.doc!!

[Insider107]

Unfolding events seem to indicate that SQ is very sensibly stepping away, for the time being, from N.Atlantic and N.Pacific B777 ETOPS operations. A decision made even more sensible in light of last Thursday’s Thai Airways RR Trent powered B777 IFSD and subsequent non-scheduled landing in Da Nang.

Similarly, perhaps the incident which took place some weeks before the last SQ B777 IFSD of 8 May 2001, when SQ236 sustained an engine failure and diverted to Bali, has at last been accorded proper weight rather than applauded as a sterling effort by a company minded crew, assisting continued massage of the IFSD statistics into manageable shape.

This event, also on flight SQ236, saw the IP captain lose No 2 engine oil pressure, with temperature climbing through to the red sector. A throttle back achieved temperature drop to the green sector but oil pressure remained around zero. Rather than shut down and divert to Bali, coincidentally the closest suitable airport, flight was continued to SIN without the inconvenience of further adding to IFSD statistical data! No satisfactory answer has yet been received as to the course of action the captain would have taken if the remaining engine had subsequently failed during the transit to SIN nor what collateral damage was further sustained to the engine following this unorthodox action.

Crews will note that rosters run only to the end of June rather than to third week of July as would normally be expected by today’s date. Experienced hands will have doubtless concluded that COP “readjustments” must shortly follow. Hence:

The A340 will continue ICN-YVR, ICN-SFO operations – B777 is not available for these sectors due “lack of crews”.

The B777 will operate SQ328 SIN-AMS but not AMS-ORD – again due “lack of crews”. This latter sector (ETOPS) now to be operated by the B744 and then onwards to DFW.

Notwithstanding “lack of crews” the B777 will very shortly take over SIN-ATH, SIN-FCO and SIN-CPH from the A340, which seems to sensibly position this type as a NOPAC mainstay for the foreseeable future.

Common sense prevailing perhaps?

[fullforward]

Insider,

Congratulations for one more excellent post!

How are the SQ efforts on recruiting captains for 777 at this time? I have a full qualified friend that got no answer so far, 10 days after sending his resume.
Do you think they have applications in excess at this time?
The guy in this case have 11,000 plus hours; 7,000 as PIC on Efis Boeing including 2,000 w/b. He has Mechanical Engineering graduation from a prestigious University. Impecable records. Sounds good, don't you think? And he is NOT from Eastern Europe...

[SE7EN]

What on earth do the last few pages have to do with SQ006?

[7times7]

Insider,

Sources have it that the rosters are out for the 1st flight SIN-AMS-ORD, B777 crew named, subject to changes off course. You should know how to verify would you?

Btw, this is way off topic. Can we start a new one, moderator?

[This message has been edited by 7times7 (edited 10 June 2001).]

[Rockhound]

What's that,7times7? Is that first 777 crew to AMS and ORD going to have problems navigating? http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/tongue.gif
Rockhound

[thegypsy]

I wonder if the Taiwanese authorities will nail the DFO of SIA who has conveniently changed his title who in my opinion is culpable for this accident beacause of the intimidatory bullying arrogant attitude displayed by him and his lackeys which by ruling by fear meant that airmanship decisions were disregarded rather than accept the consequences of not getting airborne that night.

[jstars2]

I'm new on this forum but I've been following the Singapore Airlines threads with some interest over the past few months.

It seems to me that the MI 185 cover up is merely a precursor to the one about to be attemted over SQ006 and which contributors to the relevant threads have very well documented, presumably in an attempt to prevent such cover up. I do hope that things work out along the lines hoped for by these people who in the main seem professional and well informed, as I hope things turn out well for the SQ006 relatives and survivors - as I think they will if litigation takes place in a US court but I know will not if the action takes place in a Singapore "court".

[John Barnes]

Thank you Insider for again an excellent post. Having run around the last 20 years on 4 engines makes me a complete zero on Etops, so I find your postings very educational. I still beleive strongly that a man with your obvious talents should be used in this company. Put in the letter and I know you will get a lot of support!

[OldBold]

I can definitely empathise with this pilot as at the time I was employed by SQ this same philosophy was very evident. A couple of times I was called in to see the chief pilot to answer questions which should never have arisen. Had he been anything like a good executive he would have stood up for my decisions, not asked me to explain them. SQ has lead a charmed life over the years, mainly because of the expats who are not subject to the same mind-sets as the locals, plus an incredible amount of luck. The latest two accidents (SilkAir & SQ) have broken the impeccable record and this was bound to happen. It is likely an anathema to SQ to think that any accident to one of their aircraft will in all probability occur in a foreign country where SQ cannot control the investigation or the issuance of findings.
As an example of company thinking, I asked one of the local training captains (who differed radically from the others), what would happen in the event that a copilot deemed it necessary for safety reasons to take over command from a local captain. The reply was “ if he did that and the subsequent lengthy and probably secret investigation found that he (the F/O) was correct in his action, his reputation would be ruined because, to the other locals, he had caused a captain to be disgraced and to lose face. On the other hand if it was found that he was wrong and the situation was not so serious as to warrant his action, he would be declared incompetent and his reputation ruined, along with any promotion prospects”. A “catch 22” situation !
One has only to look at the SQ Flight Safety publication. Whilst full details of other company accidents and incidents are published, no details of any SQ incidents (and there are many) are ever printed – brief references, yes, but full details – never. This on the premise that “other companies might make commercial or political gain from that knowledge”. SQ pilots learn very little from their own company’s safety investigations and this goes against all recognised flight safety philosophies.
When the Flight Safety Foundation held its annual conference in Singapore (hosted by SQ) they were urged to look deeply into the SQ safety philosophy and to ask questions of the line aircrew personnel as well as the management. This was probably not done due to the possible embarrassment it might have caused to SQ.
Until and unless SQ Operations management realise that “saying something does not necessarily make it so” and get behind their crews, demonstrating confidence and loyalty to locals and expats alike, there can never be a true safety culture in this airline.

[highcirrus]

Straits Times. 23 March 2002.. .. .Extract from a front-page piece, preparing the Singapore population for the final report of the Taiwanese Aviation Safety Council’s (ASC) analysis phase of its investigation into the SQ006 disaster of 31 October 2000, to be published on or about 30 April 2002:. .. .“Pilots and aviation experts have accepted that the pilot must ultimately take responsibility for his actions, but many will be disappointed if the report fails to highlight the factors that could have contributed to the fatal error.”. .. .Would any of these factors include the effect of a punitive, meritorious Company culture, on the clouding or otherwise of the captain’s judgement, when considering either delaying take-off or departing on schedule, in the middle of the prevailing severe typhoon conditions?

[G.Khan]

Or, more appropriately, the improperly marked, lit and (un)identified runway out of use?

[highcirrus]

Not sure whether this thread has been closed down or not - It was last time I looked but maybe the new software has opened it up again?
If it's still active that's good on acount of the fact that there's still plenty of stuff to come out that will need airing, post the Taiwanese final report and the SQ response to it.

[Bmused55]

Well, your post was most infomrative Insider.

Unfortunately I am not, nor try to suggest that I am, in a position to comment on anything said.

I have been folowing up the tragic events on that 31'st day of October in Taipei. One detail escapes me, this may seem a little morbid to be asking and at the risk of offending people I feel compelled to ask this question.

Did any of the flight crew survive this horrible accident?
Any and all reports I can get my hands on do not state whether or not they did.

I would also like to take the time to convey my condolences to any and all involved in the incident.


AR.

[G.Khan]

Yes, the flight deck crew of one Captain and two F/Os survived, sadly some of the cabin crew did not.